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Apocryphal Treatment For Conze's Heart Problems: "Non-Attainment", "Apprehension" and "Mental Hanging" in The Prajñāpāramitā H.rdaya

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0% found this document useful (0 votes)
63 views34 pages

Apocryphal Treatment For Conze's Heart Problems: "Non-Attainment", "Apprehension" and "Mental Hanging" in The Prajñāpāramitā H.rdaya

culture
Copyright
© © All Rights Reserved
We take content rights seriously. If you suspect this is your content, claim it here.
Available Formats
Download as PDF, TXT or read online on Scribd

Apocryphal Treatment for Conze’s Heart Problems:

“Non-attainment”, “Apprehension” and


“Mental Hanging” in the Prajñāpāramitā Hrdaya
.
Shì Huìfēng

Conze’s critical editions, translations and commentary on the Sanskrit Heart


Sūtra indicated three problematic statements: . “no attainment and no
non-attainment” (§.); . “because of non-attainment(ness)” (§.); and
. “without thought coverings” (§.). Utilizing Nattier’s theory of the text’s
history (§.), we trace back these three phrases from the Chinese Heart
Sūtra, to the Chinese larger Prajñāpāramitā texts, to the Sanskrit Pañca-
vimśati
. (§.). Subsequently, we generate new readings and incidentally a
new structure for these three phrases, distinct from the Sanskrit Heart Sū-
tra, which is possibly apocryphal. Our new readings are: . “no attainment”
as no realization (§). . “due to engagement in non-apprehension” (§). .
“the mind does not hang on anything” (§). e new structure ties the us-
age of the second phrase back to the first phrase within the Sūtra context of
“erefore, in emptiness there is no form, … no attainment; due to engage-
ment in non-appre-hension”, rather than at the start of the next section. e
third phrase indicates the mind which does not take any object, a synonym
for non-apprehension. While the readings and overall structure are new,
they still reflect the core notions, i.e. the heart, of the As. tasāhasrikā
. and
Pañcavimśatisāhasrikā,
. the key Perfection of Wisdom texts (§).

. Conze’s Heart Sūtra Problems


Many years ago, Edward Conze established himself as the leading Western au-
thority on the Prajñāpāramitā in the th century. is was achieved through

.  (): –. ©  Shì Huìfēng


   ’  

his prolific critical editions, translations and explanations of this range of litera-
ture. Among these, a translation and commentary on the Heart Sūtra in English.
is work was based on his very comprehensive critical edition of the text, “e
Prajñāpāramitāhrdaya
. Sūtra”, originally published in , and again in his irty
Years of Buddhist Studies in . is critical edition used no less than twelve
Nepalese Sanskrit manuscripts, seven Chinese editions and another seven Chi-
nese translations, two manuscripts from Japan, and the Tibetan. Conze identified
two problems in the Sanskrit text, both related to variant readings that required
some serious explanation. To facilitate an understanding of these problems, we
would like first to reproduce Conze’s own translation of this part of the Heart
Sūtra in English. en we shall reproduce the relevant Sanskrit critical edition
material, complete with critical apparatus.
For the translation, his commentary, and the critical edition upon which they
were based, Conze analyzed the entire text of the Heart Sūtra into eight divisions,
numbered from I to VIII. According to Conze, divisions II, III, IV-V, and VI-VII
correspond respectively to the four holy truths of dissatisfaction (II), origin (III),
cessation (IV-V) and path (VI-VII). Conze’s problematic material spans from his
division V, “e dialectics of emptiness, third stage”, through to division VI, “e
concrete embodiment of full emptiness, and its practical basis” (: ). us,
by Conze’s own analysis, the problematic material spans his division into the truth
of cessation and that of the path.
e first passage in Conze’s translation of the Sūtra, in division V “e dialec-
tics of emptiness”, reads as follows (Conze : ):
[Sūtra, V] erefore, O Śāriputra, in emptiness there is no form [the
five aggregates; the eighteen elements; the twelve limbs of dependent
origination in forward and reverse order; the four holy truths.] ere
is no cognition, no attainment and no non-attainment.
It is in the next section of his divisions, section VI, “e concrete embodiment of
full emptiness, and its practical basis”, that the passage in question continues as
follows (Conze : f):
[Sūtra, VI] erefore, O Śāriputra, it is because of his non-attainment-
ness that a Bodhisattva, through having relied on the perfection of
wisdom, dwells without thought-coverings. In the absence of thought
coverings he has not been made to tremble, he can overcome what
can upset, and in the end he attains to Nirvana.


   ’  

For reference, we here reproduce divisions V and VI from Conze’s critical edition
corresponding to the above English translation, in full, including the footnotes
most relevant to our discussion in their original numbering (Conze : f):

[Sūtra, V]  tasmāc Chāriputra  śūnyatāyām 


. na rūpam . na vedanā
na samjñā na samskārā 
h. na vijñānam, na caksu
. . . h-śrota-ghrā
. na-jihvā-
.
kāya-manāmsi  na rūpa-śabda-gandha-rasa-sprastavya-dharmāh  na
. .. .
caksur-dhātur  yāvan na  manovijñāna-dhātuh  na-avidyā  na-
. .
avidyā-ksayo  yāvan na  jarāmaranam na jarāmaranaksayo  na
. . . . .
duhkhasamudaya-nirodha-mārgā  na jñānam  na prāptir na-aprāptih.
. . .

[Sūtra, VI]  tasmāc Chāriputra  aprāptitvād bodhisattvo  prajñā-


pāramitām āśritya  viharaty acittāvarana . h.

. cittāvarana-nāstitvād
.
 atrasto  viparyāsa-atikrānto.  nisthā-nirvānah.
.. . .

It is within these two divisions, V and VI, that the problematic variant readings
occur. However, rather than Conze’s point of view that these are two problems,
we shall sub-divide the former into two distinct issues, making three in total. e
reasons for the distinction will soon become apparent. In addition to Conze’s po-
sition vis-à-vis the three, we shall also cite several other English translations and
modern commentaries on these passages. In order to highlight the lack of con-
sensus—if not outright confusion—over the understanding of this popular text,
we shall draw from a range of modern works representing the Tibetan, Chinese,
Korean and Japanese traditions.

Conze  Nk adds: na-ajñānam. .


Conze  So Nbek Cade Jb ChT , Ti. – Ja : na prāptitvam. . – Ncdim ChT,,, : na prāptih.
. ChT : na
prāptitvam . ca na-aprāpti h.
. – C b na prāptir na-abhisamaya.
Conze  Nab?c?d?eim Cg Ti: aprāptitvāt. – Jb : aprāptitvena. – Cb : aprāptitva. – Ja om. aprāptitvāt. –

Cd : aprāptitā-prāptiryāvavat. – Ce : na prāptirna-aprāptir yāvat; this is Feer’s correction for what I


read as: aprāptitāprāptir-yāvat. – bodhisattvasya Ja . – Cb Jb : bodhisattvānām. – Nbcea? : bodhisattvā
mahāsattvā. – Nk : bodhisattvo mahāsattvah. . – Nm : bodhisattvah. . – Cc : bodhisattva. – Cg Ni :
bodhisattvā. – Ti: byaṅ-chub sems-dpa’ rnams. – Ce om. Bodhisattvo.
Conze  Ja : viharati cittavarana. cittāvarana. – Kokio’s first copy: vaharaty citvavaranah, which
. . . .
he corrects to viharani citnavarana . h.
. – Jb : viharati cittavarana
. h.
. cittav- . – Cc : viharya cita / avarna
.
cita / a (varna-nā)
. stitva. – Cg : viharatya ciyāvarana. . – Nb : viharanti. – Suzuki: viharato. – Cae :
viharañś. – Nm : viharati / nacittāramvana-mātratvād
. anuttarāyām. samyaksambodhau paryāsā-
tikrāntāmtāni
. s. thā.
. – Ni : -āyāh. ... sā?
. Māsāntikrānmo ... – acittāvarana . h. om. Nabcde Cae Ti.
Conze  Cade : cittālambanam. – Nabcd?ek : cittārambana-mātratvāt. – Ti: sems-la sgrib-pa med ciṅ.
. . .


   ’  

. e Problem of “na prāptir nāprāptih”


.
Conze’s first problem, our first and second problems, concerns “…  na prāptir
na-aprāptih.  
. tasmāc Chāriputra aprāptitvād bodhisattvo ...”; translated as “…
no attainment and no nonattainment. erefore, O Śāriputra, it is because of his
nonattainmentness that a Bodhisattva…”. At footnote , we see that some edi-
tions only deny prāptih. (attainment), where others also deny its opposite, aprāptih.
(nonattainment), at the end of this long standard taxonomic list of dharmas. Some
versions also negate abhisamaya (direct realization). Conze states that (:
)

the sūtra originally was content to deny in regard to emptiness all


the main categories of Buddhist analysis. Later a part of the tradition
thought to guard against misunderstanding by denying also the nega-
tion of those categories that easily form opposites. us Kumārajīva
and several of the MSS. know nothing of the clause  na vidyā  na
vidyāksayo;
. and so with  na-a-prāptih,. which appears in the Chinese
translations only quite late, aer about , in ChT, .

It is the matter of “non-attainment” in particular, at the end of Conze’s Division V


that we would like to draw to the reader’s attention. In our study here, this shall
be our first problem. To this, Conze’s commentary to his English translation gives
the following interpretation (Conze : )

[Commentary:] Finally, () Attainment means the obtaining of ec-


static meditation, of the four Paths (of a Streamwinner, Once-Returner,
Never-Returner, and Arhat), and of the enlightenment of Buddha-
hood.

While he describes “no attainment” thus, no description of the immediately sub-


sequent statement on “no nonattainment” is given. One could argue, though,
that if Conze refers to attainments in meditation and spiritual realization, then
“no nonattainment” could simply mean that it is not the case that the bodhisattva
is lacking such states.


Other noteworthy English translations and commentaries include: ich & Levitt (: ),
Shengyan (: , ), Tenzin & upten (: ff), and Brunnhölzl (: ).


