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Legal Case Summaries: Murder, Theft, and Homicide

The Supreme Court upheld the conviction of Sia Teb Ban for theft. While Sia argued that intent to gain (animus lucrandi) had not been proven, the Court found this intent can be inferred under the law. Specifically, Article 308 of the Revised Penal Code states those who take personal property without consent and with intent to gain are guilty of theft. Though Sia stole the watch, intent to gain can be presumed based on his unlawful taking of the property without the owner's consent.

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100% found this document useful (1 vote)
831 views9 pages

Legal Case Summaries: Murder, Theft, and Homicide

The Supreme Court upheld the conviction of Sia Teb Ban for theft. While Sia argued that intent to gain (animus lucrandi) had not been proven, the Court found this intent can be inferred under the law. Specifically, Article 308 of the Revised Penal Code states those who take personal property without consent and with intent to gain are guilty of theft. Though Sia stole the watch, intent to gain can be presumed based on his unlawful taking of the property without the owner's consent.

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Copyright
© © All Rights Reserved
We take content rights seriously. If you suspect this is your content, claim it here.
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People vs Gonzales G.R. No.

80762
March 19, 1990

Facts:

Antecedence follows that Brgy. Captain Paja was awakened by spouses Gonzales,
who informed him that the lady Gonzales, in defense of her honor, had just killed their
landlord Peñacerrada from knife wounds. Per Paja’s instruction, the couple proceeded to
surrender to authorities. After been informed of the incident, police investigated the scene.

Grounded on the investigation of the police, the Prov. Fiscal filed a crime of murder
against four unknown companions and Spouses Gonzales, to which they pleaded not guilty.
Furthermore, prosecution presented a witness Huntoria, who claims that the elder
Gonzales, Custodio Sr. (appellant), was among the companions on the murder of the victim.
Huntoria further elaborated that the act was not a defense against honor, as what the
defense would like to present, but rather the defendants took turns in stabbing the victim,
even emphasizing that he clearly saw the murder as it was committed under the
illumination of the moonlight. However, he admitted that he cannot determine who
specifically performed the stabbing and as even the weapons used because apparently, the
defendants’ actions were too rapid to surmise.

Issue:

Whether or not the elder Custodio is guilty of murder.

Ruling:

No, elder Custodio is not guilty of murder.

Art. 4 (1) of the Revised Penal Code (RPC) provides that criminal liability shall be
incurred by any person committing a felony although the wrongful act be different from that
which he intended (Emphasis supplied). Furthermore, Art. 3 of the RPC provides how
felonies in general are committed: 1) there must be an act or omission, 2) which is
punishable by the RPC, 3) performed by deceit or fault.
Additionally, Art. 17 provides that principals are criminally liable when: 1) they take
direct part on the crime, 2) induce another to commit such; and 3) indispensably cooperate
of the crime’s accomplishment

In this case, Huntoria’s admission of his inability to conclude who did the stabbing
stands to fail the requisites of Art. 3 that a felony of murder has been committed by the
elder Gonzales to make the latter liable in accordance with Art. 4.
Additionally, prosecution has failed to show that the elder Gonzales is guilty by direct
participation, inducement, or indispensable cooperation.
Soriano vs People of the Philippines G.R. No. L-3008
March 19, 1951

Facts:
Soriano was the duly appointed administrator of a certain Saenz, who owns the
building rented by Eagle Cinema Co. The leasing cinema company, represented by
Benedicto, charges Soriano of theft before the Court of First Instance for allegedly stowing
away a motor generator and a lantern slide projector, which he initially denied before the
owner and the police authorities, but were eventually found in his possession.
Subsequently, he interposed a question of law, where he reiterated that a crime of
theft requires that there be an intent to gain on part of the offender for him to be liable on
his taking. In addition, it was held true that the equipment of the theater, including those
he took possession, were under mortgage in favor of Saenz. Applying this logic in his case,
he cannot be held a thief of something already in his possession. Finally, he provided of the
power-of-attorney conferred upon Soriano by Saenz, where it partially provides that the
former may take anything of value of whatsoever kind as may be of due. It is undisputed
however that he did not take the consent of the theater when he took their equipment for
supposedly settling of their standing debt.

