MARCOS

VS. MANGLAPUS (DFA Secretary)

Case No. GR. No. 88211

Ponente Cortes, J.

Topic SEC. 1, ART. 7. “The executive power shall be vested in the President of the Philippines.”

Relevant The demand of Marcos to be allowed to return cannot be considered in the light solely of the constitutional provisions
Legal guaranteeing liberty of abode and the right to travel. The residual unstated powers of the President which are implicit in its
Doctrine paramount duty to safeguard and protect general welfare must likewise be considered.

Antecedent Facts and Procedural Facts

In February 1986, Ferdinand Marcos was deposed from the presidency via the non-violent "people power" revolution and forced into exile. Now,
Marcos, in his deathbed, has signified his wish to return to the Philipppines to die. But Cory Aquino, considering the consequences to the nation of
his return at a time when the stability of government is threatened from various directions and the economy is just beginning to rise and move
forward, has stood firmly on the decision to bar the return of Marcos and his family.

This petition for mandamus and prohibition asks the Courts to order the respondents to issue travel documents to Marcos and his immediate family
members and prevent the President from barring their return to the Philippines.

Note: this issue is novel and without precedent in Philippine, even in American jurisprudence.

Marcos asserts that his right to return to the Philippines is guaranteed under the certain provisions of the Bill of Rights:
Section 1. No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law, nor shall any person be denied the equal protection of
the laws.
Section 6. The liberty of abode and of changing the same within the limits prescribed by law shall not be impaired except upon lawful order of the
court. Neither shall the right to travel be impaired except in the interest of national security, public safety, or public health, as may be provided by
law.

Marcos contends that Aquino is without power to impair the liberty of abode of the Marcoses because only a court may do so within the limits
prescribed by law. Nor may the President impair the right to travel because no law has authorized her to do so. Marcos also argues that before the
right to travel may be impaired by the government, there must be legislation to that effect.

Marcos avers that under international law, his right to return is guaranteed. Article 13 of the UDHR provides:
• Everyone has the right to freedom of movement and residence within the borders of each state.
• Everyone has the right to leave any country, including his own, and to return to his country.
Article 12 of the ICCPR likewise provides:
• Everyone lawfully within the territory of a State shall, within that territory, have the right to liberty of movement and freedom to choose his
residence.
• Everyone shall be free to leave any country, including his own.
• The above-mentioned rights shall not be subject to any restrictions except those which are provided by law, are necessary to protect national
security, public order (order public), public health or morals or the rights and freedoms of others, and are consistent with the other rights
recognized in the present Covenant.
• No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of the right to enter his own country.
On the other hand, the respondents' principal argument is that the issue in this case involves a political question which is non-justiciable. In fact,
according to Aquino, the return of Marcos will endanger national security and public safety. In short, respondents argue for the primacy of the right
of the State to national security over individual rights.



ISSUE/S RATIONALE

Whether the President has the Right to Return vs. Related Rights
power under the Constitution, to
bar the Marcoses from returning to It must be emphasized that the individual right involved is not the right to travel from the Philippines to
the Philippines. other countries or within the Philippines. These are what the right to travel would normally connote.
Essentially, the right involved is the right to return to one's country, independent from although related to
the right to travel. Thus, the UDHR and ICCPR treat the right to freedom of movement and abode within
the territory of a state, the right to leave a country, and the right to enter one's country as separate and
distinct rights.
 YES
The right to return to one's country is not among the rights specifically guaranteed in the Bill of Rights. But
the Court is of the view that the right to return may be considered, as a generally accepted principle of
international law and, under our Constitution, is part of the law of the land.

Executive Power

The Constitution provides that the executive power shall be vested in the President of the Philippines.
However, it does not define what is meant by executive power. Nonetheless, the President’s powers are
not limited to those specifically enumerated in the Constitution. It would not be accurate to state that
executive power is the power to enforce the laws, for the President is head of state as well as head of
government. Furthermore, the Constitution itself provides that the execution of the laws is only one of the
powers of the President. Executive power is more than the sum of specific powers so enumerated.
Whatever power inherent in the government that is neither legislative nor judicial has to be executive.

The Power Involved

The prime duty of the Government is to serve and protect the people, and the maintenance of peace and
order, protection of life, liberty and property, and the promotion of the general welfare are essential for
the enjoyment by all the people of the blessings of democracy (Secs. 4 &5, Art. 2).

The power involved is the President's RESIDUAL power to protect the general welfare of the people. It is
founded on the duty of the President as steward of the people. This also calls for the President's powers as
protector of the peace, which is not limited merely to exercising the commander-in-chief powers in times
of emergency or external threats, but also in attending the day-to-day problems of maintaining public order
and ensuring domestic tranquility.

That the President has the power under the Constitution to bar the Marcose's from returning is recognized
by the Congress in its Resolution proposed in the House, signed by 103 of its members, stating that the ban
of Marcos’s return is a genuine unselfish gesture for true national reconciliation and as irrevocable proof
of our collective adherence to uncompromising respect for human rights under the Constitution and our
laws.

The Extent of Review

Judicial power includes the duty to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government.
The issue in this case is not a political question.

The question for the Court to determine is whether there exist factual bases for the President to conclude
that it was in the national interest to bar the return of the Marcoses to the Philippines.

During this time, the country is besieged from within by a well-organized communist insurgency, a separatist
movement in Mindanao, rightist conspiracies to grab power, urban terrorism, the murder with impunity of
military men, police officers and civilian officials, to mention only a few. Thus, the return of the Marcoses
at this time would only exacerbate and intensify the violence directed against the State and instigate more
chaos. Moreover, the country is only now beginning to recover from the hardships brought about by the
plunder of the economy attributed to the Marcoses. Thus, the President has determined that the
destabilization which will be caused by the return of the Marcoses would wipe away the gains achieved
during the past few years and lead to total economic collapse. With these, Aquino cannot be said to have
acted arbitrarily and capriciously and whimsically in determining that the return of the Marcoses poses a
serious threat to the national interest and welfare and in prohibiting their return.

RULING: WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby DISMISSED.








 DAVID V ARROYO

Case No. GR. No. 171396

Topic Calling out powers and the power of the President to declare a state of National Emergency

Relevant Legal Doctrine SEC. 1, ART. 7. “The executive power shall be vested in the President of the Philippines.”

Antecedent Facts
• On February 24, 2006, as the nation celebrated the 20th Anniversary of the EDSA People Power I, President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, in a
move to suppress alleged plans to overthrow the government, issued Presidential Proclamation No. 1017 (PP 1017), declaring a state of
national emergency.
• She cited as factual bases for the said issuance the escape of the Magdalo Group and their audacious threat of the Magdalo D-Day
• On the same day, she issued General Order No. 5 (G.O. No. 5) setting the standards which the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) and
the Philippine National Police (PNP) should follow in the suppression and prevention of acts of lawless violence
• The following were considered as additional factual bases for the issuance of PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5: the bombing of telecommunication
towers and cell sites in Bulacan and Bataan; the raid of an army outpost in Benguet resulting in the death of three soldiers; and the directive
of the Communist Party of the Philippines ordering its front organizations to join 5,000 Metro Manila radicals and 25,000 more from the
provinces in mass protests.
• Immediately, the Office of the President announced the cancellation of all programs and activities related to the 20th People Power I
anniversary celebration. It revoked permits to hold rallies. Members of the Kilusang Mayo Uno (KMU) and the National Federation of Labor
Unions-Kilusang Mayo Uno (NAFLU-KMU), who marched from various parts of Metro Manila to converge at the EDSA Shrine, were violently
dispersed by anti-riot police.
• Professor Randolf David, Akbayan partylist president Ronald Llamas, and members of the KMU and NAFLU-KMU were arrested without a
warrant.
• In the early morning of February 25, 2006, operatives of the Criminal Investigation and Detection Group (CIDG) raided the Daily Tribune
offices in Manila and confiscated news stories, documents, pictures, and mock-ups of the Saturday issue.
• A few minutes after the search and seizure at the Daily Tribune offices, the police surrounded the premises of another pro-opposition
paper, Malaya, and its sister publication, the tabloid Abante. The PNP warned that it would take over any media organization that would
not follow “standards set by the government during the state of national emergency.”
• On March 3, 2006, exactly one week from the declaration of a state of national emergency and after all the present petitions had been
filed, President Arroyo issued Presidential Proclamation No. 1021 (PP 1021), declaring that the state of national emergency has ceased to
exist and lifting PP 1017

ISSUE/S RATIONALE

Whether or not there were factual In Integrated Bar of the Philippines v. Zamora (338 SCRA 81 [2000]), the Court considered the President’s
bases for the issuance of PP 1017 “calling-out” power as a discretionary power solely vested in his wisdom. It is incumbent upon the petitioner
to show that the President’s decision is totally bereft of factual basis. Nonetheless, the Court stressed that
YES “this does not prevent an examination of whether such power was exercised within permissible
constitutional limits or whether it was exercised in a manner constituting grave abuse of discretion.” Under
the expanded power of judicial review, the courts are authorized not only “to settle actual controversies
involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable,” but also “to determine whether or not
there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any
branch or instrumentality of the government.” As to how the Court may inquire into the President’s exercise
of the power, Lansang v. Garcia (42 SCRA 448 [1971]) adopted the test that “judicial inquiry can go no
further than to satisfy the Court not that the President’s decision is correct,” but that “the President did not
act arbitrarily.” Thus, the standard laid down is not correctness, but arbitrariness.

