Republic of the Philippines

6. Jose
SUPREME COURT .07
Silva .............................................................................................................
Manila
7. Tomasa
.08
EN BANC Mercado ................................................................................................

8. Julio
G.R. No. L-45425 April 29, 1939 .13
Gatchalian ...................................................................................................

JOSE GATCHALIAN, ET AL., plaintiffs-appellants, 9. Emiliana

.13
vs. Santiago ................................................................................................
THE COLLECTOR OF INTERNAL REVENUE, defendant-appellee.
10. Maria C.
.16
Legaspi ...............................................................................................
IMPERIAL, J.:
11. Francisco
.13
The plaintiff brought this action to recover from the defendant Collector of Internal Cabral ...............................................................................................
Revenue the sum of P1,863.44, with legal interest thereon, which they paid under
protest by way of income tax. They appealed from the decision rendered in the case 12. Gonzalo
.14
on October 23, 1936 by the Court of First Instance of the City of Manila, which Javier ....................................................................................................
dismissed the action with the costs against them.
13. Maria
.17
Santiago ...................................................................................................
The case was submitted for decision upon the following stipulation of facts:
14. Buenaventura
.13
Come now the parties to the above-mentioned case, through their respective Guzman ......................................................................................
undersigned attorneys, and hereby agree to respectfully submit to this
Honorable Court the case upon the following statement of facts: 15. Mariano
.14
Santos .................................................................................................
1. That plaintiff are all residents of the municipality of Pulilan, Bulacan, and
that defendant is the Collector of Internal Revenue of the Philippines; Total ........................................................................................................ 2.00

2. That prior to December 15, 1934 plaintiffs, in order to enable them to

purchase one sweepstakes ticket valued at two pesos (P2), subscribed and 3. That immediately thereafter but prior to December 15, 1934, plaintiffs
paid therefor the amounts as follows: purchased, in the ordinary course of business, from one of the duly
authorized agents of the National Charity Sweepstakes Office one ticket
1. Jose bearing No. 178637 for the sum of two pesos (P2) and that the said ticket
P0.18
Gatchalian .................................................................................................... was registered in the name of Jose Gatchalian and Company;
2. Gregoria
.18 4. That as a result of the drawing of the sweepstakes on December 15,
Cristobal ...............................................................................................
1934, the above-mentioned ticket bearing No. 178637 won one of the third
3. Saturnina prizes in the amount of P50,000 and that the corresponding check covering
.08 the above-mentioned prize of P50,000 was drawn by the National Charity
Silva ....................................................................................................
Sweepstakes Office in favor of Jose Gatchalian & Company against the
4. Guillermo Philippine National Bank, which check was cashed during the latter part of
.13
Tapia ................................................................................................... December, 1934 by Jose Gatchalian & Company;

5. Jesus
.15 5. That on December 29, 1934, Jose Gatchalian was required by income tax
Legaspi ......................................................................................................
examiner Alfredo David to file the corresponding income tax return covering
the prize won by Jose Gatchalian & Company and that on December 29,
1934, the said return was signed by Jose Gatchalian, a copy of which return 12. That on July 16, 1935, plaintiff filed a bond, a copy of which marked
is enclosed as Exhibit A and made a part hereof; Exhibit K is enclosed and made a part hereof, to guarantee the payment of
the balance of the alleged tax liability by monthly installments at the rate of
6. That on January 8, 1935, the defendant made an assessment against P118.70 a month, the first payment under protest to be effected on or before
Jose Gatchalian & Company requesting the payment of the sum of July 31, 1935;
P1,499.94 to the deputy provincial treasurer of Pulilan, Bulacan, giving to
said Jose Gatchalian & Company until January 20, 1935 within which to pay 13. That on July 16, 1935 the said plaintiffs formally protested against the
the said amount of P1,499.94, a copy of which letter marked Exhibit B is payment of the sum of P602.51, a copy of which protest is attached and
enclosed and made a part hereof; marked Exhibit L, but that defendant in his letter dated August 1, 1935
overruled the protest and denied the request for refund of the plaintiffs;
7. That on January 20, 1935, the plaintiffs, through their attorney, sent to
defendant a reply, a copy of which marked Exhibit C is attached and made a 14. That, in view of the failure of the plaintiffs to pay the monthly installments
part hereof, requesting exemption from payment of the income tax to which in accordance with the terms and conditions of bond filed by them, the
reply there were enclosed fifteen (15) separate individual income tax returns defendant in his letter dated July 23, 1935, copy of which is attached and
filed separately by each one of the plaintiffs, copies of which returns are marked Exhibit M, ordered the municipal treasurer of Pulilan, Bulacan to
attached and marked Exhibit D-1 to D-15, respectively, in order of their execute within five days the warrant of distraint and levy issued against the
names listed in the caption of this case and made parts hereof; a statement plaintiffs on May 13, 1935;
of sale signed by Jose Gatchalian showing the amount put up by each of the
plaintiffs to cover up the attached and marked as Exhibit E and made a part 15. That in order to avoid annoyance and embarrassment arising from the
hereof; and a copy of the affidavit signed by Jose Gatchalian dated levy of their property, the plaintiffs on August 28, 1936, through Jose
December 29, 1934 is attached and marked Exhibit F and made part thereof; Gatchalian, Guillermo Tapia, Maria Santiago and Emiliano Santiago, paid
under protest to the municipal treasurer of Pulilan, Bulacan the sum of
8. That the defendant in his letter dated January 28, 1935, a copy of which P1,260.93 representing the unpaid balance of the income tax and penalties
marked Exhibit G is enclosed, denied plaintiffs' request of January 20, 1935, demanded by defendant as evidenced by income tax receipt No. 35811
for exemption from the payment of tax and reiterated his demand for the which is attached and marked Exhibit N and made a part hereof; and that on
payment of the sum of P1,499.94 as income tax and gave plaintiffs until September 3, 1936, the plaintiffs formally protested to the defendant against
February 10, 1935 within which to pay the said tax; the payment of said amount and requested the refund thereof, copy of which
is attached and marked Exhibit O and made part hereof; but that on
9. That in view of the failure of the plaintiffs to pay the amount of tax September 4, 1936, the defendant overruled the protest and denied the
demanded by the defendant, notwithstanding subsequent demand made by refund thereof; copy of which is attached and marked Exhibit P and made a
defendant upon the plaintiffs through their attorney on March 23, 1935, a part hereof; and
copy of which marked Exhibit H is enclosed, defendant on May 13, 1935
issued a warrant of distraint and levy against the property of the plaintiffs, a 16. That plaintiffs demanded upon defendant the refund of the total sum of
copy of which warrant marked Exhibit I is enclosed and made a part hereof; one thousand eight hundred and sixty three pesos and forty-four centavos
(P1,863.44) paid under protest by them but that defendant refused and still
10. That to avoid embarrassment arising from the embargo of the property of refuses to refund the said amount notwithstanding the plaintiffs' demands.
the plaintiffs, the said plaintiffs on June 15, 1935, through Gregoria Cristobal,
Maria C. Legaspi and Jesus Legaspi, paid under protest the sum of P601.51 17. The parties hereto reserve the right to present other and additional
as part of the tax and penalties to the municipal treasurer of Pulilan, evidence if necessary.
Bulacan, as evidenced by official receipt No. 7454879 which is attached and
marked Exhibit J and made a part hereof, and requested defendant that Exhibit E referred to in the stipulation is of the following tenor:
plaintiffs be allowed to pay under protest the balance of the tax and penalties
by monthly installments;
To whom it may concern:
11. That plaintiff's request to pay the balance of the tax and penalties was
granted by defendant subject to the condition that plaintiffs file the usual I, Jose Gatchalian, a resident of Pulilan, Bulacan, married, of age, hereby
bond secured by two solvent persons to guarantee prompt payment of each certify, that on the 11th day of August, 1934, I sold parts of my shares on
installments as it becomes due; ticket No. 178637 to the persons and for the amount indicated below and the
part of may share remaining is also shown to wit:
 Purchaser Amount Address 1. Jose
P4,42 3,94
Gatchalian ..................................... D-1 P0.18 P 480
5 5
1. Mariano Santos ........................................... P0.14 Pulilan, Bulacan. .....

2. Buenaventura Guzman ............................... .13 - Do - 2. Gregoria 2,57

D-2 .18 4,575 2,000
Cristobal ...................................... 5
3. Maria Santiago ............................................ .17 - Do -
3. Saturnina 1,51
4. Gonzalo Javier .............................................. .14 - Do - D-3 .08 1,875 360
Silva ............................................. 5
5. Francisco Cabral .......................................... .13 - Do - 4. Guillermo 2,96
D-4 .13 3,325 360
Tapia .......................................... 5
6. Maria C. Legaspi .......................................... .16 - Do -
5. Jesus Legaspi by Maria 3,10
7. Emiliana Santiago ......................................... .13 - Do - D-5 .15 3,825 720
Cristobal ......... 5
8. Julio Gatchalian ............................................ .13 - Do - 6. Jose
1,51
Silva .............................................. D-6 .08 1,875 360
9. Jose Silva ...................................................... .07 - Do - 5
......
10. Tomasa Mercado ....................................... .08 - Do -
7. Tomasa 1,51
D-7 .07 1,875 360
11. Jesus Legaspi ............................................. .15 - Do - Mercado ....................................... 5

12. Guillermo Tapia ........................................... .13 - Do - 8. Julio Gatchalian by Beatriz 2,91

D-8 .13 3,150 240
Guzman ....... 0
13. Saturnina Silva ............................................ .08 - Do -
9. Emiliana 2,96
D-9 .13 3,325 360
14. Gregoria Cristobal ....................................... .18 - Do - Santiago ...................................... 5

15. Jose Gatchalian ............................................ .18 - Do - 10. Maria C. 3,14

D-10 .16 4,100 960
Legaspi ...................................... 0

2.00 Total cost of said 11. Francisco 2,96

D-11 .13 3,325 360
Cabral ...................................... 5

ticket; and that, therefore, the persons named above are entitled to the parts 12. Gonzalo 2,96
D-12 .14 3,325 360
of whatever prize that might be won by said ticket. Javier .......................................... 5

13. Maria
Pulilan, Bulacan, P.I. 3,99
Santiago ........................................ D-13 .17 4,350 360
0
..
(Sgd.) JOSE GATCHALIAN
14. Buenaventura 2,96
D-14 .13 3,325 360
Guzman ........................... 5
And a summary of Exhibits D-1 to D-15 is inserted in the bill of exceptions as follows:
15. Mariano 2,96
D-15 .14 3,325 360
RECAPITULATIONS OF 15 INDIVIDUAL INCOME TAX RETURNS FOR Santos ........................................ 5
1934 ALL DATED JANUARY 19, 1935 SUBMITTED TO THE COLLECTOR
OF INTERNAL REVENUE.
50,00
Exhibit Purchas 2.00
Price Expense Net 0
Name e
Won s prize
No. Price
The legal questions raised in plaintiffs-appellants' five assigned errors may properly of Jose Gatchalian and company, and the said partner, in the same capacity,
be reduced to the two following: (1) Whether the plaintiffs formed a partnership, or collected the said check. All these circumstances repel the idea that the plaintiffs
merely a community of property without a personality of its own; in the first case it is organized and formed a community of property only.
admitted that the partnership thus formed is liable for the payment of income tax,
whereas if there was merely a community of property, they are exempt from such Having organized and constituted a partnership of a civil nature, the said entity is the
payment; and (2) whether they should pay the tax collectively or whether the latter one bound to pay the income tax which the defendant collected under the aforesaid
should be prorated among them and paid individually. section 10 (a) of Act No. 2833, as amended by section 2 of Act No. 3761. There is no
merit in plaintiff's contention that the tax should be prorated among them and paid
The Collector of Internal Revenue collected the tax under section 10 of Act No. 2833, individually, resulting in their exemption from the tax.
as last amended by section 2 of Act No. 3761, reading as follows:
In view of the foregoing, the appealed decision is affirmed, with the costs of this
SEC. 10. (a) There shall be levied, assessed, collected, and paid annually instance to the plaintiffs appellants. So ordered.
upon the total net income received in the preceding calendar year from all
sources by every corporation, joint-stock company, partnership, joint account Avanceña, C.J., Villa-Real, Diaz, Laurel, Concepcion and Moran, JJ., concur.
(cuenta en participacion), association or insurance company, organized in
the Philippine Islands, no matter how created or organized, but not including
duly registered general copartnership (compañias colectivas), a tax of three
per centum upon such income; and a like tax shall be levied, assessed,
collected, and paid annually upon the total net income received in the
preceding calendar year from all sources within the Philippine Islands by
every corporation, joint-stock company, partnership, joint account (cuenta en
participacion), association, or insurance company organized, authorized, or
existing under the laws of any foreign country, including interest on bonds,
notes, or other interest-bearing obligations of residents, corporate or
otherwise: Provided, however, That nothing in this section shall be construed
as permitting the taxation of the income derived from dividends or net profits
on which the normal tax has been paid.

The gain derived or loss sustained from the sale or other disposition by a
corporation, joint-stock company, partnership, joint account (cuenta en
participacion), association, or insurance company, or property, real,
personal, or mixed, shall be ascertained in accordance with subsections (c)
and (d) of section two of Act Numbered Two thousand eight hundred and
thirty-three, as amended by Act Numbered Twenty-nine hundred and twenty-
six.

The foregoing tax rate shall apply to the net income received by every
taxable corporation, joint-stock company, partnership, joint account (cuenta
en participacion), association, or insurance company in the calendar year
nineteen hundred and twenty and in each year thereafter.

There is no doubt that if the plaintiffs merely formed a community of property the latter
is exempt from the payment of income tax under the law. But according to the
stipulation facts the plaintiffs organized a partnership of a civil nature because each of
them put up money to buy a sweepstakes ticket for the sole purpose of dividing
equally the prize which they may win, as they did in fact in the amount of P50,000
(article 1665, Civil Code). The partnership was not only formed, but upon the
organization thereof and the winning of the prize, Jose Gatchalian personally
appeared in the office of the Philippines Charity Sweepstakes, in his capacity as co-
partner, as such collection the prize, the office issued the check for P50,000 in favor
 Republic of the Philippines his house thereon as shown by Exh. "B" for the plaintiff, on the grounds as
SUPREME COURT he alleged in his answer that he had built on the lot in question a conjugal
Manila house worth P8,000.00 which necessarily makes the lot on which it stands
subject to Article 158 of the Civil Code and on the point of view of equity that
EN BANC the wife of the defendant Felipe Rosado received an aliquot share of
P2,400.00 only from the share and if the house were demolished the
defendant would suffer damage in the amount of P8,000.00;
G.R. No. L-27933 December 24, 1968
6. That the portion of the lot on which the house stands, would earn a
DIVERSIFIED CREDIT CORPORATION, plaintiff-appellee, monthly rental of P50.00;
vs.
FELIPE ROSADO and LUZ JAYME ROSADO, defendants-appellants.
7. That Felipe Rosado, husband of Luz Jayme, did not give his conformity to
the Deed of Sale, Exh. "A".
REYES, J.B.L.:
8. That on October 31, 1964, the defendant Felipe Rosado requested the
This appeal from a decision of the Court of First Instance of Bacolod City, Negros plaintiff in the letter, Exh. "C" for the plaintiff, for a period of six (6) months
Occidental (Civ. Case No. 7516 of that Court) was certified to us by the Court of within which to vacate the premises.
Appeals (Second Division) because the same involves no questions of fact.
9. That the letter was not answered by the plaintiff and they did not accept
The case had its origin in the Municipal Court of Bacolod City, when the Diversified the offer, and on November 25, 1964, they filed a complaint before the
Credit Corporation filed an action to compel the spouses Felipe Rosado and Luz Municipal Court which proves that plaintiff neglected the offer;
Jayme Rosado to vacate and restore possession of a parcel of land in the City of
Bacolod (Lot 62-B of Subdivision plan LRC-Psd-33823) that forms part of Lot No. 62
of the Bacolod Cadastre, and is covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 27083 in The Court of First Instance in its decision rejected the claim of ownership advanced
the name of plaintiff. After answer, claiming that the lot was defendants' conjugal by Rosado, based upon the construction of a house on the disputed lot by the
property, the Municipal Court ordered defendants to surrender and vacate the land in conjugal partnership of the Rosado spouses, which allegedly converted the land into
litigation; to pay P100.00 a month from the filing of the complaint up to the actual conjugal property under Article 158, paragraph 2 of the present Civil Code of the
vacating of the premises; to pay P500.00 attorneys' fees and costs. Upon appeal to Philippines; further held that defendants were in estoppel to claim title in view of the
the Court of First Instance, the case was submitted on the following stipulation of facts letter Exhibit C requesting for six (6) months within which to vacate the premises, and
(Rec. on App., pp. 59-60): affirmed the decision of the Inferior Court. Defendant Felipe Rosado resorted to the
Court of Appeals, and his appeal (CA-G.R. No. 37398-R) is the one now before us.
He assigns four alleged errors:
1. That Lot No. 62-B of Bacolod Cadastre belong to the thirteen co-owners,
including the wife of the defendant herein, who owns 1/13th part pro-indiviso;
(a) The lower court erred in not holding that Exhibit "A" is null and void, since
upon the construction of the conjugal dwelling thereon, the conjugal
2. That on May 11, 1964, Luz Jayme Rosado, wife of the defendant Felipe partnership of the defendant-appellant Felipe Rosado and Luz Jayme
Rosado, signed a Deed of Sale together with the co-owners of the property became the owner of the share of Luz Jayme in Lot No. 62-B, Bacolod
to the plaintiff as shown by Exh. "A" for the plaintiff; Cadastre;

3. That on the lot in question the defendant Felipe Rosado had built a house (b) The trial court erred in ordering the defendant-appellant to vacate Lot No.
sometime in 1957 without the whole property having been previously 62-B and in not holding that Exhibit "A" is null and void because as the legal
partitioned among the thirteen (13) co-owners; usufructuary of the share of Luz Jayme Rosado in Lot 62-B, Bacolod
Cadastre, the conjugal partnership, managed and administered by the
4. That the title of the property has already been transferred to the plaintiff defendant-appellant Felipe Rosado can not be deprived of its usufructuary
upon registration of the Deed of Sale in June, 1964, with the Office of the rights by any contract between Luz Jayme and the plaintiff-appellee;
Register of Deeds;
(c) The trial court erred in not holding that the defendant-appellant should be
5. That demand was made by the plaintiff upon the defendant Felipe Rosado reimbursed the value of the conjugal house constructed on Lot 62-B; and
and his wife Luz Jayme Rosado on October 19, 1964, but until now the
defendant Felipe Rosado has refused to vacate the premises or to remove
 (d) The lower court erred in ordering the defendant-appellant to pay It is the logical consequence of the foregoing ruling that the lower court did not err in
attorneys' fees in the amount of five hundred (P500.00) pesos. holding that the appellant was bound to vacate the land without reimbursement, since
he knew that the land occupied by the house did not belong exclusively to his wife,
It can be seen that the key question is whether by the construction of a house on the but to the other owners as well, and there is no proof on record that the house
lot owned in common by the Jaymes, and sold by them to the appellant corporation, occupied only 1/13 of the total area. The construction was not done in good faith.
the land in question or a 1/13th part of it became conjugal property.
WHEREFORE, the judgment of the Court of First Instance is affirmed. Costs against
Appellant, husband of vendor Luz Jayme, claims the affirmative invoking the second appellant Felipe Rosado.
paragraph of Article 158 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, prescribing that:
Concepcion, C.J., Dizon, Makalintal, Zaldivar, Sanchez, Castro, Fernando and
ART. 158. Improvements, whether for utility or adornment, made on the Capistrano, JJ., concur.
separate property of the spouses through advancements from the
partnership or through the industry of either the husband or the wife, belong
to the conjugal partnership.

Buildings constructed, at the expense of the partnership, during the marriage

on land belonging to one of the spouses, also pertain to the partnership, but
the value of the land shall be reimbursed to the spouse who owns the same.

Rosado further contends that as the building of the house at the expense of the
conjugal partnership converted the 1/13 undivided share on his wife in Lot 62-B into
property of the community, the deed of sale of May 11, 1964 in favor of the appellee
corporation was void in so far as said 1/13 share is concerned, because his wife, Luz
Jayme, had ceased to own such share from and after the building of the house; and
Rosado, as manager of the conjugal partnership, had not participated in the sale, nor
subsequently ratified the same.

We find appellant's thesis legally untenable. For it is a basic principle in the law of co-
ownership, both under the present Civil Code as in the Code of 1889, that no
individual co-owner can claim title to any definite portion of the land or thing owned in
common until the partition thereof. Prior to that time, all that the co-owner has is an
ideal, or abstract, quota or proportionate share in the entire thing owned in common
by all the co-owners. The principle is emphasized by the rulings of this Court.
In Lopez vs. Ilustre, 5 Phil. 567, it was held that while a co-owner has the right to
freely sell and dispose of his undivided interest, he has no right to sell a divided part
of the real estate owned in common. "If he is the owner of an undivided half of a tract
of land, he has the right to sell and convey an undivided half, but he has no right to
divide the lot into two parts, and convey the whole of one part by metes and bounds."
The doctrine was reiterated in Mercado vs. Liwanag, L-14429, June 20, 1962, holding
that a co-owner may not convey a physical portion of the land owned in common. And
in Santos vs. Buenconsejo, L-20136, June 23, 1965, it was ruled that a co-owner may
not even adjudicate to himself any determinate portion of land owned in common.

Since the share of the wife, Luz Jayme, was at no time physically determined, it
cannot be validly claimed that the house constructed by her husband was built on
land belonging to her, and Article 158 of the Civil Code can not apply. Certainly, on
her 1/13 ideal or abstract undivided share, no house could be erected. Necessarily,
the claim of conversion of the wife's share from paraphernal to conjugal in character
as a result of the construction must be rejected for lack of factual or legal basis.
 THIRD DIVISION 26, 1988. The Notice of Initial Hearing stating that the application was set forbe [sic]
heard on April 26, 1988 was thereafter issued by the NLTDRA.
[G.R. No. 98328. October 9, 1997]
JUAN C. CARVAJAL, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and SOLID HOMES, On June 1, 1988, an order of general default was issued by respondent
INC., respondents. Court. Exempted from the order was one Annie Jimenez who filed an opposition to
the application. On June 22, 1988, private respondent Solid Homes, Inc. filed its
DECISION opposition stating that a land registered in its name under the Torrens System and
covered by then TCT No. N-7873 is almost identical to the property subject of the
PANGANIBAN, J.: application by petitioner. The opposition was not admitted considering that no motion
to set aside the order of general default was filed by private respondent.
Is there denial of due process if an applicant for land registration is unable to
testify? May a land registration court, after it is convinced that the property subject of
On June 28, 1988, private respondent filed a motion to lift the order of general default
an application for registration under the torrens system is already covered by an
and to admit its opposition on the ground that its right would be adversely affected by
existing certificate, dismiss such application and thus ignore petitioners insistence on
the application. Acting on the motion and in order to avoid duplicity, the NLTDRA was
submitting further evidence of his alleged title? What constitutes sufficient evidence to
directed to make the plotting of the relative position of the property covered by LRC
show identity of the land applied for with the land already titled in favor of private
Psd-245998 and embraced in TCT No. N-7873 and to submit its plotting to the Court
respondent?
for its guidance. In the same order dated July 1, 1988, respondent Court in the
The Case interest of justice set aside the order of general default in so far as private respondent
was concerned and admitted private respondents opposition.
These are the main questions raised in this petition for review assailing the
November 29, 1990 Decision[1] of the Court of Appeals[2] in CA-G.R. SP No. 18318, the
On January 10, 1989, petitioner filed a motion praying that the opposition of private
dispositive portion of which reads:
respondent be dismissed for the reason that the order issued by respondent court
directing the NLRTDA [sic] to make a plotting of the land in question on the basis of
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, let this petition be, as it is hereby the title submitted by the Registry of Deeds of Marikina Branch Manila released the
DISMISSED.[3] private respondent from the duty and obligation of presenting evidence to prove that
the land applied for is private and that there is apparent lack of interest on the part of
This petition also impugns the April 25, 1991 Court of Appeals Resolution [4] which
private respondent to pursue its claim on account of its non-appearance despite the
denied reconsideration.
lapse of more than six months or to introduce evidence that will show that the land in
The Facts question is covered by the alleged torrens certificate of title.

