Vlal evluellce t'dge 1 Ot L /

'I'~3.e Uai~"~~3 ~II±IC©(>M 21tI,tA14M Search F_

Advanced

Home Glo ssarv index C ontact Us Parli ament Live section Go

Oral evidence

Taken before the Foreign Affairs Com mittee on Tuesday 15 July 2003

Members present :

Donald Anderson, in the Ch~~

M r D avl d Ch i'd gey
Fablan Ham llton
Mr --------- ---------- -
Andrew Mackinlay u
M r John Map les
M r Bill Ol ner 1 -3 1k__
Richard Ottaway
MrGreg Pope
Sir John Stanley
Ms Gisela Stuart

,-4 1

Witness : DR DAVID KELLY, Special Adviser to the Director, Counter-

proliferation and arms control, Ministry of Defence, examined .

Q1 Chairman : Dr Kelly, may I welcome you back to the Committee .

I understand you actually gave evidence to us in our inquiry with the
Foreign Secretary, you were an adviser then to the non-proliferat-on
department .

" Dr Kelly. Correct.

Q2 Chairman : You were a former Porton Down scientist, a former

UNSCOM arms inspector in Iraq, you are presently acting as an adviser
to the Ministry of Defence's Director of counter-proliferation and arms
control . I understand the Ministry of Defence pays your salary but the
Foreign Office reimburses the Department for staff costs as part of its
wider support for UN inspections in Iraq and counter-proliferation
policy . Is that correct?

Dr Kelly: That is absolutely right .

Q3 Chairman : Let me now turn to your involvement in the

September 24 dossier You know, I believe, the evidence that we have
received from Mr Gtlligan of the BBC, that essentially the story that
began the fuss came from a single source . He said on the Today
programme on 29 May : "I have spoken to a British official who was
involved in the preparation of the dossier and he told me that until the
week before it was published the draft dossier produced by the
q\f03~ oo(~J!)
http //www publications parliament uk/pa/cm200203/cmselect/cmfaff%uc 10 /uc 102502 ht 20/07/03
 viai evtoence rage z o t / /

intelligence services adds little to what was already known . He said 'It
was transformed the week before it was published to make it sexier' .
The classic example was the statement that WMD were ready for use
in 45 minutes . That information was not in the original draft. It was
included in the dossier against their wishes because it wasn't reliable ."
He again described his source as "a civil servant in the non-secret part
of the Civil Service as distinct from the secret part" . Presumably that
might cover you .

Dr Kelly: It might .

Q4 Chairman : And "one of the senior officials in charge of drawing

up the dossier and I can tell you that he is a source of longstanding,
well-known to me, closely connected with the question of Iraq's
weapons of mass destruction, easily sufficiently senior and credible to
be worth reporting ." Before I call on Mr Hamilton to continue, can I
*just ask this : can you describe your background as a civil servant and
an UNSCOM Inspector; and what was your position between March of
last year and September of last year when the dossier was published?
That is, what was your position at the relevant time?

Dr Kelly: My background is that I am a scientist, I was once head of

microbiology at Porton Down, but for the last decade I have been
involved in advising both the Foreign Office and the Ministry of
Defence on Iraq, its weapons of mass destruction and the United
Nations' inspection approach towards disarmament and monitoring .

Q5 Chairman : Specifically between March and September of last

year?

Dr Kelly: The position had not changed as it was for the past four
years . Essentially I was the senior adviser to the proliferation and
arms control secretariat carrying out essentially the function I have
since UNSCOM ceased to exist in 1999 .

Q6 Mr Hamilton : Dr Kelly, may I ask what was your involvement in

the preparation of the September dossier?

Dr Kelly; My involvement was writing an historical account of the

UNSCOM inspections and providing input into Iraq's concealment and
deception .

Q7 Mr Olner: Dr Kelly, could I ask you to speak up a bit, there are

fans running .

Dr Kelly: I will try.

Mr Olner : I am sure members of the public at the back cannot hear

you .

Q8 Mr Hamilton : May I ask when you started work on the part of the

Tv P~3~00--7 0
http //www publications parliament uk/pa/cm200203/cmselect/cmfafF/uc10 /uc102502 ht 20/07/Oi
 utat evidence rdge j ot t I

dossier that you were responsible for?

Dr Kelly: I believe I contributed in May and June .

Q9 Mr Hamilton : Just over those two months?

Dr Kelly: Yes .

Q10 Mr Hamilton : Can I ask whether you had any access to secret
intelligence material when you were writing your piece in those two
months?

Dr Kelly: I always have access to such material, yes, but it did not
form part of the contribution to those pieces that I wrote . That
information was derived from my records as a UN inspector .

Q11 Mr Hamilton : Let me be clear : you saw the intelligence that

*was subsequently used to compile the dossier?

Dr Kelly: I am familiar with some of the intelligence that went into

the dossier, but not all of it.

Q12 Mr Hamilton : But you would have seen quite a range of

intelligence that did form part of that dossier?

Dr Kelly: I see the intelligence which is relevant to my expertise

which is in the area of chemical and biological weapons, and I am
alerted to relevant intelligence .

Q13 Mr Hamilton : Did you see any of the JIC assessments that
formed the basis of the original March dossier that was not published
and subsequently the September dossier to which you contributed?

Dr Kelly: That is not an easy question to answer . I really cannot

recall . I am familiar with the JIC assessments but I cannot remember
whether I saw one in March, but it is likely, yes .

Q14 Andrew Mackinlay: It is likely?

Dr Kelly: It is likely, yes.

Q15 Mr Hamilton : May I ask which drafts of the final September

dossier did you see and were drafts sent back to you at every stage
for your comment?

Dr Kelly: No, I was not involved in that process at all .

Q16 Mr Hamilton : So you made your contribution and that went into
it subsequently'?

Dr Kelly: Yes My contribution was not to the intelligence dimension .

3 ~ ~W-1
http //www publications parliament uk/pa/cm200203/cmselect/cmfaff/uc 10 /uc1025 2 ht 20/07/03
 urat evidence rage 4 or t i

Q17 Mr Hamilton : Can I ask what meetings you attended at which

the dossier was discussed?

Dr Kelly : I attended no meetings at all at which the dossier was

discussed .

Q18 Mr Hamilton : So you were asked to prepare a section?

Dr Kelly: I was .

Q19 Mr Hamilton : You prepared that section, you had access to the
relevant intelligence material and that was submitted to the person
compiling the dossier?

Dr Kelly: The component that I wrote did not require intelligence

rinformation, let us get that straight . It was not the intelligence
-component of the dossier, it was the history of the inspections, the
concealment and deception by Iraq, which is not intelligence
information .