   ’  

. e Problem of “aprāptitvād…”


Our second problem also derives from the latter half of Conze’s passage, that is, “…
 aprāptitvād bodhisattvo ...”; translated as “… it is because of his non-attainment-

ness that a Bodhisattva…”, etc., which appears as the opening statement of his
Division VI. is is in turn explained in the commentary as (Conze : )

[Commentary:] Non-attainment-ness sums up the “no attainment


and no non-attainment” of no. , which in their turn summarized
section V. It can be understood to mean that the Bodhisattva is “in-
different to any kind of personal attainment”, and so I have translated
BT  and SS . Using an old English mystical term one can also
say that the Bodhisattva is “devoid of any propriety”.

is is more explicit than the earlier commentary, which basically skips over the
term “non-attainment”. is translated term is now glossed as meaning “indif-
ferent” or without “propriety”. Note that Conze’s translation includes the suffix
“-ness”, which, as we shall examine below, is due to his reliance on Sanskrit ver-
sions of the text.
In order to deal with the issue of negating both the term and its opposite,
Conze resorts to what we may call a trans-logical or mystical explanation. In his
critical edition he claims that “[o]bviously the rules of ordinary logic are abrogated
in this sūtra. Contradictions exist in emptiness” (: ); and “while the a-
prāpti is not a fact, a-prāptitva is the basis of the conduct of a bodhi-sattva…
one of the paradoxes in which the sūtra gives expression to the laws of spiritual
life” (: ). While the overturn of logic and other conceptualization is not
at all uncommon in religious and spiritual literature, and Conze himself refers
here to Dionysius Areopagita and earlier to old English mysticism for authority,
one must be wary of using such arguments to explain away all manner of textual
and logical tensions and contradictions. Due to his manner of analysis, it is our
overall impression that this matter is still somewhat unresolved and worthy of
deeper examination.


Other noteworthy English translations and commentaries include: Red Pine (: ff), Mu
(: , , etc.), and Brunnhölzl (: ).


   ’  

. e Problem of “cittāvarana”


. or “cittālambana”?
e third problem, Conze’s second, is that of “cittāvarana”,
. for which there are
several variants of “cittālambana”, in footnotes  and , again found in divi-
sion VI (Conze : ). Conze favored the former term “cittāvarana”. for his

later English translation of “thought coverings” (: ). However, he ac-
knowledged in the critical edition that haplography in the Nepalese Devanagari
manuscripts could easily cause this variant (: )

We may suppose that originally there was िच ार बण [cittārambana].


.
Now ल [la] and र [ra], and ब [ba] and व [va] are constantly inter-
changed in Nepalese MSS., and the म् [m] is represented by an anu-
svāra [ं m].
. is would give “रवण” [-ramva. na].
. If the anusvāra
is dropped, as oen happens, a simple juxtaposition would lead to
“वरण” [-varana].
. … e normal Chinese equivalent for āvarana . is
障 [zhàng]. … e earlier versions … all have ⼼無罣礙 [xīn wú
guà’aì] … related to a meaning “hung up”, “suspended”, and there-
fore seems to have more affinity to ā-LAMB-ana than to ā-VAR-ana. .
With no clear factor to decide between the received Sanskrit text before him and a
fairly straightforward haplographic issue that really makes more sense, Conze was
forced to admit that “Although the reading cittāvarana . makes sense it is perhaps
not the original reading” (: ).
In his commentary to the English translation, where he used “cittāvarana”, .
Conze parsed “citta” as “either (a) ‘thoughts’, mental activities, or (b) ‘ought’,
Spirit”; and “āvarana”,
. from √vri,
. as either “obstruction”, “obstacle”, “impedi-
ment” or “covering”. e resultant English was “thought coverings”, of three kinds,
namely karma-āvarana, . kleśa-āvarana. and jñeya-āvarana. . Noting that “cittāva-
rana
. is very rare”, Conze “assume[s] it to be identical with the third kind of obsta-
cles, the cognitive ones” (: ). However, he gives no reason or supporting
citations for this assumption, and we are still le with a feeling of vagueness about
what the passage really means here. In his critical edition, Conze references the
Chinese texts for a solution, texts for which he was by no means the specialist
that he was vis-à-vis the Sanskrit and Tibetan, demonstrating the potential value
of the Chinese translations which have oen received rather scathing criticisms


Other noteworthy English translations and commentaries include: Red Pine (: ), Ten-
zin & upten (: , ), Mu (: f) and Brunnhölzl (: ).


   ’  

from other scholars. e issue of the value of the Chinese texts will play a key role
in our examination here, as we shall now demonstrate.

. Textual History and Nattier’s “Apocryphal Text?”


No modern study of a religious text would be complete without an examination of
the corpus of various sources, across the classical languages, in their appropriate
historical order. With regard to the text-historical issue, our approach may differ
from the expected, in that we shall use in particular Nattier’s article, “e Heart
Sūtra: A Chinese Apocryphal Text?” (). is study in turn relies quite heav-
ily on earlier research by Fukui Fumimasa, Hannya shingyō no rekishiteki kenkyū
[“Research into the Composition of the Heart Sūtra”] (). Examining the var-
ious versions of the text in Chinese and Sanskrit, Nattier shows the following se-
quence of textual development. In her own words, the conclusion of her article is
as follows (Nattier : )
In this paper I have sought to demonstrate, primarily on the basis of
philological evidence, that a flow chart of the relationships among the
Sanskrit and Chinese versions of the Large Sūtra and the Heart Sū-
tra can reasonably be drawn in only one sequence: from the Sanskrit
Large Sūtra to the Chinese Large Sūtra of Kumārajīva to the Chinese
Heart Sūtra popularized by [Xüánzàng] to the Sanskrit Heart Sūtra.
To assume any other direction of transmission would present insu-
perable difficulties—or would, at the very least, require postulating
a quite convoluted series of processes, which (by virtue of this very
convolution) seems considerably less likely to have taken place.
e argument for a back translation is well evidenced, particularly by the fact that
while the meaning of the individual words in all these texts correspond, there is
only strict equivalence between the Chinese large and Heart sūtras, whereas the
Sanskrit Pañcavimśati
. and Heart Sūtra are quite distinct. e irregularity of the
grammatical and other syntactic forms of the Sanskrit Heart Sūtra, quite different
from any of the other Sanskrit texts of the genre, is very clear indeed.
is is naturally quite a provocative conclusion, which Nattier is well aware
of. While this article was no doubt met with skepticism in the non-academic Bud-
dhist world, perhaps it is the lack of well argued and presented articles to the con-
trary that really indicates how plausible and convincing her conclusions are. One
of the few scholars that we are aware of who has attempted to counter or otherwise


   ’  

critique Nattier’s position is Dan Lusthaus, in his article “e Heart Sūtra in Chi-
nese Yogācāra: Some Comparative Comments on the Heart Sutra Commentaries
of Wonch’uk and K’uei-chi” (). Note, however: Lusthaus’ examinations of
Wonch’uk and Kuìjī’s commentaries does not at all refute Nattier’s thesis that the
text is a Chinese apocryphal creation, but merely shows very strong evidence that
Xüánzàng’s version was not the first, as versions by Kumārajīva and others were
also known during his time (Lusthaus : -). erefore, one of Nattier’s
key findings remains, namely, the very real possibility that the Chinese Heart Sū-
tra precedes the Sanskrit text. No doubt there are other criticisms of her thesis,
but this paper has aims other than a comprehensive critique and review thereof,
and we shall adopt it as a working hypothesis.
Having already introduced Conze’s critical Sanskrit text (§), we may now
turn immediately to the Chinese versions. Taking Lusthaus’ study as an amend-
ment to Nattier, and thus including the possibility of a version at least attributed to
Kumārajīva, we presently have six Chinese editions. In historical order and with
reference to the portions equivalent to Conze’s Divisions V and VI, the six editions
are as follows: Kumārajīva (鳩麼羅什), Taishō , from -; Xüánzàng (⽞
奘), Taishō , from ; Dharmacandra (法月), Taishō , from ; Pra-
jñā (般若), Taishō , from ; Prajñācakra (智慧輪), Taishō , from ;
Făchéng (法成), Taishō , from . (All dates from Lancaster , and Nat-
tier :  n;  n). ese Chinese transliterations have already been in-
cluded in Conze’s considerations for his critical edition of the Sanskrit text. Note,
however, that the Taishō punctuation of periods, commas and so forth are mod-
ern additions.
ere are thus very strong similarities and consistency through the centuries
of Chinese versions of the text. While slight changes can be found, large changes


Kumārajīva 鳩摩羅什: Móhē Bānruòbōluómìduō Dàmíngzhoù Jīng 《摩訶般若波羅蜜⼤明
咒經》 (T, no. , p. , c-).

Xüánzàng ⽞奘: Bānruòbōluómìduō Xīn Jīng 《般若波羅蜜多⼼經》 (T, no. , p. ,
c-).

Dharmacandra 法月: Pŭpiànzhìzàng Bānruò-bōluómìduō Xīn Jīng 《普遍智藏般若波羅蜜
多⼼經》 (T, no. , p. , b-).

Prajñā 般若: Bānruòbōluómìduō Xīn Jīng 《般若波羅蜜多⼼經》 (T, no. , p. ,
c-).

Prajñācakra 智慧輪: Bānruòbōluómìduō Xīn Jīng 《般若波羅蜜多⼼經》 (T, no. , p.
, a-).

Făchéng 法成: Bānruòbōluómìduō Xīn Jīng 《般若波羅蜜多⼼經》 (T, no. , p. ,
c-).