Issue:
Whether or not Soriano is guilty of theft.

Held:
Yes, Soriano is guilty of theft.

Art. 308 of the Revised Penal Code provides that those who take personal property
without the latter’s consent with an intent to gain are guilty of theft. Furthermore, the
jurisprudence of US vs de Vera (43 Phil. 1000) states that delivery of a chattel does not
necessitate its juridical possession. Subsequently, the unconsented taking of the property
constitute the crime of theft. It is therefore presumed that intent to gain can be inferred.

In this case, though it is true the equipment were mortgaged in favor of Saenz, 1) the
things were not due and 2) they were never foreclosed. Finally, even conceding on the
argument that Soriano did physical possession of those equipment, it does not necessitate
any power to exercise any act of dominion over said chattels.
US vs Mendoza G.R. No. 13818
September 26, 1918

Facts:
Defendant Mendoza was not on good terms with the victim Creason, for the latter
refused to stand as witness on the former’s daughter’s case of interest. One night, Mendoza
entered Creason’s household, the former insulting the latter with words. As the then-sickly
Creason was about to rise from his bed, Mendoza assaulted him with a pocket knife in his
abdomen. Struggle for the weapon ensued, with Creason calling for his father-in-law’s help
in the process. Before Creason’s in-law could even come to his defense, Mendoza already
makes his escape, leaving behind the pocket knife on the scene. Fortunately, Creason
remains alive, only to be injured for a little under a month.
Creason then filed before the Court of First Instace of Tarlac the crime of frustrated
murder for the felonious act of Mendoza, to which the court affirms. Such was appealed
before this Court.

Issue:
Whether or not Mendoza is guilty of frustrated homicide.

Held:
No, Mendoza is not guilty of frustrated murder but only that of less grave physical
injuries.

In order that a crime may be classified as that of a frustrated homicide, it would be


necessary to prove that a felon have an intent to kill his victim. Furthermore, intent is
difficult to discover, it being a mental act. Such can only be deduced from the external acts
of a felon. When these acts produce a definite result, courts should not hold that other
results were intended without a clear and conclusive proof.

In this case, had Mendoza really intended to kill Creason, he should have not given
up during the struggle, as the conditions were still favorable to the former, with 1) him still
in possession of the pocket knife, 2) Creason was sickly, 3) Creason’s father-in-law has yet
to come in his aid.
People of the Philippines vs Mabug-at G.R. No. L-25459
August 10, 1926

Facts:
Defendant Mabug-at had a sweetheart named Juana Buralo. One day, Mabug-at
invited Buralo for an afternoon walk, the former knowing the latter had been jealous to
another girl because of his frequent visits to the girl. Buralo excused herself from the walk.
Days after the incident, Buralo went to a certain Banyan’s house for devotion. Mabug-
at thereafter came, with a revolver in hand, asking a certain Abellon to ask Buralo to come
down; Abellon, however refused. Instead, he threatened that he will be the one to bring
Buralo outside and will kill anyone who tries to defend her.
Finally, Buralo came outside, along with her niece Perfecta. The girls went to the
direction of their house, with Mabug-at following behind. As Juana and Perfecta were
climbing upstairs, Mabug-at fired a shot at their direction, the bullet passing through her
neck and coming out of her left eye.
A case then was filed before the Court of First Instance of Negros against Mabug-at
for a crime of frustrated murder, to which the court affirms. Mabug-at alleges that he should
not be held for the crime of frustrated homicide, as it was not proven that there was an
intention to kill. If anything, the only crime that is validly proven was for a discharge of
weapon with injuries.

Issue:
Whether or not Mabug-at is guilty of frustrated murder.