Q20 Mr Olner : Dr Kelly, could you speak up, please . The problem is
these microphones do not amplify the noise .

Dr Kelly: I apologise . I have a soft voice, I know .

Q21 Chairman : One final question under this heading . Presumably

you did discuss this with other colleagues who were involved
themselves in the preparation of the dossier, so you knew what was
going on?

Dr Kelly: I was familiar with some of it . Actually I was either on leave

" or working abroad in the August and early September of that time
frame . That component, no, I really was not involved .

Q22 Mr Chidgey : I just want to move on to the section of our inquiry

dealing with contacts with Andrew Gilligan and journalists, but before
we talk about Andrew Gilligan can I just confirm that you have also
met Susan Watts?

Dr Kelly: I have met her on one occasion .

Q23 Mr Chidgey : Thank you . I would just like to read out to you a
statement in the notes that were made : "In the run-up to the dossier
the Government was obsessed with finding intelligence to justify an
immediate Iraqi threat . While we were agreed on the potential Iraqi
threat in the future there was less agreement about the threat the
Iraqis posed at the moment . That was the real concern, not so much
what they had now but what they would have in the future, but that
unfortunately was not expressed strongly in the dossier because that
takes the case away for war to a certain extent" . Finally, "The 45
-j~( P ~ 3 ~ 0 0 "l Z-
http Ilwww publications parliament uk/pa/cm200203/cmselect/cmfafF/uc10 /uc 102502 ht 20/07/03
 Oral evidence Page 5 of 2 /

minutes was a statement that was made and it got out of all
proportion . They were desperate for information . They were pushing
hard for information that could be released
: That was one that popped
up and it was seized on and it is unfortunate that it was . That is why
there is an argument between the intelligence services and Number
10, because they had picked up on it and once they had picked up on
it you cannot pull back from it, so many people will say 'Well, we are
not sure about that' because the word smithing is actually quite
important ." I understand from Miss Watts that is the record of a
meeting that you had with her . Do you still agree with those
comments?

Dr Kelly: First of all, I do not recognise those comments, I have to

say . The meeting I had with her was on November 5 last year and I
remember that precisely because I gave a presentation in the Foreign
Office on Iraq's weapons of mass destruction . I cannot believe that on
" that occasion I made that statement .

Q24 Mr Chidgey : That is very helpful . Can I just be clear on this : I

understand that these notes refer to meetings that took place shortly
before the Newsnrght broadcasts that would have been on 2 and 4
June .

Dr Kelly: I have only met Susan Watts on one occasion, which was
not on a one-to-one basis, it was at the end of a public presentation

Mr Chidgey : Thank you very much, that is very helpful .

Q25 Andrew Mackinlay : What other journalists have you met since
2002 onwards?

Dr Kelly: You mean physically met face-to-face?

Q26 Andrew Mackinlay : Yes, precisely I mean not at an authorised

briefing but any time outside an authorised briefing where there is a
group of people, the one-to-one?

Dr Kelly: I am afraid at the moment I cannot list that but if you would
like to make a formal request to the Ministry of Defeace they will
respond to you . Basically the list is very few people.

Q27 Andrew Mackinlay: So you could phone the clerk later tonight
with the list precisely, could you, to the best of your recollection"?

Dr Kelly: I think it is something that should be formally requested of

the Ministry of Defence .

Q28 Andrew Mackinlay : Well, I disagree because it is a matter of

who you met, it cannot be state secrets, can it?

Dr Kelly: It is not state secrets at all but I have an accurate record of

~~P~3 ~00~3
http //svww publications parliament uk/pa/cm200203/cmselect/cmfaff/uc10 /uc102502 ht 20i07/03
 Vral evidence regc, o ot z i

who I have met and I will have to consult my diaries .

Q29 Andrew Mackinlay : Could you do that over the next 24 hours?

Dr Kelly : No, because at the moment I am pursued by the press and I

do not have access to my home.

Q30 Andrew Mackinlay : When could you do it by?

Dr Kelly : I could do it by the end of the week but the request should
be made to the Ministry of Defence .

Q31 Andrew Mackinlay : I will worry about who the request has got
to be made to, but in principle you will provide that for this Committee
before Thursday?

_Dr Kelly : I will provide it to the Ministry of Defence .

Q32 Andrew Mackinlay : Okay. You met Gllligan, I think, for the
first time about two and a half years ago?

Dr Kelly: Not to my recollection . The first time that I remember

meeting him was at a meeting in September of last year.

Q33 Andrew Mackinlay : September 2002?

Dr Kelly : Correct .

Q34 Andrew Mackinlay : How many times have you seen him slnce2

Dr Kelly : Twice .

" Q35 Andrew Mackinlay : On what occasions?

Dr Kelly : A day in February, a date I cannot remember, I am having

difficulty locating it, and the now infamous May 22 meeting .

Q36 Andrew Mackinlay : Of this yea0

Dr Kelly : Of this year .

Q37 Andrew Mackinlay : In the period you have known him, how
frequently have you had telephone contact with him and/or e-mail or
other communications?

Dr Kelly: I do not believe I have ever had e-mail contact with him
and very few telephone conversations .

Q38 Andrew Mackinlay : Which documents have you shown him?

wf ~~ 3 I oo-++
Dr Kelly: I have shown him none whatsoever .

http Ilwww publications parliament uk/pa/cm200203/cmselect/cmfaff/uc10 /uc102502 ht 20/07/03

 rage i or t i
Ural evidence

Q39 Andrew Mackinlay : When you met Mr Gllligan on any of these

occasions, was he fully aware of the extent of access you had to
intelligence information?

Dr Kelly: I would not think so, he would not have got it from me .

Q40 Chairman : Were any of your contacts authorised by the Ministry

of Defence?

Dr Kelly: My primary authorisation is through the Foreign Officef:

some were authorised and some were not, some were informal .

Q41 Chairman : What did you think the motives were of Mr Gilligan
and others in seeking to contact you?

" Dr Kelly: Are we talking specifically of Mr Gilligan?

Q42 Chairman : Yes .

DrKelly: The approach by Mr Gllligan was to consult with me before

his visit to Iraq as a broadcaster . He wished to know certain aspects of
Iraq, the UNMOVIC inspection process, some of the personalities that
are associated with the programme should he encounter them, some
of the sites that are involved in the programme . You may remember
that just before the war the Iraqi Government was inviting journalists
to visit the sites so they could see, according to Iraqi claims, that
there was no illicit activity occurring .

