[CRIMPRO - Bautista] 1

[Camille Umali]

I. Police Investigation
A. Const, Art. III, Secs. 3, 12, and 17

B. Statutes and Rules

1. RA 7438
2. RA 4200
3. Rev. Pen. Code, Art. 125
4. Rules of Court, Rule 113, Sec. 14

C. Cases
1. “Miranda” Rights

Miranda v. State of Arizona

Legal Doctrine:
Prosecution may not use statements, whether exculpatory or inculpatory, stemming from custodial interrogation of
defendant unless it demonstrates use of procedural safeguards effective to secure privilege against self-incrimination.

Facts:
Miranda vs. Arizona, along with other cases of similar nature, deals primarily with the relationship of the Fifth
Amendment privilege to police interrogation. In the case of Miranda vs. Arizona, Ernesto Miranda was arrested and taken into
custody to a Phoenix police station, where he was identified by the complaining witness. After two hours of interrogation, the
officers emerged from the interrogation room with a written confession signed by Miranda. At the top of the statement was a
typed paragraph stating that the confession was made voluntarily, without threats or promises of immunity and ‘with full
knowledge of my legal rights, understanding any statement I make may be used against me.’ While the officers admitted in trial
that Miranda was not advised that he had a right to have an attorney present, the written confession was admitted into evidence.
Miranda was found guilty of kidnapping and rape.
On appeal, the Supreme Court of Arizona held that Miranda’s constitutional rights were not violated in obtaining the
confession for the reason that he did not specifically requested for counsel.

Issues:
1. WON the privilege is fully applicable during a period of custodial investigation
2. WON the written confession is admissible as evidence

Held/ Ratio:
1. The Court is of the opinion that all the principles embodied in the privilege apply to informal compulsion exerted by law-
enforcement officers during in-custody questioning. Fifth Amendment privilege is available outside of criminal court
proceedings and serves to protect persons in all settings in which their freedom of action is curtailed from being
compelled to incriminate themselves.
Prosecution may not use statements, whether exculpatory or inculpatory, stemming from custodial interrogation of
defendant unless it demonstrates use of procedural safeguards effective to secure privilege against self-incrimination.
A person must, before any questioning, be warned that he has a right to remain silent, that any statement he make
may be used as evidence against him, and that he has right to presence of attorney, retained or appointed.

2. Miranda’s written confession is inadmissible. From the testimony of the officers and the admission of respondent, it is
clear that Miranda was not in any appraised of his right to consult with an attorney and to have one present during the
interrogation, nor was his right not to be compelled to incriminate himself effectively protected in any other manner.
Without these warnings, the statements were inadmissible.
 [CRIMPRO - Bautista] 2
[Camille Umali]

US v. Wade (1966)

Facts:
-Sept. 21, 1964: a bank in Texas was robbed by a man with a small strip of tape on each side of his face. The man pointed a
psitol at the female cashier and the vice president , forced them to fill a pillowcase with the bank's money. The man then drove
away with an accomplice using a stolen car outside the bank.
-March 23, 1965: an indictment was returned against Wade and two others for conspiring to rob the bank, and against Wade
and the accomplice for the robbery itself. Wade was arrested on April 2 and counsel was appointed to represent him on April 26.
-Fifteen days later, an FBI agent, without notice to Wade's lawyer arranged to have the two bank employees observe al ineup
made up of Wade and five or six other prisoners and conducted in a courtroom of the local county courthouse. Each person in
the lineup wore strips of tape as allegedlky worn by the robber and was made to say "put the money in the bag," the words
allegedly uttered by the robber. Both bank employees pinted to Wade in the lineup as the bank robber.
At trial, the two employees pointed to Wade when asked on direct examination if the robber was in the courtroom. Thus, Wade's
counsel moved for a judgment of acquittal or, alternatively, to strike the bank officials' courtroom identifications on the ground
that the conduct of the lineup without notice to snd in the absence of his appointed counsel, violated his Fifth Amendment
privilege against self-incrimination and his Sixth Amendment right to the assistance of counsel.

Issue:/Held: 1) Whether Wade's privilege against self-incrimination was violated? NO

2) Whether Wade's right to the assistance of counsel was violated? SC remanded.

Ratio:
1) The privilege against self-incrimination protects an accused only from being compelled to testify against himself, or otherwise
provided the State with evidence of a testimonial orcommunicative nature. Compelling the accused merely to exhibit his person
for observation by a prosecution witness prior to trial involves no compulsion of the accused to give evidence having testimonial
significance. It is compulsion of the accused to exhibit his physical characteristics, not compulsion to disclose any knowledge
that he might have. Specifically, the privilege offers no protection against compulsion to submit to fingerprinting, photography, or
measurements, to appear in court, etc. However, the fact that there was no violation of the privilege against self-incrimination
does not dispose counsel's contention that the courtroom identifications should have been excluded because the lineup was
conducted without notice and in the absence of Wade's counsel

2) The Sixth Amendment guarantee has been made to apply to critical stages of the proceedings. The guarantee reads: "In all
criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to have the assistance of counsel for his defense." The plain wording
thus encomapsses coynsel's assistance whenever necessary to assure a meaningful defense. It has been recognized that the
period from arraignment to trial was perhaps the most critical period of the proceedings duing which the accused requires the
assistance of counsel. Also, in addition to counsel's presence at trial, the accused is guaranteed that he need not stand alone
against the State at any stage of the prosecution, formal or informal, in or out of court, where counsel's absence might derogate
from the accused's right to a fair trial. Thus, it must be analyzed whether the presence of accused's counsel in any pretrial
confrontation of the accused is necessary to preserve the defendant's basic right to fair trial.

The confrontation (such as lineup) compelled by the State between the accused and the victim or witness to a crime to elicit
identification evidence is riddled with innumerable dangers which might seriously derogate from a fair trial. One major factor
contributing to miscarriage of justice from mistaken identification has been the degree of suggestion ineherent in the manner in
which the prosecution presents the suspect to witnesses for pretrial identification. For example, the presentation may be so
suggestive as to single out one person when one of those in the lineup is made to dress differently from the rest of those in the
lineup. The lineup is most often used to crystallize the witness' identification of the defendant for future reference. The presence
of the counsel at lineup will significantly promote fairness at the confrontation and full hearing at trial on the issue of
identification.

The proper test to be applied in this case is: Whether granting establishment of the primary illegality, the evidence to which
instant objection is made has been come at by exploitation of that illegality or instead by means sufficiently, distinguishable to be
purged of the primary taint. Since there has been no determination made, the conviction must be vacated pending a hearing to
determine whether the in-court identifications had an independent source or whether in any event, the introduction of the
evidence was harmless error.
 [CRIMPRO - Bautista] 3
[Camille Umali]

OROZCO vs. TEXAS 394 U.S. 324 (1969)

Doctrine: The use of admissions in the absence of the required warnings was a flat violation of the Self-Incrimination Clause of
the Fifth Amendment as construed in Miranda.
Nature: Certiorari to the Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas.
Date: March 25, 1969
Ponente: Mr. Justice Black

Facts:

 Petitioner Reyes Arias Orozco was convicted in the Criminal District Court of Texas of murder without malice. Court of
Criminal Appeals affirmed the decision, rejecting petitioner’s contention that the material part of the evidence against him
was obtained in violation of the Fifth Amendment which states that “No person shall be…shall be compelled in any criminal
case to be a witness against himself.”
 Petitioner and deceased quarreled outside El Farleto Café in Dallas before midnight because deceased has spoken to
petitioner’s female companion. In the heat of the quarrel, the deceased had beaten petitioner about the face and called him
“Mexican Grease.” A shot was fired killing deceased.
 At 4 am, four police arrived at petitioner’s boardinghouse, were admitted by an unidentified woman. All officers entered
bedroom and started questioning petitioner. From the moment he gave his name, petitioner was not free to go where he
pleased but was under arrest.
 Officers asked him if he’d been to El Farleto to which he answered “yes”, and was then asked if he owned a pistol.
Petitioner admitted owning one. He was asked a second time where it was and admitted that it was in the washing machine
in the backroom. Ballistics test indicated that the gun found in the washing machine was the gun used to fire the fatal shot.
 TRIAL COURT: TC allowed one of the officers, over the objection of petitioner’s lawyer, to relate statements made by
petitioner concerning the gun and his presence at the shooting. The testimony showed that the officers questioned
petitioner without first informing him of his right to remain silent, his right to have the advice of a lawyer before making any
statement, and his right to have a lawyer appointed to assist him if he could not afford to hire one.

Issue: Whether or not the admissions obtained in the absence of the required warnings was a flat violation of the Self-
Incriminating clause of the Fifth Amendment as construed in Miranda.

Held: Yes, the admissions violated the Self-Incriminating clause of the Fifth Amendment.

Ratio:

Miranda: compulsion to speak in isolated setting of the police station may well be greater than in courts or other official
investigations, where there are often impartial observers to guard against intimidation or trickery.

According to the officer’s testimony, petitioner was under arrest and was not free to leave when he was questioned in his
bedroom in the early hours of the morning. Miranda declared that the warnings were required when the person being
interrogated was “in custody at the station or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way.”

Mr. Justice White, with whom Mr. Justice Stewart joins, dissenting.

This decision carries the rule of Miranda to a new and unwarranted extreme. The opinion in Miranda was devoted in large part to
an elaborate discussion of the subtle forms of psychological pressure which could be brought to bear when an accused person
is interrogated at length in unfamiliar surroundings. The danger was that in such circumstances the confidence of the prisoner
could be eroded by techniques such as successive interrogations by police acting out friendly or unfriendly roles. In a sufficient
number of cases, exposure to station houses practices will result in compelled confessions and that additional safeguards
should be imposed in all cases to prevent possible erosion of the Fifth Am.

The Court in this case wholly ignores the question whether similar hazards exist or even are possible when police arrest and
interrogate on the spot, whether it be on the street corner or in the home, as in this case. It is difficult to imagine the police
duplicating in a person’s home or on the street those conditions and practices which the court found prevalent in the station
house. Without such demonstration, Miranda hardly reaches this case.

In this case, there was no prolonged interrogation, no unfamiliar surroundings, no opportunity for the police to invoke those
procedures which invoked the majority in Miranda. It is unquestioned that this sequence of events in their totality would NOT
constitute coercion in the traditional sense or lead any court to view the admissions as involuntary.

Mislang, Arman
 [CRIMPRO - Bautista] 4
[Camille Umali]

US v. Brown
April 2, 1993
Wollman, Circuit Judge

Facts:
 In 1991, Brown, 38 years old arrived in Pine Ridge South Dakota. While in Pine Ridge, he stayed at the residence of Gary
and Mary Moore.
 On July 4, 1991, Brown went to a softball game at Wakpamni Lake which is 30 minutes from Pine Ridge. He returned to
Pine Ridge in a car with 7 other people (3 adults sitting in front, 2 Adults sitting at the back and 2 8-year old girls). The two
girls sat on Brown’s lap.
 The two girls complained at Pine Ridge Police Department that Brown had touched them between their legs during the drive
back from Wakpamni.
 Later that day, Esselbach (FBI special agent) and Barney White Face (Criminal investigator for Oglala Sioux Tribe) went to
East Ridge Housing Area to look for Brown.
1. Esselbach introduced himself and White Face and informed Brown that they were investigating allegations
that Brown sexually abused two young girls.
2. Esselbach advised Brown that he was not under arrest but just wanted to get his side of the story if he wanted
to be interviewed.
3. Brown said he wanted to talk to the officers so he could get to the bottom of the matter. 2 officers followed
Brown into the house and into a bedroom.
4. Once inside, Esselbach told Brown the complaint of the girls which Brown initially denied. Esselbach asked
Brown if he could have accidentally touched the girls and Brown answered that he may have unintentionally
touched the vagina of one of the girls when attempted to make himself comfortable.
5. Esselbach explained the side of the girls. Brown confessed.
 Brown was indicted for 2 counts of sexual abuse of a minor. He was charged with aggravated sexual abuse of a person
which had not attained the age of 12.
 Brown made a motion to suppress his inculpatory statement for he was not been given the Miranda warnings prior to
making the statement. District court denied the motion and held that Brown had not been in custody when he made such
statements. He was sentenced to 235 months in prison.

Issue/Held: WON inculpatory statement was admissible - YES

Ratio:
 Miranda warnings must be given prior to questioning whenever an individual is in custody.
 An individual is in custody when he has been formally arrested or his freedom of movement has been restrained to a
degree associated with formal arrest.
 6 Indicia of custody (US v. Griffin) – presence of 1 to 3 will mitigate existence, 4-6 will aggravate
US v. Griffin Court
1. Whether suspect was informed at time of questioning He was specifically advised that he was not under arrest. He was
that it was voluntary and that he was free to leave or also informed that the questioning is voluntary and that officers only
request officers to do so or that suspect was not wanted to get his side of the story if Brown is willing to talk to them.
considered under arrest.
2. Whether suspect possessed unrestrained freedom of Brown was free to move. The bedroom door was open and
movement during questioning unlocked throughout the interview.
3. Whether suspect initiated contact with authorities or Brown voluntary initiated contact. He presented himself to officers
voluntary acquiesced to official request to respond to because he believed they were looking for him.
questions He also voluntary acquiesced to the interview. He wanted to get to
the bottom of the matter.
4. Whether strong arm tactics or deceptive stratagems Officers did not employ any strong-arm tactics. They did not yell at
were employed during questioning him or threaten him or employ any deceptive stratagems such as
good cop, bad cop routine.
Absence of coercive tactic is a factor indicating that a reasonable
person would not have believed that he was under arrest.
5. Whether the atmosphere of the questioning was Atmosphere was not police dominated. The interview took place at
police dominated Polar Bear residence where Brown could feel comfortable. Also, 2
other individuals were present in the house and were not asked to
do or not do anything.
6. Whether suspect was placed under arrest at the Brown was not arrested at the end of the interview. He was not
termination of the questioning even asked to stay in Pine Ridge Area
 All mitigating was present and none of aggravating. Therefore, Brown was held NOT in custody during questioning. (ie
Miranda right is not needed because he was not in custody)
 [CRIMPRO - Bautista] 5
[Camille Umali]

People v Andan
Date: March 3, 1997
Facts:
Pablito Andan was accused of the crime of rape with homicide committed against Marianne Guevarra, a 20-year old 2 nd
year student of Fatima School of Nursing. Marianne was along their subdivision in Baliuag, Bulacan when the accused invited
her inside his house because the blood pressure of his wife’s grandmother should be taken. She agreed and there she was
allegedly raped and was killed using a concrete block on a vacant lot next to the pigpen of the accused.
Marianne’s death drew public attention. Mayor Cornelio Trinidad formed a team of police officers to look for the
criminal. Policemen recovered from the place of death, a broken piece of concrete block stained with what appeared to be
blood.
Nearby house of the accused was searched, bloodstains were found on the wall of the pigpen in the backyard.
According to Romano Calma, occupant of the house, the accused left with his wife and son, without a word.
Police located the accused in his parent’s house. They took him aboard the patrol jeep and brought him to the police
headquarters where he was interrogated. Initially, accused denied knowledge of the crime. Then he pointed to his neighbours
(Gilbert Larin and Reynaldo Dizon who were rounded up earlier) as the perpetrators of the killing and that he was merely a
lookout.
The three were brought to the police HQ and there were media representatives waiting for the results of the
investigation. When Mayor Trinidad arrived, ANDAN whispered a request that they talk privately. The mayor and Andan
talked inside the office of the Chief of Poloce and there the latter broke down and said:
“Mayor, patawarin mo ako! I will tell you the truth. I am the one who killed Marianne.”
The mayor opened the door to let the public and media witness the confession. Mayor asked for a lawyer,
since no lawyer was available, he ordered the proceedings phoyographed and videotaped. In the presence of the
mayor, the police, media reps, and his wife and son, accused confessed his guilt. His confession was captured on
videotape and covered by the media nationwide.
The next two days, accused was again interviewed and he affirmed his confession to the mayor and re-enacted the
crime.
On arraignment, however, accused entered a plea of “not guilty.” His defense was an Alibi. On the day of the crime he
was at a birthday party in Tangos, Baliuag. He was brought to a hotel and there he was tortured to confess to the crime.
Triall Court convicted and sentenced him to death.

Issue: W/N the testimony given to a) the three policemen, b) Mayor of Baliuag, and c) four news reporters to whom the accused
gave his extrajudicial oral confessions are admissible as evidence?

Held: a) as to the policemen, NOT valid

b) as to the AMyor, VALID
c) as to teh reporters, VALID

Consti Art. III Sec. 12 (1), (3):

(1) Any person under investigation for the commission of an offense shall have the right to be informed of his right to
remain silent and to have competent and independent counsel preferably of his own choice. If the person cannot afford the
services of counsel, he must be provided with one. These rights cannot be waived except in writing and in the presence of
counsel.
(3) Any confession or admission obtained in violation of this or Section 17 hereof shall be inadmissible in evidence
against him.

Thus, any person under investigation for the commission of an offense shall have the right 1) to remain silent, 2) have
competent and independent counsel preferably of his own choice, and 3) to be informed of such rights.
A) When the police arrested accused, they were no longer engaged in a general inquiry about the death of Marianne.
Accused was already a prime suspect even before he was located in his parents’ house. He was already under
custodial investigation when he confessed to the police, Police failed to inform accused of his rights. His
confession therefore is inadmissible as evidence. The victim’s bags were the fruits of his uncounselled confession
to the police, they are tainted evidence, hence inadmissible.
B) His confession to the Mayor was not in response to any interrogation by the latter. Mayor did not even question
Andan at all. Andan himself who spontaneously, freely and voluntarily sought the mayor for a private meeting.
Contitutional procedures on custodial investigations don not apply to spontaneous statement, not elicited through
questioning by the authorities, but given in an ordinary manner whereby appellant orally admitted having
committed the crime. In this case, the confession to the mayor is admissible in court.
C) Andan’s confessions to the media are admissible. The questions were made in response to questions by news
reporters, not by the police or any other investigating officer. His confessions to the News reporters were given free
from undue influence from the police authorities. The news reporters acted as news reporters when they
interviewed the accused. They were not acting under the direction and control of the police. They interviewed him
on separate days and not once did the accused protest his innocence. There was no coercive atmosphere in the
interview of appellant by the news reporters.
The bill of rights does not concern itself with the relation between a private individual and another individual.
 [CRIMPRO - Bautista] 6
[Camille Umali]

People vs Caguioa
People of the Philippines vs Eduardo P. Caguioa (CFI Bulacan Judge) and Paquito Yupo
Date: January 17, 1980
Ponente: Fernando, CJ.
Doctrine: There is no bar to waiver of one’s right to counsel if made intelligently and voluntarily, with full understanding of its
consequences.
FACTS
 Sept. 14, 1973: Provincial Fiscal of Bulacan filed an information for murder in CFI Bulacan against Paquito Yupo. After
the raffle it was assigned to Caguioa.
 June 3, 1974: Corporal Conrado Roca (Meycauayan police officer before whom written statement of Yupo and his
alleged waiver of right to remain silent and to be assisted by counsel was taken) was presented at hearing. Defense objected
that written statement was inadmissible as there was no counsel assisting Yupo during the investigation. Caguioa sustained
the objection because the judicial confession was unconstitutional.
ISSUE
W/N right to counsel could be waived
HELD/RATIO
Right to counsel during custodial interrogation may be waived if such waiver is made intelligently and voluntarily with full
understanding of consequences. But in this case, it was not shown that the alleged waiver was given freely and voluntarily. One
telling circumstance against such alleged waiver being given credence was that Yupo was from Samar (Visayan) and was
interrogated extensively in Tagalog (no showing having been made that he was acquainted with the dialect and could fully
understand what was asked of him). Also, there was a failure to submit to the Court the alleged signature of Yupo for fear that
the absence of education of 19 year old Yupo may become apparent from such, and thus lead to a nullification of the waiver.

Barredo, J. concurring
Caguioa was wrong in saying that right to remain silent and right to counsel are not subject to waiver. Also, the Chief Justice is
right in saying that merely informing a person under custody of his constitutional rights under the circumstances hereinunder to
be stated and thereafter taking down his statement does not sufficiently safeguard those [Link] is not enough that he is told
that he has the right to remain silent and right to counsel, he must be asked pointedly and unequivocably whether or not he
wants to exercise them.

Aquino, J. dissenting
I believe that Roca in taking down the confession and waiver of Yupo endeavored to adhere strictly to the guidelines laid down in
Miranda case. I vote for reversal of Caguioa’s ruling ang to allow the fiscal to propound questions to Roca on Yupo’s confession
and waiver.
 [CRIMPRO - Bautista] 7
[Camille Umali]

People v Ayson (1989)

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. HON. JUDGE RUBEN AYSON, Presiding over Branch 6, Regional Trial
Court, First Judicial Region, Baguio City, and FELIPE RAMOS, respondents. | Narvasa, J.:

Facts: Felipe Ramos was a ticket freight clerk of the Philippine Airlines (PAL), assigned at its Baguio City station. It was
discovered that there were irregularities in ticket sales in which Ramos appeared to have had a hand. The PAL management
notified him of an investigation to be conducted. On the day before the investigation, February 8, 1986, Ramos gave to his
superiors a handwritten note, offering to compromise his liability in the alleged irregularities. On February 9, 1986, Felipe Ramos
was informed of the finding of the Audit Team. Thereafter, his answers in response to questions by PAL Branch Manager were to
the effect inter alia that he had not indeed made disclosure of the tickets mentioned in the Audit Team's findings, that the
proceeds had been "misused" by him, that he was still willing to settle his obligation, and that he was willing to sign his
statement (as he in fact afterwards did). About two (2) months later, a case for estafa was filed against Ramos. He pleaded not
guilty.

On the end of people's case, the private prosecutors made a written offer of evidence, which included the statement of accused
Felipe J. Ramos taken on February 9, 1986 at PAL Baguio City Ticket Office, which had been marked as Exhibit A, as well as his
handwritten admission given on February 8, 1986, which had been marked as Exhibit K. The defendant's attorneys objected to
the evidence presented particularly as regards the peoples' Exhibit A because said document, which appears to be a
confession, was taken without the accused being represented by a lawyer; that it does not appear that the accused was
reminded of this constitutional rights to remain silent and to have counsel, and that when he waived the same and gave his
statement, it was with the assistance actually of a counsel. Exhibit K was objected to for the same reasons interposed under
Exhibit A. The respondent judge admitted all the other exhibits except Exhibits A and K, which it rejected for the same reason
that it does not appear that the accused was assisted by counsel when he made those admissions.

Issue: WON CA erred in excluding the Exhibits A and K. [Yes, CA Judge erred]

Held/Ratio: The main argument of the respondent judge for not admitting the evidence is that the so-called "Miranda rights" had
not been accorded to Ramos. At the core of the controversy is Section 20, Article IV of the 1973 Constitution. There are two
rights, or sets of rights, dealt with Section 20, namely: (a) the right against self-incrimination i.e., the right of a person not to be
compelled to be a witness against himself, and (b) the rights of a person in custodial interrogation. The first right, against self-
incrimination, is accorded to every person who gives evidence, whether voluntarily or under compulsion of subpoena, in any
civil, criminal, or administrative proceeding. The right is NOT to "be compelled to be a witness against himself.” While the
second right applies to persons "under investigation for the commission of an offense," i.e., "suspects" under investigation by
police authorities; and this is what makes the second right different from the right against self-incrimination which
indiscriminately applies to any person testifying in any proceeding, civil, criminal, or administrative.

It is pertinent at this point to inquire whether the rights against self-incrimination and those during custodial interrogation apply
to persons under preliminary investigation or already charged in court for a crime.

It seems quite evident that a defendant on trial or under preliminary investigation is not under custodial interrogation.
The constitutional rights of a person under custodial interrogation under Section 20, Article IV of the 1973 Constitution did not
therefore come into play, were of no relevance to the inquiry. It is also clear, too, that Ramos had voluntarily answered
questions posed to him on the first day of the administrative investigation, February 9, 1986, and agreed that the
proceedings should be recorded, the record having thereafter been marked during the trial of the criminal action
subsequently filed against him as Exhibit A, just as it is obvious that the note (later marked as Exhibit K) that he sent to
his superiors on February 8,1986, the day before the investigation, offering to compromise his liability in the alleged
irregularities, was a free and even spontaneous act on his part. They may not be excluded on the ground that the so-
called "Miranda rights" had not been accorded to Ramos. To repeat, Ramos’ "Miranda rights" (to silence and to counsel and
to be informed thereof, etc.) are relevant only in custodial investigations.
 [CRIMPRO - Bautista] 8
[Camille Umali]

People v. Maqueda
People of the Philippines, plaintiff-appellee, vs. Hector Maqueda @ Putol, and Rene Salvamante (at large), accused, Hector
Maqueda @ Putol, accused-appellant.

Nature: Appeal from a decision of the Regional Trial Court of La Trinidad, Benguet
Date: March 22, 1995
Ponente: Davide, Jr., J.
Doctrine: The rights to remain silent and to counsel and to be informed thereof under Section 12(1), Article III of the Constitution
are not confined to that period prior to the filling of a criminal complaint or information but are available at that stage when a
person is “under investigation for the commission of an offense”

Facts:
 Horace William Barker (British national) and his wife Teresita Mendoza (Filipina) lived in the rugged and mountainous
terrain of Tuba, Benguet with Norie Dacara and Julieta Villanueva, their household helpers.
 August 27, 1991 – the household of the Barker spouses was awakened by the intrusion of Rene Salvamante, a former
househelp of the Barkers, and his companion, Hector Maqueda. Armed with lead pipes, the two men violently attacked Mr.
and Mrs. Barker as well as their household helpers. This incident resulted in the death of Mr. Barker (due to hemorrhagic
shock) and multiple lacerations sustained by Mrs. Barker.
-Mike Tabayan and Mark Pacio who were resting in a waiting shed which was only about a kilometre away from the house
of the Barkers claimed that on the morning of August 27, two men approached them and asked for directions. Tabayan and
Pacio noticed that the taller of the two men who approached them had an amputated left hand and a right hand with a
missing thumb and index finger (presumably Hector Maqueda).
 November 29, 1991 – Ray Dean Salvosa (Executive Vice President of the Baguio College Foundation) ordered Glen
Enriquez (BCF Security Officer) to go to Guinyangan, Quezon to coordinate with the police in determining the whereabouts
of accused Rene Salvamante. Although Basilio Requeron, the Barangay Captain, said that he saw Salvamante with a man
called “Putol”, the two suspects have already left the place.
 March 4, 1992 – Requeron’s daughter called up Enriquez to inform him that Putol (Hector Maqueda) had been arrested in
Guinyangan. Consequently, the Guinyangan Police Station turned over Maqueda to Maj. Anagaran who then brought him to
the Benguet Provincial Jail.
 Before Maj. Anagaran’s arrival at Guinyangan, Maqueda was taken to the PNP Mobile Force headquarters where SPO3
Armando Molleno was directed to get Maqueda’s statement. According to SPO3 Molleno, he informed Maqueda of his
rights under the Constitution. Maqueda then signed a Sinumpaang Salaysay (extrajudicial confession) wherein he
narrated his participation in the crime at the Barker house on August 27, 1991.
 April 9, 1992 – While under detention, Maqueda filed a Motion to Grant Bail and stated that “he is willing and
volunteering to be a State witness. . . , it appearing that he is the least guilty among the accused in this case”. Prosecuter
Zarate had a talk with Maqueda and asked him if he was in the company Salvamante on August 27, 1991 in entering the
house of the Barkers; Maqueda answered in the affirmative. Prosecuter Zarate opposed the motion for bail since Maqueda
was the only accused on trial.
 For his part, accused Hector Maqueda put up the defense of denial and alibi. He claimed that he had nothing to do with the
crime as he was working at the polvoron factory in Muntinlupa, Metro Manila on the day of the incident.
 The trial court convicted Maqueda based on his confession, proof of corpus delicti and circumstantial evidence (see pages
580-581 of the original case for the detailed enumeration of the circumstances proving his guilt).

Issue: Whether or not the Sinumpaang Salaysay was admissible and whether Maqueda can be convicted based on such
document
Held/Ratio:
 No, the Sinumpaang Salaysay is inadmissible because it was in palpable violation of the rights of the accused under the
Constitution. However, on the basis of his extrajudicial admissions made to Prosecuter Zarate and to Ray Dean Salvosa,
and on circumstantial evidence, his guilt is proven beyond reasonable doubt.
 The trial court made a distinction between an extrajudicial confession (the Sinumpaang Salaysay) and an extrajudicial
admission (the verbal admissions to Prosecuter Zarate and Ray Dean Salvosa) as shown in Sections 26 and 33, Rule
130 of the Rules of Court.
(a) Section 26. Admission of a party. – The act, declaration or omission of party as to a relevant fact may be given in
evidence against him.
(b) Section 33. Confession. – The declaration of an accused acknowledging his guilt of the offense charged, or of any
offense necessarily included therein, may be given in evidence against him.
 A confession is an acknowledgement of guilt. On the other hand, admission is usually applied in criminal cases to
statements of fact by the accused which do not directly involve an acknowledgement of his guilt or of the criminal intent to
commit the offense with which he is charged.
 The trial court admitted Maqueda’s Sinumpaang Salaysay even though it was taken without the assistance of a counsel
because it opined that since an information had already been filed in court against him and he was arrested pursuant to a
 [CRIMPRO - Bautista] 9
[Camille Umali]

warrant of arrest issued by the court, it was not taken during custodial investigation. As such is the case, the trial court held
that Section 12(1) Article III of the Constitution does not apply. Instead, the trial court held that the admissibility of the
Sinumpaang Salaysay should be tested on the voluntariness of its execution.
 However, the Supreme Court disagrees with the abovementioned ratiocination of the trial court. Such a view gives not only
a very restrictive application of Section 12(1); it also diminishes the accused’s rights under Section 14(2), Article III of the
Constitution. Hence, the SC held that the rights to remain silent and to counsel and to be informed thereof under Section
12(1), Article III of the Constitution are not confined to that period prior to the filling of a criminal complaint or information but
are available at that stage when a person is “under investigation for the commission of an offense”.
 The incorporation of the second paragraph of Section 20 (“Any person under investigation for the commission of an
offense shall have the right to remain silent and to counsel, and to be informed of such right. . .”) in the Bill of Rights of
the 1973 Constitution was an acceptance of the landmark doctrine laid down by the US SC in Miranda v. Arizona.
However, the adoption of the doctrine was not in toto. Instead, the second paragraph of Section 20 has broadened the
application of the Miranda doctrine by making it applicable to the investigation for the commission of an offense of a person
not in custody.
 Maqueda’s Sinumpaang Salaysay which was taken by SPO3 Molleno after his arrest was in palpable violation of his rights
under Section 12(1) Article III of the Constitution. Maqueda was not told of any of his constitutional rights and his
statement was taken in the absence of counsel. As such, it is wholly inadmissible pursuant to paragraph 3, Section 12,
Article III of the Constitution (“Any confession or admission obtained in violation of this or Section 17 hereof shall be
inadmissible in evidence against him.”).
 The extrajudicial admissions of Maqueda to Prosecutor Zarate and to Ray Dean Salvosa (private individual) stand on
different footing because these are not governed by the exclusionary rules under the Bill of Rights. This is so because the
provisions of the Bill of Rights are primarily limitations on the power of the government. In the case at hand, Maqueda’s
admission to Prosecuter Zarate was voluntary and not in the course of an investigation. Likewise, his admission to Ray
Dean Salvosa,a private party, is admissible in evidence under Section 26, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court.
 Lastly, Maqueda’s defense of alibi was futile because by his own admission he was not only at the scene of the crime at
the time of its commission, he also admitted his participation therein. The following circumstantial evidence were proven
in court: (1) he and a companion were seen a kilometre away from the Barker house an hour after the crime in question was
committed there; (2) Rene Salvamante, who is still at large, was positively identified by Mrs. Barker, Norie Dacara, and
Julieta Villanueva as one of two persons who committed the crime; (3) he and co-accused Rene Salvamante are friends; (4)
he and Rene Salvamante were together in Guinyangan, Quezon, and both left the place sometime in September 1991; (5)
He was arrested in Guinyangan, Quezon, on March 4, 1992; and (6) He freely and voluntarily offered to be a state witness
stating that “he is the least guilty”. Under Section 4, Rule 133 of the Rules of Court, circumstantial evidence is sufficient for
conviction if: (a) there is more than one circumstance; (b) the facts from which the inferences are derived are proven; and
(c) the combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt. In this case, all
these requisites are present.
 [CRIMPRO - Bautista] 10
[Camille Umali]

People vs. Amestuzo

Legal Doctrine:
Section 12 (1), Article III of the 1987 Constitution or the so-called ‘Miranda Rights’ may be invoked only by a person
while he is under custodial investigation. Police line-up is not part of custodial investigation, hence the right to counsel
guaranteed by the Constitution cannot yet be invoked at this stage.

Facts:
Accused-appellant Albino Bagas was charged and found guilty with the complex crime of robbery in band and double
rape. According to the facts presented in the Solicitor General’s Brief, a group of eight armed men entered the house of
complainant Perlita Lacsamana and robbed the said premises of valuables in the total amount of P728,000. In the course of the
robbery, two members of the gang raped the niece and employee of the complainant. It was alleged that Bagas was the one
who sexually assaulted the neice.
In his appeal, Bagas claimed that he was deprived of his constitutional right to be represented by counsel during his
identification. He maintains that from the time he was arrested until he was presented to the complainants for identification, he
was deprived of the benefit of counsel.

Issue:
WON accused-appellant’s singular presentation to the complainants for identification without the benefit of counsel
violated his constitutional prerogative to be assisted by counsel

Held/Ratio:
The Court held that accused-appellant’s constitutional right to be represented by counsel was not violated. Section 12
(1), Article III of the 1987 Constitution, or the so-called ‘Miranda Rights’ may be invoked only by a person while he is under
custodial investigation. Custodial investigation starts when the police investigation is no longer a general inquiry into an
unsolved crime but has begun to focus on a particular suspect taken into custody by the police who starts the interrogation and
propounds questions to the person to elicit incriminating statements. Police line-up is not part of custodial investigation, hence
the right to counsel guaranteed by the Constitution cannot yet be invoked at this stage.

Moreover, the alleged infringement of the constitutional rights of the accused while under custodial investigation is
relevant and material only to cases in which an extrajudicial admission or confession extracted from the accused becomes the
basis of his conviction. In the present case, there is no such confession or extrajudicial admission.

Note:
Accused-appellant was acquitted based on his alibi which was sufficiently corroborated by the testimonies of the
witnesses.
 [CRIMPRO - Bautista] 11
[Camille Umali]

People v. Mojello (2004)

Facts:
Accused- appellant Mojello was charged of rape with homicide. Witness Rogelio Rayco pointed to Dindo Mojello as the last
person to be with the victim Lenlen Rayco, 11 years of age. Lenlen Rayco's body was found at the seashore so Mojello was
arrested at Bantayan while attempting to board a motor launch bound for Cazid City. On an ivestigation conducted by SPO2
Wilfredo Giducos, Mojello admitted that he was the perpetrator of the dastardly deed. Mojello was assisted by Atty. Isaias
Giduquio during his custodial interrogation. His confession was witnessed by two Barangay captains one of whom testified that
after the confession was executed, the contents of the document were read to Mojello who later on voluntarily signed it. Mojello's
extrajudicial confession was sworn before Judge Jaca of the MCTC of Sta Fe-Bantayan. A few days after, an autopsy was
conducted and the results revealed that there was swelling of the labia majora, indicating that Lenlen was raped. There were
also froth in the lungs of Lenlen and contusions on her neck which show that she was strangled and died of asphyxia. ojello now
claims that the confession which he executed was not freely, intelligently and voluntarily entered into, that he was not knowingly
and intelligently apprised of his constitutional rights before the confession was taken from him.

Issue:/Held: Whether the extrajudicial confession executed by Mojello is admissible in evidence? Yes, admissible

Ratio: The extrajudicial confession executed by Mojello, applying Art. III, Sec. 12. par. 1 of the 1987 Constitution in relation to
Rep. Act No. 7438, Sec. 2 complies with the strict constitutional requirements of the right to counsel. Mojello was undoubtedly
apprised of his Miranda rights. The confession itself expressly stated that the investigating officers informed him of such rights.
Atty. Giduquio testified that while he was attending a Sangguniang Bayan session, he was requested by the Chief of Police of
Sta. Fe to assist appelant. Mojello manifested on record his desire to have Atty. Guidoquio as his counsel, with the latter
categorically stating that before the investigation was conducted and Mojello's statement taken, he advised appelant of his
constitutional rights. Atty. Guidoquio was a competent and independent counsel of appellant within the contemplation of the
Constitution. No evidence was presented to negate his competence and independence in representing Mojello during the
custodial investigation. The phrase "preferably of his own choice" does not convey the message that the choice of a lawyer by a
person under investigation is exclusive as to preclude other equally competent and independent attorneys from handling the
defense.

There were 2 custodial investigations held and concededly, the first CI upon Mojello's apprehension violated the doctrine
because (1) no counsel was present and (2) improper waiver of the right to counsel as it was not made in writing and in the
presence of counsel. However, the 2nd custodial investigation which elicited Mojhello's confession should be uphel for having
complied with Art. III, Sec. 12 par. 1. Even though improper interrogation methods were used at the outset, there is still a
possiblity of obtaining a legally valid confession later on by properly interrogating the subject under different conditions and
circumstances than those which prevailed originally.

The test for determining if a confession is voluntary is whether the defendant's will was overborne at the time he confessed. The
presumption of voluntariness on the part of Mojello remains unrebutted for his failure to present evidence that he was coerced.
Having complied with Art. III, Sec. 12 par 1, the confession is deemed admissible in evidence . Thus, the admission of
cuklpability is admissible . It is not a fruit of the poisonous tree since the tree itself is not poisonous. However, the records do not
adequately show that appellant admitted to killing the victim and neither is there circumstancial evidence to show that rape with
homicide was committed by Mojello. Thus, Mojello should be convicted only of statutory rape.

NOTE: The Miranda Doctrine under the 1987 Constitution took on a modified form where the right to counsel was specifically
qualified to mean competent and independent counsel preferably of the suspect's own choice. Waiver of the right to counsel
provided for stricter requirements compared to its American counterpart since it must be done in writing, and in the presence of
counsel.

Dissenting: Quisumbing, J.:

At the very start of custodial investigation, Mojello was not assisted by counsel. Nor was he informed of his right to counsel from
the time the police started to extract information from him regarding the crime that he was charged of. Much less did he waive
his right to counsel in writing. What happened was contrary to the prevailing doctrine that the accused under custodial
interrogation must continuously have a counsel assisting him from the very start thereof.
 [CRIMPRO - Bautista] 12
[Camille Umali]

2. Exclusionary rule /”Fruit of the poisonous tree” doctrine

MAPP vs. OHIO 367 U.S. 643 (1961)

Doctrine: All evidence obtained by searches and seizures in violation of the Federal Constitution is inadmissible in a criminal
trial in a state court. Wolf vs. Colorado was overruled in this case.
Nature: Appeal from the Supreme Court of Ohio.
Date: June 19, 1961
Ponente: Mr. Justice Clark

Facts:

 May 23, 1957, three Cleveland police officers arrived at appellant’s residence pursuant to an information that “a person was
hiding out in the home, who was wanted for questioning in connection with a recent bombing, and that there was a large
amount of policy paraphernalia being hidden in the home.” Officers demanded entrance but appellant, after calling her
attorney, refused to admit them without a search warrant. The officers tried again after three hours. When Mapp did not
come to the door immediately, one of the doors was forcibly opened. When Mapp’s attorney arrived , the policed didn’t
permit him to see her nor enter the house.

 Mapp demanded to see the search warrant. A paper was held by the officer. She grabbed the “warrant” and placed it in her
bosom. A struggle ensued in which the officers recovered the warrant and handcuffed Mapp. They searched the place
including the child’s room. The obscene materials for possession of which she was convicted were discovered in the course
of the search. At the trial, no search warrant was produced by the prosecution, nor was the failure to produce one explained
or accounted for.

 The State says that even if the search were made without authority, it is not prevented from using the unconstitutionally
seized evidence at trial, citing Wolf vs. Colorado, in which it was held “that in a State court for a State crime the Fourteenth
Amendment does not forbid the admission of evidence obtained by an unreasonable search and seizure.”

Historical Development of Cases Involving Unreasonable Searches and Seizures

Boyd vs. US (1886): The Court held that the doctrines of the Fourth and Fifth Amendments “apply to all invasions on the part of
the government and its employees of the sanctity of a man’s home and the privacies of life. The essence of the offence is the
invasion of his indefeasible right of personal security, personal liberty and private property. Constitutional provisions for the
security of person and property should be liberally construed.

Weeks vs. US (1914): the Fourth Am put the courts of the US and Fedeal officials, in the exercise of their power and authority,
under limitations and restraints… forever secured the people, their persons, houses, papers and effects against all
unreasonable searches and seizures under the guise of law.

On evidence unconstitutionally seized: “If letters and private documents can thus be seized and held and used in evidence
against a citizen accused of an offense, the protection of the Fourth Am…is of no value, and, so far as those thus placed are
concerned, might as well be stricken from the Constitution.” Conviction by means of unlawful seizures and enforced confessions
should find no sanction in the judgment of the courts. All evide

Olmstead vs. US (1928): The striking outcome of the Weeks case was the sweeping declaration that the Fourth Am, although
not referring to or limiting the use of evidence in courts, really forbade its introduction if obtained by government officers through
a violation of the Amendment.

McNabb vs. US (1943): A conviction in the federal courts, the foundation of which is evidence obtained in disregard of liberties
deemed fundamental by the Constitution cannot stand.

Wolf vs. Colorado (1949): Despite declaring that the security of one’s privacy against arbitrary intrusion is implicit in the concept
of ordered liberty, the Court decided that the Weeks exclusionary rule would not then be imposed upon the States as “an
essential ingredient of the right”. The Court stated that it could not brush aside the experience of States regarding evidence.

Elkins vs. US (1960): The “silver platter” doctrine which allowed federal judges use of evidence seized in violation of the
Constitution by state agents was discarded. All evidence obtained by an unconstitutional search and seizure was inadmissible in
a federal court regardless of its source.

Issue: Whether or not all evidence obtained by searches and seizures in violation of the Constitution is admissible in a state
court.
 [CRIMPRO - Bautista] 13
[Camille Umali]

Held: The evidence obtained is inadmissible in a state court. Supreme Court of Ohio decision is reversed and remanded.

