Dr. V.

Raghavan, Professor of Sanskrit and Head of

the Department of Sanskrit of the University of
Madras, whom
I often approached with questions and who always
supplied me immediately and
unhesitatingly with a wealth of information and
references.
I should also like to thank Mr. S.
Sankarasubrahmanya Ayyar, B.A., of the
Kuppuswami Sastri Research Institute, Mylapore, who
with great enthusiasm and
perseverance acquainted me both with the principles
of Sanskrit and with the
techniques of Pāṇini.
It is a privilege to be able to express my gratitude to
His Holiness Abhinava Vidyā
Tīrtha Svāmigal, present Śaṅkarācārya of the Śṛṅgeri
Maṭha, for his kindness and
interest in my work. By living in his proximity and by
speaking with him I came to
understand more than texts could provide.
I should have liked to thank personally my first
teacher in philosophy, Dr. H.J. Pos,
Professor of Philosophy in the University of
Amsterdam. His personal interest in my
work and his brilliant expositions of Greek thought
from Thales to Plotinus were very
much alive in my mind when I received in India the
announcement of his unexpected
death.
J.F. Staal, Advaita and Neoplatonism
x
With pleasure I acknowledge my indebtedness to
numerous Indian friends, in
particular to Miss Sita T. Chari, to the Rev. Dr. R.
Panikker and to my wife, who
have made valuable observations on earlier versions
of this work.
I am very grateful to the University Grants
Commission which has contributed to the
expenses of the present publication, and to members
of the Department of Philosophy
of the University of Madras who have assisted me in
correcting the proofs.
London-Philadelphia, August, 1961.
J.F. STAAL
J.F. Staal, Advaita and Neoplatonism
1
Part I
Character and Methodology of Comparative
Philosophy - with Special Reference to
Advaita and Neoplatonism
1. Introduction
A Western student of Advaita cannot approach his
subject in the same way as a
philosophy which belongs to his own tradition.
Nobody is entirely free to think as he
wishes, for first reactions are partly determined by a
philosophical background. The
relation to one's own background determines the
direction one should take in order
to reach a system of thought like Advaita. So the
simplest kind of comparative
philosophy comes into being: that between one's
own view of one's own philosophic
background and the philosophy which is the object of
study. Comparative philosophy
therefore cannot be avoided when a system like
Advaita is studied outside its own
tradition.
Comparative philosophy however is not a technique,
a tool, of which the origin is
irrelevant and which has no history like a machine: it
is a phenomenon which
originated in Western civilization and it has to be
understood as such. Though it
came into being with the book of Paul Masson-Oursel,
La philosophie comparée,
in 1923, its manifestation was foreshadowed in
various ways and is characteristic
of European culture. In order to see what
comparative philosophy means and can
mean, it becomes desirable to consider its
background.
2. The background of comparative philosophy
Comparative philosophy has been preceded in
Europe by two other fields of
comparative studies, comparative linguistics and the
comparative study of religions.
The relation between these three clarifies much of
their respective structures,
methods, achievements and aims.
Both disciplines arose mainly out of studies in Indian
languages end civilisation, It
was mainly the study of Sanskrit as an
J.F. Staal, Advaita and Neoplatonism
2
Indo-European language which led to comparative
linguistics. In this field objective
standards enable us to pass judgments which may be
universally accepted by
scholars as ‘objectively true.’
Likewise, the study of a variety of religious
developments, partly Indian, led in Europe
to the comparative study of religions. Here the
material is completely different from
that of the preceding case: the contents of a religion
represent absolute truth for the
adherents, whereas the student of different religions
has at the same time either his
own religion, or conceptions which he believes to
take the place of a religion. In this
context the problem of truth arises and two attitudes
become possible: (1) the
‘phenomenological attitude’, which leaves out the
question of truth; this is embodied
in the ‘phenomenology of religion’; (2) what may be
called the ‘missionary attitude’
(though its propounders need not be missionaries,
nor have any desire to make
propaganda for their own religion), which takes as its
starting point the acceptance
of the truth of one's own religion. Advantages and
disadvantages of both attitudes
are obvious: the first method is more reliable and
makes a more scientific impression,
but it is poor in that it is restricted to the studies of
forms and manifestations
(‘phenomena’ in the pre-phenomenological sense)
and cannot have access to what
is most essential to the religious human being:
religious belief, faith, experience or
conviction, each with its presumed transforming
power. Apart from this, the first
method may unconsciously depend upon what is
accepted as truth according to
one's own religion. The second method is at any rate
at the same level as the religion
studied, but it is subjective.
In the comparative study of philosophy the
complications are greater. Whereas the
comparative study of religions has no pretention of
being itself a religion, comparative
philosophy is, according to the term, philosophy. This
makes the subject dependent
upon the concept of philosophy, itself one of the
major problems of philosophy. If it
is denied that the subject is an aspect or part of
philosophy, the situation becomes
easier, the question of truth can be left out and it
seems that a purely descriptive
phenomenological method would be sufficient. But,
apart from the inevitable danger
caused by the influences of unconscious prejudices, a
new question arises: what
is the significance of comparative philosophy?
J.F. Staal, Advaita and Neoplatonism
3
Being aware of the fact that an important part of the
existing literature of comparative
philosophy would accept the above mentioned view,
although these questions are
generally neither asked, nor answered, we reject it,
as it seems that the subject
would lose its significance by removal of the truth
value. Comparative philosophy
would become of no philosophical and of little
scholarly interest.
If comparative philosophy is philosophy, the problem
of truth arises in all its
mysteriousness. The more so as there is an
important difference between religious
and philosophical concepts of truth. In the former
case there was a conviction on
the part of the student regarding his own religion,
whereas in the case of philosophy
there cannot be such a conviction; there can only be
open-mindedness and freedom.
It will be necessary to study the implications of
comparative philosophy regarded
as philosophy.
In the special case of Indian thought, there are
additional difficulties for here the
European definitions and concepts of ‘religion’ and
‘philosophy’ are not adequate.
According to Indian tradition philosophy and religion
are not separate, as they are
in European tradition. Therefore two fields of
comparative studies have come into
being in Europe: comparative philosophy and the
comparative study of religions.
These two have therefore to colloborate when Indian
phenomena are studied. This
justifies the above comparison.
3. Comparative philosophy as philosophy
When comparative philosophy is studied by
Europeans it becomes a twentieth
century European phenomenon. As an aspect of
philosophy it is not free to choose
an arbitrary mode of thought to which it would like to
belong. It is by nature connected
with modern European philosophy, whether this
relation is at the moment manifest
or hidden.
The consequences thereof seem to be grave. Should
the philosophical problems
which play an essential part in comparative
philosophy, such as the problem of truth,
be determined by modern European philosophy? But
this merely means that
comparative philosophy is philosophy; that it is not a
tool; and that it is not irrelevant
who deals with it. It is clear that this leads
J.F. Staal, Advaita and Neoplatonism
4
to the problem of historicism. Thus it is inevitable
that the following pages will contain
contemporary European philosophy, as the treatment
intends to be philosophical
and absence of explicitness would only mean hidden
dependence. (Lack of
knowledge of modern European philosophy on the
part of scholars dealing with any
subject does not mean that there cannot be any
dependence, as philosophy
previously shaped and still permeates the cultural
tradition in a fundamental though
often unnoticed way).
The first philosophical problem of comparative
philosophy, determining its actions,
its assertions and its judgments, is the problem of
truth.
A. Truth in Comparative Philosophy.
The present section falls into five subdivisions. The
titles of the first three are taken
from a lecture by Karl Jaspers in Frankfurt on August
28, 1947, on the occasion of
the Goethe prize being awarded to him. The words
give an indication as to the
direction of this investigation: ‘How can we receive
what need to be in art, in poetry,
in philosophy - receive it not in dogmatic
traditionalism, not in relativistic indifference,
not in esthetic irresponsible emotion, but as a claim
upon us, affecting all that we
are?’.1
In dealing with the problem of truth our point of view
will depend on considerations
concerning the special kind of comparative
philosophy dealt with here.
(i) Relativistic indifference. Is faith necessary?
One preconceived view about the truth-nature of
philosophical questions is the view
that each philosophy is true for the community and
period in which it arose, and this
is all that can be said about the truth-value. If two
solutions of a philosophical problem
are contradictory they are nevertheless equally true,
because there is no absolute
truth to which both could refer or fail to refer and
which would be a common measure.
The reason is that this, truth would again be the truth
according to a special
philosophical view. Though this relativistic view
seems to be
1 Translated into English by H.E. Fischer in: K.
Jaspers, Existentialism and Humanism, New
York, 1952, 50.
J.F. Staal, Advaita and Neoplatonism
5
theoretically weak, there is a difficulty regarding
actual philosophies, which favours
it. Each philosophy arose in a special context and
closer study often reveals that
the tenets of each are in certain respects best suited
to the context. This relativism,
therefore, is not so easy to overcome and it will
occupy us again.
The personal attitude connected with relativism is
generally one of indifference. It
might be despair. The former attitude is, in matters
of philosophy, undesirable and
it should never prevail so long as the case of
relativism is not proved. For indifference
fails to participate in the seriousness either of
conviction or of quest which is inherent
in almost all philosophies; it excludes the possibility
that the studying subject should
ever be personally involved; it has a negative answer
in advance and it does not
allow for the possibility that new truth can be found.
It also ignores the fact that the
philosophy studied deals with entities which may be
of vital importance to the student,
irrespective of philosophical context.
Thus, in the quest for truth in comparative
philosophy, the attitude of indifference
on the one hand and relativism as a preconceived
view and method on the other,
are both to be rejected. But the possibility that
relativism is true - the unique and
only truth in this case - eventually to be reached as a
kind of conclusion, may not
be initially excluded.
The one certain device against relativistic
indifference is faith. If we accept faith, we
will reach the truth embodied and presupposed in the
act of faith. This is evidently
a circle for the outsider, but we are not ready to
reject it even when we are not ready
to ‘jump’ into it. For faith may lead to certainty and
experience.
The philosophies with which we are to deal have
stressed the importance and even
the inevitability of faith. That faith (śraddhā) has to
be accepted as a serious claim
especially in Indian thought can be seen from many
texts. The Chāndogya Upaniṣad
says: ‘When one has faith, then one reflects; without
faith one does not reflect; one
reflects only when one has faith’2 and the
2 7.19; Cf. also 7.20.
J.F. Staal, Advaita and Neoplatonism
6
Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad: ‘In this fire (i.e., heaven)
the Gods offer faith’.3 The
Bhagavad Gītā says: ‘The faith of each is in
accordance with his nature, O Bhārata.
Man is made up of his faith; as a man's faith is, so is
he’.4 Faith is further given as
one of the qualifications needed for those who want
to study Advaita: Śaṅkara's
Brahmasūtrabhāsya enjoins5 as the third requirement
for an adhikāri the attainment
of the means of realisation beginning with peace and
restraint
(śama-dama-ādisādhana-sampad). The sixth and last
of these is, according to the
Vedāntasāra6, śraddhā, ‘faith’ interpreted7 as ‘faith in
the truths of Vedānta as taught
by the guru’.8 Plotinus also mentions faith (pístis) in
given teachings as a requirement
for those who want to contemplate the One.9
Even if we were personally and existentially ready to
accept faith, it cannot be
presupposed in the present study. In philosophy faith
prevents communication with
those who do not share the same faith. Even though
the ‘credo ut intelligam’ aspect
of philosophy and religion - ‘I believe in order that I
may understand’ - cannot be
excluded in advance, it should not be utilized in a
philosophical study. One must
realise however that this may fundamentally limit our
understanding of other
philosophies, and therefore our own philosophising.
(ii) Esthetic approach.
The esthetic approach likes the philosophy it deals
with. It is ready to pronounce
judgments such as ‘a profound statement’, ‘a
beautiful passage’, ‘an impressive
thought’. But it is afraid to think clearly and calmly to
the end. It escapes, consciously
or not, from the philosophical questions: is it true?
What does it mean if it is true?
What does it imply if it is true? And what does it
imply for me if it is true?
3 Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad, 6.2.9.
4 Bhagavad Gītā, 17.3.
5 Brahmasūtrabhāṣya, 1.1.1.
6 Vedāntasāra 18. (Ed. Bombay 1934; ed. & transl.
Almora 1949; Poona 1929).
7 Id. 24.
8 Cf. Vedāntaparibhāsā 9.40 (S.S. Suryanarayana
Sastri).
9 Enneads VI.9.4.32 (Bréhier).
J.F. Staal, Advaita and Neoplatonism
7
The esthetic approach therefore betrays the
presence of a weakness of thinking.
The final implications are not faced, the philosophy is
not taken as what it is meant
to be and as what it may have signified for human
beings. As such it is irresponsible,
it does not rely exclusively upon the one philosophy,
but considers it implicity as of
relative importance. The esthetic approach
dominates many Westerners who are
attracted by Oriental systems of thought. They do
not ask the question about absolute
truth, and they generally do not confront the actual
problems of their own life with
the philosophies they like. Thus a difference between
theory and practice arises.
This shows that through the esthetic approach the
Romantic movements of the West
have been attracted by the East.
This approach can also be evaluated in a different
way. If there is no sympathy for
a certain way of thinking, or at least for the human
beings who thought so, there
can be no proper understanding in philosophy,
because much in philosophy goes
beyond the level of pure reason (certainly in the
philosophies studied here). This
applies especially in the case of comparative
philosophy, where the philosophies
studied are often foreign to one's own philosophical
climate. Thus a certain degree
of congeniality, an initial liking at least in certain
respects, is needed.
There is truth too in Augustine's dictum: ‘One does
not enter in the truth, if not by
charity’10 and in Pascal's thought: ‘We know the
truth not only by reason, but also
through our heart.’11
(iii) The approach through tradition.
This is an approach, which is properly speaking no
approach at all, as there is no
question of a movement from a starting point to a
goal: there is inmutability. One's
own philosophy, as it has been consciously or
unconsciously accepted from early
childhood, is continuously looked upon as the only
valuable philosophy; it may be
occasionally restated, even readapted within certain
limits
10 ‘Non intratur in veritatem, nisi per charitatem’.
11 ‘Nous connadasons la vérité, non seulement par la
raison mais encore par le coeur’: Pensees
282 (Brunschvieg).
J.F. Staal, Advaita and Neoplatonism
8
and also defended against other views. The truth of
the philosophical statements is
never doubted or even questioned, nor is the truth of
the personal relation to them.
New experience is truth of the personal relation to
them. New experience is integrated
as a confirmation of the old view, absent is the truly
‘experiencing attitude’: to have
no theory, simply to experience in the widest and
fullest sense, and afterwards to
attempt an explanation which may lead to a theory.
This attitude can be in particular
dogmatic if it refuses to question the validity of
certain principles; in addition to that,
it can be traditionalistic if it refuses to question the
reliability of those who have
transmitted the principles concerned. The
disadvantage of self-sufficiency,
one-sidedness, etc., belonging to this attitude, are
obvious. It may be asked, however,
whether there are advantages too.
For this, in our case, we turn to the Indian
philosophical climate. Here tradition is
essential for several reasons: firstly, the texts often
aim at an experience and are
most properly transmitted by one who has had that
experience: his experience is
valued higher than our own free investigation which
is considered limited by our
mental development. Secondly, there is often an oral
tradition alongside the text in
which such experiences are embodied, and a
traditional way of expounding a text
without which it would remain partly unintelligible
(not only where religious experience
is to be transmitted, but also for instance in scientific
disciplines). In Indian philosophy
these two factors cause the importance of initiation
of a disciple by a qualified teacher.
At the same time it is clear that in this case also
there can be no certainty. There is
no method whatsoever to ascertain whether there
are different kinds or degrees of
‘divine’ experiences, and there is no guarantee that
the word-transcending experience
of the guru (or even of the student of comparative
philosophy) is the same as the
experience to which the text alludes. In addition the
oral tradition may have
undergone innumerable changes in the course of
centuries, unmanifest and
unverifiable (though there is no parallel in the
modern West for the accuracy with
which some texts in the Orient - for instance the.
Vedas - are orally transmitted and
for the power of memory needed therefore).
Notwithstanding the obvious reasons
for carefulness and
J.F. Staal, Advaita and Neoplatonism
9
a critical attitude, the student of comparative
philosophy has with regard to Indian
philosophy to take into account the data provided by
this traditional approach, as
they may contain elements of truth which are not
otherwise accessible. Therefore
we must consider the approach through tradition if
we want to receive the past as
‘a claim upon us, affecting all that we are’.
Among orientalists, dealing with ancient civilisations
that continue to-day (Islam,
India, China, until recently perhaps), there is
increasing interest for traditional
interpretations, because it is realised that the
Western philological and historical
methods are, in their exclusiveness, not sufficiently
adapted to their subject (c.f., for
instance, the work on Hindu Tantrism by Sir John
Woodroffe or Arthur Avalon,
together with his collaborators).12 The differences
between the two methods are
brought out clearly by D.H.H. Ingalls.13
(iv). Objective truth.
Repeated reference has been made to truth as a goal
for the investigations of
comparative philosophy. To come closer to this truth
and eliminate possibilities of
error, the previous three sections have attempted to
judge which methods,
approaches and attitudes have to be considered.
Which truth is meant? Evidently
‘objective’ truth, i.e., the truth of the ideas expressed
in a text. For instance if we
have a statement in Plotinus' Enneads like ‘one need
not remember everything
which one has seen’, objective truth does not mean
that it is true that this statement
occurs in the Enneads (a truth we have to accept
from philologists who have provided
us with the text), nor that it was taken from earlier
Greek thinkers and in turn taken
by later medieval thinkers (a truth to be investigated
by historians of philosophy),
nor that the manuscript provides us with certain
variants; but it
12 The French Arabist Louis Massignon emphasized
that the Kuran has to be studied in the light
of living tradition, and not by exclusive concentration
upon the text.
13 D.H.H. Ingalls, The Study of Śaṅkarācārya, Annals
of the Bhandarkar Oriental Research
Institute 33 (1952) 1-14. The author shows how the
traditional method aims at kūṭasthanityatva,
‘unchangeable timelessness’, whereas the historical
method studies temporal difference.
J.F. Staal, Advaita and Neoplatonism
10
means that one need not remember everything that
one has seen. This can only
be established as an objective truth by ascertaining
whether everything that has
been seen is remembered. We have to effectuate
what Edmund Husserl has called
the ‘historical epoche’, i.e., refrain from historical
judgments about the opinions of
others; we are interested in the ‘things’ themselves.
If it can be established that a
certain statement corresponds directly to that to
which it refers, it is evidently
objectively true. This follows from the well known
characterisation of truth as
‘adequatio intellectus et rei’, the adequacy of the
intellectual image of the thing and
the thing itself. If the truth is investigated in this
sense, it will have answered in a
philosophical way to the challenge which each
philosophical text contains.
Unfortunately this is impossible.
We have assumed that there is an objective truth
which can be found by us rather
than by the philosophers studied. This pretentious
view is not justified. We have no
right to believe that philosophy brings questions
nearer to a final solution in the
course of time, as experience neither shows this nor
the contrary. We cannot
therefore claim that we belong to a higher level than
the thinkers we study, which
would enable us to pass final judgments on the truth
value. We can at the most
investigate our opinion about the ‘things’
themselves, with which the texts also deal,
and then compare the two. But do we not slip back
then into relativism? There is no
way out of these difficulties unless we are willing to
reconsider the concept of
objective truth itself.
(v) Existential truth.
Martin Heidegger14 has analysed the traditional
concept of truth as ‘adequatio rei et
intellectus’15 and has shown how this derives from
an original concept of truth as
dis-covery and dis-covering. Anything which is dis-
covered in this sense has a
‘discovered-being’ (‘Entdecktheit’) which is called
truth. The human being (‘Dasein’)
who has originally discovered it, has a ‘discovering-
being’ (‘Entdeckendsein’), which
is also called truth.
14 Sein und Zeit, par. 44; Cf. Vom Wesen der
Wahrheit, Frankfurt 1943.
15 This so-called correspondence theory of truth is
also criticised, but from a totally different
point of view, by logicians, e.g., A.J. Ayer, Truth,
Revue internationale de philosophie 7 (1953):
183-200. Cf, JSL. 20 (1955) 58.
J.F. Staal, Advaita and Neoplatonism
11
But these truths as ‘discovered-being’ and
‘discovering-being’ are only possible on
account of a special mode of human being, which is
therefore to be called ‘truth’ in
the original and primary sense, whereas discovered-
being is true in the secondary
sense. Secondary truth depends on primary truth.
Thus there is only truth in so far
and as long as there is human being (‘Dasein’).
Heidegger illustrates this with the
laws of Newton, which were before Newton neither
true nor false. With these laws,
however, being was discovered and showed itself as
being, which had existed
previously. There can be ‘eternal truths’ if human
being is proved to be eternal,
which is not the case. ‘Objective truths’ are not only
erroneously conceived as eternal,
but also presuppose that there could be discovered-
being without discoveringbeing,
which is not so.
Heidegger's concept of truth corresponds not so
much to the notion of truth which
everyday language uses for instance in: ‘his
statement is true’ as to that which is
used in: ‘he is a true friend’ and still more in: ‘he is
true to himself’. By the thesis that
the former kind of truth depends upon the latter kind,
no subjectivism is intended. It
merely means that the foundation of a concept which
has become apparently
self-evident is made visible by means of a
phenomenological, ‘hermeneutical’,
analysis. - Since ‘Dasein’ is temporal (‘zeitlich’),
Heidegger's analysis implies a
certain ‘temporality’ of truth, which he has not
further specified.16
It is possible to give several interpretations of
Heidegger's thesis. For our purpose,
we will try to confront the philosophies studied with a
truth concept referring to the
student of comparative philosophy rather than to
these philosophies. This exemplifies
one way in which this concept of truth can be
understood. Accordingly we will not
ask the unanswerable and meaningless (according to
Heidegger's analysis) question
of objective truth, but inquire how far we can
establish a relation which can be called
true between ourselves and the philosophies studied,
Advaita and Neoplatonism.
Thus we may discover truth and discover ourselves.
16 Cf., however, Sein und Zeit par, 76.
J.F. Staal, Advaita and Neoplatonism
12
(B). The problem of historicism.
The history of philosophy shows different thinkers
stating different truths. If we
classify them historically we find different ages
believing in different truths. We can
try to find the ‘real’ truth by comparing these
different ideas and concepts; but then
we forget that we necessarily belong to our own age
and hence will be inclined to
accept as true that which is considered true in this
age. Wilhelm Dilthey, who was
fully aware of this ‘problem of historicism’ saw no
other task for philosophy than a
historical treatment of all philosophical systems. One
wonders whether there is a
way out of this difficulty.
If the problem is stated thus (and we shall see that it
is only possible to state it in a
slightly different way) theoretically no solution is
possible. We cannot become
independent from our own age, and there would be
no standard to measure such
independence. Even if we should state an objective,
‘timeless’ truth concerning any
philosophical idea expressed in the course of history,
we would have no certainty
that it was such a truth. Burckhardt once expressed
this by defining history as an
account of the facts which one age considers
important in another age.
We cannot break through this circle, but it leads to a
conclusion with respect to
method. In the history of Western philosophy we see
‘not at all the perpetual change
of standpoints, which historicism claims, but the
amazing continuity, with which
European thinking reflects upon the same themes
and problems’.17 When dealing
with the history of Western philosophy, therefore, we
can only hope to arrive at a
relatively correct picture by showing the relationship
of a certain period to our own
period and by becoming conscious of our own
position in this way. In another way
we reach the same conclusion i.e. that we should be
related to the philosophies
studied and study this relationship.
17 ‘Was uns die Geschichte der Philosophie tatächlich
zeigt ist aber gar nicht der vom Historismus
behauptete unaufhörliche Wechsel der
Weltansichten, sondern lie erstaunliche Kontinuitāt,
mit der das abendlāndische Denken immer wieder
dieselben Themen und Probleme
durchdenkt’: K. Löwith, Die Dynamik der Geschichte
und der Historismus, ERANOS - Jahrbuch
1952, Zürich 1953, 217-254: 237.
J.F. Staal, Advaita and Neoplatonism
13
In Indian philosophy ‘most of the systems developed
side by side through the
centuries’ and this development made them ‘more
and more differentiated,
determinate and coherent’.18 It is possible to give
fundamental points of agreement
between all of them.19 A modern Indian can study
Indian philosophy on account of
this continuity and tradition. But how can
comparative philosophy grasp its subject?
For a Westerner, the only possibility is to find in the
Western philosophical tradition
which factors can account for the understanding of
Oriental philosophy. The
corresponding historical question is how and when
Oriental philosophies entered
the West. Comparative philosophers should first
study how it became possible on
account of the internal development of Western
philosophy for Oriental philosophies
to be studied in Western civilisation. Oriental
philosophies can be studied in Western
philosophy only as possibilities of Western
philosophy, just as, in (existential)
phenomenology in general the phenomena can only
be understood as possibilities
of human existence.20
(C). The concept of time.
The first to deal with the history of philosophy in a
similar way was Nietzsche in ‘Die
Philosophie im tragischen Zeitalter der Griechen’
(1873). He exemplifies here the
unity between scholar and human existence.
Unfortunately the unity between subject
and object led in this early work to subjective
statements. This is the danger inherent
in a method, which includes the relation of the
person studying to the philosophy
studied - but it is no reason to abandon this method
for the sake of so-called
impersonal objectivity.
In the prefaces of his work of 1874 (?) and 1879
Nietzsche expresses a view which
is typical of the European attitude with regard to the
history of philosophy:
‘Philosophical systems are absolutely true only to
their founders, to all later
philosophers
18 S.N. Dasgupta, A History of Indian Philosophy I,
Cambridge 1922, 5.
19 Id. 71-75; M. Hiriyanna, Outlines of Indian
Philosophy, London 1932, Introduction.
20 See below: II, 5: 66.
J.F. Staal, Advaita and Neoplatonism
14
they are usually one big mistake....’.21 He turns to
the personal element as the only
irrefutable element: ‘For in systems which have been
refuted it is only this personal
element that can still interest us, for this alone is
eternally irrefutable’.22
In the West there is also a contrary opinion. This is a
consequence of a particular
view of time.23 We will sketch this concept of time
which is of Christian origin (but
since long secularised in different ways) and
compare it with the Greek as well as
the Indian view.
In Greece and India time is generally conceived as
cyclical. The world is a perpetually
recurring phenomenon. The deity is above these
circles and is non-temporal; hence,
especially in India, time is little valued. In Christianity
God manifests himself in time.
He has created the world once and Christ has come
once, just as there will be in
the end one Day of Judgment. This rectilinear view
forms the background of the
later ideas of evolution and progress. We must
understand this as constituent of
European consciousness (which at the same time
remains often unconscious), not
as a belief in external progress or evolution. For the
Occidental possibilities are
always open towards the future and can always be
realised in the present. What
has happened, happened once and for all; we can
learn from it because tradition
forms our consciousness. Through the process of
time we will be able to find truth.
This is no vulgar and unreflected optimism; it is a
mode of conceiving our
experiences, a kind of (cultural) a priori. From this
view the doctrine that truth is
temporal arose.
21 Transl. M.A. Mugge, London 1924. - ‘Nun sind
philosophische Systeme nur für ihre Grunder
ganz wahr: für alle spãteren Philosophen gewöhnlich
ein grosser Fehler......’
22 ‘Denn an Systemen, die widerlegt sind, kanz uns
eben nur noch das Persönliche interessieren,
denn dies ist das ewig Unwiderlegbare’.
23 Cf H. - C. Puech, Temps, histoire et mythe dans le
christianisme des premiers siècles,
Proceedings of the 7th Congr. for the History of
Religions, Amsterdam 1951, 33-53; the
author's Over het cyclische en het rechtlijnige
tijdsbegrip, Amsterdam 1954, the bibliography
of which refers to the important authors on the
subject, e.g., apart from Puech, O. Cullmann,
M. Eliade, J. Guitton, etc. See also below III, 1: 164 sq.
J.F. Staal, Advaita and Neoplatonism
15
The Indian view is, like the ancient Greek one,
connected with a different sentiment
(‘Stimmung’): the ideal is at the beginning; it is the
golden age, the age of Kronos
amongst the Greeks and the Satya yuga of each
kalpa in Hinduism. Thus we should
look back, and try to restore and preserve tradition
faithfully.
We have given a rough sketch, in black and white as
it were, of the complicated
picture reality offers. However, the circular view
exists also in the West, whereas
the rectilinear view is at present influencing the
whole of Asia. Here we are interested
in these concepts in so far as they reflect a method
for the history of philosophy.
Each attitude affects every total view, also if the
contrary view is taken into account.
Nietzsche24 manifests an attitude with regard to
history, which is mainly determined
by a feeling of ‘being ahead’. The Occidental may
look back at sources because
they led to later developments which are his real
concern. The Indian looks in general
at sources as the richest germs, the later
development of which is an adaptation to
changing circumstances and often a degeneration
(‘Hiraṇyagarbha’).
In the study of comparative philosophy one has to be
aware of this difference,
especially in the study of Plotinus and Śaṅkara, both
‘circularists’, whereas the
modern Western view is mainly (but not exclusively)
‘rectilinear’. Similarly the aim
at a ‘personal’ approach differs greatly from both
‘object’ -philosophies.25 Only a
conscious use of inevitable, but often unconscious
modern Western concepts may
clear the way for a relatively adequate
understanding of philosophies like Advaita
and Neoplatonism, which utilize different concepts.
Only in this way one may attain
awareness of and perhaps independence from one's
own concepts and basic
presuppositions.
24 It cannot be shown here that Nietzsche's doctrine
of eternal recurrence of the identical (‘die
ewige Wiederkehr des Gleichen’), according to
Heidegger his central doctrine, rests on
assumptions that are alien to the Indian as well as (in
a lesser degree) to the Greek ideas;
paradoxically as it may seem, they are connected
with the attitude and the sentiment of
‘rectilinear’ time.
25 See below III, 5.
J.F. Staal, Advaita and Neoplatonism
16
4. Method
In the previous sections several references have
been made to method. As in this
matter everything is interconnected, we have
touched upon some topics under
different headings. Now a survey will be given of four
points which are of primary
importance in dealing with comparative philosophy.
(A). The ‘Standard Consciousness’
It passes our understanding how scholars have been
able to compare two
philosophies, without realising that a standard of
comparison is needed resulting
from a third philosophy (which, in special cases, may
be the same as the first or the
second). That this has generally not been realised
can only mean that this third
philosophy remained unconscious and manifested
itself only indirectly in the principles
of comparison, in treatment, methods, order, and
evaluation of what is considered
as important and finally in the conclusions. Our first
aim is to become conscious of
this ‘standard philosophy’ and to make it explicit.
The ‘standard philosophy’ cannot be chosen
arbitrarily, as we have stressed before:
it is the attitude of the modern Westerner, in as far
as it implicitly contains a
philosophy. This ‘standard philosophy’ manifests
itself in the ‘standard consciousness’
of the modern Occidental. To describe it fully would
mean to describe what (better:
who) the modern Westerner is, which is of course
impossible in the present context.
This ‘standard consciousness’ can be considered as
consisting of a great number
of ‘constituents’. It is our task to investigate which
are the most important of these
in the present context. An example mentioned before
is the ‘rectilinear concept of
time’, which can be called one of the (very
important) constituents of the standard
consciousness.
The discovery of these constituents is a matter of
enlarging our consciousness; it
can be brought about by phenomenological analysis
and study of the history of
Western philosophy. It may lead to the awareness of
what might be called ‘cultural
apriorism’. The importance of comparative
philosophy lies for a great part in this
discovery of ‘cultural a prioris’ - concepts and ideas
which are considered as
self-evident in a certain culture, but which may
J.F. Staal, Advaita and Neoplatonism
17
become relativised when other cultures are studied.
What is most interesting in
comparative philosophy is not the comparison (a
purely academical achievement),
but the better understanding of the compared terms
and of one's own ‘standard
consciousness’.
(B). The existential attitude.
An existential attitude requires the absence of what
has been referred to as relativistic
indifference, esthetic approach, and dogmatic
traditionalism, as well as the presence
of a readiness to accept what is studied as a ‘claim
upon ourselves, affecting all that
we are’. This readiness is essential; whether we are
‘totally affected’ depends of
course on our subject and on our own nature. This
attitude can be specified in two
respects which are each other's complements.
Firstly, we should not only have an ‘open mind’, i.e.,
a tolerant attitudes but we
should also possess what could be called an ‘open
personality’, i.e., a personal
attitude of studying a certain philosophy in complete
freedom, ready to accept that
what we find may be the truth and may have to
replace what we accepted as true
before. As this requirement is not easy to fulfil, it is
useful to realise always that
philosophy is intended for human beings as a
standard and guide to life. Nothing is
better, therefore, than actual contact with these
human beings, a possibility which
can be realised in the case of all ‘living’ philosophies.
The ‘open personality’, however, entails as its
corollary a second attitude. If we are
not personally involved, we can study and compare
many philosophies. But if we
are personally involved, we cannot escape choice.
After the readiness to accept
what characterizes an open personality, we have to
choose which philosophies or
doctrines we are going to reject or accept ourselves.
Remembering Nietzsche's
remark we may say that no philosophies of the past
are generally accepted in their
totality. But each detail and aspect can claim the
right to be accepted or rejected,
i.e., to be taken seriously. To hesitate because of an
attitude of prudence and
precaution, which the self-criticism of the sciences
has produced, can be considered
an aspect of this attitude of choice, provided
hesitation results from a personal
conflict (in
J.F. Staal, Advaita and Neoplatonism
18
the sense in which Pascal said, that there is no living
belief without doubt), and not
from a desire to escape.
This kind of choice was first stressed by Kierkegaard.
(C). The historical character.
Constituents of the standard consciousness can be
discovered through a
phenomenological analysis of the treatment of
‘foreign’ philosophies. However this
can be achieved more easily through historical
analysis of the background of standard
consciousness, i.e., through studying relevant parts
of the history of one's own
philosophy. A Westerner must study the main lines of
development of Western
philosophy before he is able to approach Oriental
philosophies. Then only does he
know the answers and attitudes of Western thought
which influence his approach.
Only then can he know in how far he understands
other philosophies and in how
far he is a priori in a position to understand them.
Without this preparation there will
be no adequate understanding and nothing is
reached but the mistake of which
Faust was reproached by the vanishing spirit:
You resemble the spirit, whom you understand
already, Not me!26
This happens frequently when Westerners deal with
the Orient, though there may
be no spirit to tell them so.
(D). The circular procedure.
When we stressed a certain difference in the concept
of time between Indian and
modern Western philosophy, which would have to be
taken into account when
approaching Indian thought, it may have seemed
that a grave methodological error
was made: we used a certain knowledge of Indian
philosophy in order to understand
Indian philosophy - apparently a vicious circle.
Likewise, in other sections of this
first part some knowledge of Advaita will be
presumed and utilized.
This is however not a mistake but an inevitable
procedure inherent in our method.
As soon as some knowledge of Indian philosophy is
acquired it produces a certain
attitude which influ-
26 Goethe, Faust I: Du gleichst dem Geist den du
begreifst, Nicht mir!
J.F. Staal, Advaita and Neoplatonism
19
ences our views with respect to Western as well as
Indian thought. It is therefore
impossible to give a linear enumeration of subjects in
a philosophical treatment.
Philosophical knowledge is always a process, which is
never achieved and in which
everything is interconnected. The reason for this is
that a personal connection with
‘the material’ is desirable, so that all previously
acquired knowledge, which has
become part of the investigator's consciousness, has
to be taken into account. A
treatment which would not consider the
interdependence of all terms would be
unconsciously dependent upon other factors than
those dealt with at the moment.
Thus we shall utilize throughout a certain knowledge
of Advaita as well as of
Neoplatonism. Arriving at the comparison itself, our
procedure will consist in a gradual
refinement and a continuous testing of initial
‘working’ opinions. This procedure
belongs to the method used here, for it is the actual
procedure developing in the
mind, before an artificial shifting and selecting,
philosophically obscure and
phenomenologically not given, will take place.
Those who object to this apparent impurity can
realise its inevitability by reflecting
upon the analogous ‘circular procedures’ which have
been manifest throughout
Western philosophy, for instance in Parmenides'
fragment: ‘for me it is common,
wherever I start; for there I will again return,27’ and
likewise in Hegel, Dilthey and
Heidegger.28
5. On synthesis and choice
In comparative philosophy several constituents of the
standard consciousness
determine the approach, consciously or
unconsciously. One of the most important
of these is the underlying aim of the student in which
is embodied the answer to the
question: in the search for truth, should philosophies
be synthetised, or should a
choice be made between them? We have voted
already for the second alternative.
But when scholars conclude appa-
27 5. 1-2 (Diels).
28 See e.g., the beginning of the Hegel-monograph
by T, Litt. Cf. Śein und Zeit, par. 7 et passim.
J.F. Staal, Advaita and Neoplatonism
20
rently logically on apparently purely
phenomenological grounds, that we can arrive
at a world philosophy by synthetising the main
philosophical trends, or alternatively
when scholars arrive at the acceptance of one
philosophy while rejecting the others,
such ‘conclusions’ merely manifest deeper lying and
generally hidden attitudes of
synthesis or choice.
Western consciousness possesses in the first place a
constituent of choice, and
only in the second place one of synthesis. This could
be shown by historical analysis,
which would at the same time show the subordinate
place of the synthetising attitude,
and the repeated reactions against, it. A short
summary of this development will be
given below. It will be shown in the second and third
parts29 that in Indian philosophy
in general, but in the philosophies under
consideration in particular, the synthetising
attitude prevails.
As for choice, the essential dependence of Western
philosophy upon the ‘tertium
non datur’ and the ‘principium contradictionis’ must
be emphasized: Aristotle said
‘Each statement is either true or untrue’30 and ‘The
same attribute cannot at the
same time belong and not belong to the same
subject in the same respect’.31 Aristotle
has shown that even those, who would, ‘seriously or
for the sake of argument’
oppose these principles, accept them in fact and
utilize them unconsciously. His
argument remains largely valid, whereas it seems
that the reaction against it
culminating in the multi-valued logics based upon the
intuitionism of L.E.J. Brouwer,
remain as yet secondary trends in Western
philosophy.32
29 See esp. II 13.
30 De Interpretatione 9, 18 a 37-38.
31 Metaphysics Г 3, 1005 b 19-20.
32 I cannot agree with the thesis of C.T.K. Chari (On
the dialectical affinities between East and
West, Philosophy East and West 3 (1953-1954) 199-
221, 32-336), that there is a kind of
parallelism between the multivalued logics and some
Oriental modes of thought, for the
following reasons: (1) in a three-valued logic, which is
itself a meaningless formal system like
its generalisations into multivalued logics, only one
meaningful interpretation in the semantics
can be given to the third value ‘u’: it means
‘undecided’, and this means in general: ‘not yet
decided’, and possibly: never to be decided. But this
is not in contradiction with the law of
contradiction; as nobody doubts that the truth value,
once the decision may have taken place,
will be either ‘t’ (true) or ‘f’ (false). The difficulty
arises, as Brouwer has pointed out, because
we are dealing in such cases with infinite sets. (2)
When a mystic affirms: God is neither a
nor non-a, the logical meaning of this statement can
only be that God transcends such
attributions, which does not contradict the law of the
excluded middle. Example: ad (1): define
a number A as follows: A = 1, if anywhere in the
decimal development of π a sequence of
five sevens occurs; A = 0, if nowhere in the decimal
development of π a sequence of five
sevens occurs. Now to the statement ‘P’, meaning: ‘A
= 1’ the truth value ‘u’ has to be assigned;
but nobody doubts that we may be either able to
prove A = 1, and hence the statement P
obtains the value t; or that we may be able to prove
A = 0, and hence the statement P gets
the value f. There is no possibility that both are
realizable whereas the value ‘u’ is preserved
to express the fact that no proof is yet realised. - ad.
(2): if we say ‘God is light and God is
not light’ it does not mean that we expect that we
will one day be able to prove that God is
light and to refute the reverse, or conversely; but it
means that God can in some respect be
said to be light, and in some other respect not to be
light. But this does not contradict the law
of contradiction, because it is exactly for this reason
that Aristotle had added the clause ‘in
the same respect’ (katà tô autó). - See also below II,
11: 120.
J.F. Staal, Advaita and Neoplatonism
21
Just as the foundation for the logical attitude of
choice was laid by Aristotle, the
foundation for the existential attitude of choice was
laid by Christ.33 This is observable
throughout the New Testament, e.g., in: ‘Think not
that I am come to send peace
on earth. I came not to send peace, but a sword. For I
am come to set a man at
variance against his father, and the daughter against
her mother, and the
daughter-in-law against her mother-in-law. And a
man's foes shall be they of his
own household. He that loveth father or mother more
than me is not worthy of me;
and he that loveth son or daughter more than me is
not worthy of me’.34 Such
passages are not lacking in other religions, but they
have perhaps never been taken
so seriously and so much emphasised as in
Christianity. This becomes especially
clear in the scenes of Christ's temptations by the
devil, where three alternatives are
offered and rejected in three acts of choice.35
Dostoievski has given an existential
interpretation of these passages and has thereby
shown how this attitude has
remained of central
33 The existential choice is also announced in Greek
philosophy, as I hope to show elsewhere.
34 Matth. 10.34-37; Cf. Luke 12.51-53; 14.26,27;
Micah. 7.6
35 Math. 4.1-11; cf. Mark 1.12,13; Luke, 4.1-13.
J.F. Staal, Advaita and Neoplatonism
22
significance in the West.36 In the Faust legend the
choice for the devil shows how
negative choice is as decisive and existentially
irrevocable as positive choice.