Q43 Ms Stuart : I may not have heard something you said in

response to Mr Chidgey's question . You did confirm that you had a
meeting and talked with Susan Watts?

Dr Kelly: I have met with her personally once at the end of a seminar
I provided in the Foreign Office on November 5 .

Q44 Ms Stuart : You have neither met nor talked to her since?

Dr Kelly-, I have spoken to her on the telephone but I have not met
her face-to face .

Q45 Ms Stuart : When have you talked to her on the telephone'?

Dr Kelly: I would have spoken to her about four or five times .

Q46 Ms Stuart : During May at all?

Dr Kelly: During May? I cannot precisely remember . I was abroad for

a fair part of the time in May, but it is possible, yes .

Q47 Ms Stuart : Have you had any conversations or meetings with

~ 3 `0 c~~1 ~r
~(-V P102502
blip //www publications parliament uk/pa/cm200203/cmselect/cmfaff/uc 10 /uc ht 20/07/03
 oral evidence Page ts or L /

Gavin Hewitt?

Dr Kelly: Not that I am aware of, no . I am pretty sure I have not .

Q48 Mr Olner: Mr Gilllgan's article in the Mail on Sunday of 1 June

states that the location of your meeting was a central London hotel
and that you were waiting for Mr Gilligan when he got there . At whose
request did that meeting take place between you and Mr Gilligan?

Dr Kelly: Mr Gilligan .

Q49 Mr Olner : Any idea why he requested it?

Dr Kelly: For the reasons that I offered to the Chairman . Sorry, which
one are we talking about?

. Q50 Mr Olner: The one on 22 May .

Dr Kelly: The outcome of the first meeting I had with him in February
was that he would provide me with feedback from his visit to Iraq,
since I am interested in Iraq, interested in other people's perspectives
on Iraq and the process . That was the reason for meeting with him, to
get feedback on that visit .

Q51 Mr Olner : Was this not a two-way process, that you wanted also
to communicate other things to Mr Gilligan?

Dr Kelly: No .

Q52 Mr Olner : It was simply a journalist fishing for information that

you had got and you wanted to give to him?

Dr Kelly: No, it was an occasion on which I expected to get

information about Iraq, about some of the personalities that he either
had encountered or attempted to encounter, his experiences during
the war itself and the experiences he had with Iraqi minders when he
was acting as a journalist before the war.

Q53 Mr Olner: Obviously you have read Mr Gllligan's accounts of the

meeting, including the evidence that he gave to this Committee . Is
there anything in Mr Gilligan's accounts that you dispute?

Dr Kelly: I think you would have to ask me the specific question .

Q54 Mr Olner: You have obviously read it .

Dr Kelly: I have read it .

Q55 Mr Olner: Is there anything there that suggests Mr Gilligan was

perhaps being careful with the truth-.'

-wP~ 31~o-
http //www publications parliament uk/pa/cm200203/cmselect/cmfaff/uc10 /uc102502 ht 20/07/03
 Vral evidence tageyotL/

Dr Kelly: It is not a factual record of my interaction with him, the

character of it, which is actually difficult to discern from the account
that is presented there. It is not one that I recognise as being
conversations I had with him . There was one part of it which alerted
me to that, which was the comment about the 30 per cent probability
of Iraq actually possessing chemical weapons, that is the sort of thing
I might have said to him .

Q56 Mr Olner : Really Mr Gilllgan's story was basically about drafts of

dossiers being changed, being "sexed-up" . Did you infer to Mr Gilligan
in any way, shape or form that he might have misrepresented what
you said?

Dr Kelly: My conversation with him was primarily about Iraq, about

his experiences in Iraq and the consequences of the war, which was
" the failure to use weapons of mass destruction during the war and the
failure by May 22 to find such weapons . That was the primary
conversation that I had with him .

Q57 Mr Olner : You certainly never mentioned the "C" word that he
went on to explain in his column?

Dr Kelly: The "C" word?

Q58 Mr Olner : The Campbell word .

Dr Kelly: The Campbell word did come up, yes .

Q59 Mr Olner : From you? You suggested it?

Dr Kelly: No, it came up in the conversation . We had a conversation

about Iraq, its weapons and the failure of them to be used .

Q60 Mr Olner: How did the word "Campbell" come to be mixed up

with all of that? What led you to say that?

Dr Kelly: I did not say that . What I had a conversation about was the
probability of a requirement to use such weapons . The question was
then asked why, if weapons could be deployed at 45 minutes notice,
were they not used, and I offered my reasons why they may not have
been used .

Q61 Chairman : Again, I am finding it very difficult to hear. The fans

have been turned off, could you do your very best to raise your voice,
please .

Dr Kelly: It came in in that sense and then the significance of it was

discussed and then why it might have been in the dossier . That is how
it came up .

7,r~ ~3-1
http //www publications parliament uk/pa/cm200203/cmselect/cmfafF/uc 10 /uc 102502 ht 20/07/03
 Ural evidence Page lUot2/

Q62 Mr Pope : Mr Gllligan said in his article in the Mail on Sunday of

1 June "I asked him", the source, "how this transformation happened .
The answer was a single word . 'Campbell' ." In your conversation with
Mr Gilligan did you use the word "Campbell" in that context?

Dr Kelly: I cannot recall using the name Campbell in that context, it

does not sound like a thing that I would say .

Q63 Mr Pope : Do you believe that the document was transformed,

the September dossier, by Alastair Campbell?

Dr Kelly: I do not believe that at all .

Q64 Mr Pope : When you met Mr Gllligan on 22 May he says in his

article that he met a source in a central London hotel on that day . Did
" you meet him in a central London hotel?

Dr Kelly: I did .

Q65 Chairman : Which hotel was that?

Dr Kelly : The Charing Cross Hotel .

Q66 Mr Pope : Did you begin your conversation with Mr Gilligan by

discussing the poor state of Britain's railways?

Dr Kelly: No .

Q67 Mr Pope : The reason I ask is because he said "We started off by
moaning about the railways" and what I am trying to get to the
bottom of is whether or not you were the source, the main source, of
" Mr Gilligan or whether you were one of the other three minor sources
which Mr Gilligan has told us he had . I am really trying to get to the
bottom of that . Mr Gilligan will not answer this Committee's questions
on those specific points . I just want to know, in your own opinion do
you believe that you were the main source of Mr Gilligan's article on 1
June?

Dr Kelly: My belief is that I am not the main source .

Q68 Mr Pope : Do you know who the main source is?

Dr Kelly: No .

Andrew Mackinlay : Any idea?

