G.R. No.

L-33006 December 8, 1982

NICANOR NACAR, petitioner,
vs.
CLAUDIO A. NISTAL as Municipal Judge of Esperanza, Agusan del Sur, PROVINCIAL SHERIFF of Agusan del Sur, ILDEFONSO
JAPITANA and ANTONIO DOLORICON, respondents.
Tranquilino O. Calo, Jr. for petitioner.
Ildefonso Japitana and Antonio Boloricon for respondents.

GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:

Nicanor Nacar filed this petition for certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus with preliminary injunction to annul an order of the
respondent judge of the municipal court of Esperanza, Agusan del Sur directing the attachment of seven (7) carabaos, to effect
the return of four (4) carabaos seized under the questioned order, and to stop the respondent judge from further proceeding in
Civil Case No. 65.
Respondent Ildefonso Japitana filed the complaint in Civil Case No. 65 and entitled it "Claim Against the Estate of the Late
Isabelo Nacar With Preliminary Attachment:" On the basis of this complaint, including an allegation "that defendant are (sic)
about to remove and dispose the above-named property (seven carabaos) with intent to defraud plaintiff herein", and
considering that Mr. Japitana had given security according to the Rules of Court, Judge Nistal issued the order commanding the
provincial sheriff to attach the seven (7) heads of cattle in the possession of petitioner Nicanor Nacar. Actually only four (4)
carabaos were attached because three (3) carabaos had earlier been slaughtered during the rites preceding the burial of the
late Isabelo Nacar.
Nicanor Nacar filed a motion to dismiss, to dissolve writ of preliminary attachment, and to order the return of the carabaos.
Private respondent Japitana filed an opposition to this motion while intervenor Antonio Doloricon filed a complaint in
intervention asserting that he was the owner of the attached carabaos and that the certificates of ownership of large cattle
were in his name.
The respondent Judge denied the motion to dismiss prompting Mr. Nacar to come to the Supreme Court.
In a resolution dated January 12, 1971, this Court, upon the posting of a bond in the amount of P1,000.00, directed the issuance
of a preliminary mandatory injunction. The respondents were enjoined from further enforcing the writ of attachment and to
return the seized carabaos. The judge was restrained from further proceeding with Civil Case No. 65.
We find the petition meritorious.
The pertinent portions of the complaint filed by Mr. Japitana with the municipal court read as follows:
ILDEFONSO JAPITANA Civil Case No. 65 Plaintiff,
FOR:
— Versus —
CLAIM AGAINST THE ESTATE NICANOR NACAR THE LATE ISABELO NACAR WITH Defendant. PRELIMINARY ATTACHMENT x --------
-------------------------x
COMPLAINT
COMES NOW the undersigned plaintiff and before this Honorable Court, respectfully avers:
xxx xxx xxx
That at various dates since the year 1968, the defendant have (sic) incurred indebtedness to the plaintiff in the total sum of
TWO THOUSAND SEVEN HUNDRED NINETY ONE (P2,791.00) PESOS, which said amount had long been overdue for payment,
and which the defendant up to this date have (sic) not been able to pay, despite repeated demands from the plaintiff;
That the defendant Isabelo Nacar died last April, 1970 leaving among other things personal property consisting seven (7) heads
of carabaos now in the possession of the defendant Nicanor Nacar;
That plaintiff herein file a claim against the estate of the late Isabelo Nacar to recover the aforementioned sum of P2,791.99;
That defendant are (sic) about to remove and dispose the above mentioned property with intent to defraud plaintiff herein;

1
That plaintiff is willing to put up a bond for the issuance of a preliminary attachment in an amount to be fixed by the Court, not
exceeding the sum of P 2,791.00 which is the plaintiff's claim herein;
WHEREFORE, it is respectfully prayed that pending the hearing of this case, a writ of preliminary attachment be issued against
the properties of the defendant to serve as security for the payment or satisfaction of any judgment that may be recovered
herein; and that after due hearing on the principal against the defendant for the sum of P 2,791,00 with legal interest from
September 15, 1970 plus costs of this suit. (Annex "A", p. 7 rollo).
In his motion to dismiss, the petitioner raised the issue of lack of jurisdiction and absence of a cause of action. Mr. Nacar
averred that the indebtedness mentioned in the complaint was alleged to have been incurred by the late Isabelo Nacar and not
by Nicanor Nacar. There was, therefore, no cause of action against him. The petitioner also stated that a municipal court has no
jurisdiction to entertain an action involving a claim filed against the estate of a deceased person.
The same grounds have been raised in this petition. Mr. Nacar contends:
xxx xxx xxx
9. That the respondent judge acted without jurisdiction.The municipal courts or inferior courts have NO jurisdiction to settle the
estate of deceased persons. The proper remedy is for the creditor to file the proper proceedings in the court of first instance
and file the corresponding claim. But assuming without admitting that the respondent judge had jurisdiction, it is very patent
that he committed a very grave abuse of discretion and totally disregarded the provisions of the Rules of Court and decisions of
this honorable Court when he issued an ex-parte writ of preliminary attachment, when there is no showing that the plaintiff
therein has a sufficient cause of action, that there is no other security for the claim sought to be enforced by the plaintiff; or
that the amount claimed in the action is as much as the sum for which the order is prayed for above all legal counterclaims;
There was no bond to answer for whatever damages that herein petitioner may suffer; (Rollo, pp. 3- 4).
xxx xxx xxx
The respondent judge tried to avoid the consequences of the issues raised in the motion to dismiss by stating that although the
title of the complaint styled it a claim against the estate of the late Isabelo Nacar, the allegations showed that the nature of the
action was really for the recovery of an indebtedness in the amount of P2,791.99.
The rule cited by the judge is correctly stated but it is hardly relevant to the contents of the complaint filed by Mr. Japitana.
It is patent from the portions of the complaint earlier cited that the allegations are not only vague and ambiguous but
downright misleading. The second paragraph of the body of the complaint states that the defendant (herein petitioner Nicanor
Nacar) at various dates since the year 1968 incurred debts to the plaintiff in the sum of P2,791.00. And yet, in the subsequent
paragraphs, one clearly gathers that the debts were actually incurred by the late Isabelo Nacar, who died several months before
the filing of the complaint. The complaint which the respondent judge reads as one for the collection of a sum of money and all
the paragraphs of which are incidentally unnumbered, expressly states as a material averment:
xxx xxx xxx
That plaintiff herein file (sic) a claim against the estate of the late Isabelo Nacar to recover the aforementioned sum of
P2,791.00;
xxx xxx xxx
Under the circumstances of this case, respondent Japitana has no cause of action against petitioner Nacar. Mathay v.
Consolidated Bank and Trust Company (58 SCRA 559) gives the elements of a valid cause of action:
A cause of action is an act or omission of one party in violation of the legal right of the other. Its essential elements are, namely:
(1) the existence of a legal right in the plaintiff, (2) a correlative legal duty in the defendant, and (3) an act or omission of the
defendant in violation of plaintiff's right with consequential injury or damage to the plaintiff for which he may maintain an
action for the recovery of damages or other appropriate relief. ( Ma-ao Sugar Central Co., Inc. vs. Barrios, et al., 79 Phil. 666,
667; Ramitere et al. vs. Montinola Vda. de Yulo, et al., L-19751, February 28, 1966, 16 SCRA 251, 255). On the other hand,
Section 3 of Rule 6 of the Rules of Court provides that the complaint must state the ultimate facts constituting the plaintiff's
cause of action. Hence, where the complaint states ultimate facts that constitute the three essential elements of a cause of
action, the complaint states a cause of action; (Community Investment and Finance Corp. vs. Garcia, 88 Phil. 215, 218)
otherwise, the complaint must succumb to a motion to dismiss on that ground.
Indeed, although respondent Japitana may have a legal right to recover an indebtedness due him, petitioner Nicanor Nacar has
no correlative legal duty to pay the debt for the simple reason that there is nothing in the complaint to show that he incurred
the debt or had anything to do with the creation of the liability. As far as the debt is concerned, there is no allegation or

2
showing that the petitioner had acted in violation of Mr. Japitana's rights with consequential injury or damage to the latter as
would create a cause of action against the former.
It is also patent from the complaint that respondent Japitana filed the case against petitioner Nacar to recover seven (7) heads
of carabaos allegedly belonging to Isabelo Nacar which Japitana wanted to recover from the possession of the petitioner to
answer for the outstanding debt of the late Isabelo Nacar. This matter, however, is only ancillary to the main action. The
ancillary matter does not cure a fatal defect in the complaint for the main action is for the recovery of an outstanding debt of
the late lsabelo Nacar due respondent Japitana, a cause of action about which petitioner Nacar has nothing to do.
In fact the fatal defect in the complaint was noticed by the respondent court when it advised respondent Japitana to amend his
complaint to conform with his evidence and from the court's admission that it was inclined to dismiss the case were it not for
the complaint in intervention of respondent Doloricon. Respondent Doloricon filed his complaint for intervention on the ground
that the four carabaos, subject of the writ of attachment, were actually his carabaos. Thus, the respondent court in its Order
denying the petitioner's motion to dismiss, to dissolve writ of preliminary attachment and in order the return of the carabaos
said:
... Antonio Doloricon manifested before this Court that he is filing a third-party complaint alleging that he is the true and lawful
owner of the carabaos in questions.
IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, this Court for the interest of both parties will not for the meantime dismiss this case. Antonio
Doloricon is hereby given 10 days from receipt hereof within which to file his third-party complaint. The plaintiff who in his
opposition to defendant's motion to dismiss pray (sic) for the custody of the carabaos. This Court further requires plaintiff to
put up the additional bond of P I,000.00 after which the latter may be entitled of (sic) the custody of the carabaos subject of
litigation pending final termination of this case. (Rollo, pp. 18-19)
The respondent court's reason for not dismissing the case is contrary to applicable precedents on the matter. We ruled in
Mathay v. Consolidated Bank and Trust Company, supra:
Section I, Rule 16 of the Rules of Court, providing in part that:
Within the time for pleading a motion to dismiss may be made on any of the following grounds; ...
(g) That the complaint states no cause of action. ...
explicitly requires that the sufficiency of the complaint must be tested exclusively on the basis of the complaint itself and no
other should be considered when the ground for motion to dismiss is that the complaint states no cause of action. Pursuant
thereto this Court has ruled that:
As a rule the sufficiency of the complaint, when challenged in a motion to dismiss, must be determined exclusively on the basis
of the facts alleged therein' (Uy Chao vs. De La Rama Steamship Co., Inc., L-14495, September 29, 1962, 6 SCRA 69, 72. See also
De Jesus, et al. vs. Belarmino et al., 95 Phil. 365, 371; Dalandan, et at. vs. Julio, et al., L- 19101, February 29, 1964, 10 SCRA 400;
Ramitere et al. vs. Montinola Vda. de Yulo, et al., L-19751, February 28, 1966, 16 SCRA 250, 254; Acuna vs. Batac Producers
Cooperative Marketing Association, Inc., et al., L-20338, June 30, 1967, 20 SCRA 526, 531)
Hence, it was error for the respondent court not to dismiss the case simply because respondent Doloricon filed the complaint
for intervention alleging that he owned the carabaos.
Moreover, even assuming that respondent Japitana had a legal right to the carabaos which were in the possession of petitioner
Nacar, the proper procedure would not be to file an action for the recovery of the outstanding debts of the late Isabelo Nacar
against his stepfather, the petitioner Nacar as defendant. As we said in Maspil v. Romero (61 SCRA 197):
Appropriate actions for the enforcement or defense of rights must be taken in accordance with procedural rules and cannot be
left to the whims or caprices of litigants. It cannot even be left to the untrammeled discretion of the courts of justice without
sacrificing uniformity and equality in the application and effectivity thereof.
Considering the foregoing, the respondent court's denial of the motion to dismiss the complaint and its issuance of a writ of
attachment based on the allegations of the complaint are improper. With this conclusion, we find no need to discuss the other
issue on whether or not the procedural rules on the issuance of a writ of attachment were followed by the respondent court in
issuing the subject writ of attachment.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby granted. The preliminary mandatory injunction issued on January 13, 1971 is made
permanent and the cash bond filed by the petitioner in connection therewith is ordered returned to him.
SO ORDERED.

3
G.R. No. L-15388 January 31, 1961
DORA PERKINS ANDERSON, petitioner-appellee,
vs.
IDONAH SLADE PERKINS, oppositor-appellant.
Ponce Enrile, S. Reyna, Montecillo and Belo for petitioner-appellee.
Lazaro A. Marquez and J. D. Quirino for oppositor-appellant.
REYES, J.B.L., J.:
Appeal against an order of the Court of First Instance of Manila in Special Proceedings No. 29636 authorizing the special
administrator of the testate estate of the late Eugene Arthur Perkins to sell at public auction certain personal properties left by
the deceased.
It appears that said special proceedings were commenced on May 10, 1956, by a petition presented by Dora Perkin Anderson
for the probate of the supposed last will and testament of the late Eugene Arthur Perkins, who died in Manila on April 28, 1956
allegedly possessed of personal and real properties with a probable value of P5,000,000. On the same date of the filing of the
aforesaid petition, petitioner Dora Perkins Anderson also filed a urgent petition for the appointment of Alfonso Ponce Enrile as
special administrator of the estate, and on the same day, the court issued an order appointing Alfonso Ponce Enrile as such
special administrator upon his posting of a bond in the amount of P50,000. On July 9, 1956, Idonah Slade Perkins, surviving
spouse of the deceased entered an opposition to the probate of the will presented by petitioner Dora Perkins Anderson. On
September 28, 1956 the special administrator submitted an inventory of all the assets which have come to his knowledge as
belonging to the deceased Eugene Arthur Perkins at the time of his death.
About two years later, or on September 4, 1958, the special administrator submitted to the court a petition seeking authority to
sell, or give away to some charitable or educational institution or institutions, certain personal effects left by the deceased,
such as clothes, books, gadgets, electrical appliances, etc., which were allegedly deteriorating both physically and in value, in
order to avoid their further deterioration and to save whatever value migh be obtained in their disposition. When the motion
was heard on September 25, 1958, the court required the administrator to submit a specification of the properties sought to be
sold, and in compliance therewith, the special administrator, on October 21, 1958, submitted to the court, in place of a
specification, a copy of the inventory of the personal properties belonging to the estate with the items sought to be sold
marked with a check in red pencil, with the statement that said items were too voluminous to enumerate.
On July 9, 1956, Idonah Slade Perkins filed an opposetion to the proposed sale. Reasons, for the opposition were that (1) most
of the properties sought to be sold were conjugal properties of herself and her deceased husband; and (2) that unauthorized
removal of fine pieces of furniture belonging to the estate had been made.
The opposition notwithstanding, the lower court, on December 2, 1958, approved the proposed sale, authorizing the Sheriff of
Manila to conduct the same. Oppositor Idonah Slade Perkins moved to reconsider this order on the grounds (1) that said order
in effect authorized the special administrator to sell the entire personal estate of the deceased, contrary to Rule 81, section 2.
Rules of Court; (2) that said order was issued without a showing that the goods and chattels sought to be sold were perishable,
pursuant to Rule 81, section 2, Rules of Court; (3) that the personalty sought to be sold represented the lifetime savings and
collections of oppositor; (4) that there is evidence on record showing unauthorized withdrawals from the properties of the
estate, and the sale of the inventoried lot would prevent identification and recovery of the articles removed; and (5) that there
is also evidence showing oppositor's separate rights to a substantial part of the personal estate.
On February 23, 1959, the lower court denied the above motion for reconsideration. Whereupon, oppositor Idonah Slade
Perkins appealed to this court.
Appellant first claims that the personal properties sought to be sold not being perishable, the special administrator has no legal
authority to sell them. This argument is untenable, because section 2, Rule 81, of the Rules of Court, specifically provides that
the special administrator "may sell such perishable and other property as the court orders sold", which shows that the special
administrator's power to sell is not limited to "perishable" property only.
It is true that the function of a special administrator is only to collect and preserve the property of the deceased until a regular
administrator is appointed (sec. 2, Rule 81; De Gala v. Gonzales, 53 Phil. 104; Collins v. Henry, 118 S.E. 729, 155 Ga. 886;
Sqydelko v. Smith's Estate, 244 N.W. 149, 259 Mich. 519). But it is not alone the specific property of the estate which is to be
preserved, but its value as well, as shown by the legal provision for the sale by a special administrator of perishable property
(Cao vs. Cascade Silver Mines & Mills, et al., 213 P. 109 66 Mont. 488). It is in line with this general power of the special
administrator to preserve not only the property of the estate but also its value, that section 2, Rule 81, also empowers such
administrator to sell "other proerty as the court ordered sold;" .

4
There is, however, a serious obstacle to the proposed sale, namely, the vigorous opposition presented thereto the appellant,
the surviving spouse of the deceased, on the ground that she is allegedly entitled to a large portion of the personal properties in
question, either because the were conjugal property of herself and the deceased, or because they are her own, exclusive,
personal property. Indeed the records show that up to the time the propose sale was asked for and judicially approved, no
proceeding had as yet been taken, or even started, to segregate the alleged exclusive property of the oppositor-appellant from
the mass of the estate supposedly left by the deceased or to liquidate the conjugal partnership property of the oppositor-
appellant and the deceased. Until, therefore the issue of the ownership of the properties sought to be sold is heard and
decided, and the conjugal partnership liquidated; or, at least, an agreement be reached with a appellant as to which properties
of the conjugal partnership she would not mind being sold to preserve their value the proposed sale is clearly premature. After
all, most of the items sought to be sold — pieces of furniture, kitchen and dinner ware, electrical appliances, various gadget and
books — can easily be protected and preserved with proper care and storage measures in either or both of two residential
houses (in Manila and in Baguio City left by the deceased, so that no reasons of extreme urgency justify the proposed sale at
this time over the strong opposition and objection of oppositor-appellant who may later be adjudged owner of a substantial
portion of the personal estate in question.
The special administrator claims in his brief that t oppositor-appellant should have indicated the alleged "fine furniture" which
she did not want sold and that her refusal to do so is an indication of her unmeritorious claim. But it does not appear that
appellant was given a reasonable opportunity to point out which items in the inventory she did not want sold. In fact, her
opposition to the proposed sale and later her motion for reconsideration to the order approving the same were overruled by
the court without so much as stating reasons why the grounds for her opposition were not well-founded; the records do not
even show that an inquiry was made as to the validity of the grounds of her opposition.
WHEREFORE, the lower court's order of December 2, 1958 authorizing the special administrator to sell certain personal
properties of the estate is set aside, with costs against the special administrator Alfonso Ponce Enrile and petition-appellee
Dora Perkins Anderson.

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G.R. No. 92436 July 26, 1991
MARIA VDA. DE REYES, EFREN REYES, ELVIRA REYES-TIMBOL, ERLINDA REYES-VALERIO, ERNESTO REYES, ELIZABETH REYES,
ALEX, RAFAEL II, EMELINA and EVELYN, all surnamed REYES, represented by their mother, MARIA VDA. DE REYES, petitioners,
vs.
THE COURT OF APPEALS AND SPOUSES DALMACIO GARDIOLA and ROSARIO MARTILLANO respondents.
De Lara, De Lunas & Rosales for petitioners.
Santos, Pilapil & Associates for private respondents.

DAVIDE, JR., J.:

Assailed before Us in this appeal by certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court is the decision of the respondent Court of
Appeals in C.A.-G.R. CV No. 11934, promulgated on 20 October 1989,1 reversing the decision of 1 October 1986 of Branch 21
(Imus, Cavite) of the Regional Trial Court of the Fourth Judicial Region in Civil Case No. RTC-BCV-83-17 entitled Maria vda. de
Reyes, et al. vs. Spouses Dalmacio Gardiola and Rosario Martillano, and Spouses Ricardo M. Gardiola and Emelita Gardiola,2
and the resolution of 1 March 1990 denying the petitioner's motion for reconsideration.
As culled from both decisions and the pleadings of the parties, the following facts have been preponderantly established:
During his lifetime, one Gavino Reyes owned a parcel of land of approximately 70 hectares, more or less, located at Sangayad,
Ulong-Tubig, Carmona, Cavite. He sought to bring said land under the operation of the Torrens System of registration of
property. Unfortunately, he died in 1921 without the title having been issued to him. The application was prosecuted by his
son, Marcelo Reyes, who was the administrator of his property.
In 1936 the above property was surveyed and subdivided by Gavino's heirs (Exh. "6"). In the subdivision plan, each resultant lot
was earmarked, indicated for and assigned to a specific heir. It appears therein that two lots, one of which is Lot No. I A-14 (Exh.
"6-A"), were allotted to Rafael Reyes, Sr., one of Gavino's children. Per testimony of Juan Poblete, the children thereafter
secured tax declarations for their respective shares.
In 1941, or about twenty (20) years after the death of Gavino, the original certificate of title for the whole property — OCT No.
255 — was issued. It was, however, kept by Juan Poblete, son-in-law of Marcelo Reyes, who was by then already deceased. The
heirs of Gavino were not aware of this fact.
On 3 December 1943, Rafael Reyes, Sr. sold a parcel of land with an area of 23,431 square meters, more or less, to private
respondent Dalmacio Gardiola (Exh. "5"). According to the vendee, this parcel corresponds to Lot No. 1-A-14 of the subdivision
plan aforestated. The deed of sale, however, did not specifically mention Lot No. 1-A-14. The vendee immediately took
possession of the property and started paying the land taxes therein.
In 1945 or thereabouts, Juan Poblete "revalidated" the original Certificate of Title. As reconstituted, the new title is OCT (0-
4358) RO-255 (Exhs. "4" to "4-A").
On 21 October 1967, when the heirs of Gavino Reyes executed a Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement of Estate (Exh. "D") based on
the aforestated subdivision plan (Exh. "6"), the lot that was intended for Rafael Reyes, Sr., who was already deceased, was
instead adjudicated to his only son and heir, Rafael Reyes, Jr. (the predecessor-in-interest of the petitioners herein). Private
respondent Rosario Martillano signed the deed in representation of her mother, Marta Reyes, one of the children of Gavino
Reyes.
As a result of the Extrajudicial Settlement, OCT RO-255 was cancelled and in lieu thereof, several transfer certificates of title
covering the subdivided lots were issued in the names of the respective adjudicatees. One of them is TCT No. 27257 in the
name of Rafael Reyes, Jr. covering Lot No. 1-A-14. The Transfer Certificates of Title were, however, kept by one Candido
Hebron. On 10 January 1969, some of the heirs of Gavino Reyes filed a case of Annulment of Partition and Recovery of
Possession before the Court of First Instance of Cavite City, which was docketed therein as Civil Case No. 1267. One of the
defendants in said case is herein private respondent Rosario Martillano. The case was dismissed on 18 September 1969, but
Candido Hebron was ordered by the trial court to deliver to the heirs concerned all the transfer certificates of title in his
possession.3
After obtaining the Transfer Certificate of Title for Lot No. 1-A-14 from Hebron, pursuant to the aforesaid order in Civil Case No.
1267, petitioners herein, as successors-in-interest of Rafael Reyes, Jr., filed on 14 March 1983 with the Regional Trial Court the
above-mentioned Civil Case No. RTC-BCV-83-17 against private respondents (defendants therein) for recovery of possession or,
in the alternative, for indemnification, accounting and damages. They allege therein that after "having definitely discovered
that they are the lawful owners of the property," (Lot No. 1-A-14), they, "including Rafael Reyes, Jr., during his lifetime, made
repeated demands to (sic) defendants to surrender the possession of and vacate the parcel of land belonging to the former, but

6
defendants refused to vacate and surrender the possession of the said land to herein plaintiffs;" the last of the demands was
allegedly made on 8 October 1982. They further allege that they have been deprived by said defendants of the rightful
possession and enjoyment of the property since September 1969 — which coincides with the date of the order in Civil Case No.
1267.4
In their answer, private respondents deny the material averments in the complaint and assert that they are the owners of the
lot in question, having bought the same from Rafael Reyes, Sr., that the issuance of TCT No. 27257 is null and void, for such sale
was known to Rafael Reyes, Jr.; that they have been in possession of the property and have been paying the land taxes thereon;
and that petitioners are barred by prescription and/or laches.5
Petitioners amended their complaint on 21 March 1985 to implead as additional defendants the spouses Ricardo M. Gardiola
and Emerita Gardiola, on the basis of the following claims:
xxx xxx xxx
9. Meanwhile, during the presentation of the defendants spouses Dalmacio Gardiola and Rosario Martillano's evidence the
former testified that they mortgaged the subject land to the Rural Bank of Carmona Inc. For their failure to redeem the
mortgage the same was foreclosed by the bank.
10. However, within the period of one(1) year from such foreclosure the questioned land was redeemed by the original
defendants' son in the person of Ricardo M. Gardiola, who was knowledgeable/aware of the pendency of the above captioned
case. The corresponding redemption was effected through a deed of conveyance, . . . .6
The prayer of the amended complaint now contains the alternative relief for indemnification for the reasonable value of the
property "in the event restitution of the property is no longer possible."7
In its decision of 1 October 1986,8 the trial court concluded that petitioners' "title over the subject property is valid and regular
and thus they are entitled to its possession and enjoyment," and accordingly decided thus:
WHEREFORE, the defendants or anyone acting for and in their behalf are hereby ordered to relinguish possession or vacate the
property in question which is covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-27257 in favor of the plaintiffs.
All other claims and/or counterclaims of the parties relative to this case are dismissed for lack of proper substantiation.
The conclusion of the trial court is based on its finding that (a) there is no evidence that the heirs of Gavino Reyes entered into
any written agreement of partition in 1936 based on the subdivision plan; (b) there is no identity between Lot No. 1-14-A and
the land sold to private respondents by Rafael Reyes, Sr., or otherwise stated, the description of the latter as indicated in the
deed of sale (Exh. "5") does not tally with the description of the former; and (c) moreover:
Granting, arguendo, that the sale made by Rafael Reyes, Sr. to the defendants covered the land in question — Lot No. 1-A-14 —
and that Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-27257 was obtained by means of fraud, the claim of the defendants over the said
property is already barred. Action for reconveyance prescribes in four (4) years from the discovery thereof. If there was fraud,
the defendant could have discovered the same in 1967 when the partition was made in as much as defendant Rosario
Martillano was a party to that partition. Let us grant further that the issuance of Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-27257 to
Rafael Reyes, Jr. created a constructive or implied trust in favor of the defendants, again, the claim of the defendants is also
barred. From 1967 to the filing of their answer (let us consider this as an action for reconveyance) to this case sometime in July,
1983, a period of about sixteen (16) years had already elapsed. Prescriptibility of an action for reconveyance based on implied
or constructive trust is ten (10) years.
The trial court further held that the continued possession by private respondents, which it found to have started in 1943, did
not ripen into ownership because at that time, the property was already registered, hence it cannot be acquired by prescription
or adverse possession.9
Private respondents appealed the said decision to the Court of Appeals which docketed the appeal as C.A.-G.R. CV No. 11934. In
its decision of 20 October 1989, the respondent Court of Appeals formulated the issues before it as follows:
I
Whether or not the lower court erred in declaring that the property of the late Gavino Reyes consisting of 70 hectares was
partitioned only in 1967 by his grandchildren after discovery of the existence of OCT No. 255 and that no actual partition was
made in 1936 by the decedent's children.
II
Whether or not the lower court erred in concluding that the parcel of land sold by the appellees' predecessor-in-interest, the
late Rafael Reyes, Sr. to appellant Dalmacio Gardiola was not the same parcel of land under litigation.10

7
and resolved such issues, thus:
On the first issue, We believe that the lower court committed a reversible error when it declared that the landed estate of the
late Gavino Reyes was partitioned only in 1967 by the latter's grandchildren; and that no actual partition was made in 1936 by
the decedents' (sic) children. The evidence on record bears out the existence of a subdivision plan (Exh. 6) which was not
controverted nor denied by the appellees. In like manner, the lower court itself recognized the fact that the property of the late
Gavino Reyes consisting of 70 hectares was surveyed and subdivided in 1936 as evidenced by the said subdivision plan (Exh. 6).
With the existence of a subdivision plan, and from the uncontroverted testimony of appellants' witness, We can only infer that
at least an oral partition, which under the law is valid and binding, was entered into by the heirs of Gavino Reyes regarding his
properties in 1936. As held in a long line of decisions, extrajudicial partition can be done orally, and the same would be valid if
freely entered into (Belen v. Belen, 49 O.G. 997, March 1953). The reason for this is because a partition is not exactly a
conveyance for the reason that it does not involve transfer of property from one to the other but rather a confirmation by them
of their ownership of the property. It must also be remembered that when Gavino Reyes died on March 7, 1921, his property
was admittedly not yet covered by a torrens title, as it was only in 1941 when said properties were brought into the application
of the torrens system. With this factual milieu, it can also be concluded that his heirs have indeed settled, subdivided and
partitioned Gavino Reyes' landed estate without formal requirements of Rule 74 of the Rules of Court when a parcel of land is
covered by a torrens title. As told earlier, the Subdivision Plan (Exh. 6) undisputedly showed on its face that the 70 hectares of
land belonging to the late Gavino Reyes was subdivided and partitioned by his children in 1936. On this score, the partition of
the said property even without the formal requirements under the rule is valid as held in the case of Hernandez vs. Andal, 78
Phil. 176, which states:
xxx xxx xxx
Moreover, in the Deed of Sale dated December 3, 1943 (Exh. 5) executed by Rafael Reyes, Sr. in favor of appellant Dalmacio
Gardiola, the land sold therein was described as "na aking minana sa aking ama." This alone would confirm the contention of
the appellants that there was already an actual partition (at least an oral partition) of the property of Gavino Reyes in 1936. As
aforestated, the presence of the Subdivision Plan (Exh. 6) is an (sic) evidence of such partition which appellees failed to
controvert not to mention the fact that the lower court itself recognized the existence of said plan, in the same manner that it
concluded that the property was already surveyed and actually subdivided in 1936 (page 3, pars. 3 and 4, Decision).
From the foregoing considerations it is evident that the Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement of Estate (Exh. D) executed by the
grandchildren of the late Gavino Reyes in 1967 is of no moment considering that the property subject of the partition in the
deed was already partitioned in 1936 by the children of Gavino Reyes. It is for this reason that the lots supposedly inherited by
the grandchildren named in the deed of 1967 were the same lots inherited and given to their respective fathers or mothers in
1936 while the land was not yet covered by the torrens system. Hence, in the case of Rafael Reyes, Sr., the land inherited by
him was two (2) parcels of land known as Lots Nos. 1-A-3 and 1-A-14 described in the Subdivision plan of 1936 (Exh. 6), which
were the same parcels of land allegedly inherited by Rafael Reyes, Jr. from Gavino Reyes in representation of his father,
pursuant to the Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement of Estate for which TCT No. 27257 was issued.
Coming to the second issue, the lower court likewise erred when it concluded that the parcel of land sold by appellee's
predecessor-in-interest to appellant Dalmacio Gardiola was not the same parcel of land under litigation. It must be pointed out
that the identity of the parcel of land which the appellees sought to recover from the appellants was never an issue in the lower
court, because the litigants had already conceded that the parcel identified as Lot No. 1-A-14 in TCT No. 27257 was the same
parcel of land identified as Cadastral Lot No. 1228 and 1235 described in Tax Declaration No. 4766. Despite this admission,
however, the lower court declared that "as described in the deed of sale (Exh. 5), the land's description does not tally with the
description of Lot No. 1-A-14, the land in litigation." As correctly pointed out by the appellants however, the discrepancy in the
description was due to the fact that the description of the land sold in the Deed of Sale was expressed in layman's language
whereas the description of Lot No. 1-A-14 in TCT No. 27257 was done in technical terms. This was so because, when Rafael
Reyes, Sr. sold the property in dispute to appellant Dalmacio Gardiola on December 3, 1943, the only evidence of title to the
land then available in so far as Rafael Reyes, Sr. was concerned was Tax Declaration No. 4766, because at that time, neither he
nor appellant Dalmacio Gardiola was aware of the existence of OCT No. 255 as in fact TCT No. 27257 was issued only in 1967.
Consequently, the land subject of the Deed of Sale was described by the vendor in the manner as described in Tax Declaration
No. 4766. However, the description of the land appearing in the Deed of Sale (Exh. 5) was exactly the same land identified as
Lot No. 1-A-14 in the Subdivision Plan (Exh. 6) of 1936. Accordingly, the assumption of the lower court that "if the land sold by
Rafael Reyes, Sr. was the one now in litigation, he could have easily indicated Lot No. 1-A-14" is bereft of merit under the
foregoing circumstances. Interestingly enough, the appellees never denied the identity of the subject lot during the hearing at
the lower court. What they were denying only was the sale made by Rafael Reyes, Sr. to appellant Dalmacio Gardiola which
does not hold true because of the document denominated as Deed of Sale (Exh. 5).11
It concluded that the trial court erred when it ordered the private respondents or anyone acting in their behalf to relinquish the
possession or vacate the property in question. It thus decreed:

8
WHEREFORE, the appealed Judgment is ordered REVERSED and SET ASIDE and a new one is rendered declaring appellants to be
the lawful owners of the lot identified as Lot No. 1-A-14 in TCT No. 27257. No
costs.12
Their motion to reconsider the above decision having been denied by the Court of Appeals in its resolution of 1 March 1990,13
petitioners filed the instant petition on 6 April 1990 after having obtained an extension of time within which to file it.
The petition does not implead original new defendants Ricardo Gardiola and Emelita Gardiola.
As ground for their plea for the review of the decision of the Court of Appeals, petitioners allege that said court has decided
questions of substance in a way not in accord with law or applicable jurisprudence when it held that "the deed of extrajudicial
settlement of estate (Exh. "D") executed by the grandchildren of the late Gavino Reyes in 1967 is of no moment considering
that the property subject of the partition was already partitioned in 1936 by the children of Gavino Reyes." In support thereof,
they claim that (a) TCT No. 27257 covers two parcels of land; the lot described in paragraph 1 thereof is owned by petitioners
and that ownership was confirmed by this Court in G.R. No. 79882, hence, the Court of Appeals should have affirmed the
decision of the trial court; (b) private respondent Rosario Martillano was a party to the extrajudicial settlement of estate which
was duly registered in the Registry of Deeds in 1967; said registration is the operative act that gives validity to the transfer or
creates a lien upon the land and also constituted constructive notice to the whole world. The court cannot disregard the
binding effect thereof Finally, the pronouncement of the Court of Appeals that private respondents are the lawful owners of
the lot in question "militates against the indefeasible and incontrovertible character of the torrens title,"14 and allows
reconveyance which is not tenable since the action therefor had already prescribed, as stated in the decision of the trial court.
In the resolution of 7 May 1990, We required respondents to comment on the petition. But even before it could do so,
petitioner, without obtaining prior leave of the Court, filed on 29 May 1990 a so-called Supplemental Arguments in Support of
The Petition For Review On certiorari15 wherein they assert, among others, that: (a) the findings of facts of respondent Court
are contrary to those of the trial court and appear to be contradicted by the evidence on record thus calling for the review by
this Court;16 (b) it also committed misapprehension of the facts in this case and its findings are based on speculation,
conjecture and surmises; (c) private respondents' attack on petitioners' title is a collateral attack which is not allowed; even if it
is allowed, the same had already prescribed and is now barred.
It was only on 15 June 1990 that private respondents filed their Comment.17 We required petitioners to reply thereto, which
they complied with on 8 August 1990.18 A rejoinder was filed by private respondents on 29 August 1990.
We gave due course to the petition on 19 September 1990 and required the parties to submit simultaneously their respective
memoranda which they complied with.
Attached as Annex "A" to private respondent's Memorandum, which was filed on 10 December 1990, is the Resolution of this
Court (Third Division) of 20 August 1990 in G.R. No. 92811 entitled Spouses Artemio Durumpili and Angustia Reyes vs. The Court
of Appeals and Spouses Dalmacio Gardiola and Rosario Martillano, which also involves the property of Gavino Reyes, the
partition thereof among his children in 1936, and the extrajudicial settlement in 1967.
In said resolution, this Court held:
. . . The partition made in 1936, although oral, was valid. The requirement in Article 1358 of the Civil Code that acts which have
for their object the creation, transmission, modification or extinguishment of real rights over immovable property must appear
in a public instrument is only for convenience and not for validity or enforceability as between the parties themselves. [Thunga
Hui vs. Que Bentec, 2 Phil. 561 (1903)] The subsequent execution by the heirs of the Extrajudicial Partition in 1967 did not alter
the oral partition as in fact the share pertaining to Angustia Reyes corresponded to that previously assigned to her father.
Considering that Angel Reyes sold this property to Basilio de Ocampo who, in turn, sold the same to respondents, we agree
with the Court of Appeals that the latter lawfully acquired the property and are entitled to ownership and possession thereof.
In answer to the charge of private respondents that petitioners deliberately failed to cite this resolution, the latter, in their
reply-memorandum dated 15 March 1991 and filed three days thereafter, allege:
Our failure to mention the aforementioned resolution before this Honorable Court is not deliberate nor with malice
aforethought. The reason is that to date, we have not yet received any resolution to our Motion For Leave of Court To Refer
Case To The Honorable Supreme Court En Banc. Moreover, we honestly feel that the resolution that will be issued therein will
not be applicable to the case before this Honorable Court's Second Division. It should be mentioned that in the Durumpili case
before the Third Division, the Court of Appeals relied on the alleged confirmation of the sale executed by Angustia Reyes, while
in the Reyes case before this Second Division, there was no sale that was executed by the petitioners Reyes' predecessor-in-
interest, Rafael Reyes, Jr.
The foregoing claim is not supported by the rollo of G.R. No. 92811, which reveals the following: (a) On 18 September 1990,
petitioners therein, represented by De Lara, De Lunas and Rosales, who are the lawyers of petitioners in the instant case, filed a

9
motion for the reconsideration of the resolution of 20 August 1990.19 b) This motion was denied in the resolution of 1 October
1990.20 c) On 17 November 1990, petitioners therein, through the same lawyers, filed a Motion For Leave Of Court To Refer
Case To The Honorable Supreme Court En Banc And/Or Motion For Reconsideration21 wherein they specifically admit that said
case and the instant petition have "identity and/or similarity of the parties, the facts, the issues raised," even going to the
extent of "graphically" illustrating where such similarities lie.22 d) This motion was denied in the resolution of 28 November
1990. Copy thereof was furnished the attorneys for petitioners.23 e) Entry of judgment had already been made therein and a
copy thereof was sent to petitioner's counsel per Letter of Transmittal of the Deputy Court and Chief of the Judicial Records
Office dated 20 December 1990.
What comes out prominently from the disquisitions of the parties is this simple issue: whether or not respondent Court of
Appeals committed any reversible error in setting aside the decision of the trial court.
We find none. The reversal of the trial court's decision is inevitable and unavoidable because the legal and factual conclusions
made by the trial court are unfounded and clearly erroneous. The Court of Appeals was not bound to agree to such conclusions.
The trial court erred in holding that: (a) there was no partition among the children of Gavino Reyes in 1936 since there is no
written evidence in support thereof; yet, it admits that there was a survey and subdivision of the property and the adjudication
of specific subdivision lots to each of the children of Gavino; (b) the land sold by Rafael Reyes, Sr. to private respondents is not
identical to Lot No. 1-A-14, the lot specified for and adjudicated to Rafael Reyes, Jr. in the partition agreement; and (c) if the
land sold by Rafael Reyes, Sr. to private respondent Dalmacio Gardiola is indeed Lot No. 1-A-14 and that TCT No. T-27257 was
obtained through fraud, the remedy open to the vendee was an action for reconveyance, which should have been brought
within four (4) years from the discovery thereof in 1967 when the Extrajudicial Settlement was executed since private
respondent Rosario Martillano, wife of Dalmacio, was a party thereto.
The Court of Appeals correctly held that the partition made by the children of Gavino Reyes in 1936, although oral, was valid
and binding. There is no law that requires partition among heirs to be in writing to be valid.24 In Hernandez vs. Andal, supra,
this Court, interpreting Section 1 of Rule 74 of the Rules of Court, held that the requirement that a partition be put in a public
document and registered has for its purpose the protection of creditors and at the same time the protection of the heirs
themselves against tardy claims. The object of registration is to serve as constructive notice to others. It follows then that the
intrinsic validity of partition not executed with the prescribed formalities does not come into play when there are no creditors
or the rights of creditors are not affected. Where no such rights are involved, it is competent for the heirs of an estate to enter
into an agreement for distribution in a manner and upon a plan different from those provided by law. There is nothing in said
section from which it can be inferred that a writing or other formality is an essential requisite to the validity of the partition.
Accordingly, an oral partition is valid.
Barcelona, et al. vs. Barcelona, et al., supra, provides the reason why oral partition is valid and why it is not covered by the
Statute of Frauds: partition among heirs or renunciation of an inheritance by some of them is not exactly a conveyance of real
property for the reason that it does not involve transfer of property from one to the other, but rather a confirmation or
ratification of title or right of property by the heir renouncing in favor of another heir accepting and receiving the inheritance.
Additionally, the validity of such oral partition in 1936 has been expressly sustained by this Court in the Resolution of 20 August
1990 in G.R. No. 92811.25
But even if We are to assume arguendo that the oral partition executed in 1936 was not valid for some reason or another, We
would still arrive at the same conclusion for upon the death of Gavino Reyes in 1921, his heirs automatically became co-owners
of his 70-hectare parcel of land. The rights to the succession are transmitted from the moment of death of the decedent.26 The
estate of the decedent would then be held in co-ownership by the heirs. The co-heir or co-owner may validly dispose of his
share or interest in the property subject to the condition that the portion disposed of is eventually allotted to him in the
division upon termination of the co-ownership. Article 493 of the Civil Code provides:
Each co-owner shall have the full ownership of his part and the fruits and benefits pertaining thereto, and he may even
substitute another person in its enjoyment, except when personal rights are involved. But the effect of the alienation or the
mortgage, with respect to the co-owners, shall be limited to the portion which may be allotted to him in the division upon the
termination of the co-ownership.
In Ramirez vs. Bautista,27 this Court held that every co-heir has the absolute ownership of his share in the community property
and may alienate, assign, or mortgage the same, except as to purely personal rights, but the effect of any such transfer is
limited to the portion which may be awarded to him upon the partition of the property.
In the case at bar, the lot sold by Rafael Reyes, Sr. to private respondent Dalmacio Gardiola is his share in the estate of his
deceased father, Gavino Reyes. It is the same property which was eventually adjudicated to his son and heir, Rafael Reyes, Jr.,
represented in turn by his heirs-petitioners herein-in the extrajudicial settlement of 1967.

10
In respect to the issue as to whether the property sold by Rafael Reyes, Sr. is identical to Lot No. 1-14-A, the trial court based its
conclusion that it is not, on his observation that the description of the former does not tally with that of the latter, moreover, if
Rafael did intend to sell Lot No. 1-14-A, he should have specifically stated it in the deed since at that time, the property had
already been partitioned and said lot was adjudicated to him. In addition to the contrary findings and conclusion of the
respondent Court on this issue to which We fully agree, it is to be stressed that Rafael had this property declared for taxation
purposes and the tax declaration issued was made the basis for the description of the property in the deed of sale. Upon the
execution of the deed of sale, vendee — herein private respondent Dalmacio Gardiola — immediately took possession of the
property. This is the very same property which is the subject matter of this case and which petitioners seek to recover from the
private respondents. The main evidence adduced for their claim of ownership and possession over it is TCT No. T-27257, the
certificate of title covering Lot No. 1-14-A. They therefore admit and concede that the property claimed by private respondent,
which was acquired by sale from Rafael Reyes, Sr., is none other than Lot No. 1-14-A.
The participation of private respondent Rosario Gardiola in the Extrajudicial Settlement did not place private respondents in
estoppel to question the issuance of TCT No. T-27257. As correctly maintained by private respondents, she signed it in
representation of her deceased mother, Marta Reyes, a daughter and an heir of Gavino Reyes. She did not sign for and in behalf
of her husband, Dalmacio Gardiola, vendee of the share of Rafael Reyes, Sr.
The same did not operate to divest the vendee of the share of Rafael Reyes, Sr. in the estate of Gavino.1âwphi1 Petitioners, as
mere successors-in-interest of Rafael Reyes, Jr., son of Rafael Reyes, Sr., can only acquire that which Rafael, Jr. could transmit to
them upon his death. The latter never became the owner of Lot No. 1-A-14 because it was sold by his father in 1943. The
issuance of TCT No. T-27257 in the name of Rafael Reyes, Jr., in so far as Lot No. 1-14-A is concerned, was clearly erroneous
because he never became its owner. An extrajudicial settlement does not create a light in favor of an heir. As this Court stated
in the Barcelona case,28 it is but a confirmation or ratification of title or right to property. Thus, since he never had any title or
right to Lot No. 1-14-A, the mere execution of the settlement did not improve his condition, and the subsequent registration of
the deed did not create any right or vest any title over the property in favor of the petitioners as heirs of Rafael Reyes, Jr. The
latter cannot give them what he never had before. Nemo dare potest quod non habet.
There is one more point that should be stressed here. Petitioners' immediate predecessor-in-interest, Rafael Reyes, Jr., never
took any action against private respondents from the time his father sold the lot to the latter. Neither did petitioners bring any
action to recover from private respondents the ownership and possession of the lot from the time Rafael Reyes, Jr. died. As
categorically admitted by petitioners in their complaint and amended complaint, it was only in or about September 1969 when,
after the delivery of TCT No. 27257 by Candido Hebron to them, that they definitely discovered that they were the owners of
the property in question. And yet, despite full knowledge that private respondents were in actual physical possession of the
property, it was only about thirteen and one-half (13 1/2) years later that they decided to file an action for recovery of
possession. As stated earlier, the original complaint was filed in the trial court on 14 March 1983. There was then absolutely no
basis for the trial court to place the burden on private respondents to bring an action for reconveyance within four (4) years
from their discovery of the issuance of the transfer certificate of title in the name of Rafael Reyes, Jr.
The instant petition then is without merit.
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered DENYING the petition with costs against petitioners.
SO ORDERED.

11
[G.R. No. 94918. September 2, 1992.]