   ’  

are generally absent. In a recent paper, “Experimental core samples of Chinese


translations of two Buddhist Sūtras analysed in the light of recent Sanskrit man-
uscript discoveries” (a), Paul Harrison demonstrates very graphically how
later Chinese translators owed many of their lexical choices to previous transla-
tors, using the Vajracchedika and Vimalakīrtinirdeśa as examples. e range of
differences in our Heart Sūtra “core samples” above displays even less variation
than that seen in Harrison’s study. Even Xüánzàng, who was no follower of trans-
lation fashion, barely varies from the version attributed to Kumārajīva.
Some comments on the structure and parsing of these Chinese texts are in
order. While Conze’s divisions have been applied to the texts, the CBETA punc-
tuation already indicated period breaks at the start of V; at the end of V to indicate
the start of VI as a new sentence idea; and at the end of VI. e split between sen-
tences between V and VI is more natural with the last, i.e. Făchéng’s version, with
the addition of “是故舍利⼦” (shìgù shèlìzĭ), but it is not the only possibility for
the other versions. In terms of content, as Conze (: ) and Nattier (:
) have already shown, all versions before Făchéng’s have at the end of V “無
智亦無得” (wúzhì yì wúdé) or equivalent; only Făchéng’s version has the extra
negation of “…無不得” (wú búdé). At the start of VI, all versions read from “以
無所得故” (yĭ wúsuŏdé gù) which starts the section. Făchéng’s addition at the
start does not detract from this basic meaning, however. We can now proceed
to note clearly the basic lexical terms used by the Chinese editions for our three
problematic passages.
One: the equivalent term for Conze’s “no attainment” (na prāptir), at the end
of Division V, for all versions, is “無得” (wúdé), with Făchéng’s addition as “無不
得” (wúbùdé) being the only variant.
Two: for Conze’s “due to non-attainment-ness” (aprāptitvāt) at the start of
Division VI, all versions use “以無所得故” (yĭ wúsŭodé gù). Grammatically, the
structure “以…故” (yĭ…gù) functions as a Sanskrit instrumental, or less com-
monly as an ablative. e “所” (sŭo) usually turns the subsequent verb, in this
case “得” (dé), into a past participle. e only remaining question then, is the
meaning of “得” (dé), which we shall return to below.
ree: for the passage where Conze’s translation reads “without thought cov-
erings” (cittāvaranam),
. in the middle of Division VI, in all cases, the term “⼼”
(xīn) is used, which corresponds well with the Sanskrit “citta”. is is fairly un-
remarkable. e first four Chinese versions, from Kumārajīva to Prajñā, then use
“無罣礙” (wú guà’aì) and then “無罣礙故” (wú guà’aì gù); but Prajñācakra uses


   ’  

“無障礙” (wú zhàng’aì) and “無障礙故” (wú zhàng’aì gù), while Făchéng only
uses the first expression, lacking the second. us Prajñācakra and Făchéng have
decided to change the lexeme “罣礙” (guà’aì) to “障礙” (zhàng’aì). Făchéng is also
the exception in using the term only once in Division VI. e other versions use
the term twice, and add “故” (gù), to the second, which when alone aer a verbal
form is usually grammatically equivalent to a Sanskrit ablative form. is leaves
us with the problem of what is meant by “罣礙” (guà’aì) or “障礙” (zhàng’aì).

. Tracing the Sources Back To and From the Heart


As for the Chinese translations of the Pañcavimśati,
. a few caveats are in order
before we delve into the literature. e first caveat is simply that the literature
is massively extensive, not only in terms of individual texts, but in that most in-
dividual texts also have multiple translations. We must thus apologize that our
examination here cannot be exhaustive, due to the time and space constraints in-
volved. Nattier proposed that the source of the Chinese Heart Sūtra may have
been Kumārajīva’s translation of the larger Prajñāpāramitā (). So we shall
primarily rely on Kumārajīva’s Móhēbānruòbōluómì Jīng translation for parallels
of our key phrases in the Chinese Heart Sūtra. A second caveat is due to work-
ing between multiple recensions of the text, which involve Chinese translations
of different times and translators, while we really have no Indic version that any
scholar would say comes even close to a very old, let alone “original” text. at is,
when we examine an equivalent Chinese term and then the equivalent location
in the Sanskrit text, can we be sure that the Chinese translator was looking at the
same Sanskrit term? We simply cannot. Moreover, the use of standardized dic-
tionaries to ascertain “original” Sanskrit terms behind translation idioms can be
problematic. For example, the Chinese lexeme “得” (dé) was used by Kumārajīva
to translate √bhū, prāpta / prāpti, √budh, √labh, and other terms. Paul Harrison’s
recent paper entitled “Resetting the Diamond” gives an excellent account of how
Kumārajīva “flattened” translation terminology through using the same Chinese
character for multiple Indic terms in the Vajracchedikā (Harrison b), reduc-
ing a broad Indic semantic range into a narrower Chinese range. We must be
flexible, therefore, and not simply examine the exact string of Chinese characters
as they appear in the Chinese versions of the Heart Sūtra alone, but also variants
on these.
e first problematic passage concerns “e ‘No Attainment’ Problem”, which
we shall first tackle in Section §. is material is fairly straightforward, as it lies


   ’  

within the textual content of the Heart Sūtra that is also found within the larger
Pañcavimśati
. Sūtra and equivalent Chinese translations thereof. e second is
“e ‘Due to Non-attainment(ness)’ Problem”, in Section §. While this issue
follows immediately aer the material paralleled in the larger texts, Nattier’s text-
historical considerations are still valid. We shall thus attempt a reconstruction of
how the passage in the Chinese Heart Sūtra follows a form similar to that in the
Chinese translations of the larger text, and from there back to the Sanskrit Pañca-
vimśati.
. ird and last is “e ‘Mind Without Mental Obstruction’ Problem”, to
be covered in Section §. e process here is the same as that for the second prob-
lem, though we shall discover that translation “flattening” means ascertaining a
potential Sanskrit under-text is much more difficult. Having so reviewed Conze’s
three problems, attempting to reconstruct not only the individual Sanskrit terms
but also the broader ideas underlying them, we shall attempt a rereading of the
Heart Sūtra. It is intended that this reading, an “Understanding from the Heart of
Perfect Wisdom” in Section §, will thus draw from the broader Prajñāpāramitā
texts as a whole, in leading us back to the heart of wisdom.

 e ‘No Attainment’ Problem


e first problem is that of “no attainment”, in the Sanskrit “aprāptih”, . and Chi-
nese “無得” (wúdé) (§.). is term is the last of a long list of phenomena that
are negated “in emptiness”. is lies at the end of Division V according to Conze’s
analysis of the parts of the Heart Sūtra text. is is the portion of the Chinese
Heart Sūtra, Divisions III, IV and V, that is no doubt directly drawn from Kumāra-
jīva’s Chinese Móhēbānruòbōluómì Jīng. Nattier’s study already includes a useful
comparison between the Móhēbānruòbōluómì Jīng and Xüánzàng’s version of the
Heart Sūtra (Nattier : f). While content on “no attainment” in Division
V is present in the larger sūtra, the material on “due to non-attainment(ness)”
and “mental obstructions” is not found in this particular part of the larger sūtra.
How the terms for these latter two phrases in the Chinese Heart Sūtra do appear
elsewhere in the Chinese sources for the larger text will be shown in subsequent
sections (§, §).

. Chinese Sources of the Larger Sūtras for Division V


In order to give an exhaustive account of the Chinese versions of the larger text, we
must note all five translations. In the historical order of their translation and with


   ’  

reference to the portion corresponding to Conze’s Division V, they are: Moksala .


(無叉羅), Taishō , from ; Dharmaraksa . (竺法護), Taishō , from


; Kumārajīva (鳩摩羅什), Taishō , from ; and Xüánzàng (⽞奘),
Taishō  () and (), from -.
Philological consideration of this material is fairly straightforward. Moksala’s
.
translation features “無所逮得” (wú sŭodăidé), giving the impression of either
a past participle or object encountered or attained. Dharmaraksa, . Kumārajīva
and both Xüánzàng’s Assembly  and  feature “無得” (wú dé), the same term as
found in the Chinese Heart Sūtra. Without considering the Sanskrit (we shall do
this below), this could be understood as meaning “no reaching”, “no obtainment”,
“no attainment”, and so forth. However, both of Xüánzàng’s versions also add
“無現觀” (wú xiàn’guān), which by the Chinese would be read along the lines of
“no direct observation”, “no present insight”, and so forth. Obviously, we need to
examine the Sanskrit for these terms in order fully to appreciate their significance
in the context of a translation of a Mahāyāna sūtra, and so the Sanskrit sources
of the larger text, i.e. the Pañcavimśatisahāsrikā
. Prajñāpāramitā Sūtra, demand
examination.

. Sanskrit Sources of the Pañcavimśati


. for Division V
For the Sanskrit sources, again, Nattier provides a convenient synoptic tablulated
layout of both the ancient Gilgit Manuscript (from circa th century) and a more
recent Nepalese Manuscript (from circa th century) (Nattier : ff). e
former, ancient as it is, requires a few minor emendments, but these are rather
unremarkable (: n, n, n). However, it may be worth citing Conze’s
translation of e Large Sūtra on Perfect Wisdom for an English rendition of these
passages from the Sanskrit (Conze : -).
(C) And that emptiness, … (II) ere is no form in it, no feeling,
etc.; no eye, etc. to: no mind; no form, etc. to: no mind objects; no


Moksala:
. Fàngguāng Bānruòbōluómì Jīng 《放光般若波羅蜜經》〈3 假號品〉 (T, no.
, p. , a-).

. Guāngzàn Bānruòbōluómì Jīng 《光讚般若波羅蜜經》〈3 ⾏空品〉 (T,
Dharmaraksa:
no. , p. , c-).

Kumārajīva: Móhēbānruòbōluómì Jīng 《摩訶般若波羅蜜經》〈3 習應品〉 (T, no. ,
p. , a-).

Xüánzàng: Dà Bānruòbōluómì Jīng () 《⼤般若波羅蜜多經:2會》〈3 觀照品〉 (T,
no. , p. , a-); ibid. () 《⼤般若波羅蜜多經:3會》〈2 舍利⼦品〉 (T, no. , p.
, b-c).


   ’  

eye element, etc. to: no mind consciousness element; no ignorance,


no stopping ignorance, etc. to: no decay and death, no stopping of
decay and death; no suffering and no comprehension of suffering; no
origination and no forsaking of origination; no stopping and no re-
alization of stopping; no path and no development of the path; no
attainment, and no reunion; no Stream-winner, and no fruit of a
Stream-winner; etc. to: no Bodhi-sattva, and no knowledge of the
modes of the path; no Buddha, and no enlighten-ment. (III) It is in
this sense, Śāriputra, that a Bodhisattva, a great being who courses
in perfect wisdom, is to be called “joined”.

Some critical observations can be made. For the entire content, the main dif-
ferences between the two Sanskrit recensions are three in number: . e Gilgit
features “yā notpadyate na nirudhyate…, na samkliśyate
. na vyavadāyate, na hīyate
na vardhate, nātitā, nānāgatā na pratyutpannāh”, . which is a near repeat of the im-
mediately preceding sentences, not repeated and thus absent from the Nepalese.
. Almost immediately aer this, the Nepalese has a list of the six elements “na
prthivīdhātur
. … na vijñānadhātur”, not found in the Gilgit. . en, subsequent
to this, the Gilgit negates a list of the twelve sense organs and objects, followed
by the categories of the aggregates, senses and sense elements “na caksur… . na
manah; . na rūpam…na
. dharmāh; . (na) tatra skandhā na dhātavo nāyatanāni”.
Aer negating lists of the eighteen elements and the twelve limbs of dependent
origination in forward and reverse order, we then reach the negation of the four
holy truths (āryasatyāni), and finally our key problematic terms. e key words
are “na prāptir na abhisamayah” . and “na prāptir na abhisamayo” respectively,
the only difference being merely external samdhi. . is is rendered by Conze in
his Large Sūtra as “no attainment and no reunion” (: ). It is important
to note that in the larger texts, these statements are not the end of this long pas-
sage of taxonomic lists, as they continue by negating the states and fruitions of the
four stages of śrāvaka sanctity, and the states and fruitions of the pratyekabuddhas
and fully awakened buddhas too. From the aggregates, through the senses, to the
eighteen elements, dependent origination and then the truths, the appearance of
“na prāptir na abhisamayah” . has the significance that the former categories are
the objects of “attainment” and “direct realization” (Conze’s “reunion”). is is
particularly so for schools such as the Sarvāstivāda, for whom the path of vision
(darśanamārga) involved direct realization of the four truths. e result of this is
the state and fruition of a stream entrant, gradually proceeding through the other


   ’  

stages of sanctity. e end of the passage is: “So indeed, Śāriputra, the aspirant
to awakening, the great hero, who is practicing engaged with perfect knowledge
is said to be ‘engaged’” (evam . hi śāriputra bodhisattvo mahāsattvah. prajñāpāram-
itāyām . caran yukto yukta iti vaktavyah).
. e text continues in a similar vein with
respect to the six perfections, and so forth. In addition to the Pañcavimśati
. here,
the smaller As. ta-sāhasrikā
. has a different but very similarly structured passage in
Chp.  (refer Conze : ).

