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150 SUPREME COURT REPORTS

ANNOTATED
Medina vs. Greenfield Development
Corporation
*
G.R. No. 140228. November 19, 2004.

FRANCISCO MEDINA, MARIA MEDINA,

RAYMUNDO MEDINA, ENRIQUE MEDINA,
EDGARDO MEDINA, EVELYN MEDINA,
ERNIE MEDINA, ELPIDIO MEDINA, EDWIN
MEDINA, ELEONOR MEDINA, TEOFILO
MEDINA, JR., EUGENE MEDINA, ELVIRA
MEDINA, ANATALIO MEDINA, MARIO
MEDINA, CORNELIO MEDINA, ERNESTO
MEDINA, IGNACIO CONSTANTINO,
SANTOS CONSTANTINO, HERMOGENES
CONSTANTINO, FLORENCIO
CONSTANTINO, VIRGINIA CONSTANTINO,
MARCELO GEREMILLO, ROSILA
GEREMILLO, ERNESTO GEREMILLO,
MERCEDES GEREMILLO, MELENCIO
GEREMILLO, BALBINO MEDINA,
CRISANTA MEDINA, YOLANDA MEDINA,
LYDIA MEDINA, RENATO MEDINA,
EUFEMIA MEDINA, VIRGILIO MEDINA,
SONIA MEDINA, LUZVIMINDA MEDINA,
CRISPIN MEDINA, REMIGIO M. RODOLFO,
MILAGROS M. RODOLFO, NIDA M.
RODOLFO, BELEN M. RODOLFO, MANUEL
M. RODOLFO, ALFREDO M. RODOLFO,
SALLY AREVALO, ELMER AREVALO,
CELSO AREVALO, JR., VINCENT AREVALO,
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NENE AREVALO, THE HEIRS OF NAZARIA

CRUZ and SANTOS AREVALO, petitioners, vs.
GREENFIELD DEVELOPMENT
CORPORATION, respondent.

Actions; Injunctions; The purpose of a

preliminary injunction is to prevent threatened or
continuous irremediable injury to some of the parties
before their claims can be thoroughly studied and
adjudicated.—The purpose of a preliminary
injunction is to prevent threatened or continuous
irremediable injury to some of the parties before
their claims can be thoroughly studied and
adjudicated. Its sole aim is to preserve the status quo
until the merits of the case can be heard fully. Thus,
to be entitled to an injunctive writ, the petitioner
has the burden to establish the following requisites:
(1) a right in esse or a clear and unmistakable right
to be protected; (2) a violation of that

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* SECOND DIVISION.

151

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Medina vs. Greenfield Development Corporation

right; (3) that there is an urgent and permanent act

and urgent necessity for the writ to prevent serious
damage.
Same; Same; Where the complainant’s right or
title is doubtful or disputed, injunction is not proper.
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—Petitioners’ entitlement to the injunctive writ

hinges on their prima facie legal right to the
properties subject of the present dispute. The Court
notes that the present dispute is based solely on the
parties’ allegations in their respective pleadings and
the documents attached thereto. We have on one
hand, petitioners’ bare assertion or claim that they
are co­owners of the properties sold by their
predecessors to respondent, and on the other,
respondent’s claim of ownership supported by deeds
of conveyances and torrens titles in their favor. From
these alone, it is clear that petitioners failed to
discharge the burden of clearly showing a clear and
unmistakable right to be protected. Where the
complainant’s right or title is doubtful or disputed,
injunction is not proper. The possibility of
irreparable damage without proof of actual existing
right is not a ground for an injunction.
Same; Same; Notarial Law; A document
acknowledged before a notary public enjoys the
presumption of regularity—it is a prima facie
evidence of the facts therein stated.—Petitioners
contend that the Court of Appeals should not have
relied on respondent’s allegations regarding the
circumstances surrounding the sales and the
transfer of the titles. Petitioners point out that trial
on the merits of the case is still ongoing and
respondent is yet to adduce evidence in support of its
contention. The same, however, applies to
petitioners’ cause of action. They only have their own
allegations and are yet to prove their claim. And as
stated earlier, the only bases from which the
propriety of the injunction can be determined are
their respective pleadings and documents. What tilt
the balance in respondent’s favor are the notarized
documents and the titles to the properties. The well­
settled rule is that a document acknowledged before
a notary public enjoys the presumption of regularity.

