Abellana v. Spouses Ponce 437 SCRA 531 (2004) 6.

6. The Court of Appeals set aside the decision of the trial court ruling that
Felomina failed to prove the existence of an implied trust and upheld respondent
FACTS:
spouses ownership over the litigated lot.

1. Felomina, the aunt of private respondent Lucila Ponce, purchased from the
ISSUE: Who, as between Felomina and respondent spouses, is the lawful owner of
late Estela Caldoza-Pacres an agricultural lot with the intention of giving said lot to
the controverted lot?
her niece, Lucila. Thus, in the deed of sale, the latter was designated as the buyer of
the lot covered by an OCT located at Los Angeles, Butuan City. The total
consideration of the sale was P16,500.00, but only P4,500.00 was stated in the deed
RULING: It was Felomina and not Lucila who truly purchased the questioned lot
upon the request of the seller.
from Estela. The donation of immovable property by Felomina to Lucila is void.

2. Subsequently, Felomina applied for the issuance of title in the name of her
Under Article 749 of the Civil Code, in order that the donation of an immovable
niece. TCT over the subject lot was issued in the name of Lucila. Said title, however,
property may be valid, it must be made in a public document, specifying therein the
remained in the possession of Felomina who developed the lot through Juanario
property donated and the value of the charges which the donee must satisfy. The
Torreon and paid real property taxes thereon.
acceptance may be made in the same deed of donation or in a separate public
document, but it shall not take effect unless it is done during the lifetime of the
donor. If the acceptance is made in a separate instrument, the donor shall be
3. The relationship between Felomina and respondent spouses Romeo and Lucila
notified thereof in an authentic form, and this step shall be noted in both
Ponce, however, turned sour. The latter allegedly became disrespectful and
instruments.
ungrateful to the point of hurling her insults and even attempting to hurt her
physically. Hence, Felomina filed the instant case for revocation of implied trust to In the instant case, what transpired between Felomina and Lucila was a donation of
recover legal title over the property. an immovable property which was not embodied in a public instrument as required
by the foregoing article. Being an oral donation, the transaction was void.
Moreover, even if Felomina enjoyed the fruits of the land with the intention of
4. Private respondent spouses Lucila and Romeo, on the other hand, claimed that giving effect to the donation after her demise, the conveyance is still a void
the purchase price of the lot was only P4,500.00 and that it was them who paid the donation mortis causa, for non-compliance with the formalities of a will. No valid
same. The payment and signing of the deed of sale allegedly took place in the office title passed regardless of the intention of Felomina to donate the property to Lucila,
of Atty. Teodoro Emboy in the presence of the seller and her siblings namely, because the naked intent to convey without the required solemnities does not
Aquilino Caldoza and the late Lilia Caldoza. suffice for gratuitous alienations, even as between the parties inter se. At any rate,
Felomina now seeks to recover title over the property because of the alleged
ingratitude of the respondent spouses.
5. The trial court rendered a decision holding that an implied trust existed
between Felomina and Lucila, such that the latter is merely holding the lot for the
benefit of the former. It thus ordered the conveyance of the subject lot in favor of LAGAZO V. CA
Felomina.
287 SCRA 18