The facts found by public respondent are as follows: [5] During the hearings conducted on September 13, 1988, September 27, 1988,
October 4, 1988, October 11, 1988, October 18, 1988, November 22, 1988,
Petitioner is the applicant in a land registration case filed with Branch 71, Regional December 6, 1988, petitioner presented his evidence on the question as to whether or
Trial Court of the Fourth Judicial Region stationed in Antipolo, Rizal. Sought to be not he had a registrable right over the land in question.
brought by petitioner under the operation of the Land Registration Act (Act No. 496) is
a 96,470 square meter lot denominated as Lots 6846-A, 6846-B, 6846-C and 6846- Pursuant to the court order dated July 1, 1988 directing the NLTDRA to make the
D. Copies of the application were ordered by respondent Court to be furnished (to) plotting of the relative position of the property covered by LRC Psd-245998 and
the National Land Titles and Deeds Registration Administration (NLTDRA) which on embraced in TCT No. N-7873, the Land Registration Authority submitted a report
March 18, 1987 submitted a report recommending that applicant be order[ed] to dated December 22, 1986 [should be 1988] recommending that, after due hearing,
amend his petition by including the names and complete postal addresses of the the application for registration of petitioner be dismissed. The application was thus
adjoining owners and correcting the discrepancy regarding the boundary lot number dismissed by respondent court in an order dated January 2, 1989. Considering,
along line 2-3 of Lot 6846-D on plan Csd-04-005516-D. On order of respondent Court however, that the recommendation is [sic] for dismissal after due hearing, respondent
[trial court], the petition was accordingly amended. judge issued an order dated January 10, 1989 setting for hearing on January 24,
1989 the Report submitted by the Land Registration Authority. The hearing proceeded
After the NLTDRA was notified that the case is [sic] initially set for hearing on on February 8, 1989 with Engr. Silverio G. Perez, Chief, Department on Registration,
December 7, 1987, the Acting Chief, Docket Division of the NLRDRA [sic] submitted Land Registration Authority being presented in connection with his Report
another report recommending that petitioner be ordered to refer to the Bureau of recommending the dismissal of the application after due hearing. On February 28,
Lands for corrections of the discrepancy existing in the directional bearing and area of 1989, the petitioner's application for registration was dismissed.
Lot 6846-D, Csd-04-005516-D. The technical descriptions as corrected by the Bureau
of Lands was [sic] submitted and the application was initially set for hearing on April
On March 13, 1989, petitioner filed his motion to reconsider the February 28, 1989 table survey was anomalous. Petitioner adds that the matter entirely wanting in this
dismissal of the application for registration to which private respondent filed an case (is) the identity or similarity of the realties. [7] Petitioner concludes that the trial
opposition dated March 20, 1989. The motion for reconsideration was denied in an court should have ordered actual ocular inspection and ground verification survey of
order dated March 4, 1989. the properties involved.
Petitioner further maintains that he was denied due process when he, as an
On May 2, 1989 petitioner filed a second motion to reconsider the dismissal of his applicant in a land registration case, was not able to take the witness stand. According
petition. On May 8, 1989, respondent judge issued an order requiring the parties as to petitioner, even his counsel hardly participated in the proceeding except to
well as the engineers from the Land Registration Commission and the DENR to propound clarificatory questions during the examination of Engineer Silverio Perez of
appear before respondent Court on June 5, 1989. The engineer from the Land the Land Registration Authority.[8]
Registration Commission was likewise directed to inform the court whether the
property applied for by petitioner is indeed inside the titled property of private Public respondent justified its dismissal of the appeal in this wise: [9]
respondent.
Land already decreed and registered in an ordinary registration proceeding cannot
After the Land Registration Authority submitted a report showing that there was again be subject of adjudication or settlement in a subsequent conducted proceeding
indeed an overlapping of the four (4) parcels of land applied for by petitioner and the (Land Titles and Deeds by Noblejas, 1968 Revised Edition, page 96). The Report
properties of Solid Homes under TCT 7873 and considering that the properties submitted by the Land Registration Authority (Annex B) and the Survey Division of the
applied for are [sic] within the titled property and could not be the subject of an DENR (Annex RR) both indicate an overlapping of the lot applied for by petitioner and
application for registration, the second motion to reconsider the dismissal of the the lot covered by TCT N-7873 owned by private respondent Solid Homes, Inc. Even
application for registration was denied in an order dated July 5, 1989. if petitioner were allowed to continue with the presentation of his evidence, the end
result would still be the dismissal of his application for registration. Respondent Judge
As earlier stated, the Court of Appeals affirmed the dismissal of the application for was therefore justified in cutting short the proceeding as the time to be spent in
registration, and denied the subsequent motion for reconsideration. Hence, this hearing petitioners application could be used disposing the other cases pending with
recourse to this Court via Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. respondent court.
The Issues
Anent the allegation that private respondent Solid Homes did not actively participate
Petitioner submits the following issues:[6] in the trials conducted to hear his evidence, suffice it to state that it is counsels
prerogative to determine how he intends to pursue his case.
1. Whether or not an actual ground verification survey is required to establish the
identity of the two parcels of land or whether TCT No. 7873 under Plan FP-1540 of The Court's Ruling
Solid Homes Inc., situated in Barangay Mayamot, Antipolo, Rizal is identical or similar
to Lots 6846-A to 6846-D inclusive Cad. 585, Lungsod Silangan, Cadastre, situated in The petition has no merit.
Mambogan, Antipolo, Rizal applied for under LRC Case No. 414 (-A), LRC Record
No. N-60084; First Issue: Identity of the Property Applied For
We are not persuaded that the land petitioner applied for was not identical to
2. Whether or not the petitioner was given (the) chance and the opportunity to be private respondents land which was already covered by a torrens certificate of title. The
heard or allowed to fully introduce his evidence in the (proceeding) for Land two reports prepared by the Land Registration Authority and the DENR Survey Division
Registration and (to) rest (his) case; clearly showed that there was an overlapping between the two properties. Because the
futility of petitioners application was apparent, the trial court deemed it unnecessary to
3. Whether the decision of the Honorable Court of Appeals is reversible. hear further evidence. We agree.

Petitioner alleges that the table survey made by the Land Registration At the outset, we stress that there was nothing irregular in the order given by the
Authority and the geodetic engineer of the Land Management Bureau cannot serve trial court to the Land Registration Authority and the Survey Division of the DENR to
as basis for identifying his land. On the other hand, petitioner was able to establish submit reports on the location of the land covered by petitioners application and private
the identity of the land he applied for by actual ground survey which was approved by respondents certificate of title. The authority of the land registration court to require the
the Director of Lands and reprocessed by the Land Registration Authority. He claims filing of additional papers to aid it in its determination of the propriety of the application
that if said land is covered by private respondents title, the Director of Lands and/or was based on Section 21 of PD 1529:[10]
Regional Director will no(t) approve the survey. Petitioner also argues that the land in
question is situated in Mambogan, Antipolo, Rizal while that of private respondent is SEC. 21. Requirement of additional facts and papers; ocular inspection. -- The court
in Mayamot, Antipolo, Rizal. Survey Plan FP-1540, which served as basis of private may require facts to be stated in the application in addition to those prescribed by this
respondents certificate of title, cannot be found; hence, according to petitioner, the
Decree not inconsistent therewith and may require the filing of any additional Contrary to petitioners contention, the approval by the assistant chief of the
papers. It may also conduct an ocular inspection, if necessary. Bureau of Lands Survey Division of the survey conducted on the land applied for by
petitioner did not prove that the said land was not covered by any title. It merely showed
From the above provision, it is also clear that ocular inspection of the property that such land has been surveyed and its boundaries have been determined.
applied for was only discretionary, not mandatory. Likewise, the land registration court
was not obliged to order the survey of the contested lot, especially when another Also noteworthy is the finding of public respondent that "the same order
government agency had already submitted a report finding that the contested lot was (issued by the land registration court) [which set] aside the order (of) general default
identical with that described in private respondents certificate of title and recommending insofar as private respondent Solid Homes, Inc. was concerned, directed the
the dismissal of the application for registration. NLTDRA to make the plotting of the relative position of the property covered by LRC
Psd-245998 and [that which was] embraced in TCT No. N-7873.[13] The intention of
Further, the order of the land registration court for the LRA and DENR to submit the land registration court was to avoid duplicity, [14] that is, to rule out the possibility
reports was in accordance with the purposes of the Land Registration Law: [11] that the land he sought to register was already covered by a certificate of title. In this
case, the land he applied for was found to be within the land described in private
The purposes of the land registration law, in general, are: to ascertain once and for all respondents transfer certificate of title.
the absolute title over a given landed property; to make, so far as it is possible, a
certificate of title issued by the court to the owner of the land absolute proof of such Petitioner also alleges that the land he applied for was located in Barangay
title; to quiet title to the land and to put a stop forever to any question of legality to a Mambogan, while the registered land of private respondent was in Barangay
title; and to decree that land title to be final, irrevocable and, undisputable. Mayamot. In his reply filed with public respondent, however, he himself admitted that
(citing Benen vs. Tuason, L-26127, June 28, 1974, 57 SCRA 531.) Barangay Mambogan is a part of Barangay Mayamot [which is] a bigger barrio in
Antipolo, Rizal, and Mayamot covers a big parcel of land running from Antipolo up to
Marikina.[15] In view of petitioners declaration, it was not impossible for the land owned
It is true that a court of first instance acting as a land registration court has limited and by private respondent to be located in Barangay Mayamot and in Barangay
special jurisdiction. It can not be denied, however, that when the law confers Mambogan. At any rate, whether the two lands are located in Mambogan or Mayamot
jurisdiction upon a court, the latter is deemed to have all the necessary powers to or both is a factual question, and its resolution by the trial and the appellate courts is
exercise such jurisdiction to make it effective. (citing Marcelino vs. Antonio, 70 Phil. binding on this Court. Petitioner failed to provide a reason, let alone an adequate one,
388, 391.) The purpose of the applicant is to prove that he has an absolute or simple to justify the reversal of such finding of the lower courts.
title over the property sought to be registered, otherwise his application will be
denied. An absolute oppositor claims a dominical right totally adverse to that of the Petitioner also argues that the plotting made by NLTDRA was anomalous
applicant. If successful, registration will be decreed in favor of the oppositor. As to because Survey Plan FP-1540, on which private respondents title was based, could
whether or not private respondents have absolute or fee simple title over the property not be located. This argument lacks merit. The law does not require resorting to a
sought to be registered necessarily requires a resolution of the question as to whether survey plan to prove the true boundaries of a land covered by a valid certificate of title;
or not the oppositors had a dominical right totally adverse to that of the applicants. x x the title itself is the conclusive proof of the realtys metes and bounds. Section 47 of the
x Land Registration Act, or Act No. 496, provides that (t)he original certificates in the
registration book, any copy thereof duly certified under the signature of the clerk, or of
Based on the reports submitted, the land registration court correctly dismissed the the register of deeds of the province or city where the land is situated, and the seal of
application for original land registration. An application for registration of an already the court, and also the owners duplicate certificate, shall be received as evidence in all
titled land constitutes a collateral attack on the existing title. It behooves a land the courts of the Philippine Islands and shall be conclusive as to all matters contained
registration court to determine the veracity of any and all adverse claims, bearing in therein except so far as otherwise provided in this Act. It has been held that a certificate
mind Section 46 of Act No. 496 which provides that (n)o title to registered land in of title is conclusive evidence with respect to the ownership of the land described
derogation to that of the registered owner shall be acquired by prescription or adverse therein and other matters which can be litigated and decided in land registration
possession. The trial courts order to the LRA and DENR was a mere cautionary proceedings.[16]Thus, this Court in Odsigue vs. Court of Appeals[17] ruled:
measure in cognizance of the well-settled rule that a torrens title cannot be collaterally
attacked. In other words, the title may be challenged only in a proceeding for that
purpose, not in an application for registration of a land already registered in the name x x x. Petitioner contends that private respondents have not identified the property
of another person. After one year from its registration, the title is incontrovertible and is sought to be recovered as required by Art. 434 of the Civil Code. He alleges that Sitio
no longer open to review. The remedy of the landowner, whose property has been Aduas, where the land in question is located, is at the boundary of Barangay May-Iba,
wrongfully or erroneously registered in anothers name, is to institute an ordinary action Teresa, Rizal, and Barangay Lagundi, Morong, Rizal. On the other hand, petitioner
for reconveyance or -- if the property has passed into the hands of an innocent maintains, the parcel of land he is occupying is located in Barangay May-Iba. He
purchaser for value -- for damages.[12] In view of the nature of a torrens title, a land claims that the technical description in the title does not sufficiently identify the
registration court has the duty to determine whether the issuance of a new certificate property of private respondent and that a geodetic survey to determine which of his
alters a valid and existing certificate of title. improvements should be demolished should first have been conducted by the private
respondent. x x x.
But private respondents title (OCT No. 4050) indicates that the property is located in refused to reconsider the order of dismissal and reinstate the case he had neglected
Barangay Lagundi. Likewise, the certification issued by the Municipal Agrarian to perform an act which the law enjoins as a duty resulting from an office, and had
Reform Officer at Morong, Rizal stated that petitioner was occupying a landholding at thereby deprived the oppositors of a right to which they are entitled.
Barangay Lagundi.
Such ruling finds no application to the present case, because neither Respondent
Mariano Raymundo (the applicant in the land registration case) nor Petitioner
For our purposes, a survey is not necessary. A certificate of title is conclusive Constantino Tirona (the oppositor in the cited case) was a holder of any certificate of
evidence not only of ownership of the land referred but also its location. The subject title over the land intended for registration. Such being the case, the land registration
of these proceedings is the land covered by OCT No. 4050. Accordingly, petitioners court was ordered to act in accordance with Section 37 of Act No. 496 [22] either by
required to demolish only whatever is constructed within its boundaries. dismissing the application if none of the litigants succeeded in showing a proper title,
(Underscoring supplied.) or by entering a decree awarding the land applied for to the person entitled thereto.
The old case of Legarda and Prieto vs. Saleeby[18] explains the nature of a torrens WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is hereby DENIED and the
certificate of title, as follows: assailed Decision and Resolution are AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner.

x x x. The registration, under the torrens system, does not give the owner any better SO ORDERED.
title than he had. If he does not already have a perfect title, he can not have it Narvasa, C.J., (Chairman), Romero, Melo, and Francisco, JJ., concur.
registered. Fee simple titles only may be registered. The certificate of registration
accumulates in one document a precise and correct statement of the exact status of
the fee held by its owner. The certificate, in the absence of fraud, is the evidence of
title and shows exactly the real interest of its owner. The title once registered, with
very few exceptions, should not thereafter be impugned, altered, changed, modified,
enlarged, or diminished, except in some direct proceeding permitted by
law. Otherwise all security in registered titles would be lost. A registered title can not
be altered, modified, enlarged, or diminished in a collateral proceeding and not even
by a direct proceeding, after the lapse of the period prescribed by law.
All in all, the land registration court did not err in relying on the certificate of title
instead of the survey plan; likewise, the appellate court did not commit any reversible
error in affirming the trial courts decision.
Second Issue: Denial of Due Process
Petitioner claims that he was denied due process because he was unable to take
the witness stand. We disagree. The essence of due process is the opportunity to be
heard. It is the denial of this opportunity that is repugnant to due process. [19] In this case,
petitioner was afforded an opportunity to present witnesses, and he did present
three. However, petitioner did not invoke his right to take the witness stand even when
the trial court ordered the submission of the parties memoranda which signified the
termination of the proceedings. Because he acquiesced to the termination of the case,
he forfeited his right to take the witness stand.
Likewise, we are not persuaded by his allegation that his own counsel hardly
participated in the proceedings. The records show that said counsel did cross-examine
Engineer Silverio Perez by propounding clarificatory questions to the latter. In any
event, the client is generally bound by the acts of his counsel. Petitioner has not shown
at all that his previous counsel had acted in such grossly negligent manner as to deprive
him of effective representation, or of due process.[20]
In support of his contention, petitioner cites Tirona vs. Naawa[21] which held:

We hold the view, however that respondent Judge erred when he ordered the
dismissal of the registration case over the objection of the oppositors; and when he
 Republic of the Philippines
6. Three parcels of land in the pueblo of Candon; valued at 150.00
SUPREME COURT
Manila Total 7,896.00