Held:
Yes, Mabug-at is guilty of frustrated murder

Art. 4(1) of the Revised Penal Code provides that criminal liability may be incurred by
any person committing a felony although the wrongful act be different from that which he
intended. Furthermore, the case of US vs Montenegro even concedes that intent to kill is
not conclusive at a mere discharge of the firearm or the act alone, but through the
attendant circumstances. Finally, in the case decided by the Supreme Court of Spain on
May 7, 1885 provides that treachery, a qualifying circumstance for murder, pertains to
employing means to ensure commission of a crime without any risk from the offender
arising from any defense that might be made by the offended party.

In this case, it was very evident that Mabug-at aimed the gun at Juana, although the
bullet hit Perfecta. This does not however alter his criminal liability. Also, the act of aiming
the gun while the girls’ backs towards the accused goes to show that indeed the offended
party, should they be gunned down, would have no means to defend themselves; thus,
treachery was evident.
People of the Philippines vs Sia Teb Ban G.R. No. L-31695
November 26, 1929

Facts:

Defendant Sia stole someone’s watch. However, through the offended party’s friend’s
ample reaction, he managed to subdue Sia, the watch retrieved from his possession.
The victim then filed a case in the municipal court of Manila for the crime of theft
against Sia, to which the court affirms, and to the subsequent affirmation of the Court of
First Instance upon Sia’s appeal. Upon appealing to this Court, he contends that animus
lucrandi has not been proved.

Issue:
Whether or not Sia is guilty of theft.

Held:
Yes, Sia is guilty of theft.

Fundamental doctrine of law provides that the act penalized by law is presumed to
be voluntary unless there is evidence to the contrary. The felonious act being freely and
deliberately executed, the presumption of criminal and injurious intent arises conclusively,
in the absence of evidence to the contrary.

In this case, Sia’s act of taking in possession of the offended party’s watch is a prima
facie evidence his criminal intent. Therefore, in absence of evidence to his misdeed,
presumption of criminal intent is standing.
US vs Catolico G.R. No. L-4686
March 2, 1911

Facts:
Defendant Catolico was a justice of peace in their municipality in Cagayan. Before
him 16 civil cases of breach of contract was filed by a certain Canillas against 16
individuals. Catolico ruled in favor of Canillas on all 16 cases. To appeal the judgment, the
defendants on the cases filed by Canillas were required to each pay 16 pesos, along with a
bond amounting to 50 pesos. Canillas however alleged to Catolico that the securities of the
bonds presented by therein defendants were insolvent; thus Catolico moved that therein
defendants present new bonds within 15 days, lest the final judgment be executed. None
of therein defendants were able to present new bonds; the money deposited by therein
defendants attached in favor of Canillas.
After such attachment, therein defendants filed a complaint at the Court of First
Instance against Catolico, for a crime of malversation of public funds, to which the court
affirms and requires the return of the amount of 256 pesos back to therein defendants
from Canillas. Catolico appealed the judgment to the Court with respect to his conviction.

Issue:
Whether or not Catolico is guilty of malversation of public funds.

Held:
No, he is not guilty of malversation of public funds.

The legal maxim actus non facit reum, nisi mens rea states that a crime is not
committed when the mind of the person performing an act is criminal. In addition,
presumption of criminal intent is standing in a criminal act unless there is evidence to the
contrary (Underscores supplied). Furthermore, Act No. 1740 provides that there is
malversation of public funds when “missing funds or property have been put to personal
uses” by the official allegedly involved.

In this case, Catolico was the justice of the peace. He had actual jurisdictions of the
actions filed before him. It was also his duty to require payment for the appeal of therein
defendants. It is however conceded that he may have exceeded his authority in dismissing
the appeal and delivering the deposited money to Canillas but it was a pure mistake of
judgment, and not a criminal intent at work. He has therefore sufficiently defeated the
presumption of criminal intent. In fact, the presumption never existed, as it was also
sufficiently proven, even by therein defendants that the money deposited by them was
delivered to Canillas and not to Catolico for his personal gain; his action therefore is not
one that is penalized by Act No. 1740.
US vs Peñalosa G.R. No. 424
January 27, 1902

Facts:
Defendant Peñalosa married her codefendant Enriquez. The prevailing Penal Code
then provides imprisonment for minors contracting marriage without the consent of
parents or guardians. Unknown to Peñalosa, she was actually still a minor.
Subsequently, her father filed a complaint before this Court for the conviction of the
couple. Defendant Peñalosa avers that ever since her tender age, she was made to believe
by her parents that from the date she was born to the day she married, her age was
sufficient as to not violate the crime.

