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Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

FIRST DIVISION

G.R. Nos. L-60532-33 November 5,

1985

TUPAS LOCAL CHAPTER NO. 979 (R.S.

CARLOS WORKERS UNION) and 44
REGULAR WORKERS, petitioners,
vs.
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS
COMMISSION, R.S. CARLOS GENERAL
ENTERPRISES, and SONEL L. LABAO,
respondents.

Tupas & Associates for petitioners.

TEEHANKEE, J.:

This is an action of certiorari filed by

petitioner union and its forty-four (44)
petitioners-workers from the decision of
public respondent National Labor
Relations Commission. Respondent
commission in its questioned decision
of April 23, 1982 affirmed the decision
of Labor Arbiter Ricarte T. Soriano dated
March 31, 1981 that the said workers
staged a one-day "illegal strike" on
August 19, 1980, and ordered the
dismissal of all 44 workers, except
eleven who were ordered reinstated
without backwages but without loss of
seniority rights. 1 On appeal, respondent
commission, however, modified the
arbiter's decision, ruling that only the
"Militant and active leaders" should be
terminated. "Based on the warrants of
arrest issued by the municipal court of
Taguig, Metro Manila" it Identified
twenty-two (22) "out of the forty-five (45)
 2
supposed strikers (sic)" as
"leaders/instigators of the illegal strike"
whom it ordered terminated 3 and
ordered the rest, i.e. the remaining
twenty-two (including the eleven
originally ordered reinstated by the
arbiter's decision) workers to be
reinstated without back wages.

Petitioners are regular workers of

private respondent R.S. Carlos General
Enterprises, owned and managed by
Roberto S. Carlos, with co-respondent
Sonel L. Labao in charge of personnel.
Said company is engaged in the
business of poultry and hog feeds
manufacturing and production. It is duly
registered with the Bureau of
Commerce, Bureau of Animal Industry
and the National Grains Authority.

On August 17, 1980, petitioners

organized themselves into a union and
held an organization meeting in the
house of one of its members. They
affiliated their union with Trade Unions
of the Philippines and Allied Services
(TUPAS) as Local Chapter No. 979. They
named Eleuterio Paloma, Jr. as their
temporary president. The following day,
after office hours, petitioners met again
and planned to talk to the management
about their newly organized union and
certain benefits like allowances,
overtime pay and service incentive leave
pay.

According to the petitioners, they

decided to talk these matters peacefully
with respondent employer Roberto S.
Carlos before the working hours of
August 19, 1980. About 6:00 in the
morning of said date, they requested
Mrs. Teresita Carpio, the secretary of
their employer, to notify the latter about
their plan to talk to him relative to their
requests for allowances, overtime pay
and service incentive leave pay. An hour
later, Mr. Carlos arrived and was furious
at petitioners' projected plan to plead for
these benefits. They were required, one
by one, to return to their work and they
regretfully obeyed.

On August 23, 1980, before they could

receive their wages for the week,
petitioners were asked to sign a paper
captioned "Notice to All Employees"
which was a notice of their preventive
suspension. Petitioners refused to sign
and the paymaster, Mrs. Trinidad Carlos,
warned them that "Pag hindi kayo
pumirma dito, hindi kayo makakapasok
sa Lunes, August 25, 1980." On August
25, 1980, petitioners reported for work
but were not admitted.

On the other hand, it is the position of

respondent employer that about 9:00 in
the morning of August 19, 1980,
petitioners staged a sit-down strike in
the premises of respondent company to
dramatize their demands for
allowances, service incentive leave pay
and overtime pay. Caught by surprise, he
sought police assistance from the
Taguig Police Station to maintain and
secure peace and order in the premises.
Police Corporal Maximo C. Estacio
responded by dispatching Patrolmen
Rolando Cipriano and Agapito Cuenca.
Respondent employer also reported the
matter to the Ususan Barangay Council.
The barangay captain went to the
premises of the company and saw for
himself the petitioners "at strike." He
even talked to some of them.