EN BANC
That, on or about the first months of the year 1888, the defendants, without judicial
authorization, nor friendly or extrajudicial agreement, took upon themselves the
G.R. No. L-4656 November 18, 1912
administration and enjoyment of the said properties and collected the rents, fruits, and
products thereof, to the serious detriment of the plaintiffs' interest; that,
RICARDO PARDELL Y CRUZ and notwithstanding the different and repeated demands extrajudicially made upon
VICENTA ORTIZ Y FELIN DE PARDELL, plaintiffs-appellees, Matilde Ortiz to divide the aforementioned properties with the plaintiff Vicente and to
vs. deliver to the latter the one-half thereof, together with one-half of the fruits and rents
GASPAR DE BARTOLOME Y ESCRIBANO and collected therefrom, the said defendant and her husband, the self-styled administrator
MATILDE ORTIZ Y FELIN DE BARTOLOME, defendants-appellants. of the properties mentioned, had been delaying the partition and delivery of the said
properties by means of unkept promises and other excuses; and that the plaintiffs, on
TORRES, J.: account of the extraordinary delay in the delivery of one-half of said properties, or
their value in cash, as the case might be, had suffered losses and damages in the
sum of P8,000. Said counsel for the plaintiffs therefore asked that judgment be
This is an appeal by bill of exceptions, from the judgment of October 5, 1907,
rendered by sentencing the defendants, Gaspar de Bartolome, and Matilde Ortiz Felin
whereby the Honorable Dionisio Chanco, judge, absolved the defendants from the
de Bartolome, to restore and deliver to the plaintiffs one-half of the total value in cash,
complaint, and the plaintiff from a counterclaim, without special finding as to costs.
according to appraisal, of the undivided property specified, which one-half amounted
approximately to P3,948, or if deemed proper, to recognize the plaintiff Vicenta Ortiz
Counsel for the spouses Ricardo y Cruz and Vicente Ortiz y Felin de Pardell, the first to be vested with the full and absolute right of ownership to the said undivided one-
of whom, absent in Spain by reason of his employment, conferred upon the second half of the properties in question, as universal testamentary heir thereof together with
sufficient and ample powers to appear before the courts of justice, on June 8, 1905, in the defendant Matilde Ortiz, to indemnify the plaintiffs in the sum of P8,000, for losses
his written complaint, alleged that the plaintiff, Vicente Ortiz, and the defendant, and damages, and to pay the costs.
Matilde Ortiz, are the duly recognized natural daughters of the spouses Miguel Ortiz
and Calixta Felin y Paula who died in Vigan, Ilocos Sur, in 1875 and 1882,
Counsel for the defendants, in his answer denied the facts alleged in paragraphs 1, 4,
respectively; that Calixta Felin, prior to her death, executed on August 17, 1876, a
6, 7, and 8 thereof, inasmuch as, upon the death of the litigating sister's brother
nuncupative will in Vigan whereby she made her four children, named Manuel,
Manuel, their mother, who was still living, was his heir by force of law, and the
Francisca, Vicenta, and Matilde, surnamed Ortiz y Felin, her sole and universal heirs
defendants had never refused to give to the plaintiff Vicente Ortiz her share of the
of all her property; that, of the persons enumerated, Manuel died before his mother
said properties; and stated that he admitted the facts alleged in paragraph 2, provided
and Francisca a few years after her death, leaving no heirs by force of law, and
it be understood, however, that the surname of the defendant's mother was Felin, and
therefore the only existing heirs of the said testatrix are the plaintiff Vicenta Ortiz and
not Feliu, and that Miguel Ortiz died in Spain, and not in Vigan; that he also admitted
the defendant Matilde Ortiz; that, aside from some personal property and jewelry
paragraph 3 of the complaint, with the difference that the said surname should be
already divided among the heirs, the testatrix possessed, at the time of the execution
Felin, and likewise paragraph 5, except the part thereof relating to the personal
of her will, and left at her death the real properties which, with their respective cash
property and the jewelry, since the latter had not yet been divided; that the said
values, are as follows:
jewelry was in the possession of the plaintiffs and consisted of: one Lozada gold
1. A house of strong material, with the lot on which it is built, situated chronometer watch with a chain in the form of a bridle curb and a watch charm
P6,000.00
on Escolta Street, Vigan, and valued at consisting of the engraving of a postage stamp on a stone mounted in gold and
bearing the initials M. O., a pair of cuff buttons made of gold coins, four small gold
2. A house of mixed material, with the lot on which it stands, at No. buttons, two finger rings, another with the initials M. O., and a gold bracelet; and that
1,500.00
88 Washington Street, Vigan; valued at the defendants were willing to deliver to the plaintiffs, in conformity with their petitions,
one-half of the total value in cash, according to appraisement, of the undivided real
3. A lot on Magallanes Street, Vigan; valued at 100.00 properties specified in paragraph 5, which half amounted to P3,948.
4. A parcel of rice land, situated in the barrio of San Julian, Vigan;
60.00 In a special defense said counsel alleged that the defendants had never refused to
valued at
divide the said property and had in fact several years before solicited the partition of
5. A parcel of rice land in the pueblo of Santa Lucia; valued at 86.00 the same; that, from 1886 to 1901, inclusive, there was collected from the property on
Calle Escolta the sum of 288 pesos, besides a few other small amounts derived from
other sources, which were delivered to the plaintiffs with other larger amounts, in
1891, and from the property on Calle Washington, called La Quinta, 990.95 pesos, furthermore, it is prayed that the plaintiffs be awarded an indemnity of P8,000 for
which proceeds, added together, made a total of 1,278.95 pesos, saving error or losses and damages, and the costs." Notwithstanding the opposition of the
omission; that, between the years abovementioned, Escolta, and that on Calle defendants, the said amendment was admitted by the court and counsel for the
Washington, La Quinta, 376.33, which made a total of 1,141.71, saving error or defendants were allowed to a period of three days within which to present a new
omission; that, in 1897, the work of reconstruction was begun of the house on Calle answer. An exception was taken to this ruling.
Escolta, which been destroyed by an earthquake, which work was not finished until
1903 and required an expenditure on the part of the defendant Matilde Ortiz, of The proper proceedings were had with reference to the valuation of the properties
5,091.52 pesos; that all the collections made up to August 1, 1905, including the rent concerned in the division sought and incidental issues were raised relative to the
from the stores, amounted to only P3,654.15, and the expenses, to P6,252.32, there partition of some of them and their award to one or the other of the parties. Due
being, consequently, a balance of P2,598.17, which divided between the sisters, the consideration was taken of the averments and statements of both parties who agreed
plaintiff and the defendant, would make the latter's share P1,299.08; that, as shown between themselves, before the court, that any of them might at any time acquire, at
by the papers kept by the plaintiffs, in the year 1891 the defendant Bartolome the valuation fixed by the expert judicial appraiser, any of the properties in question,
presented to the plaintiffs a statement in settlements of accounts, and delivered to the there being none in existence excluded by the litigants. The court, therefore, by order
person duly authorized by the latter for the purpose, the sum of P2,606.29, which the of December 28, 1905, ruled that the plaintiffs were entitled to acquire, at the
said settlement showed was owing his principals, from various sources; that, the valuation determined by the said expert appraiser, the building known as La Quinta,
defendant Bartolome having been the administrator of the undivided property claimed the lot on which it stands and the warehouses and other improvements comprised
by the plaintiffs, the latter were owing the former legal remuneration of the percentage within the inclosed land, and the seeds lands situated in the pueblos of Vigan and
allowed by law for administration; and that the defendants were willing to pay the sum Santa Lucia; and that the defendants were likewise entitled to acquire the house on
of P3,948, one-half of the total value of the said properties, deducting therefrom the Calle Escolta, the lot on Calle Magallanes, and the three parcels of land situated in
amount found to be owing them by the plaintiffs, and asked that judgment be the pueblo of Candon.
rendered in their favor to enable them to recover from the latter that amount, together
with the costs and expenses of the suit.
After this partition had been made counsel for the defendants, by a writing of March 8,
1906, set forth: That, having petitioned for the appraisement of the properties in
The defendants, in their counter claim, repeated each and all of the allegations question for the purpose of their partition, it was not to be understood that he desired
contained in each of the paragraphs of section 10 of their answer; that the plaintiffs from the exception duly entered to the ruling made in the matter of the amendment to
were obliged to pay to the administrator of the said property the remuneration allowed the complaint; that the properties retained by the defendants were valued at P9,310,
him by law; that, as the revenues collected by the defendants amounted to no more and those retained by the plaintiffs, at P2,885, one-half of which amounts each party
than P3,654.15 and the expenditures incurred by them, to P6,252.32, it followed that had to deliver to the other, as they were pro indiviso properties; that, therefore, the
the plaintiffs owed the defendants P1,299.08, that is one-half of the difference defendants had to pay the plaintiffs the sum of P3,212.50, after deducting the amount
between the amount collected from and that extended on the properties, and asked which the plaintiffs were obliged to deliver to the defendants, as one-half of the price
that judgment be therefore rendered in their behalf to enable them to collect this sum of the properties retained by the former; that, notwithstanding that the amount of the
from the plaintiffs, Ricardo Pardell and Vicenta Ortiz, with legal interest thereon from counterclaim for the expenses incurred in the reconstruction of the pro indiviso
December 7, 1904, the date when the accounts were rendered, together with the property should be deducted from the sum which the defendants had to pay the
sums to which the defendant Bartolome was entitled for the administration of the plaintiffs, the former, for the purpose of bringing the matter of the partition to a close,
undivided properties in question. would deliver to the latter, immediately upon the signing of the instrument of purchase
and sale, the sum of P3,212.50, which was one-half of the value of the properties
By a written motion of August 21, 1905, counsel for the plaintiffs requested alloted to the defendants; such delivery, however, was not to be understood as a
permission to amend the complaint by inserting immediately after the words "or renouncement of the said counterclaim, but only as a means for the final termination
respective appraisal," fifth line of paragraph 5, the phrase "in cash in accordance with of the pro indiviso status of the property.
the assessed value," and likewise further to amend the same, in paragraph 6 thereof,
by substituting the following word in lieu of the petition for the remedy sought: "By The case having been heard, the court on October 5, 1907, rendered judgment
reason of all the foregoing, I beg the court to be pleased to render the judgment by holding that the revenues and the expenses were compensated by the residence
sentencing the defendants, Gaspar de Bartolome and Matilde Ortiz Felin de enjoyed by the defendant party, that no losses or damages were either caused or
Bartolome, to restore and deliver to the plaintiffs an exact one-half of the total vale of suffered, nor likewise any other expense besides those aforementioned, and
the undivided properties described in the complaint, such value to be ascertained by absolved the defendants from the complaint and the plaintiffs from the counterclaim,
the expert appraisal of two competent persons, one of whom shall be appointed by with no special finding as to costs. An exception was taken to this judgment by
the plaintiffs and the other by the defendants, and, in case of disagreement between counsel for the defendants who moved for a new trial on the grounds that the
these two appointees such value shall be determined by a third expert appraiser evidence presented did not warrant the judgment rendered and that the latter was
appointed by the court, or, in a proper case, by the price offered at public auction; or, contrary to law. This motion was denied, exception whereto was taken by said
in lieu thereof, it is requested that the court recognize the plaintiff, Vicenta Ortiz, to be counsel, who filed the proper bill of exceptions, and the same was approved and
vested with a full and absolute right to an undivided one-half of the said properties; forwarded to the clerk of this court, with a transcript of the evidence.
Both of the litigating sisters assented to a partition by halves of the property left in her interests of the community nor prevent the coowners from utilizing them
will by their mother at her death; in fact, during the course of this suit, proceedings according to their rights.
were had, in accordance with the agreement made, for the division between them of
the said hereditary property of common ownership, which division was recognized Matilde Ortiz and her husband occupied the upper story, designed for use as a
and approved in the findings of the trial court, as shown by the judgment appealed dwelling, in the house of joint ownership; but the record shows no proof that, by so
from. doing, the said Matilde occasioned any detriment to the interest of the community
property, nor that she prevented her sister Vicenta from utilizing the said upper story
The issues raised by the parties, aside from said division made during the trial, and according to her rights. It is to be noted that the stores of the lower floor were rented
which have been submitted to this court for decision, concern: (1) The indemnity and accounting of the rents was duly made to the plaintiffs.
claimed for losses and damages, which the plaintiffs allege amount to P8,000, in
addition to the rents which should have been derived from the house on Calle Each coowner of realty held pro indiviso exercises his rights over the whole property
Escolta, Vigan; (2) the payment by the plaintiffs to the defendants of the sum of and may use and enjoy the same with no other limitation than that he shall not injure
P1,299.08, demanded by way of counterclaim, together with legal interest thereon the interests of his coowners, for the reason that, until a division be made, the
from December 7, 1904; (3) the payment to the husband of the defendant Matilde respective part of each holder can not be determined and every one of the coowners
Ortiz, of a percentage claimed to be due him as the administrator of the property of exercises, together with his other coparticipants, joint ownership over the pro
common ownership; (4) the division of certain jewelry in the possession of the plaintiff indiviso property, in addition to his use and enjoyment of the same.
Vicenta Ortiz; and (5) the petition that the amendment be held to have been
improperly admitted, which was made by the plaintiffs in their written motion of August
21, 1905, against the opposition of the defendants, through which admission the latter As the hereditary properties of the joint ownership of the two sisters, Vicenta Ortiz,
were obliged to pay the former [Link] plaintiff, and Matilde Ortiz, defendant, were situated in the Province of Ilocos Sur, and
were in the care of the last named, assisted by her husband, while the plaintiff Vicenta
with her husband was residing outside of the said province the greater part of the time
Before entering upon an explanation of the propriety or impropriety of the claims between 1885 and 1905, when she left these Islands for Spain, it is not at all strange
made by both parties, it is indispensable to state that the trial judge, in absolving the that delays and difficulties should have attended the efforts made to collect the rents
defendants from the complaint, held that they had not caused losses and damages to and proceeds from the property held in common and to obtain a partition of the latter,
the plaintiffs, and that the revenues and the expenses were compensated, in view of especially during several years when, owing to the insurrection, the country was in a
the fact that the defendants had been living for several years in the Calle Escolta turmoil; and for this reason, aside from that founded on the right of coownership of the
house, which was pro indiviso property of joint ownership. defendants, who took upon themselves the administration and care of the properties
of joint tenancy for purposes of their preservation and improvement, these latter are
By this finding absolving the defendants from the complaint, and which was not obliged to pay to the plaintiff Vicenta one-half of the rents which might have been
acquiesced in by the plaintiffs who made no appeal therefrom, the first issue has been derived from the upper of the story of the said house on Calle Escolta, and, much
decided which was raised by the plaintiffs, concerning the indemnity for losses and less, because one of the living rooms and the storeroom thereof were used for the
damages, wherein are comprised the rents which should have been obtained from the storage of some belongings and effects of common ownership between the litigants.
upper story of the said house during the time it was occupied by the defendants, The defendant Matilde, therefore, in occupying with her husband the upper floor of the
Matilde Ortiz and her husband, Gaspar de Bartolome. said house, did not injure the interests of her coowner, her sister Vicenta, nor did she
prevent the latter from living therein, but merely exercised a legitimate right pertaining
Notwithstanding the acquiescence on the part of the plaintiffs, assenting to the said to her as coowner of the property.
finding whereby the defendants were absolved from the complaint, yet, as such
absolution is based on the compensation established in the judgment of the trial court, Notwithstanding the above statements relative to the joint-ownership rights which
between the amounts which each party is entitled to claim from the other, it is entitled the defendants to live in the upper story of the said house, yet in view of the
imperative to determine whether the defendant Matilde Ortiz, as coowner of the house fact that the record shows it to have been proved that the defendant Matilde's
on Calle Escolta, was entitled, with her husband, to reside therein, without paying to husband, Gaspar de Bartolome, occupied for four years a room or a part of the lower
her coowner, Vicenta Ortiz, who, during the greater part of the time, lived with her floor of the same house on Calle Escolta, using it as an office for the justice of the
husband abroad, one-half of the rents which the upper story would have produced, peace, a position which he held in the capital of that province, strict justice, requires
had it been rented to a stranger. that he pay his sister-in-law, the plaintiff, one half of the monthly rent which the said
quarters could have produced, had they been leased to another person. The amount
Article 394 of the Civil Code prescribes: of such monthly rental is fixed at P16 in accordance with the evidence shown in the
record. This conclusion as to Bartolome's liability results from the fact that, even as
the husband of the defendant coowner of the property, he had no right to occupy and
Each coowner may use the things owned in common, provided he uses use gratuitously the said part of the lower floor of the house in question, where he
them in accordance with their object and in such manner as not to injure the lived with his wife, to the detriment of the plaintiff Vicenta who did not receive one-half
of the rent which those quarters could and should have produced, had they been his sister-in-law, the said defendant, the claimant is not entitled to the payment of any
occupied by a stranger, in the same manner that rent was obtained from the rooms on remuneration whatsoever. Of his own accord and as an officious manager, he
the lower floor that were used as stores. Therefore, the defendant Bartolome must administered the said pro indiviso property, one-half of which belonged to his wife
pay to the plaintiff Vicenta P384, that is, one-half of P768, the total amount of the who held it in joint tenancy, with his sister-in-law, and the law does not allow him any
rents which should have been obtained during four years from the quarters occupied compensation as such voluntary administrator. He is merely entitled to a
as an office by the justice of the peace of Vigan. reimbursement for such actual and necessary expenditures as he may have made on
the undivided properties and an indemnity for the damages he may have suffered
With respect to the second question submitted for decision to this court, relative to the while acting in that capacity, since at all events it was his duty to care for and
payment of the sum demanded as a counterclaim, it was admitted and proved in the preserve the said property, half of which belonged to his wife; and in exchange for the
present case that, as a result of a serious earthquake on August 15, 1897, the said trouble occasioned him by the administration of his sister-in-law's half of the said
house on Calle Escolta was left in ruins and uninhabitable, and that, for its property, he with his wife resided in the upper story of the house aforementioned,
reconstruction or repair, the defendants had to expend the sum of P6,252.32. This without payment of one-half of the rents said quarters might have produced had they
expenditure, notwithstanding that it was impugned, during the trial, by the plaintiffs, been leased to another person.
was duly proved by the evidence presented by the defendants. Evidence,
unsuccessfully rebutted, was also introduced which proved that the rents produced by With respect to the division of certain jewelry, petitioned for by the defendants and
all the rural and urban properties of common ownership amounted, up to August 1, appellants only in their brief in this appeal, the record of the proceedings in the lower
1905, to the sum of P3,654.15 which, being applied toward the cost of the repair work court does not show that the allegation made by the plaintiff Vicenta is not true, to the
on the said house, leaves a balance of P2,598.17, the amount actually advanced by effect that the deceased mother of the litigant sisters disposed of this jewelry during
the defendants, for the rents collected by them were not sufficient for the termination her lifetime, because, had she not done so, the will made by the said deceased would
of all the work undertaken on the said building, necessary for its complete repair and have been exhibited in which the said jewelry would have been mentioned, at least it
to replace it in a habitable condition. It is therefore lawful and just that the plaintiff would have been proved that the articles in question came into the possession of the
Vicenta Ortiz, who was willing to sell to her sister Matilde for P1,500, her share in the plaintiff Vicenta without the expressed desire and the consent of the deceased mother
house in question, when it was in a ruinous state, should pay the defendants one-half of the said sisters, for the gift of this jewelry was previously assailed in the courts,
of the amount expanded in the said repair work, since the building after reconstruction without success; therefore, and in view of its inconsiderable value, there is no reason
was worth P9,000, according to expert appraisal. Consequently, the counterclaim for holding that the said gift was not made.
made by the defendants for the payment to them of the sum of P1,299.08, is a proper
demand, though from this sum a reduction must be made of P384, the amount of one- As regards the collection of the sum of P910.50, which is the difference between the
half of the rents which should have been collected for the use of the quarters assessed value of the undivided real properties and the price of the same as
occupied by the justice of the peace, the payment of which is incumbent upon the determined by the judicial expert appraiser, it is shown by the record that the ruling of
husband of the defendant Matilde, as aforesaid, and the balance remaining, P915.08, the trial judge admitting the amendment to the original complaint, is in accord with the
is the amount which the plaintiff Vicenta must pay to the defendants. law and principles of justice, for the reason that any of the coowners of a pro
indiviso property, subject to division or sale, is entitled to petition for its valuation by
The defendants claim to be entitled to the collection of legal interest on the amount of competent expert appraisers. Such valuation is not prejudicial to any of the joint
the counterclaim, from December 7, 1904. This contention can not be sustained, owners, but is beneficial to their interests, considering that, as a general rule, the
inasmuch as, until this suit is finally decided, it could not be known whether the assessed value of a building or a parcel of realty is less than the actual real value of
plaintiffs would or would not be obliged to pay the sum whatever in reimbursement of the property, and this being appraiser to determine, in conjunction with the one
expenses incurred by the plaintiffs in the repair work on the said house on Calle selected by the plaintiffs, the value of the properties of joint ownership. These two
Escolta, whether or not the defendants, in turn, were entitled to collect any such experts took part in the latter proceedings of the suit until finally, and during the
amount, and, finally, what the net sum would be which the plaintiff's might have to pay course of the latter, the litigating parties agreed to an amicable division of the pro
as reimbursement for one-half of the expenditure made by the defendants. Until final indiviso hereditary property, in accordance with the price fixed by the judicial expert
disposal of the case, no such net sum can be determined, nor until then can the appraiser appointed as a third party, in view of the disagreement between and
debtor be deemed to be in arrears. In order that there be an obligation to pay legal nonconformity of the appraisers chosen by the litigants. Therefore it is improper now
interest in connection with a matter at issue between the parties, it must be declared to claim a right to the collection of the said sum, the difference between the assessed
in a judicial decision from what date the interest will be due on the principal concerned value and that fixed by the judicial expert appraiser, for the reason that the increase in
in the suit. This rule has been established by the decisions of the supreme court of price, as determined by this latter appraisal, redounded to the benefit of both parties.
Spain, in reference to articles 1108, 1109, and 1110 of the Civil Code, reference on
April 24, 1867, November 19, 1869, and February 22, 1901. In consideration of the foregoing, whereby the errors assigned to the lower court have
been duly refuted, it is our opinion that, with a partial reversal of the judgment
With regard to the percentage, as remuneration claimed by the husband of the appealed from, in so far as it absolves the plaintiffs from the counterclaim presented
defendant Matilde for his administration of the property of common ownership, by the defendants, we should and hereby do sentence the plaintiffs to the payment of
inasmuch as no stipulation whatever was made in the matter by and between him and the sum of P915.08, the balance of the sum claimed by the defendants as a balance
of the one-half of the amount which the defendants advanced for the reconstruction or
repair of the Calle Escolta house, after deducting from the total of such sum claimed
by the latter the amount of P384 which Gaspar de Bartolome, the husband of the
defendant Matilde, should have paid as one-half of the rents due for his occupation of
the quarters on the lower floor of the said house as an office for the justice of the
peace court of Vigan; and we further find: (1) That the defendants are not obliged to
pay one-half of the rents which could have been obtained from the upper story of the
said house; (2) that the plaintiffs can not be compelled to pay the legal interest from
December 7, 1904, on the sum expanded in the reconstruction of the aforementioned
house, but only the interest fixed by law, at the rate of 6 per cent per annum, from the
date of the judgment to be rendered in accordance with this decision; (3) that the
husband of the defendant Matilde Ortiz is not entitled to any remuneration for the
administration of the pro indiviso property belonging to both parties; (4) that, neither is
he entitled to collect from the plaintiffs the sum of P910.50, the difference between the
assessed valuation and the price set by the expert appraisal solicited by the plaintiffs
in their amendment to the complaint; and, (5) that no participation shall be made of
jewelry aforementioned now in the possession of the plaintiff Vicenta Ortiz. The said
judgment, as relates to the points appealed, is affirmed, in so far as its findings agree
with those of this decision, and is reversed, in so far as they do not. No special finding
is made regarding the costs of both instances. So ordered.

Arellano, C.J., Mapa, Johnson, Carson and Trent, JJ., concur.

 Republic of the Philippines lease with the conditions and terms similar to that of the one under consideration, and
SUPREME COURT that from this it follows that she could not ratify the said lease as claimed by the
Manila defendant.

EN BANC On January 21,1928, Liberata Macapagal Viuda de Melencio, duly appointed and
qualified as administratrix of the estate of her deceased husband, Ramon Melencio,
G.R. No. L-32047 November 1, 1930 filed a petition praying to be allowed to join the plaintiffs as party to the present case,
which petition was granted in open court on January 31,1928. Her amended
complaint of intervention of February 14,1928, contains allegations similar to those
MANUEL MELENCIO, MARIANO MELENCIO, PURA MELENCIO, and CARIDAD alleged in the complaint of the original plaintiffs, and she further alleges that the
MELENCIO, plaintiffs-appellants, defendant-appellee has occupied the land in question ever since November, 1920,
vs. under and by virtue of a verbal contract of lease for a term from month to month. To
DY TIAO LAY, defendant-appellee. this complaint of intervention, the defendant-appellee filed an answer reproducing the
allegations contained in his answer reproducing the allegations contained in his
OSTRAND, J.: answer to the complaint of the original plaintiffs and setting up prescription as a
further special defense.
On August 1,1927, the plaintiffs, Manuel, Mariano, Pura and Caridad Melencio,
brought the present action against the defendant-appellee, Dy Tiao Lay for the It appears from the evidence that the land in question was originally owned by one
recovery of the possession of a parcel of land situated in the town of Cabanatuan, Julian Melencio. He died prior to the year 1905 leaving his widow, Ruperta Garcia,
Nueva Ecija, and containing an area of 4,628.25 square meters. The plaintiffs further and his five children, Juliana, Ramon, Ruperta, Pedro R., and Emilio Melencio. Emilio
demand a monthly rental of P300 for the use and occupation of the parcel from May, Melencio also died before 1905, his son Jose P. Melencio, then a minor, succeeding
1926, until the date of the surrender to them of the possession thereof; and that if it is to his interest in the said parcel of land by representation. A question has been raised
found that the said appellee was occupying the said parcel of land by virtue of a as to whether the land was community property of the marriage of Julian Melencio
contract of lease, such contract should be declared null and void for lack of consent, and Ruperta Garcia, but the evidence is practically undisputed that Ruperta Garcia in
concurrence, and ratification by the owners thereof. reality held nothing but a widow's usufruct in the land.

In his answer, the defendant pleaded the general issue, and as special defenses, he On July 24,1905, Ruperta Garcia, Pedro R. Melencio, Juliana Melencio, and Ruperta
alleged in substance that he was occupying the said tract of land by virtue of a Melencio executed a contract of lease of the land in favor of one Yap Kui Chin, but
contract of lease executed on July 24,1905, in favor of his predecessor in interest, by neither Jose P. Melencio nor Ramon Melencio were mentioned in the lease. The term
Ruperta Garcia, Pedro Melencio, Juliana Melencio, and Ruperta Melencio under the of the lease was for twenty years, extendible for a like period at the option of the
terms specified therein, and which contract is still in force; that Liberata Macapagal, lessee. The purpose of the lessee was to establish a rice mill on the land, with the
the mother of the plaintiffs, in her capacity as judicial administratrix of the estate of necessary buildings for warehouses and for quarters for the employees, and it was
Ramon Melencio, one of the original coowners of the parcel of land in question, further stipulated that at the termination of the original period of the lease, or the
actually recognized and ratified the existence and validity of the contract aforesaid by extension therof, the lessors might purchase all the buildings and improvements on
virtue of the execution of a public document by her on or about November 27,1920, the land at a price to be fixed by experts appointed by the parties, but that if the
and by collecting from the assignees of the original lessee the monthly rent for the lessors should fail to take advantage of that privilege, the lease would continue for
premises until April 30, 1926; and that said defendant deposits with the clerk of court another and further period of twenty years. The document was duly acknowledged but
the sum of P20.20 every month as rent thereof and that as a counterclaim, he seeks was never recorded with the register of deeds. The original rent agreed upon was P25
the recovery of P272 for goods and money delivered by him to the plaintiffs. per month, but by reason of the construction of a street through the land, the monthly
rent was reduced of P20.20.
The plaintiffs filed a reply to the answer alleging, among other things, that Ruperta
Garcia was not one of the coowners of the land in question; that the person who Shortly after the execution of the lease, the lessee took possession of the parcel in
signed the alleged contract of lease never represented themselves as being the sole question and erected the mill as well as the necessary buildings, and it appears that
and exclusive owners of the land subject to the lease as alleged by the defendant in in matters pertaining to the lease, he dealt with Pedro R. Melencio, who from 1905
his answer; that the said contract of lease of July 24,1905, is null and void for being until his death in 1920, acted as manager of the property held in common by the heirs
executed without the intervention and consent of two coowners, Ramon Melencio and of Julian Melencio and Ruperta Garcia. The original lessee, Yap Kui Chin, died in
Jose P. Melencio, and without the marital consent of the husbands of Juliana and 1912, and the lease, as well as the other property, was transferred to Uy Eng Jui who
Ruperta Melencio; that the lessee has repeatedly violated the terms and conditions of again transferred it to Uy Eng Jui & Co., an unregistered partnership. Finally the lease
the said contract; and that Liberata Macapagal, in her capacity as administratrix of the came into the hands of Dy Tiao Lay, the herein defendant-appellee.
property of her deceased husband, could not lawfully and legally execute a contract of
Ramon Melencio died in 1914, and his widow, Liberata Macapagal, was appointed the case of Enriquez vs. A. S. Watson and Co. (22 Phil., 623), contains a full
administratrix of his estate. In 1913 the land which includes the parcel in question was discussion of the effect of alterations of leased community property, and no further
registered under the Torrens system. The lease was not mentioned in the certificate discussion upon the point need here be considered.
of title, but it was stated that one house and three warehouses on the land were the
property of Yap Kui Chin. The second proposition is likewise of little merit. Under the circumstances, the
provision in the contract that the lessee, at any time before he erected any building on
In 1920 the heirs of Julian Melencio made an extrajudicial partition of parts of the the land, might rescind the lease, can hardly be regarded as a violation of article 1256
inheritance, and among other things, the land here in question fell to the share of the of the Civil Code.
children of Ramon Melencio, who are the original plaintiffs in the present case. Their
mother, Liberata Macapagal, as administratrix of the estate of her deceased husband, The third and fourth proposition are, in our opinion, determinative of the controversy.
Ramon, collected the rent for the lease at the rate of P20.20 per month until the The court below based its decision principally on the case of Enriquez vs. A.S.
month of May,1926, when she demanded of the lessee that the rent should be Watson & Co. (22 Phil., 623), and on the resolution of the Direccion General de
increased to P300 per month, and she was then informed by the defendant that a los Registros dated April 26,1907. (Jurisprudencia Civil, vol.107, p. 222.) An
written lease existed and that according to the terms thereof, the defendant was examination of the Enriquez case will show that it differs materially from the present.
entitled to an extension of the lease at the original rental. The plaintiffs insisted that In that case all of the coowners of a lot and building executed a contract of lease of
they never had any knowledge of the existence of such a contract of lease and the property for the term of eighteen years in favor of A. S. Watson & Co.; one of the
maintained that in such case the lease was executed without their consent and was owners was minor, but he was represented by his legally appointed guardian, and the
void. It may be noted that upon careful search, a copy of the contract of lease was action of the latter in signing the lease on behalf of the minor was formally approved
found among the papers of the deceased Pedro R, Melencio. Thereafter the present by the Court of First Instance. In the present case only a small majority of the
action was brought to set aside the lease and to recover possession of the land. Upon coowners executed the lease here in question, and according to the terms of the
trial, the court below rendered judgment in favor of the defendant declaring the lease contract the lease might be given a duration of sixty years; that is widely different from
valid and ordering the plaintiffs to pay the P272 demanded by the defendant in his a lease granted by all of the coowners for a term of only eighteen years.
counterclaim. From this judgment the plaintiffs appealed.
The resolution of April 26,1907, is more in point. It relates to the inscription or
The contention of the appellants is that the aforesaid contract of lease (Exhibit C) is registration of a contract of lease of some pasture grounds. The majority of the
null and void for the following reasons: coowners of the property executed the lease for the term of twelve years but when the
lessees presented the lease for inscription in the registry of property, the registrar
1. That Exhibit C calls for an alteration of the property in question and denied the inscription on the ground that the term of the lease exceeded six years and
therefore ought to have been signed by all the coowners as by law required that therefore the majority of the coowners lacked authority to grant the lease.
in the premises. The Direccion General de los Registros held that the contract of lease for a period
exceeding six years, constitutes a real right subject to registry and that the lease in
2. That the validity and fulfillment of the said agreement of lease were made question was valid.
to depend upon the will of the lessee exclusively.
The conclusions reached by the Direccion General led to considerable criticism and
3. That the said contract of lease being for a term of over six years, the same have been overruled by a decision of the Supreme Court of Spain dated June 1,1909.
is null and void pursuant to the provision of article 1548 of the Civil Code. In that decision the court made the following statement of the case (translation):

4. That the duration of the same is unreasonably long, thus being against The joint owners of 511 out of 1,000 parts of the realty denominated El
public policy. Mortero, leased out the whole property for twelve years to Doña Josefa de la
Rosa; whereupon the Count and Countess Trespalacios together with other
coowners brought this suit to annul the lease and, in view of the fact that the
5. That the defendant-appellee and his predecessors in interest repeatedly land was indivisible, prayed for its sale by public auction and the distribution
violated the provisions of the agreement. of the price so obtained; they alleged that they neither took part nor
consented to the lease; that the decision of the majority of part owners
The first proposition is based on article 397 of the Civil Code which provides that referred to in article 398 of the Code, implies a common deliberation on the
"none of the owners shall, without the consent of the others, make any alterations in step to be taken , for to do without it, would, even more than to do without
the common property even though such alterations might be advantageous to all." We the minority, be nothing less than plunder; and that, even if this deliberation
do not think that the alterations are of sufficient importance to nullify the lease, were not absolutely necessary, the power of the majority would still be
especially so since none of the coowners objected to such alterations until over confined to decisions touching the management and enjoyment of the
twenty years after the execution of the contract of lease. The decision of this court in common property, and would not include acts of ownership, such as a lease
 for twelve years, which according to the Mortgage Law gives rise to a real Considering that, applying this doctrine to the case before us, one of the
right, which must be recorded, and which can be performed only by the grounds upon which the judgment appealed from, denying the validity of the
owners of the property leased. lease made by the majority of the part owners of the pasture land El
Mortero is based, must be upheld; to wit, that the period of duration is twelve
The part owners who had executed the contract prayed in reconvention that years and the consent of all the coowners has not been obtained; hence, the
it held valid for all the owners in common, and if this could not be, then for all third, fourth. and fifth assignments of error are without merit; firstly, because
those who had signed it, and for the rest, for the period of six years; and article 398 of the Civil Code, alleged to have been violated, refers to acts
the Audiencia of Caceres having rendered judgment holding the contract null decided upon by the majority of the part owners, touching the management
and void, and ordering the sale of the realty and the distribution of the price, and enjoyment of the common property, and does not contradict what we
the defendants appealed alleging under the third and fourth assignments of have stated in the foregoing paragraph; secondly because although the
error, that the judgment was a violation of article 398 of the Civil Code, which cases cited were such as arose upon leases for more than six years, yet this
is absolute and sets no limit of time for the efficacy of the decisions arrived at point was not raised on appeal, and could not therefore be passed upon; and
by the majority of the part owners for the enjoyment of the common property, thirdly, because it cannot be denied that there is an analogy between a
citing the decisions of June 30th, 1897, of July 8th,1902, and of October manager without special authority, who is forbidden by article 1548 of the
30th, 1907; under the fifth assignments of error the appellants contended Code to give a lease for a period of over six years, and the joint owners
that in including joint owners among those referred to in said article, which constituting a legal majority, who may decide to lease out the indivisible
sets certain limits to the power of leasing, in the course of the management property, with respect to the shares of the other coowners; and having come
of another's property, the court applied article 1548 unduly; and by the to the conclusion that the contract is null and void, there is no need to
seventh assignments of error, they maintained the judgment appealed from discuss the first two assignments of error which refer to another of the bases
also violated article 1727, providing that the principal is not bound where his adopted, however erroneously, by the trial court;
agent has acted beyond his authority; whence it may be inferred that if in
order to hold the contract null and void, the majority of the part owners are Considering that the sixth assignment of error is without merit, inasmuch as
looked upon as managers or agents exercising limited powers, it must at the joint ownership of property is not a sort of agency and cannot be
least be conceded that in so far as the act in question lies within the scope of governed by the provisions relating to the latter contract; whence, article
their powers, it is valid; the contract cannot be annulled in toto. 1727 of the Code alleged to have been violated, can no more be applied,
than, the question of the validity or nullity of the lease being raise, upon the
The Supreme Court held that the appeal from the decision of the Audiencia of contract as celebrated, it would be allowable to modify a posteriorisome one
Caceres was not well taken and expressed the following consideranda: or other of the main conditions stipulated, like that regarding the duration of
the lease, for this would amount to a novation; still less allowable would it be
to authorize diverse periods for the different persons unequally interested in
Considering that, although as a rule the contract of lease constitutes an act the fulfillment.
of management, as this court has several times held, cases may yet arise,
either owing to the nature of the subject matter, or to the period of duration,
which may render it imperative to record the contract in the registry of Taking into consideration articles 398,1548, and 1713 of the Civil Code and following
property, in pursuance of the Mortgage Law, where the contract of lease the aforesaid decision of June 1,1909, we hold that the contract of lease here in
may give rise to a real right in favor of the lessee, and it would then question is null and void.
constitute such a sundering of the ownership as transcends mere
management; in such cases it must of necessity be recognized that the part It has been suggested that by reason of prescription and by acceptance of benefits
owners representing the greater portion of the property held in common have under the lease, the plaintiffs are estopped to question the authority for making the
no power to lease said property for a longer period than six years without the [Link] this we may answer that the burden of proof of prescription devolved upon
consent of all the coowners, whose propriety rights, expressly recognized by the defendant and that as far as we can find, there is no proof that Ramon Melencio
the law, would by contracts of long duration be restricted or annulled; and as and his successors ever had knowledge of the existence of the lease in question prior
under article 1548 of the Civil Code such contracts cannot be entered into by to 1926. We cannot by mere suspicion conclude that they were informed of the
the husband with respect to his wife's property, by the parent or guardian existence of the document and its terms; it must be remembered that under a strict
with respect to that of the child or ward, and by the manager in default of interpretation of the terms of the lease, the lessees could remain indefinitely in their
special power, since the contract of lease only produces personal tenancy unless the lessors could purchase the mill and the buildings on the land. In
obligations, and cannot without the consent of all persons interested or such circumstances, better evidence than that presented by the defendant in regard
express authority from the owner, be extended to include stipulations which to the plaintiff's knowledge of the lease must be required.
may alter its character, changing it into a contract of partial alienation of the
property leased; The fact that Ramon during his lifetime received his share of the products of land
owned in common with his coheirs is not sufficient proof of knowledge of the
existence of the contract of lease when it is considered that the land in question was
only a small portion of a large tract which Pedro R. Melencio was administering in
connection with other community property.