Petitioners failed to show that President Arroyo’s exercise of the calling-out power, by issuing PP 1017, is
totally bereft of factual basis. A reading of the Solicitor General’s Consolidated Comment and Memorandum
shows a detailed narration of the events leading to the issuance of PP 1017, with supporting reports forming
part of the records. Petitioners did not refute such events. Thus, absent any contrary allegations, the
President was justified in issuing PP 1017 calling for military aid. Judging the seriousness of the incidents,
President Arroyo was not expected to simply fold her arms and do nothing to prevent or suppress what she
believed was lawless violence, invasion or rebellion. In times of emergency, our Constitution reasonably
demands that we repose a certain amount of faith in the basic integrity and wisdom of the Chief Executive
but, at the same time, it obliges him to operate within carefully prescribed procedural limitations.
Whether or not PP 1017 is a Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution grants the President, as Commander-in-Chief, a “sequence” of
declaration of Martial Law graduated powers. From the most to the least benign, these are: the calling-out power, the power to
suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, and the power to declare Martial Law. The only criterion
NO for the exercise of the calling-out power is that “whenever it becomes necessary,” the President may call
the armed forces “to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion.” Considering the
circumstances then prevailing, President Arroyo found it necessary to issue PP 1017. Owing to her Office’s
vast intelligence network, she is in the best position to determine the actual condition of the country. But
the President must be careful in the exercise of her powers. Every act that goes beyond the President’s
calling-out power is considered illegal or ultra vires. There lies the wisdom of our Constitution, the greater
the power, the greater are the limitations. In declaring a state of national emergency, President Arroyo did
not only rely on Sec. 18, Art. VII of the Constitution, but also on Sec. 17, Art. XII, a provision on the State’s
extraordinary power to take over privately-owned public utility and business affected with public interest.

It is plain in the wordings of PP 1017 that what President Arroyo invoked was her calling out power. PP 1017
is not a declaration of Martial Law. As such, it cannot be used to justify acts that can be done only under a
valid declaration of Martial Law. Specifically, arrests and seizures without judicial warrants, ban on public
assemblies, take-over of news media and agencies and press censorship, and issuance of Presidential
Decrees, are powers which can be exercised by the President as Commander-in-Chief only where there is a
valid declaration of Martial Law or suspension of the writ of habeas corpus.

Whether or not PP 1017 arrogates The second provision of the operative portion of PP 1017 states: “and to enforce obedience to all the laws
unto the President the power to and to all decrees, orders and regulations promulgated by me personally or upon my direction.” The
legislate; operative clause of PP 1017 was lifted from PP 1081, which gave former President Marcos legislative power.
The ordinance power granted to President Arroyo under the Administrative Code of 1987 is limited to
YES and thus Unconstitutional executive orders, administrative orders, proclamations, memorandum orders, memorandum circulars, and
general or special orders. She cannot issue decrees similar to those issued by former President Marcos
under PP 1081. Presidential Decrees are laws which are of the same category and binding force as statutes
because they were issued by the President in the exercise of his legislative power during the period of
Martial Law under the 1973 Constitution.

Legislative power is peculiarly within the province of the Legislature. Neither Martial Law nor a state of
rebellion nor a state of emergency can justify President Arroyo’s exercise of legislative power by issuing
decrees. It follows that these decrees are void and, therefore, cannot be enforced. She cannot call the
military to enforce or implement certain laws. She can only order the military, under PP 1017, to enforce
laws pertinent to its duty to suppress lawless violence.

Whether or not PP 1017 authorizes Generally, Congress is the repository of emergency powers. However, knowing that during grave
the President to take over emergencies, it may not be possible or practicable for Congress to meet and exercise its powers, the framers
privately-owned public utility or of our Constitution deemed it wise to allow Congress to grant emergency powers to the President, subject
business affected with public to certain conditions, thus: (a)there must be a war or other emergency; (b)the delegation must be for a
interest limited period only; (c)the delegation must be subject to such restrictions as the Congress may prescribe;
and (d)the emergency powers must be exercised to carry out a national policy declared by Congress. The
NO taking over of private business affected with public interest is just another facet of the emergency powers
generally reposed upon Congress. Thus, when Sec. 17, Art. XII of the Constitution states that the “the State
may, during the emergency and under reasonable terms prescribed by it, temporarily take over or direct
the operation of any privately owned public utility or business affected with public interest,” it refers to
Congress, not the President. Whether or not the President may exercise such power is dependent on
whether Congress may delegate it to her pursuant to a law prescribing the reasonable terms thereof.

There is a distinction between the President’s authority to declare a state of national emergency and her
authority to exercise emergency powers. Her authority to declare a state of national emergency is granted
by Sec. 18, Art. VII of the Constitution, hence, no legitimate constitutional objection can be raised. The
exercise of emergency powers, such as the taking over of privately owned public utility or business affected
with public interest, is a different matter. This requires a delegation from Congress. The President cannot
decide whether exceptional circumstances exist warranting the take over of privately-owned public utility
or business affected with public interest. Nor can she determine when such exceptional circumstances have
ceased. Likewise, without legislation, the President has no power to point out the types of businesses
affected with public interest that should be taken over.

Whether or not PP 1017 and G.O. The criterion by which the validity of a statute or ordinance is to be measured is the essential basis for the
No. 5 are constitutional exercise of power, and not a mere incidental result arising from its exertion. PP 1017 is limited to the calling
out by the President of the military to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion. It had
YES and NO accomplished the end desired which prompted President Arroyo to issue PP 1021. But there is nothing in
PP 1017 allowing the police, expressly or impliedly, to conduct illegal arrest, search or violate the citizens’
 constitutional rights. But when in implementing its provisions, pursuant to G.O. No. 5, the military and
the police committed acts which violate the citizens’ rights under the Constitution, the Court has to
declare such acts unconstitutional and illegal.

David, et al. were arrested without a warrant while they were exercising their right to peaceful assembly.
They were not committing any crime, neither was there a showing of a clear and present danger that
warranted the limitation of that right. Likewise, the dispersal and arrest of members of KMU, et al. were
unwarranted. Apparently, their dispersal was done merely on the basis of Malacañang’s directive
canceling all permits to hold rallies. The wholesale cancellation of all permits to rally is a blatant disregard
of the principle that “freedom of assembly is not to be limited, much less denied, except on a showing of
a clear and present danger of a substantive evil that the State has a right to prevent.” Furthermore, the
search of the Daily Tribune offices is illegal. Not only that, the search violated petitioners’ freedom of the
press. It cannot be denied that the CIDG operatives exceeded their enforcement duties. The search and
seizure of materials for publication, the stationing of policemen in the vicinity of the offices, and the
arrogant warning of government officials to media, are plain censorship.