. Reading: “No attainment” as “No direct realization”


All the material in both texts is largely taxomonic lists, Abhidharmic in content
and structure, all of which are negated “in emptiness” (śūnyatāyām). e only
difference is that the Heart Sūtra gives the lists in abbreviated format (samk. sipta),
.
whereas the Pancavi
. mśati
. here gives the fully detailed schemas (vistarena).
. Be-
cause of the very clear correspondences between the Chinese Heart Sūtra, the
Chinese versions of the larger text, and the Sanskrit larger text, the reading of
these passages is not too problematic. at is to say, the Chinese Heart Sūtra’s
“無得” (wú dé) appears to directly correspond to the Sanskrit “na prāptir”, and in
this context means the “attainment” or “obtainment” of one or other of the holy
stages of the path. We can deduce that this applies to either so-called śrāvaka,
pratyekabuddha or sambuddha attainments from the larger text, even though this
is not explicit in the Heart Sūtra itself.
However, the examination of these larger texts does pose another question for
the Chinese Heart Sūtra. Whereas the larger sūtras run from the four truths to
attainment (prāpti) to direct realization (abhisamaya), the Chinese Heart Sūtra
has the four truths, then “無智…無得” (wú zhì … wú dé) (Prajñācakra has “無
智證…” (wú zhìzhèng)). A simple and plausible explanation would be that the
two terms “prāpti” and “abhisamaya” have been juxtaposed, and that the latter
equates to the Chinese “無智(證)” (wú zhì(zhèng)). is, of course, differs from
our purported Sanskrit Heart Sūtra, which has “na jñānam” . at this point. e
further negation of “無不得” (wú bùdé) by Făchéng, a solitary variant in the latest
of the Chinese Heart Sūtras, and also echoed in the Sanskrit Heart Sūtra with “na
aprāpti”, may simply be as Conze originally argued when he wrote: “Later a part
of the tradition thought to guard against misunderstanding by denying also the
negation of those categories that easily form opposites” (Conze : ). e
very fact that Indic Buddhist texts continued to grow, expand and change in the


   ’  

hands of their editors is yet another timely warning not to assume that such an
Indic manuscript equals an “original Sanskrit” text.

 e ‘Due to Non-attainment(ness)’ Problem


We may now move on to the second problematic statement, that of “Due to non-
attainment(ness)”, in the Chinese Heart Sūtra “以無所得故” (yĭ wú sŭodé gù)
(§.). Located in Division VI of the Heart Sūtra, this is a more complicated mat-
ter, due to being outside the main body of the text—Divisions III, IV and V—
which corresponds to the larger Prajñāpāramitā, whether in Chinese or Sanskrit.
us, in order to establish the meaning of the terms in the Chinese Heart Sūtra,
we are forced to look not only at the same term within the larger Chinese and then
Sanskrit text, but more specifically at the same terms as they appear in a similar
context or structure. A brief review of some extant Buddhist lexical resources will
show just how much the Heart Sūtra and its accepted providence have influenced
our scholarly understanding. For example, in the Digital Dictionary of Buddhism
we find “無所得 Basic Meaning: nothing to be attained”, with—what we assume
to be a reconstruction—the Sanskrit of “aprāptitva”, the same as the purported
Sanskrit of the Heart Sūtra (DDB ). Granted, other potential Sanskrit sources
for this Chinese phrase are also given for this entry, but it is “aprāptitva” that is
given as the default Indic term. is is also the case in the recently published e
Princeton Dictionary of Buddhism, which only references “prāpti°” (Pāli “patti°”)
for “得” (dé) (: , , ).

. Chinese “以無所得故” ← Sanskrit “an-upa√lambha(yogena)”?


Let us begin by searching for the exact phrase “以無所得故” (yĭ wú sŭodé gù)
from the Chinese Heart Sūtra, as it appears in Kumārajīva’s larger sūtra. It also
so happens that this term appears oen in the larger Chinese text. Given that the
“以…故” (yĭ…gù) construction is usually a translation for a Sanskrit instrumen-
tal case, another Chinese phrase, “用無所得故” (yòng wú sŭodé gù) would also
appear to be a translation variant of the same original Sanskrit term. Together,
these two phrases appear over  times within the Chinese larger text, and, more
importantly, we are able to identify a source for these in the Sanskrit text. Here
we shall present only a few examples in any detail, merely providing textual ref-
erences for the remaining cases.


   ’  

One excellent example is found in Chp.  of the Chinese Móhē text, with six
uses of “用無所得故”. is is in a discussion of practices all of which are “said
to be the bodhisattva mahāsattva’s going forth on the great vehicle.” Each practice
lists some negated expression, oen a kind of knowledge (智慧) or gnosis (智),
an otherwise standard form of meditation or contemplation that the bodhisattva
does not engage in (不⾏). For example, their gnosis does not engage in the past,
present or future; their gnosis does not engage in the mundane or transmundane,
conditioned or unconditioned phenomena, etc.; or in the contemplation of per-
manence or impermanence, etc. to self or not self. All of these negations which
make up the bodhisattvas going forth on the great vehicle are performed as “用
無所得故”, which from the Chinese alone could be rendered as “by application
of non-attainment”, or something to that effect.
e Sanskrit equivalent of this passage can be found in Chp. , and in En-
glish translation from Conze’s Large Sūtra (: ). e Sanskrit passage has
some slight differences from the Chinese, but these appear insignificant for our
purpose here. Without any exceptions, the clear equivalent of the Chinese phrase
“用無所得故” is “anupalabhamānena”. Our analysis of the Chinese translation as
an instrumental form proves to be correct, as the term is an instrumental singular
of “an-upa√labh” as a present participle, suffix “-māna-”. In Conze’s translation,
he renders this as “without taking them as basic facts”, and “that because there is
nothing to apprehend” (Conze : ). It could also be rendered as “by way
of not apprehending” the various phenomena which are the objects of gnosis or
contemplation.
Another good example, which uses the exact phrase “以無所得故” (yĭ wú
sŭodé gù), is found nine times in another long passage from the Móhē Chp. .
is corresponds also to Chp.  of the smaller Prajñāpāramitā, where the gods
request the teaching on perfect wisdom from Subhūti, concerning how to “stand”
or “abide” (住) in Prajñāpāramitā. All contemplations are performed with a mind
set upon omniscience (薩婆若⼼). e first contemplation is of the five aggre-
gates in terms of being impermanent, unsatisfactory, empty and not self, like a
disease, etc. to being a dart piercing the body. All this is to be carried out “以
無所得故” (yĭ wú sŭodé gù), i.e. “by way of non-attainment”. e second con-


Móhēbānruòbōluómì Jīng 《摩訶般若波羅蜜經》卷4〈15 辯才品〉 (CBETA, T, no. ,
p. , c-p. , a).

Pañcavimśati-
. (Kimura : -:f)

Móhēbānruòbōluómì Jīng 《摩訶般若波羅蜜經》卷7〈27 問住品〉 (CBETA, T, no. ,
p. , c-).


   ’  

templation is of the various senses and elements in the same manner. e third
is of the aggregates as “neither arising nor ceasing, neither tainted nor pure”; and
the fourth is of the senses and elements in the same way. is is followed by con-
templations of the twelve limbs of dependent origination in forward then reverse
order. Next, the four establishments of mindfulness, up to the various unshared
powers of a fully awakened Buddha. Finally, the six perfections. All of these prac-
tices are described as being performed “以無所得故” (yĭ wú sŭodé gù), i.e. “by
way of non-attainment”, and this phrase appears at the end of each practice in
question.
In the Sanskrit text, this is found in Chp.  (refer Conze’s translation :
f). e Sanskrit equivalent term is again clear, and while it is also an in-
strumental, it differs from our earlier example, being “an-upa-√lambha-yogena”.
Conze renders this as “without taking it / them as a basis”, though to emphasize
the term “-yoga-”, we could say “by way of engagement in non-apprehension”, or
“by way of non-apprehending engagement”.
For fear of being too verbose, we shall only cite the above two examples in
detail. However, examination of other examples reveals that the majority of the
appearances of the Chinese phrase “以無所得故” (yĭ wú sŭodé gù) directly corre-
spond to the Sanskrit “an-upa√lambha-yogena”. Others as a rule equate to some
or other Sanskrit term from the same root √labh with prefix upa, such as “upa-
labhyate”. Other uses of the character “得” (dé), in particular when in a negated
form, such as “不得” (bù dé), or “不可得” (bùkě dé), also regularly derive from
Sanskrit verbal or noun forms from the root √labh, such as “na … upalabhyate”,


Pañcavimśati-
. (Kimura : -:).