On August 23, 1980, four (4) days after

the so-called strike, respondent
employer placed petitioners under
preventive suspension pending
clearance from the Ministry of Labor
and Employment to terminate their
services. On August 25, 1980, he filed an
application with the Ministry of Labor
for clearance to terminate the
employment of petitioners.
In opposition, petitioners charged
private respondent for illegal lockout
and unfair labor practice. They further
alleged that their summary suspension
followed by the shutdown and dismissal
without prior clearance two days after
the notice of their suspension was in
gross violation of Rule XIV, Book V of
the Implementing Rules on Dismissals
in force at that time which required that
"Any application for clearance to
shutdown or to dismiss employees shall
be filed with the Regional Office having
jurisdiction over the place of
employment at least ten (10) days
before the intended shutdown or
dismissal" (section 3) and "Shutdown or
dismissal without prior clearance shall
be conclusively presumed to be
termination of employment without a
just cause. The Regional Director shall,
in such case, order the immediate
reinstatement of the employee and the
payment of his wages from the time of
the shutdown or dismissal until the time
of reinstatement" (section 2).

The arbiter's decision makes no

statement or finding of the basic
antecedent facts as above narrated. He
merely found I substantial evidence
indicating that a sit-down strike was
indeed staged by the members of the
complainant union on August 19, 1980
and that the said strike is in violation of
P.D. No. 823, as amended, and therefore
illegal. The law, as amended, is clear
and unequivocal in banning all forms of
strikes, picketing and lockouts, subject
to certain exceptions. By way of such
exceptions, a strike may be allowed
when: a) the employer against whom it
is declared is not engaged in any vital
industry; b) the ground is unresolved
economic issues in collective
bargaining; and c) notice of strike is filed
with the Bureau of Labor Relations at
least 30 days prior to the contemplated
strike." He held that not one of the
exceptions was met by petitioners, viz,
that respondent employer's business of
poultry and hog feeds manufacturing is
a vital industry and petitioners' notice of
strike was "filed seven (7) days after the
staging of the strike on August 19, 1980
contrary to the rules on notice of strike."
But the arbiter totally sidestepped and
made no mention whatever of the clear-
as-day-exception that the petitioners
had just unionized and wanted to
negotiate on the all-important economic
issues of their allowances, overtime pay
and service incentive leave pay.

Respondent commission in its sparse

three-and-a-half-page double-space
decision did not deal with nor make any
findings on the issues of fact and of law
submitted by petitioners. It simply ruled
that

We find that a concerted action was

staged in the premises of the
 company on August 19, 1980.
Otherwise stated, a sitdown strike
was staged resulting as it did in
paralyzing the operations of the
respondent company on that day.
Complainants' denial that they
staged a strike on August 19, 1980
because they were paid just the
same their wages, although the
evidence shows that some only
were paid, is belied by the notice of
strike filed with the Bureau of Labor
Relations seven (7) days dated or
specifically on August 26, 1980.

Citing the statements of certain

employees and the barangay captain's
report, and the Taguig police chief's
blotter entry that respondent employer
Carlos "seeks police assistance in the
aforecited company to secure peace
and security in that place in connection
with the Sitdown Strike of his workers
last 19 August '80, " it simply concluded
that "evidently with the foregoing a
sitdown strike was staged by
respondent company's workers on
August 19, 1980." The foregoing is
practically the whole text of respondent
commission's decision which is more to
be noted for its lack of content and
discussion of the fundamental issues
raised by petitioners.

Hence, the petition at bar. Petitioners

insist that "(W)hat happened on August
19, 1980 was not a strike but a peaceful
delegation of workers to talk to the
employer in order to inform the latter
formally that the workers already have
their own union and in order to talk to
the employer on their just grievances.
The union members and leaders
requested the secretary of the
owner/manager that the latter be
fetched for this purpose. This happened
in the morning of August 19, 1980 at
6:00 or one (1) hour before the start of
the working day. The Owner/Manager,
instead of acceding to the request of his
workers, over-reacted and called the
police. So, the workers, could do nothing
except start their work at 7:00 a.m. that
same morning. This is the reason why
they were paid for that day." 4

The Court finds merit in the petition and

sets aside the questioned decision of
respondent commission.