DANILO I. SUAREZ, EUFROCINA SUAREZ-ANDRES, MARCELO I. SUAREZ, JR., EVELYN SUAREZ-DE LEON and REGINIO I. SUAREZ,
Petitioners, v. THE COURT OF APPEALS, VALENTE RAYMUNDO, VIOLETA RAYMUNDO, MA. CONCEPCION VITO and VIRGINIA
BANTA, Respondents.

Villareal Law Offices, for Petitioners.

Nelson Loyola for Private Respondent.

SYLLABUS

1. CIVIL LAW; WILLS AND SUCCESSION; LEGITIME; PROPRIETARY INTEREST OF THE CHILDREN, DIFFERENT AND ADVERSE FROM
THEIR MOTHER. — The legitime of the surviving spouse is equal to the legitime of each child. The proprietary interest of
petitioners in the levied and auctioned property is different from and adverse to that of their mother. Petitioners became co-
owners of the property not because of their mother but through their own right as children of their deceased father. Therefore,
petitioners are not barred in any way from instituting the action to annul the auction sale to protect their own interest.

DECISION

NOCON, J.:

The ultimate issue before Us is whether or not private respondents can validly acquire all the five (5) parcels of land co-owned
by petitioners and registered in the name of petitioner’s deceased father. Marcelo Suarez, whose estate has not been
partitioned or liquidated, after the said properties were levied and publicly sold en masse to private respondents to satisfy the
personal judgment debt of Teofista Suarez, the surviving spouse of Marcelo Suarez, mother of herein petitioners.chanrobles
law library

The undisputed facts of the case are as follows:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

Herein petitioners are brothers and sisters. Their father died in 1955 and since then his estate consisting of several valuable
parcels of land in Pasig, Metro Manila has lot been liquidated or partitioned. In 1977, petitioners’ widowed mother and Rizal
Realty Corporation lost in the consolidated cases for rescission of contract and for damages, and were ordered by Branch 1 of
the then Court of First Instance of Rizal (now Branch 151, RTC of Pasig) to pay, jointly and severally, herein respondents the
aggregate principal amount of about P70,000 as damages. 1

The judgment against petitioner’s mother and Rizal Realty Corporation having become final and executory, five (5) valuable
parcel of land in Pasig, Metro Manila, (worth to be millions then) were levied and sold on execution on June 24, 1983 in favor of
the private respondents as the highest bidder for the amount of P94,170.000. Private respondents were then issued a
certificate of sale which was subsequently registered or August 1, 1983.

On June 21, 1984 before the expiration of the redemption period, petitioners filed a reinvindicatory action 2 against private
respondents and the Provincial Sheriff of Rizal, thereafter docketed as Civil Case No. 51203, for the annulment of the auction
sale and the recovery of the ownership of the levied pieces of property. Therein, they alleged, among others, that being
strangers to the case decided against their mother, they cannot be held liable therefor and that the five (5) parcels of land, of
which they are co-owners, can neither be levied nor sold on execution.

On July 31, 1984, the Provincial Sheriff of Rizal issued to private respondents a final deed of sale 3 over the properties.

On October 22, 1984, Teofista Suarez joined by herein petitioners filed with Branch 151 a Motion for Reconsideration 4 of the
Order dated October 10, 1984, claiming that the parcels of land are co-owned by them and further informing the Court the
filing and pendency of an action to annul the auction sale (Civil Case No. 51203), which motion however, was
denied.chanrobles.com:cralaw:red

12
On February 25, 1985, a writ of preliminary injunction was issued enjoining private respondents from transferring to third
parties the levied parcels of land based on the finding that the auctioned lands are co-owned by petitioners.

On March 1, 1985, private respondent Valente Raymundo filed in Civil Case No. 51203 a Motion to Dismiss for failure on the
part of the petitioners to prosecute, however, such motion was later denied by Branch 155, Regional Trial Court, Pasig.

On December 1985, Raymundo filed in Civil Case No. 51203 an Ex-Parte Motion to Dismiss complaint for failure to prosecute.
This was granted by Branch 155 through an Order dated May 29, 1986, notwithstanding petitioner’s pending motion for the
issuance of alias summons to be served upon the other defendants in the said case. A motion for reconsideration was filed but
was later denied.

On October 10, 1984, RTC Branch 151 issued in Civil Case Nos. 21736-21739 an Order directing Teofista Suarez and all persons
claiming right under her to vacate the lots subject of the judicial sale; to desist from removing or alienating improvements
thereon; and to surrender to private respondents the owner’s duplicate copy of the torrens title and other pertinent
documents.

Teofista Suarez then filed with the then Court of Appeals a petition for certiorari to annul the Orders of Branch 151 dated
October 10, 1984 and October 14, 1986 issued in Civil Case Nos. 21736-21739.

On December 4, 1986 petitioners filed with Branch 155 a Motion for reconsideration of the Order 5 dated September 24, 1986.
In an Order dated June 10, 1987, 6 Branch 155 lifted its previous order of dismissal and directed the issuance of alias
summons.chanrobles law library : red

Respondents then appealed to the Court of Appeals seeking to annul the orders dated February 25, 1985, 7 May 19, 1989 8 and
February 26, 1990 9 issued in Civil Case No. 51203 and further ordering respondent Judge to dismiss Civil Case No. 51203. The
appellate court rendered its decision on July 27, 1990, 10 the dispositive portion of which reads:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari is hereby granted and the questioned orders dated February 25, 1985, May 19, 1989
and February 26, 1990 issued in Civil Case No. 51203 are hereby annulled, further respondent Judge is ordered to dismiss Civil
Case No. 51203." 11

Hence, this appeal.

Even without touching on the incidents and issues raised by both petitioner and private respondents and the developments
subsequent to the filing of the complaint, We cannot but notice the glaring error committed by the trial court.

It would be useless to discuss the procedural issue on the validity of the execution and the manner of publicly selling en masse
the subject properties for auction. To start with, only one-half of the 5 parcels of land should have been the subject of the
auction sale.

The law in point is Article 777 of the Civil Code, the law applicable at the time of the institution of the case.

"The rights to the succession are transmitted from the moment of the death of the decedent."cralaw virtua1aw library

Article 888 further provides:chanrobles.com.ph : virtual law library

"The legitime of the legitimate children and descendants consists of one-half of the hereditary estate of the father and of the
mother.

The latter may freely dispose of the remaining half, subject to the rights of illegitimate children and of the surviving spouse as
hereinafter provided."cralaw virtua1aw library

Article 892 par. 2 likewise provides:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"If there are two or more legitimate children or descendants, the surviving spouse shall be entitled to a portion equal to the
legitime of each of the legitimate children or descendants."cralaw virtua1aw library

13
Thus, from the foregoing, the legitime of the surviving spouse is equal to the legitime of each child.

The proprietary interest of petitioners in the levied and auctioned property is different from and adverse to that of their
mother. Petitioners became co-owners of the property not because of their mother but through their own right as children of
their deceased father. Therefore, petitioners are not barred in any way from instituting the action to annul the auction sale to
protect their own interest.

WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals dated July 27, 1990 as well as its Resolution of August 28, 1990 are hereby
REVERSED and set aside; and Civil Case No. 51203 is reinstated only to determine that portion which belongs to petitioners and
to annul the sale with regard to said portion.chanrobles law library

SO ORDERED.

14
[G.R. No. 116018. November 13, 1996.]
NELIA A. CONSTANTINO, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, AURORA S. ROQUE, PRISCILLA S. LUNA and JOSEFINA S. AUSTRIA,
respondents.
Agcaoili Law Offices for petitioner.
Geronimo O. Veneracion, Jr. for private respondents.
SYLLABUS
1. REMEDIAL LAW; CIVIL PROCEDURE; FORMAL OFFER OF EVIDENCE; RIGHT THERETO DEEMED WAIVED IN CASE AT BENCH. —
The trial court was correct in holding that petitioner waived the right to formally offer his evidence. A considerable lapse of
time, about three (3) months, had already passed before petitioner's counsel made effort to formally offer his evidence. For the
trial court to grant petitioner's motion to admit her exhibits would be to condone an inexcusable laxity if not non-compliance
with a court order which, in effect, would encourage needless delays and derail the speedy administration of justice. cdasia
2. CIVIL LAW; CONTRACTS; VALIDITY; NO MEETING OF THE MINDS BETWEEN PARTIES ON LAND AREA TO BE SOLD; CASE AT
BENCH. — Petitioner also insists that the real intent of the parties was to make the entire Lot 4-B the subject matter of the sale.
She claims that during cross-examination respondent Aurora S. Roque admitted that she signed in behalf of her co-heirs a
receipt for P30,000.00 as partial payment for the lot occupied by Ka Baring and Lina (relatives of petitioner) and Iling (Consuelo
Lim). . . . The admission of respondent Roque cannot prevail in the face of the clear evidence that there was as yet no meeting
of the minds on the land area to be sold since private respondents were still awaiting the survey to be conducted on the
premises. . . . Likewise, we find the allegation of respondents that they signed the deed prior to the survey, or before
determination of the area to be sold, worthy of credit as against the contention of petitioner that they signed after the survey
or on 10 October 1984. As found by the trial court, such contention was contradicted by petitioner's own witness who
positively asserted in court that the survey was conducted only on 16 October 1984 or six (6) days after the signing. Quite
obviously, when respondents affixed their signatures on the deed, it was still incomplete since petitioner who caused it to be
prepared left several spaces blank, more particularly as regards the dimensions of the property to be sold. The heirs were
persuaded to sign the document only upon the assurance of petitioner that respondent Roque, pursuant to their
understanding, would be present when the property would be surveyed after obtaining permission from the Bureau of Lands.
As it surfaced, the supposed understanding was merely a ruse of petitioner to induce respondents to sign the deed without
which the latter would not have given their conformity thereto. EaCSHI
3. ID.; ID.; ID.; FACT THAT DEED OF SALE WAS NOTARIZED IN A PLACE OTHER THAN WHERE SUBJECT LOT WAS SITUATED CASTS
DOUBT ON DUE EXECUTION OF SAID DEED; CASE AT BENCH. — The trial court correctly appreciated the fact that the deed was
notarized in Manila when it could have been notarized in Bulacan. This additional detail casts doubt on the procedural
regularity in the preparation, execution and signing of the deed. It is not easy to believe that petitioner and the ten (10) Torres
heirs traveled all the way to Manila to have their questioned document notarized considering that they, with the exception of
respondent Roque, are residents of Balagtas, Bulacan, where notaries public are easy to find. Consequently, the claim of private
respondents that they did not sign the document before a notary public is more plausible than petitioner's feeble claim to the
contrary.
4. ID.; ID.; FRAUD; ELEMENTS THEREOF; ANNULMENT OF CONTRACT PROPER IN CASE AT BENCH. — Apparently, petitioner
deceived respondents by filling the blank spaces in the deed, having the lots surveyed and subdivided, and then causing the
issuance of transfer certificates of title without their knowledge, much less consent. Thus all the elements of fraud vitiating
consent for purposes of annulling a contract concur: (a) It was employed by a contracting party upon the other; (b) It induced
the other party to enter into the contract; (c) It was serious; and, (d) It resulted in damages and injury to the party seeking
annulment. Perhaps, another compelling reason for the annulment of the document of settlement and conveyance is that the
second page thereof clearly manifests that the number of the subdivision plan and the respective areas of Lots 4-A and 4-B
were merely handwritten while all the rest of the statements therein were typewritten, which leads us to the conclusion that
handwritten figures thereon were not available at the time the document was formalized. IaHDcT
DECISION
BELLOSILLO, J p:
JOSEFA TORRES died intestate leaving a parcel of land located at Balagtas, Bulacan. Among her heirs are respondents Aurora S.
Roque, Priscilla S. Luna and Josefina S. Austria. Sometime in 1984, the heirs of Josefa Torres, as vendors, and petitioner Nelia A.
Constantino, as vendee, entered into a contract to sell a parcel of land with a total land area of two hundred and fifty (250)
square meters. The lot, owned in common by the Torres heirs, is being occupied by petitioners' mother and sister. An adjoining
lot, also co-owned by the heirs, is being occupied by spouses Severino and Consuelo Lim. Pursuant to their agreement, the heirs
authorized petitioner to prepare the necessary Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement of Estate with Sale.

15
After having the document drafted — with several spaces left blank including the specification as to the metes and bounds of
the land — petitioner asked the heirs to affix their signatures on the document. The heirs signed the document with the
understanding that respondent Aurora S. Roque, one of the heirs, would be present when the latter would seek permission
from the Bureau of Lands and have the land surveyed.
However, without the participation of any of the Torres heirs, the property was subsequently surveyed, subdivided and then
covered by TCT Nos. T-292265 and T-292266. Petitioner did not furnish the heirs with copies of the Deed of Extrajudicial
Settlement of Estate with Salenor of the subdivision plan and the certificates of title. Upon securing a copy of the deed from the
Registry of Deeds, the respondents learned that the area of the property purportedly sold to petitioner was much bigger than
that agreed upon by the parties. It already included the portion being occupied by the spouses Severino and Consuelo Lim.
On 2 June 1986, private respondents sent a letter to petitioner demanding the surrender to them of the deed of settlement and
conveyance, the subdivision plan and the certificates of title; but to no avail. On 25 June 1986 respondents filed with the
Regional Trial Court of Bulacan an action for annulment of the deed and cancellation of the certificates of title, with prayer for
recovery of damages, attorney's fees and costs of suit. 1
Petitioner controverted the allegations of respondents by presenting the Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement of Estate with Sale
dated 10 October 1984 wherein respondents agreed to divide and adjudicate among themselves the inherited property with an
area of one thousand five hundred and three (1,503) square meters. In the same document, they caused the subdivision of the
property into two (2) lots according to Plan No. PSD-03-009105 identified as Lot 4-A with an area of one thousand ninety-six
(1,096) square meters, and Lot 4-B with an area of four hundred and seven (407) square meters, and acknowledged the sale to
petitioner of said Lot 4-B. As a consequence, on 18 March 1985, the Register of Deeds issued TCT No. T-292265 in the name of
the heirs of Josefa Torres and TCT No. T-292266 in the name of petitioner.
In reply, private respondents reiterated that all the heirs signed the document before the land was surveyed and subdivided,
hence, there was as yet no definite area to be sold that could be indicated in the deed at the time of the signing. They also
claimed that they were not notified about the survey and the subdivision of the lot and therefore they could not have agreed
on the area supposedly sold to petitioner. The respondent heirs insist that they could not have agreed to the extent of the area
actually reflected in the deed because it included the portion being occupied by the Lim spouses, which was already the subject
of a previous agreement to sell between them and their predecessor.
The trial court entertained serious doubts with respect to the preparation and due execution of the Deed of Extrajudicial
Settlement of Estate with Sale taking into account that (a) while petitioner claimed that all the heirs signed before the notary
public and in her presence, she was not able to enumerate all the signatories to the document; (b) while petitioner claimed that
the document was signed only after the survey of the land was completed, or on 10 October 1984, such fact was negated by
her own witness who testified that the survey was conducted only on 16 October 1984; and, (c) while petitioner alleged that
the document was signed and notarized in Manila no explanation was offered why the same could not have been signed and
notarized in Bulacan where notaries public abound which could have been less inconvenient to the parties concerned.
Additionally, the trial court relied heavily on the assertions of respondents as reflected in their demand letter that they did not
give their consent to the sale of Lot 4-B.
Thus, on the basis of the evidence on record, the trial court on 27 September 1990 ordered the annulment and cancellation of
the Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement of Estate with Sale, TCT Nos. T-292265 and T-292266 and Subdivision Plan No. PSD-03-
009105. It also ordered petitioner to pay private respondents P50,000.00 for moral damages, P15,000.00 for attorney's fees,
and to pay the costs of suit. 2
On 16 March 1994 respondent Court of Appeals sustained the decision of the trial court, 3 and on 20 June 1994 denied the
motion to reconsider its decision. 4
Petitioner faults respondent Court of Appeals: (a) for disregarding documentary evidence already presented, marked and
identified on a purely technical ground, and (b) for concluding that the Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement of Estate with Sale did
not reflect the true intent of the parties.
Petitioner argues that the trial court should not have denied her motion to admit formal offer of evidence merely on the basis
of technicality such as late filing, citing Siguenza v. Court of Appeals. 5 We are not persuaded. Indeed, we held in Siguenza that
rules of procedure are not to be applied in a very rigid and technical sense as they are used only to help secure, not override,
substantial justice. Yet the holding is inapplicable to the present case as the trial court had a reasonable basis for denying
petitioner's motion —
On February 6, 1990, Atty. Ponciano Mercado, defendant's counsel, manifested in Court that he has (sic) no more witness to
present. He asked that he be given 15 days to make a formal offer of evidence and which the Court granted. At the scheduled
hearing of April 03, 1990, Atty. Ponciano Mercado . . . was not in Court. Atty. Veneracion, plaintiffs' counsel, called the attention
of the Court that Atty. Mercado has (sic) not yet filed and/or complied with the Court Order dated February 06, 1990, which is

16
to file his formal offer of evidence. On motion of Atty. Veneracion, defendant's right to file a formal offer of evidence was
deemed waived. Atty. Veneracion waived the presentation of rebuttal offer of evidence.
On May 11, 1990, the Court was in receipt of a motion to admit formal offer of exhibits filed by the defendant thru counsel,
Atty. Ponciano Mercado, on May 02, 1990. Considering that the same was filed out of time and the plaintiffs having filed their
memorandum already, the motion to admit formal offer of exhibits was denied (emphasis supplied).
The trial court was correct in holding that petitioner waived the right to formally offer his evidence. A considerable lapse of
time, about three (3) months, had already passed before petitioner's counsel made effort to formally offer his evidence. For the
trial court to grant petitioner's motion to admit her exhibits: would be to condone an inexcusable laxity if not non-compliance
with a court order which, in effect, would encourage needless delays and derail the speedy administration of justice.
Petitioner also insists that the real intent of the parties was to make the entire Lot 4-B the subject matter of the sale. She claims
that during cross-examination respondent Aurora S. Roque admitted that she signed in behalf of her co-heirs a receipt for
P30,000.00 as partial payment for the lot occupied by Ka Baring and Lina (relatives of petitioner) and Iling (Consuelo Lim).
Moreover, according to petitioner, the assertions of private respondents to petitioner contained in the demand letter should
not necessarily be true and that the validity of the Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement of Estate with Sale was not affected by the
fact that it was notarized in a place other than where the subject matter thereof was situated, citing Sales v. Court of Appeals. 6
These other arguments of petitioner are barren and futile. The admission of respondent Roque cannot prevail in the face of the
clear evidence that there was as yet no meeting of the minds on the land area to be sold since private respondents were still
awaiting the survey to be conducted on the premises. Obviously, the trial court only lent credence to the assertions in the
demand letter after having weighed the respective evidence of the parties. But even without the letter, the evidence of
respondents had already amply substantiated their claims.
We ruled in the Sales case that the extrinsic validity of a document was not affected by the fact that it was notarized in a place
other than where the subject matter thereof was located. What is more important under the Notarial Law is that the notary
public has authority to acknowledge the document executed within his territorial jurisdiction. The ruling in Sales is not
applicable to the present case. Our concern here is not whether the notary public had the authority to acknowledge the
document executed within his territorial jurisdiction but whether respondents indeed appeared before him and signed the
deed. However, the quantum of evidence shows that they did not.
The trial court correctly appreciated the fact that the deed was notarized in Manila when it could have been notarized in
Bulacan. This additional detail casts doubt on the procedural regularity in the preparation, execution and signing of the deed. It
is not easy to believe that petitioner and the ten (10) Torres heirs traveled all the way to Manila to have their questioned
document notarized considering that they, with the exception of respondent Roque, are residents of Balagtas, Bulacan, where
notaries public are easy to find. Consequently, the claim of private respondents that they did not sign the document before a
notary public is more plausible than petitioner's feeble claim to the contrary.
Likewise, we find the allegation of respondents that they signed the deed prior to the survey, or before determination of the
area to be sold, worthy of credit as against the contention of petitioner that they signed after the survey or on 10 October
1984. As found by the trial court, such contention was contradicted by petitioners' own witness who positively asserted in court
that the survey was conducted only on 16 October 1984 or six (6) days after the signing. Quite obviously, when respondents
affixed their signatures on the deed, it was still incomplete since petitioner who caused it to be prepared left several spaces
blank, more particularly as regards the dimensions of the property to be sold. The heirs were persuaded to sign the document
only upon the assurance of petitioner that respondent Roque, pursuant to their understanding, would be present when the
property would be surveyed after obtaining permission from the Bureau of Lands. As it surfaced, the supposed understanding
was merely a ruse of petitioner to induce respondents to sign the deed without which the latter would not have given their
conformity thereto. 7 Apparently, petitioner deceived respondents by filling the blank spaces in the deed, having the lots
surveyed and subdivided, and then causing the issuance of transfer certificates of title without their knowledge, much less
consent. Thus all the elements of fraud vitiating consent for purposes of annulling a contract concur: (a) It was employed by a
contracting party upon the other; (b) It induced the other party to enter into the contract; (c) It was serious; and, (d) It resulted
in damages and injury to the party seeking annulment. 8
Perhaps, another compelling reason for the annulment of the document of settlement and conveyance is that the second page
thereof clearly manifests that the number of the subdivision plan and the respective areas of Lots 4-A and 4-B were merely
handwritten while all the rest of the statements therein were typewritten, which leads us to the conclusion that handwritten
figures thereon were not available at the time the document was formalized.
WHEREFORE, there being no error to warrant a reversal of the decision and resolution in question of respondent Court of
Appeals, which affirmed the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Malolos, Bulacan, Br. 22, the instant petition is DENIED.
SO ORDERED.

17
[G.R. No. 124320. March 2, 1999.]
HEIRS OF GUIDO YAPTINCHAY AND ISABEL YAPTINCHAY, NAMELY: LETICIA ENCISO-GADINGAN, EMILIO ENCISO, AURORA
ENCISO, AND NORBERTO ENCISO, REPRESENTED BY LETICIA ENCISO-GADINGAN, ATTORNEY-IN-FACT, petitioners, vs. HON.
ROY S. DEL ROSARIO, PRESIDING JUDGE, RTC, BRANCH 21, IMUS, CAVITE; THE REGISTER OF DEEDS FOR TRECE MARTIRES
CITY, GEORGE T. CHUA, SPS. ALFONSO NG AND ANNABELLE CHUA, SPS. ROSENDO L. DY AND DIANA DY, SPS. ALEXANDER NG
AND CRISTINA NG, SPS. SAMUEL MADRID AND BELEN MADRID, SPS. JOSE MADRID AND BERNARDA MADRID, SPS. DAVID
MADRID AND VIOLETA MADRID, JONATHAN NG, SPS. VICTORIANO CHAN, JR. AND CARMELITA CHAN, SPS. MARIE TES C. LEE
AND GREGORIE W.C. LEE, JACINTO C. NG, JR., SPS. ADELAIDO S. DE GUZMAN AND ROSITA C. DE GUZMAN, SPS. RICARDO G.
ONG AND JULIE LIMIT, SPS. MISAEL ADELAIDA P. SOLIMAN AND FERDINAND SOLIMAN, SPS. MYLENE T. LIM AND ARTHUR
LIM, EVELYN K. CHUA, GOLDEN BAY REALTY AND DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, respondents.
Jose J. Estrella, Jr., & Associates for petitioners.
Azcuna Yorac Sarmiento Arroyo & Chua Law Offices for private respondents.
SYNOPSIS
Petitioners are the legal heirs of the late Guido and Isabel Yaptinchay, the owners-claimants of Lot No. 1131 situated in Bancal,
Carmona, Cavite. Petitioners discovered that a portion, if not all, of the aforesaid properties were titled in the name of
respondent Golden Bay Realty and Development Corporation (Golden Bay) under Transfer Certificate of Title Nos. 225254 and
225255. They filed a complaint for annulment and/or declaration of nullity of TCT Nos. 493363-67 and its derivatives and as
alternative reconveyance of realty with prayer for writ of preliminary injunction and/or restraining order with damages with the
Regional Trial Court in Imus, Cavite. Private respondents presented a motion to dismiss on the grounds that the complaint
failed to state a cause of action and that petitioners did not have a right of action, that they have not established their status as
heirs and that the land being claimed is different from that of the private respondents. The said motion to dismiss was granted
by the respondent court holding that petitioners have not shown any proof or even a semblance of it except the allegations
that they are the legal heirs of the deceased couple. Petitioners interposed a motion for reconsideration but it was denied.
Hence, the present petition. Petitioners contended that the respondent court acted with grave abuse of discretion in ruling that
the issue of heirship should first be determined before the trial of the case could proceed. It is petitioners' submission that the
respondent court should have proceeded with the trial and simultaneously resolved the issue of heirship in the same case.
The Supreme Court dismissed the petition. The Court ruled that the trial court cannot make a declaration of heirship in the civil
action for the reason that such a declaration can only be made in a special proceeding. Under Section 3, Rule 1 of the 1997
Revised Rules of Court, a civil action is defined as "one by which a party sues another for the enforcement or protection of a
right, or the prevention or redress of a wrong" while a special proceeding is "a remedy by which a party seeks to establish a
status, a right, or particular fact." The Court held that the declaration of heirship can be made only in a special proceeding
inasmuch as the petitioners in the case at bar are seeking the establishment of a status or right. SEDICa
SYLLABUS
REMEDIAL LAW; CIVIL ACTIONS; TRIAL COURTS CANNOT MAKE A DECLARATION OF HEIRSHIP IN A CIVIL ACTION; SUCH
DECLARATION CAN ONLY BE MADE IN A SPECIAL PROCEEDING. — In Litam, etc., et al. vs. Rivera, this court opined that the
declaration of heirship must be made in an administration proceeding, and not in an independent civil action. This doctrine was
reiterated in Solivio vs. Court of Appeals, where the court held: "In Litam, et al. vs. Rivera, 100 Phil. 364, where despite the
pendency of the special proceedings for the settlement of the intestate estate of the deceased Rafael Litam, the plaintiffs-
appellants filed a civil action in which they claimed that they were the children by a previous marriage of the deceased to a
Chinese woman, hence, entitled to inherit his one-half share of the conjugal properties acquired during his marriage to Marcosa
Rivera, the trial court in the civil case declared that the plaintiffs-appellants were not children of the deceased, that the
properties in question were paraphernal properties of his wife, Marcosa Rivera, and that the latter was his only heir. On appeal
to this Court, we ruled that 'such declarations (that Marcosa Rivera was the only heir of the decedent) is improper, in Civil Case
No. 2071, it being within the exclusive competence of the court in Special Proceedings No. 1537, in which it is not as yet, in issue,
and, will not be, ordinarily, in issue until the presentation of the project of partition.' (p. 378)." The trial court cannot make a
declaration of heirship in the civil action for the reason that such a declaration can only be made in a special proceeding. Under
Section 3, Rule 1 of the 1997 Revised Rules of Court, a civil action is defined as "one by which a party sues another for the
enforcement or protection of a right, or the prevention or redress of a wrong" while a special proceeding is "a remedy by which
a party seeks to establish a status, a right, or a particular fact." It is then decisively clear that the declaration of heirship can be
made only in a special proceeding inasmuch as the petitioners here are seeking the establishment of a status or right. CacHES
DECISION
PURISIMA, J p:

18
At bar is a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court assailing the Orders dated October 25, 1995 and
February 23, 1996, respectively, of Branch 21 of the Regional Trial Court in Imus, Cavite ("RTC").
The facts that matter are, as follows:
Petitioners claim that they are the legal heirs of the late Guido and Isabel Yaptinchay, the owners-claimants of Lot No. 1131
with an area of 520,638 and Lot No. 1132 with an area of 96,235 square meters, more or less situated in Bancal, Carmona,
Cavite.
On March 17, 1994, petitioners executed an Extra-Judicial Settlement of the estate of the deceased Guido and Isabel
Yaptinchay.
On August 26, 1994, petitioners discovered that a portion, if not all, of the aforesaid properties were titled in the name of
respondent Golden Bay Realty and Development Corporation ("Golden Bay") under Transfer Certificate of Title Nos. ("TCT")
225254 and 225255. With the discovery of what happened to subject parcels of land, petitioners filed a complaint for
ANNULMENT and/or DECLARATION OF NULLITY OF TCT NO. 493363, 493364, 493665, 493366, 493367; and its Derivatives; As
Alternative Reconveyance of Realty WITH A PRAYER FOR A WRIT OF PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION and/or RESTRAINING ORDER
WITH DAMAGES, docketed as RTC BCV-94-127 before Branch 21 of the Regional Trial Court in Imus, Cavite.
Upon learning that "Golden Bay" sold portions of the parcels of land in question, petitioners filed with the "RTC" an Amended
Complaint to implead new and additional defendants and to mention the TCTs to be annulled. But the respondent court
dismissed the Amended Complaint. cdlex
Petitioners moved for reconsideration of the Order dismissing the Amended Complaint. The motion was granted by the RTC in
an Order 1 dated July 7, 1995, which further allowed the herein petitioners to file a Second Amended Complaint, 2 which they
promptly did.
On August 12, 1995, the private respondents presented a Motion to Dismiss 3 on the grounds that the complaint failed to state
a cause of action, that plaintiffs did not have a right of action, that they have not established their status as heirs, that the land
being claimed is different from that of the defendants, and that plaintiffs' claim was barred by laches. The said Motion to
Dismiss was granted by the respondent court in its Order 4 dated October 25, 1995, holding that petitioners "have not shown
any proof or even a semblance of it — except the allegations that they are the legal heirs of the above-named Yaptinchays —
that they have been declared the legal heirs of the deceased couple."
Petitioners interposed a Motion for Reconsideration 5 but to no avail. The same was denied by the RTC in its Order 6 of
February 23, 1996.
Undaunted, petitioners have come before this Court to seek relief from respondent court's Orders under attack.
Petitioners contend that the respondent court acted with grave abuse of discretion in ruling that the issue of heirship should
first be determined before trial of the case could proceed. It is petitioners' submission that the respondent court should have
proceeded with the trial and simultaneously resolved the issue of heirship in the same case. cdll
The petition is not impressed with merit.
To begin with, petitioners' Petition for Certiorari before this Court is an improper recourse. Their proper remedy should have
been an appeal. An order of dismissal, be it right or wrong, is a final order, which is subject to appeal and not a proper subject
of certiorari. 7 Where appeal is available as a remedy certiorari will not lie. 8
Neither did the respondent court commit grave abuse of discretion in issuing the questioned Order dismissing the Second
Amended Complaint of petitioners, as it aptly ratiocinated and ruled:
"But the plaintiffs who claimed to be the legal heirs of the said Guido and Isabel Yaptinchay have not shown any proof or even a
semblance of it — except the allegations that they are the legal heirs of the aforementioned Yaptinchays — that they have been
declared the legal heirs of the deceased couple. Now, the determination of who are the legal heirs of the deceased couple must
be made in the proper special proceedings in court, and not in an ordinary suit for reconveyance of property. This must take
precedence over the action for reconveyance (Elena C. Monzon, et. al., v. Angelita Taligato, CA-G-R No. 33355, August 12,
1992)."
In Litam, etc., et. al. v. Rivera, 9 this court opined that the declaration of heirship must be made in an administration
proceeding, and not in an independent civil action. This doctrine was reiterated in Solivio v. Court of Appeals 10 where the court
held: cda
"In Litam, et al. v. Rivera, 100 Phil. 364, where despite the pendency of the special proceedings for the settlement of the
intestate estate of the deceased Rafael Litam, the plaintiffs-appellants filed a civil action in which they claimed that they were
the children by a previous marriage of the deceased to a Chinese woman, hence, entitled to inherit his one-half share of the

19
conjugal properties acquired during his marriage to Marcosa Rivera, the trial court in the civil case declared that the plaintiffs-
appellants were not children of the deceased, that the properties in question were paraphernal properties of his wife, Marcosa
Rivera, and that the latter was his only heir. On appeal to this Court, we ruled that 'such declarations (that Marcosa Rivera was
the only heir of the decedent) is improper, in Civil Case No. 2071, it being within the exclusive competence of the court in Special
Proceedings No. 1537, in which it is not as yet, in issue, and, will not be, ordinarily, in issue until the presentation of the project
of partition.' (p. 378)."
The trial court cannot make a declaration of heirship in the civil action for the reason that such a declaration can only be made
in a special proceeding. Under Section 3, Rule 1 of the 1997 Revised Rules of Court, a civil action is defined as "one by which a
party sues another for the enforcement or protection of a right, or the prevention or redress of a wrong" while a special
proceeding is "a remedy by which a party seeks to establish a status, a right, or a particular fact." It is then decisively clear that
the declaration of heirship can be made only in a special proceeding inasmuch as the petitioners here are seeking the
establishment of a status or right. cdasia
We therefore hold that the respondent court did the right thing in dismissing the Second Amended Complaint, which stated no
cause of action. In Travel Wide Associated Sales (Phils.), Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 11 it was ruled that:
". . . if the suit is not brought in the name of or against the real party in interest, a motion to dismiss may be filed on the ground
that the complaint states no cause of action."
WHEREFORE, for lack of merit, the Petition under consideration is hereby DISMISSED. No pronouncement as to costs. cdtai
SO ORDERED.

20
G.R. No. 149017 November 28, 2008
VALENTE RAYMUNDO,petitioner,
vs.
TEOFISTA ISAGON VDA. DE SUAREZ, DANILO I. SUAREZ, EUFROCINA SUAREZ, MARCELO I. SUAREZ, JR, EVELYN SUAREZ, ET
AL., respondents.
DECISION
NACHURA, J.:
This petition, filed under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, assails the Court of Appeals (CA) Decision1 and Resolution2 in CA-G.R. SP
No. 58090 which reversed, set aside and recalled the Regional Trial Court (RTC) Orders3 in Civil Case No. 51203.
First, the long settled facts.
Marcelo and Teofista Isagon Suarez'4 marriage was blessed with both material wealth and progeny in herein respondents,
namely, Danilo,5 Eufrocina, Marcelo Jr., Evelyn, and Reggineo,6 all surnamed Suarez. During their marriage, governed by the
conjugal partnership of gains regime, they acquired numerous properties, which included the following: (1) a parcel of land
situated in Barrio Caniogan, Pasig with an area of 348 square meters covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 30680; (2)
property located in Pinagbuhatan, Pasig, with an area of 1,020 square meters under Tax Declaration No. A-016-01003; and (3)
Lot Nos. 5, 6 & 7, Block 2 covered by Tax Declaration No. A-01700723 (subject properties).
After the death of Marcelo Sr. in 1955, Teofista and herein respondents, as well as Elpidio Suarez,7 executed an Extrajudicial
Settlement of Estate,8 partitioning Marcelo Sr.'s estate, thus:
WHEREAS, the said deceased is survived by the parties hereto who are his only legal heirs: TEOFISTA ISAGON, being the
surviving spouse, and EUFROCINA S. ANDRES, ELPIDIO SUAREZ, DANILO SUAREZ, EVELYN SUAREZ, MARCELO SUAREZ, JR. and
REGGINEO SUAREZ, being the legitimate children of the deceased with the said TEOFISTA ISAGON;
WHEREAS, the minors ELPIDIO, SUAREZ, DANILO SUAREZ, EVELYN SUAREZ, MARCELO SUAREZ, JR. and REGGINEO SUAREZ are
represented herein by EUFROCINA S. ANDRES, in her capacity as the guardian and legal administrator of the property of the
said minors;
WHEREAS, there are no known debts or financial obligations of whatever nature and amount against the estate of the
deceased;
NOW, THEREFORE, in consideration of the foregoing premises, the Parties have agreed to settle and liquidate the assets of the
conjugal partnership between the deceased and TEOFISTA ISAGON, and to settle and adjudicate the estate of the said
deceased, by and pursuance to these presents, in the following manner, to wit:
1. That TEOFISTA ISAGON, as the surviving spouse and partner of the deceased, shall receive in absolute and exclusive
ownership the following properties as her lawful share in the assets of the conjugal partnership of gains between her and the
deceased, to wit:
(a) Half (1/2) interest and participation in the parcel of land covered by Tax Declaration No. 6938, situated at Sitio Pantayan,
Municipality of Taytay, Province of Rizal;
(b) Half (1/2) interest and participation in the parcel of land covered by Tax Declaration No. 6939, situated at Sitio Pantayan,
Municipality of Taytay, Province of Rizal;
(c) Half (1/2) interest and participation in the parcel of land covered by TCT No. 38291, situated at Barrio Rosario, Municipality
of Pasig, Province of Rizal;
(d) Half (1/2) interest and participation in the parcel of land covered by TCT No. 38290, situated at Barrio Rosario, Municipality
of Pasig, Province of Rizal;
(e) TWELVE THOUSAND FIVE HUNDRED THIRTY PESOS AND NINETY (P12,530.90) deposited with the Commercial Bank and Trust
Company of the Philippines, and THIRTY-NINE PESOS (P39.00) deposited with Prudential Bank.
2. That the Parties TEOFISTA ISAGON, EUFROCINA S. ANDRES, ELPIDIO SUAREZ, DANILO SUAREZ, EVELYN SUAREZ, MARCELO
SUAREZ, JR. and REGGINEO SUAREZ, shall each and all receive and be entitled to a share equivalent to one-seventh (1/7) of the
estate of the deceased MARCELO SUAREZ, which estate is comprised of the following properties, to wit:
(a) A parcel of land covered by TCT No. 30680, situated at Barrio Kaniogan, Municipality of Pasig, Province of Rizal, with an
assessed value of P4,150.00.

21
(b) Three (3) parcels of land covered by TCT Nos. 33982, 33983 and 33984, situated at Barrio Pineda, Municipality of Pasig,
Province of Rizal, with an assessed value of P560.00.
(c) A parcel of land covered by TCT 33986, situated at Barrio Pineda, Municipality of Pasig, Province of Rizal, with an assessed
value of P440.00.
(d) Two (2) parcels of land, being Lots Nos. 42 and 44 of the amendment-subdivision plan TY-4653-Amd., being a portion of Lot
2 described on the original plan II-4653, G.L.R.O. Record No. _____, situated at Barrio Santolan, Municipality of Pasig, Province
of Rizal, with a total assessed value of P590.00.
(e) Two parcels of land, being Lots Nos. 43 and 45 of the amendment-subdivision plan TY-4653-Amd., being a portion of Lot 2
described on the original plan II-4653, G.L.R.O. Record No. _______, situated at Barrio Santolan, Municipality of Pasig, Province
of Rizal, with a total assessed value of P1,190.00.
(f) A parcel of land, being Lot No. 6, Block 269 of the subdivision plan pos-112, being a portion of Lot 2, Block 348, Psd-3188,
G.L.R.O. Record Nos. 375,699 and 917, situated at San Felipe Neri, Province of Rizal, with an assessed value of P6,340.00.
(g) A parcel of land covered by OCT No. 391, situated in the Municipality of Taytay, Province of Rizal, with an assessed value of
P1,840.00.
(h) TWELVE THOUSAND (12,000) shares of stock of the Consolidated Mines, Inc. represented by Certificate No. 71-5-B (for
1,000 shares) and Certificate No. 12736 (for 11,000 shares).
PROVIDED, that their title to the properties hereinabove mentioned shall be in common and the share of each heir being pro
indiviso.
Curiously, despite the partition, title to the foregoing properties, explicitly identified in the Extrajudicial Settlement of Estate as
forming part of Marcelo's and Isagon's property regime, remained in the couple's name. Not surprisingly, Teofista continued to
administer and manage these properties. On the whole, apart from those now owned exclusively by Teofista, all the properties
were held pro indiviso by Teofista and her children; and respective titles thereto were not changed, with Teofista as de facto
administrator thereof.
In 1975, Rizal Realty Corporation (Rizal Realty) and Teofista, the latter owning ninety percent (90%) of the former's shares of
stock, were sued by petitioner Valente Raymundo, his wife Violeta, Virginia Banta and Maria Concepcion Vito (plaintiffs) in
consolidated cases for Rescission of Contract and Damages, docketed as Civil Case Nos. 21736 to 21739. Thereafter, in 1975,
the then Court of First Instance (CFI) of Rizal, Branch 1, rendered judgment: (1) rescinding the respective contracts of plaintiffs
with Rizal Realty and Teofista, and (2) holding the two defendants solidarily liable to plaintiffs for damages in the aggregate
principal amount of about P70,000.00.9
When the judgment of the CFI became final and executory, herein subject properties were levied and sold on execution on June
24, 1983 to satisfy the judgment against Teofista and Rizal Realty. The aforementioned plaintiffs were the highest bidder, and
bought the levied properties for the amount of P94,170.00. As a result, a certificate of sale was issued to them and registered in
their favor on August 1, 1983. On July 31, 1984, the Provincial Sheriff of Rizal issued a final deed of sale over the subject
properties.
Parenthetically, before expiration of the redemption period, or on June 21, 1984, herein respondents filed a revindicatory
action against petitioner Valente, Violeta, Virginia and Maria Concepcion, docketed as Civil Case No. 51203, for the annulment
of the auction sale and recovery of ownership of the levied properties. Essentially, respondents alleged in their complaint that
they cannot be held liable for the judgment rendered against their mother, Teofista, not having been impleaded therein; and
consequently, the subject properties, which they own pro indiviso with their mother, can neither be levied nor be sold on
execution.
Meanwhile, the RTC, Branch 151, formerly the CFI, Branch 1, in Civil Case Nos. 21376 to 21379, issued an Order10 directing
Teofista: (1) to vacate the subject properties, (2) to desist from despoiling, dismantling, removing or alienating the
improvements thereon, (3) to place petitioner Valente, Violeta, Virginia and Maria Concepcion in peaceful possession thereof,
and (4) to surrender to them the owner's duplicate copy of the torrens title and other pertinent documents. Herein
respondents, joined by their mother, Teofista, filed a Motion for Reconsideration arguing that the subject properties are co-
owned by them and further informing the RTC of the filing and pendency of Civil Case No. 51203. Nonetheless, the trial court
denied Teofista's and herein respondents' motion, reiterated its previous order, which included, among others, the order for
Teofista and all persons claiming right under her, to vacate the lots subject of the judicial sale.
Undaunted, Teofista and herein respondents filed a petition for certiorari before the CA to annul the foregoing orders. The
appellate court, on July 6, 1987, dismissed Teofista's and herein respondents' petition, thus:

22
We believe this petition cannot prosper for two reasons. First, as purported case for certiorari it fails to show how the
respondent judge had acted without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion. The two orders being assailed
were preceded by a final judgment, a corresponding writ of execution, a levy on execution and a judicial sale, all of which enjoy
a strong sense presumption of regularity.
Secondly, as far as [petitioner] Teofista Suarez is concerned, she cannot complain about the levy because she was a party in the
consolidated cases where judgment was rendered against her in her personal capacity. Since she did not appeal from the
decision, she cannot say that the judgment is erroneous for an obligation that belong to the corporation. And with respect to
the children of Teofista Suarez, who are co-petitioners in this proceedings [herein respondents], suffice it to point out that not
being parties in the consolidated cases, what they should have done was to immediately file a third party claim. The moment
levy was made on the parcels of land, which they claim are theirs by virtue of hereditary succession, they should have
seasonably filed such claim to protect their rights. As the record discloses, however, the children chose to remain silent, and
even allowed the auction sale to be held, filing almost a year later a half-hearted complaint to annul the proceedings which
they allowed to be dismissed by not diligently prosecuting it.
In Santos v. Mojica (10 SCRA 318), a partition case with third- party claimants, the Supreme Court came out with the following
ruling: "The procedure (a petition for certiorari) followed by him (a petitioner not party to the original partition case) in
vindicating his right is not the one sanctioned by law, for he should have filed a separate and independent action making parties
therein the sheriff and the plaintiffs responsible for the execution xxx. It can, therefore, be said that (he) acted improperly in
filing the present petition because his remedy was to file a separate and independent action to vindicate his ownership over the
land.
WHEREFORE, the petition is denied and the restraining order previously issued is DISSOLVED, with costs against petitioners. 11
On the other litigation front concerning Civil Case No. 51203, a writ of preliminary injunction was issued by the RTC Pasig,
Branch 155, on February 25, 1985, enjoining petitioner Valente, Violeta, Virginia and Maria Concepcion from transferring to
third parties the levied properties based on its preliminary finding that the auctioned properties are co-owned by Teofista and
herein respondents. Subsequently, however, Civil Case No. 51203 was dismissed by the RTC, Branch 155, at the instance of
petitioner Valente for failure of herein respondents to prosecute. But in yet another turn of events, the RTC, Branch 155, lifted
its previous order of dismissal and directed the issuance of alias summons.
Thus, it was now petitioner Valente's, Violeta's, Virginia's and Maria Concepcion's turn to file a petition for certiorari with the
CA, assailing the various orders of the RTC, Branch 155, which all rejected their bid to dismiss Civil Case No. 51203. The CA
granted their petition, thus:
And the fact that herein private respondents, as the legal heirs of Teofista Vda. de Suarez and supposedly not parties in Civil
Case Nos. 21376 - 21379 does not preclude the application of the doctrine of res judicata since, apart from the requisites
constitutive of this procedural tenet, they were admittedly the children of Teofista Suarez, who is the real party-in-interest in
the previous final judgment. As successors-in-interest of Teofista Suarez, private respondents merely stepped into the shoes of
their mother in regard to the levied pieces of property. Verily, there is identity of parties, not only where the parties in both
actions are the same, but where there is privity with them as in the cases of successors-in-interest by title subsequent to the
commencement of the action or where there is substantial identity.
Finally, the action to annul the judicial sale filed by herein private respondents is not the reinvindicatory suit, much less the
third party claim contemplated by Section 17 of Rule 39.
WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari is hereby granted and the questioned orders dated February 25, 1985, May 19, 1989
and February 26, 1990 issued in Civil Case No. 51203 are hereby annulled; further respondent judge is ordered to dismiss Civil
Case No. 51203.12
From this ruling, herein respondents appealed to the Supreme Court. In Suarez v. Court of Appeals, 13 we reversed the appellate
court, thus:
Even without touching on the incidents and issues raised by both petitioner [herein respondents] and private respondents
[petitioner Valente, Violeta, Virginia and Maria Concepcion] and the developments subsequent to the filing of the complaint,
[w]e cannot but notice the glaring error committed by the trial court.
It would be useless to discuss the procedural issue on the validity of the execution and the manner of publicly selling en masse
the subject properties for auction. To start with, only one-half of the 5 parcels of land [subject properties] should have been the
subject of the auction sale.
The law in point is Article 777 of the Civil Code, the law applicable at the time of the institution of the case:
The rights to the succession are transmitted from the moment of the death of the decedent."