The “acts of terrorism” portion of G.O. No. 5 is, however, unconstitutional. G.O. No. 5 mandates the AFP
and the PNP to immediately carry out the “necessary and appropriate actions and measures to suppress
and prevent acts of terrorism and lawless violence.” The phrase “acts of terrorism” is still an amorphous
and vague concept. Since there is no law defining “acts of terrorism,” it is President Arroyo alone, under
G.O. No. 5, who has the discretion to determine what acts constitute terrorism. Her judgment on this
aspect is absolute, without restrictions. Consequently, there can be indiscriminate arrest without
warrants, breaking into offices and residences, taking over the media enterprises, prohibition and
dispersal of all assemblies and gatherings unfriendly to the administration. All these can be effected in
the name of G.O. No. 5. These acts go far beyond the calling-out power of the President. Certainly, they
violate the due process clause of the Constitution.
RULING: WHEREFORE, the instant petition is PARTLY GRANTED





































 TIO v VIDEOGRAM REGULATORY BOARD
Case No. G.R. No. L-75697 | JUNE 18, 1987

Ponente Melencio-Herrera, J.

Topic Sec 6, Art. 26

Relevant Legal Imposition of tax is sufficiently related to the regulation of video industry where the title is
Doctrine comprehensive enough to include such subject (taxation) related to the general purpose (creation of Videogram
Board)

Facts
• Petition assails the constitutionality of Presidential Decree No. 1987 entitled "An Act Creating the Videogram Regulatory Board" with broad
powers to regulate and supervise the videogram industry. The Decree was promulgated on October 5, 1985 and took effect on April 10,
1986, fifteen (15) days after completion of its publication in the Official Gazette.
• On November 5, 1985, a month after the promulgation of the abovementioned decree, Presidential Decree No. 1994 amended the National
Internal Revenue Code providing, inter alia:
o SEC. 134. Video Tapes. — There shall be collected on each processed video-tape cassette, ready for playback, regardless of length,
an annual tax of five pesos; Provided, That locally manufactured or imported blank video tapes shall be subject to sales tax.
• The Greateer Manila Theaters Association were allowed to intervene to protect their rights and that their "survival and very existence is
threatened by the unregulated proliferation of film piracy."
• The rationale behind the enactment of the DECREE, is set out in its preambular clauses as follows:
1. WHEREAS, the proliferation and unregulated circulation of videograms including, among others, videotapes, discs, cassettes
or any technical improvement or variation thereof, have greatly prejudiced the operations of moviehouses and theaters, and
have caused a sharp decline in theatrical attendance by at least forty percent (40%) and a tremendous drop in the collection of
sales, contractor's specific, amusement and other taxes, thereby resulting in substantial losses estimated at P450 Million annually
in government revenues;
2. WHEREAS, videogram(s) establishments collectively earn around P600 Million per annum from rentals, sales and disposition
of videograms, and such earnings have not been subjected to tax, thereby depriving the Government of approximately P180
Million in taxes each year;
3. WHEREAS, the unregulated activities of videogram establishments have also affected the viability of the movie industry,
particularly the more than 1,200 movie houses and theaters throughout the country, and occasioned industry-wide displacement
and unemployment due to the shutdown of numerous moviehouses and theaters;
4. "WHEREAS, in order to ensure national economic recovery, it is imperative for the Government to create an environment
conducive to growth and development of all business industries, including the movie industry which has an accumulated
investment of about P3 Billion;
5. WHEREAS, proper taxation of the activities of videogram establishments will not only alleviate the dire financial condition of
the movie industry upon which more than 75,000 families and 500,000 workers depend for their livelihood, but also provide an
additional source of revenue for the Government, and at the same time rationalize the heretofore uncontrolled distribution of
videograms;
6. WHEREAS, the rampant and unregulated showing of obscene videogram features constitutes a clear and present danger to the
moral and spiritual well-being of the youth, and impairs the mandate of the Constitution for the State to support the rearing of
the youth for civic efficiency and the development of moral character and promote their physical, intellectual, and social well-
being;
7. WHEREAS, civic-minded citizens and groups have called for remedial measures to curb these blatant malpractices which have
flaunted our censorship and copyright laws;
8. WHEREAS, in the face of these grave emergencies corroding the moral values of the people and betraying the national
economic recovery program, bold emergency measures must be adopted with dispatch;

ISSUE/S RATIONALE

Whether P.D. 1987 is constitutional on the following grounds:

1. Section 10 thereof, which imposes a Section 10 is NOT a rider. (SYLLABUS TOPIC)
tax of 30% on the gross receipts Section 10. Tax on Sale, Lease or Disposition of Videograms. — Notwithstanding any provision of law
payable to the local government is a to the contrary, the province shall collect a tax of thirty percent (30%) of the purchase price or rental
RIDER and the same is not germane to rate, as the case may be, for every sale, lease or disposition of a videogram containing a
the subject matter thereof; reproduction of any motion picture or audiovisual program. Fifty percent (50%) of the proceeds of
the tax collected shall accrue to the province, and the other fifty percent (50%) shall acrrue to the
municipality where the tax is collected; PROVIDED, That in Metropolitan Manila, the tax shall be
shared equally by the City/Municipality and the Metropolitan Manila Commission.

• Constitutional requirement that "every bill shall embrace only one subject which shall be
expressed in the title thereof" is sufficiently complied with if the title be comprehensive
enough to include the general purpose which a statute seeks to achieve. The requirement
is satisfied if all the parts of the statute are related, and are germane to the subject matter
expressed in the title, or as long as they are not inconsistent with or foreign to the general
subject and title.
• The rule also is that the constitutional requirement as to the title of a bill should not be so
narrowly construed as to cripple or impede the power of legislation. It should be given
practical rather than technical construction.
• Sec.10 is allied and germane to, and is reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of,
the general object of the DECREE, which is the regulation of the video industry through the
Videogram Regulatory Board as expressed in its title.
• The tax provision is not inconsistent with, nor foreign to that general subject and title. As a
tool for regulation it is simply one of the regulatory and control mechanisms scattered
throughout the DECREE.
• The express purpose of the DECREE to include taxation of the video industry in order to
regulate and rationalize the heretofore uncontrolled distribution of videograms is evident
from Preambles 2 and 5.
• Those preambles explain the motives of the lawmaker in presenting the measure. The title
of the DECREE, which is the creation of the Videogram Regulatory Board, is comprehensive
enough to include the purposes expressed in its Preamble and reasonably covers all its
provisions. It is unnecessary to express all those objectives in the title or that the latter be
an index to the body of the DECREE.

2. The tax imposed is harsh, Tax imposed does not cease to be valid merely because it discourages or regulates or deters the
confiscatory, oppressive and/or in activities taxed.
unlawful restraint of trade in violation • The power to impose taxes is one so unlimited in force and so searching in extent, that the
of the due process clause of the courts scarcely venture to declare that it is subject to any restrictions whatever, except
Constitution; such as rest in the discretion of the authority which exercises it.
• In imposing a tax, the legislature acts upon its constituents. This is, in general, a sufficient
security against erroneous and oppressive taxation.
• The tax imposed by the DECREE is not only a regulatory but also a revenue measure
prompted by the realization that earnings of videogram establishments of around P600
million per annum have not been subjected to tax.
• It is an end-user tax, imposed on retailers for every videogram they make available for
public viewing. It is similar to the 30% amusement tax imposed or borne by the movie
industry which the theater-owners pay to the government, but which is passed on to the
entire cost of the admission ticket.
• The levy of the 30% tax is for a public purpose. It was imposed primarily to answer the
need for regulating the video industry, particularly because of the rampant film piracy, the
flagrant violation of intellectual property rights, and the proliferation of pornographic
video tapes. And while it was also an objective of the DECREE to protect the movie
industry, the tax remains a valid imposition.
3. There is no factual nor legal basis for Factual and legal basis for the exercise by the President of the vast powers conferred upon him by
th
the exercise by the President of the Amendment No. 6 as provided in the 8 whereas clause. Unresolved.
vast powers conferred upon him by • Petitioner argues that there was no legal nor factual basis for the promulgation of the
Amendment No. 6; DECREE by the former President under Amendment No. 6 of the 1973 Constitution
providing that "whenever in the judgment of the President there exists a grave emergency
or a threat or imminence thereof, or whenever the interim Batasang Pambansa or the
regular National Assembly fails or is unable to act adequately on any matter for any reason
that in his judgment requires immediate action, he may, in order to meet the exigency,
issue the necessary decrees, orders, or letters of instructions, which shall form part of the
law of the land."
• In refutation, the Intervenors and the Solicitor General's Office aver that the 8th "whereas"
clause sufficiently summarizes the justification in that grave emergencies corroding the
moral values of the people and betraying the national economic recovery program
necessitated bold emergency measures to be adopted with dispatch. Whatever the
reasons "in the judgment" of the then President, considering that the issue of the validity
of the exercise of legislative power under the said Amendment still pends resolution in
several other cases, we reserve resolution of the question raised at the proper time