Ratio:

Since the Fourth Amendment’s right of privacy has been declared enforceable against the States through the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth, it is enforceable against them by the same sanction of exclusion as is used against the
Federal Government. Were it otherwise, the assurance against unreasonable federal searches and seizures would be “a form of
words,” valueless and undeserving of mention in a perpetual charter of inestimable human liberties, so too, without that rule the
freedom from state invasions of privacy would be so ephemeral and so neatly severed from its conceptual nexus with the
freedom from all brutish means of coercing evidence as not to merit this Court’s high regard as a freedom “implicit in the concept
of ordered liberty.”

In extending the substantive protections of due process to all constitutionally unreasonable searches—state or federal
—it was logically and constitutionally necessary that the exclusion doctrine—an essential part of the right to privacy—be also
insisted upon as an essential ingredient of the right. The admission of the right could not consistently tolerate denial of its most
important constitutional privilege, namely, the exclusion of the evidence which an accused had been forced to give by reason of
unlawful seizure. To hold otherwise is to grant the right but in reality to withhold its privilege and enjoyment.

Holding that the exclusionary rule is an essential part of both the Fourth and Fourteenth Am is not only the logical
dictate of prior cases but it also makes very good sense. There is no war between the Constitution and common sense. The
State, by admitting evidence unlawfully seized, serves to encourage disobedience to the Federal Constitution which it is bound
to uphold. Nothing can destroy a government more quickly than its failure to observe its own laws, or worse, its disregard of the
charter of its own existence. If the Government becomes a lawbreaker, it breeds contempt for law; it invites every man to
become a law unto himself; it invites anarchy.

Mr. Justice Black, concurring.

I am still not persuaded that the Fourth Am standing alone, would be enough to bar the introduction into evidence
against an accused of papers and effects seized from him in violation of its commands. The Fourth does not itself contain any
provision expressly precluding the use of such evidence. Reflection on the problem has led me to conclude that when the
Fourth’s ban against unreasonable searches and seizures is considered together with the Fifth Amendment’s ban against
compelled self-incrimination, a constitutional basis emerges which not only justifies but actually requires the exclusionary rule.

Mr. Justice Harlan, whom Mr. Justice Frankfurter and Mr. Justice Whittaker join, dissenting.

Justice Harlan's dissenting opinion argued that the majority had wrongly "reached out" to overrule Wolf, saying "[I] can
perceive no justification for regarding this case as an appropriate occasion for re-examining Wolf" and complaining that the issue
had not been properly briefed. The action of the Court finds no support in the rule that decision of Constitutional issues should
be avoided wherever possible. In overruling Wolf, the Court, instead of passing upon the validity of Ohio’s statute, has simply
chosen to between two Constitutional questions, namely privacy and free though and expression. Wolf did no more than
articulate the then existing assumption among States that the federal cases enforcing the exclusionary rule “do not bind the
States, for they construe provisions of the Federal Constitution, the Fourth and Fifth Amendments, not applicable to the States.”

“…I think this Court can increase respect for the Constitution only if it rigidly respects the limitations which the
Constitution places upon it and respects as well the principles inherent in its own processes. In the present case I think we
exceed both, and that our voice becomes only a voice of power, not of reason.”
Mislang, Arman
 [CRIMPRO - Bautista] 14
[Camille Umali]

People v. Alicando
December 12, 1995
Puno, J.

Nature: Automatic review of decision of RTC of Iloilo City

Facts:
 In afternoon of June 12, 1994, Romeo Penecilla, father of victim Khazie Mae, was drinking with 2 other person at his
house in Iloilo. Alicando joined them but would take leave and return every now and then. At around, 4:30, the group
stopped drinking.
 Alicando was living in his uncle’s house 5 arms length from Penecilla’s house.
 Rebada also lives in Penecilla’s neighborhood. At around 5:30, she saw the victim at the window of Alicando’s house.
She offered her “yemas” but Alicando closed the window. Soon she heard the girl crying. She peeped through an
opening in Alicando’s house and saw latter naked and on top of the victim. She was in fright and went to her house.
She informed Lagrana but the latter was also overcome and hastily left.
 Penecilla returned to his house but did not find Khazie Mae there. He and his wife searched unti 1am in the morning.
Rebada, who was aware that Penecillas were looking for their daughter, did not tell them of what she saw.
 In the morning, Santiago, another neighbor, discovered the lifeless body of Khazie Mae.
 Rebada also informed Penecilla that it was Alicando who committed the crime.
 Alicando was arrested. He verbally confessed his guilt without assistance of counsel. On the basis of such
uncounselled verbal confession, the police came to know and recovered from Alicando’s house the following pieces of
evidence: green slippers, gold earrings, buri mat, stained pillow, stained shirt. Such were presented as evidence for the
prosecution.
 Alicando plead guilty.
TC: Guilty – Rape with Homicide – death penalty ( electric chair/ gas poisoning)

Issue/Held: WON Trial court correctly convicted Alicando – NO

Ratio:
 Decision of TC is shot full of errors, both substantive and procedural. The conviction was based on amalgam of
inadmissible and incredible evidence.

1. ARRAIGNMENT – Null and Void

 Rule 116, Sec.1(a)
Section 1. Arraignment and plea; how made. - (a) The accused must be arraigned before the court where the complaint
or information was filed or assigned for trial. The arraignment shall be made in open court by the judge or clerk by
furnishing the accused with a copy of the complaint or information, reading the same in the language or dialect known
to him, and asking him whether he pleads guilty or not guilty. The prosecution may call at the trial witnesses other than
those named in the complaint or information.
 Records do not reveal that the information was read to appellant in language/dialect known to him.
 Information was written in English and it is not shown whether Alicando can understand English or that the information
was translated to him.
 Though there is a presumption that arraignment was regularly conducted. Such presumption cannot be used when life
is at stake. Court cannot lean on such rebuttable presumption.

2. PLEA OF GUILT – Null and void

 Rule 116, Sec. 3
Sec. 3. Plea of guilty to capital offense; reception of evidence. – When the accused pleads guilty to a capital offense,
the court shall conduct a searching inquiry into the voluntariness and full comprehension of the consequences of his
plea and shall require the prosecution to prove his guilt and the precise degree of culpability. The accused may present
evidence in his behalf.
 Trial judge inadequately discharge the duty of conducting a “searching inquiry”
 Plea of guilt must be free and informed. Trial judge must focus on:
(a) Voluntariness -
(b) Full comprehension
 Records does not show information about personality profile (age, socio-economic status, educational background) of
the accused which could serve as trustworthy index of his capacity to give free and informed plea of guilt. Questions
were in English and court did not bother to explain the elements of the crime.
 Also, trial court merely inquired if appellant had physical marks of maltreatment and disregards the record of events
showing that accused was mobbed by inmates and suffered hematoma.
3. EVIDENCE – inadmissible
 [CRIMPRO - Bautista] 15
[Camille Umali]

 They were inadmissible because they were gathered as a result of custodial interrogation where accused confessed
without the benefit of a counsel.
 Constitution has stigmatized as inadmissible uncounselled confession or admission.
 Also, evidence derived from such uncounselled confession is inadmissible.
FRUITS OF POISONOUS TREE (J. Frankfurter in Nardone v US)
 Once the primary source (the tree) is shown to have been unlawfully obtained, any secondary or derivative evidence
(the fruit) derived from it is inadmissible.
 The rule is based on principle that evidence illegally obtained by the state should not be used to gain other evidence
because the originally illegally obtained evidence taints all evidence subsequently obtained.

 Assuming in arguendo that evidence were admissible, trial court still erred in holding that they strongly corroborated the
testimony of Rebada. There is no basis for the court to conclude this because the pieces of evidence were no
examined by expert.

 The prosecution has the burden of proving that accused waived his right to remain silent and to counsel. Such waiver
must be in writing and in presence of a counsel.
Dispositive: Remanded for further proceedings

Kapunan, Dissenting
 It is not necessary that all evidence is fruit of poisonous tree.
 The more appropriate question is whether the evidence to which the objection is made would not have been discovered
anyway by sources or procedures independently of the illegality.
 Exception should be made when evidence in question would have been inevitably discovered under normal conditions.
 [CRIMPRO - Bautista] 16
[Camille Umali]

People v Januario
Date: February 7, 1997
Ponente: Panaganiban, J
Nature: Appeal directly from RTC Tagaytay branch 18
One liner: In a case where the main evidence relied upon for the conviction of the accused was their own extrajudicial
confessions which admittedly were extracted and signed in the presence and with the assistance of a lawyer who was applying
for work in that investigating body(in this case the NBI), such counsel cannot be considered “independent”.

Facts:
Rene Januario, and Efren Canape and their co-accused Santiago Cid, Eliseo Sarita aka Toto, and Eduardo Sarinos
aka Digos were charged with violation of RA 6539 (Anti-carnapping Law).
Allegedly the accused were responsible for the killing of the driver and conductor of the jeep, and the taking of the
Isuzu jeep.
Only Januario (J), Canape(C1), and Cid(C2) were apprehended while the other two remained at large. J, C1, and C2
were arrested in Camarines Sur, from the “oral investigation” they conducted at the City NBI office on March 27, 1988 the team
lerned that Sarita and Sarinos took Patriarca (conductor) and Malibago (driver) inside a sugar plantation where presumably they
were killed. Appellants volunteered that their companions were their neighbours in Paliparan, Dasmarinas, Cavite who could be
in Manila already, the NBI team decided to take down their statements at the NBI office in Manila. 1pm of march 28, 1988 they
arrived in Manila.
NBI HQ in Taft, the team took the statements of appellants one at a time. They asked Atty. Carlos Saunar, who was
“just around somewhere,” to assist appellants during the investigation. Agent Aris Vela took statement of J, Agent Toribio took
statement of C1.
Appellant J1 signed and thumbmarked his statement which was sworn before NBI Executive Director Salvador Ranin
and was also signed by Atty. Carlos Saunar as counsel. C1’s statement was signed and thumbmarked by him and sworn before
Agent Vela.
*note that these two statements states the participation of the two in the alleged carnapping and killing of the driver and
conductor.
RTC convicted J and C1. Acquitted C2.

Issue:
Relevant issue – W/N the extra-judicial confessions of the appellants are inadmissible in evidence for having been
extracted in violation of their constitutional right to counsel.

Held: extra-judicial confessions of the appellants are inadmissible.

Consti Art III Sec 12(1): “xxx competent and independent counsel preferably of his own choice.”
As for J, Atty. Saunar was not his choice and it was the NBI who requested the latter to assist J in the investigation
because he was just around, thus his competence was in doubt. A competent and independent lawyer is one who is willing to
fully safeguard the constitutional rights of the accused, as distinguished from one who would be merely giving a routine, and
peremptory and meaningless recital of the individual’s constitutional rights.
Assuming that Saunar’s competence is beyond question for C2, he could not have been the independent counsel
solemnly spoken of by the Constitution. He was applicant for a position in the NBI and therefore it can never be said that his
loyalty was to the confessants. Saunar was actually employed by the NBI a few months later. C1 was merely told of his
constitutional rights and posthaste asked whether he was willing to confess, his affirmative answer may not, by any means, be
interpreted as a waiver of his right to counsel of his own choice.
Further, prior to the execution of the sworn statements at the NBI head office, appellants had already made verbal
admissions of complicity in the crime. Verbal admissions should also be made with the assistance of counsel. Their
uncounselled oral admissions in Naga City resulted in the execution of their written confessions in Manila. (fruit of the poisonous
tree)
What could have been valuable admissions and confessions as far as the prosecution was concerned were sullied and
rendered inadmissible by the irregular manner by which the law enforcement agents extracted such admissions and confessions
from appellants. Without such statements, the remaining prosecution evidence – hearsay testimonies and investigation reports –
is inadequate to prove appellants’ participation, hence they are acquitted.
 [CRIMPRO - Bautista] 17
[Camille Umali]

People vs. Samontañez

People of the Philippines vs Roberto Dela Vega Samontanez

Date: December 4, 2000
Ponente: De Leon, Jr.,J.
Doctrine: In the absence of a valid waiver, any confession obtained from the accused during police custodial investigation
relative to the crime, including any other evidence secured by virtue of the said confession is inadmissible in evidence even if
the same was not objected to during the trial by the counsel of the accused.

FACTS
 Nov. 25, 1995: Corazon delas Alas sent her 18 year old daughter, Lolita, to school. At 8pm of the same day, Lolita was
found lifeless and naked in the middle of a sugarcane plantation in Brgy. Bunducan, Nasugbu, Batangas. She apparently
raped and then strangled but nobody witnessed the actual commission of the crime.
 Police investigation reveals the ff: 1. Roberto Samontanez was seen at 630pm of that day coming out of the same
sugarcane plantation (as seen by Roberto and Lolita’s first cousin, Carlito); 2. 530 pm of the same day, Roberto was seen
heading to the sugarcane plantation and 30 minutes later Lolita was spotted heading towards the same direction (as seen by
Roberto’s uncle, Melecio); 3. 7pm, Roberto returned passing the same path along cane field.
 Nov. 28, 1995: Police fetched Roberto from his workplace (Hermogenes Trading in Cavite) and during investigation, he
admitted that Lolita’s belongings were in his bag at the office. The police then recovered said belongings (gold ring and wrist
watch).

ISSUE1
W/N the evidence (Lolita’s belongings) were admissible in court

HELD/RATIO
No. They are inadmissible in evidence for being the proverbial “fruit of a poisonous tree”. It appeared that when Roberto was
arrested, he was not informed of his constitutional rights (in accordance with ArtIII, Sec12(1) of 1987 Constitution) and was not
assisted by counsel during custodial investigation. In the absence of a valid waiver, any confession obtained in the custodial
investigation, including evidence secured by confession, is inadmissible. Lolita’s belongings were gathered after the police
illegally obtained a confession from Roberto and thus, such is inadmissible.

According to People vs Alicando: According to the “fruits of the poisonous tree”, once the primary source (tree) is shown to be
unlawfully obtained, any secondary or derivative (fruits) derived from it is also inadmissible.

1
I didn’t include the other issues (plea of guilty, witnesses, etc). I only focused on the fruits of poisonous tree doctrine kasi sa
syllabus, dun under yung case 
 [CRIMPRO - Bautista] 18
[Camille Umali]

3. Anti-Wiretapping Law

Gaanan v IAC (1986)

EDGARDO A. GAANAN, petitioner, vs. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
respondents. | Gutierrez Jr, J .:

Facts: Complainant Atty. Tito Pintor and his client Manuel Montebon discussed the terms for the withdrawal of the complaint for
direct assault which they filed against Leonardo Laconico. After they had decided on the proposed conditions, complainant
made a telephone call to Laconico. In turn, Laconico telephoned appellant Atty. Gaanan to come to his office and advise him on
the settlement. Appellant went to the office of Laconico. When complainant called up, Laconico requested appellant to secretly
listen to the telephone conversation through a telephone extension so as to hear personally the proposed conditions for the
settlement. Appellant heard complainant enumerate the conditions for withdrawal of case against Laconico. Complainant called
up again and instructed Laconico to give the money to his wife. Laconico who earlier alerted his friend Colonel Zulueta of the
Philippine Constabulary, insisted that complainant himself should receive the money. When he received the money at the Igloo
Restaurant, complainant was arrested by agents of the PC. Appellant executed on the following day an affidavit stating that he
heard complainant demand P8,000.00 for the withdrawal of the case for direct assault. Laconico filed a case against
complainant Atty. Pintor for extortion/robbery and submitted the affidavit of appellant. Since appellant listened to the telephone
conversation without complainant's consent, complainant charged appellant and Laconico with violation of the Anti-Wiretapping
Act.

The lower court found both Gaanan and Laconico guilty of violating Section 1 of Anti-Wiretapping Act. The IAC affirmed the
decision of the trial court, holding among others that the extension telephone which was used by the petitioner to overhear the
telephone conversation between complainant and Laconico is covered in the term "device' as provided in Rep. Act No. 4200.

Issue: Whether or not an extension telephone is among the prohibited devices in Section 1 of the Act, such that its use to
overhear a private conversation would constitute unlawful interception of communications between the two parties using a
telephone line. [No, an extension telephone is not among the prohibited devices. Aquitted.]

Held/Ratio: The petitioner contends that telephones or extension telephones are not included in the enumeration of "commonly
known" listening or recording devices, nor do they belong to the same class of enumerated electronic devices contemplated by
law. SC stated that the law refers to a "tap" of a wire or cable or the use of a "device or arrangement" for the purpose of
secretly overhearing, intercepting, or recording the communication. There must be either a physical interruption through a
wiretap or the deliberate installation of a device or arrangement in order to overhear, intercept, or record the spoken words. An
extension telephone cannot be placed in the same category as a dictaphone, dictagraph or the other devices
enumerated in Section 1 of RA No. 4200 as the use thereof cannot be considered as "tapping" the wire or cable of a
telephone line. The telephone extension in this case was not installed for that purpose.

Hence, the phrase "device or arrangement" in Section 1, although not exclusive to that enumerated therein, should be construed
to comprehend instruments of the same or similar nature, that is, instruments the use of which would be tantamount to tapping
the main line of a telephone. It refers to instruments whose installation or presence cannot be presumed by the party or
parties being overheard because, by their very nature, they are not of common usage and their purpose is precisely for
tapping, intercepting or recording a telephone conversation. An extension telephone is an instrument which is very
common.

It can be readily seen that our lawmakers intended to discourage, through punishment, persons such as government authorities
or representatives of organized groups from installing devices in order to gather evidence for use in court or to intimidate,
blackmail or gain some unwarranted advantage over the telephone users.

Consequently, the mere act of listening, in order to be punishable must strictly be with the use of the enumerated devices in RA
No. 4200 or others of similar nature. The petitioner is hereby ACQUITTED of the crime of violation of Rep. Act No. 4200,
otherwise known as the Anti-Wiretapping Act.
 [CRIMPRO - Bautista] 19
[Camille Umali]

KATZ V. US
Charles Katz, petitioner vs. United States

Date: December 18, 1967

Ponente: Mr. Justice Stewart

Facts:
 Charles Katz was convicted in the District Court for transmitting wagering information by telephone (public pay phones)
from Los Angeles to Miami and Boston in violation of a federal statute.
 During the trial, the District Court allowed the Government to introduce evidence of Katz’s telephone conversations,
overheard by FBI agents who had attached an electronic listening and recording device to the outside of the public
telephone booth from which he placed his calls.
 The Court of Appeals affirmed his conviction and rejected his contention that the recordings had been obtained in violation
of the Fourth Amendment.

Issues:
(1) Whether or not the right to privacy under the Fourth Amendment extends to public telephone booths
(2) Whether or not physical intrusion is necessary to constitute a search
(3) Whether or not the search and seizure conducted in this case complied with constitutional standards

Held/Ratio:
(1) Yes, the right to privacy extends to public telephone booths because they are places in which people have “a reasonable
expectation of privacy”.
 Even though public telephone booths are constructed partly of glass so that the person inside it is as visible after he entered
it as he would have if he remained outside, what the person sought to exclude when he entered the booth was not the
intruding eye – it was the uninvited ear. A person who occupies a public telephone booth, shuts the door behind him, and
pays the toll that permits him to place a call is surely entitled to assume that the words he utters into the mouthpiece will not
be broadcast to the world.
 The Court also emphasizes that the Fourth Amendment protects people, not places.

(2) No, physical intrusion is not necessary.

 The Court reiterated that it has abandoned the doctrine in Olmstead v. United States where searches and seizures were
limited only to tangible property. Instead, the controlling view at present is that the Fourth Amendment governs not only the
seizure of tangible items, but extends as well to the recording of oral statements overheard without any “technical trespass
under. . . local property law” (Silverman v. United States).
 The Government’s activities in electronically listening to and recording the petitioner’s words violated the privacy upon
which he justifiably relied while using the telephone booth and thus constituted a “search and seizure” within the meaning of
the Fourth Amendment. The fact that the electronic device employed did not happen to penetrate the wall of the booth is
immaterial and it can have no constitutional significance.

(3) No, the search conducted in the case at bar violates the constitutional standards.
 The Government claims that its agents acted in an entirely defensible manner: they did not begin their electronic
surveillance until investigation of petitioner’s activities had established a strong probability that he was using the telephone
in question to transmit gambling information; the surveillance was limited, both in scope and in duration, to the specific
purpose of establishing the contents of his unlawful telephone conversations and confined during the brief periods during
which he used the telephone booth.
 Although the government agents acted with restraint, the fact of the matter is that the restraint was imposed by the agents
themselves, not by the judicial officer. They were not required to present their estimate of probable cause and were not
compelled to observe precise limits established in advance by a specific court order. Because of the absence of such
safeguards, the search conducted was unlawful.
 The Court also reiterated that searches conducted outside the judicial process, without prior approval by a judge or
magistrate, are per se unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment, subject only to a few exceptions.

Mr. Justice Harlan, concurring:

 Justice Harlan joins the opinion of the Court in holding that: (a) an enclosed telephone booth is an area where, like a home,
a person has a constitutionally protected reasonable expectation of privacy; (b) electronic as well as physical intrusion into a
into a place that is in this sense private may constitute a violation of the Fourth Amendment; and (c) that the invasion of a
constitutionally protected area by federal authorities is, as the Court long held, presumptively unreasonable in the absence
of a search warrant.
 Twofold Requirement:
(1) A person has exhibited an actual (subjective) expectation of privacy; and
(2) That the expectation be one that society is prepared to recognize as “reasonable”
 [CRIMPRO - Bautista] 20
[Camille Umali]

 The point is not that the booth is “accessible to the public” at other times, but that it is a temporarily private place whose
momentary occupants’ expectations of freedom from intrusion are recognized as reasonable.

Mr. Justice Black, dissenting:

 His basic objection is twofold:
(1) He does not believe that the words of the Amendment will bear the meaning given them by today’s decision
(2) He does not believe that it is the proper role of this Court to rewrite the Amendment in order “to bring it into harmony
with the times” and thus reach a result that many people believe to be desirable
 The language of the Amendment is the crucial place to look in construing a written document such as our Constitution. The
first clause of the Fourth Amendment which protects “persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable
searches and seizures” connote the idea of tangible things with size, form, weight, things capable of being searched,
seized, or both. The second clause further establishes its Framers’ purpose to limit its protection to tangible things by
providing that no warrants shall issue but those “particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things
to be seized”. A conversation overheard by eavesdropping is not tangible and can neither be searched nor seized. Aside
from this, the second clause indicates that the Amendment refers not only to something tangible so it can be seized but to
something already in existence so it can be described.
 Eavesdropping (wiretapping is nothing more than eavesdropping by telephone) was an ancient practice which at common
law was condemned as nuisance. In those days, the eavesdropper listened by naked ear under the eaves of houses or their
windows, or beyond their walls seeking out private discourse. There can be no doubt that the framers were aware of this
practice, and if they had desired to outlaw or restrict the use of evidence obtained by eavesdropping, then they have used
the appropriate language to do so in the Fourth Amendment.
 [CRIMPRO - Bautista] 21
[Camille Umali]

United States vs. White

Legal Doctrine:
Neither wiretapping nor electronic eavesdropping violated a defendant’s Fourth Amendment rights ‘unless there has
been an official search and seizure of his person, or such a seizure of his paper or his tangible material effects, or an actual
physical invasion of his for the purpose of making a seizure.’

Facts:
Respondent James White was tried and convicted under two consolidated indictments charging various illegal
transactions in narcotics. Governmental agents were able to procure evidence against the defendant by means of monitoring
the frequency of a radio transmitter carried secretly by a governmental agent during his conversations with respondent.

Issue:
WON the Fourth Amendment bars from evidence the testimony of governmental agents who related certain
conversations which had occurred between defendant and a governmental agent by monitoring the frequency of a radio
transmitter carried by the latter and concealed on his person

Held/Ratio:
The Court held that the Government’s use of agents who themselves may reveal the contents of conversations with an
accused does not violate the Fourth Amendment. If the conduct and revelations of an agent operating without electronic
equipment do not invade the defendant’s constitutionally justifiable expectations of privacy, neither does a simultaneous
recording of the same conversations made by the agent or by others from transmissions received from the agent to whom the
defendant is talking and whose trustworthiness the defendant necessarily risks.
 [CRIMPRO - Bautista] 22
[Camille Umali]

Us v. Gonzales (2003)
Facts:
A Federal Express employee noticed something out of the ordinary about a package in the Brussels, Belgium warehouse. The
parcel was addressed to Dr. Miller at Kaiser Permanente Medical Center in Bellflower, California. The parcel turned out to
contain ecstasy tablets concealed in video cassette boxes instead of the indiciation MDMA or materials concerning a physician
with a master's degree. tHUS, the Belgium Customs notified the US Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) Belgium Country
Office about the matter and the Los Angeles Field Dividion of DEA agreed to conduct the requested controlled delivery at Kaiser.
The DEA obtained a waarrant to install into the parcel an electronic tracking device an an agent alert device which would emit a
signal when the parcel was opened. However, no warrant was sought for the audovisual equipment the DEA intended to use to
surveil the mailroom. DEA Agent Reuter argued that there was no need for a warrant since the mailroom was a quasi-public
room in which hospital employees did not possess a reasonable expectation of privacy. DEA installeda covert video camera in
the mailroom. When the package was delivered, the clerk Jesse Standifer accepted the package then defendant Jesus Dario
Gonzales approached Standifer 30 minutes later. They both took the package to the rear of the mailroom, placed it on a pallet
marked "other deliveries" yet set apart, and it was shown in the video that Gonzales was ecstatic clapping his hands. Fifteen
minutes later, Gomzales was informed that DEA wished to speak with him. He was shown the video tape but he claimed that his
reaction was just due to the unusual shape of the parcel. DEA agents became suspicious because the parcel was just
conventional. Gonzales was then advised of his Miranda rights.

Issue/Held: Whether the videotape is admissible in evidence on the ground that it was obtained without a warrant in violation of
his Fourt Amendment Rights? Yes, admissible in evidence

Ratio:
A person'scapacitry to calim the protection of the Fourth Amendment depends upon whether the person who claims the
protection of the Amendment has a legitimate expectation of privacy in the invaded place. Here, the space was a large quasi-
public room at a public hospital durinbg ordinary business hours. The mailroom has two doors , one that opens into the interior
of the hospital, and a large loading bay door. Both doors remain open throughout the business day. The room also has large
windows through which the room is visible from the outside. It is accessed frequently by at least 50 hospital employees and it is
open to any of the hospital's 800 employees who are permitted to deliver or retrieve packages. Gonzales did not have the
means or authority to exclude others from premises. Between the time the package was sent to the mailroom and when
Gonzales arrived, nine people can be seen in the videotape entering thhe mailroom. During the time Gonzales and Standifer
were in the mailroom, three other individuals were peresent in the room for various lengths of time.

It was held that property used for commercial purposes is treated differently from residential property and although an individual
can have a legitimate expectation of privacy in a commercial area, that legitimate expectation is less than one would have while
on a residential property. Public hospitals by their nature are institutions not only accessible to the community but places in
which the needs of security and treatment create a diminished expectation of privacy. The use of surveiullance cameras in
hospitals for patient protection, for documentation of medical procedures and to prevent theft of prescription drugs is not
uncommon. Of course, one may have an obejectively reasonable expectation of privacy in private work areas given over to an
employee for eclsuivce use buit in the situation of Gonzales, he is a privat orderly, not given private work space and he chose to
conduct his criminal activity in a public area.

The fact that the surveillance was conducted by video camera does not render the eevidence inadmissible. Video surveillancd
does not in itself violate a reasonable expectation of privacy. Videotaping of suspects in public places such as in this case, the
mailroom of a community hospital cdoes not violate the fourth amendment. The police may record what they can normally view
with the naked eye. Defendant had no objectively reasonable expectation of privacy that would preclude video surveillance of
activities already visible to the public.
 [CRIMPRO - Bautista] 23
[Camille Umali]

II. Search & Seizure – Rule 126

A. Const, Art. III, Secs. 2 and 3

B. Statutes/ Rules
1. RPC, Arts. 129-130
2. Tariff and Customs Code, Secs. 2201- 2212,2301-2304
3. RA 6235 (1971), Sec. 9

C. Cases
1. Generally

HARRY S. STONEHILL, ROBERT P. BROOKS, JOHN J. BROOKS and KARL BECK, petitioners, vs. HON. JOSE W.
DIOKNO, in his capacity as SECRETARY OF JUSTICE; JOSE LUKBAN, in his capacity as Acting Director, National
Bureau of Investigation; SPECIAL PROSECUTORS PEDRO D. CENZON, EFREN I. PLANA and MANUEL VILLAREAL JR.,
and ASST. FISCAL MANASES G. REYES; JUDGE AMADO ROAN, Municipal Court of Manila; JUDGE ROMAN CANSINO,
Municipal Court of Manila; JUDGE HERMOGENE CALUAG, Court of First Instance of Rizal-Quezon City Branch, and
JUDGE DAMIAN JIMENEZ, Municipal Court of Quezon City, respondents.

Doctrine: The right of privacy guarantees the privilege of exclusion of evidence obtained through unreasonable searches and
seizures. The exclusionary principle is a way of suppressing the evil brought about by the unreasonable searches and seizures.
Nature: Original action in the Supreme Court. Certiorari, prohibition, mandamus and injunction.
Date: June 19, 1967
Ponente: Concepcion, C.J.

Facts:
 Herein Respondent-Prosecutors and Respondent-Judges issued on different dates, a total of 42 search warrants against
petitioners herein and/or the corporations of which they were officers, directed to any peace officer, to search the persons
above-named and/or the premises of their offices, warehouses and/or residences, and to seize and take possession of the
following personal property:

“Books of accounts, financial records, vouchers, correspondence, receipts, ledgers, journals, portfolios, credit
journals, typewriters and other documents and/or papers showing all business transactions xxx”

as the subject of the offense; stolen or embezzled and proceeds or fruits of the offense, or used or intended to be used as
the means of committing the offense, which is described as violation of Central Bank Laws, Tariff and Custom Laws, Internal
Revenue Code and the Revised Penal Code.
 March 20, 1962 — Petitioners filed with the SC this original action for certiorari, prohibition, mandamus and injunction,
alleging that the aforementioned search warrants are null and void, as contravening the Constitution and the Rules of Court
because: 1) they do not describe with particularity the documents to be seized; 2) cash money not mentioned in the
warrants were seized; 3) the warrants were issued to fish evidence against the petitioners in deportation cases filed against
them; 4) the searches and seizures were made in an illegal manner; and 5) the documents, papers, cash seized were not
delivered to the courts that issued the warrants. Petitioners also prayed for writ of preliminary injunction to restrain
Respondent-Prosecutors from using the effects seized in the deportation cases referred to.
 Respondent-Prosecutors alleged that 1)the search warrants are valid and in accordance with law; 2) that the defects of said
warrants were cured by petitioners’ consent; and 3) the effects seized are admissible as evidence against petitioners
regardless of the illegality of the seizures.
 March 22, 1962 — SC issued the writ of preliminary injunction however, on June 29, 1962, the writ was lifted insofar as
papers etc seized from the offices of the corporations above are concerned; but the injunction was maintained as regards
the papers etc seized from the residences of petitioners.

Issues: 1) Whether the search warrants in question, and the searches and seizures made under the authority thereof are valid
or not. 2) If the answer to the preceding question is negative, whether said documents may be used in evidence against
petitioners.

Held: The search warrants are invalid. Therefore, the documents seized are inadmissible in evidence.

Ratio:

The Constitution guarantees that “the right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects
against unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be violated, and no warrants shall issue bit upon probable
cause to be determined by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the
 [CRIMPRO - Bautista] 24
[Camille Umali]

witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be
seized.

Two points must be stressed in connection with this mandate namely: 1) that no warrant shall issue but upon probable
cause, to be determined by the judge in the manner set forth in said provision; and 2) that the warrant shall particularly describe
the things to be seized. None of these requirements has been complied with in the contested warrants. No specific offense had
been alleged in the said applications. The averments thereof with respect to the offense were abstract. As a consequence, it is
impossible for the judge who issued the warrants to have found the existence of a probable cause, for the same presupposes
the introduction of competent proof that the party against whom it is sought has performed particular acts or committed specific
omissions, violating a given provision of our criminal laws.
To uphold the validity of the warrants in question would be to wipe out completely one of the most fundamental rights
guaranteed in our Constitution, for it would place the sanctity of the domicile and the privacy of communication and
correspondence at the mercy of the whims, caprice or passion of peace officers. Such is the seriousness of the irregularities
committed in connection with the disputed search warrants that the SC deemed it fit to amend Sec 3 Rule 122 of the former
Rules of Court by providing in the Revised Rules of Court that “a search warrant shall not issue but upon probable cause in
connection with one specific offense.” The court then added another paragraph directing that “no search warrant shall issue for
more than one specific offense.”
Moncada Doctrine: even if the searches and seizures under consideration were unconstitutional, the documents,
papers and things seized are admissible in evidence. This is inconsistent with the constitutional guarantee and the privilege of
exclusion guaranteed under the right of privacy.
The court held the doctrine adopted in the Moncada case must be abandoned and that the warrants for the search of
three residences of petitioners are null and void; that the searches and seizures made therein are illegal and that the writ of
preliminary injunction are hereby made permanent.

Castro, J., concurring and dissenting:

Justice Castro’s main dissent concerns the position taken by Chief Justice Roberto Concepcion as regards to whether
the petitioners have legal standing to move for the suppression of the documents, papers and effects seized in the places other
than the three residences. The opinion written by C.J. Concepcion refrained from expressly declaring as null and void the search
warrants served at such places and left the matter open for determination in appropriate cases in the future.

The passions and prejudices generated by the environmental, political and moral developments of this case should not
deter the Court from forthrightly laying down the law not only for this case but for future ones as well. All the search warrants in
this case are admittedly general, blanket and roving warrants and are therefore outlawed by the Constitution; and the searches
and seizures made were therefore unlawful.
No inference can be drawn from the words of the Constitution that legal standing or lack of it is a determinant of the
nullity or validity of a search warrant or of the lawlessness or illegality of a search or seizure. Since Article III Section 1
Paragraph 3 is taken almost verbatim from the Fourth amendment, the interpretation of our courts of the same should regard as
doctrinal the pronouncement made by the federal courts.
US jurisprudence on standing to move for the suppression or return of documents, papers and effects which are the
fruits of an unlawful search and seizure may be summarized as 1) ownership of documents, papers and effects gives standing;
2) ownership/control or possession of premises searched gives standing; and 3) the aggrieved person doctrine where the
search warrant and the sworn application for search warrant are primarily directed solely and exclusively against the aggrieved
person, gives standing.
Ownership of matters seized gives standing.

Ownership of the properties seized alone entitles the petitioners to bring a motion to return and suppress, and gives
them standing as persons aggrieved by an unlawful search and seizure regardless of their location at the time of seizure.
Control of premises searched gives standing.
Independent of ownership or other personal interest in the records and documents seized, the petitioners have
standing to move for return and suppression by virtue of their proprietary or leasehold interest in many of the premises
searched. It has never been held that a person with requisite interest in the premises searched must own the property seized in
order to have standing in a motion to return and suppress.
Aggrieved person doctrine where the search warrant is primarily directed against said person gives standing.
Possession (actual or constructive), no less than ownership, gives standing to move to suppress. Many personal and
corporate papers were seized from premises not petitioners’ family residences; as in US v Birrell, the searches were primarily
directed solely and exclusively against the petitioners.
Mislang, Arman
 [CRIMPRO - Bautista] 25
[Camille Umali]

Burgos Sr. v. Chief of Staff, AFP

December 26, 1984
Escolin, J.

Nature: Petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus with preliminary mandatory and prohibitory injunction to review the
validity of the issued search warrants by judge of CFI of Rizal (Quezon City)
Facts:
 2 search warrants were issued on Dec. 7, 1982 by Respondent-judge Ernani Cruz-Pano of CFI of Rizal (Quezon City)
under which premises of Metropolitan Mail and We Forum newspapers in Proj.6 Quezon city and Quezon Ave., Quezon City
respectively, were searched and the following were seized:
- Office/printing machines, equipments, paraphernalia
- Motor vehicles
- Other articles used in printing, publication and distribution
- Numerous papers, documents, books and other written literature alleged to be in possession and control of petitioner,
Jose Burgos jr. (publisher-editor) of We Forum.

Issue/Held: WON the search warrants issued were valid – NO, Null and void
Ratio:
Petitioner Court
1. Failure to conduct an examination under oath or moot and academic, petitioner conceded that there has been an
affirmation of the applicant and his witnesses examination conducted
2. 2 search warrants pinpointed only one place merely typographical error, 2 search warrants were applied for and
where Burgos Jr. was allegedly keeping and issued precisely to search 2 distinct premises
concealing the articles
3. Although search warrants were directed against Rule 126, Sec.2 of ROC* does not require that the property to be
Jose Burgos Jr. alone, articles belonging to his co- seized should be owned by the person against whom the search
petitioners Burgos Sr., Soriano and [Link] warrant is directed.
Media Services Inc. were seized.  Ownership is of no consequence and it is sufficient that the
person to whom warrant was issued has control or possession
of properties sought to be seized.
4. Real properties were seized. Davao Sawmill v Castillo: machinery which is movable by nature
becomes immobilized when placed by the owner of the tenement,
property or plant, but not so when placed by a tenant, usufructuary,
or any other person having only a temporary right, unless such
person acted as the agent of the owner.
 Petitioners are not owners of land/building on which the
properties were placed. Thus, machineries remain movable
property susceptible to seizure under a search warrant.
5. The documents (such as joint affidavits of  The application and/or its supporting affidavits must contain a
members of Metrocom Intelligence who conducted specification, stating with particularity the alleged subversive
surveillance) could not have provided sufficient material he has published or is intending to publish. Mere
basis for finding of probable cause upon which a generalization will not suffice.
warrant may validly issue.  Statement of Col. Abadilla that petitioner is in possession of
Probable cause - such facts and circumstances which equipment, paraphernalia, etc. which were used and are all
would lead a reasonably discreet and prudent man to continuously being used asa means of committing offense of
believe that an offense has been committed and that subversion is a mere conclusion of law and does not satisfy
the objects sought in connection with the offense are in requirements of probable cause.
the place sought to be searched

 Search warrants issued were in the nature of general warrants akin to that in Stanford v. Texas. In Stanford case, the
warrants which authorized the search for "books, records, pamphlets, cards, receipts, lists, memoranda, pictures,
recordings and other written instruments concerning the Communist Party in Texas," was declared void by the U.S.
Supreme Court for being too general. The description of the articles sought to be seized under the search warrants in
question cannot be characterized differently.

*Rule 126, Sec. 3: Personal property to be seized. – A search warrant may be issued for the search and seizure of personal
property:
(a) Subject of the offense;
(b) Stolen or embezzled and other proceeds, or fruits of the offense; or
(c) Used or intended to be used as the means of committing an offense.
 [CRIMPRO - Bautista] 26
[Camille Umali]

People v Marti
Date: January 18, 1991
Ponente: Bidin, J
Nature: Appeal directly from RTC Manila branch 49
One liner: Bill of rights is not meant to be invoked against acts of private individuals.

Facts:
Andre Marti sent 4 packages to Walter Fierz in Zurich, Switzerland thru Manila Packing and Export Forwarders. Anita
Reyes, the proprietress of the forwarding company, asked if she could examine and inspect the packages, which accused
refused and assured her that its contents were books, cigars, and gloves. Anita did not insist on inspecting and the packages
were placed inside a brown box.
Before delivery of the appellant’s box to the Bureau of Customs and/or Bureau of Posts, Mr. And Mrs. Reyes, following
SOP, opened the boxes for final inspection. Mr. Reyes became curious of the peculiar odor emitted from the box, he squeezed
the bundle allegedly containing gloves and felt dry leaves. He took samples of the contents and prepared a letter reporting the
shipment to the NBI and requesting a laboratory examination of the samples.
Chief of narcotics section in NBI interviewed him, and he informed the NBI that the rest of the shipment was still in his
office. 3 NBI agents and a photographer accompanied him to his office.
Mr. Reyes brought out the box, and in the presence of the NBI agents, he opened the box, and dried marijuana leaves
were found to have been contained inside the cellophane [Link] agents took charge of the box after signing a receipt
acknowledging custody of the said effects.
The forensic chemist certified that the dried leaves were marijuana flowering tops.
RTC convicted Marti of violating RA 6425 (Dangerous Drugs Act*) *repealed law RA 9165 na in effect

Issue:
Relevant issue – may an act of a private individual, allegedly in violation of appellant’s constitutional rights, be invoked
as against the State?

Held:
No, absence of governmental interference, the liberties guaranteed by the Constitution cannot be invoked against the
State. It was Mr. Job Reyes the proprietor of the forwarding company, who made search/inspection of the packages. Such
inspection was reasonable and a SOP on the part of Mr. Reyes as a precautionary measure before delivery to the Bureau of
Customs or Bureau of Posts.
The NBI agents made no search and seizure. Merely to observe and look at that which is in plain sight is not a search,
having observed that which is open, where no trespass has been committed in aid thereof is not search.
The Constitutional proscription against unlawful searches and seizures applies as a restraint only against the
government and its agencies tasked with the enforcement of law.
If the search is made upon the request of the law enforcers, a warrant must generally be first secured, however if the
search is made at the behest or initiative of the proprietor of a private establishment for its own and private purposes, as in this
case, the right against unreasonable search and seizure cannot be invoked for only the act of private individual, not the law
enforcers, is involved.
The protection against unreasonable searches and seizures cannot be extended to acts committed by private
individuals so as to bring it within the ambit of alleged unlawful intrusion by the government.
 [CRIMPRO - Bautista] 27
[Camille Umali]

People vs. Bangcarawan

People of the Philippines vs Basher Macarambon Bsngcarawan
Date: July 11, 2002
Ponente: Puno,J.
Doctrine: The constitutional proscription against unlawful searches and seizures applies as a restraint directed only against the
government and its agencies tasked with the enforcement of the law.

FACTS
 March 11, 1999: Basher met Alex Macapudi (neighbor) in Quiapo and was requested by Alex to bring with him on his
trip Alex’s Samsonite suitcase containing sunglasses and watches to give to Alex’s brother. Bashe boarded MV Super Ferry5
(going to Iligan) carrying a big luggage full of clothes, a small maleta containing sunglasses and brushes he bought in Manila,
and Alex’s Samsonite bag.
 March 13, 1999: 5 members of the vessel security force and a woman co-passenger approached Basher and accused
him of stealing the woman’s jewelry. He voluntarily went with them, was frisked, and retrieved his bags for inspection (he left
his small maleta because he feared that security personnel might confiscate his expensive sunglasses and brushes). He
opened the big luggage but refused to open the Samsonite because it was locked, he didn’t know the combination, and it
wasn’t his. Security forcibly opened it and found packs of shabu inside. Security then turned this over to the Phil. Coast
Guard.