The appealed judgment as to the validity of the lease is therefore reversed, and it is
ordered that the possession of the land in controversy be delivered to the intervenor
Liberata Macapagal in her capacity as administratrix of the estate of the deceased
Ramon Melencio. It is further ordered that the defendant pay to said administratrix a
monthly rent of P50 for the occupation of the land from May 1st, 1926, until the land is
delivered to the administratrix. The sum of P272 demanded by the defendant in his
counterclaim may be deducted from the total amount of the rent due and unpaid. The
building erected on the land by the defendant and his predecessors in interest may be
removed by him, or otherwise disposed of, within six months from the promulgation of
this decision. Without costs. So ordered.

Avanceña, C.J., , Malcolm, Johns, Romualdez, and Villa-Real, JJ., concur.

Jonhson, J., I reserve my vote.
 Republic of the Philippines Araneta Inc., particularly the financial burden, it was to receive 50 per cent of the
SUPREME COURT gross selling price of the lots, and any rents that may be collected from the property,
Manila while in the process of sale, the remaining 50 per cent to be divided in equal portions
among the three co-owners so that each will receive 16.33 per cent of the gross
EN BANC receipts.

G.R. No. L-3404 April 2, 1951 Because of the importance of paragraphs 9, 11 and 15 of the contract (Exh. 6), for
purposes of reference we are reproducing them below:
ANGELA I. TUASON, plaintiff-appellant,
vs. (9) This contract shall remain in full force and effect during all the time that it
ANTONIO TUASON, JR., and GREGORIO ARANETA, INC., defendants-appellees. may be necessary for the PARTY OF THE SECOND PART to fully sell the
said property in small and subdivided lots and to fully collect the purchase
prices due thereon; it being understood and agreed that said lots may be
MONTEMAYOR, J.: rented while there are no purchasers thereof;

In 1941 the sisters Angela I. Tuason and Nieves Tuason de Barreto and their brother (11) The PARTY OF THE SECOND PART (meaning Araneta Inc.) is hereby
Antonio Tuason Jr., held a parcel of land with an area of 64,928.6 sq. m. covered by given full power and authority to sign for and in behalf of all the said co-
Certificate of Title No. 60911 in Sampaloc, Manila, in common, each owning an owners of said property all contracts of sale and deeds of sale of the lots into
undivided 1/3 portion. Nieves wanted and asked for a partition of the common which this property might be subdivided; the powers herein vested to the
property, but failing in this, she offered to sell her 1/3 portion. The share of Nieves PARTY OF THE SECOND PART may, under its own responsibility and risk,
was offered for sale to her sister and her brother but both declined to buy it. The offer delegate any of its powers under this contract to any of its officers,
was later made to their mother but the old lady also declined to buy, saying that if the employees or to third persons;
property later increased in value, she might be suspected of having taken advantage
of her daughter. Finally, the share of Nieves was sold to Gregorio Araneta Inc., a
domestic corporation, and a new Certificate of Title No. 61721 was issued in lieu of (15) No co-owner of the property subject-matter of this contract shall sell,
the old title No. 60911 covering the same property. The three co-owners agreed to alienate or dispose of his ownership, interest or participation therein without
have the whole parcel subdivided into small lots and then sold, the proceeds of the first giving preference to the other co-owners to purchase and acquire the
sale to be later divided among them. This agreement is embodied in a document same under the same terms and conditions as those offered by any other
(Exh. 6) entitled "Memorandum of Agreement" consisting of ten pages, dated June prospective purchaser. Should none of the co-owners of the property
30, 1941. subject-matter of this contract exercise the said preference to acquire or
purchase the same, then such sale to a third party shall be made subject to
all the conditions, terms, and dispositions of this contract; provided, the
Before, during and after the execution of this contract (Exh. 6), Atty. J. Antonio PARTIES OF THE FIRST PART (meaning Angela and Antonio) shall be
Araneta was acting as the attorney-in-fact and lawyer of the two co-owners, Angela I. bound by this contract as long as the PARTY OF THE SECOND PART,
Tuason and her brother Antonio Tuason Jr. At the same time he was a member of the namely, the GREGORIO ARANETA, INC. is controlled by the members of
Board of Director of the third co-owner, Araneta, Inc. the Araneta family, who are stockholders of the said corporation at the time
of the signing of this contract and/or their lawful heirs;
The pertinent terms of the contract (Exh. 6) may be briefly stated as follows: The
three co-owners agreed to improve the property by filling it and constructing roads On September 16, 1944, Angela I. Tuason revoked the powers conferred on her
and curbs on the same and then subdivide it into small lots for sale. Araneta Inc. was attorney-in-fact and lawyer, J. Antonio Araneta. Then in a letter dated October 19,
to finance the whole development and subdivision; it was prepare a schedule of 1946, Angela notified Araneta, Inc. that because of alleged breach of the terms of the
prices and conditions of sale, subject to the subject to the approval of the two other "Memorandum of Agreement" (Exh. 6) and abuse of powers granted to it in the
co-owners; it was invested with authority to sell the lots into which the property was to document, she had decided to rescind said contract and she asked that the property
be subdivided, and execute the corresponding contracts and deeds of sale; it was held in common be partitioned. Later, on November 20, 1946, Angela filed a
also to pay the real estate taxes due on the property or of any portion thereof that complaint in the Court of First Instance of Manila asking the court to order the partition
remained unsold, the expenses of surveying, improvements, etc., all advertising of the property in question and that she be given 1/3 of the same including rents
expenses, salaries of personnel, commissions, office and legal expenses, including collected during the time that the same including rents collected during the time that
expenses in instituting all actions to eject all tenants or occupants on the property; Araneta Inc., administered said property.
and it undertook the duty to furnish each of the two co-owners, Angela and Antonio
Tuason, copies of the subdivision plans and the monthly sales and rents and
collections made thereon. In return for all this undertaking and obligation assumed by The suit was administered principally against Araneta, Inc. Plaintiff's brother, Antonio
Tuason Jr., one of the co-owners evidently did not agree to the suit and its purpose,
for he evidently did not agree to the suit and its purpose, for he joined Araneta, Inc. as to furnish the plaintiff a copy of the subdivision plans, a copy of the monthly
a co-defendant. After hearing and after considering the extensive evidence introduce, gross collections from the sale of the property.
oral and documentary, the trial court presided over by Judge Emilio Peña in a long
and considered decision dismissed the complaint without pronouncement as to costs. The Court finds from the evidence that he defendant Gregorio Araneta,
The plaintiff appealed from that decision, and because the property is valued at more Incorporated has substantially complied with obligation imposed by the
than P50,000, the appeal came directly to this Court. contract exhibit 6 in its paragraph 1, and that for improvements alone, it has
disbursed the amount of P117,167.09. It has likewise paid taxes,
Some of the reasons advanced by appellant to have the memorandum contract (Exh. commissions and other expenses incidental to its obligations as denied in
6) declared null and void or rescinded are that she had been tricked into signing it; the agreement.
that she was given to understand by Antonio Araneta acting as her attorney-in-fact
and legal adviser that said contract would be similar to another contract of subdivision With respect to the charged that Gregorio Araneta, Incorporated has failed to
of a parcel into lots and the sale thereof entered into by Gregorio Araneta Inc., and submit to plaintiff a copy of the subdivision plains, list of prices and the
the heirs of D. Tuason, Exhibit "L", but it turned out that the two contracts widely conditions governing the sale of subdivided lots, and monthly statement of
differed from each other, the terms of contract Exh. "L" being relatively much more collections form the sale of the lots, the Court is of the opinion that it has no
favorable to the owners therein the less favorable to Araneta Inc.; that Atty. Antonio basis. The evidence shows that the defendant corporation submitted to the
Araneta was more or less disqualified to act as her legal adviser as he did because plaintiff periodically all the data relative to prices and conditions of the sale of
he was one of the officials of Araneta Inc., and finally, that the defendant company the subdivided lots, together with the amount corresponding to her. But
has violated the terms of the contract (Exh. 6) by not previously showing her the plans without any justifiable reason, she refused to accept them. With the
of the subdivision, the schedule of prices and conditions of the sale, in not introducing indifferent attitude adopted by the plaintiff, it was thought useless for
the necessary improvements into the land and in not delivering to her her share of the Gregorio Araneta, Incorporated to continue sending her statement of
proceeds of the rents and sales. accounts, checks and other things. She had shown on various occasions
that she did not want to have any further dealings with the said corporation.
We have examined Exh. "L" and compared the same with the contract (Exh. 6) and So, if the defendant corporation proceeded with the sale of the subdivided
we agree with the trial court that in the main the terms of both contracts are similar lots without the approval of the plaintiff, it was because it was under the
and practically the same. Moreover, as correctly found by the trial court, the copies of correct impression that under the contract exhibit 6 the decision of the
both contracts were shown to the plaintiff Angela and her husband, a broker, and both majority co-owners is binding upon all the three.
had every opportunity to go over and compare them and decide on the advisability of
or disadvantage in entering into the contract (Exh. 6); that although Atty. Antonio The Court feels that recission of the contract exhibit 6 is not minor violations
Araneta was an official of the Araneta Inc.; being a member of the Board of Directors of the terms of the agreement, the general rule is that "recission will not be
of the Company at the time that Exhibit "6" was executed, he was not the party with permitted for a slight or casual breach of the contract, but only for such
which Angela contracted, and that he committed no breach of trust. According to the breaches as are so substantial and fundamental as to defeat the object of
evidence Araneta, the pertinent papers, and sent to her checks covering her receive the parties in making the agreement" (Song Fo & Co. vs. Hawaiian-
the same; and that as a matter of fact, at the time of the trial, Araneta Inc., had spent Philippine Co., 47 Phil. 821).
about P117,000 in improvement and had received as proceeds on the sale of the lots
the respectable sum of P1,265,538.48. We quote with approval that portion of the
decision appealed from on these points: As regards improvements, the evidence shows that during the Japanese occupation
from 1942 and up to 1946, the Araneta Inc. although willing to fill the land, was unable
to obtain the equipment and gasoline necessary for filling the low places within the
The evidence in this case points to the fact that the actuations of J. Antonio parcel. As to sales, the evidence shows that Araneta Inc. purposely stopped selling
Araneta in connection with the execution of exhibit 6 by the parties, are the lots during the Japanese occupantion, knowing that the purchase price would be
above board. He committed nothing that is violative of the fiduciary paid in Japanese military notes; and Atty. Araneta claims that for this, plaintiff should
relationship existing between him and the plaintiff. The act of J. Antonio be thankfull because otherwise she would have received these notes as her share of
Araneta in giving the plaintiff a copy of exhibit 6 before the same was the receipts, which currency later became valueles.
executed, constitutes a full disclosure of the facts, for said copy contains all
that appears now in exhibit 6.
But the main contention of the appellant is that the contract (Exh. 6) should be
declared null and void because its terms, particularly paragraphs 9, 11 and 15 which
Plaintiff charges the defendant Gregorio Araneta, Inc. with infringing the we have reproduced, violate the provisions of Art. 400 of the Civil Code, which for the
terms of the contract in that the defendant corporation has failed (1) to make purposes of reference we quote below:
the necessary improvements on the property as required by paragraphs 1
and 3 of the contract; (2) to submit to the plaintiff from time to time schedule
of prices and conditions under which the subdivided lots are to be sold; and ART. 400. No co-owner shall be obliged to remain a party to the community.
Each may, at any time, demand the partition of the thing held in common.
 Nevertheless, an agreement to keep the thing undivided for a specified Pablo, Bengzon, Padilla, Tuason, Reyes, Jugo and Bautista Angelo, JJ., concur.
length of time, not exceeding ten years, shall be valid. This period may be a Paras, C. J., I certify that Mr. Justice Feria voted to affirm.
new agreement.

We agree with the trial court that the provisions of Art. 400 of the Civil Code are not
applicable. The contract (Exh., 6) far from violating the legal provision that forbids a
co-owner being obliged to remain a party to the community, precisely has for its
purpose and object the dissolution of the co-ownership and of the community by
selling the parcel held in common and dividing the proceeds of the sale among the
co-owners. The obligation imposed in the contract to preserve the co-ownership until
all the lots shall have been sold, is a mere incident to the main object of dissolving the
co-owners. By virtue of the document Exh. 6, the parties thereto practically and
substantially entered into a contract of partnership as the best and most expedient
means of eventually dissolving the co-ownership, the life of said partnership to end
when the object of its creation shall have been attained.

This aspect of the contract is very similar to and was perhaps based on the other
agreement or contract (Exh. "L") referred to by appellant where the parties thereto in
express terms entered into partnership, although this object is not expressed in so
many words in Exh. 6. We repeat that we see no violation of Art. 400 of the Civil Code
in the parties entering into the contract (Exh. 6) for the very reason that Art. 400 is not
applicable.

Looking at the case from a practical standpoint as did the trial court, we find no valid
ground for the partition insisted upon the appellant. We find from the evidence as was
done by the trial court that of the 64,928.6 sq. m. which is the total area of the parcel
held in common, only 1,600 sq. m. or 2.5 per cent of the entire area remained unsold
at the time of the trial in the year 1947, while the great bulk of 97.5 per cent had
already been sold. As well observed by the court below, the partnership is in the
process of being dissolved and is about to be dissolved, and even assuming that Art.
400 of the Civil Code were applicable, under which the parties by agreement may
agree to keep the thing undivided for a period not exceeding 10 years, there should
be no fear that the remaining 1,600 sq. m. could not be disposed of within the four
years left of the ten-years period fixed by Art. 400.

We deem it unnecessary to discuss and pass upon the other points raised in the
appeal and which counsel for appellant has extensively and ably discussed, citing
numerous authorities. As we have already said, we have viewed the case from a
practical standpoint, brushing aside technicalities and disregarding any minor
violations of the contract, and in deciding the case as we do, we are fully convinced
that the trial court and this Tribunal are carrying out in a practical and expeditious way
the intentions and the agreement of the parties contained in the contract (Exh. 6),
namely, to dissolve the community and co-ownership, in a manner most profitable to
the said parties.

In view of the foregoing, the decision appealed from is hereby affirmed. There is no
pronouncement as to costs.

So ordered.
 Republic of the Philippines Grace, Emma, Ester, Francisco, Jr., Norma, Lina (represented by
SUPREME COURT daughter Pinky Rose), and Jacinto.
Manila
The loan being unpaid, the lot in dispute was foreclosed by the
SECOND DIVISION mortgagee bank and in the foreclosure sale held on December 27,
1963, the same was awarded to the mortgagee bank as the highest
bidder.

G.R. No. 101522 May 28, 1993 On February 7, 1964, third-party defendant Amparo Gosiengfiao-
Ibarra redeemed the property by paying the amount of P1,347.89
and the balance of P423.35 was paid on December 28, 1964 to the
LEONARDO MARIANO, AVELINA TIGUE, LAZARO MARIANO, MERCEDES SAN mortgagee bank.
PEDRO, DIONISIA M. AQUINO, and JOSE N.T. AQUINO, petitioners,
vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS, (Sixteenth Division), GRACE GOSIENGFIAO, On September 10, 1965, Antonia Gosiengfiao on her behalf and
assisted by her husband GERMAN GALCOS; ESTER GOSIENGFIAO, assisted that of her minor children Emma, Lina, Norma together with Carlos
by her husband AMADOR BITONA; FRANCISCO GOSIENGFIAO, JR., NORMA and Severino executed a "Deed of Assignment of the Right of
GOSIENGFIAO, and PINKY ROSE GUENO, respondents. Redemption" in favor of Amparo G. Ibarra appearing in the notarial
register of Pedro (Laggui) as Doc. No. 257, Page No. 6, Book No.
8, Series of 1965.
NOCON, J.:
On August 15, 1966, Amparo Gosiengfiao sold the entire property
Before Us is a petition foe review of the decision, dated May 13, 1991 of the Court of to defendant Leonardo Mariano who subsequently established
Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 13122, entitled Grace Gosiengfiao, et al. v. Leonardo residence on the lot subject of this controversy. It appears in the
Mariano v. Amparo Gosiengfiao 1 raising as issue the distinction between Article Deed of Sale dated August 15, 1966 that Amparo, Antonia, Carlos
10882 and Article 16203 of the Civil Code. and Severino were signatories thereto.

The Court of Appeals summarized the facts as follows: Sometime in 1982, plaintiff-appellant Grace Gosiengfiao learned of
the sale of said property by the third-party defendants. She went to
It appears on record that the decedent Francisco Gosiengfiao is the the Barangay Captain and asked for a confrontation with
registered owner of a residential lot located at Ugac Sur, defendants Leonardo and Avelina Mariano to present her claim to
Tuguegarao, Cagayan, particularly described as follows, to wit: said property.

"The eastern portion of Lot 1351, Tuguegarao On November 27, 1982, no settlement having been reached by the
Cadastre, and after its segregation now parties, the Barangay captain issued a certificate to file action.
designated as Lot 1351-A, Plan PSD-67391, with
an area of 1,1346 square meters." On December 8, 1982, defendant Leonardo Mariano sold the same
property to his children Lazaro F. Mariano and Dionicia M. Aquino
and covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-2416 recorded in as evidenced by a Deed of Sale notarized by Hilarion L. Aquino as
the Register of Deeds of Cagayan. Doc. No. 143, Page No. 19, Book No. V, Series of 1982.

The lot in question was mortgaged by the decedent to the Rural On December 21, 1982, plaintiffs Grace Gosiengfiao, et al. filed a
Bank of Tuguegarao (designated as Mortgagee bank, for brevity) complaint for "recovery of possession and legal redemption with
on several occasions before the last, being on March 9, 1956 and damages" against defendants Leonardo and Avelina Mariano.
29, 1958. Plaintiffs alleged in their complaint that as co-heirs and co-owners
of the lot in question, they have the right to recover their respective
On August 15, 1958, Francisco Gosiengfiao died intestate survived shares in the same, and property as they did not sell the same, and
by his heirs, namely: Third-Party Defendants: wife Antonia and the right of redemption with regard to the shares of other co-owners
Children Amparo, Carlos, Severino and herein plaintiffs-appellants sold to the defendants.
 Defendants in their answer alleged that the plaintiffs has (sic) no bank (highest, bidder in the foreclosure sale) after the redemption
cause of action against them as the money used to redeem lot in period had already expired and after the mortgagee bank had
question was solely from the personal funds of third-party consolidated it title in which case there would no longer be any co-
defendant Amparo Gosiengfiao-Ibarra, who consequently became ownership to speak of .6
the sole owner of the said property and thus validly sold the entire
property to the defendants, and the fact that defendants had The decision of the Court of Appeals is supported by a long line of case law which
already sold the said property to the children, Lazaro Mariano and states that a redemption by a co-owner within the period prescribed by law inures to
Dionicia M. Aquino. Defendants further contend that even granting the benefit of all the other co-owners.7
that the plaintiffs are co-owners with the third-party defendants,
their right of redemption had already been barred by the Statute of
Limitations under Article 1144 of the Civil Code, if not by laches. 4 The main argument of petitioners in the case at bar is that the Court of Appeals
incorrectly applied Article 1620 of the Civil Code, instead of Article 1088 of the same
code which governs legal redemption by co-heirs since the lot in question, which
After trial on the merits, the Regional Trial Court of Cagayan, Branch I, rendered a forms part of the intestate estate of the late Francisco Gosiengfiao, was never the
decision dated September 16, 1986, dismissing the complaint and stating that subject of partition or distribution among the heirs, thus, private respondents and
respondents have no right of ownership or possession over the lot in question. The third-party defendants had not ceased to be co-heirs.
trial court further said that when the subject property foreclosed and sold at public
auction, the rights of the heirs were reduced to a mere right of redemption. And when
Amparo G. Ibarra redeemed the lot from the Rural Bank on her own behalf and with On that premise, petitioners further contend that the right of legal redemption was not
her own money she became the sole owner of the property. Respondents' having timely exercised by the private respondents, since Article 1088 prescribes that the
failed to redeem the property from the bank or from Amparo G. Ibarra, lost whatever same must be done within the period of one month from the time they were notified in
rights the might have on the property.5 writing of the sale by the vendor.

The Court of Appeals in its questioned decision reversed and set aside the ruling of According to Tolentino, the fine distinction between Article 1088 and Article 1620 is
the trial court and declared herein respondents as co-owners of the property in the that when the sale consists of an interest in some particular property or properties of
question. The Court of Appeals said: the inheritance, the right redemption that arises in favor of the other co-heirs is that
recognized in Article 1620. On the other hand, if the sale is the hereditary right itself,
fully or in part, in the abstract sense, without specifying any particular object, the right
The whole controversy in the case at bar revolves on the question recognized in Article 1088 exists.8
of "whether or not a co-owner who redeems the whole property with
her own personal funds becomes the sole owner of said property
and terminates the existing state of co-ownership." Petitioners allege that upon the facts and circumstances of the present case,
respondents failed to exercise their right of legal redemption during the period
provided by law, citing as authority the case of Conejero, et al., v. Court of Appeals, et
Admittedly, as the property in question was mortgaged by the al.9 wherein the Court adopted the principle that the giving of a copy of a deed is
decedent, a co-ownership existed among the heirs during the equivalent to the notice as required by law in legal redemption.
period given by law to redeem the foreclosed property. Redemption
of the whole property by a co-owner does not vest in him sole
ownership over said property but will inure to the benefit of all co- We do not dispute the principle laid down in the Conejero case. However, the facts in
owners. In other words, it will not end to the existing state of co- the said case are not four square with the facts of the present case.
ownership. Redemption is not a mode of terminating a co- In Conejero, redemptioner Enrique Conejero was shown and given a copy of the deed
ownership. of sale of the subject property. The Court in that case stated that the furnishing of a
copy of the deed was equivalent to the giving of a written notice required by law. 11
xxx xxx xxx
The records of the present petition, however, show no written notice of the sale being
given whatsoever to private respondents. Although, petitioners allege that sometime
In the case at bar, it is undisputed and supported by records, that on October 31, 1982 private respondent, Grace Gosiengfiao was given a copy of the
third-party defendant Amparo G. Ibarra redeemed the propety in questioned deed of sale and shown a copy of the document at the Office of the
dispute within the one year redemption period. Her redemption of Barangay Captain sometime November 18, 1982, this was not supported by the
the property, even granting that the money used was from her own evidence presented. On the contrary, respondent, Grace Gosiengfiao, in her
personal funds did not make her the exclusive owner of the testimony, declared as follows:
mortgaged property owned in common but inured to the benefit of
all co-owners. It would have been otherwise if third-party defendant
Amparo G. Ibarra purchased the said property from the mortgagee
 Q. When you went back to the residence of Atty. Q. And what was the reply of Don Mariano and
Pedro Laggui were you able to see him? Dr. Mariano to the information given to them by
Brgy. Captain Bassig regarding your claim?
A. Yes, I did.
A. He insisted that the lot is already his because
Q. When you saw him, what did you tell? of the Deed of Sale. I asked for the exact copy so
that I could show to him that I did not sign and he
said he does not have a copy. 12
A. I asked him about the Deed of Sale which Mrs.
Aquino had told me and he also showed me a
Deed of Sale. I went over the Deed of Sale and I The above testimony was never refuted by Dr. Mariano who was present before Brgy.
asked Atty. Laggui about this and he mentioned Captain Bassig.
here about the names of the legal heirs. I asked
why my name is not included and I was never The requirement of a written notice has long been settled as early as in the case
informed in writing because I would like to claim of Castillo v. Samonte,13 where this Court quoted the ruling in Hernaez v. Hernaez, 32
and he told me to better consult my own attorney. Phil., 214, thus:

Q. And did you go? Both the letter and spirit of the New Civil Code argue against any
attempt to widen the scope of the notice specified in Article 1088 by
A. Yes, I did. including therein any other kind of notice, such as verbal or by
registration. If the intention of the law had been to include verbal
notice or any other means of information as sufficient to give the
Q. What kind of copy or document is that? effect of this notice, then there would have been no necessity or
reasons to specify in Article 1088 of the New Civil Code that the
A. It is a deed of sale signed by my mother, sister said notice be made in writing for, under the old law, a verbal notice
Amparo and my brothers. or information was sufficient. 14

Q. If shown to you the copy of the Deed of Sale Moreover, petitioners themselves adopted in their argument respondents' allegation
will you be able to identify it? In their complaint that sometime on October, 1982 they sought the redemption of the
property from spouses Leonardo Mariano and Avelina Tigue, by tendering the
A. Yes, sir.11 repurchase money of P12,000.00, which the spouses rejected.15 Consequently,
private respondents exercised their right of redemption at the first opportunity they
have by tendering the repurchase price to petitioners. The complaint they filed, before
Thereafter, Grace Gosiengfiao explicitly stated that she was never given a copy of the the Barangay Captain and then to the Regional Trial Court was necessary to assert
said Deed of Sale. their rights. As we learned in the case of Castillo, supra:

Q. Where did Don Mariano, Dr. Mariano and you It would seem clear from the above that the reimbursement to the
see each other? purchaser within the period of one month from the notice in writing
is a requisite or condition precedent to the exercise of the right of
A. In the house of Brgy. Captain Antonio Bassig. legal redemption; the bringing of an action in court is the remedy to
enforce that right in case the purchaser refuses the redemption.
The first must be done within the month-period; the second within
Q. What transpired in the house of the Brgy.
the prescriptive period provided in the Statute of Limitation. 16
Captain when you saw each other there?

