People v.
Perfecto,
G.R. No. L-18463, October 4, 1922
FACTS: The issue started when the Secretary of the Philippine Senate, Fernando Guerrero, discovered
that the documents regarding the testimony of the witnesses in an investigation of oil companies had
disappeared from his office. Then, the day following the convening of Senate, the newspaper La Nacion –
edited by herein respondent Gregorio Perfecto – published an article against the Philippine Senate. Here,
Mr. Perfecto was alleged to have violated Article 256 of the Spanish Penal Code – provision that punishes
those who insults the Ministers of the Crown. Hence, the issue.
ISSUE: Whether or not Article 256 of the Spanish Penal Code (SPC) is still in force and can be applied in
the case at bar?
HELD: No.
REASONING: The Court stated that during the Spanish Government, Article 256 of the SPC was enacted
to protect Spanish officials as representatives of the King. However, the Court explains that in the present
case, we no longer have Kings nor its representatives for the provision to protect. Also, with the change
of sovereignty over the Philippines from Spanish to American, it means that the invoked provision of the
SPC had been automatically abrogated. The Court determined Article 256 of the SPC to be ‘political’ in
nature for it is about the relation of the State to its inhabitants, thus, the Court emphasized that ‘it is a
general principle of the public law that on acquisition of territory, the previous political relations of the ceded
region are totally abrogated.’ Hence, Article 256 of the SPC is considered no longer in force and cannot be
applied to the present case. Therefore, respondent was acquitted.
De Leon v. Esguerra
153 SCRA 602, August, 31, 1987
Facts: On May 17, 1982, petitioner Alfredo M. De Leon was elected Barangay Captain together with the
other petitioners as Barangay Councilmen of Barangay Dolores, Muncipality of Taytay, Province of Rizal in
a Barangay election held under Batas Pambansa Blg. 222, otherwise known as Barangay Election Act of
1982.
On February 9, 1987, petitioner De Leon received a Memorandum antedated December 1, 1986 but signed
by respondent OIC Governor Benjamin Esguerra on February 8, 1987 designating respondent Florentino
G. Magno as Barangay Captain of Barangay Dolores and the other respondents as members of Barangay
Council of the same Barangay and Municipality.
Petitioners prayed to the Supreme Court that the subject Memoranda of February 8, 1987 be declared null
and void and that respondents be prohibited by taking over their positions of Barangay Captain and
Barangay Councilmen.
Petitioners maintain that pursuant to Section 3 of the Barangay Election Act of 1982 (BP Blg. 222), their
terms of office shall be six years which shall commence on June 7, 1988 and shall continue until their
successors shall have elected and shall have qualified. It was also their position that with the ratification of
the 1987 Philippine Constitution, respondent OIC Governor no longer has the authority to replace them and
to designate their successors.
On the other hand, respondents contend that the terms of office of elective and appointive officials were
abolished and that petitioners continued in office by virtue of Sec. 2, Art. 3 of the Provisional Constitution
and not because their term of six years had not yet expired; and that the provision in the Barangay Election
Act fixing the term of office of Barangay officials to six years must be deemed to have been repealed for
being inconsistent with Sec. 2, Art. 3 of the Provisional Constitution.
Issue: Whether or not the designation of respondents to replace petitioners was validly made during the
one-year period which ended on Feb 25, 1987.
Ruling: Supreme Court declared that the Memoranda issued by respondent OIC Gov on Feb 8, 1987
designating respondents as Barangay Captain and Barangay Councilmen of Barangay Dolores, Taytay,
Rizal has no legal force and effect.
The 1987 Constitution was ratified in a plebiscite on Feb 2, 1987, therefore, the Provisional Constitution
must be deemed to have superseded. Having become inoperative, respondent OIC Gov could no longer
rely on Sec 2, Art 3, thereof to designate respondents to the elective positions occupied by petitioners.
Relevantly, Sec 8, Art 1 of the 1987 Constitution further provides in part:
"Sec. 8. The term of office of elective local officials, except barangay officials, which shall be determined by
law, shall be three years x x x."
Until the term of office of barangay officials has been determined by aw, therefore, the term of office of 6
years provided for in the Barangay Election Act of 1982 should still govern.
RAUL M. GONZALES vs COMELEC
G.R. No. L-32443 September 11, 1970
Facts: These two separate but related petitions for declaratory relief were filed pursuant to Sec. 19 of R.A.
No. 6132 by petitioners Manuel B. Imbong and Raul M. Gonzales, both members of the Bar, taxpayers and
interested in running as candidates for delegates to the Constitutional Convention. Both impugn the
constitutionality of R.A. No. 6132, claiming during the oral argument that it prejudices their rights as such
candidates.
On March 16, 1967, Congress, acting as a Constituent Assembly pursuant to Art. XV of the Constitution,
passed Resolution No. 2 which among others called for a Constitutional Convention to propose
constitutional amendments to be composed of two delegates from each representative district who shall
have the same qualifications as those of Congressmen, to be elected on the second Tuesday of November,
1970 in accordance with the Revised Election Code. On June 17, 1969, Congress, also acting as a
Constituent Assembly, passed Resolution No. 4 amending the aforesaid Resolution No. 2 of March 16,
1967 by providing that the convention “shall be composed of 320 delegates apportioned among the existing
representative districts according to the number of their respective inhabitants: Provided, that a
representative district shall be entitled to at least two delegates, who shall have the same qualifications as
those required of members of the House of Representatives,” 1 “and that any other details relating to the
specific apportionment of delegates, election of delegates to, and the holding of, the Constitutional
Convention shall be embodied in an implementing legislation: Provided, that it shall not be inconsistent with
the provisions of this Resolution.” 2
On August 24, 1970, Congress, acting as a legislative body, enacted Republic Act No. 6132, implementing
Resolutions Nos. 2 and 4, and expressly repealing R.A. No. 4914.