4. There is undue delegation of power No Undue Delegation of Authority.

and authority; • The grant in Section 11 of the DECREE of authority to the BOARD to "solicit the direct
assistance of other agencies and units of the government and deputize, for a fixed and
limited period, the heads or personnel of such agencies and units to perform enforcement
functions for the Board" is not a delegation of the power to legislate but merely a
conferment of authority or discretion as to its execution, enforcement, and
implementation.
• "The true distinction is between the delegation of power to make the law, which
necessarily involves a discretion as to what it shall be, and conferring authority or
discretion as to its execution to be exercised under and in pursuance of the law.
• The first cannot be done; to the latter, no valid objection can be made." Besides, in the
very language of the decree, the authority of the BOARD to solicit such assistance is for a
"fixed and limited period" with the deputized agencies concerned being "subject to the
direction and control of the BOARD."
• That the grant of such authority might be the source of graft and corruption would not
stigmatize the DECREE as unconstitutional. Should the eventuality occur, the aggrieved
parties will not be without adequate remedy in law.

5. The Decree is an ex-post facto law; The DECREE is not violative of the ex post facto principle.
and • Petitioner contends that Section 15 violates the ex post facto principle in providing that:
o SEC. 15 - All videogram establishments in the Philippines are hereby given a
period of forty-five (45) days after the effectivity of this Decree within which to
register with and secure a permit from the BOARD to engage in the videogram
business and to register with the BOARD all their inventories of videograms,
including videotapes, discs, cassettes or other technical improvements or
variations thereof, before they could be sold, leased, or otherwise disposed of.
Thereafter any videogram found in the possession of any person engaged in the
videogram business without the required proof of registration by the BOARD,
shall be prima facie evidence of violation of the Decree, whether the possession
of such videogram be for private showing and/or public exhibition.
• There is no question that there is a rational connection between the fact proved, which is
non-registration, and the ultimate fact presumed which is violation of the DECREE, besides
the fact that the prima facie presumption of violation of the DECREE attaches only after a
forty-five-day period counted from its effectivity and is, therefore, neither retrospective in
character
 6. There is over regulation of the video We do not share petitioner's fears that the video industry is being over-regulated and being eased
industry as if it were a nuisance, which out of existence as if it were a nuisance. Being a relatively new industry, the need for its regulation
it is not. was apparent.
• While the underlying objective of the DECREE is to protect the moribund movie industry,
there is no question that public welfare is at bottom of its enactment, considering "the
unfair competition posed by rampant film piracy; the erosion of the moral fiber of the
viewing public brought about by the availability of unclassified and unreviewed video tapes
containing pornographic films and films with brutally violent sequences; and losses in
government revenues due to the drop in theatrical attendance, not to mention the fact
that the activities of video establishments are virtually untaxed since mere payment of
Mayor's permit and municipal license fees are required to engage in business.
• The enactment of the Decree since April 10, 1986 has not brought about the "demise" of
the video industry. On the contrary, video establishments are seen to have proliferated in
many places notwithstanding the 30% tax imposed.

RULING: WHEREFORE, the instant Petition is hereby dismissed.
















































 ANGARA VS. ELECTORAL COMMISSION
July 15, 1936

Petitioners Jose Angara

Respondents Electoral Commission; Pedro Ynsua; Miguel Castillo; Dionisio Mayor

Topic Article 8, Section 5

Relevant Legal Judicial Supremacy is but the power of judicial review in actual and appropriate cases and controversies and is the power
Doctrine and duty to see that no one branch or agency of government transcends the Constitution, which is the source of all authority.

Antecedent Facts and Procedural Facts
• In the 1935 elections, Jose Angara, Pedro Ynsua, Miguel Castillo, and Dionisio Mayor, were candidates vying for the position of member of the
National Assembly for the first district of the Province of Tayabas.
• On October 7, the provincial board of canvassers, proclaimed the Angara as member-elect of the National Assembly of the Commonwealth
Government. Subsequently, he took his oath of office.
• On December 3, the National Assembly passed Resolution No. 8, confirming the election of those who have not been subject of an election
protest prior to the adoption of the said resolution.
• On December 8, however, private respondent, Pedro Ynsua, filed a “Motion of Protest” against the Angara before the Electoral Commission of
the National Assembly. The following day, December 9, 1935, the Electoral Commission issued Resolution No. 9, providing that it will not
consider any election protest that was not submitted on or before that same day.
• On December 20, citing the resolution of the National Assembly, Angara sought a "Motion to Dismiss the Protest". He alleges that Resolution
No. 8 of the National Assembly was adopted in the legitimate exercise of its constitutional prerogative, and that the Motion of Protest was filed
out of the prescribed period.
• On December 27, Ynsua filed an "Answer to the Motion of Dismissal" alleging that there is no legal provision barring the presentation of a
protest after confirmation.
• On December 31, Angara, filed a "Reply". The Electoral Commission, however, denied Angara’s "Motion to Dismiss the Protest."
• Angara, then, filed for an issuance of a writ of prohibition to restrain the Electoral Commission from taking further cognizance of Ynsua's protest.
He argues that the Constitution confers exclusive jurisdiction upon the Legislative Department of the Government or the National Assembly
with regard to the power to regulate the proceedings of election contests. The power of the Electoral Commission is limited to the merits of
contested elections to the National Assembly. Thus, according to Angara, the Supreme Court therefore has no jurisdiction to hear the case.
•
ISSUE/S RATIONALE

Whether the Supreme Court has • The Supreme Court held that the separation of powers is a fundamental principle in our system of
jurisdiction over the Electoral government. It obtains not through express provision but by actual division in our Constitution. Each
Commission department has exclusive cognizance of matters within its jurisdiction, and is supreme within its own
sphere. But it does not follow from the fact that the three powers are to be kept separate and distinct
that the Constitution intended them to be absolutely unrestrained and independent of each other. The
YES Constitution has provided for an elaborate system of checks and balances to secure coordination in
the workings of the various departments of the government.
• The overlapping and interlacing of functions and duties between the several departments, however,
sometimes makes it hard to say just where the one leaves off and the other begins. In cases of conflict
between several departments and among agencies, the judiciary, with the Supreme Court as the final
arbiter, is the only constitutional mechanism devised finally to resolve the conflict and allocate
constitutional boundaries.
• The Constitution is a definition of the powers of government. Who is to determine the nature, scope
and extent of such powers? The Constitution itself has provided for the instrumentality of the judiciary
as the rational way. And when the judiciary mediates to allocate constitutional boundaries, it does not
assert any superiority over the other departments; it does not nullify an act of the legislature, but only
asserts the solemn and sacred obligation assigned to it by the Constitution. This is in truth all that is
involved in what is termed "judicial supremacy". Judicial Supremacy is but the power of judicial review
in actual and appropriate cases and controversies and is the power and duty to see that no one branch
or agency of government transcends the Constitution, which is the source of all authority.
• In the case at bar, there is an actual controversy because it involves a conflict of a grave constitutional
nature between the National Assembly and the Electoral Commission on the other. The Electoral
 Commission, is a constitutional organ, created for a specific purpose to determine all contests relating
to the election, returns and qualifications of the members of the National Assembly. Although the
Electoral Commission may not be interfered with, when and while acting within the limits of its
authority, it does not follow that it is beyond the reach of the constitutional mechanism adopted by
the people and that it is not subject to constitutional restrictions. The Electoral Commission is not a
separate department of the government. Thus, the court has jurisdiction over the Electoral
Commission.