23
Article 888 further provides:
"The legitime of the legitimate children and descendants consists of one-half of the hereditary estate of the father and of the
mother.
The latter may freely dispose of the remaining half, subject to the rights of illegitimate children and of the surviving spouse as
hereinafter provided."
Article 892, par. 2 likewise provides:
"If there are two or more legitimate children or descendants, the surviving spouse shall be entitled to a portion equal to the
legitime of each of the legitimate children or descendants."
Thus, from the foregoing, the legitime of the surviving spouse is equal to the legitime of each child.
The proprietary interest of petitioners [herein respondents] in the levied and auctioned property is different from and adverse
to that of their mother [Teofista]. Petitioners [herein respondents] became co-owners of the property not because of their
mother [Teofista] but through their own right as children of their deceased father [Marcelo Sr.]. Therefore, petitioners [herein
respondents] are not barred in any way from instituting the action to annul the auction sale to protect their own interest.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals dated July 27, 1990 as well as its Resolution of August 28, 1990 are hereby
REVERSED and set aside; and Civil Case No. 51203 is reinstated only to determine that portion which belongs to petitioners and
to annul the sale with regard to said portion.
It was at this point when another series of events transpired, culminating in the present petition.
Upon our reinstatement of Civil Case No. 51203, each and every pleading filed by herein respondents, as plaintiffs therein, was
hotly contested and opposed by therein defendants, including petitioner Valente. Moreover, even at that stage, when the case
had been remanded with a directive to "determine that portion which belongs to [herein respondents] and to annul the sale
with regard to said portion," Civil Case No. 51203 had to be re-raffled and transferred, for varied reasons, to the different court
branches in Pasig City. In between all these, petitioner Valente, along with the other defendants, repeatedly filed a Motion to
Dismiss Civil Case No. 51203 for the purported failure of herein respondents to prosecute the case. Most of these Motions to
Dismiss were denied.
With each transfer of Civil Case No. 51203, the judge to which the case was raffled had to study the records anew. Expectedly,
part of the records went missing and were lost. On April 12, 1993, the Clerk of Court of RTC, Branch 71, to which Civil Case No.
51203 was remanded, filed a report on the records of the case, to wit:
1. The first volume of the record in the above-entitled case was recorded as received on June 20, 1990, by Sheriff Alejandro O.
Loquinario;
2. That the staff of Branch 71 at this time was sharing a small room with Branch 161 at the First Floor of the Justice Hall, and as
the Branch was newly formed, it had no equipment or furniture of its own, and was still undermanned;
3. That sometime in August 1990, Branch 71 moved to the staffroom of Branch 159 at the Second Floor of the Justice Hall;
4. That on October 25, 1990, this Court received a Notice of Judgment dated October 22, 1990 from the Court of Appeals that
ruled the dismissal of the above-entitled case, and as per standing instructions of Judge Graduacion A. Reyes-Claravall, the
same was bound as volume 2 of the case;
5. That just before the Christmas vacation in 1991, the branch was forced to hastily move all of its records and equipment to
branch 69, because of the unexpected notice we received that the room we were occupying was to be demolished in order to
meet the schedule for the renovation of the building;
6. That unfortunately, the room was demolished before the undersigned could make a last check to see if everything was
transferred;
7. That it was only later on that this office discovered that important documents were indeed lost, including transcripts of
stenographic notes in a case that was submitted for decision;
8. That sometime in May 1992, the branch moved its Office to its present location;
9. That on March 8, 1993, this Court received a copy of a Decision of the Supreme Court reversing the earlier ruling of the Court
of Appeals;
10. That it was at this time that the first volume of this case, which was bundled along with other cases which were decided
and/or archived, was reported as missing;

24
11. That from the time the same was found to be missing, Judge Claravall ordered that a search for the same be made in all of
the offices wherein this branch was forced to share a room with, as well as the Court of Appeals, in the event that the same was
transmitted to said Court;
12. That all the efforts were in vain, as said record could not be located anywhere;
13. That the undersigned now concludes that the first volume of the above-entitled case was probably lost during the
renovation of the Justice Hall Building, and will have to be reconstituted with the use of documents in the possession of the
parties, or documents entered as exhibits in other Courts.14
In this regard, herein respondents filed a Motion for Reconstitution of Records15 of the case. Initially, petitioner Valente, and
the other defendants -- Violeta, Virginia and Maria Concepcion -- opposed the motion.16 However, the trial court eventually
granted the motion for reconstitution, and ordered petitioner Valente and the other defendants to submit a copy of their
Answer filed thereat and copies of other pleadings pertinent to the case.17
Thereafter, three (3) incidents, among numerous others, set off by the parties' pleadings, are worth mentioning, to wit:
1. A Motion for Leave to File and Admit Supplemental Complaint18 filed by herein respondents. The Supplemental Complaint
additionally prayed that the levy and sale at public auction of the subject properties be annulled and set aside, as the bid price
was unconscionable and grossly inadequate to the current value of the subject properties. The Supplemental Complaint further
sought a re-bidding with respect to Teofista's share in the subject properties. Finally, it prayed that TCT No. 6509 in the name of
petitioner Valente, Violeta, Virginia and Maria Concepcion be cancelled and TCT No. 30680 in the name of Marcelo Suarez,
married to Teofista Isagon, be reinstated.
2. A Manifestation and Motion (to Execute/Enforce Decision dated September 4, 1992 of the Supreme Court) 19 filed by herein
respondents pointing out that the Supreme Court itself had noted the current increased value of the subject properties and
that petitioner Valente, Violeta, Virginia and Maria Concepcion unjustly enriched themselves in appropriating the subject
properties worth millions then, for a measly bid price of P94,170.00, for a judgment obligation worth only P70,000.00.
3. An Urgent Motion [to direct compliance by plaintiffs (herein respondents) with Supreme Court Decision or to consider the
matter submitted without evidence on the part of plaintiffs]20 filed by therein defendants, including herein petitioner Valente,
pointing out that plaintiffs (herein respondents) have yet to comply with the RTC, Branch 67 Order commanding them to
submit (to the RTC) any evidence showing settlement of the estate of the deceased Marcelo Suarez, in order for the court to
determine the portion in the estate which belongs to Teofista. The Urgent Motion stated in paragraph 2, thus:
2. The defendants [including herein petitioner Valente] did everything possible to expedite the disposition of this case while the
plaintiffs [herein respondents] did everything possible to DELAY the disposition of the same obviously because the plaintiffs
[herein respondents] are in full possession and enjoyment of the property in dispute. In its decision of September 4, 1992, the
SUPREME COURT nullified TWO final and executory DECISIONS of the Court of Appeals in an unprecedented action. In said
decision, the Supreme Court ordered the plaintiffs [herein respondents] to establish with evidence their personality as heirs of
Marcelo Suarez, and after being able to do so, to adduce evidence that would determine what portion belongs to plaintiffs
hence the above matters need be litigated upon before the RTC can "annul the sale with regard to said portion" (belonging to
the plaintiffs alleged heirs).
On these incidents, the records reveal the following Orders issued by the different branches of the RTC:
1. Order dated March 17, 1995, issued by Presiding Judge Rodrigo B. Lorenzo of Branch 266, Pasig City, admitting herein
respondents' Supplemental Complaint.21
2. Order dated January 22, 1996, issued by Judge Apolinario B. Santos resolving: (a) herein respondents' Manifestation and
Motion (to execute/enforce Decision dated September 4, 1992 of the Supreme Court), and (b) therein defendants' (including
herein petitioner Valente's) Request for Answer to Written Interrogatories.22 The RTC, Branch 67, resolved the incidents, thus:
From the foregoing uncontroverted facts, this Court is convinced beyond a shadow of doubt that the Decision of the Supreme
Court of September 4, 1992, being the final arbiter in any judicial dispute, should be implemented for the following reasons:
xxxx
On the request for Answers to Written Interrogatories filed by the defendants, it is obvious that at this stage of the proceedings
where the Supreme Court had already pronounced the undisputed facts, which binds this court, the answer sought to be
elicited through written interrogatories, therefore, are entirely irrelevant, aside from having been filed way out of time.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, this court, implements the decision of the Supreme Court dated September 4, 1992 which
mandates that:

25
"xxx and Civil Case No. 51203 is reinstated only to determine that portion which belongs to petitioner and to annul the sale
with regard to said portion."
In order to enforce such mandate of the Supreme Court, this court orders that:
a. The auction sale of the five (5) parcels of land and all prior and subsequent proceedings in relation thereto are declared null
and void.
b. Transfer Certificate of Title No. 6509 in the name of defendant Valente Raymundo is also declared null and void, and the
Register of Deeds of Rizal, Pasig City, is ordered to issue a new one in the name of the deceased Marcelo Suarez or to reinstate
Transfer Certificate of Title No. 30680 in the name of Marcelo Suarez.
c. Teofista Suarez is ordered to reimburse the amount of P94,170.00, plus legal interest from the date of issuance of this order,
and failing which, the portion of the estate of Marcelo Suarez belonging to the surviving spouse, Teofista Suarez, may be levied
on execution.
d. [Herein respondents], including Teofista Suarez, are hereby ordered to submit to this court any evidence showing settlement
of the estate of the deceased, Marcelo Suarez, in order for this court to determine the portion in the estate which belongs to
Teofista Suarez.
Therein defendants, including petitioner Valente, filed a Motion for Reconsideration which the trial court denied on May 29,
1996.
3. Order dated September 10, 1996, issued by Judge Santos denying the appeal interposed by petitioner Valente from the
January 22, 1996 and May 29, 1996 Orders, ruling that these are interlocutory orders, and, therefore, not appealable. 23
4. Order dated April 8, 1999, issued by Pairing Judge Santiago Estrella which declared, thus:
Considering that counsel for the plaintiffs does not have the birth certificates of the heirs of the plaintiff to prove their
affiliation with the deceased which is one of the matters written in the decision of the higher court which must be complied
with, and in order for counsel for the plaintiffs [herein respondents] to have the opportunity to complete all documentary
evidence and in view of abbreviating the proceedings and as prayed for, today's scheduled pre-trial is re-set for the last time to
May 19, 1999 at 8:30 a.m.
In this connection, counsel for plaintiffs [herein respondents] is advised to secure all the documentary evidence she needs
material to this case which will expedite the disposition of this case.24
This last Order and therein defendants' Urgent Motion spawned another contentious issue between the parties. In this
connection, Judge Estrella issued an Order25 requiring the parties to file their respective position papers due to the "divergent
views on the nature of the hearing that should be conducted in compliance with" our decision in Suarez. Both parties duly filed
their position papers, with herein respondents attaching thereto a copy of the Extrajudicial Settlement of Estate executed by
the heirs of Marcelo Suarez in 1957.
In resolving this latest crossfire between the parties, the RTC, Branch 67, issued an Order dated January 11, 2000, which reads,
in part:
This Court is of the view that the Honorable Supreme Court is not a trier of facts, precisely it directed that the records of this
case be remanded to the Regional Trial Court for further proceedings.
xxxx
It is a matter of record that there was no trial on the merits completed in the Regional Trial Court. xxx The Supreme Court
reversed the judgment of the Court of Appeals and ordered the reinstatement of Civil Case No. 51203. Naturally, there was no
trial on the merits before this Court that allowed the parties to adduce evidence to establish their respective claims in the
plaintiffs' [herein respondents] complaint and in the defendants' [including petitioner Valente] counter-claim, respectively. It is
in this context that the Honorable Supreme Court reinstated the "action [of herein respondents] to annul the auction sale to
protect their [herein respondents] own interest.
While this Court is of the view that trial on the merits is necessary for the purpose of giving the plaintiffs [herein respondents] a
chance to adduce evidence to sustain their complaint and the defendants [including petitioner Valente] to prove their defense,
consistent with the directive of the Honorable Supreme Court (in its Decision promulgated on September 4, 1992), the Court is,
however, confronted with the very recent decision of the Honorable Supreme Court in "Heirs of Guido Yaptinchay, et al. vs. Del
Rosario, et al., G.R. No. 124320, March 2, 1999" where it held that -
The declaration of heirship must be made in an administration proceeding, and not in an independent civil action. This doctrine
was reiterated in Solve vs. Court of Appeals (182 SCRA 119, 128). The trial court cannot make a declaration of heirship in the

26
civil action for the reason that such a declaration can only be made in a special proceeding. Under Section 3, Rule 1 of the 1997
Revised Rules of Court, a civil action is defined as "one by which a party sues another for the enforcement or protection of a
right, or the prevention or redress of a wrong" while a special proceeding is "a remedy by which a party seeks to establish a
status, a right, or a particular fact." It is then decisively clear that the declaration of heirship can be made only in a special
proceeding inasmuch as the petitioners here are seeking the establishment of a status or right.
In as much as the leading case on the matter is that of "Heirs of Yaptinchay v. Del Rosario, G.R. No. 124320, March 2, 1999" it is
left with no choice but to obey said latter doctrine.
WHEREFORE, the foregoing premises considered, this Court holds that in the light of the doctrine laid down in the case of "Heirs
of Yaptinchay vs. Del Rosario, G.R. No. 124320, March 2, 1999" this case is dismissed without prejudice to the plaintiffs' [herein
respondents'] filing a special proceeding consistent with said latest ruling.26
Herein respondents moved for reconsideration thereof which, however, was denied by the RTC, Branch 67 on March 14,
2000.27
Consequently, herein respondents filed a petition for certiorari before the CA alleging grave abuse of discretion in the trial
court's order dismissing Civil Case No. 51203 without prejudice. All the defendants in the trial court were impleaded as private
respondents in the petition. Yet, curiously, only petitioner Valente filed a Comment thereto. The appellate court granted the
petition, recalled and set aside RTC, Branch 67's Orders dated January 11, 2000 and March 14, 2000, and reinstated Judge
Santos' Orders dated May 29, 1996 and September 6, 1996. It disposed of the petition, thus:
We agree with [herein respondents].
On September 4, 1992, the Supreme Court (G.R. No. 94918) reversed the decision of the Court of Appeals and mandates that
Civil Case No. 51203 be reinstated in order to determine the portion in the estate which belongs to Teofista Suarez. The sale of
the parcels of land was declared null and void. Necessarily, the title (TCT No. 5809) in the name of respondents was also
declared null and void. xxx
xxxx
Hon. Apolinario Santos of Br. 67, Regional Trial Court, Pasig City, on January 22, 1996 and on motion of [herein respondents],
issued an order to execute/enforce the decision of the Supreme Court xxx.
xxxx
[Petitioner Valente, Violeta, Virginia and Maria Concepcion] filed a notice of appeal on the order of Judge Santos. The appeal,
on motion of [herein respondents] was denied on September 10, 1996. Obviously, the decision of the Supreme Court had
become final and executory. Likewise, both orders of Judge Santos dated May 29, 1996 denying the motion for reconsideration
and the denial of the notice of appeal dated September 6, 1996 had also become final and executory.
The denial of petitioner Valente's Motion for Reconsideration prompted the filing of this present petition for certiorari.
Petitioner Valente posits that the appellate court committed grave abuse of discretion in recalling and setting aside the Orders
of Judge Estrella and reinstating those of Judge Santos because:
1. The CA ruled that the Orders dated May 29, 1996 and September 6, 1996 issued by Judge Santos were final and executory,
and yet the latter did not allow an appeal to be taken therefrom ratiocinating that the questioned orders were interlocutory,
and therefore, not appealable; and
2. The CA ignored and violated the Supreme Court's ruling in Heirs of Yaptinchay v. Del Rosario 28 which held that a declaration
of heirship must be made in a special proceeding and not in a civil action.
We find the petition bereft of merit.
At the outset, we note that petitioner Valente incorrectly filed a petition for certiorari to appeal the CA decision. Petitioner
should have filed a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. Simply imputing in a petition that the
decision sought to be reviewed is tainted with grave abuse of discretion does not magically transform a petition into a special
civil action for certiorari. The CA decision disposed of the merits of a special civil action, an original petition, filed thereat by
herein respondents. That disposition is a final and executory order, appealable to, and may be questioned before, this Court by
persons aggrieved thereby, such as petitioner Valente, via Rule 45.
On this score alone, the petition should have been dismissed outright. However, we have disregarded this procedural flaw and
now resolve this case based on the merits or lack thereof.

27
Petitioner asseverates that the assailed CA ruling "is unfair and it amounts to a trickery to prevent an appeal against a final
order by claiming that the appealed order is merely interlocutory and later maintain that the same order has become final after
declaring it to be interlocutory."
We reject petitioner's paltry contention. Petitioner apparently does not comprehend the distinction between an interlocutory
order which is final and executory, and a final order which disposes of the controversy or case; much less, understand the
available remedies therefrom.
We have defined an interlocutory order as referring to something between the commencement and the end of the suit which
decides some point or matter but it is not the final decision on the whole controversy.29 It does not terminate or finally dismiss
or finally dispose of the case, but leaves something to be done by the court before the case is finally decided on the merits.30
Upon the other hand, a final order is one which leaves to the court nothing more to do to resolve the case. 31
On more than one occasion, we laid down the test to ascertain whether an order is interlocutory or final i.e., "Does it leave
something to be done in the trial court with respect to the merits of the case?" If it does, it is interlocutory; if it does not, it is
final. The key test to what is interlocutory is when there is something more to be done on the merits of the case. 32 The Orders
dated May 29, 1996 and September 6, 1996 issued by Judge Santos are interlocutory, and therefore, not appealable, as they
leave something more to be done on the merits of the case. In fact, in paragraph (d) of Judge Santos' Order dated May 29,
1996, herein respondents were directed to submit evidence showing settlement of the estate of the deceased Marcelo Sr.
Contrary to petitioner Valente's stance, there is no trickery or chicanery in the CA's distinction between an interlocutory and a
final order. Indeed, as ruled by the CA, the RTC Order denying petitioner Valente's Notice of Appeal attained finality when he
failed to file a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.
We cannot overemphasize the rule that the correct identification of the nature of an assailed order determines the remedies
available to an aggrieved party. The old Rules of Court in Section 2, Rule 41 reads, thus:
SEC. 2. Judgments or orders subject to appeal.-Only final judgments or orders shall be subject to appeal. No interlocutory or
incidental judgment or order shall stay the progress of an action, nor shall it be the subject of appeal until final judgment or
order is rendered for one party or the other.
xxxx
With the advent of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, Section 1, Rule 41 now provides for the appropriate remedy to be taken
from an interlocutory order, thus:
SECTION 1. Subject of appeal. - An appeal may be taken from a judgment or final order that completely disposes of the case, or
of a particular matter therein when declared by these Rules to be appealable.
No appeal may be taken from:
xxx
(c) An interlocutory order;
xxx
In all the above instances where the judgment or final order is not appealable, the aggrieved party may file an appropriate
special civil action under Rule 65.
Clearly, the denial of therein defendants' (including petitioner Valente's) appeal from the Orders dated May 29, 1996 and
September 6, 1996 was in order. Thus, the CA decision affirming the RTC's denial was correct.
Further, on this crucial distinction as applied to this case, petitioner Valente filed a petition for certiorari from the CA decision in
CA-G.R. SP No. 58090, which is not an interlocutory order. It is a final order which completely disposed of the merits of the case
with nothing more left to be done therein. The correct and available remedy available to petitioner Valente was, as previously
discussed, a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.
In fine, petitioner Valente erroneously sought relief through reversed remedies. He tried to appeal the interlocutory orders of
the RTC which are unappealable. Thus, the RTC properly denied his Notice of Appeal, and the CA correctly upheld the RTC. He
should have filed a petition for certiorari; under Rule 65. On the other hand, from the final order of the CA, he comes before
this Court on a petition for certiorari under Rule 65, when the proper remedy is an appeal by certiorari under Rule 45.
In the recent case of Jan-Dec Construction Corporation v. Court of Appeals33 we ruled in this wise:
As a rule, the remedy from a judgment or final order of the CA is appeal via petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules.

28
Under Rule 45, decisions, final orders or resolutions of the CA in any case, i.e., regardless of the nature of the action or
proceedings involved, may be appealed to the Court by filing a petition for review, which would be but a continuation of the
appellate process over the original case. It seeks to correct errors of judgment committed by the court, tribunal, or officer. In
contrast, a special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 is an independent action based on the specific grounds therein
provided and proper only if there is no appeal or any plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. It is an
extraordinary process for the correction of errors of jurisdiction and cannot be availed of as a substitute for the lost remedy of
an ordinary appeal.
Independently of this procedural infirmity, even on the merits of the case, the petition does not fare otherwise. It must be
dismissed for lack of merit.
Petitioner Valente insists that, following our ruling in Heirs of Yaptinchay v. Del Rosario,34 herein respondents must first be
declared heirs of Marcelo Sr. before they can file an action to annul the judicial sale of what is, undisputedly, conjugal property
of Teofista and Marcelo Sr.
We disagree. Our ruling in Heirs of Yaptinchay is not applicable.
Herein respondents' status as legitimate children of Marcelo Sr. and Teofista ― and thus, Marcelo Sr.'s heirs ― has been firmly
established, and confirmed by this Court in Suarez v. Court of Appeals.35 True, this Court is not a trier of facts,36 but as the final
arbiter of disputes,37 we found and so ruled that herein respondents are children, and heirs of their deceased father, Marcelo
Sr. This having been settled, it should no longer have been a litigated issue when we ordered a remand to the lower court. In
short, petitioner Valente's, Violeta's, Virginia's, and Maria Concepcion's representation in the RTC that our ruling in Suarez
required herein respondents to present evidence of their affiliation with the deceased, Marcelo Sr., is wrong.
As was set forth in the dispositive portion of Suarez, "Civil Case No. 51203 is reinstated only to determine that portion which
belongs to [herein respondents] and to annul the sale with regard to said portion." There is clearly no intimation in our decision
for the RTC to have to determine an already settled issue i.e., herein respondents' status as heirs of Marcelo Sr.
Moreover, petitioner Valente cannot assail, directly or indirectly, the status of herein respondents as legitimate children of
Marcelo Sr. and Teofista, and likewise demand that herein respondents first prove their filiation to Marcelo Sr. The following
records bear out Marcelo, Sr.'s and Teofista's paternity of herein respondents, and the latter's status as legitimate children:
1. The CA decision in CA-G.R. SP Nos. 10646 to 10649 where Teofista, along with herein respondents, questioned the RTC,
Branch 151's Orders dated October 10, 1984 and October 14, 1986. Although the CA ruled against Teofista and herein
respondents, it explicitly recognized the latter's status as legitimate children of Teofista and Marcelo Sr.; and38
2. The CA decision in CA-G.R. SP No. 20320 which incorrectly ruled that herein respondents were, as children of Teofista, merely
successors-in-interest of the latter to the property and by virtue thereof, bound by the judgment in Civil Case Nos. 21376 to
21379 consistent with the doctrine of res judicata.39 We subsequently reversed this ruling on the wrong application of res
judicata in the conclusive case of Suarez. We retained and affirmed, however, the CA's factual finding of herein respondents'
status as heirs of Marcelo Sr. We categorically held therein that "the proprietary interest of [herein respondents] in the levied
and auctioned [properties] is different from and adverse to that of [Teofista]. [Herein respondents] became co-owners of the
property not because of [Teofista] but through their own right as children of their deceased father [, Marcelo Sr.]."
Clearly, herein respondents' long possessed status of legitimate children of Marcelo Sr. and Teofista cannot be indirectly or
directly attacked by petitioner Valente in an action to annul a judicial sale.
Articles 262,40 263,41 265 and 26642 of the Civil Code, the applicable law at the time of Marcelo's death, support the foregoing
conclusion, to wit:
Art. 262. The heirs of the husband may impugn the legitimacy of the child only in the following cases:
(1) If the husband should die before the expiration of the period fixed for bringing his action;
(2) If the husband should die after the filing of the complaint, without having desisted from the same;
(3) If the child was born after the death of the husband.
Art. 263. The action to impugn the legitimacy of the child shall be brought within one year from the recording of birth in the
Civil Register, if the husband should be in the same place, or in a proper case, any of his heirs.
If he or his heirs are absent, the period shall be eighteen months if they should reside in the Philippines; and two years if
abroad. If the birth of the child has been concealed, the term shall be counted from the discovery of the fraud.
Art. 265. The filiation of legitimate children is proved by the record of birth appearing in the Civil Register, or by an authentic
document or a final judgment.

29
Art. 266. In the absence of the titles indicated in the preceding article, the filiation shall be proved by the continuous possession
of status of a legitimate child.
In Heirs of Yaptinchay, the complaint for annulment and/or declaration of nullity of certain TCT's was dismissed for failure of
the petitioners to demonstrate "any proof or even a semblance of it" that they had been declared the legal heirs of the
deceased couple, the spouses Yaptinchay. In stark contrast, the records of this case reveal a document, an Extrajudicial
Settlement of Marcelo Sr.'s estate, which explicitly recognizes herein respondents as Marcelo Sr.'s legitimate children and heirs.
The same document settles and partitions the estate of Marcelo Sr. specifying Teofista's paraphernal properties, and separates
the properties she owns in common with her children, herein respondents. Plainly, there is no need to re-declare herein
respondents as heirs of Marcelo Sr., and prolong this case interminably.
Petitioner Valente, along with Violeta, Virginia and Maria Concepcion, became owners of the subject properties only by virtue
of an execution sale to recover Teofista's judgment obligation. This judgment obligation is solely Teofista's, and payment
therefor cannot be made through an execution sale of properties not absolutely owned by her. These properties were evidently
conjugal properties and were, in fact, even titled in the name of Marcelo, Sr. married to Teofista. Thus, upon Marcelo Sr.'s
death, by virtue of compulsory succession, Marcelo Sr.'s share in the conjugal partnership was transmitted by operation of law
to his compulsory heirs.
Compulsory succession is a distinct kind of succession, albeit not categorized as such in Article 77843 of the Civil Code. It
reserves a portion of the net estate of the decedent in favor of certain heirs, or group of heirs, or combination of heirs,
prevailing over all kinds of succession.44 The portion that is so reserved is the legitime. Article 886 of the Civil Code defines
legitime as "that part of the testator's property which he cannot dispose of because the law has reserved it for certain heirs
who are, therefore, called compulsory heirs." Herein respondents are primary compulsory heirs,45 excluding secondary
compulsory heirs,46 and preferred over concurring compulsory heirs in the distribution of the decedent's estate. 47
Even without delving into the Extrajudicial Settlement of Marcelo Sr.'s estate in 1957, it must be stressed that herein
respondents' rights to the succession vested from the moment of their father's death.48 Herein respondents' ownership of the
subject properties is no longer inchoate; it became absolute upon Marcelo's death, although their respective shares therein
remained pro indiviso. Ineluctably, at the time the subject properties were sold on execution sale to answer for Teofista's
judgment obligation, the inclusion of herein respondents' share therein was null and void.
In fine, Teofista's ownership over the subject properties is not absolute. Significantly, petitioner Valente does not even attempt
to dispute the conjugal nature of the subject properties. Since Teofista owns only a portion of the subject properties, only that
portion could have been, and was actually, levied upon and sold on auction by the provincial sheriff of Rizal. Thus, a separate
declaration of heirship by herein respondents is not necessary to annul the judicial sale of their share in the subject properties.
We note the recent case of Portugal v. Portugal-Beltran,49 where we scrutinized our rulings in Heirs of Yaptinchay and the cited
cases of Litam v. Rivera50 and Solivio v. Court of Appeals,51 and Guilas v. CFI Judge of Pampanga52 cited in Solivio. We ruled thus:
The common doctrine in Litam, Solivio and Guilas in which the adverse parties are putative heirs to the estate of a decedent or
parties to the special proceedings for its settlement is that if the special proceedings are pending, or if there are no special
proceedings filed but there is, under the circumstances of the case, a need to file one, then the determination of, among other
issues, heirship should be raised and settled in said special proceedings. Where special proceedings had been instituted but had
been finally closed and terminated, however, or if a putative heirs has lost the right to have himself declared in the special
proceedings as co-heir and he can no longer ask for its re-opening, then an ordinary civil action can be filed for his declaration
as heir in order to bring about the annulment of the partition or distribution or adjudication of a property or properties
belonging to the estate of the deceased.
In the case at bar, respondent, believing rightly or wrongly that she was the sole heir to Portugal's estate, executed on February
15, 1988 the questioned Affidavit of Adjudication under the second sentence of Rule 74, Section of the Revised Rules of Court.
Said rule is an exception to the general rule that when a person dies leaving property, it should be judicially administered and
the competent court should appoint a qualified administrator, in the order established in Sec. 6, Rule 78 in case the deceased
left no will, or in case he did, he failed to name an executor therein.
xxx
It appearing, however, that in the present case the only property of the intestate estate of Portugal is the Caloocan parcel of
land, to still subject it, under the circumstances of the case, to a special proceeding which could be long, hence, not
expeditious, just to establish the status of petitioners as heirs is not only impractical; it is burdensome to the estate with the
costs and expenses of an administration proceedings. And it is superfluous in light of the fact that the parties to the civil case-
subject of the present case, could and had already in fact presented evidence before the trial court which assumed jurisdiction
over the case upon the issues it defined during pre-trial.

30
In fine, under the circumstances of the present case, there being no compelling reason to still subject Portugal's estate to
administration proceedings since a determination of petitioners' status as heirs could be achieved in the civil case filed by
petitioners xxx.53
All told, under the circumstances, in addition to the already settled status of herein respondents as heirs of Marcelo Sr., there is
no need to dismiss Civil Case No. 51203 and require herein respondents to institute a separate special proceeding for a
declaration of their heirship.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is DENIED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 58090 is
AFFIRMED. The Orders dated May 29, 1996 and September 6, 1996 issued by Judge Santos are REINSTATED. Costs against the
petitioner.
SO ORDERED.

31
[G.R. No. 172248. September 17, 2008.]
DEVELOPMENT BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. ELLA GAGARANI, ISAGANI, ADRIAN, NATHANIEL, NIEVA,
JONATHAN, DIONESIO, FLORENCE and JEREMIAS, all surnamed ASOK, respondents.
RESOLUTION
CORONA, J p:
This is a petition for review on certiorari 1 of the December 14, 2005 decision 2 and March 28, 2006 resolution 3 of the Court of
Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 64259. aAHDIc
The spouses Dionesio and Matea S. Asok owned several parcels of land. Upon their death on September 14, 1973 and February
22, 1982, respectively, their eleven children inherited the properties. One of the lands inherited was a lot covered by Original
Certificate of Title (OCT) No. P-4272, a free patent issued on July 19, 1967, located at Pagawan, Manticao, Misamis Oriental with
an area of 39,552 sq. m. 4
Pursuant to the extrajudicial settlement of the estate with quitclaim executed by the spouses' children, the subject property
was inherited by Denison Asok (Asok). As a result, OCT No. P-4272 was cancelled and Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T-
9626 was issued and registered in his name on November 17, 1987. 5
On August 31, 1989, Asok and his wife, respondent Ella Gagarani Asok, borrowed P100,000 from petitioner Development Bank
of the Philippines, a government financial institution created and operating under EO 81, 6 as amended by RA 8523. They
mortgaged the subject lot as collateral to guarantee payment of the loan. On due date, however, they failed to pay the loan and
the mortgage was extrajudicially foreclosed pursuant to Act 3135. 7 Petitioner emerged as the highest bidder with a bid of
P163,297. 8
On November 28, 1991, a certificate of sale was issued in favor of petitioner. This was registered on December 24, 1992. 9 On
March 25, 1998, petitioner's ownership over the property was consolidated and TCT No. T-27172 was issued in its name. 10
Meanwhile, Asok died on October 24, 1993 and was succeeded by his surviving spouse and children (respondents). 11
On May 15, 1998, respondents filed a complaint for repurchase against petitioner in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Initao,
Misamis Oriental, Branch 44, docketed as Civil Case No. 98-68. On July 3, 1998, they filed an amended complaint on learning
that TCT No. T-9626 had been cancelled by TCT No. T-27172 issued in the name of petitioner. They invoked their right to
repurchase the property under Sec. 119 of CA 141, as amended: 12
Sec. 119. Every conveyance of land acquired under the free patent or homestead provisions, when proper, shall be subject to
repurchase by the applicant, his widow, or legal heirs, within a period of five years from date of the conveyance.
In a decision dated January 7, 1999, the RTC dismissed the complaint. Reconsideration was denied on February 3, 1999. 13 It
ruled that the one-year period for redemption should be reckoned from the date of sale, i.e., November 28, 1991. Then the
five-year period provided under Sec. 119 of CA 141 should be counted from the expiration of the redemption period, i.e.,
November 28, 1992. Therefore, respondents had until November 28, 1997 to exercise their right to repurchase. However, the
complaint was filed on May 15, 1998 which was beyond the prescribed period. 14
Aggrieved, respondents appealed to the CA. In a decision dated December 14, 2005, the CA reversed and set aside the RTC
decision. Reconsideration was denied in a resolution dated March 28, 2006. It held that the period of redemption started from
the date of registration of the certificate of sale, i.e., December 24, 1992, and not from the date of sale. Thus, respondents had
until December 24, 1998 to repurchase the property and the complaint was seasonably filed. 15 ESaITA
Hence this petition.
Petitioner raises the following issues: (1) whether Sec. 119 of CA 141 is applicable in this case; (2) whether respondents are the
legal heirs of the patentees and (3) whether the right to repurchase has already prescribed.
The petition lacks merit.
Petitioner contends that respondents cannot claim the right under Sec. 119 which covers homesteads and free patents because
the free patent issued to Asok's parents had already been cancelled and a new TCT had in fact been issued to him. Thus, the
property mortgaged to it was no longer covered by a free patent but by a TCT. 16
This contention deserves scant consideration.
The plain intent of Sec. 119 is to give the homesteader or patentee every chance to preserve and keep in the family the land
that the State has gratuitously given him as a reward for his labor in cleaning, developing and cultivating it. 17 Hence, the fact
that the land had been inherited by the patentees' son (and a new title in his name issued) does not bring it outside the

32
purview of Sec. 119. In fact, the policy behind the law is fulfilled because the land remains in the family of the patentee. As we
explained in Ferrer v. Mangente: 18
The applicant for a homestead is to be given all the inducement that the law offers and is entitled to its full protection. Its
blessings, however, do not stop with him. This is particularly so in this case as the appellee is the son of the deceased. There is
no question then as to his status of being a legal heir. The policy of the law is not difficult to understand. The incentive for a
pioneer to venture into developing virgin land becomes more attractive if he is assured that his effort will not go for naught
should perchance his life be cut short. This is merely a recognition of how closely bound parents and children are in a Filipino
family. Logic, the sense of fitness and of right, as well as pragmatic considerations thus call for continued adherence to the
policy that not the individual applicant alone but those so closely related to him as are entitled to legal succession may take full
advantage of the benefits the law confers. 19
Having ruled that Sec. 119 is applicable to this case, we now go to the next issue: are respondents the "legal heirs"
contemplated in the provision?
Petitioner argues that respondents are not the legal heirs of the patentees because respondents are merely their daughter-in-
law and grandchildren.
We disagree. In line with the rationale behind Sec. 119, we reject a restricted definition of legal heirs. It is used in a broad sense
and the law makes no distinctions. 20 In Madarcos v. de la Merced, 21 we held that:
The term "legal heirs" is used in Section 119 in a generic sense. It is broad enough to cover any person who is called to the
succession either by provision of a will or by operation of law. Thus, legal heirs include both testate and intestate heirs
depending upon whether succession is by the will of the testator or by law. Legal heirs are not necessarily compulsory heirs but
they may be so if the law reserves a legitime for them. EHCcIT
xxx xxx xxx
Verily, petitioners are legal heirs. Having been decreed under the rules on intestacy as entitled to succeed to the estate of the
Catain spouses due to the absence of compulsory heirs, they now step into the shoes of the decedents. They should be
considered as among the legal heirs contemplated by Section 119 as entitled to redeem the homestead.
The above interpretation of "legal heirs" as contra-distinguished from the restrictive construction given it by the lower court is
more in keeping with the salutary purpose behind the enactment of Section 119 and the jurisprudence laid down on the
matter. Indeed, it is not far-fetched to arrive at a more liberal conclusion if the section is analyzed in accordance with its
purpose . . . 22
Respondents inherited the property from Asok, their husband and father, who in turn inherited it from his parents. Respondent
Ella Gagarani Asok, as daughter-in-law of the patentees, can be considered as among the legal heirs who can repurchase the
land in accordance with Salenillas v. CA. 23 In that case, we allowed the daughter and son-in-law of the patentees to repurchase
the property because this would be "more in keeping with the spirit of the law. We have time and again said that between two
statutory interpretations, that which better serves the purpose of the law should prevail". 24 Furthermore, the law must be
liberally construed in order to carry out its purpose. 25
Finally, petitioner asserts that even if respondents could be considered as being entitled to the right under Sec. 119, this had
already prescribed because the period should be counted from the date of conveyance which means the date of sale and not
the date of registration of the certificate of sale.
This argument lacks merit.
This is far from a novel issue. It was already resolved in Rural Bank of Davao City, Inc. v. CA: 26
Thus, the rules on redemption in the case of an extrajudicial foreclosure of land acquired under free patent or homestead
statutes may be summarized as follows: . . . If the land is mortgaged to parties other than rural banks, the mortgagor may
redeem the property within one (1) year from the registration of the certificate of sale pursuant to Act No. 3135. If he fails to
do so, he or his heirs may repurchase the property within five (5) years from the expiration of the redemption period also
pursuant to Section 119 of the Public Land Act. 27 HTcADC
There is no dispute that in extrajudicial foreclosures under Act 3135, the debtor or his or her successors-in-interest may redeem
the property within one year. This redemption period should be reckoned from the date of registration of the certificate of sale.
28 The five-year period fixed in Sec. 119 begins to run from the expiration of the one-year redemption period. 29 Here, the
certificate of sale was registered on December 24, 1992 and the one-year redemption period expired on December 24, 1993.
Reckoned from that day, respondents had a five-year period, or until December 24, 1998, to exercise their right to repurchase
under Sec. 119 of CA 141. Consequently, the CA was correct in holding that the complaint filed on May 15, 1998 was on time.

33
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED. Petitioner Development Bank of the Philippines is ordered to execute a deed of
reconveyance in favor of respondents upon payment by the latter of the redemption price. aETADI
No costs.
SO ORDERED.

34
G.R. No. 145545 June 30, 2008
PAZ SAMANIEGO-CELADA, petitioner,
vs.
LUCIA D. ABENA, respondent.
DECISION
QUISUMBING, J.:
This is a petition for review under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure seeking to reverse the Decision 1 dated October
13, 2000 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 41756, which affirmed the Decision2 dated March 2, 1993 of the Regional
Trial Court (RTC), Branch 66, Makati City. The RTC had declared the last will and testament of Margarita S. Mayores probated
and designated respondent Lucia D. Abena as the executor of her will. It also ordered the issuance of letters testamentary in
favor of respondent.
The facts are as follows:
Petitioner Paz Samaniego-Celada was the first cousin of decedent Margarita S. Mayores (Margarita) while respondent was the
decedent’s lifelong companion since 1929.
On April 27, 1987, Margarita died single and without any ascending nor descending heirs as her parents, grandparents and
siblings predeceased her. She was survived by her first cousins Catalina Samaniego-Bombay, Manuelita Samaniego Sajonia,
Feliza Samaniego, and petitioner.
Before her death, Margarita executed a Last Will and Testament3 on February 2, 1987 where she bequeathed one-half of her
undivided share of a real property located at Singalong Manila, consisting of 209.8 square meters, and covered by Transfer
Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 1343 to respondent, Norma A. Pahingalo, and Florentino M. Abena in equal shares or one-third
portion each. She likewise bequeathed one-half of her undivided share of a real property located at San Antonio Village,
Makati, consisting of 225 square meters, and covered by TCT No. 68920 to respondent, Isabelo M. Abena, and Amanda M.
Abena in equal shares or one-third portion each. Margarita also left all her personal properties to respondent whom she
likewise designated as sole executor of her will.
On August 11, 1987, petitioner filed a petition for letters of administration of the estate of Margarita before the RTC of Makati.
The case was docketed as SP Proc. No. M-1531.
On October 27, 1987, respondent filed a petition for probate of the will of Margarita before the RTC of Makati. The case was
docketed as SP Proc. No. M-1607 and consolidated with SP Proc. No. M-1531.
On March 2, 1993, the RTC rendered a decision declaring the last will and testament of Margarita probated and respondent as
the executor of the will. The dispositive portion of the decision states:
In view of the foregoing, judgment is hereby rendered:
1) declaring the will as probated;
2) declaring Lucia Abena as the executor of the will who will serve as such without a bond as stated in paragraph VI of the
probated will;
3) ordering the issuance of letters testamentary in favor of Lucia Abena.
So ordered.4
Petitioner appealed the RTC decision to the Court of Appeals. But the Court of Appeals, in a decision dated October 13, 2000,
affirmed in toto the RTC ruling. The dispositive portion of the Court of Appeals’ decision states:
WHEREFORE, foregoing premises considered, the appeal having no merit in fact and in law, is hereby ORDERED DISMISSED and
the appealed Decision of the trial court AFFIRMED IN TOTO, with cost to oppositors-appellants.
SO ORDERED.5
Hence, the instant petition citing the following issues:
I.
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED A REVERSIBLE ERROR IN NOT INVALIDATING THE WILL SINCE IT DID
NOT CONFORM TO THE FORMALITIES REQUIRED BY LAW;
II.

35
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED ERROR IN NOT INVALIDATING THE WILL BECAUSE IT WAS PROCURED
THROUGH UNDUE INFLUENCE AND PRESSURE[;] AND
III.
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN NOT DECLARING PETITIONER, HER SIBLINGS AND COUSIN AS
THE LEGAL HEIRS OF MARGARITA S. MAYORES AND IN NOT ISSUING LETTERS OF ADMINISTRATION TO HER. 6
Briefly stated, the issues are (1) whether the Court of Appeals erred in not declaring the will invalid for failure to comply with
the formalities required by law, (2) whether said court erred in not declaring the will invalid because it was procured through
undue influence and pressure, and (3) whether it erred in not declaring petitioner and her siblings as the legal heirs of
Margarita, and in not issuing letters of administration to petitioner.
Petitioner, in her Memorandum,7 argues that Margarita’s will failed to comply with the formalities required under Article 8058
of the Civil Code because the will was not signed by the testator in the presence of the instrumental witnesses and in the
presence of one another. She also argues that the signatures of the testator on pages A, B, and C of the will are not the same or
similar, indicating that they were not signed on the same day. She further argues that the will was procured through undue
influence and pressure because at the time of execution of the will, Margarita was weak, sickly, jobless and entirely dependent
upon respondent and her nephews for support, and these alleged handicaps allegedly affected her freedom and willpower to
decide on her own. Petitioner thus concludes that Margarita’s total dependence on respondent and her nephews compelled
her to sign the will. Petitioner likewise argues that the Court of Appeals should have declared her and her siblings as the legal
heirs of Margarita since they are her only living collateral relatives in accordance with Articles 10099 and 101010 of the Civil
Code.
Respondent, for her part, argues in her Memorandum11 that the petition for review raises questions of fact, not of law and as a
rule, findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are final and conclusive and cannot be reviewed on appeal to the Supreme Court.
She also points out that although the Court of Appeals at the outset opined there was no compelling reason to review the
petition, the Court of Appeals proceeded to tackle the assigned errors and rule that the will was validly executed, sustaining the
findings of the trial court that the formalities required by law were duly complied with. The Court of Appeals also concurred
with the findings of the trial court that the testator, Margarita, was of sound mind when she executed the will.
After careful consideration of the parties’ contentions, we rule in favor of respondent.
We find that the issues raised by petitioner concern pure questions of fact, which may not be the subject of a petition for
review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Civil Procedure.
The issues that petitioner is raising now i.e., whether or not the will was signed by the testator in the presence of the witnesses
and of one another, whether or not the signatures of the witnesses on the pages of the will were signed on the same day, and
whether or not undue influence was exerted upon the testator which compelled her to sign the will, are all questions of fact.
This Court does not resolve questions of fact in a petition for review under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. Section
112 of Rule 45 limits this Court’s review to questions of law only.
Well-settled is the rule that the Supreme Court is not a trier of facts. When supported by substantial evidence, the findings of
fact of the Court of Appeals are conclusive and binding on the parties and are not reviewable by this Court, unless the case falls
under any of the following recognized exceptions:
(1) When the conclusion is a finding grounded entirely on speculation, surmises and conjectures;
(2) When the inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible;
(3) Where there is a grave abuse of discretion;
(4) When the judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts;
(5) When the findings of fact are conflicting;
(6) When the Court of Appeals, in making its findings, went beyond the issues of the case and the same is contrary to the
admissions of both appellant and appellee;
(7) When the findings are contrary to those of the trial court;
(8) When the findings of fact are conclusions without citation of specific evidence on which they are based;
(9) When the facts set forth in the petition as well as in the petitioners’ main and reply briefs are not disputed by the
respondents; and

36
(10) When the findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are premised on the supposed absence of evidence and contradicted by
the evidence on record.13
We find that this case does not involve any of the abovementioned exceptions.
Nonetheless, a review of the findings of the RTC as upheld by the Court of Appeals, reveal that petitioner’s arguments lack
basis. The RTC correctly held:
With [regard] to the contention of the oppositors [Paz Samaniego-Celada, et al.] that the testator [Margarita Mayores] was not
mentally capable of making a will at the time of the execution thereof, the same is without merit. The oppositors failed to
establish, by preponderance of evidence, said allegation and contradict the presumption that the testator was of sound mind
(See Article 800 of the Civil Code). In fact, witness for the oppositors, Dr. Ramon Lamberte, who, in some occasions, attended to
the testator months before her death, testified that Margarita Mayores could engage in a normal conversation and he even
stated that the illness of the testator does not warrant hospitalization…. Not one of the oppositor’s witnesses has mentioned
any instance that they observed act/s of the testator during her lifetime that could be construed as a manifestation of mental
incapacity. The testator may be admitted to be physically weak but it does not necessarily follow that she was not of sound
mind. [The] testimonies of contestant witnesses are pure aforethought.
Anent the contestants’ submission that the will is fatally defective for the reason that its attestation clause states that the will is
composed of three (3) pages while in truth and in fact, the will consists of two (2) pages only because the attestation is not a
part of the notarial will, the same is not accurate. While it is true that the attestation clause is not a part of the will, the court,
after examining the totality of the will, is of the considered opinion that error in the number of pages of the will as stated in the
attestation clause is not material to invalidate the subject will. It must be noted that the subject instrument is consecutively
lettered with pages A, B, and C which is a sufficient safeguard from the possibility of an omission of some of the pages. The
error must have been brought about by the honest belief that the will is the whole instrument consisting of three (3) pages
inclusive of the attestation clause and the acknowledgement. The position of the court is in consonance with the "doctrine of
liberal interpretation" enunciated in Article 809 of the Civil Code which reads:
"In the absence of bad faith, forgery or fraud, or undue [and] improper pressure and influence, defects and imperfections in
the form of attestation or in the language used therein shall not render the will invalid if it is proved that the will was in fact
executed and attested in substantial compliance with all the requirements of Article 805."
The court also rejects the contention of the oppositors that the signatures of the testator were affixed on different occasions
based on their observation that the signature on the first page is allegedly different in size, texture and appearance as
compared with the signatures in the succeeding pages. After examination of the signatures, the court does not share the same
observation as the oppositors. The picture (Exhibit "H-3") shows that the testator was affixing her signature in the presence of
the instrumental witnesses and the notary. There is no evidence to show that the first signature was procured earlier than
February 2, 1987.
Finally, the court finds that no pressure nor undue influence was exerted on the testator to execute the subject will. In fact, the
picture reveals that the testator was in a good mood and smiling with the other witnesses while executing the subject will (See
Exhibit "H").
In fine, the court finds that the testator was mentally capable of making the will at the time of its execution, that the notarial
will presented to the court is the same notarial will that was executed and that all the formal requirements (See Article 805 of
the Civil Code) in the execution of a will have been substantially complied with in the subject notarial will.14 (Emphasis
supplied.)
Thus, we find no reason to disturb the abovementioned findings of the RTC. Since, petitioner and her siblings are not
compulsory heirs of the decedent under Article 88715 of the Civil Code and as the decedent validly disposed of her properties in
a will duly executed and probated, petitioner has no legal right to claim any part of the decedent’s estate.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The assailed Decision dated October 13, 2000 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No.
41756 is AFFIRMED.
Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.