FACTS: Catalina Jacob Vda. de Reyes, a widow and grandmother of plaintiff-

appellee, was awarded a 60.10-square meter lot which is a portion of the
Monserrat Estate located in Old Sta. Mesa, Manila. The Monserrat Estate is a public installment arrearages, may the donation be deemed onerous and thus governed
land owned by the City of Manila and distributed for sale to bona fide tenants under by the law on ordinary contracts?
its land-for-the-landless program. Catalina Jacob constructed a house on the lot.
2. Where the acceptance of a donation was made in a separate instrument but not
Shortly before she left for Canada where she is now a permanent resident, Catalina formally communicated to the donor, may the donation be nonetheless considered
Jacob executed a special power of attorney in favor of her son-in-law Eduardo B. complete, valid and subsisting?
Español authorizing him to execute all documents necessary for the final
HELD:
adjudication of her claim as awardee of the lot.
1. NO. At the outset, let us differentiate between a simple donation and an onerous
Due to the failure of Eduardo B. Español to accomplish the purpose of the power of
one. A simple or pure donation is one whose cause is pure liberality (no
attorney granted to him, Catalina Jacob revoked said authority in an instrument
strings attached), while an onerous donation is one which is subject to burdens,
executed in Canada. Simultaneous with the revocation, Catalina Jacob executed
charges or future services equal to or more in value than the thing donated. Under
another power of attorney of the same tenor in favor plaintiff-appellee.
Article 733 of the Civil Code, donations with an onerous cause shall be governed by
Catalina Jacob executed in Canada a Deed of Donation over the subject lot in favor the rules on contracts; hence, the formalities required for a valid simple donation
of plaintiff-appellee. Following the donation, plaintiff-appellee checked with the are not applicable.
Register of Deeds and found out that the property was in the delinquent list, so that
We rule that the donation was simple, not onerous. Even
he paid the installments in arrears and the remaining balance on the lot and
conceding that petitioner’s full payment of the purchase price of the lot might
declared the said property in the name of Catalina Jacob.
have been a burden to him, such payment was not however imposed by the donor
Plaintiff-appellee thereafter sent a demand letter to defendant-appellant asking as a condition for the donation.
him to vacate the premises. A similar letter was sent by plaintiff-appellee’s counsel
It is clear that the donor did not have any intention to burden or charge petitioner
to defendant. However, defendant-appellant refused to vacate the premises
as the donee. The words in the deed are in fact typical of a pure donation. We
claiming ownership thereof. Hence, plaintiff-appellee instituted the complaint for
agree with Respondent Court that the payments made by petitioner were merely
recovery of possession and damages against defendant-appellant.
his voluntary acts. This much can be gathered from his testimony in court, in which
Petitioner contends that the burdens, charges or conditions imposed upon a he never even claimed that a burden or charge had been imposed by his
donation need not be stated on the deed of donation itself. Thus, although the grandmother.
deed did not categorically impose any charge, burden or condition to be satisfied by
The payments even seem to have been made pursuant to the power of attorney
him, the donation was onerous since he in fact and in reality paid for the
executed by Catalina Reyes in favor of petitioner, her grandson, authorizing him to
installments in arrears and for the remaining balance of the lot in question. Being
execute acts necessary for the fulfillment of her obligations. Nothing in the records
an onerous donation, his acceptance thereof may be express or implied, as
shows that such acts were meant to be a burden in the donation.
provided under Art. 1320 of the Civil Code, and need not comply with the
formalities required by Art. 749 of the same code. His payment of the arrearages 2. NO. As a pure or simple donation, the provisions of the civil code apply. The
and balance and his assertion of his right of possession against private respondent donation, following the theory of cognition (Article 1319, Civil Code), is perfected
clearly indicate his acceptance of the donation. only upon the moment the donor knows of the acceptance by the
donee.” Furthermore, “[i]f the acceptance is made in a separate instrument, the
ISSUE:
donor shall be notified thereof in an authentic form, and this step shall be noted in
1. Where the deed of donation did not expressly impose any burden — the both instruments.”
expressed consideration being purely one of liberality and generosity — but the
Acceptance of the donation by the donee is, therefore, indispensable; its absence
recipient actually paid charges imposed on the property like land taxes and
makes the donation null and void.
 There are three requisites for the validity of a simple donation of a real property:
(1) it must be made in a public instrument;
(2) it must be accepted, which acceptance may be made either in the same Deed of
Donation or in a separate public instrument; and
ELVIRA T. ARANGOTE, petitioner, (3) if the acceptance is made in a separate instrument, the donor must be notified
vs. in an authentic form, and the same must be noted in both instruments.
SPS. MARTIN MAGLUNOB and LOURDES S. MAGLUNOB, and ROMEO SALIDO,
Respondents.
In the present case, the said Affidavit, which is tantamount to a Deed of Donation,
met the first requisite, as it was notarized; thus, it became a public instrument.
FACTS: Nevertheless, it failed to meet the aforesaid second and third requisites. The
acceptance of the said donation was not made by the petitioner and her husband
Esperanza Maglunob-Dailisan donated a subject lot to the petitioner spouses Elvira
either in the same Affidavit or in a separate public instrument. As there was no
and Ray Mars Arangote.
acceptance made of the said donation, there was also no notice of the said
acceptance given to the donor, Esperanza. Therefore, the Affidavit executed by
In 1985, Esperanza executed a Last Will and Testament granting the subject Esperanza in favor of petitioner and her husband is null and void.
property to petitioner and her husband, but it was never probated. That on 1986,
Esperanza again executed another document in which she renounced, relinquished,
waived and quitclaimed all her rights, share, interest and participation whatsoever
in the subject property in favor of the petitioner spouse, thus, a tax declaration was
issued under the petitioner’s name. ERLINDA A. AGAPAY vs. CARLINA (CORNELIA) V. PALANG and HERMINIA P. DELA
CRUZ