Móhēbānruòbōluómì Jīng 《摩訶般若波羅蜜經》卷5〈18 問乘品〉: (CBETA, T, no.
, p. , a-b); ≈ Pañcavimśati-
. (Kimura : -: ); Móhēbānruòbōluómì Jīng 《摩訶般若
波羅蜜經》卷8〈30 三歎品〉: (CBETA, T, no. , p. , a-); ≈ Pañcavimśati- . (Kimura
: -:); Móhēbānruòbōluómì Jīng 《摩訶般若波羅蜜經》卷8〈30 三歎品〉: (CBETA,
T, no. , p. , b-); ≈ Pañcavimśati-
. (Kimura : -:); Móhēbānruòbōluómì Jīng 《摩
訶般若波羅蜜經》卷8〈31 滅諍品〉: (CBETA, T, no. , p. , c-); ≈ Pañcavimśati- .
(Kimura : -:); Móhēbānruòbōluómì Jīng 《摩訶般若波羅蜜經》卷8〈31 滅諍品〉:
(CBETA, T, no. , p. , b-); ≈ Pañcavimśati- . (Kimura : -:); Móhēbānruò-
bōluómì Jīng 《摩訶般若波羅蜜經》卷10〈37 法稱品〉: (CBETA, T, no. , p. , c-p.
, a); ≈ Pañcavimśati-
. (Kimura : -:); Móhēbānruòbōluómì Jīng 《摩訶般若波羅蜜
經》卷10〈37 法稱品〉: (CBETA, T, no. , p. , a-); ≈ Pañcavimśati- . (Kimura :
-:); Móhēbānruòbōluómì Jīng 《摩訶般若波羅蜜經》卷10〈38 法施品〉: (CBETA, T,
no. , p. , a-); ≈ Pañcavimśati-
. (Kimura : -:); etc.

Móhēbānruòbōluómì Jīng 《摩訶般若波羅蜜經》卷8〈30 三歎品〉: (CBETA, T, no.
, p. , c-); ≈ Pañcavimśati-
. (Kimura : -:); etc.


   ’  

“na … upalabhate”, and so forth. In fact, in all the examples we have examined,
none are found to derive from any other Sanskrit verbal root.

. Chinese “無得” ← Sanskrit “aprāpti” or “abhisamaya”?


At this point we may wonder what happened to Conze’s Heart Sūtra term “aprāp-
titvāt”, and the equating of the Chinese “得” (dé) with Sanskritic “prāpti” forms?
For “無得” (wú dé) alone, without “以…故”, we do find that there are correspon-
dences to negations of Sanskrit “prāpti”. However, these seem to mostly occur
together with “abhisamaya”. is conforms to our findings at the end of Division
V, but may have implications for our phrase here at the start of Division VI.
ere is some inconsistency among the correspondences between the Chi-
nese translations and the Sanskrit, however. For example, “無得無著” (wúdé
wúzhuó) appears to be for “aprāpti … anabhisamaya”; or “…�…�” (… zhī …
dé) for “prāpti … abhisamaya”; and in other examples the Chinese “得” (dé) is
used with “-道” (-daò), “-果” (-guŏ), or “能-” (néng-) etc., for some other combi-
nation of “prāpti” and / or “abhisamaya”. It would appear as if “prāpti” and “ab-
hisamaya” were near synonyms for the compilers and later scribes of the text, so


Móhēbānruòbōluómì Jīng 《摩訶般若波羅蜜經》卷12〈43 無作品〉: (CBETA, T, no.
, p. , b-); Sanskrit “anupalabdhitah” . in Pañcavimśati-
. (Kimura : -:); Móhē-
bānruòbōluómì Jīng 《摩訶般若波羅蜜經》卷2〈4 往⽣品〉: (CBETA, T, no. , p. ,
a-); Sanskrit “na … upalabhate” in Pañcavimśati- . (Kimura : -: ); Móhēbānruòbōluómì
Jīng 《摩訶般若波羅蜜經》卷3〈9 集散品〉: (CBETA, T, no. , p. , a-b); Sanskrit
“upalabhyate” in Pañcavimśati-
. (Kimura : -: ); etc. etc.

Móhēbānruò-bōluómì Jīng 《摩訶般若波羅蜜經》卷12〈42 歎淨品〉: (CBETA, T, no.
, p. , c—p. , b); for Sanskrit “na prāptir nābhisamayah” . in Pañcavimśati-
. (Kimura
: -: , ); etc.

Móhēbānruòbōluómì Jīng 《摩訶般若波羅蜜經》卷7〈26 無⽣品〉: (CBETA, T, no.
, p. , c-); for Sanskrit “nāsti prāptir nāsty abhisamayah” . or “asti prāptir asty abhisamayo”
in Pañcavimśati-
. (Kimura : -: ); etc.

Móhēbānruòbōluómì Jīng 《摩訶般若波羅蜜經》卷26〈86 平等品〉: 「不得道、不得
果」 (CBETA, T, no. , p. , b-c); Sanskrit “na ca dvayena kācit prāptir nābhisamayah” .
in Pañcavimśati-
. (Kimura : -:); Móhēbānruòbōluómì Jīng 《摩訶般若波羅蜜經》卷
25〈80 實際品〉: 「能得道、能得果」 (CBETA, T, no. , p. , a-); for Sanskrit
“prāptim. vābhisamayam . vā” in Pañcavimśati-
. (Kimura : -:); Móhē-bānruòbōluómì Jīng
《摩訶般若波羅蜜經》卷22〈74 遍學品〉: 「能得」 (CBETA, T, no. , p. , c-); for
Sanskrit “prāptir nābhisamayo” in Pañcavimśati-. (Kimura : :); Móhēbānruòbōluómì Jīng
《摩訶般若波羅蜜經》卷22〈74 遍學品〉: 「不得」 (CBETA, T, no. , p. , c-);
for Sanskrit “nāsti kutah. punah. prāptih. kuto ’bhisamayah” . in Pañcavimśati-
. (Kimura : :);
etc.


   ’  

that the two were nearly interchangeable. Note, however, that none of the corres-
ponding Sanskrit passages appears in an instrumental form, which is a critical
part of the Chinese passage in this second problematic phrase. While they are
not verbs, the notions of “prāpti” and “abhisamaya” are used specifically with re-
spect to particular holy fruitions and insights.

. Reading: “Due to non-apprehending engagement”


Despite the appearance of “得” in this form, and the acceptance that at the end
of Division V of the Heart Sūtra the correct sense is indeed that of “na prāpti”
and / or “anabhisamaya”, the usage in our second problematic phrase “以無所
得故” is substantially different here at the start of Division VI. e first differ-
ence is grammatical: our Chinese Heart Sūtra text strongly suggests a kind of
instrumental semantic function. e second is structural: the Chinese Heart Sū-
tra phrase comes at the end of a list of various dharmas—either in the sense of
phenomena or in the sense of practices to be undertaken. Neither is the case
for the reading of “prāpti” or “abhisamaya” in the larger Sanskrit texts. A third
difference is that our reading maintains consistency of meaning with later por-
tions of the text. Division VI of the Heart Sūtra ends with “and in the end he
[i.e. the bodhisattva] attains to nirvāna” . (from Conze : ). Where most
translators render the two statements as “no attainment” and then “attains to…”
respectively, the contradictory tension demands a clear and appropriate explana-
tion. Our reading here avoids this problem. e whole thread of the passages
from the end of Division V to the end of VI would thus read that “due to not at-
taining (holy fruitions) he attains (holy fruitions)”, a logical contradiction which
it requires a paradoxical interpretation to resolve. While we should not reject
such an interpretation as intrinsically implausible, rather to say that “due to non-
apprehension (of phenomena) he attains (holy fruition)” not only avoids direct
contradiction, but also makes sense in a Buddhist epistemological cum soterio-
logical world view, wherein holy fruitions are not phenomena in the manner in
which the aggregates and so forth are. All our earlier versions of the Divisions V
to VI still place our phrase here at the start of Division VI. But our discovery that
the phrase “due to non-apprehension” usually lies at the end of a passage, not at
the start, is a critical challenge to this. If we reposition “due to non-apprehension”
to the end of Division V, the whole passage would read as: “In emptiness, there
are no aggregates, etc.; no realization, etc.; due to non-apprehension.” at is to
say, in the state of emptiness, one does not apprehend phenomena. e “In empti-


   ’  

ness” is referring, not to the ontological status of phenomena, but to a subjective


state—a meditative state if you will—which should rather be described as epis-
temological in nature. erefore, we conclude that the phrase “以無所得故” (yĭ
wú suŏdé gù) is more plausibly derived from “an-upa√lamba-yogena”, i.e. “due to
non-apprehending engagement”, than from the idea of “due to non-attainment-
ness” of Conze, or other similar readings which imply the non-attainment of a
spiritual realization or holy fruition in the classic Buddhist sense.

 e ‘Mind Without Mental Obstruction’ Problem


We may now turn to our third problematic phrase, the “mind without mental
obstruct-tion”, in the Chinese “⼼無罣礙” (xīn wú guà’aì), and either “acittāvarana” .
or debatably “acittālambana” . in Conze’s critical Sanskrit edition (§.). Imme-
diately aer its first appearance, the phrase reappears a second time in modi-
fied form, as “due to the mind being without mental obstruction”, that is, “無罣
礙故” (wú guà’aì gù) in Chinese, Sanskrit “cittāvarananāstitvāt”
. (or presumably
“cittālambananāstitvāt”).
. Both of these expressions are located in the middle of
Division VI according to Conze’s analysis of the text. As mentioned previously,
the first element of the compound, i.e. “⼼°” (xīn°) or “citta°”, translated as “mind”
or “thought”, is quite straightforward. It is the second part of the compound that
is problematic and draws our attention.
Before we examine the broader range of Prajñāpāramitā literature in both
Chinese and Sanskrit, it is again worth referring to some standard Buddhist stud-
ies dictionaries and other reference texts to see how the purported Sanskrit Heart
Sūtra has influenced the reading and standard back translation of the terms in
the Chinese texts. Unlike in our previous example, for our present problematic
phrase, the Chinese “無罣礙” (wú guà’aì), we see a much greater range of possible
Sanskrit forms. For example, in the Digital Dictionary of Buddhism, while the ex-
pression “āvarana-nāstitva”
. of the Sanskrit Heart Sūtra is given as an equivalent
for the Chinese phrase, a range of other Sanskrit possibilities are also listed (DDB
: 無罣礙). A large range of other uses of the character “罣” (guà) within the
Prajñāpāramitā literature when not in this particular compound is also provided
from Karashima’s glossaries (, in DDB ). Drawing from such a broader
textual basis to provide Sanskrit back translations for Chinese terms is far more
reliable than a single, short text. It is worth noting that e Princeton Dictionary
of Buddhism actually references Chinese “障” (zhàng) for “āvarana” . (Buswell &


   ’  

Lopez : ), though this is of course not restricted to a Prajñā-pāramitā con-
text.
us, with this term, there again appears to be some degree of translational
“flattening” as described by Harrison (b): the same Chinese character is used
to translate a number of distinctly different Indic terms. So while we may begin
by examining the exact phrase from the Chinese Heart Sūtra as it appears in the
larger Prajñā-pāramitā texts, we must also examine a broader range to avoid too
narrow a focus.