Q69 Mr Pope : I want to be absolutely clear on this . You do not

believe that you are the main source, that it is someone else?

Dr Kelly: From the conversation I had with him, I do not see how he

'IY,P ~3 1 20018
blip //www publications parliament uk/pa/cm200203/cmselect/cmfafT/uc10 /uc1025 ht 20/07/03
 vini evulence rage i i or / r

could make the authoritative statement he was making from the

comments that I made .

Q70 Mr Maples : Dr Kelly, just following on from what Mr Pope was

saying . Mr Gilligan told us that he had four sources in this area and we
are trying to find out whether you are the one or whether you are one
of the other three . Did you know about this 45 minute claim before
the dossier was published?

Dr Kelly: No, it became apparent to me on publication .

Q71 Mr Maples : So you did not know about it before you, like all of
us, read the dossier?

Dr Kelly: No . I might have appreciated it 48 hours beforehand but not

before that .

" Q72 Mr Maples : You would not have known about it significantly in
advance . You were never part of any discussions about whether this
should or should not be included in the dossier?

Dr Kelly: No .

Q73 Mr Maples : Similarly with the question of the uranium from

Niger - I do not want to put words in your mouth but it is the same
question really - when did you know about that?

Dr Kelly: The only knowledge I have about Niger and uranium is from
the newspapers . At that stage at the end of May it was the time when
Mr Baradei, head of the International Atomic Energy Authority, had
made the statement that the documents were forged .

~ Q74 Mr Maples : Of course there is a claim in the dossier about the

uranium from Niger .

Dr Kelly: Yes .

Q75 Mr Maples : Did you first become aware of that at or around the
time the dossier was published? In other words, were_you a part of
any conversations?

Dr Kelly: I am not an expert on nuclear matters . When I read it I was

aware that the statement was there but I had no opinion on it .

Q76 Mr Maples : You said that your work which went into the dossier
was largely history and it was done in April and May of last year .

Dr Kelly: May and June, I think .

Q77 Mr Maples : Sorry, May and June, and that you were away,
either on leave or abroad, in August and early September . In evidence

3 ~~a~
'fVPInc~ 0250
http Ilwww publications parliament uk/pa/cm20o203/cmselect/cmfaff/uc 10
n
ht 20/07/03
 viai eviaence t-et;e i / ot t i

to us it has become clear that the final form of this dossier was
published and emerged in a first draft, whatever in that context it
means, a first draft of this document on 9/10 September last year and
was published, I think, on 23/24 September . During that period did
you go to any meetings or have any discussions with anybody about
what was in there?

Dr Kelly : No . I would have been in the country at that time but I did
not participate in any meetings .

Q78 Mr Maples: So after you had written your bit in May and June --

Dr Kelly: I forgot about it .

Q79 Mr Maples : ---- you had nothing more to do with it . I just

" wanted to ask you a couple more questions since you are here . When
you were a weapons inspector with UNSCOM in Iraq - I only got this
from newspaper reports and you can tell me if it is not true - you were
shown by an Iraqi general or minister a site in evidence that Iraq had
tested a radiological weapon, or sought to test a radiological weapon,
a dirty bomb I suppose in the jargon .

Dr Kelly: On one inspection that I led the Iraqi authorities asked that
there should be a special briefing to the team and at that mission,
which was an interview mission, the acknowledgement was made by
General Fahi Shaheen, together with Brigadier Haifa, that they had
undertaken experiments with radiological weapons in 1987 . I have
been to the site since but not to investigate the radiation .

Q80 Mr Maples : You did not go to the site at the time?

l. Dr Kelly : Not at the time . I have been there since to investigate other
claims .

Q81 Mr Maples : Not in 1995 when you were there with UNSCOM?

Dr Kelly: The site I actually went to in September 1995, but not to

investigate that aspect . --

Q82 Mr Maples : Is your only evidence for this what General Shaheen
told you? Did you check that out through documents or whatever?

Dr Kelly: Subsequently documents were found and there is a

document that has been provided to the United Nations, a document
which has been leaked by the Wisconsin Institute and which,
unfortunately, is now available on the Internet.

Q83 Mr Maples : Do you think that is true?

Dr Kelly: Undoubtedly it is true .

V~~`3~oago
http //www publications parliament uk/pa/cm200203/cmselect/cmfaff/uc 10 /uc 102502 ht 20/07/03
 i 'r, i J u i a i
vi at cviuctlc,e

Q84 Mr Maples : I do not think it is given much, if any, prominence

in the dossier, either in the history or in current threats, and yet if
Iraq had the technology and ability to detonate a dirty nuclear bomb I
would have thought that was pretty significant . I hesitate to say that
there is no mention of it in here because I may have missed it, but I
do not think there is.

Dr Kelly: I am not sure it is for me to discuss the dossier .

Q85 Mr Maples: This is your subject.

Dr Kelly: We are talking about an historical aspect of some 15 years

ago . Iraq claimed, and I think we believed them, that that project was
terminated in 1988 .

Q86 Mr Maples : When you were writing the historical bit of this in
" May and June, did that feature in what you wrote?

Dr Kelly: No .

Q87 Mr Maples : Is there some reason why it was left out?

Dr Kelly: Essentially it had to be a concise account and you cannot

include everything .

Mr Maples : A dirty nuclear bomb I would have thought was pretty

significant myself .

Chairman : We are concentrating on Gilligan .

Mr Maples : I know, but this is the dossier and Dr Kelly had a part in
~ it.

Q88 Andrew Mackinlay : You told us that you discovered about the
Niger issue from the press .

Dr Kelly: Let me get this straight . I was aware of the Niger issue in
the dossier, of course, I read the dossier . After that I had no insight
into it until it appeared in the press when the International Atomic
Energy Authority made its comments .

Q89 Andrew Mackinlay : And you had a conversation with Gilligan

after that, did you not?

Dr Kelly: I did .

Q90 Andrew Mackinlay : You did?

Dr Kelly: I did .

T(p'3 ~Da81
http //www publications parliament uk/paicm200203/cmselect/cmfaff/ucl0 /uc102S02 ht 20/07/03
 uici eviuence i'eoe t4 ot 2 /

Q91 Andrew Mackinlay : And at that conversation obiter dicta, by

the way, you said "That is all dodgy", or whatever words you used, but
basically that was what you said, was it not?

Dr Kelly: No .

Q92 Andrew Mackinlay: You did not?

Dr Kelly: No .

Q93 Andrew Mackinlay : You discussed it?

Dr Kelly: It came up .

Q94 Andrew Mackinlay : What did you say?