Reacting against the synthesizing efforts of Hegel,
Kierkegaard considers choice,
which was already announced by Pascal, the decisive
factor of human existence.
Existentialism has developed this and expressed it in
a more philosophical way.
With Plotinus, who was in this respect a forerunner of
Hegel, the synthesizing attitude
becomes predominant in Greek thought. In his age,
syncretism, for which Alexandria
was the symbol, had become widespread. The
synthesizing attitude of Plotinus is
connected with his traditionalism which will be
studied below.37 This holds similarly
for many currents in Indian philosophy, and in
particular for Śaṅkara's Advaita.38
The synthesizing attitude is still more characteristic
of Śrī Aurobindo.39
The synthesizing attitude, a minor trend of thought in
Europe, has become important
in the United States. The historical reasons for this
are clear. The American quest
for a world-philosophy, as expressed for instance in
the East-West philosopher's
Conferences held in Hawaii, ‘Attempts at World
Philosophical Synthesis’, by scholars
like C.A. Moore, E.A. Burtt, F.C.S. Northrop and
others,40 has found little response
in Europe. On the other hand, the philosophies which
emphasize choice, e.g.,
existentialism, have been often misunderstood in the
United States (and in the
English speaking world in general).
6. On influences
Those who are interested in comparative philosophy
have often occupied themselves
with possible influences of philosophies upon each
other. The problem of the possible
historical influences of Indian thought upon Advaita
will be discussed below in an
36 in: The Brothers Karamazov, Book 5, Chapter 5:
The Great Inquisitor.
37 See below III 1.
38 See below II 13.
39 See below p. 134-5, n. 444 and p. 137, n. 449.
40 Cf. the journal: Philosophy East and West - A
Journal of Oriental and Comparative Thought,
published by C.A. Moore in Honolulu, Hawaii.
J.F. Staal, Advaita and Neoplatonism
23
appendix. However a general remark may be made
about this problem, though it is
not primarily a philosophical question. The treatment
of problems of influence and
of origination depends on philosophical convictions,
and therefore, in the case of
comparative philosophy, on constituents of the
standard consciousness.
The constituents concerned are those regarding
causality. Here opinions range
between two extremes: the docrtine of the
‘preexistence of the effect in the cause’41
and the doctrine of ‘creatio ex nihilo’.42 Whoever is
inclined, perhaps unconsciously,
to the first view, will tend to stress points which are
common to a certain field and
its preceding background, and interpret these as
effect and cause respectively;
whoever is inclined to the other view will stress the
differences and try to show that
there are elements of the later phenomenon
counterparts of which cannot be found
in the earlier phenomenon. The first view stresses
causality and is especially
appropriate for scientific explanations; rationality
requires a certain amount of identity.
Whoever holds the second view is in a better position
to understand phenomena
such as creativity and freedom. In these cases the
approach determines the result
up to a degree which varies with each case. It will be
seen how far our comparative
study depends upon the view which stresses ‘creatio
ex nihilo’; for in comparisons
we will often stress the differences.
The same consideration applies to the different views
on possible Oriental origins
of Greek civilisation. It becomes clear how
Westerners, stressing the novelty of
phenomena in general, came to speak about ‘le
miracle grec’ for denoting the
increase of creativity in Greek culture during the fifth
and fourth centuries B.C. The
impact of these constituents is considerable and
should not be underrated. It should
not be concluded, however, that statements
concerning influences and origins can
never be valid conclusions from phenomenological
observations.
One other factor has to be considered. When
influences are supposed to exist, it is
not enough to prove this supposition by
41 e.g. the Indian Satkāryavāda. See below II. 12:
126.
42 The theistic (Judaic, Christian, Muslim) doctrine;
and the Nyāya ārambhavāda.
J.F. Staal, Advaita and Neoplatonism
24
showing that similarities exist, that historical
contacts took place, that more direct
influences cannot account for a certain development
and that the creativity and
originality of the philosophers concerned were not a
sufficient explanation. In addition
to this the susceptibility, by which a certain existing
influence was also accepted
and absorbed, must be explained. This can only be
done by studying the
philosophical characteristics of doctrines supposed to
have undergone influence.
Philosophical investigations into parallels and
similarities should therefore precede
historical investigations into the problem of actual
influences. In short the capacity
to be influenced has to be understood as a possible
development of the entity which
has undergone an influence.
7. Comparative philosophy and the Orient
A few remarks may be added which apply in
particular to the comparison of Western
and Eastern philosophies by Westerners.43 If a
previous remark, i.e., that Oriental
philosophies can only be studied as possibilities of
Western philosophy, is true, the
question arises what is ‘the Orient’ as a constituent
of the Occident.
For this extensive historical investigations would be
required. It may be shortly
indicated in which direction such specifications
should be sought, disregarding many
details.
It can be said that Western culture is built upon a
double foundation: Greek culture
and Christian religion. Christianity follows upon
Judaism and is, like Judaism,
generally regarded as an Oriental religion. At the
same time it has become the
religion of the West. Having shaped the whole of
Western civilisation (not exclusively
in the religious realm), it is tightly interwoven with
Greek elements and is traceable
and visible almost everywhere (also in secularisation,
itself a phenomenon of
Christian
43 Philosophically, it remains justified to speak of
East and West, though the terms are
generalisations and though we know that ‘East’ and
‘West’ in the most general sense, applying
to all fields of life, are abstractions. See esp. P.J.
Zoetmulder, Cultuur Oost en West,
Amsterdam 1951, reviewed by [Link]. Bertling in:
Bijdragen Taal-, Land-en Volkenkunde 108,
2.
J.F. Staal, Advaita and Neoplatonism
25
origin). The continuous struggle and tension between
Greek and Christian elements
is one of the main reasons for the Western search for
self-knowledge. Because of
this the West does not only contain, but is in its inner
essence constituted by an
Oriental element. The discrimination ‘East and West’
did arise in the West because
the West itself covers East and West. Therefore the
West is vitally interested in the
East. It has a greater understanding (not only
enumerative and ‘external’ knowledge,
as it is sometimes said) of the East, than the East has
of the West - for the simple
historical reasons that some of its knowledge of the
East results from self-knowledge.
The East is more than a mirror into which the West
looks, as has been said.44 The
West sees in the East at a ‘safe’ distance something
which internally moves itself
and which therefore fascinates it. There is no doubt
that the fascination for the Orient
among Westerners (which has a different character
from the enthusiasm of some
modern Orientals for the West) has to be partly
explained on account of this.
However, the advantage of a first understanding
implies a disadvantage: the Orient
is the scene on which the West projects; it is a
receptacle of Western projections.
Though the sources of these projections are often
Oriental, there is no guarantee
that the reality upon which these projections are
imposed corresponds to the image.
So, paradoxically as it may seem, the
misunderstanding of the East by the West is
also greater than that of the West by the East. All this
could originate, because there
is an urge in the West towards the East ‘which is
outside’, because of the East ‘which
is inside’. The primary step to be taken by
Westerners who want to have a real
understanding of any aspect of the East, is to try to
remove the projections.
As Christianity may be considered the ‘Oriental
element’ in Western civilisation, it
might be assumed that always Christianity is
projected upon Oriental systems of
thought. This has very often been the case at least
unconsciously, for conciously
the Christian claim of unicity tended to differentiate,
which was favourable for later
scholarly discrimination. But Christianity is by no
means the only source of
projections. The actual situation is less
44 H.S. Nyberg, Das Studium des Orients und die
europäische Kultur, Zeitschrift der deutschen
morgenländischen Gesellschaft 103 (1953) 9-21: 20.
J.F. Staal, Advaita and Neoplatonism
26
simple and consists of an increasing number of
structures and superstructures, of
which little is known.
The Christian element is emotionally connected with
the Orient (though a deeper
analysis shows that certain Oriental modes of
thought are more Greek in character
than Christian - as will be repeatedly seen in this
study). This is connected with the
history of Western Orientalism. This discipline
originated when Bible study was
revived on account of Protestantism. Hebrew
language and thought were studied,
and subsequently other Semitic languages,
especially Arabic (and hence Islam).
Once the study of Oriental languages and cultures
had begun, India became the
great rediscovery of the Romantic movements45 and
China of the Enlightenment.
Apart from this religious relation to the Orient, fore-
shadowed in Christianity and
symbolized in the words: ‘Ex Oriente Lux’ - ‘The light
comes from the East’ - the
relation between West and East has also been
conceived as a relation of tension
and opposition, as for instance in the wars of Greece
against the Persians or in the
crusades against the Muslims. Also in this connection
Western consciousness arose
but as a reaction and protest against the great
Oriental powers - with the
consciousness of the child, who revolts against his
parents, and sets himself free.
Nietzsche's somewhat exaggerated words about the
relations of the Greeks to other
countries apply in particular to the Orient: ‘Nothing is
more foolish than to swear by
the fact that the Greeks had an aboriginal culture;
no, they rather absorbed all the
culture flourishing amongst other nations, and they
advanced so far, just because
they understood how to hurl the spear further from
the very spot where another
nation had let it rest’.46
Both attitudes resulted in what may be called
historical consciousness, itself a
development of the Christian concepts of time and
history. Nyberg says about what
could be called the oriento-
45 Cf. above, p. 7.
46 Transl. M.A. Mugge, London 1924 - ‘Nichts ist
törichter, als den Griechen eine autochtone
Bildung nachzusagen, sie haben vielmehr alle bei
anderen Volkern lebende Bildung in sich
eingesogen, sie kamen gerade deshalb so weit, weil
sie es verstanden, den Speer von dort
weiter zu schleudern, wo ihn ein anderes Volk liegen
liess’ (o.c., 1).
J.F. Staal, Advaita and Neoplatonism
27
version of Western historical consciousness: ‘Only
contact with the Orient and our
capacity to assimilate this meeting internally caused
the origin and development of
historical consciousness.’47
8. Comparative philosophy and Advaita
Advaita also presents an inner possibility of Western
philosophy (this does not mean
that we are entitled to affirm dogmatically that the
West has its own Advaita; but it
means that what we can philosophically understand
of Indian Advaita can only be
the development of a possibility of Western
thought).48 Some material will here be
presented which may contribute to the solution of
the problem of the philosophical
foundation of ‘Western Advaita’. It may be suggested
as a tentative solution to this
problem that modern Western interest in
philosophies like Advaita, is only the latest
form of an ancient ‘counter-tradition’ of
impersonalism. This tradition starts with
Neoplatonism (according to Emile Bréhier),49 or at
least contains Neoplatonism as
one of its earliest manifestations. It re-appeared
regularly and has been repeatedly
criticised and rejected. In a similar manner as
Augustine rejected Plotinus, the
medieval church rejected Meister Eckehart, Muslim
orthodoxy50 rejected Ibn 'Arabī
and, in only a partly secularized way, Kierkegaard
rejected Hegel.51. We look through
Neoplatonic eyes at Advaita, and the attitude of
Western thought with regard to
Neoplatonism predetermines our attitude to Advaita.
Finally a few remarks may be added about
Schopenhauer and Deussen, the first
philosophical interpreters of Advaita in Europe, for
they do not seem to belong to
the impersonalist tradition. The incorrectness of their
historical perspective, which
nowadays seems
47 ‘Erst die Berührung mit dem Orient und unsere
Fähigkeit, diese Begegnung innerlich zu
erleben haben bei uns das geschichtliche
Bewusstsein erweckt und erweitert’ (Ibid).
48 Moreover it is not at all against the spirit of
Advaita to be expounded in different ways: cf.
T.M.P. Mahadevan, Western Vedänta in: Vedänta for
modern man, New York, 1951, 15-19.
49 La philosophie de Plotin, Paris 1928, Chap. VII:
‘Avec Plotin, nous saississons done le premier
chaînon d'une tradition religieuse, qui n'est pas
moins puissante que la tradition chrétienne....’
50 e.g. Ibn. Taimīya.
51 see e.g. M. Bense, Hegel und Kierkegaard, Kōln-
Krefeld 1948.
J.F. Staal, Advaita and Neoplatonism
28
evident, can be easily gathered from a booklet by
Deusson entitled ‘Vedänta and
Platonism in the light of Kantian philosophy’.52 There
Indian thinkers are regarded
as subjective idealists, especially Sankara,
notwithstanding the essential differences
between Advaita and subjective idealism.53
Moreover, Parmenides and Plato are
also interpreted in a Kantian way: for instance, when
Parmenides speaks about
being as indivisible and unchanging, it is argued that
indivisibility excludes space
and time from being and immutability excludes
causality (which is true), so that these
entities have to be attributed to the human subject in
the Kantian sense. Lastly, Kant
himself is interpreted in a Schopenhauerian (i.e.
metaphysical) way, through the
identification of will as the thing in itself. Through all
these interpretations and
interpolations a unified and apparently final world
view has come into being. No
major difficulties are left for a philosopher like
Deussen. But in fact we have not gone
beyond the philosophy of Schopenhauer, itself only
one of the possible developments
of Kant's thought, the latter itself only one of the
various outcomes of Greek
philosophy combined with later reflection and
analysis. And likewise an interpretation
of Advaita is given, which tells us more about
Schopenhauer than about Advaita.
52 P. Deussen, Vedänta und Platonismus im Lichte
der Kantischen Philosophie, Berlin 1922.
53 See below II, 11: 123.
J.F. Staal, Advaita and Neoplatonism
29
Part II
The Metaphysics of Advaita
Introduction
Much has been written about the Advaita Vedānta of
Śrī Saṅkarācārya. When in
the following pages another attempt is made to
describe the main features of his
metaphysics little that is new can be achieved.
Especially in this field of Indian
philosophy, the widespread quest for originality has
to give way to the more modest
recognition of work previously done by noteworthy
scholars. Still controversies
remain concerning the significance, if not the
interpretations of several points of the
Ācārya's doctrine. In the following description and
analysis the search for a more
existential characteristic in the sense laid down in
the first part has led to special
attention being paid to three concepts which denote
entities rooted in human being:
sacrifice, meditation and knowledge. All three are
closely related to the Vedic
scriptures which every Hindu (who is vaidika, āstika)
accepts: sacrifice is the act
prescribed in the Veda; meditation takes place
according to the supposed injunctions
in the Veda; knowledge comprises what is taught in
the Veda. These are the central
‘existential’ acts or attitudes from which the various
concepts of Advaita came into
being. A short investigation into the meaning of śruti
and smṛti will therefore precede
the main description. Here stress will be laid upon
the sacred texts as they occur in
Śaṅkara's works and especially in the
Brahmasūtrabhāṣya, as the investigation is
not historical but searches for the significance śruti
and smṛti had for Śaṅkara.
Likewise, the following remarks (under 1.) are not
intended as a short description
of the historical development from the Veda to the
Vedānta, but intend to point out
the influence of the older tradition on Śafiṅkara's
works.
Concerning historical factors it must again be borne
in mind that the question of
methodological approach is related to the
background of the investigator, and that
it is not often on objective grounds that scholars
utilize to a greater or lesser degree
the historical approach. This is evident from the fact
that most Western
J.F. Staal, Advaita and Neoplatonism
30
scholars pay much attention to the historical order of
texts, manifesting thereby the
stress laid in European philosophy on time and
history; whereas most Indian scholars
disregard historical problems in favour of the
philosophical questions concerned,
thereby showing the low evaluation of the temporal
in Indian thought. A
phenomenological investigation into the desirability
and justifiability of either approach
has to proceed on the basis of the material studied.
As long as this is not explicitly
questioned it will be advisable to follow a more or
less ‘middle path’. We shall not
hesitate to elucidate points which are not fully clear
or which are insufficiently
developed in Śaṅkara, in the light of earlier as well as
later texts. But on the other
hand we will not attribute these later developments
to Śaṅkara himself nor claim
that they were ‘potentially’ contained in his works.
For by this practice we would
have implicitly voted for satkāryavāda, a
metaphysical doctrine which itself constitutes
a problem.1
Over a considerable length of time it has been
fashionable to approach philosophical
problems from an epistemological point of view and
to claim this as the only sound
and reliable method. This has been an increasing
tendency in Western philosophy
from the beginning of the modern period, after the
middle ages, until Kant, and it
has also been an important element in later Advaita,
e.g., in the
Khaṇḍanakhaṇḍakhādya2 or in the
Vedāntaparibhāṣā.3 Accordingly it is often said
that Śaṅkara recognised three valid means of
knowledge (pramāṅas): perception
(pratyakṣa), inference (anumāna) and scriptural
testimony (śabda).4 But no explicit
discussion of these pramāṇas occurs in the
Brahmasūtrabhāṣya where especially
the śabdapramāṇa is stressed. Though in later
Advaita six pramāṇas are recognized,5
it seems more true to the spirit of Śaṅkara's Advaita
not to apply this epistemological
1 Cf. below II, 12: 126.
2 Of the 12th century, made partly accessible in: A.
Bhattacharya Sastri: Studies in Post-Śaṅkara
dialectics, Calcutta, 1936.
3 Of the 17th century. Ed. and trans. Madras 1942.
4 e.g. S. Radhakrishnan, Indian Philosophy II, New
York - London, 1951, 488.
5 See P. Deussen, The System of the Vedānta,
Chicago 1912, 89-90. In BSB 2.1.11 a quotation
occurs of Manusmrti (XII 105, 106); ‘Perception,
inference and the śāstra according to the
various traditions, this triad is to be known well by
one desiring clearness in regard to right’,
J.F. Staal, Advaita and Neoplatonism
31
monism, and accordingly not to make an attempt to
build his Vedānta upon an
epistemological basis. Nearer to the Eastern as well
as Western (Greek and
medieval) traditional outlook are the later
developments of Western philosophy,
where it is realised that all epistemology is rooted in
human being or is at any rate
dependent upon the general structure of being, so
that it is an ontological mistake
to make a discussion of the validity of knowledge the
starting point of metaphysics.6
For those who have much regard for the
epistemological approach - it is not our
task to refute such a view, as has been done in post-
Kantian philosophy7 - the
following investigation may be considered an inquiry
into the nature and background
of ṇabdapramāṇa.
That the Brahmasūtras themselves entitle us to
stress above all the importance of
śabda is evident right from the beginning: ‘Then
therefore the enquiry into Brahman’
(athāto brahmajijṇāsā) says the first sūtra, and the
third: ‘(The omniscience of
Brahman follows) from its being the source of
scripture’ (śāstrayonitvāt). The object
of Uttara Mīmāṋsā is the enquiry (jijñāsā) into
Brahman and Brahman is the source
(yoni) of the scripture. Śaṅkara also refers to another
interpretation where śruti,
taken as a means of valid knowledge, leads to
Brahman. The commentary itself
leaves no doubt about the importance of śabda,
scriptural testimony or revelation,
as has been shown previously by Deussen8 and
recently by Lacombe.9 The latter
has analysed a passage,10 which states that our
chains of inference starting from
perception cannot reach Brahman; they are
important only on the basis of revelation.
Not only does the idea of the Absolute depend on
śabda (Lacombe speaks in this
connection somewhat misleadingly of ‘theology’, a
monotheistic term, as perhaps
‘revelation’ is too), but the whole of metaphysics
depends on it, as for instance
vivartavāda: for pratyakṣa and anumāna can only
lead to pariṇāmavāda.11 In short
the suprasensible realm is exclusively the
6 See e.g. M. Heidegger, Sein und Zeit par. 31-33.
7 Especially (implicitly) in phenomenology.
8 O.c. 94-96: ‘The revelation of the Veda’.
9 O. Lacombe, L'Absolu selon le Védānta, Paris 1937,
218-224; ‘Raison et révélation’.
10 2.1.11.
11 See below II. 12.
J.F. Staal, Advaita and Neoplatonism
32
sphere of śabda. Śaṇkara says: ‘It is impossible to
reach suprasensible objects
without the śāstras’.12 Some portions of the text
analysed by Lacombe and referred
to above run as follows: ‘In matters to be known from
Scripture mere reasoning is
not to be relied on for the following reason also. As
the thoughts of men are altogether
unfettered, reasoning which disregards the holy texts
and rests on individual opinion
only has no proper foundation. We see how
arguments, which some clever men
had excogitated with great pains, are shown, by
people still more ingenious, to be
fallacious, and how the arguments of the latter again
are refuted in their turn by
other men; so that, on account of the diversity of
men's opinions, it is impossible to
accept mere reasoning as having a sure foundation.
Nor can we get over this difficulty
by accepting as well-founded the reasoning of some
person of recognised mental
eminence, may he now be Kapila or anybody else;
since we observe that even men
of the most undoubted mental eminence, such as
Kapila, Kaṇāda, and other founders
of philosophical schools, have contradicted one
another...13 It is clear that in the
case of a perfect knowledge (samyagjñāna) a mutual
conflict of men's opinions is
impossible. But that cognitions founded on reasoning
do conflict is generally known;
for we continually observe that what one logician
endeavours to establish as perfect
knowledge is demolished by another, who, in his
turn, is treated alike by a third.
How, therefore, can knowledge, which is founded on
reasoning, and whose object
is not something permanently uniform, be perfect
knowledge?... The Veda, which
is eternal and the source of knowledge, may be
allowed to have for its object firmly
established things, and hence the perfection of that
knowledge which is founded on
the Veda cannot be denied by any of the logicians of
the past, present or future...
Our final position therefore is, that on the ground of
scripture and of reasoning
subordinate to scripture14 the intelligent Brahman is
to be considered the cause and
substance of the world.’15
12 BSB. 2.1.1 referred to by Lacombe, o.c. 223, n. 5.
13 This may have been taken from Bhartṛhari: See
J.F. Staal in: Philosophy East and West, 10
(1960), 53-7.
14 Āgamavaśenāgamānusāritarkavaśenāca.
15 BSB. 2.1.11 transl. Thibaut, Oxford, 1890, Cf. also
the often quoted passage: ‘Even a hundred
śrutis, declaring fire to be cold and without light,
cannot prove authoritative’: Gītābhāṣya 18.66
ap. T.M.P. Mahadevan, Gauḍapāda: A Study in Early
Advaita, Madras 1954, 80, n. 5 and
S.K. Belvalkar, Basu Mallik Lectures on Vedanta
Philosophy I, Poona 1929, 17, note.
J.F. Staal, Advaita and Neoplatonism
33
Thus the relation between the two pramāṇas, śabda
and pratyakṣa is as follows:
pratyakṣa informs us about the sensible realm, śabda
(and only śabda) about the
suprasensible. For instance: ‘The Lord, about whom
ordinary experience tells us
nothing, is to be considered as the special topic of all
scriptural passages’, whereas
it is on the other hand said with reference to the jīva:
‘It is not the primary purport of
scripture to make statements regarding the
individual soul’.16
The metaphysical ground for the belief in authority
and for traditionalism is the
conviction that time passes from higher to lower,
that the ideal was in the beginning
and that development is degeneration. Then it
becomes desirable to attempt to
restore the original situation, to try to live up to it
and hence to accept its scriptures
as infallible authority. This conviction exists in the
idea of the four yugas, the purest,
Satya yuga, in the beginning, the basest, Kali yuga,
at the end. Combined with the
idea of perpetual saṁsāra17 the belief of ever
recurrent world cycles (manvantaras)
arises, as it is found in the Purāṇas and existed for
Śaṅkara. In the Vedas, the belief
in a gradual deterioration of time does not occur and
neither does a looking up at
an ideal original situation, nor traditionalism and
belief in authority prevail. Later, the
belief in evolution came to be expressed in the idea
of sarvamukti.18
Notwithstanding the relative stress on śabda in a
discussion of the value of the
pramāṇas, it cannot be said that Advaita is ultimately
based upon śruti in the same
way as Mīmāṁsā. For ultimately the śabdapramāṇa is
unreal, as we will see below.
Ultimately for Advaita one's own plenary experience
anubhava counts and produces
the conviction that the Advaitic doctrines are true.19
This had already been the thesis
of Gauḍapāda,20 who also stressed
16 1.3.7. Thibaut's translation (‘It is nowhere the
purpose of scripture to make statements regarding
the individual soul’) is not justifiable on the basis of
the succinct expression of the text:
tasyāvivakṣitatvāt.
17 See below II, 3.
18 See below II, 14.
19 See below II, 7: 88-9.
20 See Mahadevan, Gauḍapāda. Chap. III. 77-88.
J.F. Staal, Advaita and Neoplatonism
34
the independent value of reasoning.21 In this spirit
Ānandagiri says in his gloss on
Gauḍapāda's Kārikā with an unambiguous reference
to Mīmāṁsā, about a person
who possesses anubhava: ‘Such an enlightened
person does not become a
bondslave of the Veda. The meaning that he gives of
the Veda, that alone becomes
the meaning of the Veda’.22
1. Scripture: śruti and smṛti
A few well known facts, to be constantly referred to
below, will be mentioned here.
The term śruti (‘what is heard’), denotes the
revelation received by the seers (ṛṣis)
and handed over by them to their descendants who
did not receive any direct
revelation.23 Being itself not of human or personal
origin (apauruṣeya), it consists
of the mantras (saṃhitās), the brāhmaṇas, the
āraṇyakas and the upaniṣads. The
smṛti (‘what is remembered’), which is of human
origin but inspired by the texts of
the śruti, consists for example of the sūtras24 along
with the Darśana literature,
vedāṇgas, upavedas, dharmaśāstras, itihāsas and
purāṇas.25
The doctrine of the superhuman, impersonal origin of
the Veda (apauruṣeyatva),
stressing the principal difference between śruti and
smṛti as between direct
experience and memory, is the Mīmāṁsā doctrine and
was rejected for instance by
the Naiyāyikas who held the Veda to be the work of
Īśvara and therefore pauruṣeya.
The position of Advaita is that the Vedas are
apauruṣeya but nevertheless the work
of Īśvara, who is the Absolute conditioned by māyā.26
The Naiyāyika reasoning does
not hold, as any utterance by a person need not be
paurunṣeya: the guru for instance
utters knowledge which is apauruṣeya, as there is
21 See above p. 32, n. 15.
22 II. 30 ap. Mahadevan, Gauḍapāda, 88.
23 See Nirukta 1.20, where it is stated that ‘duty
(dharma) revealed itself to the ṛṣis, who handed
it down by oral instruction to their descendants, to
whom dharma did not manifest itself’, (V.S.
Ghate, Lectures on the Ṛgveda, Poona, 23).
24 Wrongly classified under śruti by J. Masui and R.
Daumal in their ‘Survey of the development
of the Hindu tradition’. (Approches de l'Inde, Paris
1949, 28-29).
25 Cf. T.M.P. Mahadevan, Outlines of Hinduism,
Bombay 1956, 31 sq.
26 See below II, 14.
J.F. Staal, Advaita and Neoplatonism
35
‘contingence of personal origin through the
succession of teachers’.27 Accordingly,
apauruṣeyatva ‘consists in the fact that the Vedas in
this creation are exactly like
those in the previous creation and so on without
beginning’.28 According to the
Vedāntaparibhāṣā: ‘in the initial period of creation
Parameśvara created the Veda
with the same sequence as the sequence of the Veda
existent in earlier creation,
but not a Veda of a kind different from that....’.29
It seems that the Vedāntic view concerning the
superhuman character of the Veda
finds more support in the text of the Ṛgveda itself
than the Nyāya view. There are
references to knowledge supernaturally
communicated or favours divinely conferred
on Vaśiṣṭa and on Viśvāmitra. Sometimes the divine
speech (vāk) is described as
having entered into the ṛṣis, whereas a miraculous
power is attributed to their prayers.
Ghate who gathered these references concludes
therefore that ‘it is quite clear that
some of the ancient ṛṣis entertained a belief, though,
no doubt, indistinct and
hesitating, in their own inspiration.’30 Thus, the
words of the Veda were ‘expired’ by
Brahman and immediately observed (‘heard’ - cf.
śruti: ‘seen’ - cf. ṛṣi) by the ‘inspired’
sages.31
This impersonal and superhuman ‘sacred knowledge’
(veda) consists in the saṁhitā
portions mainly of hymns, prayers and ritual
formulas. The object to be secured is
not mokṣa (release, as in the Vedāntic systems) or
even svarga (heaven, as in the
Pūrva Mīmāṁsā), but ‘a long life for full hundred
years, prosperity, warlike offspring,
in short, all pleasures of this earth. Conquest of
enemies, freedom from diseases,
abundance of food and drink seem to be the happiest
ideal which the Vedic ṛṣis
placed before themselves’.32 When sacrifice is
introduced how-
27 Vedāntaparibhāṣā 4.54.
28 Ghate, o.c. 114.
29 Vedāntaparibhāṣā 4.55. Cf. J.F. Staal, Nambudiri
Veda Recitation, 's-Gravenhage 1961, 11.
30 Ghate, o.c. 116. Cf. also L. Renou in: Etudes
Védiques et Pāṇinéennes I, Paris 1955, 1-27.
31 L. Renou-J. Filliozat, L'Inde classique I, Paris 1947,
270.
32 Ghate, o.c. 126. - Some interpret the Veda
exclusively in a spiritual sense, e.g., Śrī Aurobindo,
who interprets, e.g. ṛta as ‘Spiritual, interior truth’;
the frequent go not as cow but in the first
place as light ray and then as a ray of knowledge;
ghṛta not as ghee, but as light and hence
as mystical light (in his Introduction to: Hymns to the
Mystic Fire, Pondicherry 1946). Cf. also
the defence of Aurobindo's view against modern
scholarship, Sāyaṇa and Mīmāṁsā by T.V.
Kapali Sastri, Lights on the Veda, Pondicherry 1946. -
For an evaluation of this view see
below p. 42, n. 54.
J.F. Staal, Advaita and Neoplatonism
36
ever, the above aim undergoes, as we will see, a
certain modification.
The Brāhmaṇas are in particular concerned with the
sacrifice or ritual act (karma)
par excellence, which we will consider below. The
Āraṇyakas form the transition to
the Upaniṣads, which represent the jñānamārga, ‘way
of knowledge’, in opposition
to the karmamārga, ‘way of action’. The respective
portions of the Vedic literature
are accordingly called karmakāṇḍa and jñānakāṇḍa.
But this Vedāntic distinction is
not accepted by Mīmāṁśā, which looks upon the Veda
as karmakāṇḍa only. The
road which (according to Advaita) having started with
the recitation of the mantras,
leads from action to knowledge, goes via meditation
(upāsanā), as could be seen
for instance from the parallelism which is sometimes
established between the four
parts of the śruti and the four stages of life (āśrama):
the student, brahmacārī has
to recite the mantras; the householder, gṛhastha, has
to perform the actions and
rites as prescribed mainly in the Brāhmaṇas; the
forest-dweller, vānaprastha, has
to perform meditations as dealt with in the forest
books, Āraṇyakas; and the
saṁnyāsin's task is to find the ultimate knowledge
(jñāna). Mīmāṁsā accordingly
rejects saṁnyāsa. But in Advaita, since knowledge is
unconnected with karma or
meditation, one can at any time go beyond the
āśramas33 and become a saṁnyāsin
who is atyāśramin. This is a typically Advaitic view,
which is for instance expressed
in the Mahābhārata in the ‘dialogue between father
and son’, where the father
represents the orthodox view, that renunciation
should come at the end of the āśrama
discipline, whereas the son wants to take up
saṁnyāsa immediately.34 Śaṅkara
himself became according to tradition a saṁnyāsin at
an early age
33 Originally (e.g. in the Chāndogya Upaniṣad) a
division into three āśramas existed, to which
later (Śvetāśvataropaniṣad) a fourth and highest
stage was added for the person who is
beyond the āśramas (atyāśramin), to be called
subsequently saṁnyāsin, ‘who has renounced’
(Maitryupaniṣad; Dharmasūtra) (Renou-Filliozat, o.c.,
379).
34 See M. Hiriyanna, Outlines of Indian Philosophy,
London 1932, 21.
J.F. Staal, Advaita and Neoplatonism
37
(as still do his successors in the four maṭhas).35 The
Nambudiri Mīmāṁsakas of his
community disapproved of this. On the other hand,
the legendary conversion of the
Mīmāṁsaka, Maṇḍana Miśra, to Advaita36 is
expressed in his taking up of saṁnyāsa
under the new name Sureśvara.
This short description shows that the Upaniṣads, the
jñānakāṇḍa, constitute the
most important source for all later philosophical
systems, which each in their own
way aim at knowledge besides the other aim,
especially stressed by some, i.e.
release (there is in Advaita a close connection
between the two). But it should not
be forgotten that this knowledge is in fact the
successor of meditation, so that the
later generations were facing two possibilities: either
to accept these results as
apauruṣeya, revelation, faithful and dogmatic, as
authority; or, to perform again the
original existential act and arrive at the same
knowledge by performing themselves
the meditation as prescribed in the text, i.e.,
meditating on the basis of the text, not
‘freely’. Thus the apauruṣeya experience of the
ancient seers is utilised, but
personally regained.
The old duality karma-jñāna corresponds among the
later darśanas (viewpoints,
rather than systems)37, to the two-fold aim: dharma
and brahma of (Pūrva) Mīmāṁsā
and Vedānta respectively. The proper denomination,
pūrva and uttara mīmāṁsā is
more instructive. Mīmāṁsā is a term derived from the
root man-, ‘to think’ (cf. manas).
This derivative has the function of desire and
intensification; mīmāṁsā could therefore
be translated as ‘attempt an intense reflection’. In
both cases this refers to meditation
which will lead to (Mūmāṁsā) or which will have to
make place for (Advaita)
knowledge. The difference is gradual: Pūrva Mīmāṁsā
means the first, the earlier,
the previous meditation (a denomination given, of
course, by the Vedāntins
expressing their advancement with regard to the
Mīmāṁsakas); Uttara Mīmāṁsā
35 See below II 13: 139. Suka was born a saṁnyāsin.
The head of the Advaitic maṭha must be
a brahmacārī even before the installation; the heads
of the Rāmānuja or Madhva maṭhas may
have been gṛhasthas and celibacy is enjoined only
after installation: Cf. V. Krishnaswami,
Swami in Kanchi, Madras 1957, 13.
36 See below II, 8 94 with n. 270.
37 See R. Guénon, Introduction générale à l'étude des
doctrines hindoues, Part III, Chap. 8: ‘Les
points de vue de la doctrine’, Paris, 1932, 213-222.
J.F. Staal, Advaita and Neoplatonism
38
means the ultimate, final meditation. When it is said
that Pūrva Mīmāṁsā deals with
the interpretation of acts and rituals as prescribed in
the Veda (especially in the
Brāhmanas) and Vedānta with pure knowledge, it
should not be forgotten that the
link between the two is the act of meditation. The
reflection on texts dealing with
sacrifice in the Pūrva Mīmāṁsā can be intensified and
become a meditation which
will ultimately be replaced by the highest knowledge.
The word dharma as occurring
in the first sūtra of Jaimini's Mīmāṁsāsūtra: ‘Then
therefore the enquiry into dharma’
(athāto dharmajijñāsā) refers to the religious duties
and acts to be performed; their
study can be looked upon as a first meditation. The
ultimate meditation, however,
will make place for the knowing of the Absolute itself,
and thus it is but natural that
Bādarāyana's Brahmasūra begins with: ‘Then
therefore the enquiry into Brahman’
(athāto brahmajijñāsā).
Terms like jñāna (also vidyā) cannot be simply
identified with Western terms like
knowledge, Erkenntnis, connaissance or even gnōsis
(though the Gnostic use of
the latter term resembles the Vedātic usage of the
Sanskrit term). They have to be
understood in their context and against the
background of the sacrifice, of which
they are, as it were, an interiorisation in a particular
way to be specified below. Thus
Sénart could translate the term vidyā and its
counterpart avidyā, as they occur in
the Chāndogyopaniṣad, by ‘magical efficiency of
knowledge and inefficiency of its
contrary’.38
We are now in a position to see: (1) that śruti and
smṛti are related to each other as
immediate experience and mediate memory; (2) that
the second depends on the
first in such a way that smṛti as ‘second-hand
(human) exposition of the (divine)
inspiration’, can become ‘memory’ through a
meditation or reflection and thus become
knowledge, i.e., first-hand knowledge, comparable to
the original immediate
experience of the sages; (3) therefore that
knowledge as used in this context is
derived from a meditation on a revealed text, in such
a way that the derived
knowledge rises to the level of the original
knowledge.39
38 Chāndogya Upaniṣad, ed. et. transl. E. Sénart,
Paris 1930, 142.
39 The relation śruti-smṛti can also be compared to
pratyaksa-anumāna: Sankara interprets the
latter terms, when occurring in a sūtra, several times
as denoting the former.
J.F. Staal, Advaita and Neoplatonism
39
We see, therefore, that where there seemed to be an
unbridgeable gap between
human and divine knowledge, a closer analysis
shows that there is in fact continuity,
the reason being that smṛti ‘memory’, becomes
knowledge, when the original
knowledge, which constituted śruti, is regained.
There are texts, where this
fundamental and cognitive aspect of ‘memory’ is
stressed; some are collected by
Coomaraswamy.40 We may quote as an example the
Chādogyopaniṣad: ‘Memory
is from the Self’ (ātmatah smaraḥ).41 There are
traces in Buddhist literature too. In
the Dīgha Nikāya it is said that the Gods fall from
heaven only when their ‘memory
fails and they are of confused memory’.42
If meditation on a revealed text leads to a knowledge
comparable to that which was
possessed by the seers of the revealed text, we find
here announced a very
interesting doctrine which combines infallible
authority with independent philosophical
reflection.
There seems to be no justification in śruti itself, which
directly enjoins that one should
attempt to regain the original knowledge. The term
vidhi43 means injunction, formula,
precept, especially (in the Brāhmanas) the injunction
for the performance of a rite,
a ritual act or sacrifice, as for instance injunctions of
the form: yajeta, ‘he ought to
sacrifice’, kuryāt, ‘he ought to perform’. This is
further developed in Mimāṁsā. While
Advaita accepts the Mīmāṁsaka interpretation of
vidhi, it lays more stress on the
jñāna aspect, as we shall see below.
2. Concepts of continuity. Karman
An analysis of the duality of śruti and smṛti leads to a
recognition of the continuity
which exists between the two. Likewise it was seen
that the ritual act can be gradually
‘interiorised’ and can lead to meditation and
subsequently to immediate knowledge.
40 A. K. Coomaraswamy, Recollection: Indian and
Platonic, Suppl. to the Journal of the American
Oriental Society 1944, 1-18. It remains questionable
whether the author is right in his
identification of smṛti with the Platonic anámnēsis. Cf.
below III, 4, 188. Memory is also required
for memorizing śruti: Cf. Staal, Nambudiri Veda
Recitation, 15, passim.
41 7, 26.1. ap. Coomaraswamy, o.c. 3.
42 I. 19-22, ap. id. 7.
43 M. Monier-Williams, A Sanskrit-English Dictionary,
Oxford 1951, s.v.
J.F. Staal, Advaita and Neoplatonism
40
Meditation on a sacred text, originally a matter of
interpretative reflection and
elucidation (in Pūrva Mīmāṁsā) develops gradually
into a meditation on the Absolute
itself and into knowledge of or identity with the
Absolute (in Uttara Mīmāṁsā). The
common factor of all these developments is the
element of continuity, a characteristic
of early Indian thought.
It is a primary tendency of man to experience himself
as an everlasting and
indestructible entity.44 The belief in immortality of
the soul, the reluctance to accept
death, the immortalization of kings (e.g., amongst
the old Egyptians), of heroes, of
sages, of saints, and later of everybody, but also the
urge of modern man to preserve
and continue his personality are some of the
manifestations of this. So are the
negative counterparts: the fear to die, to be
dissolved or destroyed. In all ancient45
civilisations this desire for continuity is projected (in
a more than psychological sense)
outside upon the external world, which is in its
entirety perceived as a continuum.
In ancient India this tendency must have been
exceptionally strong, as can be seen
from many facts. Betty Heimann, who noted this,
speaks of a certain constancy
(‘Konstanz’) and explains this in the light of the
richness of tropical vegetation.46 In
the light of the fact that the first achievements of
ancient Indians took place in the
plain of the Ganges or still further towards the North
West, where there was no
exuberance of tropical vegetation, it seems
preferable to accept this simply as a
human tendency which is general and which seems
to have especially developed
in India for reasons which are unknown to us.
Three examples of this preponderance of ideas about
continuity and preservation
may be given, which are each instructive in
themselves. They are connected with
three important terms: ṛta, annam and karman.
44 E. Neumann, Ursprungsgeschichte des
Bewusstseins, Zürich 1949, 242: ‘Grundtendenz im
Menschen, sich als ein Bleibendes und
Unzerstōrbares zu erfahren’.
45 A term to be preferred to primitive, primordial
un(der)developed, in which a certain unjustified
evaluation is implied.
46 B. Heimann, Studien zur Eigenart indischen
Denkens, Tübingen 1930, 146, sq. Cf. also F.D.K.
Bosch, De gouden kiem, Haarlem 1945. The
discontinuous in Indian thought, especially in
Buddhism, is the special subject of the work by L.
Silburn, Instant et cause, Paris 1955.
J.F. Staal, Advaita and Neoplatonism
41
The most important of the general or all-
encompassing (it may be doubted whether
it is appropriate to speak here about ‘abstract’)47
concepts of the Veda is ṛta,48 a
supra-divine force (though in particular connected
with Varuṇa) expressing a kind
of general order, cosmic, ritual as well as moral.
Ghate discriminates49 (the modern
mind must discriminate and dissolve when dealing
with the unity in meaning of such
archaic concepts) the following developments of
these three meanings: (1) ṛta
regulates the alternations of the seasons and of day
and night, in short of all the
recurrences of natural phenomena (which are, it may
be remarked, of special
importance in an agricultural society - something to
be accounted for when we arrive
at a general idea of who and what the original
‘Aryans’ were - and which are typical
for the Indian climate with its regularly recurrent
monsoons). Ṛta gives birth to the
Gods too. (2) From this(?) it comes to signify the
correctness and the regularity of
the cult or sacrifice; the ritual acts are conducted by
ṛta50. (3) It then denotes the
moral law which every righteous man must observe.