Neither respondent commission's

decision nor the labor arbiter's decision
as affirmed with modification by it cites
any substantial facts or evidence to
warrant the terribly harsh imposition of
the capital penalty of dismissal and
forfeiture of employment on twenty-two
of forty-four workers for having staged
the so-called one day (more accurately,
a one morning) "sitdown strike" on
August 19, 1980 to inform respondent
employer of their having formed their
own union and to present their just
requests for allowances, overtime pay
and service incentive leave pay.
Prescinding from respondent
commission's misappreciation of the
facts and evidence and accepting for
the nonce its factual conclusion that the
petitioners staged a one morning sit-
down strike instead of making a mass
representation for the employer to
recognize their newly formed union and
negotiate their demands, respondent
commission's decision is not in
consonance with the constitutional
injunction that the Court has invariably
invoked and applied to afford protection
to labor and assure the workers' rights
to self- organization, collective
bargaining, security of tenure and just
and humane conditions of work. The
said decision likewise is not in
accordance with settled and
authoritative doctrine and legal
principles that a mere finding of the
illegality of a strike does not
automatically warrant a wholesale
dismissal of the strikers from their
employment and that a premature or
improvident strike should not be visited
with a consequence so severe as
dismissal where a penalty less punitive
would suffice. Numerous precedents to
this effect have been cited and
reaffirmed in the recent case of Bacus
vs. Ople, 5 among them, the' Court's
pronouncement through the now Chief
Justice in Almira vs. BF Goodrich Phil.
Inc. 6 that the Constitution's security of
tenure provision

... would imply at the very least that

where a penalty less punitive would
suffice, whatever steps may be
committed by labor ought not to be
visited with a consequence so
severe. It is not only because of the
law's concern for the workingman.
There is, in addition, his family to
consider. Unemployment brings
untold hardships and sorrows on
those dependent on the wage
earlier. The misery and pain
attendant on the loss of jobs then
could be avoided if there is
acceptance of the view that under
all the circumstances of this case,
petitioners should not be deprived
of their means of livelihood. Nor is
this to condone what had been
done by them. For all this while,
since private respondent
considered them separated from
the service, they had not been paid.
From the strictly juridical
standpoint, it cannot be too strongly
stressed, to follow Davis in his
masterly work, Discretionary
Justice, that where a decision may
be made to rest on informed
judgment rather than rigid rules, all
the equities of the case must be
accorded their due weight. Finally,
labor law determination, to quote
 from Bultmann, should be not only
secundum rationem but also
secundum caritatem.

Respondent commission merely relied

on the arbiter's conclusion that "a
sitdown strike was staged resulting as it
did in paralyzing the operations of the
respondent company on that day
[August 19, 1980]" and "complainants'
denial that they staged a strike on
August 19, 1980 because they were paid
just the same their wages, although the
evidence shows that some only were
paid, is belied by the notice of strike
filed with the Bureau of Labor Relations
seven (7) days dated or specifically on
August 26, 1980. " But as may be
gleaned from the labor arbiter's decision
itself, there is no dispute that R.S. Carlos
of respondent employer was furious at
the workers' concerted action and called
the police, and thereafter secured
warrants of arrest for the "illegal strike"
against 22 workers led by their just
elected president Eleuterio Paloma,
although there is no complaint of the
workers having in any way resorted to
force or violence. It is likewise unrefuted
that the workers were ordered by Carlos
to go back to work which they obeyed
and they were paid their wages for that
very same day that they were supposed
to be on a " sitdown strike." (As quoted
above, the arbiter would qualify that
"only some were paid," but gives no
particulars.) Four days later, on August
23, 1980 before the workers could
receive their wages for the week,
respondent employer fully exploiting the
situation and obviously to abort the
incipient union, suspended an the
workers and two days thereafter filed
the application for clearance to dismiss
them. It should likewise be noted that
the commission's ratiocination that the
workers' notice of strike seven (7) days
after the staging of the "sitdown strike"
belies their denial that they had gone on
strike on August 19, 1980 is quite forced
— for the workers had gone back to work
right on that day and following days until
their preventive suspension effective
August 25, 1980. The said notice of
strike rather corroborates the workers'
contention that they did not strike and
had no intention of striking on August
19, 1980 — and decided to strike and
accordingly gave notice thereof
afterwards upon realizing their
employer's intractable and anti-union
attitude.