. Chinese “無罣礙” ← Sanskrit “a-√saṅga” / “a-√sañj”?


e direct phrase “無罣礙” (wú guà’aì), or simply “罣礙” (guà’aì) without the
negation, appears only twice in Kumārajīva’s Móhē text, in Chp. . We may
translate the first passage in context as follows.

en, Śakra, Lord of the Gods, said to Subhūti: Whatever Subhūti


has stated is only for the sake of emptiness, without being hung-
obstructed (無罣礙). Just as an arrow shot up into empty space is
not obstructed (無礙), so too is Subhūti’s Dharma teaching not ob-
structed (無礙).

As we can see, the term differs slightly between the first reading and the second
and third instances, which are slightly abbreviated by using only the second char-
acter. We have rendered “罣” (guà) as “hung”, based partly on the Kāngxī Dictio-
nary entry which gives as an alternative the character “絓” (guà, guī), explained
as “掛” (guà), meaning “to hang up”, or “suspend”, as in “懸掛” (xüán’guà). e
common glyph sans radical “圭” (guī), coupled with the similar phonetics “guà”
of all three terms, may help draw together or conflate their otherwise nuanced
meanings.
e Sanskrit for the corresponding passage in the Pañcavimśati . uses a verbal
form, identical in all three instances, “na kvacit sajjati”, i.e. “it does not hang any-
where”. e verb “sajjati” is from the root √sañj, meaning “to stick”, “to hang”,
“to be attached”, and so forth. We may cite Conze’s translation of the full passage
here (: ):


Móhēbānruòbōluómì Jīng 《摩訶般若波羅蜜經》卷19〈65 度空品〉 (CBETA, T, no.
, p. , a-).

Sanskrit Pañcavimśati-
. (Kimura : :).


   ’  

Śakra: Whatever Subhūti the Elder may expound, all that he ex-
pounds with reference to emptiness, and he does not get stuck any-
where [(na kvacit sajjati)]. Just as an arrow shot into the air does not
get stuck anywhere [(na kvacit sajjati)], just so Subhūti the Elder’s
demonstration of Dharma.
is metaphor of an arrow not getting stuck, hanging, or being obstructed in
empty space appears earlier in the text, at Chp.  in the Chinese, and Chp.  of
the Sanskrit. ere, it is a metaphor for how the bodhisattva’s skillful arrow of in-
sight upholds the merit of their virtuous deeds alo in emptiness, without letting
that merit prematurely fall to the ground of the two vehicles as opposed to the
ground of a fully awakened Buddha (see Conze : ). However, this full
explanation of the arrow metaphor in this earlier chapter does not use the terms
“無(罣)礙” or “na kvacit sajjati” at all.
A possible explanation for the exact translation idiom of this singular appear-
ance of the term “無罣礙” in Kumārajīva’s Móhē could be the influence of the
earlier translation of the same text, the Fàngguāng Bānruòbōluómì Jīng (放光般
若波羅蜜經). e wording in the Fàngguāng is nearly identical in the first case,
with “無所罣礙” (wú suŏguà’aì). e subsequent second and third appearances
use “無礙” (wú aì) and “無所著” (wú suŏzhuó), i.e. “without any attachment”.
is influence may be similar to Harrison’s explan-ation of the translation history
of the Vajracchedikā (a), whereby later translators and translations borrow
heavily from earlier efforts.
Both these passages from the larger texts are in turn also found in, and thus ac-
tually derived from, the earlier literature of the As. tasāhasrikā
. and Chinese equiv-

alents. ey are thus not new material added when the As. tasāhasrikā expanded
.
into the Pañcavimśati.
. However, for the former shorter passage, while the San-
skrit As. ta
. still uses “na kvacit sajjati”, Kumārajīva’s Xiaŏpĭn translation only uses
“無礙” (wú aì), just like the second and third instances of this term in the Móhē.
A second appearance of “無罣” (wúguà) is also present in the Móhē transla-
tion. is, however, appears to have undergone editorial emendment by the com-


Sanskrit in Pañcavimśati-
. (Kimura : :). Refer the Chinese at Móhēbānruòbōluómì
Jīng 《摩訶般若波羅蜜經》卷18〈60 不證品〉 (CBETA, T, no. , p. , b-c).

Fàngguāng Bānruòbōluómì Jīng 《放光般若經》卷15〈66 牢固品〉 (CBETA, T, no. ,
p. , a-).

As. tasāhasrikā-
. (Vaidya : ); cf. Conze (: ). e detailed explanation at
As. tasāhasrikā
. (Vaidya : ); cf. Conze (: ). Xiaŏpĭn Bānruòbōluómì Jīng 《小品
般若波羅蜜經》卷9〈24 囑累品〉 (CBETA, T, no. , p. , a-b).


   ’  

pilers of the Taishō, who have “corrected” the term “意無閡” (yì wúhé) to “意無
罣閡” (yì wú-guàhé); where a variant of “罣” (guà) is given as “絓” (guà, guī) in
the Sòng and Gōng editions. e Sanskrit for this in the Pañcavimśati . is “aprati-
hatacittair”, i.e. “who have unobstructed minds”. We shall return to the use
of “a-prati-√han” below (§.). Since this second appearance in the Taishō may
simply be due to modern critical editing, we cannot lay too much importance on
it here for an attempted reconstruction and rereading of the classic Chinese Heart
Sūtra.
While there are only the above two uses of “無罣” (wúguà) in the larger Chi-
nese Móhē text, terms from the root √sañj or √saj, meaning “to stick” or “to hang”,
are much more common, and worthy of examination. Several more examples can
be mentioned in brief as follows:
. In the same list of qualities of the bodhisattvas found at the very start of the text,
which includes “an unobstructed mind” above, we also have “得無閡陀羅尼”
(dé wú’aì tuóluóní), equivalent to Sanskrit “asaṅgadhāranīpratilabdhair”, meaning
“have obtained unobstructed mnemonics”. is therefore translates “asaṅga”,
from “a-√sañj”, as “無閡” (wúhé), and thus is like our earlier second case of the
emendment from “意無閡” (yì wúhé) to “意無罣閡” (yì wúguàhé) in the Móhē
text.
. e large text continues the well known definition of “bodhisattva” that is found
in the middle of the first chapter of the As. tasāhasrikā
. and Chinese translations.
is definition is based on the etymological similarities between what is most
likely a Prakrit “(bodhi)satta” Sanskritized as either “°sattva” (“living being”) or
the past participle of “sañj”, i.e. “°sakta” (“attached”). at is, the “awakening
being” (bodhisattva) is both “not a being” (asattva, asatta) and also “unattached”
(asakta, asatta). e expanded Móhē text of this definition states that the bodhi-
sattva should train in and know “nonattachment toward all phenomena” (⼀切法
無閡(相)中); in the Pañcavimśati . this is “sarvadharmānā
. m. … asaktatāyām”.



Móhēbānruòbōluómì Jīng 《摩訶般若波羅蜜經》卷1〈1 序品〉 (CBETA, T, no. , p.
, a-). Refer Sanskrit Pañcavimśati-
. (Kimura : -: ).

Móhēbānruòbōluómì Jīng 《摩訶般若波羅蜜經》卷1〈1 序品〉 (CBETA, T, no. ,
p. , a); Sanskrit, Pañcavimśati-
. (Kimura : -: ) “ksāntisamatāpratilabdhair
. asaṅga-
dhāranīpratilabdhair
. acyutābhijñair ādeyavacanair akūhakair”.

Móhē-bānruòbōluómì Jīng 《摩訶般若波羅蜜經》卷4〈12 句義品〉 (CBETA, T, no.
, p. , b-c).

Pañcavimśati-
. (Kimura : -: ); Conze (: ).


   ’  

e Xiaŏpĭn version of this gives “無障礙”; the Sanskrit, also “[a]saktatāyām”.


e term “asaktatā” is the negative of the past participle from verbal root √sañj,
in the abstract (-tā).
. Another appearance of “na … sajjati” in the sense of “not hang” can be found
in the Sanskrit Pañcavimśati.
. e idea is that the bodhisattva engages in the full
range of Mahāyāna practices, as well as teaching other living beings to engage
in them, all without either himself or others “being attached” (nābhinivis. to) . or
“hanging on anything” (na kvacit sajjati). is is just as a magical creation of the
Tathāgata “does not hang” (i.e. get attached to) (na…sajjati) onto a donor, dona-
tion or recipient. So says the Sanskrit, but the Chinese Móhē only features “無所
著” (wú suŏzhuó), which corresponds to “nābhinivis. ta”.  e Sanskrit “na … saj-
.
jati” may well be a later addition, though this association of terms still highlights
its sense as “not be attached to” something.
. ere are other uses of “無(所)礙” (wú (suŏ)aì) to translate “√sañj”. For ex-
ample, the notion of “being without obstruction (無所礙; asaṅga) through the
power of skillful means”. It is worth noting that this passage in didactic question
and answer style is punctuated with “e bodhisattva should perceive the mind
(citta)”, combining the term with “mind” as in the Heart Sūtra, and also the
“unobstructed (無礙; asaṅga) practice of perfect knowledge”.
. In a call and response litany section, from the Móhē translation, Prajñāpāramitā
is also described as “unobstructed (無礙) gnosis”, “because of non-obstruction,
non-hindrance (無障無礙) of gnosis with regard to all (phenomena)”. When
we compare with the Sanskrit, it appears that the Chinese may have elided pas-
sages, , for the Sanskrit is far more coherent. e Sanskrit states that it is an unob-
structed perfection “asaṅgapāramitā” due to all phenomena having the same own
nature as space (ākāśa); and that it is a direct penetrative wisdom (pratisamvid),
.
due to “non-obstruction, non-hindrance of all gnosis” (sarvatrajñānāsaṅgāprati-


Xiaŏpĭn Bānruòbōluómì Jīng 《小品般若波羅蜜經》卷1〈1 初品〉 (CBETA, T, no. ,
p. , c-); Sanskrit, As. tasāhasrikā
. (Vaidya : ); cf. Conze (: ).

Pañcavimśati-
. (Kimura : -:).

Móhēbānruòbōluómì Jīng 《摩訶般若波羅蜜經》卷24〈78 四攝品〉 (CBETA, T, no.
, p. , c-p. , a).

Móhēbānruòbōluómì Jīng 《摩訶般若波羅蜜經》卷12〈42 歎淨品〉 (CBETA, T, no.
, p. , c-); Sanskrit, Pañca-vimśati-
. (Kimura : -:).