Respondents Martin and Romeo Salido questioned the legality of the donation FACTS
being the heirs, and lawful owners and possessors of the entire subject property.
In 1949 Miguel Palang married private respondent Carlina (or Cornelia) Vallesterol.
A few months after the wedding, he left to work in Hawaii. Miguel and Carlina had
one child, Herminia Palang.
ISSUE:
He visited the Philippines twice but did not stay with his wife and child. When he
Whether the donation made by Esperanza to the petitioner-spouse is valid. returned for good, he refused to live with private respondents, but stayed alone.
HELD: In 1973, 63-year-old Miguel then contracted his second marriage with 19-year-old
Erlinda Agapay. Two months earlier, Miguel and Erlinda jointly purchased a parcel
of agricultural land.
No, the donation suffered from legal infirmities.
A house and lot was likewise purchased allegedly by Erlinda as the sole vendee.
In Art. 749. In order that the donation of an immovable may be valid, it must be Miguel and Cornelia Palang executed a Deed of Donation as a form of compromise
made in a public document, specifying therein the property donated and the value agreement to settle and end a case filed by the latter. The parties agreed to donate
of the charges which the donee must satisfy. their conjugal property consisting of six parcels of land to their only child, Herminia.
Miguel and Erlinda’s cohabitation produced a son, Kristopher A. Palang. In 1979, unrealistic to conclude that she contributed P3,750.00 as her share in the purchase
Miguel and Erlinda were convicted of Concubinage upon Carlina’s complaint. Two price, there being no proof.
years later, Miguel died.
Petitioner now claims that the riceland was bought two months before she and
Respondents instituted an action for recovery of ownership and possession with Miguel actually cohabited, but such assertion was intended only to exclude their
damages against petitioner. Private respondents sought to get back the riceland case from the operation of Article 148. We cannot state definitively that the
and the house and lot allegedly purchased by Miguel during his cohabitation with riceland was purchased even before they started living together with no proof of
petitioner. the precise date they started cohabiting. But even assuming that it was bought
before cohabitation, the rules of co-ownership would still apply and proof of actual
Lower court dismissed complaint after declaring that there was little evidence to
contribution would still be essential.
prove that the subject properties pertained to the conjugal property of Carlina and
Miguel Palang. It went on to provide for the intestate share of Kristopher of ½ of Since petitioner failed to prove that she contributed money to the purchase price of
the agricultural land as his inheritance, so long as he executes a quit-claim the riceland we find no basis to justify her co-ownership with Miguel over the same.
renouncing any claim to donation to Herminia. Consequently, the riceland should revert to the conjugal partnership property of
the deceased Miguel and private respondent Carlina Palang.
On appeal, respondent court reversed the trial court’s decision.
Furthermore, it is immaterial that Miguel and Carlina previously agreed to donate
ISSUES
their conjugal property in favor of their daughter Herminia in 1975. The trial court
Whether or not the deeds of sale covering the riceland and house and lot are valid erred in holding that the decision adopting their compromise agreement “in effect
partakes the nature of judicial confirmation of the separation of property between
Whether Kristopher should have been declared Miguel’s illegitimate son and be spouses and the termination of the conjugal partnership.” Separation of property
entitled to his estate between spouses during the marriage shall not take place except by judicial order
or without judicial conferment when there is an express stipulation in the marriage
FACTS
settlements. The judgment which resulted from the parties’ compromise was not
Court denies the petition and affirms the CA decision. specifically and expressly for separation of property and should not be so inferred.

Petitioner assails the validity of the deeds of conveyance over the same parcels of With respect to the house and lot, Erlinda allegedly bought the same for P20,000.00
land. There is no dispute that the transfers of ownership of the properties from the when she was only 22 years old. But the notary public who prepared the deed of
original owners were valid. conveyance testified that Miguel provided the money for the purchase price and
directed that Erlinda’s name alone be placed as the vendee.
But under Article 148 of the Family Code, which provides for cases when a man and
a woman who are not capacitated to marry each other live as husband and wife, The transaction was a void donation made by Miguel to Erlinda, made between
only the properties acquired by both of the parties through their actual joint persons guilty of adultery or concubinage at the time of the donation, under Article
contribution of money, property or industry shall be owned by them in common in 739 of the Civil Code. Moreover, Article 87 of the Family Code expressly provides
proportion to their respective contributions. If the actual contribution of the party is that the prohibition against donations between spouses now applies to donations
not proved, there will be no co-ownership and no presumption of equal shares. between persons living together as husband and wife without a valid marriage.