ISSUE
- W/N drug confiscated is admissible in evidence against Basher
- W/N Basher can be held to be the owner of the confiscated items

HELD/RATIO
- Yes, it is admissible. Basher contends that there was unlawful search and seizure thus the evidence is inadmissible but the
Court held that such constitutional proscription against unlawful search and seizure applies as a restraint directed only against
the government and its agencies tasked with the enforcement of the law. In this case, vessel security personnel were the ones
who searched Basher’s bags. Vessel security personnel are private employees and do not discharge any governmental function,
thus the constitutional protection against unreasonable search and seizure cannot apply as there was no government
intervention.
- Yes, Basher can be held as owner. In prosecution for illegal possession of dangerous drugs, ff must be proven beyond
reasonable doubt: 1. accuse is in possession of object identified as prohibited/regulated drug; 2. possession is not authorized by
law; 3. accused freely and consciously possessed said drug. First 2 elements are clearly present. Third element is present since
US vs Tan Misa concludes that knowledgeable possession must be that wherein there is animus possidendi (wherein
possession of drug is prima facie evidence of knowledge or animus possidendi and burden to explain such possession shifts to
the accused). With regard to the 3rd element, Basher was not able to explain possession of the drugs. Mere denial of ownership
is not enough. The things in possession of a person are presumed by law to be owned by him. To overcome this presumption, it
is necessary to present clear and convincing evidence to the contrary.
 [CRIMPRO - Bautista] 28
[Camille Umali]

2. Procedure for issuance of a search warrant

Pendon v. CA
(citations only)
According to the foregoing provisions, a search warrant can be issued only upon a finding of probable cause. Probable cause
means such facts and circumstances which would lead a reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe that an offense has
been committed and that the objects sought in connection with the offense are in the place sought to be searched.- People of
the Phils. v Choi (2006) citing Pendon v CA

In determining the existence of probable cause for the issuance of a search warrant, the examining magistrate must make
probing and exhaustive, not merely routine or pro forma examination of the applicant and the witnesses. - Nala v Barroso (2003)
citing Pendon v CA

The Court, in Pendon v. Court of Appeals, reiterated the requirements of Section 2 on the issuance of search warrants, which
judges must strictly observe, as follows:
Under the above provision, the issuance of a search warrant is justified only upon a finding of probable cause. x x x In
determining the existence of probable cause, it is required that: (1) the judge x x x must examine the x x x witnesses personally;
(2) the examination must be under oath; and (3) the examination must be reduced to writing in the form of searching questions
and answers. (Emphasis supplied) - Chu v Tamin (2003) citing Pendon v CA
 [CRIMPRO - Bautista] 29
[Camille Umali]

Silva v. Hon. Presiding Judge Of Rtc Negros Oriental

Nicomedes Silva @ “Comedes”, Marlon Silva @ “Tama”, and Antonieta Silva, petitioners, vs. The Honorable Presiding Judge,
Regional Trial Court of Negros Oriental, Branch XXXIII, Dumaguete City, respondent.

Nature: Special civil action for certiorari

Date: October 21, 1991
Ponente: Fernan, C. J.
Doctrine: In issuing a search warrant, the judge must strictly comply with the constitutional and statutory requirement that he
must determine the existence of probable cause by personally examining the applicant and his witnesses in the form of
searching questions and answers.

Facts:
 June 13, 1986 – M/Sgt. Ranulfo Villamor, Jr. (chief of PC Narcom Detachment in Dumaguete City) filed an “Application for
Search Warrant” with the Regional Trial Court against petitioners Nicomedes Silva and Marlon Silva, and was also
accompanied by a “Deposition of Witness” executed by Pfc. Arthur Alcoran and Pat. Leon T. Quinto.
 Judge Nickarter A. Ontal (then Presiding Judge) issued Search Warrant No. 1 directing the police officers to search the
room of Marlon Silva in the residence of Nicomedes Silva for violation of RA 6425 (Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972).
 In the course of their search, the serving officers also seized money belonging to Antonieta Silva in the amount of
Php1,231.40.
 June 16, 1986 – Antonieta filed a motion for the return of the said amount on the grounds that the search warrant only
authorized the officers to seize marijuana dried leaves, cigarettes and joint, and that said officers failed or refused to make a
return of the said search warrant in violation of Section 11, Rule 126 of the ROC.
 July 28, 1987 – petitioners filed a motion to quash Search Warrant No.1 on the grounds that (1) it was issued on the sole
basis of a mimeographed “Application for Search Warrant” and “Deposition of Witness”, which were accomplished merely
by filling in the blanks; and (2) the judge failed to personally examine the complainant and witnesses in violation of Section
3, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court.

Issue:
Whether or not Search Warrant No. 1 is valid

Held/Ratio:
 No, Search Warrant No. 1 is null and void. Section 2, Article III of the 1987 Constitution guarantees the right to personal
liberty and security of homes against unreasonable searches and seizures. The purpose of this provision is to prevent
violations of private security in person and property, and unlawful invasion of the sanctity of the home by officers of the law
acting under legislative or judicial sanction and to give remedy against such usurpations when attempted.
 Sections 3 and 4, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court, provide for the requisites for the issuance of a search warrant
Sec. 3. Personal property to be seized. – A search warrant may be issued for the search and seizure of personal property:
(a) Subject of the offense;
(b) Stolen or embezzled and other proceeds, or fruits of the offense; or
(c) Used or intended to be used as the means of committing an offense.

Sec. 4. Requisites for issuing search warrant. – A search warrant shall not issue except upon probable cause in
connection with one specific offense to be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or
affirmation of the complainant and the witness he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and
the things to be seized which may be anywhere in the Philippines.

 Based on the abovementioned provisions, the judge must, before issuing a search warrant, determine whether there is
probable cause by examining the complainant and witnesses through searching questions and answers. In Prudente v.
Dayrit, “probable cause” was defined as: “as such facts and circumstances which would lead a reasonably discreet and
prudent man to believe that an offense has been committed, and that objects sought in connection with the offense are in
the place sought to be searched. This probable cause must be shown to be within the personal knowledge of the
complainant or the witnesses he may produce and not based on mere hearsay.”
 In the case at bar, the Court held that Judge Ontal failed to comply with the legal requirement that he must examine the
applicant and his witnesses in the form of searching questions and answers to determine the existence of probable cause.
Both the “Application for Search Warrant” and the “Deposition of Witness” contained suggestive answers answerable by
merely placing “yes” or “no”. Thus, in this case, the questions propounded by the Judge to the applicant’s witness are not
sufficiently searching to establish probable cause. Such failure on the part of Judge Ontal to comply with this requirement
constitutes grave abuse of discretion.
The officers implementing the search warrant clearly abused their authority when they seized the money of Antonieta Silva, who
was not even named as one of the respondents and that the warrant did not indicate the seizure of money but only of marijuana
leaves, cigarettes, and joints. Thus, Judge Ontal also abused his discretion when he rejected the motion of petitioner Antonieta
Silva seeking the return of her seized money.
 [CRIMPRO - Bautista] 30
[Camille Umali]

People v. Mamaril, 420 SCRA 662 (2004)

Appeal from a decision of the Regional Trial Court of Lingayen, Pangasinan

Azcuna, J.

FACTS:
 On January 25, 1999, the Intelligence Section PNCO of the Lingayen Police Station, represented by SPO2 Chito
Esmenda, applied before the RTC of Lingayen, Pangasinan, for a search warrant authorizing the search for marijuana
—a prohibited drug—at the family residence of the appellant Benhur Mamaril, in Lingayen Pangasinan.
 On the said day, presiding Executive Judge Eugenio Ramos issued Search Warrant 99-51.
 On February 1, 1999, at about 2:30 pm, the Chief of Police of the Lingayen Police Station, SPO3 Alfredo Rico, SPO4
Faustino Ferrer, Jr. and other police officers went to the residence of Mamaril.
 Upon arrival at Mamaril’s residence, they saw his mother under the house. The police officers asked her where Mamaril
was and she replied by saying that Mamaril was in the house, upstairs.
 When they went upstairs, they saw Mamaril coming out of the room. Upon seeing the police officers, Mamaril tried to
run towards the back door.
 SPO3 Rico told Mamaril to stop, which he did. Then, Mamaril was informed that they had a search warrant to search
the house premises.
 Mamaril and his mother were shown the search warrant. Mother and son looked at the search warrant but did not say
anything.
 The police then searched the house. There were two witnesses during the search—Barangay Kagawad Leonardo
Ramos and Barangay Tanod Valentino Quintos, whom the police brought with them.
 The following items were confiscated:
1.) 55 heat-sealed plastic sachets containing suspected marijuana leaves found in a bayong under Mamaril’s house
2.) 3 heat-sealed plastic sachets containing suspected marijuana leaves and seeds found in an eye-glass case
3.) 22 heat-sealed plastic sachets containing suspected marijuana leaves and seeds taken under a pillow placed on a
monobloc chair
4.) 2 bricks of suspected marijuana contained in a white and grey bag found inside the closet of appellant’s room
Note: The total number of sachets is 78. In all, the marijuana in sachets weigh 263.83 grams. On the other hand, the
two bricks of marijuana fruiting tops weigh 1,600 grams.

 Pictures of the seized items were taken. A receipt for the seizure of the items was prepared. A certification that the
house was properly searched was signed by Mamaril and the two witnesses.
 On February 2, 2009, police officers Rico, Santiago and Madrid brought the confiscated articles to the crime laboratory
at Can Florendo, San Fernando, La Union for examination. Mamaril was also brought there for drug testing.
 The specimens were tested by Police Superintendent Ma. Theresa Ann Bugayon Cid, forensic chemist and head of the
PNP crime lab Region I.
 Cid found that the specimens were positive for the presence of marijuana. Likewise, Mamaril was found positive for the
presence of metamphetamine hypochloride, known as shabu.

ISSUE:

WON the trial court erred in not declaring as inadmissible in evidence the articles allegedly seized from accused-
appellant, considering that search warrant No. 99-51 was illegally issued.

HELD/RATIO:

The Court finds that the requirement mandated by the law that the examination of the complainant and his witnesses must be
under oath and reduced to writing in the form of searching questions was not complied with, rendering the search warrant
invalid. Consequently, the evidence seized, pursuant to said illegal search warrant cannot be used in evidence against Mamaril,
in accordance with Section 3(2), Article III of the Constitution.

The right against unreasonable searches and seizures is guaranteed under Article III, Section 2 of the Constitution. Said
provision is also implemented under Rule 126 of the Rules of Court.

The said provisions says that the issuance of a search warrant is justified only upon finding of a probable cause. Probable cause
for a search has been defined as such facts and circumstances which would lead a reasonably discreet and prudent man to
believe that an offense has been committed and that the objects sought in connection with the offense are in the place sought to
be searched. In determining the existence of probable cause, it is required that:
1. the judge must examine the complainant and his witnesses personally.
2. the examination must be under oath
3. the examination must be reduced in writing in the form of searching questions and answers.
 [CRIMPRO - Bautista] 31
[Camille Umali]

Attorney Enrico Castillo, Branch Clerk of Court, who was requested to testify on the records kept in their office regarding Search
Warrant No. 99-51, presented before the court only the application for search warrant and the supporting affidavits of PO3
Alberto Santiago and Diosdado Fernandez. Attorney Castillo could not produce the sworn statements of the complainant and his
witnesses showing that the judge examined them in the form of searching questions and answers in writing as required by law.

Based on the testimony of Castillo and other evidence on record, the prosecution failed to prove that Executive Judge Eugenio
Ramos put into writing his examination of the applicant and his witnesses in the form of searching questions and answers before
issuance of the search warrant. The records only show the existence of an application for a search warrant and the affidavits of
the complainant’s witnesses.
 [CRIMPRO - Bautista] 32
[Camille Umali]

Malaloan v. CA
Petition for review of a decision of the Court of Appeals
Regalado, J.
FACTS:
Lt. Absalon V. Salboro of the CAPCOM filed with the RTC of Kalookan City an application for search warrant. The search
warrant was
sought for in connection with an alleged violation of P.D. 1866 (Illegal Possession of Firearms and Ammunitions). Firearms,
explosive materials and subversive documents were seized and taken during the search. Petitioners presented a Motion for
Consolidation, Quashal of Search Warrant and For the Suppression of All Illegally Acquired Evidence. However, the court denied
the quashal of the search warrant and the validity of which warrant was upheld invoking paragraph 3(b) of the Interim Rules and
Guidelines which provides that search warrants can be served not only within the territorial jurisdiction of the issuing court but
anywhere in the judicial region of the issuing court.
ISSUE:
WON a court may take cognizance of an application for a search warrant in connection with an offense committed outside its
territorial
boundary and, thereafter, issue the warrant to conduct a search on a place outside the court’s supposed territorial jurisdiction

HELD/RATIO:
A warrant, such as a warrant of arrest or a search warrant, merely constitutes process. A search warrant is defined in our
jurisdiction as an order in writing issued in the name of the People of the Philippines signed by a judge and directed to a peace
officer, commanding him to search for personal property and bring it before the court.5 A search warrant is in the nature of a
criminal process akin to a writ of discovery. It is a special and peculiar remedy, drastic in its nature, and made necessary
because of a public necessity.
A judicial process is defined as a writ,warrant, subpoena, or other formal writing issued by authority of law. It is clear, therefore,
that a search warrant is merely a judicial process designed by the Rules to respond only to an incident in the main case, if one
has already been instituted, or in anticipation thereof. Since a search warrant is a judicial process, not a criminal action, no legal
provision, statutory or reglementary, expressly or impliedly provides a jurisdictional or territorial limit on its area of enforceability.
Moreover, in our jurisdiction, no period is provided for the enforceability of warrants of arrest, and although within ten days from
the delivery of the warrant of arrest for execution a return thereon must be made to the issuing judge, said warrant does not
become functus officio but is enforceable indefinitely until the same is enforced or recalled.
The following are the guidelines when there are possible conflicts of jurisdiction where the criminal case is pending in one court
and the search
warrant is issued by another court for the seizure of personal property intended to be used as evidence in said criminal case:
1. The court wherein the criminal case is pending shall have primary jurisdiction to issue search warrants necessitated by and
for purposes of said case. An application for a search warrant may be filed with another court only under extreme and
compelling circumstances that the applicant must prove to the satisfaction of the latter court which may or may not give due
course to the application depending on the validity of the justification offered for not filing the same in the court with primary
jurisdiction thereover.
2. When the latter court issues the search warrant, a motion to quash the same may be filed in and shall be resolved by said
court, without prejudice to any proper recourse to the appropriate higher court by the party aggrieved by the resolution of the
issuing court. All grounds and objections then available, existent or known shall be raised in the original or subsequent
proceedings for the quashal of the warrant, otherwise they shall be deemed waived.
3. Where no motion to quash the search warrant was filed in or resolved by the issuing court, the interested party may move in
the court where the criminal case is pending for the suppression as evidence of the personal property seized under the warrant
if the same is offered therein for said purpose. Since two separate courts with different participations are involved in this
situation, a motion to quash a search warrant and a motion to suppress evidence are alternative and not cumulative remedies.
In order to prevent forum shopping, a motion to quash shall consequently be governed by the omnibus motion rule, provided,
however, that objections not available, existent or known during the proceedings for the quashal of the warrant may be raised in
the hearing of the motion to suppress. The resolution of the court on the motion to suppress shall likewise be subject to any
proper remedy in the appropriate higher court.
4. Where the court which issued the search warrant denies the motion to quash the same and is not otherwise prevented from
further proceeding thereon, all personal property seized under the warrant shall forthwith be transmitted by it to the court
wherein the criminal case is pending, with the necessary safeguards and documentation therefore
5. These guidelines shall likewise be observed where the same criminal offense is charged in different informations or
complaints and filed in two or more courts with concurrent original jurisdiction over the criminal action. Where the issue of which
court will try the case shall have been resolved, such court shall be considered as vested with primary jurisdiction to act on
applications for search warrants incident to the criminal case.
WHEREFORE, on the foregoing premises, the instant petition is DENIED.
 [CRIMPRO - Bautista] 33
[Camille Umali]

Groh v. Ramirez et al
Certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals

Stevens, J.

FACTS:
Petitioner, who is a Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms agent, prepared and signed an application for a warrant to search
respondents’ Montana ranch, which stated that the search was for specified weapons, explosives, and records. The application
was supported by petitioner’s detailed affidavit setting forth his basis for believing that such items were on the ranch and was
accompanied by a warrant form that he completed. The Magistrate Judge (Magistrate) signed the warrant form even though it
did not identify any of the items that petitioner intended to seize. The portion calling for a description of the “person or property”
described respondents’ house, not the alleged weapons; the warrant did not incorporate by reference the application’s itemized
list. Petitioner led federal and local law enforcement officers to the ranch the next day but found no illegal weapons or
explosives. Petitioner left a copy of the warrant, but not the application, with respondents. Respondents sued petitioner and
others under Bivens v. Six Unknown Fed. Narcotics Agents, 403 us 488, and 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claiming, inter alia, a Fourth
Amendment violation. The District Court granted the defendants summary judgment, finding no Fourth Amendment violation,
and finding that even if such a violation occurred, the defendants were entitled to qualified immunity. The Ninth Circuit affirmed
except as to the Fourth Amendment claim against petitioner, holding that the warrant was invalid because it did not describe with
particularity the place to be searched and the items to be seized. The court also concluded that United States v. Leon, 468 U.S.
897, precluded qualified immunity for petitioner because he was the leader of a search who did not read the warrant and satisfy
himself that he understood its scope and limitations and that it was not obviously defective.

ISSUE:
WON the search violated the Fourth Amendment
WON petitioner is entitled to qualified immunity, given that a Magistrate Judge, relying on an affidavit that particularly described
the items in question, found probable cause to conduct the search

HELD/RATIO:
1. The search was clearly “unreasonable” under the Fourth Amendment.
(a)The warrant was plainly invalid. It did not meet the Fourth Amendment’s unambiguous requirement that a warrant “particularly
33escribe[e] … the persons or things to be seized.” The fact that the application adequately described those things does not
save the warrant; Fourth Amendment interests are not necessarily vindicated when another document says something about the
objects of the search, but that document’s contents are neither known to the person whose home is being searched nor
available for her inspection. It is not necessary to decide whether the Amendment permits a warrant to cross-reference other
documents, because such incorporation did not occur here.
(b)Petitioner’s argument that the search was nonetheless reasonable is rejected. Because the warrant did not describe the items
at all, it was so obviously deficient that the search must be regarded as warrantless, and thus presumptively unreasonable. This
presumptive rule applies to searches whose only defect is a lack of particularity in the warrant. Petitioner errs in arguing that
such searches should be exempt from the presumption if they otherwise satisfy the particularity requirement’s goals. Unless
items in the affidavit are set forth in the warrant, there is no written assurance that the Magistrate actually found probable cause
for a search as broad as the affiant requested. The restraint petitioner showed in conducting the instant search was imposed by
the agent himself, not a judicial officer. Moreover, the particularity requirement’s purpose is not limited to preventing general
searches; it also assures the individual whose property is searched and seized of the executing officer’s legal authority, his need
to search, and the limits of his power to do so. This case presents no occasion to reach petitioner’s argument that the
particularity requirements’ goals were served when he orally described the items to respondents, because respondents dispute
his account.
2. Petitioner is not entitled to qualified immunity despite the constitutional violation because “it would be clear to a reasonable
officer that his conduct was unlawful in the situation he confronted,” Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 202. Given that the
particularity requirement is stated in the Constitution’s text, no reasonable officer could believe that a warrant that did not comply
with that requirement was valid. Moreover, because petitioner prepared the warrant, he may not argue that he reasonably relied
on the Magistrate’s assurance that it contained an adequate description and was valid. Nor could a reasonable officer claim to
be unaware of the basic rule that, absent consent or exigency, a warrantless search of a home is presumptively unconstitutional.
“[A] warrant may be so facially deficient … that the executing officers cannot reasonably presume it to be valid.” Leon, 468 U.S.,
at 923. This is such a case.
Decision of CA affirmed.
 [CRIMPRO - Bautista] 34
[Camille Umali]

II. Procedure for Issuance of a Search Warrant

People vs. Dichoso

Doctrine:
The Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972 is a special law that deals specifically with dangerous drugs which are subsumed
into prohibited and regulated drugs and defines and penalizes categories of offenses which are closely related or which belong
to the same class or species. Thus, one search warrant may be validly issued for the said violations of Dangerous Drugs Act.

Facts:
 Redentor Dichoso was charged of violating Sec. 15 of the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972 for selling, delivering and distributing
1.3 grams of shabu while Jaime Pagtakhan was charged for illegally possessing a regulated drug (shabu) under Sec. 16, Art III
of the Dangerous Drugs Act. Redentor’s wife, Sonia, however, could not be arrested because she cannot be located. Based on
the facts found by the trial court, the Narcotics Command applied for a search warrant on Feb. 22. 1991 to be issued on
the house of spouses Dichoso. After searching questions and answers, the judge was satisfied and thus found probable
cause to believe that the spouses were keeping, selling and using an undetermined quantity of shabu and marijuana in said
residence. Search Warrant No. 028 was issued by the Court.
 The team organized by the NARCOM Unit I approaching Dichoso’s residence met an old man and so the team leader
Evangelista introduced the team as NARCOM agents duly armed with a search warrant. Evangelista asked for Redentor and
Sonia and thus, the old man opened the gate into the Dichoso compound for the team to enter. The old man then led them to
the nipa house where they saw Redento Dichoso, Jaime Pagtakhan and two other companions sitting near a small table with
suspected shabu and paraphernalia on top. Evangelista introduced the team as NARCOM agents and he instructed a team
member to fetch the barangay chairman. In the meantime Evangelista served a copy to Redentor and within 15 to 20 minutes,
Brgy. Captain Calbria arrived.
 Calabria read the search warrant and explained its contents to Redentor. The team then conducted a search inside the nipa
house. Evangelista discovered 200 grams more or less of marijuana, 6 decks of suspected shabu, and a Golden Gate notebook
containing the list of suspected customers of dangerous and regulated drugs together with the corresponding quantity and
prices. When the search was shifted to the main house of Dichosos, the search produced negative results.
 The team then proceeded to collect the confiscated items and one agent prepared the PAGPAPATUNAY (Exhibit B) attesting to
the result of the search conducted by NARCOM with a list of the confiscated items, PAGAPAPATUNAY (Exhibit C) attesting to
the lawful manner the search was conducted, and the Receipt (Exhibit D), all dated Feb. 23. 1991. The said exhibits were
given to Brgy. Capt. Calabria who affixed his signature and who explained the contents of the said exhibits to Redentor and
Pagtakhan. Redentor voluntarily affixed his signature on B, C and D while Pagtakhan voluntarily affixed his signature on B and
D. They were then brought to the headquarters for further investigation.
 On Feb, 25, 1991, the NARCOM made a return of the search warrant and inventory to the Court. Laboratory results indicated
that the confiscated items were actually shabu and marijuana, and Pagtakhan was found positive of shabu.

Dichoso now assails the validity of the search warrant for being a “general warrant” because it was issued for “Violation of
RA 6425 known as the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972 as amended” and did not specify the particular offense. He claims that it
was issued in violation of Sec. 3, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court which provides that “no search warrant shall issue for more
than one specific offense” since it was issued for three possible offenses: (1) illegal possession of marijuana dried leaves, (2)
illegal possession of methampetamine hydrocholoride (shabu); and (3) illegal possession of opium pipe and other paraphernalia
for prohibited drug.

Issue:/Held: WON the search warrant is valid. Yes

Ratio:
The search warrant cannot be assailed as a general warrant since while it is for “Violation of RA 6425 known as the
Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972 as amended,” the body thereof which is controlling, particularizes the place to be searched and
the things to be seized, and specifies the offense involved, i.e., illegal possession of marijuana and shabu and paraphernalia in
connection therewith. These are evident from the clause “are illegally in possession of undetermined quantity/ amount of dried
marijuana leaves and methampethamine hydrochloride and sets of paraphernalias stored inside the nipa hut within the
compound of their residence at Farconville Sub, Phase II, San Pablo City.
As to the contention that the search warrant was issued for more than one offense, it must be taken into account that
the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972 is a special law that deals specifically with dangerous drugs which are subsumed into
prohibited and regulated drugs and defines and penalizes categories of offenses which are closely related or which belong to
the same class or species. Thus, one search warrant may be validly issued for the said violations of Dangerous Drugs Act.
Since Search Warrant No. 028 is valid, the seized items are admissible in evidence.
- Arianne Cerezo

People vs. Salanguit

 [CRIMPRO - Bautista] 35
[Camille Umali]

Plaintiff-appellee: The People of the Philippines

Accused-appellant: Roberto Salanguit
Nature: Appeal from a decision of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Br. 96.
Date: April 19, 2001
Ponente: Mendoza, J.

Summary:
This is an appeal from the decision of RTC QC finding accused Salanguit guilty of violation of sec. 16 of RA 6425
(Dangerous Drug Act of 1972) sentencing him to suffer imprisonment from 6 mos to 4 years, and of sec. 8 of the same law and
sentencing him to suffer reclusion perpetua and P700,000 fine. This case basically details the steps/procedures on how valid
search warrant is obtained.

Facts:
Prosecution:
 December 26, 1995 – Sr. Insp. Aguilar applied for a warrant in RTC Cavite, to search the residence of accused-appellant Robert
Salanguit y Ko on Binhagan St. Novaliches, Quezon City. He presented as witness SPO1 Edmund Badua, who testified as
poseur-buyer, he was able to purchase 2.12 grams of Methamphetamine Hydrochloride (shabu) from accused. Badua saw that
the shabu was taken from a cabinet inside Salanguit’s room. The application was granted, and a search warrant was issued by
Judge Espanol.
 Same day; 10:30 pm – Group of 10 policemen went to the residence of accused. They knocked on the door but nobody opened
it. They heard people panicking inside which forced them to open the door and enter the house. After presenting the warrant,
they searched the house and found 12 small heat-sealed transparent plastic bags containing a white crystalline substance (2.77
g) (w/c was confirmed thru lab tests to be shabu), a paper clip box also containing shabu (8.37 g) and two bricks of dried leaves
which turned out to be marijuana wrapped in newsprint (1,255 g).

Defense:
 Accused heard a commotion at the gate and on roof of their house. Suddenly 20 men in civilian attire climbed through the
opening in the roof. They showed the ‘warrant’ which they just waved in front of him and withdrew it without accused having the
chance to read it. According to Salanguit’s mom, Soledad Arcano, the police ransacked their house, ate their food and took
away canned goods and valuables.

Trial Court:
Trial court found him guilty on both charges sentencing him to the above mentioned punishments.

Issues:
1. WON shabu allegedly recovered from his residence is admissible as evidence against him on the ground that the
warrant used in obtaining it was invalid.
2. Whether the marijuana allegedly seized pursuant to the “plain view” doctrine is admissible as evidence.

Held:
1. Shabu is admissible as evidence. Search warrant is valid only as to the shabu.
2. Marijuana is inadmissible because it was not covered by search warrant. Decision as to shabu, affirmed; as to
marijuana, accused was acquitted.

Ratio:
1. Rule 126, sec 4 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure provides that a search warrant shall not issue except upon
probable cause in connection with ONE specific offense to be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath
or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and
the things to be seized which may be anywhere in the Philippines. In issuing a search warrant, judges must comply strictly with
the requirements of the Constitution and the Rules of Criminal Procedure. No presumption of regularity can be invoked in aid of
the process. Nothing can justify the issuance of the search warrant unless all legal requisites are fulfilled.

Existence of Probable Cause (Please refer to original case for the search warrant)
The warrant authorized the seizure of “undetermined quantity of shabu and drug paraphernalia.” Evidence was
presented showing probable cause of the existence of shabu. The fact that there was no probable cause to support the
application for the seizure of drug paraphernalia does not warrant the conclusion that the search warrant is void. This fact would
be material only if drug paraphernalia was in fact seized. The search warrant is void only insofar as it authorized the seizure of
drug paraphernalia, but it is valid as to the seizure of shabu. It would be a drastic remedy if a warrant, which was issued on
probable cause and particularly describing the items to be seized, is to be invalidaded in toto because the judge erred in
authorizing a search for other items was not supported by evidence.

Specificity of the Offenses Charged

The fact that the information contains violations of two separate provisions of RA 6425 is immaterial. Only one warrant
was necessary to cover the violations under the various provisions of the said law.
 [CRIMPRO - Bautista] 36
[Camille Umali]

Particularity of the Place

The rule is that a description of the place to be searched is sufficient if the officer with the warrant can, with reasonable
effort, ascertain and identify the place intended to be seized.

2. The warrant authorized seizure of shabu, not marijuana. Seizure of marijuana was justified on the ground that the drug was
seized within the “plain view” of the searching party. Plain view doctrine: unlawful objects within the plain view of an officer who
has the right to be in the position to have that view are subject to seizure and may be presented in evidence.

Prior Justification and Discovery by Inadvertence

Because the shabu was indicated in the warrant, it is reasonable to assume that the police found the packets of the
shabu first. Once the valid portion of the search warrant has been executed, the plain view doctrine can no longer apply. The
police failed to allege which came first therefore it is invalid.

Apparent Illegality of the Evidence

The marijuana bricks were wrapped in newsprint. There was no apparent illegality to justify the seizure. The plastic bag
was in the kitchen and they even had to ask accused what was in it. The incriminating nature of the contents of the plastic bag
was not immediately apparent.
-Arman Mislang
 [CRIMPRO - Bautista] 37
[Camille Umali]

Kho vs. Makalintal

Petitioner: Benjamin Kho and Elizabeth Alindogan
Respondents: Hon. Roberto L. Makalintal and National Bureau of Investigation
Nature: petition for certiorari assailing order of Metropolitan Trial Court of Paranaque
Date: April 21, 1999
Ponente: Purisima, J.

Facts:
 On May 15, 1990, NBI Agent Max Salvador applied for issuance of search warrant by respondent judge against petitioner in his
residence at BF Homes, Phase 1, Paranaque
 On same day, NBI Agent Eduardo Arugay applied with the same court for issuance of search warrant against petitioner in his
house at Moonwalk, Paranaque
 The search warrants were applied for after teams of NBI agents had conducted a personal surveillance and investigation in two
houses on the basis of confidential information they received that the said places were being used as storage centers for
unlicensed firearms and chop-chop vehicles.
 NBI agents sought issuance of search warrants in anticipation of criminal cases to be filed.
 On same day, Judge conducted necessary examination after which he issued search warrants:
Search Warrant No. 90- 11
- Unlicensed radio communications equipments such as transmitters, transceivers, handsets, scanners, monitoring device and
the like
Search Warrant No. 90-13
- Unlicensed radio communications equipments such as transmitters, transceivers, handsets, radio communications equipments,
scanners, monitoring devices and others
Subject Warrant Nos. 90-12 and 90-15
- Unlicensed firearms of various calibers and ammunitions for the said firearms
Search Warrant No. 90-14
- Chop-chop vehicles and other spare parts
 The following day, NBI agents armed with the search warrants, searched the subject premises and recovered various high-
powered firearms and hundreds of rounds of ammunitions from the BF Homes house and high-powered firearms, explosives,
rounds of ammunitions, radio and telecommunications equipment, 2 motor vehicles and one motorcycle from the Moonwalk
house. It is also found that the seized items were unlicensed.
 Petitioners filed a Motion to Quash on the following grounds:
- Issued without probable cause
- Prohibited by constitution for being general warrant
- Violates procedural requirements set forth by the constitution.
- Violates the revised Rules of court
- Object seized were illegally possessed and issued

Issue/Held: WON Motion to Quash can be granted. No

Ratio:
Petitioner Court
Probable cause - surveillance and investigation conducted - NBI agents testified that they saw guns being
by NBI agents within the premises were carried to and unloaded at the two houses
not sufficient to vest applicants personal searched
knowledge of facts and circumstances - question of WON a probable cause exists is one
which must be determined in light of the conditions
obtaining given situations
- finding or opinion of the judge who conducted the
required examination of the applicants and
weaknesses
Violates - judge failed to ask specific questions - nothing improper in the manner respondent judge
constitutional which is particularly important during conducted the examination
and statutory examination - it is within the discretion of judge to determine
requirements - the question that judge asked assumed what questions to ask the witnesses so long as the
that firearms where unlicensed and did questions asked are germane to the pivot of inquiry
not ask how NBI agents knew that those which is the existence of a probable cause
where unlicensed
 [CRIMPRO - Bautista] 38
[Camille Umali]

General - firearms listed were not classified as to - law does not require that the things seized must
Warrant size or make be described in precise and minute details as to
leave no room for doubt on the part of searching
authorities.
- NBI agents could not have been in a position to
know beforehand the exact caliber or make of the
firearms
- technical description is not required
Procedure Irregularities: - Not within the scope of Motion to Quash
3. Before Breaking into premises, they did Motion to quash – assail the validity of the search
not: warrant
a) Identify themselves, show credentials and Manner of serving the warrant and effecting the
present search warrant search are NOT an issue
b) Furnish search warrant and let occupants
scrutinize it
c) Give time to occupants to voluntarily allow
the raiders to search the premises
4. Entered the premises by climbing fence
and force open the door
5. Maids and son were confined in the dining
room. Son was gagged with a piece of
cloth, tied the hands and made to lie face
down.
6. Defendant was tied (first with cloth then
with electric cord). Gun was pointed at
him while he’s kneeling down. He is also
forced to sign the search warrant.
7. Defendant and companions were kept in
dining room and intimidated of being shot.
The raiders searched the room without
anybody seeing whatever they are doing.

-Camille Umali
 [CRIMPRO - Bautista] 39
[Camille Umali]

Maryland vs. Garrison

Nature: Certiorari to the Court of Appeals of Maryland

Date: Feb 24, 2987
Ponente: Justice Stevens

Facts: (there’s a summary of the case on the first page of the case)
 Baltimore police officers obtained and executed a warrant to search the person of Lawrence McWebb and “the premises known
as 2036 Park Avenue third floor apartment” when the police applied for the warrant, the officers conducted an investigation
including a verification of information from a reliable informant, an exterior examination of the three-story building at 2036 Park
Avenue, and an inquiry of the utility company, the officer who obtained the warrant reasonably concluded that there was only
one apartment on the third floor and that it was occupied by McWebb.
 When they conducted the search pursuant to the warrant, it was found out that the apartment was in fact divided into two
apartments, one occupied by Mcwebb and the other by Garrison. Before the officers executing the warrant became that they
were in a separate apartment occupied by garrison, they had discovered the contraband that provided the basis for the
conviction of Garrison for violating Maryland’s Controlled Substances Act. Only after Garrison’s apartment had been entered and
the heroin, cash, and drug paraphernalia had been found did the officers realize that the third floor contained two apartments. All
the officers believed that they were searching McWebb’s apartment. No further search of Garrison’s apartment was made.
 Trial Court denied Garrison’s motion to suppress the evidence seized from his apartment. Maryland Court of Special Appeals
affirmed. The Court of Appeals of Maryland reversed and remanded with instruction to remand the case for a new trial.

Issue:
1. WON the factual mistake invalidated the warrant
2. WON the manner of execution of the warrant was valid

Held: Warrant is valid. Manner of execution of the warrant is valid

A. The Warrant Clause of the 4th amendment categorically prohibits the issuance of any warrant except one “particularly
describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized”, the requirement ensures that the search will be
carefully tailored to its justifications, and will not take on the character of the wide-ranging exploratory searches intended by the
Framers of the Consti to prohibit. In this case there is no claim that the “persons or things to be seized? Were inadequately
described or that there was no probable cause to believe that those things might be found in “the place to be searched” as it was
described on the warrant.
The validity of the warrant must be assessed on the basis of the information that the officers disclosed, or had a duty to
discover and to disclose, to the issuing Magistrate, on that basis the warrant, insofar as it authorized a search that turned out to
be ambiguous in scope, was valid when issued.

B. Manner of execution was proper. The entry of the police officers was legal, they carried a warrant for those premises,
and they were accompanied by McWebb, who provided the key that they used to open the door giving access to the third floor
common area. If the officers had known that the third floor contained two apartments before they entered the living quarters on
the third floor, and thus had been aware of the error in the warrant, they would have been obligated to limit their search to
McWebb’s apartment.
They were required to discontinue the search of Garrison’s apartment as soon as they discovered that there were two
separate units on the third floor and were put on notice of the risk they might be in a unit erroneously included within the terms of
the warrant. The officers’ conduct and the limits of the search were based on the information available as the search proceeded.
The Court recognizes the need to allow some latitude for honest mistakes that are made by officers in the dangerous
and difficult process of making arrests and executing search warrants. The objective facts available to the officers at the time
suggested no distinction between McWebb’s and the third floor premises.
The officers properly responded to the command contained in a valid warrant even if the warrant is interpreted as
authorizing a search limited to McWebb’s apartment rather than the third floor. Prior to the discovery of the factual mistake by
the officers, they perceived McWebb’s apartment and the third floor premises as one and the same; thus their execution of the
warrant reasonably included the entire third floor. Their conduct was consistent with a reasonable effort to ascertain and identify
the place intended to be searched within the meaning of the 4th amendment.
-Cyril Arnesto
 [CRIMPRO - Bautista] 40
[Camille Umali]

Twentieth Century Fox vs. CA

Petitioner: 20th Fentury Fox Film Corporation
Respondents: Court of Appeals, Eduardo Barreto, Raul Sagullo, and Fortune Ledesma
Date: August 19, 1988
Ponente: Gutierrez, Jr., J.

Doctrine:
Constitutional right against illegal searches and seizures protects a citizen against unreasonable invasion of privacy
and liberty as to person, papers and effects. Privacy of a person must not be disturbed except in case of overriding need.

Facts:
 August 26, 1985: 20th Century Fox through a letter sought NBI’s assistance in the conduct search and seizure in connection with
NBI’s anti-film piracy campaign, alleging that videotape outlets in Metro Manila are engaged in unauthorized sale and renting out
of copyrighted films in videotape form which constitute a violation of PD No.49 (Protection of Intellectual Property).
 NBI conducted surveillance and investigation of the outlets and filed 3 applications for search warrants against the video outlets
owned by Barreto (Junction Video, Paranaque), Sagullo (South Video Bug Center, BF Homes Paranaque), and Ledesma (Sonix
Video Services, Forbes Park, Makati).
 September 4, 1985: RTC Makati issued the search warrants.
 NBI accompanied by 20th Century Fox’s agents and raided outlets and seized the items. (Inventory of items made and left with
Barreto, Sagullo, and Ledesma)
 October 3, 1985: lower court lifted search warrants saying that the articles listed in the returns of the search warrants could not
be basis of criminal prosecution and have to be returned by NBI to the owners. Search warrants were lifted on the ground that
they were issued based on the misrepresentations of NBI that piracy had been committed, that there was absence of probable
cause, and that the witnesses did not have personal knowledge.
 January 2, 1986: lower court denied reconsideration. 20 th Century Fox filed petition for certiorari with CA to annul RTC’s Oct3
and Jan2 decisions, but was dismissed.

Issue:
WON the judge properly lifted the search warrants he issued earlier upon application of the NBI (What is the meaning
of probable cause within the constitutional provision (Section 3, Article IV, 1973 Constitution or Section 2, Art III, 1987
Constitution) against illegal searches and seizures

Held/ Ratio:
Yes the judge properly lifted the search warrants issued.
The constitutional right protects a citizen against wanton and unreasonable invasion of his privacy and liberty as to his
person, papers and effects. The government’s right to issue search warrants against a citizen’s papers and effects is
circumscribed by the requirements mandated in the searches and seizures provision of the Constitution. Proceedings which
make a person an offender should be interpreted strictissimi juris against the government and liberally in favor of offender.
In Burgos vs. Chief of Staff, probable cause was defined as such facts and circumstances which would lead a
reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe that an offense has been committed and that the objects sought in connection
with the offense are in the place sought to be searched. There should also be personal knowledge by complainant or witnesses
of the facts upon which the search warrant may be justified.
The presentation of the master tapes of the copyrighted films from which the pirated films were copied was necessary
for the validity of the search warrants because the court cannot presume that the copies were necessarily reproduced from the
master tapes of 20th Century Fox. The essence of copyright infringement is the substantial similarity of pirated works to
copyrighted works. Thus the copyrighted works must be presented in order to compare and determine whether the copied works
are pirated. The link of the copyright films to the pirated films must be established for there to be probable cause.
Also, the search warrants described the articles to be seized as “TV sets, video cassette recorders, rewinders, tape
head cleaners, accessories, equipment, machines used in unlawful reproduction, sale, rental, lease, distribution”. In accordance
with Burgos vs. Chief of Staff and Stanford vs state of Texas, the search warrants are void since the items mentioned are too
general. Such items can usually be found in a legitimate video tape store and do not necessarily show that there is piracy.
Including these articles without specificity that they were really instruments in violating Anti-Piracy Law make the search
warrants too general.
-Gianna Comsti
 [CRIMPRO - Bautista] 41
[Camille Umali]

Columbia Pictures, Inc. vs. CA (1994)

Facts:
 NBI, thru its agent Lauro Reyes filed with RTC three applications for search warrant against private respondents Tube Video
Enterprises and E. Cham (ASW No. 95), the Blooming Rose Tape Center and M. Uy (ASW No. 96), and the Video Channel and
L. Nabong (ASW No. 97), charging said respondents with violation of Section 56 of the Decree on the Protection of
Intellectual Property.
 In the three applications, Reyes stated that respondents had in their possession and control: (1) pirated video tapes of the
copyrighted motion pictures/films; (2) posters, advertising leaflets etc. used for unlawful videogram business; (3) television sets,
video cassette and/or laser disc recorders etc. for unlawful exhibition, showing, reproduction, sale lease or disposition of
videograms they are keeping and concealing. RTC Judge Austria conducted a joint hearing and found just and probable
cause for granting the application at that time. Hence, he issued Search Warrants (SW) numbered 95, 96, 97.
 Private respondents filed their respective motions to quash the three search warrants. In SW no. 95, respondents argue among
others that there is no probable cause nor the existence of a satisfactory fact upon which the search warrant is based; that NBI
has no authority to initiate the filing of suit; that the confiscation of defendants' seized articles based on the questioned search
warrant violated the latter's constitutional right against deprivation of properties without due process. In SW No. 96, the
respondents argue that the complainants, the Motion Picture Association of America, Inc., have not proven their ownership over
the films listed in Annex "A" of the search warrant; that the information provided by the NBI agents and the representatives of the
MPAA, Inc. are replete with generalities. In SW No. 97, respondents adopted the motions filed for the quashal of both SW No.
95 and SW No. 96.
 Petitioners submitted their oppositions to the motions to quash. In a Joint Order, Judge Austria ruled that the NBI had the
authority to apply for the search warrants; that in the issuance of the search warrants, due process of law was duly observed;
and that the questioned search warrants were not general in character since the provision of law violated, i.e., Sec. 56 of P.D.
No. 49, as amended by P.D. No. 1988, was clearly specified. Judge Austria, nonetheless, reversed her former stand initially
finding probable cause for the issuance of the search warrants and ordered the quashal of the search warrants. Judge
Austria thus ordered the return of all the items seized by virtue of the warrants. While, CA held that complainants were of
the ownership of the titles subject of the pirated video tapes and they have protectable copyright under Philippine laws. CA also
affirmed RTC decision in ordering the quashal of the search warrants on the ground that the requirement of producing
the “master tapes” during the application for a search warrant was not complied with. Hence, this petition.