37
A.C. No. 5281 February 12, 2008
MANUEL L. LEE, petitioner,
vs.
ATTY. REGINO B. TAMBAGO, respondent.
RESOLUTION
CORONA, J.:
In a letter-complaint dated April 10, 2000, complainant Manuel L. Lee charged respondent Atty. Regino B. Tambago with
violation of the Notarial Law and the ethics of the legal profession for notarizing a spurious last will and testament.
In his complaint, complainant averred that his father, the decedent Vicente Lee, Sr., never executed the contested will.
Furthermore, the spurious will contained the forged signatures of Cayetano Noynay and Loreto Grajo, the purported witnesses
to its execution.
In the said will, the decedent supposedly bequeathed his entire estate to his wife Lim Hock Lee, save for a parcel of land which
he devised to Vicente Lee, Jr. and Elena Lee, half-siblings of complainant.
The will was purportedly executed and acknowledged before respondent on June 30, 1965.1 Complainant, however, pointed
out that the residence certificate2 of the testator noted in the acknowledgment of the will was dated January 5, 1962.3
Furthermore, the signature of the testator was not the same as his signature as donor in a deed of donation4 (containing his
purported genuine signature). Complainant averred that the signatures of his deceased father in the will and in the deed of
donation were "in any way (sic) entirely and diametrically opposed from (sic) one another in all angle[s]."5
Complainant also questioned the absence of notation of the residence certificates of the purported witnesses Noynay and
Grajo. He alleged that their signatures had likewise been forged and merely copied from their respective voters’ affidavits.
Complainant further asserted that no copy of such purported will was on file in the archives division of the Records
Management and Archives Office of the National Commission for Culture and the Arts (NCCA). In this connection, the
certification of the chief of the archives division dated September 19, 1999 stated:
Doc. 14, Page No. 4, Book No. 1, Series of 1965 refers to an AFFIDAVIT executed by BARTOLOME RAMIREZ on June 30, 1965 and
is available in this Office[’s] files.6
Respondent in his comment dated July 6, 2001 claimed that the complaint against him contained false allegations: (1) that
complainant was a son of the decedent Vicente Lee, Sr. and (2) that the will in question was fake and spurious. He alleged that
complainant was "not a legitimate son of Vicente Lee, Sr. and the last will and testament was validly executed and actually
notarized by respondent per affidavit7 of Gloria Nebato, common-law wife of Vicente Lee, Sr. and corroborated by the joint
affidavit8 of the children of Vicente Lee, Sr., namely Elena N. Lee and Vicente N. Lee, Jr. xxx."9
Respondent further stated that the complaint was filed simply to harass him because the criminal case filed by complainant
against him in the Office of the Ombudsman "did not prosper."
Respondent did not dispute complainant’s contention that no copy of the will was on file in the archives division of the NCCA.
He claimed that no copy of the contested will could be found there because none was filed.
Lastly, respondent pointed out that complainant had no valid cause of action against him as he (complainant) did not first file
an action for the declaration of nullity of the will and demand his share in the inheritance.
In a resolution dated October 17, 2001, the Court referred the case to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for
investigation, report and recommendation.10
In his report, the investigating commissioner found respondent guilty of violation of pertinent provisions of the old Notarial Law
as found in the Revised Administrative Code. The violation constituted an infringement of legal ethics, particularly Canon 1 11
and Rule 1.0112 of the Code of Professional Responsibility (CPR).13 Thus, the investigating commissioner of the IBP Commission
on Bar Discipline recommended the suspension of respondent for a period of three months.
The IBP Board of Governors, in its Resolution No. XVII-2006-285 dated May 26, 2006, resolved:
[T]o ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby ADOPTED and APPROVED, with modification, the Report and Recommendation of the
Investigating Commissioner of the above-entitled case, herein made part of this Resolution as Annex "A"; and, finding the
recommendation fully supported by the evidence on record and the applicable laws and rules, and considering Respondent’s
failure to comply with the laws in the discharge of his function as a notary public, Atty. Regino B. Tambago is hereby suspended
from the practice of law for one year and Respondent’s notarial commission is Revoked and Disqualified from reappointment
as Notary Public for two (2) years.14

38
We affirm with modification.
A will is an act whereby a person is permitted, with the formalities prescribed by law, to control to a certain degree the
disposition of his estate, to take effect after his death.15 A will may either be notarial or holographic.
The law provides for certain formalities that must be followed in the execution of wills. The object of solemnities surrounding
the execution of wills is to close the door on bad faith and fraud, to avoid substitution of wills and testaments and to guarantee
their truth and authenticity.16
A notarial will, as the contested will in this case, is required by law to be subscribed at the end thereof by the testator himself.
In addition, it should be attested and subscribed by three or more credible witnesses in the presence of the testator and of one
another.17
The will in question was attested by only two witnesses, Noynay and Grajo. On this circumstance alone, the will must be
considered void.18 This is in consonance with the rule that acts executed against the provisions of mandatory or prohibitory
laws shall be void, except when the law itself authorizes their validity.
The Civil Code likewise requires that a will must be acknowledged before a notary public by the testator and the witnesses. 19
The importance of this requirement is highlighted by the fact that it was segregated from the other requirements under Article
805 and embodied in a distinct and separate provision.20
An acknowledgment is the act of one who has executed a deed in going before some competent officer or court and declaring it
to be his act or deed. It involves an extra step undertaken whereby the signatory actually declares to the notary public that the
same is his or her own free act and deed.21 The acknowledgment in a notarial will has a two-fold purpose: (1) to safeguard the
testator’s wishes long after his demise and (2) to assure that his estate is administered in the manner that he intends it to be
done.
A cursory examination of the acknowledgment of the will in question shows that this particular requirement was neither strictly
nor substantially complied with. For one, there was the conspicuous absence of a notation of the residence certificates of the
notarial witnesses Noynay and Grajo in the acknowledgment. Similarly, the notation of the testator’s old residence certificate in
the same acknowledgment was a clear breach of the law. These omissions by respondent invalidated the will.
As the acknowledging officer of the contested will, respondent was required to faithfully observe the formalities of a will and
those of notarization. As we held in Santiago v. Rafanan:22
The Notarial Law is explicit on the obligations and duties of notaries public. They are required to certify that the party to every
document acknowledged before him had presented the proper residence certificate (or exemption from the residence tax); and
to enter its number, place of issue and date as part of such certification.
These formalities are mandatory and cannot be disregarded, considering the degree of importance and evidentiary weight
attached to notarized documents.23 A notary public, especially a lawyer,24 is bound to strictly observe these elementary
requirements.
The Notarial Law then in force required the exhibition of the residence certificate upon notarization of a document or
instrument:
Section 251. Requirement as to notation of payment of [cedula] residence tax. – Every contract, deed, or other document
acknowledged before a notary public shall have certified thereon that the parties thereto have presented their proper [cedula]
residence certificate or are exempt from the [cedula] residence tax, and there shall be entered by the notary public as a part of
such certificate the number, place of issue, and date of each [cedula] residence certificate as aforesaid.25
The importance of such act was further reiterated by Section 6 of the Residence Tax Act26 which stated:
When a person liable to the taxes prescribed in this Act acknowledges any document before a notary public xxx it shall be the
duty of such person xxx with whom such transaction is had or business done, to require the exhibition of the residence
certificate showing payment of the residence taxes by such person xxx.
In the issuance of a residence certificate, the law seeks to establish the true and correct identity of the person to whom it is
issued, as well as the payment of residence taxes for the current year. By having allowed decedent to exhibit an expired
residence certificate, respondent failed to comply with the requirements of both the old Notarial Law and the Residence Tax
Act. As much could be said of his failure to demand the exhibition of the residence certificates of Noynay and Grajo.
On the issue of whether respondent was under the legal obligation to furnish a copy of the notarized will to the archives
division, Article 806 provides:

39
Art. 806. Every will must be acknowledged before a notary public by the testator and the witness. The notary public shall not
be required to retain a copy of the will, or file another with the office of the Clerk of Court. (emphasis supplied)
Respondent’s failure, inadvertent or not, to file in the archives division a copy of the notarized will was therefore not a cause
for disciplinary action.
Nevertheless, respondent should be faulted for having failed to make the necessary entries pertaining to the will in his notarial
register. The old Notarial Law required the entry of the following matters in the notarial register, in chronological order:
1. nature of each instrument executed, sworn to, or acknowledged before him;
2. person executing, swearing to, or acknowledging the instrument;
3. witnesses, if any, to the signature;
4. date of execution, oath, or acknowledgment of the instrument;
5. fees collected by him for his services as notary;
6. give each entry a consecutive number; and
7. if the instrument is a contract, a brief description of the substance of the instrument.27
In an effort to prove that he had complied with the abovementioned rule, respondent contended that he had crossed out a
prior entry and entered instead the will of the decedent. As proof, he presented a photocopy of his notarial register. To
reinforce his claim, he presented a photocopy of a certification28 stating that the archives division had no copy of the affidavit
of Bartolome Ramirez.
A photocopy is a mere secondary evidence. It is not admissible unless it is shown that the original is unavailable. The proponent
must first prove the existence and cause of the unavailability of the original,29 otherwise, the evidence presented will not be
admitted. Thus, the photocopy of respondent’s notarial register was not admissible as evidence of the entry of the execution of
the will because it failed to comply with the requirements for the admissibility of secondary evidence.
In the same vein, respondent’s attempt to controvert the certification dated September 21, 199930 must fail. Not only did he
present a mere photocopy of the certification dated March 15, 2000;31 its contents did not squarely prove the fact of entry of
the contested will in his notarial register.
Notaries public must observe with utmost care32 and utmost fidelity the basic requirements in the performance of their duties,
otherwise, the confidence of the public in the integrity of notarized deeds will be undermined. 33
Defects in the observance of the solemnities prescribed by law render the entire will invalid. This carelessness cannot be taken
lightly in view of the importance and delicate nature of a will, considering that the testator and the witnesses, as in this case,
are no longer alive to identify the instrument and to confirm its contents.34 Accordingly, respondent must be held accountable
for his acts. The validity of the will was seriously compromised as a consequence of his breach of duty.35
In this connection, Section 249 of the old Notarial Law provided:
Grounds for revocation of commission. — The following derelictions of duty on the part of a notary public shall, in the
discretion of the proper judge of first instance, be sufficient ground for the revocation of his commission:
xxx xxx xxx
(b) The failure of the notary to make the proper entry or entries in his notarial register touching his notarial acts in the manner
required by law.
xxx xxx xxx
(f) The failure of the notary to make the proper notation regarding cedula certificates.36
These gross violations of the law also made respondent liable for violation of his oath as a lawyer and constituted
transgressions of Section 20 (a), Rule 138 of the Rules of Court37 and Canon 138 and Rule 1.0139 of the CPR.
The first and foremost duty of a lawyer is to maintain allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines, uphold the Constitution and
obey the laws of the land.40 For a lawyer is the servant of the law and belongs to a profession to which society has entrusted
the administration of law and the dispensation of justice.41
While the duty to uphold the Constitution and obey the law is an obligation imposed on every citizen, a lawyer assumes
responsibilities well beyond the basic requirements of good citizenship. As a servant of the law, a lawyer should moreover make

40
himself an example for others to emulate.42 Being a lawyer, he is supposed to be a model in the community in so far as respect
for the law is concerned.43
The practice of law is a privilege burdened with conditions.44 A breach of these conditions justifies disciplinary action against
the erring lawyer. A disciplinary sanction is imposed on a lawyer upon a finding or acknowledgment that he has engaged in
professional misconduct.45 These sanctions meted out to errant lawyers include disbarment, suspension and reprimand.
Disbarment is the most severe form of disciplinary sanction.46 We have held in a number of cases that the power to disbar must
be exercised with great caution47 and should not be decreed if any punishment less severe – such as reprimand, suspension, or
fine – will accomplish the end desired.48 The rule then is that disbarment is meted out only in clear cases of misconduct that
seriously affect the standing and character of the lawyer as an officer of the court.49
Respondent, as notary public, evidently failed in the performance of the elementary duties of his office. Contrary to his claims
that he "exercised his duties as Notary Public with due care and with due regard to the provision of existing law and had
complied with the elementary formalities in the performance of his duties xxx," we find that he acted very irresponsibly in
notarizing the will in question. Such recklessness warrants the less severe punishment of suspension from the practice of law. It
is, as well, a sufficient basis for the revocation of his commission50 and his perpetual disqualification to be commissioned as a
notary public.51
WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Regino B. Tambago is hereby found guilty of professional misconduct. He violated (1) the
Lawyer’s Oath; (2) Rule 138 of the Rules of Court; (3) Canon 1 and Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility; (4) Art.
806 of the Civil Code and (5) the provisions of the old Notarial Law.
Atty. Regino B. Tambago is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for one year and his notarial commission REVOKED.
Because he has not lived up to the trustworthiness expected of him as a notary public and as an officer of the court, he is
PERPETUALLY DISQUALIFIED from reappointment as a notary public.
Let copies of this Resolution be furnished to all the courts of the land, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and the Office of the
Bar Confidant, as well as made part of the personal records of respondent.
SO ORDERED.

41
G.R. No. 176943 October 17, 2008
DANILO ALUAD, LEONORA ALUAD, DIVINA ALUAD, PROSPERO ALUAD, and CONNIE ALUAD, petitioners,
vs.
ZENAIDO ALUAD, respondent.
DECISION
CARPIO MORALES, J.:
Petitioners’ mother, Maria Aluad (Maria), and respondent Zenaido Aluad were raised by the childless spouses Matilde Aluad
(Matilde) and Crispin Aluad (Crispin).
Crispin was the owner of six lots identified as Lot Nos. 674, 675, 676, 677, 680, and 682 of the Pilar Cadastre, Capiz. After Crispin
died, his wife Matilde adjudicated the lots to herself.1
On November 14, 1981, Matilde executed a document entitled "Deed of Donation of Real Property Inter Vivos"2 (Deed of
Donation) in favor of petitioners’ mother Maria3 covering all the six lots which Matilde inherited from her husband Crispin. The
Deed of Donation provided:
That, for and in consideration of the love and affection of the DONOR [Matilde] for the DONEE [Maria], the latter being adopted
and hav[ing] been brought up by the former the DONOR, by these presents, transfer and convey, BY WAY OF DONATION, unto
the DONEE the property above-described, to become effective upon the death of the DONOR, but in the event that the
DONEE should die before the DONOR, the present donation shall be deemed rescinded and [of] no further force and effect;
Provided, however, that anytime during the lifetime of the DONOR or anyone of them who should survive, they could use[,]
encumber or even dispose of any or even all of the parcels of land herein donated.4 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
On September 30, 1986, Original Certificates of Title over Lot Nos. 674 and 676 were issued in Matilde’s name.
On August 26, 1991, Matilde sold Lot No. 676 to respondent by a Deed of Absolute Sale of Real Property.5
Subsequently or on January 14, 1992, Matilde executed a last will and testament,6 devising Lot Nos. 675, 677, 682, and 680 to
Maria, and her "remaining properties" including Lot No. 674 to respondent.
Matilde died on January 25, 1994, while Maria died on September 24 of the same year.7
On August 21, 1995, Maria’s heirs-herein petitioners filed before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Roxas City a Complaint,8 for
declaration and recovery of ownership and possession of Lot Nos. 674 and 676, and damages against respondent, alleging:
That in 1978, plaintiff[s] possessed the two (2) parcels of land above-described until January 1991 when defendant entered and
possessed the two (2) parcels of land claiming as the adopted son of Crispin Aluad who refused to give back possession until
Matilde Aluad died in [1994] and then retained the possession thereof up to and until the present time, thus, depriving the
plaintiffs of the enjoyment of said parcels of land x x x;
That after the death of Matilde R. Aluad, the plaintiffs succeeded by inheritance by right of representation from their deceased
mother, Maria Aluad who is the sole and only daughter of Matilde Aluad[.] 9
To the complaint respondent alleged in his Answer.10
That Lot 674 is owned by the defendant as this lot was adjudicated to him in the Last Will and Testament of Matilde Aluad x x x
while Lot 676 was purchased by him from Matilde Aluad. These two lots are in his possession as true owners thereof.11
(Underscoring supplied)
Petitioners later filed a Motion for Leave to Amend Complaint Already Filed to Conform to Evidence12 to which it annexed an
Amended Complaint13 which cited the donation of the six lots via Deed of Donation in favor of their mother Maria. Branch 15 of
the RTC granted the motion and admitted the Amended Complaint.14
Respondent filed an Amended Answer15 contending, inter alia, that the Deed of Donation is forged and falsified and petitioners’
change of theory showed that "said document was not existing at the time they filed their complaint and was concocted by
them after realizing that their false claim that their mother was the only daughter of Matild[e] Aluad cannot in anyway be
established by them";16 and that if ever said document does exist, the same was already revoked by Matilde "when [she]
exercised all acts of dominion over said properties until she sold Lot 676 to defendant and until her death with respect to the
other lots without any opposition from Maria Aluad."17
The trial court, by Decision18 of September 20, 1996, held that Matilde could not have transmitted any right over Lot Nos. 674
and 676 to respondent, she having previously alienated them to Maria via the Deed of Donation. Thus it disposed:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, judgment is hereby rendered:

42
1. Declaring the plaintiffs as the rightful owners of the subject Lots Nos. 674 and 676, Pilar Cadastre;
2. Ordering the defendant to deliver the possession of the subject lots to the plaintiffs;
3. Ordering the defendant to pay the plaintiffs:
a. Thirty thousand pesos (P30,000.00) as attorney’s fees;
b. Twenty thousand pesos (P20,000.00), representing the income from subject Lot 676, a year from 1991 up to the time said lot
is delivered to the plaintiffs, together with the interest thereof at the legal rate until fully paid;
c. Ten thousand pesos (P10,000.00), representing the income from the subject Lot No. 674, a year from 1991 up to the time
said lot is delivered to the plaintiffs, plus legal interest thereof at the legal rate until fully paid; and
d. The costs of the suit.
Defendant’s counterclaim is ordered dismissed for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.19
On petitioners’ motion, the trial court directed the issuance of a writ of execution pending appeal. 20 Possession of the subject
lots appears to have in fact been taken by petitioners.
By Decision21 of August 10, 2006, the Court of Appeals reversed the trial court’s decision, it holding that the Deed of Donation
was actually a donation mortis causa, not inter vivos, and as such it had to, but did not, comply with the formalities of a will.
Thus, it found that the Deed of Donation was witnessed by only two witnesses and had no attestation clause which is not in
accordance with Article 805 of the Civil Code, reading:
Art. 805. Every will, other than a holographic will, must be subscribed at the end thereof by the testator himself or by the
testator’s name written by some other person in his presence, and by his express direction, and attested and subscribed by
three or more credible witnesses in the presence of the testator and of one another.
The testator or the person requested by him to write his name and the instrumental witnesses of the will shall, also sign, as
aforesaid, each and every page thereof, except the last on the left margin and all the pages shall be numbered correlatively in
letters placed on the upper part of each page.
The attestation shall state the number of pages used upon which the will is written, and the fact that that testator signed the
will and every page thereof, or caused some other person to write his name, under his express direction, in the presence of the
instrumental witnesses, and that the latter witnessed and signed the will and all the pages thereof in the presence of the
testator, and of one another.
If the attestation clause is in a language not known to the witnesses, it shall be interpreted to them.
While the appellate court declared respondent as the rightful owner of Lot No. 676, it did not so declare with respect to Lot No.
674, as Matilde’s last will and testament had not yet been probated. Thus the Court of Appeals disposed:
WHEREFORE, finding the instant petition worthy of merit, the same is hereby GRANTED and the Decision of the Regional Trial
Court of Roxas City, Branch 15, dated 20 September 1996, in Civil Case No. V-6686 for declaration of ownership, recovery of
ownership and possession, and damages is REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
A new one is entered in its stead declaring defendant-appellant as the lawful owner of Lot [No.] 676 of the Pilar Cadastre.
Accordingly, plaintiffs-appellees are directed to return the possession of the said lot to the defendant-appellant.
Moreover, plaintiffs-appellees are ordered to pay P40,000.00 to defendant-appellant as attorney’s fees and litigation expenses.
Costs against plaintiffs-appellees.
SO ORDERED.22 (Emphasis in the original; underscoring supplied)
Their Motion for Reconsideration23 having been denied,24 petitioners filed the present Petition for Review,25 contending that
the Court of Appeals erred
I
X X X WHEN IT REVERSED THE DECISION OF THE COURT BELOW (RTC, Branch 15, Roxas City) HOLDING THAT THE DEED OF
DONATION INTER VIVOS IN FAVOR OF PETITIONERS’ MOTHER IS IN FACT A DONATION MORTIS CAUSA.
II

43
X X X WHEN IT RULED THAT RESPONDENT IS THE RIGHTFUL OWNER OF LOT NO. 676 AS LOT BUYER ON THE BASIS OF A DEED OF
SALE EXECUTED BY THE DONOR WHO HAD NO MORE RIGHT TO SELL THE SAME.
III
X X X WHEN IT FAILED TO DECLARE PETITIONERS THE RIGHTFUL OWNER OF LOT NO. 674 AFTER HAVING RULED WHEN IT HELD
THAT RESPONDENT CANNOT BE DECLARED OWNER THEREOF.
IV
X X X WHEN IT HELD THAT THE ISSUANCE OF A WRIT OF EXECUTION PENDING APPEAL IS IN VIOLATION OF PARAGRAPH (a)
SECTION 2, RULE 39, OF THE RULES OF COURT (AND ORDERING PETITIONERS TO RETURN POSSESSION OF LOT 676 TO
RESPONDENT) AND ORDERING PETITIONERS TO PAY ATTORNEY’S FEES AND COST[S] OF SUIT. 26
As did the appellate court, the Court finds the donation to petitioners’ mother one of mortis causa, it having the following
characteristics:
(1) It conveys no title or ownership to the transferee before the death of the transferor; or what amounts to the same thing,
that the transferor should retain the ownership (full or naked) and control of the property while alive;
(2) That before the death of the transferor, the transfer should be revocable by the transferor at will, ad nutum; but revocability
may be provided for indirectly by means of a reserved power in the donor to dispose of the properties conveyed; and
(3) That the transfer should be void if the transferor should survive the transferee.27 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
The phrase in the earlier-quoted Deed of Donation "to become effective upon the death of the DONOR" admits of no other
interpretation than to mean that Matilde did not intend to transfer the ownership of the six lots to petitioners’ mother during
her (Matilde’s) lifetime.28
The statement in the Deed of Donation reading "anytime during the lifetime of the DONOR or anyone of them who should
survive, they could use, encumber or even dispose of any or even all the parcels of land herein donated"29 means that Matilde
retained ownership of the lots and reserved in her the right to dispose them. For the right to dispose of a thing without other
limitations than those established by law is an attribute of ownership.30 The phrase in the Deed of Donation "or anyone of them
who should survive" is of course out of sync. For the Deed of Donation clearly stated that it would take effect upon the death of
the donor, hence, said phrase could only have referred to the donor Matilde. Petitioners themselves concede that such phrase
does not refer to the donee, thus:
x x x [I]t is well to point out that the last provision (sentence) in the disputed paragraph should only refer to Matilde Aluad, the
donor, because she was the only surviving spouse at the time the donation was executed on 14 November 1981, as her
husband – Crispin Aluad [–] had long been dead as early as 1975.31
The trial court, in holding that the donation was inter vivos, reasoned:
x x x The donation in question is subject to a resolutory term or period when the donor provides in the aforequoted provisions,
"but in the event that the DONEE should die before the DONOR, the present donation shall be deemed rescinded and [of] no
further force and effect". When the donor provides that should the "DONEE" xxx die before the DONOR, the present donation
shall be deemed rescinded and [of] no further force and effect" the logical construction thereof is that after the execution of
the subject donation, the same became effective immediately and shall be "deemed rescinded and [of] no further force and
effect" upon the arrival of a resolutory term or period, i.e., the death of the donee which shall occur before that of the donor.
Understandably, the arrival of this resolutory term or period cannot rescind and render of no further force and effect a
donation which has never become effective, because, certainly what donation is there to be rescinded and rendered of no
further force and effect upon the arrival of said resolutory term or period if there was no donation which was already effective
at the time when the donee died?32 (Underscoring supplied)
A similar ratio in a case had been brushed aside by this Court, however, thus:
x x x [P]etitioners contend that the stipulation on rescission in case petitioners [donee] die ahead of [donor] Cabatingan is a
resolutory condition that confirms the nature of the donation as inter vivos.
Petitioners’ arguments are bereft of merit.33
xxxx
x x x The herein subject deeds expressly provide that the donation shall be rescinded in case [donees] the petitioners
predecease [the donor] Conchita Cabatingan. As stated in Reyes v. Mosqueda, one of the decisive characteristics of a donation
mortis causa is that the transfer should be considered void if the donor should survive the donee. This is exactly what
Cabatingan provided for in her donations. If she really intended that the donation should take effect during her lifetime and

44
that the ownership of the properties donated to the donee or independently of, and not by reason of her death, she would not
have expressed such proviso in the subject deeds.34 (Underscoring supplied)
As the Court of Appeals observed, "x x x [t]hat the donation is mortis causa is fortified by Matilde’s acts of possession as she
continued to pay the taxes for the said properties which remained under her name; appropriated the produce; and applied for
free patents for which OCTs were issued under her name."35
The donation being then mortis causa, the formalities of a will should have been observed36 but they were not, as it was
witnessed by only two, not three or more witnesses following Article 805 of the Civil Code.37
Further, the witnesses did not even sign the attestation clause38 the execution of which clause is a requirement separate from
the subscription of the will and the affixing of signatures on the left-hand margins of the pages of the will. So the Court has
emphasized:
x x x Article 805 particularly segregates the requirement that the instrumental witnesses sign each page of the will from the
requisite that the will be "attested and subscribed by [the instrumental witnesses]. The respective intents behind these two
classes of signature[s] are distinct from each other. The signatures on the left-hand corner of every page signify, among others,
that the witnesses are aware that the page they are signing forms part of the will. On the other hand, the signatures to the
attestation clause establish that the witnesses are referring to the statements contained in the attestation clause itself. Indeed,
the attestation clause is separate and apart from the disposition of the will. An unsigned attestation clause results in an
unattested will. Even if the instrumental witnesses signed the left-hand margin of the page containing the unsigned attestation
clause, such signatures cannot demonstrate these witnesses’ undertakings in the clause, since the signatures that do appear on
the page were directed towards a wholly different avowal.
x x x It is the witnesses, and not the testator, who are required under Article 805 to state the number of pages used upon which
the will is written; the fact that the testator had signed the will and every page thereof; and that they witnessed and signed the
will and all the pages thereof in the presence of the testator and of one another. The only proof in the will that the witnesses
have stated these elemental facts would be their signatures on the attestation clause.39 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Furthermore, the witnesses did not acknowledge the will before the notary public,40 which is not in accordance with the
requirement of Article 806 of the Civil Code that every will must be acknowledged before a notary public by the testator and
the witnesses.
More. The requirement that all the pages of the will must be numbered correlatively in letters placed on the upper part of each
page was not also followed.41
The Deed of Donation which is, as already discussed, one of mortis causa, not having followed the formalities of a will, it is void
and transmitted no right to petitioners’ mother. But even assuming arguendo that the formalities were observed, since it was
not probated, no right to Lot Nos. 674 and 676 was transmitted to Maria.42 Matilde thus validly disposed of Lot No. 674 to
respondent by her last will and testament, subject of course to the qualification that her (Matilde’s) will must be probated.
With respect to Lot No. 676, the same had, as mentioned earlier, been sold by Matilde to respondent on August 26, 1991.
Petitioners nevertheless argue that assuming that the donation of Lot No. 674 in favor of their mother is indeed mortis causa,
hence, Matilde could devise it to respondent, the lot should nevertheless have been awarded to them because they had
acquired it by acquisitive prescription, they having been in continuous, uninterrupted, adverse, open, and public possession of
it in good faith and in the concept of an owner since 1978.43
Petitioners failed to raise the issue of acquisitive prescription before the lower courts, however, they having laid their claim on
the basis of inheritance from their mother. As a general rule, points of law, theories, and issues not brought to the attention of
the trial court cannot be raised for the first time on appeal.44 For a contrary rule would be unfair to the adverse party who
would have no opportunity to present further evidence material to the new theory, which it could have done had it been aware
of it at the time of the hearing before the trial court.45
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED.
SO ORDERED.

45
G.R. No. L-33592 March 31, 1931
Estate of the deceased Victorina Villaranda.
EUSEBIA LIM, petitioner-appellant,
vs.
JULIANA CHINCO, oppositor-appellee.
Perfecto Gabriel and Eusebio Orense for appellant.
Camus and Delgado for appellee.
STREET, J.:
This is a contest over the probate of a paper writing purporting to be the will of Victorina Villaranda y Diaz, a former resident of
the municipality of Meycauayan, Province of Bulacan, who died in the Hospital of San Juan de Dios, in the City of Manila, on
June 9, 1929. The deceased left no descendants or ascendants, and the document produced as her will purports to leave her
estate, consisting of properties valued at P50,000, more or less, chiefly to three collateral relatives, Eusebia, Crispina, and
Maria, of the surname of Lim. This instrument was offered for probate by Eusebia Lim, named in the instrument as executrix
Opposition was made by Juliana Chinco, a full sister of the deceased. Upon hearing the cause the trial court sustained the
opposition and disallowed the will on the ground that the testatrix did not have testamentary capacity at the time the
instrument purports to have been executed by her From this judgment the proponent of the will appealed.
The deceased was a resident of Mercauayan, Province of Bulacan, and was about 80 years of age at the time of her death. On
the morning of June 2, 1929, she was stricken with apoplexy, incident to cerebral hemorrhage, and was taken in an unconscious
condition, seated in a chair, to her room. Doctor Geronimo Z. Gaanan, a local physician of Meycauayan, visited the old lady,
with whom he was well acquianted, three or four times, the first visit having occurred between 6 and 7 p. m. of June 3d. Upon
examining the patient, he found her insensible and incapable of talking or controlling her movements. On the same day the
parish priest called for the purpose of administering the last rites of the church, and being unable to take her confession, he
limited himself to performing the office of extreme unction. Doctor Isidoro Lim, of Manila, was also called upon to visit the
patient and he came to see her two or three times. With his approval, it was decided to take the woman to the hospital of San
Juan de Dios in Manila, and on the morning of June 5, 1929, the ambulance from this hospital arrived, in charge of Doctor
Guillermo Lopez del Castillo, a resident physician of the hospital. At about 11 c'clock a.m. on that day she was embarked on the
ambulance and taken to the hospital, where she died four days later.
The purported will, which is the subject of this proceeding, was prepared by Perfecto Gabriel, a practicing attorney of Manila,
whose wife appears to be related to the chief beneficiaries named in the will. This gentlemen arrived upon the scene at 9
o'clock on the forenoon of June 5, 1929. After informing himself of the condition of the testatrix, he went into a room adjacent
to that occupied by the patient and, taking a sheet from an exercise book, wrote the instrument in question. He then took it
into the sick room for execution. With this end in view Gabriel suggested to Doctor Lopez del Castillo that he would be pleased
to have Doctor Castillo sign as a witness, but the latter excused himself for the reason that he considered the old lady to be
lacking in testamentary capacity. Another person present was Marcos Ira, a first cousin of the deceased, and attorney Gabriel
asked him also whether or not he was willing to sign as one of the witnesses. Ira replied in a discouraging tone, and the
attorney turned away without pressing the matter. In the end three persons served as witnesses, all of whom were in friendly
relations with the lawyer, and two relatives of his wife. The intended testatrix was not able to affix her signature to the
document, and it was signed for her by the attorney.
The vital question in the case is whether the supposed testatrix had testamentary capacity at the time the paper referred to
was signed. Upon this point we are of the opinion, as was the trial judge, that the deceased, on the morning of June 5, 1929,
was in a comatose condition and incapable of performing any conscious and valid act. The testimony of Doctor Gaanan and
Doctor Lopez del Castillo is sufficient upon this point, and this testimony is well corroborated by Paciana Diaz and Irene Ahorro.
The first of these witnesses was the one who chiefly cared for the deceased during her last illness in Meycauayan until she was
carried away to the hospital in Manila; and the second was a neighbor, who was called in when the stroke of apoplexy first
occurred and who visited the patient daily until she was removed from Meycauayan.
The testimony of these witnesses is convincing to the effect that the patient was in a continuous state of coma during the entire
period of her stay in Meycauayan, subsequent to the attack, and that on the forenoon of June 5, 1929, she did not have
sufficient command of her faculties to enable her to do any valid act. Doctor Lim, the physician from Manila, testified for the
proponent of the will. His testimony tends to show that the patient was not suffering from cerebral hemorrhage but from
uræmic trouble, and that, after the first attack, the patient was much relieved and her mind so far cleared up that she might
have made a will on the morning of June 5th. The attorney testified that he was able to communicate with the deceased when
the will was made, and that he read the instrument over to her clause by clause and asked her whether it expressed her wishes.
He says that she made signs that enabled him to understand that she concurred in what was written. But it is clear, even upon

46
the statement of this witness, that the patient was unable to utter intelligent speech. Upon the authority of Perry vs. Elio (29
Phil., 134), the paper offered for probate was properly disallowed.
The judgment appealed from will therefore be affirmed, and it is so ordered, with costs against the appellant.

47
G.R. No. L-5263 February 17, 1954
AGUSTIN BARRERA, ET AL., proponents-appellants,
vs.
JOSE TAMPOCO, ET AL., oppositors-appellees.
Jesus G. Barrera for appellants.
Filemon Cajator for appellees.
PARAS, C.J.:
Olivia Villapaña died in Tarlac, Tarlac, on December 13, 1948. On December 31, 1948, a petition was filed by Agustin Barrera in
the Court of First Instance of Tarlac for the probate of the will executed by Olivia Villapaña on July 17, 1948, and for the
appointment of the petitioner as executor. According to the petition the properties left by the testatrix are worth P94,852.96,
and the heirs instituted are nephews and nieces and grandchildren in the collateral line. Jose Tampoco and Victoriano
Tampoco, alleged grandchildren of the testatrix in the direct line, filed an opposition, claiming that the will was not executed
and attested in accordance with the law, that the testatrix lacked testamentary capacity, that there was undue influence and
pressure in its execution, that the signature of Olivia Villapaña was obtained by fraud and trickery, and that the testamentary
provisions are illegal. Consorcia Lintang, Nemesio Villapaña, Marcos Villapaña, Jesus Villapaña, Vicente Villapaña, Ursulo
Villapaña, Avelina Villapaña, and Rosario Villapaña, alleged nephews and nieces, also filed an opposition on substantially the
same grounds on which the opposition of Jose and Victoriano Tampoco was based. After protracted trial, and more than a year
after submission of the case, a decision was rendered by the Court of First Instance of Tarlac on August 11, 1951, disallowing
the will. The court found that Olivia Villapaña had testamentary capacity, that there was no forgery, fraud, trickery or undue
influence in the execution of the will, and that petition of forced heirs is not a ground for denying probate; but the will was
disallowed because it was not the personal last will and testament of the deceased and it was not based on the finding that
Olivia Villapaña did not furnish the names of the persons instituted as heirs and that the will was not read to her before she
signed it. The second ground is premised on the conclusion that attesting witness Laureano Antonio was not present when
Olivia Villapaña and attesting witness Honorio Lacson signed the will; that Antonio only partially saw the signing by attesting
witness Modesto Puno; and that Olivia Villapaña saw Antonio sign only two or three times. From this decision the petitioner has
appealed.
According to appellant's evidence, two or three days before July 10, 1948, Pilar Tañedo called on Modesto Puno, a lawyer and
justice of the peace of Concepcion, Tarlac, and requested the latter to come to Manila for a conference with Olivia Villapaña,
aunt of Pilar. On July 10, 1948, Atty. Puno, complying with the request, went to the house of Pilar Tañedo in Singalong Street
where Olivia was staying. The latter, after preliminary greetings and courtesies, informed Atty. Puno that she wanted him to
prepare her will, giving the names of the heirs and the properties to be left. Olivia Villapaña asked Atty. Puno to get the
description of the properties from the herein appellant, Agustin Barrera, husband of Pilar Tañedo. Atty. Puno noted the wishes
of Olivia, and, as there was then no available typewriter, he informed the old woman that he would prepare the will in his office
in Concepcion and come back with it on the following Saturday. As promised, on or July 17, 1948, Atty. Puno returned to the
house of Olivia Villapaña in Singalong, carrying with him one original and three copies, in typewritten form, of the will he
drafted in accordance with the instructions of Olivia Villapaña. Atty. Puno arrived about noon. He read the will to Olivia to find
out whether it conformed to her wishes, and she indicated that it was all right. After lunch Atty. Puno manifested that two
other witnesses were necessary, whereupon Pilar Tañedo requested Honorio Lacson and Laureano Antonio, who were then
living in the first floor of the house, to come up. Lacson and Antonio did as requested. Olivia Villapaña, Atty. Puno, Lacson and
Antonio were then seated around a small rectangular table in sala, and at this juncture Atty. Puno gave a copy of the will to
Olivia, Lacson and Antonio, while he retained one. The Attorney again read the will aloud, advising the rest to check their
respective copies. As Olivia Villapaña agreed to the will, she proceeded to sign all the four copies, on the lines previously placed
by Atty. Puno, followed successively by Lacson, Atty. Puno and Antonio, all in the presence of each other. After the signing,
Atty. Puno gave the original and a copy to Olivia, and retained the other two copies. Atty. Puno , Lacson and Antonio stayed for
a while even ate merienda prepared by the sisters Pilar and Beatriz Tañedo. Olivia Villapaña delivered her will to Agustin
Barrera for safekeeping on October 17, 1948 when she was taken to the U.S.T. Hospital where she remained until November 7,
1948. On this date her doctors lost all hope for her recovery and Olivia Villapaña was brought to Tarlac, Tarlac, her hometown,
where, as already stated, she died on December 13, 1948.
According to the evidence for the oppositors-appellees, the will presented in the court by the petitioner was not executed in
accordance with law, in that attesting witness Laureano Antonio did not see the testatrix and attesting witness Lacson sign the
will or any of its copies, that he saw Atty. Puno when the latter was already half thru signing the document, and that the
testatrix did not see Antonio sign all the copies.
After a thorough study of the record and mature reflection on the conflicting evidence, we are constrained to conclude that the
trial court erred in denying probate of the will.

48
Of the three attesting witnesses, namely, Atty. Modesto Puno, Honorio Lacson, and Laureano Antonio, the first two testified
positively that the will was signed by the testatrix and the three witnesses in the presence of each other, and that it was read to
the testatrix before being signed. In view of the opposition filed by the two sets of oppositors , the third attesting witness,
Laureano Antonio, had to be presented by the petitioner but, contrary to expectations, Antonio testified that he arrived at the
scene of the execution of the will after testatrix and Honorio Lacson had already signed and after Atty. Puno was half through
affixing his signatures, and that the testatrix left before Antonio finished signing all the copies. By numerical superiority alone,
the weight of the testimony of Atty. Puno and Honorio Lacson outbalances the probative value of the testimony of Laureano
Antonio. Intrinsically, we cannot state that Laureano Antonio spoke the truth on the witness stand, since, in the first place, the
attestation clause signed by him contradicts his pretense and, in the second place, there is enough evidence on the record to
show that in his conferences with Atty. Barrera before taking the witness stand, Antonio never gave the slightest indication that
he was not present when the testatrix left before Antonio finished signing. Modesto Puno is a lawyer and at the time a justice
of the peace, and it is improbable that he would unnecessarily risk his honor and reputation. Indeed, the trial court gave the
impression that Atty. Puno was anxious to strictly meet the requirements of the law and in the absence, as in the case at bar, of
any reason for a hasty completion, we do not believe that Atty. Puno would have allowed the signing of the will to be
proceeded with unless three attesting witnesses were already present. On the other hand, we can fairly state that there was in
fact no hurry on the part of any of the participants in the will, because the testatrix Olivia Villapaña was not dying (she died
some five months after the execution of the will) and the parties could therefore take all the time that they wanted, Indeed,
none of the three witnesses, left the house of Olivia Villapaña and they even stayed therein until after merienda time.
The fact that Atty. Puno id the brother of Jose Puno who is the husband of Carmen Tañedo, one of the beneficiaries of the will,
and that Honorio Lacson is the husband of Bibiana Lacson who is a first cousin of Agustin Barrera, herein petitioner and
husband of Pilar Tañedo, is not sufficient to make then biased witnesses. If Atty. Puno had any material interest, this fact should
have caused him to be more careful in seeing to it that the formalities of the law were strictly complied with, and this should be
true with respect to Honorio Lacson.
In deciding against the probate of the will, the trial court believed the testimony of Laureano Antonio to the effect that he
arrived at the place of the signing at about 2:30 in the afternoon, and thereby found that a greater part of the proceeding was
finished, because Atty. Puno declared in one place that "the signing of the testament commenced around between one o'clock
and two o'clock" and in another place that the signing took place "around two and three o'clock," and Honorio Lacson declared
that he was called by Pilar Tañedo to act as witness at around two o'clock or two thirty. From the testimony of Atty. Puno and
Honorio Lacson the court concluded that the signing actually commenced between one and two o'clock. We are of the opinion
that the specification of the time of the signing refers to an immaterial or unimportant detail which, in view of the lapse of
time, might have been a mistake by one or the other participant in the execution of Oliva's will. What is important and decisive
— and this should be impressed in the mind of an attorney preparing and taking charge of the signing of will, — is that the
testatrix and each of the three attesting witnesses must affix their signatures in the presence of one another. In the case before
us, Atty. Puno and Honorio
Lacson both attesting witnesses, categorically affirmed that this procedure was followed. At any rate, even under the testimony
of Atty. Puno and Honorio Lacson, the signing could have taken place at about or after two thirty, since the former declared
that it took place between two and three o'clock and Honorio Lacson stated that the time was two or two thirty. another point
invoked by the trial court against the probate of the will is the circumstance that, while Atty. Puno testified that he placed the
lines on which the testatrix and the witnesses were to sign before he read the document to the testatrix whom he gave the
original witness Lacson testify that Atty. Puno read the original after giving a copy to the testatrix, and after reading Atty. Puno
placed the lines for signatures. The discrepancy again refers to a minor detail which is not sufficient to negative the truthfulness
of Atty. Puno and Honorio Lacson on the main and important fact that the will was signed by the testatrix and the three
attesting witnesses in the presence of each other.
Oppositors-appellees presented in corroboration of the testimony of Laureano Antonio, Joaquin Villapaña and Consolacion del
Mundo. Joaquin Villapaña, a painter allegedly was then the maid of Oliva Villapaña. Apart from the fact that there is evidence
to show that both Joaquin Villapaña and Consolacion del Mundo were not yet employed in the house of Oliva when the latter's
will was executed, there is little or no reason for their version to prevail over the positive testimony is even corroborated by
two other witnesses, Bibiana Lacson and Beatriz Tañedo. Certainly the story of Joaquin Villapaña and Consolacion del Mundo
can have no greater weight than that of Laureano Antonio.
In the holding that the will was not that of Oliva Villapaña, the trial court found that it was not read to her; and this finding was
premised on the alleged contradiction of Atty. Puno and Honorio Lacson regarding the sequence of the reading of the will and
the placing of the lines for signatures, and regarding the question whether a copy or the original was handed to the testatrix. As
we have already observed, the discrepancy relates to an insignificant matter which cannot vitally detract from the credibility of
Atty. Puno to the effect that upon arrival at the house of Oliva Villapaña at about noon, he read the will to her with a view to
finding whether she was agreeable thereto. It is not necessary that said will be read upon its signing and in the presence of the
witnesses.