The ruling in Castillo v. Samonte; supra, was reiterated in the case of Garcia
A. Brgy. Captain Bassig informed my intention of
v. Calaliman, where We also discussed the reason for the requirement of the written
claiming the lot and I also informed him about the
notice. We said:
Deed of Sale that was not signed by me since it
is mine it is already sold and I was informed in
writing about it. I am a legal heir and I have also Consistent with aforesaid ruling, in the interpretation of a related
the right to claim. provision (Article 1623 of the New Civil Code) this Court had
 stressed that written notice is indispensable, actual knowledge of
the sale acquired in some other manners by the redemptioner,
notwithstanding. He or she is still entitled to written notice, as
exacted by the code to remove all uncertainty as to the sale, its
terms and its validity, and to quiet and doubt that the alienation is
not definitive. The law not having provided for any alternative, the
method of notifications remains exclusive, though the Code does
not prescribe any particular form of written notice nor any distinctive
method written notification of redemption (Conejero et al. v. Court of
Appeals et al., 16 SCRA 775 [1966]; Etcuban v. Court of Appeals,
148 SCRA 507 [1987]; Cabrera v. Villanueva, G.R. No. 75069, April
15, 1988).17 (Emphasis ours)

We likewise do not find merit in petitioners' position that private respondents could not
have validly effected redemption due to their failure to consign in court the full
redemption price after tender thereof was rejected by the petitioners. Consignation is
not necessary, because the tender of payment was not made to discharge an
obligation, but to enforce or exercise a right. It has been previously held that
consignation is not required to preserve the right of repurchase as a mere tender of
payment is enough on time as a basis for an action to compel the vendee a retroto
resell the property; no subsequent consignation was necessary to entitle private
respondents to such
reconveyance. 18

Premises considered, respondents have not lost their right to redeem, for in the
absence of a written notification of the sale by the vendors, the 30-day period has not
even begun to run.

WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals is hereby AFFIRMED. Cost

against petitioners.

SO ORDERED.

Narvasa, C.J., Padilla and Nocon, JJ., concur.

 Republic of the Philippines Aquitania, Sergio Aquitania and Aurora Aquitania sold to Elena Pajimula, the
SUPREME COURT remaining 2/3 western portion of Lot No. 802 with an area of 958 square
Manila meters (Annex C of the complaint).

EN BANC The action of the plaintiff is premised on the claim of co-ownership. From the
deed of sale executed in favor of the plaintiff, it can be seen that the 1/3
G.R. No. L-24419 July 15, 1968 portion sold to plaintiff is definitely identified as the 1/3 portion located on the
southeastern part of Lot No. 802 and specifically bounded on the north by
De Guzman Street, on the east by Posadas Street, on the south by Perez
LEONORA ESTOQUE, plaintiff-appellant, Street, and on the west by remaining portion of the same lot, which
vs. contained an area of 640 square meters. And in the deed of sale executed
ELENA M. PAJIMULA, assisted by her husband CIRIACO by Crispina Perez and her children in favor of defendant Elena Pajimula over
PAJIMULA, defendants-appellees. the remaining 2/3 portion of Lot No. 802, said portion is identified as the
western portion of Lot No. 802 which is bounded on the north by De Guzman
REYES, J.B.L., J.: Street, on the east by properties of Leonarda Estoque, on the south by the
national road and on the west by Lots Nos. 799 and 801, containing an area
Direct appeal from an order of the Court of First Instance of La Union, in its Civil Case of 598 square meters.
No. 1990, granting a motion to dismiss the complaint for legal redemption by a co-
owner (retracto legal de comuneros) on account of failure to state a cause of action. The appellant's stand is that the deed in her favor was inoperative to convey the
southeastern third of Lot 802 of the Rosario Cadastre notwithstanding the description
The basic facts and issues are stated in the decision appealed from, as follows: in the deed itself, for the reason that the vendor, being a mere co-owner, had no right
to sell any definite portion of the land held in common but could only transmit her
undivided share, since the specific portion corresponding to the selling co-owner is
Plaintiff based her complaint for legal redemption on a claim that she is a co- not known until partition takes place (Lopez vs. Ilustre, 5 Phil. 567; Ramirez vs.
owner of Lot No. 802, for having purchased 1/3 portion thereof, containing Bautista, 14 Phil. 528). From this premise, the appellant argues that the sale in her
an area of 640 square meters as evidenced by a deed of sale, Annex "A", favor, although describing a definite area, should be construed as having conveyed
which was executed on October 28, 1951 by Crispina Perez de Aquitania, only the undivided 1/3 interest in Lot 802 owned at the time by the vendor, Crispina
one of the co-owners, in her favor. Perez Vda. de Aquitania. Wherefore, when the next day said vendor acquired the 2/3
interest of her two other co-owners, Lot 802 became the common property of
On the other hand, the defendant, who on December 30, 1959 acquired the appellant and Crispina Perez. Therefore, appellant argues, when Crispina sold the
other 2/3 portion of Lot No. 802 from Crispina Aquitania and her children, rest of the property to appellee Pajimula spouses, the former was selling an undivided
claimed that the plaintiff bought the 1/3 southeastern portion, which is 2/3 that appellant, as co-owner, was entitled to redeem, pursuant to Article 1620 of
definitely identified and segregated, hence there existed no co-ownership at the New Civil Code.
the time and after said plaintiff bought the aforesaid portion, upon which right
of legal redemption can be exercised or taken advantage of. ART. 1620. A co-owner of a thing may exercise the right of redemption in
case the shares of all the other co-owners or of any of them, are sold to a
From the complaint, it would appear that Lot No. 802 of the Cadastral survey third person. If the price of the alienation is grossly excessive the
of Rosario, covered by original certificate of title No. RO-2720 (N.A.) was redemptioner shall pay only a reasonable one.
originally owned by the late spouses, Rosendo Perez and Fortunata Bernal,
who were survived by her children, namely, Crispina Perez, Lorenzo Perez Should two or more co-owners desire to exercise the right of redemption,
and Ricardo Perez. Ricardo Perez is also now dead. On October 28, 1951, they may only do so in proportion to the share they may respectively have in
Crispina P. Vda. de Aquitania sold her right and participation in Lot No. 802 the thing owned in common.
consisting of 1/3 portion with an area of 640 square meters to Leonora
Estoque (Annex A of the complaint). On October 29, 1951, Lorenzo Perez,
Crispina Perez and Emilia P. Posadas, widow of her deceased husband, The lower court, upon motion of defendant, dismissed the complaint, holding that the
Ricardo Perez for herself and in behalf of her minor children, Gumersindo, deeds of sale show that the lot acquired by plaintiff Estoque was different from that of
Raquel, Emilio and Ricardo, Jr., executed a deed of extrajudicial settlement the defendants Pajimula; hence they never became co-owners, and the alleged right
wherein Lorenzo Perez, Emilia P. Posadas and her minor children assigned of legal redemption was not proper. Estoque appealed.
all their right, interest and participation in Lot No. 802 to Crispina Perez
(Annex B of the complaint). On December 30, 1959, Crispina Perez and her We find no error in the order of dismissal, for the facts pleaded negate the claim that
children Rosita Aquitania Belmonte, Remedios Aquitania Misa, Manuel appellant Estoque ever became a co-owner of appellees Pajimula.
(1) The deed of sale to Estoque (Annex A of the complaint) clearly specifies the object
sold as the southeastern third portion of Lot 802 of the Rosario Cadastre, with an area
of 840 square meters, more or less. Granting that the seller, Crispina Perez Vda. de
Aquitania could not have sold this particular portion of the lot owned in common by
her and her two brothers, Lorenzo and Ricardo Perez, by no means does it follow that
she intended to sell to appellant Estoque her 1/3 undivided interest in the lot
forementioned. There is nothing in the deed of sale to justify such inference. That the
seller could have validly sold her one-third undivided interest to appellant is no proof
that she did choose to sell the same. Ab posse ad actu non valet illatio.

(2) While on the date of the sale to Estoque (Annex A) said contract may have been
ineffective, for lack of power in the vendor to sell the specific portion described in the
deed, the transaction was validated and became fully effective when the next day
(October 29, 1951) the vendor, Crispina Perez, acquired the entire interest of her
remaining co-owners (Annex B) and thereby became the sole owner of Lot No. 802 of
the Rosario Cadastral survey (Llacer vs. Muñoz, 12 Phil. 328). Article 1434 of the Civil
Code of the Philippines clearly prescribes that — .

When a person who is not the owner of a thing sells or alienates and delivers
it, and later the seller or grantor acquires title thereto, such title passes by
operation of law to the buyer or grantee."

Pursuant to this rule, appellant Estoque became the actual owner of

the southeastern third of lot 802 on October 29, 1951. Wherefore, she never acquired
an undivided interest in lot 802. And when eight years later Crispina Perez sold to the
appellees Pajimula the western two-thirds of the same lot, appellant did not acquire a
right to redeem the property thus sold, since their respective portions were distinct
and separate.

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the appealed order of dismissal is affirmed. Costs

against appellant Estoque.1äwphï1.ñët

Concepcion, C.J., Dizon, Makalintal, Zaldivar, Sanchez, Castro, Angeles and

Fernando, JJ., concur.
 Republic of the Philippines was plaintiff Julita Go Ong who promised to secure the court's
SUPREME COURT approval, adding that Julita Go Ong informed the defendant that
Manila she was processed the sum of P300,000.00 by the JK Exports, Inc.
which will also take charge of the interest of the loan.
SECOND DIVISION
Concluding, the trial court ruled:
G.R. No. 75884 September 24, 1987
Absent (of) any evidence that the property in
JULITA GO ONG, FOR HERSELF AND AS JUDICIAL GUARDIAN OF STEVEN GO question is the capital of the deceased husband
ONG, petitioners, brought into the marriage, said property should
vs. be presumed as acquired during the marriage
THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS, ALLIED BANKING CORPORATION and the and, therefore, conjugal property,
CITY SHERIFF OF QUEZON CITY, respondents.
After the dissolution of the marriage with the
death of plaintiff's husband, the plaintiff acquired,
PARAS, J.: by law, her conjugal share, together with the
hereditary rights thereon. (Margate vs. Rabacal,
L-14302, April 30, 1963). Consequently, the
This is a petition for review on certiorari of the March 21, 1986 Decision * of the Court mortgage constituted on said property, upon
of Appeals in AC-G.R. CV No. 02635, "Julita Ong etc. vs. Allied Banking Corp. et al." express authority of plaintiff, notwithstanding the
affirming, with modification, the January 5, 1984 Decision of the Regional Trial Court lack of judicial approval, is valid, with respect to
of Quezon City in Civil Case No. Q-35230. her conjugal share thereon, together with her
hereditary rights.
The uncontroverted facts of this case, as found by the Court of Appeals, are as
follows: On appeal by petitioner, respondent Court of Appeals affirmed, with modification, the
appealed decision (Record, pp. 19-22). The dispositive portion of the appellate court's
...: Two (2) parcels of land in Quezon City Identified as Lot No. 12, decision reads:
Block 407, Psd 37326 with an area of 1960.6 sq. m. and Lot No. 1,
Psd 15021, with an area of 3,660.8 sq. m. are covered by Transfer WHEREFORE, with the modification that the extrajudicial
Certificate of Title No. 188705 in the name of "Alfredo Ong Bio foreclosure proceedings instituted by defendant against plaintiff
Hong married to Julita Go Ong "(Exh. D). Alfredo Ong Bio Hong shall be held in abeyance to await the final result of Civil Case No.
died on January 18, 1975 and Julita Go Ong was appointed 107089 of the Court of First Instance of Manila, 6th Judicial District
administratrix of her husband's estate in Civil Case No. 107089. Branch XXXII, entitled "IN THE MATTER OF THE INTESTATE
The letters of administration was registered on TCT No. 188705 on ESTATE OF THE LATE ALFREDO ONG BIO: JULITA GO ONG,
October 23, 1979. Thereafter, Julita Go Ong sold Lot No. 12 to Lim ADMINISTRATRIX". In pursuance with which the restraining order
Che Boon, and TCT No. 188705 was partially cancelled and TCT of the lower court in this case restraining the sale of the properties
No. 262852 was issued in favor of Lim Che Boon covering Lot No. levied upon is hereby ordered to continue in full force and effect
12 (Exh. D-4). On June 8, 1981 Julita Go Ong through her attorney- coterminous with the final result of Civil Case No. 107089, the
in-fact Jovita K. Yeo (Exh. 1) mortgaged Lot No. 1 to the Allied decision appealed from is hereby affirmed. Costs against plaintiff-
Banking Corporation to secure a loan of P900,000.00 obtained by appellant.
JK Exports, Inc. The mortgage was registered on TCT No. 188705
on the same date with the following notation: "... mortgagee's
consent necessary in case of subsequent alienation or SO ORDERED.
encumbrance of the property other conditions set forth in Doc. No.
340, Page No. 69, Book No. XIX, of the Not. Public of Felixberto On April 8, 1986, petitioner moved for the reconsideration of the said decision (Ibid.,
Abad". On the loan there was due the sum of P828,000.00 and pp. 24-29), but in a Resolution dated September 11, 1986, respondent court denied
Allied Banking Corporation tried to collect it from Julita Go Ong, the motion for lack of merit (Ibid., p. 23). Hence, the instant petition (Ibid., pp. 6-17).
(Exh. E). Hence, the complaint alleging nullity of the contract for
lack of judicial approval which the bank had allegedly promised to The Second Division of this Court, in a Resolution dated November 19, 1986 (Rollo,
secure from the court. In response thereto, the bank averred that it p. 30), without giving due course to the petition, resolved to require private
respondent to comment thereon and it did on February 19, 1987 (Ibid., pp. 37-42). and voluntarily entered into by the petitioner. An opposite view would result in an
Thereafter, in a Resolution dated April 6, 1987, the petition was given due course and injustice. Under similar circumstances, this Court applied the provisions of Article 493
the parties were required to file their respective memoranda (Ibid., p. 43). of the Civil Code, where the heirs as co-owners shall each have the full ownership of
his part and the fruits and benefits pertaining thereto, and he may therefore alienate,
Petitioner filed her Memorandum on May 13, 1987 (Ibid., pp. 45-56), while private assign or mortgage it, and even effect of the alienation or mortgage, with respect to
respondent filed its Memorandum on May 20, 1987 (Ibid., pp. 62-68). the co-owners, shall be limited to the portion which may be allotted to him in the
division upon the termination of the co-ownership (Philippine National Bank vs. Court
of Appeals, 98 SCRA 207 [1980]).
The sole issue in this case is —
Consequently, in the case at bar, the trial court and the Court of Appeals cannot be
WHETHER OR NOT THE MORTGAGE CONSTITUTED OVER THE PARCEL OF faulted in ruling that the questioned mortgage constituted on the property under
LAND UNDER PETITIONER'S ADMINISTRATION IS NULL AND VOID FOR WANT administration, by authority of the petitioner, is valid, notwithstanding the lack of
OF JUDICIAL APPROVAL. judicial approval, with respect to her conjugal share and to her hereditary rights. The
fact that what had been mortgaged was in custodia legis is immaterial, insofar as her
The instant petition is devoid of merit. conjugal share and hereditary share in the property is concerned for after all, she was
the ABSOLUTE OWNER thereof. This ownership by hers is not disputed, nor is there
The well-settled rule that the findings of fact of the trial court are entitled to great any claim that the rights of the government (with reference to taxes) nor the rights of
respect, carries even more weight when affirmed by the Court of Appeals as in the any heir or anybody else have been prejudiced for impaired. As stated by Associate
case at bar. Justice (later Chief Justice) Manuel Moran in Jakosalem vs. Rafols, et al., 73 Phil. 618
—

In brief, the lower court found: (1) that the property under the administration of
petitioner — the wife of the deceased, is a community property and not the separate The land in question, described in the appealed decision, originally
property of the latter; (2) that the mortgage was constituted in the wife's personal belonged to Juan Melgar. The latter died and the judicial
capacity and not in her capacity as administratrix; and (3) that the mortgage affects administration of his estate was commenced in 1915 and came to a
the wife's share in the community property and her inheritance in the estate of her close on December 2, 1924, only. During the pendency of the said
husband. administration, that is, on July 5, 1917, Susana Melgar, daughter of
the deceased Juan Melgar, sold the land with the right of
repurchase to Pedro Cui, subject to the stipulation that during the
Petitioner, asserting that the mortgage is void for want of judicial approval, quoted period for the repurchase she would continue in possession of the
Section 7 of Rule 89 of the Rules of Court and cited several cases wherein this Court land as lessee of the purchase. On December 12, 1920, the
ruled that the regulations provided in the said section are mandatory. partition of the estate left by the deceased Juan Melgar was made,
and the land in question was adjudicated to Susana Melgar. In
While petitioner's assertion may have merit insofar as the rest of the estate of her 1921, she conveyed, in payment of professional fees, one-half of
husband is concerned the same is not true as regards her conjugal share and her the land in favor of the defendant-appellee Nicolas Rafols, who
hereditary rights in the estate. The records show that petitioner willingly and entered upon the portion thus conveyed and has been in
voluntarily mortgaged the property in question because she was processed by JK possession thereof up to the present. On July 23, 1921, Pedro Cui
Exports, Inc. the sum of P300,000.00 from the proceeds of the loan; and that at the brought an action to recover said half of the land from Nicolas
time she executed the real estate mortgage, there was no court order authorizing the Rafols and the other half from the other defendants, and while that
mortgage, so she took it upon herself, to secure an order. case was pending, or about August 4, 1925, Pedro Cui donated the
whole land in question to Generosa Teves, the herein plaintiff-
appellant, after trial, the lower court rendered a decision absolving
Thus, in confirming the findings of the lower court, as supported by law and the
Nicolas Rafols as to the one-half of the land conveyed to him by
evidence, the Court of Appeals aptly ruled that Section 7 of Rule 89 of the Rules of
Susana Melgar, and declaring the plaintiff owner of the other half by
Court is not applicable, since the mortgage was constituted in her personal capacity
express acknowledgment of the other defendants. The plaintiff
and not in her capacity as administratrix of the estate of her husband.
appealed from that part of the judgment which is favorable to
Nicolas Rafols.
Nevertheless, petitioner, citing the cases of Picardal, et al. vs. Lladas (21 SCRA
1483) and Fernandez, et al. vs. Maravilla (10 SCRA 589), further argues that in the
The lower court absolved Nicolas Rafols upon the theory that
settlement proceedings of the estate of the deceased spouse, the entire conjugal
Susana Melgar could not have sold anything to Pedro Cui because
partnership property of the marriage is under administration. While such may be in a
the land was then in custodia legis, that is, under judicial
sense true, that fact alone is not sufficient to invalidate the whole mortgage, willingly
administration. This is error. That the land could not ordinary be
 levied upon while in custodia legis, does not mean that one of the
heirs may not sell the right, interest or participation which he has or
might have in the lands under administration. The ordinary
execution of property in custodia legis is prohibited in order to avoid
interference with the possession by the court. But the sale made by
an heir of his share in an inheritance, subject to the result of the
pending administration, in no wise stands in the way of such
administration.

The reference to judicial approval in Sec. 7, Rule 89 of the Rules of Court cannot
adversely affect the substantiverights of private respondent to dispose of her Ideal
[not inchoate, for the conjugal partnership ended with her husband's death, and her
hereditary rights accrued from the moment of the death of the decedent (Art. 777,
Civil Code) share in the co-heirship and/or co-ownership formed between her and the
other heirs/co-owners (See Art. 493, Civil Code, supra.). Sec. 7, Art. 89 of the Civil
Code applies in a case where judicial approval has to be sought in connection with,
for instance, the sale or mortgage of property under administration for the payment,
say of a conjugal debt, and even here, the conjugal and hereditary shares of the wife
are excluded from the requisite judicial approval for the reason already adverted to
hereinabove, provided of course no prejudice is caused others, including the
government.

Moreover, petitioner is already estopped from questioning the mortgage. An estoppel

may arise from the making of a promise even though without consideration, if it was
intended that the promise should be relied upon and in fact it was relied upon, and if a
refusal to enforce it would be virtually to sanction the perpetration of fraud or would
result in other injustice (Gonzalo Sy Trading vs. Central Bank, 70 SCRA 570).

PREMISES CONSIDERED, the instant petition is hereby DENIED and the assailed
decision of the Court of Appeals is hereby AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

Yap (Chairman), Melencio-Herrera, Padilla and Sarmiento, JJ., concur.

 Republic of the Philippines respondents-heirs have already received their proportionate share of the six (6)
SUPREME COURT million pesos paid by the buyer, Yu Hwa Ping, as earnest money; that the balance of
Manila P6,000,000.00 is more than enough to pay the unsettled claims against the estate.
Thus, they prayed for the Court to direct the administrator, Herodotus Acebedo
SECOND DIVISION (referred to as petitioner-administrator hereafter):

1. to sell the properties mentioned in the motion;

G.R. No. 102380 January 18, 1993 2. with the balance of P6 million, to pay all the claims against the
Estate; and
HERODOTUS P. ACEBEDO and DEMOSTHENES P. ACEBEDO, petitioners,
vs. 3. to distribute the residue among the Heirs in final settlement of the
HON. BERNARDO P. ABESAMIS, MIGUEL ACEBEDO, ALEXANDER ACEBEDO, Estate.
NAPOLEON ACEBEDO, RIZALINO ACEBEDO, REPUBLICA ACEBEDO,
FILIPINAS ACEBEDO and YU HWA PING, respondents. To the aforesaid Motion, herein petitioner-administrator interposed an "Opposition to
Approval of Sale", to wit:
CAMPOS, JR., J.:
1. That he has learned that some of the heirs herein have sold
The lower court's jurisdiction in approving a Deed of Conditional Sale executed by some real estate property of the Estate located at Balintawak,
respondents-heirs and ordering herein administrator-petitioner Herodotus Acebedo to Quezon City, without the knowledge of the herein administrator,
sell the remaining portions of said properties, despite the absence of its prior approval without the approval of this Honorable Court and of some heirs, and
as a probate court, is being challenged in the case at bar. at a shockingly low price;

The late Felix Acebedo left an estate consisting of several real estate properties 2. That he is accordingly hereby registering his vehement objection
located in Quezon City and Caloocan City, with a conservative estimated value of to the approval of the sale, perpetrated in a manner which can even
about P30 million. Said estate allegedly has only the following unsettled claims: render the proponents of the sale liable for punishment for
contempt of this Honorable Court;
a. P87,937.00 representing unpaid real estate taxes due Quezon
City; 3. The herein Administrator instead herein prays this Honorable
Court to authorize the sale of the above mentioned property of the
Estate to generate funds to pay certain liabilities of the Estate and
b. P20,244.00 as unpaid real estate taxes due Caloocan City; with the approval of this Honorable Court if warranted, to give the
heirs some advances chargeable against theirs (sic) respective
c. The unpaid salaries/allowances of former Administrator Miguel shares, and, for the purpose to authorize the herein Administrator,
Acebedo, and the incumbent Administrator Herodotus Acebedo; and the other heirs to help the Administrator personally or through a
and broker, to look for a buyer for the highest obtainable price, subject
always to the approval of this Honorable Court. 1
d. Inheritance taxes that may be due on the net estate.
On October 30, 1989, herein petitioners moved to be given a period of forty-five (45)
The decedent was succeeded by eight heirs, two of whom are the petitioners herein, days within which to look for a buyer who will be willing to buy the properties at a price
and the others are the private respondents. higher than P12,000,000.00.

