The Missionary Sisters of Our Lady of Fatima, Petitioners
versus
Amado Alzona, et al., Respondents
G.R. No. 224307
August 6, 2018
Second Division
Reyes, Jr., J.:
NATURE OF THE CASE:
Before this court is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court
seeking to annul and set aside the Decision of the Court of Appeals and its Resolution,
denying the motion for recobsideration thereof. The assailed decision partly granted the
respondent’s appeal and set aside the Decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Calamba City.
FACTS:
Petitioners otherwise called a Peach Sisters of Laguna, is a religious and charitable
group created to take care of the abandoned and neglected elderly persons. Mother
Ma. Conception Realon is its superior general.
The respondents are the legal heirs of the late Purification Alzona. The latter being the
registered owner of parcels of land located in Calamba City, Laguna. In 1997,
Purification discovered that she has lung cancer. Considering her restrictions in her
movement, Purification requested Mother Conception to take care of her house to which
the latter agreed.
Later, Purification called Mother Conception and handed her a handwritten letter,
purportedly donating her house and lot to the petitioner through Mother Conception.
Sometime in 2001, Mother Conception went to SEC and filed the registration
application. On August 2001, Purification executed a Deed of Donation Inter Vivos
conveying the subject properties to the petitioner through Mother Conception.
ISSUE:
Whether at the time of donation by Purification in favor of the Petitioner, the petitioner
was a de facto corporation and has the personality to be a beneficiary and has the
power to acquire and possess property.
RULING:
The petition is meritorious.
In order that a donation of an immovable property be valid, the following elements must
be present: (a) the essential reduction of the patrimony of the donor; (b) the increase in
the patrimony of the donee; ( c) the intent to do an act of liberality or animus donandi;
(d) the donation must be contained in a public document; and e) that the acceptance
thereof be made in the same deed or in a separate public instrument; if acceptance is
made in a separate instrument, the donor must be notified thereof in an authentic form,
to be noted in both instruments.
Under Article 737 of the Civil Code, "[t]he donor's capacity shall be determined as of the
time of the making of the donation." By analogy, the legal capacity or the personality of
the donee, or the authority of the latter's representative, in certain cases, is determined
at the time of acceptance of the donation.
Article 738, in relation to Article 745, of the Civil Code provides that all those who are
not specifically disqualified by law may accept donation5either personally or through an
authorized representative with a special power of attorney for the purpose or with a
general and sufficient power.
The Court finds that for the purpose of accepting the donation, the petitioner is deemed
vested with personality to accept, and Mother Concepcion is clothed with authority to
act on the latter's behalf.
Precisely, the existence of the petitioner as a corporate entity is upheld in this case for
the purpose of validating the Deed to ensure that the primary objective for which the
donation was intended is achieved, that is, to convey the property for the purpose of
aiding the petitioner in the pursuit of its charitable objectives.
In this controversy, while the initial conveyance is defective, the genuine intent of
Purificacion to donate the subject properties in favor of the petitioner is indubitable.
Also, while the petitioner is yet to be incorporated, it cannot be said that the initial
conveyance was tainted with fraud or misrepresentation. Contrarily, Purificacion acted
with full knowledge of circumstances of the Petitioner. This is evident from Purificacion's
act of referring Mother Concepcion to Atty. Arcillas, who, in tum, advised the petitioner
to apply for registration. Further, with the execution of two (2) documents of conveyance
in favor of the petitioner, it is clear that what Purificacion intended was for the sisters
comprising the petitioner to have ownership of her properties to aid them in the pursuit
of their charitable activities, as a token of appreciation for the services they rendered to
her during her illness.
People of the Philippines
v.
Wilson Cacho y Songco
G.R. No. 218425
September 27, 2017
First Division
Tijam, J.:
NATURE OF THE CASE:
For automatic review is the DecisioN of the Court of Appeals (CA) which affirmed the Decision
of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of San Mateo, Rizal finding Wilson Cacho y Songco (accused-
appellant) guilty of the crimes of Murder and Destructive Arson.
FACTS:
On January 2, 2004, Rodriguez Police Station received a report from a certain Willy Cacho
about a fire in Rodriguez, Rizal. The Bureau of Fire Protection went to Sitio Catmon to verify
said report.
Upon arriving in Sitio Catmon, the police officers saw a burned house, which was owned by a
certain Mario Balbao. Upon investigation, they discovered a burned body of a headless man
underneath an iron sheet. Willy Cacho informed the police officers that it was his brother,
[accused-appellant], who killed Boy. [Accused-appellant's] wife likewise told the police officers
that her husband was a patient of [the] National Center for Mental Health and has a recurring
mental illness.