49
The trial court also concluded that the testatrix could not have furnished the names of the heirs instituted under the will,
because (1) Salvador Tañedo, one of such heirs, was long dead and (2) Marcelo Villapaña, another instituted heir, was non-
existent, since Oliva Villapaña did not have a grandson by such name. It is true that Salvador Tañedo was already dead and the
testatrix knew about it, but it is not uncommon for a woman of old age, confused by the big number of her relatives, to commit
the mistake of unwittingly mentioning a dead one. With respect to the instituted heir, Marcelo Villapaña, while it appears that
Oliva did not have a grandson answering to that name, there is evidence tending to show that Pioquinto Villapaña, a child of
Ruperta Pineda, must have been reffered to, because Oliva, who was the child's god-mother, originally wanted said child to be
baptized as Marcelo, after his father. Moreover, if Atty. Puno had supplied the names instituted as heirs, he would have
consulted all the interested parties and would be sure that no mistake of the kind was made.
As a closing observation, it is not for us to discover the motives of Oliva Villapaña in leaving her properties to the person named
in the will, and omitting therefrom the oppositors-appellees. Suffice it to state that the trial court itself found the will to have
been executed free from falsification, fraud, trickery or undue influence, with Oliva having testamentary capacity; and in such a
situation it becomes our duty to give expression to her will.
Wherefore, the appealed order is reversed and the will executed by Oliva Villapaña on July 17, 1948, is hereby allowed. So
ordered without costs.

50
G.R. No. 76648 February 26, 1988
THE HEIRS OF THE LATE MATILDE MONTINOLA-SANSON, petitioners,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and EDUARDO F. HERNANDEZ, respondents.

GANCAYCO, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari of the decision of the Court of Appeals 1 promulgated August 29,1986 affirming in toto
the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch XXII 2 dated March 21, 1985, the dispositive part of which reads:
WHEREFORE, the Court renders judgment declaring the holographic will marked in evidence as Exhibit "H" as one wholly
written, dated, and signed freely by the late Herminia Montinola in accordance with law while in possession of full
testamentary capacity, and allowing and admitting the same to probate.
Upon the finality of the decision, let letters testamentary issue to the executor, Eduardo F. Hernandez, as well as the certificate
of probate prescribed under Section 13 of Rule 76 of the Rules of Court.
SO ORDERED. 3
This case arose from a petition filed by private respondent Atty. Eduardo F. Hernandez on April 22, 1981 with the Court of First
Instance of Manila (now Regional Trial Court) seeking the probate of the holographic will of the late Herminia Montinola
executed on January 28, 1980. 4 The testatrix, who died single, parentless and childless on March 29,1981 at the age of 70
years, devised in this will several of her real properties to specified persons.
On April 29,1981, private respondent who was named executor in the will filed an urgent motion for appointment of special
administrator. 5 With the conformity of all the relatives and heirs of the testatrix except oppositor, the court in its order of May
5, 1981 6 appointed private respondent as Special Administrator of the testate estate of deceased.
On June 29,1981, Matilde Montinola Sanson (petitioner), the only surviving sister of the deceased but who was not named in
the said win, filed her Opposition to Probate of Will, 7 alleging inter alia: that the subject will was not entirely written, dated
and signed by the testatrix herself and the same was falsely dated or antedated; that the testatrix was not in full possession of
her mental faculties to make testamentary dispositions; that undue influence was exerted upon the person and mind of the
testatrix by the beneficiaries named in the win; and that the will failed to institute a residual heir to the remainder of the
estate.
After a hearing on the merits, the probate court, finding the evidence presented in support of the petition to be conclusive and
overwhelming, rendered its decision allowing the probate of the disputed will.
Petitioner thus appealed the decision of the probate court to the Court of Appeals which affirmed in toto the decision. 8
On September 24,1986, petitioner filed with the respondent court a motion for new trial. 9 Attached to her motion was the
Affidavit of Merit of Gregorio Montinola Sanson, petitioner's son, alleging that witnesses have been located whose testimonies
could shed light as to the ill health of the testatrix as well as undue influence exerted on the latter.
The appellate court in its resolution of October 13, 1986, 10 denied the motion for new trial of petitioner on the following
grounds: (1) the Affidavit of merit attached to the motion alleged that efforts were exerted to locate unnamed witnesses only
after the court's decision was handed down, and (2) the unnamed witnesses would allegedly shed light on the fact of grave
illness of the testatrix as well as the undue influence exerted on her which are merely corroborative or cumulative since these
facts were brought to light during the trial.
The motion for reconsideration of petitioner dated October 27, 1986 11 was likewise denied by the appellate court in its
resolution of November 20, 1986 12 on the ground that the affidavit of one Patricia Delgado submitted with the motion
constitutes cumulative evidence and the motion being in reality a second motion for reconsideration which is prescribed by
law.
In the petition now before Us, petitioner assigned the following errors:
I
THE RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN DENYING PETITIONERS' MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL ON THE GROUND THAT THE
EVIDENCE SOUGHT TO BE PRESENTED IS MERELY CUMULATIVE.
II

51
THE SAID COURT ERRED IN DENYING PETITIONERS' MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION OF THE RESOLUTION DENYING THE
AFORESAID MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL.
III
AT ANY RATE, THE SAID COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE HOLOGRAPHIC WILL IN QUESTION WAS WHOLLY WRITTEN,
DATED AND SIGNED BY THE LATE HERMINIA MONTINOLA.
IV
THE SAID COURT ERRED IN NOT FINDING THAT THE ALLEGED WILL WAS FRAUDULENTLY ANTEDATED TO CONCEAL ITS ACTUAL
DATE OF EXECUTION AND TO SHIELD IT FROM PROBABLE DISPUTES AS TO THE TESTAMENTARY CAPACITY ON THE PART OF THE
ALLEGED TESTATRIX AT THE TIME OF ITS ACTUAL EXECUTION.
V
THE SAID COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE LATE HERMINIA MONTINOLA WAS NOT SUBJECTED TO UNDUE PRESSURE AND
IMPROPERIMPORTUNINGS ON THE PART OF THOSE STANDING TO BENEFIT FROM THE ALLEGED WILL.
VI
THE SAID COURT ERRED IN ALLOWING THE HOLOGRAPHIC WILL IN QUESTION TO PROBATE.
In the meantime, petitioner who passed away on November 3, 1986, was substituted by her heirs.
In the first and second assigned errors, petitioners maintain that the appellate court erred in denying the motion for new trial
insisting that the new evidence sought to be presented is not merely corroborative or cumulative.
On the other hand, the contention of private respondent is that the motion for new trial was a pro-forma motion because it
was not in accordance with Sec. 1, Rule 53 of the Rules of Court. We find merit in this contention.
Section 1, Rule 53 provides —
Before a final order or judgment rendered by the Court of appeals becomes executory, a motion for new trial may be filed on
the ground of newly discovered evidence which could not have been discovered prior to the trial in the court below by the
exercise of the diligence and which is of such a character as would probably change the result. The motion shall be
accompanied by affidavits showing the facts constituting the grounds therefor and the newly discovered evidence.
The affidavit of merit executed by Gregorio Montinola Sanson alleged the following:
xxx xxx xxx
3. That in her plea for new trial in the said case, I have exerted efforts to locate witnesses whose whereabouts were not known
to us during the trial in the lower court, but I have finally succeeded in tracking them down;
4. That despite their initial reluctance to testify in this case,I am convinced that they would testify under proper subpoena for
purposes of shedding light on the fact that the testatrix was gravely ill at or but the time that the questioned will was allegedly
executed;
5. That they had the clear opportunity to know the circumstances under which the purported will was executed; and that they
know for a fact that there was 'undue influence' exerted by petitioner and other relatives to procure improper favors from the
testatrix;
xxx xxx xxx 13
Said motion for new trial is not in substantial compliance with the requirements of Rule 53. The lone affidavit of a witness who
was already presented said the hearing is hardly sufficient to justify the holding of new trial. The alleged new witnesses were
unnamed without any certainty as, to their appearance before the court to testify. Affiant attests only on his belief that they
would testify if and when they are subpoenaed by the court. Furthermore, the allegations in the affidavit as to the undue
influence exerted on the testatrix are mere conclusions and not statement of facts. The requisite affidavits must state facts and
not mere conclusions or opinions, otherwise they are not valid. 14 The affidavits are required to avoid waste of the court's time
if the newly discovered evidence turns out to be immaterial or of any evidentiary weight.
Moreover, it could not be said that the evidence sought to be presented is new having been discovered only after the trial. It is
apparent from the allegations of affiant that efforts to locate the witnesses were exerted only after the decision of the
appellate court was handed down. The trial lasted for about four years so that petitioner had ample time to find said alleged
witnesses who were admittedly known to her. The evidence which the petitioner now propose to present could have been

52
discovered and presented during the hearing of the case, and there is no sufficient reason for concluding that had the
petitioner exercised proper diligence she would not have been able to discover said evidence. 15
In addition, We agree with the appellate court that since the alleged illness of the testatrix as well as the charges of undue
influence exerted upon her had been brought to light during the trial, and new evidence on this point is merely corroborative
and cumulative which is generally not a ground for new trial. 16 Accordingly, such evidence even if presented win not carry
much probative weight which can alter the judgment. 17
It is very patent that the motion for new trial was filed by petitioner only for the purpose of delaying the proceedings. In fact,
petitioners son in his manifestation admitted that he had to request a new law firm to do everything legally possible to meet
the deadline for the filing of a motion for reconsideration and/or for new trial. 18 This would explain the haphazard preparation
of the motion, thus failing to comply with the requirements of rule 53, which was filed on the last day of the reglementary
period of appeal so that the veracity of the ground relied upon is questionable. The appellate court correctly denied the motion
for new trial.
The motion for new trial being pro-forma, it does not interrupt the running of the period for appeal. 19 Since petitioner's
motion was filed on September 24,1986, the fifteenth or last day of the period to appeal, the decision of the respondent court
became final on the following day, September 25. And when the motion for reconsideration of petitioner was filed on October
30,1986, it was obviously filed out of time.
Since the questioned decision has already become final and executory, it is no longer within the province of this Court to review
it. This being so, the findings of the probate court as to the due execution of the will and the testamentary capacity of testatrix
are now conclusive. 20
At any rate, even assuming that We can still review this case on its merits, the petition will also have to fail.
During the hearing before the probate court, not only were three (3) close relatives of the testatrix presented but also two (2)
expert witnesses who declared that the contested will and signature are in the handwriting of the testatrix. These testimonies
more than satisfy the requirements of Art. 811 of the Civil Code 21 in conjunction with Section 11 of Rule 76, Revised Rules of
Court, 22 or the probate of holographic wills.
As regards the alleged antedating of the will, petitioner failed to present competent proof that the will was actually executed
sometime in June 1980 when the testatrix was already seriously ill and dying of terminal lung cancer. She relied only on the
supposed inconsistencies in the testimony of Asuncion Gemperle, niece and constant companion of testatrix, which upon
careful examination did not prove such claim of antedating.
The factual findings of the probate court and the Court of Appeals that the will in question was executed according to the
formalities required by law are conclusive on the Supreme Court when supported by evidence. 23 We have examined the
records of this case and find no error in the conclusion arrived at by the respondent court that the contested will was duly
executed in accordance with law.
Petitioner alleges that her exclusion from the alleged holographic will was without rhyme or reason, being the only surviving
sister of the testatrix with whom she shares an intimate relationship, thus demonstrating the lack of testamentary capacity of
testatrix.
In the case of Pecson v. Coronel, 24 it was held —
The appellants emphasize the fact that family ties in this country are very strongly knit and that the exclusion of a relative from
one's estate is an exceptional case. It is true that the ties of relationship in the Philippines are very strong, but we understand
that cases of preterition of relatives from the inheritance are not rare. The liberty to dispose of one's estate by will when there
are no forced heirs is rendered sacred by the Civil Code in force in the Philippines since 1889...
Article 842 of the Civil Code provides that one who has no compulsory heirs may dispose by will of all his estate or any part of it
in favor of any person having capacity to succeed.
It is within the right of the testatrix not to include her only sister who is not a compulsory heir in her will. Nevertheless, per
testimony of Asuncion Gemperle, the latter had reserved two boxes of jewelry worth P850,000.00 for petitioner. Furthermore,
petitioner's son Francis was instituted as an heir in the contested will.
Petitioner still insists that the fact that in her holographic will the testatrix failed to dispose of all of her estate is an indication of
the unsoundness of her mind.
We cannot subscribe to this contention. Art. 841 of the Civil Code provides —

53
A will shall be valid even though it should not contain an institution of an heir, or such institution should not comprise the
entire estate, and even though the person so instituted should not accept the inheritance or should be incapacitated to
succeed.
In such cases, the testamentary dispositions made in accordance with law shall be complied with and the remainder of the
estate shall pass to the legal heirs.
Thus, the fact that in her holographic will, testatrix disposed of only eleven (11) of her real properties does not invalidate the
will, or is it an indication that the testatrix was of unsound mind. The portion of the estate undisposed of shall pass on to the
heirs of the deceased in intestate succession.
Neither is undue influence present just because blood relatives, other than compulsory heirs have been omitted, for while
blood ties are strong in the Philippines, it is the testator's right to disregard non-compulsory heirs. 25 The fact that some heirs
are more favored than others is proof of neither fraud or undue influence. 26 Diversity of apportionment is the usual reason for
making a testament, otherwise, the decedent might as well die intestate. 27
The contention of the petitioner that the will was obtained by undue influence or improper pressure exerted by the
beneficiaries of the will cannot be sustained on mere conjecture or suspicion; as it is not enough that there was opportunity to
exercise undue influence or a possibility that it may have been exercised. 28 The exercise of improper pressure and undue
influence must be supported by substantial evidence that it was actually exercised. 29
Finally, We quote with approval the observation of the respondent court —
There is likewise no question as to the due execution of the subject Will. To Our minds, the most authentic proof that
decreased had testamentary capacity at the time of the execution of the Will, is the Will itself which according to a report of
one of the two expert witnesses (Exhibits X to X-3) reveals the existence of significant handwriting characteristics such as:
1. Spontaneity, freedom, and speed of writing
xxx xxx xxx
3. good line quality.
4. presence of natural variation... (Exhibit X).
The characteristics of spontaneity, freedom and good line quality could not be achieved by the testatrix if it was true that she
was indeed of unsound mind and/or under undue influence or improper pressure when she the Will.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING CONSIDERATIONS, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit with costs against petitioner. The
decision of respondent court dated August 29, 1986 in toto the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Manila dated March 21,
1985 is hereby declared to be immediately executory.
SO ORDERED.

54
G.R. No. L-16749 January 31, 1963
IN THE MATTER OF THE TESTATE ESTATE OF EDWARD E. CHRISTENSEN, DECEASED.
ADOLFO C. AZNAR, Executor and LUCY CHRISTENSEN, Heir of the deceased, Executor and Heir-appellees,
vs.
HELEN CHRISTENSEN GARCIA, oppositor-appellant.
M. R. Sotelo for executor and heir-appellees.
Leopoldo M. Abellera and Jovito Salonga for oppositor-appellant.
LABRADOR, J.:
This is an appeal from a decision of the Court of First Instance of Davao, Hon. Vicente N. Cusi, Jr., presiding, in Special
Proceeding No. 622 of said court, dated September 14, 1949, approving among things the final accounts of the executor,
directing the executor to reimburse Maria Lucy Christensen the amount of P3,600 paid by her to Helen Christensen Garcia as
her legacy, and declaring Maria Lucy Christensen entitled to the residue of the property to be enjoyed during her lifetime, and
in case of death without issue, one-half of said residue to be payable to Mrs. Carrie Louise C. Borton, etc., in accordance with
the provisions of the will of the testator Edward E. Christensen. The will was executed in Manila on March 5, 1951 and contains
the following provisions:
3. I declare ... that I have but ONE (1) child, named MARIA LUCY CHRISTENSEN (now Mrs. Bernard Daney), who was born in the
Philippines about twenty-eight years ago, and who is now residing at No. 665 Rodger Young Village, Los Angeles, California,
U.S.A.
4. I further declare that I now have no living ascendants, and no descendants except my above named daughter, MARIA LUCY
CHRISTENSEN DANEY.
xxx xxx xxx
7. I give, devise and bequeath unto MARIA HELEN CHRISTENSEN, now married to Eduardo Garcia, about eighteen years of age
and who, notwithstanding the fact that she was baptized Christensen, is not in any way related to me, nor has she been at any
time adopted by me, and who, from all information I have now resides in Egpit, Digos, Davao, Philippines, the sum of THREE
THOUSAND SIX HUNDRED PESOS (P3,600.00), Philippine Currency the same to be deposited in trust for the said Maria Helen
Christensen with the Davao Branch of the Philippine National Bank, and paid to her at the rate of One Hundred Pesos (P100.00),
Philippine Currency per month until the principal thereof as well as any interest which may have accrued thereon, is
exhausted..
xxx xxx xxx
12. I hereby give, devise and bequeath, unto my well-beloved daughter, the said MARIA LUCY CHRISTENSEN DANEY (Mrs.
Bernard Daney), now residing as aforesaid at No. 665 Rodger Young Village, Los Angeles, California, U.S.A., all the income from
the rest, remainder, and residue of my property and estate, real, personal and/or mixed, of whatsoever kind or character, and
wheresoever situated, of which I may be possessed at my death and which may have come to me from any source whatsoever,
during her lifetime: ....
It is in accordance with the above-quoted provisions that the executor in his final account and project of partition ratified the
payment of only P3,600 to Helen Christensen Garcia and proposed that the residue of the estate be transferred to his daughter,
Maria Lucy Christensen.
Opposition to the approval of the project of partition was filed by Helen Christensen Garcia, insofar as it deprives her (Helen) of
her legitime as an acknowledged natural child, she having been declared by Us in G.R. Nos. L-11483-84 an acknowledged
natural child of the deceased Edward E. Christensen. The legal grounds of opposition are (a) that the distribution should be
governed by the laws of the Philippines, and (b) that said order of distribution is contrary thereto insofar as it denies to Helen
Christensen, one of two acknowledged natural children, one-half of the estate in full ownership. In amplification of the above
grounds it was alleged that the law that should govern the estate of the deceased Christensen should not be the internal law of
California alone, but the entire law thereof because several foreign elements are involved, that the forum is the Philippines and
even if the case were decided in California, Section 946 of the California Civil Code, which requires that the domicile of the
decedent should apply, should be applicable. It was also alleged that Maria Helen Christensen having been declared an
acknowledged natural child of the decedent, she is deemed for all purposes legitimate from the time of her birth.
The court below ruled that as Edward E. Christensen was a citizen of the United States and of the State of California at the time
of his death, the successional rights and intrinsic validity of the provisions in his will are to be governed by the law of California,
in accordance with which a testator has the right to dispose of his property in the way he desires, because the right of absolute
dominion over his property is sacred and inviolable (In re McDaniel's Estate, 77 Cal. Appl. 2d 877, 176 P. 2d 952, and In re

55
Kaufman, 117 Cal. 286, 49 Pac. 192, cited in page 179, Record on Appeal). Oppositor Maria Helen Christensen, through counsel,
filed various motions for reconsideration, but these were denied. Hence, this appeal.
The most important assignments of error are as follows:
I
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN IGNORING THE DECISION OF THE HONORABLE SUPREME COURT THAT HELEN IS THE
ACKNOWLEDGED NATURAL CHILD OF EDWARD E. CHRISTENSEN AND, CONSEQUENTLY, IN DEPRIVING HER OF HER JUST SHARE
IN THE INHERITANCE.
II
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN ENTIRELY IGNORING AND/OR FAILING TO RECOGNIZE THE EXISTENCE OF SEVERAL FACTORS,
ELEMENTS AND CIRCUMSTANCES CALLING FOR THE APPLICATION OF INTERNAL LAW.
III
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO RECOGNIZE THAT UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW, PARTICULARLY UNDER THE RENVOI
DOCTRINE, THE INTRINSIC VALIDITY OF THE TESTAMENTARY DISPOSITION OF THE DISTRIBUTION OF THE ESTATE OF THE
DECEASED EDWARD E. CHRISTENSEN SHOULD BE GOVERNED BY THE LAWS OF THE PHILIPPINES.
IV
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT DECLARING THAT THE SCHEDULE OF DISTRIBUTION SUBMITTED BY THE EXECUTOR IS
CONTRARY TO THE PHILIPPINE LAWS.
V
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT DECLARING THAT UNDER THE PHILIPPINE LAWS HELEN CHRISTENSEN GARCIA IS ENTITLED
TO ONE-HALF (1/2) OF THE ESTATE IN FULL OWNERSHIP.
There is no question that Edward E. Christensen was a citizen of the United States and of the State of California at the time of
his death. But there is also no question that at the time of his death he was domiciled in the Philippines, as witness the
following facts admitted by the executor himself in appellee's brief:
In the proceedings for admission of the will to probate, the facts of record show that the deceased Edward E. Christensen was
born on November 29, 1875 in New York City, N.Y., U.S.A.; his first arrival in the Philippines, as an appointed school teacher,
was on July 1, 1901, on board the U.S. Army Transport "Sheridan" with Port of Embarkation as the City of San Francisco, in the
State of California, U.S.A. He stayed in the Philippines until 1904.
In December, 1904, Mr. Christensen returned to the United States and stayed there for the following nine years until 1913,
during which time he resided in, and was teaching school in Sacramento, California.
Mr. Christensen's next arrival in the Philippines was in July of the year 1913. However, in 1928, he again departed the
Philippines for the United States and came back here the following year, 1929. Some nine years later, in 1938, he again
returned to his own country, and came back to the Philippines the following year, 1939.
Wherefore, the parties respectfully pray that the foregoing stipulation of facts be admitted and approved by this Honorable
Court, without prejudice to the parties adducing other evidence to prove their case not covered by this stipulation of facts.
1äwphï1.ñët
Being an American citizen, Mr. Christensen was interned by the Japanese Military Forces in the Philippines during World War II.
Upon liberation, in April 1945, he left for the United States but returned to the Philippines in December, 1945. Appellees
Collective Exhibits "6", CFI Davao, Sp. Proc. 622, as Exhibits "AA", "BB" and "CC-Daney"; Exhs. "MM", "MM-l", "MM-2-Daney"
and p. 473, t.s.n., July 21, 1953.)
In April, 1951, Edward E. Christensen returned once more to California shortly after the making of his last will and testament
(now in question herein) which he executed at his lawyers' offices in Manila on March 5, 1951. He died at the St. Luke's Hospital
in the City of Manila on April 30, 1953. (pp. 2-3)
In arriving at the conclusion that the domicile of the deceased is the Philippines, we are persuaded by the fact that he was born
in New York, migrated to California and resided there for nine years, and since he came to the Philippines in 1913 he returned
to California very rarely and only for short visits (perhaps to relatives), and considering that he appears never to have owned or
acquired a home or properties in that state, which would indicate that he would ultimately abandon the Philippines and make
home in the State of California.

56
Sec. 16. Residence is a term used with many shades of meaning from mere temporary presence to the most permanent abode.
Generally, however, it is used to denote something more than mere physical presence. (Goodrich on Conflict of Laws, p. 29)
As to his citizenship, however, We find that the citizenship that he acquired in California when he resided in Sacramento,
California from 1904 to 1913, was never lost by his stay in the Philippines, for the latter was a territory of the United States (not
a state) until 1946 and the deceased appears to have considered himself as a citizen of California by the fact that when he
executed his will in 1951 he declared that he was a citizen of that State; so that he appears never to have intended to abandon
his California citizenship by acquiring another. This conclusion is in accordance with the following principle expounded by
Goodrich in his Conflict of Laws.
The terms "'residence" and "domicile" might well be taken to mean the same thing, a place of permanent abode. But domicile,
as has been shown, has acquired a technical meaning. Thus one may be domiciled in a place where he has never been. And he
may reside in a place where he has no domicile. The man with two homes, between which he divides his time, certainly resides
in each one, while living in it. But if he went on business which would require his presence for several weeks or months, he
might properly be said to have sufficient connection with the place to be called a resident. It is clear, however, that, if he
treated his settlement as continuing only for the particular business in hand, not giving up his former "home," he could not be a
domiciled New Yorker. Acquisition of a domicile of choice requires the exercise of intention as well as physical presence.
"Residence simply requires bodily presence of an inhabitant in a given place, while domicile requires bodily presence in that
place and also an intention to make it one's domicile." Residence, however, is a term used with many shades of meaning, from
the merest temporary presence to the most permanent abode, and it is not safe to insist that any one use et the only proper
one. (Goodrich, p. 29)
The law that governs the validity of his testamentary dispositions is defined in Article 16 of the Civil Code of the Philippines,
which is as follows:
ART. 16. Real property as well as personal property is subject to the law of the country where it is situated.
However, intestate and testamentary successions, both with respect to the order of succession and to the amount of
successional rights and to the intrinsic validity of testamentary provisions, shall be regulated by the national law of the person
whose succession is under consideration, whatever may be the nature of the property and regardless of the country where said
property may be found.
The application of this article in the case at bar requires the determination of the meaning of the term "national law" is used
therein.
There is no single American law governing the validity of testamentary provisions in the United States, each state of the Union
having its own private law applicable to its citizens only and in force only within the state. The "national law" indicated in Article
16 of the Civil Code above quoted can not, therefore, possibly mean or apply to any general American law. So it can refer to no
other than the private law of the State of California.
The next question is: What is the law in California governing the disposition of personal property? The decision of the court
below, sustains the contention of the executor-appellee that under the California Probate Code, a testator may dispose of his
property by will in the form and manner he desires, citing the case of Estate of McDaniel, 77 Cal. Appl. 2d 877, 176 P. 2d 952.
But appellant invokes the provisions of Article 946 of the Civil Code of California, which is as follows:
If there is no law to the contrary, in the place where personal property is situated, it is deemed to follow the person of its
owner, and is governed by the law of his domicile.
The existence of this provision is alleged in appellant's opposition and is not denied. We have checked it in the California Civil
Code and it is there. Appellee, on the other hand, relies on the case cited in the decision and testified to by a witness. (Only the
case of Kaufman is correctly cited.) It is argued on executor's behalf that as the deceased Christensen was a citizen of the State
of California, the internal law thereof, which is that given in the abovecited case, should govern the determination of the
validity of the testamentary provisions of Christensen's will, such law being in force in the State of California of which
Christensen was a citizen. Appellant, on the other hand, insists that Article 946 should be applicable, and in accordance
therewith and following the doctrine of the renvoi, the question of the validity of the testamentary provision in question should
be referred back to the law of the decedent's domicile, which is the Philippines.
The theory of doctrine of renvoi has been defined by various authors, thus:
The problem has been stated in this way: "When the Conflict of Laws rule of the forum refers a jural matter to a foreign law for
decision, is the reference to the purely internal rules of law of the foreign system; i.e., to the totality of the foreign law minus its
Conflict of Laws rules?"

57
On logic, the solution is not an easy one. The Michigan court chose to accept the renvoi, that is, applied the Conflict of Laws rule
of Illinois which referred the matter back to Michigan law. But once having determined the the Conflict of Laws principle is the
rule looked to, it is difficult to see why the reference back should not have been to Michigan Conflict of Laws. This would have
resulted in the "endless chain of references" which has so often been criticized be legal writers. The opponents of the renvoi
would have looked merely to the internal law of Illinois, thus rejecting the renvoi or the reference back. Yet there seems no
compelling logical reason why the original reference should be the internal law rather than to the Conflict of Laws rule. It is true
that such a solution avoids going on a merry-go-round, but those who have accepted the renvoi theory avoid this inextricabilis
circulas by getting off at the second reference and at that point applying internal law. Perhaps the opponents of the renvoi are a
bit more consistent for they look always to internal law as the rule of reference.
Strangely enough, both the advocates for and the objectors to the renvoi plead that greater uniformity will result from adoption
of their respective views. And still more strange is the fact that the only way to achieve uniformity in this choice-of-law problem
is if in the dispute the two states whose laws form the legal basis of the litigation disagree as to whether the renvoi should be
accepted. If both reject, or both accept the doctrine, the result of the litigation will vary with the choice of the forum. In the
case stated above, had the Michigan court rejected the renvoi, judgment would have been against the woman; if the suit had
been brought in the Illinois courts, and they too rejected the renvoi, judgment would be for the woman. The same result would
happen, though the courts would switch with respect to which would hold liability, if both courts accepted the renvoi.
The Restatement accepts the renvoi theory in two instances: where the title to land is in question, and where the validity of a
decree of divorce is challenged. In these cases the Conflict of Laws rule of the situs of the land, or the domicile of the parties in
the divorce case, is applied by the forum, but any further reference goes only to the internal law. Thus, a person's title to land,
recognized by the situs, will be recognized by every court; and every divorce, valid by the domicile of the parties, will be valid
everywhere. (Goodrich, Conflict of Laws, Sec. 7, pp. 13-14.)
X, a citizen of Massachusetts, dies intestate, domiciled in France, leaving movable property in Massachusetts, England, and
France. The question arises as to how this property is to be distributed among X's next of kin.
Assume (1) that this question arises in a Massachusetts court. There the rule of the conflict of laws as to intestate succession to
movables calls for an application of the law of the deceased's last domicile. Since by hypothesis X's last domicile was France, the
natural thing for the Massachusetts court to do would be to turn to French statute of distributions, or whatever corresponds
thereto in French law, and decree a distribution accordingly. An examination of French law, however, would show that if a
French court were called upon to determine how this property should be distributed, it would refer the distribution to the
national law of the deceased, thus applying the Massachusetts statute of distributions. So on the surface of things the
Massachusetts court has open to it alternative course of action: (a) either to apply the French law is to intestate succession, or
(b) to resolve itself into a French court and apply the Massachusetts statute of distributions, on the assumption that this is what
a French court would do. If it accepts the so-called renvoi doctrine, it will follow the latter course, thus applying its own law.
This is one type of renvoi. A jural matter is presented which the conflict-of-laws rule of the forum refers to a foreign law, the
conflict-of-laws rule of which, in turn, refers the matter back again to the law of the forum. This is renvoi in the narrower sense.
The German term for this judicial process is 'Ruckverweisung.'" (Harvard Law Review, Vol. 31, pp. 523-571.)
After a decision has been arrived at that a foreign law is to be resorted to as governing a particular case, the further question
may arise: Are the rules as to the conflict of laws contained in such foreign law also to be resorted to? This is a question which,
while it has been considered by the courts in but a few instances, has been the subject of frequent discussion by textwriters and
essayists; and the doctrine involved has been descriptively designated by them as the "Renvoyer" to send back, or the
"Ruchversweisung", or the "Weiterverweisung", since an affirmative answer to the question postulated and the operation of
the adoption of the foreign law in toto would in many cases result in returning the main controversy to be decided according to
the law of the forum. ... (16 C.J.S. 872.)
Another theory, known as the "doctrine of renvoi", has been advanced. The theory of the doctrine of renvoi is that the court of
the forum, in determining the question before it, must take into account the whole law of the other jurisdiction, but also its
rules as to conflict of laws, and then apply the law to the actual question which the rules of the other jurisdiction prescribe. This
may be the law of the forum. The doctrine of the renvoi has generally been repudiated by the American authorities. (2 Am. Jur.
296)
The scope of the theory of renvoi has also been defined and the reasons for its application in a country explained by Prof.
Lorenzen in an article in the Yale Law Journal, Vol. 27, 1917-1918, pp. 529-531. The pertinent parts of the article are quoted
herein below:
The recognition of the renvoi theory implies that the rules of the conflict of laws are to be understood as incorporating not only
the ordinary or internal law of the foreign state or country, but its rules of the conflict of laws as well. According to this theory
'the law of a country' means the whole of its law.

58
xxx xxx xxx
Von Bar presented his views at the meeting of the Institute of International Law, at Neuchatel, in 1900, in the form of the
following theses:
(1) Every court shall observe the law of its country as regards the application of foreign laws.
(2) Provided that no express provision to the contrary exists, the court shall respect:
(a) The provisions of a foreign law which disclaims the right to bind its nationals abroad as regards their personal statute, and
desires that said personal statute shall be determined by the law of the domicile, or even by the law of the place where the act
in question occurred.
(b) The decision of two or more foreign systems of law, provided it be certain that one of them is necessarily competent, which
agree in attributing the determination of a question to the same system of law.
xxx xxx xxx
If, for example, the English law directs its judge to distribute the personal estate of an Englishman who has died domiciled in
Belgium in accordance with the law of his domicile, he must first inquire whether the law of Belgium would distribute personal
property upon death in accordance with the law of domicile, and if he finds that the Belgian law would make the distribution in
accordance with the law of nationality — that is the English law — he must accept this reference back to his own law.
We note that Article 946 of the California Civil Code is its conflict of laws rule, while the rule applied in In re Kaufman, Supra, its
internal law. If the law on succession and the conflict of laws rules of California are to be enforced jointly, each in its own
intended and appropriate sphere, the principle cited In re Kaufman should apply to citizens living in the State, but Article 946
should apply to such of its citizens as are not domiciled in California but in other jurisdictions. The rule laid down of resorting to
the law of the domicile in the determination of matters with foreign element involved is in accord with the general principle of
American law that the domiciliary law should govern in most matters or rights which follow the person of the owner.
When a man dies leaving personal property in one or more states, and leaves a will directing the manner of distribution of the
property, the law of the state where he was domiciled at the time of his death will be looked to in deciding legal questions
about the will, almost as completely as the law of situs is consulted in questions about the devise of land. It is logical that, since
the domiciliary rules control devolution of the personal estate in case of intestate succession, the same rules should determine
the validity of an attempted testamentary dispostion of the property. Here, also, it is not that the domiciliary has effect beyond
the borders of the domiciliary state. The rules of the domicile are recognized as controlling by the Conflict of Laws rules at the
situs property, and the reason for the recognition as in the case of intestate succession, is the general convenience of the
doctrine. The New York court has said on the point: 'The general principle that a dispostiton of a personal property, valid at the
domicile of the owner, is valid anywhere, is one of the universal application. It had its origin in that international comity which
was one of the first fruits of civilization, and it this age, when business intercourse and the process of accumulating property
take but little notice of boundary lines, the practical wisdom and justice of the rule is more apparent than ever. (Goodrich,
Conflict of Laws, Sec. 164, pp. 442-443.)
Appellees argue that what Article 16 of the Civil Code of the Philippines pointed out as the national law is the internal law of
California. But as above explained the laws of California have prescribed two sets of laws for its citizens, one for residents
therein and another for those domiciled in other jurisdictions. Reason demands that We should enforce the California internal
law prescribed for its citizens residing therein, and enforce the conflict of laws rules for the citizens domiciled abroad. If we
must enforce the law of California as in comity we are bound to go, as so declared in Article 16 of our Civil Code, then we must
enforce the law of California in accordance with the express mandate thereof and as above explained, i.e., apply the internal
law for residents therein, and its conflict-of-laws rule for those domiciled abroad.
It is argued on appellees' behalf that the clause "if there is no law to the contrary in the place where the property is situated" in
Sec. 946 of the California Civil Code refers to Article 16 of the Civil Code of the Philippines and that the law to the contrary in
the Philippines is the provision in said Article 16 that the national law of the deceased should govern. This contention can not
be sustained. As explained in the various authorities cited above the national law mentioned in Article 16 of our Civil Code is the
law on conflict of laws in the California Civil Code, i.e., Article 946, which authorizes the reference or return of the question to
the law of the testator's domicile. The conflict of laws rule in California, Article 946, Civil Code, precisely refers back the case,
when a decedent is not domiciled in California, to the law of his domicile, the Philippines in the case at bar. The court of the
domicile can not and should not refer the case back to California; such action would leave the issue incapable of determination
because the case will then be like a football, tossed back and forth between the two states, between the country of which the
decedent was a citizen and the country of his domicile. The Philippine court must apply its own law as directed in the conflict of
laws rule of the state of the decedent, if the question has to be decided, especially as the application of the internal law of

59
California provides no legitime for children while the Philippine law, Arts. 887(4) and 894, Civil Code of the Philippines, makes
natural children legally acknowledged forced heirs of the parent recognizing them.
The Philippine cases (In re Estate of Johnson, 39 Phil. 156; Riera vs. Palmaroli, 40 Phil. 105; Miciano vs. Brimo, 50 Phil. 867;
Babcock Templeton vs. Rider Babcock, 52 Phil. 130; and Gibbs vs. Government, 59 Phil. 293.) cited by appellees to support the
decision can not possibly apply in the case at bar, for two important reasons, i.e., the subject in each case does not appear to be
a citizen of a state in the United States but with domicile in the Philippines, and it does not appear in each case that there exists
in the state of which the subject is a citizen, a law similar to or identical with Art. 946 of the California Civil Code.
We therefore find that as the domicile of the deceased Christensen, a citizen of California, is the Philippines, the validity of the
provisions of his will depriving his acknowledged natural child, the appellant, should be governed by the Philippine Law, the
domicile, pursuant to Art. 946 of the Civil Code of California, not by the internal law of California..
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby reversed and the case returned to the lower court with instructions that the
partition be made as the Philippine law on succession provides. Judgment reversed, with costs against appellees.

60
G.R. No. L-23678 June 6, 1967
TESTATE ESTATE OF AMOS G. BELLIS, deceased.
PEOPLE'S BANK and TRUST COMPANY, executor.
MARIA CRISTINA BELLIS and MIRIAM PALMA BELLIS, oppositors-appellants,
vs.
EDWARD A. BELLIS, ET AL., heirs-appellees.
Vicente R. Macasaet and Jose D. Villena for oppositors appellants.
Paredes, Poblador, Cruz and Nazareno for heirs-appellees E. A. Bellis, et al.
Quijano and Arroyo for heirs-appellees W. S. Bellis, et al.
J. R. Balonkita for appellee People's Bank & Trust Company.
Ozaeta, Gibbs and Ozaeta for appellee A. B. Allsman.
BENGZON, J.P., J.:
This is a direct appeal to Us, upon a question purely of law, from an order of the Court of First Instance of Manila dated April 30,
1964, approving the project of partition filed by the executor in Civil Case No. 37089 therein.1äwphï1.ñët
The facts of the case are as follows:
Amos G. Bellis, born in Texas, was "a citizen of the State of Texas and of the United States." By his first wife, Mary E. Mallen,
whom he divorced, he had five legitimate children: Edward A. Bellis, George Bellis (who pre-deceased him in infancy), Henry A.
Bellis, Alexander Bellis and Anna Bellis Allsman; by his second wife, Violet Kennedy, who survived him, he had three legitimate
children: Edwin G. Bellis, Walter S. Bellis and Dorothy Bellis; and finally, he had three illegitimate children: Amos Bellis, Jr.,
Maria Cristina Bellis and Miriam Palma Bellis.
On August 5, 1952, Amos G. Bellis executed a will in the Philippines, in which he directed that after all taxes, obligations, and
expenses of administration are paid for, his distributable estate should be divided, in trust, in the following order and manner:
(a) $240,000.00 to his first wife, Mary E. Mallen; (b) P120,000.00 to his three illegitimate children, Amos Bellis, Jr., Maria
Cristina Bellis, Miriam Palma Bellis, or P40,000.00 each and (c) after the foregoing two items have been satisfied, the remainder
shall go to his seven surviving children by his first and second wives, namely: Edward A. Bellis, Henry A. Bellis, Alexander Bellis
and Anna Bellis Allsman, Edwin G. Bellis, Walter S. Bellis, and Dorothy E. Bellis, in equal shares.1äwphï1.ñët
Subsequently, or on July 8, 1958, Amos G. Bellis died a resident of San Antonio, Texas, U.S.A. His will was admitted to probate in
the Court of First Instance of Manila on September 15, 1958.
The People's Bank and Trust Company, as executor of the will, paid all the bequests therein including the amount of
$240,000.00 in the form of shares of stock to Mary E. Mallen and to the three (3) illegitimate children, Amos Bellis, Jr., Maria
Cristina Bellis and Miriam Palma Bellis, various amounts totalling P40,000.00 each in satisfaction of their respective legacies, or
a total of P120,000.00, which it released from time to time according as the lower court approved and allowed the various
motions or petitions filed by the latter three requesting partial advances on account of their respective legacies.
On January 8, 1964, preparatory to closing its administration, the executor submitted and filed its "Executor's Final Account,
Report of Administration and Project of Partition" wherein it reported, inter alia, the satisfaction of the legacy of Mary E.
Mallen by the delivery to her of shares of stock amounting to $240,000.00, and the legacies of Amos Bellis, Jr., Maria Cristina
Bellis and Miriam Palma Bellis in the amount of P40,000.00 each or a total of P120,000.00. In the project of partition, the
executor — pursuant to the "Twelfth" clause of the testator's Last Will and Testament — divided the residuary estate into
seven equal portions for the benefit of the testator's seven legitimate children by his first and second marriages.
On January 17, 1964, Maria Cristina Bellis and Miriam Palma Bellis filed their respective oppositions to the project of partition
on the ground that they were deprived of their legitimes as illegitimate children and, therefore, compulsory heirs of the
deceased.
Amos Bellis, Jr. interposed no opposition despite notice to him, proof of service of which is evidenced by the registry receipt
submitted on April 27, 1964 by the executor.1
After the parties filed their respective memoranda and other pertinent pleadings, the lower court, on April 30, 1964, issued an
order overruling the oppositions and approving the executor's final account, report and administration and project of partition.
Relying upon Art. 16 of the Civil Code, it applied the national law of the decedent, which in this case is Texas law, which did not
provide for legitimes.
Their respective motions for reconsideration having been denied by the lower court on June 11, 1964, oppositors-appellants
appealed to this Court to raise the issue of which law must apply — Texas law or Philippine law.

61
In this regard, the parties do not submit the case on, nor even discuss, the doctrine of renvoi, applied by this Court in Aznar v.
Christensen Garcia, L-16749, January 31, 1963. Said doctrine is usually pertinent where the decedent is a national of one
country, and a domicile of another. In the present case, it is not disputed that the decedent was both a national of Texas and a
domicile thereof at the time of his death.2 So that even assuming Texas has a conflict of law rule providing that the domiciliary
system (law of the domicile) should govern, the same would not result in a reference back (renvoi) to Philippine law, but would
still refer to Texas law. Nonetheless, if Texas has a conflicts rule adopting the situs theory (lex rei sitae) calling for the
application of the law of the place where the properties are situated, renvoi would arise, since the properties here involved are
found in the Philippines. In the absence, however, of proof as to the conflict of law rule of Texas, it should not be presumed
different from ours.3 Appellants' position is therefore not rested on the doctrine of renvoi. As stated, they never invoked nor
even mentioned it in their arguments. Rather, they argue that their case falls under the circumstances mentioned in the third
paragraph of Article 17 in relation to Article 16 of the Civil Code.
Article 16, par. 2, and Art. 1039 of the Civil Code, render applicable the national law of the decedent, in intestate or
testamentary successions, with regard to four items: (a) the order of succession; (b) the amount of successional rights; (e) the
intrinsic validity of the provisions of the will; and (d) the capacity to succeed. They provide that —
ART. 16. Real property as well as personal property is subject to the law of the country where it is situated.
However, intestate and testamentary successions, both with respect to the order of succession and to the amount of
successional rights and to the intrinsic validity of testamentary provisions, shall be regulated by the national law of the person
whose succession is under consideration, whatever may he the nature of the property and regardless of the country wherein
said property may be found.
ART. 1039. Capacity to succeed is governed by the law of the nation of the decedent.
Appellants would however counter that Art. 17, paragraph three, of the Civil Code, stating that —
Prohibitive laws concerning persons, their acts or property, and those which have for their object public order, public policy and
good customs shall not be rendered ineffective by laws or judgments promulgated, or by determinations or conventions agreed
upon in a foreign country.
prevails as the exception to Art. 16, par. 2 of the Civil Code afore-quoted. This is not correct. Precisely, Congress deleted the
phrase, "notwithstanding the provisions of this and the next preceding article" when they incorporated Art. 11 of the old Civil
Code as Art. 17 of the new Civil Code, while reproducing without substantial change the second paragraph of Art. 10 of the old
Civil Code as Art. 16 in the new. It must have been their purpose to make the second paragraph of Art. 16 a specific provision in
itself which must be applied in testate and intestate succession. As further indication of this legislative intent, Congress added a
new provision, under Art. 1039, which decrees that capacity to succeed is to be governed by the national law of the decedent.
It is therefore evident that whatever public policy or good customs may be involved in our System of legitimes, Congress has
not intended to extend the same to the succession of foreign nationals. For it has specifically chosen to leave, inter alia, the
amount of successional rights, to the decedent's national law. Specific provisions must prevail over general ones.
Appellants would also point out that the decedent executed two wills — one to govern his Texas estate and the other his
Philippine estate — arguing from this that he intended Philippine law to govern his Philippine estate. Assuming that such was
the decedent's intention in executing a separate Philippine will, it would not alter the law, for as this Court ruled in Miciano v.
Brimo, 50 Phil. 867, 870, a provision in a foreigner's will to the effect that his properties shall be distributed in accordance with
Philippine law and not with his national law, is illegal and void, for his national law cannot be ignored in regard to those matters
that Article 10 — now Article 16 — of the Civil Code states said national law should govern.
The parties admit that the decedent, Amos G. Bellis, was a citizen of the State of Texas, U.S.A., and that under the laws of Texas,
there are no forced heirs or legitimes. Accordingly, since the intrinsic validity of the provision of the will and the amount of
successional rights are to be determined under Texas law, the Philippine law on legitimes cannot be applied to the testacy of
Amos G. Bellis.
Wherefore, the order of the probate court is hereby affirmed in toto, with costs against appellants. So ordered.

62
G.R. No. 108581 December 8, 1999
LOURDES L. DOROTHEO, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, NILDA D. QUINTANA, for Herself and as Attorney-in-Fact of VICENTE DOROTHEO and JOSE DOROTHEO,
respondents.

YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
May a last will and testament admitted to probate but declared intrinsically void in an order that has become final and
executory still be given effect? This is the issue that arose from the following antecedents:
Private respondents were the legitimate children of Alejandro Dorotheo and Aniceta Reyes. The latter died in 1969 without her
estate being settled. Alejandro died thereafter. Sometime in 1977, after Alejandro's death, petitioner, who claims to have taken
care of Alejandro before he died, filed a special proceeding for the probate of the latter's last will and testament. In 1981, the
court issued an order admitting Alejandro's will to probate. Private respondents did not appeal from said order. In 1983, they
filed a "Motion To Declare The Will Intrinsically Void." The trial court granted the motion and issued an order, the dispositive
portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, Order is hereby issued declaring Lourdes Legaspi not the wife of the late Alejandro
Dorotheo, the provisions of the last will and testament of Alejandro Dorotheo as intrinsically void, and declaring the oppositors
Vicente Dorotheo, Jose Dorotheo and Nilda Dorotheo Quintana as the only heirs of the late spouses Alejandro Dorotheo and
Aniceta Reyes, whose respective estates shall be liquidated and distributed according to the laws on intestacy upon payment of
estate and other taxes due to the government.1
Petitioner moved for reconsideration arguing that she is entitled to some compensation since she took care of Alejandro prior
to his death although she admitted that they were not married to each other. Upon denial of her motion for reconsideration,
petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals, but the same was dismissed for failure to file appellant's brief within the extended
period
granted.2 This dismissal became final and executory on February 3, 1989 and a corresponding entry of judgment was forthwith
issued by the Court of Appeals on May 16, 1989. A writ of execution was issued by the lower court to implement the final and
executory Order. Consequently, private respondents filed several motions including a motion to compel petitioner to surrender
to them the Transfer Certificates of Titles (TCT) covering the properties of the late Alejandro. When petitioner refused to
surrender the TCT's, private respondents filed a motion for cancellation of said titles and for issuance of new titles in their
names. Petitioner opposed the motion.
An Order was issued on November 29, 1990 by Judge Zain B. Angas setting aside the final and executory Order dated January
30, 1986, as well as the Order directing the issuance of the writ of execution, on the ground that the order was merely
"interlocutory", hence not final in character. The court added that the dispositive portion of the said Order even directs the
distribution of the estate of the deceased spouses. Private respondents filed a motion for reconsideration which was denied in
an Order dated February 1, 1991. Thus, private respondents filed a petition before the Court of Appeals, which nullified the two
assailed Orders dated November 29, 1990 and February 1, 1991.
Aggrieved, petitioner instituted a petition for review arguing that the case filed by private respondents before the Court of
Appeals was a petition under Rule 65 on the ground of grave abuse of discretion or lack of jurisdiction. Petitioner contends that
in issuing the two assailed orders, Judge Angas cannot be said to have no jurisdiction because he was particularly designated to
hear the case. Petitioner likewise assails the Order of the Court of Appeals upholding the validity of the January 30, 1986 Order
which declared the intrinsic invalidity of Alejandro's will that was earlier admitted to probate.
Petitioner also filed a motion to reinstate her as executrix of the estate of the late Alejandro and to maintain the status quo or
lease of the premises thereon to third parties.3 Private respondents opposed the motion on the ground that petitioner has no
interest in the estate since she is not the lawful wife of the late Alejandro.
The petition is without merit. A final and executory decision or order can no longer be disturbed or reopened no matter how
erroneous it may be. In setting aside the January 30, 1986 Order that has attained finality, the trial court in effect nullified the
entry of judgment made by the Court of Appeals. It is well settled that a lower court cannot reverse or set aside decisions or
orders of a superior court, for to do so would be to negate the hierarchy of courts and nullify the essence of review. It has been
ruled that a final judgment on probated will, albeit erroneous, is binding on the whole world. 4
It has been consistently held that if no appeal is taken in due time from a judgment or order of the trial court, the same attains
finality by mere lapse of time. Thus, the order allowing the will became final and the question determined by the court in such
order can no longer be raised anew, either in the same proceedings or in a different motion. The matters of due execution of

63
the will and the capacity of the testator acquired the character of res judicata and cannot again be brought into question, all
juridical questions in connection therewith being for once and forever closed.5 Such final order makes the will conclusive
against the whole world as to its extrinsic validity and due execution.6
It should be noted that probate proceedings deals generally with the extrinsic validity of the will sought to be probated,7
particularly on three aspects:
n whether the will submitted is indeed, the decedent's last will and testament;
n compliance with the prescribed formalities for the execution of wills;
n the testamentary capacity of the testator; 8
n and the due execution of the last will and testament.9
Under the Civil Code, due execution includes a determination of whether the testator was of sound and disposing mind at the
time of its execution, that he had freely executed the will and was not acting under duress, fraud, menace or undue influence
and that the will is genuine and not a forgery, 10 that he was of the proper testamentary age and that he is a person not
expressly prohibited by law from making a will. 11
The intrinsic validity is another matter and questions regarding the same may still be raised even after the will has been
authenticated. 12 Thus, it does not necessarily follow that an extrinsically valid last will and testament is always intrinsically
valid. Even if the will was validly executed, if the testator provides for dispositions that deprives or impairs the lawful heirs of
their legitime or rightful inheritance according to the laws on succession, 13 the unlawful provisions/dispositions thereof
cannot be given effect. This is specially so when the courts had already determined in a final and executory decision that the
will is intrinsically void. Such determination having attained that character of finality is binding on this Court which will no
longer be disturbed. Not that this Court finds the will to be intrinsically valid, but that a final and executory decision of which
the party had the opportunity to challenge before the higher tribunals must stand and should no longer be reevaluated. Failure
to avail of the remedies provided by law constitutes waiver. And if the party does not avail of other remedies despite its belief
that it was aggrieved by a decision or court action, then it is deemed to have fully agreed and is satisfied with the decision or
order. As early as 1918, it has been declared that public policy and sound practice demand that, at the risk of occasional errors,
judgments of courts must at some point of time fixed by law 14 become final otherwise there will be no end to litigation.
Interes rei publicae ut finis sit litium — the very object of which the courts were constituted was to put an end to controversies.
15 To fulfill this purpose and to do so speedily, certain time limits, more or less arbitrary, have to be set up to spur on the
slothful. 16 The only instance where a party interested in a probate proceeding may have a final liquidation set aside is when he
is left out by reason of circumstances beyond his control or through mistake or inadvertence not imputable to negligence, 17
which circumstances do not concur herein.
Petitioner was privy to the suit calling for the declaration of the intrinsic invalidity of the will, as she precisely appealed from an
unfavorable order therefrom. Although the final and executory Order of January 30, 1986 wherein private respondents were
declared as the only heirs do not bind those who are not parties thereto such as the alleged illegitimate son of the testator, the
same constitutes res judicata with respect to those who were parties to the probate proceedings. Petitioner cannot again raise
those matters anew for relitigation otherwise that would amount to forum-shopping. It should be remembered that forum
shopping also occurs when the same issue had already been resolved adversely by some other court. 18 It is clear from the
executory order that the estates of Alejandro and his spouse should be distributed according to the laws of intestate
succession.
Petitioner posits that the January 30, 1986 Order is merely interlocutory, hence it can still be set aside by the trial court. In
support thereof, petitioner argues that "an order merely declaring who are heirs and the shares to which set of heirs is entitled
cannot be the basis of execution to require delivery of shares from one person to another particularly when no project of
partition has been filed." 19 The trial court declared in the January 30, 1986 Order that petitioner is not the legal wife of
Alejandro, whose only heirs are his three legitimate children (petitioners herein), and at the same time it nullified the will. But it
should be noted that in the same Order, the trial court also said that the estate of the late spouses be distributed according to
the laws of intestacy. Accordingly, it has no option but to implement that order of intestate distribution and not to reopen and
again re-examine the intrinsic provisions of the same will.
It can be clearly inferred from Article 960 of the Civil Code, on the law of successional rights that testacy is preferred to
intestacy. 20 But before there could be testate distribution, the will must pass the scrutinizing test and safeguards provided by
law considering that the deceased testator is no longer available to prove the voluntariness of his actions, aside from the fact
that the transfer of the estate is usually onerous in nature and that no one is presumed to give — Nemo praesumitur donare. 21
No intestate distribution of the estate can be done until and unless the will had failed to pass both its extrinsic and intrinsic
validity. If the will is extrinsically void, the rules of intestacy apply regardless of the intrinsic validity thereof. If it is extrinsically
valid, the next test is to determine its intrinsic validity — that is whether the provisions of the will are valid according to the

64
laws of succession. In this case, the court had ruled that the will of Alejandro was extrinsically valid but the intrinsic provisions
thereof were void. Thus, the rules of intestacy apply as correctly held by the trial court.
Furthermore, Alejandro's disposition in his will of the alleged share in the conjugal properties of his late spouse, whom he
described as his "only beloved wife", is not a valid reason to reverse a final and executory order. Testamentary dispositions of
properties not belonging exclusively to the testator or properties which are part of the conjugal regime cannot be given effect.
Matters with respect to who owns the properties that were disposed of by Alejandro in the void will may still be properly
ventilated and determined in the intestate proceedings for the settlement of his and that of his late spouse's estate.
Petitioner's motion for appointment as administratrix is rendered moot considering that she was not married to the late
Alejandro and, therefore, is not an heir.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED and the decision appealed from is AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.

65
G.R. No. 122880 April 12, 2006
FELIX AZUELA, Petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, GERALDA AIDA CASTILLO substituted by ERNESTO G. CASTILLO, Respondents.
DECISION
TINGA, J.:
The core of this petition is a highly defective notarial will, purportedly executed by Eugenia E. Igsolo (decedent), who died on 16
December 1982 at the age of 80. In refusing to give legal recognition to the due execution of this document, the Court is
provided the opportunity to assert a few important doctrinal rules in the execution of notarial wills, all self-evident in view of
Articles 805 and 806 of the Civil Code.
A will whose attestation clause does not contain the number of pages on which the will is written is fatally defective. A will
whose attestation clause is not signed by the instrumental witnesses is fatally defective. And perhaps most importantly, a
will which does not contain an acknowledgment, but a mere jurat, is fatally defective. Any one of these defects is sufficient
to deny probate. A notarial will with all three defects is just aching for judicial rejection.
There is a distinct and consequential reason the Civil Code provides a comprehensive catalog of imperatives for the proper
execution of a notarial will. Full and faithful compliance with all the detailed requisites under Article 805 of the Code leave little
room for doubt as to the validity in the due execution of the notarial will. Article 806 likewise imposes another safeguard to the
validity of notarial wills — that they be acknowledged before a notary public by the testator and the witnesses. A notarial will
executed with indifference to these two codal provisions opens itself to nagging questions as to its legitimacy.
The case stems from a petition for probate filed on 10 April 1984 with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila. The petition
filed by petitioner Felix Azuela sought to admit to probate the notarial will of Eugenia E. Igsolo, which was notarized on 10 June
1981. Petitioner is the son of the cousin of the decedent.
The will, consisting of two (2) pages and written in the vernacular Pilipino, read in full:
HULING HABILIN NI EUGENIA E. IGSOLO
SA NGALAN NG MAYKAPAL, AMEN:
AKO, si EUGENIA E. IGSOLO, nakatira sa 500 San Diego St., Sampaloc, Manila, pitongput siyam (79) na gulang, nasa hustong
pagi-isip, pag-unawa at memoria ay nag-hahayag na ito na ang aking huling habilin at testamento, at binabali wala ko lahat ang
naunang ginawang habilin o testamento:
Una-Hinihiling ko na ako ay mailibing sa Sementerio del Norte, La Loma sang-ayong sa kaugalian at patakaran ng simbahang
katoliko at ang taga-pag-ingat (Executor) ng habiling ito ay magtatayo ng bantayog upang silbing ala-ala sa akin ng aking pamilya
at kaibigan;
Pangalawa-Aking ipinagkakaloob at isinasalin ang lahat ng karapatan sa aking pamangkin na si Felix Azuela, na siyang nag-alaga
sa akin sa mahabang panahon, yaong mga bahay na nakatirik sa lote numero 28, Block 24 at nakapangalan sa Pechaten
Korporasyon, ganoon din ibinibigay ko ang lahat ng karapatan sa bahay na nakatirik sa inoopahan kong lote, numero 43, Block
24 na pag-aari ng Pechaten Corporation. Ipinagkakaloob kong buong buo ang lahat ng karapatan sa bahay at lupa na nasa 500
San Diego St., Lot 42, Block 24, Sampaloc, Manila kay Felix Azuela at ang pagkakaloob kong ito ay walang pasubali’t at
kondiciones;
Pangatlo- Na ninunumbrahan ko si VART PAGUE na siyang nagpapatupad ng huling habiling ito at kagustuhan ko rin na hindi na
kailanman siyang mag-lagak ng piyansiya.
Aking nilagdaan ang Huling Habilin na ito dito sa Maynila ika 10 ng Hunyo, 1981.
(Sgd.)
EUGENIA E. IGSOLO
(Tagapagmana)
PATUNAY NG MGA SAKSI
Ang kasulatang ito, na binubuo ng ____ dahon pati ang huling dahong ito, na ipinahayag sa amin ni Eugenia E. Igsolo,
tagapagmana na siya niyang Huling Habilin, ngayon ika-10 ng Hunyo 1981, ay nilagdaan ng nasabing tagapagmana sa ilalim ng
kasulatang nabanggit at sa kaliwang panig ng lahat at bawa’t dahon, sa harap ng lahat at bawa’t sa amin, at kami namang mga
saksi ay lumagda sa harap ng nasabing tagapagmana at sa harap ng lahat at bawa’t isa sa amin, sa ilalim ng nasabing kasulatan
at sa kaliwang panig ng lahat at bawa’t dahon ng kasulatan ito.

66
EUGENIA E. IGSOLO
address: 500 San Diego St.
Sampaloc, Manila Res. Cert. No. A-7717-37
Issued at Manila on March 10, 1981.
QUIRINO AGRAVA
address: 1228-Int. 3, Kahilum
Pandacan, Manila Res. Cert. No. A-458365
Issued at Manila on Jan. 21, 1981
LAMBERTO C. LEAÑO
address: Avenue 2, Blcok 7,
Lot 61, San Gabriel, G.MA., Cavite Res.
Cert. No. A-768277 issued at Carmona, Cavite on Feb. 7, 1981
JUANITO ESTRERA
address: City Court Compound,
City of Manila Res. Cert. No. A574829
Issued at Manila on March 2, 1981.
Nilagdaan ko at ninotario ko ngayong 10 ng Hunyo 10, 1981 dito sa Lungsod ng Maynila.
(Sgd.)
PETRONIO Y. BAUTISTA
Doc. No. 1232 ; NOTARIO PUBLIKO
Page No. 86 ; Until Dec. 31, 1981
Book No. 43 ; PTR-152041-1/2/81-Manila
Series of 1981 TAN # 1437-977-81
The three named witnesses to the will affixed their signatures on the left-hand margin of both pages of the will, but not at the
bottom of the attestation clause.
The probate petition adverted to only two (2) heirs, legatees and devisees of the decedent, namely: petitioner himself, and one
Irene Lynn Igsolo, who was alleged to have resided abroad. Petitioner prayed that the will be allowed, and that letters
testamentary be issued to the designated executor, Vart Prague.
The petition was opposed by Geralda Aida Castillo (Geralda Castillo), who represented herself as the attorney-in-fact of "the 12
legitimate heirs" of the decedent.2 Geralda Castillo claimed that the will is a forgery, and that the true purpose of its emergence
was so it could be utilized as a defense in several court cases filed by oppositor against petitioner, particularly for forcible entry
and usurpation of real property, all centering on petitioner’s right to occupy the properties of the decedent. 3 It also asserted
that contrary to the representations of petitioner, the decedent was actually survived by 12 legitimate heirs, namely her
grandchildren, who were then residing abroad. Per records, it was subsequently alleged that decedent was the widow of
Bonifacio Igsolo, who died in 1965,4 and the mother of a legitimate child, Asuncion E. Igsolo, who predeceased her mother by
three (3) months.5
Oppositor Geralda Castillo also argued that the will was not executed and attested to in accordance with law. She pointed out
that decedent’s signature did not appear on the second page of the will, and the will was not properly acknowledged. These
twin arguments are among the central matters to this petition.
After due trial, the RTC admitted the will to probate, in an Order dated 10 August 1992.6 The RTC favorably took into account
the testimony of the three (3) witnesses to the will, Quirino Agrava, Lamberto Leano, and Juanito Estrada. The RTC also called
to fore "the modern tendency in respect to the formalities in the execution of a will x x x with the end in view of giving the
testator more freedom in expressing his last wishes;"7 and from this perspective, rebutted oppositor’s arguments that the will
was not properly executed and attested to in accordance with law.
After a careful examination of the will and consideration of the testimonies of the subscribing and attesting witnesses, and
having in mind the modern tendency in respect to the formalities in the execution of a will, i.e., the liberalization of the
interpretation of the law on the formal requirements of a will with the end in view of giving the testator more freedom in
expressing his last wishes, this Court is persuaded to rule that the will in question is authentic and had been executed by the
testatrix in accordance with law.
On the issue of lack of acknowledgement, this Court has noted that at the end of the will after the signature of the testatrix, the
following statement is made under the sub-title, "Patunay Ng Mga Saksi":

67
"Ang kasulatang ito, na binubuo ng _____ dahon pati ang huling dahong ito, na ipinahayag sa amin ni Eugenia N. Igsolo,
tagapagmana na siya niyang Huling Habilin, ngayong ika-10 ng Hunyo 1981, ay nilagdaan ng nasabing tagapagmana sa ilalim ng
kasulatang nabanggit at sa kaliwang panig ng lahat at bawa’t dahon, sa harap ng lahat at bawa’t sa amin, at kami namang mga
saksi ay lumagda sa harap ng nasabing tagapagmana at sa harap ng lahat at bawa’t isa sa amin, sa ilalim ng nasabing kasulatan
at sa kaliwang panig ng lahat at bawa’t dahon ng kasulatan ito."
The aforequoted declaration comprises the attestation clause and the acknowledgement and is considered by this Court as a
substantial compliance with the requirements of the law.
On the oppositor’s contention that the attestation clause was not signed by the subscribing witnesses at the bottom thereof,
this Court is of the view that the signing by the subscribing witnesses on the left margin of the second page of the will
containing the attestation clause and acknowledgment, instead of at the bottom thereof, substantially satisfies the purpose of
identification and attestation of the will.
With regard to the oppositor’s argument that the will was not numbered correlatively in letters placed on upper part of each
page and that the attestation did not state the number of pages thereof, it is worthy to note that the will is composed of only
two pages. The first page contains the entire text of the testamentary dispositions, and the second page contains the last
portion of the attestation clause and acknowledgement. Such being so, the defects are not of a serious nature as to invalidate
the will. For the same reason, the failure of the testatrix to affix her signature on the left margin of the second page, which
contains only the last portion of the attestation clause and acknowledgment is not a fatal defect.
As regards the oppositor’s assertion that the signature of the testatrix on the will is a forgery, the testimonies of the three
subscribing witnesses to the will are convincing enough to establish the genuineness of the signature of the testatrix and the
due execution of the will.8
The Order was appealed to the Court of Appeals by Ernesto Castillo, who had substituted his since deceased mother-in-law,
Geralda Castillo. In a Decision dated 17 August 1995, the Court of Appeals reversed the trial court and ordered the dismissal of
the petition for probate.9 The Court of Appeals noted that the attestation clause failed to state the number of pages used in the
will, thus rendering the will void and undeserving of probate.10
Hence, the present petition.
Petitioner argues that the requirement under Article 805 of the Civil Code that "the number of pages used in a notarial will be
stated in the attestation clause" is merely directory, rather than mandatory, and thus susceptible to what he termed as "the
substantial compliance rule."11
The solution to this case calls for the application of Articles 805 and 806 of the Civil Code, which we replicate in full.
Art. 805. Every will, other than a holographic will, must be subscribed at the end thereof by the testator himself or by the
testator's name written by some other person in his presence, and by his express direction, and attested and subscribed by
three or more credible witnesses in the presence of the testator and of one another.
The testator or the person requested by him to write his name and the instrumental witnesses of the will, shall also sign, as
aforesaid, each and every page thereof, except the last, on the left margin, and all the pages shall be numbered correlatively in
letters placed on the upper part of each page.
The attestation shall state the number of pages used upon which the will is written, and the fact that the testator signed the
will and every page thereof, or caused some other person to write his name, under his express direction, in the presence of the
instrumental witnesses, and that the latter witnessed and signed the will and all the pages thereof in the presence of the
testator and of one another.
If the attestation clause is in a language not known to the witnesses, it shall be interpreted to them.
Art. 806. Every will must be acknowledged before a notary public by the testator and the witnesses. The notary public shall not
be required to retain a copy of the will, or file another with the office of the Clerk of Court.
The appellate court, in its Decision, considered only one defect, the failure of the attestation clause to state the number of
pages of the will. But an examination of the will itself reveals several more deficiencies.
As admitted by petitioner himself, the attestation clause fails to state the number of pages of the will.12 There was an
incomplete attempt to comply with this requisite, a space having been allotted for the insertion of the number of pages in the
attestation clause. Yet the blank was never filled in; hence, the requisite was left uncomplied with.
The Court of Appeals pounced on this defect in reversing the trial court, citing in the process Uy Coque v. Navas L. Sioca13 and In
re: Will of Andrada.14 In Uy Coque, the Court noted that among the defects of the will in question was the failure of the
attestation clause to state the number of pages contained in the will.15 In ruling that the will could not be admitted to probate,

68
the Court made the following consideration which remains highly relevant to this day: "The purpose of requiring the number of
sheets to be stated in the attestation clause is obvious; the document might easily be so prepared that the removal of a sheet
would completely change the testamentary dispositions of the will and in the absence of a statement of the total number of
sheets such removal might be effected by taking out the sheet and changing the numbers at the top of the following sheets
or pages. If, on the other hand, the total number of sheets is stated in the attestation clause the falsification of the document
will involve the inserting of new pages and the forging of the signatures of the testator and witnesses in the margin, a matter
attended with much greater difficulty."16
The case of In re Will of Andrada concerned a will the attestation clause of which failed to state the number of sheets or pages
used. This consideration alone was sufficient for the Court to declare "unanim[ity] upon the point that the defect pointed out in
the attesting clause is fatal."17 It was further observed that "it cannot be denied that the x x x requirement affords additional
security against the danger that the will may be tampered with; and as the Legislature has seen fit to prescribe this
requirement, it must be considered material."18
Against these cited cases, petitioner cites Singson v. Florentino19 and Taboada v. Hon. Rosal,20 wherein the Court allowed
probate to the wills concerned therein despite the fact that the attestation clause did not state the number of pages of the will.
Yet the appellate court itself considered the import of these two cases, and made the following distinction which petitioner is
unable to rebut, and which we adopt with approval:
Even a cursory examination of the Will (Exhibit "D"), will readily show that the attestation does not state the number of pages
used upon which the will is written. Hence, the Will is void and undeserving of probate.
We are not impervious of the Decisions of the Supreme Court in "Manuel Singson versus Emilia Florentino, et al., 92 Phil. 161
and Apolonio [Taboada] versus Hon. Avelino Rosal, et al., 118 SCRA 195," to the effect that a will may still be valid even if the
attestation does not contain the number of pages used upon which the Will is written. However, the Decisions of the Supreme
Court are not applicable in the aforementioned appeal at bench. This is so because, in the case of "Manuel Singson versus
Emilia Florentino, et al., supra," although the attestation in the subject Will did not state the number of pages used in the will,
however, the same was found in the last part of the body of the Will:
"x x x
The law referred to is article 618 of the Code of Civil Procedure, as amended by Act No. 2645, which requires that the
attestation clause shall state the number of pages or sheets upon which the will is written, which requirement has been held to
be mandatory as an effective safeguard against the possibility of interpolation or omission of some of the pages of the will to
the prejudice of the heirs to whom the property is intended to be bequeathed (In re Will of Andrada, 42 Phil. 180; Uy Coque vs.
Navas L. Sioca, 43 Phil., 405; Gumban vs. Gorcho, 50 Phil. 30; Quinto vs. Morata, 54 Phil. 481; Echevarria vs. Sarmiento, 66 Phil.
611). The ratio decidendi of these cases seems to be that the attestation clause must contain a statement of the number of
sheets or pages composing the will and that if this is missing or is omitted, it will have the effect of invalidating the will if the
deficiency cannot be supplied, not by evidence aliunde, but by a consideration or examination of the will itself. But here the
situation is different. While the attestation clause does not state the number of sheets or pages upon which the will is written,
however, the last part of the body of the will contains a statement that it is composed of eight pages, which circumstance in our
opinion takes this case out of the rigid rule of construction and places it within the realm of similar cases where a broad and
more liberal view has been adopted to prevent the will of the testator from being defeated by purely technical considerations."
(page 165-165, supra) (Underscoring supplied)
In "Apolonio Tabaoda versus Hon. Avelino Rosal, et al." supra, the notarial acknowledgement in the Will states the number of
pages used in the:
"x x x
We have examined the will in question and noticed that the attestation clause failed to state the number of pages used in
writing the will. This would have been a fatal defect were it not for the fact that, in this case, it is discernible from the entire will
that it is really and actually composed of only two pages duly signed by the testatrix and her instrumental witnesses. As earlier
stated, the first page which contains the entirety of the testamentary dispositions is signed by the testatrix at the end or at the
bottom while the instrumental witnesses signed at the left margin. The other page which is marked as "Pagina dos" comprises
the attestation clause and the acknowledgment. The acknowledgment itself states that "this Last Will and Testament consists of
two pages including this page" (pages 200-201, supra) (Underscoring supplied).
However, in the appeal at bench, the number of pages used in the will is not stated in any part of the Will. The will does not
even contain any notarial acknowledgment wherein the number of pages of the will should be stated.21
Both Uy Coque and Andrada were decided prior to the enactment of the Civil Code in 1950, at a time when the statutory
provision governing the formal requirement of wills was Section

69
618 of the Code of Civil Procedure.22 Reliance on these cases remains apropos, considering that the requirement that the
attestation state the number of pages of the will is extant from Section 618.23 However, the enactment of the Civil Code in 1950
did put in force a rule of interpretation of the requirements of wills, at least insofar as the attestation clause is concerned, that
may vary from the philosophy that governed these two cases. Article 809 of the Civil Code states: "In the absence of bad faith,
forgery, or fraud, or undue and improper pressure and influence, defects and imperfections in the form of attestation or in the
language used therein shall not render the will invalid if it is proved that the will was in fact executed and attested in substantial
compliance with all the requirements of article 805."
In the same vein, petitioner cites the report of the Civil Code Commission, which stated that "the underlying and fundamental
objective permeating the provisions on the [law] on [wills] in this project consists in the [liberalization] of the manner of their
execution with the end in view of giving the testator more [freedom] in [expressing] his last wishes. This objective is in accord
with the [modern tendency] in respect to the formalities in the execution of wills."24 However, petitioner conveniently omits
the qualification offered by the Code Commission in the very same paragraph he cites from their report, that such liberalization
be "but with sufficient safeguards and restrictions to prevent the commission of fraud and the exercise of undue and improper
pressure and influence upon the testator."25
Caneda v. Court of Appeals26 features an extensive discussion made by Justice Regalado, speaking for the Court on the
conflicting views on the manner of interpretation of the legal formalities required in the execution of the attestation clause in
wills.27 Uy Coque and Andrada are cited therein, along with several other cases, as examples of the application of the rule of
strict construction.28 However, the Code Commission opted to recommend a more liberal construction through the "substantial
compliance rule" under Article 809. A cautionary note was struck though by Justice J.B.L. Reyes as to how Article 809 should be
applied:
x x x The rule must be limited to disregarding those defects that can be supplied by an examination of the will itself: whether all
the pages are consecutively numbered; whether the signatures appear in each and every page; whether the subscribing
witnesses are three or the will was notarized. All these are facts that the will itself can reveal, and defects or even omissions
concerning them in the attestation clause can be safely disregarded. But the total number of pages, and whether all persons
required to sign did so in the presence of each other must substantially appear in the attestation clause, being the only check
against perjury in the probate proceedings.29 (Emphasis supplied.)
The Court of Appeals did cite these comments by Justice J.B.L. Reyes in its assailed decision, considering that the failure to state
the number of pages of the will in the attestation clause is one of the defects which cannot be simply disregarded. In Caneda
itself, the Court refused to allow the probate of a will whose attestation clause failed to state that the witnesses subscribed
their respective signatures to the will in the presence of the testator and of each other,30 the other omission cited by Justice
J.B.L. Reyes which to his estimation cannot be lightly disregarded.
Caneda suggested: "[I]t may thus be stated that the rule, as it now stands, is that omission which can be supplied by an
examination of the will itself, without the need of resorting to extrinsic evidence, will not be fatal and, correspondingly, would
not obstruct the allowance to probate of the will being assailed. However, those omissions which cannot be supplied except by
evidence aliunde would result in the invalidation of the attestation clause and ultimately, of the will itself."31 Thus, a failure by
the attestation clause to state that the testator signed every page can be liberally construed, since that fact can be checked by a
visual examination; while a failure by the attestation clause to state that the witnesses signed in one another’s presence should
be considered a fatal flaw since the attestation is the only textual guarantee of compliance.32
The failure of the attestation clause to state the number of pages on which the will was written remains a fatal flaw, despite
Article 809. The purpose of the law in requiring the clause to state the number of pages on which the will is written is to
safeguard against possible interpolation or omission of one or some of its pages and to prevent any increase or decrease in the
pages.33 The failure to state the number of pages equates with the absence of an averment on the part of the instrumental
witnesses as to how many pages consisted the will, the execution of which they had ostensibly just witnessed and subscribed
to. Following Caneda, there is substantial compliance with this requirement if the will states elsewhere in it how many pages it
is comprised of, as was the situation in Singson and Taboada. However, in this case, there could have been no substantial
compliance with the requirements under Article 805 since there is no statement in the attestation clause or anywhere in the
will itself as to the number of pages which comprise the will.
At the same time, Article 809 should not deviate from the need to comply with the formal requirements as enumerated under
Article 805. Whatever the inclinations of the members of the Code Commission in incorporating Article 805, the fact remains
that they saw fit to prescribe substantially the same formal requisites as enumerated in Section 618 of the Code of Civil
Procedure, convinced that these remained effective safeguards against the forgery or intercalation of notarial wills. 34
Compliance with these requirements, however picayune in impression, affords the public a high degree of comfort that the
testator himself or herself had decided to convey property post mortem in the manner established in the will.35 The
transcendent legislative intent, even as expressed in the cited comments of the Code Commission, is for the fruition of the
testator’s incontestable desires, and not for the indulgent admission of wills to probate.

70
The Court could thus end here and affirm the Court of Appeals. However, an examination of the will itself reveals a couple of
even more critical defects that should necessarily lead to its rejection.
For one, the attestation clause was not signed by the instrumental witnesses. While the signatures of the instrumental
witnesses appear on the left-hand margin of the will, they do not appear at the bottom of the attestation clause which after all
consists of their averments before the notary public.
Cagro v. Cagro36 is material on this point. As in this case, "the signatures of the three witnesses to the will do not appear at the
bottom of the attestation clause, although the page containing the same is signed by the witnesses on the left-hand margin."37
While three (3) Justices38 considered the signature requirement had been substantially complied with, a majority of six (6),
speaking through Chief Justice Paras, ruled that the attestation clause had not been duly signed, rendering the will fatally
defective.
There is no question that the signatures of the three witnesses to the will do not appear at the bottom of the attestation clause,
although the page containing the same is signed by the witnesses on the left-hand margin.
We are of the opinion that the position taken by the appellant is correct. The attestation clause is "a memorandum of the facts
attending the execution of the will" required by law to be made by the attesting witnesses, and it must necessarily bear their
signatures. An unsigned attestation clause cannot be considered as an act of the witnesses, since the omission of their
signatures at the bottom thereof negatives their participation.
The petitioner and appellee contends that signatures of the three witnesses on the left-hand margin conform substantially to
the law and may be deemed as their signatures to the attestation clause. This is untenable, because said signatures are in
compliance with the legal mandate that the will be signed on the left-hand margin of all its pages. If an attestation clause not
signed by the three witnesses at the bottom thereof, be admitted as sufficient, it would be easy to add such clause to a will on a
subsequent occasion and in the absence of the testator and any or all of the witnesses. 39
The Court today reiterates the continued efficacy of Cagro. Article 805 particularly segregates the requirement that the
instrumental witnesses sign each page of the will, from the requisite that the will be "attested and subscribed by [the
instrumental witnesses]." The respective intents behind these two classes of signature are distinct from each other. The
signatures on the left-hand corner of every page signify, among others, that the witnesses are aware that the page they are
signing forms part of the will. On the other hand, the signatures to the attestation clause establish that the witnesses are
referring to the statements contained in the attestation clause itself. Indeed, the attestation clause is separate and apart from
the disposition of the will. An unsigned attestation clause results in an unattested will. Even if the instrumental witnesses
signed the left-hand margin of the page containing the unsigned attestation clause, such signatures cannot demonstrate these
witnesses’ undertakings in the clause, since the signatures that do appear on the page were directed towards a wholly different
avowal.
The Court may be more charitably disposed had the witnesses in this case signed the attestation clause itself, but not the left-
hand margin of the page containing such clause. Without diminishing the value of the instrumental witnesses’ signatures on
each and every page, the fact must be noted that it is the attestation clause which contains the utterances reduced into writing
of the testamentary witnesses themselves. It is the witnesses, and not the testator, who are required under Article 805 to state
the number of pages used upon which the will is written; the fact that the testator had signed the will and every page thereof;
and that they witnessed and signed the will and all the pages thereof in the presence of the testator and of one another. The
only proof in the will that the witnesses have stated these elemental facts would be their signatures on the attestation clause.
Thus, the subject will cannot be considered to have been validly attested to by the instrumental witnesses, as they failed to sign
the attestation clause.
Yet, there is another fatal defect to the will on which the denial of this petition should also hinge. The requirement under
Article 806 that "every will must be acknowledged before a notary public by the testator and the witnesses" has also not been
complied with. The importance of this requirement is highlighted by the fact that it had been segregated from the other
requirements under Article 805 and entrusted into a separate provision, Article 806. The non-observance of Article 806 in this
case is equally as critical as the other cited flaws in compliance with Article 805, and should be treated as of equivalent import.
In lieu of an acknowledgment, the notary public, Petronio Y. Bautista, wrote "Nilagdaan ko at ninotario ko ngayong 10 ng
Hunyo 10 (sic), 1981 dito sa Lungsod ng Maynila."40 By no manner of contemplation can those words be construed as an
acknowledgment. An acknowledgment is the act of one who has executed a deed in going before some competent officer or
court and declaring it to be his act or deed.41 It involves an extra step undertaken whereby the signor actually declares to the
notary that the executor of a document has attested to the notary that the same is his/her own free act and deed.
It might be possible to construe the averment as a jurat, even though it does not hew to the usual language thereof. A jurat is
that part of an affidavit where the notary certifies that before him/her, the document was subscribed and sworn to by the

71
executor.42 Ordinarily, the language of the jurat should avow that the document was subscribed and sworn before the notary
public, while in this case, the notary public averred that he himself "signed and notarized" the document. Possibly though, the
word "ninotario" or "notarized" encompasses the signing of and swearing in of the executors of the document, which in this
case would involve the decedent and the instrumental witnesses.
Yet even if we consider what was affixed by the notary public as a jurat, the will would nonetheless remain invalid, as the
express requirement of Article 806 is that the will be "acknowledged", and not merely subscribed and sworn to. The will does
not present any textual proof, much less one under oath, that the decedent and the instrumental witnesses executed or signed
the will as their own free act or deed. The acknowledgment made in a will provides for another all-important legal safeguard
against spurious wills or those made beyond the free consent of the testator. An acknowledgement is not an empty
meaningless act.43 The acknowledgment coerces the testator and the instrumental witnesses to declare before an officer of the
law that they had executed and subscribed to the will as their own free act or deed. Such declaration is under oath and under
pain of perjury, thus allowing for the criminal prosecution of persons who participate in the execution of spurious wills, or those
executed without the free consent of the testator. It also provides a further degree of assurance that the testator is of certain
mindset in making the testamentary dispositions to those persons he/she had designated in the will.
It may not have been said before, but we can assert the rule, self-evident as it is under Article 806. A notarial will that is not
acknowledged before a notary public by the testator and the witnesses is fatally defective, even if it is subscribed and sworn
to before a notary public.
There are two other requirements under Article 805 which were not fully satisfied by the will in question. We need not discuss
them at length, as they are no longer material to the
disposition of this case. The provision requires that the testator and the instrumental witnesses sign each and every page of the
will on the left margin, except the last; and that all the pages shall be numbered correlatively in letters placed on the upper part
of each page. In this case, the decedent, unlike the witnesses, failed to sign both pages of the will on the left margin, her only
signature appearing at the so-called "logical end"44 of the will on its first page. Also, the will itself is not numbered correlatively
in letters on each page, but instead numbered with Arabic numerals. There is a line of thought that has disabused the notion
that these two requirements be construed as mandatory.45 Taken in isolation, these omissions, by themselves, may not be
sufficient to deny probate to a will. Yet even as these omissions are not decisive to the adjudication of this case, they need not
be dwelt on, though indicative as they may be of a general lack of due regard for the requirements under Article 805 by
whoever executed the will.
All told, the string of mortal defects which the will in question suffers from makes the probate denial inexorable.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.

72
G.R. No. 74695 September 14, 1993
In the Matter of the Probate of the Last Will and Testament of the Deceased Brigido Alvarado, CESAR ALVARADO, petitioner,
vs.
HON. RAMON G. GAVIOLA, JR., Presiding Justice, HON. MA. ROSARIO QUETULIO LOSA and HON. LEONOR INES LUCIANO,
Associate Justices, Intermediate Appellate Court, First Division (Civil Cases), and BAYANI MA. RINO, respondents.
Vicente R. Redor for petitioner.
Bayani Ma. Rino for and in his own behalf.

BELLOSILLO, J.:
Before us is an appeal from the Decision dated 11 April 19861 of the First Civil Cases Division of the then Intermediate Appellate
Court, now Court of Appeals, which affirmed the Order dated 27 June 19832 of the Regional Trial Court of Sta. Cruz, Laguna,
admitting to probate the last will and testament3 with codicil4 of the late Brigido Alvarado.
On 5 November 1977, the 79-year old Brigido Alvarado executed a notarial will entitled "Huling Habilin" wherein he disinherited
an illegitimate son (petitioner) and expressly revoked a previously executed holographic will at the time awaiting probate
before Branch 4 of the Regional Trial Court of sta. Cruz, Laguna.
As testified to by the three instrumental witnesses, the notary public and by private respondent who were present at the
execution, the testator did not read the final draft of the will himself. Instead, private respondent, as the lawyer who drafted
the eight-paged document, read the same aloud in the presence of the testator, the three instrumental witnesses and the
notary public. The latter four followed the reading with their own respective copies previously furnished them.
Meanwhile, Brigido's holographic will was subsequently admitted to probate on 9 December 1977. On the 29th day of the same
month, a codicil entitled "Kasulatan ng Pagbabago sa Ilang Pagpapasiya na Nasasaad sa Huling Habilin na may Petsa Nobiembre
5, 1977 ni Brigido Alvarado" was executed changing some dispositions in the notarial will to generate cash for the testator's eye
operation. Brigido was then suffering from glaucoma. But the disinheritance and revocatory clauses were unchanged. As in the
case of the notarial will, the testator did not personally read the final draft of the codicil. Instead, it was private respondent who
read it aloud in his presence and in the presence of the three instrumental witnesses (same as those of the notarial will) and the
notary public who followed the reading using their own copies.
A petition for the probate of the notarial will and codicil was filed upon the testator's death on 3 January 1979 by private
respondent as executor with the Court of First Instance, now Regional Trial Court, of Siniloan, Laguna.5 Petitioner, in turn, filed
an Opposition on the following grounds: that the will sought to be probated was not executed and attested as required by law;
that the testator was insane or otherwise mentally incapacitated to make a will at the time of its execution due to senility and
old age; that the will was executed under duress, or influence of fear and threats; that it was procured by undue and improper
pressure and influence on the part of the beneficiary who stands to get the lion's share of the testator's estate; and lastly, that
the signature of the testator was procured by fraud or trick.
When the oppositor (petitioner) failed to substantiate the grounds relied upon in the Opposition, a Probate Order was issued
on 27 June 1983 from which an appeal was made to respondent court. The main thrust of the appeal was that the deceased
was blind within the meaning of the law at the time his "Huling Habilin" and the codicil attached thereto was executed; that
since the reading required by Art. 808 of the Civil Code was admittedly not complied with, probate of the deceased's last will
and codicil should have been denied.
On 11 April 1986, the Court of Appeals rendered the decision under review with the following findings: that Brigido Alvarado
was not blind at the time his last will and codicil were executed; that assuming his blindness, the reading requirement of Art.
808 was substantially complied with when both documents were read aloud to the testator with each of the three instrumental
witnesses and the notary public following the reading with their respective copies of the instruments. The appellate court then
concluded that although Art. 808 was not followed to the letter, there was substantial compliance since its purpose of making
known to the testator the contents of the drafted will was served.
The issues now before us can be stated thus: Was Brigido Alvarado blind for purpose of Art, 808 at the time his "Huling Habilin"
and its codicil were executed? If so, was the double-reading requirement of said article complied with?
Regarding the first issue, there is no dispute on the following facts: Brigido Alvarado was not totally blind at the time the will
and codicil were executed. However, his vision on both eyes was only of "counting fingers at three (3) feet" by reason of the
glaucoma which he had been suffering from for several years and even prior to his first consultation with an eye specialist on
14 December 1977.

73
The point of dispute is whether the foregoing circumstances would qualify Brigido as a "blind" testator under Art. 808 which
reads:
Art. 808. If the testator is blind, the will shall be read to him twice; once, by one of the subscribing witnesses, and again, by the
notary public before whom the will is acknowledged.
Petitioner contends that although his father was not totally blind when the will and codicil were executed, he can be so
considered within the scope of the term as it is used in Art. 808. To support his stand, petitioner presented before the trial
court a medical certificate issued by Dr. Salvador R. Salceda, Director of the Institute of Opthalmology (Philippine Eye Research
Institute),6 the contents of which were interpreted in layman's terms by Dr. Ruperto Roasa, whose expertise was admitted by
private respondent.7 Dr. Roasa explained that although the testator could visualize fingers at three (3) feet, he could no longer
read either printed or handwritten matters as of 14 December 1977, the day of his first consultation.8
On the other hand, the Court of Appeals, contrary to the medical testimony, held that the testator could still read on the day
the will and the codicil were executed but chose not to do so because of "poor eyesight."9 Since the testator was still capable of
reading at that time, the court a quo concluded that Art. 808 need not be complied with.
We agree with petitioner in this respect.
Regardless of respondent's staunch contention that the testator was still capable of reading at the time his will and codicil were
prepared, the fact remains and this was testified to by his witnesses, that Brigido did not do so because of his "poor," 10
"defective," 11 or "blurred"12 vision making it necessary for private respondent to do the actual reading for him.
The following pronouncement in Garcia vs. Vasquez 13 provides an insight into the scope of the term "blindness" as used in Art.
808, to wit:
The rationale behind the requirement of reading the will to the testator if he is blind or incapable of reading the will himself (as
when he is illiterate), is to make the provisions thereof known to him, so that he may be able to object if they are not in
accordance with his wishes . . .
Clear from the foregoing is that Art. 808 applies not only to blind testators but also to those who, for one reason or another, are
"incapable of reading the(ir) will(s)." Since Brigido Alvarado was incapable of reading the final drafts of his will and codicil on
the separate occasions of their execution due to his "poor," "defective," or "blurred" vision, there can be no other course for us
but to conclude that Brigido Alvarado comes within the scope of the term "blind" as it is used in Art. 808. Unless the contents
were read to him, he had no way of ascertaining whether or not the lawyer who drafted the will and codicil did so confortably
with his instructions. Hence, to consider his will as validly executed and entitled to probate, it is essential that we ascertain
whether Art. 808 had been complied with.
Article 808 requires that in case of testators like Brigido Alvarado, the will shall be read twice; once, by one of the instrumental
witnesses and, again, by the notary public before whom the will was acknowledged. The purpose is to make known to the
incapacitated testator the contents of the document before signing and to give him an opportunity to object if anything is
contrary to his instructions.
That Art. 808 was not followed strictly is beyond cavil. Instead of the notary public and an instrumental witness, it was the
lawyer (private respondent) who drafted the eight-paged will and the five-paged codicil who read the same aloud to the
testator, and read them only once, not twice as Art. 808 requires.
Private respondent however insists that there was substantial compliance and that the single reading suffices for purposes of
the law. On the other hand, petitioner maintains that the only valid compliance or compliance to the letter and since it is
admitted that neither the notary public nor an instrumental witness read the contents of the will and codicil to Brigido, probate
of the latter's will and codicil should have been disallowed.
We sustain private respondent's stand and necessarily, the petition must be denied.
This Court has held in a number of occasions that substantial compliance is acceptable where the purpose of the law has been
satisfied, the reason being that the solemnities surrounding the execution of wills are intended to protect the testator from all
kinds of fraud and trickery but are never intended to be so rigid and inflexible as to destroy the testamentary privilege. 14
In the case at bar, private respondent read the testator's will and codicil aloud in the presence of the testator, his three
instrumental witnesses, and the notary public. Prior and subsequent thereto, the testator affirmed, upon being asked, that the
contents read corresponded with his instructions. Only then did the signing and acknowledgement take place. There is no
evidence, and petitioner does not so allege, that the contents of the will and codicil were not sufficiently made known and
communicated to the testator. On the contrary, with respect to the "Huling Habilin," the day of the execution was not the first
time that Brigido had affirmed the truth and authenticity of the contents of the draft. The uncontradicted testimony of Atty.
Rino is that Brigido Alvarado already acknowledged that the will was drafted in accordance with his expressed wishes even prior

74
to 5 November 1977 when Atty. Rino went to the testator's residence precisely for the purpose of securing his conformity to
the draft. 15
Moreover, it was not only Atty. Rino who read the documents on
5 November and 29 December 1977. The notary public and the three instrumental witnesses likewise read the will and codicil,
albeit silently. Afterwards, Atty. Nonia de la Pena (the notary public) and Dr. Crescente O. Evidente (one of the three
instrumental witnesses and the testator's physician) asked the testator whether the contents of the document were of his own
free will. Brigido answered in the affirmative. 16 With four persons following the reading word for word with their own copies,
it can be safely concluded that the testator was reasonably assured that what was read to him (those which he affirmed were in
accordance with his instructions), were the terms actually appearing on the typewritten documents. This is especially true when
we consider the fact that the three instrumental witnesses were persons known to the testator, one being his physician (Dr.
Evidente) and another (Potenciano C. Ranieses) being known to him since childhood.
The spirit behind the law was served though the letter was not. Although there should be strict compliance with the substantial
requirements of the law in order to insure the authenticity of the will, the formal imperfections should be brushed aside when
they do not affect its purpose and which, when taken into account, may only defeat the testator's will. 17
As a final word to convince petitioner of the propriety of the trial court's Probate Order and its affirmance by the Court of
Appeals, we quote the following pronouncement in Abangan v. Abangan, 18 to wit:
The object of the solemnities surrounding the execution of wills is to close the door against bad faith and fraud, to avoid the
substitution of wills and testaments and to guaranty their truth and authenticity. Therefore the laws on the subject should be
interpreted in such a way as to attain these primordial ends. But, on the other hand, also one must not lose sight of the fact
that it is not the object of the law to restrain and curtail the exercise of the right to make a will. So when an interpretation
already given assures such ends, any other interpretation whatsoever, that adds nothing but demands more requisites entirely
unnecessary, useless and frustrative of the testator's will, must be disregarded (emphasis supplied).
Brigido Alvarado had expressed his last wishes in clear and unmistakable terms in his "Huling Habilin" and the codicil attached
thereto. We are unwilling to cast these aside fro the mere reason that a legal requirement intended for his protection was not
followed strictly when such compliance had been rendered unnecessary by the fact that the purpose of the law, i.e., to make
known to the incapacitated testator the contents of the draft of his will, had already been accomplished. To reiterate,
substantial compliance suffices where the purpose has been served.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED and the assailed Decision of respondent Court of Appeals dated 11 April 1986 is AFFIRMED.
Considering the length of time that this case has remained pending, this decision is immediately executory. Costs against
petitioner.
SO ORDERED.