Whether the Electoral Commission • The Electoral Commission acted within the legitimate exercise of its constitutional prerogative in
acted without or in excess of its assuming to take recognition of the protest filed by Ynsua against the election of Angara, and that the
jurisdiction in taking cognizance of earlier resolution of the National Assembly cannot in any manner toll the time for filing election
the election protest protests against members of the National Assembly, nor prevent the filing of a protest within such time
as the rules of the Electoral Commission might prescribe.
• The Electoral Commission, being the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns and
NO qualifications of members of the National Assembly, is an independent constitutional creation with
specific powers and functions to execute and perform, closer for purposes of classification to the
legislative than to any of the other two departments of the government.
• Section 4, Article 6 of the 1935 Constitution (Section 17 at present) provides:
“...The Electoral Commission shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns and
qualifications of the members of the National Assembly.”
• The grant of power to the Electoral Commission is intended to be as complete and unimpaired as if it
had remained originally in the legislature. The express lodging of that power in the Electoral
Commission is an implied denial of the exercise of that power by the National Assembly.
• The creation of the Electoral Commission carried with it the power, regulative in character, to limit the
time with which protests intrusted to its cognizance should be filed. Where a general power is
conferred or duty enjoined, every particular power necessary for the exercise of the one or the
performance of the other is also conferred. In the absence of any further constitutional provision
relating to the procedure to be followed in filing protests before the Electoral Commission, therefore,
the incidental power to promulgate such rules necessary for the proper exercise of its exclusive power
must be deemed by necessary implication to have been lodged also in the Electoral Commission.

RULING: The petition for a writ of prohibition against the Electoral Commission is hereby denied.































 ANGARA V ELECTORAL COMMISSION

Case No. GR. No. L-45081

Ponente LAUREL, J.

Topic Constitution

Relevant Legal Congress had power over its members before, but because of the constitution it now belongs to the Electoral
Doctrine Commission

SC ruled: Constitution is supreme

Antecedent Facts
• Jose A. Angara filed for the issuance of a writ of prohibition to restrain and prohibit the EleCom, one of the respondents from taking further
cognizance of the protest filed by Pedro Ynsua against the election of the said petitioner as a member of the National Assembly for the first
assembly district of the Province of Tayabas.
• In the elections of September 17, 1973, Jose A Angara, Pedro Ynsua, Miguel Castillo, and Dionisio Mayor, were candidates voted for the
position of member f the National Assembly for the first district of the Provice of Tayabas.
• On October 7, 1935, the provincial board of canvassers, proclaimed the petitioner as membe-elect of the National Assembly.
• On November 15, 1935, petitioner Jose Angara was proclaimed winner and took his oath of office as member of the National Assembly of
the Commonwealth Government.
• On December 3, 1935, the National Assembly passed a resolution confirming the election of those who have not been subject of an election
protest prior to the adoption of the said resolution.
• On December 8, 1935, however, private respondent Pedro Ynsua filed an election protest against the Angara before the Electoral
Commission of the National Assembly.
• The following day, December 9, 1935, the Electoral Commission adopted its own resolution providing that it will not consider any election
protest that was not submitted on or before December 9, 1935.
• Citing the resolution of the National Assembly, Angara sought the dismissal of Ynsuat’s protest. The Electoral Commission however denied
his motion.

ISSUE/S RATIONALE

W/N has Supreme Court jurisdiction over the EleCom and The separation of powers is a fundamental principle in our system of government. It
the subject matter f the controversy upon the foregoing obtains not through express provision but by actual division in our Constitution. Each
related facts -- YES department has exclusive cognizance of matters within its jurisdiction, and is
supreme within its own sphere. But it does not follow from the fact that the three
power are to be kept separate and distinct that the Constitution intended them to
be absolutely unrestrained and independent of each other. The Constitution has
provided for an elaborate system of checks and balances to secure coordination in
the workings of the various departments of the government.

In cases of conflict between several departments and among the agencies thereof,
the judiciary, with the Supreme Court as the final arbiter, is the only constitutional
mechanism devised finally to resolve the conflict and allocate constitutional
boundaries.

Judicial Supremacy is but the power of judicial review in actual and appropriate cases
and controversies and is the power and duty to see that no one branch or agency of
government transcends the Constitution, which is the source of all authority.
 Whether or not the Electoral Commission acted without or The Electoral Commission did not act without or in excess of its jurisdiction in
in excess of its jurisdiction in taking cognizance of the acknowledging the protest filed against the election of the petitioner in spite of the
protest filed against the election of the petitioner resolution of the National Assembly.
notwithstanding the previous confirmation of such The Electoral Commission acted within the legitimate exercise of its constitutional
election by resolution of the National Assembly – NO prerogative in assuming to take recognition of the protest filed by the respondent
Ynsua against the election of the petitioner Angara, and that the earlier resolution of
the National Assembly cannot in any manner toll the time for filing election protests
against members of the National Assembly, nor prevent the filing of a protest within
such time as the rules of the Electoral Commission might prescribe.
The Electoral Commission, being the sole judge of all contests relating to the election,
returns and qualifications of members of the National Assembly, is an independent
constitutional creation with specific powers and functions to execute and perform,
closer for purposes of classification to the legislative than to any of the other two
departments of the government.

RULING
The petition for a writ of prohibition against the Electoral Commission is hereby denied, with costs against the petitioner. So ordered.













































 PHARMACEUTICAL vs. DOH

Case No. GR No. 173034

Ponente PUNO, CJ.

Topic Article 2, Section 2

Relevant Legal Doctrine Transformation of international laws

Antecedent Facts
• On Oct 28, 1986, President Corazon Aquino, by virtue of the legislative powers granted to the President under the Freedom Constitution,
issued Executive Order No. 51 (Milk Code).
• One of the preamble clauses in that Code states that it seeks to give effect to Article 11 of the International Code of Marketing of
Breastmilk Substitutes (ICBMS), a code adopted by the World Health Assembly in 1981.
• From 1982-2006, the WHA adopted several resolutions to the effect that breastfeeding should be supported, promoted and protected,
hence, it should be ensured that nutrition and health claims are not permitted for breastmilk substitutes.
• The Philippines ratified the International Convention on the Rights of the Child in 1990
• Article 24 of the said instrument provides that State Parties should take appropriate measures to diminish infant and child mortality, and
ensure that all segments of society, especially parents and children, are informed of the advantages of breastfeeding
• On May 15, 2006, the DOH issued herein assailed Administrative Order No. 2006-0012 or the Revised Implementing Rules and
Regulations of Executive Order No. 51 which took effect on July 7, 2006

Procedural Facts
• On June 28, 2006, petitioner, representing its members that are manufacturers of breastmilk substitutes, filed the present petition for
certiorari and prohibition with prayer for TRO alleging that the Milk Code is not valid as it contains provisions that are not constitutional.


ISSUE/S RATIONALE

Whether the international instruments • The international instruments that do have specific provisions regarding breastmilk
(ICBMS and WHA resolutions) adverted substitutes are the ICBMS and various WHA resolutions.
to by the respondents are part of the • Only the ICBMS became part of the law of the land because of TRANSFORMATION by local
law of the land legislation in the Milk Code E.O. 51
• The WHA resolutions are considered as “soft law” or non-binding norms, principles, and
practices that influence state behavior
• Treaties become part of the law of the land through transformation pursuant to Article 7,
Section 21 of the Consti
• Thus, treaties or conventional international law must go through a process prescribed by
the Consti for it to be transformed into municipal law
• The ICBMS and WHA resolutions are NOT treaties as they have not been concurred in by at
least 2/3 of all members of the Senate as required under Article 21.
• However, the ICBMS which was adopted by the WHA in 1981 had been TRANSFORMED
into domestic law through local legislation, the MILK CODE. Consequently, it is the Milk
Code that has the force and effect of law in this jurisdiction, not the ICBMS per se
• Unlike the ICBMS which was adopted through the Milk Code, the WHA resolutions which
specifically provides for exclusive breastfeeding from 0-6 months, continued breastfeeding
up to 24 months, and absolutely prohibiting advertisements and promotions of breastmilk
substitutes, HAVE NOT BEEN adopted as domestic law
RULING Wherefore, the petition is PARTIALLY GRANTED. Sections 4(f), 11, and 46 of the Milk Code are NULL and VOID for being ultra vires (being
beyond one’s authority). The DOH is prohibited from implementing them. The TRO is lifted










 BAYAN MUNA v SECRETARY ROMULO (2011)

Petitioners Bayan Muna

Respondents Executive Secretary Romulo, Foreign Affairs Sec. Blas Ople

Provision Section 21, Article 7

Relevant Legal The President is vested with its executive authority to enter into executive agreements that are similar to a treaty. This
Doctrine is the power of the President alone.
The power to enter into executive agreements has long been recognized to be lodged with the President.