Thereafter, the police officers went to the house of [accused-appellant] where they saw a
shallow pit measuring one (1) foot in diameter and five (5) inches deep with a steel peg standing
at the center, which they believed was used to bum a head because there were traces of ash
and a human skull on top of the heap of charcoal. The police officers then saw [accused-
appellant] in his backyard. Upon introducing themselves as police officers, [accused-appellant]
acted strangely and exhibited signs of mental illness. According to SPO4 Tavas, [accused-
appellant] admitted killing Boy and burning the latter's house but did not say why he did it.
When they tried to arrest him, [accused-appellant] became wild. The police officers sought help
from other people to subdue [accused-appellant] and to place him inside the mobile car.
[Accused-appellant] was then brought to the prosecutors [sic] office for inquest proceedings.
After the inquest, [accused-appellant] was brought to the National Center for Mental Health for
confinement.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the accused-appellant sufficiently proved his defense of insanity
RULING:
NO. Accused-appellant alleges that he was diagnosed with Major Depression with Psychosis in
1996 for which he was admitted at the National Center for Mental Health (NCMH) for two (2)
months. Thereafter, he was discharged when there were no longer any symptom that was
observed. Then on January 7, 2004, he was again admitted to the NCMH and it was discovered
that his Major Depression with Psychosis had already progressed to Chronic Schizophrenia.
Thus, his defense of insanity was sufficiently proved by his medical record with the NCMH as
well as the expert testimony of Dr. Sagun.
Here, while Dr. Sagun testified that accused-appellant was confined at the NCMH in 1996 and
that accused-appellant was diagnosed with Major Depression with Psychosis which progressed
to Chronic Schizophrenia, no other evidence was presented to show that accused-appellant
was insane immediately prior to or at the very moment that the crime was committed. Mere prior
confinement into a mental institution does not automatically exonerate the accused-appellant
from criminal liability in the absence of any evidence showing that accused-appellant was
completely deprived of reason immediately prior or at the time of the commission of the crime. If
at all, there is no evidence showing that the mental illness of the accused-appellant, as narrated
by Dr. Sagun, constitutes insanity, in that, there is complete deprivation of his intelligence in
committing the act.
ERIC SIBAYAN CHUA, Petitioner
vs.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent
G.R. No. 231998
November 20, 2017
Third Division
Velasco, Jr., J.:
NATURE OF THE CASE:
For consideration of the Court is the Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court assailing the Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals (CA). The assailed rulings
disallowed petitioner from changing the name registered in his birth certificate from "Eric Sibayan
Kiat" (Eric) to "Eric Sibayan Chua."
FACTS:
Eric filed a petition for change of surname from "Kiat" to "Chua." In his petition, Eric alleged that he
was born on November 8, 1973 to a Chinese father named "Cheong Kiat" (Cheong) and a Filipino
mother named "Melania Sibayan" (Melania). However, after his birth, his father Cheong allegedly
secured a favorable judgment allowing him (Cheong) to change his surname from "Kiat" to "Chua."
Thus, Eric adopted the new surname of his father, "Chua," and had been using the name "Eric
Sibayan Chua" in all of his credentials. Eric likewise averred in his petition that he is known in their
community as "Eric Chua" instead of "Eric Kiat." The petition was docketed as Special Proceeding
before the RTC in Balaoan, La Union.
At the trial, Eric testified that he was not able to secure a copy of his father's birth certificate since
the latter was born in China; that his mother Melania told him that his father Cheong changed his
surname from "Kiat" to "Chua;" and that his Certificate of Live Birth is the only document where his
surname appears as "Kiat." Eric offered in evidence which all state Eric's name to be "Eric Sibayan
Chua."
Melania also testified in support of the petition, claiming that Cheong used the surname "Kiat" in
China, but used "Chua" in the Philippines; that "Chua" is the surname Cheong used when they
married; that it was her uncle who erroneously caused the registration of Eric's name as "Eric Kiat;"
and that when Eric was 16, Cheong, who was already weak, returned to China and contacted them
no longer.
The asseveration that Eric is known in their community as "Eric Chua" was corroborated by his
neighbor, Avelino Fernandez.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the petitioner Eric shall be allowed from officially changing his name.
RULING:
The petition is meritorious.
Contrary to the ruling of the CA, there is legal and factual basis for granting Eric's petition for change
of name. To recall, his petition is not only anchored on his father's alleged change of surname from
"Kiat" to "Chua," but also on the fact that he (Eric) had been using the surname "Chua" in all of his
credentials. Thus, it may be that Eric and Melania's testimonies are not preponderant proof of
Cheong's change of surname, but this should not foreclose the possibility of granting the petition on
a different ground.