Móhēbānruòbōluómì Jīng 《摩訶般若波羅蜜經》卷12〈42 歎淨品〉 (CBETA, T, no.
, p. , c-p. , a); Sanskrit, Pañca-vimśati-
. (Kimura : -:).

Móhēbānruòbōluómì Jīng 《摩訶般若波羅蜜經》卷12〈44 遍歎品〉 (CBETA, T, no.
, p. , a-).


   ’  

ghātitām). is echoes the arrow metaphor with respect to “empty space”. e
use of “無礙智” (wú’aì zhì) for Sanskrit “pratisamvid” . is prevalent throughout
the entire Móhē translation. e Chinese translation idiom strongly suggests a
reading of the root “√vid” as meaning both “gnosis” (√vid), hence “智”, and also
“penetrate” (√vidh), therefore “無礙”, combined as a binome.
From these multiple examples, we see that while there may be a number of
gramma-tical and contextual variations, Sanskrit terms from √sañj or √saj and
their translation into Chinese based around “礙” (aì) are very common through-
out the larger Prajñāpāramitā text. While this Chinese matches the Heart Sūtra,
the particular Sanskrit term is neither the standard phrase in the Sanskrit Hrdaya,
.
nor the common variant from “ālambana”.

. Chinese “無礙” ← Sanskrit “a-prati-√gha” / “a-prati-√han”?


Our last example above combined “無障” (wúzhàng) and “無礙” (wú’aì) together,
the former from a-√sañj, the latter from a-prati-√han with the sense of “not (a-)
striking (√han) against (-prati-)”. e latter in turn derives from the same root as
another expression which was oen translated as the verbal form “不礙” (bú aì),
in Sanskrit “na … prati-√han”. is is another potential Sanskrit source for the
Heart Sūtra’s notion of “無罣礙” (wú guà’aì) which is in need of examination.
One passage in Chp.  of the Chinese and Chp.  in the Sanskrit cor-
responds to the expansion of the central chapter of the As. tasāhasrikā
. entitled
“Suchness” (Tathatā; 如 rú). is passage refers to the Prajñāpāramitā in terms
used much earlier in the Buddhist tradition to describe the Buddha’s reflections
immediately aer his awakening, in which he describes the Dharma he has re-
alized as profound, difficult to know and comprehend, and “running against the
entire world” (sarvalokavipratyanīkā) (cf. Conze : ). Aer the discus-
sion within the larger Prajñāpāramitā, the conclusion is in fact the reverse of this.
In the Móhē, “is Dharma is in accord with all dharmas” (是法隨順⼀切法;
sarvadharmānulomiko ’yam . … dharmah), . and thus “It does not obstruct form”
(不礙; na pratihanyate), or the other dharmas, up to omniscience itself. e


Sanskrit in Pañcavimśati-
. (Kimura : :).

For example, Rhys Davids & Oldenberg (: -); = Pāli Vinaya i -; other Vinayas have
equivalent passages. Also in Samyutta
. Nikāya, SN :, i ; Bodhi (: ); etc.

Móhēbānruò-bōluómì Jīng 《摩訶般若波羅蜜經》卷16〈54 ⼤如品〉 (CBETA, T, no.
, p. , b-); and ibid. (CBETA, T, no. , p. , c-). Pañcavimśati-
. (Kimura :
:); and also ibid. (Kimura : :ff). Refer English translation in Conze (: f).


   ’  

conflicting points of view of being against or in accord with the world are largely
due to the respective senses of Dharma as teaching and fundamental law, but the
rhetorical effect of “shock” is still striking.
Another use of Chinese “無礙” (wú aì) for Sanskrit “prati-√han” later in the
same chapter appears to be a case of a confused attempt at translation standard-
ization possibly brought about by the earlier passage. In the Sanskrit, referring
to the altruistic ideal of the bodhisattva, it states how they “should develop an
attitude of benefit” (hitacittatotpādayitavyā) toward all beings, “an attitude of
nonaversion” (apratihatam . cittam),
. and likewise for “an attitude of non-harm”
(avihethanācittam)
. (cf. Conze : ). ese are precisely the three posi-
tive attitudes that are the traditional defining features of right intention (samyak
saṅkalpa) within the eightfold path. e Chinese translation of the Móhē has “安
隱” (ānyĭn), “無礙” (wú’aì), and “無腦” (wú’naŏ), respectively. e first and last
translation maintain the original sense, but the use of “無礙” (wú’aì) for “aprati-
hata” really does not convey the notion of “nonaversion” or “non-aggression”.
e choice of translation lexicon may be due to the earlier passages on “non-
obstruction”, and perhaps a perceived need for consistency of idiom between the
Sanskrit and Chinese. is reading is thus more an exception than the rule, and
carries little interpretative weight for our present purposes.
Other translations in the Móhē of “無礙” (wú’aì) for “aprati-√gha” appear to
be significantly different from our intended meaning here.. An example is within
the formulaic Ābhidharmika expression describing phenomena as “without form,
invisible, non-obstructing (apratighā; 無礙)”. e variants outside the Taishō of
“無對” (wúduì) is oen the more standard translation term. “Obstructing” in
this sense is the defining characteristic of material form (rūpa) for the Abhid-
harma systems.
Above we have provided ample evidence for the use of “無罣礙” (wú guà’aì) as
a translation in the Móhē for Sanskrit terms derived from the verbal “na … √sañj”
or noun forms “a-√saṅga”; and also from the verbal form “a-prati-√han” or noun
“a-prati√gha”. e reader may recall, however, that in the textual passage we are
examining, the Sanskrit text had neither of these terms.


Sanskrit, Pañcavimśati-
. (Kimura : :).

Móhēbānruòbōluómì Jīng 《摩訶般若波羅蜜經》卷16〈54 ⼤如品〉 (CBETA, T, no.
, p. , a-).

Pañcavimśati-
. (Kimura : :); English cf. Conze (: f). Móhēbānruòbōluómì
Jīng 《摩訶般若波羅蜜經》卷22〈74 遍學品〉 (CBETA, T, no. , p. , b-).


   ’  

. Chinese “無礙” ← Sanskrit “an-ā-√vr”


. (anāvarana)?
.
Conze’s critical text of the Heart sutra has “cittāvarana”,
. though he conceded that
“cittālambana” was another possibility (see §.). Neither of these terms appears
in a compound with “citta°” in the Sanskrit Pañcavimśati . or As. tasāhasrikā
. texts.
is is yet another hint at the language correspondences between Sanskrit and
Chinese in the Heart Sūtra that underlie Nattier’s thesis (§.). However, there
are numerous cases where either “āvarana” . or “ālambana” alone, or prefixed, do
feature.
One of the passages featuring “anāvarana” . appears at the end of Chp.  of
the Chinese, Chp.  of the Sanskrit, on Suchness (Tathatā; 如 rú). We have al-
ready discussed the start of this chapter, which features “不礙” as a translation
for “not obstruct” (na prati-√han) (see §.). Conze’s translation from the San-
skrit reads “When he thus trains and abides, then form, etc. to: the stability of the
Good Dharma, will be uncovered (anāvarana) 
. to him” (: ). Kumāra-
jīva’s Móhē reads “When the bodhisattva thus trains, thus practices, he shall attain
unobstructed form (當得無礙⾊) … attain unobstructed stability of Dharma (得
無礙法住)”. e sentence construction in either Sanskrit or Chinese could also
potentially be rendered “shall attain non-obstruction [with respect to] form”.
Another passage at the end of the text brings in the notion of the “essential
emptiness” (prakrtiśūnyatā)
. of phenomena as the manner in which the bodhi-
sattva “contemplates all phenomena without any obstruction” (na kasyacid dhar-
masyāvarana . m. samanupaśyati). Without apprehending a living being, they teach
the Dharma to living beings, just as if there were illusory creations. is state-
ment is rendered into Chinese in the Móhē as “知⼀切法無礙” (zhī yīqièfă wú’aì),
i.e. “knowing all phenomena without obstructtion”.
In both cases, the use of “without obstruction” is used to describe—adjectivally
or adverbally—a form of practice or contemplation. With only a couple of appear-
ances, we note that this is a rare phrase in the larger Prajñāpāramitā text.


Pañcavimśati-
. (Kimura : :f). Cf. Conze (: ).

Móhēbānruòbōluómì Jīng 《摩訶般若波羅蜜經》卷16〈54 ⼤如品〉 (CBETA, T, no.
, p. , c-p. , a).

Pañca-vimśati-
. (Kimura : -:).

Móhēbānruòbōluómì Jīng 《摩訶般若波羅蜜經》卷24〈78 四攝品〉 (CBETA, T, no.
, p. , a-).


   ’  

. Chinese “無礙” ← Sanskrit “an-ā-√lamb(h)” (anālambana)?


ere are, in addition, several examples in the Sanskrit text of terms from “an-ā-
√lamb(h)”, either in verbal or nominal forms. e term is also uncommon, how-
ever, and mainly appears in the latter half of the text, where the material may have
been added as the text expanded over time. In our present commonly used late
manuscripts and critical editions of the Pañcavimśati,
. the term appears frequently
within the section headings of the embedded Abhisamayālamkāra. . As they were
unknown in the classic Chinese Buddhist sphere, and likewise in Chinese trans-
lations, we rightly ignore such section headings here. Even more curiously, the
term is far more prevalent in the As. tasāhasrikā
. than in the Pañcavimśati,
. which
runs against our usual texthistorical notion of the relation-ship between the two,
namely that almost the entirety of the smaller text is preserved intact within the
larger. We shall only focus on the Pañcavimśati . here, however, for its direct con-
nection with the Heart Sūtra.
A prosaic non-technical use of the verb “adhy-ā-√lamb” as “get hold of ” ap-
pears in Chp.  of the Sanskrit and Chp.  of the Móhē. is is “get hold of ” a
log or plank from a shipwreck in the ocean in order to avoid death, as a metaphor
for how the practitioner “gets hold of ”, i.e. takes as an object, this Prajñā-pāramitā
to escape the ocean of samsāra.
. e Chinese translation uses “取” (qü), i.e. “seize
upon”, rather than the more technical translation “所緣” (suŏyüán) for “ālam-
bana” (refer Buswell & Lopez : ). Other appearances of the term are
also translated in a non-technical sense in the Chinese. For example, “to seek”
(求 qíü) supreme awakening, for “adhy-ālambhate”; and also that the bodhi-
sattva does “not desire” (不貪 bù tān) the grounds of the two vehicles, for “na
… adhyālambate”. Note that only one of these non-technical uses of the term
is a negation, and both are prefixed in the Sanskrit with “adhi°”, which distin-
guishes them from the term under examination in the variant Sanskrit reading of
the Heart Sūtra.
e only technical uses of the term in the sense of an object of cognition or
contem-plation in the Sanskrit are near the end of the text. e first is that of


Pañca-vimśati-
. (Kimura : :); cf. Conze (: ). Móhēbānruòbōluómì Jīng 《摩訶
般若波羅蜜經》卷15〈51 譬喻品〉 (CBETA, T, no. , p. , c-).