The postulate of continuity explains how such a
unifying term for order or law, a link
between a variety of phenomena, could come into
existence. A term like ṛta would
not have any definite meaning and would be merely
confusing if this belief in
continuity were not to exist in the background. This
unity of denotation exists in the
idea of order and presupposes the idea of continuity.
Secondly, the term annam clearly shows the
continuity which exists between the
material and the psychical and spiritual. This unity is
difficult for the modern mind
to understand. But after the increasing dualism of
body and soul in modern philosophy
since Descartes, which led to nothing but insoluble
problems and insurmountable
difficulties, there is again a tendency in philosophy to
accept the unity of body and
soul and the identity of the material, psychical and
spiritual.51 This is a return - in a
way which is more justified than ever (i.e., on a
phenomenological basis) -
47 Renou-Filliozat, o.c. 329.
48 Cf. the Avestan aša.
49 o.c. 144 sq.
50 See e.g., J.C. Heesterman, The Ancient Indian
Royal Consecration, 's-Gravenhage 1957.
51 See e.g. J.-P. Sartre, L'êre et le néant, Paris 1943,
368-427; ‘Le corps’ (troisi ème partie,
chapitre II).
J.F. Staal, Advaita and Neoplatonism
42
to the traditional view, itself a development of the
archaic view as it existed in ancient
India and as it is for instance manifest in the term
annam. Annam, from the root ad-,
‘to eat’, means food. Nothing is as continuous as
eating; food is continuously eaten,
digested and absorbed, throughout the life of each
individual. Moreover, the desire
for a continuation of eating is one of the most basic
desires. Before this phenomenon
had become unconscious and self-evident, it must
have been an important conscious
element, drawing the full attention of human beings.
In that period of human
development it must have been looked upon as a
ready basis for many analogies.
Under such circumstance annam could mean
‘Everything which is eaten, digested
and transformed on the fundamental basis of
transformation’.52 Subsequently it
became an equivalent of the later concept of
substance. Betty Heimann has shown
by analysing several Upaniṣadic texts,53 that the
term points at a universal belief in
transformation, a continuous transformation from
everything into everything. That
this should not be interpreted in an exclusively
spiritual way is evident. But that there
is, on the other hand, not even a preponderance of
the material aspect (both errors
result from habits of thought of the period of
philosophy from Descartes to Kant)54
can be easily seen from a text like Chāndogyopaniṣad
6.5.1: ‘When absorbed, the
food (annam) is transformed into three portions: the
most gross elements become
the excrements (purīsa) the middle become flesh
(māṁsa); the most subtle become
spirit (manas)’.
52 B. Heimann in: The Journal of Oriental Research
(Madras) 23 (1954) 8 sq.
53 CU 6. 5.1; 6, 7.1; Ait. Up. 2.1 sq.; BAU. 1.2.11 sq;
2.5.1 sq. ap. Id. 8-10.
54 Thus as well a spiritualistic as a materialistic
monism fails: Sri Aurobindo (see above p. 35,
n. 32) as well as W. Ruben, Die Philosophen der
Upanishaden, Bern, 1947, who identified
the whole realm of denotations of a trem like annam
exclusively with the material, which was
convincingly refuted by Betty Heimann, o.c. (Cf. also
L. Renou, Religions of Ancient India,
London,. 1953, 17). It is instructive to observe how as
well a convinced materialist as a great
spiritualist can err when facing archaic
undifferentiated unities of entities where we are used
to discriminate. In such cases the all too often
blamed spirit of detached scholarly research,
if undogmatic even in its method, is beneficial.
For Ruben's book, see also the review by P. Hacker,
Zeitschrift der deutschen
morgenl'dndischen Gesellschaft 100 (1950) 393-398.
J.F. Staal, Advaita and Neoplatonism
43
Since annam had a very general significance it could
become extremely important
and central, connected with the fundamental
phenomena of life and death and of
life-giving breath (prāṇa; cf. ātman - both concepts
which manifest too the
unseparatedness of material and spiritual). We read
for instance: ‘It is food that is
called exhaling and inhaling; it is food that is called
life and death. It is food that
Brahmins call growing old; it is food which is called
procreation’.55 Similarly the
ultimate concept, Brahman, is identified with food.56
Annam as food is not an image denoting phenomena
of transformation in general,
but denotes substance which is the principle of any
transformation. Analogous terms
are also utilised, for instance the term bhoktṛ,
‘enjoyer of the food’, which has become
a very important term in later philosophy, denoting
the experiencer in general. The
concept also occurs in Śaṅkara: ‘The highest self,
when reabsorbing the entire
aggregate of effects may be said to eat everything‘
(when commenting upon the
sūtra: ‘The eater (is the highest self) since what is
movable and what is immovable
is mentioned (as his food) )’.57
This symbolism of eating and food (which is not only
Indian, but occurs for instance
in the Christian eucharist)58 has reached a kind of
existence in the human mind,
though sometimes in the unconscious layer where
modern psychology discovered
it. The importance of eating and of food is manifest
from the fact that sexual
symbolism as discovered by Sigmund Freud, is
preceeded by a more fundamental
symbolism, namely that of food and of its digestion.
Also in the struggle for life the
urge for food is stronger than the urge for sexual
satisfaction. In the footsteps of
Jung, Neumann has shown that the concept of eating
can express living as well as
the general idea of possessing power. There are
numerous references to this, old
Egyptian for instance as well as Indian,59 where food
is described as the entire
content of the world and
55 Taittirīya Brāhmana II, 8.8. 3 ap. H. Oldenberg, Dis
Weltanschaung der Brahmana-Texte,
Gōttingen 1919, 42, n. 4.
56 Taittirīya Upaniṣad 2.2.1.
57 BSB. 1.2.9.
58 See Matthew 26.26; ‘And as they were eating,
Jesus took bread, and blessed it, and broke
it, and gave it to the disciples, and said: Take, eat;
this is my body’.
59 o.c. 40 sq.
J.F. Staal, Advaita and Neoplatonism
44
hunger as the negation of everything, as destruction
and death (which actually it
can be). The same ideas are traceable in
contemporary dreams. In the historical
process there is a development towards
spiritualization or interiorisation; to eat and
to digest the world becomes to conquer the world
and lastly to be beyond ‘this world’.
In case of the Gods, to eat the world comes to mean
to withdraw or to dissolve it,60
and philosophers interpret this in a purified
terminology as a ‘reabsorption of the
entire aggregate of effects’ (Śaṅkara). This occurs in
archaic world views as well
as in contemporary dream material, whereas it can
be shown to possess a special
significance for the child in an early stage of its
development. To this conceptual
realm belong breath, hunger, thirst, semen,
excrement, breasts, sweat, spitting,
teeth, etc.61
One might wonder whether any philosophical
significance can be attached to this.
The answer is in the affirmative and the significance
might be formulated as follows.
Originally in human being (and still in us, although
often as a hidden background)
a unity of different entities existed, which the
progress of consciousness (which
means repeated bifurcations through negation) split
up in parts some of which were
more highly evaluated than others. Then the tension
which is typical for
consciousness comes into being, and errors arise
when the mind starts reflecting
and identifying the original whole with one of the
parts which have come out of it.
The mind is unable to regain the fundamental unity
which is at the back of such
partition. To understand archaic concepts like ṛta and
annam we would have to
abandon the multiplicity which has arisen in the
meantime through further
developments and refinements, not by a synthesis of
the manifold, but by an
endeavour to see the continuous background of the
whole.
Perhaps the boldest generalisation of ancient India is
the idea of karma.62 This word
denoted originally the ritual act, which established
identity or continuity, or at any
rate a link between the
60 Ait. Up. 2.1; Tait. Up. 2.2; 3.2; Muṇḍ. Up. 1.1.8;
Maitrāyaṇa Up. 6.9.1; BAU. 1.1.1; 1.2.5 ap.
Neumann, o.c. 41-43.
61 See Neumann, o.c. Index s.v.
62 See Renou-Filliozat, o.c. 341-342; 555-558;
Heimann, o.c. 32-35; Oldenberg, o.c. 162; J.
Gonda Inleiding tot het Indische denken 53-60.
J.F. Staal, Advaita and Neoplatonism
45
performer of the sacrifice and his aim (see below).
Later it came, to be applied to
moral activity and to its results. It retained its
function of re-establishing a continuity,
applied in this case to human life in its duration as a
whole. Thus it filled the gap
before birth and after death, and took the shape of a
rational causal element
explaining the ancient doctrine of rebirth or saṃsāra.
Man is supposed to dissolve
at the moment of his death, but ‘his’ (and the
meaning of a possessive pronoun
becomes questionable in such cases where the
possessor has ceased to be) karman
is the indestructible substance which survives him
and causes a new birth determined
by good or bad acts of a previous existence.
This doctrine of karman offers a solution for the
discontinuous and therefore
unintelligible elements of human existence and it
explains at the same time the
existence of suffering, solving the problem of the
‘theodices’ (bound to arise, as we
will see, especially in such world views as the
Christian). The doctrine of karman
need not, as it is sometimes said (referring to its
identity with destiny as expressed
in terms like niyata, vidhi, or diṣṭa, ‘fixed, settled’,
etc.) destroy human freedom,63
because every human being, though born in a
particular situation and provided with
a determinate karmic inheritance, can in his life
freely accumulate good or bad
karman.64 Advaita develops this in its own way, as
we shall see.65
It follows from this idea of strict causality in human
life, where a kind of equivalent
to the law of preservation of energy holds (which the
Western mind does not accept
in the spiritual realm, because of the idea of
creativity) that karman is conceived as
something close to annam. On the other hand, it
preserves the idea of a universal
law in its causality, cosmic as well as individual. Here
it turns out to be the proper
heir to the ancient ṛṭa. The karman substance
belongs again to the realm where
physical and mental are not separated. Thus, karman
is assimilated to the current
of
63 As the Ājīvikas did.
64 As such its general structure is not so very
different from the structure of freedom in the
existentialism of Heidegger. Entschlossenheit
(resolution, decision, decisiveness) is stressed,
but on the basis of and in conflict with the in-die-
Welt-geworfen-sein,
‘to-be-thrown-in-the-World’.
65 See below II. 14.
J.F. Staal, Advaita and Neoplatonism
46
a river, to the shadow which follows man,66 or again
to the food, in particular specified
as its undigested portion.
The ritual background of karman is never lost in the
later developments of its
meaning; and there may be even an element of
magic or witchcraft always
distinguishable in it. A psychological or mental
tendency must have been associated
with it from the early beginning, as we can see from
the root kr- itself, which can be
applied to manas with the meaning: ‘to direct the
thoughts or the mind’ (occurring
since the Ṛgveda) and later also connected with
buddhi, etc.67
The idea of karman has remained a central idea and
dogma of Hinduism, (as S.N.
Dasgupta frankly admitted) probably mainly as the
rational expression of the notion
of saṁsāra.68 It becomes an all-powerful principle on
which also the Gods depend.
Apart from explaining social inequality and providing
a metaphysical basis and
therefore justification for the caste-system, it is a
kind of general theory of heredity,
which applies to character, intelligence, behaviour
and physique.69 Its fruitfulness in
the field of psychology was especially great:70 the
saṁskāras (a term derived from
the same root kṛ-), the impressions left in the mind
from previous experience,
particularly during a former life, are forerunners of
what modern psychology calls
determinants (determining factors) of the
unconscious. It can even be said that with
the ‘collective unconsciousnesses’ of C.G. Jung
(however questionable as yet the
status may be of this philosophically unclarified and
problematic concept) we are
no more so far removed from an interpretation of the
theories of reincarnation.
66 Notice a curious prefiguration of Schatten
(shadow), a technical term in the psychology of
C.G. Jung, denoting an important factor of personal
unconsciousness, constituting a kind of
complement to the conscious personality and
consisting of dark ‘shadows’ and ‘shades’ and
of obscure, generally unrecognised or oppressed,
tendencies. The karmic influences are in
particular those which we would nowadays call
activities of the unconscious, so that the
connection is not unexpected. Cf. also the term
saṁskāra, ‘residual impression’, which could
be compared with the mechanism of Jung's
archetypes.
67 Monier-Williams' dictionary s.v.
68 Concerning the historical problem, see below II,
3.51.
69 Renou-Filliozat, o.c. 557.
70 See above n. 66.
J.F. Staal, Advaita and Neoplatonism
47
In the doctrine of karman the tendency towards the
establishment or re-establishment
of continuity has found a rational expression,
especially on account of its causal
structure. Its rationality makes this doctrine
universally intelligible and popular even
in the West.71 But we have to investigate further into
its background. We shall find
a causality which is much more universal and tends
towards identifications of special
sets of particulars. Of this, the karmic causation
constitutes only the most intelligible
and rational portion. This will be seen in the next
sections, dealing with identifications
and with sacrifice. Sacrifice will lead to the act of
meditation.
3. Karman - Samsāra - Transmigration
We shall now consider a few problems connected
with karman and saṁsāra as
discussed mainly in Buddhism and in Advaita
Vedānta. Such considerations do not
concern us only as history, but they investigate the
background of self-evidence,
which is often the determining factor of purely
metaphysical doctrines.
The Indian doctrine of karman was accepted in
Buddhism as kammagāda72 or
kirtavāda.73 Buddhism sought to avoid two
extremes: (1) the view that ‘all that a
being suffers from or experiences is due to the sum
totals of his deeds in the past;’
(2) the view that ‘all that a being experiences in this
life is only a matter
71 Cf. C. Eliot, Hinduism and Buddhism, I. London
1954, Iv. n.3; ‘Several other Europeans of
eminence have let their mind play with the ideas of
metempsychosis, pre-existence and karma,
as for instance Giordano Bruno, Swedenborg,
Goethe, Lessing, Lavater, Harder,
Schopenhauer, Ibsen, von Helmont, Lichtenberg and
in England such different spirits as
Hume and Wordsworth. It would appear that towards
the end of the eighteenth century these
ideas were popular in some literary circles on the
continent. See Bertholet, The Transmigration
of Souls, pp. 111 ff. Recently Prof. McTaggart has
argued in favour of the doctrine with great
lucidity and persuasiveness. Huxley too did not think
it absurd... As Deussen observes, Kant's
argument of the moral law, attainable only by an
infinite process of approximation, points to
transmigration rather than immortality in the usual
sense’. As for Deussen's interpretation of
Kant, it might be suggested that there is more
connection with the Christian idea of Purgatory.
- As for the Greeks see below III, 1: 165.
72 Kamma is the Pali equivalent of the Sanskrit
karma.
73 Cf. for the following B.C. Law, Concepts of
Buddhism, Amsterdam 1937, Chapter IX.
J.F. Staal, Advaita and Neoplatonism
48
of chance.’74 It has succeeded in avoiding these by
stressing the possibility of
freedom, by making the ancient Hindu doctrine more
explicit. It is pointed out for
instance in the Mahāniddesa75 ‘that a man need not
be afraid of the vast accumulation
of karma through a long cycle of births and rebirths.
For considered from the point
of view of the mind the whole of such accumulation
may be completely undone by
a momentary action of mind. Mind is in its own place
and as such can make and
unmake all such accumulations of karma.’
Accordingly, karman becomes cetanā, ‘volition’, and
Buddhaghosa defines it as
‘volition expressed in action.’76 The result
constitutes the substance which is the
cause of another existence, but in a very general and
impersonal way. The more
individual khandhas, which originated in the past as
consequences of actions
(volitions), have ceased to be. In actual existence
other khandhas arise out of the
consequences of past deeds, but they are destroyed
too. In another existence others
will be produced from those in this existence, not a
single condition will pass on to
the next existence.77
The Buddhists do not believe in a theory of
transmigration of the individual soul: ‘It
goes without saying,’ says Law,78 ‘that the Buddhist
thinker repudiates the action of
the passing of the ego from an embodiment to an
embodiment.’ ‘With the Buddhist,
rebirth is to be considered as kammasantati or the
continuity of an impulse.’79 This
is still more evident from a text of the Śālistamba
sūtra.80 ‘There is no element which
migrates from this world to the other; but there is
recognition (realisation) of the
fruition of karma, as there is continuity of causes and
conditions. It is not as it were
that one, dropping out from this world, is born into
another, but there is continuity
of causes and conditions.’
74 It may be remarked here, that this excludes an
‘unphilosophical’ monotheistic doctrine, i.e.,
that ‘all what a being experiences is due to the will of
God.’
75 I. 117-118 ap. Law, o.c. 56.
76 Atthasālinī 88, ap. Id. 57.
77 Viśuddhimagga II. 603 ap. id, 58.
78 Id. 45.
79 Id. 46.
80 Quoted in T.R.V. Murti, The Central Philosophy of
Buddhism, London 1956, 33.
J.F. Staal, Advaita and Neoplatonism
49
This conclusion should not be looked upon as a
philosophical addition to the Buddha's
teachings, which never deal, as some say, with
metaphysics; for the Buddha is
sometimes expressed to have ‘rigorously eschewed
all theoretical considerations
as vain.’ But this is not true.81 The same idea can be
found in less philosophical, but
perhaps more suggestive language in a parable from
the Milindapanha.82
Said the king: ‘Bhante Nagasena, does rebirth take
place without anything
transmigrating?’ - ‘Yes, your majesty, rebirth takes
place without anything
transmigrating’, - ‘How, Bhante Nagasena, does
rebirth take place without anything
transmigrating? Give an illustration’. - ‘Suppose, your
majesty, a man were to light
a light from another light; pray, would the one light
have passed over to the other
light?’ - ‘Nay, verily, Bhante’. - ‘In exactly the same
way, your majesty, does rebirth
take place without anything transmigrating.’
Thus with Buddhism we are back in the realm of the
original Vedic idea of karman
as universal causality and continuity.
What has Śaṅkara to say to this? He may be expected
to uphold the Brahmanical
ātmavāda as against the Buddhist anātmavāda. Let us
consider his view more
closely.
There are many passages in the Brahmasūtrabhāṣya
where views concerning ‘life
after death’ are put forward, which seem to leave no
doubt about the implicit
conviction of Śaṅkara that there is a continuity of the
ego after death. This seems
to be evident, for instance, from the treatment of the
Upaniṣadic pitṛyāṇa and
devayāṇa. Especially in the Chāndogya but also in the
Bṛhadāraṇyaka83 at least two
possible destinies for the individual soul after death
are mentioned. Some souls
ascend, passing through divisions of time and astral
bodies, up to Brahman and
attain release (devayāṇa, the path of the gods, or
archirmārga, the bright way);
others ascend only partially and have to return to the
earth (pitṛyāṇa, the path of the
fathers, or dhūmamārga, the dark way). Those who
follow the pitṛyāṇa do not pass
beyond the sphere of
81 Murti, o.c. 29-31 and Chapter 11.
82 From H.C. Warren, Buddhism in translations.
Cambridge Mass. 1947, 334; Cf. 234-241.
83 CU. 4.15. 5-6; 5.10. 3-7; BAU. 6.2.16.
J.F. Staal, Advaita and Neoplatonism
50
the moon (cf. candramāsaṃ jyotiḥ in the Gītā84)
which signifies according to Guénon85
that these souls remain invested with bodies and
therefore remain individual; the
others transcend the sublunary world and are beyond
all form and individuality.
The superiority of knowledge to works, which is a
characteristic doctrine of Advaita,86
is manifest in the interpretation that pitṛyāṇa is for
those who have attained right
knowledge. Śaṅkara interprets the verses of the Gītā
referring to this as follows:
‘Those who die, having been engaged in the
contemplation of Brahman, reach
Brahman by this path’ (i.e. devayāṇā);87 whereas by
the other path (pitṛyāṇa) ‘the
Yogin - the karmin who performs sacrifices (to Gods)
and other works - attains to
the lunar light, and on the exhaustion thereof,
returns again to earth.’88
In the commentary on the Brahmasūtras, however, in
4.3.7-14, Śaṅkara holds the
view that Brahman which is attained as goal of the
devayāṇā is not the highest
Brahman, or, let us say (anticipating a future
discussion of the doctrine of the ‘two’
Brahmans), is not the real Brahman. Then who is to
reach the real Brahman, and
how?
The answer cannot be provided at this level of
knowledge and thinking, which is
capable only of attaining a lower insight according to
Śaṅkara. If there is higher a
Brahman which can be attained in some way, there
must also be a higher knowledge
which refers to it. Here we see the origin of the
doctrine of parabrahman and
aparabrahman to which correspond respectively
paravidyā and aparavidyā. Deussen,
who speaks in this connection about an exoteric and
an esoteric eschatology,89
describes Śaṅkara' system as a combination of both.
But the term combina-
84 BG. 8.25.
85 R. Guénon, L'homme et son devenir selen le
Védānta, Paris 1947, Chapitre XXI.
86 See below II. 6-8.
87 Ad BG. 8.24; transl. A. Mahadeva Sastry, Madras,
1947, 235.
88 Ad BG. 8.25; transl. ibid.
89 Deussen, o.c. Chapter XXIX, Section 2 (358-359).
All the three terms, exoteric, esoteric and
eschatology, breathe too much of a Christian or at
any rate not Indian atmosphere and should
not be applied. Eschatology is characteristic of
Judaism, Christianity and Islam, where it has
a specific significance.
J.F. Staal, Advaita and Neoplatonism
51
tion is much too weak: higher knowledge transcends
lower knowledge in its entirety
and in fact does away with it. In reality Śaṅkara does
not believe in a continuity of
the ego after death, despite many texts which make
a contrary impression. Ultimately
transmigration is not real. The ultimate doctrine is
clearly stated as follows: ‘There
is in reality no transmigrating soul different from the
Lord.’90 This is nothing but the
consequence or mere re-statement of the central
Advaitic doctrine that the individual
soul is not different from the Absolute.
Concluding this short investigation, in which
anticipations of future analyses had to
occur, we may say that it is clear that in Buddhism as
well as in Advaita Vedānta
the somewhat simple or naive doctrine of the
transmigration of souls or of
reincarnation in the popular sense does not occur. In
both cases general and
impersonal forces and supraindividual causal
relations replace the view of the simple
continuity of the ego after death, and thus we return
again to the ancient doctrine
of impersonal karman.
A historical but philosophically speaking important
question is whether originally
only the impersonal karman theory occurred in India,
or whether there was also the
concept of an individual soul which is reborn after an
interval separating death and
birth. Both possibilities have found ardent and
learned advocates. In the opinion of
A.A. Macdonell and A.B. Keith91 the theory of
transmigration was only introduced
with the Upaniṣads and did not exist previously.
Against this R.D. Ranade defended
the view that the idea of transmigration could be
traced back to the Vedas. He quotes
especially a hymn of the first maṇḍala of the
Ṛgveda,92 of which the last two verses
state that ‘the immortal principle, conjoined with the
mortal one, moves backwards
and forwards by virtue of its natural power; but the
wonder of it is, the poet goes on
to say that the mortal and immortal elements keep
moving ceaselessly in opposite
directions, with the result that people are able to see
the one but unable to see the
other.’93 Ranade fol-
90 Satyam, neśvarād anyaḥ saṁsārī: BSB. 1.1.5.
91 Taittirīya Saṁhitā, Introduction clxxii: ‘absence of
metempsychosis before 600 B.C.’
92 I. 164.
93 R.D. Ranade, A Constructive Survey of
Upanishadic Philosophy, Poona 1926, 151.
J.F. Staal, Advaita and Neoplatonism
52
lows here the interpretation of Roth, Böhtlingk and
Geldner - against Oldenberg -,
i.e., that the idea of transmigration is contained in
these verses. It seems, however,
not quite necessary to draw this conclusion. It is
possible and perhaps even likely
that the lines express a more or less contrary view.
When we consider the verse
more closely, we see first expressed the conviction
that there are two principles in
men, one immortal and one mortal - the well known
theme of ‘due sunt in homine’
(‘there are two in man’), which is universally found
(cf. the celebrated Vedic hymn
of the two birds on the tree, one eating and one
watching; etc.). Next it is stressed
that it is the immortal (and not the mortal) principle
which moves, which comes thus
very near to Śaṅkara's ‘verily, there is no other
transmigrant than the Lord.’ If this
refers to transmigration at all it is incompatible with
the opinion that a mortal principle
transmigrated. After this the lines speak of
movements of both principles in opposite
directions. This may have come into being by
noticing how the tendencies in man
which aim at temporal aims contrast with those
whose aim is everlasting. Lastly it
is stressed that the mortal principle is visible while
the immortal is not; a necessary
statement, as it has to elucidate the fact that there
are two in man, whereas we see
only one.
The last passage which Ranade quotes in support of
the view that reincarnation
occurs in the Veda speaks about the ‘guardian of the
body’ ‘returning frequently
(varīvarti)’ inside the mundane regions.94 His
argument that this guardian denotes
the soul is convincing. But then it must be specified
which of the two souls is meant
here: and there can be no doubt that it is the
immortal principle. It is then likely that
we should understand that this divine principle
comes again and again into the world,
manifesting itself in us, as the immortal principle.
If our interpretations are right, there is no
reincarnation in the Vedas, whereas it is
also rejected or subordinated in different ways in
Buddhism as well as in Advaita.
The theory of karman may have originated among
the Ājīvikas.95 It seems to be
beyond doubt that it is an Upaniṣadic doctrine. The
locus classicus96 for
94 Ṛgveda I. 164.31 ap. Ranade, ibid.
95 See Renou, Religions of Ancient India, 117.
96 Ranade, o.c. 154.
J.F. Staal, Advaita and Neoplatonism
53
reincarnation is perhaps the following passage of the
Bṛhadāraṇyakopaniṣad:97
‘Being attached, he, together with the work, attains
that result to which his subtle
body or mind is attached. Exhausting the results of
whatever work he did in this life,
he returns from that world to this for (fresh) work.
Thus does the man who desires
(transmigrate)’. Even this passage has been
interpreted by Coomaraswamy98 in an
anti-reincarnationist sense; but his arguments are
not very convincing.
There is no certainty that the theory of
transmigration was ever universally accepted;
it is quite possible that it was a popular belief, from
time to time rejected by the
philosophers. This holds for Buddhism and Advaita. In
Buddhism, the ego does not
transmigrate because there is merely continuity of
karman; in Advaita neither the
ego nor transmigration is real; the notion of
transmigration disappears as soon as
the Self is realized as the sole reality.
The karmic causality, of which the theory of
transmigration is a further development,
constitutes a special case of a much more universal
trend of thought, tending, as
we said, towards identifications of special sets of
particulars.
4. Identifications. Plenitude
In a verse of the Bṛhadāraṇyakopaniṣad, preceding
the verse quoted in the previous
section,99 Brahman, the Self, is identified
consecutively ‘with the intellect, the manas
and the vital force, with the eyes and ears, with
earth, water, air and ether, with fire
and what is other than fire, with desire and the
absence of desire, with anger and
the absence of anger, with righteousness and
unrighteousness, with everything -’
in short, ‘identified with this and with that,’ i.e.,
according to Śaṅkara in the
commentary, with what is perceived and with what is
inferred.
One might suppose that such lists of identifications
are especially applied to Brahman
as it is the Absolute and the supporter of everything,
and is probably contained in
some way or
97 4.4.6.
98 A.K. Coomaraswamy, On the one and only
Transmigrant. Supplement, Journal of the American
Oriental Society 3 (1944) 19-42.
99 BAU. 4.4.5.
J.F. Staal, Advaita and Neoplatonism
54
another in everything. But this is not so. The
identifications of all kinds of entities
with each other, already beginning in the Vedas,
occur very frequently in the
Brāhmaṇas, of which they can be said to be
characteristic. Examples are abundant.
We may quote, with Oldenberg:100 ‘Viṣṇu is the
sacrifice’, ‘Prajāpati is the year’, ‘the
cow is breath’, ‘there are three kinds of water: the
frog, the water plant avakā and
the bamboo stem’, etc.
Oldenberg has shown that the significance is not
merely symbolic. Here are realities
and real identifications, as can be seen from the fact
that identities are utilised to
influence reality. When for instance a certain reality
is to be influenced, it is
considered equally effective if the same influence is
exerted on another entity, which
is considered ‘identical’ with the former. Before
attention is paid to the magical
element which is undoubtedly contained herein, texts
of the Brāhmaṇas themselves
may be considered. They offer two further
suggestions. Firstly a term is used which
characterises the relation between two identified
entities: nidāna (from the root dā-,
‘to bind’). It denotes in the Ṛgveda a band, a rope or
a halter, referring for instance
to the bondage of cows before they are released by
Indra. In the Brāhmaṇas it
comes to denote the reason and foundation of
identifications, e.g., ‘verily, the
sacrificing priest is the animal by virtue of the
nidāna’,101 etc.102 A magical rope or
band binds the two phenomena which are considered
identical.
The second suggestion consists of explanations, e.g.,
‘the animal is breath; because
as long as it breathes it is an animal’103 or ‘the ṛks
(of the Ṛgveda) are the earth,
because they are recited on the earth’;104 and
various etymological explanations
like: ‘Indra is the central breath; because the central
breath kindles the other breaths
and is accordingly called indha, “kindling”’ etc.
These explanations are valid in so far as they explain
why certain entities are
connected with others (whether they are
100 H. Oldenberg, Die Weltanschaung der Brāhmaṇa-
Texte. Gōttingen 1919, 110. For what
follows 110-123.
101 Śatapatha Brāhmaṇa III. 7.1.11 ibid., 117.
102 Id. III. [Link] ibid.
103 Id. III. 8.3.15. ibid., 118.
104 Id. IV. 6.7.1 ibid.
J.F. Staal, Advaita and Neoplatonism
55
sometimes so-called ‘secondary’ explanations does
not concern us here); but they
do not explain why this special mode or connection,
i.e., identity, is supposed to
exist; this is presupposed. Likewise, it remains
unclarified why the nidānas do not
only bind, but establish identity between two sides.
When such forms of thought are characterised as
‘magical’,105 a term is used which
denotes that at least the following two elements are
present here: the conviction
that knowledge is power; and the conviction that
power over an entity can be obtained
by gaining power over another entity which is
considered identical with the former.
When a power B is known, power over another entity
A is secured by gaining
knowledge of the effective identity of A and B: ‘the
main procedure in achieving that
knowledge’, says Gonda,106 ‘consisted in identifying
these powers, because, in their
opinion, a potency A would doubtless be known and
controlled, if only its identity
with a potency B which was already known, could be
established.’
That identifications are magically effective and not
arbitrary or a play with concepts
and words can also be seen from the fact that certain
identifications are rejected.
Oldenberg has given examples such as: ‘goats,
sheep and wild animals are not all
animals; but cattle constitutes all animals’.107 The
wrong identifications are as
dangerous as the right ones are beneficial. This is
seen especially when the ideas
of identity receive concrete shape in the central ritual
act, the sacrifice, as we shall
see below.
105 A term like magical need not be associated
exclusively with primitive and undeveloped
(nowadays also ‘underdeveloped’) stages of
humanity. It is on the contrary a permanent factor
in all ancient civilisations and in civilisations like the
Indian, which are highly developed. It is
for instance an essential element, amazingly
effective too, in Gandhi's satyāgraha, ‘holding
to the truth’, as Zimmer has shown describing in
general the power of the ‘act of truth’ (H.
Zimmer, Philosophies of India, London 1952, 160-
172). - For magical elements in other aspects
of Indian culture see for instance: J. Gonda, Zur Frage
nach dem Ursprung und Wesen des
Indischen Dramas, Acta Orientalia 19 (1943) 329-
453; W. Ruben, Schamanismus im alten
Indien, Acta Orientalia 18 (1940); J.F. Staal, Sanskrit
and Sanskritization.
106 J. Gonda, Notes on Brahman, Utrecht 1950, 9; Cf.
id., Inleiding tot het Indische denken,
Antwerpen-Nijmegen 1948, ch. II.
107 Śatapatha Brāhmaṇa XIII 3.2.3 ap. Oldenberg,
o.c. 119.
J.F. Staal, Advaita and Neoplatonism
56
Prāyaścitta, ‘atonement, expiation’108 became
necessary in connection with wrong
identifications, i.e., errors in performance of the
ritual. Whether the ritual act is
disturbed by an error made by the priest (wrong
recitation of a mantra, reversed
order of certain actions, effects of forgetfulness,
changes, etc.) or by factors which
lie outside him (extinction of the fire, breaking of a
ritual object, theft of the soma,
appearance of a raven on the sacred beverage, etc.)
- the result of the sacrifice is
annihilated and dangerous consequences may
result.109 In such cases prāyaścitta
has to take place, consisting in general in a sacrifice
addressed to Varuṇa.
From this magical efficiency of the right identification
and the calamity resulting from
wrong identification, or from the corresponding
effects of rightly and wrongly
performed ritual acts, it is but a step to the ideas
expressed in the terms vidyā and
avidyā, translated by Sénart as ‘magical efficiency of
knowledge and inefficiency of
its contrary.’110 This translation is justified from the
beginning of the Chāndogya,
which deals with the sacred syllable Om.111 First
certain identifications are given:
‘Ṛk is speech; Sāma is life; the udgītha is the syllable
Om...’. Then it is stated that
knowledge of those identities is magically effective:
‘He verily becomes the gratifier
of desires, who, knowing (vidvān) this, realises that
the syllable Om is the udgītha...
From this syllable the threefold knowledge (trayī
vidyā, i.e., the three Vedas) comes
forth: Om precedes the incantations (of the
Yajurveda). Om precedes the recitations
(of the Ṛgveda). Om precedes the chants (of the
Sāmaveda)... Through this syllable
sacrifices are performed by those who know this and
by those who do not. Knowledge
(vidyā) and ignorance (avidyā), how-
108 See Renou-Filliozat, o.c. 360-361. The term
occurs since the Atharvaveda.
109 S.N. Dasgupta, A History of Indian Philosophy I,
Cambridge 1922, 21, gives a good example:
‘... when Tvastr performed a sacrifice for the
production of a demon who would be able to kill
his enemy Indra, owing to the mistaken account of a
single word the object was reversed and
the demon produced was killed by Indra’. Cf.
Śatapathabrāhmaṇa I 6.3.10. Con scious use
is made of the effects of a wrongly performed
sacrifice, in order to injure the lover of one's
wife, in BAU 4.4. 12 (see B. Heimann, o.c. 155).
110 See above p. 38, n. 38.
111 CU. 1.1.5; 7-10.
J.F. Staal, Advaita and Neoplatonism
57
ever, are different. Only what is performed with
knowledge (vidyā), with faith
(śraddhā), with upaniṣad112 is effective
(vīryavattaraz)’.
Thus knowledge of identifications gives power, and
this power is gained primarily
by the central act which effectuates and realises
identifications: the sacrifice. It can
be approximately seen what the universe (in which
man is supposed to be included)
must have been, at least in one of its aspects, for the
human beings who expressed
themselves in the BrāhmaǤas and the Upaniṣads: an
originally unknown and
uncontrolled whole, unified through recurrent
identifications which increase man's
power over it and which make man realize the whole
to be a whole of interdependent
entities where ‘everything is in everything’113 (the
inter-connections between inside
and outside are still so close and numerous that it is
impossible to discriminate here
between realism and idealism). This remains the
background of Advaita: its influence
can be perceived throughout the system. It can be
symbolically expressed in the
central idea of pūrṇam, plenum, plenitude, fullness,
which occurs in a famous
Brāhmaṇa of the Bṛhadāraṇyankopaniṣad, known as
the peace chant:114
‘That is plenitude, this is plenitude,
Plenitude proceeds from plenitude
Taking plenitude from plenitude,
It remains as plenitude’.
Its survival in Advaita can be seen from the
identification of pūrṇan with release
itself, for instance by Sureśvara.115 Śaākara
interprets in his commentary116 ‘that’
(adaḥ) as Brahman and ‘this’ (idam) as the universe.
PūrǤam, he says, is infinite
and all-pervading. This differentiated Brahman (the
universe) pro-
112 Which probably means here ‘truth’; cf. Sénart ad
hoc.
113 The expression is from J.C. Heesterman.
114 BAU. 5.1.1.
115 Saṁbandha Vārtika 268-269 a: ‘wholeness is
release (pūrṅam niḥśsreyasam). Hence the
non-wholesomeness (apūrṇam) which is on account
of nescience appears but illusory.
Therefore, when nescience is destroyed through the
knowledge of the real self, wholeness
alone remains’. I am thankful to Dr. T.M.P.
Mahadevan, who has given me free access to his
translation of the Saṁbandha Vārtika.
116 Transl. Swami Madhavananda, Almora 1950, 801
sq.
J.F. Staal, Advaita and Neoplatonism
58
ceeds from the infinite supreme Brahman as the
effect proceeds from its cause. But
‘although it emanates as an effect, it does not give
up its nature, infinitude, the state
of the supreme Self; it emanates as infinite’. If our
ignorance is removed, the original
identity between the two, which has in reality never
disappeared, is realized and ‘it
remains as the unconditioned infinite Brahman
alone’. The Ācārya quotes other
scriptural passages which have the same meaning,
e.g., ‘This was indeed Brahman
in the begining. It knew only itself. Therefore it
became all (sarvam)’.117 Elsewhere
he quotes a passage which is a typical example of
the magical concept of the
universe: ‘Whatever is here is there and whatever is
there is here’.118
Sarvam has almost always to be understood in this
sense, which refers to certain
magical connections and relations which keep the
whole together and unify the All.
In this manner the significance of the epithet ananta
‘infinite, endless’ must be
understood. It occurs at an important and central
place in the Taittirīya as a proper
definition (svarūpalakṣaṇa)119 of Brahman:
‘Brahman is reality, knowledge, infinity’120
and in his commentary upon this passage Śaṇkara
calls the infinitude a characteristic
mark of Brahman.121
The same remark occurs in the commentary on the
Brahmasūtras, when Śaṅkara
interprets ether (ākāśa) in the sütra: ‘the ether on
account of characteristic marks’122
- as meaning Brahman. One of the arguments for this
equation is based upon two
identifications, where both entities have the infinite
as their common characteristic.
One infinite is identified with the udgītha,
117 BAU. 1.4.10.
118 KaǦha Up. 4.10: Yadeveha tadamutra yadamutra
tadanviha. Such a principle can be called
the foundation of the entire Tantra, a doctrinal
development (or a Veda, namely, the fifth) of
undoubtedly magical character. Cf. Viśvasāratantra:
yad ihāsti tad anyatra. yan nehāsti na
tat kvacit. ‘What is here is elsewhere; what is not
here is nowhere’ (c.f. P.H. Pott, Yoga en
yantra, Leiden 1946, 31, 126, 153, 159), where
magical significance is given to these well
known lines of the Mahābhārata, where they denote
the ‘wholeness’ of itihāsa itself.
119 See e.g. Mahadevan, The Philosophy of Advaita,
London 1938, 104.
120 Tait. Up. 2.1: satyaǤ j÷ānam anantam brahma.
121 taccānantyam brahmaliṅgam.
122 ākāśtallingāt BS. 1.1.22.
J.F. Staal, Advaita and Neoplatonism
59
of which the Chāndogya says: ‘the udgītha is superior
to everything; it is infinite
(ananta)’123 after which the bhāṣyakāra remarks:
‘Now this endlessness (infinity) is
a characteristic mark of Brahman.’124
The idea of ananta preserves a universe filled with
magical connections and
identifications. This aspect is in all probability much
more fundamental and certainly
more difficult to understand for the ‘modern mind’,
than the purely quantitative aspect
which is also present.125 The quantitative element is
traceable in other terms denoting
the same infinitude, as for instance (apart from the
above mentioned pūrṇam and
sarvam) bhūman, ‘greatness, abundance’,126 or
bṛhat ‘the great’, signifying in the
programmatic title of the Bṛhadāraṇyaka according to
Śaṅkara not only that this is
the greatest of the Upaniṣads, but also that it is ‘the
greatest in respect of its
substance and theme’,127 as it deals with the great,
bṛhat i.e., Brahman, the Absolute.
Apart from this, the quantitative aspect is also
expressed by ŚaǤkara in his
commentary upon the definition of the Taittirīya,
where he says that Brahman is
omnipresent, i.e., infinite in space, eternal, i.e.,
infinite in time and a universal
substance, i.e., infinite in substance.128 That is,
Brahman is actually infinite.
This actuality of infinity in Brahman is the basis of
perhaps the most important, and
certainly the most striking, of the doctrines of
Advaita: i.e., that the Absolute is not
only a reality, but the only reality. For in Śaṇkara's
interpretation outside actual
infinitude nothing can exist. From the thesis that only
Brahnan is real the whole
system of Advaita can be derived. It is presupposed
in all the other Advaitic doctrines.
The quantitative aspect of infinity remains
secondary: magical identifications remain
in the background of the ‘plenum’, as we
123 CU. 1.9.2.
124 BSB. 1.1.22.
125 Cf. also Lacombe, o.c. 213-214.
126 e.g. in CU. 7.23 sq.
127 S. Kuppuswami Sastri, Introduction to Swami
Madhavananda's translation of Śaṇkara's
commentary on the BAU, vii.
128 tatra trividhaṃ hyānantyaṃ deśataḥ kālato
vastutaśceti, ap. Lacombe, o.c, 214, n. 3.
J.F. Staal, Advaita and Neoplatonism
60
shall observe repeatedly. Thus Śaṇkara comments
upon pūrṇa in the peace chant
of the BṛhadāracǤyaka as: ‘pūrṇa, not limited by
anything (infinite), i.e., all-pervading’.