Due to the prolonged pendency of the case before the respondent Court for sixteen The case was set for hearing on December 15, 1989. However, by said date,
years, respondents-heirs filed a "Motion for Approval of Sale", on October 4, 1989. petitioners have not found any buyer offering better terms. Thus, they asked the
The said sale involved the properties covered by Transfer Certificate of Title Nos. Court, on February 8, 1990, for an in extendible period of thirty days to look for a
155569, 120145, 9145, and 18709, all of which are registered in Quezon City, and buyer.
form part of the estate. The consideration for said lots was twelve (12) million pesos
and by that time, they already had a buyer. It was further stated in said Motion that
Petitioner-administrator then filed a criminal complaint for falsification of a public Petitioners, then, instead filed a "Supplemental Opposition" to the approval of the
document against Yu Hwa Ping and notary public Eugenio Obon on February 26, Deed of Conditional Sale.
1990. He initiated this complaint upon learning that it was Yu Hwa Ping who caused
the notarization of the Deed of Conditional Sale wherein allegedly petitioner- On March 29, 1991, the respondent Court issued the challenged Order, the
administrator's signature was made to appear. He also learned that after he dispositive portion of which states, to wit:
confronted the notary public of the questioned document, the latter revoked his
notarial act on the same.
WHEREFORE, the Order dated August 7, 1990, is hereby lifted,
reconsidered and set aside, and another one is hereby issued as
On April 2, 1990, petitioner-administrator filed the civil action to secure the declaration follows:
by the Court of the nullity of the Deed of Conditional Sale and the Deed of Absolute
Sale.
1. Approving the conditional sale, dated September 10, 1989,
executed by the heirs-movants, in favor of Yu Hwa Ping, pertaining
The period granted herein petitioners having lapsed without having found a buyer, to their respective shares in the properties covered by TCT Nos.
petitioner Demosthenes Acebedo sought to nullify the Orders granting them several 155569, 120145, 1945 and 18709 of the Register of Deeds of
periods within which to look for a better buyer. Respondents filed a comment thereon. Quezon City;

Having miserably failed to find a better buyer, after seven long months, petitioner- 2. Ordering the administrator Herodotus Acebedo to sell the
administrator filed another "Opposition to Approval of Sale", dated May 10, 1990, remaining portions of the said properties also in favor of Yu Hwa
maintaining that the sale should wait for the country to recover from the effects of the Ping at the same price as the sale executed by the herein heirs-
coup d'etat attempts, otherwise, the properties should be divided among the heirs. movants;

On June 21, 1990, petitioners filed a "Motion for Leave of Court to Mortgage and 3. Ordering Yu Hwa Ping to deposit with the Court the total
Lease some of the Properties of the Estate". To this Motion, respondents filed an remaining balance of the purchase price for the said lots within
Opposition on the following grounds : that the motion is not proper because of the TWENTY (20) DAYS from notice hereof;
pending motion to approve the sale of the same properties; that said conditional sale
was initiated by petitioner-administrator who had earlier signed a receipt for
P500,000.00 as earnest money; that the approval of the sale would mean Yu Hwa 4. The motion to cite former administrator Miguel Acebedo in
Ping's assumption of payment of the realty taxes; that the estate has no further debts contempt of court, resulting from his failure to submit the owner's
and thus, the intestate administrator may be terminated. copy of TCT Nos. 155569, and 120145 is hereby denied.3

On August 17, 1990, respondent Court issued an Order, the dispositive portion of Yu Hwa Ping, on April 4, 1991, deposited the remaining balance of the purchase price
which, stated, among others, to wit:2 for the properties subject of the Deed of Conditional Sale in the amount of
P6,500,000.00.
b. the motion filed by the heirs-movants, dated October 4, 1989,
praying that the new administrator be directed to sell the properties Petitioners herein received the questioned Order on April 11, 1991. Twenty one (21)
covered by TCT Nos. 155569, 120145, 9145 and 18709, in favor of days thereafter, they filed a Motion for Reconsideration, praying that the Court
Yu Hwa Ping is hereby denied; and reinstate its Order of August 17, 1990. To this, private respondents filed their
Opposition.4
c. the new administrator is hereby granted leave to mortgage some
properties of the estate at a just and reasonable amount, subject to Instead of making a reply, petitioners herein filed a Supplemental Motion for
the approval of the Court. Reconsideration. The motions for reconsideration of herein petitioners were denied by
the respondent Court on August 23, 1991.
On December 4, 1990, the respondent Judge issued an order resolving to call the
parties to a conference on December 17, 1990. The conference was held, but still the On September 23, 1991, herein petitioners filed a Motion for Partial Reconsideration,
parties were unable to arrive at an agreement. So, on January 4, 1991, it was hoping for the last time that they would be able to convince the Court that its Order
continued, wherein the parties actually agreed that the heirs be allowed to sell their dated March 29, 1991 in effect approving the conditional sale is erroneous and
shares of the properties to Yu Hwa Ping for the price already agreed upon, while beyond its jurisdiction.
herein petitioners negotiate for a higher price with Yu Hwa Ping.
On October 17, 1991, the respondent Court denied the Motion for Partial The Civil Code, under the provisions on co-ownership, further qualifies this
Reconsideration for "lack of merit". right.11 Although it is mandated that each co-owner shall have the full ownership of his
part and of the fruits and benefits pertaining thereto, and thus may alienate, assign or
On November 7, 1991, private respondents filed a Motion for Execution of the Order mortgage it, and even substitute another person in its enjoyment, the effect of the
dated March 29, 1991. This was pending resolution when the petitioners filed this alienation or the mortgage, with respect to the
Petition for Certiorari. co-owners, shall be limited to the portion which may be allotted to him in the division
upon the termination of the co-ownership.12 In other words, the law does not prohibit a
co-owner from selling, alienating or mortgaging his ideal share in the property held in
The controversy in the case at bar revolves around one question: Is it within the common.13
jurisdiction of the lower court, acting as a probate court, to issue an Order approving
the Deed of Conditional Sale executed by respondents-heirs without prior court
approval and to order herein Administrator to sell the remaining portion of said As early as 1942, this Court has recognized said right of an heir to dispose of property
properties? under administration. In the case of Teves de Jakosalem vs. Rafols, et al.,14 it was
said that the sale made by an heir of his share in an inheritance, subject to the result
of the pending administration, in no wise, stands in the way of such administration.
We answer in the positive? The Court then relied on the provision of the Old Civil Code, Article 440 and Article
339 which are still in force as Article 533 and Article 493, respectively, in the new Civil
In the case of Dillena vs. Court of Appeals,5 this Court made a pronouncement that it Code. The Court also cited the words of a noted civilist, Manresa: "Upon the death of
is within the jurisdiction of the probate court to approve the sale of properties of a a person, each of his heirs 'becomes the undivided owner of the whole estate left with
deceased person by his prospective heirs before final adjudication. Hence, it is error respect to the part or portion which might be adjudicated to him, a community of
to say that this matter should be threshed out in a separate action. ownership being thus formed among the co-owners of the estate which remains
undivided'."
The Court further elaborated that although the Rules of Court do not specifically state
that the sale of an immovable property belonging to an estate of a decedent, in a Private respondents having secured the approval of the probate court, a matter which
special proceeding, should be made with the approval of the court, this authority is is unquestionably within its jurisdiction, and having established private respondents'
necessarily included in its capacity as a probate court. Therefore, it is clear that the right to alienate the decedent's property subject of administration, this Petition should
probate court in the case at bar, acted within its jurisdiction in issuing the Order be dismissed for lack of merit.
approving the Deed of Conditional Sale.
PREMISES considered, Petition is hereby DISMISSED. With Costs.
We cannot countenance the position maintained by herein petitioners that said
conditional sale is null and void for lack of prior court approval. The sale precisely was SO ORDERED.
made conditional, the condition being that the same should first be approved by the
probate court.
Narvasa, C.J., Feliciano, Regalado and Nocon, JJ., concur.
Petitioners herein anchor their claim on Section 7, Rule 89 of the Rules of Court. 6 It is
settled that court approval is necessary for the validity of any disposition of the
decedent's estate. However, reference to judicial approval cannot adversely affect the
substantive rights of the heirs to dispose of their ideal share in the co-heirship and/or
co-ownership among the heirs.7

This Court had the occasion to rule that there is no doubt that an heir can sell
whatever right, interest, or participation he may have in the property under
administration. This is a matter which comes under the jurisdiction of the probate
court.8

The right of an heir to dispose of the decedent's property, even if the same is under
administration, is based on the Civil Code provision9 stating that the possession of
hereditary property is deemed transmitted to the heir without interruption and from the
moment of the death of the decedent, in case the inheritance is accepted. Where
there are however, two or more heirs, the whole estate of the decedent is, before its
partition, owned in common by such heirs. 10
 Republic of the Philippines As regards Lot No. 1091, Donato executed on May 28, 1974 a Deed of Sale over the
SUPREME COURT same in favor of petitioner Juliana P. Fanesa, his daughter. 5
Manila
In the meantime, sometime in 1952, for non-payment of taxes, Lot No. 1091 was
THIRD DIVISION forfeited and sold at a public auction, with the Provincial Government of Negros
Occidental being the buyer. A Certificate of Sale over the land was executed by the
Provincial Treasurer in favor of the Provincial Board of Negros Occidental. 6

G.R. No. 61584 November 25, 1992 On May 29, 1974, Juliana P. Fanesa redeemed the property from the Provincial
Government of Negros Occidental for the amount of P2,959.09. 7
DONATO S. PAULMITAN, JULIANA P. FANESA and RODOLFO
FANESA, petitioners, On learning of these transactions, respondents children of the late Pascual Paulmitan
vs. filed on January 18, 1975 with the Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental a
COURT OF APPEALS, ALICIO PAULMITAN, ELENA PAULMITAN, ABELINO Complaint against petitioners to partition the properties plus damages.
PAULMITAN, ANITA PAULMITAN, BAKING PAULMITAN, ADELINA PAULMITAN
and ANITO PAULMITAN, respondents. Petitioners set up the defense of prescription with respect to Lot No. 757 as an
affirmative defense, contending that the Complaint was filed more than eleven years
after the issuance of a transfer certificate of title to Donato Paulmitan over the land as
ROMERO, J.: consequence of the registration with the Register of Deeds, of Donato's affidavit
extrajudicially adjudicating unto himself Lot No. 757. As regards Lot No. 1091,
petitioner Juliana P. Fanesa claimed in her Answer to the Complaint that she acquired
This is a petition for review on certiorari seeking the reversal of the decision 1 of the exclusive ownership thereof not only by means of a deed of sale executed in her favor
Court of Appeals, dated July 14, 1982 in CA-G.R. No. 62255-R entitled "Alicio by her father, petitioner Donato Paulmitan, but also by way of redemption from the
Paulmitan, et al. v. Donato Sagario Paulmitan, et al." which affirmed the decision 2 of Provincial Government of Negros Occidental.
the then Court of First Instance (now RTC) of Negros Occidental, 12th Judicial
District, Branch IV, Bacolod City, in Civil Case No. 11770.
Acting on the petitioners' affirmative defense of prescription with respect to Lot No.
757, the trial court issued an order dated April 22, 1976 dismissing the complaint as to
The antecedent facts are as follows: the said property upon finding merit in petitioners' affirmative defense. This order,
which is not the object of the present petition, has become final after respondents'
Agatona Sagario Paulmitan, who died sometime in 1953, 3 left the two following failure to appeal therefrom.
parcels of land located in the Province of Negros Occidental: (1) Lot No. 757 with an
area of 1,946 square meters covered by Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. RO- Trial proceeded with respect to Lot No. 1091. In a decision dated May 20, 1977, the
8376; and (2) Lot No. 1091 with an area of 69,080 square meters and covered by trial court decided in favor of respondents as to Lot No. 1091. According to the trial
OCT No. RO-11653. From her marriage with Ciriaco Paulmitan, who is also now court, the respondents, as descendants of Agatona Sagario Paulmitan were entitled
deceased, Agatona begot two legitimate children, namely: Pascual Paulmitan, who to one-half (1/2) of Lot No. 1091, pro indiviso. The sale by petitioner Donato
also died in 1953, 4 apparently shortly after his mother passed away, and Donato Paulmitan to his daughter, petitioner Juliana P. Fanesa, did not prejudice their rights.
Paulmitan, who is one of the petitioners. Petitioner Juliana P. Fanesa is Donato's And the repurchase by Juliana P. Fanesa of the land from the Provincial Government
daughter while the third petitioner, Rodolfo Fanes, is Juliana's husband. Pascual of Negros Occidental did not vest in Juliana exclusive ownership over the entire land
Paulmitan, the other son of Agatona Sagario, is survived by the respondents, who are but only gave her the right to be reimbursed for the amount paid to redeem the
his children, name: Alicio, Elena, Abelino, Adelina, Anita, Baking and Anito, all property. The trial court ordered the partition of the land and directed petitioners
surnamed Paulmitan. Donato Paulmitan and Juliana P. Fanesa to pay private respondents certain amounts
representing the latter's share in the fruits of the land. On the other hand, respondents
Until 1963, the estate of Agatona Sagario Paulmitan remained unsettled and the titles were directed to pay P1,479.55 to Juliana P. Fanesa as their share in the redemption
to the two lots mentioned above remained in the name of Agatona. However, on price paid by Fanesa to the Provincial Government of Negros Occidental. The
August 11, 1963, petitioner Donato Paulmitan executed an Affidavit of Declaration of dispositive portion of the trial court's decision reads:
Heirship, extrajudicially adjudicating unto himself Lot No. 757 based on the claim that
he is the only surviving heir of Agatona Sagario. The affidavit was filed with the WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered on the second cause
Register of Deeds of Negros Occidental on August 20, 1963, cancelled OCT No. RO- of action pleaded in the complain as follows:
8376 in the name of Agatona Sagario and issued Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT)
No. 35979 in Donato's name.
 1. The deed of sale (Exh. "F") dated May 28, 1974 is valid insofar When Agatona Sagario Paulmitan died intestate in 1952, her two (2) sons Donato and
as the one-half undivided portion of Lot 1091 is concerned as to Pascual were still alive. Since it is well-settled by virtue of Article 777 of the Civil Code
vest ownership over said half portion in favor of defendant Juliana that "[t]he rights to the succession are transmitted from the moment of the death of
Fanesa and her husband Rodolfo Fanesa, while the remaining half the decedent," 10 the right of ownership, not only of Donato but also of Pascual, over
shall belong to plaintiffs, pro-indiviso; their respective shares in the inheritance was automatically and by operation of law
vested in them in 1953 when their mother died intestate. At that stage, the children of
2. Lot 1091, Cadastral Survey of Pontevedra, Province of Negros Donato and Pascual did not yet have any right over the inheritance since "[i]n every
Occidental, now covered by TCT No. RO-11653 (N.A.), is ordered inheritance, the relative nearest in degree excludes the more distant
partitioned. The parties must proceed to an actual partition by ones." 11 Donato and Pascual excluded their children as to the right to inherit from
property instrument of partition, submitting the corresponding Agatona Sagario Paulmitan, their mother.
subdivision within sixty (60) days from finality of this decision, and
should they fail to agree, commissioners of partition may be From the time of the death of Agatona Sagario Paulmitan to the subsequent passing
appointed by the Court; away of her son Pascual in 1953, the estate remained unpartitioned. Article 1078 of
the Civil Code provides: "Where there are two or more heirs, the whole estate of the
3. Pending the physical partition, the Register of Deeds of Negros decedent is, before its partition, owned in common by such heirs, subject to the
Occidental is ordered to cancel Original Certificate of Title No. RO- payment of debts of the deceased." 12 Donato and Pascual Paulmitan were, therefore,
11653 (N.A.) covering Lot 1091, Pontevedra Cadastre, and to issue co-owners of the estate left by their mother as no partition was ever made.
in lieu thereof a new certificate of title in the name of plaintiffs and
defendants, one-half portion each,pro-indiviso, as indicated in When Pascual Paulmitan died intestate in 1953, his children, the respondents,
paragraph 1 above; succeeded him in the co-ownership of the disputed property. Pascual Paulmitan's
right of ownership over an undivided portion of the property passed on to his children,
4. Plaintiffs are ordered to pay, jointly and severally, defendant who, from the time of Pascual's death, became co-owners with their uncle Donato
Juliana Fanesa the amount of P1,479.55 with interest at the legal over the disputed decedent estate.
rate from May 28, 1974 until paid;
Petitioner Juliana P. Fanesa claims ownership over Lot No. 1091 by virtue of two
5 Defendants Donato Sagario Paulmitan and Juliana Paulmitan transactions, namely: (a) the sale made in her favor by her father Donato Paulmitan;
Fanesa are ordered to account to plaintiffs and to pay them, jointly and (b) her redemption of the land from the Provincial of Negros Occidental after it
and severally, the value of the produce from Lot 1091 representing was forfeited for non-payment of taxes.
plaintiffs' share in the amount of P5,000.00 per year from 1966 up
to the time of actual partition of the property, and to pay them the When Donato Paulmitan sold on May 28, 1974 Lot No. 1091 to his daughter Juliana
sum of P2,000.00 as attorney's fees as well as the costs of the suit. P. Fanesa, he was only a co-owner with respondents and as such, he could only sell
that portion which may be allotted to him upon termination of the co-ownership. 13 The
xxx xxx xxx sale did not prejudice the rights of respondents to one half (1/2) undivided share of
the land which they inherited from their father. It did not vest ownership in the entire
land with the buyer but transferred only the seller's pro-indiviso share in the
On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's decision. Hence this petition. property 14 and consequently made the buyer a co-owner of the land until it is
partitioned. In Bailon-Casilao v. Court of Appeals, 15 the Court, through Justice Irene
To determine the rights and obligations of the parties to the land in question, it is well R. Cortes, outlined the effects of a sale by one co-owner without the consent of all the
to review, initially, the relatives who survived the decedent Agatona Sagario co-owners, thus:
Paulmitan. When Agatona died in 1953, she was survived by two (2) sons, Donato
and Pascual. A few months later in the same year, Pascual died, leaving seven The rights of a co-owner of a certain property are clearly specified
children, the private respondents. On the other had, Donato's sole offspring was in Article 493 of the Civil Code, Thus:
petitioner Juliana P. Fanesa.
Art. 493. Each co-owner shall have the full ownership of his part
At the time of the relevant transactions over the properties of decedent Agatona and of the fruits and benefits pertaining thereto, and he may
Sagario Paulmitan, her son Pascual had died, survived by respondents, his children. therefore alienate, assign or mortgage it and even substitute
It is, thus, tempting to apply the principles pertaining to the right of representation as another person its enjoyment, except when personal rights are
regards respondents. It must, however, be borne in mind that Pascual did no involved. But the effect of the alienation or mortgage, with respect
predecease his mother, 8 thus precluding the operation of the provisions in the Civil to the co-owners, shall be limited to the portion which may be
Code on the right of representation 9 with respect to his children, the respondents.
 allotted to him in the division upon the termination of the co- the provisions of Article 1515 of the old Civil Code, Article 1613 of
ownership. [Emphasis supplied.] the present Code, giving the vendee a retro the right to demand
redemption of the entire property.
As early as 1923, this Court has ruled that even if a co-owner sells
the whole property as his, the sale will affect only his own share but There is no merit in this petition.
not those of the other co-owners who did not consent to the sale
[Punsalan v. Boon Liat, 44 Phil. 320 (1923)]. This is because under The right of repurchase may be exercised by co-owner with respect
the aforementioned codal provision, the sale or other disposition to his share alone (CIVIL CODE, art. 1612, CIVIL CODE (1889),
affects only his undivided share and the transferee gets only what art. (1514.). While the records show that petitioner redeemed the
would correspond to his grantor in the partition of the thing owned property in its entirety, shouldering the expenses therefor, that did
in common [Ramirez v. Bautista, 14 Phil. 528 (1909)]. not make him the owner of all of it. In other words, it did not put to
Consequently, by virtue of the sales made by Rosalia and end the existing state of co-ownership (Supra, Art. 489). There is no
Gaudencio Bailon which are valid with respect to their proportionate doubt that redemption of property entails a necessary expense.
shares, and the subsequent transfers which culminated in the sale Under the Civil Code:
to private respondent Celestino Afable, the said Afable thereby
became a co-owner of the disputed parcel of land as correctly held
by the lower court since the sales produced the effect of Art. 488. Each co-owner shall have a right to compel the other co-
substituting the buyers in the enjoyment thereof [Mainit v. Bandoy, owners to contribute to the expenses of preservation of the thing or
14 Phil. 730 (1910)]. right owned in common and to the taxes. Any one of the latter may
exempt himself from this obligation by renouncing so much of his
undivided interest as may be equivalent to his share of the
From the foregoing, it may be deduced that since a co-owner is expenses and taxes. No such waiver shall be made if it is
entitled to sell his undivided share, a sale of the entire property by prejudicial to the co-ownership.
one co-owner without the consent of the other co-owners is not null
and void. However, only the rights of the co-owner-seller are
transferred, thereby making the buyer a co-owner of the property. The result is that the property remains to be in a condition of co-
ownership. While a vendee a retro, under Article 1613 of the Code,
"may not be compelled to consent to a partial redemption," the
Applying this principle to the case at bar, the sale by petitioner Donato Paulmitan of redemption by one co-heir or co-owner of the property in its totality
the land to his daughter, petitioner Juliana P. Fanesa, did not give to the latter does not vest in him ownership over it. Failure on the part of all the
ownership over the entire land but merely transferred to her the one half (1/2) co-owners to redeem it entitles the vendee a retro to retain the
undivided share of her father, thus making her the co-owner of the land in question property and consolidate title thereto in his name (Supra, art. 1607).
with the respondents, her first cousins. But the provision does not give to the redeeming co-owner the right
to the entire property. It does not provide for a mode of terminating
Petitioner Juliana P. Fanesa also claims ownership of the entire property by virtue of a co-ownership.
the fact that when the Provincial Government of Negros Occidental bought the land
after it was forfeited for non-payment of taxes, she redeemed it. Although petitioner Fanesa did not acquire ownership over the entire lot by virtue of
the redemption she made, nevertheless, she did acquire the right to reimbursed for
The contention is without merit. half of the redemption price she paid to the Provincial Government of Negros
Occidental on behalf of her co-owners. Until reimbursed, Fanesa hold a lien upon the
The redemption of the land made by Fanesa did not terminate the co-ownership nor subject property for the amount due her. 17
give her title to the entire land subject of the co-ownership. Speaking on the same
issue raised by petitioners, the Court, in Adille v. Court of Appeals, 16 resolved the Finally, petitioners dispute the order of the trial court, which the Court of Appeals
same with the following pronouncements: affirmed, for them to pay private respondents P5,000.00 per year from 1966 until the
partition of the estate which represents the share of private respondents in the fruits
The petition raises a purely legal issue: May a co-owner acquire of the land. According to petitioners, the land is being leased for P2,000.00 per year
exclusive ownership over the property held in common? only. This assigned error, however raises a factual question. The settled rule is that
only questions of law may be raised in a petition for review. As a general rule, findings
of fact made by the trial court and the Court of Appeals are final and conclusive and
Essentially, it is the petitioners' contention that the property subject cannot be reviewed on appeal. 18
of dispute devolved upon him upon the failure of his co-heirs to join
him in its redemption within the period required by law. He relies on
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED and the decision of the Court of Appeals
AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

Gutierrez, Jr., Bidin, Davide, Jr., Romero and Melo, JJ., concur.
 Republic of the Philippines prayed for monthly rentals for the use of the house by respondent after their father
SUPREME COURT died.
Manila
In his answer with counterclaim, respondent alleged that he had no objection to the
FIRST DIVISION sale as long as the best selling price could be obtained; that if the sale would be
effected, the proceeds thereof should be divided equally; and, that being a co-owner,
he was entitled to the use and enjoyment of the property.

G.R. No. 76351 October 29, 1993 Upon issues being joined, the case was set for pre-trial on 26 April 1979 with the
lawyers of both parties notified of the pre-trial, and served with the pre-trial order, with
private respondent executing a special power of attorney to his lawyer to appear at
VIRGILIO B. AGUILAR, petitioner, the pre-trial and enter into any amicable settlement in his behalf. 1
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and SENEN B. AGUILAR, respondents.
On 20 April 1979, Atty. Manuel S. Tonogbanua, counsel for respondent, filed a motion
to cancel pre-trial on the ground that he would be accompanying his wife to
BELLOSILLO, J.: Dumaguete City where she would be a principal sponsor in a wedding.

