TO APPEAR IN PHILOSOPHICAL PERSPECTIVES, VOL.

14, 2000

THE SURVIVAL OF THE SENTIENT

1. Introduction: Ourselves and Sentient Others

In this quite modestly ambitious essay, I'll generally just assume that, for the most part, our

"scientifically informed" commonsense view of the world is true. Just as it is with such

unthinking things as planets, plates and, I suppose, plants, too, so it also is with all earthly

thinking beings, from people to pigs and pigeons; each occupies a region of space, however large

or small, in which all are spatially related to each other. Or, at least, so it is with the bodies of

these beings. And, even as each of these ordinary entities extends through some space, so, also,

each endures through some time. In line with that, each ordinary entity is at least very largely,

and is perhaps entirely, an enduring physical entity (which allows that many might have certain

properties that aren't purely physical properties.) Further, each ordinary enduring entity is a

physically complex entity: Not only is each composed of parts, but many of these parts, whether

or not absolutely all of them, are themselves enduring physical entities, and many of them also

are such physically complex continuing entities.

When an ordinary entity undergoes a significant change, then, at least generally, this change

will involve changes concerning that entity's constituting physical parts, whether it be a

rearrangement of (some of) these parts, or a loss of parts, or a gain of parts, or whatever. Often,

the entity will still exist even after the change occurs. As we may well suppose, this happens

when, from two strokes of an ax, an ordinary log loses just a chip of wood. As we may then say,

such a change conforms with the log's "persistence conditions." Somewhat less often, such an

ordinary entity undergoes a change that means an end to it: When a bomb's explosion makes our

log become just so many widely scattered motes of dust, the log will no longer exist. Such a

momentous change doesn't conform with the log's persistence conditions.

 Insofar as we may learn which changes involving a particular log conform with its

persistence conditions, and which do not, we might learn a fair amount about what it is for a

physically complex enduring entity to be that log. Perhaps pretty similarly, insofar as we may

learn which changes involving you conform with your persistence conditions, and also which do

not, we might learn a fair amount about what it is for a physically complex enduring entity to be

you; and, presumably in parallel, we might learn what it is for another such complex entity to be

me. This learning is clearly a possibility for us, I'll suggest, should materialism be true, and

should a weak form of dualism be true, where some concrete individuals, at least, have not only

physical properties, but also some nonphysical mental properties. And, it may also be possible,

I'll suggest, should the truth lie, instead, with a more substantial dualism, rather like Descartes'

view, but one allowing, perhaps, there to be nonphysical minds that aren't personal minds, as

with porcine minds, and canine, and feline.

Whatever the metaphysic we might favor, when inquiring into our persistence conditions we

should seek to appreciate what's involved in a philosophically adequate concept of ourselves. As

I'll even now suggest, such an adequate concept must be well suited for engagement with our

central prudential thoughts and concerns, with what, in my Identity, Consciousness and Value

(henceforth ICV), I called our (broad) egocentric values.i And, it must be well suited for

engagement with our morality. Our appreciation of that may help us see, better than I saw in

ICV, that an adequate concept of ourselves must be a psychological conception, perhaps the

concept of a being who'll exist when, and only when, his mind does. This may be so whatever

worldview may be true, whether materialistic, or dualistic, or idealistic, or [Link]

A prompting cause of the present effort is the appearance of Eric Olson's valuable (1997)

book, The Human Animal: Personal Identity without Psychology (henceforth THA). Using the

label "The Psychological Approach" very broadly, Olson has it cover all the views on which our

persistence is tied to the continuation of our psychology. In opposition to all such views, he

forcefully advocates a Biological Approach:

 In place of the Psychological Approach I propose a radically nonpsychological account of
our identity. What it takes for us to persist through time is ... biological continuity: one
survives just in case one's purely animal functions -- metabolism, the capacity to breathe and
circulate one's blood, and the like -- continue. I would put biology in place of psychology,
and one's biological life in place of one's mind, in determining what it takes for us to persist:
a biological approach to personal [Link]

In much of what follows, I'll be arguing that, with the Biological Approach, there can't possibly

be any philosophically adequate view of our existence or persistence: As any conception of

ourselves that's a biological concept isn't (primarily) a mental conception, it won't comport well

with central prudential thoughts and concerns, and also with our moral thinking. Even as either

failure shows the inadequacy of a Biological Approach to ourselves, with both there's an

overwhelming case for a Psychological Approach.

In parallel, I'll argue that it's only a Psychological Approach, and not a Biological Approach,

that's adequate for those nonpersonal sentient beings whom, in the normal course of events, will

be found with typical living animals: Even if they be subpersonal entities, still, a philosophically

adequate concept of such nonpersonal beings my feline pet, Felix, and your canine pet, Oscar,

must closely parallel an adequate concept of ourselves.

Toward the essay's end, I'll float an extremely general thought about our commonsense

metaphysic, about our ordinary ontology: Though this ontology recognizes many entities whose

mentality is essential to their very existence, it recognizes none whose biology is truly essential.

Perhaps there are no ordinary entities, I'll conjecture, for which the Biological Approach

provides an adequate account.

2. Questions of Strict Survival, Vegetable Cases and Transplant Cases

After the book's Introduction, the body of The Human Animal (THA) begins with this paragraph:
The topic of this book is our identity through time. What does it take for you and me to
persist from one time to another? What sort of changes could one survive, and what would
bring one's existence to an end? What makes it the case that some past or future being, rather
than another, is you or I? (7)
As an early step in advocating a Biological answer to these opening questions, in the book's first

section Olson presents a relevantly puzzling pair of cases. Apparently favoring the Biological

Approach, there's first a "Vegetable Case;" and, apparently favoring the Psychological Approach,

there's then a "Transplant Case."iv

To do justice to the intriguing Vegetable Case, I quote Olson at some considerable length:
Imagine that you fall into what physiologists call a persistent vegetative state. As a result
of temporary heart failure, your brain is deprived of oxygen for ten minutes...by which time
the neurons of your cerebral cortex have died of anoxia. Because thought and consciousness
are impossible unless the cortex is intact, and because brain cells do not regenerate, your
higher mental functions are irretrievably lost. You will never again be able to remember the
past, or plan for the future, or hear a loved one's voice, or be consciously aware of anything
at all,....
The subcortical parts of the brain, however,....are more resistant to damage from lack of
blood that the cerebrum is, and they sometimes hold out and continue functioning even when
the cerebrum has been destroyed. Those...sustain your "vegetative" functions such as
respiration, circulation, digestion, and metabolism. Let us suppose that this happens to
you... The result is a human animal that is as much like you as anything could be without
having a mind.
The animal is not comatose. Coma is a sleep-like state; but a human vegetable has
periods in which.... It can respond to light and sound, but not in a purposeful way; it can
move its eyes, but cannot follow objects consistently with them....
Neither is the animal "brain-dead," for those parts of its brain that maintain its vegetative
functions remain fully intact. .... The patient (sic) is very much alive, at least in the
biological sense in which oysters and oak trees are alive.
How can we be sure that the patient (sic) in this state has really lost all cognitive
functions? ..... there may be room for doubt. So imagine that you lapse into a persistent
vegetative state and that as a result your higher cognitive functions are destroyed and that the
loss is permanent. (THA, 7-8)
........ My question in the Vegetable Case is whether the human animal that results when
the cerebrum is destroyed is strictly and literally you, or whether it is no more you than a
statue erected after your death would be you. Do you come to be a human vegetable, or do
you cease to exist...? (THA, 9)
Both among people and within folks, there are conflicting responses to the Vegetable Case. Of

most interest for Olson, there's the reaction that, even at the Case's end, you'll still exist (albeit as

a "human vegetable.")