" Dr Kelly: I just confirmed that, in fact, Baradei had made the
statements that he had made because that was the only knowledge
that I had .

Q95 Andrew Mackinlay : You did not pass any other comment on it?

Dr Kelly: Did I pass any other comment?

Q96 Andrew Mackinlay : Yes .

Dr Kelly: No .

Q97 Andrew Mackinlay : What did you tell Gilligan about the
process by which the September dossier was compiled? Did you
explain to him your role?

Dr Kelly: No . I was not involved in the process of its compilation so I

was not in a position to discuss it .

Q98 Andrew Mackinlay : You were aware that it was signed off by
the JIC Chairman, that is correct, is it not?

Dr Kelly: I am aware that the Joint Intelligence Committee was

involved in the final compilation, yes .

Q99 Andrew Mackinlay : What was your understanding of who put

the final imprimatur, the final seal, on the document?

Dr Kelly: I was not involved in that process and I did not have that
understanding .

Q100 Andrew Mackinlay : You did not discuss it with Gilligan?

Dr Kelly: No .
'IV P ~3 1 i6(-)S Z
http //www publications parliament uk/pa/cm200203/cmselect/cmfaff/uc10 /uct02502 ht 20/07/03
 oral evidence Page 15 ot 27

Q101 Andrew Mackinlay : So you made no comments about the

veracity of that document at all to Gllllgan, you did not say it was
exaggerated, embellished, probably over-egged?

Dr Kelly : No, I had no doubt that the veracity of it was absolute.

Q102 Chairman : Sorry, I had no doubts?

Dr Kelly: On the veracity of the document .

Q103 Andrew Mackinlay : Did you express any view about that
document at all to him which you can share with this Committee?

Dr Kelly: We are talking of a conversation we had six weeks ago and

for me it is very difficult to recall that, so I cannot recall the
~ comments that I made . All I can say is that the general tenet of that
document is one that I am sympathetic to . I had access to an
immense amount of information accumulated from the UN that
complements that dossier quite well, remarkably so, and although the
final assessment made by the United Nations was status of verification
documentation, not a threat assessment, the UN did not make a threat
assessment, put the two together and they match pretty well .

Q104 Andrew Mackinlay : Okay . Dr Kelly, a few moments ago I

asked you for the names of other journalists you have had contact
with in the tlmescale we were talking about and you said you have not
got access to your home . We are going to write formally to the MoD
and by that time you will have done your homework and sent it to us
in an envelope, but this afternoon can you tell me those journalists
who you do recall having met in the tlmescale? What are their names_~

" Dr Kelly: Having met?

Q105 Andrew Mackinlay : Yes .

Dr Kelly: I have met very few journalists .

Q106 Andrew Mackinlay : I heard "few", but who are the ones in
your mind's eye at this moment? What are their names?

Dr Kelly: That will be provided to you by the Ministry of Defence .

Q107 Andrew Mackinlay : No, I am asking you now . This is the high
court of Parliament and I want you to tell the Committee who you
met .

Dr Kelly: On this occasion I think it is proper that the Ministry of

Defence communicates that to you .

7\(P)l 3 joaIFl~ 3
Chairman : But it is a proper question

http //www publications parliament uk/pa/cm200203/cmselect/cmfaff/uc10 /uc102502 ht 20/07/03

 ragc Lo ul LJ
VldleVlUence

Andrew Mackinlay : You are under an obligation to reply .

Chairman : If you have met journalists there is nothing sinister in

itself about meeting journalists, save in an unauthorised way .

Q108 Andrew Mackinlay : Who are they?

Dr Kelly: The only people that I can remember having spoken to in

recent times about this particular issue - not ab this parti ular
issue - is lane Corbin and Susan Watts . tV =-G`--~

Q109 Andrew Mackinlay : Okay . Can I ask you this : I think part of
what you have said in the press, and I do have some sympathy with
this, is that it was like a culture and some of your meetings with the
press were not necessarily authorised but it was understood that you
" had been around a long time, is that correct?

Dr Kelly: I do not think I have made any such statement to the press .

Q110 Andrew Mackinlay : What are the ground rules for talking to
the press amongst you and your peers?

Dr Kelly. Normally you have to have authorisation or a request by the

Ministry to interact in such a way .

Qili Andrew Mackinlay : But you did not on this occasion?

Dr Kelly : I did not .

Q112 Andrew Mackinlay : Why not?

" Dr Kelly: I think you have to look back at my history . I have been
involved with the press for ten to 12 years, primarily as an UNSCOM
inspector, and when I was a chief inspector I had responsibility for
dealing with the press . Since then I have been asked on many
occasions by both the United Nations and by the Foreign Office and
the Ministry of Defence to provide interviews both to British and
international press . As a consequence of that, it is quite often follow-
ups on clarification of issues with contact numbers, and so one
responds to that.

Q113 Andrew Mackinlay: Basically you are saying you have a

general mandate?

Dr Kelly: I would not say I have a general mandate . Normally if I

have an approach the request is put to the Foreign Office press office
and that is the routine that I undertake .

Andrew Mackinlay : I am obliged, thank you .

P~3~~~4'
http //www publications parliament uk/pa/cm200203/cmselect/cmfaff/uc 10 /uc 102502 ht 20/07/03
 VI al l, v IUCI ll:e
rae c I i 01 t /

Q114 Chairman : What lessons have you learned from this episode?

Dr Kelly. Never to talk to a journalist again, I think .

Q115 Chairman : Are you going to respond to any requests from Mr

Gilligan again?

Dr Kelly : I think we will leave that question . I think that one I can
leave .

Q116 Richard Ottaway : Dr Kelly, you confirmed in response to

questions from Mr Pope that in your opinion you do not think that you
were the central source of Mr Gilligan's report?

Dr Kelly: That is my belief .

OQ117 Richard Ottaway : In Mr Gilligan's report there were two

fundamental assertions which have subsequently been proved correct .
One is that the 45 minute assertion was entered late into the
September dossier and, secondly, that the 45 minute assertion came
from a single, uncorroborated source . I think we can safely say from
what you have been saying that you were unaware of either of those
two things?

Dr Kelly : Correct .

Q118 Richard Ottaway : Given that Mr Gilligan's source of the story

has proved to be correct, do you think it is fair to say that you could
not have been the source? It is not just a question of your opinion, but
you could not have been the source .

" Dr Kelly: It is very difficult for me to be that strong . I do realise that

in the conversation that I had there was reinforcement of some of the
ideas he has put forward .

Q119 Richard Ottaway : Given that there were two assertions which
have been proved correct, which you did not know about, you clearly
were not the source of those assertions .