ANTECEDENT FACTS
• Petitioner Bayan Muna is a duly registered party-list group established to represent the marginalized sectors of society. Respondent Blas F. Ople,
now deceased, was the Secretary of Foreign Affairs during the period material to this case. Respondent Alberto Romulo was impleaded in his
capacity as then Executive Secretary. The issue started when the Philippines attempted to bind itself under the Rome Statute of the International
Criminal Court, which has the power to exercise its jurisdiction over persons for the most serious crimes of international concern and shall be
complementary to the national criminal jurisdictions (crimes like genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes).
• On December 28, 2000, the RP, through Charge d’Affaires Enrique A. Manalo, signed the Rome Statute which, by its terms, is “subject to
ratification, acceptance or approval” by the signatory states. On May 9, 2003, the Ambassador of US Embassy, Ricciardone, in Note No. 047-
proposed terms with the DFA of a non-surrender bilateral agreement called RP-US Non-Surrender Agreement. Via exchange of notes, DFA Sec.
Ople agreed with and accepted the US proposals embodied under the US Embassy note and put in effect the Agreement with the US government.
• Agreement aims to protect what it refers to and defines as “persons”, or military personnel or nationals of the RP and US from frivolous and
harassment suits that might be brought against them in international tribunals. The Agreement states that US or RP shall not, absent the express
consent of the first party, be surrendered or transferred any of the people of the other Party to
1. International tribunal for any purpose or
2. Other entity or third country
• Ambassador Ricciardone said that the exchange of diplomatic notes constituted a legally binding agreement under international law; and that,
under US law, the said agreement did not require the advice and consent of the US Senate.
• In this proceeding, petitioner imputes grave abuse of discretion to respondents in concluding and ratifying the Agreement and prays that it be
struck down as unconstitutional, or at least declared as without force and effec.

ISSUE RATIONALE

W/N the RP President and the DFA Secretary The RP-US Agreement does not undermine or contravene the Rome Statute. In fact, both
committed grave abuse of discretion for complement each other. The purpose of ICC is to be complementary of the signatory states
concluding the RP-US non surrender agreement as stated in Article 1 that it shall be complementary to national criminal jurisdiction. The ICC
by means of a letter when the RP gov’t has recognizes that the State has primary jurisdiction to the first instance of the so-called crime
already signed the Rome Statute of the ICC - NO that was committed; does not put a person into trial without undergoing first a trial in
domestic courts. ICC will only come into play when the states are unwilling or unable to
prosecute.

W/N the RP-US Agreement was executed by the • Two types of treaty: treaties that require legislative concurrence after executive
President thru grave abuse of discretion as it does ratification and executive agreements that are similar to treaty, except that they do
not have the concurrence of at least two-thirds of not need legislative concurrence and are usually less formal.
all the members of the Senate – NO • The power to ratify a treaty is within the President and with the Senate only there for
concurring or withholding its ratification. The President is vested with its executive
authority to enter into executive agreements that are similar to a treaty. This is the
power of the President alone.
• The Court has, in Eastern Sea Trading, given recognition to the obligatory effect of
executive agreements without the concurrence of the Senate:
• “ The right of the Executive to enter into binding agreements without the necessity of
subsequent Congressional approval has been confirmed by long usage. From the
earliest days of our history, we have entered executive agreements covering such
subjects as commercial and consular relations, most favored-nation rights, patent
rights, trademark and copyright protection, postal and navigation arrangements and
the settlement of claims. The validity of these has never been seriously questioned by
our courts.”
• By constitutional and by the nature of his or her office, the President, as head of state
and government, is the sole organ and authority in the external affairs of the country.
The Constitution vests in the President the power to enter into international
 agreements, subject, in appropriate cases, to the required concurrence votes of the
Senate.
• But as earlier indicated, executive agreements may be validly entered into without
such concurrence. As the President wields vast powers and influence, her conduct in
the external affairs of the nation is, "executive altogether." The right of the President
to enter into or ratify binding executive agreements has been confirmed by long
practice.
• An act of the executive branch with a foreign government must be afforded great
respect. The power to enter into executive agreements has long been recognized to
be lodged with the President. The rationale behind this principle is the inviolable
doctrine of separation of powers among the legislative, executive and judicial
branches of the government.
• Thus, absent any clear contravention of the law, courts should exercise utmost
caution in declaring any executive agreement invalid.

W/N the RP-US Agreement is VOID AB INITIO for • Petitioner urges that the Agreement be struck down as void ab initio for imposing
contracting obligations that are either immoral or immoral obligations and/or being at variance with allegedly universally recognized
otherwise at variance with universally recognized principles of international law. The immoral aspect proceeds from the fact that the
principles of international law – NO Agreement, as petitioner would put it, “leaves criminals immune from responsibility
for unimaginable atrocities that deeply shock the conscience of humanity, it precludes
our country from delivering an American criminal to the ICC.”
• Petitioner contends that the RP, by entering into the Agreement, virtually abdicated
its sovereignty and in the process undermined its treaty obligations under the Rome
Statute, contrary to international law principles.
• The Court is not persuaded. The Solicitor General said that the non-surrender
agreement, “is an assertion by the Philippines of its desire to try and punish crimes
under its national law. The agreement is a recognition of the primacy and
competence of the country’s judiciary to try offenses under its national criminal laws
and dispense justice fairly and judiciously.”
• Persons who may have committed acts penalized under the Rome Statute can be
prosecuted and punished in the Philippines or in the US; or with the consent of the
RP or the US, before the ICC, assuming, for the nonce, that all the formalities
necessary to bind both countries to the Rome Statute have been met. For
perspective, what the Agreement contextually prohibits is the surrender by either
party of individuals to international tribunals, like the ICC, without the consent of
the other party, which may desire to prosecute the crime under its existing laws.
With the view we take of things, there is nothing immoral or violative of international
law concepts in the act of the Philippines of assuming criminal jurisdiction pursuant
to the non-surrender agreement over an offense considered criminal by both
Philippine laws and the Rome Statute.
RULING
In light of the above consideration, the position or view that the challenged RP-US Non-Surrender Agreement ought to be in the form of a treaty, to
be effective, has to be rejected.
WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari, mandamus and prohibition is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit. No costs.



















 White Light Corp. v. City of Manila
January 20, 2009

Petitioners White Light Corp, Titanium Corp, and Sta. Mesa Tourist and Development

Respondents City of Manila, represented by Mayor Alfredo Lim

Provision Art 8 Sec 5(2a) states that The Supreme Court shall have the following powers:
2. Review, revise, reverse, modify, or affirm on appeal or certiorari, as the law or the Rules of Court may provide, final
judgments and orders of lower courts in:
a. All cases in which the constitutionality or validity of any treaty, international or executive agreement, law,
presidential decree, proclamation, order, instruction, ordinance, or regulation is in question.

Relevant Legal A reasonable relation must exist between the purpose of the measure and the means employed for its accomplishment,
Doctrine for even under the guise of protecting the public interest, personal rights and those pertaining to private property will not
be permitted to be arbitrarily invaded.