When confronting a relevantly similar case right on the heels of the Vegetable example, we'll

be pretty primed to respond to it, too, along a similarly Biological line.v And, it's right on those

heels that Olson offers us his Transplant Case:

....Imagine that an ingenious surgeon removes your cerebrum...and implants it into another
head. ...Your cerebrum comes to be connected to that human being in just the way that it
was once connected to the rest of you. ...; and so it is able to function properly inside its
new head just as it once functioned inside yours.
The result is a human being who is psychologically more or less exactly like you. ... On
the other hand, she does not remember anything that happened to the person into whose head
your cerebrum was implanted, nor does she acquire anything of that person's character (at
least at first).
The puzzle, as you have no doubt guessed, is what happens to you in this story (call it the
"Transplant Case"). Are you the biologically living but empty-headed human being that has
inherited your vegetative functions? Or are you the person who ends up with your cerebrum
and your memories? (Or has the operation simply brought your existence to an end?)
(THA, 9-10)

(Now, for such a Transplant Case to be most instructive, what's extracted from [the head of] the

body must be fit for subserving what's central to mentality. But, as science seems to show, your

upper brain, by itself, can't subserve conscious experience; rather, there must be some neural

interaction between your upper and your lower brain. So, the presented example will be

suppositionally enhanced; as may be safely done in the current context, we suppose this

scientific appearance misleading and, in fact, your cerebrum's sufficient to subserve all your

mentality.) Even though it's presented right after the Vegetable Case, most respond to the

Transplant Case by thinking you are "the person who ends up with your cerebrum and your

memories."vi

With our responsive tendencies to Olson's two main cases being such a perplexingly messy

batch of proclivities, there's much reason to think hard about the examples. What's more, we
have yet more reason to think hard when we ponder passages in W. R. Carter's valuable recent

(1990) paper, "Why Personal Identity is Animal Identity," which boldly begins:
We start with two felines, Felix and Jefferson, say, who are treated by the same veterinarian.
A bizarre surgical blunder occurs and Felix's brain winds up in Jefferson's head. The
resulting cat, call him Felixson, looks for all the world like Jefferson but behaves exactly like
Felix (and not at all like Jefferson). The situation is complicated by the fact that Felix's
debrained body is provided with enough transplanted tissue [tissue that does not come from
Jefferson] so that it continues to live and function in feline-like ways. (Let's call this cat
Felixless.) We are confronted here by certain questions of feline identity. To my way of
thinking, these questions have rather obvious answers. It is true that Felixless is (=) Felix.
Accordingly, it is false that Felixson is (=) Felix. My guess is that this assessment of the
matter will encounter little, if any, serious resistance. This is surprising (to me), since many
people take an entirely different view of a similar situation involving human rather than
feline [Link]

As we'll eventually see, the questions Carter thinks "have rather obvious answers" are actually

subtly difficult questions. Now, we'll see these related words from Carter's paper:
... a psychological continuity account of feline identity looks so utterly implausible. Why is
this? Well, perhaps it is because it is clear (isn't it) that cats are (attributively) animals. ...
Since the term "Felix" refers to the animal .., and the term "Felixless" refers to the animal ..,
there is no denying that Felix is identical with Felixless. Accordingly, Felix is not identical
with Felixson. .... And why should the situation be different when we turn from feline
identity to personal identity?

With at least some force, Carter challenges the thought that, in the Transplant Case, you are the

being who ends up with your mentality, even as he provides at least some plausibility for the

idea that (before getting new brain tissue) you are the (temporarily) mindless being that's

inherited your vegetative functions, much as you (permanently) might be in the Vegetable Case.

Much more than favoring any particular Approach to ourselves, this section supports this

importantly more general proposition: Whatever the right approach to the general conditions for

the existence and persistence of Peter Unger, the personal sentient being, it will be, in all

essentials, the same as the right approach for Felix Unger, the nonpersonal sentient being.

3. Thoughts and Concerns about Particular Sentient Beings: Avoiding Great Pain
Whatever else you may be, you must certainly be whatever it is that you think about when you

think about yourself; if you're not that, you're nothing at all. Likewise, you must be whatever it

is you care about when you care about yourself. On a most natural and central reading of these

sentences, both are, of course, quite platitudinous. Yet, the second sentence, concerning your

concern for yourself, might serve as a helpful reminder and guide, helpful toward our

appreciating our deepest beliefs about ourselves. For, it may help us bear in mind these related

sentences: When you truly care about yourself, then, whatever else may concern you, you must

certainly care, and care very greatly, that you'll not experience protracted excruciating pain;

when just that concern of yours is quite fully in force, it's from a strictly egoistic perspective that

your concern flows. Conversely, and maybe most instructively, if there's someone that, from a

strictly egoistic perspective, you don't care whether she'll experience such horrible great pain,

then, as far as you can tell or believe, that person isn't you.

A concept of ourselves that comports well with these points concerning self-concern might

be a philosophically adequate conception, as with, perhaps, a concept that's central to a

Psychological Approach. By contrast, any concept that comports poorly with them, as with,

perhaps, concepts central to a Biological Approach, can't be an adequate concept of ourselves.

The sensible thoughts just proposed may be sensibly generalized from us people to all sorts

of sentient beings: So, flowing from a concern for Oscar, there might be no concern on your part

whether a certain canine sentient being will feel great pain. But, then, as far as you can tell or

believe, that sentient being isn't Oscar. And, any concept that comports poorly with this point,

as might be true of any central to a Biological Approach, can't then be a philosophically adequate

concept of Oscar, or of any canine sentient being.

Guided by this section's reflections, I'll look to use a "philosophical tool" first employed in

ICV, the Avoidance of Future Great Pain [Link] Eventually, I'll apply it to Olson's Vegetable

Case, or to a most suitable enlargement of that example, and to Carter's Feline Transplant Case,

or to a most suitable enlargement of that related example. By the time all that's done, few should

be friends of a Biological Approach to the existence and persistence of any sentient beings,
ourselves included, and many should favor a Psychological Approach. First, let's look at a case

where it's easy to observe the test to be quite well employed.

To begin, suppose that, for no good reason, a bad surgeon replaces your heart with an

artificial blood-pumper. About the person who has only such a plastic "heart," our central

question is this: Is the person emerging from this operation you? For a most convincing answer

to the question, we may employ our Test: With the choice flowing fully from your purely

egoistic concern, will you choose to (have yourself) suffer considerable pain right before the

operation takes place, if your not taking the bad hit up front will mean that, soon after the

procedure's over, the person emerging from the operation then will suffer far greater pain? Yes;

of course, you will. This response indicates that, as your strongest beliefs run, you'll be that

person. Now, I'll try to use our Test to make progress with this essay's philosophically far more

interesting questions.