Issue:
Whether or not the couple are in violation of Art. 475 of the then-prevailing Penal
Code.

Held:
No they are not in violation of the provision.

Various legal commentators are in agreement that crime cannot exist without intent.
Jurisprudence prior to the case also are consistent: “it is indispensable that … in order to
constitute a crime, [it] should carry with all the malice which the volition and intention to
cause the evil…”

In this case, it was an honest mistake in part of Peñalosa that she was made to
believe that she was already at the age of majority when she married Enriquez. The fact
that the father, who made her understand of her age, did not argue of the statements of
the witness just shows that indeed she acted under a mistake of fact.
People vs Taneo G.R. No. L-37673
March 31, 1933

Facts:
Defendant Taneo lived with her wife at his parent’s house in Leyte. When a barrio
fiesta came, their house accommodated a certain Tanner and Malinao. Early that
afternoon, Taneo went to sleep. While sleeping, he suddenly got up, left the room with a
bolo at hand, and hacked 1) his wife, 2) the guests Tanner and Malinao, 3) his own father
before wounding himself.
Subsequently, a case of parricide was filed against him, to which he lost, and
appealed.
It was found out that prior to that day, Taneo had a quarrel over a glass of tuba with
a certain Collantes and Abadilla, who invited him to fight. When Taneo was about to go
down, he was stopped both by his wife and his mother. The following morning, Taneo was
sad and weak, and by the early afternoon had experience severe stomachache which made
it necessary for him to go to bed.
While asleep, he dreamt that Collantes and Abadilla were aiming to kill him, the
former armed with bolo, the latter holding him down by grabbing his legs. He further that
the duo were inviting him to come down (of the house), he grabbed his bolo by the door and
started hacking anybody that came in his way, with him perceiving them as enemies that
have been multiplying.

Issue:
Whether or not Taneo is guilty of parricide.

Held:
No, Taneo is not guilty of parricide

The Court considered the special circumstances found in this case: 1) he dearly loved
his wife, 2) he is under the house and protection of his father, and 3) he personally invited
the injured guests in his home. Furthermore, a Dr. Serafica is of expert opinion that Taneo
acted under the influence of hallucination was not in his right mind.
People vs Beronilla G.R. No. L-4445
February 28, 1955

Facts:
Defendant Beronilla was a military mayor of the guerilla force in La Paz, Abra. Per
directive of Lt. Col. Arnold, they were to appoint a 12-bolomen jury

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The court determined that Taneo was not guilty of parricide due to the psychological state at the time of the incident. Expert testimony from Dr. Serafica substantiated that Taneo acted under a hallucination, with no rational intent of murder. The analysis considered 1) his established love for his wife, 2) his respectful cohabitation with his father, and 3) his role in welcoming the guests he injured, demonstrating no malice or premeditated aggression. The court recognized that Taneo's attacks were driven by a psychotic episode rather than conscious criminal intent, hence acquitting him of parricide .

Peñalosa and Enriquez were acquitted based on the principle that a criminal act requires malicious intent, which was absent in their case. Peñalosa was unaware of her minor status due to misinformation from her family about her age. Various legal doctrines agree that a crime requires volition and intent to cause harm. The father's silence regarding his previous statements about her age further substantiated the lack of malicious intent, demonstrating it as an honest mistake of fact. Thus, Peñalosa's action lacked the criminal intent necessary for violation of the Penal Code .