In the sale of the riceland made in favor of Miguel and Erlinda, Erlinda tried to In the second issue respondent court is correct in that the trial court erred in
establish by her testimony that she is engaged in the business of buy and sell and making pronouncements regarding Kristopher’s heirship and filiation “inasmuch as
had a sari-sari store but failed to persuade us that she actually contributed money questions as to who are the heirs of the decedent, proof of filiation of illegitimate
to buy the subject riceland. On the date of conveyance, petitioner was only around children and the determination of the estate of the latter and claims thereto should
20 and Miguel was already 64 and a pensioner of the U.S. Government. It is be ventilated in the proper probate court or in a special proceeding instituted for
the purpose and cannot be adjudicated in the instant ordinary civil action which is
for recovery of ownership and possession.”
Imperial v. CA
GR No. 112483, October 8, 1999

EDUARTEvs CA FACTS:

FACTS: In 1951, Leoncio sold his 32, 837m² parcel of land to his acknowledged natural
son Eloy Imperial. However, in 1953, Leoncio filed a copmplaint for annulment of
Pedro Calapine was the registered owner of a parcel of land. He executed a deed of
the sale alleging that he was deceived by his son. They entered into a compromise
donation inter vivos of ½ of the land to his niece, Helen Doria. Subsequently, he
agreement that Leoncio will recognize the validity and legality of the sale
executed another deed of donation inter vivos ceding the other ½ of the property to
but Eloyhas to sold the 1000m² to Leoncio. In 1962, Leoncio died and Victor, his
Helen Doria. Helen Doria donated a protion of the lot (157 sqm) to the Calauan
adopted child, substituted him in the execution of the compromise agreement.
Christian Reformed Church. Helen Doria sold and conveyed the remaining portion
However, in 1977, Victor died single and without issue. After 4 years, Ricardo,
save some 700 meters for his residence. Pedro Calapine sought to annul the sale
Victors’s natural father, died too. Cesar and Trasa, children of Ricardo, filed a
and donation to eduarte and CCRC on the ground that the deed of donation was a
complaint for annulment of the donation. A motion to dismiss was filed on the
forgery and that Doria was unworthy of his liberality claiming ingratitude
ground of res judicata. The trial court dismissed the case. On appeal, the CA
(commission of offense against the person, honor or property of donor [par. 1])
reversed the ruling of the trial court and remanded the case for further
proceedings. Cesar and Teresa filed an Amended Complaint alleging that
the conveyance impaired the legitime of Victor. The RTC ruled that the donation is
ISSUE: inofficiousimparing the legitime of Victor. CA affirmed in toto the decision of the
RTC.
W/N the falsification of public document committed by Doria is an act of ingratitude
against Calapine (considering that falsification is a crime against public interest)? ISSUE:

Whether or not the action for inofficious donation has prescribed.

RULING: YES RULING:
In commentaries of Tolentino, it is said that “all crimes which offend the donor Yes. The Supreme court applied Article 1144 of the Civil Code which atates that
show ingratitude and are causes of revocation.” Petitioner attempted to categorize “actions upon an obligation created by law must be brought within ten years from
the offenses according to their classification under the RPC by deleting the first the time the right accrues. Here, the right accrues from the moment Leoncio died,
sentence. However, this is unwarr but it took the respondents 24 years to file the action.
anted considering that illegal detention, threats and coercion are considered crimes Also, there is estoppel by laches on their part. First, Victor is a lawyer; he even
against the person of the donor despite the fact that they are classified as crimes substituted his father in the execution of the compromise agreement regarding
against personal liberty and security under the RPC. the contested conveyance of parcel of land. Second, Richardo is the lessee of
the contested land and it is expected that he was aware of the sale of the land. And,
the respondents only institud the complaint five years after the death of Ricardo.
Note: Eduarte and the Church still won although the donation was deemed by the
Court to be revocable. The Court applied the CHAIN OF TITLE THEORY because the The petition is granted.
lands were registered lands and it has already passed from the forger (Doria) to
innocent purchasers for value (Eduarte, et al.).