Following Sydney Shoemaker's early work on the subject, in recent decades the literature on

personal identity has seen many cases where there's the exchange of two people's [Link]

Much as was done in ICV, let's consider such a case involving you and, not someone

qualitatively quite unlike you, but, rather, your precisely similar twin. x At this case's end, do you

still exist? And, if so, who are you? Toward answering these questions reasonably, we may

employ the Avoidance of Future Great Pain Test. Indeed, we may employ it twice over.

First, about the person who ends up with your original brain and a new body, we ask this

question: With the choice flowing fully from your purely egoistic concern, will you choose to

(have yourself) suffer considerable pain right before this case's wild processes begin if your not

taking the bad hit up front will mean that, soon after all its processes are complete, the person

then with your brain, and thus with your mind, will suffer far greater pain? Yes, of course, you

will. Though not completely conclusive, this strongly indicates that, as we most deeply believe,

throughout this case you're the person with your [Link]

Second, and yet more tellingly, we ask the parallel question: With the choice flowing fully

from your purely egoistic concern, will you choose to (have yourself) suffer considerable pain
right before this case's wild processes begin if your not taking the bad hit up front will mean that,

soon after all its processes are complete, the person then with your body, but with your twin's

mentally productive brain, then will suffer far greater pain? Not at all; from an egoistic basis,

that's a poor choice. Though this response might not be absolutely decisive, it's quite conclusive

enough. So, we conclude, well enough, that you haven't even the slightest belief that here you're

the being (with your healthy old body) who's inherited your vegetative biological functioning.

At least as regards our commonsense view of ourselves, about the general conditions of our

existence and persistence, this negative response may be indicating a very bad fate for the

Biological Approach, in any of its versions. As well, it may also be indicating doom for any

view on which the survival of our bodies is central to our own survival.

With parallel moves, we may see some indications that a Biological Approach might be no

better for canine sentient beings than it is for personal sentient beings: We may see this with a

slight variant on the case just considered, in which each occurrence of you is replaced by Oscar,

each occurrence of your precise twin is replaced by an occurrence of his twin, and so on. About

the canine being who ends up with Oscar's original brain and a new body, we ask this question:

With the choice flowing fully from your concern for Oscar, will you choose to have him suffer

considerable pain right before this case's wild processes begin if his not taking the bad hit up

front will mean that, toward the end, the being then with his brain, and his mentality, will suffer

far greater pain? Yes, of course, you will. And, this strongly indicates that, as we most deeply

believe, here he'll be the being with his brain. Second, and again far more tellingly, we ask the

parallel question: With the choice flowing fully from your concern for him, will you have him

suffer considerable pain near the start if his not taking the bad hit up front will mean that, toward

the end, the being then with his body, but not his mind, then will suffer far greater pain? Not at

all. So, again well enough, we can conclude that you haven't even the slightest belief that Oscar

is the being (with his healthy old canine body) who has inherited Oscar's vegetative biological

functioning.
4. Can There Be an ENORMOUS Separation of Strict Survival and Relevant Concern?

For clear thinking about (our deepest beliefs about) the conditions of our existence and

persistence, the points observed in the preceding section are, I think, of great importance: Where

there is a being that's the proper object of your full-fledged egoistic concern, just there you

yourself will be. And, most crucially, where there's no such "properly protected" being, there's

no being that's you. But, some able philosophers have even so much as denied that importance,

and many, I think, may fail to appreciate [Link] Why?

In recent thinking about the relation between our transtemporal identity and our egoistic

concern, there's much confusion engendered, I believe, from encounters with some salient and

seductive hypothetical examples. Most salient among them may be a certain physically robust

case of "symmetrical fission." Toward dispelling the confusion, and toward furthering clarity,

let's now most thoughtfully encounter just such an example.

Suppose, now, that each half of your brain can do all that the whole does, as far as subserving

mentality goes (and, we may now add, as far as sustaining biology goes.) Further, suppose that,

when we extract your brain from your body, and we nicely slice your brain in two, we'll have

two new people, each relevantly just like you were right before this two-sided fission occurs.

(Each of them may then be given a new body, each precisely like the old was at the time of

extraction.) Further still, we'll agree that you're not either of the two who are so new.

From a rational concern for yourself, how much should you care about each of the two

resulting people? Well, as we've agreed, neither is you; so, from just that concern, you shouldn't

care a fig. But, then, closely related to your purely egoistic concern, you might have other

rational attitudes that are quite small and natural extensions of self-concern. And, then, we may

ask: Flowing from at least some few of these related concernful attitudes, how much should you

care about one of your fission descendants?

As it has seemed to many philosophers, you should care just as much as, even in the ordinary

case of your own day to day survival, you today should care for yourself tomorrow. And, as it

has seemed to some of these many, the salient lesson to be learned from that first thought is this
second proposition: Questions regarding someone's strict survival can come apart from

questions regarding his egoistic concern, and also his closely related concerns, quite as far as

you please.

Even should all of the prior paragraph hold true, a thought that seems nearly as absurd as it's

extravagant, there still might be no reason whatever to think that these questions can come apart

so enormously that, from concerns much like purely egoistic attitudes, it may be natural, or

rational, for us to care about beings with whom we have no substantial mental connection. But,

what's needed to give some plausibility to the Biological Approach is precisely some reason to

think just that. And, as it certainly seems, the prospects here are as bleak as can be.

Suppose that, flowing from your own egoistic concern, or even from any relevantly small

extension thereof, you haven't even the least concern whether a certain being will experience

terrible pain. Well, while that being might then be a certain horse, perhaps somewhere in

Australia, or even a certain person, perhaps a young girl in Africa, one thing of which we can be

quite confident is that, as far as you know or believe, that being isn't you. Perfectly parallel

points hold for other sentient beings: Suppose that, flowing from your concern for Oscar, you

haven't even the least concern whether a certain being will experience terrible pain. Now, while

that being might then be the President of France, we can be quite certain that, as far as you know

or believe, that being isn't Oscar.

5. A Complementary Pain Test Confirms Our Avoidance of Great Pain Test

Because we're hardly omniscient, and we're not even close to being perfectly logical or rational,

it's good to see that, as a check on our results with the Avoidance of Great Pain Test, we may

appropriately employ a logically related test, even a complementary test, and observe the results

that then obtain. Just so, we'll now look to apply, most relevantly, a philosophical tool that may

well be called the Sparing from Future Great Pain [Link]

So, let's return to consider the body-exchange (or, as the Biological Approach would have it,

the brain-exchange) between Oscar and his precisely similar twin. As we've supposed, at this
case's end there'll be one canine being with Oscar's original brain and mind, though little of his

biological structures and processes, and there'll be another with another canine being's original

brain-based mentality, and a great deal of Oscar's biological structures and their continuing

processes. About all of that, you've never had even the least choice or influence.