In an analogous case, Diwa ng

Pagkakaisa-PAFLU vs. Filtex
International Corp., 7 the Court, speaking
through Chief Justice Querube C.
Makalintal, held that a stoppage of work
of one night (which would otherwise be
a violation of the no-strike clause of the
governing collective bargaining
agreement) should not be considered as
an illegal strike and that "good labor-
management relations as well as the
broader imperatives of industrial peace
dictated that the spontaneous
recalcitrance of some employees, which
after all had been settled without
unnecessary delay, should not be made
an excuse to punish the union officers. "

Respondent commission's decision

does not deal with the petitioners'
submittal that their dismissal was in
violation of the Implementing Rules on
Dismissals 8 that there be a prior
clearance filed ten (10) days before the
intended dismissal. Neither does it deal
with the fact that the
suspended/dismissed workers were
ordered provisionally reinstated in the
Return-to-work Order issued by then
Director Carmelo Noriel on March 16,
1981. The main issue at bar was and is
the factual issue of whether or not the
workers staged a "sitdown strike" on one
day, August 19, 1980. Even accepting
the factual finding of public respondents
that such a strike was staged, which
was undisputedly aborted on the same
day, such action does not merit the
capital penalty of dismissal of the would
be leaders of the union or organization
that they were organizing to press the
workers' just demands. The employer's
nefarious objective of busting the
workers' union before it could even be
born and see the light of day and justice
would thus be a fait accompli, in gross
violation of the constitutional guarantee
of the workers' right to self-organization
and collective bargaining for just and
humane conditions of work. The glaring
fact is that the employer's preemptive
act of calling in the police and filing
criminal complaints against the workers
as to the results of which the Court has
not been informed at all, thereby busted
the union even before it could be born
and press and bargain collectively for
the workers' just demands and achieved
its purpose. The workers' demands were
completely brushed aside with the
summary dismissal of their leaders.
Who would dare lead them under such
repressive tactics?

The petitioners' questions in their

petition were likewise left unanswered
by respondent commission: "if there
was really a sit-down strike on August
19, 1980 why were employees who are
now ordered dismissed paid their wages
from August 1823, 1980? Secondly, why
did not the employer. Enterprise in its
Application for Clearance filed on
August 25, 1980 to dismiss the workers
on the same day mention the sitdown
strike or specify the alleged misconduct
or manifest threat? Thirdly, the
dismissal came after the employees
were asking for living allowance,
overtime and service incentive leave pay
which the employer refused. The
accusation on alleged. economic
sabotage was, therefore, a concoction
to do away with the workers' right 9

In the analogous case of PBM

Employees Organization vs. PBM Co.,
Inc., 10 the Court, in setting aside the
questioned industrial court's orders held
that "the dismissal or termination of the
employment of the petitioning eight (8)
leaders of the union is harsh for a one-
day absence from work." They had been
ordered dismissed for having carried out
a mass demonstration at Malacañang
on March 4, 1969 in protest against
alleged abuses of the Pasig police
department, upon two days' prior notice
to respondent employer company, as
against the latter's insistence that the
first shift should not participate but
instead report for work, under pain of
dismissal. The Court held that they were
merely exercising their basic human
rights and fighting for their very survival
"in seeking sanctuary behind their
freedom of expression as well as their
right of assembly and of petition against
alleged persecution of local
officialdom." We ruled that "(T)he
appropriate penalty — if it deserves any
penalty at all — should have been simply
to charge said one-day absence against
their vacation or sick leave. But to
dismiss the eight (8) leaders of the
petitioner Union is a most cruel penalty,
since as aforestated the Union leaders
depend on their wages for their daily
sustenance as well as that of their
respective families aside from the fact
that it is a lethal blow to unionism while
at the same time strengthening the
oppressive hand of the petty tyrants in
the localities."

Petitioners' prayer for reversal of the

questioned decisions and for
reinstatement of all the workers with full
backwages should, therefore, be
granted. In this connection, the record
discloses that after the workers did
strike on March 16, 1981, Carmelo C.
Noriel as then officer-in-charge of the
Bureau of Labor Relations, issued a
return-to-work order as of the same
date, ordering all striking workers "to
return to work immediately and to desist
from continuing with the concerted
action" and "direct(ing) the management
to allow all workers to return to work
under the same terms and conditions
prevailing previous to the work
stoppage." The eleven (11) workers
ordered reinstated in the arbiter's
decision of March 31, 1981 had
apparently been reinstated at the time
of this return-to-work order, as affirmed
by respondent employer himself in his
comment of August 2, 1982. 11 Hence,
the return-to-work order concerned the
thirty-three (33) remaining unreinstated
workers and ordered their provisional
reinstatement, as follows:
 The thirty-four (34) workers (sic)"
who were alleged to have been
dismissed illegally by the company
and who are now subject of Case
No. AB-10-8251-80 are hereby
provisionally reinstated pending the
final disposition of said case by the
Arbitration Branch of the National
Capital Region.