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G.R. No. 76714 June 2, 1994
SALUD TEODORO VDA. DE PEREZ, petitioner,
vs.
HON. ZOTICO A. TOLETE in his capacity as Presiding Judge, Branch 18, RTC, Bulacan, respondent.
Natividad T. Perez for petitioner.
Benedicto T. Librojo for private respondents.

QUIASON, J.:
This is a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court to set aside the Order dated November 19, 1986 of
the Regional Trial Court, Branch 18, Bulacan presided by respondent Judge Zotico A. Tolete, in Special Proceedings No. 1793-M.
We grant the petition.
II
Dr. Jose F. Cunanan and his wife, Dr. Evelyn Perez-Cunanan, who became American citizens, established a successful medical
practice in New York, U.S.A. The Cunanans lived at No. 2896 Citation Drive, Pompey, Syracuse, New York, with their children,
Jocelyn, 18; Jacqueline, 16; and Josephine, 14.
On August 23, 1979, Dr. Cunanan executed a last will and testament, bequeathing to his wife "all the remainder" of his real and
personal property at the time of his death "wheresoever situated" (Rollo, p. 35). In the event he would survive his wife, he
bequeathed all his property to his children and grandchildren with Dr. Rafael G. Cunanan, Jr. as trustee. He appointed his wife
as executrix of his last will and testament and Dr. Rafael G. Cunanan, Jr. as substitute executor. Article VIII of his will states:
If my wife, EVELYN PEREZ-CUNANAN, and I shall die under such circumstances that there is not sufficient evidence to determine
the order of our deaths, then it shall be presumed that I predeceased her, and my estate shall be administered and distributed,
in all respects, in accordance with such presumption (Rollo, p. 41).
Four days later, on August 27, Dr. Evelyn P. Cunanan executed her own last will and testament containing the same provisions
as that of the will of her husband. Article VIII of her will states:
If my husband, JOSE F. CUNANAN, and I shall die under such circumstances that there is not sufficient evidence to determine
the order of our deaths, then it shall be presumed that he predeceased me, and my estate shall be administered and
distributed in all respects, in accordance with such presumption. (Rollo, p. 31).
On January 9, 1982, Dr. Cunanan and his entire family perished when they were trapped by fire that gutted their home.
Thereafter, Dr. Rafael G. Cunanan, Jr. as trustee and substitute executor of the two wills, filed separate proceedings for the
probate thereof with the Surrogate Court of the County of Onondaga, New York. On April 7, these two wills were admitted to
probate and letters testamentary were issued in his favor.
On February 21, 1983, Salud Teodoro Perez, the mother of Dr. Evelyn P. Cunanan, and petitioner herein, filed with the Regional
P. Cunanan, and petitioner herein, filed with the Regional Trial Court, Malolos, Bulacan a petition for the reprobate of the two
bills ancillary to the probate proceedings in New York. She also asked that she be appointed the special administratrix of the
estate of the deceased couple consisting primarily of a farm land in San Miguel, Bulacan.
On March 9, the Regional Trial Court, Branch 16, Malolos, Bulacan, presided by Judge Gualberto J. de la Llana, issued an order,
directing the issuance of letters of special administration in favor of petitioner upon her filing of a P10,000.00 bond. The
following day, petitioner posted the bond and took her oath as special administration.
As her first act of administration, petitioner filed a motion, praying that the Philippine Life Insurance Company be directed to
deliver the proceeds in the amount of P50,000.00 of the life insurance policy taken by Dr. Jose F. Cunanan with Dr. Evelyn
Perez-Cunanan and their daughter Jocelyn as beneficiaries. The trial court granted the motion.
Counsel for the Philippine American Life Insurance Company then filed a manifestation, stating that said company then filed a
manifestation, stating that said company had delivered to petitioner the amount of P49,765.85, representing the proceeds of
the life insurance policy of Dr. Jose F. Cunanan.
In a motion dated May 19, 1983, petitioner asked that Dr. Rafael Cunanan, Sr. be ordered to deliver to her a Philippine Trust
Company passbook with P25,594.00 in savings deposit, and the Family Savings Bank time deposit certificates in the total
amount of P12,412.52.

76
On May 31, Atty. Federico Alday filed a notice of appearance as counsel for the heirs of Dr. Jose F. Cunanan, namely, Dr. Rafael
Cunanan, Sr., Priscilla Cunanan Bautista, Lydia Cunanan Ignacio, Felipe F. Cunanan and Loreto Cunanan Concepcion (Cunanan
heirs). He also manifested that before receiving petitioner's motion of May 19, 1983, his clients were unaware of the filing of
the testate estate case and therefore, "in the interest of simple fair play," they should be notified of the proceedings (Records,
p. 110). He prayed for deferment of the hearing on the motions of May 19, 1983.
Petitioner then filed a counter manifestation dated June 13, 1983, asserting: (1) that the "Cunanan collaterals are neither heirs
nor creditors of the late Dr. Jose F. Cunanan" and therefore, they had "no legal or proprietary interests to protect" and "no right
to intervene"; (2) that the wills of Dr. Jose F. Cunanan and Dr. Evelyn Perez-Cunanan, being American citizens, were executed in
accordance with the solemnities and formalities of New York laws, and produced "effects in this jurisdiction in accordance with
Art. 16 in relation to Art. 816 of the Civil Code"; (3) that under Article VIII of the two wills, it was presumed that the husband
predeceased the wife; and (4) that "the Cunanan collaterals are neither distributees, legatees or beneficiaries, much less, heirs
as heirship is only by institution" under a will or by operation of the law of New York (Records, pp. 112-113).
On June 23, the probate court granted petitioner's motion of May 19, 1983. However, on July 21, the Cunanan heirs filed a
motion to nullify the proceedings and to set aside the appointment of, or to disqualify, petitioner as special administratrix of
the estates of Dr. Jose F. Cunanan and Dr. Evelyn Perez-Cunanan. The motion stated: (1) that being the "brothers and sisters
and the legal and surviving heirs" of Dr. Jose F. Cunanan, they had been "deliberately excluded" in the petition for the probate
of the separate wills of the Cunanan spouses thereby misleading the Bulacan court to believe that petitioner was the sole heir
of the spouses; that such "misrepresentation" deprived them of their right to "due process in violation of Section 4, Rule 76 of
the Revised Rules of Court; (2) that Dr. Rafael G. Cunanan, Jr., the executor of the estate of the Cunanan spouses, was likewise
not notified of the hearings in the Bulacan court; (3) that the "misrepresentation and concealment committed by" petitioner
rendered her unfit to be a special administratrix; (4) that Dr. Rafael G. Cunanan, Jr. had, by virtue of a verified power of
attorney, authorized his father,
Dr. Rafael Cunanan, Sr., to be his attorney-in-fact; and (5) that Dr. Rafael Cunanan, Sr. is qualified to be a regular administrator
"as practically all of the subject estate in the Philippines belongs to their brother, Dr. Jose F. Cunanan" (Records, pp. 118-122).
Hence, they prayed: (1) that the proceedings in the case be declared null and void; (2) that the appointment of petitioner as
special administratrix be set aside; and (3) that Dr. Rafael Cunanan, Sr. be appointed the regular administrator of the estate of
the deceased spouses.
Thereafter, the Cunanan heirs filed a motion requiring petitioner to submit an inventory or accounting of all monies received by
her in trust for the estate.
In her opposition, petitioner asserted: (1) that she was the "sole and only heir" of her daughter, Dr. Evelyn Perez-Cunanan to
the exclusion of the "Cunanan collaterals"; hence they were complete strangers to the proceedings and were not entitled to
notice; (2) that she could not have "concealed" the name and address of Dr. Rafael G. Cunanan, Jr. because his name was
prominently mentioned not only in the two wills but also in the decrees of the American surrogate court; (3) that the rule
applicable to the case is Rule 77, not Rule 76, because it involved the allowance of wills proved outside of the Philippines and
that nowhere in Section 2 of Rule 77 is there a mention of notice being given to the executor who, by the same provision,
should himself file the necessary ancillary proceedings in this country; (4) that even if the Bulacan estate came from the
"capital" of Dr. Jose F. Cunanan, he had willed all his worldly goods to his wife and nothing to his brothers and sisters; and (5)
that Dr. Rafael G. Cunanan, Jr. had unlawfully disbursed $215,000.00 to the Cunanan heirs, misappropriated $15,000.00 for
himself and irregularly assigned assets of the estates to his American lawyer (Records, pp. 151-160).
In their reply, the Cunanan heirs stressed that on November 24, 1982, petitioner and the Cunanan heirs had entered into an
agreement in the United States "to settle and divide equally the estates," and that under Section 2 of Rule 77 the "court shall fix
a time and place for the hearing and cause notice thereof to be given as in case of an original will presented for allowance"
(Records, pp. 184-185).
Petitioner asked that Dr. Rafael G. Cunanan, Jr. be cited for contempt of court for failure to comply with the Order of June 23,
1983 and for appropriating money of the estate for his own benefit. She also alleged that she had impugned the agreement of
November 24, 1982 before the Surrogate Court of Onondaga, New York which rendered a decision on April 13, 1983, finding
that "all assets are payable to Dr. Evelyn P. Cunanan’s executor to be then distributed pursuant to EPTL4-1.1 subd [a] par [4]"
(Rollo, p. 52).
On their part, the Cunanan heirs replied that petitioner was estopped from claiming that they were heirs by the agreement to
divide equally the estates. They asserted that by virtue of Section 2 of Rule 77 of the Rules of Court, the provisions of Sections
3, 4 and 5 of Rule 76 on the requirement of notice to all heirs, executors, devisees and legatees must be complied with. They
reiterated their prayer: (1) that the proceedings in the case be nullified; (2) that petitioner be disqualified as special
administratrix; (3) that she be ordered to submit an inventory of all goods, chattels and monies which she had received and to
surrender the same to the court; and (4) that Dr. Rafael Cunanan, Sr. be appointed the regular administrator.

77
Petitioner filed a rejoinder, stating that in violation of the April 13, 1983 decision of the American court Dr. Rafael G. Cunanan,
Jr. made "unauthorized disbursements from the estates as early as July 7, 1982" (Records, p. 231). Thereafter, petitioner moved
for the suspension of the proceedings as she had "to attend to the settlement proceedings" of the estate of the Cunanan
spouses in New York (Records, p. 242). The Cunanans heirs opposed this motion and filed a manifestation, stating that
petitioner had received $215,000.00 "from the Surrogate’s Court as part of legacy" based on the aforesaid agreement of
November 24, 1982 (Records, p. 248).
On February 21, 1984, Judge de la Llana issued an order, disallowing the reprobate of the two wills, recalling the appointment
of petitioner as special administratrix, requiring the submission of petitioner of an inventory of the property received by her as
special administratrix and declaring all pending incidents moot and academic. Judge de la Llana reasoned out that petitioner
failed to prove the law of New York on procedure and allowance of wills and the court had no way of telling whether the wills
were executed in accordance with the law of New York. In the absence of such evidence, the presumption is that the law of
succession of the foreign country is the same as the law of the Philippines. However, he noted, that there were only two
witnesses to the wills of the Cunanan spouses and the Philippine law requires three witnesses and that the wills were not
signed on each and every page, a requirement of the Philippine law.
On August 27, 1985, petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration of the Order dated February 21, 1984, where she had
sufficiently proven the applicable laws of New York governing the execution of last wills and testaments.
On the same day, Judge de la Llana issued another order, denying the motion of petitioner for the suspension of the
proceedings but gave her 15 days upon arrival in the country within which to act on the other order issued that same day.
Contending that the second portion of the second order left its finality to the discretion of counsel for petitioner, the Cunanans
filed a motion for the reconsideration of the objectionable portion of the said order so that it would conform with the pertinent
provisions of the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980 and the Interim Rules of Court.
On April 30, 1985, the respondent Judge of Branch 18 of the Regional Trial Court, Malolos, to which the reprobate case was
reassigned, issued an order stating that "(W)hen the last will and testament . . . was denied probate," the case was terminated
and therefore all orders theretofore issued should be given finality. The same Order amended the February 21, 1984 Order by
requiring petitioner to turn over to the estate the inventoried property. It considered the proceedings for all intents and
purposes, closed (Records,
p. 302).
On August 12, petitioner filed a motion to resume proceedings on account of the final settlement and termination of the
probate cases in New York. Three days later, petitioner filed a motion praying for the reconsideration of the Order of April 30,
1985 on the strength of the February 21, 1984 Order granting her a period of 15 days upon arrival in the country within which
to act on the denial of probate of the wills of the Cunanan spouses. On August 19, respondent Judge granted the motion and
reconsidered the Order of April 30, 1985.
On August 29, counsel for petitioner, who happens to be her daughter, Natividad, filed a motion praying that since petitioner
was ailing in Fort Lee, New Jersey, U.S.A. and therefore incapacitated to act as special administratrix, she (the counsel) should
be named substitute special administratrix. She also filed a motion for the reconsideration of the Order of February 21, 1984,
denying probate to the wills of the Cunanan spouses, alleging that respondent Judge "failed to appreciate the significant
probative value of the exhibits . . . which all refer to the offer and admission to probate of the last wills of the Cunanan spouses
including all procedures undertaken and decrees issued in connection with the said probate" (Records, pp. 313-323).
Thereafter, the Cunanans heirs filed a motion for reconsideration of the Order of August 19, 1985, alleging lack of notice to
their counsel.
On March 31, 1986, respondent Judge to which the case was reassigned denied the motion for reconsideration holding that the
documents submitted by petitioner proved "that the wills of the testator domiciled abroad were properly executed, genuine
and sufficient to possess real and personal property; that letters testamentary were issued; and that proceedings were held on
a foreign tribunal and proofs taken by a competent judge who inquired into all the facts and circumstances and being satisfied
with his findings issued a decree admitting to probate the wills in question." However, respondent Judge said that the
documents did not establish the law of New York on the procedure and allowance of wills (Records, p. 381).
On April 9, 1986, petitioner filed a motion to allow her to present further evidence on the foreign law. After the hearing of the
motion on April 25, 1986, respondent Judge issued an order wherein he conceded that insufficiency of evidence to prove the
foreign law was not a fatal defect and was curable by adducing additional evidence. He granted petitioner 45 days to submit the
evidence to that effect.
However, without waiting for petitioner to adduce the additional evidence, respondent Judge ruled in his order dated June 20,
1986 that he found "no compelling reason to disturb its ruling of March 31, 1986" but allowed petitioner to "file anew the
appropriate probate proceedings for each of the testator" (Records, p. 391).

78
The Order dated June 20, 1986 prompted petitioner to file a second motion for reconsideration stating that she was "ready to
submit further evidence on the law obtaining in the State of New York" and praying that she be granted "the opportunity to
present evidence on what the law of the State of New York has on the probate and allowance of wills" (Records, p. 393).
On July 18, respondent Judge denied the motion holding that to allow the probate of two wills in a single proceeding "would be
a departure from the typical and established mode of probate where one petition takes care of one will." He pointed out that
even in New York "where the wills in question were first submitted for probate, they were dealt with in separate proceedings"
(Records, p. 395).
On August 13, 1986, petitioner filed a motion for the reconsideration of the Order of July 18, 1986, citing Section 3, Rule 2 of
the Rules of Court, which provides that no party may institute more than one suit for a single cause of action. She pointed out
that separate proceedings for the wills of the spouses which contain basically the same provisions as they even named each
other as a beneficiary in their respective wills, would go against "the grain of inexpensive, just and speedy determination of the
proceedings" (Records, pp. 405-407).
On September 11, 1986, petitioner filed a supplement to the motion for reconsideration, citing Benigno v. De La Peña, 57 Phil.
305 (1932) (Records,
p. 411), but respondent Judge found that this pleading had been filed out of time and that the adverse party had not been
furnished with a copy thereof. In her compliance, petitioner stated that she had furnished a copy of the motion to the counsel
of the Cunanan heirs and reiterated her motion for a "final ruling on her supplemental motion" (Records, p. 421).
On November 19, respondent Judge issued an order, denying the motion for reconsideration filed by petitioner on the grounds
that "the probate of separate wills of two or more different persons even if they are husband and wife cannot be undertaken in
a single petition" (Records, pp. 376-378).
Hence, petitioner instituted the instant petition, arguing that the evidence offered at the hearing of April 11, 1983 sufficiently
proved the laws of the State of New York on the allowance of wills, and that the separate wills of the Cunanan spouses need
not be probated in separate proceedings.
II
Petitioner contends that the following pieces of evidence she had submitted before respondent Judge are sufficient to warrant
the allowance of the wills:
(a) two certificates of authentication of the respective wills of Evelyn and Jose by the Consulate General of the Philippines
(Exhs. "F" and "G");
(b) two certifications from the Secretary of State of New York and Custodian of the Great Seal on the facts that Judge Bernard L.
Reagan is the Surrogate of the Country of Onondaga which is a court of record, that his signature and seal of office are genuine,
and that the Surrogate is duly authorized to grant copy of the respective wills of Evelyn and Jose
(Exhs. "F-1" and "G-1");
(c) two certificates of Judge Reagan and Chief Clerk Donald E. Moore stating that they have in their records and files the said
wills which were recorded on April 7, 1982 (Exhs. "F-2" and "G-2");
(d) the respective wills of Evelyn and Jose (Exhs. "F-3", "F-6" and Exh. "G-3" — "G-6");
(e) certificates of Judge Reagan and the Chief Clerk certifying to the genuineness and authenticity of the exemplified copies of
the two wills (Exhs. "F-7" and "F-7");
(f) two certificates of authentication from the Consulate General of the Philippines in New York (Exh. "H" and "F").
(g) certifications from the Secretary of State that Judge Reagan is duly authorized to grant exemplified copies of the decree of
probate, letters testamentary and all proceedings had and proofs duly taken
(Exhs. "H-1" and "I-1");
(h) certificates of Judge Reagan and the Chief Clerk that letters testamentary were issued to Rafael G. Cunanan (Exhs. "H-2" and
"I-2");
(i) certification to the effect that it was during the term of Judge Reagan that a decree admitting the wills to probate had been
issued and appointing Rafael G. Cunanan as alternate executor (Exhs. "H-3" and
"I-10");
(j) the decrees on probate of the two wills specifying that proceedings were held and proofs duly taken (Exhs. "H-4" and "I-5");

79
(k) decrees on probate of the two wills stating that they were properly executed, genuine and valid and that the said
instruments were admitted to probate and established as wills valid to pass real and personal property (Exhs. "H-5" and "I-5");
and
(l) certificates of Judge Reagan and the Chief Clerk on the genuineness and authenticity of each other’s signatures in the
exemplified copies of the decrees of probate, letters testamentary and proceedings held in their court (Exhs. "H-6" and "I-6")
(Rollo, pp. 13-16).
Petitioner adds that the wills had been admitted to probate in the Surrogate Court’s Decision of April 13, 1983 and that the
proceedings were terminated on November 29, 1984.
The respective wills of the Cunanan spouses, who were American citizens, will only be effective in this country upon compliance
with the following provision of the Civil Code of the Philippines:
Art. 816. The will of an alien who is abroad produces effect in the Philippines if made with the formalities prescribed by the law
of the place in which he resides, or according to the formalities observed in his country, or in conformity with those which this
Code prescribes.
Thus, proof that both wills conform with the formalities prescribed by New York laws or by Philippine laws is imperative.
The evidence necessary for the reprobate or allowance of wills which have been probated outside of the Philippines are as
follows: (1) the due execution of the will in accordance with the foreign laws; (2) the testator has his domicile in the foreign
country and not in the Philippines; (3) the will has been admitted to probate in such country; (4) the fact that the foreign
tribunal is a probate court, and (5) the laws of a foreign country on procedure and allowance of wills (III Moran Commentaries
on the Rules of Court, 1970 ed., pp. 419-429; Suntay v. Suntay, 95 Phil. 500 [1954]; Fluemer v. Hix, 54 Phil. 610 [1930]). Except
for the first and last requirements, the petitioner submitted all the needed evidence.
The necessity of presenting evidence on the foreign laws upon which the probate in the foreign country is based is impelled by
the fact that our courts cannot take judicial notice of them (Philippine Commercial and Industrial Bank v. Escolin, 56 SCRA 266
[1974]).
Petitioner must have perceived this omission as in fact she moved for more time to submit the pertinent procedural and
substantive New York laws but which request respondent Judge just glossed over. While the probate of a will is a special
proceeding wherein courts should relax the rules on evidence, the goal is to receive the best evidence of which the matter is
susceptible before a purported will is probated or denied probate (Vda. de Ramos v. Court of Appeals, 81 SCRA 393 [1978]).
There is merit in petitioner’s insistence that the separate wills of the Cunanan spouses should be probated jointly. Respondent
Judge’s view that the Rules on allowance of wills is couched in singular terms and therefore should be interpreted to mean that
there should be separate probate proceedings for the wills of the Cunanan spouses is too literal and simplistic an approach.
Such view overlooks the provisions of Section 2, Rule 1 of the Revised Rules of Court, which advise that the rules shall be
"liberally construed in order to promote their object and to assist the parties in obtaining just, speedy, and inexpensive
determination of every action and proceeding."
A literal application of the Rules should be avoided if they would only result in the delay in the administration of justice (Acain
v. Intermediate Appellate Court, 155 SCRA 100 [1987]; Roberts v. Leonidas, 129 SCRA 33 [1984]).
What the law expressly prohibits is the making of joint wills either for the testator’s reciprocal benefit or for the benefit of a
third person (Civil Code of the Philippines, Article 818). In the case at bench, the Cunanan spouses executed separate wills.
Since the two wills contain essentially the same provisions and pertain to property which in all probability are conjugal in
nature, practical considerations dictate their joint probate. As this Court has held a number of times, it will always strive to
settle the entire controversy in a single proceeding leaving no root or branch to bear the seeds of future litigation (Motoomull
v. Dela Paz, 187 SCRA 743 [1990]).
This petition cannot be completely resolved without touching on a very glaring fact — petitioner has always considered herself
the sole heir of
Dr. Evelyn Perez Cunanan and because she does not consider herself an heir of Dr. Jose F. Cunanan, she noticeably failed to
notify his heirs of the filing of the proceedings. Thus, even in the instant petition, she only impleaded respondent Judge,
forgetting that a judge whose order is being assailed is merely a nominal or formal party (Calderon v. Solicitor General, 215
SCRA 876 [1992]).
The rule that the court having jurisdiction over the reprobate of a will shall "cause notice thereof to be given as in case of an
original will presented for allowance" (Revised Rules of Court, Rule 27, Section 2) means that with regard to notices, the will
probated abroad should be treated as if it were an "original will" or a will that is presented for probate for the first time.
Accordingly, compliance with Sections 3 and 4 of Rule 76, which require publication and notice by mail or personally to the

80
"known heirs, legatees, and devisees of the testator resident in the Philippines" and to the executor, if he is not the petitioner,
are required.
The brothers and sisters of Dr. Jose F. Cunanan, contrary to petitioner's claim, are entitled to notices of the time and place for
proving the wills. Under Section 4 of Rule 76 of the Revised Rules of Court, the "court shall also cause copies of the notice of the
time and place fixed for proving the will to be addressed to the designated or other known heirs, legatees, and devisees of the
testator, . . . "
WHEREFORE, the questioned Order is SET ASIDE. Respondent Judge shall allow petitioner reasonable time within which to
submit evidence needed for the joint probate of the wills of the Cunanan spouses and see to it that the brothers and sisters of
Dr. Jose F. Cunanan are given all notices and copies of all pleadings pertinent to the probate proceedings.
SO ORDERED.

81
G.R. No. L-4067 November 29, 1951
In the Matter of the will of ANTERO MERCADO, deceased. ROSARIO GARCIA, petitioner,
vs.
JULIANA LACUESTA, ET AL., respondents.
Elviro L. Peralta and Hermenegildo A. Prieto for petitioner.
Faustino B. Tobia, Juan I. Ines and Federico Tacason for respondents.
PARAS, C.J.:
This is an appeal from a decision of the Court of Appeals disallowing the will of Antero Mercado dated January 3, 1943. The will
is written in the Ilocano dialect and contains the following attestation clause:
We, the undersigned, by these presents to declare that the foregoing testament of Antero Mercado was signed by himself and
also by us below his name and of this attestation clause and that of the left margin of the three pages thereof. Page three the
continuation of this attestation clause; this will is written in Ilocano dialect which is spoken and understood by the testator, and
it bears the corresponding number in letter which compose of three pages and all them were signed in the presence of the
testator and witnesses, and the witnesses in the presence of the testator and all and each and every one of us witnesses.
In testimony, whereof, we sign this statement, this the third day of January, one thousand nine hundred forty three, (1943) A.D.

(Sgd.) NUMERIANO EVANGELISTA (Sgd.) "ROSENDA CORTES

(Sgd.) BIBIANA ILLEGIBLE

The will appears to have been signed by Atty. Florentino Javier who wrote the name of Antero Mercado, followed below by "A
reugo del testator" and the name of Florentino Javier. Antero Mercado is alleged to have written a cross immediately after his
name. The Court of Appeals, reversing the judgement of the Court of First Instance of Ilocos Norte, ruled that the attestation
clause failed (1) to certify that the will was signed on all the left margins of the three pages and at the end of the will by Atty.
Florentino Javier at the express request of the testator in the presence of the testator and each and every one of the witnesses;
(2) to certify that after the signing of the name of the testator by Atty. Javier at the former's request said testator has written a
cross at the end of his name and on the left margin of the three pages of which the will consists and at the end thereof; (3) to
certify that the three witnesses signed the will in all the pages thereon in the presence of the testator and of each other.
In our opinion, the attestation clause is fatally defective for failing to state that Antero Mercado caused Atty. Florentino Javier
to write the testator's name under his express direction, as required by section 618 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The herein
petitioner (who is appealing by way of certiorari from the decision of the Court of Appeals) argues, however, that there is no
need for such recital because the cross written by the testator after his name is a sufficient signature and the signature of Atty.
Florentino Javier is a surplusage. Petitioner's theory is that the cross is as much a signature as a thumbmark, the latter having
been held sufficient by this Court in the cases of De Gala vs. Gonzales and Ona, 53 Phil., 104; Dolar vs. Diancin, 55 Phil., 479;
Payad vs. Tolentino, 62 Phil., 848; Neyra vs. Neyra, 76 Phil., 296 and Lopez vs. Liboro, 81 Phil., 429.
It is not here pretended that the cross appearing on the will is the usual signature of Antero Mercado or even one of the ways
by which he signed his name. After mature reflection, we are not prepared to liken the mere sign of the cross to a thumbmark,
and the reason is obvious. The cross cannot and does not have the trustworthiness of a thumbmark.
What has been said makes it unnecessary for us to determine there is a sufficient recital in the attestation clause as to the
signing of the will by the testator in the presence of the witnesses, and by the latter in the presence of the testator and of each
other.
Wherefore, the appealed decision is hereby affirmed, with against the petitioner. So ordered.

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G.R. No. 6845 September 1, 1914
YAP TUA, petitioner-appellee,
vs.
YAP CA KUAN and YAP CA KUAN, objectors-appellants.
Chicote and Miranda for appellants.
O'Brien and DeWitt for appellee.
JOHNSON, J.:
It appears from the record that on the 23d day of August, 1909, one Perfecto Gabriel, representing the petitioner, Yap Tua,
presented a petition in the Court of First Instance of the city of Manila, asking that the will of Tomasa Elizaga Yap Caong be
admitted to probate, as the last will and testament of Tomasa Elizaga Yap Caong, deceased. It appears that the said Tomasa
Elizaga Yap Caong died in the city of Manila on the 11th day of August, 1909. Accompanying said petition and attached thereto
was the alleged will of the deceased. It appears that the will was signed by the deceased, as well as Anselmo Zacarias, Severo
Tabora, and Timoteo Paez.
Said petition, after due notice was given, was brought on for hearing on the 18th day of September, 1909. Timoteo Paez
declared that he was 48 years of age; that he had known the said Tomasa Elizaga Yap Caong; that she had died on the 11th day
of August, 1909; that before her death she had executed a last will and testament; that he was present at the time of the
execution of the same; that he had signed the will as a witness; that Anselmo Zacarias and Severo Tabora had also signed said
will as witnesses and that they had signed the will in the presence of the deceased.
Pablo Agustin also declared as a witness and said that he was 40 years of age; that he knew Tomasa Elizaga Yap Caong during
her lifetime; that she died on the 11th day of August, 1909, in the city of Manila; that before her death she had executed a last
will and testament; that he was present at the time said last will was executed; that there were also present Timoteo Paez and
Severo Tabora and a person called Anselmo; that the said Tomasa Elizaga Yap Caong signed the will in the presence of the
witnesses; that he had seen her sign the will with his own eyes; that the witnesses had signed the will in the presence of the
said Tomasa Elizaga Yap Caong and in the presence of each other; that the said Tomasa Elizaga Yap Caong signed the will
voluntarily, and in his judgment, she was in the possession of her faculties; that there were no threats or intimidation used to
induce her to sign the will; that she signed it voluntarily.
No further witnesses were called and there was no further opposition presented to the legalization of the said will.
After hearing the foregoing witnesses, the Honorable A. S. Crossfield, judge, on the 29th day of September, 1909, ordered that
the last will and testament of Tomasa Elizaga Yap Caong be allowed and admitted to probate. The will was attached to the
record and marked Exhibit A. The court further ordered that one Yap Tua be appointed as executor of the will, upon the giving
of a bond, the amount of which was to be fixed later.
From the record it appears that no further proceedings were had until the 28th of February, 1910, when Yap Ca Kuan and Yap
Ca Llu appeared and presented a petition, alleging that they were interested in the matters of the said will and desired to
intervene and asked that a guardian ad litem be appointed to represent them in the cause.
On the 1st day of March, 1910, the court appointed Gabriel La O as guardian ad litem of said parties. Gabriel La O accepted said
appointment, took the oath of office and entered upon the performance of his duties as guardian ad litem of said parties. On
the 2d day of March, 1910, the said Gabriel La O appeared in court and presented a motion in which he alleged, in substance:
First. That the will dated the 11th day of August, 1909, and admitted to probate by order of the court on the 29th day of
September, 1909, was null, for the following reasons:
(a) Because the same had not been authorized nor signed by the witnesses as the law prescribes.
(b) Because at the time of the execution of the will, the said Tomasa Elizaga Yap Caong was not then mentally capacitated to
execute the same, due to her sickness.
(c) Because her signature to the will had been obtained through fraud and illegal influence upon the part of persons who were
to receive a benefit from the same, and because the said Tomasa Elizaga Yap Caong had no intention of executing the same.
Second. That before the execution of the said will, which they alleged to be null, the said Tomasa Elizaga Yap Caong had
executed another will, with all the formalities required by law, upon the 6th day of August, 1909.
Third. That the said Yap Ca Kuan and Yap Ca Llu were minors and that, even though they had been negligent in presenting their
opposition to the legalization of the will, said negligence was excusable, on account of their age.

83
Upon the foregoing facts the court was requested to annul and set aside the order of the 29th day of September, 1909, and to
grant to said minors an opportunity to present new proof relating to the due execution of said will. Said petition was based
upon the provisions of section 113 of the Code of Procedure in Civil Actions.
While it is not clear from the record, apparently the said minors in their petition for a new trial, attached to said petition the
alleged will of August 6, 1909, of the said Tomasa Elizaga Yap Caong, and the affidavits of Severo Tabora, Clotilde and Cornelia
Serrano.
Upon the 10th day of March, 1910, upon the hearing of said motion for a rehearing, the Honorable A. S. Crossfield, judge,
granted said motion and ordered that the rehearing should take place upon the 18th day of March, 1910, and directed that
notice should be given to the petitioners of said rehearing and to all other persons interested in the will. At the rehearing a
number of witnesses were examined.
It will be remembered that one of the grounds upon which the new trial was requested was that the deceased, Tomasa Elizaga
Yap Caong, had not signed the will (Exhibit A) of the 11th of August, 1909; that in support of that allegation, the protestants,
during the rehearing, presented a witness called Tomas Puzon. Puzon testified that he was a professor and an expert in
handwriting, and upon being shown the will (of August 11, 1909) Exhibit A, testified that the name and surname on Exhibit A, in
his judgment were written by two different hands, though the given name is the same as that upon Exhibit 1 (the will of August
6, 1909), because he found in the name "Tomasa" on Exhibit A a similarity in the tracing to the "Tomasa" in Exhibit 1; that
comparing the surname on Exhibit A with the surname on Exhibit 1 he found that the character of the writing was thoroughly
distinguished and different by the tracing and by the direction of the letters in the said two exhibits; that from his experience
and observation he believed that the name "Tomasa" and "Yap Caong," appearing in the signature on Exhibit A were written by
different person.
Puzon, being cross-examined with reference to his capacity as an expert in handwriting, testified that while he was a student in
the Ateneo de Manila, he had studied penmanship; that he could not tell exactly when that was, except that he had concluded
his course in the year 1882; that since that time he had been a telegraph operator for seventeen years and that he had acted as
an expert in hand- writing in the courts in the provinces.
Gabriel La O was called as a witness during the rehearing and testified that he had drawn the will of the 6th of August, 1909, at
the request of Tomasa Elizaga Yap Caong; that it was drawn in accordance with her request and under her directions; that she
had signed it; that the same had been signed by three witnesses in her presence and in the presence of each other; that the will
was written in her house; that she was sick and was lying in her bed, but that she sat up to sign the will; that she signed the will
with great difficulty; that she was signed in her right mind.
The said Severo Tabora was also called as a witness again during the rehearing. He testified that he knew Tomasa Elizaga Yap
Caong during her lifetime; that she was dead; that his signature as a witness to Exhibit A (the will of August 11, 1909) was
placed there by him; that the deceased, Tomasa Elizaga Yap Caong, became familiar with the contents of the will because she
signed it before he (the witness) did; that he did not know whether anybody there told her to sign the will or not; that he signed
two bills; that he did not know La O; that he did not believe that Tomasa had signed the will (Exhibit A) before he arrived at the
house; that he was not sure that he had seen Tomasa Elizaga Yap Caong sign Exhibit A because there were many people and
there was a screen at the door and he could not see; that he was called a a witness to sign the second will and was told by the
people there that it was the same as the first; that the will (Exhibit A) was on a table, far from the patient, in the house but
outside the room where the patient was; that the will was signed by Paez and himself; that Anselmo Zacarias was there; that he
was not sure whether Anselmo Zacarias signed the will or not; that he was not sure whether Tomasa Elizaga Yap Caong could
see the table on which the will was written at the time it was signed or not; that there were many people in the house; that he
remembered the names of Pedro and Lorenzo; that he could not remember the names of any others; that the will remained on
the table after he signed it; that after he signed the will he went to the room where Tomasa was lying; that the will was left on
the table outside; that Tomasa was very ill; that he heard the people asking Tomasa to sign the will after he was (the witness)
had signed it; that he saw Paez sign the will, that he could not remember whether Anselmo Zacarias had signed the will,
because immediately after he and Paez signed it, he left because he was hungry; that the place where the table was located
was in the same house, on the floor, about two steps down from the floor on which Tomasa was.
Rufino R. Papa, was called as a witness for the purpose of supporting the allegation that Tomasa Elizaga Yap Caong was
mentally incapacitated to make the will dated August 11, 1909 (Exhibit A). Papa declared that he was a physician; that he knew
Tomasa Elizaga Yap Caong; that he had treated her in the month of August; that he visited her first on the 8th day of August;
that he visited her again on the 9th and 10th days of August; that on the first visit he found the sick woman completely weak —
very weak from her sickness, in the third stage of tuberculosis; that she was lying in bed; that on the first visit he found her with
but little sense, the second day also, and on the third day she had lost all her intelligence; that she died on the 11th of August;
tat he was requested to issue the death certificate; that when he asked her (Tomasa) whether she was feeling any pain or
anything of that kind, she did not answer at all; that she was in a condition of stupor, induced, as he believed, by the stage of
uraemia from which she was suffering.

84
Anselmo Zacarias, who had signed the will of August 11, 1909, was also called as a witnesses during the rehearing. He testified
that he had known Tomasa Elizaga Yap Caong since he was a child; that Tomasa was dead; that he had written the will exhibit
A; that it was all in his writing except the last part, which was written by Carlos Sobaco; that he had written the will Exhibit A at
the request of the uncle of Tomasa; that Lorenzo, the brother of the deceased, was the one who had instructed him as to the
terms of the will ; that the deceased had not spoken to him concerning the terms of the will; that the will was written in the
dining room of the residence of the deceased; that Tomasa was in another room different from that in which the will was
written; that the will was not written in the presence of Tomasa; that he signed the will as a witness in the room where Tomasa
was lying; that the other witnesses signed the will in the same room that when he went into the room where the sick woman
was (Tomasa Elizaga Yap Caong) Lorenzo had the will in his hands; that when Lorenzo came to the bed he showed the will to his
sister (Tomasa) and requested her to sign it; that she was lying stretched out on the bed and two women, who were taking care
of her, helped her to sit up, supporting her by lacing their hands at her back; that when she started to write her name, he
withdrew from the bed on account of the best inside the room; when he came back again to the sick bed the will was signed
and was again in the hands of Lorenzo; that he did not see Tomasa sign the will because he withdrew from the room; that he
did not know whether Tomasa had been informed of the contents of the will or not; he supposed she must have read it
because Lorenzo turned the will over to her; that when Lorenzo asked her to sign the will, he did not know what she said — he
could not hear her voice; that he did not know whether the sick woman was him sign the will or not; that he believed that
Tomasa died the next day after the will had been signed; that the other two witnesses, Timoteo Paez and Severo Tabora, had
signed the will in the room with the sick woman; that he saw them sign the will and that they saw him sign it; that he was not
sure whether the testatrix could have seen them at the time they signed the will or not; that there was a screen before the bed;
that he did not think that Lorenzo had been giving instructions as to the contents of the will; that about ten or fifteen minutes
elapsed from the time Lorenzo handed the will to Tomasa before she started to sign it; that the pen with which she signed the
will as given to her and she held it.
Clotilde Mariano testified that he was a cigarette maker; that he knew Tomasa Elizaga Yap Caong and that she was dead; that
she had made two wills; that the first one was written by La O and the second by Zacarias; that he was present at the time
Zacarias wrote the second one; that he was present when the second will was taken to Tomasa for signature; that Lorenzo had
told Tomasa that the second will was exactly like the first; that Tomasa said she could not sign it.
On cross examination he testified that there was a lot of visitors there; that Zacarias was not there; that Paez and Tabora were
there; that he had told Tomasa that the second will was exactly like the first.
During the rehearing Cornelia Serrano and Pedro Francisco were also examined as witnesses. There is nothing in their
testimony, however, which in our opinion is important.
In rebuttal Julia e la Cruz was called as a witness. She testified that she was 19 years of age; that she knew Tomasa Elizaga Yap
Caong during her lifetime; that she lived in the house of Tomasa during the last week of her illness; that Tomasa had made two
wills; that she was present when the second one was executed; that a lawyer had drawn the will in the dining room and after it
had been drawn and everything finished , it was taken to where Doña Tomasa was, for her signature; that it was taken to her by
Anselmo Zacarias; that she was present at the time Tomasa signed the will that there were many other people present also;
that she did not see Timoteo Paez there; that she saw Severo Tabora; that Anselmo Zacarias was present; that she did not hear
Clotilde Mariano ask Tomasa to sign the will; that she did not hear Lorenzo say to Tomasa that the second will was the same sa
the first; that Tomasa asked her to help her to sit up and to put a pillow to her back when Zacarias gave her some paper or
document and asked her to sign it; that she saw Tomasa take hold of the pen and try to sign it but she did not see the place she
signed the document, for the reason that she left the room; that she saw Tomasa sign the document but did not see on what
place on the document she signed; and that a notary public came the next morning; that Tomasa was able to move about in the
bed; that she had seen Tomasa in the act of starting to write her signature when she told her to get her some water.
Yap Cao Quiang was also called as a witness in rebuttal. He testified that he knew Tomasa Elizaga Yap Caong and knew that she
had made a will; that he saw the will at the time it was written; that he saw Tomasa sign it on her head; that he did not hear
Lorenzo ask Tomasa to sign the will; that Lorenzo had handed the will to Tomasa to sign; that he saw the witnesses sign the will
on a table near the bed; that the table was outside the curtain or screen and near the entrance to the room where Tomasa was
lying.
Lorenzo Yap Caong testified as a witness on rebuttal. He said that he knew Anselmo Zacarias and that Zacarias wrote the will of
Tomasa Elizaga Yap Caong; that Tomasa had given him instructions; that Tomasa had said that she sign the will; that the will
was on a table near the bed of Tomasa; that Tomasa, from where she was lying in the bed, could seethe table where the
witnesses had signed the will.
During the rehearing certain other witnesses were also examined; in our opinion, however, it is necessary to quote from them
for the reason that their testimony in no way affects the preponderance of proof above quoted.