In application to such a nicely relevant case, our Sparing from Future Great Pain Test directs

that, always to be flowing (as closely as possible) from your concern for Oscar, your choice is to

be just this choice: Shortly after awakening from the operations just envisioned, one of the two

canine beings will experience much excruciating pain and the other will be spared from feeling

even any pain at all. You are to choose, perhaps even before the operations are performed, which

of the resulting beings suffers such great pain and which of the canines is spared. Very

rationally, you will choose for the canine with Oscar's original brain, and Oscar's canine mind, to

be spared, and for the torture to go to the other resulting canine. For, your reasoning, evidently,

is every bit as appropriate as it's simple: The former canine is Oscar, the being about whom

you're here so especially concerned; the latter is another sentient [Link]

With simple variations, we may strengthen the probative value of our Sparing Test. For

example, we may suppose that your choice is between (1) sparing the being with Oscar's old

brain the infliction of severe pain for a certain significant period and letting the being with his

old body suffer far more severe pain for a far greater period and (2) sparing the being with his

old body that far worse severe pain and letting the one with his old brain suffer that far less bad

pain. With the concern being for Oscar, this great imbalance of pain makes no difference; just as

surely as before, you choose (1), sparing the one with Oscar's brain-based mind. So, this now

seems very clear: It's just that canine being that, as far as you really believe, is actually Oscar.

Now, if we were perfectly logical and rational, it would be a foregone conclusion that these

responses with the Sparing Test would comport with those previously elicited with our

Avoidance Test. But, of course, we're not perfectly logical or rational. So, while the observed

agreement was at least somewhat to be expected, it wasn't a foregone conclusion. Thus, the
results obtained with our truly complementary test confirm those obtained with our previous

philosophical tool. So, in our inquiry, we'll employ them both.

6. Clear Moral Thinking about Particular Sentient Beings

Early on, I said that, just as much as for engagement with our central prudential thoughts and

concerns, a philosophically adequate concept of ourselves must be well suited for engagement

with our morality. In a brief treatment of the issue, I'll show why that should be so.

As the progress of our project suggests strongly, many of our moral thoughts regarding you

and me will regard, just as well, Oscar and Felix. Then, at a bare minimum, an adequate concept

of ourselves must engage morality in the way that's well done, as well, by a philosophically

adequate concept of a particular sentient being.

Suppose that I've solemnly promised you, a moral agent, to look out for (the well-being of)

your son, Al, who's another moral agent, and also to look out for (the well-being of) your

sentient canine pet, Oscar, who's not a moral agent. Then, in the normal run of things, I'll have

incurred a moral obligation, first, to look out for Al, and, second, to look out for Oscar. Let's

focus on this second obligation.

Going philosophically hypothetical, suppose that some dastardly super-scientists have

produced a precise duplicate of Oscar, one Oscarnew, and, shortly thereafter, they've taken

Oscar's brain and nicely placed it in Oscarnew's debrained body, and vice versa, with the

philosophically expected result. Finally, we suppose that they force, on me, this instance of our

Sparing Test. I must choose between (1) having terrible pain inflicted on the being with Oscar's

original brain - still subserving Oscar's mind - in Oscarnew's original body and sparing from pain

the being with Oscarnew's brain - still subserving Oscarnew's mind - in Oscar's body and (2)

having terrible pain inflicted on the being with Oscarnew's brain in Oscar's body and sparing the

being with Oscar's brain in Oscarnew's body. Flowing from my obligation to keep my promise

to you, what should I do? As we deeply believe, I morally must choose (2) over (1). What does
that suggest? Contrary to the Biological Approach, it suggest that, as we deeply believe, Oscar

will be where his original brain is still subserving his mind.

As it is here with Oscar, so it is with Al. And, so it will be with us, too. As with any sentient

beings, a philosophically adequate concept of ourselves, one well suited for engagement with

morality, must be, primarily and essentially, a psychological conception. So, as those suitably

sensitive to moral matters should agree, a Psychological Approach is very far superior to a

Biological Approach even for the likes of Oscar and Felix, let alone for you and me.

7. Properly Painful Problems with Human Vegetables, and with Feline Vegetables

As I'm suspecting, by now most will indeed agree that, at least for such personal sentient beings

as ourselves, a Psychological Approach is quite as appropriate as a Biological Approach is

irrelevant. But, even if there's very widespread agreement on the matter, it's still well worth

resolving, I think, some problems, or puzzlement, whose treatment we've deferred. Among this

unfinished business, perhaps the most salient task is to provide a satisfactory treatment for

Olson's intriguing Vegetable Case. Anyhow, to that task, we'll now turn.

As with other examples relevant to our central topic, for a treatment that's revealing we

should use one of our Pain Tests. But, as a being in persistent vegetative state hasn't any

capacity to feel any pain, how can we apply even our Avoidance of Pain Test? Initially at least,

that seems a tall order. As things turn out, the job may be done rather well.

Toward that end, we make these suppositions: Within the next month, you'll have just such a

horrible temporary heart failure that, as your brain will be deprived of oxygen for ten minutes,

your cerebral cortex will die of anoxia; consequently, you'll "become a human vegetable." As

you also know, there'll then be extracted, from the head of the "vegetative animal," its dead

(upper) brain. And, into the continuously living "debrained body," there'll be well implanted a

suitable living (upper) brain: Perhaps even coming into existence via a "statistical miracle," but,

in any case, this will be a brain made of matter quite distinct from any that ever served toward

constituting you. At the same time, this implant will be precisely similar to your (upper) brain,
as it was when last it subserved your mentality. By the end of this sequence, there'll be a person

with your original body, who's inherited your biology, though there'll be nobody who's inherited

your mentality. While this person's mind will be precisely similar to yours, in its last moments

of existence, it will be a numerically different normal mind. As with anyone with a normal

mind, this person can certainly suffer terrible pain.

With such suitable suppositions made, there's an Aptly Enlarged Vegetable Case. And, with

this Enlarged Case, there's ready to hand, I think, a revealing employment of our Avoidance of

Future Great Pain Test: From your egoistic concerns, at the beginning you are to choose

between (1) your suffering some significant pain, before a human vegetable's in the situation, so

that, near the sequence's end, the person with the new (upper) brain suffers no pain at all and (2)

your suffering no early pain and having it that, near the end, that person suffers terrible torture.

Rationally, you choose (2) over (1). This choice shows that, as far as you know or believe, you

won't be the entity that's inherited your biology.

It's still a "logical possibility," let's agree, that, after the anoxia but before the implantation of

a new living upper brain, you were an insensate human vegetable. Then, just with that

vegetable's receiving just such a new brain, you ceased to exist. But, really, is any of that even

the least bit plausible? Are we really to believe that, though it's possible for you to come to have

no mind, what's impossible is for such a mindless you to survive your coming to have a mind?

Such a suggestion as that, I'll suggest, is quite an absurd idea.

From Human Vegetable Cases, there's really no case to be made for a Biological Approach to

ourselves. And, from Feline Vegetable Cases, as may happen with my sentient Felix, there's

nothing to be gained for a Biological Approach to nonpersonal sentient beings, as an Aptly

Enlarged Feline Vegetable Case can help us easily see.