This gives not only a literal interpretation (as
infinite), but also (unconvincingly
connected) a more significant dynamic
interpretation, which transcends the
quantitative denotation of infinitude and which
contains a magical element.
In general magic plays an important, though often
hidden, part in Śaṅkara's
doctrine.129 These heritages of the Brahmāṇical and
Upaniṣadic days play a smaller
part in later Advaita, where the rational approach
becomes increasingly predominant.
The magical aspect interests us here not for
historical reasons, but because its
power undoubtedly pervades much of original
Advaita. Advaita interpreted as the
rational system, which it becomes in later works
(Khaṇḍanakhaṇḍakhādya,
Vedāntaparibhāṣā etc.) could never have captured the
mind as entirely as it has
done. It could not have conquered Buddhism,
however rationalistic the Buddhistic
systems, especially Mādhyamika were at that time,
and it could not have unified
Hinduism as it did. But as we shall see, Śaṅkara's
concept of j÷āna goes beyond
magic, whereas there are reasons to accept the
tradition that Śaṅkara set limits to
some magical practices of Tantric origin.130
A seemingly lucid concept like anantatva, ‘infinity’ is
pervaded by magical elements.
The background and content of this concept is totally
different from the background
and content of the concept of infinity in the West.
The terminological parallelism,
here as often, is misleading. This may be seen from
three characteristics of the
Western concept (or concepts) of infinitude. Later the
meaning of the Neoplatonic
infinite will be considered in greater detail.
(1) In the deeper and possibly unconscious layers of
the Western mind, the infinite
is associated with the ouroborós, the infinity of the
snake which keeps its own tail
in its mouth. This is an obscure dragonish being, a
terrible and devouring mother,
dwelling in a profound and dangerous region.131 (2)
In Greece, the limited
129 Cf. especially Lacombe, o.c. 305 sq. and Index,
s.v. magic; cf. also B. Heimann, o.c. 154, n.
1.
130 See below II, 10, 110, n. 357.
131 Cf. E. Neumann, o.c. Index s.v. Ouroboros.
J.F. Staal, Advaita and Neoplatonism
61
is the clear cut and well ordered divine, whereas the
unlimited and infinite, ápeiron,
is chaotic dark matter (húlē), counterpart of the deity,
sometimes conceived as the
evil principle (kakón). In the classical age of the
Greeks the Gods are never conceived
as infinite beings. Infinity as a positive concept
appears late and becomes
preponderant only in Neoplatonism.132 (3) The
Christian God is infinite, but his infinity
does not prevent him from being arbitrary in his
choices of existence in space and
time. He creates for instance once, at a particular
time, and not in all eternity (as
some later sects interpret it). Likewise he appears
once and is not omnipresent
(despite the contrary opinion of some later
mystics).133 Infinity does not mean that
nothing exists outside God: it has on the contrary
only meaning in opposition to and
in contrast with the finitude of the created being.
A comparative study of the infinite or plenum is
bound to yield interesting and possibly
unexpected results. In connection with contemporary
European philosophy we will
have to ask what the place of freedom can be in a
universe conceived as a plenum.
Identifications constitute the background of much of
Śaṅkara's Advaita, as will be
seen below. The fundamental relation of Advaita,
however is identity, and not
identification. Adhyāsa on the other hand, perhaps
the most original of Śaṅkara's
concepts, is an identification. Lacombe has moreover
shown how identifications as
‘correspondances ontologiques’ could develop into
the theory of lakṣaṇa, ‘indirect
expression’.134
5. Sacrifice. Ontological reflections
In Vedic literature the religious act par excellence is
the sacrifice (yaj÷a, homa).135
The view that sacrifice is an act by which certain
advantages are gained, such as
prosperity, long life, health, cattle and male
offspring, is only partly true; the real
significance lies deeper. According to Hubert and
Mauss, sacrifice is a con-
132 See below III, 3 and Appendix 236-7.
133 Cf. the author's Remarks on rationality and
irrationality in East and West, Mysindia, June 19,
1955.
134 o.c. 83. Cf. R. de Smet, The Theological Method
of Śaṅkara. Revue philosophique de Louvain
52 (1954) 31-74.
135 Renou-Filliozat, o.c. 345-346.
J.F. Staal, Advaita and Neoplatonism
62
secreation which transforms not only the victim, but
also the sacrificing priest and
sometimes an external object, which is connected
with the ritual act. Thus it
transforms profane into sacred and establishes with
the victim as mediator a
communication between profane and sacred. This
communication is a transformation,
‘fulfilled not by the grace of the Gods, but as a
natural result of the sacrifice’.136 Thus
it becomes difficult to discriminate between a
sacrifice and a magical act. Accordingly,
the efficacy of the sacrifice is determined by the
correctness of the ritual mechanism,
which does not depend upon will or intention of the
sacrificing priest. Therefore, and
also because the Gods play no part in granting the
fruit of an act137 which itself
produces the effects, the sacrifice can be called an
impersonal activity or process.
The doctrine of sacrifice is the central topic of the
Brāhmaṇas, which are rightly
called ‘the true source of Indian thought’.138 The
God of sacrifice is also the creative
principle of the world, Prajāpati. He creates for
instance the sun by sacrificing.139
There is a close connection between the creative act
in the Vedic sense and the act
of sacrifice. Betty Heimann has dealt with this and
summarizes her investigations
as follows. She refers to myths of creation where the
creator is also the material
cause of the universe (e.g., the primordial puruṣa is
sacrificed and his parts become
the different realms of the world). In connection with
sacrifice she refers to the ‘do
ut des-principle’,140 which explains the significance
of the sacrifice only partly.141 She
says: 142 ‘Both the concept of creation and the
concept of sacrifice contain possibilities
of development which are unintelligible for the West.
The Indian idea of creation
starts from the unconscious and mechanical urge
towards emanation, and develops
only in the second place into the variant, in which the
material cause is replaced by
a conscious activity. The sacrifice is conceived in
India as it were as a scientific
process of transformation; (starting with the con-
136 Dasgupta, o.c. I, 21.
137 See below 65.
138 Renou-Filliozat, o.c. 293.
139 Śatapatha Brāhmaṇa II, 2.4.6 ap. Oldenberg. o.c.
173. Cf. also Ṛgveda. 10.130: Sṛṣṭiyaj÷a.
140 e.g. BAU, 6.3.1.
141 Keith shared this opinion; Cf. Renou-Filliozat, o.c.
345.
142 Heimann, o.c. 153.
J.F. Staal, Advaita and Neoplatonism
63
scious “give and take”) it comes to denote (also)
changes which are unconscious
and more or less mechanical’.
Thus eating and digesting, but also speaking are acts
interpreted as sacrifices.143
On the other hand, there are many examples which
show that entities come into
being not through creation, but through sacrifice. In
the Chāndogyopaniṣad, for
instance, it is said144 that each member of the
sequence: rain, food, sperm, embryo,
‘is born from this offering.’145 Through the sacrifice
transformation takes place, which
presupposes the existence of a factor which
transforms, a kind of substance which
can be represented by food.146 The idea of sacrifice
can also denote unconscious,
organical transformation. The sacrificial background
limits creation rigorously to that
which follows the rule of continuity, - that nothing
can come out of nothing. In this
context we have to understand numerous passages
such as the famous Chāndogya
text:147 ‘How from the non-existent could the
existent be produced?’148 which plays
a very important role in the later philosophies. The
Indian concept of creation need
not imply the idea of creation out of nothing, as it
generally does in the monotheistic
religions, Judaism, Christianity and Islam. This will be
discussed below.149 Indian
ideas of sacrifice and creation can be characterized
as continuous, objective,
scientific as it were, and entirely impersonal.
With regard to sacrifice the ways in which
transformations take place and connections
are established should be specified. In general
magical connections are established
between ritual acts and the cosmic order. These
connections are the above
mentioned nidānas. Through these connections
‘sacrifice has created the world,
and its correct order determines and maintains the
world process’.150
143 id. 157.
144 CU. 5.5.1-5.8.2.
145 tasyā āhuter saṁbhavati.
146 See above II, 2: 41-44.
147 6.2.2; Cf. BG. 2.16. See the author's Parmenides
and Indian thought, The Philosophical
Quarterly 28 (1955), 81-106: 86 sq. and below II. 12.
148 Kaṭham asataḥ saj jāyeta?
149 Especially III, 5.
150 Renou-Filliozat, o.c. 338.
J.F. Staal, Advaita and Neoplatonism
64
This last remark is important and may explain the
real significance and meaning of
the Vedic sacrifice. It is not easy to understand,
personally and existentially, the
world view and sentiment of those, for whom the
sacrifice was so central. A fuller
elucidation will require reference to contemporary
philosophy.
Our easy way of approaching ancient or distant
philosophies is to seek their answers
to our questions. Instead of following the inner
rhythm which a sensitive student
may perceive in ancient texts, we order our
questions in large frames, which seem
universally applicable. Thus it has become customary
to report about philosophies
under three headings (either preceded or not by an
epistemological introduction):
God, world and the human soul. This procedure is at
any rate preferable to the one
which is unconsciously determined by this world
view. Both are however misleading.
Concerning the epistemological point of view,
referred to above, we can be brief:
though it has become increasingly important in later
Advaita, it is strikingly out of
place in connection with original Advaita. There is
some truth in a remark of Guénon,
an often exaggerating and emotional interpreter of
Indian thought despite his
profundity, that modern man has become so much
interested in the theory of
knowledge itself has receded into the background.
We fail accordingly if we try to apply the three
headings mentioned above to Vedic
views. For there is not only no God in any sense
associated with that concept in our
mind, but there is no world which surrounds us as an
independent external entity
or as an object; and there is no soul as foundation of
our consciousness or receptacle
of sense perceptions. That those concepts play no
central part in Vedic literature
means that we have to remove them from our mind.
Such concepts should not be
in the background as an established order, in which
e.g. the sacrifice can be
understood and interpreted. We should for example
not assume that there is a
human being and an outside world and that one of
the possible relations between
the two is the act of sacrifice. Both ‘human being’
and ‘world’ are ideas which arose
in a modern context. Therefore we have to see how
sacrifice existed in the beginning
and how only later ‘human beings’ and ‘world’ came
to exist. If a kind of meditative
reflection can lead us away from the modern
phenomena and lead us towards
sacrifice as a unique phenomenon, we may be in a
position to understand how only
J.F. Staal, Advaita and Neoplatonism
65
sacrifice created a world which was the predecessor
of what we now call world. We
have to imagine sacrifice as the act, physical as well
as spiritual, which organized
and ordered an entirely unknown and unintelligible
chaos into a world and made
man himself man. Sacrifice is one of the possible
steps by which man reached
consciousness of a world as the basis of a world view
and of himself as a being.
Through the sacrificial act the world and man came
into being as conscious and
intelligible beings; i.e., sacrifice provided being with
what was previously inaccessible.
This does not mean that sacrifice created man and
the world as entities in
themselves, but that it made them exist for human
consciousness (and created
human consciousness), and made them accessible or
gave them intelligibility. This
is the philosophical significance of the belief that
sacrifice created everything.
Sacrifice determined previously unknown chaos as
being for some being. The world
and man did not exist for anybody until the sacrifice
made them accessible and
‘discovered’ them.
That the Gods were unimportant when compared
with sacrifice can be seen from
the Mīmāṁsā view, a later and more formal
development in the spirit of the
Brāhmaṇas. According to the Prābhākara school, the
sacrifice ‘cannot be regarded
as laid down for the purpose of securing the favours
of the Deity.... the Deity is there
only as a hypothetical entity postulated as the
recipient of the sacrificial offering’.151
In Mīmāṁsā the Gods were simply regarded as
‘grammatical datives’.
He who creates intelligibility makes being accessible,
because that which is
intelligible, must be. The reverse does not hold
according to all philosophical
doctrines, but in the West it is generally accepted,
since its scholastic formulation
in the thesis of the intelligibility of being. Among
contemporary philosophers, being
and intelligibility seem to coincide completely for
Martin Heidegger.152 An attempt
will be made to show that the Vedic sacrifice is the
counterpart of the concept of
being as conceived by
151 Śālikanātha Miśra, Prakaranapa÷cikā, 185 sq. ap.
G.N. Jha Pūrva Mīmāṁsā in its sources,
Banaras 1942, 257.
152 M. Heidegger, Sein und Zeit; cf. A. de Waelhens,
La philosophie de Martin Heidegger, Louvain
1955, Chap. XVI, 267-274. For Plotinus, see below III.
3: 185.
J.F. Staal, Advaita and Neoplatonism
66
this important contemporary thinker, whose chief
interest is ontology.
Heidegger on methodological grounds chooses as a
starting point for his
investigations human being (Dasein). His ultimate
aim is to proceed to being itself
(Sein) and thus towards a general ontology. We do
not in the beginning know what
being is, as there is at first only the opaque, chaotic
and unintelligible structure of
the various kinds of ‘existants’ (Seiendes), of which
our own being is one. We have
to presuppose that our Seiendes, Dasein, has as a
mode of its being,
‘discovering-being’ (Entdeckendsein); because of this
it is able to discover being.
Being, on the other hand, (including Dasein itself)
must be principally open,
accessible, intelligible - nay, constitute the
intelligibility itself which our being projects
upon the ‘existants’. Neither the intelligibility of
being nor being as intelligibility, nor
the Entdeckendsein of our own being have to be
understood in an intellectual sense
only. To discover being means on the one hand to
superimpose upon the existants
intelligibility and order, on the other hand to realize
some of the possibilities of our
own being. The latter is a pro-ject and it cannot be
otherwise, as it is evident
according to Heidegger153 that our own being
cannot transcend its own possibilities,
but only realise them. Thus ‘the constitution of being
of the existants is equivalent
to the interpretation of these existants as a function
of our own possibilities of
existence’.154
Thus we find in Heidegger's work a philosophy - only
part of its foundation could be
sketched here - which reduces being and
intelligibility to our own human being and
which shows how our own being through being gives
shape to the chaos of existants,
which only then becomes accessible or becomes
‘being’. Such a philosophical view
is the basis of e.g., the psychological view according
to which consciousness
originates from the unconscious and constitutes the
outside world as outside world
as well as the inside world as inside world. The
metaphysical idea, however,
153 But it is difficult to understand the significance of
the expression; a being transcends its own
possibilities.
154 ‘On le voit: constituer l'être des existants
équivaut à interpreter ces existants en fonction des
possibilités d'existence du Dasein lui-même’: de
Waelhens, o.c. 269. Cf. above I. 3 B: 13.
J.F. Staal, Advaita and Neoplatonism
67
should not be understood as a psychologism; it is on
the other hand the ontological
foundation of any possible psychology.
The Vedic sacrifice can now be interpreted as one of
the modes of human being
which constitutes being. This ontological
interpretation enables us to see how it was
possible (ontically, as Heidegger would say) that
such importance was attached to
the ritual act. Any other approach would be bound to
judge ritualistic ideas as
exaggerations.
The transformation or consecration which is
effectuated through sacrifice, is not as
a transformation from one being into another but the
constitution of being itself.
Previously nothing existed but the undifferentiated
and chaotic, unknown and
unconscious, supposed unity of the existants. The
sacrifice brought the light of
consciousness, in accordance with the well known
psychological interpretation of
many light mythologies (C.G. Jung, E. Neumann,
etc.), as well as the light of being
in the sense alluded to above. Human being realised
in the sacrificial act one of its
possibilities and discovered therefore apart from
other being also its own being.
Because of this it must have become impressed with
its own power and strength.
Accordingly, a deeper interpretation has to be given
to other phenomena connected
with the sacrifice. It is not meaningful to hold the
view that sacrifice connects previous
known beings with each other; on the contrary, it
gives being and makes accessible
what previously was entirely hidden. This
differentiation breaks through a chaotic
unity, which is supposed to have previously existed
only at the time of the
differentiation itself. The frightening and abysmal
character, which must have been
connected with these first differentiating
discoveries,155 caused man to desire to be
connected or united with the newly discovered
reality. The nidānas and identifications
do not connect previously known beings with each
other, but discover aspects of
being and try at the same time to appease the
conflict of differentiation by positing
connections and identifications. This explains the
unifying tendency found in all
ancient and archaic civilisations. Later, human being
was able to endure the tensions
of the mind regarding unidentified and unconnected
entities.
155 Cf. Neumann, o.c. Index s.v. Grosse Mutter als
furchtbare Mutter, 520.
J.F. Staal, Advaita and Neoplatonism
68
When in the beginning, for example, the cow is
identified with breath, the ‘power’ -
interpretation fails to give any explanation: we do not
possess power over breath,
and try to obtain power over a cow, or the reverse.
Although this interpretation
remains sometimes valid, another activity of human
being is at work here: first being
is discovered, i.e., the cow is understood as being a
cow and breath as being breath;
next, the awe and perhaps fear resulting from this
discovery is somewhat tempered
by the bold identification of cow and breath. This fear
is not something ‘modern’,
but it existed wherever being came into being or
where consciousness arose, as
for instance in the Bṛhadāraṇyakopaniṣad:156 ‘The
Ātman existed alone, in the
beginning, in the form of a puruṣa. Looking round
himself, he saw nothing but himself.
Then he said: ‘I am’!.... He feared thereupon;
therefore he who is alone fears’. Only
the fact that we have gone beyond identifications
and have accepted discriminations
more fully, i.e., recognised as being the meagre
connections which exist between
breath and cow, accounts for the fact that we style
the previous mode of being of
human being ‘magical’.
It is probable that man started soon reflecting about
this discovery and creative
activity, in which being came into being. To say that
he tried to appease the
discrimination by identification is the same as saying
that he refused to accept his
activity as really creative and held on to the doctrine
that no being can originate if
not from being. The power nevertheless connected
with this activity must have been
so impressive that human being ascribed it readily to
the superhuman, rather than
bear himself this first responsibility, which must have
been experienced as a guilt157
in as far as it created the awe-inspiring but
conflicting discriminations. Thus the
Gods were created by the performance of a sacrificial
act and nothing new was
supposed to have come into being through them. The
sacrificial act led necessarily
to the existence of Gods - and this was recognised
explicitly (with more readiness
than in many modern minds): according to our texts,
the Gods have come into being
through sacrifice and they have
156 i. 4. 1-2; quoted as a motto for the chapter on
existentialism in: I.M. Bocheński, Europāische
Philosophie der Gegenwart, Bern 1947, 159.
157 In a non-religious sense; cf. for instance in
Sartre's ‘we are condemned to be free’.
J.F. Staal, Advaita and Neoplatonism
69
gained immortality through sacrifice. Rightly famous
is the Ṛgvedic verse: ‘with
sacrifice the Gods sacrificed the sacrifice. These were
the first usages’.158
Here we have almost all the themes which will
develop into Advaitic doctrines. The
magical and creative activity by which being came
into being and which caused awe
and fear becomes adhyāsa, ‘superimposition’, which
is the key-term of Śaṅkara's
explanation (which is an ‘explaining away’, as a
modern Advaitin said) of the world.
The constitution of being or the sacrifice which also
produces the Gods, results in
the idea that even Īśvara is conditioned by māyā (as
avidyā or adhyāsa). The view
that nothing can come into being through
discriminations and through human or
divine creativity, becomes the doctrine that only
Brahman exists, the rest being
illusory, whereas Īśvara is not really creative. The
appeasing of discriminations by
resorting to identifications leads to the central idea of
mokṣa, ‘release’, the highest
identity, the fullness (pūrṇam) of being, the ultimate
peace (śānti). And thus the aim
of Advaita can provisionally be described as the re-
constitution of this fullness of
being which is mokṣa. That this can be realised by
knowledge, and no longer by
karma, is Śaṅkara's thesis, which is related to the
general reaction against karma
which took place in Indian thought.
The above interpretation of the sacrifice as being
could be further corroborated by
terminological investigations. There seems to be a
close connection between sat
and ṛta, which meant originally159 the wheel,
described by the sun in its daily or
annual revolution. Subsequently it denoted the wheel
of existence (saṁsāra,
transmigration) as the norm of existence (in ṛta and
later in dharmacakra).160 If the
sacrifice is sat, it is appropriate that the ritual
exactness, with which it is performed
is called satyam, as in the Brāhmaṇas.161
One last remark, referring to Heidegger's thought,
may be made concerning the
‘world’. That sacrifice created man and his world in a
certain sense means that man,
constituted himself as a
158 Ṛgveda 1.164. 50.
159 See above II 2: 42.
160 Cf. Silburn, o.c. 14-16; 192, n. 2.
161 Cf. id. 89: ‘exactitude rituelle’.
J.F. Staal, Advaita and Neoplatonism
70
being, and therefore as Dasein, a Seiendes of which
the most central characteristic
(existential) is ‘being-in-the-world’ (in-der-Welt-sein).
The negative aspect of this
creation is accordingly expressed as ‘being immersed
in the world’ (Saṁsāra).162
6. Reaction against the sacrifice
The Vedic sacrifice was a mile-stone, symbolising and
indicating one of the
impressive achievements of human being in its
development as being and towards
being. The conviction that sacrifice was the basis of
the entire universe, including
even the Gods, shows that it was itself the basis of
the entire Vedic civilisation and
the main inspiration of the vast Vedic literature. But
as soon as the reality, which
was accessible to it, was discovered and the
sacrificial act had lost its creative
efficacy, the central place accorded to the sacrifice
led to over-emphasis and
codification, which became increasingly rigid. This
led to several new developments
which are clearly interconnected: (1) the ritual acts
were maintained, but interpreted
symbolically (as for instance in the Āraṇyakas and in
the opening sections of the
Bṛhadāraṇyaka, where the horse-sacrifice
(aśvamedha) is interpreted allegorically);163
(2) the ritual acts were ‘interiorised’164 or
spiritualised (leading to another act of equal
importance: meditation, and hence to the Advaitic
jñāna or vidyā); (3) the ritual acts
were regarded as ineffective in the purely spiritual
realm (leading to one of the main
theses of Advaita: the inferiority of karma): and (4)
the ritual acts were abolished
altogether (leading to the rejection of the authority of
the Vedas and thus to avaidika
and nāstika doctrines, of which the most important
ones are the Bauddha
doctrines.)165 Only Mīmāṁsā maintained the Vedic
tradition of sacri-
162 This connection was pointed out by Prof. J.L.
Mehta (Banaras).
163 T.M.P. Mahadevan, The Upanishads in: History of
Philosophy, Eastern and Western
(Government of India), London 1953, 57.
164 See, however, below 71 sq.
165 The close relation between these developments
shows clearly that Buddhism was but a
natural, though revolutionary, development, a
possibility of which the realisation could be
expected, and thus closely connected with the
vaidika and āstika developments in the Hindu
tradition. This view need not conflict with the view of
Murti that there are two traditions in
Indian philosophy: ātmavāda and anātmavāda, or the
substance view of reality and the modal
view of reality (following a Jaina discrimination
dravyārthika and paryāyārthika naya: see
Murti's book, quoted above 48, n. 80, especially 10
sq.). But it changes the content thereof
and makes the distinction somewhat more existential
than logical: if our view that the sacrifice
was the central act and entity is right, the idea of a
continuous, self-identical human soul is
only a consequence thereof; this is the significance of
the statement that the sacrifice when
preformed creates the being of human being (or: that
the human being becomes human being
or realises himself through the sacrificial act). If the
idea of sacrifice lies much deeper than
the idea of the soul, the abolition of the sacrifice led
first to the nairātmya doctrine and next
to the ‘Modal view of Reality’. It may be also possible
to see the modal view of reality as the
direct outcome of the above mentioned
discriminations, which come into being with the
origination of being.
J.F. Staal, Advaita and Neoplatonism
71
fice and karma, though even here further
developments took place. We have to
consider the second and third developments in
greater detail, as they lead to the
heart of Advaita.
It is sometimes suggested that a development from
the ‘outer’ to the ‘inner’ sacrifice
took place.166 This is not exactly correct, because
the discrimination between inner
and outer did not exist in the earlier portions of the
Vedas: when the inner is opposed
to the outer, a developed form of self-consciousness
has already come into being,
and the supremacy of the sacrifice means exactly
that this is not yet so and that the
dualities of the opposites (the later dvandvas) are yet
unseparated.167 In the oldest
Vedic sacrifice, the sacrificial act is a total act of what
we have afterwards
discriminatingly called body and mind. Separation of
the two constitutes degeneration:
the sacrifice became an external act, after which it
was only natural that the possibility
of an internal act, which only came then into
existence, should be realized. Thus it
is merely a convenient modern representation when
we speak about a degeneration
of the Vedic sacrifice into a purely external activity
and subsequently, as a reaction,
into interiorisation. In reality it is different: the
degeneration itself, caused by the loss
by sacrifice of its creative and discovering function
has two aspects: exteriorisation
and interiorisation. ‘Inner’ sacrifice is required
166 e.g., Ranade, o.c. 6-8.
167 Cf. Renou-Filliozat, o.c. 339: ‘on no distingue
pas...entre substance et qualité, substrat et
force, animé et inanimé’. The dvandvas are later
again felt as a burden, when the philosopher
wants to return to the original, primordial, unified,
plenary situation, comparable with the Vedic
situation (cf. the previous section). See e.g.
Vedāntasāra 1.22, where one of the preliminary
requirements for the qualified pupil, titikṣā, is defined
as ‘the ability to bear the pairs of
opposites like heat and cold’
(śītoṣṇādidvandvasahiṣṇutā) (see the translation of
Hiriyanna,
Poona 1929, and Nikhilananda, Mayavati 1949, 13
and cf. Zimmer, Philosophies of India,
55).
J.F. Staal, Advaita and Neoplatonism
72
only in the case of prevailing ‘outer’ sacrifice, which
occurs only at a later stage. It
is therefore incorrect to say that the older texts lack
the ‘inner’ and purely spiritual
sacrifice. It is an anachronistic projection to blame
the early Vedic sacrifice for
externalism. Originally, there was nothing external
and therefore no need for anything
internal.
When discrimination begins there is no conflict yet
and unity is still experienced (or
perhaps desired for as an escape from beginning
conflict). This is expressed in a
passage of a Brāhmaṇa of the Sāmaveda,168 where
the creator ‘thinks silently in his
mind: what is in his mind becomes the sāman Bṛhat.’
For thinking the root dhyā- is
used, connected with dhyāna about which we shall
speak below. Thinking is still
conceived quite materially, as is manifest from the
next sentence: ‘he speaks, his
speech gives birth to the sāman Rathaṁtara, which
is, located in him as an embryo’.
But it is important to bear in mind - though often
forgotten by scholars dealing with
ancient civilisations, as well as cultural
anthropologists - that in such cases not only
the spiritual is conceived rather materially, but the
material rather spiritually as well
- the two being in fact unseparated.
A transition to the inner sacrifice (from the earlier
situation in which the concept of
inner and outer is not yet meaningful) is constituted
by the prāṇa sacrifice. The
occasions at which this may have been utilized and
the reasons for this are dealt
with in a passage of the Taittirīya Saṁhitā. This shows
how a more spiritualized
sacrifice was called for, whenever technicalities of
the sacrifice led to a conflict of
highly formal character (announcing Pūrva Mīmāṁsā
and Dharmaśāstra) and the
living force of the ancient sacrifice seemed to have
been lost. The difficulty is
expressed as follows: ‘The theologians say: “Should
an offering, be made in the
house of one who is consecrated, or should an
offering not be made?” The man
who is consecrated is the oblation, and if he were to
sacrifice he would offer a part
of the sacrificer; if he were not to sacrifice, then he
would omit a joint of the
sacrifice’.169 Keith says. that the solution of this
paradoxical difficulty consisted in
the performance of the sacrifices concerned, i.e., the
new and
168 Pañcaviṁśa Brāhmaṇa 7.6.1 ap. Oldenberg, 91,
173.
169 Taittirīya Saṁhitā VI. 1.4.5 transl. Keith II, 490.
J.F. Staal, Advaita and Neoplatonism
73
full moon sacrifices (darśapūrṇamāsa), not in the
ordinary way, but ‘In the breath’
(prāṇa) - ‘an idea not rare.’170
A prāṇāgnihotra,171 which was also used by the
Vaiṣṇava Vaikhānasa,172 occurs in
the Chāndogyopaniṣad.173 The last portion of the
fifth prapāṭhaka of the Chāndogya
deals with the Vaiśvānara, ‘common to all men,
universal,’ an epithet of ātman and
earlier an epithet of Agni.174 Six sages (the sixth
being the famous Uddālaka Āruṇi)
expound their views to king Aśvapati Kaikeya, but he
characterizes all views as
partial views of reality; the Ātman Vaiśvānara is all
that and much more. Śaṅkara
quotes in the commentary the well known parable of
the blind men, touching different
parts of an elephant; and proceeds to give more
meanings for Vaiśvānara. The next
verse175 contains several identifications which
Śaṅkara explains in the following
terms: ‘The text proceeds to show how in the case of
the knower of the
Vaiśvānara-Self, the act of eating constitutes the
agnihotra offering.’176 Hence the
identifications: the chest of the Vaisvānara-Self is the
altar, the hairs are the grass
(which is strewn on the altar), the mouth is the
Āhāvanīya fire, etc. The agnihotra
(thus being identified with the Vaiśvānara-Self, the
performance of the agnihotra is
replaced by a meditation on these identifications and
connections. Śaṅkara expresses
this as: ‘the whole of this may be taken as an
injunction of meditation (vidhi) - the
sense being that one should meditate in this
manner.’177
170 Ibid. n. 2; ‘Cf. Aitareya Āraṇyaka III. 2.6;
Śatapatha Āraṇyaka VIII. 11’.
171 The agnihotra is the most important and one of
the most simple sacrifices, to be performed
in the morning and in the evening by every
brāhmaṇa or vaiśya householder.
172 See Renou-Filliozat, o.c. 346.
173 CU. 5.18-24 (trans. Sénart) and Śaṅkara's bhāṣya
(text: Ānandāśrama Series XIV, 309-318;
transl. G.N. Jha, Poona 1942, 283-290).
174 See Ṛgveda 3.2 (236) and 3.3 (237). The
universal character of the Ātman Vaiśvānara is
foreshadowed by the universal character of Agni
Vaiśvānara: see e.g. 3.2.10, 11: Agni places
in all beings his fiery germ (Geldner: ‘In diese Wesen
legt or seinen Keim’). The individual's
wish to participate in the splendour of the Agni
Vaiśvānara, which foreshadows the equation
of Ātman and Brahman, occurs in 3.3.10; ‘Vaiśvānara!
your properties I wish for me.....’
(Geldner: ‘Vaiśvānara! Deine Eigenschaften wünsche
ich mir’).
175 5.18.2.
176 bhojane 'gnihotraṁ sampipādayisannāha.
177 athavā vidhyarthametadvacanamevamupāsya iti.
J.F. Staal, Advaita and Neoplatonism
74
Thus a sacrificial act is replaced by an act of
meditation. Even if one objects on the
ground that this is only Śaṅkara's interpretation, and
not necessarily the meaning
of the somewhat obscure Upaniṣad (a view which
would merely change the
chronology of this philosophical development), it
must be admitted that the agnihotra
sacrifice is not performed, but replaced by other acts,
i.e., offering to the different
manifestations of prāṇa.178 In the following verses
symbolic offerings are prescribed,
taking place in the mouth of the sacrificer, which is
regarded (according to previous
identifications) as the fire Āhavanīya. These are
offerings to the different
manifestations of prāṅa, because they have to be
performed while uttering: ‘svāhā
to prāṇa’, ‘svāhā to vyāna’, etc. Every time the
magical efficacy of the symbolic
sacrifice is described in analogous terms, for instance
(in the first case) as follows:
‘Prāṇa being satisfied (tṛpyati), the Eye becomes
satisfied; the Eye being satisfied,
Heaven becomes satisfied; Heaven being satisfied
whatever is under the Heaven
and under the Sun becomes satisfied; and through
the satisfaction thereof, he himself
becomes satisfied; also with offspring, cattle, food,
brightness (boldness) and Brahmic
glory’.179
Lastly some general and very instructive reflections
follow. The agnihotra seems to
be deprecated in another verse180 where a person
who performs it without knowing
the philosophy of Vaiśvānara, is compared to
someone who commits grave mistakes
in the performance. This implies that the philosophy
of Vaiśvānara (in Śaṅkara's
words: Vaiśvānaradarśana) is evaluated more highly
than the sacrifice. Śaṅkara
himself does not go so far and understands the text
as an eulogy: ‘By deprecating
the well-known agnihotra, the text means to eulogise
the agnihotra-offering made
by one who knows the Vaiśvānara’. Knowledge,
however, increases the efficacy,
because the Upaniṣad says: ‘But if one knowing this
offers the agnihotra, his libation
falls upon all regions, all beings and all selves.’181
178 Mahadevan, o.c.
179 19.2.
180 24.1.
181 24.2:.... sarveṣu lokeṣu sarveṣu bhūteṣu sarveṣv
ātmasu.
J.F. Staal, Advaita and Neoplatonism
75
Next it is said that whoever sacrifices while knowing
the Vaiśvānara, loses all sin.
Śaṅkara stresses in the commentary the value of
knowledge of the Self for the
removal of previously gathered ‘merit and demerit’.
Ritual mistakes like offering the
remnants of one's food to a Caṇḍala are unimportant
when the Vaiśvānara is known.
This passage, referred to by Mahadevan as well as by
Ranade,182 is rightly famous.
Still it is not a completely inner sacrifice which is
found here;183 there are still many
purely ritualistic remnants. But this text constitutes a
transition to the pure act of
meditation.
Both scholars also refer to a text which is more
explicit. It occurs in the
Kauṣītaki-Brāhmaṅa Upaniṣad184 and speaks about
an inner agnihotra
(antara-agnihotra) in the following terms: ‘As long as
a man speaks, so long he
cannot breathe, then he offers the breath in speech;
as long as a man breathes, so
long he cannot speak, then he offers the speech in
the breath. These are the two
never ending immortal oblations; waking and
sleeping, he continually offers them.
All other oblations have an end and possess the
nature of works. The ancients,
knowing this true sacrifice, did not use to offer the
agnihotṛ’185 Here the sacrifice is
rejected and replaced by generally unconscious
activities which may be performed
consciously (as for instance in prāṇāyāma, in the daily
sandhyā or in elaborate
developments of the Yoga-dar-śana which have
preserved characteristics of a ritual
act).
182 Mahadevan, I.c.; Ranade o.c. 7-8.
183 It seems that Ranade sees too much of an inner
sacrifice in the text; he says: “Even so early
as at the time of the Chāndogya, the efficacy of the
‘inner sacrifice’ had come to be definitely
recognised” and continues with a translation of the
passage which is somewhat free and
modernised; ‘our real sacrifice consists in making
oblations to the prāṇa within us. One who
does not know this inner sacrifice, even if he were to
go in for a formal sacrifice, throws oblation
merely on ashes. On the other hand, he who knows
this inner sacrifice is relieved of his sins
as surely as wool is burnt in a flame of fire. Knowing
this inner sacrifice, even if a man were
to do acts of charity for a Caṇḍāla, he may verily be
regarded as having sacrificed to the
Universal soul’.
184 2.5.
185 Transl. R.R. Mitra and E.B. Cowell, Adyar, 1932,
298.
J.F. Staal, Advaita and Neoplatonism
76
More interesting than the rejection of sacrifice is its
preservation and transformation
as meditation. Here the efficacy is preserved as in
the ritual act. Before discussing
this further a passage of the Muṇḍakopaṇiṣad186
may be mentioned, where the
sacrifice is termed inefficient and useless: ‘Perishable
(and) transient are verily the
eighteen supporters187 of the sacrifice, on whom, it
is said the interior work depends.
The fools who consider this (work) as the highest
(object of man), undergo again
even decay and death.... Fancying oblations and
pious gifts (to lead to) the highest
(object of man) fools do not know anything (as the
cause of the) good. Having
enjoyed (the fruit of) their works, on the high place of
heaven, which they gained by
their act they enter again this world or one that is
lower.’188 Here the inferiority of
karma is evident; whoever depends on karma will be
reborn.189 In order to understand
this we should know what jñāna, which replaces
karma, really signifies.
Śaṅkara in the commentary on the Brahmasūtras
does not go far in denouncing
sacrifice.190 His quotations are taken from
Agnirahasyam, i.e., the tenth book of the
Śatapatha Brāhmaṇa, which speaks about: ‘fire-altars,
made of mind (manas), built
of mind (manas)’191 or: ‘built of knowledge
(vidyā)’.192 An entire sacrifice is to be
performed in the mind only: ‘With mind only
(manasaiva) they are established, with
mind only they are piled, with mind only the cups
were taken, with mind the udgātṛ
praised, with mind the hotṛ recited; whatever work is
done at the sacrifice, whatever
sacrificial work was done as consisting of mind, by
mind only, as those fire-altars
made of mind, piled by mind’.193 Śaṅkara shows that
this mental sacrifice is not part
of the sacrifice (so that mental acts could be
substituted for the actual act) but
constitutes itself a subject of meditation (vidyā): ‘For
the text expressly asserts that
“they are built of knowledge only”......’ and: ‘these
agnis are indeed knowledge-piled
only.’
186 1.2. 7-10; also referred to by Ranade and
Mahadevan, 11. o.c.
187 Namely, according to Śaṅkara, sixteen priests,
the sacrificer and his wife.
188 Transl. E. Roer, Adyar, 1931, 148-150.
189 See above, II. 3: 50.
190 BSB. 3.3.44-50.
191 Agnīnarkānmanomayānmanaścitaḥ
192 Vidyācita.
193 Ad. BS. 3.3.47 and 49.
J.F. Staal, Advaita and Neoplatonism
77
Śaṅkara then does not want to replace the actual
sacrifice by meditation, as one
could have expected. But this is characteristic. He
does not reject, but subordinates.
Similarly the Mīmāṁsā view is not rejected, but
allotted its proper place. The ritual
act may lead to svarga, heaven, the highest goal of
Mīmāṁsā and of the greater
part of Vedic literature. But the Advaitic goal, mokṣa,
which is higher in a way to be
specified below, can only be reached through jñāna.
According to Advaita, in the
empirical level of our everyday experience Mīmāṁsā,
and (according to later
Advaitins) in particular the Bhāṭṭa-school of Mīmāṁsā,
holds:194 Vyavalvāre
Bhāṭṭa-nayaḥ.195
In the same context reference is made to a mental
(mānasa) cup which is offered
also meritally: ‘all the rites connected with that cup,
viz., taking it up, putting it down
in its place, offering the liquid in it, taking up the
remaining liquid, the priests inviting
one another to drink the reminder, and the drinking,
all these rites the text declares
to be mental only, i.e., to be done in thought
only’.196 In a note Thibaut refers to other
texts where this occurs.197 Śaṅkara also refers to the
above quoted passage of the
Kauṣītakī Brāhmaṇa Upaniṣad, where reference is
made (in his words) to an
‘imaginary agnihotra consisting of speech and
breath’.198
Throughout the Upaniṣad texts are utilized as
prescripts which enjoin meditations.
But the substitution of meditation for the ritual act
must also have been influenced
by the fact that many of the sacrifices required
materials which only a wealthy person
like a king could afford. Meditation gradually takes
the place of the ritual act and
comes to share in all its particular powers. Though
the inner sacrifice tends to reject
the ordinary sacrifice, it preserves in itself all the
significant characteristics of the
latter. Meditation is magical in its efficacy199 and
constitutes one of the important
modes of being.
194 See below II. 13.
195 See Hiriyanna, Outlines of Indian Philosophy,
357, n. 4.-‘Bhaṭṭa’ refers to the school of Kumārila
Bhaṭṭa.
196 Transl. Thibaut II. 261.
197 Ibid. n. 2; ‘Cf. Tāṇḍya Brāh. IV. 9; Taitt. Saṁh.
VII.3.1.’
198 vākprāṇamayo, gnihotra.
199 See below II. 9.
J.F. Staal, Advaita and Neoplatonism
78
For these reasons the act of meditation must be
considered in greater detail: it is
the gateway to Advaita. We propose to do this in the
three following sections: in the
first section (7) more examples will be given of
meditations on sacrificial acts which
will lead to the central meditation on Brahman; it will
then be seen in which respect
meditation itself is transcended; in the second
section (8) certain conclusions
regarding sacrifice, meditation and knowledge in
Pūrva and Uttara Mīmāṁsā and
thought and action in general will be considered; and
in the third section (9) an
investigation will be made into concepts of
meditation and knowledge, occurring in
different forms in different texts, while the thesis of
their magical efficacy will be
questioned. The middle section of these three
sections (8) will also consider the
relation of Advaita in this respect to some other
systems of thought in India.
7. Meditation - pariṇāma - saguṇabrahman
Large portions of Śaṅkara's commentary on the
Brahmasūtras interpret texts dealing
with sacrifices as giving injunctions to meditate on
sacrifices or portions thereof
(e.g., the third pāda of the third adhyāya). Everyone
who reads the bhāṣya must
pay attention to these portions, including those who
are only looking for the so-called
purely philosophical portions. The latter often maker
the mistake of having a
preconceived idea of what philosophy is (an idea
which is generally formed on
modern lines, even in the case of those who try to
follow the tradition, the sanātana
dharma) -and imposing that upon the text. But the
text does not indicate which are
the so-called philosophical portions and which are
not. Thus a discrimination and
evaluation of the text is forced upon us, which is as
difficult to justify as Śaṅkara's
own evaluation of different Upaniṣadic passages, for
instance their being of different
value when dealing with saprapañca and niṣprapañca
expositions.200 Declaring some
portions, for instance, those dealing with the
interpretation of texts or with sacrifices,
less important from a ‘philosophical’ point of view,
disregards that the bhāṣya includes
those portions (though it may assign them their
proper place) and is as such different
from Western ways of thinking. Such anachronistic
attitude underrates the supreme
importance attached to śabdapramāṇa.