85
At the close of the rehearing the Honorable A. S. Crossfield, judge, in an extended opinion, reached the conclusion that the last
will and testament of Tomasa Elizaga Yap Caong, which was attached to the record and marked Exhibit A was the last will and
testament of the said Tomasa Elizaga Yap Caong and admitted it to probate and ordered that the administrator therefore
appointed should continue as such administrator. From that order the protestants appealed to this court, and made the
following assignments of error:
I. The court erred in declaring that the will, Exhibit A, was executed by the deceased Tomasa Yap Caong, without the
intervention of any external influence on the part of other persons.
II. The court erred in declaring that the testator had clear knowledge and knew what she was doing at the time of signing the
will.
III. The court erred in declaring that the signature of the deceased Tomasa Yap Caong in the first will, Exhibit 1, is identical with
that which appears in the second will, Exhibit A.
IV. The court erred in declaring that the will, Exhibit A, was executed in accordance with the law.
With reference to the first assignment of error, to wit, that undue influence was brought to bear upon Tomasa Elizaga Yap
Caong in the execution of her will of August 11th, 1909 (Exhibit A), the lower court found that no undue influence had been
exercised over the mind of the said Tomasa Elizaga Yap Caong. While it is true that some of the witnesses testified that the
brother of Tomasa, one Lorenzo, had attempted to unduly influence her mind in the execution of he will, upon the other hand,
there were several witnesses who testified that Lorenzo did not attempt, at the time of the execution of the will, to influence
her mind in any way. The lower court having had an opportunity to see, to hear, and to note the witnesses during their
examination reached the conclusion that a preponderance of the evidence showed that no undue influence had been used. we
find no good reason in the record for reversing his conclusions upon that question.
With reference to the second assignment of error to wit, that Tomasa Elizaga Yap Caong was not of sound mind and memory at
the time of the execution of the will, we find the same conflict in the declarations of the witnesses which we found with
reference to the undue influence. While the testimony of Dr. Papa is very strong relating to the mental condition of Tomasa
Elizaga Yap Caong, yet, nevertheless, his testimony related to a time perhaps twenty-four hours before the execution of the will
in question (Exhibit A). Several witnesses testified that at the time the will was presented to her for her signature, she was of
sound mind and memory and asked for a pen and ink and kept the will in her possession for ten or fifteen minutes and finally
signed it. The lower court found that there was a preponderance of evidence sustaining the conclusion that Tomasa Elizaga Yap
Caong was of sound mind and memory and in the possession of her faculties at the time she signed this will. In view of the
conflict in the testimony of the witnesses and the finding of the lower court, we do not feel justified in reversing his conclusions
upon that question.
With reference to the third assignment of error, to wit, that the lower court committed an error in declaring that the signature
of Tomasa Elizaga Yap Caong, on her first will (August 6, 1909, Exhibit 1), is identical with that which appears in the second will
(August 11, 1909, Exhibit A), it may be said:
First. That whether or not Tomasa Elizaga Yap Caong executed the will of August 6, 1909 (Exhibit 1), was not the question
presented to the court. The question presented was whether or not she had duly executed the will of August 11, 1909 (Exhibit
A).
Second. There appears to be but little doubt that Tomasa Elizaga Yap Caong did execute the will of August 6, 1909. Several
witnesses testified to that fact. The mere fact, however, that she executed a former will is no proof that she did not execute a
later will. She had a perfect right, by will, to dispose of her property, in accordance with the provisions of law, up to the very
last of moment her life. She had a perfect right to change, alter, modify or revoke any and all of her former wills and to make a
new one. Neither will the fact that the new will fails to expressly revoke all former wills, in any way sustain the charge that she
did not make the new will.
Third. In said third assignment of error there is involved in the statement that "The signature of Tomasa Elizaga Yap Caong, in
her first will (Exhibit 1) was not identical with that which appears in her second will (Exhibit A)" the inference that she had not
signed the second will and all the argument of the appellants relating to said third assignment of error is based upon the
alleged fact that Tomasa Elizaga Yap Caong did not sign Exhibit A. Several witnesses testified that they saw her write the name
"Tomasa." One of the witnesses testified that she had written her full name. We are of the opinion, and we think the law
sustains our conclusion, that if Tomasa Elizaga Yap Caong signed any portion of her name tot he will, with the intention to sign
the same, that the will amount to a signature. It has been held time and time again that one who makes a will may sign the
same by using a mark, the name having been written by others. If writing a mark simply upon a will is sufficient indication of the
intention of the person to make and execute a will, then certainly the writing of a portion or all of her name ought to be
accepted as a clear indication of her intention to execute the will. (Re Goods of Savory, 15 Jur., 1042; Addy vs. Grix, 8 Ves. Jr.,

86
504; Baker vs. Dening, 8 Ad. and El., 94 Long vs. Zook, 13 Penn., 400; Vernon vs. Kirk, 30 Penn., 218; Cozzen's Will, 61 Penn.,
196; Re Goods of Emerson, L. R. 9 Ir., 443; Main vs. Ryder, 84 Penn., 217.)
We find a very interesting case reported in 131 Pennsylvania State, 220 (6 L. R. A., 353), and cited by the appellees, which was
known as "Knox's Appeal." In this case one Harriett S. Knox died very suddenly on the 17th of October, 1888, at the residence of
her father. After her death a paper was found in her room, wholly in her handwriting, written with a lead pencil, upon three
sides of an ordinary folded sheet of note paper and bearing the signature simply of "Harriett." In this paper the deceased
attempted to make certain disposition of her property. The will was presented for probate. The probation was opposed upon
the ground that the same did not contain the signature of the deceased. That was the only question presented to the court,
whether the signature, in the form above indicated, was a sufficient signature to constitute said paper the last will and
testament of Harriett S. Knox. It was admitted that the entire paper was in the handwriting of the deceased. In deciding that
question, Justice Mitchell said:
The precise case of a signature by the first name only, does not appear to have arisen either in England or the United States; but
the principle on which the decisions already referred to were based, especially those in regard to signing by initials only, are
equally applicable to the present case, and additional force is given to them by the decisions as to what constitutes a binding
signature to a contract. (Palmer vs. Stephens, 1 Denio, 478; Sanborne vs. Flager, 9 Alle, 474; Weston vs. Myers, 33 Ill., 424;
Salmon Falls, etc. Co. vs. Goddard, 14 How. (U. S.), 446.)
The man who cannot write and who is obliged to make his mark simply therefor, upon the will, is held to "sign" as effectually as
if he had written his initials or his full name. It would seem to be sufficient, under the law requiring a signature by the person
making a will, to make his mark, to place his initials or all or any part of his name thereon. In the present case we think the
proof shows, by a large preponderance, that Tomasa Elizaga Yap Caong, if she did not sign her full name, did at least sign her
given name "Tomasa," and that is sufficient to satisfy the statute.
With reference to the fourth assignment of error, it may be said that the argument which was preceded is sufficient to answer
it also.
During the trial of the cause the protestants made a strong effort to show that Tomasa Elizaga Yap Caong did not sign her name
in the presence of the witnesses and that they did not sign their names in their presence nor in the presence of each other.
Upon that question there is considerable conflict of proof. An effort was made to show that the will was signed by the
witnesses in one room and by Tomasa in another. A plan of the room or rooms in which the will was signed was presented as
proof and it was shown that there was but one room; that one part of the room was one or two steps below the floor of the
other; that the table on which the witnesses signed the will was located upon the lower floor of the room. It was also shown
that from the bed in which Tomasa was lying, it was possible for her to see the table on which the witnesses signed the will.
While the rule is absolute that one who makes a will must sign the same in the presence of the witnesses and that the
witnesses must sign in the presence of each other, as well as in the presence of the one making the will, yet, nevertheless, the
actual seeing of the signatures made is not necessary. It is sufficient if the signatures are made where it is possible for each of
the necessary parties, if they desire to see, may see the signatures placed upon the will.
In cases like the present where there is so much conflict in the proof, it is very difficult for the courts to reach conclusions that
are absolutely free from doubt. Great weight must be given by appellate courts who do not see or hear the witnesses, to the
conclusions of the trial courts who had that opportunity.
Upon a full consideration of the record, we find that a preponderance of the proof shows that Tomasa Elizaga Yap Caong did
execute, freely and voluntarily, while she was in the right use of all her faculties, the will dated August 11, 1909 (Exhibit A).
Therefore the judgment of the lower court admitting said will to probate is hereby affirmed with costs.

87
G.R. No. L-13431 November 12, 1919
In re will of Ana Abangan.
GERTRUDIS ABANGAN, executrix-appellee,
vs.
ANASTACIA ABANGAN, ET AL., opponents-appellants.
Filemon Sotto for appellants.
M. Jesus Cuenco for appellee.

AVANCEÑA, J.:
On September 19, 1917, the Court of First Instance of Cebu admitted to probate Ana Abangan's will executed July, 1916. From
this decision the opponent's appealed.
Said document, duly probated as Ana Abangan's will, consists of two sheets, the first of which contains all of the disposition of
the testatrix, duly signed at the bottom by Martin Montalban (in the name and under the direction of the testatrix) and by
three witnesses. The following sheet contains only the attestation clause duly signed at the bottom by the three instrumental
witnesses. Neither of these sheets is signed on the left margin by the testatrix and the three witnesses, nor numbered by
letters; and these omissions, according to appellants' contention, are defects whereby the probate of the will should have been
denied. We are of the opinion that the will was duly admitted to probate.
In requiring that each and every sheet of the will should also be signed on the left margin by the testator and three witnesses in
the presence of each other, Act No. 2645 (which is the one applicable in the case) evidently has for its object (referring to the
body of the will itself) to avoid the substitution of any of said sheets, thereby changing the testator's dispositions. But when
these dispositions are wholly written on only one sheet signed at the bottom by the testator and three witnesses (as the instant
case), their signatures on the left margin of said sheet would be completely purposeless. In requiring this signature on the
margin, the statute took into consideration, undoubtedly, the case of a will written on several sheets and must have referred to
the sheets which the testator and the witnesses do not have to sign at the bottom. A different interpretation would assume
that the statute requires that this sheet, already signed at the bottom, be signed twice. We cannot attribute to the statute such
an intention. As these signatures must be written by the testator and the witnesses in the presence of each other, it appears
that, if the signatures at the bottom of the sheet guaranties its authenticity, another signature on its left margin would be
unneccessary; and if they do not guaranty, same signatures, affixed on another part of same sheet, would add nothing. We
cannot assume that the statute regards of such importance the place where the testator and the witnesses must sign on the
sheet that it would consider that their signatures written on the bottom do not guaranty the authenticity of the sheet but, if
repeated on the margin, give sufficient security.
In requiring that each and every page of a will must be numbered correlatively in letters placed on the upper part of the sheet,
it is likewise clear that the object of Act No. 2645 is to know whether any sheet of the will has been removed. But, when all the
dispositive parts of a will are written on one sheet only, the object of the statute disappears because the removal of this single
sheet, although unnumbered, cannot be hidden.
What has been said is also applicable to the attestation clause. Wherefore, without considering whether or not this clause is an
essential part of the will, we hold that in the one accompanying the will in question, the signatures of the testatrix and of the
three witnesses on the margin and the numbering of the pages of the sheet are formalities not required by the statute.
Moreover, referring specially to the signature of the testatrix, we can add that same is not necessary in the attestation clause
because this, as its name implies, appertains only to the witnesses and not to the testator since the latter does not attest, but
executes, the will.
Synthesizing our opinion, we hold that in a will consisting of two sheets the first of which contains all the testamentary
dispositions and is signed at the bottom by the testator and three witnesses and the second contains only the attestation clause
and is signed also at the bottom by the three witnesses, it is not necessary that both sheets be further signed on their margins
by the testator and the witnesses, or be paged.
The object of the solemnities surrounding the execution of wills is to close the door against bad faith and fraud, to avoid
substitution of wills and testaments and to guaranty their truth and authenticity. Therefore the laws on this subject should be
interpreted in such a way as to attain these primordal ends. But, on the other hand, also one must not lose sight of the fact that
it is not the object of the law to restrain and curtail the exercise of the right to make a will. So when an interpretation already
given assures such ends, any other interpretation whatsoever, that adds nothing but demands more requisites entirely
unnecessary, useless and frustative of the testator's last will, must be disregarded. lawphil.net

88
As another ground for this appeal, it is alleged the records do not show that the testarix knew the dialect in which the will is
written. But the circumstance appearing in the will itself that same was executed in the city of Cebu and in the dialect of this
locality where the testatrix was a neighbor is enough, in the absence of any proof to the contrary, to presume that she knew
this dialect in which this will is written.
For the foregoing considerations, the judgment appealed from is hereby affirmed with costs against the appellants. So ordered.

89
G.R. No. L-1787 August 27, 1948
Testacy of Sixto Lopez. JOSE S. LOPEZ, petitioner-appellee,
vs.
AGUSTIN LIBORO, oppositor-appellant.
Tirona, Gutierrez and Adorable for appellant.
Ramon Diokno for appellee.
TUASON, J.:
In the Court of First Instance of Batangas the appellant opposed unsuccessfully the probate of what purports to be the last will
and testament (Exhibit A) of Don Sixto Lopez, who died at the age of 83 in Balayan, Batangas, on March 3, 1947, almost six
months after the document in question was executed. In the court below, the present appellant specified five grounds for his
opposition, to wit: (1) that the deceased never executed the alleged will; (2) that his signature appearing in said will was a
forgery; (3) that at the time of the execution of the will, he was wanting in testamentary as well as mental capacity due to
advanced age; (4) that, if he did ever execute said will, it was not executed and attested as required by law, and one of the
alleged instrumental witnesses was incapacitated to act as such; and it was procured by duress, influence of fear and threats
and undue and improper pressure and influence on the part of the beneficiaries instituted therein, principally the testator's
sister, Clemencia Lopez, and the herein proponent, Jose S. Lopez; and (5) that the signature of the testator was procured by
fraud or trick.
In this instance only one of these objections is reiterated, formulated in these words: "That the court a quo erred in holding
that the document Exhibit "A" was executed in all particulars as required by law." To this objection is added the alleged error of
the court "in allowing the petitioner to introduce evidence that Exhibit "A" was written in a language known to the decedent
after petitioner rested his case and over the vigorous objection of the oppositor.
The will in question comprises two pages, each of which is written on one side of a separate sheet. The first sheet is not paged
either in letters or in Arabic numerals. This, the appellant believes, is a fatal defect.
The purpose of the law in prescribing the paging of wills is guard against fraud, and to afford means of preventing the
substitution or of defecting the loss of any of its pages. (Abangan vs. Abangan, 40 Phil., 476.) In the present case, the omission
to put a page number on the first sheet, if that be necessary, is supplied by other forms of identification more trustworthy than
the conventional numerical words or characters. The unnumbered page is clearly identified as the first page by the internal
sense of its contents considered in relation to the contents of the second page. By their meaning and coherence, the first and
second lines on the second page are undeniably a continuation of the last sentence of the testament, before the attestation
clause, which starts at the bottom of the preceding page. Furthermore, the unnumbered page contains the caption
"TESTAMENTO," the invocation of the Almighty, and a recital that the testator was in full use of his testamentary faculty, — all
of which, in the logical order of sequence, precede the direction for the disposition of the marker's property. Again, as page two
contains only the two lines above mentioned, the attestation clause, the mark of the testator and the signatures of the
witnesses, the other sheet can not by any possibility be taken for other than page one. Abangan vs. Abangan, supra, and
Fernandez vs. Vergel de Dios, 46 Phil., 922 are decisive of this issue.
Although not falling within the purview and scope of the first assignment of error, the matter of the credibility of the witnesses
is assailed under this heading. On the merits we do not believe that the appellant's contention deserves serious consideration.
Such contradictions in the testimony of the instrumental witnesses as are set out in the appellant's brief are incidents not all of
which every one of the witnesses can be supposed to have perceived, or to recall in the same order in which they occurred.
Everyday life and the result of investigations made in the field of experimental psychology show that the contradictions of
witnesses generally occur in the details of a certain incident, after a long series of questioning, and far from being an evidence
of falsehood constitute a demonstration of good faith. Inasmuch as not all those who witness an incident are impressed in like
manner, it is but natural that in relating their impressions they should not agree in the minor details; hence, the contradictions
in their testimony. (People vs. Limbo, 49 Phil., 99.)
The testator affixed his thumbmark to the instrument instead of signing his name. The reason for this was that the testator was
suffering from "partial paralysis." While another in testator's place might have directed someone else to sign for him, as
appellant contends should have been done, there is nothing curious or suspicious in the fact that the testator chose the use of
mark as the means of authenticating his will. It was a matter of taste or preference. Both ways are good. A statute requiring a
will to be "signed" is satisfied if the signature is made by the testator's mark. (De Gala vs. Gonzales and Ona, 53 Phil., 108; 28 R.
C. L., 117.)
With reference to the second assignment of error, we do not share the opinion that the trial court communicated an abuse of
discretion in allowing the appellant to offer evidence to prove knowledge of Spanish by the testator, the language in which the

90
will is drawn, after the petitioner had rested his case and after the opponent had moved for dismissal of the petition on the
ground of insufficiency of evidence. It is within the discretion of the court whether or not to admit further evidence after the
party offering the evidence has rested, and this discretion will not be reviewed except where it has clearly been abused. (64 C.
J., 160.) More, it is within the sound discretion of the court whether or not it will allow the case to be reopened for the further
introduction of evidence after a motion or request for a nonsuit, or a demurrer to the evidence, and the case may be reopened
after the court has announced its intention as to its ruling on the request, motion, or demurrer, or has granted it or has denied
the same, or after the motion has been granted, if the order has not been written, or entered upon the minutes or signed. (64
C. J., 164.)
In this jurisdiction this rule has been followed. After the parties have produced their respective direct proofs, they are allowed
to offer rebutting evidence only, but, it has been held, the court, for good reasons, in the furtherance of justice, may permit
them to offer evidence upon their original case, and its ruling will not be disturbed in the appellate court where no abuse of
discretion appears. (Siuliong and Co. vs. Ylagan, 43 Phil., 393; U. S. vs. Alviar, 36 Phil., 804.) So, generally, additional evidence is
allowed when it is newly discovered, or where it has been omitted through inadvertence or mistake, or where the purpose of
the evidence is to the evidence is to correct evidence previously offered. (I Moran's Comments on the Rules of Court, 2d ed.,
545; 64 C. J., 160-163.) The omission to present evidence on the testator's knowledge of Spanish had not been deliberate. It
was due to a misapprehension or oversight.
Although alien to the second assignment of error, the appellant impugns the will for its silence on the testator's understanding
of the language used in the testament. There is no statutory requirement that such knowledge be expressly stated in the will
itself. It is a matter that may be established by proof aliunde. This Court so impliedly ruled in Gonzales vs. Laurel, 46 Phil., 781,
in which the probate of a will written in Tagalog was ordered although it did not say that the testator knew that idiom. In fact,
there was not even extraneous proof on the subject other than the fact that the testator resided in a Tagalog region, from
which the court said "a presumption arises that said Maria Tapia knew the Tagalog dialect.
The order of the lower court ordering the probate of the last will and testament of Don Sixto Lopez is affirmed, with costs.

91
G.R. No. L-36033 November 5, 1982
IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR THE PROBATE OF THE WILL OF DOROTEA PEREZ, (deceased): APOLONIO TABOADA,
petitioner,
vs.
HON. AVELINO S. ROSAL, as Judge of Court of First Instance of Southern Leyte, (Branch III, Maasin), respondent.
Erasmo M. Diola counsel for petition.
Hon. Avelino S. Rosal in his own behalf.

GUTIERREZ, JR. J.:

This is a petition for review of the orders issued by the Court of First Instance of Southern Leyte, Branch III, in Special
Proceedings No. R-1713, entitled "In the Matter of the Petition for Probate of the Will of Dorotea Perez, Deceased; Apolonio
Taboada, Petitioner", which denied the probate of the will, the motion for reconsideration and the motion for appointment of a
special administrator.
In the petition for probate filed with the respondent court, the petitioner attached the alleged last will and testament of the
late Dorotea Perez. Written in the Cebuano-Visayan dialect, the will consists of two pages. The first page contains the entire
testamentary dispositions and is signed at the end or bottom of the page by the testatrix alone and at the left hand margin by
the three (3) instrumental witnesses. The second page which contains the attestation clause and the acknowledgment is signed
at the end of the attestation clause by the three (3) attesting witnesses and at the left hand margin by the testatrix.
Since no opposition was filed after the petitioner's compliance with the requirement of publication, the trial court
commissioned the branch clerk of court to receive the petitioner's evidence. Accordingly, the petitioner submitted his evidence
and presented Vicente Timkang, one of the subscribing witnesses to the will, who testified on its genuineness and due
execution.
The trial court, thru then Presiding Judge Ramon C. Pamatian issued the questioned order denying the probate of the will of
Dorotea Perez for want of a formality in its execution. In the same order, the petitioner was also required to submit the names
of the intestate heirs with their corresponding addresses so that they could be properly notified and could intervene in the
summary settlement of the estate.
Instead of complying with the order of the trial court, the petitioner filed a manifestation and/or motion, ex parte praying for a
thirty-day period within which to deliberate on any step to be taken as a result of the disallowance of the will. He also asked
that the ten-day period required by the court to submit the names of intestate heirs with their addresses be held in abeyance.
The petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration of the order denying the probate of the will. However, the motion together
with the previous manifestation and/or motion could not be acted upon by the Honorable Ramon C. Pamatian due to his
transfer to his new station at Pasig, Rizal. The said motions or incidents were still pending resolution when respondent Judge
Avelino S. Rosal assumed the position of presiding judge of the respondent court.
Meanwhile, the petitioner filed a motion for the appointment of special administrator.
Subsequently, the new Judge denied the motion for reconsideration as well as the manifestation and/or motion filed ex parte.
In the same order of denial, the motion for the appointment of special administrator was likewise denied because of the
petitioner's failure to comply with the order requiring him to submit the names of' the intestate heirs and their addresses.
The petitioner decided to file the present petition.
For the validity of a formal notarial will, does Article 805 of the Civil Code require that the testatrix and all the three
instrumental and attesting witnesses sign at the end of the will and in the presence of the testatrix and of one another?
Article 805 of the Civil Code provides:
Every will, other than a holographic will, must be subscribed at the end thereof by the testator himself or by the testator's
name written by some other person in his presence, and by his express direction, and attested and subscribed by three or more
credible witnesses in the presence of the testator and of one another.
The testator or the person requested by him to write his name and the instrumental witnesses of the will, shall also sign, as
aforesaid, each and every page thereof, except the last, on the left margin, and all the pages shall be numbered correlatively in
letters placed on the upper part of each page.
The attestation shall state the number of pages used upon which the will is written, and the fact that the testator signed the
will and every page thereof, or caused some other person to write his name, under his express direction, in the presence of the

92
instrumental witnesses, and that the lacier witnesses and signed the will and the pages thereof in the presence of the testator
and of one another.
If the attestation clause is in a language not known to the witnesses, it shall be interpreted to the witnesses, it shall be
interpreted to them.
The respondent Judge interprets the above-quoted provision of law to require that, for a notarial will to be valid, it is not
enough that only the testatrix signs at the "end" but an the three subscribing witnesses must also sign at the same place or at
the end, in the presence of the testatrix and of one another because the attesting witnesses to a will attest not merely the will
itself but also the signature of the testator. It is not sufficient compliance to sign the page, where the end of the will is found, at
the left hand margin of that page.
On the other hand, the petitioner maintains that Article 805 of the Civil Code does not make it a condition precedent or a
matter of absolute necessity for the extrinsic validity of the wig that the signatures of the subscribing witnesses should be
specifically located at the end of the wig after the signature of the testatrix. He contends that it would be absurd that the
legislature intended to place so heavy an import on the space or particular location where the signatures are to be found as
long as this space or particular location wherein the signatures are found is consistent with good faith and the honest frailties of
human nature.
We find the petition meritorious.
Undoubtedly, under Article 805 of the Civil Code, the will must be subscribed or signed at its end by the testator himself or by
the testator's name written by another person in his presence, and by his express direction, and attested and subscribed by
three or more credible witnesses in the presence of the testator and of one another.
It must be noted that the law uses the terms attested and subscribed Attestation consists in witnessing the testator's execution
of the will in order to see and take note mentally that those things are, done which the statute requires for the execution of a
will and that the signature of the testator exists as a fact. On the other hand, subscription is the signing of the witnesses' names
upon the same paper for the purpose of Identification of such paper as the will which was executed by the testator. (Ragsdale
v. Hill, 269 SW 2d 911).
Insofar as the requirement of subscription is concerned, it is our considered view that the will in this case was subscribed in a
manner which fully satisfies the purpose of Identification.
The signatures of the instrumental witnesses on the left margin of the first page of the will attested not only to the genuineness
of the signature of the testatrix but also the due execution of the will as embodied in the attestation clause.
While perfection in the drafting of a will may be desirable, unsubstantial departure from the usual forms should be ignored,
especially where the authenticity of the will is not assailed. (Gonzales v. Gonzales, 90 Phil. 444, 449).
The law is to be liberally construed, "the underlying and fundamental objective permeating the provisions on the law on wills in
this project consists in the liberalization of the manner of their execution with the end in view of giving the testator more
freedom in expressing his last wishes but with sufficient safeguards and restrictions to prevent the commission of fraud and the
exercise of undue and improper pressure and influence upon the testator. This objective is in accord with the modern tendency
in respect to the formalities in the execution of a will" (Report of the Code commission, p. 103).
Parenthetically, Judge Ramon C. Pamatian stated in his questioned order that were not for the defect in the place of signatures
of the witnesses, he would have found the testimony sufficient to establish the validity of the will.
The objects of attestation and of subscription were fully met and satisfied in the present case when the instrumental witnesses
signed at the left margin of the sole page which contains all the testamentary dispositions, especially so when the will was
properly Identified by subscribing witness Vicente Timkang to be the same will executed by the testatrix. There was no question
of fraud or substitution behind the questioned order.
We have examined the will in question and noticed that the attestation clause failed to state the number of pages used in
writing the will. This would have been a fatal defect were it not for the fact that, in this case, it is discernible from the entire wig
that it is really and actually composed of only two pages duly signed by the testatrix and her instrumental witnesses. As earlier
stated, the first page which contains the entirety of the testamentary dispositions is signed by the testatrix at the end or at the
bottom while the instrumental witnesses signed at the left margin. The other page which is marked as "Pagina dos" comprises
the attestation clause and the acknowledgment. The acknowledgment itself states that "This Last Will and Testament consists
of two pages including this page".
In Singson v. Florentino, et al. (92 Phil. 161, 164), this Court made the following observations with respect to the purpose of the
requirement that the attestation clause must state the number of pages used:

93
The law referred to is article 618 of the Code of Civil Procedure, as amended by Act No. 2645, which requires that the
attestation clause shall state the number of pages or sheets upon which the win is written, which requirement has been held to
be mandatory as an effective safeguard against the possibility of interpolation or omission of some of the pages of the will to
the prejudice of the heirs to whom the property is intended to be bequeathed (In re will of Andrada, 42 Phil., 180; Uy Coque vs.
Navas L. Sioca, 43 Phil. 405; Gumban vs. Gorecho, 50 Phil. 30; Quinto vs. Morata, 54 Phil. 481; Echevarria vs. Sarmiento, 66 Phil.
611). The ratio decidendi of these cases seems to be that the attestation clause must contain a statement of the number of
sheets or pages composing the will and that if this is missing or is omitted, it will have the effect of invalidating the will if the
deficiency cannot be supplied, not by evidence aliunde, but by a consideration or examination of the will itself. But here the
situation is different. While the attestation clause does not state the number of sheets or pages upon which the will is written,
however, the last part of the body of the will contains a statement that it is composed of eight pages, which circumstance in our
opinion takes this case out of the rigid rule of construction and places it within the realm of similar cases where a broad and
more liberal view has been adopted to prevent the will of the testator from being defeated by purely technical considerations.
Icasiano v. Icasiano (11 SCRA 422, 429) has the following ruling which applies a similar liberal approach:
... Impossibility of substitution of this page is assured not only (sic) the fact that the testatrix and two other witnesses did sign
the defective page, but also by its bearing the coincident imprint of the seal of the notary public before whom the testament
was ratified by testatrix and all three witnesses. The law should not be so strictly and literally interpreted as to penalize the
testatrix on account of the inadvertence of a single witness over whose conduct she had no control where the purpose of the
law to guarantee the Identity of the testament and its component pages is sufficiently attained, no intentional or deliberate
deviation existed, and the evidence on record attests to the fun observance of the statutory requisites. Otherwise, as stated in
Vda. de Gil. Vs. Murciano, 49 Off. Gaz. 1459, at 1479 (decision on reconsideration) 'witnesses may sabotage the will by
muddling or bungling it or the attestation clause.
WHEREFORE, the present petition is hereby granted. The orders of the respondent court which denied the probate of tile will,
the motion for reconsideration of the denial of probate, and the motion for appointment of a special administrator are set
aside. The respondent court is ordered to allow the probate of the wig and to conduct further proceedings in accordance with
this decision. No pronouncement on costs.
SO ORDERED.

94
G.R. No. L-5971 February 27, 1911
BEATRIZ NERA, ET AL., plaintiffs-appellees,
vs.
NARCISA RIMANDO, defendant-appellant.
Valerio Fontanilla and Andres Asprer for appellant.
Anacleto Diaz for appellees.
CARSON, J.:
The only question raised by the evidence in this case as to the due execution of the instrument propounded as a will in the
court below, is whether one of the subscribing witnesses was present in the small room where it was executed at the time
when the testator and the other subscribing witnesses attached their signatures; or whether at that time he was outside, some
eight or ten feet away, in a large room connecting with the smaller room by a doorway, across which was hung a curtain which
made it impossible for one in the outside room to see the testator and the other subscribing witnesses in the act of attaching
their signatures to the instrument.
A majority of the members of the court is of opinion that this subscribing witness was in the small room with the testator and
the other subscribing witnesses at the time when they attached their signatures to the instrument, and this finding, of course,
disposes of the appeal and necessitates the affirmance of the decree admitting the document to probate as the last will and
testament of the deceased.
The trial judge does not appear to have considered the determination of this question of fact of vital importance in the
determination of this case, as he was of opinion that under the doctrine laid down in the case of Jaboneta vs. Gustilo (5 Phil.
Rep., 541) the alleged fact that one of the subscribing witnesses was in the outer room when the testator and the other
describing witnesses signed the instrument in the inner room, had it been proven, would not be sufficient in itself to invalidate
the execution of the will. But we are unanimously of opinion that had this subscribing witness been proven to have been in the
outer room at the time when the testator and the other subscribing witnesses attached their signatures to the instrument in
the inner room, it would have been invalid as a will, the attaching of those signatures under circumstances not being done "in
the presence" of the witness in the outer room. This because the line of vision from this witness to the testator and the other
subscribing witnesses would necessarily have been impeded by the curtain separating the inner from the outer one "at the
moment of inscription of each signature."
In the case just cited, on which the trial court relied, we held that:
The true test of presence of the testator and the witnesses in the execution of a will is not whether they actually saw each
other sign, but whether they might have been seen each other sign, had they chosen to do so, considering their mental and
physical condition and position with relation to each other at the moment of inscription of each signature.
But it is especially to be noted that the position of the parties with relation to each other at the moment of the subscription of
each signature, must be such that they may see each other sign if they choose to do so. This, of course, does not mean that the
testator and the subscribing witnesses may be held to have executed the instrument in the presence of each other if it appears
that they would not have been able to see each other sign at that moment, without changing their relative positions or existing
conditions. The evidence in the case relied upon by the trial judge discloses that "at the moment when the witness Javellana
signed the document he was actually and physically present and in such position with relation to Jaboneta that he could see
everything that took place by merely casting his eyes in the proper direction and without any physical obstruction to prevent his
doing so." And the decision merely laid down the doctrine that the question whether the testator and the subscribing witnesses
to an alleged will sign the instrument in the presence of each other does not depend upon proof of the fact that their eyes were
actually cast upon the paper at the moment of its subscription by each of them, but that at that moment existing conditions
and their position with relation to each other were such that by merely casting the eyes in the proper direction they could have
seen each other sign. To extend the doctrine further would open the door to the possibility of all manner of fraud, substitution,
and the like, and would defeat the purpose for which this particular condition is prescribed in the code as one of the requisites
in the execution of a will.
The decree entered by the court below admitting the instrument propounded therein to probate as the last will and testament
of Pedro Rimando, deceased, is affirmed with costs of this instance against the appellant.

95
G.R. No. 124371 November 23, 2000
PAULA T. LLORENTE, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and ALICIA F. LLORENTE, respondents.
DECISION
PARDO, J.:
The Case
The case raises a conflict of laws issue.
What is before us is an appeal from the decision of the Court of Appeals1 modifying that of the Regional Trial Court, Camarines
Sur, Branch 35, Iriga City2 declaring respondent Alicia F. Llorente (herinafter referred to as "Alicia"), as co-owners of whatever
property she and the deceased Lorenzo N. Llorente (hereinafter referred to as "Lorenzo") may have acquired during the
twenty-five (25) years that they lived together as husband and wife.
The Facts
The deceased Lorenzo N. Llorente was an enlisted serviceman of the United States Navy from March 10, 1927 to September 30,
1957.3
On February 22, 1937, Lorenzo and petitioner Paula Llorente (hereinafter referred to as "Paula") were married before a parish
priest, Roman Catholic Church, in Nabua, Camarines Sur.4
Before the outbreak of the Pacific War, Lorenzo departed for the United States and Paula stayed in the conjugal home in barrio
Antipolo, Nabua, Camarines Sur.5
On November 30, 1943, Lorenzo was admitted to United States citizenship and Certificate of Naturalization No. 5579816 was
issued in his favor by the United States District Court, Southern District of New York.6
Upon the liberation of the Philippines by the American Forces in 1945, Lorenzo was granted an accrued leave by the U. S. Navy,
to visit his wife and he visited the Philippines.7 He discovered that his wife Paula was pregnant and was "living in" and having an
adulterous relationship with his brother, Ceferino Llorente.8
On December 4, 1945, Paula gave birth to a boy registered in the Office of the Registrar of Nabua as "Crisologo Llorente," with
the certificate stating that the child was not legitimate and the line for the father’s name was left blank.9
Lorenzo refused to forgive Paula and live with her. In fact, on February 2, 1946, the couple drew a written agreement to the
effect that (1) all the family allowances allotted by the United States Navy as part of Lorenzo’s salary and all other obligations
for Paula’s daily maintenance and support would be suspended; (2) they would dissolve their marital union in accordance with
judicial proceedings; (3) they would make a separate agreement regarding their conjugal property acquired during their marital
life; and (4) Lorenzo would not prosecute Paula for her adulterous act since she voluntarily admitted her fault and agreed to
separate from Lorenzo peacefully. The agreement was signed by both Lorenzo and Paula and was witnessed by Paula’s father
and stepmother. The agreement was notarized by Notary Public Pedro Osabel.10
Lorenzo returned to the United States and on November 16, 1951 filed for divorce with the Superior Court of the State of
California in and for the County of San Diego. Paula was represented by counsel, John Riley, and actively participated in the
proceedings. On November 27, 1951, the Superior Court of the State of California, for the County of San Diego found all factual
allegations to be true and issued an interlocutory judgment of divorce.11
On December 4, 1952, the divorce decree became final.12
In the meantime, Lorenzo returned to the Philippines.
On January 16, 1958, Lorenzo married Alicia F. Llorente in Manila.13 Apparently, Alicia had no knowledge of the first marriage
even if they resided in the same town as Paula, who did not oppose the marriage or cohabitation.14
From 1958 to 1985, Lorenzo and Alicia lived together as husband and wife.15 Their twenty-five (25) year union produced three
children, Raul, Luz and Beverly, all surnamed Llorente.16
On March 13, 1981, Lorenzo executed a Last Will and Testament. The will was notarized by Notary Public Salvador M. Occiano,
duly signed by Lorenzo with attesting witnesses Francisco Hugo, Francisco Neibres and Tito Trajano. In the will, Lorenzo
bequeathed all his property to Alicia and their three children, to wit:

96
"(1) I give and bequeath to my wife ALICIA R. FORTUNO exclusively my residential house and lot, located at San Francisco,
Nabua, Camarines Sur, Philippines, including ALL the personal properties and other movables or belongings that may be found
or existing therein;
"(2) I give and bequeath exclusively to my wife Alicia R. Fortuno and to my children, Raul F. Llorente, Luz F. Llorente and Beverly
F. Llorente, in equal shares, all my real properties whatsoever and wheresoever located, specifically my real properties located
at Barangay Aro-Aldao, Nabua, Camarines Sur; Barangay Paloyon, Nabua, Camarines Sur; Barangay Baras, Sitio Puga, Nabua,
Camarines Sur; and Barangay Paloyon, Sitio Nalilidong, Nabua, Camarines Sur;
"(3) I likewise give and bequeath exclusively unto my wife Alicia R. Fortuno and unto my children, Raul F. Llorente, Luz F.
Llorente and Beverly F. Llorente, in equal shares, my real properties located in Quezon City Philippines, and covered by Transfer
Certificate of Title No. 188652; and my lands in Antipolo, Rizal, Philippines, covered by Transfer Certificate of Title Nos. 124196
and 165188, both of the Registry of Deeds of the province of Rizal, Philippines;
"(4) That their respective shares in the above-mentioned properties, whether real or personal properties, shall not be disposed
of, ceded, sold and conveyed to any other persons, but could only be sold, ceded, conveyed and disposed of by and among
themselves;
"(5) I designate my wife ALICIA R. FORTUNO to be the sole executor of this my Last Will and Testament, and in her default or
incapacity of the latter to act, any of my children in the order of age, if of age;
"(6) I hereby direct that the executor named herein or her lawful substitute should served (sic) without bond;
"(7) I hereby revoke any and all my other wills, codicils, or testamentary dispositions heretofore executed, signed, or published,
by me;
"(8) It is my final wish and desire that if I die, no relatives of mine in any degree in the Llorente’s Side should ever bother and
disturb in any manner whatsoever my wife Alicia R. Fortunato and my children with respect to any real or personal properties I
gave and bequeathed respectively to each one of them by virtue of this Last Will and Testament."17
On December 14, 1983, Lorenzo filed with the Regional Trial Court, Iriga, Camarines Sur, a petition for the probate and
allowance of his last will and testament wherein Lorenzo moved that Alicia be appointed Special Administratrix of his estate.18
On January 18, 1984, the trial court denied the motion for the reason that the testator Lorenzo was still alive.19
On January 24, 1984, finding that the will was duly executed, the trial court admitted the will to probate.20
On June 11, 1985, before the proceedings could be terminated, Lorenzo died.21
On September 4, 1985, Paula filed with the same court a petition22 for letters of administration over Lorenzo’s estate in her
favor. Paula contended (1) that she was Lorenzo’s surviving spouse, (2) that the various property were acquired during their
marriage, (3) that Lorenzo’s will disposed of all his property in favor of Alicia and her children, encroaching on her legitime and
1/2 share in the conjugal property.23
On December 13, 1985, Alicia filed in the testate proceeding (Sp. Proc. No. IR-755), a petition for the issuance of letters
testamentary.24
On October 14, 1985, without terminating the testate proceedings, the trial court gave due course to Paula’s petition in Sp.
Proc. No. IR-888.25
On November 6, 13 and 20, 1985, the order was published in the newspaper "Bicol Star".26
On May 18, 1987, the Regional Trial Court issued a joint decision, thus:
"Wherefore, considering that this court has so found that the divorce decree granted to the late Lorenzo Llorente is void and
inapplicable in the Philippines, therefore the marriage he contracted with Alicia Fortunato on January 16, 1958 at Manila is
likewise void. This being so the petition of Alicia F. Llorente for the issuance of letters testamentary is denied. Likewise, she is
not entitled to receive any share from the estate even if the will especially said so her relationship with Lorenzo having gained
the status of paramour which is under Art. 739 (1).
"On the other hand, the court finds the petition of Paula Titular Llorente, meritorious, and so declares the intrinsic disposition
of the will of Lorenzo Llorente dated March 13, 1981 as void and declares her entitled as conjugal partner and entitled to one-
half of their conjugal properties, and as primary compulsory heir, Paula T. Llorente is also entitled to one-third of the estate and
then one-third should go to the illegitimate children, Raul, Luz and Beverly, all surname (sic) Llorente, for them to partition in
equal shares and also entitled to the remaining free portion in equal shares.

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"Petitioner, Paula Llorente is appointed legal administrator of the estate of the deceased, Lorenzo Llorente. As such let the
corresponding letters of administration issue in her favor upon her filing a bond in the amount (sic) of P100,000.00 conditioned
for her to make a return to the court within three (3) months a true and complete inventory of all goods, chattels, rights, and
credits, and estate which shall at any time come to her possession or to the possession of any other person for her, and from
the proceeds to pay and discharge all debts, legacies and charges on the same, or such dividends thereon as shall be decreed or
required by this court; to render a true and just account of her administration to the court within one (1) year, and at any other
time when required by the court and to perform all orders of this court by her to be performed.
"On the other matters prayed for in respective petitions for want of evidence could not be granted.
"SO ORDERED."27
In time, Alicia filed with the trial court a motion for reconsideration of the aforequoted decision.28
On September 14, 1987, the trial court denied Alicia’s motion for reconsideration but modified its earlier decision, stating that
Raul and Luz Llorente are not children "legitimate or otherwise" of Lorenzo since they were not legally adopted by him.29
Amending its decision of May 18, 1987, the trial court declared Beverly Llorente as the only illegitimate child of Lorenzo,
entitling her to one-third (1/3) of the estate and one-third (1/3) of the free portion of the estate.30
On September 28, 1987, respondent appealed to the Court of Appeals.31
On July 31, 1995, the Court of Appeals promulgated its decision, affirming with modification the decision of the trial court in
this wise:
"WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that Alicia is declared as co-owner of
whatever properties she and the deceased may have acquired during the twenty-five (25) years of cohabitation.
"SO ORDERED."32
On August 25, 1995, petitioner filed with the Court of Appeals a motion for reconsideration of the decision.33
On March 21, 1996, the Court of Appeals,34 denied the motion for lack of merit.
Hence, this petition.35
The Issue
Stripping the petition of its legalese and sorting through the various arguments raised,36 the issue is simple. Who are entitled
to inherit from the late Lorenzo N. Llorente?
We do not agree with the decision of the Court of Appeals. We remand the case to the trial court for ruling on the intrinsic
validity of the will of the deceased.
The Applicable Law
The fact that the late Lorenzo N. Llorente became an American citizen long before and at the time of: (1) his divorce from Paula;
(2) marriage to Alicia; (3) execution of his will; and (4) death, is duly established, admitted and undisputed.
Thus, as a rule, issues arising from these incidents are necessarily governed by foreign law.
The Civil Code clearly provides:
"Art. 15. Laws relating to family rights and duties, or to the status, condition and legal capacity of persons are binding upon
citizens of the Philippines, even though living abroad.
"Art. 16. Real property as well as personal property is subject to the law of the country where it is situated.
"However, intestate and testamentary succession, both with respect to the order of succession and to the amount of
successional rights and to the intrinsic validity of testamentary provisions, shall be regulated by the national law of the person
whose succession is under consideration, whatever may be the nature of the property and regardless of the country wherein
said property may be found." (emphasis ours)
True, foreign laws do not prove themselves in our jurisdiction and our courts are not authorized to take judicial notice of them.
Like any other fact, they must be alleged and proved.37
While the substance of the foreign law was pleaded, the Court of Appeals did not admit the foreign law. The Court of Appeals
and the trial court called to the fore the renvoi doctrine, where the case was "referred back" to the law of the decedent’s
domicile, in this case, Philippine law.

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We note that while the trial court stated that the law of New York was not sufficiently proven, in the same breath it made the
categorical, albeit equally unproven statement that "American law follows the ‘domiciliary theory’ hence, Philippine law applies
when determining the validity of Lorenzo’s will.38
First, there is no such thing as one American law.1ªwph!1 The "national law" indicated in Article 16 of the Civil Code cannot
possibly apply to general American law. There is no such law governing the validity of testamentary provisions in the United
States. Each State of the union has its own law applicable to its citizens and in force only within the State. It can therefore refer
to no other than the law of the State of which the decedent was a resident.39 Second, there is no showing that the application
of the renvoi doctrine is called for or required by New York State law.
The trial court held that the will was intrinsically invalid since it contained dispositions in favor of Alice, who in the trial court’s
opinion was a mere paramour. The trial court threw the will out, leaving Alice, and her two children, Raul and Luz, with nothing.
The Court of Appeals also disregarded the will. It declared Alice entitled to one half (1/2) of whatever property she and Lorenzo
acquired during their cohabitation, applying Article 144 of the Civil Code of the Philippines.
The hasty application of Philippine law and the complete disregard of the will, already probated as duly executed in accordance
with the formalities of Philippine law, is fatal, especially in light of the factual and legal circumstances here obtaining.
Validity of the Foreign Divorce
In Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr.40 we held that owing to the nationality principle embodied in Article 15 of the Civil Code, only
Philippine nationals are covered by the policy against absolute divorces, the same being considered contrary to our concept of
public policy and morality. In the same case, the Court ruled that aliens may obtain divorces abroad, provided they are valid
according to their national law.
Citing this landmark case, the Court held in Quita v. Court of Appeals,41 that once proven that respondent was no longer a
Filipino citizen when he obtained the divorce from petitioner, the ruling in Van Dorn would become applicable and petitioner
could "very well lose her right to inherit" from him.
In Pilapil v. Ibay-Somera,42 we recognized the divorce obtained by the respondent in his country, the Federal Republic of
Germany. There, we stated that divorce and its legal effects may be recognized in the Philippines insofar as respondent is
concerned in view of the nationality principle in our civil law on the status of persons.
For failing to apply these doctrines, the decision of the Court of Appeals must be reversed.43 We hold that the divorce obtained
by Lorenzo H. Llorente from his first wife Paula was valid and recognized in this jurisdiction as a matter of comity. Now, the
effects of this divorce (as to the succession to the estate of the decedent) are matters best left to the determination of the trial
court.
Validity of the Will
The Civil Code provides:
"Art. 17. The forms and solemnities of contracts, wills, and other public instruments shall be governed by the laws of the
country in which they are executed.
"When the acts referred to are executed before the diplomatic or consular officials of the Republic of the Philippines in a
foreign country, the solemnities established by Philippine laws shall be observed in their execution." (underscoring ours)
The clear intent of Lorenzo to bequeath his property to his second wife and children by her is glaringly shown in the will he
executed. We do not wish to frustrate his wishes, since he was a foreigner, not covered by our laws on "family rights and duties,
status, condition and legal capacity."44
Whether the will is intrinsically valid and who shall inherit from Lorenzo are issues best proved by foreign law which must be
pleaded and proved. Whether the will was executed in accordance with the formalities required is answered by referring to
Philippine law. In fact, the will was duly probated.
As a guide however, the trial court should note that whatever public policy or good customs may be involved in our system of
legitimes, Congress did not intend to extend the same to the succession of foreign nationals. Congress specifically left the
amount of successional rights to the decedent's national law.45
Having thus ruled, we find it unnecessary to pass upon the other issues raised.
The Fallo
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G. R. SP No. 17446 promulgated on July 31,
1995 is SET ASIDE.

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In lieu thereof, the Court REVERSES the decision of the Regional Trial Court and RECOGNIZES as VALID the decree of divorce
granted in favor of the deceased Lorenzo N. Llorente by the Superior Court of the State of California in and for the County of
San Diego, made final on December 4, 1952.
Further, the Court REMANDS the cases to the court of origin for determination of the intrinsic validity of Lorenzo N. Llorente’s
will and determination of the parties’ successional rights allowing proof of foreign law with instructions that the trial court shall
proceed with all deliberate dispatch to settle the estate of the deceased within the framework of the Rules of Court.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.

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G.R. No. L-54919 May 30, 1984
POLLY CAYETANO, petitioner,
vs.
HON. TOMAS T. LEONIDAS, in his capacity as the Presiding Judge of Branch XXXVIII, Court of First Instance of Manila and
NENITA CAMPOS PAGUIA, respondents.
Ermelo P. Guzman for petitioner.
Armando Z. Gonzales for private respondent.

GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:

This is a petition for review on certiorari, seeking to annul the order of the respondent judge of the Court of First Instance of
Manila, Branch XXXVIII, which admitted to and allowed the probate of the last will and testament of Adoracion C. Campos, after
an ex-parte presentation of evidence by herein private respondent.
On January 31, 1977, Adoracion C. Campos died, leaving her father, petitioner Hermogenes Campos and her sisters, private
respondent Nenita C. Paguia, Remedios C. Lopez and Marieta C. Medina as the surviving heirs. As Hermogenes Campos was the
only compulsory heir, he executed an Affidavit of Adjudication under Rule 74, Section I of the Rules of Court whereby he
adjudicated unto himself the ownership of the entire estate of the deceased Adoracion Campos.
Eleven months after, on November 25, 1977, Nenita C. Paguia filed a petition for the reprobate of a will of the deceased,
Adoracion Campos, which was allegedly executed in the United States and for