Sensibly, we may extrapolate from our recent experiences: The more we're free from

confusions about sentient beings, saliently including ourselves, the less there'll even seem to be

said for a Biological Approach to beings that must have [Link] Nor will there seem anything

significantly favoring a "Bodily Approach" to ourselves, or to nonpersonal mental others. Now,

without going hypothetical in a way that's utterly wild, it may be impossible to take a case with a

completely dead human, wholly devoid of life as well as mind, and to enlarge it so that our Pain

Tests can be revealingly applied. But, so what: If a living mindless human body won't ever be

one of us, and won't even ever subserve one of us, a dead mindless body will hardly do better.

And, again, what's true of you and me also holds for Oscar and Felix.

By this point, we've seen more than enough, I think, to do a good job with what may be the

sole remaining salient piece of unfinished business, namely, the provision of a satisfactory

treatment for Carter's Feline Transplant Case. For, what does this case involve, if not a feline

vegetable, an insensate Felixless obtained from the sentient Felix, by the extraction of that feline

being's (upper) brain? According to Carter, though he has no mentality at all, still Felixless is (=)

Felix, because the mindless entity's inherited the biology that supported, or subserved, the

sentient being. But, Felixless really isn't Felix, as our recent reasoning revealed.

We've just taken good care of what might well be called "the harder of the two main halves"

of Carter's Transplant Case. The easier half concerns what we are to make of Carter's Felixson, a

feline being who results from transplanting Felix's brain into the debrained body resulting from

extracting a feline brain from one Jefferson; at the case's start, this Jefferson is another normal

feline sentient being, who's wholly distinct from Felix. In either of two ways, our Avoidance

Test can show that (as far as we know or believe) Felixson is Felix (and he's not Jefferson.) To

the most energetic reader, I leave all that as an exercise.

8. People and Seople

On our "scientifically informed" commonsense view of things, your psychology is realized in, or

it's at least subserved by, your brain: If there's someone else who's physically precisely similar

to you, then his mentality will be realized only in his brain and yours will be subserved only by

yours. There will be this numerical difference of the two mentalities, of the two minds, even if

the distinct brains that subserve the two are precisely similar in every detail. And, if your
mentality ceases to exist, then you yourself will cease to exist, even though your "duplicate" may

continue to exist.

Equally on this commonsense view, though quite completely against the "vivisectionist"

view of Descartes, the brain of Oscar, your beloved canine pet, realizes Oscar's psychology, or

at least it subserves the mentality of that canine sentient being: If there's a canine who's

physically precisely similar to Oscar, and wholly distinct from Oscar, there will be a numerical

difference of the two minds, even if the canine mentalities are qualitatively quite the same. And,

if his mentality ceases to exist, then Oscar himself will cease to exist, even though his

"duplicate" may continue to exist.

Now, even while our commonsense view has these parallels be quite deep commonalities,

our common language might lack a sortal common noun that serves nicely to highlight them for

us, so that, for such central issues as this essay's main questions, we're prompted to take an

essentially parallel approach to all sentient beings, us people being just some among many. In

what's meant to be a sensibly progressive spirit, let me introduce a new English sortal noun,

"serson," whose meaning is the same as the phrase "sentient being," and whose most colloquial

plural is "seople." (As well as having such new nouns, we may have correlative new words,

saliently including new quantifier words. For example, even if "everyone" doesn't include, in its

proper reference, Oscar and Felix, we may have "everyane" - pronounced EVERYWANE - properly

include them, just as properly as it will include you and me.)

With these terms, we may progressively express propositions that, even as they concern our

main topics, feature centrally in our commonsense view of things: Every earthly serson, and not

just every earthly person, has both a body and a mind. And, while it's not true that an earthly

serson will exist just exactly in case her body exists, it is true that any serson at all, whether

earthly or not, will exist when, and only when, her mind exists. Following from the foregoing,

some such sentences as these should be treated more as commonplace thoughts than contentious

ideas, both by materialists and by commonsensical dualists: If there's only a barely developed

organic body extant, and there's not yet any mind even so much as barely subserved by the body,
as with an early fetus, then, in such a mentally insignificant situation, there's really no serson

existing, neither personal nor even nonpersonal. [In ICV I left it as an open question whether

there might have been an (earlier) time when I wasn't a person and, even, when I lacked all

capacity for thought and feeling. (5-6) In THA Olson argues that, given my book's main views,

there's no good way for me to have us people, or any seople, be (identical with) any such wholly

mindless things. (81-85) Agreeing now with Olson, in the present essay I no longer leave that

question open; on my present position, a more complete view, I never was any mindless early

fetus, nor was sentient Oscar ever any mindless canine fetus.] By contrast with such wholly

mindless early episodes, if there's a more developed body that's subserving a mind, even a quite

rudimentary mind, then there'll be a serson. And, if it comes to pass that there's only our serson's

body extant, with the mind no longer existing, then this serson will no longer exist.

When a serson is alive and well, what's the relation between the serson himself and, on the

other hand, his body?

On what I take to be a pretty appealing substantial dualist view, but a view that might be at

least as troubling as it's appealing, a serson's body will causally support, and subserve, the

serson's immaterial mind. What's more, and what may be metaphysically even a bit more basic,

just when providing just such support, the serson's body will support the immaterial being that's

the serson himself. Further, Oscar won't have any spatial extension and, perhaps, that immaterial

being won't even have any spatial location. In ways we might never well understand, immaterial

Oscar may be, nonetheless, quite directly affected by, and he may quite directly affect, certain

physical entities, perhaps certain parts of a certain brain.

On what I take to be a pretty appealing materialist view, but perhaps also a view as troubling

as it's appealing, a serson and his body will be spatially coincident entities; with each in the very

same space as the other at the very same time, the very same matter will serve to constitute each

of the two distinct material entities. So, even as Oscar may now be alive and well, he and his

body will be different material complexes, though each is composed of exactly the same matter,

and each occupies precisely the same space. On a pretty commonsensical materialist view, a
rather plausible reckoning of such ordinary entities will have that be so, even if, perhaps, that

reckoning is hardly free of difficulties. How, or why, will that be so? As with you and me,

Oscar's persistence conditions differ from those of his body. To see what that rather technical

sentence says, I'll aim to display its main implications, in the next section, while providing the

sentence with intuitive support.

9. A Serson and His Body Are Distinct Entities

Even if it subserves mentality, as it now does, your brain is just one of several salient organs in

your body that, together with various other bodily parts, serve to constitute the body as a whole.

Accordingly, whether your body's dead or alive, in this regard, at least, the relation between

your brain and your body is very like that between your heart and your body, and very like that

obtaining between your liver and that whole human body. It's no surprise, then, that, if any

single one of these organs is removed from the bodily whole, and then is even annihilated, your

body will still exist. Of course, the same holds for other serson's bodies, as with Oscar's.

Along with some philosophically familiar thoughts, and some ideas here previously

presented, those intuitive propositions suggest a certain pair of cases. While each example is but

a slight variant on the other, the lesson that one suggests is, in an obvious way, quite the opposite

of, and quite a nice complement of, the lesson we may learn from the other.