Issue:
WON master tapes should be presented during the application for search warrants. [Yes, they should be presented
during application in cases of this nature. Search Warrants which were issued are invalid]

Held/Ratio:
The petitioner argues to the effect that the presentation of the master tapes at the time of application may not be
necessary as these would be merely evidentiary in nature and not determinative of whether or not a probable cause exists to
justify the issuance of the search warrants.

This Court, in 20th Century Fox Film Corp. vs. Court of Appeals (164 SCRA 655) has already laid down the rule that
the presentation of the master tapes of the copyrighted films from which the pirated films were allegedly copied, was
necessary for the validity of search warrants against those who have in their possession the pirated films. Citing 20th
Century Fox Film Corp case, “xxx The application for search warrants was directed against video tape outlets which allegedly
were engaged in the unauthorized sale and renting out of copyrighted films belonging to the petitioner pursuant to P.D. 49. The
essence of a copyright infringement is the similarity or at least substantial similarity of the purported pirated works to
the copyrighted work. Hence, the applicant must present to the court the copyrighted films to compare them with the
purchased evidence of the video tapes allegedly pirated to determine whether the latter is an unauthorized
reproduction of the former. This linkage of the copyrighted films to the pirated films must be established to satisfy the
requirements of probable cause. Mere allegations as to the existence of the copyrighted films cannot serve as basis for the
issuance of a search warrant.” Moreover, SC noted that even assuming, as appellants argue, that only the sale, lease, or
distribution of pirated video tapes are involved, the fact remains that there is need to establish probable cause that the
tapes being sold, leased or distributed are pirated tapes, hence the issue reverts back to the question of whether there was
unauthorized transfer, directly or indirectly, of a sound recording or motion picture or other audio visual work that has been
recorded. Master tapes, at any rate, are therefore required.
-Carla Badi
 [CRIMPRO - Bautista] 42
[Camille Umali]

Columbia Pictures, Inc. vs. CA (1996)

Facts:
 Alfredo G. Ramos, intelligence officer of the Videogram Regulatory Board (VRB), received information that private respondent
Jose B. Jinco had in his possession pirated videotapes, posters, advertising materials and other items used or intended to
be used for the purpose of sale, lease, distribution, circulation or public exhibition of the said pirated videotapes.
 Ramos ascertained the information to be true and filed a verified Application for Search Warrant dated July 28, 1986 with
prayer for the seizure of the properties described in the search warrant.
 On the same date, a hearing was conducted by Judge Florentino A. Flor of the Regional Trial Court of Pasig, Branch 168,
wherein Ramos and his two witnesses, Analie Jimenez and Rebecca Benitez-Cruz testified on the need for the issuance of
search warrant.
 On July 28, 1986, the prayer for the issuance of the search warrant was granted and, on the same date, Search Warrant No. 23
was issued.
 On June 2, 1987, private respondent filed a Motion to Quash Search Warrant No. 23 on the grounds that the Search
Warrant did not state a specific offense and that, even assuming it stated a specific offense, it covered more than one
specific offense. The VRB opposed the Motion to Quash stating that Search Warrant No. 23 was issued for a single
specific offense namely, violation of Section 56 and other related sections of Presidential Decree No. 49 as amended by
Presidential Decree No. 1988.
 On September 30, 1987, the trial court denied the Motion to Quash finding that the Search Warrant was issued for one
specific offense. A Motion for Reconsideration was filed but the same was likewise denied.
 Private respondent then filed an Urgent Motion to Lift the Search Warrant and For the Return of the Seized Articles alleging that
Search Warrant No. 23 is a general warrant, and that it was issued without probable cause.
 On May 22, 1989, the assailed order was issued by Judge Benjamin V. Pelayo, now presiding over Branch 168 of the Pasig
RTC, granting the Motion to Quash and ordering the return of all seized articles to private respondent.
 Petitioners appealed to the Court of Appeals, which affirmed the said Order in toto.

Issue:
1. WON petitioners have the legal personality and standing to file the appeal.
2. WON Search Warrant No. 23 is valid

Held/Ratio:
1. From the records it is clear that, as complainants, petitioners were involved in the proceedings which led to the
issuance of Search Warrant No. 23. In People v. Nano,[3] the Court declared that while the general rule is that it is only the
Solicitor General who is authorized to bring or defend actions on behalf of the People or the Republic of the Philippines once the
case is brought before this Court or the Court of Appeals, if there appears to be grave error committed by the judge or a lack of
due process, the petition will be deemed filed by the private complainants therein as if it were filed by the Solicitor General. In
line with this ruling, the Court gives this petition due course and will allow petitioners to argue their case against the questioned
order in lieu of the Solicitor General.
2. As regards the issue of the validity of Search Warrant No. 23, there are two questions to be resolved: first, whether the 20th
Century Fox decision promulgated on August 19, 1988 is applicable to the Motion to Quash Search Warrant No. 23 (issued
on July 28, 1986).
We hold in the negative.
In the recent Columbia Pictures, et al. v. Court of Appeals, et al.[4] case which resolved the same issue involving the
same petitioners but with different respondents, the Court en banc held:
"Mindful as we are of the ramifications of the doctrine of stare decisis and the rudiments of fair play, it is our considered view that
the 20th Century Fox ruling cannot be retroactively applied to the instant case to justify the quashal of Search Warrant No. 87-
053. Herein petitioners' consistent position that the order of the lower court of September 5, 1988 denying therein defendant's
motion to lift the order of search warrant was properly issued, there having been satisfactory compliance with the then prevailing
standards under the law for determination of probable cause, is indeed well taken. The lower court could not possibly have
expected more evidence from petitioners in their application for a search warrant other than what the law and
jurisprudence, then existing and judicially accepted, required with respect to the finding of probable cause.”
The instant case also differs from 20th Century Fox in that what herein private respondent put in issue was the application of the
ruling in that case, not the conduct of Judge Flor in the issuance of Search Warrant No. 23. From the records, it is clear that
Judge Flor observed all the requirements necessary before the search warrant was issued: he heard the testimonies and
studied the depositions of the witnesses for the petitioners, namely Ms. Rebecca Benitez-Cruz, Ms. Analie I. Jimenez and the
VRB's Intelligence Officer, Alfredo G. Ramos on the existence of probable cause before issuing the warrant.
Under Sec. 3 and 4, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court, the requirements for the issuance of a valid search warrant are:
"Sec. 3. Requisites for issuing search warrant.
A search warrant shall not issue but upon probable cause in connection with one specific offense to be determined by the judge
or such other responsible officer authorized by law after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the
witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the things to be seized.
Sec. 4. Examination of complainant; record. -
 [CRIMPRO - Bautista] 43
[Camille Umali]

The judge must, before issuing the warrant, personally examine in the form of searching questions and answers, in writing and
under oath the complainant and any witnesses he may produce on facts personally known to them and attach to the record their
sworn statements together with any affidavits submitted."
Having satisfied these requirements, Judge Flor committed no grave abuse of discretion in issuing the warrant.
Private respondent contends that Search Warrant No. 23 also violates the constitutional requirements of particularity of
the description of the warrant, being a general warrant and thus, is null and void.
In several cases, this Court has held that:
"To be valid, a search warrant must be supported by probable cause to be determined by the judge or some other
authorized officer after examining the complainant and the witnesses he may produce. No less important, there must be a
specific description of the place to be searched and the things to be seized, to prevent arbitrary and indiscriminate use of the
warrant. (Sec. 3, Art. IV, 1974 Constitution, now Sec. 2, Art. III of the 1986 Constitution; Sec. 3, Rule 126 of the New Rules of
Court; Stonehill v. Diokno, 20 SCRA 383; Lime v. Ponce de Leon, 66 SCRA 299; Uy Kheytin v. Villareal, 42 Phil. 886; People v.
Veloso, 48 Phil. 169; People v. Rubio, 57 Phil. 384; Bache and Co., (Phil.) Inc. v. Ruiz, 37 SCRA 823; Roan v. Gonzales, 145
SCRA 687)."[5] (Underscoring supplied)
When may a search warrant be deemed to satisfy the legal requirements of specificity?
In Bache and Co., (Phil.) Inc. v. Ruiz, we said:
“A search warrant may be said to particularly describe the things to be seized when the description therein is as
specific as the circumstances will ordinarily allow (People v. Rubio, 57 Phil. 384). . . . ."
An examination of Search Warrant No. 23 shows that it was worded in such a manner that the enumerated items to be seized
bear a direct relation to the offense of violation of Sec. 56 of Presidential Decree No. 49, as amended.
In other words, it authorized only the seizure of articles used or intended to be used in the unlawful sale, lease and other acts in
violation of the said decree. The search warrant ordered the seizure of the following properties:
"(a) Pirated video tapes of the copyrighted motion pictures/films the titles of which are mentioned in the attached list;
(b) Posters, advertising leaflets, brochures, invoices, journal, ledgers, and books of accounts bearing/or mentioning the pirated
films with titles (as per attached list);
(c) Television sets, video cassettes records, rewinders, tape head cleaners, accessories, equipment and other machines and
paraphernalia or material used or intended to be used in the unlawful sale, lease, distribution, or possession for purpose of sale,
lease, distribution, circulation or public exhibition of the above-mentioned pirated video tapes which he is keeping and
concealing in the premises above-described."
Clearly, the above items could not be anymore specific as the circumstances will allow since they are all used or intended to be
used in the unlawful sale or lease of pirated tapes. Therefore, the finding of the appellate court that Search Warrant No. 23 is a
"general" warrant is devoid of basis.
-Macel Dacanay
 [CRIMPRO - Bautista] 44
[Camille Umali]

Sony Music Entertainment (Phil.), Inc. vs. Espanol

Date: 14 March 2005

Ponente: Garcia, J.
Nature: Special Civil action in the Supreme Court. Certiorari.

Legal Doctrine:
Absent the element of personal knowledge by the applicant or his witnesses of the facts upon which the issuance of a
search warrant may be justified, the warrant is deemed not based on probable cause and is a nullity.
Facts:
 A criminal complaint (I.S. No. 2000-1576) was filed by the Video Regulatory Board (VRB) with the DOJ charging James Uy,
David Chung, Elena Lim, and officers of Solid Laguna Corporation (SLC) for allegedly violating P.D. No. 1987 2 by replicating,
duplicating, and distributing videograms (video and music CDs3) without authority from the VRB. Sony Music also filed a
complaint (I.S. No. 2001-1158) for violation of R.A. 8293 4 or copyright infringement. Because of these complaints, the NBI
applied for search warrants with judge Espanol.
 During the application proceedings, NBI Agent Lavin presented as “witnesses” Pedralvez, a deputized agent of the VRB, and
Baltazar, an investigator retained by Sony Music’s attorney-in-fact, R.V. Domingo and Associates. They testified that Sony Music
and VRB had sought their assistance in abetting copyright infringement and that unnamed sources had informed them of illegal
manufacturing of CDs in Laguna. They said that they were able to enter the premises of SLC and saw replicating equipment and
stacks of CDs. Their unnamed source told them that they were being manufactured there.
 Judge Espanol thus issued Search warrant No. 219-00 for the copyright infringement complaint and Search Warrant No. 220-00,
for violation of P.D. 1987. They were carried out by the PNP CIDG, who transferred the seized items to Carepak Moving and
Storage under the custody of VRB.
 Respondents, however, were able to prove that they did in fact have a license from VRB to replicate and duplicate videograms.
As such, the DOJ issued a resolution dismissing criminal complaint I.S. No. 2000-1576 (for violation of P.D. 1987). Judge
Espanol then issued an order to quash Search Warrant No. 220-00.
 Respondents then asked that they be allowed to examine the seized materials to prepare for their defense in the copyright
infringement case. They were only able to examine one box containing 35 CDs, however, since all the other seized materials
had been comingled with other items in the warehouse.
 Respondents then filed a motion to quash the remaining search warrant and for the return of the seized materials on the ground
of lack of probable cause, since: a.) applicant and his witnesses lacked the requisite personal knowledge to justify the valid
issuance of a search warrant, b.) the warrant did not sufficiently describe the items to be seized, c.) the warrant was improperly
enforced.
 Judge Espanol granted the motion to quash on the ground that the “integrity of the seized items as evidence had been
compromised” as they were comingled with other articles. She subsequently denied the motion for reconsideration stating that
she had been misled by the applicants when they said that SLC was not licensed by the VRB, when in fact they were and that
such was the basis for the issuance of the two search warrants.

Main Issue:
WON Search Warrant No. 219-00 (for the copyright infringement against Sony) should have been quashed.

Held: Yes, it was properly quashed since there was no requisite personal knowledge on the part of the applicant or his
witnesses.
 Core requisite for the issuance of a search warrant is the existence of probable cause: “the existence of such facts and
circumstances that would lead a reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe that an offense has been committed and that
the objects sought in connection with the offenses are in the place to be searched.”
- “facts” refers to facts, data, or information personally known to the applicant or his witnesses
 Absent the element of personal knowledge by the applicant or his witnesses of the facts upon which the issuance of a search
warrant may be justified, the warrant is deemed not based on probable cause and is a nullity. Testimony based on what is
supposedly told to a witness is hearsay.
 Agent Lavin and his witnesses relied on what alleged unnamed sources told them and on certifications made by persons who
were never presented as witnesses. In effect, they had no personal knowledge of that which they were testifying when they were
applying for the warrants.
- Difference with Columbia Pictures, Inc. v. CA: In Columbia, Columbia’s attorney-in-fact was proven to have personal knowledge
that respondents never had the license and authority to sell his client’s copyrighted films. On the other hand, in this present case
there was even misrepresentation on the part of the applicants and his witnesses.
 Although initial hearsay information or tips from confidential informants could serve as the basis for the issuance of search
warrants, these must be followed up personally by the recipient and validated. However, this was not the case here.

2
An Act creating the Video Regulatory Board
3
E.g. Kenny Rogers Videoke, Englebert Humberdinck Videoke, Andrew E. Wholesome Videoke.
4
Intellectual Property Code
 [CRIMPRO - Bautista] 45
[Camille Umali]

Sub-Issues:
WON the proceedings for the quashal of the search warrants constituted a “preliminary investigation” and the resulting quashal
absolved respondents of criminal liability.
- No. The order of quashal is entirely independent of the proceedings in Criminal Complaint I.S. No. 2001-1158. One proceeding
is not bound by the other as regards the existence of a crime.
WON Sony Music can assail Respondents’ motion to quash on the ground that they do not have proper standing.
- No. Sony Music is deemed in estoppel. Respondents stand to be inconvenienced by any judgment to be promulgated based on
the seized properties and they are therefore real parties in interest who ought not to be prevented from assailing the search
warrants.
-Mickey Chatto
 [CRIMPRO - Bautista] 46
[Camille Umali]

III. Warrantless Searches

A. Moving Vehicles

Carroll vs. US
Nature: Writ of Error to the District Court of the United States for the Western District of Michigan
Date: March 2, 1925
Ponente: Mr. Chief Justice Taft

Doctrine:
If the search and seizure without a warrant are made upon probable cause, that is, upon a belief, reasonably arising
out of circumstances known to the seizing officer, that an automobile or other vehicle contains that which by law is subject to
seizure and destruction, the search and seizure are VALID.

Facts:
 Cronenwett, Scully, and Thayer are federal prohibition agents engaged in patrolling the road leading from Detroit to Grand
Rapids, looking for violators of the National Prohibition Act which bans the transport of intoxicating liquors across the
international boundary.
 September 29, 1921 – Federal prohibition officers Cronenwett and Scully (acting undercover) went to an apartment in Grand
Rapids where they met with Kruska, and the defendants George Carroll and John Kiro. Cronenwett introduced himself as
Stafford and declared his intention to buy three cases of whiskey. With the price fixed at $130 a case, the three men said they
had to go to the east end of the Grand Rapids in order to get the liquor. However, Kruska came back and said that they could
not get the liquor that night. The supposed transaction between the undercover federal prohibition officers and the vendors
never materialized, perhaps because of the vendors’ suspicion as to the real character of the proposed purchasers.
 October 6, 1921 – Carroll and Kiro (aboard their Oldsmobile Roadster) passed Cronenwett and Scully some distance out from
Grand Rapids. The officers followed Carroll and Kiro but lost track of them on East Lansing.
 December 15, 1921 – Cronenwett, Scully, and Peterson (a state officer) were going from Grand Rapids to Ionia when Kiro and
Carroll met and passed them in the same automobile (Oldsmobile Roadster), coming from the direction of Detroit to Grand
Rapids.
 The officers turned their car and followed the defendants to a point 16 miles of Grand Rapids where they stopped and searched
their car. They found behind the upholstering of the seats, the filling of which had been removed, 68 bottles.
 The bottles contained labels, some purporting to be certificates of English chemists that the contents were blended Scotch
whiskeys while the others were Gordon gin made in London.
 The defendants were arrested and the liquor and their car were seized.
 It is important to note that the officers were not anticipating that the defendants would be coming through on the highway at that
particular time, but when they met them there, they believed they were carrying liquor; hence, the search, seizure, and arrest.
 Carroll and Kiro were indicted and convicted for transporting in an automobile intoxicating spirituous liquor (68 quarts of so-
called bonded whiskey and gin) in violation of the National Prohibition Act.

Arguments of Carroll and Kiro:

1. There was nothing about the appearance of the car to indicate that it carried liquor. The liquor was only found after a thorough
search and destruction of the cushion. Although the officers have seen the car twice before, there was no evidence that it had
ever transported liquor before.
2. When an arrest is made without warrant, the burden is on the officers to show legality of the arrest. While an officer
might arrest one upon reasonable grounds of suspicion that he had committed a felony, he could not arrest for a misdemeanour
unless it was committed in his presence. The officers admitted that they had no reason to believe that the defendants were
committing a felony or a misdemeanor. Therefore, the search was made upon a mere capricious venture.
3. No federal statute sets forth the circumstances under which an officer may arrest without a warrant.
4. The search and seizure were in violation of the Constitution. The doctrine in Weeks v. United States which states that an
officer may search a person legally arrested to discover and seize the fruits or evidences of the crime, is not applicable in this
case because: (a) the search preceded the arrest; and (b) the arrest, being illegal, gave no more right to search than if there had
been no arrest at all.
5. The mere fact that general searches of vehicles may help enforce the Eighteenth Amendment does not make those
searches reasonable.

Issue:
WON the warrantless search of the car is valid

Held/Ratio:
Yes, the warrantless search of the car is valid and does not violate the Constitution. The Fourth Amendment
denounces only such searches and seizures as are unreasonable. In the case at bar, the search without a warrant of an
 [CRIMPRO - Bautista] 47
[Camille Umali]

automobile and seizure therein of liquor were made upon probable cause – that is, upon a belief, reasonably arising out of the
circumstances known to the officer, that the vehicle contains such contraband liquor.

The constitutional and statutory provisions involved in this case include the Fourth Amendment and the National
Prohibition Act:
a. Fourth Amendment (in part) -- “The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects,
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause,
supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the person, or things to be seized. “
b. Section 25, Title II, National Prohibition Act – makes it unlawful to have or possess any liquor intended for use in violating the
Act, or which has been so used, and provides that no property rights shall exist in such liquor. A search warrant may issue and
such liquor, with the containers thereof, may be seized under the warrant and be ultimately destroyed.
c. Section 26, Title II, National Prohibition Act – “When the commissioner, his assistants, inspectors, or any officer of the law
shall discover any person in the act of transporting in violation of the law, intoxicating liquors in any wagon, buggy, automobile,
water, or air craft, or other vehicle, it shall be his duty to seize any and all intoxicating liquors found therein being
transported contrary to law. Whenever intoxicating liquors transported or possessed illegally shall be seized by an officer he
shall take possession of the vehicle and team or automobile, boat, air, or water craft, or any other conveyance, and shall arrest
any person in charge thereof”.

Under the common law and agreeably under the Constitution, search may in many cases be legally made without a
warrant. The Constitution does not forbid search, but it does forbid unreasonable search. If the law will prohibit all search or
attempt to search any property or premises without a search warrant, the effect would necessarily be to prohibit all search. If
such were the case, it would be impossible to stop perpetrators aboard their automobiles while engaging in illegal traffic. From
the circumstances of the case at bar, it is impossible to get a warrant to stop an automobile. Before a warrant could be
secured, the automobile would be beyond the reach of the officer with its load of illegal liquor disposed of.
The Court lays down the rule that: if the search and seizure without a warrant are made upon probable cause, that
is, upon a belief, reasonably arising out of circumstances known to the seizing officer, that an automobile or other
vehicle contains that which by law is subject to seizure and destruction, the search and seizure are VALID.
The guaranty of freedom from unreasonable searches and seizures by the Fourth Amendment has been construed as
recognizing a necessary difference between a search of a store, dwelling house, or other structure in respect of which a proper
official warrant readily may be obtained, and a search of a ship, motor boat, wagon or automobile, for contraband goods, where
it is not practicable to secure a warrant because the vehicle can be quickly moved out of the locality or jurisdiction in
which the warrant must be sought.
The measure of the legality of the seizure is that the seizing officer shall have reasonable or probable cause for
believing that the automobile which he stops and seizes has contraband liquor therein which is being illegally transported. This
leads to the line of distinction between legal and illegal seizures of liquor in transport in vehicles. It gives the owner of an
automobile or other vehicle seized under Section 26, in absence of probable cause, a right to have restored to him the
automobile, it protects him under the Weeks and Amos cases from use of the liquor as evidence against him, and it subjects the
officer making the seizures to damages. On the other hand, in a case showing probable cause, the Government and its
officials are given the opportunity which they should have, to make the investigation necessary to trace reasonably
suspected contraband goods and seize them.
The circumstances of the case show that Grand Rapids is about 152 miles from Detroit and that Detroit and its
neighbourhood along the Detroit River, which is the International Boundary, is one of the most active centers for
introducing illegally into the country spirituous liquors for distribution. It is obvious from the evidence that the prohibition
agents were engaged in a regular patrol along the important highways from Detroit to Grand Rapids to stop and seize liquor
carried in automobiles. They knew or had convincing evidence to make them believe that Carroll and Kiro (so-called
“bootleggers” in the Grand Rapids) were engaged in plying the unlawful trade of selling such liquor in the city.
In the present case, it is clear that the officers had justification for the search and seizure. The facts and circumstances
within their knowledge and of which they had reasonably trustworthy information which were sufficient in themselves to warrant
a man of reasonable cause in the belief that intoxicating liquor was being transported in the automobile which they stopped and
searched.
-Rafaella Reyes
 [CRIMPRO - Bautista] 48
[Camille Umali]

People vs. Que

Caballes vs. CA

Doctrine:
In search of moving vehicle, the vehicle’s inherent mobility reduces expectation of privacy especially when its transit in
public thoroughfares furnishes a highly reasonable suspicion amounting to probable cause that the occupant committed a
criminal activity. However, the mere mobility of these vehicles does not give the officers unlimited discretion to conduct
indiscriminate searches without warrants if made within the interior of the territory and in the absence of probable cause.

Facts:
 Rudy Caballes was charged of theft for allegedly stealing and carrying away about 630-kg of Aluminum Cable Conductors
belonging to and to the damage of NAPOCOR.)While two police officers were on a routine patrol in Pagsanjan Laguna, they
spotted passenger jeep unusually covered with Kakakwati leaves. Suspecting that the jeep was loaded with smuggled goods,
the two police officers flagged down the vehicle which was driven by Caballes. When he was asked what was loaded on the
jeep, he did not answer and he looked pale and nervous.
 With Caballes’ consent, the police officers checked the cargo and they discovered bundles of aluminium/galvanized conductor
wires exclusively owned by NAPOCOR. Caballes and the vehicle with high voltage wires were then brought to the Pagsanjan
Police Station. Caballes now assails the constitutionality of the search and the validity of his arrest on the ground that no warrant
was issued to that effect.

Issue:/Held:
WON the constitutional right of Caballes was violated when the police officers searched his vehicle and seized the
wires found therein without a search warrant and when samples of the wires were admitted as evidence. Yes

Ratio:
The constitutional proscription against warrantless searches and seizures is not absolute but admits of certain
exceptions namely: (1) warrantless search incidental to a lawful arrest recognized under Sec. 12, Rule 126 of the ROC and by
prevailing jurisprudence, (2) seizure of evidence in plain view, (3) search of moving vehicles, (4) consented warrantless
searches, (5) customs search, (6) stop and frisk situations and (7) exigent and extraordinary circumstances.
In search of a moving vehicle, the vehicle’s inherent mobility reduces expectation of privacy especially when its transit
in public thoroughfares furnishes a highly reasonable suspicion amounting to probable cause that the occupant committed a
criminal activity. The rules governing search have been liberalized on the basis of practicality. This is so considering that before
a warrant could be obtained, the place, things and persons to be searched must be described to the satisfaction of the issuing
judge- a requirement which borders on the impossible in the case of smuggling effected by the use of a moving vehicle that can
transport contraband from one place to another with impunity. It is not practicable to secure a warrant because the vehicle can
be moved quickly out of the locality or jurisdiction in which the warrant must be sought. However, the mere mobility of these
vehicles does not give the officers unlimited discretion to conduct indiscriminate searches without warrants if made within the
interior of the territory and in the absence of probable cause.
Routine inspections are not regarded as violative of an individual’s right against unreasonable search. The search
which is normally permissible in this instance is limited to the following instances: (1) where the officer merely draws the curtain
of a vacant vehicle which is parked on the public fair grounds, (2) simply looks into a vehicle, (3) flashes a light therein without
opening the car’s doors, (4) where the occupants are not subjected to a physical or body search , (5) where the inspection of the
vehicle is limited to a visual search or visual inspection, (6) where the routine check is conducted in a fixed area. In the instant
case, however, THE POLICE OFFICERS DID NOT MERELY CONDUCT A VISUAL SEARCH OR VISUAL INSPECTION OF
CABALLES’ VEHICLE. THEY HAD TO REACH INSIDE THE VEHICLE, LIFT THE KAKAWATI LEAVES AND LOOK INSIDE
THE SACKS BEFORE THEY WERE ABLE TO SEE THE CABLE WIRES. THUS, IT CANNOT BE CONSIDERED A SIMPLE
ROUTINE CHECK. Citing US v. Pierre, an officer did not conduct a search when he physically intruded part of his body
into a space in which the suspect had a reasonable expectation of privacy. Physical intrusion of a part of a body of an
agent into the vehicle goes beyond the are protected by the Fourth Amendment.
On the other hand, when a vehicle is stopped and subjected to an extensive search, such a warrantless search would
be constitutionally permissible only if the officers conducting the search have reasonable or probable cause to believe before the
search that either the motorist is a law offender or they will find the instrumentality or evidence pertaining to a crime in the
vehicle to be searched. In the instant case, THE FACT THAT THE VEHICLE LOOKED SUSPICIOUS SIMPLY BECAUSE IT IS
NOT COMMON FOR SUCH TO BE COVERED WITH KAKAWATI LEAVES DOES NOT CONSTITUTE PROBABLE CAUSE
AS WOULD JUSTIFY THE CONDUCT OF A SEARCH WITHOUT A WARRANT. In addition, the police authorities do not claim
to have received any confidential report or tipped information that petitioner was carrying stolen cable wires in his vehicle which
could have otherwise sustained their suspicion.
 [CRIMPRO - Bautista] 49
[Camille Umali]

People vs. Escano

Plaintiff-appellee: People of the Philippines

Accused-appellant: Virgilio Tome Usana, Jerry Casabaan Lopez
Nature: Appeal from a decision of RTC Makati
Br. 64.
Date: January 28, 2000
Ponente: Davide, JR, CJ.

Summary:
Accused-appellants Virgilio T. Usana and Jerry C. Lopez, together with Julian Escano, were charged and convicted before
RTC Makati with violation of Sec 4 of RA 6425 (Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972). Escano and Usana were charged with illegal
possession of firearms pursuant to the gun ban of the Comelec. With regard to this case, only the judgement re illegal drug
possession is appealed. Usana and Lopez were acquitted.

Facts:
Prosecution
 April 5, 1996 – During the Comelec gun ban, some law enforcers of the Makati Police were manning checkpoint at the corner of
Senator Gil Puyat Ave and the SLEX. At past midnight, they stopped a Kia Pride. One officer saw a long firearm on the lap of
Usana. They asked Escano to park the car and the other passengers were searched for more weapons. The search yielded a .
45 caliber firearm from Escano. They were brought to police station Block 5. One of the officers asked Escano to open the trunk
of the car to which he readily agreed. They noticed a blue bag inside and found it containing 3.3143 kg of hashish.5
Escano’s Defense
 He was to meet with business partners. Upon crossing SLEX, they were flagged down. Police officer demanded to see his
license. He refused and reiterated that there was no reason for him to surrender his license for he had not committed any
violation. In the police station, police asked him if they could search his car. He inquired if he was entitled to a lawyer and why
they needed to conduct a search when they had not told him what law he violated. After 2 hours, he was brought to office and
was shown a bag, rifle, a pistol and package. He was surprised that they found those items given that his key was with him.
Lopez’s Defense
 When police officers saw the guns, Escano tried to intercede and said that “these two don’t know anything, I just took them for a
drive.” He told police that all he knew was that Escano was a wealthy flight attendant with military connections. Escano admitted
he owned the bag.
Usana’s Defense
 Usana was an architect. He was going to negotiate with Escano regarding the helicopter gunship they were going to supply for
the Air Force. He said that when he got in the car, he did not see any gun.
Trial Court
 Found the prosecution’s version more credible and found the accused as guilty. They were sentenced to reclusion perpetua as
regards the illegal drug and 10-17 years re gun ban.

Issue:
WON trial court erred in convicting the appellants of illegal possession of hashish.

Held: Trial court erred. The appellants are acquitted.

Ratio:
On the Establishment of checkpoints
Not all checkpoints are illegal. Routine checkpoints do intrude, to a certain extent, on motorist’s right to “free passage
without interruption,” but it cannot be denied that, AS A RULE, it involves only a brief detention of travelers during which the
occupants are required to answer a brief question or two. For as long as the vehicle is neither searched nor its occupants
subjected to a body search, and the inspection of the vehicle is limited to a visual search, said routine checks cannot be
regarded as violative of an individual’s right against unreasonable search.
Jurisprudence recognizes six generally accepted exceptions to warrant requirement: 1) search incidental to an arrest;
2) seach of moving vehicles; 3) evidence in plain view; 4) customs searches; 5) consented warrantless search; and 6) stop-and-
frisk situations. We cannot invalidate the search of the vehicle for Escano consented to such. He readily agreed to open the
trunk upon request of the officer.
Despite the validity of the search, we cannot affirm the conviction of Usana and Lopez for violation of RA 6425. The following
facts militate against finding a conviction:
d) The car belonged to Escano
e) The trunk of the car was not opened soon after it was stopped and after the accused were searched for firearms

5
Hashish - is a preparation of cannabis composed of the compressed stalked resin glands called trichomes, collected from
the cannabis plant. No reports of a statistical linkage between hashish and violent crime have been published in known
scientific literature; instead it has been found to generally inhibit aggressive impulses.
 [CRIMPRO - Bautista] 50
[Camille Umali]

f) The car was driven by a policeman from the place where it was stopped until the police station.
g) The car’s trunk was opened, with permission of Escano without the presence of Usana and Lopez
h) After arrival at police station and until opening of the trunk, the car was in the possession and control of the police authorities.
No fact was adduced to link Usana and Lopez to the Hashish found in the trunk. There was no sowing that they knew of the
presence of hashish in the trunk of the car or that they saw the same before it was seized.
-Armand Mislang
 [CRIMPRO - Bautista] 51
[Camille Umali]

US vs. Chadwick
Nature: Certiorari to the US Court of Appeals for the First Circuit
Date: June 21, 1977
Ponente: Chief Justice Burger

Facts:
 May 8, 1973, Amtrak Railroad officials in San Diego observed respondents Machado and Leary load a brown footlocker onto a
train bound for Boston.
- Trunk was unusually heavy and it leaks talcum powder which is often used to mask odor of marijuana or hashish
- Machado also matched a profile used to spot drug traffickers
 Railroad officials reported the matter to federal agents
 When train arrived in Boston 2 days later, Federal narcotics agents were waiting though they did NOT have an arrest or search
warrant. They only have a police dog trained to detect marijuana. Inside.
 Machado and Leary were kept under surveillance.

 The agents released the dog and the latter signaled the presence of a controlled substance.
 Chadwick joined Machado and Leary. They tried to load the footlocker into Chadwick’s waiting automobile but they were
arrested while the trunk was still open and before the car engine had been started. Keys to the footlocker were taken from
Machado.
 Respondents were taken to the Federal Building. From respondent’s arrest at around 9pm, the footlocker remained under
exclusive control of law enforcement where there’s no risk that it would be taken by the defendant or their associate.
 About 1 and ½ hour after the arrest, the agents opened the footlocker and luggage WITHOUT respondent’s consent and
WITHOUT a search warrant. The footlocker was locked with a padlock and a regular trunk lock.
 Respondents were indicted for possession of marijuana. They tried to suppress the marijuana obtained from footlocker.
 Government justifies its failure to secure search warrant under “automobile exception” of Chambers v. Maroney.

District court: rejected the justifications

 relationship between the footlocker and Chadwick's automobile as merely coincidental, and held that the double-locked, 200-
pound footlocker was not part of "the area from within which [respondents] might gain possession of a weapon or destructible
evidence
Court of Appeals: affirmed the suppression of the seized material
Issue/Held: WON search of the footlocker was lawful .No
 [CRIMPRO - Bautista] 52
[Camille Umali]

Ratio:
Government Court
- Only homes, offices, and private - In Katz case, 4th amendment protects people from unreasonable
communications implicate interests which government intrusions into their legitimate expectation of privacy.
lie at the core of the Fourth Amendment. In - list of cases where Warrant clause was applied beyond the narrow
all other situations, the Government limits suggested by Government ( ie hotel room, office, automobile on
contends, less significant privacy values private person, etc.)
are at stake, and the reasonableness of a - a rule permitting a search of personalty on probable cause alone
government intrusion should depend solely had not yet "received sufficient recognition by the Supreme Court
on whether there is probable cause to outside the automobile area, or generally, for us to recognize it as a
believe evidence of criminal conduct is valid exception to the fourth amendment warrant requirement
present.
- Rationale for automobile search cases - Treatment of automobiles has been based in part on their inherent
demonstrates the reasonableness of mobility, which often makes obtaining a judicial warrant impracticable.
permitting warrantless searches of luggage - The factors which diminish the privacy aspects of an automobile do
not apply to respondents' footlocker. Luggage contents are not open
to public view nor is luggage subject to regular inspections and official
scrutiny on a continuing basis. Unlike an automobile, whose primary
function is transportation, luggage is intended as a repository of
personal effects.
- a person's expectations of privacy in personal luggage are
substantially greater than in an automobile.

Warrantless searches of luggage or other property seized at the time of an arrest cannot be justified as incident to that arrest
either if the "search is remote in time or place from the arrest," or no exigency exists.
Once law enforcement officers have reduced luggage or other personal property not immediately associated with the
person of the arrestee to their exclusive control, and there is no longer any danger that the arrestee might gain access to the
property to seize a weapon or destroy evidence, a search of that property is no longer an incident of the arrest
-Camille Umali
 [CRIMPRO - Bautista] 53
[Camille Umali]

B. Plain View
US vs. Gray

Date: Aug 7, 1973

Ponente: William E. Miller, Circuit Judge

Facts:
 Gray was found guilty under two counts of violation of the federal firearms law. In July 1972, Kentucky State Trooper, John R.
Miller received an information that Gray , the operator of a small grocery store, was selling beer without license. Trooper Miller
requested Trooper Brodt to attempt to set up a sale. Trooper Brodt in plain clothes, went to gray’s store and bought five cans of
beer. He then left the store to procure a search warrant and a warrant for Gray’s arrest. Armed with the two warrants, Troopers
Miller and Brodt returned to Gray’s store and execute the search warrant which directed the seizure of “any intoxicating liquors
or materials used in the manufacture of intoxicating liquors.”
 Gray was immediately arrested and the property was searched, after locating and seizing a small quantity of beer, Trooper Brodt
proceeded to the upper level of the building to search. No alcoholic beverages were found in the upper area, but Trooper Brodt
noticed two rifles leaning against the wall in an upstairs clothes closet. Trooper Brodt removed the rifles from the closet and
took them downstairs to the store area of the building where he copied down the serial numbers of the weapons. Then
he returned the weapons to the upstairs closet. After searching the out-building and the motor on the property and seizing
several cases of beer the officers departed with the defendant.
 The officers then ran the serial numbers obtained from the rifles through the computer of the National Crime Investigation Center
and learned for the first time that the firearms had been stolen in Tennessee. Trooper Brodt filed for and obtained a search
warrant for gray’s arrest for knowingly receiving stolen property.

Issue:
WON Trooper Brodt’s actions in removing the rifles from the closet, examining them, and copying the serial numbers
are covered by the plain view doctrine.

Held:
No.
“Plain view” cases have in common is that the police officer in each of them had a prior justification for an intrusion in
the course of which he came inadvertently across a piece of evidence incriminating the accused. The extension of the original
justification is legitimate only where it is immediately apparent to the police that they have evidence before them.
In this case the seizure of the rifles by Trooper Brodt cannot be justified. The first prong of the doctrine requires that
the “police officer . . . had a prior justification for an intrusion.” This requirement was met since the officers were acting in
pursuant to a legitimate search warrant directing the seizure of alcoholic beverages upon gray’s property. The Second prong of
the doctrine requires that during the search the officers “came inadvertently across a piece of evidence incriminating the
accused.” Third “the extension of the original justification is legitimate only where it is immediately apparent to the police that
they have evidence before them.”
Officer Brodt inadvertently discovered the rifles in the upstairs closet while searching for alcoholic beverages but it
WAS NOT immediately apparent that the rifles were evidence incriminating the accused. The rifles were not contraband, there
was no nexus between the rifles and the crimes of selling or possessing intoxicating liquor without a license, nor did the officers
at that time have any knowledge that the rifles were evidence of any other crimes. It was only after Trooper Brodt had seized the
weapons, copied down the serial numbers, left the defendant’s premises, and then run the information taken off the rifles that he
learned that they were stolen and hence incriminating.
The doctrine is a recognition of the fact that when the police come across immediately recognizable incriminating
evidence not named in the warrant they should not be required to shut their eyes to it, regardless of whether it is evidence of the
crime they are investigating or evidence of some other crime. It would be a needless inconvenience to require the police to
obtain another warrant.
-Cyril Arnesto
 [CRIMPRO - Bautista] 54
[Camille Umali]

Arizona vs. Hicks

Ponente: Scalia, J.
Date: March 3, 1987

Doctrine: Probable cause needed in plain view doctrine

Facts:
 April 18, 1984: A bullet was fired through the floor of Hicks’ apartment, striking and injuring a man in the apartment below.
 Police officers arrived at the apartment to search for the shooter, other victims and weapons. They found 3 weapons (one sawed
off rifle) and a stocking cap mask.
 Officer Nelson noticed expensive stereo components and suspected that such were stolen so he read and recorded the serial
numbers. He moved the components and a Bang and Olufsen turntable in order to get the serial numbers and phone them in to
the headquarters. He was told that the turntable was taken in an armed robbery so he immediately took it. Later he found out
that the component was also taken in the same robbery so a warrant was obtained to seize that equipment.
 State trial court granted Hicks’ motion to suppress evidence seized. CA of Arizona affirmed saying that although the initial
warrantless entry and search was justified due to an exigent circumstance (shooting), the moving around of the component and
the obtaining of serial numbers was an unjustified warrantless search and was not related to that exigency. Both TC and CA
rejected Nelson’s defense that what he did falls under the plain view doctrine.

Issues:
1. WON Nelson’s actions constitute search or seizure
2. WON search was reasonable under 4th amendment
Held/ Ratio:
Mere recording of serial numbers did not constitute seizure. But Nelson’s moving of the equipment constitutes a search
separate from the justified warrantless search in pursuit of the shooter, victims, weapons. Mere inspection of parts of turntable
that came into view during initial search is not an independent search but taking action to view concealed portions is a new
invasion of Hicks’ privacy. It doesn’t matter whether the independent search uncovered anything, what matters is that there was
a search that occurred. A search is a search even if it happens to disclose nothing but the bottom of a turntable.
The court rejects the position that because the Nelson’s action was unrelated to the justification for entry into the
apartment, it was ipso facto unreasonable. The lack of relationship always exists in the plain view doctrine since if the action
taken is for the purpose of justifying entry then the plain view doctrine need not be invoked.
The plain view doctrine says that it is well established that under certain circumstances the police may seize evidence
in plain view without a warrant (Coolidge vs New Hampshire). Those circumstances include situations where initial intrusion that
brings police within plain view of such is supported by one of the recognized exceptions to the warrant requirement.
Probable cause is needed in plain view doctrine. The theory of that doctrine consists of extending to non-public places
such as the home, where searches and seizures without a warrant are presumptively unreasonable, the police’s longstanding
authority to make warrantless seizures in public places of such objects as weapons and contraband. No reason is apparent why
an object should routinely be seizable on lesser grounds, during an unrelated search and seizure, than would have been needed
to obtain a warrant for that same object if it had been known to be on the premises. Thus probable cause is needed, in this case
there is no probable cause in Nelson’s search.
Even if Nelson’s search violated the 4 th amendment, the court should have admitted the evidence obtained under good
faith exception to exclusionary rule (but since not the issue, court did not decide)

White, J. concurring
I do not accept dissent’s assertion that evidence seized in plain view must have been inadvertently discovered in order
to satisfy the dictates of the 4th amendment.