This is a petition for review on certiorari seeking to reverse and set aside the Decision On 23 April 1979, finding the reasons of counsel to be without merit, the trial court
of the Court of Appeals in CA-GR CV No. 03933 declaring null and void the orders of denied the motion and directed that the pre-trial should continue as scheduled.
23 and 26 April, 1979, the judgment by default of 26 July 1979, and the order of 22
October 1979 of the then Court of First Instance of Rizal, Pasay City, Branch 30, and
directing the trial court to set the case for pre-trial conference. When the case was called for pre-trial as scheduled on 26 April 1979, plaintiff and his
counsel appeared. Defendant did not appear; neither his counsel in whose favor he
executed a special power of attorney to represent him at the pre-trial. Consequently,
Petitioner Virgilio and respondent Senen are brothers; Virgilio is the youngest of the trial court, on motion of plaintiff, declared defendant as in default and ordered
seven (7) children of the late Maximiano Aguilar, while Senen is the fifth. On 28 reception of plaintiff's evidence ex parte.
October 1969, the two brothers purchased a house and lot in Parañaque where their
father could spend and enjoy his remaining years in a peaceful neighborhood. Initially,
the brothers agreed that Virgilio's share in the co-ownership was two-thirds while that On 7 May 1979, defendant through counsel filed an omnibus motion to reconsider the
of Senen was one-third. By virtue of a written memorandum dated 23 February 1970, order of default and to defer reception of evidence. The trial court denied the motion
Virgilio and Senen agreed that henceforth their interests in the house and lot should and plaintiff presented his evidence.
be equal, with Senen assuming the remaining mortgage obligation of the original
owners with the Social Security System (SSS) in exchange for his possession and On 26 July 1979, rendering judgment by default against defendant, the trial court
enjoyment of the house together with their father. found him and plaintiff to be co-owners of the house and lot, in equal shares on the
basis of their written agreement. However, it ruled that plaintiff has been deprived of
Since Virgilio was then disqualified from obtaining a loan from SSS, the brothers his participation in the property by defendant's continued enjoyment of the house and
agreed that the deed of sale would be executed and the title registered in the lot, free of rent, despite demands for rentals and continued maneuvers of defendants,
meantime in the name of Senen. It was further agreed that Senen would take care of to delay partition. The trial court also upheld the right of plaintiff as co-owner to
their father and his needs since Virgilio and his family were staying in Cebu. demand partition. Since plaintiff could not agree to the amount offered by defendant
for the former's share, the trial court held that this property should be sold to a third
person and the proceeds divided equally between the parties.
After Maximiano Aguilar died in 1974, petitioner demanded from private respondent
that the latter vacate the house and that the property be sold and proceeds thereof
divided among them. The trial court likewise ordered defendant to vacate the property and pay plaintiff
P1,200.00 as rentals2 from January 1975 up to the date of decision plus interest from
the time the action was filed.
Because of the refusal of respondent to give in to petitioner's demands, the latter filed
on 12 January 1979 an action to compel the sale of the house and lot so that the they
could divide the proceeds between them. On 17 September 1979, defendant filed an omnibus motion for new trial but on 22
October 1979 the trial court denied the motion.
In his complaint, petitioner prayed that the proceeds of the sale, be divided on the
basis of two-thirds (2/3) in his favor and one-third (1/3) to respondent. Petitioner also
Defendant sought relief from the Court of Appeals praying that the following orders seriously if it is to attain its objective, i.e., the speedy and inexpensive disposition of
and decision of the trial court be set aside: (a) the order of 23 April 1970 denying cases.
defendants motion for postponement of the pre-trial set on 26 April 1979; (b) the order
of 26 April 1979 declaring him in default and authorizing plaintiff to present his Moreover, the trial court denied the motion for postponement three (3) days before
evidence ex-parte; (e) the default judgment of 26 July 1979; and, (d) the order dated the scheduled pre-trial. If indeed, counsel for respondent could not attend the pre-trial
22 October 1979 denying his omnibus motion for new trial. on the scheduled date, respondent at least should have personally appeared in order
not to be declared as in default. But, since nobody appeared for him, the order of the
On 16 October 1986, the Court of Appeals set aside the order of the trial court of 26 trial court declaring him as in default and directing the presentation of petitioner's
April 1979 as well as the assailed judgment rendered by default., The appellate court evidence ex parte was proper.7
found the explanation of counsel for defendant in his motion to cancel pre-trial as
satisfactory and devoid of a manifest intention to delay the disposition of the case. It With regard to the merits of the judgment of the trial court by default, which
also ruled that the trial court should have granted the motion for postponement filed respondent appellate court did not touch upon in resolving the appeal, the Court holds
by counsel for defendant who should not have been declared as in default for the that on the basis of the pleadings of the parties and the evidence presented ex parte,
absence of his counsel. petitioner and respondents are co-owners of subject house and lot in equal shares;
either one of them may demand the sale of the house and lot at any time and the
Petitioner now comes to us alleging that the Court of Appeals erred (1) in not holding other cannot object to such demand; thereafter the proceeds of the sale shall be
that the motion of defendant through counsel to cancel the pre-trial was dilatory in divided equally according to their respective interests.
character and (2) in remanding the case to the trial court for pre-trial and trial.
Private respondent and his family refuse to pay monthly rentals to petitioner from the
The issues to be resolved are whether the trial court correctly declared respondent as time their father died in 1975 and to vacate the house so that it can be sold to third
in default for his failure to appear at the pre-trial and in allowing petitioner to present persons. Petitioner alleges that respondent's continued stay in the property hinders its
his evidence ex-parte, and whether the trial court correctly rendered the default disposal to the prejudice of petitioner. On the part of petitioner, he claims that he
judgment against respondent. should be paid two-thirds (2/3) of a monthly rental of P2,400.00 or the sum of
P1,600.00.
We find merit in the petition.
In resolving the dispute, the trial court ordered respondent to vacate the property so
As regards the first issue, the law is clear that the appearance of parties at the pre- that it could be sold to third persons and the proceeds divided between them equally,
trial is mandatory.3 A party who fails to appear at a pre-trial conference may be non- and for respondent to pay petitioner one-half (1/2) of P2,400.00 or the sum of
suited or considered as in default.4 In the case at bar, where private respondent and P1,200.00 as monthly rental, conformably with their stipulated sharing reflected in
counsel failed to appear at the scheduled pre-trial, the trial, court has authority to their written agreement.
declare respondent in default.5
We uphold the trial court in ruling in favor of petitioner, except as to the effectivity of
Although respondent's counsel filed a motion to postpone pre-trial hearing, the grant the payment of monthly rentals by respondent as co-owner which we here declare to
or denial thereof is within the sound discretion of the trial court, which should take into commence only after the trial court ordered respondent to vacate in accordance with
account two factors in the grant or denial of motions for postponement, namely: (a) its order of 26 July 1979.
the reason for the postponement and (b) the merits of the case of movant. 6
Article 494 of the Civil Code provides that no co-owner shall be obliged to remain in
In the instant case, the trial court found the reason stated in the motion of counsel for the co-ownership, and that each co-owner may demand at any time partition of the
respondent to cancel the pre-trial to be without merit. Counsel's explanation that he thing owned in common insofar as his share is concerned. Corollary to this rule, Art.
had to go to by boat as early as 25 March 1979 to fetch his wife and accompany her 498 of the Code states that whenever the thing is essentially, indivisible and the co-
to a wedding in Dumaguete City on 27 April 1979 where she was one of the principal owners cannot agree that it be, allotted to one of them who shall indemnify the others,
sponsors, cannot be accepted. We find it insufficient to justify postponement of the it shall be sold and its proceeds accordingly distributed. This is resorted to (1) when
pre-trial, and the Court of Appeals did not act wisely in overruling the denial. We the right to partition the property is invoked by any of the co-owners but because of
sustain the trial court and rule that it did not abuse its discretion in denying the the nature of the property it cannot be subdivided or its subdivision would prejudice
postponement for lack of merit. Certainly, to warrant a postponement of a mandatory the interests of the co-owners, and (b) the co-owners are not in agreement as to who
process as pre-trial would require much more than mere attendance in a social among them shall be allotted or assigned the entire property upon proper
function. It is time indeed we emphasize that there should be much more than mere reimbursement of the co-owners. In one case,8 this Court upheld the order of the trial
perfunctory treatment of the pre-trial procedure. Its observance must be taken court directing the holding of a public sale of the properties owned in common
pursuant to Art. 498 of the Civil Code.
However, being a co-owner respondent has the right to use the house and lot without
paying any compensation to petitioner, as he may use the property owned in common
long as it is in accordance with the purpose for which it is intended and in a manner
not injurious to the interest of the other co-owners.9 Each co-owner of property
held pro indiviso exercises his rights over the whole property and may use and enjoy
the same with no other limitation than that he shall not injure the interests of his co-
owners, the reason being that until a division is made, the respective share of each
cannot be determined and every co-owner exercises, together with his co-participants
joint ownership over the pro indiviso property, in addition to his use and enjoyment of
the
same. 10

Since petitioner has decided to enforce his right in court to end the co-ownership of
the house and lot and respondent has not refuted the allegation that he has been
preventing the sale of the property by his continued occupancy of the premises,
justice and equity demand that respondent and his family vacate the property so that
the sale can be effected immediately. In fairness to petitioner, respondent should pay
a rental of P1,200.00 per month, with legal interest; from the time the trial court
ordered him to vacate, for the use and enjoyment of the other half of the property
appertaining to petitioner.

When petitioner filed an action to compel the sale of the property and the trial court
granted the petition and ordered the ejectment of respondent, the co-ownership was
deemed terminated and the right to enjoy the possession jointly also ceased.
Thereafter, the continued stay of respondent and his family in the house prejudiced
the interest of petitioner as the property should have been sold and the proceeds
divided equally between them. To this extent and from then on, respondent should be
held liable for monthly rentals until he and his family vacate.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed Decision of the Court of

Appeals dated 16 October 1986 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The decision of the
trial court in Civil Case No. 69.12-P dated 16 July 1979 is REINSTATED, with the
modification that respondent Senen B. Aguilar is ordered to vacate the premises in
question within ninety (90) days from receipt of this and to pay petitioner Virgilio B.
Aguilar a monthly rental of P1,200.00 with interest at the legal rate from the time he
received the decision of the trial court directing him to vacate until he effectively
leaves the premises.

The trial court is further directed to take immediate steps to implement this decision
conformably with Art. 498 of the Civil Code and the Rules of Court. This decision is
final and executory.

SO ORDERED.

Cruz, Davide, Jr., Quiason, JJ., concur.

 Republic of the Philippines Pablo Moreto died intestate on April 25, 1942 leaving no issue and as his heirs his
SUPREME COURT brother plaintiff Leandro Moreto and the other plaintiffs herein.
Manila
On May 6, 1946, Monica Maniega died intestate in Calamba, Laguna.
FIRST DIVISION
On July 30, 1952, or more than six (6) years after the death of his wife Monica
G.R. No. L-33187 March 31, 1980 Maniega, Flaviano Moreto, without the consent of the heirs of his said deceased wife
Monica, and before any liquidation of the conjugal partnership of Monica and Flaviano
CORNELIO PAMPLONA alias GEMINIANO PAMPLONA and APOLONIA could be effected, executed in favor of Geminiano Pamplona, married to defendant
ONTE, petitioners, Apolonia Onte, the deed of absolute sale (Exh. "1") covering lot No. 1495 for P900.00.
vs. The deed of sale (Exh. "1") contained a description of lot No. 1495 as having an area
VIVENCIO MORETO, VICTOR MORETO, ELIGIO MORETO, MARCELO MORETO, of 781 square meters and covered by transfer certificate of title No. 14570 issued in
PAULINA MORETO, ROSARIO MORETO, MARTA MORETO, SEVERINA the name of Flaviano Moreto, married to Monica Maniega, although the lot was
MENDOZA, PABLO MENDOZA, LAZARO MENDOZA, VICTORIA TUIZA, acquired during their marriage. As a result of the sale, the said certificate of title was
JOSEFINA MORETO, LEANDRO MORETO and LORENZO cancelled and a new transfer certificate of title No. T-5671 was issued in the name of
MENDOZA, respondents. Geminiano Pamplona married to Apolonia Onte (Exh. "A").

GUERRERO, J.: After the execution of the above-mentioned deed of sale (Exh. "1"), the spouses
Geminiano Pamplona and Apolonia Onte constructed their house on the eastern part
of lot 1496 as Flaviano Moreto, at the time of the sale, pointed to it as the land which
This is a petition for certiorari by way of appeal from the decision of the Court of he sold to Geminiano Pamplona. Shortly thereafter, Rafael Pamplona, son of the
Appeals 1 in CA-G.R. No. 35962-R, entitled "Vivencio Moreto, et al., Plaintiff- spouses Geminiano Pamplona and Apolonia Onte, also built his house within lot 1496
Appellees vs. Cornelio Pamplona, et al., Defendants-Appellants," affirming the about one meter from its boundary with the adjoining lot. The vendor Flaviano Moreto
decision of the Court of First Instance of Laguna, Branch I at Biñan. and the vendee Geminiano Pamplona thought all the time that the portion of 781
square meters which was the subject matter of their sale transaction was No. 1495
The facts, as stated in the decision appealed from, show that: and so lot No. 1495 appears to be the subject matter in the deed of sale (Exh. "1")
although the fact is that the said portion sold thought of by the parties to be lot No.
Flaviano Moreto and Monica Maniega were husband and wife. During their marriage, 1495 is a part of lot No. 1496.
they acquired adjacent lots Nos. 1495, 4545, and 1496 of the Calamba Friar Land
Estate, situated in Calamba, Laguna, containing 781-544 and 1,021 square meters From 1956 to 1960, the spouses Geminiano Pamplona and Apolonio Onte enlarged
respectively and covered by certificates of title issued in the name of "Flaviano their house and they even constructed a piggery corral at the back of their said house
Moreto, married to Monica Maniega." about one and one-half meters from the eastern boundary of lot 1496.

The spouses Flaviano Moreto and Monica Maniega begot during their marriage six (6) On August 12, 1956, Flaviano Moreto died intestate. In 1961, the plaintiffs demanded
children, namely, Ursulo, Marta, La Paz, Alipio, Pablo, and Leandro, all surnamed on the defendants to vacate the premises where they had their house and piggery on
Moreto. the ground that Flaviano Moreto had no right to sell the lot which he sold to
Geminiano Pamplona as the same belongs to the conjugal partnership of Flaviano
Ursulo Moreto died intestate on May 24, 1959 leaving as his heirs herein plaintiffs and his deceased wife and the latter was already dead when the sale was executed
Vivencio, Marcelo, Rosario, Victor, Paulina, Marta and Eligio, all surnamed Moreto. without the consent of the plaintiffs who are the heirs of Monica. The spouses
Geminiano Pamplona and Apolonia Onte refused to vacate the premises occupied by
them and hence, this suit was instituted by the heirs of Monica Maniega seeking for
Marta Moreto died also intestate on April 30, 1938 leaving as her heir plaintiff Victoria the declaration of the nullity of the deed of sale of July 30, 1952 above-mentioned as
Tuiza. regards one-half of the property subject matter of said deed; to declare the plaintiffs
as the rightful owners of the other half of said lot; to allow the plaintiffs to redeem the
La Paz Moreto died intestate on July 17, 1954 leaving the following heirs, namely, one-half portion thereof sold to the defendants. "After payment of the other half of the
herein plaintiffs Pablo, Severina, Lazaro, and Lorenzo, all surnamed Mendoza. purchase price"; to order the defendants to vacate the portions occupied by them; to
order the defendants to pay actual and moral damages and attorney's fees to the
plaintiffs; to order the defendants to pay plaintiffs P120.00 a year from August 1958
Alipio Moreto died intestate on June 30, 1943 leaving as his heir herein plaintiff
until they have vacated the premises occupied by them for the use and occupancy of
Josefina Moreto.
the same.
The defendants claim that the sale made by Flaviano Moreto in their favor is valid as The fundamental and crucial issue in the case at bar is whether under the facts and
the lot sold is registered in the name of Flaviano Moreto and they are purchasers circumstances duly established by the evidence, petitioners are entitled to the full
believing in good faith that the vendor was the sole owner of the lot sold. ownership of the property in litigation, or only one-half of the same.

After a relocation of lots 1495, 1496 and 4545 made by agreement of the parties, it There is no question that when the petitioners purchased the property on July 30,
was found out that there was mutual error between Flaviano Moreto and the 1952 from Flaviano Moreto for the price of P900.00, his wife Monica Maniega had
defendants in the execution of the deed of sale because while the said deed recited already been dead six years before, Monica having died on May 6, 1946. Hence, the
that the lot sold is lot No. 1495, the real intention of the parties is that it was a portion conjugal partnership of the spouses Flaviano Moreto and Monica Maniega had
consisting of 781 square meters of lot No. 1496 which was the subject matter of their already been dissolved. (Article 175, (1) New Civil Code; Article 1417, Old Civil
sale transaction. Code). The records show that the conjugal estate had not been inventoried,
liquidated, settled and divided by the heirs thereto in accordance with law. The
After trial, the lower court rendered judgment, the dispositive part thereof being as necessary proceedings for the liquidation of the conjugal partnership were not
follows: instituted by the heirs either in the testate or intestate proceedings of the deceased
spouse pursuant to Act 3176 amending Section 685 of Act 190. Neither was there an
extra-judicial partition between the surviving spouse and the heirs of the deceased
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered for the plaintiffs spouse nor was an ordinary action for partition brought for the purpose. Accordingly,
declaring the deed of absolute sale dated July 30, 1952 pertaining the estate became the property of a community between the surviving husband,
to the eastern portion of Lot 1496 covering an area of 781 square Flaviano Moreto, and his children with the deceased Monica Maniega in the concept
meters null and void as regards the 390.5 square meters of which of a co-ownership.
plaintiffs are hereby declared the rightful owners and entitled to its
possession.
The community property of the marriage, at the dissolution of this
bond by the death of one of the spouses, ceases to belong to the
The sale is ordered valid with respect to the eastern one-half (1/2) legal partnership and becomes the property of a community, by
of 1781 square meters of Lot 1496 measuring 390.5 square meters operation of law, between the surviving spouse and the heirs of the
of which defendants are declared lawful owners and entitled to its deceased spouse, or the exclusive property of the widower or the
possession. widow, it he or she be the heir of the deceased spouse. Every co-
owner shall have full ownership of his part and in the fruits and
After proper survey segregating the eastern one-half portion with an benefits derived therefrom, and he therefore may alienate, assign
area of 390.5 square meters of Lot 1496, the defendants shall be or mortgage it, and even substitute another person in its enjoyment,
entitled to a certificate of title covering said portion and Transfer unless personal rights are in question. (Marigsa vs. Macabuntoc, 17
Certificate of Title No. 9843 of the office of the Register of Deeds of Phil. 107)
Laguna shall be cancelled accordingly and new titles issued to the
plaintiffs and to the defendants covering their respective portions. In Borja vs. Addision, 44 Phil. 895, 906, the Supreme Court said that "(t)here is no
reason in law why the heirs of the deceased wife may not form a partnership with the
Transfer Certificate of Title No. 5671 of the office of the Register of surviving husband for the management and control of the community property of the
Deeds of Laguna covering Lot No. 1495 and registered in the name marriage and conceivably such a partnership, or rather community of property,
of Cornelio Pamplona, married to Apolonia Onte, is by virtue of this between the heirs and the surviving husband might be formed without a written
decision ordered cancelled. The defendants are ordered to agreement." In Prades vs. Tecson, 49 Phil. 230, the Supreme Court held that
surrender to the office of the Register of Deeds of Laguna the "(a)lthough, when the wife dies, the surviving husband, as administrator of the
owner's duplicate of Transfer Certificate of Title No. 5671 within community property, has authority to sell the property with•ut the concurrence of the
thirty (30) days after this decision shall have become final for children of the marriage, nevertheless this power can be waived in favor of the
cancellation in accordance with this decision. children, with the result of bringing about a conventional ownership in common
between the father and children as to such property; and any one purchasing with
Let copy of this decision be furnished the Register of Deeds for the knowledge of the changed status of the property will acquire only the undivided
province of Laguna for his information and guidance. interest of those members of the family who join in the act of conveyance.

With costs against the defendants. 2 It is also not disputed that immediately after the execution of the sale in 1952, the
vendees constructed their house on the eastern part of Lot 1496 which the vendor
pointed out to them as the area sold, and two weeks thereafter, Rafael who is a son
The defendants-appellants, not being satisfied with said judgment, appealed to the of the vendees, also built his house within Lot 1496. Subsequently, a cemented
Court of Appeals, which affirmed the judgment, hence they now come to this Court.
piggery coral was constructed by the vendees at the back of their house about one 1495 is bounded on the west by Lot 4545. Lot 1496 is bounded on the west by Lot
and one-half meters from the eastern boundary of Lot 1496. Both vendor and 4545. It is therefore, clear that the three lots constitute one big land. They are not
vendees believed all the time that the area of 781 sq. meters subject of the sale was separate properties located in different places but they abut each other. This is not
Lot No. 1495 which according to its title (T.C.T. No. 14570) contains an area of 781 disputed by private respondents. Hence, at the time of the sale, the co-ownership
sq. meters so that the deed of sale between the parties Identified and described the constituted or covered these three lots adjacent to each other. And since Flaviano
land sold as Lot 1495. But actually, as verified later by a surveyor upon agreement of Moreto was entitled to one-half pro-indiviso of the entire land area or 1,173 sq. meters
the parties during the proceedings of the case below, the area sold was within Lot as his share, he had a perfect legal and lawful right to dispose of 781 sq. meters of
1496. his share to the Pamplona spouses. Indeed, there was still a remainder of some 392
sq. meters belonging to him at the time of the sale.
Again, there is no dispute that the houses of the spouses Cornelio Pamplona and
Apolonia Onte as well as that of their son Rafael Pamplona, including the concrete We reject respondent Court's ruling that the sale was valid as to one-half and invalid
piggery coral adjacent thereto, stood on the land from 1952 up to the filing of the as to the other half for the very simple reason that Flaviano Moreto, the vendor, had
complaint by the private respondents on July 25, 1961, or a period of over nine (9) the legal right to more than 781 sq. meters of the communal estate, a title which he
years. And during said period, the private respondents who are the heirs of Monica could dispose, alienate in favor of the vendees-petitioners. The title may be pro-
Maniega as well as of Flaviano Moreto who also died intestate on August 12, 1956, indiviso or inchoate but the moment the co-owner as vendor pointed out its location
lived as neighbors to the petitioner-vendees, yet lifted no finger to question the and even indicated the boundaries over which the fences were to be erectd without
occupation, possession and ownership of the land purchased by the Pamplonas, so objection, protest or complaint by the other co-owners, on the contrary they
that We are persuaded and convinced to rule that private respondents are in estoppel acquiesced and tolerated such alienation, occupation and possession, We rule that a
by laches to claim half of the property, in dispute as null and void. Estoppel by laches factual partition or termination of the co-ownership, although partial, was created, and
is a rule of equity which bars a claimant from presenting his claim when, by reason of barred not only the vendor, Flaviano Moreto, but also his heirs, the private
abandonment and negligence, he allowed a long time to elapse without presenting respondents herein from asserting as against the vendees-petitioners any right or title
the same. (International Banking Corporation vs. Yared, 59 Phil. 92) in derogation of the deed of sale executed by said vendor Flaiano Moreto.

We have ruled that at the time of the sale in 1952, the conjugal partnership was Equity commands that the private respondents, the successors of both the deceased
already dissolved six years before and therefore, the estate became a co-ownership spouses, Flaviano Moreto and Monica Maniega be not allowed to impugn the sale
between Flaviano Moreto, the surviving husband, and the heirs of his deceased wife, executed by Flaviano Moreto who indisputably received the consideration of P900.00
Monica Maniega. Article 493 of the New Civil Code is applicable and it provides a and which he, including his children, benefitted from the same. Moreover, as the heirs
follows: of both Monica Maniega and Flaviano Moreto, private respondents are duty-bound to
comply with the provisions of Articles 1458 and 1495, Civil Code, which is the
Art. 493. Each co-owner shall have the full ownership of his part obligation of the vendor of the property of delivering and transfering the ownership of
and of the fruits and benefits pertaining thereto, and he may the whole property sold, which is transmitted on his death to his heirs, the herein
therefore alienate, assign or mortgage it, and even substitute private respondents. The articles cited provide, thus:
another person in its enjoyment, except when personal rights are
involve. But the effect of the alienation or the mortgage, with Art. 1458. By the contract of sale one of the contracting parties
respect to the co-owners, shall be limited to the portion which may obligates himself to transfer the ownership of and to deliver a
be allotted to him in the division upon the termination of the co- determinate thing, and the other part to pay therefore a price certain
ownership. in money or its equivalent.

We agree with the petitioner that there was a partial partition of the co-ownership A contract of sale may be absolute or conditionial.
when at the time of the sale Flaviano Moreto pointed out the area and location of the
781 sq. meters sold by him to the petitioners-vendees on which the latter built their Art. 1495. The vendor is bound to transfer the ownership of and
house and also that whereon Rafael, the son of petitioners likewise erected his house deliver, as well as warrant the thing which is the object of the sale.
and an adjacent coral for piggery.
Under Article 776, New Civil Code, the inheritance which private respondents
Petitioners point to the fact that spouses Flaviano Moreto and Monica Maniega owned received from their deceased parents and/or predecessors-in-interest included all the
three parcels of land denominated as Lot 1495 having an area of 781 sq. meters, Lot property rights and obligations which were not extinguished by their parents' death.
1496 with an area of 1,021 sq. meters, and Lot 4545 with an area of 544 sq. meters. And under Art. 1311, paragraph 1, New Civil Code, the contract of sale executed by
The three lots have a total area of 2,346 sq. meters. These three parcels of lots are the deceased Flaviano Moreto took effect between the parties, their assigns and
contiguous with one another as each is bounded on one side by the other, thus: Lot heirs, who are the private respondents herein. Accordingly, to the private respondents
4545 is bounded on the northeast by Lot 1495 and on the southeast by Lot 1496. Lot is transmitted the obligation to deliver in full ownership the whole area of 781 sq.
meters to the petitioners (which was the original obligation of their predecessor
Flaviano Moreto) and not only one-half thereof. Private respondents must comply with
said obligation.

The records reveal that the area of 781 sq. meters sold to and occupied by petitioners
for more than 9 years already as of the filing of the complaint in 1961 had been re-
surveyed by private land surveyor Daniel Aranas. Petitioners are entitled to a
segregation of the area from Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-9843 covering Lot
1496 and they are also entitled to the issuance of a new Transfer Certificate of Title in
their name based on the relocation survey.

WHEREFORE, IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the judgment appealed from is

hereby AFFIRMED with modification in the sense that the sale made and executed by
Flaviano Moreto in favor of the petitioners-vendees is hereby declared legal and valid
in its entirely.

Petitioners are hereby declared owners in full ownership of the 781 sq. meters at the
eastern portion of Lot 1496 now occupied by said petitioners and whereon their
houses and piggery coral stand.

The Register of Deeds of Laguna is hereby ordered to segregate the area of 781 sq.
meters from Certificate of Title No. 9843 and to issue a new Transfer Certificate of
Title to the petitioners covering the segregated area of 781 sq. meters.

No costs.

SO ORDERED.

Teehankee (Chairman), Makasiar, Fernandez, De Castro and Melencio-Herrera, JJ.,

concur.
 Republic of the Philippines In the meantime, Tomas de Castro died.
SUPREME COURT
Manila In the month of November, 1956, plaintiff as lessee and defendant
Arsenio de Castro, Sr. as one of the lessors, agreed to set aside
EN BANC and annul the contract of lease and for this purpose an agreement
(Exh. A) was signed by them, Exhibit A as signed by plaintiff and
defendant shows that Felisa Cruz Vda. de Castro, widow of Tomas
de Castro, was intended to be made a party thereof in her capacity
as representative of the heirs of Tomas Castro.
G.R. No. L-25014 October 17, 1973
Condition No. 2 of Exhibit A reads as follows:
DOLORES LAHORA VDA. DE CASTRO, ARSENIO DE CASTRO, JR., WILFREDO
DE CASTRO, IRINEO DE CASTRO and VIRGINIA DE CASTRO ALEJANDRO, (in
substitution for the deceased defendant-appellant ARSENIO DE CASTRO, "2. Na sa pamamagitan nito ay pinawawalang kabuluhan namin
SR.)., petitioners, ang nasabing kasulatan at nagkasundo kami na ang bawat isa sa
vs. amin ni Arsenio de Castro at Felisa Cruz Vda. de Castro ay isauli
GREGORIO ATIENZA, respondent. kay GREGORIO ATIENZA ang tig P2,500.00 o kabuuang halagang
P5,000.00 na paunang naibigay nito alinsunod sa nasabing
kasulatan; na ang nasabing tig P2,500.00 ay isasauli ng bawat isa
TEEHANKEE, J.: sa amin sa o bago dumating ang Dec. 30, 1956."