Dr Kelly: Correct .

Q120 Richard Ottaway : So, therefore, you could not have been the
central source?

Dr Kelly: Correct .

Q121 Richard Ottaway : When it was announced that the MoD put
out a statement that you had been in contact with the press, in the
penultimate paragraph the MoD says : "We do not know whether this
official is the single source quoted by Mr Gilligan" Given what you

~(Q ~ 3 ~ ~o~~
http //www publications parliament uk/pa/cm200203/cmselect/cmfaff/ucl /ucl 2502 u 20/07/03
kiiai c:viaence rage ia ot z r

have said today, why did you allow that statement to be made?

Dr Kelly: Can you repeat the statement, please?

Q122 Richard Ottaway : "We do not know whether this official is the
single source quoted by Mr Gilligan" .

Dr Kelly: Because I think that is the MoD's assessment .

Q123 Richard Ottaway : Did you know that they were going to say
that?

Dr Kelly: I did .

Q124 Richard Ottaway : Did you tell them that that was an incorrect
statement?

Dr Kelly: No . The whole reason why this has come up and the reason
why I wrote to my line management was because I had a concern that
because I had met with Andrew Gllligan in fact I may have contributed
to that story. When I reflected on my interaction with him and reallsed
the balance between the general conversation and the very specific
aspect we are now discussing today, which was a very, very minor
part of it, I did not see how on earth I could have been the primary
source. I did not see how the authority would emanate from me .

Q125 Richard Ottaway : I share your analysis, I do not see how you
could have been the primary source . Why did you not complain to the
MoD that this was an inaccurate statement that they were making?

Dr Kelly: Because, as I have just explained, I did realise that in fact I

may have inadvertently, if you like, contributed to that .

Q126 Richard Ottaway : You reached the conclusion that you were
not the source?

Dr Kelly: I do not believe I am the source.

Q127 Richard Ottaway : You have just concurred with me that you
could not have been the source .

Dr Kelly: Following the logic I agree with that, yes .

Q128 Richard Ottaway : In that, the MoD says they do not know of
the source and it was knowingly said by you .

Dr Kelly: That is the situation .

Q129 Richard Ottaway : Do you think possibly the MoD knowingly

got it wrong?

http //www publications parliament uk/pa/cm200203/cmselect/cmfaff/ucl /uc102S02~ht 20/07/03

 Vldl CvlUence t'drC L7 ()1 L /

Dr Kelly: No, I am saying that the MoD cannot make the categorical
statement that you want it to make based on my information provided
to them .

Q130 Richard Ottaway : I have to say that there seems to be an

inconsistency between your two statements . Would you agree that
there is an inconsistency between your belief that you were not the
single source and the MoD's statement?

Dr Kelly: There is an element of inconsistency there, I have to agree

with you .

Q131 Richard Ottaway : In response to my colleague, David

Chldgey, he gave you a quote which appeared on Newsnlght in a
programme introduced by Susan Watts . You have confirmed that you
" have spoken to Susan Watts . Can I just take you through the quote
again that was read out . You said you did not recognise it. Could you
just concentrate on it. It is talking about the 45 minute point. It said :
"The 45 minute point was a statement that was made and it got out of
all proportion . They were desperate for information . They were
pushing hard for information that could be released . That was the one
that popped up and it was seized on and it is unfortunate that it was .
That is why there is the argument between the intelligence services
and Number 10, because they picked up on it and once they had
picked up on it you cannot pull back from it, so many people will say
'Well, we are not sure about that' because the word smlthlng is
actually quite important ." There are many people who think that you
were the source of that quote . What is your reaction to that
suggestion?

Dr Kelly: I find it very difficult . It does not sound like my expression

" of words . It does not sound like a quote from me .

Q132 Richard Ottaway : You deny that those are your words?

Dr Kelly: Yes .

Q133 Richard Ottaway : In a throwaway line to a question just now

you said you did have a view as to why weapons of mass destruction
were not used in 45 minutes . Would you like to elaborate on that?

Dr Kelly: I did not say I had a view as to why they were not used in
45 minutes, what I said was that I had a view as to why weapons
were not used during the conflict .

Q134 Richard Ottaway : What was that?

Dr Kelly: Basically early on in the war the weather conditions were

such that you could not possibly consider the use of chemical and
biological weapons and later in the conflict command and control had

-w,O I 31oDE -1
http //www publications parliament uk/pa/cm200203/cmselect/cmfafl7uc 10 /uc 1 502 lit 20/07/03
 ulei cvuuence rage /u ot 2 i

collapsed to such a state that you still would not be able to use them .

Q135 Richard Ottaway : So they could not have been deployed in

45 minutes?

Dr Kelly; That is a separate discussion as to what the 45 minutes

means . Basically it would be very difficult to see how Iraq could
deploy in 45 minutes .

Q136 Richard Ottaway : The original statement was that "employed

within 45 minutes" meant they could be got up to - I think the word
was - the utility within 45 minutes, which implied some sort of holding
camp or base camp . Do you agree with that?

Dr Kelly: I do not remember that statement being made, it does not

actually make sense to me .

" Q137 Richard Ottaway : You are quite an expert on this. Do you
actually think that biological and chemical weapons could have been
deployed within 45 minutes?

Dr Kelly: It depends what you mean by "deployment" .

Q138 Richard Ottaway : From Saddam Hussein saying "use them"

to delivery on the battlefield, to actually being fired at enemy troops,
allied troops?

Dr Kelly; It makes a number of assumptions, that the weapons were

all ready to go in the right place with whatever system was being used
with the right tracking to attack, and that is very unlikely . We are
talking in terms of Iraq, in terms of what we knew ten years ago, a
country which filled its weapons to use them, it did not maintain a
stockpile of filled weapons, with the exception of mustard gas . It is
actually quite a long and convoluted process to go from having bulk
agent and munitions to actually getting them to the bunker for storage
and then issue them and subsequently deploy them .

Q139 Richard Ottaway : Do you think on September 24 2002 there

were weapons that could be deployed within 45 minutes?

Dr Kelly: I have no idea whether there were weapons or not at that

time .

Q140 Richard Ottaway : Is it possible that that was not the case?

Dr Kelly: It is possible it was not the case, it is possible that there

were weapons . Whether they were weapons that could be deployed
within 45 minutes is a separate issue .

