Hutton Inquiry Team
From : Robert Aitken iRAitken@treasury-
Sent: 21 October 2003 16 05
Subject : RE Annex, Sir Kevin Tebbit
Dear Martin,
Please find attached ANNEX for Sir Kevin Tebbit .
Kind regards,
Robert
21/10/03
27/01/04
HUTTON INQUIRY
ANNEX: SIR KEVIN TEBBIT
17 102001
The MoD press statement
1 The decision to issue a press statement was taken at a meeting on the morning
of 8 Julv chaired by the Prime Minister and attended by Sir David Manning,
Sir David Omand, Mr Scarlett . Mr Powell and Mr Campbell . Sir Kevin was
not present at that meeting. 'When he arrived at No 10 he was informed by the
Prime Minister that the meeting had just finished and that Jonathan Powell
would brief lum on what had been decided (Day 25 pp. 18 - 20)
Jonathan Powell informed Sir Kevin that a decision had been taken to issue a
statement that day and that colleagues were beginning to draft on that basis
Sir Kevin concurred with the decision that had been taken although he was
not party to it . After briefing Sir Kevin on the approach that was being taken,
Mr Powell suggested that he and Sir Kevin went to the room where the
drafting was being done (Day 8 p 87 ; Day 25 pp 18 - 19) .
Mr Campbell . Mr Kelly, Mr Smith. Mr Scarlett, Mr Powell and Sir Kevin
prepared a draft statement m Godnc Smith's office The draft statement was
typed up on Mr Smith's computer by Mr Campbell . Those present, including
Sir Kevin. were collectively responsible for the draft statement (CAB/ 1/ 70-
71) prepared at that meeting (Day 25 p 20) .
4. Sir Kevin returned to the MoD with the draft statement In oral evidence, he
explained his understanding of what had been decided and what he was being
asked to do .
"But as far as I was concerned_ it ~k as clear the Government, through
the Prime Minister, had decided that a statement should be issued
Q C' C' 'z
broadly along the lines of this, but that we first needed to make sure it
was something that Dr Kelly would accept " (Day 25 p. 22)
5. At the MoD . a small number of minor amendments were made to the draft
statement. A comparison of the draft statement (CAB/1/70-71) with the final
version of the statement (MOD/1i67) reveals that the following changes of
substance were made at the MoD
(t) The final paragraph about the BBC (CAB/1'71) was deleted;
(ii) The paragraph stating that . as far as the official was aware, Mr
Gtlhgan had not attempted to contact him since 29 May, was
deleted ;
(in) The reference to the official not being a member of the Senior
Civil Service was deleted :
(iv) The reference to the official not being a member of the Defence
Intelligence Staff was re-inserted - the phrase "he is not a member
of the Intelhgence Services or the Defence Intelligence Staff' had
been added m manuscript by Mr Howard prior to the contingent
press statement being aueed with Dr Kelly on 7 July (TVP'3'302) ;
(v) The statement that the official "savs he did not see the 45 minute
intelligence report" was moved from the third paragraph to the
fifth paragraph.
(vi) The phrase "it was an unauthorised meeting" was inserted at the
suggestion of Mr Hatfield .
6. It was not realistically open to Sir Kevin to make more substantial
amendments to the draft statement prepared at No 10. In particular, it was not
realistically open to him to reduce the level of detail pro"ided m the draft
statement about the official who had come forward Sir Kevin had been aware
since 7 July that No 10 considered that any press statement needed to be
detailed
"Jonathan Powell took the view that if we made a statement, we would
need to be able to stand it up fully m public to explain why it was we
were bringing foruard this information and that we would need to
c~~~f~WO 3
explain that the status of the individual was such as to render it highly
improbable that he could authoritatively have made the allegations that
were central to Glltgan's broadcast, as well as the denial that he
actually made those staternents " (Day 25 p 13)
7 Sir Kevin asked Mr Hatfield to clear the final version of the press statement
with Dr Kelly, which Mr Hatfield duly did In oral evidence, Sir Kevin stated
that-
"Had Dr Kelly said- '1 am not happy with it' or, 'I want to discuss it
further' or, `I am concerned about the implications of this statement'
. . 1 have no doubt whatsoever we would have discussed it with him
and explained to him the reasons why it was necessary for the
Government to come forward with a statement of this kind. As it
happened, that was not necessary But I think we could only have
delayed it a matter of hours The sense m No 10 was we really did
need to come forward with a statement." (Day 25 pp 23 - 24)
8. The decision on the timing of the publication of a statement which did not
name Dr Kelly had been taken at the meeting chaired by the Prime Minister
on the morning of 8 July Sir Kevin's understanding was that :
(r) A factor which had particularly influenced the decision on timing
was that officials, beginning with Mr Scarlet[, were due to start
giving evidence to the ISC on Wednesday 9 July (Day 25 pp . 14 .
111) This was combined with a growing concern that . if the story
were to break before any statement had been issued . the
Government would be accused of having withheld it from the FAC
(Day 25 p . 19)
(it) The degree of likelihood as to whether Dr Kelly was Mr Gilligan's
claimed single-source was such that a statement needed to be made
but was not such as to enable Dr Kelly to be narned in the
statement (Day 25 pp 22-25, 45)
9. Sir Kevin concurred with the decision on the timing of the statement and the
fact that it should not name Dr Kelly The final version of the press statement
w as approved by the SecretarN of State for Defence before it was issued
10. Sir Kevin relies on his Memorandum and on the relevant parts of the
Governnment's main submissions in support of his contention that there should
be no criticism of the decision to issue the press statement on 8`h July or its
content nor should he be cnticised for his part in drafting it.
The O&A document
11 . Sir KeN-in had no involvement m the drafting of Q&A documents and did not
see the earlier drafts of the Q&A at the time He approved the final version of
the Q&A when it was shown to him on the afternoon of 8 July. In doing so, he
focussed on the proposal that the press office would confirm Dr Ke11v's name
if it were put forward by journalists Sir Kevin subsequently informed the
Secretary of State for Defence of the approach beat-. adopted . The Defence
Secretary approved it
12 Sir Kevin relies on his Memorandum and on the relevant parts of the
Government's main submissions m support of his contention that there should
be no criticism of the Q&A brief and that he should not be criticised for
approN mg it.
The support provided to Dr Kelly
13 Sir Kevin never met Dr Kellv and had no knowledge of him before this
incident . Nevertheless, once Dr Kelly came forward. Sir Kevin took a
personal interest m his welfare-
(1) He asked Mr Hatfield to conduct the first interview, of Dr Kelly
because of Mr Hatfield's experience as Personnel Director and
because he had no involvement m the dispute between the
Government and the BBC (Day 35 p. 1)
(2) On 9 July. he enquired whether the press office had been am
contact with Dr Kelly and was mfonned that it had been (Dav
25 p 30)
rS .3~ I! ~ ~;00 S