The Court rejects petitioners' appeal as without merit and affirms the judgment of the Felisa Cruz Vda. de Castro refused to sign Exhibit A. Defendant did
appellate court. Petitioners' predecessor-in-interest as co-owner of an undivided one- not pay the P2,500.00 which under the above-quoted paragraph of
half interest in the fishpond could validly lease his interest to a third party, respondent Exhibit A, he should have paid on December 30, 1956. Demand for
Atienza, independently of his co-owner (although said co-owner had also leased his payment was made by plaintiff's counsel on January 7, 1957 but to
other undivided one-half interest to the same third party) and could likewise by mutual no avail, hence the present action.
agreement independently cancel his lease agreement with said third party. Said
predecessor-in-interest (and petitioners who have substituted him as his heirs)
therefore stands liable on his express undertaking to refund the advance rental paid On the conflicting contentions between the parties as to who between them would
to him by the lessee on the cancelled lease and cannot invoke the non-cancellation of attend to securing the signature of Mrs. Felisa Cruz Vda. de Castro (widow of Tomas
the co-owner's lease to elude such liability. de Castro) to the agreement of cancellation of the lease with respondent Atienza, the
appellate court found that "the testimony of the defendant (Arsenio de Castro, Sr.) ...
supports the contention of the plaintiff (Atienza) "that it was the defendant Arsenio
The Court of Appeals, in its decision affirming in toto the judgment of the Manila court who was interested and undertook to do so, citing Arsenio's own declaration that "I
of first instance ordering therein defendant-appellant Arsenio de Castro, Sr. (now agreed to sign this document (referring to the cancellation) because of my desire to
deceased and substituted by above-named petitioners as his heirs) "to return to the cancel our original agreement" and that his purpose in obtaining the cancellation of
plaintiff (respondent) Gregorio Atienza the sum P2,500.00 with legal interest from the said lease agreement with plaintiff Atienza was "(B)ecause I had the intention of
date of the filing of complaint until fully paid plus the sum of P250.00 as attorney's having said fishpond leased to other persons and I cannot lease it to third parties
fees and the costs of the suit", found the following facts to undisputed: unless I can secure the signature of Felisa Vda. de Castro."

On January 24, 1956 the brothers Tomas de Castro and Arsenio de The appellate court thus held in effect that as Arsenio "was the one interested in
Castro, Sr. leased to plaintiff a fishpond containing an area of 26 cancelling the lease (Exh. 1), it stands to reason that he most probably undertook to
hectares situated in Polo, Bulacan and forming part of a bigger obtain the signature of Mrs. Castro [widow and successor-in-interest of his brother
parcel of land covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 196450 of Tomas]" and that he could not invoke his own failure to obtain such signature to elude
the registry of the property of Bulacan. The lessors are co-owners his own undertaking and liability to refund respondent (plaintiff) his share of the rental
in equal shares of the leased property. paid in advance by respondent on the cancelled lease in the sum of P2,500.00.

According to the contract of lease (Exh. 1) the term of the lease The appellate court furthermore correctly held that the consent or concurrence of
was for five years from January 24, 1956 at a rental of P5,000 a Felisa Vda. de Castro (as co-owner in succession of Tomas) was not an essential
year, the first year's rental to be paid on February 1, 1956, the condition to the validity and effectivity of the agreement of cancellation of the lease
second on February 1, 1957 and the rental for the last three years (Exhibit A) as between Arsenio and respondent-lessee, contrary to petitioners' claim,
on February 1, 1958. The first year's rental was paid on time.
holding that "(S)ince there is no specific provision in Exhibit A supporting defendant's
claim, we are not prepared to supply such condition unless the same can be deduced
from other evidence or unless the terms of Exhibit A cannot be performed by plaintiff
and defendant without Mrs. Castro being bound as a party thereto."

The issue is simply reduced to whether Arsenio as co-owner of the fishpond

owned pro-indiviso by him with his brother Tomas (succeeded by Felisa Vda. de
Castro) could validly lease his half-interest to a third party (respondent
Atienza) independently of his
co-owner, and in case his co-owner also leased his other half interest to the same
third party, whether Arsenio could cancel his own lease agreement with said third
party?

The appellate court correctly resolved the issue thus: "Our view of the contract of
lease Exhibit 1 is that each of the Castro brothers, leased his undivided one-half
interest in the fishpond they owned in common to the plaintiff. Could one of them have
validly leased his interest without the other co-owner leasing his own? The answer to
this is given by appellant in his own brief (p. 14) when he said that it would result in a
partnership between the lessee and the owner of the other undivided half. If the lease
could be entered into partially by one of the co-owners, insofar as his interest is
concerned, then the lease, Exhibit 1, can also be cancelled partially as between
plaintiff and defendant. Therefore, we conclude that the consent of Mrs. Felisa Cruz
Vda. de Castro is not essential for the cancellation of the lease of defendant's one-
half undivided share in the fishpond to plaintiff."

The appellate court's judgment is fully supported by the Civil Code provisions on the
rights and prerogatives of co-owners, and specifically by Article 493 which expressly
provides that

Art. 493. Each co-owner shall have the full ownership of his
part and of the fruits and benefitspertaining thereto, and he may
therefore alienate, assign or mortgage it, and even substitute
another person in its enjoyment, except when personal rights are
involved. But the effect of the alienation or the mortgage, with
respect to the co-owners, shall be limited to the portion which may
be alloted to him in the division upon the termination of the co-
ownership. *

ACCORDINGLY, the appealed judgment is hereby affirmed with costs against

petitioners.

Makalintal, Actg. C.J., Zaldivar, Castro, Fernando, Barredo, Makasiar, Antonio and
Esguerra, JJ., concur.
 FIRST DIVISION jurisdiction over the person of the defendants and lack of cause of action. Respondents
prayed that the affirmative defenses be set for preliminary hearing and that the
[G.R. No. 137152. January 29, 2001] complaint be dismissed.[4] Petitioner replied.
CITY OF MANDALUYONG, petitioner, vs. ANTONIO N., FRANCISCO N., THELMA On November 5, 1997, petitioner filed an Amended Complaint and named as an
N., EUSEBIO N., RODOLFO N., all surnamed AGUILAR, respondents. additional defendant Virginia N. Aguilar and, at the same time, substituted Eusebio
Aguilar with his heirs. Petitioner also excluded from expropriation TCT No. 59870 and
DECISION thereby reduced the area sought to be expropriated from three (3) parcels of land to
two (2) parcels totalling 1,636 square meters under TCT Nos. 63766 and 63767. [5]
PUNO, J.:
The Amended Complaint was admitted by the trial court on December 18,
This is a petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court of the Orders 1997. Respondents, who, with the exception of Virginia Aguilar and the Heirs of
dated September 17, 1998 and December 29, 1998 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch Eusebio Aguilar had yet to be served with summons and copies of the Amended
168, Pasig City[1] dismissing the petitioners Amended Complaint in SCA No. 1427 for Complaint, filed a Manifestation and Motion adopting their Answer with Counterclaim
expropriation of two (2) parcels of land in Mandaluyong City. and Motion for Preliminary Hearing as their answer to the Amended Complaint. [6]
The antecedent facts are as follows: The motion was granted. At the hearing of February 25, 1998, respondents
presented Antonio Aguilar who testified and identified several documentary
On August 4, 1997, petitioner filed with the Regional Trial Court, Branch 168,
evidence. Petitioner did not present any [Link], both parties filed their
Pasig City a complaint for expropriation entitled City of Mandaluyong, plaintiff v. Antonio
respective memoranda.[7]
N., Francisco N., Thelma N., Eusebio N., Rodolfo N., all surnamed Aguilar, defendants.
Petitioner sought to expropriate three (3) adjoining parcels of land with an aggregate On September 17, 1998, the trial court issued an order dismissing the Amended
area of 1,847 square meters registered under Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. 59780, Complaint after declaring respondents as small property owners whose land is exempt
63766 and 63767 in the names of the defendants, herein respondents, located at 9 de from expropriation under Republic Act No. 7279. The court also found that the
Febrero Street, Barangay Mauwag, City of Mandaluyong; on a portion of the 3 lots, expropriation was not for a public purpose for petitioners failure to present any evidence
respondents constructed residential houses several decades ago which they had since that the intended beneficiaries of the expropriation are landless and homeless residents
leased out to tenants until the present; on the vacant portion of the lots, other families of Mandaluyong. The court thus disposed of as follows:
constructed residential structures which they likewise occupied; in 1983, the lots were
classified by Resolution No. 125 of the Board of the Housing and Urban Development
Coordinating Council as an Area for Priority Development for urban land reform under WHEREFORE, the Amended Complaint is hereby ordered dismissed without
pronouncement as to cost.
Proclamation Nos. 1967 and 2284 of then President Marcos; as a result of this
classification, the tenants and occupants of the lots offered to purchase the land from
respondents, but the latter refused to sell; on November 7, 1996, the Sangguniang SO ORDERED.[8]
Panlungsod of petitioner, upon petition of the Kapitbisig, an association of tenants and
occupants of the subject land, adopted Resolution No. 516, Series of 1996 authorizing Petitioner moved for reconsideration. On December 29, 1998, the court denied
Mayor Benjamin Abalos of the City of Mandaluyong to initiate action for the the motion. Hence this petition.
expropriation of the subject lots and construction of a medium-rise condominium for Petitioner claims that the trial court erred
qualified occupants of the land; on January 10, 1996, Mayor Abalos sent a letter to
respondents offering to purchase the said property at P3,000.00 per square meter;
respondents did not answer the letter. Petitioner thus prayed for the expropriation of IN UPHOLDING RESPONDENTS CONTENTION THAT THEY QUALIFY AS SMALL
the said lots and the fixing of just compensation at the fair market value of P3,000.00 PROPERTY OWNERS AND ARE THUS EXEMPT FROM EXPROPRIATION.[9]
per square meter.[2] Petitioner mainly claims that the size of the lots in litigation does not exempt the
In their answer, respondents, except Eusebio N. Aguilar who died in 1995, denied same from expropriation in view of the fact that the said lots have been declared to be
having received a copy of Mayor Abalos offer to purchase their lots. They alleged that within the Area for Priority Development (APD) No. 5 of Mandaluyong by virtue of
the expropriation of their land is arbitrary and capricious, and is not for a public purpose; Proclamation No. 1967, as amended by Proclamation No. 2284 in relation to
the subject lots are their only real property and are too small for expropriation, while Presidential Decree No. 1517.[10] This declaration allegedly authorizes petitioner to
petitioner has several properties inventoried for socialized housing; the fair market expropriate the property, ipso facto, regardless of the area of the land.
value of P3,000.00 per square meter is arbitrary because the zonal valuation set by the Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1517, the Urban Land Reform Act, was issued by
Bureau of Internal Revenue is P7,000.00 per square meter. As counterclaim, then President Marcos in 1978. The decree adopted as a State policy the liberation of
respondents prayed for damages of P21 million.[3] human communities from blight, congestion and hazard, and promotion of their
Respondents filed a Motion for Preliminary Hearing claiming that the defenses development and modernization, the optimum use of land as a national resource for
alleged in their Answer are valid grounds for dismissal of the complaint for lack of public welfare.[11] Pursuant to this law, Proclamation No. 1893 was issued in 1979
declaring the entire Metro Manila as Urban Land Reform Zone for purposes of urban (APD), Zonal Improvement Program (ZIP) sites, Slum Improvement and Resettlement
land reform. This was amended in 1980 by Proclamation No. 1967 and in 1983 by (SIR) sites which have not yet been acquired; (5) BLISS sites which have not yet been
Proclamation No. 2284 which identified and specified 245 sites in Metro Manila as acquired; and (6) privately-owned lands.
Areas for Priority Development and Urban Land Reform Zones.
There is no dispute that the two lots in litigation are privately-owned and therefore
In 1992, the Congress of the Philippines passed Republic Act No. 7279, the Urban last in the order of priority acquisition. However, the law also provides that lands within
Development and Housing Act of 1992. The law lays down as a policy that the state, in the declared APDs which have not yet been acquired by the government are fourth in
cooperation with the private sector, undertake a comprehensive and continuing Urban the order of priority. According to petitioner, since the subject lots lie within the declared
Development and Housing Program; uplift the conditions of the underprivileged and APD, this fact mandates that the lots be given priority in acquisition. [14]
homeless citizens in urban areas and resettlement areas by making available to them
decent housing at affordable cost, basic services and employment opportunities and Section 9, however, is not a single provision that can be read separate from the
provide for the rational use and development of urban land to bring about, among others, other provisions of the law. It must be read together with Section 10 of R.A. 7279 which
equitable utilization of residential lands; encourage more effective people's participation also provides:
in the urban development process and improve the capability of local government units
in undertaking urban development and housing programs and projects.[12] Towards this Section 10. Modes of Land [Link] modes of acquiring lands for purposes of
end, all city and municipal governments are mandated to conduct an inventory of all this Act shall include, among others, community mortgage, land swapping, land
lands and improvements within their respective localities, and in coordination with the assembly or consolidation, land banking, donation to the Government, joint-venture
National Housing Authority, the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board, the National agreement, negotiated purchase, and expropriation: Provided, however, That
Mapping Resource Information Authority, and the Land Management expropriation shall be resorted to only when other modes of acquisition have
Bureau, identify lands for socialized housing and resettlement areas for the immediate been exhausted: Provided, further, That where expropriation is resorted to,
and future needs of the underprivileged and homeless in the urban areas, acquire the parcels of land owned by small property owners shall be exempted for
lands, and dispose of said lands to the beneficiaries of the program.[13] purposes of this Act: Provided, finally, That abandoned property, as herein defined,
shall be reverted and escheated to the State in a proceeding analogous to the
The acquisition of lands for socialized housing is governed by several provisions procedure laid down in Rule 91 of the Rules of Court. [15]
in the law. Section 9 of R.A. 7279 provides:
For the purposes of socialized housing, government-owned and foreclosed properties
Sec. 9. Priorities in the Acquisition of [Link] for socialized housing shall be shall be acquired by the local government units, or by the National Housing Authority
acquired in the following order: primarily through negotiated purchase: Provided, That qualified beneficiaries who are
(a) Those owned by the Government or any of its subdivisions, actual occupants of the land shall be given the right of first refusal.
instrumentalities, or agencies, including government-owned or Lands for socialized housing under R.A. 7279 are to be acquired in several
controlled corporations and their subsidiaries; modes. Among these modes are the following: (1) community mortgage; (2) land
(b) Alienable lands of the public domain; swapping, (3) land assembly or consolidation; (4) land banking; (5) donation to the
government; (6) joint venture agreement; (7) negotiated purchase; and (8)
(c) Unregistered or abandoned and idle lands; expropriation. The mode of expropriation is subject to two conditions: (a) it shall be
resorted to only when the other modes of acquisition have been exhausted; and (b)
(d) Those within the declared Areas for Priority Development, Zonal parcels of land owned by small property owners are exempt from such acquisition.
Improvement Program sites, and Slum Improvement and Resettlement
Program sites which have not yet been acquired; Section 9 of R.A. 7279 speaks of priorities in the acquisition of lands. It
enumerates the type of lands to be acquired and the heirarchy in their
(e) Bagong Lipunan Improvement of Sites and Services or BLISS Sites acquisition. Section 10 deals with the modes of land acquisition or the process of
which have not yet been acquired; acquiring lands for socialized housing. These are two different things. They mean that
the type of lands that may be acquired in the order of priority in Section 9 are to
(f) Privately-owned lands.
be acquired only in the modes authorized under Section 10. The acquisition of the
lands in the priority list must be made subject to the modes and conditions set forth in
Where on-site development is found more practicable and advantageous to the the next provision. In other words, land that lies within the APD, such as in the instant
beneficiaries, the priorities mentioned in this section shall not apply. The local case, may be acquired only in the modes under, and subject to the conditions of,
government units shall give budgetary priority to on-site development of government Section 10.
lands.
Petitioner claims that it had faithfully observed the different modes of land
Lands for socialized housing are to be acquired in the following order: (1) acquisition for socialized housing under R.A. 7279 and adhered to the priorities in the
government lands; (2) alienable lands of the public domain; (3) unregistered or acquisition for socialized housing under said law. [16] It, however, did not state with
abandoned or idle lands; (4) lands within the declared Areas for Priority Development
particularity whether it exhausted the other modes of acquisition in Section 9 of the law meters in highly urbanized cities and 800 square meters in other urban areas; and (2)
before it decided to expropriate the subject lots. The law states expropriation shall be that they do not own real property other than the same.
resorted to when other modes of acquisition have been exhausted. Petitioner alleged
only one mode of acquisition, i.e., by negotiated purchase. Petitioner, through the City The case at bar involves two (2) residential lots in Mandaluyong City, a highly
Mayor, tried to purchase the lots from respondents but the latter refused to sell. [17] As urbanized city. The lot under TCT No. 63766 is 687 square meters in area and the
to the other modes of acquisition, no mention has been made. Not even Resolution No. second under TCT No. 63767 is 949 square meters, both totalling 1,636 square meters
516, Series of 1996 of the Sangguniang Panlungsod authorizing the Mayor of in area. TCT No. 63766 was issued in the names of herein five (5) respondents, viz:
Mandaluyong to effect the expropriation of the subject property states whether the city
government tried to acquire the same by community mortgage, land swapping, land FRANCISCO N. AGUILAR, widower; THELMA N. AGUILAR, single; EUSEBIO N.
assembly or consolidation, land banking, donation to the government, or joint venture AGUILAR, JR., widower; RODOLFO N. AGUILAR, single and ANTONIO N.
agreement under Section 9 of the law. AGUILAR, married to Teresita Puig; all of legal age, Filipinos.[28]
Section 9 also exempts from expropriation parcels of land owned by small TCT No. 63767 was issued in the names of the five (5) respondents plus Virginia
property owners.[18] Petitioner argues that the exercise of the power of eminent domain Aguilar, thus:
is not anymore conditioned on the size of the land sought to be expropriated.[19] By the
expanded notion of public use, present jurisprudence has established the concept that FRANCISCO N. AGUILAR, widower; THELMA N. AGUILAR, single; EUSEBIO N.
expropriation is not anymore confined to the vast tracts of land and landed estates, but AGUILAR, JR., widower; RODOLFO N. AGUILAR, single and ANTONIO N.
also covers small parcels of land.[20] That only a few could actually benefit from the AGUILAR, married to Teresita Puig; and VIRGINIA N. AGUILAR, single, all of legal
expropriation of the property does not diminish its public use character. [21] It simply is age, Filipinos.[29]
not possible to provide, in one instance, land and shelter for all who need them. [22]
Respondent Antonio Aguilar testified that he and the other registered owners are
While we adhere to the expanded notion of public use, the passage of R.A. No. all siblings who inherited the subject property by intestate succession from their
7279, the Urban Development and Housing Act of 1992 introduced a limitation on the parents.[30] Their father died in 1945 and their mother in 1976. [31] Both TCTs were
size of the land sought to be expropriated for socialized housing. The law expressly issued in the siblings names on September 2, 1987. [32] In 1986, however, the siblings
exempted small property owners from expropriation of their land for urban land agreed to extrajudicially partition the lots among themselves, but no action was taken
reform. R.A. No. 7279 originated as Senate Bill No. 234 authored by Senator Joey by them to this end. It was only eleven (11) years later, on November 28, 1997 that a
Lina[23] and House Bill No. 34310. Senate Bill No. 234 then provided that one of those survey of the two lots was made[33] and on February 10, 1998, a consolidation
lands not covered by the urban land reform and housing program was land actually subdivision plan was approved by the Lands Management Service of the Department
used by small property owners within the just and equitable retention limit as provided of Environment and Natural Resources.[34] The co-owners signed a Partition
under this Act.[24] Small property owners were defined in Senate Bill No. 234 as: Agreement on February 24, 1998[35] and on May 21, 1998, TCT Nos. 63766 and 63767
were cancelled and new titles issued in the names of the individual owners pursuant to
4. Small Property Ownersare those whose rights are protected under Section 9, the Partition Agreement.
Article XIII of the Constitution of the Philippines, who own small parcels of land within
the fair and just retention limit provided under this Act and which are adequate to Petitioner argues that the consolidation of the subject lots and their partition was
meet the reasonable needs of the small property owners family and their means of made more than six (6) months after the complaint for expropriation was filed on August
livelihood.[25] 4, 1997, hence, the partition was made in bad faith, for the purpose of circumventing
the provisions of R.A. 7279.[36]
The exemption from expropriation of lands of small-property owners was never
questioned on the Senate floor.[26] This exemption, although with a modified definition, At the time of filing of the complaint for expropriation, the lots subject of this case
was actually retained in the consolidation of Senate Bill No. 234 and House Bill No. were owned in common by respondents. Under a co-ownership, the ownership of an
34310 which became R.A. No. 7279.[27] undivided thing or right belongs to different persons.[37] During the existence of the co-
ownership, no individual can claim title to any definite portion of the community property
The question now is whether respondents qualify as small property owners as until the partition thereof; and prior to the partition, all that the co-owner has is an ideal
defined in Section 3 (q) of R.A. 7279. Section 3 (q) provides: or abstract quota or proportionate share in the entire land or thing. [38] Article 493 of the
Civil Code however provides that:
Section 3 x x x (q). Small property owners refers to those whose only real property
consists of residential lands not exceeding three hundred square meters (300 sq.m.) Art. 493. Each co-owner shall have the full ownership of his part and of the fruits and
in highly urbanized cities and eight hundred square meters (800 sq.m.) in other urban benefits pertaining thereto, and he may therefore alienate, assign or mortgage it, and
areas. even substitute another person in its enjoyment, except when personal rights are
involved. But the effect of the alienation or the mortgage, with respect to the co-
Small-property owners are defined by two elements: (1) those owners of real property owners shall be limited to the portion which may be allotted to him in the division upon
whose property consists of residential lands with an area of not more than 300 square termination of the co-ownership.[39]
Before partition in a co-ownership, every co-owner has the absolute ownership of his survive.[56] After Eusebio died, his five heirs became co-owners of his 347 square-meter
undivided interest in the common property. The co-owner is free to alienate, assign or portion. Dividing the 347 square meters among the five entitled each heir to 69.4 square
mortgage his interest, except as to purely personal rights.[40] He may also validly lease meters of the land subject of litigation.
his undivided interest to a third party independently of the other co-owners.[41] The
effect of any such transfer is limited to the portion which may be awarded to him upon Consequently, the share of each co-owner did not exceed the 300 square meter
the partition of the property.[42] limit set in R.A. 7279. The second question, however, is whether the subject property
is the only real property of respondents for them to comply with the second requisite for
small property owners.
Article 493 therefore gives the owner of an undivided interest in the property the right
to freely sell and dispose of his undivided interest.[43] The co-owner, however, has no Antonio Aguilar testified that he and most of the original co-owners do not reside
right to sell or alienate a concrete specific or determinate part of the thing owned in on the subject property but in their ancestral home in Paco, Manila. [57] Respondents
common, because his right over the thing is represented by a quota or ideal portion therefore appear to own real property other than the lots in litigation. Nonetheless, the
without any physical adjudication.[44] If the co-owner sells a concrete portion, this, records do not show that the ancestral home in Paco, Manila and the land on which it
nonetheless, does not render the sale void. Such a sale affects only his own share, stands are owned by respondents or any one of them. Petitioner did not present any
subject to the results of the partition but not those of the other co-owners who did not title or proof of this fact despite Antonio Aguilars testimony.
consent to the sale.[45]
On the other hand, respondents claim that the subject lots are their only
In the instant case, the titles to the subject lots were issued in respondents names real property[58] and that they, particularly two of the five heirs of Eusebio Aguilar, are
as co-owners in 1987ten (10) years before the expropriation case was filed in 1997. As merely renting their houses and therefore do not own any other real property in Metro
co-owners, all that the respondents had was an ideal or abstract quota or proportionate Manila.[59] To prove this, they submitted certifications from the offices of the City and
share in the lots. This, however, did not mean that they could not separately exercise Municipal Assessors in Metro Manila attesting to the fact that they have no registered
any rights over the lots. Each respondent had the full ownership of his undivided real property declared for taxation purposes in the respective cities. Respondents were
interest in the property. He could freely sell or dispose of his interest independently of certified by the City Assessor of Manila;[60] Quezon City;[61] Makati City;[62] Pasay
the other co-owners. And this interest could have even been attached by his City;[63] Paranaque;[64]Caloocan City;[65] Pasig City;[66] Muntinlupa;[67] Marikina;[68] and
creditors.[46] The partition in 1998, six (6) months after the filing of the expropriation the then municipality of Las Pias[69] and the municipality of San Juan del Monte [70] as
case, terminated the co-ownership by converting into certain and definite parts the having no real property registered for taxation in their individual names.
respective undivided shares of the co-owners.[47] The subject property is not a thing
essentially indivisible. The rights of the co-owners to have the property partitioned and Finally, this court notes that the subject lots are now in the possession of
their share in the same delivered to them cannot be questioned for "[n]o co-owner shall respondents. Antonio Aguilar testified that he and the other co-owners filed ejectment
be obliged to remain in the co-ownership."[48] The partition was merely a necessary cases against the occupants of the land before the Metropolitan Trial Court,
incident of the co-ownership;[49] and absent any evidence to the contrary, this partition Mandaluyong, Branches 59 and 60. Orders of eviction were issued and executed on
is presumed to have been done in good faith. September 17, 1997 which resulted in the eviction of the tenants and other occupants
from the land in question.[71]
Upon partition, four (4) co-owners, namely, Francisco, Thelma, Rodolfo and
Antonio Aguilar each had a share of 300 square meters under TCT Nos. 13849, 13852, IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petition is DENIED and the orders dated September 17,
13850, 13851.[50] Eusebio Aguilars share was 347 square meters under TCT No. 1998 and December 29, 1998 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 168, Pasig City in
13853[51] while Virginia Aguilars was 89 square meters under TCT No. 13854. [52] SCA No. 1427 are AFFIRMED.

It is noted that Virginia Aguilar, although granted 89 square meters only of the SO ORDERED.
subject lots, is, at the same time, the sole registered owner of TCT No. 59780, one of Davide, Jr., C.J., (Chairman), Kapunan, Pardo, and Ynares-Santiago, JJ., concur.
the three (3) titles initially sought to be expropriated in the original complaint. TCT No.
59780, with a land area of 211 square meters, was dropped in the amended
complaint. Eusebio Aguilar was granted 347 square meters, which is 47 square meters
more than the maximum of 300 square meters set by R.A. 7279 for small property
owners. In TCT No. 13853, Eusebios title, however, appears the following annotation:

subject to x x x, and to the prov. of Sec. 4 Rule 74 of the Rules of Court with respect
to the inheritance left by the deceased Eusebio N. Aguilar. [53]
Eusebio died on March 23, 1995,[54] and, according to Antonios testimony, the
former was survived by five (5) children.[55] Where there are several co-owners, and
some of them die, the heirs of those who die, with respect to that part belonging to the
deceased, become also co-owners of the property together with those who