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It is a prima facie evidence of the facts therein

stated. To overcome this presumption, there must be
presented evidence that is clear and convincing.
Absent such evidence, the presumption must be
upheld. In addition, the titles in the name of
respondent, having been registered under the
Torrens system, are generally a conclusive evidence
of the ownership of the land referred to therein, and
a strong presumption exists that the titles are
regularly issued and valid. Therefore, until

152

152 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Medina vs. Greenfield Development Corporation

and unless petitioners show that the documents are

indeed spurious and the titles invalid, then the
presumptions must prevail at this juncture.
Same; Same; Courts should avoid issuing a writ
of preliminary injunction, which in effect, would
dispose of the main case without trial.—Equally
pertinent is the rule that courts should avoid issuing
a writ of preliminary injunction, which in effect,
would dispose of the main case without trial. The
ground relied upon by the trial court in issuing the
writ of preliminary injunction in this case is its
doubt over the acquisition of the properties by
respondent. Such basis would be virtually
recognizing petitioners’ claim that the deeds of
conveyances and the titles are a nullity without
further proof, to the detriment of the doctrine of
presumption of validity in favor of these documents.
There would, in effect, be a prejudgment of the main
case and a reversal of the rule on the burden of proof

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since it would assume the proposition which the

petitioners are inceptively duty bound to prove.
Ownership; Possession; Possession and
ownership are two different legal concepts—just as
possession is not a definite proof of ownership,
neither is non­possession inconsistent with
ownership; Execution of a deed of conveyance is
already deemed equivalent to delivery of the property,
and prior physical delivery or possession is not
legally required.—Possession and ownership are two
different legal concepts. Just as possession is not a
definite proof of ownership, neither is non­possession
inconsistent with ownership. Even assuming that
petitioners’ allegations are true, it bears no legal
consequence in the case at hand because the
execution of the deeds of conveyances is already
deemed equivalent to delivery of the property to
respondent, and prior physical delivery or possession
is not legally required. Under Article 1498 of the
Civil Code, “when the sale is made through a public
instrument, the execution thereof shall be equivalent
to the delivery of the object of the contract, if from
the deed the contrary does not appear or cannot be
inferred.” Possession is also transferred, along with
ownership thereof, to respondent by virtue of the
notarized deeds of conveyances.

PETITION for review on certiorari of a decision

of the Court of Appeals.

The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.

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     Arturo S. Santos for petitioners.

     Castillo, Laman, Tan, Pantaleon and San
Jose for respondent.
          Estelito P. Mendoza co­counsel for
respondent.

AUSTRIA­MARTINEZ, J.:

The propriety of the writ of preliminary

injunction issued by the Regional Trial Court of
Muntinlupa City (Branch 276) in Civil Case
No. 98­233 is the sole issue in this petition for
review on certiorari, assailing the decision of
the Court of Appeals nullifying said writ.
Petitioners are the grandchildren of Pedro
Medina from two marriages. In his first
marriage to Isadora San Jose, Pedro sired three
children: Rafael, Rita and Remegia; in his
second marriage, this time to Natalia Mullet,
Pedro had five: Cornelio, Brigida, Balbino,
Crisanta and Rosila. Except for Balbino and
Crisanta, all of Pedro’s children likewise
1
bore
children, the petitioners in this case.
On June 5, 1962, Pedro, his brother Alberto
Medina and his niece Nazaria Cruz (Alberto’s
daughter) executed a notarized Contract to Sell
in favor of respondent Greenfield Development
Corporation over a parcel of land located in
Muntinlupa City, then in the Province of Rizal,
covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT)
No. 100177 (Lot 2
90­A) and measuring 17,121
square meters. A notarized Deed of Sale
covering said property was subsequently
entered into on June 27, 1962, in favor of
respondent, and this time signed by Pedro,
Cornelio, Brigida, Balbino, Gregoria, Crisanta,
Rosila, and Alberto, all surnamed
3
Medina, and
Nazaria Cruz, as vendors.