Antecedent and Procedural Facts
• On December 3, 1992, City Mayor Alfredo S. Lim signed into law Manila City Ordinance No. 7774 entitled “An Ordinance Prohibiting Short-
Time Admission, Short-Time Admission Rates, and Wash-Up Rate Schemes in Hotels, Motels, Inns, Lodging Houses, Pension Houses, and
Similar Establishments in the City of Manila” (the Ordinance).”
o The ordinance sanctions any person or corporation who will allow the admission and charging of room rates for less than 12
hours or the renting of rooms more than twice a day.
• Malate Tourist and Development Corporation filed a complaint for declaratory relief with prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction and a
TRO. Prayed that the Ordinance, insofar as it includes motels and inns, be declared invalid and unconstitutional. (They later on moved to
withdraw as plaintiff, which the RTC granted)
• The petitioners White Light Corporation (WLC), Titanium Corporation (TC), and Sta. Mesa Tourist and Development Corporation (STDC),
who own and operate several hotels and motels in Metro Manila, filed a motion to intervene and to admit attached complaint-in-
intervention on the ground that the ordinance will affect their business interests as operators. RTC granted their motion to intervene
• The respondents, in turn, alleged that the ordinance is a legitimate exercise of police power.
• RTC declared Ordinance No. 7774 null and void as it “strikes at the personal liberty of the individual guaranteed and jealously guarded by
the Constitution.” Also ordered the City to cease and desist from enforcing said ordinance.
o Reference was made to the provisions of the Constitution encouraging private enterprises and the incentive to needed
investment, as well as the right to operate economic enterprises.
o Finally, from the observation that the illicit relationships the Ordinance sought to dissuade could nonetheless be consummated
by simply paying for a 12-hour stay,
• The City later filed a petition for review on certiorari with the SC, but it was referred to the CA.
• In CA, the respondents asserted that the ordinance is a valid exercise of police power pursuant to Section 458 (4)(iv) of the Local
Government Code
o which confers on cities the power to regulate the establishment, operation and maintenance of cafes, restaurants, beerhouses,
hotels, motels, inns, pension houses, lodging houses and other similar establishments, including tourist guides and transports.
o Also, they contended that under Art III Sec 18 of Revised Manila Charter, they have the power to enact all ordinances it may deem
necessary and proper for the sanitation and safety, the furtherance of the prosperity and the promotion of the morality, peace,
good order, comfort, convenience and general welfare of the city and its inhabitants and to fix penalties for the violation of
ordinances.
• Petitioners argued that the ordinance is unconstitutional and void since it violates the right to privacy and freedom of movement; it is
an invalid exercise of police power; and it is unreasonable and oppressive interference in their business.
• Court of Appeals reversed the decision of RTC and affirmed the constitutionality of the ordinance.
o The ordinance did not violate the right to privacy or the freedom of movement, as it only penalizes the owners or operators of
establishments that admit individuals for short time stays.
o The virtually limitless reach of police power is only constrained by having a lawful object obtained through a lawful method. The
lawful objective of the ordinance is satisfied since it aims to curb immoral activities. There is a lawful method since the
establishments are still allowed to operate.
o The adverse effect on the establishments is justified by the well-being of its constituents in general.






ISSUE/S RATIONALE
 W/N the petitioners Petitioners allege that as owners of establishments offering "wash-up" rates, their business is being unlawfully interfered
have standing – YES with by the Ordinance. However, petitioners also allege that the equal protection rights of their clients are also being
interfered with.

Standing or locus standi is the ability of a party to demonstrate to the court suf cient connection to and harm from the
law or action challenged to support that party's participation in the case. The requirement of standing is a core component
of the judicial system derived directly from the Constitution. In this jurisdiction, the extancy of "a direct and personal
interest" presents the most obvious cause, as well as the standard test for a petitioner's standing. Nonetheless, the
general rules on standing admit of several exceptions such as the overbreadth doctrine, taxpayer suits, third party
standing and, especially in the Philippines, the doctrine of transcendental importance.

In the case at bar, the concepts of a third party standing and overbreadth doctrine are appropriate. Herein, it is clear that
the business interests of the petitioners are likewise injured by the Ordinance. They rely on the patronage of their
customers for their continued viability which appears to be threatened by the enforcement of the Ordinance. US
jurisprudence explained that “the vendors had standing "by acting as advocates of the rights of third parties who seek
access to their market or function"”

Assuming that petitioners do not have a relationship with their patrons for the former to assert the rights of the latter, the
overbreadth doctrine comes into play. In overbreadth analysis, challengers to government action are in effect permitted
to raise the rights of third parties. Generally applied to statutes infringing on the freedom of sp eech, the overbreadth
doctrine applies when a statute needlessly restrains even constitutionally guaranteed rights. In this case, the petitioners
claim that the Ordinance makes a sweeping intrusion into the right to liberty of their clients. We can see that based on the
allegations in the petition, the Ordinance suffers from overbreadth. We thus recognize that the petitioners have a right to
assert the constitutional rights of their clients to patronize their establishments for a "wash-rate" time frame.

W/N the Ordinance The test of a valid ordinance is well established. For an ordinance to be valid, it must not only be within the corporate
is constitutional – powers of the local government unit to enact and pass according to the procedure prescribed by law, it must also
NO conform to the following substantive requirements:
1. must not contravene the Constitution or any statute;
2. must not be unfair or oppressive;
3. must not be partial or discriminatory;
4. must not prohibit but may regulate trade;
5. must be general and consistent with public policy; and
6. must not be unreasonable

The goal of the ordinance is to eliminate and if not, minimize the use of covered establishments for illicit sex, prostitution,
drug use and alike. These goals by themselves are unimpeachable and certainly fall within the ambit of the police power
of the State. However, the desirability of these ends do not sanctify any all means for their achievement. Those means
must align with the Constitution, and our emerging sophisticated analysis of its guarantees to the people.

The Ordinance prevents the lawful uses of wash rate depriving patrons of a product and the petitioners of lucrative
business ties in with another constitutional requisite for the legitimacy of the Ordinance as police power measure. It must
appear that the interest of the public, generally, as distinguished from those of particular class, require an interference
with private rights and that the means employed be reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose and not
unduly oppressive of private rights. It must be evident that no other alternative for the accomplishment of the purpose
less intrusive of the private rights can work. More importantly, a reasonable relation must exist between the purpose of
the measure and the means employed for its accomplishment, for even under the guise of protecting the public interest,
personal rights and those pertaining to private property will not be permitted to be arbitrarily invaded. Lacking a
concurrence of these requisites, the police measure shall be struck down as an arbitrary intrusion into private rights. The
promotion of public welfare and a sense of morality among citizens deserves the full endorsement of the judiciary provided
that such measures do not trample rights this Court is sworn to protect.
RULING: Wherefore, the petition is GRANTED.












 De Castro vs. JBC

Case No. and Date GR No. 191002, March 17 2010; MR April 20 2010

Ponente Bersamin, J.

Topic Constitution

Relevant Legal Doctrine When there is doubt or ambiguity in the provisions of the Constitution, look at the intent
Antecedent Facts
• This case is about the compulsory retirement of Chief Justice Puno on May 17, 2010, seven days after the presidential election
• “Vacancy shall be filled within 90 days from the occurrence thereof from a list of at least 3 nominees prepared by the JBC for every vacancy”
• On December 22, 2009, Cong. Defensor, ex officio member of JBC, addressed a letter to the JBC requesting that the process for nominations
to the office of the CJ be commenced immediately
• In effect, JBC opened the position of CJ for application or recommendation on Jan 20, 2010
o In line with tradition, JBC automatically considered the 5 most senior associate justices of the Court
• The JBC is unable to decide when to submit to the President its list of nominees due to the issues arising from it

Procedural Facts
• These are consolidated cases
o De Castro and Peralta moved for certiorari and mandamus, praying that the JBC be compelled to submit to the incumbent
President the list of at least three nominees for the position of the next CJ
o Soriano filed his petition for prohibition, proposed that the JBC be prevented from conducting its search, selection, and
nomination proceedings
o PHILCONSA wants the JBC to submit its list of nominees for CJ because the incumbent President is not covered by the prohibition
that applies only to appointments in the Executive Department
o Tolentino and Inting (IBP Governors for Southern Luzon and Eastern Visayas) enjoins and restrains the JBC from submitting a list
of nominees
• The Court ruled that all petitioners have locus standi because of the transcendental importance of the case. The appointment of the CJ is
the most important appointment a President makes.
• This Court also found this to be justiciable as there are actual controversies between the provisions of Art 7 and Art 8 on when and who
can appoint the justices of the Supreme Court.