Continuing to employ the suppositions that have served us so well so far, we'll start with the

Brain Explosion Case: Right out of sentient Oscar's skull, some strangely fanatical scientists

remove his (upper) brain, and they place it in the philosophically familiar stimulatory vat. While

in this vat, that living brain will subserve just as rich a stream of conscious experience as ever it

did when in the serson's head. At the same time, and still lying on a laboratory table, (the rest

of) Oscar's body, as it's placed on a highly effective life-support system, remains alive, though it

can't, of course, subserve [Link] For a while all is pretty peaceful, until an exploding

bomb destroys the brain in the vat, the vat itself, and even the building in which the vat is

housed. In this explosion, the matter that served to compose Oscar's brain is so utterly wrenched
apart, and the tiny bits are so fully intermingled with so much other dust from the explosion, that

there's not even any significant chance of anything like a relevant reversal ever occurring.

Meanwhile, (the rest of) your canine serson's body remains intact, and even alive.

At the end of this Brain Explosion Case, Oscar, the salient serson, no longer exists. (On a

materialistic metaphysic, and on plausible forms of dualism, that will be so.) At the same time,

Oscar's body continues to exist. On the most relevant understanding of the terms employed, it's

most reasonable to accept both sentences. So, Oscar's body can survive the termination of Oscar

himself.

It's time to turn to the complementary example, the Body Explosion Case. From the

example's start right up to the time when "all is pretty peaceful," things are just as in the previous

case, with Oscar's brain in a vat in one area and, at a distance, his living body on a lab table.

Then, an exploding bomb destroys (the rest of) the body on the table, the table itself, and the

whole lab building. In this explosion, the matter that served to compose (the rest of) Oscar's

body is so utterly wrenched apart, and the tiny bits so fully intermingled with so much other dust,

that there's not even any significant chance of anything like a relevant reversal. Meanwhile,

your canine serson's brain continues to subserve his mind.

At the end of this Body Explosion Case, the salient serson's body no longer exists. At the

same time, Oscar himself continues to exist. On the most relevant understanding of our terms,

Oscar can survive the termination of Oscar's body.

Now, if Oscar could survive the cessation of his body, but Oscar's body couldn't survive

Oscar's own cessation, then, while we should think the two were different, we might well think

that, while Oscar himself was a genuine entity, his body had some lesser ontological status. And,

in such an event, perhaps we shouldn't think that, with Oscar and his body, we have two distinct

entities. But, as we saw just before, Oscar's body can survive Oscar's own cessation, just as

Oscar can survive his body's cessation. So, apparently, we do quite well to think that, inasmuch

as each has persistence conditions so utterly different from the other's, sentient Oscar is one

being and, though spatially and materially coincident with him, Oscar's body is quite another
entity. Apparently and intuitively, even if we should accept a most materialistic version of our

commonsense metaphysic, we should think that much to be true.

Finessing Questions about Materially Coincident Entities: At least to my mind, sometimes

it's puzzling, to put the point mildly, how there could be two quite different entities each

composed of the very same matter, in the very same space, at the very same time, and not just

one entity that we may think of in two quite different ways. But, for two related reasons, this

paper's not the place to dwell on any such puzzle.

First, and as was stated at its outset, we're here just assuming that, for the most part, our

"scientifically informed" commonsense view of the world is true. And, in dwelling on our

puzzle, we might well be calling into question what's here our working hypothesis, rather than

seeing what work we can do within the compass of what seems the accepted view.

Second, and as is familiar in philosophy, the puzzle about the possibility of materially

coincident entities is a quite general puzzle, hardly peculiar to questions about embodied seople

and their bodies: In illustration, consider a certain ball, we'll call it "Barry," and a certain

spherical piece of brass, we'll call it "Patty," each composed of the very same brass, in the very

same place, throughout all the time of their existence. (The brazen alloy first comes to exist in

the very form in which it composes Patty and Barry and, later, it ceases to exist suddenly,

suddenly composing neither.) Yet, even as Barry and Patty have quite different persistence

conditions, there are here, it seems, two quite distinct entities. So, on the one side, if the brass

were forced through a wire extruder, that brass would come to compose a long thin brass wire

and no ball at all. In such an event, it seems, we'd have the same piece of brass as before, and

Patty would still exist, but Barry wouldn't exist. And, on the other side, we might have

gradually replaced our ball's brass, bit by tiny bit, by congruous bits of gold, widely scattering all

our brass. In such a very different event, it seems, we'd have the same ball as before, and Barry

would still exist, but our piece of brass, our Patty, wouldn't still exist.

As is proper with this quite modestly ambitious essay, we leave for other inquiries such a

general problem as the puzzle about the possibility of materially coincident entities. As is also
proper, we set aside other puzzles, more or less related, that may similarly seem to call into

question, more or less effectively, our commonsense view of the world.

10. Reference and Existence, Appearance and Reality

For what's really a very bad reason, many of my paper's points might be denied by philosophers,

perhaps especially by materialists, who may be unduly impressed by what sometimes seem plain

expressions of common sense in ordinary discourse. For example, after my mind no longer

exists and there's only my living body in a vegetative state, someone may point at what's in that

state and say, apparently with complete propriety, "There's Peter Unger." Doesn't that serve to

indicate that, even if my mind no longer exists, I can still exist? And, isn't that a strong point in

favor of a Biological Approach to my existence and persistence?

Well, quite the same may be done, apparently, when there's only my dead body in the

situation. So, such apparently ordinary and proper episodes won't provide any strong points, it

seems clear, in favor of a Biological Approach to me. But, then, mightn't they provide a strong

point in favor of a Bodily Approach to my existence and persistence, on which I may still exist

not only without my mind, or any mind, but also without my biological life, or any such life? No;

it does not.

Very often, we refer to one entity, conveniently, obliquely and indirectly, by more directly

referring to another, with which the first is, especially in the context of the current discourse,

readily associated. Now, sometimes the discrepancy between the two referents is blatantly

obvious. This happens when we say of a bus driver that she's over fifteen feet high, and unable

to get through a certain tunnel, referring not only to her but, less directly and more truthfully, to

the bus that she drives. Now, when the discrepancies are that blatant, there's little tendency to

take our direct remark, about the driver herself, to be a literal statement that's really true; rather,

it's only some implied statements, like the statement that a certain bus is over fifteen feet high,

that we take to be true.

 Other times, however, the discrepancy is less blatant. That happens, I'll suggest, with

(standard uses of) sentences like "As Uncle Joe is dead, we should get him off the floor and out

of the house, so that we can put some nice big potted plant right where he is" and "As Oscar is

dead, we should get him off the floor and out of the house, so that we can put some nice big

potted plant right where he is." Though not so blatantly obvious, in these sentence's closing

clauses there's reference to more than just the relevant seople themselves; rather indirectly, there

may be a reference to the seople's bodies, or to their remains, or to both of the foregoing, or to

yet something else that's fit for spatial removal. And, while the standardly expressed statement

about the moving of the seople themselves might not be true, there may then be such suitable

implied statements, about the moving of their bodies, and about the moving of their remains, that

are perfectly true. And, the discrepancy just stressed will be made yet more evident when we

observe such closely related sentences as "Billions of years after Uncle Joe's death, he'll be

interstellar dust" and "Billions of years after Oscar's death, he'll be interstellar dust."