200 Cf. Hiriyanna, Outlines, 59 sq.
J.F. Staal, Advaita and Neoplatonism
79
The exposition attempted here does not present
Advaita as a system of philosophy
with a modern structure, resting upon an
epistemological basis, etc. This does not
mean that we criticise Śaṅkara's Advaita as being not
‘up to the standard of modern
philosophy’ - which would be a somewhat ridiculous
presumption. It means, on the
contrary, that we are able and willing to abstain not
only from modern philosophical
ideas, but also from their high evaluation. Though an
epistemological approach
would be quite in accordance with some later works
on Advaita, this approach itself
belongs to a phase of thought which seems to be
superseded in the West.201. Shortly,
to present Advaita as a modern system of thought is
not paying it a compliment, but
betrays the presence of an implicit high evaluation of
some modern systems of
thought.
It is of little value to attempt to show that Advaita is
rationalistic, when this attempt
is based upon an implicit faith in reason, as may
occur in some later philosophies
which the investigator happens to prefer. But it can
be valuable to show without any
implicit or explicit evaluation whether Advaita is
rationalistic or not, and to compare
it with other doctrines, rationalistic or not, ultimately
investigating in this way the
attitude towards rationality which is implicit in
contemporary philosophy.202
These remarks formulate only some of the principles
of scholarly research. But it is
not superfluous to formulate them when dealing with
Advaita, where so much of the
literature (implicitly or explicitly) praises or blames or
tries to establish the superiority
or inferiority of the system. Just like the sage
according to the Gītā, every philosopher
and scholar has to strive for the attainment of
sarvakarmaphalatyāga - the
abandonment of the fruit of all works.
We should attempt to find in Śaṅkara's works some
data concerning the relationship
between meditation on a sacrificial act on the one
hand and sacrifice itself on the
other hand. It is stated that meditations, such as the
Udgītha, are based upon the
sacri-
201 In different ways in the existential as well as in
the logical current which are the characteristical
achievements of contemporary philosophy.
202 See the author's Remarks on rationality and
irrationality in East and West.
J.F. Staal, Advaita and Neoplatonism
80
fices along with which they are prescribed, but are
not dependent on them and are
therefore valid separately.203 Thus meditations are
more general than sacrifices.
Accordingly, meditations are not restricted to
particular śākhās (branches, schools)
of the Veda, but belong to all śākhās: ‘the vidyās
mentioned refer to the udgītha and
so on belonging to all śākhās because the text speaks
only of the udgītha and so
on in general.‘204
Some scriptural passages with which the bhāṣyahāra
deals enjoin ritual actions and
others meditations, for instance the meditation on
Brahman. There is no conflict
when different texts prescribe different sections.
According to Śaṅkara the
karmakāṇḍa of the Veda enjoins a ‘plurality of works’
(karmabahutva). But he asks205
whether there can also be a plurality in Brahman
(brahmabahutva). In this case we
are not dealing with an injunction to perform an act,
but with an injunction to meditate
which is similar to an instruction. In the passage
concerned, Śaṅkara refers back
to his commentary on one of the beginning sūtras
(tattusamanvayāt),206 which states
that ‘the knowledge of Brahman (brahmavijñāna) is
produced by passages which
treat of Brahman as an existing accomplished thing
and thus do not aim at enjoining
anything’.207 Here what probably was originally an
injunction to meditate has become
a teaching-but a kind of teaching which seems to be
as ‘magically’ loaded as sacrifice
and meditation themselves. The sūtra referred to
might be profitably consulted before
this discussion is continued.
This sūtra: tat tu samanvayāt, ‘but that because it is
connected’ is one of the important
sources of the entire Vedānta and will occupy us
below. In the commentary Śaṅkara
discusses the question whether scriptural texts
enjoin action or simply convey
information or knowledge. The Pūrva Mīmāṁsā view,
to which he refers is clear and
seems plausible. Śabara says, commenting upon the
first sūtra of Jaimini: ‘the object
of the Vedas is evident: it is to give information with
regard to action
(karmāvabodhana)’.
203 Śaṅkara ad. 3.3.42.
204 Ad. 3.3.55.
205 Ad. 3.1.1.
206 1.1.4.
207 Transl. Thibaut II. 165.
J.F. Staal, Advaita and Neoplatonism
81
The scriptural texts prompt action (pravṛtti) or
prevent action (nivṛtti). This means
that a text is not purely informative in a general,
impersonal and as it were scholarly
way. The pūruapakṣhij, Śaṅkara combats,208 is
explicit about this: ‘If the Vedānta
texts were considered to have no reference to
injunctions of actions,209 but to contain
statements about mere (accomplished) things, just
as if one were saying. ‘the earth
comprises seven islands’,210 ‘that king is marching
on’, they would be purportless,
because then they could not possibly be connected
with something to be shunned
or endeavoured after’.211 Here all purely indicative
sentences are rejected. According
to the pūrvapakṣin, Vedānta texts are injunctions to
meditate and this is a highly
purposeful act: ‘From the devout meditation
(upāsanā) on this Brahman there results
as its fruit (phalam) final release (mokṣa) which
although not to be discerned (aḍṛṣṭa)
in the ordinary way, is discerned (ḍṛṣṭa) by means of
the śāstra’.212
Plausible as all this may seem, Śaṅkara disagrees
entirely with it (‘to all this, we,
the Vedāntins, make the following reply’). He
establishes the siddhānta view, that
brahmavijyñāna is not fruit of any action, not even of
(the act of) meditation. Texts
dealing with Brahman do not enjoin but inform and
convey knowledge.213
Regarding brahmabahutva Śaṅkara says: ‘as
Brahman is one and of uniform nature,
it certainly cannot be maintained that the Vedānta-
texts, aim at establishing a plurality
in Brahman comparable to the plurality of works’.214
‘If it should be assumed that the
different Vedānta-texts aim at teaching different
cognitions of Brahman, it would
follow that only one cognition could be the
208 The Ācāryadeśīya according to the Bhāmatī, the
vṛttikāra according to the Ratnaprabhā (L.
Renou. Prolégomènes au Vedānta, Paris 1951, 21, n.
2).
209 kartavyavidhyananupraveśē.
210 saptadvīpā, vasumatī: an example from
Patañjali's Mahābhāṣya.
211 Ad. 1.1.4, transl. Thibaut I, 25.
212 Ad. 1.1.4.
213 The old magical view, superseded by Śaṅkara, is
alive in contemporary India among those
who uphold a spirituality on the basis of purposeful
knowledge while rejecting all ‘useless’
indicative information - thus interpreting the Indian
tradition and deprecating Western
philosophy, assumed to deal only with knowledge like
‘the earth comprises seven islands’,
which does not lead to liberation.
214 Id., Transl. Thibaut II, 184.
J.F. Staal, Advaita and Neoplatonism
82
right one while all others were mistaken, and this
would lead to a general distrust
of all Vedānta’.215
At this point an important distinction is introduced.
Scripture teaches that some
meditations on Brahman have, like acts, various
results: ‘some of them have visible
results, others unseen results, and others again-as
conducive to the springing up
of perfect knowledge-have for their result release by
successive steps’.216 Therefore
it is impossible to hold the opinion that all the texts
teach only one cognition of
Brahman. This difficulty is solved by a discrimination
which is rightly famous and
characteristic of Advaita:217 that between the
saguṇabrahman and the
nirguṇabrahman (the qualified and the unqualified
Brahman).218 Śaṅkara's final view
is therefore that ‘devout meditations on the qualified
Brahman may, like acts, be
either identical or different’;219 whereas knowledge
of the nirguṇabrahman can only
be one, for the reasons stated above.
Thus we have arrived at the view, that in the
scriptures different acts are prescribed;
different meditations may be prescribed on the
saguṇabrahman; but only one
cognition exists of the nirguṇabrahman. There is a
certain progress when one
proceeds from action to meditation and from
meditation to knowledge, while
considering respectively the sacrifice, the
saguṇabrahman, and the nirguṇabrahman.
This constitutes a series of entities of increasing
value, culminating in the highest
value; and accordingly graded conceptions of the
ultimate being.
215 Ibid.
216 Id., Transl. II, 185.
217 Especially as conflicting with Viśiṣṭādvaita:
Rāmānuja combats at length the doctrine of the
‘two Brahmans’; see e.g. P.N. Srinivasachari, The
Philosophy of Viśiṣṭādvaita, Adyar 1946,
Chap. III, 61-92; or the first objection of the sixty-six
objections against Advaita of Veṅkaṭanātha
in his Śatadūṣaṇī (See Dasgupta III, 306).
218 To speak about a nirguṇa entity involves logical
difficulties, just as to speak about the ineffable
in Western philosophy. Vyāsa-tīrtha attacked Advaita
for it; if Brahman is nirguṇa, it becomes
śūnya ‘void’ (and Śaṅkara becomes a śūnyavādin: see
below II, 13: 136, n. 447.. Cf. also
Dasgupta IV, 312). But Śaṅkara had complained
already that Brahman was ‘regarded by
persons of dull intellect as śūnya’
(Chāndogyopaniṣadbhāṣya 8, Introduction; transl.
414).
219 Ad. 1.1.4, ibid,
J.F. Staal, Advaita and Neoplatonism
83
Concrete examples follow in further sūtras.220
Commenting upon ‘Bliss and other
(qualities) as belonging to the subject of the qualities
(have to be attributed to
Brahman everywhere)’221 Śaṅkara establishes the
view that qualities like ānanda,
‘bliss, delight’, and the other qualities which belong
to the subject (pradhāna) are
all to be understood in each place (sarvatra),
because the subject referred to is
Brahman and is one and non-different. These are
evidently qualities (dharmāḥ)
which do not literally qualify and have to be
‘attributed to’ (in as far as we can speak
of attribution) the nirguṇabrahman-a term which
Śaṅkara, however, does not mention
in this text because of the somewhat embarassing
connection of the unqualified
with qualities. The next sūtra, however, ‘(Such
qualities as) joy being its head and
so on have no force (for other passages); for increase
and decrease belong to
plurality (only)’222 is interpreted as referring to
qualities, in which lower and higher
degrees can be distinguished223 and which therefore
refer to the saguṇabrahman
and have no universal application. They have no
validity for other meditations on
Brahman and do not belong to the unqualified
highest Brahman (nirguṇa
parabrahman). But the following sūtra: ‘But other
(attributes are valid for all passages
relative to Brahman), the purport being the
same’224 refers again to attributes such
as bliss and so on and belong again to the
nirguṇabrahman which is one. But
Śaṅkara adds: ‘those attributes are mentioned with a
view to knowledge only, not
to meditation’.225 In the next sūtra qualities are
again supposed to refer to the
saguṇabrahman ‘for the purpose of pious meditation
(dhyāna)’.
Let us for the moment leave aside the purely
metaphysical question-a question
which has occupied religious thinkers both of the
East and of the West-of how far
we can deal with a nirguṇa entity (to which even
according to Śaṅkara himself still
the qualities such as ‘bliss and so on’ refer). We
observe that meditation (dhyāna)
may lead to saguṇabrahman but not to
nirguṇabrahman
220 3.3. 11-13, etc.
221 ānandädayaḥ pradhānasya: 3.3.11
222 priyaśirastvādyaprāptirupacayāpacayau hi bhede
[Link].
223 upacitâpacitagunatva.
224 itare tvarthasāmānyāt: 3.3.13.
225 ad hoc. transl. Thibaut II, 204.
J.F. Staal, Advaita and Neoplatonism
84
which belongs to the domain of pure knowledge.
Though the philosophical
development kas proceeded from the sacrifice to
meditation with knowledge as its
fruit, Śaṅkara's thesis is that there is a knowledge
which is independent of previous
action or meditation and which arises spontaneously
(svābhāvika). We will examine
the difference between meditation and knowledge
and their relationship.
The most important distinction is that knowledge
(jñāna) is not subordinate to action
(kratvartha), as meditation is. Mere knowledge
(kevala vidyā) effects the purpose
of man (puruṣārtha, i.e. mokṣa) and is independent
(svatantra).226 This knowledge
does not lead to mokṣa, but constitutes mokṣa itself,
mainly because it is knowledge
in which there is no difference between subject and
object, as we shall see below.
There is no establishment of a link and no
identification, and this knowledge can
therefore no longer be called magical: it is not
effective but constitutes its own
purpose. The texts ‘establish the fact that the so-
called release doffers from all the
fruits of action (karmaphalavilakṣaṇa).’227 That this
knowledge is release itself points
back to the sacrificial background; but that it springs
from itself and is not a fruit of
action or meditation shows that it is a new concept.
That mokṣa is entirely independent from action is
brought out clearly by Padmapāda
in his Pañcapādikā, in the gloss on the commentary
on the sūtra: tattusamanvayāt.228
It is summarised by Venkataramiah in his
‘conspectus’ as follows:229 ‘Any karma to
be purposeful must originate something (utpatti),
secure something (āpti), bring
about some changes (vikāra), or effect purification
(saṁskāra). Now since karma
is incapable of effecting mokṣa in any of these ways
there is no scope for it, i.e.,
there is not even the remotest connection of mokṣa
with action’.
Śaṅkara's view underscores that meditation also is an
act and therefore unfit to be
the basis of knowledge. This is stated in
226 See ad. 3.4.1, 16, etc.
227 Ad. 1.1.4, transl. I. 28.
228 Pañcapādikā, 9.10 (22-26).
229 Transl. D. Venkataramiah, Baroda 1948, 399. Cf.
Mahadevan, Philosophy of Advaita 240
(Vivaraṇaprameyasaṁgraha) and Sureśvara,
Saṁbandhavārtika, 236.
J.F. Staal, Advaita and Neoplatonism
85
several passages in the same context, for example:
‘The meditation, for instance,
on man and woman as fire, which is founded on CU
5.7.1; 8.1; .... is on account of
its being a Vedic statement merely an action and
dependent on man; that conception
of fire, on the other hand, which refers to the well
known (real) fire, is neither
dependent on Vedic statements nor on man, but only
on a real thing which is an
object of perception; it is therefore knowledge and
not an action’230 (note here the
rejection of magical identification); or: ‘The
meditations on the other hand are
themselves acts, and as such capable of a special
injunction; hence there is no
reason why a special result should not be enjoined
for those meditations which are
based on sacrificial acts’.231 The term jñāanakriyā is
used for ‘aact of meditation’
(not ‘act of knowledge’).232
The examination of the development from sacrifice to
the act of meditation and from
meditation to knowledge and in particular to that
knowledge which is no longer
dependent on it, leads to three conclusions: (I)
Actions are generally performed on
the ground of Vedic injunction, while knowledge of
Brahman is independent of
actions. The highest knowledge (paramavidyā) is
independent of the Vedic
injunctions: ‘knowledge which has the existant
Brahman as its object is not dependent
on Vedic injunction’.232a Scripture may lead to the
knowledge of Brahman, but this
knowledge does not depend on it. Thereby Advaita
does not become a doctrine
which might be called avaidika, as it accepts the
authority of the Veda and Īśvara
is the source of scripture.233 This doctrine
safeguards the purity, independence and
transcendence of the cognition of Brahman and
therefore of Brahman itself.234
(II) Whereas a causal series of karmic processes can
reach most goals, including
the felicity of heaven, svarga (the highest goal in the
Pūrva Mīmāṁsā); there is a
highest goal which is
230 Ad. 1.1.4 transl. I. 35.
231 Ad. 3.3.42, transl. II. 256.
232 Venkatararniah, o.c. 309.
232a bhūtabrahmātmaviṣayamapijñānaṁ na
codanātantram: Ad. 1.1.4., Transl. I. 35.
233 śāstrayonitvāt: 1.1.3.
234 See below, third conclusion: 87-8,
J.F. Staal, Advaita and Neoplatonism
86
entirely transcendent and which can never be the
result of activities as it is beyond
all causes and effects. This is mokṣa. Whereas all
causal activity proceeds step by
step and is a process of transformation (pariṇāma),
this highest release is a sudden
realization which manifests itself spontaneously. It
does not change our mode of
being, but it shows the existence of a more
authentic235 mode of being. Since Advaita
rejects the reality of transformation and change,
mokṣa is eternal (nitya). It is not
the result of an act or the effect of a cause which is
bound to appear at a certain
moment in time: mokṣa is absolutely real
(pāramārthika), fixed (kūṭastha),236 eternal
(nitya), omnipresent (sarvavyāpin) like the
atmosphere, free from all modifications
(sarvavikriyārahita), eternally self-sufficient
(nityatṛpta), not composed of parts
(niravayava) and of self-luminous nature (svayam-
jyotiḥsvabhāva). That bodiless
state (aśarīratva), to which merit and demerit
(dharmādharma) with their
consequences (saha kāryeṇa) and threefold time
(kālatraya) do not apply, is called
mokṣa. This definition agrees with scriptural
passages such as the following:237
‘different from merit and demerit (dharmād-
anyatraadharmād-anyatra), different
from effect and cause (kṛtakṛtāt), different from past
and future (bhūtācca
bhavyācca)’.238 Sureśvara says that action is not
eternal (anitya) but knowledge is
eternally attained (nityaprāpta).239
As the state of mokṣa is beyond all actions and their
fruit beyond all causal relation
and beyond time, nothing ‘happens’ when somebody
‘attains’ release. Hence,
‘there is none in bondage, none aspiring for wisdom,
no seeker of liberation
(mumukṣu) and none liberated (mukta)’
as Gauḍapāda has already said.240 That a like verse
occurs in
235 ‘eigentlich’.
236 Possibly of Buddhist origin (kūṭattho) and
occurring in the Bhagavad Gītā (see Renou,
Prolégomènes, 25, n. 53).
237 Kaṭha Up. 1.2.14.
238 Ad. 1.1.4, transl. Thibaut I, 28 with some
alterations in accordance with Renou, o.c. 25.
239 Saṁbandhavārtika, 369 b; cf. 300.
240 Kārikā, 2.32.
J.F. Staal, Advaita and Neoplatonism
87
Nāgārjuna241 need not imply that Gauḍapāda has
taken it from him (a historical
possibility of relative philosophical importance)242
but reminds us of a wider context:
in a less revolutionary but perhaps more subtle way
than the Buddhists, Śaṅkara
goes beyond the sacrifice without abolishing it. This
is itself a manifestion of the
predilection for the continuous as the ‘substance of
tradition’ in Hinduism. For sacrifice
is connected with the doctrines of karma, cause and
temporal action. Śaṅkara
overcomes the sacrificial mentality by means of a
knowledge which is no longer a
temporal act (as meditation is) and which transcends
the realm of karma and
causation. In this way we arrive at Brahman as the
new concept of being, realised
by mokṣa as the new intuition of being. Śaṅkara
however does not reject karma and
causality but accepts them in subordinate position.
(III) The third conclusion enables us to introduce in an
existentially and
phenomenologically justifiable way the Absolute,
Brahman. In the Veda this term
may have denoted a kind of power connected with
the sacrifice and manifesting
itself as sacred or magical word.243 Its manifestation
results from the ritual act and
appears magically loaded. As a result of the ritual
act, which creates and discovers
being, Brahman is being itself. In Śaṅkara Brahman is
likewise not an abstract
concept but the goal itself, i.e., mokṣa. The above
exposition can be called existential
and phenomenological in the sense that it starts with
the mode of our being which
is sacrifice and proceeds to the mode of our being
which is knowledge or mokṣa,
without referring to external, i.e.,
phenomenologically unaccessible entities. The text
dealing with mokṣa quoted above, proceeds as
follows: ‘It (i.e. mokṣa) is therefore
the same as Brahman,244 in the enquiry (jijñāsā) into
which we are at present
engaged’ (Cf. the first sūtra: athāto brahmajijñāsā).
Therefore Brahman is beyond
all karma,245 beyond all causality and beyond time.
This means that it is not the result
of an act, not even of the act of meditation; that it is
241 Madhyamaka, 16.5.
242 Cf. Mahadevan, Gauḍapāda.
243 See T. Gonda, Notes on Brahman, Utrecht 1950
and the literature referred to.
244 atastadbrahma.
245 Cf. Ratnaprabhā, ad hoc, quoted by Thibaut 28,
n. 2.
J.F. Staal, Advaita and Neoplatonism
88
neither an effect, nor a cause e.g. of the universe (as
we will see below);246 and that
it is the ever unchanging timeless.
Mokṣa or Brahman is nitya, ‘eternal’ and this eternity
excludes all change and
transformation (pariṇāma). It is, as Śaṅkara remarks,
not eternal in the less proper
sense in which some things are conceived as
‘eternal, although changing’
(pariṇāmānitya), for instance the guṇas in the
Sāṁkhya system.247 For the guṇas
are in a perpetual process of always uniting,
separating and uniting again, and in
this sense the Sāṁkhya professes the eternity of the
world (pariṇāmanityatva),248
as Advaita professes the perpetuity of saṁsāra. But
Brahman is in Advaita eternal
without any modifications (sarvavikriyārahita).
The doctrine that Brahman is the only reality signifies
that mokṣa is not only more
authentic than ordinary experience, but also shows
the illusoriness of ordinary
experience. It is an important but philosophically
unsoluble question, whether this
doctrine is the outcome of speculation or of the
experience (anubhava) of mokṣa
itself. Against the second view it might be objected
that such an unqualified
experience in which subject and object are one is not
likely to have the character
of a possible cause the outcome of which may be any
metaphysical doctrine.249 In
support of the view that the basis of Advaita is
speculative it can moreover be argued
that the doctrine of the sole reality of Brahman
follows from the view that the Absolute
is unqualified. For the relation of Brahman to any
other reality would affect its
nirguṇatva. The fact that we can understand Advaita
and follow the developments
of its thought and arguments may also show that its
basis is speculation.
But even if the basis is speculation it need not be
exclusively speculation. For
speculation can lead to a consistent philosophical
doctrine but cannot establish
truth. If the basis of Advaita were mere speculation
nobody could be sincerely
convinced of its truth, We may by philosophical
means arrive at the conclusion that
246 II. 14.
247 Ad. 1.1.4.
248 See e.g. Dasgupta I, 243-245.
249 See below II. 15: 159.
J.F. Staal, Advaita and Neoplatonism
89
Advaita is a consistent system without being
convinced of its being true. The
experience is decisive. As long as we do not possess
it we can neither affirm nor
deny its validity.
In accordance with this Śaṅkara generally shows in
his commentaries the consistency
of his doctrines without attempting to prove them by
referring to the experience
which tradition attributes to him. There may be one
passage in the Sūtrabhāṣya
where he refers indirectly to his own experience,
though we cannot be certain even
here. This passage, mentioned by Mahadevan,250
deals with the concept of
Jīvan-mukti and expresses with an insistence which
seems based upon personal
experience that the experience of the Jīvan-mukta
cannot be contested: ‘How can
one contest the heart-felt condition of another as
possessing Brahman-knowledge,
even though bearing a body?’251
Summarizing we can say that meditation is
considered an act like sacrifice while
knowledge is not; that acts and meditations can be
many while knowledge is one;
that acts and meditations may have several
purposes and objects, including
saguṇabrahman, while nirguṇabrahman can only be
the object of knowledge or
rather knowledge itself (because in this knowledge
subject and object are identical
and therefore identical with knowledge itself) which
is mokṣa. Such knowledge is
given in some Vedic texts, which are not injunctions
or prescriptions to act but are
of a purely indicative character. This knowledge
arises spontaneously, is not the
fruit of any action, not even of meditation, is not
effect of a cause (or cause of an
effect) and is eternal. The same applies to mokṣa and
Brahman, which are identical
with it and with each other. The reaction against
sacrifice has also entailed a certain
independence with regard to the Vedic authority,
which is accepted as such but
which is not the cause of the knowledge which is
mokṣa, the śāstra being itself
founded in Īśvara.
All these topics are closely interwoven and
interconnected and this is a sign of the
unity of thought reached and achieved in the Advaitic
doctrine on the basis of a
tradition which does not at all make such a unified
impression. It is difficult to indicate
at the
250 T.M.P. Mahadevan, Outlines of Hinduism, Bombay
1956, 143-144.
251 4.1.15.
J.F. Staal, Advaita and Neoplatonism
90
same time all meanings and to develop the ideas in
all directions. This is as we saw
in the first part252 due to the ‘circular procedure’
which is characteristic of philosophy.
Some of the topics already dealt with have therefore
to be developed somewhat
further. The next section (Section 8), will once again
deal with karma and jñāna but
in a different context; it will also touch upon an
instructive and interesting comparison
with another ‘revolt against karma’, which has a
Western counterpart. The section
following (Section 9) will study magical efficacy of
meditation and the concept of
jñāna by means of a discussion of their terminology
and occurrence in several texts.
8. Action - meditation - knowledge: Advaita
and other systems
The term karman characterises the atmosphere of
the beginning of Vedic literature.
It denotes any action which is conceived as causation
and it can be applied to
different levels, which coincided in the beginning. It
denotes everyday action
consciously applied on the basis of causal
connections which are generally observed
(or, with a philosophical critique, which manifest
themselves to the observer): every
action establishes a cause desired for the sake of an
effect. It denotes the sum total
of activities which result after death in a certain
status leading to a new life; and
lastly it denotes certain magically efficient acts, the
sacrifices, which lead to various
desirable results. In the last two cases it is not always
obvious what constitutes the
substratum of the causal connection (e.g. dharma
and adharma or puṇya and pāpa
subsisting after death). For this reason Prabhākara
and his followers in Mīmāṁsā
call the result of sacrificial acts apūrva (litt. ‘never
before’).253 This apūrva is a typically
magical concept and by rejecting it Śaṅkara shows
the magical and unintelligible
character of all activity, even there where the result
is immediately present so that
no apūrva is needed. The evidence for Advaita, the
jīvan-mukta, ‘wbo is released
while embodied’, is dṛṣṭa, ‘visible’, whereas the proof
for Mīmāṁsā, apūrva, is adṛṣṭa
‘invisible’. Sureśvara therefore says: ‘The Vedānta-
texts have seen fruit (dṛṣṭa-
252 1.4.D.
253 Hiriyanna, Outlines, 327. Cf. L. Renou in: Journal
Asiatique, 233 (1941-42), 126-7.
J.F. Staal, Advaita and Neoplatonism
91
phala), whereas svarga or the result of agnihotra is
an unseen fruit (adṛṣṭaphala)’.254
Elsewhere he calls jñāna a dṛṣṭārtha.255
The Karmakāṇḍa deals with all these aspects of
karman but the Jñānakāṇḍa
supplements it. The difference between the two
corresponds to the difference
between Brāhmaṇas and Upaniṣads, between
sacrifice or action in general and
knowledge (with meditation as a link between the
two) and between Pūrva and
Uttara Mīmāṁsās. In Pūrva Mīmāṁsā Vedic injunctions
are interpreted as referring
to action only; in Advaita knowledge is Vastu-tantra
dependent on the thing and not
on injunction. One school of Pūrva Mīmāṁsā is nearer
to Advaita: the school of
Kumārila Bhaṭṭa. Whereas the rival school of
Prabhākara holds that scriptural
statements point only at things to be accomplished
(sādhya), the school of Kumārila
Bhaṭṭa believes that scriptural statements may either
point to sādhya or else to
siddha, an existent and accomplished thing. Both
schools agree that action is the
major mode of our being referred to in the Veda and
prescribed there. Even if the
existence of passages which merely refer to existent
things (siddha) is recognized,
these are looked upon as arthavāda, ‘explanatory
passages’, i.e., passages
explaining the injunctions. In the context of any
siddha passage another passage
can be found which prescribes an action and to which
the siddha can be related. It
is obvious that this practice may become artificial
when dealing with passages like
the famous ‘tat tvam asi.’
The Advaita view is that the Vedic propositions refer
to both siddha and sādhya,
but that the siddha statements are the most
important. We saw already instances
of the fact that Śaṅkara does not reject, but
subordinates. The same occurs in this
context. Whereas the activity which is prescribed in
śruti is supposed to be able to
help us and to lead us to heaven (svarga) and
prosperity (abhyudaya),256 Śaṅkara
holds that the siddha passages are not connected
with any action but establish the
knowledge of Brahman, which is mokṣa and the
highest good (niḥśreyasa).257 Such
siddha
254 Saṁbandhavārtika, 275/6; cl 341, Transl.
Mahadevan.
255 Id. 296, with a reference to Muṇḍakopaniṣad,
2.2.8.
256 Ad. 1.1.1. The Ratnaprabhā calls this the abode
of the pitṛyāṇa (Renou, Prolégomènes, 7, n.
6). Cf. above II. 3.
257 ‘The good beyond which there is no other good’:
identical with mokṣa according to the
Ratnaprabhā (Renou. id. 8, n. 1).
J.F. Staal, Advaita and Neoplatonism
92
passages treat directly of matters of fact (bhūta-
vastu), which is especially important
in mahāvākyas like ‘tat tvam asi’. The relative validity
of the Mīmāṁsaka point of
view is expressed in the saying quoted above:
vyāvahāre Bhāṭṭa-nayaḥ, ‘in the level
of everyday experience the opinion of the Bhāṭṭa
holds’.258
It may be lastly remarked that Advaita remains close
to this Mīmāṁsaka point of
view in as far as even these purely indicative
passages are of importance only in
as far as they embody the knowledge which is
mokṣa. They are not of purely
theoretical interest, as are greater portions of
Western philosophy in certain
respects.259
It is clear that according to Śaṅkara the Pūrva and
Uttara Mīmāṁsās are not
conflicting views but merely refer to different realms.
The higher goal is that for which
the Uttara Mīmāṁsā-unstrivingly-strives. It must be
remembered however260 that
Uttara Mīmāṁsā is in certain respects a continuation
of Pūrva Mīmāṁsā. Advaita
has developed on the basis of Pūrva Mīmāṁsā and it
can be rightly said that
‘Śaṅkara's work is entirely pervaded by Mīmāṁsā’.261
Notwithstanding the explicit
differences between the two Mīmāṁsās, it is possible
to trace several common
points. This is also the view of Pūrva Mīmāṁsā
itself.262 A comparable view is
advocated by Viśiṣṭādvaita as against Advaita: ‘The
two Mīmāṁsās are really integral
parts of one systematic whole, and their object is to
lead the seeker after truth step
by step till he ascends to his home in the absolute.
Rāmānuja, following Bodhāyana,
therefore thinks that the entire Mīmāṁsā Śāstra.... has
a definite spiritual meaning
and value .... The Vedavādin who follows karma ....
realizes its perishing value and
tries to become the Brahmavādin. The transition from
karma-vicāra to Brahmavicāra
thus involves temporal sequence as well as logical
consequence’ says
Srinivasachari.263 The same opinion is defended by
the Viśiṣṭādvaitin Vātsya Varada,
about whom Dasgupta remarks: ‘Vātsya Varada holds
that the study of Vedic
injunction and the
258 For the last paragraph see Hiriyanna, Outlines,
318-319, 357-8.
259 See above II, 7, 81, n. 213.
260 See above II, 1.
261 ‘Śaṅkara est tout pénétré de Mīmāṁsā’: Renou, Id.
III,
262 See Jha, Pūrva Mīmāṁsa, 7-9.
263 Srinivasachari, The Philosophy of Viśiṣṭādvaita,
135-36.
J.F. Staal, Advaita and Neoplatonism
93
inquiry relating to Brahman form the parts of one
unified scripture, i.e. the latter
follows or is a continuation of the former; and he
mentions Bodhāyana in his
support’.264
The word atha with which the Brahmasūtra
commences (athāto brahmajijñāsā) is
not an argument in favour of the opinion that Uttara
Mīmāṁsā is merely a continuation
of Pūrva Mīmāṁsā. For the Pūrva Mīmāṁsā sūtra starts
in the same manner (athāto
dharmajijñāsā). Śaṅkara and Śabara commenting upon
the first sūtra of Jaimini and
Bādarāyaṇa respectively interpret atha in the same
manner: it denotes immediate
sequence and signifies that both jijñāsās follow
immediately upon the recitation of
the Veda (Vedādhyāyana). Śaṅkara denies that
Brahmajijñāsā can only take place
after dharmajijñāsā: ‘For a man who has read the
Vedānta portions of the Veda it
is possible to enter on the inquiry into Brahman even
before engaging in the inquiry
into dharma’. The reason is of course that no action
can give access to Brahman:
‘the knowledge of active religious duty has for its
fruit transitory felicity, and that
again depends on the performance of religious acts.
The inquiry into Brahman, on
the other hand, has for its fruit eternal bliss and does
not depend on the performance
of any acts’.265
There were also important teachers, not only
amongst the Mīmāṁsakas but also
amongst the Vedāntins, who apparently disagreed
with Śaṅkara that only jñāna
effects mokṣa. In Mīmāṁsā, through Vedāntic
influence attention was also paid to
mokṣa as a higher aim than svarga. But it was held
that the seekers for mokṣa
should not abstain from all karma but only from
kāmyaharma and pratiṣiddhakarma,
the activities leading to respectively good and bad
births. Nobody can abstain from
the performance of nityakarma; otherwise he will be
disobeying the Vedic law.266
A combination of knowledge and works,
jñānakarmasamuccaya, was not only held
by the Mīmāṁsakas (e.g. Kumārila), but also by the
Vedāntin Brahmadatta.267 It
occurs likewise in the
264 Dasgupta, III. 3.50.
265 Ad. 1.1.1. Transl. Thibaut, I, 10-11.
266 See Naiṣkarmyasiddhi, ed. G.A. Jacob, Poona
1925, Introduction (by M. Hiriyanna), xiv.
267 Id. xxii.
J.F. Staal, Advaita and Neoplatonism
94
Yoga-Vāsiṣṭha.268 It is noteworthy, that also
Maṇḍana Miśra was apparently a
samuccayavādin; but not the celebrated
Sureśvara269 (the latter two were therefore
not identical, notwithstanding tradition, unless there
was a change of opinion which
is perfectly possible),270 who was on the contrary
very clear about the difference
between karma and jñāna:271 ‘He alone is eligible to
the study of the Vedāntas, who
has renounced all actions without residue ....’.272
And elsewhere: ‘Action is required
in respect of what is to be accomplished (sādhya). In
respect of the established
(siddha) it is of no use.’273 ‘Knowledge removes
entirely all action’274 And more in
particular about rites and about the act of
meditation: ‘Rites are enjoined on the man
who is endowed with nescience’.275 According to
Sureśvara, Mīmāṁsā is wrong
when it holds that mokṣa results from the injunction
‘meditate’ (upāsīta), just as
abhyudaya results from the injunction ‘perform the
rite’ (kurvītḥ kratum).276 For ‘the
good (śreyaḥ) is one thing, the pleasing (preyaḥ)
quite another’.277 And combined:
‘Nor is knowledge of one self dependent on practice
(abhyāsa); nor is it dependent
on meditation (bhāvanā) for the sake of release’.278
The
jñānakarmasamuccaya-sādhana is also explicitly
mentioned and refuted in the
Aitareyopaniṣadbhāṣya ascribed to Śaṅkara.279
In later Advaita a difference arises concerning the
relation between karma and jñāna
between the Bhāmatī and the Vivaraṇa schools. In
the Bhāmatī karma is called a
remote auxiliary (ārādupakāraka) for the generation
of knowledge; for through its
influ-
268 See Dasgupta, II. 228.
269 See, however, Brahmasiddhi, ed. S. Kuppuswami
Sastri, Madras 1927, Introduction xlvi.
270 Id. xxiv-lvii; Naiṣkarmyasiddhi, Introduction
xxxiii. Cf. also M. Hiriyanna in JRAS 1923 (April),
1924 (January). See, however, Dasgupta II, 82-87.
271 Cf. Saṁbandhavārtika, 356 sq. against
jñānakarmasamuccaya.
272 Id. 12.
273 Id. 90.
274 Id. 124.
275 Id. 164.
276 Id. 22.
277 Id. 24. Cf. Kaṭhopaniṣad. 2.1.
278 Id. 438 b.
279 Introduction, transl. D. Venkataramiah,
Bangalore 1934, 2; cf. 6. The occurrence of the term
may indicate that the bhāṣya is not genuine.
J.F. Staal, Advaita and Neoplatonism
95
ence sin can decrease, and with the cessation of sin
sattva, i.e., the intellect, is
purified. This leads to the desire for knowledge and
hence to pure knowledge.280
That karma is cause of the desire for knowledge can
be inferred from a text of the
Bṛhadāraṇyakopaniṣad:281 ‘That (Self) the Brahmins
desire to know through study
of the Veda, through sacrifice, through gifts and
through austerities like fasting’.282
Following the same śruti Sureśvara says: ‘Reciting the
Vedas etc. are for the sake
of generating the desire to know the inner Self
(pratyagvividiṣā)’.283
According to the Vivaraṇa school, however, karma is
useful in generating vidyā
itself: it is a proximate auxiliary
(sannipatyaupakāraka). This comes nearer to the
Mīmāṁsakā view. The Vivaraṇa view occurs in the
Vedāntaparibhāsā: ‘And this
knowledge (i.e., brahmajñāna) results from
consumption of sin (pāpakṣaya), while
this (in turn) results from observance of (obligatory)
rites (i.e. nityakarma); there is
thus indirect utility for rites’.284
At first sight it seems that a kind of samuccayavāda
of jñāna and karma occurs
in the Bhagavad Gītā for it teaches renunciation from
the fruits of works as the means
to mokṣa and this is not the same as jñāna. Moreover
the Gītā seems to combine
different tendencies. Since the Gītā is one of the
three members of the prasthānatraya
Śaṅkara has in his Gītābhāya given an Advaitic
interpretation. This interpretation
can neither be logically proved, nor refuted, as it
declares that all non-Advaitic
passages, like the saprapañca-passages of the
Upaniṣads, refer to the
vyāvahārika-realm (see below). This interpretation,
which recon-ciles the different
tendencies, is defended by some scholars,285 but
rejected by others.286 The historical
problem need not occupy us
280 Bhamatī, ad. 1.1.1., ed. and transl. Madras 1933,
85.
281 Quoted by Mahadevan, Philosophy of Advaita,
243 and by S.S. Suryanarayana Sastri in the
Notes to the edition of the Vedāntaparibhāṣā, 81.
282 BAU. 4.4.22.
283 Saṁbandhavārtika, 14. Cf. also 191b-193a.
284 Prayojanam, 24. Cf. also Mahadevan, ibid., and
the note ad loc. by Stiryanarayana Sastri.
Cf. also B.K. Sengupta, A Critique on the Vivarana
School, Calcutta 1959, and: J.F. Staal in:
Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society, (1960) 192-3.
285 See e.g. T.M.P. Mahadevan, The two-fold path in
the Gītā, Kalahasti 1940.
286 For example, B, Faddegon, who has especially
dealt with this problem in his book; Śaṅkara's
Gītābhaṣya toegelicht en beoordeeld. Amsterdam
1906, the conclusion of which (115) reads:
‘voor ons kan het voldoende zijn te hebben
aangetoond, welkeen afstand er ligt tussen de
chaotische, soms verheven en poetische
gemoedswereld van den Gitadichter eenerzijds en
de subtiele, soms diepzinnige doch meestal
spitsvondige en ledige dogmatiek van Śaṅkara
anderzijds’.
J.F. Staal, Advaita and Neoplatonism
96
here,287 neither the kindred problem of Śaṅkara's
correctness in interpreting the
Brahmasūtras.288
To give an idea of the complications which can arise
in interpreting the Gītā we may
quote a verse translated by F. Edgerton as
follows:289
Action arises from Brahman, know;
And Brahman springs from the Imperishable (akṣara);
Therefore the universal Brahman
Is eternally based on worship (yajñe pratiṣṭhitam).
This śloka seems to state clearly the efficacy of
karma for those who want to reach
Brahman. But according to the traditional view, if the
words are understood in their
ordinary sense Brahman cannot be the highest in the
Gītā, where Kṛṣṇa is an avatāra
of Brahman (not of Viṣṇu). Therefore the terms
akṣara and brahma are said to
denote each a different concept according to the
great commentators. But the
Ācāryas differ on the other hand greatly
287 A few facts about which there can be no
difference of opinion, may be recalled here. Śaṅkara
quotes in the Brahmasūtrabhāṣya not only the Gītā
much less often than the Chāndogya or
the Bṛhadāraṇyakopaniṣad (the number of quotations
from the Gītā being about a sixth of
those from the Bṛhadāraṇyaka and an eight of those
from the Chāndogya), but also less often
than the Kaṭhopaniṣad or the Muṇḍakopaniṣad (see
Thibaut, Index of quotations, II, 421-430).
The twelfth adhyāya which deals with bhakti is never
quoted, In the 38 ślokas which are
quoted the term bhakti occurs once, in an
unessential context: ‘at the time of
death...disciplined
with devotion (bhaktyā, yuktaḥ) and the power of
discipline (yogabalena)....he goes to that
supreme divine Spirit’ (8.10), of which Śaṅkara
quotes only a part (‘at the time of death with
unswerving thought’), leaving out the rest (ad.
4.1.12). The term bhākta occurs once when
the sloka 7.21 is quoted completely (ad. 3.2.41); but
this passage is only utilised to show that
the Lord is ‘not only the giver of fruits, but also the
causal agent with reference to all actions
whether good or evil’ (transl. II. 184). An evaluation
of the member of quotations can only be
given after studying the quotations in the
Brahmasūtra itself.
288 See V.S. Ghate, The Vedānta-A study of the
Bramaūtras with the Bhāsyas, Poona, 1926 (in
French-1918).
289 3. 15 (F. Edgerton, The Bhagavad Gita,
Cambridge Mass. 1946).
J.F. Staal, Advaita and Neoplatonism
97
in the actual interpretation of what the terms denote.