ISSUE/S RATIONALE

W/N the President can • Two provisions of the Consti supposedly in conflict
appoint the CJ, considering o Art 7, Sec 15: Two months immediately before the next presidential elections and up to the end
Art 7, Sec 15 and Article 8, of his term, a President or Acting president shall not make appointments, except temporary
Sec 4 -- YES appointments to executive positions when continued vacancies therein will prejudice public
service or endanger public safety
o Art 8, Sec 4(1): The SC shall be composed of a CJ and 14 AJs. It may sit en banc or in its discretion,
in divisions of 3,5, or 7. Any vacancy shall be filled within 90 days from the occurrence thereof.
• FIRST, the records show that the Consti Commission devoted time to meticulously draft, style, and arrange
the Constitution.
• The arrangement of having three separate sections for the legislative, executive, and judiciary implicitly
shows the principle of separation of powers
o Had the framers intended to extend the prohibition contained in Art 7 Sec 15 to members of
the SC, they could have EXPLICITLY done so.
o The fact the it was not explicitly done reveals that the prohibition DOES NOT REFER to the
members of the SC
• Valenzuela Case vs. Intent of Constitutional Commission
o It was ruled in Valenzuela that Art 7 Sec 15 covers appointments of members of the SC because
of its “stronger negative language” in using “.. a President or Acting President SHALL NOT make
appointments..” against that of Art 8 Sec 4 “vacancy SHALL be filled within ninety days…”
o But the records of the ConComm shows that the intent was for the President to fill the vacancy
within 90 days in accordance with Art 8, Sec. 4
o The use of the word “shall” imposes an IMPERATIVE DUTY to the President to make such
appointment
o In statutory construction,
 § “the Court should seek to avoid any conflict in the provisions of the stature by
endeavoring to harmonize and reconcile every part so that each shall be effective …
Undoubtedly, each provision was inserted for a definite reason …”
§ “But a word should not be given effect, if to do so gives the statute a meaning contrary
to the intent of the legislature … Nor should the provisions of a statute which are
inconsistent be harmonized at a sacrifice of the legislative intention … When the
conflict is between two statutes, more may be said in favor of the rule’s application,
largely because of the principle of implied repeal.”
o The decision in Valenzuela is reversed for being inconsistent with the intent of the framers of
the Constitution
• SECOND, Article 7, Section 15 does not apply to other appointments in the Judiciary because:
o Aytona ruling: the provision is exclusive to the Executive to avoid vote-buying and for partisan
considerations
o In addition, this provision was made to prevent appointments that can influence the
Presidential elections
o The ConComm therefore could not have intended to extend the prohibition in the provision to
the SC
o In fact, there is already a JBC to manage the appointments and ensure that no midnight
appointments would happen
• THIRD, there was already a case penned by Justice Regalado where he said that the Article 7 provision
DOES NOT extend to the appointments in the CA
• FOURTH, there are provisions in Article 7 that talk about the appointing powers of the President:
o Section 14: power of the succeeding President to revoke appointments made by an Acting
President EXCEPT appointments in the judiciary (Why? To safeguard the independence of the
Judiciary)
o Section 16: about the role of the Commission on Appointments over the appointments of the
President
o Obviously sections 14 and 16 refer to the exclusivity of appointments in the executive branch.
Section 15, being in the middle, undoubtedly means that it applies only to the Executive branch
as well
• FIFTH, there was an argument that there will be no need for the incumbent President to appoint during
the prohibition period because there will still be about 45 days of the 90 days mandated in Article 8,
Section 4
o This is flawed. It only applies in the present case. It ignores the need to apply the provision to
all cases
o If the elections were held on May 8 (earlier second Monday of May), the prohibition period is
115 days
o If the elections were held on May 14 (later second Monday of May, the prohibition is 109 days)
o In both cases, it will be longer than the full mandatory 90 day period to fill the vacancy

W/N Sec 12 of the Judiciary • Sec 12 of the Judiciary Act of 1948: In case of a vacancy in the office of CJ or his inability to perform the
Act of 1948 can be applied - duties and powers of the office, they shall devolve upon the AJ who is first in precedence until such
- NO disability is removed or another CJ is appointed and duly qualified
• It is argued that there is no need to appoint a CJ right away because there can be an Acting CJ in
accordance with the abovementioned provision
• If the framers intended that there be an Acting CJ, they would have explicitly said so
• Sec 12 is only applicable to a RARE situation in which the new CJ is not yet appointed. (In the 1935 Consti,
they had to wait for the Comm. on Appointments confirmation kasi. Now, no need)
• The appointment of the CJ by the President is PREFERABLE.
• In this case, there being no obstacle to the appointment of the next CJ, such provision cannot be applied

W/N the JBC may be • Mandamus shall issue when any tribunal, corporation, board, officer or person unlawfully neglects the
compelled to submit a list performance of an act that the law specially enjoins as a duty resulting from an office, trust, or station. It
of nomination through a is proper when the act against which it is directed is one addressed to the discretion of the tribunal or
writ of mandamus -- NO officer. Mandamus is not available to direct the exercise of a judgment or discretion in a particular way.
• Requisites:
o The plaintiff has a clear legal right to the act demanded
o Must be the duty of the defendant to perform the act, as it is mandated by law
o The defendant unlawfully neglects the performance of the duty enjoined by law
o The act to be performed is ministerial, not discretionary
o There is no appeal or any other plain, speedy, and adequate remedy
 • JBC must submit the list BEFORE the start of the 90 day period. This is ministerial. BUT the selection of the
names to be included is JBC’s DISCRETION.
• There is no need to issue the writ of mandamus because JBC still had until May 17, 2010, the latest, to
submit the names

RULING
WHEREFORE the petitions are DISMISSED. The JBC shall resumed their proceedings.

MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION
APRIL 20, 2010

RELEVANT ARGUMENTS RULING

Tolentino: All motions were DENIED.

• Plain reading of Section 15, Article 7 does not
lead to an interpretation that exempts judicial FIRST: The movants argued that the principle of stare decisis is controlling, and the
appointments from the express ban on midnight Court erred in disobeying the Valenzuela Case.
appointments
• In the Court’s decision, they created an • This contention has no basis
exception where there is none • Stare decisis: the principle underlying the decision in one case is deemed
• The ban on midnight appointments is placed in of imperative authority, controlling the decisions of like cases in the
Article 7 and not in 8 because it limits the same court and in lower courts within the same jurisdiction, unless and
executive power, not judiciary until the decision in question is reversed or overruled by a court of
• Resort to the deliberations of the ConComm is competent authority
superfluous and is powerless • The Constitution itself recognizes the innate authority of the Court EN
• Valenzuela should not be reverse BANC to modify or reverse a doctrine or principle of law laid down in any
decision rendered en banc or in division
Philippine Bar Association:
• The Court violated the basic principle that the LAST: Movants argue that Art 7, Sec 15 does not apply to appointments in the
Judiciary. They aver that the Court either ignored or refused to apply many
Court should not formulate a rule of
principles of statutory construction
Constitutional law broader than what is required

by the precise facts of the case
• Article 7, Section 15 is clear and straightforward. • The movants, in disregarding the absence from Section 15, Article 7 of
The Court should have just applied it as it is the express extension of the ban on appointments to the Judiciary AND
YET insist that the ban be applied to the Judiciary under the principle of
• The Court erred in failing to apply the basic
Verba Legis is SELF-CONTRADICTION AT ITS WORST.
principles of statutory construction in
interpreting the Constitution
• The movants insist the express applicability of Sections 4 and 9 of Article
8 to Section 15, Article 7, despite the silence of the provisions about it.
• The Court relied heavily on the title, chapter or
o “Construction cannot supply the omission, for doing so would
section headings, despite precedents on statcon
generally constitute an enroachment upon the field of the
holding that headings carried very little weight
ConComm. Interpolation of words is unnecessary because the
law is more than likely to fail to express the legislative intent
IBP - Davao del Sur
with the interpolation. The addition of new words may alter
• The language being ambigous, Article 7, Section the thought intended to be conveyed.”
15 of the Consti applies to the Judiciary

Corvera
• The exclusion of appointments to the Judiciary is
based on an interpretation beyond the plain and
unequivocal language of the Consti
• The intent of the ban on midnight
appointments extends to the Executive and
Judiciary. The principle of Verba Legis should
have been applied. If there is ambiguity, the
intent behind the provision, which is to prevent
political partisanship in ALL branches, should
have controlled
• A plain reading is preferred to a contorted and
strained interpretation based on
compartmentalization and physical
arrangement, considering that the Consti should
be interpreted as a whole
 Bayan, et al
• In ruling that Section 15, Article VII is in conflict
with Section 4 (1), Article VIII, the Court has
violated the principle of ut magis valeat quam
pereat (which mandates that the Constitution
should be interpreted as a whole, such that any
conflicting provisions are to be harmonized as to
fully give effect to all). There is no conflict
between the provisions; they complement each
other.
• The titles, chapters, sections, and draftsmanship
carry little weight in statcon. The clear and plain
language of the provision precludes
interpretation

Bello et al
• Section 15, Article VII does not distinguish as to
the type of appointments an outgoing President
is prohibited from making within the prescribed
period. Plain textual reading and the records of
the Constitutional Commission support the view
that the ban on midnight appointments extends
to judicial appointments.