Chairman : I think we are getting close to being outside the terms of

reference .
-j\j,V 13 I Q~ o 3 g
http //www publications parliament uk/pa/cm200203/cmselect/cmfaff/uc10 /uc102s02 ht 20/07/03
 l' abc L t U t a 1
W 6i cVlucnce

Q141 Richard Ottaway : I am talking about the 45 minutes which

was the central part of Mr Gilligan's report . My final question is what
sort of threat do you feel Iraq posed to the rest of the world in
September 2002?

Dr Kelly: I think I would quote the dossier, that it was a serious and a
current threat .

Q142 Richard Ottaway : You are on public record as saying as far as

anthrax was concerned you thought that Russia had a bigger capacity
than Iraq .

Dr Kelly : If you are quoting me now, think of where the quote is

coming from . I think we are talking of a separate issue .

Q143 Richard Ottaway : I am talking about Canadian television on

" 23 October 2002 .

Dr Kelly: I cannot recall the interview . Essentially, yes, in terms of

the Russian biological weapons programme and the Iraqi biological
weapons programme there is no doubt as to which was the larger .

Q144 Richard Ottaway : The Russians?

Dr Kelly : The Russians .

Q145 Richard Ottaway : Do you think that Iraq was a threat to the
rest of the world?

Dr Kelly: I think it was a threat to its neighbours and to the interests

of the UK .

` Richard Ottaway : Thank you very much .

Q146 Sir John Stanley : Dr Kelly, when did you read the entire
transcript of this Committee's evidence session with Mr Gilligan?

Dr Kelly. The Thursday after he provided the information .

Q147 Sir John Stanley : When you read it, did you recognise
yourself in the description he gave of the nature, the experience, the
working position of the single source for the 45 minute claim?

Dr Kelly: No, because I am not part of British Intelligence and I was

not someone who was involved in drafting the dossier or compiling the
dossier, I cannot remember the exact phrase he used .

Q148 Sir John Stanley : When you read the transcript did you
recognise the conversation that Mr Gilligan described between himself
and his sole source for the 45 minute claim as being one that was held

'[,lP ~3 20/07/03
/uc102 02 ht) Q)6 F~
http //www publications parliament uk/pa/cm200203/cmselect/cmfaff/uc10
 uf dl Cvluence tdgC LL O t L l

with you?

Dr Kelly : No .

Q149 Sir John Stanley : When he came before the Committee Mr

Gilligan told us about the length of time that he had known this
particular source . If I heard you in the rather bad acoustics a little
time ago, I think you said to one of my colleagues that you first met
Mr Gilligan in September of last year. Did I hear that correctly?

Dr Kelly: You heard it correctly . When I made my statement to the

Ministry of Defence what I said was I cannot exclude the possibility
that I have met him at a meeting at Chatham House or IISS before
then . That was the first time I can remember holding a long
conversation with him .

Q150 Sir John Stanley : You will, of course, be aware that Mr

" Gllllgan said to this Committee in relation to this source that : "I have
known this man for some time" and he also said in response to a
question from the Chairman : "It was something like a year since I had
last seen him face-to-face when we met" . Would you agree that that,
again, bears absolutely no relationship to what you have just
described as your contact with Mr Gilligan?

Dr Kelly: Before the May meeting the previous meeting had been in
February, two months earlier.

Q151 Sir John Stanley : If you met him for the first time last
September that is completely removed from something like "I have
known this man for some time . . . . It was something like a year since I
had last seen him face-to-face . . ." Having read the transcript, Dr Kelly,
you have already confirmed to me and to other colleagues on this
Committee that the description Mr Gllligan gave of the person in terms
of position and experience of his source for the 45 minute claim bore
no relationship to yourself?

Dr Kelly: It does not match up .

Q152 Sir John Stanley : You have already said to this Committee
that Mr Gilligan's account of the conversation which he had with the
single source on the 45 minute claim bears no relationship to the
conversation which you yourself had with him . Thirdly, you have just
confirmed to me that the history of your relatively short relationship
with Mr Gllligan bears no relationship to what Mr Gilligan said was the
last time he had met his source and the length of time he had known
him .

Dr Kelly: Yes .

Q153 Sir John Stanley : So when you read that in the transcript, I
find it difficult to understand why it was not absolutely clear to you

http //www publications parliament uk/pa/cm200203/cmselect/cmfaPF/uc10

P )i,~ I non
/uc102 0 ht 20/07/03
 Vldt CVIQeRce 1"db'c LJ UL L /

that whatever conversation you had with Mr Gilltgan there is

absolutely no way you were the source that he was referring to when
he came before this Committee as far as the 45 minute claim is
concerned .

Dr Kelly: The difficulty I have is that there are other elements of it

which do match the things that I say, and I have referred to that : the
issue of the 30 per cent probability of Iraq possessing chemical
weapons . That is the sort of statement that I do make and may well
have made to him, and that is when I became concerned that I may,
in fact, be part and parcel of the story .

Q154 Sir John Stanley: Of course, references to those particular

points may have come in other public statements that Mr Gllligan has
made and on which he might reasonably have drawn from the
separate conversation he had with you .

" Dr Kelly: True .

Q155 Sir John Stanley: Who made the proposition to you, Dr Kelly,
that you should be treated absolutely uniquely, in a way which I do
not believe any civil servant has ever been treated before, in being
made a public figure before being served up to the Intelligence and
Security Committee?

Dr Kelly : I cannot answer that question . I do not know who made that
decision . I think that is a question you have to ask the Ministry of
Defence .

Q156 Sir John Stanley: So you did not make it yourself?

Dr Kelly: Certainly not.

Q157 Sir John Stanley : We have to assume therefore that your

ministers then are responsible for treating you uniquely as a civil
servant in highly publicising you before going to the Intelligence and
Security Committee?

Dr Kelly: That is a conclusion you can draw .

Q158 Sir John Stanley : Why did you go along with it, Dr Kelly? You
were being exploited, were you not?

Dr Kelly: I would not say I was being exploited .

Q159 Sir John Stanley : You had been before them to rubbish Mr
Gllllgan and his source, quite clearly?

Dr Kelly: I just found myself to be in this position out of my own

honesty in acknowledging the fact that I had interacted with him . I felt
obliged to make that statement once I realised that I may possibly be

- v~-
I
http //www publications parllament uk/pa/cm200203/cmselect/cmfafF/ucl0
`3
/uc 10250Z ht
5I
~ 20/07/03
 V161 UVWCII(,e 1'a8C L4 (it L /

that source . Until then, I have to admit that I was out of the country
for most of the time this debate was going on so I was not following
the actual interactions that were going on . It was not until I was
alerted to the transcript by a friend that I actually even considered
that I might be the source.