Powell, J. dissenting
The plurality opinion in Coolidge v. New Hampshire required only that it be "immediately apparent to the police that they
have evidence before them; the `plain view' doctrine may not be used to extend a general exploratory search from one object to
another until something incriminating at last emerges." There was no general exploratory search in this case, and I would not
approve such a search. All the pertinent objects were in plain view and could be identified as objects frequently stolen. There
was no looking into closets, opening of drawers or trunks, or other "rummaging around." Justice O’Connor properly emphasizes
that the moving of a suspicious object in plain view results in a minimal invasion of privacy.

O’Connor, J. dissenting
The Court today gives the right answer to the wrong question. The Court asks whether the police must have probable
cause before either seizing an object in plain view or conducting a full-blown search of that object, and concludes that they must.
 [CRIMPRO - Bautista] 55
[Camille Umali]

I agree. In my view, however, this case presents a different question: whether police must have probable cause before
conducting a cursory inspection of an item in plain view. Because I conclude that such an inspection is reasonable if the police
are aware of facts or circumstances that justify a reasonable suspicion that the item is evidence of a crime, I would reverse the
judgment of the Arizona Court of Appeals, and therefore dissent.
Three requirements that the plurality thought must be satisfied for a plain-view search or seizure are the ff: First, the
police must lawfully make an initial intrusion or otherwise be in a position from which they can view a particular area. Second,
the officer must discover incriminating evidence "inadvertently." Third, it must be "immediately apparent" to the police that the
items they observe may be evidence of a crime, contraband, or otherwise subject to seizure. As another plurality observed in
these three requirements have never been expressly adopted by a majority of this Court, but "as the considered opinion of four
Members of this Court [the Coolidge plurality] should obviously be the point of reference for further discussion of the issue."
-Gianna Comsti
 [CRIMPRO - Bautista] 56
[Camille Umali]

Horton vs. California

People vs. Musa

Facts:
 Sgt. Amado Ani was ordered by T/Sgt. Jesus Belarga to conduct a surveillance and test buy on Mari Musa of Suterville,
Zamboanga. Information received from civilian informer was that this Mari Musa was engaged in selling marijuana in said place.
 Sgt. Ani and another NARCOM agent, together with the civilian informer proceeded to the house of Musa. Sgt. Ani was able to
buy one newspaper-wrapped dried marijuana.
 The following day, a buy-bust operation was planned. Sgt. Ani was assigned as the poseur-buyer and he was given PHP 20.00.
A pre-arranged signal was arranged consisting of Sgt. Ani's raising his right hand, after he had succeeded to buy the marijuana.
 Sgt. Ani proceeded to the house of Musa. He told Musa that he wanted more stuff. Ani gave Musa the PHP 20.00 marked
money. After receiving the money, Musa went back to his house and gave Sgt. Ani 2 newspaper wrappers containing dried
marijuana. After confirming that the newspaper contained marijuana, Sgt. Ani raised his right hand.
 The 2 NARCOM teams went inside the house to arrest Musa. Sgt. Belarga frisked Musa in the living room but could not find
the PHP 20.00 marked money. When asked where the money was, Musa said he gave the money to his wife who had slipped
away. Sgt. Belarga then went to the kitchen and found a plastic bag containing dried marijuana inside it, somewhere in the
kitchen.
 Musa was then arrested and brought to the NARCOM office. The RTC convicted him for the violation of the Dangerous Drugs
Act of 1972.

Issue:
WON the plastic bag containing dried marijuana inside it found in the kitchen is admissible against Musa

Held/Ratio:
 NO, but Musa is still convicted for violating the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972.
 The Constitution declares inadmissible, any evidence obtained in violation of the freedom from unreasonable searches and
seizures.
 While a valid search warrant is generally necessary before a search and seizure may be effected, exceptions to this rule are
recognized. The most important exception to the necessity for a search warrant is the right of search and seizure as an incident
to a lawful arrest.
 Rule 126, Section 12 of the Rules of Court (old rules of court) expressly authorizes a warrantless search and seizure incident to
a lawful arrest. It provides that “A person lawfully arrested may be searched for dangerous weapons or anything which may be
used as proof of the commission of an offense, without a search warrant.”
 There is no doubt that the warrantless search incidental to a lawful arrest authorizes the arresting officer to make a search
upon the person of the person arrested.
 An officer making an arrest may take from the person arrested any money or property found upon his person which was used in
the commission of the crime or was the fruit of the crime or which might furnish the prisoner with the means of committing
violence or of escaping, or which may be used as evidence in the trial of the cause.
 Hence, in a buy-bust operation conducted to entrap a drug-pusher, the law enforcement agents may seize the marked money
found on the person of the pusher immediately after the arrest even without arrest and search warrants.
 In the case at bar, the NARCOM agents searched the person of the Musa after arresting him in his house but found nothing.
They then searched the entire house and, in the kitchen, found and seized a plastic bag hanging in a corner.
 The warrantless search and seizure, as an incident to a suspect's lawful arrest, may extend beyond the person of the one
arrested to include the premises or surroundings under his immediate control. Objects in the "plain view" of an officer who has
the right to be in the position to have that view are subject to seizure and may be presented as evidence.
 The "plain view" doctrine may not, however, be used to launch unbridled searches and indiscriminate seizures nor to extend a
general exploratory search made solely to find evidence of defendant's guilt.
 The "plain view" doctrine is usually applied where a police officer is not searching for evidence against the accused, but
nonetheless inadvertently comes across an incriminating object. Furthermore, the U.S. Supreme Court stated the following
limitations on the application of the doctrine:
 What the "plain view" cases have in common is that the police officer in each of them had a prior justification for an intrusion in
the course of which he came inadvertently across a piece of evidence incriminating the accused. The doctrine serves to
supplement the prior justification — whether it be a warrant for another object, hot pursuit, search incident to lawful arrest, or
some other legitimate reason for being present unconnected with a search directed against the accused — and permits the
warrantless seizure. Of course, the extension of the original justification is legitimate only where it is immediately apparent to
the police that they have evidence before them; the "plain view" doctrine may not be used to extend a general exploratory
search from one object to another until something incriminating at last emerges.
 It must be immediately apparent to the police that the items that they observe may be evidence of a crime, contraband, or
otherwise subject to seizure.
 [CRIMPRO - Bautista] 57
[Camille Umali]

 In the instant case, Musa was arrested and his person searched in the living room. The plastic bag containing marijuana was
found in the kitchen. The plastic bag was, therefore, not within their "plain view" when they arrested the appellant as to justify
its seizure. The NARCOM agents had to move from one portion of the house to another before they sighted the plastic bag.
 Moreover, when the NARCOM agents saw the plastic bag hanging in one corner of the kitchen, they had no clue as to its
contents. They had to ask the Musa what the bag contained. When Musa refused to respond, they opened it and found the
marijuana. The NARCOM agents in this case could not have discovered the inculpatory nature of the contents of the bag had
they not forcibly opened it.
 Even assuming then, that the NARCOM agents inadvertently came across the plastic bag because it was within their "plain
view," what may be said to be the object in their "plain view" was just the plastic bag and not the marijuana. The incriminating
nature of the contents of the plastic bag was not immediately apparent from the "plain view" of said object. It cannot be
claimed that the plastic bag clearly betrayed its contents, whether by its distinctive configuration, its transprarency, or otherwise,
that its contents are obvious to an observer.
 The plastic bag containing marijuana is inadmissible. However, the exclusion of this particular evidence does not, however,
diminish, in any way, the damaging effect of the other pieces of evidence presented by the prosecution to prove that the
appellant sold marijuana.
-Macel Dacanay
 [CRIMPRO - Bautista] 58
[Camille Umali]

People vs. Doria

Date: 22 January 1999

Ponente: Puno, J.
Nature: Appeal from a decision of the RTC of Pasig City, Br. 156.

Facts:
 PNP Narcotics Command (Narcom) received information from 2 civilian informants (CS) that a “Jun” (Doria) was engaged in
illegal drug activities in Mandaluyong City. The Narcom agents thus planned to entrap and arrest “Jun” in a buy-bust operation.
PO3 Manlangit was to be the poseur-buyer and SPO1 Badua his back-up. PO3 Manlangit was given P2000 by Superintendent
Alcantara for the operation, of which P1600 was allocated for the purchase of marijuana 6. PO3 Manlangit marked the bills with
his initials and listed down the bills’ serial numbers.
 At Jacinto St., PO3 Manlangit was introduced by a CI to “Jun” who, after receiving the marked money, instructed PO3 Manlangit
to wait at the corner of Jacinto and Shaw Blvd while he got marijuana from his associate. When they met up an hour later, “Jun”
gave PO3 Manlangit an object wrapped in plastic and was immediately arrested. Since they could not find the marked bills on
him, he revealed that they were at the house of his associate, “Neneth”, in Daang Bakal.
 The door to “Neneth”’s house was open and as SPO1 Badua was asking “Neneth” (Gaddao) about the money, PO3 Manlangit
spotted a carton box under the dining table from the doorway. One of the box’s flaps was open and something wrapped in plastic
could be seen. Such plastic was similar to the plastic used to wrap the marijuana that “Jun” had given PO3 Manlangit. PO3
Manlangit then entered “Neneth”’s house and when he looked inside the box, he found 10 bricks of dried marijuana leaves.
SPO1 Badua recovered the marked bills from “Neneth”.
 Doria’s version: he was a carpenter reading a tabloid newspaper at the gate of his house when two men appeared looking for
“Totoy”. When he denied knowing a Totoy, the men took him inside his house and accused him of being a drug pusher. He was
then brought to their car and ordered to point out the house of “Totoy”. After a 5-min ride, he pointed to the Gaddao residence.
PO3 Manlangit pushed the door open and he and his companions entered and searched the house. When the policemen saw
Gaddao carrying water from a well, they asked her about “Totoy” but she said he wasn’t there. Doria then overheard the
policemen saying they found an open carton box on top of the table with something inside. Doria and Gaddao were then
arrested.
 Gaddao’s version: her husband, Totoy, had left for Pangasinan 5 days earlier. After accompanying one of her sons (Arjay) to
school (taking with her 3-y.o. Jason) she went to an artisan well to get water but when she was there was grabbed by PO3
Manlangit who pulled her to her house and asked about a box on her table. It was a closed box tied with green straw. It was
Gaddao’s first time to see it.
 Police claim that warrants were not necessary for Gaddao’s arrest and the search of her house because the arrest was made in
“hot pursuit” and the search was incident to her lawful arrest. They also submit that the items seized were in plain view. RTC
found an organized/syndicated crime group and sentenced both Doria and Gaddao to death.
Issues:
1. WON the buy-bust operation and arrest of Doria was valid
2. WON the warrantless arrest of Gaddao and the search of her person and house were valid.

Held:
1. YES, Doria’s arrest was valid. Sentenced to reclusion perpetua.
 A buy-bust operation is a form of entrapment employed by peace officers as an effective way of apprehending a criminal in the
act of the commission of an offense.
 Entrapment
- Unheard of in common law; sprouted from the doctrine of estoppel and the public interest in the formulation and application of
decent standards in the enforcement of criminal law.
- In American jurisdiction, negative meaning = inducement. It pertained to the seduction of an otherwise innocent person into a
criminal career by law enforcement. The criminal intent originated from the mind of the entrapping person.
Tests used in American jurisdiction:
- “Subjective / Origin of Intent / Predisposition Test” = accused’s mental and character traits, activities, eagerness, propensity to
commit a crime are taken into consideration to assess an individual’s state of mind before the commission of the crime.
- “Objective test” = whether the conduct of the law enforcement agent was likely to induce a normally law-abiding person, other
than one who is ready and willing, to commit an offense. (focus: police conduct)
Entrapment in Philippine jurisdiction: it is a valid positive defense for the accused. It is different from the American conception of
entrapment, which is similar to “Instigation”.
- Instigation = would-be accused is induced into the commission of an offense and the instigator himself becomes co-principal. It
is contrary to public policy, illegal, a valid defense on the part of the accused and is an absolutory cause.
- Entrapment = peace officers employ ways and means to trap and capture a lawbreaker in the execution of his criminal plan. It is
not contrary to public policy and does not constitute a defense for the accused.
- In this case, the court emphasized the need to use both Objective and Subjective tests. Courts should look at all factors.
6
Going price for marijuana at the time was P1600 per kilo.
 [CRIMPRO - Bautista] 59
[Camille Umali]

 PO3 Manlangit’s testimony was frank, spontaneous, straight-forward and categorical. It was not crumpled on cross-examination
and it was also corroborated by SPO4 Badua.
 Doria’s warrantless arrest was not unlawful as it falls under Sec. 5, Rule 113 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure which provides
the instances for warrantless arrests. Doria was caught in fragrante delicto.

2. No, Gaddao’s arrest and the search of her house were invalid. The evidence seized from her house is inadmissible. She is
acquitted.
 Gaddao’s arrest does not fall under Sec. 5(a) of Rule 113 because she was not caught in fragrante delicto. She was not
committing any crime upon arrest. There was no occasion for her flee from arresting officers to justify an arrest “in hot pursuit”.
Se was merely doing her chores at the time.
 Neither could her arrest fall under Sec. 5(b) of Rule 113 since it requires that the arresting officer must have “personal
knowledge” of the facts and must be based upon probable cause, meaning “actual belief, or reasonable grounds of suspicion”.
Gaddao was arrested solely on the basis of the alleged identification made by Doria that she had the marked money. This
identification does not necessarily lead to the conclusion that she conspired with him in drug pushing. Therefore, no reasonable
grounds to believe that she was engaged in drug pushing.
 Since the arrest was illegal, it follows that the search of her house as incidental to the arrest was also illegal.

Pertinent Sub-issue:
W/N the box of marijuana was in plain view, making the warrantless search valid.

No, it was not.

 Plain view doctrine’s requisites:
a. Law enforcement officer in search of the evidence has a prior justification for an intrusion or is in a position from which he can
view a particular area;
b. The discovery of the evidence in plain view is inadvertent;
c. It is immediately apparent to the officer that the item he observes may be evidence of a crime, contraband, or otherwise subject
to seizure.
 The object must be open to the eye and hand and its discovery inadvertent.
 Albeit PO3 Manlangit had a view of the interior of the house and could see a partially open carton box under the dining table 2 ½
meters away, he only presumed that the contents of the box were marijuana because it had the same plastic wrapping as the
“buy-bust marijuana”.
 Each of the marijuana bricks were individually wrapped in newspapers and placed inside plastic bags. PO3 Manlangit did not
know what was inside the box; the marijuana therefore was not in plain view.
-Mickey Chatto
 [CRIMPRO - Bautista] 60
[Camille Umali]

[Link] or Consented Searches

Schneckloth vs. Bustamonte

Nature: Certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
Date: May 29, 1973
Ponente: Mr. Justice Stewart

Doctrine:
When the subject of a search is not in custody and the State would justify a search on the basis of his consent, the
Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments require that it demonstrate that the consent was in fact voluntary; voluntariness is a
question of fact which is to be determined from the totality of all the surrounding circumstances . While knowledge of a
right to refuse consent is an important factor to take into consideration, the State need not prove that the one giving
permission to search knew that he had a right to withhold his consent.

Facts:
 Police Officer James Rand was on a routine patrol in Sunnyvale, California. At around 2:40 in the morning, he stopped an
automobile when he observed that one headlight and its license plate light were burned out.
 Six men were inside the automobile. Joe Alcala, Robert Bustamonte (respondent), and Joe Gonzales (driver) were seated in
front, while three older men were seated at the rear.
 When Gonzales could not produce a driver’s license, Officer Rand asked if any of the other five passengers had any evidence of
identification. Alcala produced a license and explained that the car was his brother’s.
 When the men stepped out of the vehicle, Officer Rand asked Alcala if he could search the car. Alcala replied, “Sure, go
ahead”. Gonzales even testified that Alcala actually helped in the search of the car, by opening the trunk and glove
compartment. When the trunk was opened, wadded up under the left rear seat, the police officers found three checks that
had previously been stolen from a car wash.
 Trial Court: Admitted the checks as evidence after ascertaining that consent had freely been given without coercion or
submission to authority. On this basis as well as other evidence, Bustamonte was convicted.
 California Court of Appeal for the First Appellate District affirmed the conviction. In affirming the validity and constitutionality
of the search and seizure, the appellate court applied the standard of whether an apparent consent was voluntarily given or
was in submission to an express or implied assertion of authority. The use of such standard is a question of fact which
should be determined in light of all the circumstances.
 Respondent Bustamonte sought a writ of habeas corpus in a federal district court but it was denied. On appeal, the Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit set aside the District Court’s order and reasoned that a consent was a waiver of a person’s
Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment Rights. As such, the State was under obligation to demonstrate not only that
consent had been uncoerced, but that it had been with an understanding that it could be freely and effectively withheld.
Since the District Court had not determined that Alcala had known his consent could have been withheld and that he could have
refused to have his vehicle searched, the CA vacated the order denying the writ of habeas corpus and remanded the case for
further proceedings.

Issue:
WON the prosecution must prove that the one giving permission to search knew that he had a right to withhold his
consent in order to demonstrate that consent was “voluntary” given

Held/Ratio:
No, the prosecution need not specifically prove that the one giving permission to search knew that he had a right to
withhold his consent. Voluntariness is to be determined not by the person’s knowledge of a right to refuse consent, but rather
on the totality of ALL the surrounding circumstances – both the characteristics of the accused and the details of the
interrogation.
The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit concluded that it is an essential part of the State’s initial burden to prove
that a person knows he has a right to refuse consent. On the other hand, the California courts have followed the rule that
voluntariness is a question of fact to be determined from the totality of all the circumstances, and that the state of a
defendant’s knowledge is only one factor to be taken into consideration.
The concept of “voluntariness” has developed largely from cases involving the voluntariness of defendant’s
confessions for purposes of the Fourteenth Amendment. The ultimate test of voluntariness used in these kinds of cases is
this: “Is the confession the product of an essentially free and unconstrained choice by its maker?” If it is, if he has willed
to confess, it may be used against him.
The ruling of the Court of Appeals that the State must affirmatively prove that the subject of the search knew that he
had the right to refuse consent, would, in practice, create serious doubt whether consent searches could continue to be
conducted. More often than not, although there is no evidence of any coercion, the prosecution would be unable to
 [CRIMPRO - Bautista] 61
[Camille Umali]

demonstrate that the subject of the search had known his right to refuse consent, this is precisely because such inquiry
involves the person’s subjective understanding.
One alternative that could very well prove that the subject of a search did know that he had a right to refuse consent
would be to advise him of that right before eliciting his consent for the search. However, this has been universally repudiated
because it would be impractical to impose on instances of normal consent search such detailed requirements of an effective
warning.
A“consent” is a “waiver” of a person’s rights under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments. The argument is that
by allowing the police to conduct a search, a person “waives” whatever right he had to prevent the police from searching.
The doctrine in the case of Johnson v. Zerbst states that to establish such a “waiver”, the State must demonstrate “an
intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege”. In the Johnson case, it must be noted that the
strict standard of waiver is being applied in the context of a fair criminal trial. The Court emphasizes that there is a vast
difference between those rights that protect a fair criminal trial and the rights guaranteed under the Fourth
Amendment. Nothing suggests that it ought to be extended to the constitutional guarantee against unreasonable searches and
seizures. The Fourth Amendment protects the “security of one’s privacy against arbitrary intrusion by the police. . “, it has
nothing to do with promoting the fair ascertainment of truth at a criminal trial.
Applying the detailed type of examination demanded by the Johnson case in the informal and unstructured context of a
consent search would be unrealistic. In some instances, a diluted form of “waiver” were found acceptable; such is an ample
recognition that there is no universal standard that must be applied in every situation where a person forgoes a
constitutional right.
-Rafaella Reyes
 [CRIMPRO - Bautista] 62
[Camille Umali]

US vs. Matlock

Date: 20 February 1974

Ponente: White, J.
Nature: Certiorari

Legal Doctrine:
Voluntary consent of any joint occupant of a residence to search the premises jointly occupied is valid against the co-
occupant, thereby permitting discovered in the search to be used against him at a criminal trial. (cf. 1st par. In Held below)

Facts:
 Matlock was arrested in connection with a bank robbery in the front yard of the Pardeeville home, which was leased by Mr. and
Mrs. Marshall. Mrs. Marshall lived in the home with her children, including Gayle Graff, Gayle’s 3-y.o. son, and Matlock, who
cohabited with Gayle in the east bedroom on the second floor. The police did not ask Matlock in which room he stayed or if he
consented to a search.
 When 3 arresting police officers told Gayle that they were looking for money and a gun and asked if they could search the
house, Gayle voluntarily consented to the search of the house, including the east bedroom on the 2 nd floor. The police were able
to recover $4995 in a diaper bag in the closet.
 District Court: Government had the burden on proving: 1. That just prior to the search, it reasonably appeared to the officers that
facts exist which will render the consenter’s consent binding on the putative defendant, and 2. That just prior to the search facts
do exist which render the consenter’s consent binding on the putative defendant. The District court ruled that it did indeed
appear that Gayle had the authority to give consent to the search but the actual existence of this was not actually proved. The
District Court rendered as inadmissible (being hearsay) Gayle’s statements that she and Matlock had been sleeping in that
bedroom regularly and that they were husband and wife (which they were not). It said that there was thus insufficient evidence
to establish that Gayle and Matlock had been living together.

Issues:
WON Gayle’s relationship to the east bedroom was sufficient to make her consent to the search valid against Matlock.

Held: Yes, it was sufficient. Case remanded.

 When the prosecution seeks to justify a warrantless search by proof of voluntary consent, it is not limited to proof that consent
was given by the defendant himself, but may also show that permission to search was obtained from a third party who
possessed common authority over or sufficient relationship to the premises or effects to be inspected.
 Whether or not Gayle’s statements were hearsay, Matlock’s own admissions out-of-court reasonably proved that there was joint
occupancy in the east bedroom. Also, the rules of evidence normally applicable in criminal trials do not operate with full force at
hearings before the judge to determine admissibility of evidence.
 Nothing on record to raise serious doubts about the validity of Gayle’s statements that they were cohabiting.
- Gayle and Matlock had lived together for several months in Florida before moving to Wisconsin
- There were clothes and articles for both a man and woman in the room
- Cohabitation out of wedlock (a crime in Wisconsin) is not falsely confessed
 [CRIMPRO - Bautista] 63
[Camille Umali]

II. SEARCH AND SEIZURE

3. Warrantless searches

c. WAIVER OR CONSENTED SEARCHES

OHIO v. ROBINETTE

Petitioners: Ohio
Respondents: Robert D. Robinette
Nature: Petition for certiorari to the Supreme Court of Ohio
Doctrine: The Fourth Amendment does not require that a lawfully seized defendant be advised that he is “free to go” before his
consent to search will be recognized as voluntary.
Date: November 18, 1996
Ponente: REHNQUIST, C. J.
Facts:
 Respondent Robinette was speeding (69 mi/hr) on Interstate 70 north of Dayton, Ohio, where the posted speed limit was 45
miles per hour .
 He was stopped by Deputy Roger Newsome of the Montgomery County Sheriff's office. Newsome asked for and was
handed Robinette's driver's license, and uponchecking and finsding that he had no previous violations he just issued a
verbal warning to Robinette, and returned his license.
 Newsome asked, "One question before you get gone: [A]re you carrying any illegal contraband in your car? Any weapons of
any kind, drugs, anything like that?"
 Robinette answered "no" to these questions, after which Deputy Newsome asked if he could search the car.
 Robinette consented. Newsome then searched the car and found a small amount of marijuana and, in a film container, a
pill which was later determined to be methylenedioxymethamphetamine (MDMA).
 Robinette was then arrested and charged with knowing possession of a controlled substance, MDMA, in violation of Ohio
Rev. Code Ann. Section(s) 2925.11(A) (1993).
 Robinette unsuccessfully tried to suppress the evidence and was convicted.
 On appeal, the Ohio Court of Appeals reversed, ruling that the search resulted from an unlawful detention. The
Supreme Court of Ohio, by a divided vote, affirmed.
o The court established a bright-line prerequisite for consensual interrogation under these circumstances:
 "The right, guaranteed by the federal and Ohio Constitutions, to be secure in one's person and property
requires that citizens stopped for traffic offenses be clearly informed by the detaining officer when they
are free to go after a valid detention, before an officer attempts to engage in a consensual interrogation.
Any attempt at consensual interrogation must be preceded by the phrase `At this time you legally are free
to go' or by words of similar import."

 Hence, this petition.

Issues/Held:
PROCEDURAL ISSUE: Whether the Court has jurisdiction to review the Ohio Supreme Court’s decision. Yes
MAIN ISSUE: Whether the Fourth Amendment requires that a lawfully seized defendant must be advised that he is “free to go”
before his consent to the search will be recognized as voluntary. No

Ratio:
On the Procedural Issue
The respondent’s contention that jurisdiction is lacking because the Ohio decision rested in part uon the State constitution is
rejected under Michigan v. Long. Also, although the court below mentions the Ohio constitution in passing, it relies on federal
law and discusses and cites mostly federal cases and those citation appear only in the body of the decision and not in the
syllabus when under Ohio law, :the Supreme court speaks as a court only through the syllabi of its cases. Nor is the Court’s
jurisdiction defeated by the additional holding that continuing detention of a person stopped for a traffic violation constitutes and
illegal seizure when the officer’s motivation is not related to the purpose of the original constitutional stop and there are no
articulable facts giving rise to a suspicion of a separate illegal activity. Under Whren v. US, the officer’s subjective intentions are
immaterial and does not make the detention illegal, so long as the detention is justified by the circumstances viewed objectively.

On the Main Issue

 Reasonableness is the touchstone of the Fourth Amendment and this, in turn, is measured in objective terms by
examining the totality of the circumstances, instead of bright-line rules.
 In Florida v. Bostick, this Court reversed the per se rule adopted by the Florida Supreme Court, reiterating that the
proper inquiry necessitates a consideration of “all the circumstances surrounding the encounter.”
 The Supreme Court has previously rejected a per se rule very similar to the one adopted byby the Supreme Court of
Ohio in determining the validity of a consent to search. In Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, it was held that “While
 [CRIMPRO - Bautista] 64
[Camille Umali]

knowledge of the right to refuse consent is one factort to be taken into account, the government need not establish
such knowledge as the sine qua non of an effective consent.”
 It would be unrealistic to require police officers to always inform detainees that hey are free to go before a consent to
search may be deemed voluntary.
 The Fourth Amendment test for a valid consent to search is that the consent be voluntary and voluntariness is a
question of fact to be determined from all the circumstances.

Ginsburg, J., concurring in the judgment

 Robinette’s traffic stop for a speeding violation on an insterstate highway served as a prelude to a search on his
automobile for illegal drugs. This experience is not uncommon in Ohio.
 As the Ohio Supreme Court related, the sheriff’s deputy who detained Robinette for speeding as then asked for
permission to search the vehicle “was on drug interdiction patrol at that time.”
 From their unique vantage point, Ohio courts observed that traffic stops in the State were regularly giving way to
contraband searches, characterized as consensual, even when officers had no reason to suspect illegal activity.
 The Ohio Supreme Court’s held that An officer wishing to engage in consensual interrogation of a motorist at the
conclusion of a traffic stop must first tell the motorist that he or she is free to go.
 It found for such a need because they do not want the legality of consensual encounters to be used by police officers to
turn a routine traffic stop into a fishing expedition for unrelated criminal activity.
 This present opinion reversing the decision of the Ohio Supreme Court does not pass judgment on the
wisdom of the first-tell-then-ask rule. The Court’s opinion Simply clarifies that the Ohio SC’s instruction to
police officers in Ohio is not the command of the Federal Constitution.
 Ohio SC’s first-tell-then-ask rule is a prophylactic measure and it is improbable that he Ohio SC saw their deicison as
the command of the Federal Constitution for all the 50 states.
Stevens, J,, dissenting
 The Supreme Court of Ohio correctly held that the respondent’s consent ot the search of his vehicle was the
product of an unlawful detention.
 It is also important to emphasize that nothing in the Federal Constitution – or the present decision- prevents the State
from requiring its lawenforcement officers to five the detained motorists the advice mandated by the Ohio Court.

Dispositive: Judgment REVERSED and remanded for further proceedings

-Andrei Milaor-
 [CRIMPRO - Bautista] 65
[Camille Umali]

d. STOP AND FRISK

Terry vs. Ohio

Facts:
 While patrolling in downtown Cleveland (2:30 pm), police detective Martin McFadden noticed 2 men, Terry and Chilton,
standing on the corner of Huron Road and Euclid Avenue. McFadden positioned himself 300 to 400 feet away from
them in order to observe their actuations.
Important: McFadden’s credentials
 Policeman for 39 years
 Detective for 35 years
 Assigned to patrol downtown Cleveland for 30 years
 He saw them proceed alternately back and forth along an identical route, pausing to stare in the same store window,
which they did for 24 times. Each completion of the route was followed by a conference between the two. At one point,
a third man, Katz, joined them but left swiftly. Terry and Chilton continued their measured pacing for 10-20 minutes then
they walked off together heading west on Euclid Avenue, following the path taken earlier by Katz.
 Suspecting the men of ‘casing a job, a stick-up’, he approached the three, identified himself as a policeman, and then
asked for their names.
 When the men mumbled something in response, McFadden grabbed Terry and patted the outside of his clothing. He
felt a pistol in the left breast pocket of Terry’s overcoat, but he wasn’t able to remove it. He then ordered the three to
enter Zucker’s store.
 Once inside, he removed Terry’s overcoat and recovered a .38 caliber revolver. McFadden also patted down the outer
clothing of Chilton and Katz. He found another revolver in Chilton’s overcoat but none in Katz. The officer asked the
proprietor of the store to call a police wagon, and brought all three to the station.
 Terry and Chilton were charged with carrying concealed weapons.
 The defense moved to suppress the weapons, but the court denied to the motion and admitted the weapons into
evidence on the ground that the officer had cause to believe petitioner and Chilton were acting suspiciously, that their
interrogation was warranted, and that the officer for his own protection had the right to pat down their outer clothing
having reasonable cause to believe that they might be armed. The two men were convicted.
 Both the intermediate appellate court and the State Supreme Court affirmed the conviction.

Issue:
WON the admission of the revolvers in evidence violated petitioner’s rights under the Fourth Amendment
Held: Admission of the revolvers as evidence does not violate petitioner’s rights
Ratio:
 While it is always unreasonable for a policeman to seize a person and subject him to a limited search for weapons, it is
allowed if there is probable cause for an arrest.
 The reasonableness of any particular search and seizure must be assessed in the light of the particular circumstances
against the standard of whether a man of reasonable caution is warranted in believing that the action taken was
appropriate.
 At the time McFadden seized and searched petitioner for weapons, he had reasonable grounds to believe that
petitioner was armed and dangerous, and it was necessary for the protection of himself and others to take swift
measures to discover the true facts and neutralize the threat of harm if it is materialized.
 The actions of petitioner and his companions were consistent with the officer’s hypothesis that they were contemplating
a daylight robbery and were armed.
 The policeman carefully restricted his search to what was appropriate to the discovery of the particular items which he
sought.

Note:
Stop and frisk- an officer ‘stops’ an individual and detains him briefly for questioning upon suspicion that he may be
connected with criminal activity. Upon suspicion that the person may be armed, the police should have the power to ‘frisk’ him
for weapons or tap down the outer clothing.

-Anne Amantillo-
 [CRIMPRO - Bautista] 66
[Camille Umali]

ADAMS, WARDEN vs. WILLIAMS

Date: June 12, 1972
Ponente: Mr. Justice Rehnquist

Summary: Robert Williams was convicted in a Connecticut state court of illegal possession of a handgun found during a “stop
and frisk”, as well as possession of heroin that was found during a full search incident to the weapons arrest. CA reversed the
conviction on the ground that there was unlawful search. Supreme Court of the US reversed CA applying the doctrine laid down
in Terry vs. Ohio.
Facts:
 Police Sgt. John Connolly was alone early in the morning on car patrol duty in a high-crime area of Bridgeport, Connecticut.
Around 2:15 am, a person known to Connolly approached him and informed him that an individual seated in a vehicle was
carrying narcotics and had a gun at his waist. After calling for assistance, Connolly tapped on the car window and asked
Williams to open the door. Williams rolled down the windows instead and Connolly reached into the car and removed a fully
loaded revolver from William’s waistband. The gun was not visible from the outside, but it was precisely where informant
said it would be.
 Williams was then arrested for unlawful possession of pistol. A search incident to arrest was conducted and found
substantial quantities of heroin on William’s person and in the car, there was a machete and a second revolver hidden in the
automobile.
 Respondent contends that the initial seizure of his pistol, upon which rested the later search, was not justified by informant’s
tip. He claims that absent a more reliable informant, or some corroboration of the tip, the actions were unreasonable under
the standards set for in Terry vs. Ohio.

Issue: Whether or not the search and seizure conducted by Connolly is valid.
Held: It is valid. CA decision reversed.
Ratio:
Terry vs. Ohio: “a police officer may in appropriate circumstances and in an appropriate manner approach a person for
purposes of investigating possible criminal behavior even though there is no probable cause to make an arrest”

 The Fourth Am does not require a policeman who lacks the precise level of information necessary for probable cause to
arrest to simply shrug his shoulders and allow a crime to occur or a criminal to escape. In Terry, the Court recognized that
policemen making reasonable investigatory stop should not be denied the opportunity to protect himself from attack by a
hostile suspect. When an officer is justified in believing that the individual whose suspicious behavior he is investigating at
close range is armed and presently dangerous to the officer or to others, he may conduct a limited protected search for
concealed weapons. The purpose of this is to allow the officer to pursue investigation without fear of violence and thus the
frisk for weapons might be equally necessary and reasonable, whether or not carrying a concealed weapon violated any
applicable law. So long as the officer is entitled to make a forcible stop, and has reason to believe that the suspect is armed
and dangerous, he may conduct a weapons search limited in scope to this protected purpose.

 In this case, Connolly acted justifiably in responding to informant’s tip. The informant was known to him personally and had
provided him with information in the past. The information carried enough indicia of reliability to justify the officer’s forcible
stop of Williams. We reject respondent’s argument that reasonable cause for a stop and frisk can only be based on officer’s
personal observation rather than on information supplied by another person. The search of William’s person and of the car
incident to the arrest was lawful. The fruits of the search were therefore properly admitted at William’s trial, and the CA erred
in reaching a contrary conclusion.
Mr. Justice Douglas dissenting:
Connecticut allows its citizens to carry weapons concealed or otherwise, at will, provided they have a permit.
Connecticut law gives its police no authority to frisk a person for a permit. The easy extension of Terry vs. Ohio to possessory
offenses is a serious intrusion on the Fourth Am safeguards. If it is to be extended at all, this should be only where observation
by the officer himself or well authenticated information shows that criminal activity may be afoot.
Mr. Justice Brennan dissenting:
There is too much danger that, instead of the stop being the object and the protective frisk the incident thereto, the
reverse will be true. Connecticut allows… (Supra). If the contrary view should be followed, Terry will have opened the
sluicegates for serious and unintended erosion of the protection of the Fourth Am.
Mr. Justice Marshall dissenting:
Terry vs. Ohio, Sybron vs. New York and Peters vs. New York were the first cases in which this Court explicitly
recognized the concept of stop and frisk and squarely held that police officers may, under appropriate circumstances, stop and
frisk persons suspected of criminal activity even though there is less than probable cause for an arrest. This instant case marks
the first opportunity to give some flesh to the bones of Terry. Unfortunately, the flesh provided by today’s decision cannot
possible be made to fit on Terry’s skeletal framework. Terry stands only for the proposition that police officers have a narrowly
drawn authority to search for weapons. This decision treats this case as if warrantless searches were the rule rather than the
narrowly drawn exception. This decision betrays the careful balance that Terry sought to strike between a citizen’s right to
privacy and the government’s responsibility for effective law enforcement.
 [CRIMPRO - Bautista] 67
[Camille Umali]

-Arman Mislang-
Minnesota v. Dickerson
Date: June 7, 1993
Ponente: White, J.
Nature: Certiorari to the Supreme Court of Minnesota

Facts:
 Two Minneapolis police officers were patrolling an area in a marked squad car.
 One of the officers observed respondent leaving a 12-unit apartment building which has been previously searched upon
complaints of drug sales and considered a notorious “crack house”.
 Respondent began walking toward the police but upon spotting the squad car, he halted and began walking the other
direction. Suspicion of officers heightened when respondent turned and entered an alley on the other side of the apartment
building.
 Because of seemingly evasive actions and the fact that he had just left building known for cocaine traffic, officers decided to
stop respondent and investigate further.
 Officers ordered respondent to stop and submit him to a patdown search. There was no weapon found but officers take
interest on the small lump in the jacket. Officer reached into the pocket and retrieved a small plastic bag containing crack
cocaine. He was arrested.
 Respondent moved to suppress the cocaine.
Trial Court: guilty of possession of controlled substance.
o Officers were justified under Terry v. Ohio in stopping respondent to investigate whether he might be engaged in
criminal activity
o Plain feel is no different from Plain view and will equally support the seizure
Court of Appeals: reversed
o Investigative stop and protective patdown search of respondent were lawful under Terry because the officers had a
reasonable belief based on specific facts that respondent was engaged in criminal behavior and that he might be
armed and dangerous. However, the officers had overstepped the bounds allowed by Terry in seizing the cocaine
State Supreme Court: affirmed

Issue/Held: WON contraband detected through the sense of touch during patdown search may be admitted into evidence
(in general) – YES
(in this case) – NO (not within the bounds of Terry
Ratio:
General Rule: (Mapp v. Ohio) the right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects against
unreasonable searches and seizures is guaranteed by the 4th amendment.
Exception: (Terry v. Ohio) where a police officer observes unusual conduct which leads him reasonably to conclude in light
of his experience that criminal activity may be afoot, the officer may briefly stop the suspicious person and make
"reasonable inquiries" aimed at confirming or dispelling his suspicions
 Police may seize nonthreatening contraband detected during a protective patdown search so long as the search stays
within the bounds marked by Terry.

Plain view doctrine

- If police are lawfully in a position from which they view an object, if its incriminating character is immediately apparent,
and if the officers have a lawful right of access to the object, they may seize it without a warrant.
Rationale: if contraband is left open and can be observed from a lawful vantage point, there is no invasion of legitimate
expectation of privacy and no “search” within the meaning of the 4th amendment
 No invasion of privacy beyond that already authorized by the officer’s search for weapons

State Supreme Court Supreme court
the sense of touch is inherently less  Touch is capable of revealing nature of objects
immediate and less reliable than the  Even if less reliable than sense of touch, only suggest that officers will less often be
sense of sight able to justify the seizures
 The requirement that officer has probable cause ensure against excessively
speculative seizures (applicable to both plain view and plain touch)
the sense of touch is far more  Intrusion is already authorized by lawful search of weapons.
intrusive into the personal privacy  Seizure of item already known means no further invasion of privacy
HOWEVER..
 Police officer overstepped the bounds of the strictly circumscribed search for weapons allowed under Terry
 [CRIMPRO - Bautista] 68
[Camille Umali]

 Although the officer was lawfully in a position to feel the lump in respondent's pocket, because Terry entitled him to
place his hands upon respondent's jacket, the incriminating character of the object was not immediately apparent to
him.
 The further search of the pocket was constitutionally invalid, the seizure of cocaine is unconstitutional.
-Camille Umali-

People v Solayao

Date: September 20, 1996

Ponente: Romero, J.
Nature: Appeal from decision of RTC

Facts:
Nilo Solayao was charged with the crime of illegal possession of firearm and ammunition under PD 1866.

At about 9:00 pm of July 9, 1992, SPO3 Jose Niño with CAFGU members Teofilo Lorad Jr. and Cecilio Cenining, went
to Barangay Caulongohan, Caibiran, Biliran. They were to conduct an intelligence patrol as required of them by their intelligence
officer to verify the reports of the presence of armed persons roaming around the barangays of Caibiran.

From Brgy. Cauolangohan, the team of Niño proceeded to Brgy. Onion where they met the group of Solayao numbering
five. The officers became suspicious when they observed that the group of Solayao were drunk and that Solayao himself was
wearing a camouflage uniform or a jungle suit. Solayao’s companions, upon seeing the officers, fled.

Officer Niño told Solayao not to run away and introduced himself as “PC”, after which he seized the dried coconut
leaves which Solayao was carrying and found wrapped in it a 49-inch long homemade firearm locally known as “latong.” When
Niño asked Solayao who issued him a license to carry the firearm or whether he was connected with the military or any
intelligence group, Solayao answered that he has no permission to possess the firearm. Then, officer Niño confiscated the
firearm and turned him over to the custody of the Caibiran Policemen.

Solayao’s defense:
The shotgun was only given to him by his companion, Hermogenes Cenining when it was still wrapped in coconut
leaves, and that he does not know there was a shotgun concealed in the coconut leaves since they are using the coconut leaves
as a torch.

The search made on his person violated his rights to be secure in his person and effects against unreasonable
searches and seizures. The search wasz made without a warrant and it did not fall under any of the circumstances of a valid
warrantless arrest.
Trial court convicted him of violation of Section 1 of PD 1866.

Issue:
W/N the homemade firearm is admissible as evidence

Held:
Yes. Under the circumstances in this case the confiscation is valid. Solayao and his companions’ drunken actuations
aroused the suspicion of SPO3 Niño’s group, as well as the fact that he himself was attired in a camouflage uniform or a jungle
suit and that upon seeing the officers, his companions fled. The peace officers were on an intelligence mission to verify reports
that armed persons were roaming around the Barangays of Caibiran.
The search and seizure brought about by a suspicious conduct can be likened to a “stop and frisk” situation. There was
probable cause to conduct a search even before an arrest could be made.

After SPO3 Niño told Solayao not to run away, the former introduced himself as a government agent. The peace
officers did not know that he had committed, or was actually committing, the offense of illegal possession of firearm. Tasked with
verifying the report that there were armed men roaming in the barangays surrounding Caibiran, their attention was
understandably drawn to the group tha had aroused their suspicion.

There was justifiable cause to “stop and frisk” Solayao when his companions fled upon seeing the government’s
agents. Under the circumstances, the government agents could not possibly have procured a search warrant first.