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Thereafter, a notarized Deed of Absolute

Sale with Mortgage was executed on
September 4, 1964 in favor of respon­

_______________

1 Records, pp. 3­4.

2 Id., pp. 19­22, Annex “C”.
3 Id., pp. 160­165, Annex “I”.

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154 SUPREME COURT REPORTS

ANNOTATED
Medina vs. Greenfield Development
Corporation

dent over Lot 90­B covered by TCT No. 100178,

measuring 16,291 square meters. Signing as
vendors were Pedro, Cornelio, Brigida, Balbino,
Gregoria, Crisanta, Rosila, and Alberto,4
all
surnamed Medina, and Nazaria Cruz.
By virtue of these sales, respondent was able
to register in its name the title to the two
parcels of land with TCT No. 100578 covering
Lot 90­A and TCT No. 133444 covering Lot 90­
B. These properties were consolidated with
other lots and were eventually registered on
July 19, 1995, in the name of respondent 5
under
TCT Nos. 202295, 202296 and 202297.
On November 6, 1998, petitioners instituted
Civil Case No. 98­233, an action for annulment
of titles and deeds, reconveyance, damages
with preliminary injunction and restraining
order, against respondent
6
and the Register of
Deeds of Makati. Included in the complaint are
the heirs7 of Nazaria Cruz, as unwilling co­
plaintiffs. Petitioners allege in their complaint

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that they are co­owners of these two parcels of

land. While the titles were registered in the
names of Pedro, Alberto, Cornelio, Brigida and
Gregoria, all surnamed Medina, they alleged
that they were recognized as co­owners thereof.
In support of their case, petitioners maintain
that the deeds of sale on these properties were
simulated and fictitious, and the signatures of
the vendors therein were fake. Despite the
transfer of the title to respondent’s name, they
remained in possession thereof and in fact,
their caretaker, a certain Santos Arevalo and
his family still reside on a portion of the
property. On July 13, 1998, petitioners caused
an adverse claim to be annotated on the titles.
After discovering the annotation, respondent
constructed a fence on the property and posted
security personnel, barring their ingress and
egress. Thus, petitioners sought, among others,
the issuance of a temporary restraining order
and a writ of preliminary

_______________

4 Id., pp. 23­28, Annex “D”.

5 Id., pp. 29­31, Annexes “E”, “F”, and “G”.
6 Id., p. 1.
7 Id., p. 2.

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Medina vs. Greenfield Development
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injunction enjoining respondent and its agents

and representatives from preventing

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petitioners8 to exercise their rights over the

properties.
Respondent denied the allegations, stating
that petitioners have no valid claim on the
properties as it is already titled in its name by
virtue of the public documents executed by
their predecessors. As counterclaim,
respondent alleged that Santos Arevalo is not
petitioners’ caretaker and 9 it was them who
employed him as caretaker.
On January 18, 1999, the trial court issued
its resolution granting petitioners’ prayer for
injunctive relief. The dispositive portion of the
resolution reads:

“Let therefore an injunction issue, enjoining and

directing defendant GREENFIELD
DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, its security
guards, agents, representatives, and all those
claiming rights under it, from preventing plaintiffs
and their caretaker Santos Arevalo, from entering
and going out of the subject premises, and from
preventing them to exercise their property rights,
upon payment of a bond in the amount of
P100,000.00. 10
It is SO ORDERED.”

Respondent filed a special civil action for

certiorari and prohibition with the Court of
Appeals, docketed as CA­G.R. SP No. 52015. 11
On July 16, 1999, the Court of Appeals
rendered its decision nullifying the trial court’s
resolution, the dispositive portion of which
provides:

“IN THE (sic) LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING,

the petition is hereby GRANTED. The assailed
Resolution of the Public Respon­

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_______________

8 Id., pp. 4­10.

9 Id., pp. 132­135.
10 Id., p. 216.
11 Associate Justice Candido V. Rivera, ponente; Associate
Justices Cancio C. Garcia (now a Member of this Court) and
Bernardo Ll. Salas, concurring.

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156 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Medina vs. Greenfield Development Corporation

dent Judge, dated January 18, 1999, in Civil Case

No. 98­233 is hereby
12
NULLIFIED.
SO ORDERED.”