Avoidance of confusion was invoked in Alfon v. Republic, wherein the Court granted the petition for
change of name of Maria Estrella Veronica Primitiva Duterte to Estrella S. Alfon.
The same circumstances are attendant in the case at bar. As Eric has established, he is known in
his community as "Eric Chua," rather than "Eric Kiat." Moreover, all of his credentials exhibited
before the Court, other than his Certificate of Live Birth, bear the name "Eric Chua." Guilty of
reiteration, Eric's Certificate of Baptism, Voter Certification, Police Clearance, National Bureau of
Investigation Clearance, Passport, and High School Diploma all reflect his surname to be "Chua."
Thus, to compel him to use the name "Eric Kiat" at this point would inevitably lead to confusion. It
would result in an alteration of all of his official documents, save for his Certificate of Live Birth. His
children, too, will correspondingly be compelled to have their records changed. For even their own
Certificates of Live Birth state that their father's surname is "Chua." To deny this petition would then
have ramifications not only to Eric's identity in his community, but also to that of his children.
The imperatives of avoiding confusion dictate that the instant petition be granted. Additionally, public
respondent failed to demonstrate that allowing petitioner to change his surname will prejudice the
State, strengthening Our resolve to grant the sought-after relief.
ALEX RAUL B. BLAY, Petitioner
vs.
CYNTHIA B. BANA, Respondent
G.R. No. 232189
March 7, 2018
Second Division
Perlas-Bernabe, J.:
NATURE OF THE CASE:
Assailed in this petition for review on certiorari1 are the Decision and the Resolution of the Court of
Appeals (CA), which affirmed the Orders of the Regional Trial Court of Pasay City (RTC) in
that: (a) granted petitioner Alex Raul B. Blay’s (petitioner) Motion to Withdraw; and (b) declared
respondent Cynthia B. Baña’s (respondent) Counterclaim for independent adjudication.
FACTS:
Petitioner filed before the RTC a Petition for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage, seeking that his
marriage to respondent be declared null and void on account of his psychological incapacity
pursuant to Article 36 of the Family Code. Subsequently, respondent filed her Answer with
Compulsory Counterclaim .
However, petitioner later lost interest over the case, and thus, filed a Motion to Withdraw his petition.
In her comment/opposition thereto, respondent invoked Section 2, Rule 17 of the Rules of Court
(alternatively, Section 2, Rule 1 7), and prayed that her counterclaims be declared as remaining for
the court's independent adjudication. In turn, petitioner filed his reply, averring that respondent's
counterclaims are barred from being prosecuted in the same action due to her failure to file a
manifestation therefor within fifteen (15) days from notice of the Motion to Withdraw, which -
according to petitioner - was required under the same Rules of Court provision. In particular,
petitioner alleged that respondent filed the required manifestation only on March 30, 2015. However,
respondent's counsel received a copy of petitioner's Motion to Withdraw on March 11, 2015; hence,
respondent had only until March 26, 2015 to manifest before the trial court her desire to prosecute
her counterclaims in the same action.
ISSUE:
Whether or not it is proper to issue an Order declaring respondent's counterclaim for independent
adjudication before the same trial court.
RULING:
The petition is meritorious.
In this case, the CA confined the application of Section 2, Rule 17 to that portion of its second
sentence which states that the "dismissal shall be limited to the complaint." Evidently, the CA
ignored the same provision's third sentence, which provides for the alternatives available to the
defendant who interposes a counterclaim prior to the service upon him of the plaintiff's motion for
dismissal. As may be clearly inferred therefrom, should the defendant desire to prosecute his
counterclaim, he is required to manifest his preference therefor within fifteen (15) days from notice of
the plaintiff's motion to dismiss. Failing in which, the counterclaim may be prosecuted only in a
separate action.
The rationale behind this rule is not difficult to discern: the passing of the fifteen (15)-day period
triggers the finality of the court's dismissal of the complaint and hence, bars the conduct of further
proceedings, i.e., the prosecution of respondent's counterclaim, in the same action. Thus, in order to
obviate this finality, the defendant is required to file the required manifestation within the aforesaid
period; otherwise, the counterclaim may be prosecuted only in a separate action.
A new one is ENTERED solely granting petitioner Alex Raul B. Blay’s Motion to Withdraw his
Petition for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage. The aforesaid dismissal is, among others, without
prejudice to the prosecution of respondent Cynthia B. Baña's counterclaim in a separate action.