Thus, there was no violation of the constitutional guarantee against unreasonable searches and seizures, and therefore
the homemade firearm is admissible as evidence.
Note that the accused was acquitted because his guilt was not proven beyond reasonable doubt, since the prosecution
failed to present evidence that Solayao has no license to carry the said firearm.
 [CRIMPRO - Bautista] 69
[Camille Umali]

-Cyril Arnesto-
 [CRIMPRO - Bautista] 70
[Camille Umali]

PEOPLE vs SY CHUA
People of the Philippines vs Binad Sy Chua

Ponente: Ynares-Santiago, J.
Date: February 4, 2003

Facts:
 Sept 21, 1996: (10pm) SPO2 Mario Nulud and PO2 Emmeraldo Nunag received report from informant that Chua was
about to deliver drugs at the Thunder Inn Hotel in Balibago, Angeles and that Chua distributes drugs in different karaoke
bars in Angeles City.
 Angeles PNP Chief Col. Neopito Gutierrez formed a team (Bernardino, Tuliao, Emmanuel Nunag, Emmeraldo Nunag,
Go, civilian informant, and Nulud as team investigator) which positioned itself across McArthur Highway near Bali Hai
Restaurant in front of Thunder Inn.
 (1145pm) Informant pointed to Chua’s car near Thunder Inn’s entrance and Chua alighted carrying sealed Zesto juice
box. Nulud and Emmeraldo Nunag accosted him and introduced themselves.
 Chua pulled out his wallet causing a plastic bag of crystalline substance to protrude from his right back pocket. Nulud
body searched him and got 20 .22 bullets from his left pocket. Nunag peeked into the Zesto box and found 2 bags of
crystalline substance. Nulud then confiscated the box, the bag protruding from right back pocket, the bullets, and the car
then brought these items to PNP headquarters (Camp Pepito). It was later determined that the substance was shabu.
 Chua says that that night he was driving the car to follow his wife and son to Manila and felt sleepy that’s why he
stopped to buy cigarettes and candies at Thunder Inn. During that time, someone approached his car and when he called
that person’s attention, the person pullet out a .45 gun, introduced himself as a policeman, took out his wallet, and asked
him to open the car. He refused so the man took his keys and opened the car. The man’s companions came, he was pulled
away from the car while the others searched it then brought to Salakot Police Station, was locked in the bathroom (15mins),
and then brought out by Col. Gutierrez to face the media while being photographed with the box. Wilfredo Lagman
corroborated his story.

Issues:
W/N Chua’s arrest was lawful (W/N the search of Chua’s person and subsequent confiscation of shabu were conducted in lawful
and valid manner)

Held/Ratio:
No. With respect to the warrantless arrest and consequent search and seizure, the trial court held that ‘Chua was caught in
flagrante delicto. Thus, the search made upon his personal effects allow a warrantless search incident to a lawful arrest, and
there was probable cause for officers to believe Chua was committing a crime. The police received information, had to act
quickly, and did not have time for a warrant. The search is valid being akin to a “stop and frisk”.’ But the Supreme Court said that
the trial court confused in flagrante delicto and stop and frisk doctrines.

In Malacat vs CA, in flagrante delicto and stop and frisk were distinguished (the two have different quantum of proof). In a
search incidental to a lawful arrest (in flagrante delicto), as the precedent arrest determines the validity of the incidental search,
the law requires that there first be arrest before a search can be made—the process cannot be reversed. Assuming a valid
arrest, the arresting officer may search the person of the arrestee and the area within which the latter may reach for a weapon or
for evidence to destroy.
Stop-and-frisk as a “limited protective search of outer clothing for weapons,” as laid down in Terry states that where a police
officer observes unusual conduct which leads him reasonably to conclude in light of his experience that criminal activity may be
afoot and that the persons with whom he is dealing may be armed and presently dangerous, where in the course of
investigating this behavior he identifies himself as a policeman and makes reasonable inquiries, and where nothing in the initial
stages of the encounter serves to dispel his reasonable fear for his own or others’ safety, he is entitled for the protection of
himself and others in the area to conduct a carefully limited search of the outer clothing of such persons in an attempt to
discover weapons which might be used to assault him. Probable cause is not needed in stop and frisk, but mere hunch is not
valid. There has to be a genuine reason. It serves a two-fold interest: (1) the general interest of effective crime prevention and
detection, which underlies the recognition that a police officer may, under appropriate circumstances and in an appropriate
manner, approach a person for purposes of investigating possible criminal behavior even without probable cause; and (2) the
more pressing interest of safety and self-preservation which permit the police officer to take steps to assure himself that the
person with whom he deals is not armed with a deadly weapon that could unexpectedly and fatally be used against the police
officer.
Neither in flagrante delicto nor stop and frisk is applicable in the case at bar. In in flagrante delicto, there are two elements: (1)
the person to be arrested must execute an overt act indicating that he has just committed, is actually committing, or is
attempting to commit a crime; and (2) such overt act is done in the presence or within the view of the arresting officer. Both are
not present in this case since Chua did not act in a suspicious manner (merely got out of the car) and there was no overt
manifestation of crime. Also, it has been held that “reliable information” alone, absent any overt act indicative of a felonious
 [CRIMPRO - Bautista] 71
[Camille Umali]

enterprise in the presence and within the view of the arresting officers, is not sufficient to constitute probable cause that would
justify an in flagrante delicto arrest.
A stop-and-frisk was defined as the act of a police officer to stop a citizen on the street, interrogate him, and pat him for
weapon(s) or contraband. The police officer should properly introduce himself and make initial inquiries, approach and restrain a
person who manifests unusual and suspicious conduct, in order to check the latter’s outer clothing for possibly concealed
weapons. The apprehending police officer must have a genuine reason, in accordance with the police officer’s experience and
the surrounding conditions, to warrant the belief that the person to be held has weapons (or contraband) concealed about him. It
should therefore be emphasized that a search and seizure should precede the arrest for this principle to apply. There is no stop
and frisk in this case since the search and seizure was made after the arrest, there were no initial questions regarding what was
in the box, the police only introduced themselves when Chua was already in their custody, and there was no genuine reason for
immediacy of Chua’s arrest since he was not acting suspiciously.
Neither can there be valid seizure in plain view on the basis of the seized items found in accused-appellant’s possession. First,
there was no valid intrusion. Second, the shabu and the bullets were not inadvertently discovered. The police intentionally
searched his person before discovering such items. Also, the search cannot be categorized as a search of a moving vehicle, a
consented warrantless search, or a customs search. It cannot even fall under exigent and emergency circumstances, for the
evidence at hand is bereft of any such showing.
Furthermore, there are doubts whether items allegedly seized are same items presented since such were not marked at the
place they were taken.
-Gia Comsti-
 [CRIMPRO - Bautista] 72
[Camille Umali]

PEOPLE v EXALA
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. RODELIO C. EXALA, RESTITUTO B. BOCALAN and JAIME P.
FERNANDEZ, accused, RESTITUTO B. BOCALAN, accused-appellant.

Date: 1993
Ponente: BELLOSILLO, J

Facts:
A private jeep driven by accused-appellant Bocalan was stopped at a police checkpoint in Cavite City for routine inspection. He
was with his co-accused Fernandez and Exala. The checkpoint was established in line with "Operational Bakal" the main object
of which was to search for unlicensed firearms and other prohibited items in the possession of unauthorized persons passing
through it. Pfc. Ricardo Galang, a member of the inspection team, asked the accused if there were firearms inside. They
answered in the negative. Pfc. Galang then proceeded to inspect the vehicle with a flashlight and he noticed a black
leather bag measuring about 1 foot wide and 2 feet long with its sides bulging. He asked what it contained. But nobody
answered. Instead, the three accused suddenly became fidgety. Pfc. Galang became suspicious so he ordered the bag opened.
He found what he excitedly described as "marijuana, marijuana, napakaraming marijuana!" At this point in time, the three
remained motionless in their seats and appeared petrified with fear. They were brought to the police station that same night for
further investigation. The bag was verified to contain more than two (2) kilos of Indian hemp otherwise known as marijuana.
Thereafter, Exala, Bocalan and Fernandez were accordingly charged for violation of Sec. 4, Art. II, of R.A. 6425, as amended.
After trial, Bocalan was held guilty as principal and sentenced to life imprisonment. The other two were convicted as
accomplices and received lighter penalties. Fernandez appealed to the Court of Appeals. Exala did not. Bocalan, whose
punishment is reviewable only by this Court, is now before Us assailing his conviction.

Contentions of Accused-Appellant Bocalan: (A) Exala alone owns the bag. He and Fernandez offered Exala a ride. Exala
accepted the offer and requested Bocalan to make a detour to Salitran, where he was to pick up some clothes. They agreed and
Exala got the bag which he kept beside him all the time until their apprehension at the checkpoint. (B) The trial court erred in
admitting the bag as evidence against him since it was obtained through a warrantless search. And since the search was
conducted prior to the arrest, it was not incident to a lawful arrest.

Issue:/Held:
WON the evidence (the marijuana) seized from the accused at a checkpoint after being stopped for routine inspection is
admissible. [Yes, it is.]

(A) We agree with the trial court that the conduct of Bocalan was not only unusual but also contrary to normal human
experience. He alleged he had no personal association with him; yet he agreed to detour to Salitran which was some fifteen (15)
to twenty (20) kilometers out of his way. Thus, his contention that it was Exala who owned the bag containing the marijuana is
hardly credible. On the other hand, Exala denied ownership and swore that Bocalan and Fernandez offered him money to take
the blame alone, but he refused. Proof of ownership, however, is immaterial where the accused is charged with the unlawful
transportation of marijuana. Nonetheless, there is substantial evidence to prove that Bocalan was directly involved in the
unlawful dispatch in transit or transport of marijuana. The trial court noted that Bocalan picked up Fernandez and Exala one after
the other to accompany him to the place where the bag of marijuana was taken and to help him bring the marijuana to Cavite
City.

(B) Bocalan never objected to the admissibility of the evidence in the proceedings below on the ground that the same was
obtained in a warrantless search. Consequently, he is deemed to have waived his objection on the legality of the search
and the admissibility of the evidence obtained in the course thereof. In view of such waiver, the court is bound to admit the
evidence. But even assuming arguendo that there was no waiver, still appellant's contention deserves scant consideration.

There are indeed instances where search and seizure can be effected without necessarily being preceded by an arrest. An
illustration would be the "stop-and-search" without a warrant at military or police checkpoints, the constitutionality of
which has already been upheld by this Court. Vehicles are generally allowed to pass through these checkpoints after a
routine inspection and answering a few questions. If vehicles are stopped and extensively searched it is because of some
probable cause which justifies a reasonable belief of those manning the checkpoints that either the motorist is a law-offender or
the contents of the vehicle are or have been instruments in the commission of an offense. The case before Us is an incident to
or an offshoot of a lawful "stop-and-search" at a military or police checkpoint.

The submissive stance of the accused after the discovery of the bag of marijuana, as well as the absence of any
protest on their part when arrested, not only casts serious doubts on their professed innocence but also confirms their
acquiescence to the search. Clearly then, there was waiver of the right against unreasonable search and seizure. The arrest
of the three (3) accused was lawful because it was made upon the discovery of the prohibited drug in their possession. There
 [CRIMPRO - Bautista] 73
[Camille Umali]

was no need for a warrant; the arrest was made while a crime was committed. This is one of the situations when a warrantless
arrest may be made.

Dispositive: BOCALAN is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the act of dispatching in transit or transporting marijuana, in
violation of Sec. 4, Art. II, of R.A. 6425, as amended. RTC decision is affirmed

CRUZ, J., dissenting:

I do not agree that in the interest of peace and order, any or every vehicle may be stopped at any time by the authorities and
searched without warrant on the chance that it may be carrying prohibited articles. That possibility is not the probable cause
envisioned in the Bill of Rights xxx In the case of the ordinary checkpoint, there is not even any suspicion to justify the search.
The search is made as a matter of course, either of all vehicles or at random. There is no showing that a crime is about to be
committed, is actually being committed, or has just been committed and the searching officer has personal knowledge that the
person being searched or arrested is the culprit xxx I realize that this view would result in the inadmissibility of the seized
marijuana as evidence against the petitioner and in his inevitable acquittal. But as I have always maintained, we cannot
retroactively validate an illegal search on the justification that, after all, the articles seized are illegal.

-Carla-Badi-
 [CRIMPRO - Bautista] 74
[Camille Umali]

e. SEARCH INCIDENTAL TO A LAWFUL ARREST

CHIMEL v CALIFORNIA
This case raises basic questions concerning the permissible scope under the Fourth Amendment of a search incident to a lawful
arrest.

Date:1969
Ponente:Stewart, J.

FACTS:
 A warrant for the arrest of the petitioner was made for the burglary of a coin shop. On September 13, 1965, the officers
identified themselves and were allowed entrance to the house by the petitioner’s wife where they waited for the
accused man to come home.
 Upon arrival of the petitioner, the arresting officers showed the arrest warrant to the accused and asked permission to
“look around”.
 The petitioner refused the request and the officers told the petitioner that a search could be conducted on “the basis of
lawful arrest” and carried out the search.
 The officers searched the entire house including the attic, garage, and a small workshop, etc. and found various items
which were admitted as evidence in court, over the defendant’s objection that they were admitted unconstitutionally.
 DECISIONS OF THE LOWER COURTS:
The judgment of the district court found the defendant guilty on two counts of burglary. All appellate courts in the state
of California affirmed the judgment of the district court. A writ of certiorari was granted to the petitioner by the Supreme
Court.
ISSUE:
WON the warrantless search of an arrestee’s entire house can be constitutionally justified as incident to the arrest itself?

HELD/RATIO:
NO. The judgment of the district court is reversed.

The decision of the Supreme Court, delivered by Justice Stewart, was based on the decision of United States v. Rabinowitz. The
search was unreasonable under the 4th and 14th Amendments. Until this point, a “warrantless search incident to a lawful arrest
may generally extend to the area that is considered to be in the possession or under the control of the person arrested.”

The Court held that a warrantless search was reasonable only of the defendant’s person i.e. whatever he/she has in pockets
and etc. as well as anything that may be in reach such as a weapon in a nearby drawer.

When an arrest is made, it is reasonable for the arresting officer to search the person arrested in order to remove any weapons
that the latter might seek to use in order to resist arrest or effect his escape. It is entirely reasonable for the arresting officer to
search for and seize any evidence on the arrestee’s person in order to prevent its concealment or destruction. And the area
which an arrestee might reach in order to grab a weapon or evidentiary items must, of course, be governed by a like rule.
The Court felt that there was “no comparable justification, for routinely searching rooms other than that in which an arrest
occurs…” “Such searches, in the absence of well recognized exceptions, may be made only under the authority of a search
warrant.” The court held the opinion that the 4th Amendment, at no point, allowed a search to go beyond that of the area where
the person is arrested “from which the person might obtain weapons or evidentiary items.”

CONCURRING OPINIONS:
Justice Harlan concurred with the opinion of the Court in that “as a result of Mapp v. Ohio, every change in the 4th Amendment
law must now be obeyed by state officials facing widely different problems of local law enforcement”. Justice Harlan also states
“the warrant requirement plays an essential role in the protection of those fundamental liberties protect again state infringement
by the 4th Amendment.”

DISSENTING OPINIONS:
Justice White and Justice Black join dissenting claiming that a search in a case such as this is justified for the fact that if the
petitioner had been arrested at his place of work, a warrant would have been obtained to search his home at a later time. Also, if
they had left the premises of the home where the arrest was made to obtain a warrant to search the content of the house, the
spouse of the defendant, knowing that her husband had committed a crime, may have removed the evidence from its location
where it may have never been found.

POLICY EFFECT: The outcome of this case says that upon arrest, only a person’s body and immediate area is justified by
a warrantless search. Searching beyond those points must be accompanied by a search warrant.

-Macel Dacanay-
 [CRIMPRO - Bautista] 75
[Camille Umali]

New York v. Belton

Legal Doctrine: The passenger compartment of a car in which an arrestee was a recent occupant just before his arrest falls
within the meaning of “within his immediate control” and is therefore subject to search incident to a lawful arrest.

Date: 1 July 1981

Ponente: Stewart, J.
Nature: Certiorari

Facts:
 New York State policeman Douglas Nicot, while driving an unmarked car on the New York Thurway, was passed by a
speeding car. He gave chase, overtook the car and ordered the driver to pull over. Inside the car were four men, including
Belton. As Nicot was discovering that not one of them owned the vehicle, he smelled burnt marijuana and saw on the floor
of the car an envelope marked “Supergold”, which he surmised was marijuana.
 Nicot then ordered the men to get out and he placed them under arrest for the unlawful possession of marijuana. He patted
down each of them and split them into four separate areas so that they would not be in physical touching area of each
other.
 Nicot then picked up the envelope and discovered marijuana. Nicot gave the arrestees the Miranda warnings, searched
them, and proceeded to search the passenger compartment of the car. He found Belton’s black leather jacket and found
cocaine after unzipping one of the pockets.
 The four men were then convicted for criminal possession of a controlled substance. Belton assails the decision, saying that
the cocaine was seized in violation of the 4th and 5th amendments.

Issues: W/N the interior of a car in which the arrestee was a recent occupant falls “within the arrestee’s immediate control” and
therefore subject to search incident to a lawful arrest.

Held: Yes, it does.

 Chimel v. California: laid down an exemption to the requirement of a warrant for searches and seizures. “A lawful custodial
arrest creates a situation which justifies the contemporaneous search without a warrant of the person arrested and of the
immediately surrounding area.” The reason for this is to remove any weapons that the arrestee might seek to use in order to
resist arrest or to affect his escape as well as to prevent the concealment or destruction of evidence.
 In this case, the Court attempted to create a standard definition of Chimel’s “area within the immediate control of the
arrestee” when that area includes the interior of an automobile and the arrestee is its recent occupant.
 The rule is this: “…when a policeman has made a lawful custodial arrest of the occupant of an automobile, he may, as a
contemporaneous incident of that arrest, search the passenger compartment of that automobile.” This also includes any
containers7 within the reach of the arrestee, since they will also be within his reach.
 Belton was already under arrest for the unlawful possession of marijuana and the search of his jacket followed immediately
after that arrest. The jacket was located inside the passenger compartment in which Belton had been just before he was
arrested. The jacket is therefore “within the arrestee’s immediate control”, in line with the meaning of the Chimel case. The
search of the jacket was therefore a search incident to a lawful custodial arrest and did not violate the 4 th and 14th
Amendments.

J. Brennan, dissenting:
 The Chimel exception to the warrant requirement was to narrowly address two concerns: 1. The safety of the arresting
officer, and 2. The preservation of easily concealed or destructible evidence. It places a temporal and spatial limitations of
searches incident to arrest and is confined to the immediate vicinity of the arrest.
 When the arrest has been consummated and the arrestee safely taken into custody, the justifications underlying Chimel’s
limited exception to the warrant requirement cease to apply because at that point there is no possibility that the arrestee
could reach weapons or contraband.
 The Court disregards those principles and instead adopts a fiction – that the interior of a car is always within the immediate
control of an arrestee who has recently been in the car. The Court substantially expands the permissible scope of searches
incident to arrest by permitting police officers to search areas and containers the arrestee could not possibly reach at the
time of the arrest.
 The court’s attempt to make a “bright-line rule” to make law enforcement more efficient cannot by itself justify the disregard
of the 4th amendment. The attempt itself also fails because it raises too many questions: how long after the arrest could the
search be validly conducted? Why is it limited to the search of cars? Etc.

7
Footnote 4 (p.460): includes glove compartments, any receptacles in the passenger compartment, luggage, boxes, clothing,
etc. The trunk, however, is excluded.
 [CRIMPRO - Bautista] 76
[Camille Umali]

-Mickey Chatto-

PEOPLE V. CHUA HO SAN

People of the Philippines, plaintiff-appellee, vs. Chua Ho San @ Tsay Ho San, accused-appellant.

Nature: Appeal from a decision of the Regional Trial Court of San Fernando, La Union Branch 66 / Automatic review
Date: June 17, 1999
Ponente: Davide, Jr., C. J.

Doctrine: In a search incidental to a lawful arrest, the law requires that there be first a lawful arrest before a search can be
made – the process cannot be reversed

Facts:
 While monitoring the coastal area of Barangay Bulala, Chief of Police Jim Lagasca Cid intercepted a radio call from Juan
Almoite (Barangay Captain of Barangay Tammocalao) requesting police assistance regarding an unfamiliar speedboat that
he (Almoite) has spotted. Almoite claimed that the vessel looked different from the boats ordinarily used by fisherfolk in the
area and was poised to dock at Barangay Tammocalao.
 Cid and six of his men (led by Chief Investigator SPO1 Reynoso Badua) proceeded to Tammocalao beach. Cid observed
that the speedboat ferried a lone male passenger. When the speedboat landed, the male passenger alighted carrying a
multicoloured strawbag. The man walked towards the road; upon seeing the approaching officers, he suddenly changed
direction and broke into a run.
 Badua prevented the man from fleeing by holding on to his right arm. Cid introduced themselves as police officers but the
man was impassive. Speaking in English, Cid requested the man to open his bag, but the man did not seem to understand.
Cid tried speaking in Tagalog, then Ilocano, but to no avail. Finally, Cid resorted to what he termed “sign language”; he
motioned with his hands for the man to open the bag. This time, the man understood and acceded to the request. The
search of the bag yielded several transparent plastic packets containing yellow crystalline substances (which later turned
out to be shabu).
 At the police station, Cid surmised that based on the facial features of the man, he was probably Taiwanese. Cid then
“recited and informed the man of his constitutional rights” but the man gave no response. Cid ordered his men to find a local
resident who spoke Chinese to act as an interpreter. In the meantime, Badua opened the bag and counted 29 plastic
pockets of the yellowish crystalline substances.
 When Mr. Go Ping Guan (the interpreter) arrived, the man was “apprised of his constitutional rights”. When the police asked
several questions, the man gave no response and merely held out his I.D. with the name Chua Ho San.
 Chua was charged for illegally transporting 28.7 kilos of methamphetamine hydrochloride (shabu) without the
necessary permit or authority in violation of Section 15, Article III of RA 6425 (Dangerous Drugs Act) as amended by RA
7659 (Death Penalty Law).
 For his defense, Chua presented this version of the facts: He hails from Taiwan and was employed in a shipbuilding and
repairing company. He was instructed by his employer Cho Chu Rong to board the latter’s ship going to China where they
would buy fish. When they arrived in China, Rong left the ship and came back without fish but with two bags, the contents of
which were never divulged to Chua. Rong showed him a document purportedly granting them authority to fish on Philippine
waters. When they docked on Philippine shore, Rong left to look for a telephone while Chua rested near one of the bags.
One of the bags went missing much to Rong’s dismay. A crowd started to mill around them and the police arrived. Chua
realized that Rong was nowhere to be found. The police approached him, and with only gestures and hand movements,
they escorted him to the precinct where he was handcuffed and tied to a chair. Chua denounces the prosecution’s story as
a distortion of the truth. He denied he was ever favoured with an interpreter or informed of his “constitutional rights”,
particularly his right to counsel. Consequently, he argues that his arrest was tainted with illegality and the
methamphetamine hydrochloride found in the bag should have been regarded as inadmissible in evidence.
 RTC: found Chua guilty of transporting 28.7 kilos of methamphetamine hydrochloride without legal authority to do so. The
RTC characterized the search as incidental to a valid in flagrante delicto arrest, hence it allowed the admission of the
methamphetamine hydrochloride as corpus delicti.

Issue:
Whether or not the warrantless arrest, search, and seizure conducted in the present case constitutes a valid exemption from the
warrant requirement.

Held/Ratio:
NO. The search was not incidental to a lawful arrest. A valid arrest must precede the search, the process cannot be reversed.
Hence, the warrantless arrest, search, and seizure conducted in this case are illegal.
 [CRIMPRO - Bautista] 77
[Camille Umali]

 The Court reiterates that the prohibition against warrantless searches and seizures is not absolute and deemed
permissible in instances of: (1) search of moving vehicles; (2) seizure in plain view; (3) customs searches; (4) waiver or
consent searches; (5) stop and frisk situations (Terry search); and (6) search incidental to a lawful arrest.
 Rule 113, Sec. 5 of the Rules of Court recognizes permissible warrantless arrests in the following instances: (1) arrests
in flagrante delicto; (2) arrests effected in hot pursuit; and (3) arrests of escaped prisoners.
 In cases of in flagrante delicto arrests, a peace officer or a private person may without a warrant, arrest a person, when, in
his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense. The
arresting officer must have personal knowledge of facts or circumstances convincingly indicative or constitutive of probable
cause. In the case at bar, there are no facts on record that is reasonably suggestive or demonstrative of Chua’s
participation in an ongoing criminal enterprise that could have spurred police officers from conducting the obtrusive search.
The prosecution was not able to establish probable cause.
 In a search incidental to a lawful arrest, the law requires that there be first a lawful arrest before a search can be
made – the process cannot be reversed. In this case, the search was not incidental to an arrest. There was no
warrant of arrest and the warrantless arrest did not fall under the exemptions allowed by the Rules of Court. From all
indications, the search was nothing but a fishing expedition. It must be noted that after introducing themselves, the police
officers immediately inquired about the contents of the bag. There was nothing that would impel the officers from displaying
such inordinate interest in the bag but to ferret out evidence and discover if a felony had indeed been committed by Chua –
in effect, they tried to “retroactively establish probable cause and validate an illegal search and seizure”.
 The prosecution tried to persuade the Court that there was a consented search, a legitimate waiver of the constitutional
guarantee against obtrusive searches. The Court disagrees. The Court believes that Chua never exhibited that he knew,
actually or constructively, of his right against unreasonable searches or that he intentionally conceded the same.
 Evidence obtained during an illegal search even if tending to confirm or actually confirming initial information or suspicion of
felonious activity is absolutely considered inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding, the same being the fruit of a
poisonous tree. Casting aside the regulated substance as evidence, the remaining evidence on record are insufficient to
sustain Chua’s conviction.

Dispositive:
RTC Decision is reversed and set aside; Chua Ho San is acquitted of the crime charged.
-Raffi Reyes-
 [CRIMPRO - Bautista] 78
[Camille Umali]

CADUA V. CA
-Andrei Milaor-

Johnson vs. United States

Facts:
 At 7:30 pm, Detective Lieutenant Belland, an officer of the Seattle police force narcotic detail, received information from
a confidential informer regarding unknown persons smoking opium in the Europe Hotel. Said informant was also a
known narcotic user.
 The informer was taken back to the hotel to interview the manager, but he returned saying that he could smell burning
opium in the hallway.
 At 8:30 or 9 pm, Belland and four federal narcotic agents went back to the hotel and recognized at once a strong odor
of burning opium. The odor led to Room 1.
 They knocked and when asked who was at the door, Belland identified himself. It took sometime before the occupant
opened the door.
 Belland told Johnson to consider herself under arrest because he and the other agents were going to search the room.
The search turned up incriminating opium and smoking apparatus.
 Petitioner was convicted on four counts charging violation of federal narcotics laws on evidence obtained by a search
made without warrant. This decision was affirmed by the Circuit Court of Appeals.
 Petitioner challenged the search of her home as a violation of the rights secured to her by the Fourth Amendment.

Issue:
WON the search of her home violated her rights under the Fourth Amendment

Held:
The search constitutes a violation of petitioner’s rights

Ratio:
 It being conceded that the officer did not have probable cause to arrest petitioner until he entered the room and found
her to be the sole occupant, the search cannot be sustained as being incident to a valid arrest. A warrantless search
could be valid only if a crime is committed in the presence of the arresting officer or for a felony of which he had
reasonable cause to believe defendant guilty.
 The Government cannot at the same time justify an arrest by a search and justify a search by the arrest.
 An officer gaining access to private living quarters under color of his office and of the law must then have some valid
basis in law for the intrusion.
 Odors alone do not authorize a search without warrant. If the presence of odors is testified before a magistrate and he
finds the affiant qualified to know the odor, and it is one sufficiently distinctive to identify a forbidden substance, it could
have been an adequate basis for the issuance of a warrant.
 As a general rule, the question when the right of privacy must reasonably yield to the right of search must be decided
by a judicial officer, not by a policeman or governmental enforcement agent.

Note:
The reasons given by the officers as to why they did not procure a warrant are inconvenience and some slight delay in
the preparation of papers to be presented as evidence to a magistrate. These, obviously, are not convincing reasons.

-Anne Amantillo-
 [CRIMPRO - Bautista] 79
[Camille Umali]

f. EXIGENT AND EMERGENCY CIRCUMSTANCES

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. ROLANDO DE GRACIA, CHITO HENSON and JOHN DOES,
accused. ROLANDO DE GRACIA, accused-appellant.

Nature: Appeal from a judgment of the RTC of Quezon City Br. 103.
Date: July 6, 1994
Ponente: Regalado, J.

Facts:
 The incidents involved in this case took place at the height of the coup d’ etat staged in December 1989 by ultra-rightist
elements headed by the Reform the Armed Forces Movement-Soldiers of the Filipino People (RAM-SFP) against the
government.
 Accused-appellant Rolando de Gracia was charged in two separate information for illegal possession of ammunition and
explosives in furtherance of rebellion, and for attempted homicide. The information stated that he was in possession of 5
bundles of C-4 or dynamites, 6 cartoons of M-16 ammunition at 20 each and 100 bottles of MOLOTOV bombs.

Prosecution
 December 1, 1989 — Maj. Soria of Intelligence Division, National Capital Region Defense Command together with his
team, was on board a brown Toyota car conducting surveillance of the Eurocar Sales Office located at EDSA. The
surveillance started on November 30, 1989 pursuant to a report received by the division that said Eurocar was being
occupied by elements of RAM-SFP as communication command post.
 Sgt. Crispin Sagario, the driver, parked the car a few meters away from Eurocar near P. Tuazon Street. A crowd was
gathered watching the ongoing bombardment near Camp Aguinaldo. After a while, a group of 5 men disengaged from the
crowd and walked towards the car of the team. At that moment, Soria saw the group and told Sagario to start the car and
leave the area. As they passed the group, the latter pointed and fired at them, which resulted to the wounding of Sgt.
Sagario on the right thigh.
 December 5, 1989 – searching team composed of Babao and elements of the 16 th Infantry Battalion under Santos raided
the Eurocar office. They were able to confiscate the above mentioned weapons inside one of the rooms belonging to a
certain Col. Matillano. They saw De Gracia inside the office of Matillano, holding a C-4 and suspiciously peeping through a
door. Raid team arrested De Gracia as well as two janitors. No search warrant was secured by the team because there was
much disorder and that the courts were closed.

Defense
 De Gracia claims that on November 30, he was in Antipolo to help in the birthday party of Matillano. He denied that he was
at the Eurocar office during December 1. He also contends that when the raid team arrived, he was inside his house, a
small nipa hut adjacent to the building. According to him, he was tasked by Matillano to guard the office. He avers that he
does not know anything about the explosives and insists that when they were asked to stand up, the explosives were
already there. He claims that he went to see Matillano because he was jobless. He believes that the prosecution witnesses
were moved to testify against him because “bata raw ako ni Matillano eh may atraso daw sa kanila si Matillano so sabi nila
ito na lang bata niya ang ipitin natin.”

Trial Court
 De Gracia was acquitted as to attempted homicide but found him guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the offense of illegal
possession of firearms in furtherance of rebellion and sentenced him to serve the penalty of reclusion perpetua. TC
recommended that he be accorded executive clemency after 5 years in prison of good behavior.

Issues: 1) Whether or not intent to possess is an essential element of the offense punishable under PD 1866.
MAIN: 2) Whether or not there was a valid search and seizure in this case.
3) Whether or not appellant’s possession of the explosives was for the furtherance of rebellion.

Held/Ratio:
1. When the crime is punished by a special law, as a rule, intent to commit the crime is not necessary. It is sufficient that the
offender has the intent to perpetrate the act prohibited by the special law. Intent to commit the crime and intent to perpetrate the
act must be distinguished. Criminal intent is not important in convicting a person under PD 1866. It is sufficient that the accused
had no authority or license to possess a firearm, and that he intended to possess the same, even if such possession was made
in good faith and without criminal intent. (Illegal possession of firearms is malum prohibitum therefore, good faith and absence of
criminal intent are not valid defenses.) Also, De Gracia was a former soldier so it would be absurd for him to know anything
about the dangerous uses and power of these weapons.

2. It is admitted that the raid team did not possess a search warrant. However, given the circumstances of the case, it is our
considered opinion that the instant case falls under one of the exceptions to the prohibition against a warrantless search. The
 [CRIMPRO - Bautista] 80
[Camille Umali]

military operatives had reasonable ground to believe that a crime was being committed. They also had no opportunity to secure
a search warrant because the courts were closed.

Umil vs. Ramos: The arrest of persons involved in the rebellion whether as its fighting armed elements, or for
committing non-violent acts but in the furtherance of the rebellion, is more an act of capturing them in the course of
armed conflict, to quell the rebellion, than for the purpose of immediately prosecuting them in court for statutory
offense. The arrest, therefore, need not follow the usual procedure in the prosecution of offenses which requires
the determination by a judge of the existence of probable cause before the issuance of a judicial warrant of arrest
and the granting of bail if the offense is bailable.

3. Yes. The firearms, explosives and ammunition confiscated from appellant De Gracia were illegally possessed by him in the
furtherance of rebellion existing at that time. Also, it follows that subject to the presence of the requisite elements in each case,
unlawful possession of an unlicensed firearm in furtherance of rebellion may give rise to separate prosecution for violation of PD
1866 and Articles 134 and 135 of the Revised Penal Code.

Dispositive: PD 1866 imposes death penalty where the illegal possession of firearms and ammunition is committed in
furtherance of rebellion. At the time the offense was charged, the imposition of death penalty was proscribed by the Constitution.
Sentenced to Reclusion Perpetua and the recommendation for executive clemency is deleted.
-Arman Mislang-
 [CRIMPRO - Bautista] 81
[Camille Umali]

People v. Lita Ayangao

Date: April 14, 2004
Ponente: Corona, J.

Facts:
(Prosecution)
 PO3 Galvez and PO3 Sagum received information from one of their informants that a certain woman from Mountain
Province delivers dried marijuana leaves for sale to some drug pusher. They conducted surveillance.
 At 5am in the morning, their informant went to their headquarters and informed that their suspect was due to arrive.
The 3 went to Mabalacat and parked their car near the entrance of the road to Sapang Biabas. The woman arrived with
2 sacks with camote fruits on top.
 The officers followed the woman and noticed marijuana dried leaves protruding through hole of one of the sacks.
 The police officers introduced themselves and requested woman to put out the contents of the sack. The sack contains
sweet potatoes mixed with 15 brick like substance wrapped in brown paper and masking tape. A brick which was
damaged and in plain view of the officers revealed dried marijuana leaves.
(Defense)
 She went to Sapang Biabas upon request of Magda Dumpao. The latter bought a house and learned that it was being
sold again. Magda the requested her to talk to Alarcon (agent).
 She arrived at the house but Alarcon was not there so she slept first. At around 6am, CIS agents knocked at the door.
Police officers asked her to go with them and when she refused, they forced her out of the house and boarded her into
a car. While inside the car, she saw the sack and carton box.
 She was accused on owing the sack and its contents.
Trial court: Guilty

Issue/Held: WON the warrantless search was valid – YES

Ratio:
Petitioner: Her arrest was illegal because she was not read her Miranda Rights. 15 bricks of marijuana were inadmissible
since warrantless search was invalid not having been made pursuant to a lawful arrest.
Court: No merit
 By entering plea upon arraignment and by actively participating in the trial, an accused is deemed to have waived any
objection to his arrest and warrantless search.
 the waiver of the non-admissibility of the “fruits” of an invalid warrantless arrest and warrantless search and seizure
is not to be casually presumed for the constitutional guarantee against unreasonable searches and seizures to retain
vitality
 Since arrest is lawful, the resulting warrantless search on appellant was also valid
 There is also probable cause in making the arrest (tip they received from informant)

On exigent and emergency circumstance

 The informant arrived at 5am and informed the officers that the accused will be arriving at 6am.
 The circumstance called for an immediate response
 They couldn’t have applied for a search warrant since the validity of search warrant was only for 10 days.
 Since they do not know when the accused will be arriving, prudence made them act the way they did

-Camille Umali-
 [CRIMPRO - Bautista] 82
[Camille Umali]

g. HOT PURSUIT
PEOPLE V DE LARA

Date: September 5, 1994

Ponente: Quiason, J.
Nature: Appeal from a decision of RTC

Facts:
Armando De Lara was charged with violation of RA 6425 (Dangerous Drugs Act), as amended by BP 179.
Capt. Restituto Cablayan of the National Criminal Investigation Service (NCIS) of the WPD, instructed Sgt. Enrique
David to conduct a surveillance operation in the vicinity of Garrido and Zamora Streets at Ata. Ana, Manila, after receiving
reports of rampant drug-pushing in that area.
A team led by Sgt. Enrique David conducted a surveillance operation on Dec. 15 and 17, 1986 and confirmed the
reported drug-pushing activities in that area by the group of De Lara and a certain Ricky alias Pilay. No arrest was made
because the team was instructed by their superior to conduct a surveillance operation only.
January 8, 1987 Malaya and People’s Tonight reported that there were rampant, drug-pushing activities in the vicinity of
Garrido and Zamorra Streets in Sta. Ana, Manila, prompting Gen. Alfredo Lim, then WPD Superintendent, to reprimand the
NCIS office.
Capt. Cablayan instructed Sgt. David to plan a buy-bust operation and to form a six-man team with Pfc. Martin orolfo Jr.
as the poseur buyer.
The team went to garrido Street, and strategically positioned themselves. Pfc. Orolfo Jr. and the confidential informant
proceeded to the house of De Lara, where they saw him standing outside. The informant introduced Pfc. Orolfo Jr. as an
interested buyer and De Lara asked Orolfo Jr. “ilan ang bibilhin nio?” to which the officer replied “Two foils” handing the same
time the marked twenty-peso bill. After placing the money in the right pocket of his pants, De Lara went inside his house and
minutes later he came back and handed two foils to Pfc. Orolfo Jr. When De Lara sensed the presence of police operatives, he
then tried to retrieve the two foils but Pfc. Orolfo Jr. prevented him from doing so, and during the scuffle, one foil was torn. De
Lara went inside his house with Pfc. Orolfo Jr. in pursuit. The latter was able to subdue De Lara. Sgt. David confronted De
Lara, who admitted that he kept prohibited drugs in his house. De Lara showed the arresting officers a blue plastic bag with
white lining containing prohibited drugs.

De Lara:
The arresting officers merely planted the marijuana on his person. On the day he was arrested, he came from work,
and after fetching his son, he was arrested by the police officers and the officers proceeded to search his house without any
warrant shown to him. After the search he and his wife were brought to the WPD hq.
He was merely forced to sign his name on the photocopy of the twenty-peso bill (exh. F) and that the first time he saw
the blue plastic bag containing prohibited drugs was when he was at the police station.

Issue:
W/N his arrest and the seizure of prohibited drugs found inside his house were legal

Held:
For the arrest, the police operatives acted within the bounds of law. De Lara was caught red-handed in delivering the
two tin foils of marijuana to Pat. Orolfo Jr., the poseur-buyer. The arrest was lawfully effected without need of a warrant of arrest.
“having caught the accused in flagrante as a result of the buy-bust operation, the policemen were not only authorized but were
also under obligation to apprehend the drug pusher even without a warrant of arrest”

De Lara’s eventual arrest was the result of the surveillance conducted and the buy-bust operation and not because of
the newspaper reports.
As for the seizure of the plastic bag which contained prohibited drugs and was found inside De Lara’s house, the same
is valid. The policemen’s entry into the house of de Lara without a search warrant was in a hot-pursuit of a person caught
committing an offense in flagrante. The arrest that followed the hot-pursuit was valid. The seizure of the plastic bag containing
marijuana was the result of De Lara’s arrest inside his house. A contemporaneous search may be conducted upon the
immediate vicinity where the arrest was made.

-Cyril Arnesto-
 [CRIMPRO - Bautista] 83
[Camille Umali]

h. CUSTOMS SEARCHES

PADILLA vs CA
Robin Carino Padilla (Robinhood Padilla) vs CA and People of the Philippines

Ponente: Francisco, J.
Date: March 12, 1997

FACTS
 Oct 26, 1992:(8pm) Enrique Manarang and his compadre Danny Perez were inside the Manukan sa Highway
Restaurant in Sto. Kristo, Angeles City where they took shelter from the rain that had interrupted their motorcycle ride along
McArthur Highway when they saw a Mitsubishi Pajero, running fast down the highway. After the vehicle had passed the
restaurant, Manarang and Perez heard a screeching sound produced by the sudden and hard braking of a vehicle running
very fast followed by a sickening sound of the vehicle hitting something.
 Manarang, being a member of both the Spectrum, a civic group and the Barangay Disaster Coordinating Council,
decided to report the incident to the Philippine National Police of Angeles City. He took out his radio and called the Viper,
the radio controller of the Philippine National Police of Angeles but by the time he completed the call, the vehicle had started
to leave the place of the accident taking the general direction to the north. He then discovered that the vehicle hit someone.
 He chased the vehicle (PMA777) while Cruz looked after the victim. He called the Viper (SPO2 Ruby Buan) reporting
the hit and run and Buan called all PNP Angeles units to apprehend the car. Manarang lost the vehicle and saw it emerging
from the corner adjoining Tina's Restaurant heading towards Abacan bridge.
 Soon the vehicle was within sight of SPO2 Borja and SPO2 Miranda of Mobile No. 3 stationed in Abacan bridge. When
the vehicle was about 12 meters away from their position, the two police officers boarded their Mobile car, switched on the
engine, operated the siren and strobe light and drove out to intercept the vehicle. They cut into the path of the vehicle
forcing it to stop.
 The driver (Robin Padilla) rolled down the window and put his head out while raising both his hands. SPO2 Miranda
told him to alight to which he complied. Robin was wearing a short leather jacket such that when he alighted with both his
hands raised, a the butt of a gun (exhibit C) tucked on the left side of his waist was revealed. SPO2 Borja made the move
to confiscate the gun but Robin held the former's hand alleging that the gun was covered by legal papers. SPO2 Borja,
however, insisted that if the gun really was covered by legal papers, it would have to be shown in the office. After disarming
Robin, SPO2 Borja told him about the hit and run incident which was angrily denied by him. By that time, a crowd had
formed at the place. SPO2 Borja checked the cylinder of the gun and find six (6) live bullets inside.
 The most senior police officer in the group, SPO Mercado took over the matter and informed Robin that he was being
arrested for the hit and run incident. He pointed out to him the fact that the plate number of his vehicle was dangling and
the railing and the hood were dented. Robin then raised his hands again and his short jacket revealed the magazine of an
armalite tucked in his right back pocket. SPO3 Borja confiscated the magazine and suspected the armalite would be in the
car so he opened the car and found a baby armalite (exhibit D). Robin was arrested for illegal possession of firearms and
read his constitutional rights.
 Police brought Robin to Traffic Division at Jake Gonzales Boulevard where Robin voluntarily surrendered a third
firearm, a pietro berreta pistol (exhibit L) with a single round in its chamber and a magazine loaded with seven 7 other live
bullets and a black bag containing two additional long magazines and one short magazine (exhibits M, N, and O). He
admitted he used them for shooting and he was not able to produce permit to carry. (He says that he is a confidential agent
authorized, under a Mission Order and Memorandum Receipt, to carry the subject firearms)

ISSUE
W/N his arrest was legal

HELD/RATIO
Yes. Warrantless arrests may be done by a peace officer or private person (a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested
has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense; (b) When an offense has in fact just been
committed, and he has personal knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be arrested has committed it; (c) When the
person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal establishment or place where he is serving final judgment or
temporarily confined while his case is pending, or has escaped while being transferred from one confinement to another. In
paragraph a, both elements are present in this case since the hit and run was committed in the presence of Manarang who then
sought to arrest Robin. Presence does not require that the arresting person sees the offense, but also when he hears the
disturbance created thereby and proceeds at once to the scene.
Also, the exigent circumstances of - hot pursuit, a fleeing suspect, a moving vehicle, the public place and the raining nighttime -
all created a situation in which speed is essential and delay improvident. The Court acknowledges police authority to make the
forcible stop since they had more than mere "reasonable and articulable" suspicion that the occupant of the vehicle has been
engaged in criminal activity.
Furthermore, Robin was caught in flagrante delicto with possession of unlicensed firearm, thus warrantless arrest was
proper since another offense has been made.
 [CRIMPRO - Bautista] 84
[Camille Umali]

The policemen's warrantless arrest of petitioner could likewise be justified under paragraph b as he had in fact just committed an
offense. There was no supervening event or a considerable lapse of time between the hit and run and the actual apprehension.
Moreover, after having stationed themselves at the Abacan bridge in response to Manarang's report, the policemen saw for
themselves the fast approaching Pajero of Robin, its dangling plate number (PMA 777 as reported by Manarang), and the
dented hood and railings thereof. These formed part of the arresting police officer's personal knowledge of the facts indicating
that his Pajero was indeed the vehicle involved in the hit and run incident. Verily then, the arresting police officers acted upon
verified personal knowledge and not on unreliable hearsay information.
Furthermore, search and seizure was valid under plain view doctrine since no active search was made to discover the firearms.