Petitioners now seek recourse with this Court,

alleging the following grounds:

THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN RELYING

HEAVILY ON THE ANTECEDENT FACTS
NARRATED IN THE PETITION OF THE
RESPONDENT IN CA­G.R. SP NO. 52015 AND
ADOPTED THE SAME AS ITS OWN WITHOUT
EVIDENTIARY SUPPORT

II

THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED A

GRAVE ERROR IN UPHOLDING THE VALIDITY
OF THE DEEDS OF SALE IN FAVOR OF THE
RESPONDENT AND IN HOLDING THAT
RESPONDENT’S TRANSFER CERTIFICATES OF
TITLE ARE VALID DESPITE THE FACT THAT
THE SAID ISSUES ARE YET TO BE TRIED

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III

THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN

PRESUMING THAT NOTARIZED DOCUMENTS
ARE VALID AND THAT RESPONDENT’S
TORRENS TITLES ARE INDEFEASIBLE ON THE
WRONG NOTION THAT THE RESPONDENT WAS
PRESUMED INNOCENT PERSON

IV

THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED A

MISTAKE IN HOLDING THAT RESPONDENT
WAS IN CONSTRUCTIVE POSSESSION OF THE
SUBJECT PREMISES NOTWITHSTANDING
THAT PETITIONERS ARE IN ACTUAL
POSSESSION THEREOF

THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN

FINDING THAT PETITIONERS’ RIGHT TO
IMPUGN RESPONDENT’S TITLES HAVE

_______________

12 CA Rollo, p. 196.

157

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Medina vs. Greenfield Development Corporation

(SIC) PRESCRIBED SINCE AN ACTION OR

DEFENSE BASED ON THE INEXISTENCE
13
OF A
CONTRACT DOES NOT PRESCRIBE

As stated at the outset, the sole issue in this

case is whether or not the trial court erred in
granting petitioners’ prayer for injunctive
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relief. This Court’s resolution will revolve only

on the propriety of the injunction. Any
reference to the validity or invalidity of the
transfers and the titles is merely preliminary,
as the matter should be resolved after trial on
the merits.
It was the trial court’s opinion that
petitioners are entitled to the injunction for the
following reasons:

“The Court however holds suspect the acquisition by

Greenfield Development Corporation of the two
parcels. Lot 90­A covered by Transfer Certificate of
Title No. 100177, was promised to be sold to
defendant under a contract to sell but the other co­
owners did not sign this Contract to Sell, who all
denied knowledge of the same. No contract of Sale
followed this Contract to Sell which cannot be the
bases of the issuance of a new title. A Contract to
Sell is only a promise to sell, and is not a deed of
sale, specially as this Contract to Sell is not signed
by all of the registered owners.
This Court cannot also understand how the
document, denominated as DEED OF ABSOLUTE
SALE WITH MORTGAGE can be the bases (sic) of a
new title. The absoluteness of the sale, is
contradicted by the mortgage it also provides. There
is absoluteness of sale only when the buyer upon
execution of the contract, pay (sic) in full the
consideration and ownership passes to the Vendee.
The registered owners of Lot 90­B covered by
Transfer Certificate of Title No. 100178 even deny
having executed this document of Deed of Absolute
Sale with Mortgage.
Until these matters are threshed out at the trial
on the merits, and after this is fully explained and
determined, whether the properties were actually
sold to Defendant Greenfield Development

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Corporation, irreparable injury will visit the

landowner if the claim of

_______________

13 Rollo, pp. 15­16.

158

158 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Medina vs. Greenfield Development Corporation

ownership by Greenfield Development Corporation

14
is allowed and not enjoined.”

The Court of Appeals, however, disagreed with

the trial court. It noted that the trial court
relied mainly on petitioners’ allegations in the
complaint, which were not supported by
substantial evidence, and ignored the
presumption of validity ascribed to the duly
notarized deeds of conveyances and the titles
issued to respondent. The Court of Appeals also
found that respondent is in constructive
possession of the properties in dispute
considering that it is already the registered
owner thereof since 1962. Lastly, the Court of
Appeals held that petitioners’ right to impugn
respondent’s15
title to the property has already
prescribed.
Section 3, Rule 58 of the Rules of Court
provides for the grounds justifying the issuance
of a preliminary injunction, to wit:

SEC. 3. Grounds for issuance of preliminary

injunction.—A preliminary injunction may be
granted when it is established:

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(a) That the applicant is entitled to the relief

demanded, and the whole or part of such
relief consists in restraining the commission
or continuance of the act or acts complained
of, or in requiring the performance of an act
or acts, either for a limited period or
perpetually;
(b) That the commission, continuance or non­
performance of the act or acts complained of
during the litigation would probably work
injustice to the applicant; or
(c) That a party, court, agency or a person is
doing, threatening or is attempting to do, or
is procuring or suffering to be done, some act
or acts probably in violation of the rights of
the applicant respecting the subject of the
action or proceeding, and tending to render
the judgment ineffectual.