Thus Śaṅkara interprets brahma
as the Veda and akṣara as the nirguṇabrahman;
Rāmānuja interprets brahma as
prakṛti (hesitatingly followed by Edgerton in his note)
and akṣara as the jīvātman;
and Madhva accepts brahma in the ordinary sense
whilst interpreting akṣara as the
text of the Veda.290
As an example of the typical Advaitic way of
interpretation another śloka may be
quoted, which again seems nearer to Mīmāṁsā or the
Brāhmaṇas than to Advaita
or even samuccayavāda. This śloka is translated by
Edgerton as follows
The (sacrificial) presentation is Brahman; Brahman is
the oblation;
In the (sacrificial) fire of Brahman it is poured by
Brahman;
Just to Brahman must he go,
Being concentrated upon the (sacrificial section that
is Brahman).
Śaṅkara stresses the unreality of everything apart
from the absolute by speaking
about ‘the instrument by which the oblation is
poured in the fire’ as being ‘nothing
but Brahman (tat brahmaiva iti). He declares in the
commentary that ultimately all
action is unreal: ‘the action performed by him who
wishes to set an example to the
world is in reality no action (karma paramārthato
'karma), as it has been destroyed
by the realisation of Brahman
(brahmabuddhyupamṛditatvāt)’. The reason is that
‘to
one who realises that all is Brahman there is no
action’.291
The Bhagavad Gītā presents fundamental problems.
It cannot easily be maintained
that it reacts against karma in an Advaitic way; it
cannot even be said with certainty
that its teaching constitutes at all a reaction against
karma. It may be that in the Gītā
an attempt is made to synthetise the karmic and the
non-karmic trends of Indian
thought. One example from later Indian thought
shows that the doctrine of karma
was also overcome in
290 Cf, R.C. Zaehner, Hindu and Muslim Mysticism,
London 1960. Chap. IV.
291 brahmaiva idaṁ sarvam iti ābhijānatar viduṣaḥ
karmābhāvaḥ: Gītābhāṣya, ad. 4.24,
J.F. Staal, Advaita and Neoplatonism
98
another way-although related to the Gītā. It occurs in
Viśiṣṭādvaita, especially in the
Teṅkalai school. In the whole of Viśiṣṭādvaita bhakti-
yoga counts more than
jñāna-yoga. Mukti is defined as the conquest of karma
by kṛpā, ‘redemptive love’.292
Īśvara rules the world by His relentless law of karma’,
says Srinivasachari,293 ‘and
His holy wrath against the evil-doer is inescapable,
but the rigour of karma is
overpowered by the redemptive love of kṛpā. Evil is
destroyed and the evil-doer
saved’.
In the two schools of the later Viśiṣṭādvaita, the
Northern school (Vaḍakalai)
recognizes a certain usefulness of works, whereas
the Southern school (Teṅkalai)
only believes in grace, prapatti and the utter
inefficacy of works, emphasising the
unconditional nature of God's grace (nirhetuka
kaṭākṣa)294 and the emptiness of all
other means (upāya-śūnyatā).295
These doctrines parallel the attitude of Protestantism
in Christianity, where salvation
can be gained sola fide, ‘through faith alone’. This
parallelism has been studied by
R. Otto.296
So karma is replaced by jñāna i.e., the sacrifice, with
its unity of the spiritual and
the material, has been overcome by a purely spiritual
entity (indicating therefore the
presence also of a purely material entity). Thus a
new concept of being is evolved.
It remains for us to understand this jñāna which is as
mokṣa and Brahman at the
same time the new concept of being.
9. Concepts of meditation and knowledge
In the previous section several points of view
regarding the relations between karma,
meditation and jñāna have been reviewed. Now
several definitions will be considered
in order to analyse further what is meant by the
terms for meditation (dhyāna,
nididhyāsana; ef. manana, ‘reflection’) and
knowledge (jñāna, vijñāna ; vidyā; cf.
bodha, ‘thought’ cit, ‘intelligence’).
292 Srinivasachari, o.c. 402.
293 id. 166; cf. 174.
294 id. 530; cf. 536.
295 Dasgupta III 87.
296 R. Otto, Indiens Gnadenreligion und das
Christentum, Gotha 1930.
J.F. Staal, Advaita and Neoplatonism
99
Already in the Śvetāśvataropaniṣad a characterization
of dhyāna occurs, which
shows how the sacred syllable Om becomes
efficacious only through dhyāna and
how on that account an all together novel effect is
produced. Making use of the
analogy of kindling fire by means of rubbing297 two
pieces of wood (araṇi) together,
the text says:298
Making his body the lower araṇi and the sacred
syllable
Om the upper araṇi-
He can by that practice of rubbing which is
meditation
(dhyāna) see God as the hidden (fire becomes
visible).
It seems to be a mystery how from dry, dark, cold
wood fire can suddenly spring;
likewise it seems to be a mystery how the
unmanifest divine can suddenly become
manifest. That this phenomenon can be produced as
the effect of a cause is clear
from the text. The mysterious or magical efficacy has
as its divine prototype the
creator, who things silently in his mind and who
subsequently materializes the content
of his thought.299 The act of meditation is one of the
remnants of the period when
material and spiritual were not conceived as different
and separate realms. Since
the two are discriminated by the increasingly
differentiating consciousness, their
interconnection has also become mysterious or
magical. Moreover, it becomes
intelligible that Śaṅkara sees the same magical and
unintelligible adhyāsa300 at work
in the act of meditation and in Īśvara's creation.
More and better, though perhaps less suggestive,
characterizations of what
meditation really consists of can be collected from
Śaṅkara's works. In the
Bṛhadāraṇyakopaniṣadbhāṣya meditation is spoken of
as a mental act of
concentration, approaching the form of an object,
dependent on scriptural injunctions
and resulting in complete identification: ‘Upāsanā is
mentally approaching (upa) the
form of a deity or something else as delineated in
scriptural passages relating to
meditation, and concentrating the mind
297 Cf. the lamp of Aladin in the Arabian 1001 Nights
and the psychoanalytical interpretation
(Diets), which reveals one aspect of the mysterious
result in its psychological value.
298 Śvetāśvataropaniṣad 1. 14.
299 Cf. above II 6: 72, n. 168.
300 Cf. below II. 11.
J.F. Staal, Advaita and Neoplatonism
100
on it (āsanā), uninterrupted by secular thoughts, till
one is as completely identified
with it as with one's own body, conventionally
regarded as one's self’.301 Meditation
cannot go beyond the world of names and forms
(nāmarūpa), though it may help to
reach the highest reach thereof. Therefore we read
somewhere else in the same
commentary: ‘Through meditation (vidyayā) the
world of the Gods (devaloka) is to
be won....therefore they praise meditation’.302
Concentration is especially stressed in a passage of
the Gītābhāṣya:303 ‘Upāsana
consists in approaching the object of worship by way
of meditating on it according
to the teaching (yathāśāstram) and dwelling for a
long time steadily in the current
of same thought, (continuous) like a thread of
descending oil’. When the meaning
of concentration is further analysed, it is seen that it
is rather difficult to express what
it positively contains since its content manifests itself
only ultimately. Therefore the
negative is stressed in the Gītābhāṣya,304 as follows:
‘Dhyāna consists in withdrawing
by concentration (upasaṁhrtya) hearing and other
senses into the manas (mind)
away trom sound, etc, and other sense objects, then
withdrawing manas into the
inner intelligence and then contemplating (the inner
intelligence)’. This leads further
to the definition of the Vedāntaparibhāṣā:305 ‘What is
called contemplation
(nididhyāsana) is that mental operation, which, in the
case of mind (citta) attracted
to (external) objects by beginning-less evil
associations, is helpful to turn it away
from (external) objects and secure firmness (for it) in
respect of the Self (alone) as
object’. In the definition of the Vedāntasāra both
aspects are mentioned:306
‘Nididhyāsana is the procession of like thoughts
referring to the secondless Brahman,
dissociated from other objects like the body and so
forth’. The positive
characterization occurs already in the
Brahmasūtrabhāṣya too:307 ‘By upāsana we
under-
301 Ad. 1.3.9, transl. Swami Madhavananda; cf. M.
Hiriyanna's translation of the first three
brāhmaṇas of the first chapter of the
Bṛhadārāṇyakopaniṣadbhāṣya, Srirangam 1919, 92.
302 Ad. 1.5.16. Here vidyā denotes ‘meditation’.
303 Ad. 12. 3-4.
304 Ad. 13-24.
305 IX. (Prayojanam) 24.
306 192; transl. Hiriyanna 59.
307 Ad. 4.1.7.
J.F. Staal, Advaita and Neoplatonism
101
stand the lengthened carrying on of an identical train
of thought.’308
The positive characterisation corresponds to the
central Advaitic idea expressed as
‘the world is (in as far as it really is) identical with
Brahman’. The negative
characterisation corresponds to the same idea
expressed as ‘the world is (in as far
as it is different from Brahman) unreal.’ Both ideas
may have the same significance;
but the second is more especially Saṅkara's
approach309 and is reflected in the
definition of meditation rather as a withdrawal from
the world than as a concentration
upon the Absolute. Both, however, cannot be
separated.
In one passage of the Brahmasūtrabhāṣya meditation
and knowledge are very
clearly differentiated; it may serve as a transition to
the consideration of knowledge.
There it is said,310 that meditation (dhyāna) and
reflection (cintana) are mental
(mānasa); they may be performed or not performed
or modified (kartumakartum
anyathā vā kartum śakyam) by a human being
(puruṣena), because of their
dependence on man (puruṣatantratvāt). But
knowledge (jñāna) is the result of the
means of right knowledge (pramāṇjanyam) and the
pramāṇas refer to the things as
they exist (pramāṇam yathābhūtavastuviṣayam).
Therefore one cannot say that
knowledge may be performed or not performed or
modified (kartumakartumanyathā
vā kartum aśakyam): it only depends on the thing
(kevalam vastutantram eva), not
on Vedic injunction (na codanātantram) and also not
on man (na api puruṣatantram).
Meditation is performed (or not performed), i.e. it is
an act of the human being, taking
its starting point from śruti. Knowledge is
independent from man and from śruti; it
is not an act,311 but it represents the things as they
are. This quite phenomenological
definition of knowledge does away with the
subjective element of meditation as well
as with the magical element.
308 samānapratyayapravāhakaraṇam.
309 The first approach will find an exponent in Śrī
Aurobindo, who substitutes līlāvāda for
māyāvāda.
310 Ad 1.1.4; Nirṇaya Sāgar ed. 83.
311 A mistake, easily made in the Thomistic tradition
(where the act plays such an important part)
and also in the French language, occurs throughout
the work of Lacombe who speaks of
‘l'acte de connaissance’ (e.g., p. 184).
J.F. Staal, Advaita and Neoplatonism
102
Through jñāna Śaṅkara goes beyond the magical
atmosphere of previous thought
and arrives at an approach to reality which might be
called gnoseological in as far
as it places knowledge in the centre, but goes
beyond the pure intellect.
According to Śaṅkara the objectivity of jñāna is a fact,
while the objectivity of
meditation is not. He explicitly denies the reality of
certain identifications to which
meditation may lead; they have to be understood
figuratively. In the commentary
on the Brahmasūtras, for instance, reference is made
to mantras and arthavādas
which have to be explained in a secondary sense,
when the primary literal sense is
rendered impossible by other pramāṇas.312 ‘The
following arthavāda passage, for
instance’, says Thibaut,313 ‘the sacrificial post is the
sun’, is to be taken in a
metaphorical sense; because perception renders it
impossible for us to take it in its
literal meaning. This is different from the archaic
atmosphere of magical identification
in the Brāhmanas.
The view that jñāna is objective ‘just like the things as
they exist’
(yathābhūtavastu)-appears as realistic in the
epistemological sense. But we have
to discriminate between two kinds of knowledge:
empirical knowledge of external
things and knowledge of the Self. The first is
adequate in as far as it reveals the
second; in every experience the Absolute is given
and can be revealed and
discovered.314 The mechanism of knowledge is
analysed in the later Advaita Vivaraṇa
school in the following manner.315 It is hardly
necessary to say that also this analysis
shows that the Advaitic position cannot be
adequately understood when compared
with critical idealism in epistemology (Deussen; cf.
Vijñānavāda).
According to Vidyāraṇya316 in empirical knowledge
the mind when pervading an
object assumes the form of that object. This
constitutes a modification or (as
translated by Mahadevan and by Bhattacharya)
psychosis (vṛtti) of the internal organ
(antaḥkaraṇa) in which there is a reflection (ābhāsa)
of the intelligence-self (cit). But
for the ‘known-ness’ as well as for the ‘unknown-
312 Ad. 2.1.13.
313 Ad hoc: I, 318, n. 1.
314 See Murti, o.c. 315 for the difference with
Vijñānavāda.
315 See Mahadevan. Philosophy of Advaita. 9 sq.
316 Pañcadaśī 4.28 ap. Mahadevan, o.c. 11.
J.F. Staal, Advaita and Neoplatonism
103
ness’ of an object Brahman-intelligence is required.
The reflection of intelligence
(cidābhāsa) is an appearance of which Brahman is
the sole reality. Whereas ābhāsa
reveals the object alone, Brahman-intelligence
illuminates vṛtti, ābhāsa and the
object as well. Such knowledge arises through the
psychosis of the internal organ
and is called vṛttijñāna.
In the case of Self-knowledge there is no external
object, there is nothing outside,
there can be no ābhāsa, no object and no subject.
Concerning this jñāna expressed
in the mahāvākya ‘aham brahmāsmi’317 the
Vedāntasāra says:318 ‘Spirit (caitanya)
as reflected in that state of mind, being unable to
illumine the self-luminous Brahman,
not distinct from the internal self, will be overcome
as a lamp flame for example is,
by the sun's rays, being unable to overcome them.
And it will lapse into Brahman
itself, not distinct from the inmost self, as its
condition (upādhi), viz., the mental state,
is no longer there .... Its being affected by the vṛtti is
necessary in order that ignorance
may be dispelled.319 The reflection serves no
purpose here, Brahman being
self-luminious’.320 This knowledge is called
svarūpajñāna and is possible because
of a characteristic of knowledge which is very much
stressed in Advaita:
self-luminosity (svaprakāśatva). In this knowledge
none of the characteristics of
vṛtti-jñāna remain. But it remains affected by vṛtti for
the purpose of dispelling the
ignorance regarding it. In other words there is vṛtti-
vyāpti (pervasion by psychosis),
and not phala-vyāpti (pervasion by fruit, i.e.,
reflection).
Self-luminosity explains not only svarūpajñāna but
also empirical knowledge, for
light is the condition of any possible reflection. In a
suggestive comparison the
self-luminosity of knowledge (jñānasvaprakāśatva),
rooted in the self-luminosity of
the Absolute which is identical with it, is compared to
the lamp used on the stage
when dance or drama is performed (nāṭakadīpa).321
The lamp illuminates the actors
for the audience and the audience itself; but it shines
even if the theatre be emptied
of all persons.
317 BAU 1.4.10.
318 173, 175, 176; transl. Hiriyanna 58.
319 Pañcadaśi 6, 90.
320 Pañcadaśī 6.92; svayamprakāśamāṅatvānnābhāsa
upayujyate.
321 Mahadevan, o.c. 175.
J.F. Staal, Advaita and Neoplatonism
104
Similarly objects as well as subjects are revealed by
Brahman which manifests itself
as self-luminous in the knowledge in which subjects
and objects have altogether
disappeared. In the unity which still is the mark of
India's traditional culture, not only
do philosophers take their illustrations from the stage
and from nāṭyaśāstra, but
dancers or actors also realise the symbolism of their
performance. At present the
stage lamp (valiya vilakku or kali vilakku in
Malayāḷam) is considered essential and
central on the stage of Kathakaḷi-the dance-drama of
Kerala, the homeland of
Śaṅkara.322 Its symbolic significance is felt and
explained.323
Apart from being self-luminous (about which more
below) knowledge is one and is
said to rest upon one-ness, unity, as opposed to the
multiplicity of works.324
Knowledge, not being an effect or cause, springs
from itself and is svābhāvika. Its
immediacy and the fact that it is not knowledge of an
object distinct from itself (in
the case of svarūpajñāna) causes its fruit to be also
immediately present and not
manifest only at a later time, as the fruits of
action.325 Knowledge is therefore dṛṣṭa,
goes beyond the magical realm and does not need
an unseen, adṛṣṭa, entity like
the Mīmāṁsā apūrva. Accordingly there can be no
successive stages in knowledge
either.326 The jīvan-mukti is a fact of experience,
direct and immediate. Śaṅkara's
insight into the absolute character of jñāna
differentiates hirn from mystical
philosophers who speak about numerous levels and
stages of illumination, mystical
insight and realization.
The concept of self-luminosity is analysed at length
by Citsukha in the
Tattvapradīpikā327 by means of a discussion of its
several definitions. It may be
referred to here as an example of the ‘logistic’ of
later Advaita. When a thing is
considered self-luminous if and only if illumination
constitutes its very being and
322 Śaṅkara was probably born in Kaladi, near
Alwaye on the banks of the river Pūrna (Periyar)
in Kerala.
323 Cf. K.B. Bharata Iver. Kathakali-the sacred dance-
drama of Malabar, London 1955, 23-25
and plate XIX.
324 Cf also BAU-bhāṣya ad. 2.4.14.
325 Cf. BSB ad. 3.4.15.
326 See BSB ad. 4.1.2.
327 See Bhattacharyya, Studies in Post-Śaṅkara
dialectics. 48 sq. The discussion is simplified
here.
J.F. Staal, Advaita and Neoplatonism
105
nature, then we have not yet expressed that the
illumination is caused by itself and
not by something else, as for example the
paraprakāśatva (‘alter-illumination’) of
the Naiyāyikas. Thus, svaprakāśatva must be
considered as caused by itself. But
this knowledge must also be manifest, as no sane
knower argues that he has,
knowledge which is not manifest to him. Therefore it
is to be jñānasattāka, always
known and never unknown. As the same holds
however for pleasure, pain and other
similar feelings, the definition is too wide. It is
therefore proposed to define
self-luminosity as something which can never be the
object of knowledge (avedya),
as pleasure, pain, etc. are. But, the Naiyāyikas object
and question, how it can be
the subject of any discussion in that case? Again a
refinement is brought into the
definition, which ultimately characterizes the self-
illuminating character of knowledge
as follows: ‘Self-luminosity is that, which, while being
not an object of knowledge,
is fit to be called immediate.’328 ‘Even this
elaboration of the concept might be made
the target of criticism’ says Bhattacharyya.329
However we shall not follow these
investigations, which exemplify the style of later
Advaitic works such as the
Tattvapradīpikā, any further.
It is sometimes held that, since knowledge is self-
luminous, jīva is self-luminous too,
as it is constituted by knowledge.330
The importance of jñāna lies in the fact that Brahman
or mokṣa is the fruit of the
knowledge of Brahman. Knowledge is the means to
mokṣa (mokṣasādhana),331
which is the realization of Brahman. For this view
there is considerable scriptural
support,332 especially the passage of the Muṇḍaka:
‘he who knows that
328 This is the translation of Dr. Mahadevan, which is
clearer than Bhattacharyya's ‘though
incapable of being an object of knowledge, yet
possessing competence for perceptual use’.
329 Bhattacharyya, o.c. 52.
330 See Vadāntaparibhāṣā VIII (viṣayāh) 84.
331 e.g. Aitareyopaniṣadbhāṣya, transl.
Venkataramiah 3.
332 Cf. the quotations given by Śaṅkara in the bhāṣya
and 3.4.1. ‘He who knows the Self
overcomes grief’ (CU 3.4.1); ‘he who knows Brahman
attains the highest’ (Tait, Up. 2.1); ‘he
who has searched out and understands the self
which is free from sin etc. etc, obtains all
worlds and all desires’ (CU. 8.7.1: the latter might
refer to svarga rather than to
mokṣa)-commenting the sūtra ‘the purpose of man
(is effected) thence (i.e, through the mere
knowledge of Brahman) thus Bādarāyaṇa opines’
(puruṣārtho 'tah śabdāditi Bādarāyaṇaḥ).
J.F. Staal, Advaita and Neoplatonism
106
highest Brahman becomes verily Brahman’.333
Jñānān mokṣa ‘from knowledge
liberation’334 is the principal doctrine of Śaṅkara
concerning mokṣa and concerning
jñāna. It occurs for instance as the conclusion of the
last chapter of the
Vedāntaparibhāṣā entitled prayojanam, ‘the fruit’.335
‘Thus, therefore, release results
from Brahman-knowledge (tadevam brahmajñānān
mokṣa) .... hence is established
the fruit (iti siddham prayojanam)’.
Brahman is also directly conceived as pure
knowledge. It consists of nothing but
knowledge, ‘a solid mass of knowledge only’
(vijñānaghana eva), says the
Bṛhadāraṇyakopaniṣad.336 Therefore the term
vijñānātman, ‘the Self of knowledge’,
occurs.337 Śaṅkara comments upon the passage as
follows ‘the word ghana (a solid
mass) excludes everything belonging to a different
species .... the particle eva, ‘only’,
is intensive. The idea is that there is no foreign
element in it’. We recognise here
the idea of the actual infinite. The same passage is
quoted in a text of the great
commentary, where existence and thought are
equated in Brahman;338 existence is
thought and thought is existence (sattaiva bodho
bodha eva ca sattā). Śaṅkara
elaborates this at length, showing that Brahman is
existence but not excluding
thought, and thought but not excluding existence.
Since it cannot have both as
distinct attributes it is both, and both are identical
with each other.
The ultimate reason for saying that knowledge is the
only means to realise Brahman,
which is neither a cause nor an effect, is that
Brahman itself is knowledge or
consciousness. This is manifest in the most famous
svarūpalakṣaṇa, ‘essential,
intrinsic definition’ occurring in the Taittirīyopaniṣad:
Brahman is satyaṁ jñānam
anantam ‘(true) reality-knowledge-infinity’.339 Later
Brahman was mostly spoken of
as Saccidānanda, ‘being-consciousness-bliss’.
333 sa yo ha vai tatparamaṃ brahma veda
brahmaiva bhavati: Muṇḍakopaniṣad 3.2.9.
334 Deussen refers (The system of the Vedānta 269)
in this connection to Kapila's(?) Sāṁkhyasūtra
3.28; jñānam muktiḥ.
335 IX. 56.
336 2.4.12.
337 e.g. BSB. 1.3.25.
338 Ad. 3.2.21, partly quoted and analysed in
Lacombe, o.c. 119-129 notes.
339 Tait. Up. 2.1.
J.F. Staal, Advaita and Neoplatonism
107
In his commentary upon jñānam, the second element
of the definition, Śaṅkara
clearly states what should be understood here:340
‘The term jñānam means
apprehension (jñāpti), consciousness (avabodha). It
denotes the ontological
perfection (bhāvasādhana) (of knowing) and not the
fact of being a performer of
acts of knowledge (na tu jñānakartṛ). It denotes
Brakman, in fact, in accordance with
the terms satyam, and anantam, and true reality and
infinity are incompatible with
the fact of being a performer of acts of knowledge.
For, being dependent upon the
change of the fact of being a performer of acts of
knowledge, how could Brahman
be true reality and infinity? What is infinite, indeed,
cannot be separated from anything
else, and if Brahman is a knower it has to be
separate from the knowing and from
the known and it cannot be infinite.’
10. Identifications and the central Advaitic
identity
The result of identification is complete identification.
This identification was called
magical, because the two identified elements are not
ordinarily identical. When
Śaṅkara comments upon that text of the
Brhadāraṇyakopaniṣad where sampad,
‘meditation based on resemblance’ is spoken of341
he explains this as follows: ‘By
this is meant a meditation, by virtue of some point of
resemblance (sāmānya), on
rites with inferior results like the agnihotra, as rites
with superior results, in order to
obtain these results’.342
While meditation is being spoken of in connection
with saguṇabrahman,
nirguṇabrahman, is exclusively connected with
cognition (knowledge);343 therefore
there may be different meditations on
saguṇabrahman, whereas there is only one
knowledge (which is identical with) nirguṇabrahman.
Assuming that in meditation
on saguṇabrahman identity is reached, we shall only
consider the real
nirguṇabrahman in the following investigation. In a
sūtra of the fourth adhyāya344 the
pivotal question is taken up;
340 Transl. de Smet. o.c. 47 sq., where the
commentary is analysed in as far as it is an
application
of what the author calls the Indian ‘polyvalence
sémantique des mots’ in the theory of definition.
For the translation of jñapti as ‘acte de de connaître’
see above 101, n. 311.
341 3.1.6-10.
342 Ad. 3.1.6. transl. Swami Madhavananda 421; cf.
also ad. 1.4.10
343 See above II, 7: 82 sq.
344 4.1.3.
J.F. Staal, Advaita and Neoplatonism
108
in how far in the knowledge345 of the highest
Brahman the latter is known as identical
with something else, known before, so that this
cognition would in fact be a
recognition.346 As the ego is the starting point of
each meditation and the basis of
any knowledge, it is asked whether the highest
Brahman is to be understood as the
I or as different from it. The siddhānta view, basing
itself exclusively upon scriptural
authority, is that the Absolute must be understood as
the self. For this several texts
are quoted of which the most important are: ‘I am
Brahman’347 and: ‘That thou art’.348
With regard to these scriptural passages an
important assertion of the pūrvapakṣin
has to be refùted first. Is it not possible that these
passages merely teach the seeing
(darśana) of Brahman in certain symbols (pratīka),
analogous to the seeing of Viṣṇu
in an image? This is rejected for two reasons: (1) it
would violate the principle that
texts should, if possible, be understood in their
primary sense (mukhyārtha) and not
in their secondary sense (lakṣyārtha): ‘mukhyatvāt’
as Śaṅkara himself enunciates
it ad. 4.3.12. This is known in Pūrvamīmāṁsā under
the name barhirnyāya, ‘the
maxim of the Kuśa-grass’.349 (2) It would contradict
the syntactical form generally
used in the scripture for teaching contemplation by
means of a symbol, e.g., ‘Brahman
is mind’350 or ‘Brahman is Āditya’.351 Moreover the
contrary interpretation is explicitly
rejected in other important texts such as: ‘Now if a
man worships another deity,
thinking the deity is one and he another, he does not
know’352 and: ‘whosoever looks
for anything elsewhere than in the Self is abandoned
by everything’.353
345 Not meditation, as Thibaut says in his
conspectus (I lxxvi). I have never found that Śaṅkara
uses the term meditation in immediate connection
with the highest Brahman; but the term
dṛṣṭi ‘vision’ occurs, e.g. in 4.1.5.
346 In how far in Advaita all cognition is in reality
recognition is a point (resulting directly from the
unreal character of avidyā) developed further by
Coomaraswamy in his Recollection: Indian
and Platonic, Suppl. Journal of the American Oriental
Society 3 (April-June 1944) 1-18. In
this paper smṛti is unconvincingly equated with the
Platonic anāmnēsis.
347 BAU. 1.4.10.
348 CU. 6.8.7.
349 Jha, Pūrva-Mīmāṁsā, 379, n. 34; cf. Mahadevan,
Philosophy of Advaita, 45 sq.
350 CU. 3.18.1.
351 CU.3.19.1.
352 BAU. 1.4.10.
353 BAU. 2.4.6; also quoted: BAU 4.4.19.
J.F. Staal, Advaita and Neoplatonism
109
Śaṅkara discusses again in his commentary upon the
next sūtras the exceptional
cases where Brahman is viewed as a symbol. He
sharply differentiates these
‘pratikopāsanās’ from the knowledge that Brahman
must be understood as the Self.
In the commentary upon sūtra, 4.1.3 the significance
of the statement is brought
out by answering the main objections which can be
made against it. These
developments are important and have to be followed
in greater detail.
Firstly, it is clear that almost exclusively
śabdapramāṇa is used in establishing the
central doctrine of identity of the self and the
Absolute. Scripture, especially the
Brāhmaṇas, goes in its identifications even beyond
the establishment of connections
and relations. That amongst all these, identification
of the Self with the Absolute
occurs is not surprising. But with Śaṅkara the identity
is neither magical, nor can its
foundation in śruti be termed dogmatic.
(1) It is not magical because we are here concerned
with an identity and not with
an identification. ‘Identification’ means ‘making
identical’, e.g., through an act of
meditation; according to Śaṅkara, this is a subjective
process, e.g. (an example of
Zimmer) the gradual identification of the ego with a
cow to which no objective reality
need correspond.354 ‘Identity’, on the other hand,
means ‘being identical’ in reality.
This is according to Śaṅkara,355 objective and does
not depend on any activity on
our part. As it is real or true, the question is only
whether we ‘see’ it or ‘know’ it.
Therefore Śaṅkara speaks in connection with the
identity of the Self and of Brahman,
of dṛṣṭa ‘vision’, and vidyā, ‘knowledge,
cognition’,356 which are not activities. The
difference between identity and identification
354 Cf. for instance, the identification of certain
points with other points in topology, a branch of
modern mathematics, which can be arbitrarily done
(at least in principle), and where it is not
required that these ‘magical’ identifications
correspond to identities, i.e. ‘exist’ (a dubious
concept in mathematics). They can be developed
into a formal system of connections.
355 Cf. previous section: yathābhūtavastu, ‘just like
the things as they exist’, i.e., objectively.
356 We should consequently translate the acts
dhyāna and upāsanā as respectively ‘meditation’
and ‘contemplation’, and dṛṣṭa as ‘vision’ (not as
contemplation, as Thibaut does ad 4.1.5:
brahmadṛṣṭi....).
J.F. Staal, Advaita and Neoplatonism
110
reveals a new aspect of the struggle against magical
and subjective applications of
the idea of karma.357
(2) Śaṅkara's use of the śabdapramāṇa is not
dogmatic. This is sometimes
misunderstood because we are here in a kind of
vicious circle. Those who are
seeking for justification by means of pramāṇas do not
possess the vision of the
Absolute, which conceals all duality. They deny the
truth of the central Advaitic
identity because they are enveloped by ignorance
concerning it. If they would possess
the highest knowledge (paravidyā), śabdapramāṇa
-and all other pramāṇas-would
altogether vanish for them. The position of Advaita
regarding this point is clear.
Advaita is not based upon scripture: all relations and
contradictions disappear in
mokṣa which is the goal of the system. Advaita is
therefore consistent, which need
not lead to any conviction regarding its truth.358
Plotinus said: ‘Thus we arrived at a
proof; but are we convinced? A proof entails
necessity, but not conviction. Necessity
resides in the intelligence, and conviction in the
soul.’359 Theorems in logic are only
acceptable for those who accept certain axioms and
rules of inference.
In the same adhikaraṇa Śaṅkara refers to this
problem and accepts unhesitatingly,
paradoxically enough on scriptural authority, that
śabdapramāṇa and śruti and smṛti
themselves are unreal, as soon as the Brahman-
knowledge arises: "Nor do we mind
your objection....that scripture itself ceases to be
valid (becomes unreal: abhāva);
for this conclusion is just what we assume. For on the
ground of the text ‘Then a
father is not a father’360 upto ‘Then the Vedas are
not Vedas’361 we ourselves assume
that when knowledge springs up scripture ceases to
be valid. And should you ask
who then is characterised by the absence of true
knowledge, we reply: You yourself
who ask this question! And if you
357 It may be mentioned here that there is still a
tradition in India that one of the important
achievements of Śaṅkara was to control and limit
magical practices which were widespread
at the time, partly due to exaggerations and abuses
of Tantric practices. Tantric elements
have, on the other hand, been traced in Śaṅkara's
works. Cf. Lacombe, o.c. 379 (IV).
358 Cf. above II, 7.
359 Enneads V 3.6.8-10 (Bréhier).
360 BU, 4.3.22.
361 Ibid.
J.F. Staal, Advaita and Neoplatonism
111
retort: ‘But I am the Lord as declared by scripture’,
we reply: ‘very well, if you have
arrived at that knowledge, then there is nobody who
does not possess such
knowledge’. The position of the last sentences can be
summed up by saying: he
who disagrees is ignorant; if he knew he would
agree. This excludes the possibility
of somebody who knows and nevertheless disagrees.
This is evidently appropriate
in the case of brahmavidyā; whoever knows that the
self is Brahman will certainly
have no objection against the doctrine which
propounds this thesis. But one might
perfectly well understand the meaning and
significance of the statement ‘the self is
identical with the Absolute’, without having
confidence in its truth and without agreeing
with it.362
The topic of the unreality of śabdapramāṇa has
repeatedly occupied the later
Advaitins. Appaya Dikṣita for instance asks363
whether the śabdapramāṇa, which is
the evidence for Brahman is real or unreal. ‘If it be
real, then, as there is a reality
which is other than Brahman, the latter's non-duality
will be destroyed. If it be unreal,
then, what is revealed by an unreal evidence should
also be unreal’. But the latter
conclusion is invalid, as what is unreal can
nevertheless be practically efficient, just
as the roaring of a dream-lion in a dream can sublate
the dream-experience itself
and awaken the dreamer.364
The commentary upon the same sūtra, 4.1.3. also
refutes other objections. One
objection is that Advaita is not in accordance with
experience. It seems to contradict
all our experiences radically; we know the Self as
ourselves, i.e., our egos, invested
with a number of qualities which cannot belong to
the Absolute which is nirguṇa,
without qualities365; e.g., all evil qualities and
qualities of ignorance. But this opposition
of qualities has to be declared false, says Śaṅkara:
‘Nor is there any force in the
objection that things with contrary qualities cannot
be identical; for this opposition
of qualities can be shown to be false.’ Not false in the
sense that the evil qualities
have to be ascribed to the
362 It is unfortunately an all-too-easy opinion among
some Advaitins that whoever disagrees with
Advaita, evidently does not understand it. This is
defining disagreement a priori as ignorance.
363 Siddhāntaleśasaṁgraha ap. Mahadevan,
Philosophy of Advaita, 57 sq.
364 Mahadevan o.c. 59.
365 Śaṅkara treats it in this context rather as saguṇa.
J.F. Staal, Advaita and Neoplatonism
112
Absolute so that the Lord would not be a Lord; but in
non-ascribing these same
qualities to the other side of the duality, i.e., the Self,
which is not the same as our
transmigrating soul: ‘Nor is it true that from our
doctrine it would follow that the Lord
is not a Lord. For in these matters scripture alone is
authoritative, and we, moreover
do not at all admit that scripture teaches the Lord to
be the Self of the transmigrating
soul, but maintain that by denying the
transmigrating character of the soul it aims
at teaching that the soul is the Self of the Lord. From
this it follows that the non-dual
Lord is free from all evil qualities, and that to ascribe
to him contrary qualities is an
error.’
Thus we arrive at the real Self ‘by denying the
transmigrating character of the soul’
(ātma) saṁsāritvāpohena.366 This being posited as
the truth it becomes a matter of
realisation to see this non-transmigrating Self as the
deeper ground of our
transmigrating selves. This knowledge cannot arise
for the transmigrating soul for
it has to be gained by ceasing to transmigrate, i.e.,
by attaining mokṣa. To conceive
of the deepest Self as the transmigrating soul
constitutes the principal ignorance
(avidyā) which obstructs insight and real knowledge
(vidyā). All positions differing
from the ultimate truth are affected by avidyā. Avidyā
is the main stumbling-block
obstructing the brahmavidyā. It poses the main
metaphysical problem of Advaita.
Although it is a unique concept in Śaṅkara, its central
position in the system and its
psychological appeal could only be explained by a
series of older ideas, such as
the dangerous actions performed in erroneous
sacrifices, which have to be expiated
by prayaścitta, and also the magical inefficiency of
avidyā as it occurs in the
Chāndogyopaniṣad.
The Sanskrit term Ātman does not fully correspond to
the English term Self, as the
latter can only be used in connection with persons
whereas the former has a much
wider application. Commenting upon the sūtra 4.1.4,
Śaṅkara speaks for instance
of gold as being the ātman of golden ornaments: ‘for
golden ornaments and figures
made of gold are not identical with each other but
only in as far as gold constitutes
the ātman of both’. Lacombe367
366 Note here the occurrence of the term apoha,
which is of central importance in Vijñānavāda
and in several speculations about language.
367 o.c. 52.
J.F. Staal, Advaita and Neoplatonism
113
quotes a passage, where quality (guṇa) has its ātman
in substance (dravyātma).368
Here ātman could be translated as ‘essence’.369
Compare also the usages of ātman
in BAU 1. 2.1 and 1. 2. 4, where it might be similarly
translated by ‘essence’.
According to Lacombe, ātman designates ‘the
metaphysical moment where being
interiorizes and becomes perfect, complete, final,
reaching the Absolute by this very
interiorization’.370 But in Advaita ‘interiorizing’,
‘becoming’, ‘reaching’ cannot be
understood as changes or transformations and seem
rather to denote a situation.
Though we need not deviate from the established
usage of translating ātman by
‘Self’, we have to realize that the term has a greater
extension. Were we to adopt
the term essence the central Advaitic doctrine could
be formulated in a way which
sounds more familiar in Western philosophical
terminology: ‘the Absolute, i.e., the
essence of the All, is identical with the essence of
myself’. What prevents us from
seeing this is avidyā, the incapacity to see the
essence underlying the manifestations.
It may be remarked here, that in this formulation the
similarity with some later phases
of Muslim thought, becomes exceedingly great. The
doctrine of Ibn 'Arabī can be
summarized as: ‘the essence of the creator is
identical with the essence of the
creatures’. Kindred formulations occur also in
Angelus Silesius.
11. Adhyāsa - avidyā - māyā
What is avidyā? In the beginning of the great
commentary this concept is introduced
and defined as adhyāsa, adhyāropa,
‘superimposition’.371 This idea is often discussed
and defined by the important Advaitic thinkers. We
will analyse its significance by
considering a passage in the Brahmasūtrabhāṣya
where the term is used in an
ordinary sense, not referring to the metaphysical
adhyāsa which is identical with
avidyā. This passage establishes a
368 Ad. 2.2.17; not as Lacombe has it: the guṇa is
the ātman of the dravya (tasmāddravyātmakatā
guṇasya).
369 Lacombe (o.c. 51; cf. 104) mentions on the other
hand as the Sanskrit equivalents of ‘essence’:
svarūpa, svabhāva, bhāva, sāra.
370 ‘Le moment métaphysique ou l'être s'intériorise
et de quelque façon s'achève, se termine et
finalement se hausse à l'absolu par ce mouvement
même d'intériorisation’. ‘Mouvement’ is
certainly misleading: the French language is too
dynamical.
371 upodghāta.
J.F. Staal, Advaita and Neoplatonism
114
connection with the sūtra just analysed372 and deals
with the above mentioned
pratīkopāsanās.
In the commentary upon the sūtra ‘Not in the symbol
(is the Self to be contemplated);
for he (the meditating person) (may) not (view
symbols as being the Self).’373 Śaṅkara
argues, that when Brahman is meditated upon in a
symbol, pratīka (e.g. Āditya), the
pratīka should not be understood as the Self. This
follows from previous
considerations. When scripture speaks about a
meditation on a symbol, this cannot
be understood as the Self, which is never the object
of meditation. The question
arises as to which mental act is enjoined by: ‘Āditya
is Brahman’ and which relation
obtains in such a case between Brahman and its
pratīka, āditya. The answer is that
the act and the relation, which it establishes, are
adhyāsa ‘superimposition’.
The commentary upon the next sūtra deals with the
question whether the vision
(dṛṣṭi) of Āditya is to be superimposed upon Brahman
(brahmaṇyadhyasitavya), or
the vision of Brahman upon Āditya. This doubt arises
because scriptural texts present
both members in the same case and in apposition
(āditya brahma, prāṇo brahma).
An objection is that these texts inform us perhaps
about a causal relation between
Brahman and Āditya, etc. Against this it is argued,
that it would be entirely
purposeless to mention any particular effect of
Brahman. However, if the text does
not embody knowledge, it must be an injunction to
meditate. In that case, as two
members are given, their relation must be
superimposition.
To the question, which is to be superimposed upon
which, the sūtra answers: the
Brahman-vision upon Āditya, ‘on account of
exaltation’ (utkarṣāt). ‘For thus Āditya
and so on are viewed in an exalted way (utkarṣeṇa),
the vision of something higher
than they being superimposed upon them.’ We might
think of some pratīka as an
actual object and superimpose that object upon
Brahman, i.e., view Brahman as
this limited object. But it is ‘exalting’ to take the
pratīka only as the starting point for
a meditation, in which Brahman is superimposed
upon it: for the
372 4.1.3.
373 na pratīke na hi saḥ: 4.1.4.
J.F. Staal, Advaita and Neoplatonism
115
pratīka is exalted and Brahman is not degraded. This
is even true, Śaṅkara adds,
according to a worldly (laukika) rule, ‘viz., the one
enjoining that the idea of something
higher is to be superimposed upon something lower,
as when we view-and speak
of- the king's character as a king. This rule must be
observed in worldly matters,
because to act contrary to it would be
disadvantageous; for should we view a king
as a charioteer, we should thereby lower him, and
that would be in no way beneficial’.
The usage of the term adhyāsa becomes perfectly
clear, especially from the example:
viewing something lower as if it were something
higher or seeing the higher entity
in the lower is ‘superimposing’ the higher on the
lower. ‘Superimposition’ denotes
as well the relation from the higher to the lower, as
also, from the point of view of
the agent, the activity which establishes this relation.