-Gia Comsti-
 [CRIMPRO - Bautista] 85
[Camille Umali]

Boac v People

RAUL BASILIO D. BOAC, RAMON B. GOLONG, CESAR F. BELTRAN, and ROGER A. BASADRE, petitioners vs. PEOPLE OF
THE PHILIPPINES, respondent. | VELASCO, JR., J.: | A certiorari (2008)

Facts:
Boac, Golong, Beltran, Basadre, and Alfonso are members of the (PNP)-Criminal Investigation and Detection Group (CIDG). In
an information, they were charged with violation of Sec. 2203 in relation to Sec. 3612 of the Tariff and Customs Code for
conducting search and seizure of three (3) container vans consigned to Japan Trak surplus (Kakiage Surplus) without
a written authority form the Commissioner of Customs. All accused pleaded not guilty except Alfonso who remained at
large. At pretrial, the prosecution and defense stipulated that in the evening of July 27, 2004, Golong, Beltran, Basadre, and
Alfonso, upon the order of Boac, but without the authority from and coordination with the Bureau of Customs (BOC), Collection
District X, Cagayan de Oro City, flagged down three container vans consigned to Kakiage Surplus. The said vans were allowed
to be brought to the warehouse of the consignee and the actual search was done on July 28, 2004. Atty. Lourdes V.
Mangaoang, then Customs District Collector of Cagayan de Oro City, testified that the CIDG operatives (herein
petitioners) did not have a written authority from the Commissioner of Customs or the District Collector. She instructed
her personnel to open the vans only to show that there was nothing illegal in their contents. She prepared a letter of protest
addressed to Boac but it was ignored; hence, she filed the instant case.

Decision of the Sandiganbayan: petitioners are guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violating Section 2203 of the Tariff and
Customs Code which provides- “Sec. 2203. Persons Having Police Authority. - For the enforcement of the tariff and customs
laws, the following persons are authorized to effect searches, seizures and arrests conformably with the provisions of said laws.
x x x d. Officers generally empowered by law to effect arrests and execute processes of the courts, when acting under the
direction of the Collector.” The petitioners belong to the category of officers in Sec. 2203(d); thus, they needed a written authority
from the Commissioner of Customs or District Collector in order to conduct searches, seizures and arrests. In this case, the
prosecution established the lack of said written authority. Petitioners' MFR was denied by Sandiganbayan. Hence, this petition.

Issue:
1. WON the petitioners are guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violation of section 2203 of the Tariff and Customs Code despite
the evidence from both the parties that the petitioners did not conduct search, seizure or arrest. [No, they are not guilty. No
search and seizure happened.]

2. WON authority from the collector of customs is required when the petitioners flagged down the container vans outside the
jurisdiction of the collector of customs in the exercise of their official duties as police officers. [Yes, it is required, but petitioners
cannot be convicted since there is no evidence that they did search the container vans.]

Held/Ratio:
1. The prosecution has the burden of proving the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt. In this case, it is clear that
petitioners neither searched the container vans nor effected seizure and arrest. The testimony of Customs Broker Amolata, the
prosecution witness, supports this finding. It should be noted that the container vans were brought to the consignee's warehouse
and not to the CIDG headquarters. On July 28, 2004, the container vans were searched but not by petitioners, as testified
to by petitioners Beltran and Golong and the prosecution does not rebut these testimonies. In fact, the prosecution witness,
Customs Broker Amolata, attested to the same fact. The search was actually conducted by Customs Police Yamit and Godoy on
July 28, 2004. The Customs Police even held the keys of the vans. The search was under the direction of the Customs
Police because when the Customs Police decided to stop the search, petitioners acceded and left the premises.

It is thus very clear that the search was not done by petitioners but by the Customs Police. Petitioners did not seize anything
nor arrested anybody. They merely observed the search which they requested to be undertaken to check for
contrabands. Notably, the consignee did not file any complaint against petitioners.

Petitioners, however, could not also be held liable for illegally flagging down, searching, and seizing the three container vans on
July 27, 2004. It is a fact that no search and seizure of the vans was done on the night of July 27, 2004. Also, the act of
flagging down the vehicles is not among those proscribed by Sec. 2203 of the Tariff and Customs Code. Mere flagging
down of the container vans is not punishable under the said law.

2. Petitioners further claim that the police's authority to stop, search, and effect seizure and arrest, if necessary, is no longer
exclusively vested on the Collector of Customs. Regular PNP members are generally empowered by law to effect arrests in
accordance with Republic Act No. (RA) 6975. Petitioners contend that they were investigating a possible connivance of
smugglers with some corrupt customs personnel. They maintained that their act of flagging down the container vans was not
connected with the enforcement of the tariff and customs laws, smuggling being a form of economic sabotage which is within the
powers of the PNP-CIDG to monitor and investigate. Thus, according to them, no prior authority from the Collector of Customs is
required in performing their duties as police officers.
 [CRIMPRO - Bautista] 86
[Camille Umali]

As regards the second issue, the jurisdiction of the Commissioner of Customs is clearly with regard to customs duties. Should
the PNP suspect anything, it should coordinate with the BOC and obtain the written authority from the Collector of
Customs in order to conduct searches, seizures, or arrests. Coordination is emphasized in the laws. While it is an
admitted fact that there was no such coordination initiated by the PNP-CIDG in this instance, nevertheless, petitioners cannot be
convicted under the Tariff and Customs Code since there is no evidence that they did actually search the container vans.

Dispositive: Resolutions of Sandiganbayan are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Petitioners are ACQUITTED of the charge against
them.

-Carla Badi-
 [CRIMPRO - Bautista] 87
[Camille Umali]

BOC AND EEIB v OGARIO

Regional Trial Courts are devoid of any competence to pass upon the validity or regularity of seizure and forfeiture proceedings
conducted by the BOC and to enjoin or otherwise interfere with these proceedings.

Ponente: Mendoza, J.

FACTS:

On December 9, 1998, Felipe Bartolome, District Collector of Customs of Cebu, issued a Warrant of Seizure and Detention of
25,000 bags of rice, bearing the name of “SNOWMAN, Milled in Palawan”, shipped on board M/V Alberto, docked in Pier 6, in
Cebu City.
According to the EIIB, the rice was landed in Palawan by a foreign vessel and then placed in sacks marked “SNOWMAN, Milled
in Palawan.” It was then shipped to Cebu City on board the vessel M/V “Alberto.”
On December 10, 1998, respondent Mark Montelibano, the consignee of the sacks of rice, and his buyer, respondent Elson
Ogario, filed a complaint for injunction (Civil Case No. CEB-23077) in the Regional Trial Court of Cebu City, impugning the
issuance of the Warrant.

The RTC ruled in favor of respondents and ordered the return of the goods. Meanwhile, in the forfeiture proceedings before the
Collector of Customs of Cebu, a decision was rendered ordering the goods forfeited in favor of the government.

ISSUE:

WON the RTC has jurisdiction to pass upon the validity of seizure and forfeiture proceedings

HELD/RATIO:

No. There is no question that Regional Trial Courts are devoid of any competence to pass upon the validity or regularity of
seizure and forfeiture proceedings conducted by the BOC and to enjoin or otherwise interfere with these proceedings. The
Collector of Customs sitting in seizure and forfeiture proceedings has exclusive jurisdiction to hear and determine all questions
touching on the seizure and forfeiture of dutiable goods. The Regional Trial Courts are precluded from assuming cognizance
over such matters even through petitions for certiorari, prohibition or mandamus.

The rule that RTCs have no review powers over such proceedings is anchored upon the policy of placing no unnecessary
hindrance on the government’s drive, not only to prevent smuggling and other frauds upon Customs, but more importantly, to
render effective and efficient the collection of import and export duties due the State, which enables the government to carry out
the functions it has been instituted to perform.

Even if the seizure by the Collector of Customs were illegal, such act does not deprive the BOC of jurisdiction thereon.

-Macel Dacanay-
 [CRIMPRO - Bautista] 88
[Camille Umali]

i. AIRPORT SEARCHES
People v. Johnson

Legal Doctrine: Ordinary constitutional protections against warrantless searches and seizures do not apply to routine airport
procedures

Date: 18 December 2000

Ponente: Mendoza, J.
Nature: Appeal from RTC of Pasay City
Facts:
 Leila Reyes Johnson was a naturalized American citizen who had been working in the States as a nurse for geriatric
patients since 1968. She went to the Philippines to visit her son’s family. On the day of her return flight to the U.S., she was
frisked by Olivia Ramirez, the lady frisker at Gate 16 of NAIA who was tasked frisk departing passengers for weapons,
bombs, contraband goods, and explosives.
 As she was frisking Johnson, Ramirez felt something hard on Johnson’s abdominal area. Ramirez tried to explain that she
had to wear two panty girdles due to an operation as a result of an ectopic pregnancy. Ramirez reported the matter to her
superior and then took Johnson to the women’s restroom for inspection, together with SPO1 Rizalina Bernal. There
Ramirez asked her to bring out the thing under her girdle. Johnson brought out three plastic bags containing what was later
found to be shabu.
 Johnson was taken to the 1st Regional Aviation and security Office. Her pictures were taken, the drugs confiscated and her
belongings were itemized.
 Johnson’s version: while waiting in line at the boarding gate, she was approached by security officers, handcuffed and taken
to the women’s room. She was asked to undress and subjected to a body search. Since nothing was found on her person,
she was taken to a room with boxes, garbage, and a chair. Her passport and purse containing $850 were taken from her
and was issued no receipt. After 2 hours of waiting, a Col. Castillo entered and threw two white packages on the table and
was told to admit her ownership of the packages. She was kept in the RASO from 26 June-28 June without being allowed to
talk to anyone – counsel, family, or U.S. Embassy.
 Johnson’s arguments: 1. She was arrested and detained in gross violation of her constitutional rights. The shabu
confiscated from her is inadmissible bec she was forced to affix her signature on the plastic bags while she was detained at
the RASO office, without counsel and without being informed of her rights. 2. Prosecution failed to fully ascertain the
quantity of shabu to justify the imposition of reclusion perpetua by the trial court. 3. Prosecution failed to prove that she did
not have a license to possess or use shabu. 4. Evidence presented is insufficient to warrant a conviction.

Main Issue: W/N the arrest and seizure of the shabu was in violation of Johnson’s constitutional rights

Held:
 No statement was taken from Johnson during her detention and used in evidence against her. Therefore, there is no basis
for the invocation of Art III, 12 (1), and 3. Rather, this was an arrest in flagrante delicto.
 The shabu was legitimately acquired pursuant to airport security procedures. Persons may lose the protection of the search
and seizure clause by exposure of their persons or property to the public in a manner reflecting a lack of subjective
expectation of privacy, which society is prepared to recognize as reasonable. This is recognized implicitly in airport security
procedures.
 Airport security searches are reasonable, given their minimal intrusiveness (metal detectors, x-ray, etc) and the gravity of
the safety interests involved (fear of terrorist attacks, hijacking, etc.), and the reduced privacy expectations associated with
airline travel as often notified by signs notices, and public address systems. “These announcements place passengers on
notice that ordinary constitutional protections against warrantless searches and seizures do not apply to routine airport
procedures.
 The search was therefore valid. The subsequent arrest was also valid because she was caught in flagrante delicto.
However, there is no justification for the confiscation of Johnson’s passport, ticket, luggage, and other personal effects. The
pictures taken, and the girdle with her signature are inadmissible since they do not fall under Rule 126 Sec. 2

-Mickey Chatto-
 [CRIMPRO - Bautista] 89
[Camille Umali]

PEOPLE V. CANTON
People of the Philippines, appellee, vs. Susan Canton, appellant.
Nature: Appeal from a decision of the Regional Trial Court of Pasay City, Branch 110
Date: December 27, 2002
Ponente: Davide, Jr., C. J.
Doctrine: RA 6235 Sec. 9 is another exception to the proscription against warrantless searches and seizures. The provision
clearly states that the search, unlike in the Terry search, is not limited to weapons. Passengers are also subject to search for
prohibited materials or substances.
Facts:
 February 12, 1998 – Susan Canton was at the NAIA, being a departing passenger bound for Saigon, Vietnam. When she
passed through the metal detector booth, a beeping sound was emitted. Mylene Cabunoc, a civilian employee of the
National Action Committee on Hijacking and Terrorism (NACHT) and the frisker on duty at that time, called her attention and
asked her if she (Cabunoc) could search her (Canton). Upon frisking Canton, Cabunoc felt something bulging at her
abdominal area, and similar packages in front of her genital area and thighs. According to Cabunoc, she noticed that the
package contained what felt like rice granules. Cabunoc asked Canton to bring out the packages but Canton refused,
saying: “Money, money only”. Cabunoc reported the matter to her supervisor on duty, SPO4 Victorio de los Reyes.
 SPO4 de los Reyes instructed Cabunoc to call Customs Examiner Lorna Jalac and to bring Canton to a comfort room for a
thorough physical examination. Upon further frisking in the ladies’ room, Cabunoc touched something in front of Canton’s
sex organ and she directed Canton to remove her skirt, girdles and panty. Canton obliged and Cabunoc and Jalac
discovered three packages (abdominal area, in front of her genital area, and right thigh) individually wrapped and sealed in
gray colored packing tape, which Canton voluntarily handed to them.
 Cabunoc turned over the packages to SPO4 de los Reyes who then informed Police Superintendent Daniel Santos about
the incident. Together with Canton, they brought the gray plastic packs to the customs examination table, opened them, and
found white crystalline substances inside, which after laboratory examination yielded positive results for
methamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu, a regulated drug.
 For the defense, SPO2 Jerome Cause testified that no investigation was ever conducted on Canton. However, Canton
signed a receipt of the following articles seized from her: (1) 3 bags of methamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu
approximately 1,100 grams; (2) 1 American passport; (3) 1 Continental Micronesia plane ticket; and (4) two panty girdles.
SPO2 Cause said that he informed Canton of her rights but admitted that she did not have a counsel when she signed the
receipt.
 RTC: found Canton guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violating Section 16 Article III of RA 6425, and sentencing her to
suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and to pay a fine of Php1million.

Issue: Whether or not the warrantless search made on Canton was valid. YES, it was valid.
 [CRIMPRO - Bautista] 90
[Camille Umali]

Held/Ratio:
Canton’s contentions Supreme Court
TC erred in justifying the warrantless search against her The search conducted on Canton was not incidental to a
based on the alleged existence of probable cause lawful arrest
 Canton’s arrest did not precede the search. When
the metal detector alarmed while Canton was
passing through it, the lady frisker on duty made a
pat down search on her. In the process, Cabunoc felt
a bulge on Canton’s abdomen. The strip search that
followed was for the purpose of ascertaining what
were the packages concealed on Canton’s body.
TC erred in holding that she was caught in flagrante Canton, having been flagrante delicto, was lawfully
delicto and that the warrantless search was incidental to arrested without a warrant
a lawful arrest  Section 5, Rule 113 ROC provides that a peace
 The arrest could not be said to have been made officer or a private person may, without a warrant,
before the search because at the time of the strip arrest a person: (a) When, in his presence, the
search, the arresting officers could not have known person to be arrested has committed, is actually
what was inside the plastic containers hidden in her committing, or is attempting to commit an offense...
body, which were wrapped and sealed.  The present case falls under paragraph (a) of
 They could not have determined whether Canton Section 5, Rule 113. The search conducted on
was actually committing a crime; the strip search Canton resulted in the discovery of shabu. Armed
was therefore nothing but a fishing expedition with the knowledge that Canton was committing a
crime, the airport security personnel and police
authorities were duty-bound to arrest her. Her
subsequent arrest without a warrant was justified,
since it was effected upon the discovery and
recovery of shabu in her person flagrante delicto.
TC erred in not ruling that the frisker went beyond the The scope of a search pursuant to airport security
limits of the “Terry search” doctrine procedure is not confined only to search for
 The stop and frisk search should have been limited weapons under the “Terry search” doctrine
to the patting of her outer garments in order to  The Terry search or “stop and frisk” situation refers
determine whether she was armed or dangerous. to a case where a police officer approaches a person
who is acting suspiciously for purposes of
investigating possibly criminal behavior in line with
the general interest of effective crime prevention and
detection. He could validly conduct a carefully limited
search of the outer clothing of such person to
discover weapons which might be used to assault
him.
 In the present case, the search was made
pursuant to routine airport security procedure.
RA 6235 Section 9 provides: Every ticket issued to
a passenger by the airline or air carrier concerned
shall contain among others the following condition
printed thereon: “Holder hereof and his hand-
carried luggage(s) are subject to search for, and
seizure of, prohibited materials or substances.
Holder refusing to be searched shall not be
allowed to board the aircraft”, which shall
constitute a part of the contract between the
passenger and the air carrier.
 RA 6235 Sec. 9 is another exception to the
proscription against warrantless searches and
seizures. The provision clearly states that the
search, unlike in the Terry search, is not limited to
weapons. Passengers are also subject to search for
prohibited materials or substances.
 The strip search in the ladies’ room was justified
under the circumstances.
TC erred in not ruling that Canton was under custodial The constitutional right to counsel afforded an accused
 [CRIMPRO - Bautista] 91
[Camille Umali]

investigation without counsel under custodial investigation was not violated

 Canton alleges that from the moment frisker  In this case, no custodial investigation was
Cabunoc felt a package at her abdominal area, conducted after Canton’s arrest. She affixed her
started inquiring about its contents, detained her, signature to the receipt of the articles seized from
and stripped search her in the ladies’ room, she was her, but before she did so, she was told that she had
under custodial investigation without counsel. the option to sign or not to sign it. Aside from this, no
statement was taken from her during her detention
and used in evidence against her.
TC erred in admitting to the records of the case the The admission of the medical report was erroneous.
report of Dr. Ma. Bernadette Arcena, which was not  Canton assails the validity of the medical report as
testified on or offered in evidence, and using the same in evidence on the ground that it violates the hearsay
determining her guilt rule.
 The medical report contained the following: “This is
the first time I carried shabu. I need the money”.
 SC held that this contention is meritorious. The
admission of the questioned document was
erroneous because it was not properly identified.
TC erred in applying the ruling in People v. Johnson The ruling in People v. Johnson is applicable to the
 Canton questions the applicability of the doctrine in instant case
the Johnson case because of its sweeping  The Johnson case, which involves similar facts and
statement allowing searches and seizures of issues, finds application to the present case. The
departing passengers in airports in view of the court ruled that the packs of “methamphetamine
gravity of the safety interests involved. hydrochloride” seized during the routine frisk at the
 She argues that the applicable case should have airport was acquired legitimately pursuant to
been Katz v. United States which upholds the 4th airport security procedures and are therefore
Amendment that “protects people and not places”. admissible in evidence against Johnson.
 Canton’s reliance on Katz v. United States is
misplaced. The facts and circumstances of that case
are entirely different from the case at bar.

Dispositive: Canton guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the violation of Section 16 Article III of RA 6425, sentencing
her to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and to pay the fine of Php 1 million. The appellant’s passport, plane
ticket, and girdles are ordered to be returned to her.

-Raffi Reyes-
 [CRIMPRO - Bautista] 92
[Camille Umali]

United States v. Davis

Legal Doctrine: The appropriate standard for evaluating airport search programs is through “administrative
searches”. Searches conducted as a part of a general regulatory scheme in furtherance of an administrative purpose,
rather than as a part of a criminal investigation to secure evidence of crime may be permissible under the 4 th
Amendment though not supported by showing of probable cause directed to an individual to be searched.

Date: 29 June 1973

Ponente: Browning, Circuit Judge
Nature: Certiorari

Facts:
 Davis and a friend checked in a few minutes before his flight to LA in the San Francisco International Airport. As
they were about to board, Malcolm Read, a TWA employee, told him that a routine security check was necessary
and simultaneously reached for his briefcase. Davis did not do anything to signify a protest.
 Read opened it and found a gun, which he handed to Donald Graub, a U.S. Customs Service security agent,
who found it to be loaded. U.S. deputy Marshalls standing nearby then escorted Davis to a room where a search
was conducted on his person. Davis was charged with a minor offense and fined $250.
 Government: 1. Davis did not have a reasonable expectation of privacy (Katz v. U.S.), and 2. Police officer is not
required to have probable cause for arrest before he can seize a person and subject him to a limited search for
weapons. (Terry v. Ohio)
Issues:
1. W/N the government was sufficiently involved to subject the search to the limitations of the 4th Amendments.
2. W/N the search made was in violation of the 4th Amendment.

Held:
1. Yes, the government was.
 A search begins with the planning of the invasion and continues until “effective appropriation” of the fruits of
the search “for subsequent proof of an offense.
 The search of Davis’ briefcase was not an isolated event but part of a nationwide anti-hijacking program
conceived, directed, and implemented by federal officials in cooperation with air carriers.
- President announced a program to deal with airplane hi-jacking, directing airlines to extend the use of
surveillance equipment to all appropriate airports in the U.S., and providing enforcement officers to work with
this equipment and to have authority to conduct searches and make necessary arrests.
 Government’s participation in the development and implementation of airport search program has been of
such significance as to bring any search conducted pursuant to that program within the reach of the 4 th
Amendment.
2. No, it was not. Remanded to determine if there was consent to search.
 Katz is a threshold test: if there is no reasonable expectation of privacy, then the 4 th amendment is
inapplicable. If there is, then the government must demonstrate that the intrusion was justified. Two-fold
requirement: 1. Person exhibited an actual (subjective) expectation of privacy, 2. That expectation is one
that society is prepared to recognize as “reasonable”. Both requirements are satisfied here. (Government
must thus prove legitimate interest to justify intrusion.)
 Terry case inapplicable here. In that case, the search was limited to patting down a stopped person’s outer
clothing in order to detect the presence of weapons which might be used against the officer. Here, the
general screening is directed against the general introduction of weapons or explosives in a restricted area.
The search here is indiscriminate and not against a particular individual as such.
 Appropriate standard for evaluating airport search programs: “Administrative searches”. Essence:
searches conducted as a part of a general regulatory scheme in furtherance of an administrative purpose,
rather than as a part of a criminal investigation to secure evidence of crime may be permissible under the 4 th
Amendment though not supported by showing of probable cause directed to an individual to be searched.
The purpose is not to detect weapons or explosives or to apprehend those who carry them, but to deter
persons from carrying such material to board at all.
 Legitimate government interests to justify administrative searches: a. enormous potential damage to persons
and property, b. severe disruption of air traffic, c. serious risk of complications in foreign relations, d. no other
less intrusive or more effective means.
 However, such searches are valid only if prospective boarder retains the right to leave rather than submit to
the search = Consent.
 [CRIMPRO - Bautista] 93
[Camille Umali]

Mickey Chatto-
III. ARREST
RULE 113 - ARREST
Section 1. Definition of arrest. – Arrest is the taking of a person into custody in order that he may be bound to answer
for the commission of an offense.
Sec. 2. Arrest; how made. – An arrest is made by an actual restraint of a person to be arrested, or by his
submission to the custody of the person making the arrest.
No violence or unnecessary force shall be used in making an arrest. The person arrested shall not be subject to a
greater restraint than is necessary for his detention.

Sec. 3. Duty of arresting officer. – It shall be the duty of the officer executing the warrant to arrest the accused and
deliver him to the nearest police station or jail without unnecessary delay.

Sec. 4. Execution of warrant. – The head of the office to whom the warrant of arrest was delivered for execution
shall cause the warrant to be executed within ten (10) days from its receipt. Within ten (10) days after the expiration
of the period, the officer to whom it was assigned for execution shall make a report to the judge who issued the
warrant. In case of his failure to execute the warrant, he shall state the reason therefore.

Sec. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. – A peace officer or a private person may, without a warrant, arrest a
person:
(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is
attempting to commit an offense;
(b) When an offense has just been committed and he has probable cause to believe based on
personal knowledge of facts or circumstances that the person to be arrested has committed it; and
(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal establishment or
place where he is serving final judgment or is temporarily confined while his case is pending, or has
escaped while being transferred from one confinement to another.
In cases falling under paragraphs (a) and (b) above, the person arrested without a warrant shall be forthwith
delivered to the nearest police station or jail and shall be proceeded against in accordance with section 7 of Rule 112.
Sec. 6. Time of making arrest. – An arrest may be made on any day and at any time of the day or night.
Sec. 7. Method of arrest by officer by virtue of warrant.
– When making an arrest by virtue of a warrant, the officer shall inform the person to be arrested of the cause of the
arrest and the fact that a warrant has been issued for his arrest, except when he flees or forcibly resists before the
officer has opportunity to so inform him, or when the giving of such information will imperil the arrest. The officer need
not have the warrant in his possession at the time of the arrest but after the arrest, if the person arrested so requires,
the warrant shall be shown to him as soon as practicable.
Sec. 8. Method of arrest by officer without warrant. – When making an arrest without a warrant, the officer shall
inform the person to be arrested of his authority and the cause of the arrest, unless the latter is either engaged in the
commission of an offense, is pursued immediately after its commission, has escaped, flees, or forcibly resists before
the officer has opportunity to so inform him, or when the giving of such information will imperil the arrest.
Sec. 9. Method of arrest by private person. – When making an arrest, a private person shall inform the person to
be arrested of the intention to arrest him and the case of the arrest, unless the latter is either engaged in the
commission of an offense, is pursued immediately after its commission, or has escaped, flees, or forcibly resists
before the person making the arrest has opportunity to so inform him, or when the giving of such information will
imperil the arrest.
Sec. 10. Officer may summon assistance. – An officer making a lawful arrest may orally summon as many persons
as he deems necessary to assist him in effecting the arrest. Every person so summoned by an officer shall assist him
in effecting the arrest when he can render such assistance without detriment to himself.
Sec. 11. Right of officer to break into building or enclosure. – An officer, in order to make an arrest either by virtue
of a warrant, or without a warrant as provided in section 5, may break into any building or enclosure where the person
to be arrested is or is reasonably believed to be, if he is refused admittance thereto, after announcing his authority
and purpose.
Sec. 12. Right to break out from building or enclosure. – Whenever an officer has entered the building or enclosure
in accordance with the preceding section, he may break out therefrom when necessary to liberate himself.
Sec. 13. Arrest after escape or rescue. – If a person lawfully arrested escapes or is rescued, any person may
immediately pursue or retake him without a warrant at any time and in any place within the Philippines.
Sec. 14. Right of attorney or relative to visit person arrested. – Any member of the Philippine Bar shall, at the
request of the person arrested or of another acting in his behalf, have the right to visit and confer privately with such
person in the jail or any other place of custody at any hour of the day or night. Subject to reasonable regulations, a
relative of the person arrested can also exercise the same right.
 [CRIMPRO - Bautista] 94
[Camille Umali]

RULE 112 - PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATION

Section 1. Preliminary investigation defined; when required. – Preliminary investigation is an inquiry or proceeding
to determine whether there is sufficient ground to engender a well-founded belief that a crime has been committed
and the respondent is probably guilty thereof, and should be held for trial.
Except as provided in Section 7 of this Rule, a preliminary investigation is required to be conducted before the filing
of a compliant or information for an offense where the penalty prescribed by law is at least four (4) years, two (2)
months and one (1) day without regard to the fine.

Sec. 2. Officers authorized to conduct preliminary investigations. – The following may conduct preliminary
investigations:
(a) Provincial or City Prosecutors and their assistants;
(b) Judges of the Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts;
(c) National and Regional State Prosecutors; and
(d) Other officers as may be authorized by law.
Their authority to conduct preliminary investigations shall include all crimes cognizable by the proper court in their
respective territorial jurisdictions.
Sec. 3. Procedure.– The preliminary investigation shall be conducted in the following manner:
(a) The complaint shall state the address of the respondent and shall be accompanied by the affidavits of the
complainant and his witnesses, as well as other supporting documents to establish probable cause. They shall be in
such number of copies as there are respondents, plus two (2) copies for the official file. The affidavits shall be
subscribed and sworn to before any prosecutor or government official authorized to administer oath, or, in their
absence or unavailability, before a notary public, each of whom must certify that he personally examined the affiants
and that he is satisfied that they voluntarily executed and understood their affidavits.
(b) Within ten (10) days after the filing of the complaint, the investigating officer shall either dismiss it if he finds no
ground to continue with the investigation, or issue a subpoena to the respondent attaching to it a copy of the
complaint and its supporting affidavits and documents.
The respondent shall have the right to examine the evidence submitted by the complainant which he may not have
been furnished and to copy them at his expense. If the evidence is voluminous, the complainant may be required to
specify those which he intends to present against the respondent, and these shall be made available for examination
or copying by the respondent at his expense.
Objects as evidence need not be furnished a party but shall be made available for examination, copying, or
photographing at the expense of the requesting party.
(c) Within ten (10) days from receipt of the subpoena with the complaint and supporting affidavits and documents,
the respondent shall submit his counter-affidavit and that of his witnesses and other supporting documents relied
upon for his defense. The counter-affidavits shall be subscribed and sworn to and certified as provided in paragraph
(a) of this section, with copies thereof furnished by him to the complainant. The respondent shall not be allowed to file
a motion to dismiss in lieu of a counter-affidavit.
(d) If the respondent cannot be subpoenaed, or if subpoenaed, does not submit counter-affidavits within the ten
(10) day period, the investigating office shall resolve the complaint based on the evidence presented by the
complainant.
(e) The investigating officer may set a hearing if there are facts and issues to be clarified from a party or a witness.
The parties can be present at the hearing but without the right to examine or cross-examine. They may, however,
submit to the investigating officer questions which may be asked to the party or witness concerned.
The hearing shall be held within ten (10) days from submission of the counter-affidavits and other documents or
from the expiration of the period for their submission. It shall be terminated within five (5) days.
(f) Within ten (10) days after the investigation, the investigating officer shall determine whether or not there is
sufficient ground to hold the respondent for trial.

Sec. 4. Resolution of investigating prosecutor and its review. – If the investigating prosecutor finds cause to hold
the respondent for trial, he shall prepare the resolution and information. He shall certify under oath in the information
that he, or as shown by the record, an authorized officer, has personally examined the complainant and his
witnesses; that there is reasonable ground to believe that a crime has been committed and that the accused is
probably guilty thereof; that the accused was informed of the complaint and of the evidence submitted against him;
and that he was given an opportunity to submit controverting evidence. Otherwise, he shall recommend the dismissal
of the complaint.
Within five (5) days from his resolution, he shall forward the record of the case to the provincial or city prosecutor
or chief state prosecutor, or to the Ombudsman or his deputy in cases of offenses cognizable by the Sandiganbayan
in the exercise of its original jurisdiction. They shall act on the resolution within ten (10) days from their receipt thereof
and shall immediately inform the parties of such action.
 [CRIMPRO - Bautista] 95
[Camille Umali]

No complaint or information may be filed or dismissed by an investigating prosecutor without the prior written
authority or approval of the provincial or city prosecutor or chief state prosecutor or the Ombudsman or his deputy.
Where the investigating prosecutor recommends the dismissal of the complaint but his recommendation is
disapproved by the provincial or city prosecutor or chief state prosecutor or the Ombudsman or his deputy on the
ground that a probable cause exists, the latter may, by himself, file the information against the respondent, or direct
another assistant prosecutor or state prosecutor to do so without conducting another preliminary investigation.
If upon petition by a proper party under such rules as the Department of Justice may prescribe or motu propio, the
Secretary of Justice reverses or modifies the resolution of the provincial or city prosecutor or chief state prosecutor,
he shall direct the prosecutor concerned either to file the corresponding information without conducting anther
preliminary investigation, or to dismiss or move for dismissal of the complaint or information with notice to the parties.
The same rule shall apply in preliminary investigations conducted by the officers of the Office of the Ombudsman.

Sec. 5. Resolution of investigating judge and its review.

– Within ten (10) days after the preliminary investigation, the investigating judge shall transmit the resolution of the
case to the provincial or city prosecutor, or to the Ombudsman or his deputy in cases of offenses cognizable by the
Sandiganbayan in the exercise of its original jurisdiction, for appropriate action. The resolution shall state the findings
of facts and the law supporting his action, together with the record of the case which shall include: (a) the warrant, if
the arrest is by virtue of a warrant; (b) the affidavits, counter-affidavits and other supporting evidence of the parties;
(c) the undertaking or bail of the accused and the order for his release; (d) the transcripts of the proceedings during
the preliminary investigation; and (e) the order of cancellation of his bail bond, if the resolution is for the dismissal of
the complaint.
Within thirty (30) days from receipt of the records, the provincial or city prosecutor, or the Ombudsman or his
deputy, as the case may be, shall review the resolution of the investigating judge on the existence of probable cause.
Their ruling shall expressly and clearly state the facts and the law on which it is based and the parties shall be
furnished with copies thereof. They shall order the release of an accused who is detained if no probable cause is
found against him.

Sec. 6. When warrant of arrest may issue. – (a) By the Regional Trial Court. – Within ten (10) days from the filing of
the complaint or information, the judge shall personally evaluate the resolution of the prosecutor and its supporting
evidence. He may immediately dismiss the case if the evidence on record clearly fails to establish probable cause. If
he finds probable cause, he shall issue a warrant of arrest, or a commitment order if the accused has already been
arrested pursuant to a warrant issued by the judge who conducted the preliminary investigation or when the
complaint or information was filed pursuant to section 7 of this Rule. In case of doubt on the existence of probable
cause, the judge may order the prosecutor to present additional evidence within five (5) days from notice and the
issue must be resolved by the court within thirty (30) days from the filing of the complaint of information.
(b) By the Municipal Trial Court. – When required pursuant to the second paragraph of section of this Rule, the
preliminary investigation of cases falling under the original jurisdiction of the Metropolitan Trial Court, Municipal Trial
Court in Cities, Municipal Trial Court, or Municipal Circuit Trial Court may be conducted by either the judge or the
prosecutor. When conducted by the prosecutor, the procedure for the issuance of a warrant of arrest by the judge
shall be governed by paragraph (a) of this section. When the investigation is conducted by the judge himself, he shall
follow the procedure provided in section 3 of this Rule. If his findings and recommendations are affirmed by the
provincial or city prosecutor, or by the Ombudsman or his deputy, and the corresponding information is filed, he shall
issue a warrant of arrest. However, without waiting for the conclusion of the investigation, the judge may issue a
warrant of arrest if he finds after an examination in writing and under oath of the complainant and his witnesses in the
form of searching questions and answers, that a probable cause exists and that there is a necessity of placing the
respondent under immediate custody in order not to frustrate the ends of justice.
(c) When warrant of arrest not necessary. – A warrant of arrest shall not issue if the accused is already under
detention pursuant to a warrant issued by the municipal trial court in accordance with paragraph (b) of this section, or
if the complaint or information was filed pursuant to section 7 of this Rule or is for an offense penalized by fine only.
The court shall them proceed in the exercise of its original jurisdiction.

Sec. 7. When accused lawfully arrested without warrant. – When a person is lawfully arrested without a warrant
involving an offense which requires a preliminary investigation, the complaint or information may be filed by a
prosecutor without need of such investigation provided an inquest has been conducted in accordance with existing
rules. In the absence or unavailability of an inquest prosecutor, the complaint may be filed by the offended party or a
peace officer directly with the proper court on the basis of the affidavit of the offended party or arresting officer or
person.
Before the complaint or information is filed, the person arrested may ask for a preliminary investigation in
accordance with this Rule, but he must sign a waiver of the provision of Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code, as
 [CRIMPRO - Bautista] 96
[Camille Umali]

amended, in the presence of his counsel. Notwithstanding the waiver, he may apply for bail and the investigation
must be terminated within fifteen (15) days from its inception.
After the filing of the complaint or information in court without a preliminary investigation, the accused may, within
five (5) days from the time he learns of its filing, ask for a preliminary investigation with the same right to adduce
evidence in his defense as provided in this Rule.

Sec. 8. Records. – (a) Records supporting the information or complaint. – An information or complaint filed in court
shall be supported by the affidavits and counter-affidavits of the parties and their witnesses, together with the other
supporting evidence and the resolution on the case.
(b) Record of preliminary investigation. – The record of the preliminary investigation, whether conducted by a judge
or a prosecutor, shall not form part of the record of the case. However, the court, on its own initiative or on motion of
any party, may order the production of the record or any of its part when necessary in the resolution of the case or
any incident therein, or when it is to be introduced as an evidence in the case by the requesting party.

Sec. 9. Cases not requiring a preliminary investigation nor covered by the Rule on Summary Procedure. – (a) If
filed with the prosecutor. – If the complaint is filed directly with the prosecutor involving an offense punishable by
imprisonment of less than four (4) years, two (2) months and one (1) day, the procedure outlined in section 3(a) of
this Rule shall be observed. The prosecutor shall act on the complaint based on the affidavits and other supporting
documents submitted by the complainant within ten (10) days from its filing.
(b) If filed with the Municipal Trial Court. – If the complaint or information is filed with the Municipal Trial Court or
Municipal Circuit Trial Court for an offense covered by this section, the procedure in section 3 (a) of this Rule shall be
observed. If within ten (10) days after the filing of the complaint or information, the judge finds no probable cause
after personally evaluating the evidence, or after personally examining in writing and under oath the complainant and
his witnesses in the form of searching questions and answers, he shall dismiss the same. He may, however, require
the submission of additional evidence, within ten (10) days from notice, to determine further the existence of probable
cause. If the judge still finds no probable cause despite the additional evidence, he shall, within ten (10) days from its
submission or expiration of said period, dismiss the case. When he finds probable cause, he shall issue a warrant of
arrest, or a commitment order if the accused had already been arrested, and hold him for trial. However, if the judge
is satisfied that there is no necessity for placing the accused under custody, he may issue summons instead of a
warrant of arrest.
ARTICLE III – BILL OF RIGHTS
Section 1. No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law, nor shall any person be
denied the equal protection of the laws.

Section 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable
searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant
of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after examination under
oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be
searched and the persons or things to be seized.