_______________

14 Records, p. 218.
15 CA Rollo, pp. 189­195.

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Medina vs. Greenfield Development
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The purpose of a preliminary injunction is to

prevent threatened or continuous irremediable
injury to some of the parties before their claims
can be thoroughly studied and adjudicated. Its
sole aim is to preserve the status quo16 until the
merits of the case can be heard fully. Thus, to
be entitled to an injunctive writ, the petitioner

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has the burden

17
to establish the following
requisites:

(1) a right in esse or a clear and

unmistakable right to be protected;
(2) a violation of that right;
(3) that there is an urgent and permanent
act and urgent necessity for the writ to
prevent serious damage.

Hence, petitioners’ entitlement to the

injunctive writ hinges on their prima facie legal
right to the properties subject of the present
dispute. The Court notes that the present
dispute is based solely on the parties’
allegations in their respective pleadings and
the documents attached thereto. We have on
one hand, petitioners’ bare assertion or claim
that they are co­owners of the properties sold
by their predecessors to respondent, and on the
other, respondent’s claim of ownership
supported by deeds of conveyances and torrens
titles in their favor. From these alone, it is
clear that petitioners failed to discharge the
burden of clearly showing a clear and
unmistakable right to be protected. Where the
complainant’s right or title is doubtful or
disputed, injunction is not proper. The
possibility of irreparable damage without proof
of actual existing
18
right is not a ground for an
injunction.

_______________

16 First Global Realty and Development Corporation vs.

San Agustin, G.R. No. 144499, February 19, 2002, 377
SCRA 341, 349.
17 Tayag vs. Lacson, G.R. No. 134971, March 25, 2004,
426 SCRA 282.
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18 Heirs of Joaquin Asuncion vs. Gervacio, Jr., G.R. No.

115741, March 9, 1999, 304 SCRA 322, 329.

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Medina vs. Greenfield Development
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Petitioners contend that the Court of Appeals

should not have relied on respondent’s
allegations regarding the circumstances
surrounding the sales and the transfer of the
titles. Petitioners point out that trial on the
merits of the case is still ongoing and
respondent is yet to adduce evidence in support
of its contention. The same, however, applies to
petitioners’ cause of action. They only have
their own allegations and are yet to prove their
claim. And as stated earlier, the only bases
from which the propriety of the injunction can
be determined are their respective pleadings
and documents. What tilt the balance in
respondent’s favor are the notarized documents
and the titles to the properties. The well­settled
rule is that a document acknowledged before a
notary public enjoys the presumption of
regularity. It is a prima facie evidence of the
facts therein stated. To overcome this
presumption, there must be presented evidence
that is clear and convincing. Absent such 19
evidence, the presumption must be upheld. In
addition, the titles in the name of respondent,
having been registered under the Torrens
system, are generally a conclusive evidence of 20
the ownership of the land referred to therein,
and a strong presumption exists that the titles
21
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21
are regularly issued and valid. Therefore,
until and unless petitioners show that the
documents are indeed spurious and the titles
invalid, then the presumptions must prevail at
this juncture.
Petitioners, however, argue that the
presumption of validity of the notarized
documents and titles cannot be applied in
respondent’s
22
case as it is not an innocent
purchaser. According to petitioners,
respondent is fully aware that at the time

_______________

19 Ceballos vs. Intestate Estate of the Late Emigdio

Mercado, G.R. No. 155856, May 28, 2004, 430 SCRA 323.
20 Section 49, Act 496; Tichangco vs. Enriquez, G.R. No.
150629, June 30, 2004, 433 SCRA 324.
21 Ching vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 59731, January
11, 1990, 181 SCRA 9, 18.
22 Rollo, p. 21.