Petitioner Raul M. Gonzales assails the validity of the entire law as well as the particular provisions
embodied in Sections 2, 4, 5, and par. 1 of 8(a). Petitioner Manuel B. Imbong impugns the constitutionality
of only par. I of Sec. 8(a) of said R.A. No. 6132 practically on the same grounds advanced by petitioner
Gonzales.
Issue: Whether the Congress has a right to call for Constitutional Convention;
Whether the parameters set by such a call is constitutional.
Decision: The Congress has the authority to call for a Constitutional Convention as a Constituent
Assembly. Furthermore, specific provisions assailed by the petitioners are deemed as constitutional.
Ratio:
– Sec 4 RA 6132: it is simply an application of Sec 2 Art 12 of Constitution
– Constitutionality of enactment of RA 6132:
Congress acting as Constituent Assembly, has full authority to propose amendments, or call for convention
for the purpose by votes and these votes were attained by Resolution 2 and 4
– Sec 2 RA 6132: it is a mere implementation of Resolution 4 and is enough that the basis employed for
such apportions is reasonable. Macias case relied by Gonzales is not reasonable for that case granted
more representatives to provinces with less population and vice versa. In this case, Batanes is equal to the
number of delegates I other provinces with more population.
– Sec 5: State has right to create office and parameters to qualify/disqualify members thereof. Furthermore,
this disqualification is only temporary. This is a safety mechanism to prevent political figures from
controlling elections and to allow them to devote more time to the Constituional Convention.
– Par 1 Sec 8: this is to avoid debasement of electoral process and also to assure candidates equal
opportunity since candidates must now depend on their individual merits, and not the support of political
parties. This provision does not create discrimination towards any particular party/group, it applies to all
organizations.
Dissenting Opinion:
Justice Fernando “ I find it difficult to reconcile the decision reached insofar as the aforesaid ban on political
parties and civic, professional and other organizations is concerned with the explicit provision that the
freedom to form associations or societies for purposes not contrary to law shall not be abridged. 2 The right
of an individual to join others of a like persuasion to pursue common objectives and to engage in activities
is embraced within if not actually encouraged by the regime of liberty ordained by the Constitution. This
particular freedom has an indigenous cast, its origin being traceable to the Malolos Constitution.
Lambino Vs. Comelec
G.R. No. 174153, Oct. 25 2006
Facts: Petitioners (Lambino group) commenced gathering signatures for an initiative petition to change the
1987 Constitution, they filed a petition with the COMELEC to hold a plebiscite that will ratify their initiative
petition under RA 6735. Lambino group alleged that the petition had the support of 6M individuals fulfilling
what was provided by art 17 of the constitution. Their petition changes the 1987 constitution by modifying
sections 1-7 of Art 6 and sections 1-4 of Art 7 and by adding Art 18. the proposed changes will shift the
present bicameral- presidential form of government to unicameral- parliamentary. COMELEC denied the
petition due to lack of enabling law governing initiative petitions and invoked the Santiago Vs. Comelec
ruling that RA 6735 is inadequate to implement the initiative petitions.
Issue: Whether or Not the Lambino Group’s initiative petition complies with Section 2, Article XVII of the
Constitution on amendments to the Constitution through a people’s initiative.
Whether or Not this Court should revisit its ruling in Santiago declaring RA 6735 “incomplete, inadequate or
wanting in essential terms and conditions” to implement the initiative clause on proposals to amend the
Constitution.
Whether or Not the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in denying due course to the Lambino
Group’s petition.
Decision: According to the SC the Lambino group failed to comply with the basic requirements for
conducting a people’s initiative. The Court held that the COMELEC did not grave abuse of discretion on
dismissing the Lambino petition.
The Initiative Petition Does Not Comply with Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution on Direct Proposal
by the People
The petitioners failed to show the court that the initiative signer must be informed at the time of the signing
of the nature and effect, failure to do so is “deceptive and misleading” which renders the initiative void.
The Initiative Violates Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution Disallowing Revision through Initiatives
The framers of the constitution intended a clear distinction between “amendment” and “revision, it is
intended that the third mode of stated in sec 2 art 17 of the constitution may propose only amendments to
the constitution. Merging of the legislative and the executive is a radical change, therefore constitutes a
revision.
A Revisit of Santiago v. COMELEC is Not Necessary
Even assuming that RA 6735 is valid, it will not change the result because the present petition violated Sec
2 Art 17 to be a valid initiative, must first comply with the constitution before complying with RA 6735
Petition is dismissed.
Ratio:
Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution is the governing constitutional provision that allows a people’s
initiative to propose amendments to the Constitution. This section states:
Sec. 2. Amendments to this Constitution may likewise be directly proposed by the people through initiative
upon a petition of at least twelve per centum of the total number of registered voters of which every
legislative district must be represented by at least three per centum of the registered voters therein. x x x x
(Emphasis supplied)
The deliberations of the Constitutional Commission vividly explain the meaning of an amendment “directly
proposed by the people through initiative upon a petition,”