We may go one step further
and say that adhyāsa evidently does not rest upon an
identity which is objectively
real, but is an identification. It can be realized
through the identifying act of meditation
and depends on subjective activity. Other examples,
equally instructive, are
mentioned by Śaṅkara, for instance: the idea of the
God Viṣṇu is superimposed
upon a statue of Viṣṇu, etc.374
In the context of the last example a kind of definition
is also given, which is interesting
as here again we are concerned with ordinary
adhyāsa and not with the metaphysical
concept which is identical with avidyā. Śaṅkara
says:375 ‘Adhyāsa takes place when
the idea of one of two things not being dismissed
from the mind, the idea of the
second thing is superimposed upon the first thing; so
that together with the
superimposed idea the former idea remains
attached. to the thing on which the
second idea is superimposed. When e.g., the idea of
(the entity) Brahman
superimposes itself upon the idea of the name (i.e.,
Om), the latter idea continues
in the mind and is not driven out by the former’. This
needs almost no clarification,
but may be restated utilising the previous
terminology and including the concepts
‘higher’ and ‘lower’ as follows: Adhyāsa,
‘superimposition’, is a mental act of
identification of a higher entity A and lower entity B,
in such
374 Ad. 3.3.9; cf. also ad. 4.1.5, towards the end,
375 Ibid.
J.F. Staal, Advaita and Neoplatonism
116
a way that the lower B is looked upon as A or that A
is seen through or in B, i.e.,
while the entity B also continues in the mind (which
would otherwise not identify
two, but move from the one to the other). It is said,
then, that A is ‘superimposed’
upon B. Thus it is clear that superimposition is a kind
of identification which can be
realized by a meditation and which has a subjective
and unintelligible-magical
character. This meaning arises even before we turn
to metaphysics.
Now let us turn to definitions of the metaphysical
adhyāsa, which is avidyā. The
significance of this concept is stressed by the fact
that the great commentary's
introduction (upodghāta) opens with its definition and
discussion. In this introduction
Śaṅkara is not bound by any text and can freely
explain the meaning of perhaps
the most original of his ideas-partly coined, it is true,
in order to maintain the unity
of the scriptural texts, but itself not easily justifiable
with the help of scriptural support.
The upodghāta of the Brahmasūtrabhāṣya gives the
best picture of the thought of
Śaṅkara, as it constitutes the ‘free’ introduction to
the work which is (apart from the
Upadeśasāhasrī, which is genuine as it is quoted by
Sureśvara) least bound by the
text it comments upon (because of the
unintelligibility of the Brahmasūtras
themselves). It is therefore always and rightly taken
as the basis for the study of his
system.376
In the upodghāta Śaṅkara defines adhyāsa as follows:
‘the apparent presentation
(avabhāsa) (to consciousness) of something
previously observed (pūrvadṛṣṭa) in
some other thing (paratra), in the form of
remembrance (smṛtirūpah)’.377 Here adhyāsa
is again presented as a mental activity, through
which the higher is not seen in the
lower (as in the above definition), but the previously
observed in the actually
observed. Thus we have previously observed silver
while observing mother-of-pearl
at present. But only if we see mother-of-pearl as
silver or see silver in mother-
376 A detailed and perhaps stylometric study of the
language of the Brahmasūtrabhāṣya, has to
be the standard for judging the authenticity of other
works (a task begun by P. Hacker)-as
Plato's Laws, commonly regarded as his last work,
was taken as a starting point for establishing
the relative chronology of his dialogues.
377 Smṛtirūpaḥ paratra pūrvadṛṣṭāvabhāsaḥ.
J.F. Staal, Advaita and Neoplatonism
117
of-pearl, we superimpose silver upon mother-of-pearl.
This identification is only
called superimposition, in the newly defined sense, if
it is erroneous and subjective:
for instance, if we perceive at present a silver
ornament and see in it the silver which
we perceived before, this is not called
superimposition. As here silver is also
perceived at present, this is actual perception and
not of the nature of remembrance,
as the definition requires (smṛtirūpah). In this way
the additional clause is explained
in the Bhāmatī.378 The addition is very important, as
it stresses the fact that adhyāsa
is subjective and ‘magically-creative’ in the sense in
which identifying meditation is.
Comparing this definition with the above mentioned
definition of ‘meditation-adhyāsa’,
it can be said that it analyses further in one respect
whereas it differs in another
respect. (1) It analyses more deeply because it
observes that, from the point of view
of the agent, an entity A cannot be superimposed
upon an actually perceived entity
B, if A were not previously observed. This stresses
the temporal character of
adhyāsa, which is an activity (and not a situation or a
timeless vision or knowledge).
It also shows that Śaṅkara does not operate with a
priori concepts, which are in a
certain way also superimposed upon the objects.379
(2) The definition of the
metaphysical adhyāsa differs from that of the
meditation-adhyāsa because the
condition, that only the higher should be
superimposed upon the lower, has
disappeared.
This also follows from the context in which the
definition is given. It is preceded by
examples, where the lower is superimposed upon the
higher, such as the
superimposition of the body upon the I (in
expressions like ‘I am the body’, or ‘I am
this’, ahamidam) and it leads to the conclusion that it
is not absurd to superimpose
the non-Self upon the Self.
The upodghāta starts with the observation that to
superimpose upon the subject
(which is the sphere or realm of the notion ‘I’), with
all its attributes, the object (which
is the sphere of the
378 See Thibaut I, 4, n.3.
379 Kant's a priori concepts do neither spring from
experience, nor do they arise without experience:
but as soon as the object is experienced, the a priori
manifests itself as being superimposed
upon it. The discovery of an a priori could be
considered the removal of a superimposition.
J.F. Staal, Advaita and Neoplatonism
118
notion ‘Thou’), with its attributes-and the reverse
likewise has to be considered
erroneous. This is continuously done in everyday life.
Because of this error adhyāsa
is the same as avidyā. Next the full significance of
the metaphysical adhyāsa
becomes manifest: it is superimposition of the non-
Self upon the inner Self
(pratyagātman). It may be understood more
definitely from the following examples:
‘Extra-personal attributes are superimposed upon the
Self if a man considers himself
sound and entire, as long as his wife, children, and so
on are sound and entire.
Attributes of the body are superimposed upon the
Self if a man thinks of himself (his
Self) as stout, lean, fair, as standing, walking or
jumping. Attributes of the
sense-organs, if he thinks ‘I am mute, or deaf, or
one-eyed, or blind’. Attributes of
the internal organ (antaḥkaraṇa) if he considers
himself (his Self) subject to desire,
intention, doubt, determination, and so on. Having
superimposed the producer of
the notion of the ego (ahampratyayin, i.e. the
antaḥkaraṇa) upon the inner Self ....
one superimposes again the inner Self upon the inner
organ, etc. Thus is the nature
of the original adhyāsa, beginningless and endless
(anādirananta), having the form
of an erroneous notion (mithyāpratyayarūpa),380
cause of the fact that the individual
souls are agents and enjoyers (kartṛtva-bhoktṛtva-
pravartaka), observed by everyone
(sarvalokapratyakṣa)’. All this is presupposed in the
level of daily practical activity
(vyavahāra). But, concludes the introduction, the
abolition of this wrong notion which
is the cause of all evil is the purport of all Vedānta
texts; thus will be established
‘the knowledge of the absolute unity of the Self
(ātmaikatva)’.
There is a parallelism here which provides us with a
deeper philosophical explanation
of doctrinal differences: just as Śaṅkara has
combated, in the name of jñāna, the
Mīmāṁsakas with their magical karmavāda and the
karma-background of Indian
thought in general, he shows how a deeper lying
magical activity, superimposition,
causes the situation where all who are in the level of
vyavahāra, will be exempt from
brahmavidyā in their wrong identification of the non-
Self and the Self. The most
subtle of all
380 In Śaṅkara, avidyā is the same as mithyājñāna;
amongst other Advaitins it is its cause: P.
Hacker, Eigentümlichkeitein der Lehre und
Terminologie Śaṅkaras: Avidyā, Nāmarūpa, Māyā,
Īśvara, Zeitschrift der deutschen morgenländischen
Gesellschaft 100 (1950) 246-268; 249.
J.F. Staal, Advaita and Neoplatonism
119
karmas is the superimposing activity, adhyāsa,381
which Śaṅkara combats in the
name of jñāna. He need not fight this concept in
specific groups of human beings,
e.g. the Mīmāṁsakas, but finds it everywhere in
human nature itself, since
superimposition is at the root of human existence.
We do not only fail to reach the
goal when we engage upon the activities of
sacrificing and meditating (these being
additional, secondary superimpositions), but we even
fail when we do not cancel
the deepest activity, i.e., the superimposition of the
non-Self which is presupposed
in all other forms of action.
The addition smṛtirūpaḥ ‘in the form of
remembrance’, underscores the subjective
character of adhyāsa. But adhyāsa necessarily has an
objective character too. In
order to know how far the latter is related to its
subjective character, we may contrast
adhyāsa which is smṛtirūpaḥ with smṛti
‘remembrance’ itself.382 In remembrance we
are conscious of the fact that we are concerned with
a mental image of the past. In
superimposition we do not possess that
consciousness (we are deluded in avidyā)
and we take the mental image as referring to an
extra-mental fact. But what is the
status of the mental image, say, the silver of the
stock-example? In the situation of
superimposing it upon mother-of-pearl, it is neither
real, nor unreal. It is not real,
because it is sublated; but it is not unreal, because it
appears. It is sublated, because
it does not really occur in mother-of-pearl; it appears,
because it is based upon the
past perception of real silver. It is therefore called
anirvacanīya, ‘inexplicable’. If this
holds for the mental image, adhyāsa and avidyā must
necessarily be anirvacanīya
too.383 They neither belong to the category of being,
nor to that of non-being. If avidyā
would be unreal it would not trouble us and we would
not be caught in it; if it would
be real the Absolute would not be the only reality and
we would lose the non-dualistic
position. Therefore, it neither is, nor is not; it
381 Cf. Lacombe o.c. 125: ‘....dans la synthèse
çankarienne avidyā marque la place qui revient
au karman .... l'une et l'autre sont essentiellement
dynamiques ....’
382 See A. Bhattacharya Sastry, o.c. 237 sq.
383 Śaṅkara himself in the sūtrabhāṣya does not
characterise adhyāsa or avidyā as anirvacanīya;
but it occurs there as an attribute of nāmarūpe; see
Hacker, o.c. 255.
J.F. Staal, Advaita and Neoplatonism
120
is of a different category, about which we cannot
speak; it is anirvacanīya.
It is clear that there lies a problem here.384 In fact,
any slightest negation of the
unreality of avidyā attributes being to it and thus
destroys non-dualism.385 In order
to safeguard the advaitic character of Advaita, avidyā
is sometimes called tucchā,
‘non-being’;386 but this holds only for the possessor
of brahmavidyā. The Pañcadaśī
clarifies the position as follows. According to the
ultimate point of view, for the person
who has attained realization, māyā is tucchā, ‘non-
being’; for the metaphysician or
dialectician it is neither real nor unreal
(anirvacanīya); and for the man in the street
it is real (vāstavī).387 One of the main objections of
Rāmānuja against Advaita is the
‘neither-being-nor-non-being’ character of avidyā,
which violates according to
Rāmānuja the law of the excluded third.388 Also
modern critics of Advaita often look
upon anirvacanīya as the weakest point of the
system. But we ought rather to admire
Śaṅkara for the firmness of mind, with which he has
accepted the conclusion, that
multiplicity becomes inexplicable if Brahman is
posited as the only reality. He readily
admits that there are important points which his
system fails to explain, but this is
due to a principal inexplicability based upon the
structure of reality. In other
philosophies we often discover flaws where their
explanation fails. In Advaita these
failures are part of the system.
No term expresses better the magical and erroneous
character of the primary
identification than anirvacanīya. Śaṅkara, having
384 Cf. the ambiguity of anirvacarīzyatva, which can
be interpreted as strength or as weakness.
Rāmānuja formulated in the Śrī Bhāṣya his sapta-
vidha-anupapatti (seven main objections)
against Advaita; but the Advaitins replied: these
objections are bhūṣana ‘ornaments’, not
dūṣaṇia, ‘defects’.
385 Cf. D.H.H. Ingalls, Whose is avidyā? Philosophy
East and West 3 (1953-1954) 69-72, where
it is shown how Śaṅkara always denies any
connection of avidyā with the soul, but nowhere
denies the reality of avidyā itself.
386 e.g. Prakāśānanda: Dasgupta II 224.
387 Pañcadaśī 6.130. See Mahadevan, Philosophy of
Advaita 216.
388 It is perhaps not superfluous to add for the
seekers for parallels that there is no connection
between the Advaitic anirvacanīya and the third
undeclined ‘u’ value of the intuitionism of
L.E.J. Brouwer, which denies the validity of the law of
the excluded third (cf. above I 5: 20, n.
32). Śaṅkara, moreover, seems to accept the
principle of the excluded. third (see below II
13: 136, n. 446) and uses it (e.g. ad 3.1.1, quoted
above II 7 : 81-2). Cf. also Staal, Negation
and the law of contradiction in Indian thought-A
comparative study, Bulletin of the School of
Oriental and African Studies 25 (1962).
J.F. Staal, Advaita and Neoplatonism
121
criticized the magical character of karmic activity as
manifest e.g. in the apūrva of
Mīmāṁsā, and safeguarding the intelligibility of
brahnavidyā and of brahmajñāna,
has descended from the pure realm of the non-dual
Absolute and recognised the
inscrutable character of the activity which causes the
multiplicity of this world.
The characterization of the metaphysical adhyāsa as
superimposition of the non-Self
upon the Self answers more questions than we have
yet asked. Thus it is often
asked in later Advaita what the āśraya, ‘locus’, of
avidyā is. Where does avidyā
exist?389 The jīva cannot be its locus (although this
was the opinion of Vācaspati
Miśra and his followers), as it itself a product of
avidyā. It is clear that the only entity
which is independent from avidyā is Brahman, and
that therefore, if avidyā. has a
locus at all (which must be the case), it must be
Brahman. But this means that
superimposition is of the non-Self upon the Self. That
avidyā has its locus in Brahman
also means that it is the function of avidyā to cover
and to conceal the real nature
of Brahman, just as a cloud hides the sun.
The magical activity of the mind which wrongly
identifies the object with the Absolute
constitutes the superimposition of non-Self upon the
Self. Thus interpreted, human
existence as we know it is superimposition. This
existence arose by superimposition
and it continues by superimposition. In Heidegger's
terminology, superimposition
would be the first ‘Existential’ of ‘Dasein’. The Vedic
sacrifice, which corresponds
to our notion of being in as far as it makes being
accessible and determines being
as being, including the human being of the sacrificer,
led to the interiorised activity
of meditation. Here the newly discovered being
wants to reassure itself of its unity
and continuity and accept differentiations. Hence it
meditates and identifies the
discontinuous. In a next step, the discriminations are
accepted-but as unreal or
inexplicable; the illusory character of identification is
underlined; hence the distrust
of upāsanā and of adhyāsa. Lastly we have arrived at
the doctrine of a universal
erroneous identification, termed adhyāsa, which is a
closer characterization of human
being itself. In its most authentic mode of being, the
rest appears again as illusory
if the ultimate knowledge of being arises.
389 Sec Bhattacharyya op. cit. 288.
J.F. Staal, Advaita and Neoplatonism
122
The ancient interconnectedness of things expressed
in archaic continuity and in the
symbolic pūrṇam requires that all being as we know
it and as it presents itself to us
(i.e. being in the sense of Seiendes, ón, not as
ultimate being, the sat of
saccidānanda) is likewise superimposition. This is the
ultimate significance of the
expression, that the non-Self is superimposed - and
not only that ‘we superimpose’,
which may reveal our nature. Thus adhyāsa, avidyā or
ajñāna has an objective or
ontic aspect, apart from its being the complement of
the gnoseological aspect of
reality exhibited in jñāna or vidyā. For this objective
aspect Śaṅkara has used the
term māyā. Just as jñāna in the ultimate analysis is
the same as Brahman, àjñāna
is also the same as māyā. If in jñāna there is unity of
knowledge, knower and known,
and therefore non-difference from the object,
Brahman - avidyā must necessarily
also be the same as its objective counterpart, māyā.
If māyā is the same as avidya its nature is not at all
fully expressed by the
conventional rendering ‘illusion’. Here another line of
investigation, followed by
several authors, joins our investigation and leads to
the same conclusion. If we
analyse the common denotation of the term māyā,
we do not find anything like
‘illusion’, but rather ‘magically-creative activity’. But
we have tried to show exactly
that the concept of māyā in Advaita expresses the
erroneous identification which
creates this world in a magical sense. Hence the
term māyā was very appropriate,
as can be seen from its meaning before Śaṅkara.390
Not ‘illusion’, but ‘creative activity’ seems to be the
principal meaning of māyā in
the Vedas: ‘the powerful Aśvins, with māyā endowed,
created (heaven and earth).’391
The divine craftsman, who fabricates for instance
tumblers for the Gods, is rich in
māyā.392 Āditya creates the day and night by his
māyā,393 etc. A consideration of the
term māyā also shows that in the Veda ‘there is no
basis for any conception of the
unreality of the world’ (Radhakrishnan). In the
Śvetāśvataropaniṣad Maheśvara is
mūyin, ‘who operates with or who possesses māyā’;
his māyā is pra-
390 The following references are taken from: J.
Gonda, Maya, Tijdschrift voor Philosophie 14
(1952) 3-62.
391 Ṛgveda 10.24.4.
392 id. 53.9.
393 Atharvaveda 13.2.3.
J.F. Staal, Advaita and Neoplatonism
123
kṛti ‘nature’.394 In the Bhagavad Gītā the term
manifests its covering, concealing,
hiding character: ‘I am not easily perceivable for
everybody, being covered by my
yogamāyā.’395
With Gauḍapāda the term comes to possess a more
central philosophical
significance. The meaning of creative (and perhaps
also: deluding) activity remains
essential, e.g., ‘all bodies in the phenomenal world
are projected in the manner of
a dream by the māyā of the Ātman’.396 It is
conspicuous how this could develop into
Śaṅkara's characterization ‘superimposition of the
non-Self upon the Self.’
The subjective aspect (avidyā) can be conceived as
rooted in the human being and
is acceptable from an existential-phenomenological
point of view. This does not
mean that the objective aspect (māyā) is not likewise
acceptable. Phenomenology
is not subjectivism. But the phenomenological
method has to consider avidyā first
and māyā next. That for Śaṅkara both occupy the
same level may be true, but it is
not phenomenologically given. It is a metaphysical
assertion concerning reality,
which we can neither deny, nor take as our
methodological starting point, unless
we are ready to go beyond the phenomenological
approach. Analogously, the
principle of anirvacanīyatva reveals itself first in the
human realm, and subsequently
in the total realm of māyā.
Considering the objective māyā aspect of avidyā, we
have to realize that also this
renders an idealistic interpretation of Advaita
impossible. As we have seen already
from the analysis of the process of perception,
Advaita is quite different from any
kind of subjective idealism:397 the subject does not
create the objective world. It is
true that there is no world outside the Self which is
real; but the Self is not at all the
same as ‘the subject’. The outside world of māyā
does neither depend upon my
avidyā, nor does
394 id. 4.9.10.
395 BG. 7.25.
396 3.10.
397 It should never be forgotten that also Kant did
not propound any subjective idealism, but
critical idealism, which is more ‘criticism’ than
'idealism". As for Śaṅkara, the fact that he
rejects the subjective idealism of Vijñānavāda (ad
2.2.28-32) speaks for itself. Cf. Murti o.c.
313-316; and D.H.H. Ingalls, Śaṅkara's arguments
against the Buddhists. Philosophy East
and West 3 (1953-1954) 291-306.
J.F. Staal, Advaita and Neoplatonism
124
the reverse hold: both are aspects of the same
mysterious activity of adhyāsa. The
approach of Deussen and his endeavour to show the
virtual identity of the Advaita
of Śaṅkara with the doctrines of Kant and
Schopenhauer398 were erroneous and
have led to much misunderstanding of Advaita in the
West. This misunderstanding
rests upon the confusion of the Self with the subject,
as can for instance be seen
from Deussen's account of adhyāsa:399 ‘.... the
Vedanta declared the empirical
concept which represents to us a manifold existing
outside the Self, a world of the
Object existing independently of the subject, to be
glamour (māyā), an innate illusion
(bhrama) resting on an illegitimate transference
(adhyāsa) in virtue of which we
transfer the reality, which alone belongs to the
subject, to the world of the object,
and, conversely, the characteristics of the objective
world, e.g., corporeality, to the
subject, the Self, the Soul.’ Deussen also spoke
erroneously, in connection with
brahmavidyā about an ‘objectless knowing
subject’,400 whereas in fact this knowledge
transcends both subject and object.
The difference from subjective idealism is also
manifest in the characterization of
avidyā as positive -notwithstanding the clanger of
dualism. This positive character
explains that avidyā can cover or conceal Brahman.
This concealment consists in
the fact401 that the jīva is ignorant of its own self-
luminosity. This is one of the marks
of the jīva, as we saw before, on account of the
svayamprakāśatva of jñāna. It seems
that the positive character of avidyā is not yet
stressed in the Sūtrabhāṣya.402 In
general, the later Advaitins seem to have
increasingly substantialized avidyā.
Nevertheless, in Śaṅkara also the substantial aspect
occurs and deserves a closer
analysis.
12. Vivarta, Nāmarūpe
Several adhyāsas have been noticed to which several
āśrayāḥ, ‘loci’, correspond:
the texts speak of superimposition upon an
398 Or of Plato with Kant and Schopenhauer, as was
still more or less the view of Cohen and
Natorp. Cf. above I.8: 27-8.
399 System of Vedanta 43.
400 Rightly criticised by Hiriyanna, Outlines of Indian
Philosophy, 71.
401 Bhattacharyya, o.c. 292.
402 See Hacker, o.c. 254-255.
J.F. Staal, Advaita and Neoplatonism
125
image, upon a king's charioteer, and generally upon
essence (ātman). But ‘essence’
was for instance the element silver in a silver
ornament i.e., what Aristotle called
the material cause. In the Indian terminology the
formal cause is superimposed upon
the material cause and this is a wrong identification
because the formal element is
ultimately unreal. In the case of the king and the
charioteer, it is simply the wrong
name or concept, ‘king’ which is superimposed upon
the king's charioteer: no other
reality whatsoever. These two examples illustrate the
two elements, which are
generally superimposed upon essence: i.e.,
nāmarūpe, ‘(the world of) names and
forms.’ Śaṅkara called avidyā or adhyāsa, anādi
‘beginningless’ and ananta,
‘endless’. This can be specified by the fact that there
are avyākṛte nāmarūpe,
‘unmanifest names and forms,’ and vyākrte
nāmarūpe ‘manifest names and forms.’
They denote respectively the material cause of the
world403 and the phenomenal
world as it appears.404 Śaṅkara says that avidyā
‘makes’ the nāmarūpe, which ‘fixes’
them ‘upon’, ‘attaches’ them ‘to’, ‘throws’ them
‘over’ the essence (Ātman).405 All this
activity is superimposition, and since this is a
temporal activity, whereas the
nāmarūpe which are māyā are beginningless and
endless, the nāmarūpe are called
avyākṛte before the superimposition and vyākṛte
afterwards. He quotes406 as scriptural
support for this ‘in the beginning this was that only
which is not’407 and ‘non-existent
(asat) indeed this was in the beginning.’408 Here not
absolute non-existence is meant,
but ‘only a different quality or state, viz., the state of
names and forms being
unmanifest, which state is different from the state of
names and forms being
manifest.’ And also: ‘the designation of ‘non-
existence’ applied to the effect before
its production has reference to a different state of
being merely. And as those things
which are distinguished by name and form are in
ordinary language called ‘existent’,
the term ‘non-existent’ is figuratively applied to them
to denote the state in which
they were previously to their differentiation.’
403 ‘Nāmarūpe als Urstoff’: Hacker, o.c. 258. The
avyākṛte nāmarūpe are once called prakṛt (ad.
2. 1.1.14).
404 ‘Nāmarūpe als Erscheinungswelt’; 259.
405 Id. 264.
406 Ad. 2.1.17.
407 CU. 3.19.1.
408 Taitt, Up. 2.7.
J.F. Staal, Advaita and Neoplatonism
126
What strikes us in this way of thought is the
continuity; it is the idea that nothing can
come out of nothing, and that for this reason and in
this sense only the world is
beginningless and endless. This solves at the same
time another difficulty. If adhyāsa
is not a situation but an activity, or at any rate nearer
to the second concept than to
the first, the question arises as to when this activity
took place; whether it was for
instance a unique occurrence comparable to creation
in the monotheistic religions.
Although it is an activity, it has a continuous,
everlasting and also omnipresent
character. The only thing that ‘happens’ through it is
that the unmanifest becomes
manifest. When looked upon from the Absolute,
nothing happens at all. This is why
adhyāsa could be called anādirananta. The erroneous
identification by which a world
of names and forms seems to come into being is a
continuous ephemeral
phenomenon, superimposing itself upon Brahman
but not affecting Brahman.
Thus we find the archaic continuity back in the
celebrated Advaitic doctrine that the
effect is only an illusory imposition upon the cause,
or, popularly speaking, the
opinion that nothing comes out of nothing. A specific
form of the universal adhyāsa
is that we superimpose upon what we call ‘causes’
other entities which we call
‘effects.’ As the superimposition is erroneous, the
effects are unreal and the causes
are no causes. Because of this specific form of our
adhyāsa we create a world of
change and causality by supposing that the cause
transforms itself into the effect
(pariṇāma); it seems to us (this is the satkāryavāda or
parināmavada of the Sāṁkhya
system409) that there is always a material cause
which manifests itself in different
forms. The truth is that the forms are superimposed,
i.e., neither real, nor unreal,
but anirvacanīya. In connection with this view of
causality, a special technical term
for adhyāsa is introduced in post-Śaṅkara Advaita:
vivarta. This may be defined as
adhyāsa of the effect upon the cause. satkāraṇavada
is therefore also called
vivartavāda.
These indications may be further specified by a
closer examination of some of the
texts. The examples with the help of which
satkāraṇavāda or vivartavāda is illustrated
are mostly
409 A system which Śaṅkara generally combats (ad.
2.1.1-2; 2.2.1-10); its pariṇāmavada, as we
will see, implicitly.
J.F. Staal, Advaita and Neoplatonism
127
taken from the material realm. We are here
concerned with an evaluation and not
with a phenomenological observation: when it seems
that the clay is transformed
into a jar, we can either attach a higher value to the
material cause (clay) and look
upon the form as ephemeral (as Śaṅkara does), or we
can evaluate the form more
highly and speak of the creation of something new,
the jar. This shows that the way
in which we conceive of causation is a priori and
depends on us rather than on the
phenomena. Because of this we are entitled to say
that the archaic universal desire
for continuity continues to live in satkāraṇavāda. But
in addition to that we have also
to note that our rational thinking cannot accept
creation out of nothing, which makes
a very irrational impression. Satkāraṇaväda is
therefore more rational. Rationality
requires continuity. Satkäraṇavāda or vivartavāda,
therefore, depend on a mental
status and on a rational or rationalizing attitude, not
on phenomenological data. We
shall discuss this below and note that there is much
in common with Aristotle's
doctrine of ‘potentiality’ and ‘actuality’.
Śaṅkara discusses causality at length in the
commentary upon the apparently
creationistic passages of the Bṛhadāraṇyaka
beginning with ‘there was nothing
whatsoever here in the beginning’.410 K.C.
Bhattacharyya analysed this passage411
and we may refer for further details to his discussion.
Śaṅkara says that ‘nothing’
should not be conceived as a mere void (śūnya), but
rather as ‘something’. This
follows from the scriptural context and also from the
eternity of both cause and effect.
Elaborate proofs for both views are given. Even if the
text seems to speak about a
kind of creation, Śaṅkara infers ‘the existence of
cause and effect before creation’.
In this way the idea of creation become meaningless.
The eternity of the cause is
plausible when we regard cause as material cause,
as Śaṅkara does, and take the
example of the clay. For clay continues to exist in the
jar. This is subsequently
generalised. The eternity of the effect is less obvious.
But according to Śaṅkara
existence refers only to the manifest state, whereas
the effect exists in the cause
in the unmanifest state as the form of the jar
previous to its production in the clay.
It seems that the term ‘unmanifest’ in this case has
no meaning at all. But even if it
410 naiveha kimcanāgra āsīt; BAU. 1.2.1.
411 K.C. Bhattacharyya, Studies in Vedantism,
Calcutta 1909, 26-28.
J.F. Staal, Advaita and Neoplatonism
128
were meaningful, we are speaking at the level of
māyā as if this world of names and
forms and of causes and effects existed. Actually it is
anirvacanīya and in Brahman
neither cause nor effect has any meaning.
Analogously Śaṅkara shows that what
is in the future and not in the present is not non-
existent, but only unmanifest. If
objects lastly would not be eternally existent how
would foreknowledge of God or
of the yogin be possible?
‘This elaborate discussion of causality’, concludes
Bhattacharyya, ‘leads to the
recognition of Brahman as the material cause of the
universe and of the primal hiding
principle, co-eternal with Brahman, viz., māyā, which
by itself is nothing, like the
blue tint which seems to pervade objects viewed
through blue glasses.412 But he
adds, that the ‘dynamic principle’ he has been
seeking for ‘remains undiscovered’.
This will occupy us again.413 That Brahman is the
material cause of the universe414
is more in accordance with strict non-dualism than
calling avidyā positive or stressing
the nāmarūpa-prakṛti, which is extremely near to
Sāṁkhya. It expresses the same
as the doctrine of super-imposition of the
‘inessential’ upon essence. To say that
Brahman (or Īu347 .vara: see below) is the material
cause of the universe is the same
as saying that Brahman is the āu347 .raya of all
superimpositions.
The same problems-though with less emphasis upon
the theory of causation-are
discussed in the Chādogyopaniṣdbhāu7779 .ya.
First415 the Upaniṣad says: ‘just as
through a lump of clay, all that is made of clay would
become known;-all products
being due to words, a mere name; the clay alone is
real....’; and Śaṅkara adds: ‘the
product (effect) is non-different from its (material)
cause....it exists in name only’.
This shows that it is irrelevant whether the apparent
difference in the effect is ascribed
to the form or to the name; both have the same
function and are erroneously
superimposed upon the one and only real material
cause.416 When discussing the
question whether there
412 Id. 28.
413 See below II. 14: 149.
414 Cf. also ad. 1.4. 23-27.
415 CU. 6.1.4.
416 With the theory of causation in Śaṅkara it is as
with the concept of metaphysics, especially
in scholastic philosophy; when he speaks about
pariṇāmavāda the term cause may refer to
cause in general or to the saguṇabrahman, and when
he speaks about vivartavada it may
likewise denote cause in general or the
nirguṇabrahman. Thus when we speak about being,
it may either denote being in general (in the
metaphysica generalis: ontology), or it may denote
the divine being (in the metaphysica specialis:
theology).
J.F. Staal, Advaita and Neoplatonism
129
was being or non-being in the beginning, he refutes
the Vaiśeṣika asatkāryavāda,
‘the doctrine that the effect is non-existent before its
production’. But not only the
Vaiśeṣika asatkāryavāda (which is obviously
unacceptable to Advaita) but also the
Śāṁkhya satkäryaväda has to be refuted. The
differences between these two is
brought out more clearly by later Advaitins than by
Śaṅkara himself. The latter seems
for instance inconsistent when he explains the fact,
that Brahman is the material
cause of the universe, with the term: pariṇāmāt,
‘because of transformation’, following
the term of the sūtra upon which he comments.417 A
later commentator,
Nārāyaṇānanda Sarasvatī, therefore says that in this
passage pariṇāma denotes
vivarta. It would also be possible to interpret
Brahman in this passage as
saguṇabrahman, as is done elsewhere when it is
said:418 ‘The view of Brahman as
undergoing modifications will, moreover, be of use in
the devout meditations on the
saguṇabrahman’. It would be rather confusing if the
qualification saguṇa had been
left out in the present context. On the other hand,
the explanation of this pariṇāmāt
in the commentary sounds more like vivartavāda
than like pariṇāmavāda. ‘The Self,
although in full existence previously to the action,
modifies itself into something
special, viz., the Self of the effect. Thus we see that
causal substances, such as
clay and the like, are, by undergoing the process of
modification, changed into their
products’. The term ‘Self of the effect’ seem to point
in the direction of vivartavāda,
the second sentence again in the direction of
pariṇāmavāda. No reference is made
to the saguṇabrahman, but only to cause in general.
In Śaṅkara the terms pariṇāma
and vivarta did not yet possess the specific technical
meaning which they would
later possess.
The position is clearer in a section entirely devoted to
the problem of causality,419
from which several important passages have been
quoted already. The Chāndogya
passage420 is discussed
417 1.4.26.
418 e.g. Ad. 2.1.4. last Unes.
419 Ad. 2.1.14-20.
420 6.1.4.
J.F. Staal, Advaita and Neoplatonism
130
again.421 The products of causation are non-
different from the original situation,
because ‘in as far as they are (new) names they are
untrue; in as far as they are
clay they are true.’ Many objections are again
answered, including familiar ones. If
there is non-difference of effect and cause and
nothing but absolute unity, what
happens to the scriptural injunctions and
prohibitions? What of the pramāṇas? What
of the distinction between teacher and pupil? The
answer is also familiar: ‘These
objections we reply, do not damage our position
because the entire complex of
phenomenal existence is considered as true as long
as the knowledge of Brahman
being the Self of all has not arisen; .... For as long as
a person has not reached the
true knowledge of the unity of the Self, so long it
does not enter his mind that the
world of effects with its means and objects of right
knowledge and its results of
actions is untrue....’ The dialectic of causality is
foreshadowed by Gaudapāda in his
kārikās, for which reference may be made to
Mahadevan's discussion.422
The apparently contradicting statements of Śaṅkara
can be explained by holding
(though Śaṅkara himself is nowhere so explicit) that
pariṇāmavāda applies to
saguṇabrahman and vivartavāda to nirguṇabrahman.
Saguṇabrahman is called the
material cause of the universe, and not
nirguṇabrahman. This is in accordance with
the fact that in the Vivaraṇa school Īśvara is called
the material cause of the
universe.423 Likewise the saguṇabrahman is meant
when Brahman is called the
efficient cause (nimitta karaṇa) of the world.424 The
nirguṇabrahman cannot be called
a cause and stands in no relation to this world. In the
taṭaṣṭha-lakṣaṇa, ‘definition
by accidents’ it is called ‘that from which the origin,
subsistence and dissolution of
this world proceed’, as in the second sūtra:
janmādyasya yataḥ, where janmādi
means: ‘janman, utpatti (birth, origin), sthiti
(subsistence, conservation) and bhaṅga,
nāśa, pralaya (dissolution, destruction).425 In other
words, Brahman is not the
421 Ad. 2.1.14.
422 Gaudapāda, Chapter VI: ‘Non-origination’.
423 Siddhāntaleśasaṁgraha II 13-14 ap. Mahadevan,
The Philosophy of Advaita 179; cf. id.
184-187.
424 Cf. ad. I.4.23: prakṛtiśca...., ‘the material cause
also....’, which is interpreted as referring to
the nimitta karaṇa.
425 Ad. 1.1.2.
J.F. Staal, Advaita and Neoplatonism
131
cause but the locus upon which all causal
connections are super-imposed through
the erroneous activity of avidyā
These ideas are closely connected with the ancient
ideas of karma and with the
Vedic sacrifice. Only the Absolute is really
transcendent. Pariṇāmavāda expresses
the ideas of saṁsara, of transmigration and of the
efficacy of the sacrifice (cf. also
the digestion of the food, which could be called
pariṇāma). Vivartavāda, on the other
hand, expresses that we can attain release from
saṁsāra, from karma and from
rebirth. Śaṅkara says that ‘the works of him who
knows Brahman are extinguished,’426
otherwise it would follow ‘that he must necessarily
enjoy the fruits of his works and
thus cannot obtain release.’ Likewise all sin is
extinguished. It is characteristic of
mokṣa and accounts for its desirability (though desire
would not bring it nearer it is
nevertheless a necessary condition: mumukṣutvam):
‘and his works are extinguished’,
as the Muṇḍakopaniṣad says.427
Also in as far as it is opposed to the idea of creation,
the doctrine of the
non-difference of cause and effect is closely related
to the Vedic concepts. Doctrines
like pariṇāmavāda and vivartavāda were virtually
contained in many Vedic modes
of thought.428 This explains the relative rareness (in
comparison with other religious
mythologies) of creation myths in the Veda429 and
also the fact that creation is
replaced by, for instance, sacrifice (‘the rain, the
food, the sperm, etc., are originated
from sacrifices’). Creation in general is also looked
upon as a sacrifice (Prajāpati).
In refuting creation the great predecessor of Śaṅkara
was Gaudapāda. According
to him, the creation texts of śruti are merely a device
(upāya) to introduce the true
teaching which relates to the non-dual reality.430
The saprapañca is only a
426 Ad. [Link].
427 kṣīyante cāsya karināṇi: Mund Up. 2.2.5 quoted
Ad. 4.1.14.
428 Cf. above II 5.
429 Renou and Filliozat noticed the relative rareness
of creation myths in the Veda and the relative
frequency of vegetation hymns. The latter, related to
the Indian climate, are typically
continuity-myths, often possessing a cyclical
character (cf. M. Eliade, Le mythe de l'éternel
retour, Archétypes et répétition. Paris 1949).
430 Kārikā 3.15 ap. Mahadevan, Gauḍapāda, 129.
J.F. Staal, Advaita and Neoplatonism
132
means; the niṣprapañca is the end.431 The main
doctrine of Gauḍapāda, for which
he adduces several arguments, is ajāti, ‘non-
origination.’432
Śaṅkara is equally explicit and clear on this point: for
him creation (‘with its ether,
air, etc.’) is unreal.433 In the commentary upon one
sūtra he deals almost exclusively
with creation.434 Here the pūrvapakṣin mentions a
number of apparently conflicting
scriptural passages. Śaṅkara reconciles them partly
(about the principle of such
reconciliation we shall speak below), but concludes
with the remark: ‘And, to consider
the matter more thoroughly, a conflict of statements
regarding the world does not
even matter greatly, since the creation of the world
and similar topics are not at all
what scripture wishes to teach. For we neither
observe nor are told by scripture that
the welfare of man (puruṣārtha) depends on these
matters in any way; nor have we
the right to assume such a thing; because we
conclude from the introductory and
concluding clauses that the passages about the
creation and the like form only
subordinate members of passages treating of
Brahman’. Elsewhere, the relative
validity of the concept of creation is shown by
referring to a number of consecutive
creations (with their respective dissolutions, pralaya),
which are ‘essentially’ the
same and which are embedded in the karma-
doctrine: ‘As therefore each new
creation is (nothing but) the result of the religious
merit and demerit (of the animated
beings of the preceding creation), it is produced with
a nature resembling that of the
preceding creation.’435
All this holds for the human being too. Human being
is characterized by
superimposition; superimposing, it creates a world of
names and forms and of causes
and effects. This creation is only a manifestation of
avidyā and māyā. The change
which a human being may cause or introduce cannot
be said to be real- though it
may not be possible to call it unreal either. Human
being itself does therefore not
change either; all change is anirva-
431 3.26 ibid. 130.
432 See Mahadevan, Chap. VI.
433 Ad. 3.2.4.
434 1.4.14.
435 Ad. 1.3.30.
J.F. Staal, Advaita and Neoplatonism
133
canīya. This is realized by whoever has attained
brahmavidyā: then everything
becomes nothing, tucchā. This is not a transformation
but the mere realization of
an eternal reality, which was temporarily hidden on
account of inexplicable reasons.
13. Vyavahāra and paramārtha
One of the most important Advaitic doctrines is the
doctrine of vyavahāra and
paramārtha. This doctrine is related to the distinction
between paravidyā and
aparavidyā and correspondingly between
parabrahman and aparabrahman.
Westerners need special introduction to this topic as
they are likely to look without
sympathy upon such a doctrine for reasons which we
shall have to study too.436
Some illuminating remarks regarding this can be
found in the short introduction to
K.C. Bhattacharyya's book and can be recommended
to every Western student of
Indian Philosophy.
Vedānta in general has a triple scriptural basis, the
prasthānatraya consisting of
Upaniṣads, Bhagavad Gītā and Brahmasūtra. Advaita
is presented as the
systematised philosophy which is embodied in these
texts. For convenience the
doctrine of revelation or apauruṣeyatva of these
texts will be disregarded and the
ṛṣis or other human beings will be considered as their
authors. This restriction will
later be removed. The question then arises as to
whether the claim that Vedānta
embodies the metaphysical views of these texts
means, that every ‘author’ of an
Upaniṣad adhered to Advaita Vedānta. This would
repeatedly lead to difficulties
(e.g., in connection witli the Gïtä).437 But this seems
not to have been Śaṅkara's
intention either. According to Bhattacharyya,438
‘Śāndilya, the teacher of the
Śāṇḍilya-vidyā in the Chāndogya Upaniṣad, may not
have ‘looked upon his doctrine
as anything else but a statement of the highest truth
accessible to man’, ‘but that is
no reason why Śaṅkara may not look upon it as the
inferior wisdom.’ This shows
clearly that Śaṅkara did not claim to give a
436 See e.g. Thibaut in the introduction to his
translation. Also Rāmānuja criticised this doctrine
vehemently. See further below III. 7.
437 See above II 8: 95 sq.
438 o.c. viii.