RA 9344 - AN ACT ESTABLISHING A COMPREHENSIVE JUVENILE JUSTICE AND WELFARE SYSTEM,

CREATING THE JUVENILE JUSTICE AND WELFARE COUNCIL UNDER THE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,
APPROPRIATING FUNDS THEREFOR AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES
CRIMINAL RESPONSIBILITY
SEC. 20. Children Below the Age of Criminal Responsibility. - If it has been determined that the child taken into
custody is fifteen (15) years old or below, the authority which will have an initial contact with the child has the duty to
immediately release the child to the custody of his/her parents or guardian, or in the absence thereof, the child's
nearest relative. Said authority shall give notice to the local social welfare and development officer who will determine
the appropriate programs in consultation with the child and to the person having custody over the child. If the parents,
guardians or nearest relatives cannot be located, or if they refuse to take custody, the child may be released to any of
the following: a duly registered nongovernmental or religious organization; a barangay official or a member of the
Barangay Council for the Protection of Children (BCPC); a local social welfare and development officer; or when and
where appropriate, the DSWD. If the child referred to herein has been found by the Local Social Welfare and
Development Office to be abandoned, neglected or abused by his parents, or in the event that the parents will not
comply with the prevention program, the proper petition for involuntary commitment shall be filed by the DSWD or the
Local Social Welfare and Development Office pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 603, otherwise ,known as "The
Child and Youth Welfare Code".
INITIAL CONTACT WITH THE CHILD
SEC. 21. Procedure for Taking the Child into Custody. - From the moment a child is taken into custody, the law
enforcement officer shall:
 [CRIMPRO - Bautista] 97
[Camille Umali]

(a) Explain to the child in simple language and in a dialect that he/she can understand why he/she is being
placed under custody and the offense that he/she allegedly committed;
(b) Inform the child of the reason for such custody and advise the child of his/her constitutional rights in a
language or dialect understood by him/her;
(e) Properly identify himself/herself and present proper identification to the child;
(d) Refrain from using vulgar or profane words and from sexually harassing or abusing, or making sexual
advances on the child in conflict with the law;
(e) Avoid displaying or using any firearm, weapon, handcuffs or other instruments of force or restraint,
unless absolutely necessary and only after all other methods of control have been exhausted and have
failed;
(f) Refrain from subjecting the child in conflict with the law to greater restraint than is necessary for his/her
apprehension;
(g) Avoid violence or unnecessary force;
(h) Determine the age of the child pursuant to Section 7 of this Act;
(i) Immediately but not later than eight (8) hours after apprehension, turn over custody of the child to the
Social Welfare and Development Office or other accredited NGOs, and notify the child's apprehension. The
social welfare and development officer shall explain to the child and the child's parents/guardians the
consequences of the child's act with a view towards counseling and rehabilitation, diversion from the
criminal justice system, and reparation, if appropriate;
(j) Take the child immediately to the proper medical and health officer for a thorough physical and mental
examination. The examination results shall be kept confidential unless otherwise ordered by the Family
Court. Whenever the medical treatment is required, steps shall be immediately undertaken to provide the
same;
(k) Ensure that should detention of the child in conflict with the law be necessary, the child shall be secured
in quarters separate from that of the opposite sex and adult offenders;
(l) Record the following in the initial investigation:
1. Whether handcuffs or other instruments of restraint were used, and if so, the reason for such;
2. That the parents or guardian of a child, the DSWD, and the PA0 have been informed of the
apprehension and the details thereof; and
3. The exhaustion of measures to determine the age of a child and the precise details of the
physical and medical examination or the failure to submit a child to such examination; and
(m) Ensure that all statements signed by the child during investigation shall be witnessed by the child's
parents or guardian, social worker, or legal counsel in attendance who shall affix his/her signature to the said
statement.
A child in conflict with the law shall only be searched by a law enforcement officer of the same gender and shall not
be locked up in a detention cell.
BATAS PAMBASA BLG. 129 (1980)
Section 37. Preliminary investigation. — Judges of Metropolitan Trial Courts, except those in the National Capital
Region, of Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts shall have authority to conduct preliminary
investigation of crimes alleged to have been committed within their respective territorial jurisdictions which are
cognizable by the Regional Trial Courts.
The preliminary investigation shall be conducted in accordance with the procedure prescribed in Section 1,
paragraphs (a), (b), (c), and (d), of Presidential Decree No. 911: Provided, however, That if after the preliminary
investigation the Judge finds a prima facie case, he shall forward the records of the case to the Provincial/City Fiscal
for the filing of the corresponding information with the proper court.
No warrant of arrest shall be issued by the Judge in connection with any criminal complaint filed with him for
preliminary investigation, unless after an examination in writing and under oath or affirmation of the complainant and
his witnesses, he finds that a probable cause exists.
Any warrant of arrest issued in accordance herewith may be served anywhere in the Philippines.
REVISED PENAL CODE
Article 269. Unlawful arrest. — The penalty of arresto mayor and a fine not exceeding 500 pesos shall be imposed
upon any person who, in any case other than those authorized by law, or without reasonable ground therefor, shall
arrest or detain another for the purpose of delivering him to the proper authorities.

REVISED RULE ON SUMMARY PROCEDURE

Sec. 16. Arrest of accused. — The court shall not order the arrest of the accused except for failure to appear
whenever required. Release of the person arrested shall either be on bail or on recognizance by a responsible citizen
acceptable to the court.
[CRIMPRO - Bautista] 98
[Camille Umali]
 [CRIMPRO - Bautista] 99
[Camille Umali]

CASES

CHANCE VS STATE
Perry Lee CHANCE (appellant) v. STATE of Florida(appellee)
Ponente: Shannon, Acting C.J.
Date: July 14, 1967
Nature: Appeal from conviction of robbery by Pinellas County Circuit Court
Facts:
- Perry Lee Chance appeals from three convictions for robbery : a service station , a market on July 31,
1965, and a loquor store on August 6, 1965.
He filed motions to suppress in all three cases on the ground that his arrest was illegal because it was made without
probable cause or reasonable ground on the part of the arresting officer to believe that he had committed a felony.
He also filed a motion to suppress the testimony at the trial identifying him as the perpetrator of said offenses on the
ground that such identification resulted frojm his illegal detention and arrest
The court denied all four motions, hence this present appeal.
The details of the arrest are as follows:
o August 6, 1965- Officer Ritter of the St. Petersburg Police Dept. received a call on his radio
that two tall and thin colored males had rovved a liquor store 25 blocks away from where he
was patrolling.
He received no information concerning the automobile the robbers used but after proceeding a short distance he saw
an automobile containing two colored males, one of which was appellant Chance.
He stopped this automobile and while this detention was taing place, Officer Casswell arrived with further information
that one of the robbers had been wearing a white hat.
Thereafter, through the car window, he spotted a white hat on the front floorboard.
Officer Ritter, through the same window, noticed a butt of an automatic and rolls of coins.
Thus, he drew his revolver, handcuffed the two men and searched the car.
- The court ruled that the arrest took place when Officer Ritter drew his revolver and handcuffed the
appellant. However, Chance contends that it took place when Officer Ritter stopped the car(when there
was no probable cause ).

Issue/Held: When did the arrest take place? Did the arrest take place when Officer Ritter drew his revolver (when
there was probable cause) or when he stopped the car (when there was no probable cause)? It took place when
Officer Ritter drew his revolver because up until that time the elements of an arrest were not all present.
Ratio:
In ruling that way the Court enumerated the following as elements of an arrest:
 the intention to effect an arrest under a real or pretended authority
an actual or constructive detention of the person to be arrested by the person having present power to control the
person arrested
a communication by the arresting officer to the person being arrested of his intention then and there to effect an
arrest
an understanding by the person being arrested that it is the officer's intention then and there to arrest and detain him.
- Andrei Milaor
 [CRIMPRO - Bautista] 100
[Camille Umali]

SANCHEZ VS. DEMETRIOU

Petitioner: Antonio Sanchez
Respondents: Judge Harriet Demetriou,Secretary of Justice Franklin Drilon, Jovencito Zuno, Leonardo Guiyab Jr.,
Carlos de Leon, Ramoncito Mison, Reynaldo Lugto and Rodrigo Lorenzo

Nature: Petition for certiorari to set aside an order of the Regional Trial Court of Pasig
Ponente: Cruz, J.
Date: November 9, 1993

Legal Doctrine:
Arrest is defined as the taking of a person into custody in order that he may be bound to answer for the
commission of an offense. Application of actual force, manual touching of the body, physical restraint or a formal
declaration of arrest is not required. It is enough that there be an intent on the part of one of the parties to arrest the
other and an intent on the part of the other to submit, under the belief and impression that the submission is
necessary.

Facts:
Antonio Sanchez, then Mayor of Calauan, Laguna, was accused of committing the crime of rape with
homicide. He brought this petition to challenge the order of the respondent judge denying his motion to quash the
information filed against him and 6 other persons. The facts leading to this case are as follows:
 The Presidential Anti-Crime Commission made a request for the filing of appropriate charges against several
persons in connection with the rape-slay of Mary Eileen Sarmenta and the killing of Allan Gomez.
 The Panel of State Prosecutors of the DOJ conducted a preliminary investigation on August 9, 1993. Atty.
Marciano Brion Jr. represented Sanchez as he was not present during the prelim.
 On August 12, 1993, petitioner was issued an ‘invitation’ by PNP Commander Rex Piad requesting him to
appear for investigation at Camp Vicente Lim in Canlubang, Laguna. The ‘invitation’ was served to Sanchez
the next day, and he was immediately taken to said camp.
 That same day, petitioner was positively identified by Aurelio Centeno and SPO III Vivencio Malabanan, who
both executed extrajudicial confessions implicating him as principal in the crimes. He was then placed on
‘arrest-status’ and was brought to the DOJ in Manila.
 An inquest was conducted by the respondent prosecutors upon petitioner’s arrival, with Atty. Salvador
Panelo as his counsel.
 Afterwhich, a warrant of arrest was served on Sanchez. Said warrant was issued on the same day, August
13, by Judge Enrico Lanzanas of Manila RTC Branch 7 for violation of Section 8, in relation to Section 11 of
RA No. 6713. Petitoner was then taken to the CIS Detention Center, Camp Crame.
 On August 16, 1993, the respondent prosecutors filed with the RTC of Calauan, Laguna, 7 informations
charging Sanchez and 6 others with the rape and killing of Mary Eileen Sarmenta.
 On August 26, 1993, Judge Eustaquio Sto. Domingo issued a warrant for the arrest of all the accused in
connection with the said crime. The venue of the 7 cases was transferred to Pasig, where they were raffled
to respondent judge Demetriou. This was done in order to avoid miscarriage of justice due to the tense and
partisan atmosphere in Laguna in favor of the petitioner and the relationship of an employee in the trial court
with one of the accused.
 On September 10, the informations were amended to include the killing of Allan Gomez.
 On the same date, petitioner filed a motion to quash the informations but the same was denied by
respondent judge. Hence, this instant petition for certiorari and prohibition with prayer for a temporary
restraining order/ writ of injunction was filed.

Main issue:
WON petitioner was arrested on August 13, 1993 (was the ‘invitation’ tantamount to petitioner’s arrest?)

Sub-issues/Held:
1. WON petitioner was denied the right to present evidence at the preliminary investigation.
 Petitioner was not denied of his right. Petitioner’s counsel manifested that his client was waiving
the presentation of a counter-affidavit. The head of the Panel of Prosecutors told Atty. Brion that he
could still file a counter-affidavit until August 27, but no such affidavit was filed.
2. WON the proceedings conducted by the Department of Justice were null and void for lack of jurisdiction
 While the Ombudsman was indeed empowered to investigate and prosecute any illegal act or
omission of any public official (Section 15 (1) RA 6770), this authority is not exclusive but rather a
shared or concurrent authority in respect of the offense charged.
 [CRIMPRO - Bautista] 101
[Camille Umali]

Held/Ratio:
Main issue: Yes. The initial arrest was illegal but the RTC lawfully acquired jurisdiction over the person of the
petitioner by virtue of the warrant of arrest issued on August 26, 1993 in connection with the rape-slay case.
Section 1, Rule 113 of the Rules of Court defines arrest as ‘the taking of a person into custody in order that he may
be bound to answer for the commission of an offense.’ Article 2 of the same Rule provides that ‘an arrest is effected
by an actual restraint of the person to be arrested or by his voluntary submission to the custody of the person making
the arrest.’

Application of actual force, manual touching of the body, physical restraint or a formal declaration of arrest is not
required. It is enough that there be an intent on the part of one of the parties to arrest the other and an intent on the
part of the other to submit, under the belief and impression that the submission is necessary.

In the case at bar, the invitation came from a high-ranking military official and the investigation of petitioner was to be
made at a military camp. Although in the guise of a request, it was obviously a command or an order that the
petitioner could hardly be expected to defy. Moreover, it should be noted that petitioner was placed on ‘arrest status’
after he was positively identified by Centeno and Malabanan.

Petitoner was correct in stating that his arrest did not come under Section 5, Rule 113 of the Rules of Court, providing
as follows:

Section 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful- A peace officer or a private person may, without a warrant,
arrest person:
a. When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting
to commit an offense;
b. When an offense has in fact just been committed and he has personal knowledge of facts indicating that
the person to be arrested has committed it; and
c. When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal establishment or place
where he is serving final judgment or temporarily confined while his case is pending, or has escaped
while being transferred from one confinement to another

 The arresting officers were not present when the petitioner allegedly participated in the killing of Gomez and
the rape-slay of Sarmenta.
 The arresting officers did not have personal knowledge of the facts as they have relied solely on the
identification of Centeno and Malabanan
 The killing of Gomez and the rape-slay of Sarmenta took place on June28-29, or 46 days before the date of
the arrest, it cannot be said that the offense had ‘just in fact been committed’ when the petitioner was
arrested.

The initial arrest was illegal but the RTC lawfully acquired jurisdiction over the person of the petitioner by virtue of the
warrant of arrest issued on August 26, 1993 in connection with the rape-slay case. The Court also notes that on
August 13, Judge Lanzanas issued a warrant of arrest against petitioner for violation of RA 6713. Pending the
issuance of the warrant for the rape-slay cases, this first warrant served as an initial justification for his detention.

Moreover, even on the assumption that no search warrant was issued at all, the trial court still acquired jurisdiction
over the person of petitioner. The rule is that if the accused objects to the jurisdiction of the court over his person, he
may move to quash the information, but only on that ground. If, as in this case, the accused raises other grounds in
the motion to quash, he is deemed to have waived that objection and to have submitted his person to the jurisdiction
of the court.

- Anne Amantillo
 [CRIMPRO - Bautista] 102
[Camille Umali]

DIOSDADO JOSE ALLADO and ROBERTO L. MENDOZA, petitioners vs. HON. ROBERTO C. DIOKNO,
Presiding Judge, Br. 62, Regional Trial Court, Makati, Metro Manila, and PRESIDENTIAL ANTI-CRIME
COMMISSION, respondents
Date: May 5, 1994
Ponente: Bellosillo, J.

Doctrine:The Judge does not have to personally examine the complainant and his witnesses to determine probable
cause. The Prosecutor can perform the same functions as a commissioner for the taking of evidnece. However, there
should be a report and necessary documents supporting the Fiscal's bare certification... The Judge must go beyond
the Prosecutor's certification and investigation report whenever necessary. He should call for the complainant and
witnbesses themselves when the circumstances of the case so require.

Facts:
Petitioners Diosdado Jose Allado and Roberto L. Mendoza, alumni of UP College of Law and partners of the Law
Firm of Salonga, Hernandez and Allado, were accused of the heinous crime of kidnapping with murder by the
Presdiential Anti-Crime Commission (PACC) on the basis of an alleged extrajudicial confession of the security guard,
Escolastico Umbal, a dischargee of the Philippine Constabulary. Umbal implicated them as the brains behind the
alleged kidnapping and slaying of one Eugene Alexander Van Twest, a German national. Umbal claimed that he and
his companions met Allado and Mendoza at the Silahis Hotel where Umbal and company undertook in exchange for
P2.5 M who allegedly had an international warrant of arrest against him. Umbal claimed that Van Twest's remains
were burned into fine ashes using gasoline and rubber tires.
A day after Umbal's extrajudicial confession, the operatives of PACC, armed with a search warrant, raided the two
dwellings of Santiago, Umbal's cohort in the abduction. Santiago was put under arrest together with his aide. Umbal's
other cohorts were arrested. Sr. Supt. Panfilo Lacson of PACC Task Force Habagat referred the case to DOJ for the
institution of criminal proceedings against the above persons arrested, and Atty. Allado and Atty. Mendoza for illegal
possession of firearms and ammunition, carnapping, kidnapping for ransom with murder and usurpation of authority.
Lacson alleged that Allado and Mendoza conspired with the other suspects to abduct and kill Van Twest to eliminate
him after forcing him to sign several documents transferring ownership of several properties and that the two caused
the withdrawal of P5M from Van Twest's bank account. The Senior State Prosecutor then issued a subpoena to
petitioners informing them of a complaint filed against them. Mendoza moved for the production of documents
including those indicating transfer of ownership and records of PACC's investigation, for examination so that they can
prepare for their defense. Mendoza also moved for the inhibition of the panel of prosecutors which was granted.
Task Force Habagat only submitted copies of request for verification of the firearms seized from the companions of
Umbal and a Philippine Times Journal article on the case. Before the new panel of prosecutors could resolve the
case, one of the accused SPO2 Bato moved for the admission of his counteraffidavit confessing participation of
Allado and Mendoza. Before the two petitioners copuld refute the conter-affidavit, Bato moved to supress it on the
ground that it was extracted through intimidation and duress. The new panel failed to act on the twin motions of SPO2
Bato and issued a resolution fonding a prima facie case against Allado and Mendoza. The two were able to secure a
copy of the information for kidnapping with murder against them and the undated resolution under the letterhead of
PACC, signed by the panel of prosecutors and with the Head of the PACC Task Force recommending approval
thereof.
On the same day, the information was filed at RTC Makati Branch 62 presided by Judge Roberto C. Diokno. Judge
Diokno issued the assailed warrant of arrest against Allado and Mendoza. Hence, the two filed petition for certiorari
and prohibition with prayer for a temporary restraining order.
Issue/Held: Is there probable cause for the issuance of a warrant of arrest against Allado and Mendoza? NO

Ratio:
Probable cause for an arrest or for the issuance of a warrant of arrest has been defined as such facts and
circumstances which would lead a reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe that an offense has been
commited by the person sought to be arrested.

Before issuing a warrant of arrest, the judge must satisfy himself that based on the evidence submitted, there is
sufficient proof that a crime has been committed and that the perosn to be arrested is probably guilty thereof. In this
case however, the evidence is insufficient for a finding of probable cause against Allado and Mendoza.

REASONS FOR INSUFFICIENCY:

1. There is serious doubt on the death of Van Twest since the corpus delicti has not been established, nor have his
remains been recovered. It is impossiblke for a human body to be pulvarized into ashes by just using gasoline and
rubber tires since even crematoria use entirely closed incinerators where the corpse is subjected to intense heat and
the remains undergo a process where the bones are completely ground to dust.
 [CRIMPRO - Bautista] 103
[Camille Umali]

2. There were no earnest efforts to recover the traces of Van Twest's remains.
3. After Van Twest's reported abduction which led to his decimation by cremation, his counsel continue to represent
him before judicial and quasi-judicial proceedings. Counsel himself did not believe that his client was already dead.
4. The extrajudicial confession of Umbal suffers from material inconsistencies. In his sworn statement, Umbal said
that he and his cohorts met Allado and Mendoza at Silahis Hotel but during the preliminary investigation, he stated
that he was not part of the meeting. Umbal also claimed that he was part of the mock interrogation of Van Twest but
during the clarificatory questioning, he said that he was asked to go outside the safehouse at the time Van Twest was
interrogated.
5. While the whole investigation was trigerred by Umbal's confession dated September 16, 1993, the application of
PACC operatives for search warrant was granted by the RTC of Manila on September 15, 1993, a day before Umbal
executed his sworn statement. SPO2 Bato on the other hand moved to supress his counteraffidavit on the ground
that it was exacted through duress and intimidation.
6. The PACC operatives who applied for the search warrants never implicated Allado and Mendoza. They even
claimed that it was Santiago who was the mastermind

Thus, there is no probable cause to incriminate Allado and Mendoza. Judge Diokno committed grave abuse of
discretion in issuing the assailed warranbt of arrest it appearing that he did not personally examine the evidence nor
did he call for the complainant and his witnesses. HE MERELY RELIED ON THE CERTIFICATION OF THE
PROSECUTORS THAT PROBABLE CAUSE EXISTED. Otherwise, he would have found out that the evidence
presented was utterly insufficent to warrant the arrest of Allado and Mendoza.

The Court noted the difference between preliminary inquiry and preliminary investigation. Preliminary inquiry is for the
determination of probable cause for the issuance of warrant of arrest made by the judge while preliminary
investigation ascertains whether the offender should be held for trial or released. Citing Lim v. Felix, the Court held
that the Judge does not have to personally examine the complainant and his witnesses. The Prosecutor can perform
the same functions as a commissioner for the taking of evidnece. However, there should be a report and necessary
documents supporting the Fiscal's bare certification... The Judge must go beyond the Prosecutor's certification and
investigation report whenever necessary. He should call for the complainant and witnbesses themselves when the
circumstances of the case so require.

In this case, it appears that the prosecutors missapropriated if not abused their discretion. They should have
presented sufficient evidence to demonstreate existence of probable cause. Umbal's statement was full of
inconsistencies, Allado and Mendoza were not given an opportunity to refute Bato's counteraffidavit, and PACC
appeared to have had a hand in the determination of probable cause in the preliminary inquiry (PACC's letterhead
and recommendation of approval by PACC Task Force head).
- Arianne Cerezo
 [CRIMPRO - Bautista] 104
[Camille Umali]

PANGANDAMAN VS. CASAR

Petitioners: Hadji Ibrahim Pangandaman, et al

Respondent: Dimaporo Casar (Municipal Trial Court Judge of Lanao del Sur) and People of the Phil.

Doctrine: Warrant of Arrest may be issued even before completion of prescribed procedure on preliminary
investigation. Issuance of warrant of arrest only await finding of probable cause.
Date: April 14, 1988
Ponente: Narvasa, J.

Facts:
 July 27, 1985: a shooting incident occurred in Masiu Lanao del Sur (5 dead, 2 injured)
o One version: armed men attacked a residence in Pantao Masiu
o Second version: one group on their way to another place was ambushed
 Following day: Atty. Batuampar, claiming to representative of widow of victim), filed letter complaint with
Provincial Fiscal of Marawi City asking for a full blast investigation.
o Provincial fiscal addressed a “1st indorsement” to respondent judge and requested that “all cases
that may be filed relative to the incident” be forwarded to his office which “has taken cognizance of
said cases”
 Aug. 10, 1985 (Saturday): a criminal complaint was filed by PC Sgt. Laruan.
o Judge examined personally 3 witnesses brought by sergeant under oath and closed/direct
supervision reducing to writing the questions and answers
o Judge approved the complaint and issued warrant of arrest against 14 petitioners named by
respondent 50 John Does (total of 64 people)
 Aug. 14, 1985: Ex parte motion for reconsideration was filed alleging that judge hastily and haphazardly issued
WOA with no searching questions. It was denied for lack of basis.
Arguments:
Petitioners/SOLGEN:
 Respondent judge did not conduct investigation in accordance with ROC Sec.3, Rule 112
 They were denied due process
 It is impossible to determine probable cause against 64 people whose partition varies in nature and degree in a
matter of hours because Aug.10 is a Saturday and MTC is open only from 8am to 1pm.
 Judge conducted investigation in total disregard of the Provincial Fiscal who had taken cognizance 12 days
earlier
CASE: No information yet filed in RTC. Preliminary investigation not yet completed. Judge does not intend to
undertake second phase.
- Receive complaint → examine witnesses →believe that there is basis → issued warrant

Issue: WON the judge has power to issue warrant without completing entire prescribed procedure of preliminary
investigation under Sec.3, Rule 112 of Rules on Criminal Procedure.
Held: Yes.

Ratio:

PRESCRIBED PROCEDURE

 In conducting a pre-investigation the Rule 112, Sec.3 of Rules on Criminal Procedure must be observed. This
procedure actually consists of 2 stages:
1. Ex parte inquiry into sufficiency of complaint and affidavits → determination of judge of:
a. No ground to continue with inquiry → dismiss the complaint and transmit order of dismissal
b. Sufficient cause → continue with inquiry and proceed to second phase
2. Give respondent notice of complaint, access to complainant’s evidence and opportunity to submit
counter affidavit and supporting document → judge render resolution (dismiss complaint or hold for trial
→ transmit with record to provincial fiscal for appropriate action

 Procedure above must be followed before complaint or information is filed in RTC. Failure would be denial of
due process

ON COMPLETITION OF THE PROCEDURE

 [CRIMPRO - Bautista] 105
[Camille Umali]

 There is NO requirement that procedure for preliminary investigation be completed before warrant may be
issued
 Sec. 6, Rule 112 clearly authorize the MTC to order arrest even before opening of the second phase if court is
satisfied that probable cause exists and there is necessity to place the respondent under immediate custody so
as not to frustrate the ends of justice
 Issuance need only probable cause not the completion of the entire procedure of preliminary investigation

ON ISSUING WARRANT TO 64 PEOPLE

For the 14 named (herein petitioners) - VALID

 Nothing unusual in completing within 3 hour period the questioning of 3 witnesses presented in a preliminary
examination to determine existence of probable cause
 Witnesses affirmed and identified the victims and the 14 petitioners as members of the ambush group.
For the 50 John Does - INVALID
 It is in the nature of a general warrant
 Warrant of arrest must particularly describe the persons to be seized, otherwise, it should be VOIDED.
- Camille Umali
 [CRIMPRO - Bautista] 106
[Camille Umali]

GUTIERREZ VS. HERNANDEZ

P/SUPT. ALEJANDRO GUTIERREZ, PCI ANTONIO RICAFORT, SPO4 RICARDO G. ONG, and SPO1 ARNULFO
MEDENILLA, complainants,
vs.
JUDGE GODOFREDO G. HERNANDEZ, SR., respondent.
Date: June 8, 2007
Ponente: Garcia, J.
Nature: Administrative Case
Summary/Doctrine: Police Officers, who rescued certain girls from allegedly being employed in KTV bars, are
charged by the owners of the place where they rescued the girls with grave coercion and qualified trespass to
dwelling in which judge Hernandez issued warrants of arrest.
The issued warrants of arrest were invalid since the MTC judge did not conduct a preliminary investigation of the
charges against the police officers.
Municipal Judges, before issuing warrants of arrest, must conduct a preliminary investigation (personally
examine the complainant/s and the witnesses he may produce and be satisfied that probable cause exists) and
determine the necessity of placing the respondent under immediate custody in order not to frustrate the ends of
justice.

Facts:
Petitioners, all of the Criminal Investigation and Detective Division (CIDD) of the Philippine National Police
(PNP), filed an administrative case against then (now retired) Judge Godofredo G. Hernandez, Sr. of the Municipal
Trial Court (MTC) of Pinamalayan, Oriental Mindoro charging the latter with:
1. Gross ignorance of the law;
2. Impropriety;
3. Grave misconduct;
4. Conduct unbecoming of a judge; and
5. Lack of integrity to continue as a member of the judiciary.
Gus Abelgas of ABS-CBN's "Private Eye" TV program accompanied Ernesto Cruz to Camp Crame to file a
complaint involving Cruz's minor daughter who was allegedly recruited in Malabon, Metro Manila to work in a KTV bar
in Pinamalayan, Oriental Mindoro.
Complainants, as CIDD officers and agents, conducted a rescue operation accompanied by Ernesto Cruz,
Gus Abelgas and other ABS-CBN TV crew members who took footage of the operation. The CIDD team was able to
rescue five (5) young girls from the house of a certain Salvador Napolitano in Pinamalayan, Oriental Mindoro who
claimed that PO2 Jose Ringor, allegedly a member of the Provincial Mobile Group of the PNP, Oriental Mindoro,
brought the women to him for safekeeping.
As a result of the rescue operation, a complaint for violation of Republic Act (RA) 9208 in relation to RA 7610
was filed before the City Prosecutor's Office of Malabon against PO2 Ringor, his recruiter wife Imelda and a certain
Bebang. Thereafter, the rescued minors were brought and turned over to the Department of Social Welfare and
Development. Later, the corresponding Information was filed and warrants of arrest with no bail recommended were
then issued against PO2 Ringor, et al.
The police officers were surprised to discover that cases for grave coercion and qualified trespass to
dwelling had been filed against them, Gus Abelgas and Ernesto Cruz in the MTC of Pinamalayan, Oriental Mindoro,
before the sala of the respondent judge. Apparently, the rescued girls, except Joahna Cruz, had retracted their
complaint against PO2 Ringor, et al. and had, instead, filed charges of grave coercion and qualified trespass to
dwelling against the members of the CIDD rescue team.
In connection with the charges against them, the police officers seeks to hold the respondent judge liable for
gross ignorance of the law in –

1. Issuing warrants of arrest in inordinate haste, forgoing the mandatory conduct of preliminary
examination and personal determination of probable cause in contravention of the provisions of the
Rules of Court and in denial of complainants' constitutional rights to due process; and
2. Setting the said criminal cases for arraignment without the requisite Informations having yet been filed in
court.

Judge’s defense –
 His act of setting said criminal cases for the arraignment of the police officers even without any information
having yet been filed, and issuing warrants of arrest despite the absence of any such information, were all
"pursuant to a valid exercise of his judicial function as the presiding judge of Pinamalayan."
 [CRIMPRO - Bautista] 107
[Camille Umali]

 He conducted a preliminary investigation and then issued the corresponding warrant of arrest there being a
motion filed by the private offended parties for the early issuance thereof.
 The determination of probable cause for the purpose of issuing a warrant of arrest is his sole prerogative as
a judge.

OCA: came out with its findings that the respondent judge was guilty of gross ignorance of procedural rules.

Issue: W/N the issued warrant for the arrest of the police officers is valid

Held: invalid.

There was no preliminary investigation conducted as required by the rules since no subpoena was issued to
the Police officers for them to file their counter-affidavits

The inordinate haste attending the issuance of the warrants of arrest against Police officers, Ernesto Cruz,
and Gus Abelgas belies the conduct of preliminary examination and personal determination of probable cause, in
contravention of the provisions of the Rules of Court, and constituting a denial of due process. The warrant for
Ernesto was issued the next day after a complaint was filed against him. The Warrants for the police officers and Gus
Abelgas were issued on the same date the complaint was amended to include their names. Three conditions
that must concur for the issuance of the warrant of arrest by the municipal judge during a preliminary investigation.
The investigating judge must:
1. Have examined in writing and under oath the complainant and his witnesses by searching questions and
answers;
2. Be satisfied that a probable cause exists; and
3. That there is a need to place the respondent under immediate custody in order not to frustrate the ends
of justice.

The issuance of the warrants of arrest in this case was clearly irregular since, not only did it lack a
preliminary investigation, but the order granting such issuance did not show any finding of a need to place
complainants under immediate custody in order not to frustrate the ends of justice.

Even if the judge finds probable cause, it is not mandatory for him to issue a warrant of arrest. He must
further determine the necessity of placing the respondent under immediate custody in order not to frustrate the ends
of justice. It is improper for a municipal judge to issue a warrant of arrest without any finding that it was necessary to
place the accused in immediate custody to prevent frustration of the ends of justice.

Judge was fined P20,000 only.

- Cyril Arnesto
 [CRIMPRO - Bautista] 108
[Camille Umali]

AAA vs. HON. JUDGE CARBONELL and ENGR. ARZADON

Ynares-Santiago; 2007; Petition for Certiorari assailing order of RTC in a Criminal Case

Doctrine
For the determination of existence of probable cause for the issuance of warrant of arrest, it is not mandatory that the
judge personally examine the complainant and the witnesses. Judge may rely on the report and documents submitted
by the prosecutor. If the judge is not satisfied with such report and documents, he may require affidavits from
witnesses to help him determine the existence of probable cause for the issuance of warrant of arrest.

Facts
AAA worked as a secretary at the Arzadon Automotive and Car Service Center from Feb to Aug 2001. 6:30pm,
Arzadon asked her to deliver a book to an office in another building. When she returned, lights were off, gate was
closed. Still, she went inside to get her handbag.
On her way out, she saw Arzadon standing beside a van holding a pipe. He threatened and asked her to lie on the
pavement. He inserted his penis into her vagina. She cried out for help but nobody was around.
AAA did not report the incident because Arzadon threatened to kill her and her family. But when she discovered that
the rape resulted in her pregnancy, she told her parents what happened. 2002, AAA filed a complaint for rape against
Arzadon.
Assistant City Prosecutor found probable cause and recommended the filing of information. Arzadon moved for
reconsideration. During one of the hearings, AAA failed to appear and the case was provisionally dismissed.
2003, AAA filed another affidavit-complaint. Case was assigned to the Assistant Provincial Prosecutor, who found a
prima facie rape case and recommended the filing of information.
Arzadon moved for reconsideration and requested a panel of prosecutors to review the case. The panel found
probable. An information for rape was filed before RTC.
Arzadon filed a Motion to Hold in Abeyance All Court Proceedings Including the Issuance of Warrant of Arrest and to
Determine Probable Cause for the Purpose of Issuing a Warrant of Arrest. Judge Carbonell granted the motion and
directed AAA to take the witness stand.
Arzadon appealed the Resolution of the panel before the DOJ. Acting Secretary of Justice Merceditas Gutierrez
found no probable cause and directed withdrawal of information. AAA moved for reconsideration and Secretary Raul
Gonzales reversed and found probable cause. New information was filed.
Arzadon filed an Urgent Motion for Judicial Determination of Probable Cause for the Issuance of a Warrant of Arrest.
Judge Carbonell granted motion and directed AAA to take the witness stand.
AAA moved for reconsideration claiming that the documentary evidence sufficiently established existence of probable
cause. She also filed for transfer of venue of criminal case. SC granted request for transfer of venue.
Judge Carbonell issued Order dismissing criminal case for lack of probable cause. AAA moved for reconsideration
but was denied.

Issues/Held
Whether the petition for certiorari is one under Rule 45 or Rule 65  Rule 65
Whether or not the judge is required to personally examine AAA and her witnesses for the determination of probable
cause for the issuance of a warrant of arrest  NO

Ratio
Certiorari under Rule 45  for review of errors of judgment
Certiorari under Rule 65  for review of errors of jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess
of jurisdiction
However, Certiorari under Rule 45 may be considered Certiorari under Rule 65 where it is alleged that the respondent
abused their discretion in the questioned acts, as in the case at bar
However, AAA committed procedural error in filing the case to the SC instead of the CA  violating principle of
judicial hierarchy of courts. Nevertheless, considering the gravity of the crime charged and the length of time that has
passed, the controversy shall be resolved to avoid further delay.
Judge Carbonell dismissed criminal case for lack of probable cause on the ground that AAA and her witnesses failed
to comply with his Order to take the witness stand. He cites Sec 2 Art III of the 1987 Consti, which states that no
warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after examination
under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses produced.
Soliven vs. Makasiar  this constitutional provision does not mandatorily require the judge to personally examine the
complainant and the witnesses. He may opt to personally evaluate the report and documents submitted by the
prosecutor, or he may require the submission of affidavits of witnesses.
What the Consti underscores is the exclusive and personal responsibility of the judge to satisfy himself of existence of
probable cause for the issuance of warrant of arrest. Estabished doctrine and procedure: (1) judge shall personally
 [CRIMPRO - Bautista] 109
[Camille Umali]

evaluate report and documents submitted by fiscal regarding existence of probable cause, and issue a warrant, (2) if
the judge finds no probable cause, he may disregard the fiscal’s report and require the submission of affidavits of
witnesses to aid him in the determination of the existence of probable cause.
Procedure is practical  personal examination of criminal complaints will divert the attention of the judge from
hearing and deciding cases before the court
Webb vs. De Leon  before issuing warrants of arrest, judges merely determine the probability, not the certainty, of
guilt of an accused
There is a distinction between: (1) judicial inquiry which determines probable cause for the issuance of a warrant of
arrest, and (2) preliminary investigation by prosecutor which ascertains whether offender should be tried or released
Okabe vs. Gutierrez  judge should consider not only the report of the investigating prosecutor but also the affidavits
and documents, the counter-affidavits, and the stenographic notes taken during preliminary investigation. If the report
and the evidence are sufficient to sustain finding of probable cause, personal examination of complainant and
witnesses is not compulsory
Judge Carbonell dismissed criminal case without taking into consideration the Resolution of Assistant Provincial
Prosecutor, Resolution of panel of prosecutors, and the Resolution of DOJ, all of which sustain probable cause
against Arzadon. Judge Carbonell also failed to evaluate evidence in support thereof.
AAA narrated in detail the alleged rape in her Sinumpaang Salaysay and her Complaint-Affidavit. She attended
several clarificatory hearings. Transcript of stenographic notes shows that AAA positively identified Arzadon as her
assailant and the time and place of the incident. She claimed that she bore a child as a result of the rape and
presented such child and her birth certificate as evidence. Arzadon merely relied on alibi.
There is sufficient evidence to show probable cause. Probable need not be based on evidence beyond reasonable
doubt. Probable cause engenders a well-founded belief that a crime has been committed and that respondent is
probably guilty.
Order of Judge Carbonell reversed. Information reinstated. Case and records remanded for proceedings.
- Faye Celso
 [CRIMPRO - Bautista] 110
[Camille Umali]

PEOPLE VS. MONTILLA

People of the Philppines, plaintiff-appellee vs Ruben Gatdula Montilla, accused-appellant

Date: January 30, 1998

Ponente: Regalado, J.
Nature: Appeal from the judgment of RTC Dasmarinas
Doctrine: A legitimate warrantless arrest necessarily cloaks the arresting officer with authority to validly search and
seize from the offender dangerous weapons and those that may be used as proof of the commission of an offense

FACTS
 Ruben Montilla alias Joy was charged for violating section 4, article II of the dangerous drugs act of 1972
(RA6425).
 June 19 1994 (2pm): Informant informed SPO1 Concordio Talingting and SPO1 Armando Clarin that a drug
courier (whom the informer could recognize) would be arriving somewhere in Brgy. Salitran, Dasmarinas from
Baguio with an undetermined amount of marijuana.
 June 20 1994 (4am): SPO1s caught Montilla at a waiting shed in Brgy. Salitran transporting 28 marijuana
bricks contained in a travelling bag and a carton box, which marijuana bricks (dried marijuana leaves) had a total
weight of 28 kilos.
- The informant pinpointed to Montilla as he alighted from a passenger jeepney carrying his bag and a box
(informant said that the drugs were probably inside his luggage).
- Policemen approached Montilla and introduced themselves as policemen and requested Montilla to open and
show them the contents of his travelling bag, which Montilla voluntarily did.
- Upon cursory inspection, SPO1 Clarin found prohibited drugs so without bothering to further search the box,
they brought Montilla to the headquarters for questioning.
 Montilla claims that he travelled to Dasmarinas from Baguio with some pocket money and no luggage to
look up his cousin who offered a job at a garment factory. He never got around to doing so as he was accosted.
He claims that he was interrogated at a house in Dasmarinas, was never informed of his constitutional rights,
and was even robbed of P500. Melita Adaci, his cousin, corroborated hi testimony about the job offer.
 RTC says that he was caught in flagrante delicto.

ISSUES
- W/N trial court erred in convicting him on the basis of insufficient evidence (no proof that he wilfully administered,
transported, delivered dried marijuana leaves and failure to present informant in court)
- W/N the marijuana were confiscated in course of unlawful warrantless search and seizure
- W/N there was valid warrantless search based on search incidental to lawful arrest (warrantless arrest
based on in flagrante delicto)
- W/N failure of prosecution to legally, properly and adequately establish that marijuana confiscated were the same
marijuana examined by forensics and presented to court
- W/N the interrogation was valid
- W/N penalty should be death

HELD/RATIO
- No. Montilla was charged with violation of section 4, the acts attributed to him being that he administered, delivered,
and transported marijuana. In this case there is evidence clearly establishing that he transported marijuana from
Baguio to Cavite. By that act alone he had already run afoul of that particular statute. The non presentation of
informant was justified. The testimony of informant is merely corroborative of the declarations of SPO1s and
informants are generally not presented in court because of the need to hide their identities and preserve their
invaluable services to the police.
- No. Montilla says that the enforcers had opportunity to procure the requisite warrant and their misfeasance should
invalidate the search, seizure, and arrest. The court says that even assuming that the police were not pressed for
time, the information relayed by the informant was too sketchy and not detailed enough for the obtention of the
corresponding arrest or search warrant (informant didn’t know the ff: his name, to whom the drugs were to be
delivered, at what particular time, where in the barangay, means of transportation, container where the drugs will be
concealed)
- Yes. A legitimate warrantless arrest necessarily cloaks the arresting police officer with the authority to
validly search and seize from the offender dangerous weapons and those that may be used as proof of the
commission of the crime. But the apprehending officer must have been spurred by probable cause in
effecting an arrest. In this case, the mere fact of seeing a person carrying a travelling bag and a carton box
should not elicit the slightest suspicion of the commission of any crime since that is normal. But it is in the
 [CRIMPRO - Bautista] 111
[Camille Umali]

ordinary nature of things that drugs being illegally transported are necessarily hidden in containers and
concealed from view. Thus the officers could reasonably assume and not merely on hollow suspicion since
the informant was by their side and had so informed them that the drugs were in Montilla’s luggage. There
were sufficient facts antecedent to the search and seizure that were already constitutive of probable cause
and which could properly create in the minds of the officers a well grounded and reasonable belief that
Montilla was in the act of violating the law. The search yielded affirmance both of that probable cause and
actuality of committing a crime. It is ineluctable that Montilla was caught in flagrante delicto, hence his arrest
and search were both justified. Furthermore, Montilla also consented to the search. When he was asked to
open his bag, he readily acceded (presumably resigned to the fact that the law has caught up with his
criminal activities). When an individual voluntarily submits to a search or consents to have same conducted
upon his person or premises, he is precluded from later complaining thereof.
- Yes. The articles were properly marked as confiscated evidence and proper safeguards were taken to ensure that
the marijuana turned over to the chemist for examination, and which subsequently proved positive as such, were the
same drugs taken from Montilla.
- Yes. Montilla says that he was not allowed to communicate with anybody, was not duly informed of his right to
remain silent and to have competent and independent counsel. The court says that Montilla never admitted or
confessed anything during the custodial investigation. Thus no incriminatory evidence in the nature of compelled or
involuntary confession or admission was elicited from him which would be inadmissible in evidence. Also the guilt of
Montilla was clearly established by other evidence adduced by prosecution.
- No. There was no mitigating or aggravating circumstance attending in which case the lesser penalty of reclusion
perpetua is proper imposable penalty.

Panganiban, J. Separate Opinion

I beg to disagree with the conclusion that warrantless search conducted upon Montilla was valid for being search
incidental to lawful arrest. No arrest may be lawfully effected upon a person caught in flagrante delicto (in the very act
of committing a crime). I don’t see how Montilla who was apprehended while merely alighting from a jeepney carrying
a bag and box could have been perceived by police as committing a crime at the moment of his arrest.

Lawful arrest must precede warrantless search

Malacat vs CA: In search incidental to lawful arrest, precedent arrest determines the validity of the search. The law
requires that there first be a lawful arrest before a search can be made, the process can’t be reversed. In this case,
there is no valid in flagrante delicto preceding the search in light of lack of personal knowledge on part of officer and
no overt physical act on part of Malacat. The warrantless arrest being invalid, search conducted upon him could not
be valid incident to lawful arrest.
People vs Mengote: No valid arrest based on in flagrante delicto. Suspect was arrested because an informant
reported suspicious persons in the place and the police deemed him to be suspicious as he was darting his eyes and
had his hand on his abdomen. Court says that it could not be inferred from these acts that he had just committied, is
committing, or is attempting to commit an offense.

Personal knowledge required in in flagrante delicto arrests

Under in flagrante delicto rule, the officer arresting the person who has just committed, is committing, or is about to
commit an offense must have personal knowledge of that fact and the offense must also be committed in the
presence or within his view. In the case of Montilla, the arresting officers had no personal knowledge. Even if the
possession of an intelligence report is equated with personal knowledge, the act was not performed in his the
presence or within the view of arresting officers. The officers didn’t see Montilla exhibit any overt ac or strange
conduct that would reasonably arouse in their minds suspicion that he was embarking on some felonious enterprise.

Hot pursuit doctrine not applicable

A crime must in fact or actually have been committed first. That a crime has actually been committed is an essential
precondition. It is not enough to suspect that a crime may have been committed.
People vs Aminnudin: accused was not, at the moment of his arrest, committing a crime nor was it shown that he was
about to do so or that he has just done so. What he was doing was descending the gangplank of MV Wilcon and
there was no outward indication that called for his arrest. The arrest being illegal, so was the warrantless search
subsequent thereto.
People vs