Custodio Gonzales was acquitted because the prosecution failed to establish his criminal liability under the Revised Penal Code (RPC). According to Art. 4 (1) of the RPC, criminal liability arises if a person commits a felony, even if the wrongful act is different from the intended act. Additionally, principles set in Art. 17 demand direct participation or indispensable cooperation for liability. In this case, the witness Huntoria's inability to specify who performed the stabbing undermined the prosecution's efforts, as it failed the criteria for establishing a felony under Art. 3. The lack of direct evidence linking Custodio to the murder as a principal through participation, inducement, or cooperation resulted in his acquittal .

Soriano was found guilty of theft despite having a power-of-attorney because ownership of the projector and generator had not transferred to him or his principal, Saenz, even though the equipment was mortgaged in favor of Saenz. Theft, as per Art. 308 of the Revised Penal Code, requires taking personal property without consent with the intent to gain. Soriano's de facto possession did not equate to lawful possession because the equipment was not due or foreclosed, and importantly, consensual possession from the theater owner was absent. Additionally, the presumption of criminal intent to gain through unauthorized taking was sufficient to establish guilt .

The Mabug-at case illustrates the concept of treachery by showcasing how deliberate actions during a criminal act, which prevent any defense by the victim, qualify as treacherous. Mabug-at's choice to shoot Juana and Perfecta from behind ensured no risk to him from any potential defense they could mount. This method of execution employed by Mabug-at aligns with the jurisprudential definition of treachery: ensuring no risk from the offended party and securing the successful commission of the crime, thus qualifying the act as frustrated murder needing no further proof of intent to kill .

Catolico was not found liable for malversation of public funds because the court recognized a lack of criminal intent, which is crucial for such a conviction. His actions were deemed a misjudgment rather than an act with criminal intent, as defined by Act No. 1740, which requires the misuse of funds for personal use. The court held that although Catolico's handling of the funds exceeded his authority, it resulted from an honest error in judgment without intent for personal gain. Instead, the funds went directly to the claimant Canillas, defeating the presumption of criminal intent .

In the Sia Teb Ban case, the doctrine of animus lucrandi applies as it involves the intent to gain, a requisite element for the crime of theft. The court ruled that animus lucrandi, or the intent to gain, was presumed because Sia took possession of the watch without consent, evidenced by the act itself being indicative of his criminal intent. Despite Sia's appeal, arguing the absence of such intent, the conclusive presumption of criminal and injurious intent held, as there were no contrary evidences to disprove this presumption .

The legal issues in the US vs Peñalosa case revolve around the absence of criminal intent due to honest mistaken belief. The court considered her unintentional violation of the Penal Code since Peñalosa thought she was of legal age based on her father's misleading information. This illustrates the challenges in determining liability where actions rest on genuine misunderstanding of factual circumstances, especially when they negate the malicious intent required for a crime. This emphasis highlights the judiciary's cautious approach in adjudicating similar cases of alleged statutory violations influenced by false beliefs .

The court convicted Mabug-at of frustrated murder due to the evident intention to kill, as demonstrated by the calculated act of shooting at Juana and her niece. Despite the shot mistakenly hitting Perfecta, the presence of treachery was apparent due to manner of the assault—shooting the victims from behind, ensuring they could not defend themselves. The court relied on Art. 4(1) of the Revised Penal Code to establish criminal liability when an unintended wrongful act results differently from the offender's intention. The deliberate aiming and favorable shooting conditions evidenced the intent to cause fatal harm, thereby constituting frustrated murder rather than mere discharge of a firearm .

The court distinguished between the intent to kill and actual injury based on the circumstances surrounding the altercation. In this case, intent to kill is critical for classifying the act as frustrated homicide. The court pointed out that Mendoza did not sustain his attack despite the opportunity, as he ceased struggling and fled, leaving the weapon behind. These actions suggested an absence of intent to kill, indicating that the act resulted in less grave physical injuries rather than a failed murder attempt. The assessment was supported by the fact that Mendoza had favorable conditions for potential further violence but chose not to continue .

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