J.F. Staal, Advaita and Neoplatonism
134
historical interpretation, i.e., an interpretation in
which he tried to reconstruct the
intentions of a historical author. He did not give
commentaries but explanations by
constructing a philosophical system on the basis of
which every textual statement
can be explained and understood. Historians
generally misunderstand this since
they look upon Advaita also as a historical system
(‘as a historic curiosity rather
than a recipe for the human soul’ says
Bhattacharyya).439 But only when we fully
realize that Advaita claims to be true440 are we able
to accept that it must in that
case attempt to explain everything, including
Upaniṣadic statements, whether the
contents of the latter themselves embody the
Advaitic wisdom or only a ‘lower’
wisdom.441 The lower wisdom must be such that it
can in principle be extended to
the higher wisdom: it may not be incompatible with it
as for instance the Bauddha
doctrines can be. There is no scope for questioning
the sincerity of the bhāṣyakāra
with regard to the author: Śaṅkara did never hold
that Śaṇḍilya was an Advaitin who
for opportunistic reasons (as, e.g., Rāmakṛṣṇa
Paramahaṁsa) expounded at a
certain occasion the lower wisdom-e.g., because of
the limited spirituality of his
audience. Śaṅkara simply looked upon Śāṇḍilya
himself as a man of limited
spirituality. śaṅkara himself admits elsewhere that
the Ṛgveda ‘and so on’ constitutes
only the lower wisdom.442 This view solves the
difficulty of historical interpretation
and of sincerity. If this interpretation is right, we
ought to translate bhāṣya not by
commentary but by explanation. This seems feasible:
Gītābhāsya, would mean
‘explanation of the Gītā’ i.e., explanation that the
views expounded in the Gītā are
not incompatible with the views of Advaita
Vedānta.443 What holds for Śaṅkara is
likely to hold also for the Ācāryas of the rival schools
of Vedānta.444
439 id. v.
440 Cf. above 1.3. A.
441 Even the different types of Upaniṣadic seers
ought, in principle, to be explained (as Jaspers
tries to do for Western philosophy in his ‘Psychologie
der Weltanschaungen’, referred to
below).
442 Ad. 1.2.21.
443 Cf. the terminological differences sometimes
made between bhāṣya, ṭīkā and vārtiha, where
the maximal freedom is allotted to the bhāṣya.
Compare the differences between the
‘commentaries’ upon Aristotle by Alexander
Aphrodisias, Ibn Rushd, Thomas Aquinas, or Sir
David Ross.
444 It is the same case, mutatis mutantis, with Śrī
Aurobindo. When he says ahout Śaṅkara that
he ‘stresses the aspect of the divine unity’ and of the
Buddha that he ‘stresses the phenomenal
character, which is an aspect of this world’, he would
do a grave injustice to the personalities
of Śaṅkara and of the Buddha, who did not ‘stress
aspects’ but who stood for their respective
doctrines as total and not partial explanations of
reality. But Aurobindo's view becomes
acceptable, whether we agree with it or not, if we
understand it as an attempt to explain the
philosophies and personalities of Śaṅkara and of
Buddha in the light of his own philosophy.
J.F. Staal, Advaita and Neoplatonism
135
This view can also be held when we accept the divine
origin, apauruṣeyatva, of the
text, as the term śruti demands. In that case we need
not assume that all the seers
have received complete revelations: many, or even
all, may have been partially
enlightened. Śaṅkara's system can be described as
an attempt to reconstruct on
the basis of partial revelations and with the help of
other pramāṇas, the real content
of the transcendental divine wisdom (paramārthika
paravidyā).
This practice of the bhāṣyas (and we have to be more
explicit in this respect than
Śaṅkara himself was), is related to the treatment
which philosophers generally give
to their colleagues. Aristotle for example reviews in
the first book of the Metaphysics
the Pre-Socratics and Plato, from the standpoint of
the causes he discovered himself.
Hegel interprets the previous philosophies as steps
leading to his own doctrine445
and explains this entire process itself as the
unfolding of Reason. Heidegger never
fails to explain why doctrines which he combats (e.g.
Descartes or Hegel) had
nevertheless to come into being. Jaspers, lastly, in
his ‘Psychologie der
Weltanschaungen’ uses the same practice
systematically.
Historians are nevertheless, right when they reject
most of these interpretations as
unhistorical. It would indeed not be wise to study the
Pro-Socratics exclusively from
Aristotle, Hegel or Nietzsche-nor the Upaniṣads
exclusively from Śaṅkara, Rāmānuja
or Madhva. But philosophers may see more deeply
than historians.
A doctrine like Advaita, which denies the reality of
everything other than Brahman,
i.e., which denies itself, its expression, its reasoning,
its teaching, its teachers and
its pupils-in short, everything which enters our
consciousness in as far as we have
not yet
445 Cf. again Aurobindo.
J.F. Staal, Advaita and Neoplatonism
136
entered brahmavidyā-such a doctrine cannot abstain
from discussing the unreality
to which it claims to belong itself. Advaita accordingly
enters the anirvacanīya world
of māyā and of avidyā and deals with many of the
problems which present
themselves there. The true answer to all these
problems is always the same: they
do not exist, as only the Absolute exists. But such
answers would fail to satisfy us,
and answers are therefore given at the practical level
of unreality to which the
problems belong as much as we ourselves. Unless
Advaita would be altogether
silent this is an unavoidable but useful compromise
with the ‘world’. This explains
that the Absolute is in one place declared
nirguṇabrahman while elsewhere the
saguṇabrahman is accepted and discussed; or
vivartavāda is established as the
only truth about causation, while elsewhere
pariṇāmavāda is accepted and discussed.
In general there are a higher and a lower wisdom,
para and aparavidyā. ‘Lower
wisdom’ or ‘lower knowledge’ are here euphemistic
expressions: ultimately they are
avidyā. This follows from the principle of the excluded
third which Śaṅkara never
denies.446 In reality the saguṇabrahman does not
exist and the pariṇāmavāda does
not hold. The two levels, in which these two kinds of
wisdom of knowledge reside
and in which the explanations take place, are called
paramārthika ‘the absolutely
real (level)’ and vyāvahārika ‘the practical (level)’.
They have necessarily to obtain
in any philosophy which denies the reality of the
world in which we live and which
contains us, but which nevertheless presents itself as
a philosophy. It existed before
Śaṅkara in Nāgārjuna's distinction of
paramārthasatya, ‘absolute truth’, and
saṁvṛtisatya, ‘apparent truth’.
Unlike Nāgārjuna447 Śaṅkara has a second and
equally important reason to adopt
the view of two levels: he has to explain the
446 Cf. II. 11: 120, n. 388. Cf. the term śabdāntaram
and context Ad. 3.2.21 in fine. Cf. also
Śrutisārasamuddharana (by a pupil of Śaṅkara) 149-
150; ‘an intermediary entity between sat
and asat does not exist’. P. Hacker, Untersuchungen
über texte des frühen Advaitavāda, 1.
Die Schüler Śaṅkara's Akademie der Wiss. und der
Lit., Abhandl. der Geistes- und
Sozialwissenschaftlichen Klasse, 26 Mains-Wiesbaden
1950, 2069. Later the catuṣkoṭi (sat,
asat, sat and asat, neither sat nor asat) are accepted
as possible categories.
447 This fact has to be taken into account when it is
investigated in how far Śaṅkara (or his
paramaguru Gauḍapāda) might have been influenced
by the great śūnyavādin, whose doctrine
he combats (e.g. Ad. 2.2.18, 21). It is true that he
combats other Buddhist schools more
extensively: the Sarvāstivāda Ad. 2.2.18-27 and the
Vijñānavāda Ad. 2.2.28-32. C. above II.
11: 123, n. 397; Ingalls, Śaṅkara's arguments against
the Buddhists and Murti, o.c. 312-313.
J.F. Staal, Advaita and Neoplatonism
137
scripture. Since roughly speaking two main views
occur there, the best device is to
explain their discrepancy by declaring one view as
absolutely true and the other as
apparently true. The latter view is in fact untrue, but
practically speaking a lower
view which can be looked upon as a step towards the
higher view. In the Upaniṣads
for example we find niṣprapañca and saprapañca
views:448 the first is absolutistic,
non-dualistically inclined, looks upon the divine as
quality-less and is akin to
vivartavāda; the second is realistic, creationist,
dualistic, looks upon the divine as
quahiied and is akin to pariṇāmavāda. The first is
impersonalistic, the second more
personalistic. Śaṅkara's Advaita is the culmination of
the first view, but the
metaphysical structure of his absolutism enables him
to interpret the second view
as lower wisdom. This explains that we see that
Śaṅkara so often subordinates
other views, without rejecting them. There are
however also views which are explicitly
rejected and others which are chosen and
preferred:449 Śaṅkara can be
uncompromising.450 Nevertheless he has with the
help of this distinction ‘synthesized’
the scriptural doctrines. He speaks therefore about
samanvaya ‘concord (of the
texts)’, commenting upon the fourth sūtra; tat tu
samanvayāt, ‘but that (Brahman is
to be known from scripture), because there is
concord’.451 This is explained in the
commentary as follows: ‘i.e., all the texts of the
Vedānta are concordant (samanugata)
in establishing the same meaning and in tending
towards the same aim (tātparya)’.
448 Hiriyanna (Outlines of Indian philosophy)
classifies the Upaniṣadic doctrines thus.
449 Śrī Aurobindo goes much further in rejecting
nothing and subordinating everything. There is
a general modern tendency, widespread all over the
world but especially in India, to do this.
But when support for the all-encompassing attitude,
which is more syncretistic than
synthesizing, is sought in Śaṅkara, it is forgotten that
he vehemently and uncompromisingly
attacked Buddhism, Nyaya, Vaiśeṣika, Sāṁkhya, etc.
450 Cf. also in connection with the two levels,
Śaṅkara's criticism of the view of Bhartṛprapañca
and BAU. 5.1.1. (transl. Swami Madhavananda 804-
805).
451 Thibaut translates samanvayāt: ‘because it is
connected (with the Vedānta texts) as their
purport’; Renou, more rightly, ‘parce qu'il ya
concordance’.
J.F. Staal, Advaita and Neoplatonism
138
There are however views which cannot be
understood properly and adequately
when interpreted as ‘lower wisdom’, as for instance
the view that the divine is qualified
meaning not only that the divine is qualified, but also
that anything which is not
qualified is not the divine and is not higher or more
perfect than it. Recognizing the
legitimacy of the interpretation of this view prevents
it from being regarded as ‘lower
wisdom’ along with a ‘higher wisdom’ concerning a
quality-less divine. Because of
his compromising attitude Śaṅkara comes to
misinterpret other views, and though
this does not matter very much when historical
interpretation is concerned, it becomes
very important when an attempt is made (as often
throughout the history of Advaita)
to prove the supremacy of Advaita over
contemporary or later systems (e.g.
Viśiṣṭadvaita) by allotting a ‘lower’ place to those
system and by subordinating, but
not rejecting them. This apparently powerful weapon
of apologetics is often bound
to fail, as it rejects the exclusiveness which is
essential for many doctrines (e.g., the
saguṇa-doctrine of Viśiṣṭādvaita is essentially
incompatible with a higher
nirguṇa-wisdom). These problems will occupy us
again.
The Upaniṣads provide us with a distinction between
higher and lower knowledge
as applicable to the higher and lower Brahman
respectively.452 They do not state,
however, that this duality should be utilized for the
interpretation of the Upaniṣadic
texts themselves. Śaṅkara clearly goes beyond
scripture453 by adopting a standard
with the help of which he explains the scriptural texts
themselves. This need not
imply that he was necessarily influenced by
śūnyavāda (though this is of course
possible), but shows that both Nāgārjuna and Śaṅkara
adopted on metaphysical
grounds the same view of two levels. So there is a
metaphysical and a historical
reason for the theory of two levels. Next Śaṅkara's
own formulation of this doctrine
may be examined.
‘Two kinds of knowledge,’ says the Ācārya,454 ‘are
enjoined... a lower and a higher
one. Of the lower one it is said that it
452 See e.g., Svetāśvātaropanisad, 5.
453 Cf. Thibaut's introduction; esp. cviii sq., together
with the remark about Thibaut's opinion
concerning māyā, in Bhattacharyya's introduction,
viii.
454 Ad, 1.2.21.
J.F. Staal, Advaita and Neoplatonism
139
comprises the Ṛgveda and so on, and the text
continues455 “the higher knowledge
is that by which the indestructible (akṣara) is
apprehended”.’ Two remarks come to
our mind: if Śaṅkara looks upon ‘the Ṛgveda and so
on’ (ṛgvedädi), which probably
comprises the entire śruti with the exception of the
Upaniṣads (and perhaps also
smṛti apart from the Bhagavad Gītā and the
Brahmasutras) as ‘lower wisdom’, i.e.,
in reality as avidyā-this implies that (1) there is no
harm in looking upon a sage like
Śāṇḍilya as a person of limited spirituality; and (2)
there is in as far as the problem
of authority is concerned, not so much a
philosophical as a practical difference with
Buddhism, which rejected śabdapramāṇa alltogether.
For the greater part of the
scripture Śaṅkara does in fact the same (calling it
compromisingly and
euphemistically lower wisdom), while on the other
hand the Buddha could also have
found scriptural support in the Vedic tradition. This
did not concern the Buddha
whereas Śaṅkara had in addition to a philosophical
aim also ‘worldly’ aim, i.e.,
restoring the unity of Hinduism.
That the latter aim was attained was not due to the
purely metaphysical pāramārthika
doctrine of Advaita, but to its compromising and
synthesizing attitude in the practical,
vyāvahārika realm. Śaṅkara did not reject any part of
the Vedic tradition and was
therefore welcomed by all who regarded themselves
as followers of the sanātana
dharma. Śaṅkara's philosophical compromise with the
vyāvahārika realm is
connected with the fact that he was not a secluded
cave-dwelling sage, as some
picture him, but an active and creative mind and a
great organiser, who, in a short
life, established according to tradition the four
maṭhas at ŚṚṅgeri, Puri, Dvāraka
and Badrināth (and perhaps another one at
Kāñcīpuram), expelled Buddhism from
Indian soil, founded the six ‘cults’ still preponderant
in Hinduism,456 established the
main orders of saṁnyāsa, kept Tantrism within limits
and expelled magical practices
which had become abundant.457 In addition he was
so sincere
455 It is not known which text; in the context Śaṅkara
quotes the Muṇḍakopaniṣad several times.
456 Śaiva, Vaiṣṇava, Śākta, Saurya, Ganapatīya,
Kaumāra.
457 Cf. above II 10: 110, n. 357. This is the traditional
account partly basect upon the
Śaṅkaradigvijaya. It has little additional evidence to
support it. Śaṅkara did not defeat Mīmāṁsā
which is still the philosophic presupposition of Hindu
orthodoxy, or rather: orthopraxy (‘right
practice’: see J.F. Staal in: Kairos. Zeitschrift für
Religionswissenschaft und Theologie 4 (1959)
215-8) is itself primarily a Mīmāṁsā concept. Mīmāṁsā
is especially strong in Śaṅkara's
birthplace Kerala, called karmabhūmi despite
Śaṅkara's lifelong struggle against the
entanglement by karma.
J.F. Staal, Advaita and Neoplatonism
140
in his compromising attitude458 that he composed a
number of devotional (bhākta)
hymns,459 in which the saguṇa aspects of the deity
are praised. We do not know
which of these are authentic and which are
spurious.460 In all these respects it is
clear that the vyāvahārika realm is an important
aspect of Advaita. The paradox
therefore arises that a doctrine summarized in the
words jaganmithyā ‘the world is
false’ is expounded by a jagadguru or ‘world
teacher’.461
By his attempts to establish Hinduism as a ‘national’
religion Śaṅkara shows how
in India philosophy influences not only the individual
(as is often stressed) but also
the country.462 Despite these vyāvahārika efforts,
the pāramārthika realm denies
uncompromisingly that any effort of karma may lead
to brahmavidyā. Almost all
Advaitins therefore reject samuccayavāda.463 The
later Advaitins pay less attention
to the vyāvahārika realm, which comes under the
jurisdiction of Mīmāṁsā. The aim
of Mīmāṁsā in the vyāvahārika realm is called svarga,
whereas the pāramārthika
realm is the realm of mokṣa: ‘for the distinction of
higher and lower knowledge is
made on account of the diversity of their results, the
former leading to more worldly
exaltation, the latter to absolute bliss’.464 All
concepts related to karma and meditation,
to Vedic injunctions etc., are transferred to the lower
level. The terms Pīrva and
Uttara Mīmāṁsā are generally interpreted by
Advaitins as referring to the lower and
the higher level respectively. Whosoever is incapable
of realizing the nirguṇabrahman
belongs to the vyāvahārika level and is hence bound
by all that holds and is
applicable in this level. ‘The lower knowledge which
comprises the Ṛgveda and so
on is mentioned preliminary to the knowledge of
Brahman for the mere purpose of
glorifying the
458 This is rightly stressed by H. Zimmer in:
Philosophies of India, London 1951, 460-1.
459 Cf. for example Thomas Aquinas.
460 Cf. above II 11: 116, n. 376.
461 This title is given to the present Śaṅkarācāryas of
the maṭhas.
462 See further Belvalkar, Lectures on Vedanta, 239.
463 See above II 8: 93 sq.
464 Ad 1.2.21.
J.F. Staal, Advaita and Neoplatonism
141
latter; as appears from the passages in which it (the
lower knowledge) is spoken of
slightingly, such as ‘but frail indeed are these boats,
the sacrifices, the eighteen in
which the lower ceremonial has been told. Fools who
praise this as the highest good
are subject again and again to old age and
death.’465 Whoever turns away from the
lower knowledge is prepared for the highest one:466
‘Let a brāhmaṇa after he has
examined all these worlds which are gained by works
acquire freedom from all
desires. Nothing that is eternal can be gained by
what is not eternal. Let him in order
to understand this take fuel in his hand and approach
a guru who is learned and
dwells entirely in Brahman’.467
The last 58 sūtras of the Brahmasūtras468 are
interpreted by Śaṅkara as ‘describing
the path of the Gods (devayāna) which leads those
who possess the lower kind of
knowledge towards the attainment of their
reward’.469 This describes the fate after
death of souls which possess aparavidyā. Occasional
remarks are added concerning
the status of the soul which possesses paravidyā and
is free from all rebirth.470 In
this connection later Advaitins deal with the
difference between two kinds of human
beings which have gone beyond lower knowledge:
the videha-mukta ‘released at
the moment of death’, and the jīvan-mukta ‘released
while embodied’.471
The refinement of the theory of two levels into three
levels is a natural extension
though it is not of great metaphysical importance. It
plays an important part in the
epistemology of later Advaita. If vyāvahārika denotes
the sum total of all errors
caused by avidyā, we have to distinguish those errors
which are made
465 Muṇḍ. Up. 1.2.7.
466 Id. 1.2.12.
467 Ad. 1.2.21.
468 Adhyāya 4, padas 2-4.
469 Ad. 4.2.1.
470 In particular with regard to the last three sūtras
Rāmānuja and Thibaut cannot accept their
interpretation as referring only to the soul who
possesses a lower knowledge. Thibaut points
in this connection at the solemn final sūtra: anāvṛttiḥ
śabdād anāvṛttiḥ śabdāt, ‘(of them) there
is non-return according to scripture; non-return
according to scripture’. But the repetition in
the end is familiar to readers of the Upaniṣads and
the content expresses simply in the succinct
sūtra style that scripture teaches that the souls, who
have reached there, do not return.
471 e.g. the Jīvanmuktiviveka of Vidyāranya.
J.F. Staal, Advaita and Neoplatonism
142
within the vyāvahārika level and which may be
cleared at that level too: for instance
the error of the famous example of taking mother-of-
pearl for silver.472 Such errors
are as it were errors of the second degree. What
pertains to these errors is denoted
by the term pratibhasika. According to Murti,473 the
doctrine of these three truths, in
Advaita as well as in vijñānavāda, is necessitated by
the fact, that both analyse first
an empirical illusion and then apply this analysis
analogically to the world-illusion.
‘The Madhyamika, however, addresses himself
directly to the world-illusion....’.
14. Īśvara
The saguṇabrahman belongs to the vyāvahārika
level. It was first introduced as the
object of dhyāna or upāsanā, in contradistinction to
nirguṇabrahman which is the
same as its knowledge or mokṣa. Also Īśvara, ‘God’,
is the object of dhyāna and
upāsanā.474 It seems that Īśvara and
saguṇabrahman are more or less the same.
In later Advaita the saguṇabrahman is often
conceived as Īśvara and the world
together. A detailed analysis of the denotations of
both terms in the bhāṣya led
Hacker to the conclusion that in Śaṅkara Īśvara is a
concept that ‘in a strange way
resides somewhere between para- and
aparabrahman’.475 In later Advaita Īśvara,
saguna- or aparabrahman are further specified
existentially (1) and metaphysically
(2). (1) Brahmavidyā is knowledge from which all
temporality is excluded, which
manifests itself suddenly and which arises on
account of its own nature (svābhāvika).
472 In the erroneous judgment ‘This is silver’, ‘this’
belongs to the vyāvahārika, ‘silver’ to the
pratibhāsika realm.
473 o.c. 321.
474 See Hacker, Eigentümlichkeiten .... 283.
475 Id. 286: ‘Īśvara ist bei Śaṅkara sin Begriff, das
merkwürdig in der Schwebe steht zwischen
Param und Aparam Brahma’. Such conclusions are
important in as far as they establish
terminological characteristics of Śaṅkara's language,
required when the authenticity of works
is to be determined. Metaphysically speaking, in the
pāramārthika realm nirguṇabrahman and
sarguṇabrahman are the same. When the reality of
the world is denied and when everything
is ultimately regarded as one and the same,
terminological discriminations become less
important. This explains that Śaṅkara often
disregards the systematical analysis of concepts
and likewise definitions as Hacker concluded (‘nach
dieser Betrachtung müssen wir als
allgemeine Eigentümlichkeit des Denken Śaṅkaras
eine Abneiging gegen Definìtionen und
eine souverāne Sorglosigkeit gegenüber begrifflicher
Systematik festhalten’; id. 285). When
discrimination and differentiation are metaphysically
adopted the need for terminological
differentiation is much greater. The Western
Orientalist, whose implicit philosophy is generally
a kind of bhedavāda, should not expect
terminological differentiations where they are not
philosophically necessitated.
J.F. Staal, Advaita and Neoplatonism
143
It can therefore be called intuition, samādhi.476 As
this status is not an exceptional
phenomenon but the eternal reality only under
special circumstances accessible to
us, samādhi is called sahaja-samādhi, ‘natural
intuition’. Later Advaitins sometimes
adopted the Yoga discrimination of two kinds of
samādhi: savikalpa-samādhi
‘determinate intuition’, and nirvikalpasamādhi,
‘indeterminate intuition’. The former
term denotes477 that a level is reached where the
illusoriness of everything other
than the Absolute is realized and where this stage is
thereby overcome. The latter
term means that even the consciousness of the
illusoriness of everything other than
the Absolute has disappeared. The first section
corresponds to Īśvara, who is
conscious of the illusoriness of the world in which he
operates. The second
corresponds to Brahman which is only self-conscious
in self-luminosity. Therefore
(2) the later Advaitins (e.g. Vidyāraṇya) define Īśvara
as the Absolute qualified by
māya.478 This specifies guṇa in saguṇabrahman. In
the Vedāmtasāra, Īśvara is
described as the conditioned Brahman which
‘experiences joy through subtle
modification of ajñäna’.479 This denotes the close
connection between the situation
of Īśvara and svarga, the goal reached through the
accumulation of good karma.
This is in accordance with the Brahmasūtrabhāṣya,
where all works are conceived
as dependent on Īśvara: the fruits of action do not
spring from the actions themselves
but come from Īśvara.480 In any kind of
pariṇāmavāda actions cannot produce their
own effects. This would lead to the assumption of the
apūrva of Mīmāmsā, which
Śaṅkara rejects (in the same context).481 In
476 The term occurs in sūtra 2, 3.39.
477 If we rightly understand Bhattacharyya's
interpretation (o.c. 14-16).
478 In the Vivaraṇaprameyasaṁgraha: see
Mahadevan, o.c. 179; and in the Pañcadasï: see
Hacker, o.c. 285.
479 Transl. Hiriyanna, 48.
480 Ad. 3.2.38-41.
481 Ad. 3, 2, 40; ‘Jaimini (thinks) for the same reason
that religious merit (is what brings about
the fruits of actions)’.
J.F. Staal, Advaita and Neoplatonism
144
the vyāvahārika realm there is no reason to reject
apūrva. Therefore Śaṅkara says:
‘The final conclusion then is that the fruits come from
the Lord with a view to the
deeds done by the souls, or, if it be so preferred, with
a view to the apūrva springing
from the deeds’.482 There is hardly any reason to
reject in the vyāvahārika realm
apūrva on account of its magical character, since it is
replaced by Īśvara, who is
himself affected by the inexplicable avidyā and who
is himself often called a yogin
or magician.483
How can the fruits of action spring from Īśvara? This
is specified in the commentary
upon two other sūtras,484 where Īśvara is called
hetukartṛ, ‘the counsel agent in all
activity’. He ‘makes the soul act, having regard to the
efforts made by it, whether
meritorious or non-meritorious’. ‘Having regard to
the inequality of the virtuous and
vicious actions of the souls, the Lord, acting as a
mere occasional cause
(nimittatva-mātreṇa), allots to them corresponding
unequal results’. Thus God does
not act himself but arranges the whole field of action
for the soul: ‘The Lord indeed
causes it to act, but it acts itself’.485 From a
comparison of the causal activity of Īśvara
with that of the rain, ‘an occasional cause’, we see
that ‘the Lord arranges favourable
or unfavourable circumstances for the souls with a
view to their former efrorts’. This
means that Īśvara acts as a sufficient cause, not as a
necessary cause. Hence there
is scope for free activity on the part of the souls
themselves. Assuming for the
moment that Īśvara also possesses free activity, the
question arises as to whether
he will ever use his power to create ‘favourable or
unfavourable circumstances’
according to his own free will. It appears that this is
not so as can be concluded from
the following interesting passage: ‘Moreover, the
Lord in causing it to act now has
regard to its former efforts previous to that
existence; a regressus against which,
considering the eternity of the saṁsāra, no
objections can be raised’. Evidently
Īśvara always needs the meritorious or non-
meritorious karma-substance of a
previous birth, with a view to which he will arrange
the circumstances. This is always
possible
482 Ad. 3.2.41.
483 e.g. ad. 1.3.19 (Thibaut translates ‘thaumaturg’)
cf. ad, 2.1.18 and also Dakṣiṇamūrtyaṣṭakam
2.
484 2.3.41-42; cf. Hacker, o.c. 282.
485 kurvanta hi tam īśvara kārayati.
J.F. Staal, Advaita and Neoplatonism
145
because of the beginningless nature of saṁsāra.
Similarly Īśvara creates in each
creation the Veda as it existed in the previous
creation.486 That means that the ancient
karma theory is not discarded. It remains true that
every soul is born in a situation
which depends on its karma of a previous life. It can
act freely during its actual life
within the limits of its actual situation and thus
create a new amount of karma,
meritorious or non-meritorious, leading to the
situation in which it will be reborn in
its next life, etc. Thus Īśvara is only an explicatory
link in the karma theory. Whereas
the original karma doctrine does not explain the
mechanism of causation, Mīmāṁsā
gave a partial explanation with the help of the apūrva
concept. Mīmāṁsākas of the
school of Prabhākara were very definite in stating
that there can be no connection
between ‘dharma-adharma’ and a possible God. God
cannot control these subtle
entities, cannot supervise them and cannot even
know them.487 Śaṅkara saw the
insufficiency of the apūrva concept as an explanatory
factor and introduced Īśvara
as a conscious agent, who judges the karma sum of
previous life and creates the
birth situation accordingly. Śaṅkara felt that it was
impossible to judge (the traditional
karma theory also implies some judgment of karma
which remained however
unclarified) without affecting the laws of karma. In
this sense Īśvara is justice,488 but
a justice which strictly adds and substracts according
to the eternal laws of karmic
arithmetic. In this theory, there seems to be no room
for anything like grace, i.e.,
the allotment by Īśvara of a birth situation, regarding
previous merit but disregarding
(a part of) previous demerit.
However the main thesis of Advaita is that we can be
released from saṁsāra by the
unpredictable manifestation of brahmavidyā, which is
not the effect of previous
karma, but which is svābhāvika and svayaṁprakāśa.
This is exactly the significance
which may be given to the term grace, which cannot
be primarily characterized (as
in the monotheistic religions) as an act of the
inscrutable will of God, but which
should be characterized as an exception
486 See above II 1: 35.
487 According to the Prakaraṇa-pañcikā (137 sq. ap.
Jha. Pūrva Mīmāṁsā, 45) of Śālikanātha
Miśra, a work probably written shortly after Śaṅkara
(see id., Appendix 34, 31).
488 See K.C. Bhattacharyya, o.c. 41.
J.F. Staal, Advaita and Neoplatonism
146
to the rule that there is no effect without a cause in
which the effect was not
pre-existent, i.e., as an effect not pre-existent in any
cause. This would involve an
effect without a cause, i.e., a svābhāvika
phenomenon. Viewed from the karmic
transmigration in the vyāvahārika level mokṣa can
only arise if the intelligent agent,
who creates circumstances on account of previous
karma, disregards this karmic
substance and allows mokṣa to take place-i.e.,
through the mercy of Īśvara. This is
perfectly consistent.
To these conclusions we are led not so much by
expositions of traditional Vedānta
as by ‘problematic constructions on Vedantic
lines’.489 In the Sūtrabhāṣya we find
confirmation of the above: ‘we must .... assume that
final release also is effected
through knowledge caused by the grace (anugraha)
of the Lord’.490 Moreover a
remainder of karma does not prevent the occurrence
of mokṣa.491 The concept of
grace (which according to several critics is alien to
Advaita Vedānta) can in Advaita
only be explained in the way sketched above. Grace
means in this context the
occurrence of a causeless phenomenon: the
vyāvahārika anugraha of Īśvara
corresponds to the pāramārthika svabhāvikatva of
mokṣa. In the monotheistic
religions grace could be described as the occurrence
of a phenomenon, not caused
by the actions of the creature, but by the will of the
Creator. It follows also that Īśvara
is free because of mokṣa (as he allows the
occurrence of mokṣa by freely
disregarding the laws of karma).
Another important characteristic of Īśvara is his
function as a creator. In Mīmāṁsā
the existence of a creator is denied.492 In Advaita
we have seen that nirguṇabrahman
is according to the taṭastha definition ‘the cause of
the origin, subsistence and
dissolution of the world’, i.e., itself not causally
connected with the world, whereas
the saguṇabrahman can be called its material cause.
In later Advaita Īśvara is called
the material as well as the
489 As Bhattacharyya calls his own Studies in
Vedāntism (Introduction, v).
490 tadanugraha hetukenaiva ca vijñānena
mokṣasiddhirbhavitumarhati; ad. 2.3.41.
491 Ad. 3.1.8, in fine.
492 See Jha, o.c. 45-52.
J.F. Staal, Advaita and Neoplatonism
147
efficient cause of the world.493 Moreover, we may
expect a certain kind of creativity
in connection with Īśvara since avidyā and adhyāsa
are themselves creative activities,
whereas Īśvara is Brahman as qualified by them.
Creativity is on the other hand
excluded by the perpetual nature of saṁsāra: every
moment tnat Īśvara could
possibly create, he faces the pre-existence of merit
and demerit caused by souls in
innumerable former lives. Moreover the souls are
explicitly described as uncreated
and eternal.494 On the other hand, the world is a
manifestation of what exists in Īśvara
in a subtle form (as is illustrated in a Purāṇic myth).
But this also is different from
creativity.
Theoretically there is the following possibility. If all
souls attain mokṣa and if there
is universal release (sarvamukti) this Universe
disappears because it is ‘universally’
realized that it was eternally non-existant (provided
there is no good karma left in
the universe, because in that case svarga still
subsists). This leads to mahāpralaya,
‘universal dissolution’, and ‘afterwards’ (though also
time will have disappeared in
the non-dual Brahman) Īśvara can create a new
universe in no way connected with
the previous one. Because of the perpetual nature of
saṁsāra we must assume an
infinite number of creations and dissolutions. This is
often envisaged in Indian
speculations (cf. the kalpas and manvantaras) and
signifies perhaps that we have
to conceive of creation against a background of the
timeless (which we cannot do
in our vyāvahārika consciousness).
Sarvamukti was a doctrine of some later Advaitins,
especially Appayya Dīksiṭa in
his Siddhāntaleśasaṁgraha. The above possibilities
can therefore be realized in
his perspective of thought. It seems that Śaṅkara did
not believe in the possibility
of sarvamukti495 and that therefore these
considerations are not relevant to his
system. But he did believe in an infinity of creations
and universes.496 That here
creation is meant in a relative sense follows from the
fact that in the interval between
two creations
493 abhinna-nimitto-pādāna-kāraṇa: ap. Mahadevan,
o.c. 180. In the Naiṣkarmyasiddhi of
Sureśvara avidyā is often called upādāna: see P.
Hacker, Untersuchungen .... 1970.
494 Ad. 2.3.17.
495 Cf. ad. 3.2.21; cf. Pañcapādikā Introduction xli.
496 See e.g. ad. 2.1.8-9; 1.3.30.
J.F. Staal, Advaita and Neoplatonism
148
(‘the night of Brahma’, or ‘the sleep of Viṣṇu’ of the
Purāṇas) not only the non-dual
Brahman subsists, but also the subtle forms of merit
and demerit of the previous
creation, i.e., apūrva or Īśvara. This can be seen from
a previously quoted497 passage:
‘As therefore each new creation is (nothing but) the
result of the religious merit and
demerit (of the animated beings of the preceding
creation), it is produced with a
nature resembling that preceding creation.498 Hence
neither creation (sṛṣṭi) nor
dissolution (pralaya) are to be conceived in an
absolute sense. Mahāpralaya is not
the same as sarvamukti and there neither is creation
out of nothing nor are the
intervals nothing apart from the non-dual Brahman.
All this holds in the vyāvahārika
level. In the pāramārthika level there is no creation at
all since creation is a typical
saprapañca idea.
The question arises as to what these ‘relative’
creations really signify. Īśvara is
spoken of in a creationist sense in texts which deal
with the nāmarūpe.499 There we
read: ‘That the highest Lord (parameśvara) is he who
manifests the names and
forms (nāmarūpayorvyākartṛ) is a principle
acknowledged by all the Upaniṣads’.500
Hence creation in a ‘relative’ sense merely means
manifestation. The creator
transforms the avyākṛte nāmarūpe into vyākṛte
nāmarūpe; therefore he is called
vyākartṛ. Sṛṣṭi is ‘vyākarma’. The unmanifested
names and forms are manifested
by avidyā or adhyāsa. Hence creation or
manifestation is the same as avidyā or
adhyāsa, and the activity of Īśvara is nothing but the
inexplicable superimposing
activity. This means ultimately that the āśraya of
adhyāsa is Brahman, for Īśvara is
saguṇabrahman. The term māyāvin, ‘magician’, as an
epithet of Īśvara, obtains
therefore the specific significance of: ‘he who
produces māyā‘.
In adhyāsa superimposition, the superimposed and
the superimposing activity (not
the locus of superimposition) are the same, and
therefore the creative activity and
creation are likewise the same. Īśvara is therefore
both material and efficient cause
of the universe. That we make such erroneous
distinctions is due to the
497 Above II, 12: 132.
498 Ad. 1.3.30.
499 Cf. above II 12.
500 Ad. 2.4.20; cf. also ad. 1.3.41.
J.F. Staal, Advaita and Neoplatonism
149
fact that we have personified au impersonal entity.
Summarising, we may say that
the vyāvahārika Īśvara corresponds as a creator to
adhyāsa.501
This implies that creation is not a very important
concept in Advaita.502 It is rather a
negative concept too. Creation which is considered a
positive activity from the world
affirming vyāvahārika point of view, is the same as
the obscure and negative
superimposing activity. This is ultimately an
evaluation since the same reality is
evaluated differently in the vyāvahārika and in the
pāramārthika realm.
That in Īśvara the creative activity, the preexistent
material and the (subtle form of)
creation are one and the same503 can also be
observed from the use of the concept
śakti ‘power’. This concept is the dynamical principle
Bhattacharyya was seeking.504
Among later Advaitins śakti is a power, and at the
same time prakṛti from which the
universe is created: the śakti attributed to Īśvara is a
bījaśakti.505 This power makes
the unreal appear as real; it resides in Brahman, but
it is māyā (as also māyā resides
in Brahman). Bhattacharyya regards it as a dynamic
principle, because he says:
‘Brahman existing in the śakti becomes the effect:
the effect is thus not non-existent.’
But this is clear, as it has been shown that in the
vyāvahārika realm not vivartavāda
holds, but pariṇāmavāda. The ‘dynamical’ creation of
the vyāvahārika level, which
presupposes pariṇāmavāda, corresponds to the
doctrine of adhyāsa, which is in
terms of causation the same as vivartavāda.
More details could be given if a descent would be
attempted from the self-luminous
Brahman into the obscure regions of the inexplicable
māyā. But as it would at the
same time be necessary to go beyond Śaṅkara on to
the later Advaitins, a mere
reference
501 Cf. the attribution of characteristics of Īśvara to
avidyā by Sureśvara (see above 147 n. 493
and below n. 505).
502 See above II 12.
503 ‘Schöpferkraft Material der Schöpfung und
Urzustand des Geschaffenen fallen also zusammen:
eine folge substanzialistischen Denkens ebenso wie
des satkāryavāda’: Hacker
Eigentümlichkeiten .... 274. It is rightly remarked that
this identity is also a consequence of
satkāryavāda.
504 See above II 12 and Bhattacharyya, o.c. 28-29.
505 Hacker, ibid. Sureśvara uses for avidyā also bīja
‘seed’ (Hacker, Untersuchungen .... 1970).
J.F. Staal, Advaita and Neoplatonism
150
may be made to four different directions in which
further specification can be sought:
(1) ajñāna can be conceived as possessing two
powers, āvaraṇa, ‘the obscuring’,
and vikṣepa, ‘the diversifying.’ Both are closely
connected with the superimposing
activity, as can be seen from the Vedāntasāra.506 (2)
Either māyā itself, or the above
mentioned vikṣepa, can be conceived as threefold
when use is made of the Sāṁkhya
categories sattva, rajas and tamas. The resulting
cosmogony is described by
Dasgupta.507 (3) The avyākṛte nāmarūpe and the
vyākṛte nāmarūpe in their cosmic
aspect can be brought into connection with two other
entities of ancient origin,
Hiraṇyagarbha and Virāṭ. Their relation to Īśvara is
analysed by Mahadevan,508 (4)
The concept of śakti can be further developed and
two forms of Īśvara can be
distinguished. This line of thought is followed by
Bhattacharyya.509
In this way entities of the vyāvahārika realm, such as
Īśvara, conceived as a merciful
being or as a creator, can be shown to be actually
unreal and can be reduced to
the basic concepts of the highest truth, which can in
turn be reduced to Brahman
and adhyāsa, - the latter mysterious entity
mysteriously residing in the former.
Attributes of God which play an important part in
religion, such as grace and creativity,
can be interpreted in Advaita. This yields a more
detailed picture of the way in which
Śaṅkara accepts and sometimes subordinates the
Vedic heritage. Despite this
development the concept of a central deity such as
Īśvara even if ultimately denied,
and in the pāramārthika level devoid of sense, plays a
much more important part in
Advaita than in the religious feelings of the Vedic
period. The reason for this is that
the non-dual Brahman becomes Īśvara as soon as we
speak or think about the
universe or about ourselves as individuals. Īśvara is
God of the universe as the
qualified manifestation of Brahman. Śaṅkara's non-
dualism is therefore nearer to
monotheism than to Vedic polytheism and
henotheism (despite the monotheistic
tendencies in later Vedic texts, themselves
connected with the development of
‘proto’-Advaitic ideas).510 Advaita is, however, a
metaphysical
506 Transl. Hiriyanna 48 sq.
507 II. 73-77.
508 o.c. 192-193.
509 o.c. 29 sq.
510 Cf. the famous passage Ṛgveda 1.164.46, where
the Gods, named variously by the sages,
are said to be one.
J.F. Staal, Advaita and Neoplatonism
151
doctrine and not a religion. It is an exaggeration
which is not far from the truth when
Wadia says that ‘Śaṅkara did not attach any
importance to religion’.511
The gods of Vedic polytheism are not altogether
denied and rejected as in Mīmāṁsā,
which considers the deities as ‘hypothetical entities
postulated as the recipients of
the sacrificial offering’ and as ‘grammatical
datives.’512 But they are, as is also often
the case in the Vedas, considered beings of a
somewhat higher order than human
beings. This may for instance be inferred from the
way in which Śaṅkara discusses
the problem whether the gods are entitled to
knowledge of Brahman.513 The answer
is in the affirmative, whereas the Mīmāṁsakas denied
them even this.514
Lastly an important problem may be raised in view of
the above considerations: is
Īśvara a person? The answer is in the negative: even
in the vyāvahārika realm he
is not a person. Īśvara creates mechanically and both
in creation as in supervising
karmic results he makes less use of his hypothetical
freedom than the souls who
perform their karma. But even if he could be termed
a relative personalization (in
the vyāvahārika realm) of impersonal entities (in the
pāramārthika realm), he could
not be called a person for the idea of the personal
implies and includes that a person
is as person more perfect and higher than anything
impersonal. Therefore it is
impossible to say that the lower God is a person,
when the higher Deity is an
impersonal Absolute. The notion of the personal itself
excludes the supra-personal.515
Impersonalism is traditional in India. The idea of
karma transcends the human
individuality. The highest authority, śruti, is of
apauruṣeya origin. The sacrifice is
typically impersonal: only the precise and faultless
performance of the prescribed
ritual act coun