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Medina vs. Greenfield Development
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that the Contract to Sell was entered into in

1962, Leon Medina who is a co­owner of the
property then covered by TCT No. 21314, was
already dead. Suffice it to say that these
arguments already involve the merits of the
main case pending before the trial court, which
should not even be preliminarily dealt with, as
it would be premature.
Equally pertinent is the rule that courts
should avoid issuing a writ of preliminary
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injunction, which in effect,23 would dispose of the

main case without trial. The ground relied
upon by the trial court in issuing the writ of
preliminary injunction in this case is its doubt
over the acquisition
24
of the properties by
respondent. Such basis would be virtually
recognizing petitioners’ claim that the deeds of
conveyances and the titles are a nullity without
further proof, to the detriment of the doctrine
of presumption of validity in favor of these
documents. There would, in effect, be a
prejudgment of the main case and a reversal of
the rule on the burden of proof since it would
assume the proposition which the 25petitioners
are inceptively duty bound to prove.
Petitioners also claim that they are in actual
possession of the property. As alleged in their
complaint, they instituted
26
Santos Arevalo, a co­
petitioner, as caretaker. They also alleged in
their petition filed before this Court that
Balbino and Yolanda Medina and their
respective families are 27still residing on a
portion of the property. Respondent belies
their claim, declaring that it employed Arevalo
as caretaker. Respondent presented a notarized
Receipt and Quitclaim dated April 26, 1994,
signed by Arevalo, who attested that he was
employed by respondent as caretaker and that
his stay on the property was a mere privilege
granted by respondent.

_______________

23 Searth Commodities Corp. vs. Court of Appeals, G.R.

No. 64220, March 31, 1992, 207 SCRA 622, 629­630.
24 Records, p. 218.
25 Supra, Note 23. Searth Commodities Corp. case.
26 Records, p. 8.
27 Rollo, p. 11.
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162

162 SUPREME COURT REPORTS

ANNOTATED
Medina vs. Greenfield Development
Corporation

Possession and ownership are two different

legal concepts. Just as possession is not a
definite proof of ownership, neither is non­
possession inconsistent with ownership. Even
assuming that petitioners’ allegations are true,
it bears no legal consequence in the case at
hand because the execution of the deeds of
conveyances is already deemed equivalent to
delivery of the property to respondent, and
prior physical delivery
28
or possession is not
legally required. Under Article 1498 of the
Civil Code, “when the sale is made through a
public instrument, the execution thereof shall
be equivalent to the delivery of the object of the
contract, if from the deed the contrary does not
appear or cannot be inferred.” Possession is
also transferred, along with ownership thereof,
to respondent by 29
virtue of the notarized deeds
of conveyances.
In sum, the trial court committed grave
abuse of discretion in issuing the writ of
preliminary injunction, and the Court of
Appeals was correct in nullifying the same.
The Court, however, finds that it was
precipitate for the Court of Appeals to rule that
petitioners’ action is barred by prescription. As
previously stressed, the parties are yet to prove
their respective allegations and the trial court
is yet to receive the evidence. There is nothing
on record that can conclusively support the
conclusion that the action is barred by
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prescription. Hence, the Court of Appeals

should not have made such ruling.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby
DENIED for lack of merit. The Decision dated
July 16, 1999 rendered by the Court of Appeals
in CA­G.R. SP No. 52015 is AFFIRMED,
except as to its view on prescription, as
discussed in the body of the text.

_______________

28 Sabio vs. International Corporate Bank, Inc., G.R. No.

132709, September 4, 2001, 364 SCRA 385, 416.
29 Ibid.

163

VOL. 443, NOVEMBER 19, 2004 163

Lorenzo Shipping Corp. vs. BJ Marthel
International, Inc.

Let the original records of this case be

remanded to the Regional Trial Court of
Muntinlupa City (Branch 276) with dispatch
for further proceedings.
SO ORDERED.

          Puno (Chairman), Callejo, Sr., Tinga

and Chico­Nazario, JJ., concur.

Petition denied, judgment affirmed.

Notes.—The party acknowledging must

personally appear before the Notary Public or
any other person authorized to take such
acknowledgment of instruments or documents.
(Maligsa vs. Cabanting, 272 SCRA 408 [1997])
Injunction may be resorted to for the
preservation or protection of the rights of the
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7/4/2018 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED VOLUME 443

complainant and for no other purpose during

the pendency of the principal action.
(Development Bank of the Philippines vs. Court
of Appeals, 344 SCRA 492 [2000])

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