What is more, paralleling the "apparent facts of reference" regarding ourselves, there are

such apparent facts regarding our bodies. Thus, after I'm dead, you may point at my corpse and

say "There's Peter Unger's body;" and, not only may what you say be in perfect conversational

order, but, as well, it may be perfectly true. Now, a sentence like "Billions of years after it

decays, Unger's body will be interstellar dust" also looks to be in perfect order. But, when

standardly uttering such an orderly sentence, will you be saying what's true? Of course, not.

Now, suppose that, after I die, my corpse is placed in a spaceship and, when the ship is

somewhere between Mars and Jupiter, the spaceship explodes, along with all its salient contents,

including my body. Pointing at an apt place between Mars and Jupiter, when night next comes

you may say "There's Peter Unger's body;" and, what you say may be in perfect conversational

order. But, is what you say really true; does my body really still exist? Not a chance. By

contrast, it might well be that my remains still exist and, mainly between Mars and Jupiter,

they're widely scattered.

 Over a wide range of referential discourse, what may first look to be plain facts may come to

look, much more realistically, to be nothing factual at all.

11. Seople (Conceptually) Can Survive the Loss of Their Biological Lives

Absent sufficient psychological continuity, biological continuity isn't sufficient for the continued

existence of sentient beings, neither people, like you and me, nor nonpersonal seople like Oscar

and Felix. But, is biological continuity necessary for our survival? Well, insofar as it's needed

for subserving the serson's mind it may be necessary. But, then, this biology's needed only

causally, or quasi-causally; it's not most basically necessary, as the persistence of the serson's

mind is necessary, for the survival of the sentient being.

As a philosophically adequate concept of the sentient canine who is Oscar centers on his

sentience, it follows that the concept won't place any biological requirements on Oscar, provided

only that there's no entailment from his sentience to anything biological. And, as it certainly

seems, there isn't any such entailment. To confirm this appearance, it may be useful to reflect on

an example that's just an adaptation, to the canine situation, of a case concerning people that,

perhaps a bit too timidly, I offered in ICV. (122) So, suppose that very gradually, over the

course of a year, the neurons of Oscar's brain are replaced by inorganic entities, but always in

such a way that, from one day to the next, there's precious little effect on his thought and feeling.

(If the supposed proposition conflicts with actual natural laws, then, suppose that there's a

change in the laws so that, in consequence, there's no longer any conflict.) During the year,

there's a serson whose brain, partly natural and organic, and partly artificial and inorganic,

continues to subserve Oscar's mind, including his conscious thoughts and feelings. By the end of

this year, there's a serson whose entirely inorganic brain, we're supposing, still subserves the

nonpersonal mind of sentient Oscar. Finally, suppose that this mentally productive brain is

transplanted into a suitable inorganic "canine" body, so that the nonbiological whole is able to

engage with his environment, and experience this active engagement, just as effectively, and just

as vividly, as the original organic Oscar ever did.

 From your concern for Oscar himself, supposing that also to continue, you choose lesser

early pain for Oscar, even though he's then organic, rather than much greater later pain to be

inflicted on the inorganic being we've just been supposing. As this indicates, we take this later

being to be the very same sentient being that was sentient Oscar at the case's start; though he's no

longer biologically alive, your nonpersonal serson survives.

12. Are There ANY Ordinary Entities that CAN'T Survive Losing Their Biological Lives?

On our ordinary metaphysic, many of the things we recognize are in fact alive; they all share the

property of being alive, we may say, where that property's understood to be a purely biological

attribute, a property without any psychological implications. And, among these living entities,

there are many that, so far as we know and believe, haven't even the least capacity for thought or

experience. These insensate ordinary entities include many organisms, as with a tree outside my

window that we may conveniently call Trudy, as well as many that are far from ever being

organisms, as with a skin cell of yours that we may call Sylvia.

As has happened with ever so many trees, some day Trudy will die. When that happens, we

may agree, Trudy will no longer be alive; but, will Trudy no longer exist? On our commonsense

metaphysic, at least, it seems that Trudy may still exist, even as, on this common view, there may

exist, on earth right now, very many dead trees that were once alive. (Now, when a dead tree

undergoes a great deal of decay, and almost all its matter becomes widely dispersed, then, in the

typical case, at least, the tree will no longer exist. So, should all that happen to Trudy, and not

just the cessation of her (biological) life, then Trudy will no longer exist. And, should an

exploding bomb blow our living Trudy sky high, as we lately imagined happened with Oscar's

living body, then, again, Trudy will no longer exist. But, then, apparently, it will not be simply

by ending Trudy's (biological) life that the bomb will end Trudy's existence.) Perhaps it might

be that, on our common metaphysic, Trudy's being alive isn't essential to Trudy's existence, no

more than it's essential to the continued existence of Oscar's body that it remain alive.
 As has happened with ever so many cells, some day Sylvia will die. When that happens,

Sylvia will no longer be alive, we may agree; but, will Sylvia no longer exist? Perhaps it might

be that, on our commonsense metaphysic, Sylvia will still exist, even as it seems that, on your

feet right now, there really are many dead cells that were once alive.

Without having confidence in the proposed propositions, I've suggested some thoughts for

the serious consideration of contemporary philosophers. Continuing to assume our

commonsense metaphysic is generally correct, I'll just as neutrally propose a few further

propositions.

First, there's this quite general statement: With being alive not essential even for the likes of

Trudy and Sylvia, there aren't any ordinary things, or things (of a sort) ordinarily recognized by

us, for which having that property is crucial to their existence.

Second, and more cautiously, there's this more specific statement: It's not essential to the

continued existence of any animals that they continue to be alive.

For the moment, let's suppose that this second proposition is true. Then, even if it may be

easy to distinguish conceptually between sentient Oscar and his body, it might be impossible to

distinguish between Oscar's body, which might also bear Oscar's name, and a certain canine

animal, which might also be an Oscar. So, then, it just might be that, while there's one Oscar

who's so much as a sentient being, there's another, materially coincident with him, that's both a

canine animal and a canine body. On the other hand, it may still be possible to distinguish

between Oscar the canine body and Oscar the canine animal, even if, as we're supposing, neither

need be alive. Then, there'll be (at least) three materially coincident Oscars, the serson, the

animal and the body. Sometimes inclined even toward this somewhat suspicious last alternative,

I leave further thinking on these matters to future investigations.

13. Maintaining an Adequate Philosophical Perspective on Ourselves

When attempting ambitious philosophical work, we may fail to maintain an adequate

philosophical perspective: For example, we may come to think that, when properly concerned
for ourselves, what we should be most concerned for are certain bodies, or animals, or

organisms, that may have not even the least capacity for any thought or feeling at all. Far from

bettering our understanding of ourselves, we've then quite lost sight of ourselves. To better our

understanding, we must, at the very least, maintain an adequate philosophical perspective on

ourselves. And, for that, we must continue to think of ourselves as being, most essentially,

thinking and feeling [Link]

 NOTES

i1 In ICV, see pages 212-217 Henceforth, ICV's numbers will be (bracketed) in the text.
ii Owing largely to considerations concerning agency and the will, I'm now far more inclined

toward a substantial dualism than when I wrote ICV and when, a couple of years later, I replied

to a prominent dualist, Richard Swinburne, in a Book Symposium on ICV; see Swinburne (1992)

and Unger (1992) Detailing these considerations would be the work of another essay, much

longer than the present paper. Due to the complex considerations, I'm now at least somewhat

more inclined toward any view on which I'm not wholly constituted of parts each ontologically

more basic than myself. So, it's important to me now that, for the most part, this paper's thoughts

comport well with very many metaphysical conceptions.

iii THA, pages 16-17 [As with ICV, often THA's page numbers will be (bracketed) in the text.]