Q160 Sir John Stanley : If I may say so, I think you have behaved
in a very honourable and proper manner by going to your
departmental line managers in the circumstances you describe . That
does not get away from the key issue, which is why did you feel it was
incumbent upon you to go along with the request that clearly had
been made to you to be thrown to the wolves, not only to the media
but, also, to this Committee?

Dr Kelly: I think that is a line of questioning you will have to ask the
Ministry of Defence . I am sorry .

" Sir John Stanley : I am grateful .

Q161 Chairman : Do you feel any concern at the way the Ministry of
Defence responded after you volunteered your admission?

Dr Kelly: I accept what has happened .

Q162 Andrew Mackinlay : The feeling I have, and you might be able
to help me with this, was that there was no serious attempt by the
security or intelligence services or the Ministry of Defence Police to
find out Gilllgan's source . Did they come knocking at your door or that
of your colleagues, to your knowledge at all, to discover that?

Dr Kelly: I have no knowledge of that whatsoever .

" Q163 Andrew Mackinlay : Since you wrote to your superiors in the
way you have done, have you met Geoff Hoon?

Dr Kelly: No .

Q164 Andrew Mackinlay : Any ministers?

Dr Kelly: No .

Mr Pope : Any special advisers?

Q165 Andrew Mackinlay : Any special advisers?

Dr Kelly: No .

Q166 Andrew Mackinlay : Do you know of any other inquiries which

have gone on in the department to seek the source - to clarify in
addition to you or instead of you or apart from you?

-P~3~~d5z
http //www publications parliament uk/pa1cm200203/cmselect/cmfafF/uc 1/uc 102502
t 20/07/03
 U1 al ev iuence i'age / ~
~ ut =i

None whatsoever?

Dr Kelly: No .

Q167 Andrew Mackinlay : I reckon you are chaff; you have been
thrown up to divert our probing . Have you ever felt like a fall-guy? You
have been set up, have you not?

Dr Kelly: That is not a question I can answer .

Q168 Andrew Mackinlay : But you feel that?

Dr Kelly: No, not at all . I accept the process that is going on .

Q169 Chairman : I am sorry . You accept . . . ?

0 Dr Kelly: I accept the process that is happening .

Q170 Mr Hamilton : Dr Kelly, I am sorry to go back to something

that I know you have already answered or partially answered, but I
just want to clarify . My colleague, Mr Ottaway, did refer to this earlier .
I just want to come back to this question of Alastair Campbell and Mr
Gilligan . The MoD statement states that when Mr Gilligan asked about
the role of Alastair Campbell with regard to the 45 minute issue "he
made no comment and explained that he was not involved in the
process of drawing up the intelligence parts of the dossier" - that is
you, of course . Just for the record, can you tell me absolutely whether
you named or otherwise identified Alastair Campbell or did you say
anything which Mr Gilligan might reasonably have interpreted as
identifying Mr Alastair Campbell as wanting to change the dossier or
"sex it up" in any way or make undue reference to the 45 minute
claim?
"
Dr Kelly: I cannot recall that . I find it very difficult to think back to a
conversation I had six weeks ago . I cannot recall but that does not
mean to say, of course, that such a statement was not made but I
really cannot recall it . It does not sound like the sort of thing I would
say. __

Q171 Sir John Stanley: One final point on the timetable . What was
the date on which you went to your line managers expressing the
concern that Mr Gilligan might have drawn on his conversation with
you?

Dr Kelly: I wrote a letter on Monday 30 June.

Q172 Sir John Stanley : How do you explain the reasons for the
delay between the letter you wrote on 30 June and the release of the
Ministry of Defence statement throwing you to the wolves?

VP ~3 10053
http //www publications parliament uk/pa/cm200203/cmselect/cmfaff/uc10/uc1025 2 ht 20/07/03
 u1ni c~Iuw(,e t aSc cu ul a 4

Dr Kelly: I cannot explain the bureaucracy that went on in between . I

think it went through the line management system and went through
remarkably quickly .

Q173 Sir John Stanley : Did you get any impression that the
statement was delayed by the Ministry of Defence in order to ensure
that it went out only after our report was published?

Dr Kelly.- I cannot answer that question . I really do not know .

Q174 Mr Olner: You work for the MoD, Dr Kelly, but work obviously
very closely with the intelligence and security services . Did you
suggest to anyone at all that the intelligence and security services
were unhappy about the September dossier?

Dr Kelly: Unhappy? I do not think they were unhappy . I think they

~ had confidence in the information that was provided in that dossier .

Q175 Mr Olner : So there was no, if you like, feeling within the
security services that this was a piece of work that had been "sexed-
up" and it was going to be rubbished at the end of the day?

Dr Kelly: I think there were people who worked extremely hard to

achieve that document and the calibre of the document that was
produced .

Q176 Mr Pope : When you met Mr Gilligan on 27 May did you feel at
the time that you were doing anything untoward, that you were
breaching the confidence that is expected of you within your job?

Or Kelly: No . I think it has been agreed by the Ministry of Defence

_ there was no security breach involved in the interactions I had .

Q177 Mr Pope : Do you think, in your experience, that there is a

widespread culture in the MoD and, perhaps, in the intelligence and
security services of people speaking in an unofficial capacity to
journalists? Certainly the impression I got from Mr Gilligan was that
that was a widespread culture that journalists would have a number of
contacts in the MoD or in the security services. Is that your
experience?

Dr Kelly: It is not my experience but I think you have to recognise

that I have a strange background in the sense that I operated for ten
years internationally interacting with the international press and was
well-known to the press and had quite a lot of contact. I think I am
somewhat unusual in terms of the people who have an interest in that
situation .

Q178 Mr Pope : Finally, were you aware of any widespread unease

about the accuracy of the September dossier, at the time it was

wp~3
http //www publications parliament uk/pa/cm200203/cmselect/cmfaff/uc10/uc102502 ht
11)03+
20/07/03
Vial GvWCIII,G
vagc~iol4 l

published, amongst people who were involved in providing information

for it?

Dr Kelly: I do not believe there was any difficulty over the accuracy of
that document.

Q179 Chairman : Dr Kelly, Sir John has properly said that you acted
honourably . When you thought that you might have been the source
you wrote a letter volunteering the fact of your meeting . Given what
has subsequently happened, do you feel used in any way?

Dr Kelly: You have already asked that question . I accept the process
that I have encountered .

Chairman : May I thank you on behalf of the Committee . You have

been most helpful .

http //www publications parliament uk/pa/cm200203/cmselect/cmfaff/ucl0

T\,-P )13 ) (J'o5 ~
/uc102502 ht 20/07/03