The petitioners' averment that "pursuant

to this Order the strikers lifted the picket
but the employer refused to admit the
workers to work. Hence, they remain
locked out until now — since August
1980 13 stands unrefuted and is in effect
confirmed in respondent employer's
comment. 14

The thirty-three (33) remaining workers

who were not reinstated by respondent
employer notwithstanding the return-to-
work order of March 16, 1981 shall be
entitled to full backwages without
deduction or qualification as of this date
until their reinstatement. This is by way
of departing from the usual equivalent
of the three years backwages generally
awarded by this Court, in line with the
principle enunciated in Davao Free
Workers Front vs. CIR 15 that an
employer like respondent employer, who
is guilty "of oppressive and unfair labor
practices, discriminatory acts and union-
busting activities ... must bear the full
consequences of its acts particularly in
the light of its obstinacy in persisting in
its refusal to reinstate the unlawfully
dismissed ... employees and accept the
returning strikers" notwithstanding the
return-to-work order issued in this case.
By way of concession to the general
rule, no backwages for the period from
August 23, 1980 until March 15, 1981,
the day preceding the issuance of the
March 16, 1981 return-to-work order
obstinately disregarded by respondent
employer are herein granted. It may be
noted that in the aforecited case of
Davao Free Workers Front, a record full
backwages without deduction or
qualification equivalent to 17 years was
awarded the workers "surpassing the
almost sixteen years of such
backwages paid in the recent case of
NASSCO vs. CIR 16 owing also to the
employer's obstinacy and aversion to
reinstating the employee in said case
notwithstanding the finality of the
judgment for reinstatement. 17

ACCORDINGLY, the petition is granted

and respondent commission's
questioned decision and that of the
labor arbiter are hereby set aside.
Judgment is hereby further rendered
ordering respondent employer to
reinstate the thirty-three (33) dismissed
workers (including the eleven [11]
workers ordered reinstated in
respondent commission's decision of
April 23, 1982) with full backwages from
March 16, 1981, without qualification or
deduction and without loss of seniority
rights and benefits, until they are
actually reinstated.

SO ORDERED.

Melencio-Herrera, Plana, Gutierrez, Jr., De

la Fuente and Patajo, JJ., concur.

Relova, J., is on leave.

 
Footnotes

1 The eleven workers ordered

reinstated were: , Pio Santos,
Elpidio Bello, Rogelio Gigante,
Benjamin Tamo, Pio Lacson,
Jonathan Ferrer, Renato Paloma,
Danilo Pineda, Rodolfo Santos,
Jaime de Vera and Dominador
Gregorio. (Rollo, p. 32)

2 NLRC decision, Record, pp. 41-42.

The NLRC mentions 45 supposed
strikers while both the petitioners
and the arbiter mention one less,
i.e. 44 workers.

3 The twenty-two workers ordered

terminated were as listed in the
commission's decision: Eleuterio
Paloma, Rolly Adorna, Rodolfo
Aguinaldo, Gerry Rebadolla, Agaton
Binggoy, Leonardo Tayaban, Rogelio
Katang-Katang, Nicanor Agarin,
Federico Agarin, Jose Cascano,
Danilo Tena, Teodoro Hulguin,
Cesar Sayson, Manuel Inano,
Domingo de la Rama, Renato
Agarin, Armando Adorable,
Concordio Beo, Antonio Blase,
Rogelio Agarin, Quinciano Castillo
and Guillermo Tena.

4 Rollo, pp. 117-118.

5 G.R. No. 56856, Oct. 23,1984 (2nd

Div.) per Cuevas, J.
6 58 SCRA 120,131 (1974).

7 Rule XIV, Book V of the

Implementing Rules, supra, p. 3.

8 43 SCRA 217, 223 (1972).

9 Rollo, at page 14.

10 51 SCRA 189, 219 (1973).

11 Rollo, P. 69.

12 This should be 33 remaining

workers, deducting the 11
reinstated workers from the original
44 workers. Annex M. Petition,
Rollo, p. 53.

13 Rollo, P. 117.

14 Rollo, pp. 68-69.

15 60 SCRA 408,424.

16 57 SCRA 642.
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