Though failing to notice the intriguingly allied work of W. R. Carter, Olson does usefully

observe on page 19 that, in recent decades, such a biological view, or a position much like his,

has been advocated by at least these other able authors: Michael Ayers, Paul F. Snowdon, Judith

J. Thomson, Bernard A. O. Williams, and Peter van Inwagen. Yet, on that very page, Olson

says, "The Biological Approach has been strangely neglected in the literature (sic) on personal

identity." If, along with the five philosophers he there notes, we count Olson himself, who'd

already published several papers to this effect, and Carter, with even more such papers then

published, we find at least seven able and active advocates in the recent literature. (Mentions of

their relevant works constitute most of the present paper's References.) By my standards, this

Approach has been very strangely neglected!

iv The Vegetable Case is first presented on pages 7-9, the Transplant Case on 9-11
v Here, I may well rehearse these words from page 92 of my (1996): "Long examined by

psychologists, but longer ignored by philosophers, the response someone makes to a given

example can be greatly influenced by (her memory of) responses made to cases previously
encountered And, since folks want their responses to seem consistent, often the influence is

greatest when the present case seems "essentially the same" as the just previous example."
vi Though it seems recently to have gone into a great and welcome decline, at least for several

decades and right up through the 1980s, all too many philosophers have championed the view

that, when thinking about hypothetical cases that are more than just quite modestly hypothetical,

we'll be (almost) doomed to promote far more confusion than philosophical insight Toward

showing the prominence of that protracted pessimism, on page 200 of his (1984) Reasons and

Persons, Derek Parfit presents this passage from W. V. Quine (1972): "The method of science

fiction has its uses in philosophy, but ... I wonder whether the limits of the method are properly

heeded. To seek what is "logically required" for sameness of person under unprecedented

circumstances is to suggest that words have some logical force beyond what our past needs have

invested them with." But, such very wholesale pessimism has no real basis. Indeed, soon after

offering the quote from Quine, Parfit makes quite a good case for the truth that there's at least as

much to be lost from a great aversion to using far-fetched cases as from a dogged reliance on

such examples.

Let me close this note with the observation that in my (1996) I give a great deal of

thought, and space, to making the case that, though very far from always, quite often our

responses to cases, including even actual cases, do more toward engendering confusion than

providing instruction. So, I'm no friend of an uncritical reliance on cases, not even on actual

cases.
vii For the quoted opening passage, Carter (1990) has two notes; the first just specifies salient

ways in which Felix and Jefferson are qualitatively different, and the second just says what I've

above place in [square brackets] Right after the quoted material, Carter places in display a quote

from page 78 of Sydney Shoemaker's contribution to Sydney Shoemaker and Richard Swinburne

(1984), rightly acknowledges Shoemaker's seminal influence for our topics.

viii In ICV, it's first used in section 10 of chapter 1 Much later, in "How Presumptive Tests for

Survival Beliefs May be Improved," which is section 5 of chapter 7, the avoidance of future

great pain test is refined. But, for most of what's to be done in the present essay, the refinements

are more distracting than enlightening.

ix For the exchange case that starts this flurry of examples, see pages 23-25 of Shoemaker (1963)

As he plainly realizes that case is very naturally regarded as a materially robust version of a

famous case in Locke. Indeed, just before presenting his own example, on page 22 Shoemaker

quotes Locke's remark that "should the soul of a prince, carrying with it the consciousness of the

prince's past life, enter and inform the body of a cobbler, as soon deserted of his own soul, every

one sees that he would be the same person with the prince, accountable only for the prince's

actions," appending a footnote for Locke: Essay, I, 457. (In a footnote on his page 14,

Shoemaker cites Locke's Essay.)

x On page 103 of ICV, there's an exchange case that's thus qualitatively symmetrical In some

notable respects, the qualitative symmetry provides a useful purification.

xi What I've just been saying doesn't imply that, throughout all conceivable cases, or even all

nomologically possible cases, you will be wherever your mentally productive brain will be

Indeed, in ICV there's an entire section, section 6 of chapter 5, that's devoted to providing

argument for the contrary view, those arguments providing an affirmative answer to the section's

interrogative title, "Might We Survive Brain Replacements and even Brain Exchanges?"
xii In section IV, chapter 3 of THA, Olson conspicuously denies this
xiii In ICV I used this test rather rarely Thus, till now, it's been anonymous.
xiv Though the examples are pretty far-fetched, it's very clear, and it's perfectly determinate, what

is the truth of the salient matters in these cases Indeed, the salient matters are very nearly as

clear as with cases of heart-exchange: When there's the exchange of hearts between you and a

qualitatively identical other person, it's extremely clear, and of course perfectly determinate,

who's who throughout and, in later stages, who's acquiring which heart. And, that's hardly any
clearer right now than it was years before the first (successful) heart transplant operation, when it

was (already) very clear, and perfectly determinate, who'd survive in the event of such a

(successful) operation.
xv As our treatment of Vegetable cases also shows, there's also precious little to be gained from

hybrid approaches that feature biological continuity as an even reasonably central element For

example, we might consider a "closest continuer" view according to which, whenever suitable

psychology is present, the mentality dictates the conditions of our survival, but, when it's absent,

biological continuity might suffice for our survival. What we just said for the Biological

Approach itself, we may say, apparently with equal justice, for such hybrid approaches: The

more we're free from confusions about our existence and persistence, the less there'll even seem

to be said for them. For the main point of this note, I'm grateful to Kit Fine.
xvi When the serson's active brain is way over there and (the rest of) his healthy body is right

nearby here, is the serson simply over there, a quite cohesive entity, or he is partly there and

partly here, a rather scattered entity? And, what of his body? In this essay, I mean to leave open

what are the answers to these questions

As I'm inclined to believe, the serson himself is, in the envisaged situation, a quite

cohesive entity that's just where his mentally productive brain is, way over there. As I'm also

inclined to think, the body is also quite cohesive, but it's right nearby here, not at all where the

brain is. But, to support these inclinations, at all well, rather complex arguments may be

requited. So, in this essay, I set them both aside.

xvii Many people have been helpful toward getting this paper to be more useful and less riddled

with error Very helpful indeed have been David Barnett, John Carroll, W. R. Carter, John

Gibbons, John Heil, Peter Kung, Jeff McMahan, Michael Lockwood, Eric Olson, Michael Rea,

Sydney Shoemaker and, most especially, Mark Bajakian and Kit Fine. To such helpful sentient

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