Pañcavimśati-
. (Kimura : :). Móhē-bānruòbōluómì Jīng 《摩訶般若波羅蜜經》卷
19〈64 淨願品〉 (CBETA, T, no. , p. , b-).

Pañca-vimśati-
. (Kimura : :). Móhēbānruòbōluómì Jīng 《摩訶般若波羅蜜經》卷
20〈68 攝五品〉 (CBETA, T, no. , p. , c-).


   ’  

“purity of the object” (ālambanapariśuddhih), . the second item on a list of four



“purities”. e context is an explanation of technical lists; this list of four is
merely one of many. In the second appearance, according to Conze’s translation,
the bodhisattvas “obtain the sovereignty of thought through a cognition which
has the indiscriminate realm for its object” (avikalpadhātvālambanena) (:
). We have unfortunately been unable to uncover the parallel textual pas-
sages in the Chinese Móhē translation, suggesting that perhaps it is an addition in
our late Sanskrit recension. is, plus the fact that the wider context is a discourse
involving Maitreya, are strong indications that the appearance of these terms from
“ā-√lamb” are not useful for our study here.

. Reading: “Mind without hanging on anything”


Applying Nattier’s theory of the textual history of the Heart Sūtra, there are no
passages in the Sanskrit that offer clear and obvious equivalents to the Chinese
phrase of our third problematic statement, “⼼無罣礙” (xīn wú guà’aì). Granted,
this statement itself comes from Conze’s Division VI of the text, which lies outside
the body of Division V taken directly from the larger Sūtra, and, if Nattier’s theory
is correct, it is thus as much a creation of the compiler as a reworking of established
textual terms, passages and ideas.
Still, some observations can be made, and a cautious thesis presented. We ex-
amined four possible Sanskrit sources for our phrase: . e first was “a-√saṅga”
or “a-√sañj”, “to hang”. is was the only one that directly corresponded to the
Chinese phrase from the Heart Sūtra. It is widely used throughout the text, and
the arrow in empty space metaphor indicates that it had greater philosophical
depth of usage. . e second “a-prati-√gha” or “a-prati-√han”, “to strike against”
or “to obstruct”. is was also fairly common, though it had a broad semantic
range, parts of which differed somewhat from our Heart Sūtra usage. Between
these first two potential sources is an overlap of their broad range of meaning:
the idea of being obstructed, stuck to, hitting up against. Subjectively, the bodhi-
sattva’s mind is so freed in his meditation on the gnosis of emptiness; and ob-
jectively, the Dharma itself is not in conflict with anything. . e third “an-ā-
√vr”. (anāvarana), . “to cover”, which together with the fourth and last, . “an-ā-
√lamb(h)” (anālambana), “to grasp at” or “to take as a mental object”, were both


Pañcavimśati-
. (Kimura : -:).

Pañca-vimśati-
. (Kimura : -:); cf Conze (: ).


   ’  

rarely used, and oen in a manner quite dissimilar to that of the Heart Sūtra. De-
spite “an-ā-√vr”
. being the term Conze eventually opted for, and his theory of a
possible scribal error from “an-ā-√lamb(h)”, these two seem to be the least likely
matches for our problematic statement.
Comparing and weighing these possible sources, we thus read “⼼無罣礙”
(xīn wú guà’aì) in the Heart Sūtra in the sense of “na … sajjati”, but also containing
the shared sense of non-attachment also found in “a-prati-√han”. us, the mind
of the bodhisattva “does not hang on anything”.

 Understanding from the Heart of Perfect Wisdom


We began this essay with the importance of the Heart Sūtra in the Mahāyāna tra-
dition, both past and present. Conze’s critical edition of the Sanskrit, and his
translation thereof into English, have—along with a vast plethora of other English
translations—also pointed the way for the future of this text in the ever grow-
ing Western Buddhist tradition (§). Conze noted three problematic elements of
his Sanskrit text, that of “na prāptir nāprāptih”
. (§.), “aprāptitvād” (§.) and
“cittāvarana”
. or “cittālambana” (§.). Subsequent translations, whether also
from Sanskrit, or from Chinese or Tibetan, have done little to resolve these prob-
lems. Many popular books on the Heart Sūtra in English use the text as little more
than a cypher to plug in sectarian or favorite Buddhist systems for commentary,
rather than attempting to explain the text in its own context and thought world.
Nattier’s theory (§.) of an apocryphal Chinese source for the Heart Sūtra
provides a possible avenue for examination. is avenue may lead to an authentic
and contextualized reading of the Heart Sūtra, despite the claim of “apocryphal”
that may alarm more traditional readers. In her thesis of the text’s history, the
Sanskrit text of the larger Pañcavimśati
. Prajñāpāramitā was translated into Chi-
nese, e.g. Kumārajīva’s Móhē text; from this a core passage of text was extracted,
and a head and tail appended, to create the first Heart Sūtra in Chinese, not San-
skrit. Only subsequently did this Chinese compilation become translated, per-
haps rather idiosyn-cratically, into Sanskrit. Her theory provides an approach to
resolving Conze’s problems, by reading not the Sanskrit Heart Sūtra variants, but
by taking the pro-blematic passages in the Chinese of the Heart Sūtra, tracing
their appearance and usage in the larger Chinese Prajñāpāramitā, and from there
delving back into the Sanskrit of the larger Pañcavimśati
. Sūtra (§.). We repeat
that our readings here take Nattier’s basic thesis as a working hypothesis.


   ’  

is is the process that we have followed for each of the three problematic
passages in the body of this essay. Our basic results are as follows: . For “無
得” (wúdé), we followed the part of the Heart Sūtra extracted directly from the
larger text to adopt a reading of “no attainment”, in the sense of realization of spir-
itual fruitions. is is still in conformity with the majority of modern readings
(§). . Regarding the phrase “以無所得故” (yĭ wú sŭodé gù), we concluded
that it most closely corresponds to the notion of “due to engagement in non-
apprehension”. is clearly differs from the common notion that it is the same
basic term as the first phrase, i.e. “attainment”, and means the non-apprehension
of an object of the senses or of a contemplative practice. e term is more likely
from “an-upa-√labh(-yoga)” in the instrumental, and not from “prāpti(tva)” in
the ablative. Moreover, we also considered that this phrase not only does not start
the next section of the Heart Sūtra, but clearly concludes the early part of the text,
from “erefore, Śāriputra, in emptiness…”. e notion of “non-apprehension” of
a mental object matches well with the opening of this portion of the text (§). .
Lastly, the term “⼼無罣礙” (xīn wú guà’aì) does not seem to correspond to either
of the terms from the Sanskrit text. Rather than referring to “mental obstructions”
as one of a range of specific “obstructions” as suggested by Conze—karma, kleśa
and jñeya—it seems to refer to the mind which does not get hung up, i.e. attached,
to any phenomena. us, the term “⼼無罣礙” bears closest association with the
usage of terms from the Sanskrit root √sañj in the larger texts, particularly where
the semantic range of this term overlaps with prati-√han (§).
Finally, we would like to take our new readings of these passages in the Heart
Sūtra, and return them to the context of the two divisions of the text, V and VI.
In addition, some reflections about each of the two divisions as a whole, and also
their mutual relationship, can be given.

[V] erefore, Śāriputra, in emptiness


there is no form, no sensation, perception, volitions or cognition;
no eye, ear, nose, tongue, body or mind;
no sight, sound, aroma, flavor, tactile or mental object;
no eye, sight, visual cognition, up to, no mind, mental object,
mental cognition;
no ignorance, no extinction of ignorance, up to, no aging and death,
no extinction of aging and death;
no dissatisfaction, origin, cessation, path;


   ’  

no gnosis, no realization;
due to engagement in non-apprehension.
While many have focused on this part of the text as indicating that the various
standard taxonomies are negated, our new reading brings attention back to the
framing of these lists and their negation. e key difference in this framing is
that here, division V ends in the statement which is otherwise commonly placed
at the start of division VI. e frame is “In emptiness, … due to engagement in
non-appre-hension”. It is our view that this shis emphasis from an ontological
negation of classical lists, i.e. “there is no X”, to an epistemological stance. at
is, when the bodhisattva is “in emptiness”, i.e. the contemplative meditation of
the emptiness of phenomena, he is “engaged in the non-apprehension” of these
phenomena. “Engagement” can be seen as a broad term covering practices, med-
itations, contemplations and so forth of perfect wisdom. Such a reading thus does
not run counter to the notion that when not “in emptiness”, such phenomena may
still be apprehended, perceived to exist and function as objects of contemplation.
e next division, VI, now shorn of the statement which most editions and
translations place at the start, therefore reads as follows:
[VI] e bodhisattvas, due to being supported by transcendental
knowledge, have minds which do not hang on anything;
due to their minds not hanging on anything, they are without fear;
removed from perverted perceptions and views, they ultimately
realize nirvāna.
.
e bodhisattva, who at V was said to be “engaged in non-apprehension”, i.e.
medi-tating on emptiness, is here “supported by transcendental knowledge”, i.e.
prajñāpāramitā. e two phrases are basically synonymous. erefore, due to
not apprehending phenomena, the mind of the bodhisattva does not hang up on
anything at all. ey are “not hung up”, possibly from “asakta” (or “asatta”), and
thus a bodhi- “sattva” (or “satta”) is freed of views of a living being “asattva”
(or “asatta”) by his non-apprehension, his engagement in the contemplation of
emptiness.
We have based our reading of Conze’s problematic poritions of the Heart Sūtra
on an approach which takes Nattier’s theory of an apocryphal source for the text as
a working hypothesis, with a little help from Harrison. However, our conclusions
are not at all radically opposed to traditional readings. Rather, we hope to recon-
struct as much as possible the ideas of the terms in the mind of the text’s com-


   ’  

piler(s), i.e. the Heart of the Perfection of Wisdom, the Prajñāpāramitā Hrdaya.
.
By this, we obliquely seek to point those interested in the Heart Sūtra to draw from
the larger body of this genre in their readings and understanding. We welcome
all comments, corrections and criticisms from the learned readership.

Bibliography

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T 《⼤般若波羅蜜多經》 Da Bānruòbōluómìduō Jīng (), (), (≈ Pañcavimśati-
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
   ’  

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