1

SECOND DIVISION payment of holiday pay, 13th month pay differential, salary increase differential,
Christmas bonus, and cash equivalent of Sick Leave Benefit due its members as
employees of PaBC. In its order dated September 13, 1991, the trial court ordered
G.R. No. 109373 March 20, 1995
payment of the principal claims of the Union.5

PACIFIC BANKING CORPORATION EMPLOYEES ORGANIZATION, PAULA S.

The Liquidator received a copy of the order on September 16, 1991. On October 16,
PAUG, and its officers and members, petitioners,
1991, he filed a Motion for Reconsideration and Clarification of the order. In his
vs.
order of December 6, 1991, the judge modified his September 13, 1991 6 but in
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and VITALIANO N. NAÑAGAS II, as
effect denied the Liquidator's motion for reconsideration. This order was received by
Liquidator of Pacific Banking Corporation, respondents.
the Liquidator on December 9, 1991. The following day, December 10, 1991, he
filed a Notice of Appeal and a Motion for Additional Time to Submit Record on
G.R. No. 112991 March 20, 1995 Appeal. On December 23, 1991, another Notice of Appeal was filed by the Office of
the Solicitor General in behalf of Nañagas.
THE PRESIDENT OF THE PHILIPPINE DEPOSIT INSURANCE CORPORATION,
as Liquidator of the Pacific Banking Corporation , petitioner, In his order of February 10, 1992, respondent judge disallowed the Liquidator's
vs. Notice of Appeal on the ground that it was late, i.e., more than 15 days after receipt
COURT OF APPEALS, HON. JUDGE REGINO T. VERIDIANO II, DEPUTY of the decision. The judge declared his September 13, 1991 order and subsequent
SHERIFF RAMON ENRIQUEZ and ANG ENG JOO, ANG KEONG LAN and E.J orders to be final and executory and denied reconsideration. On March 27, 1992, he
ANG INT'L. LTD., represented by their Attorney-in-fact, GONZALO C. SY, granted the Union's Motion for issuance of a writ of Execution.
respondents.
Ang Keong Lan and E.J. Ang Int'l., private respondents in G.R. No. 112991, likewise
MENDOZA, J. filed claims for the payment of investment in the PaBC allegedly in the form of
shares of stocks amounting to US$2,531,632.18. The shares of stocks, consisting of
These cases have been consolidated because the principal question involved is the 154,462 common shares, constituted 11% of the total subscribed capital stock of
same: whether a petition for liquidation under §29 of Rep. Act No. 265, otherwise the PaBC. They alleged that their claim constituted foreign exchange capital
known as the Central Bank Act, is a special proceeding or an ordinary civil action. investment entitled to preference in payment under the Foreign Investments Law.
The Fifth and the Fourteenth Divisions of the Court of Appeals reached opposite
results on this question and consequently applied different periods for appealing. In his order dated September 11, 1992, respondent judge of the RTC directed the
Liquidator to pay private respondents the total amount of their claim as preferred
The facts are as follows:I. creditors.7

Proceedings in the CB and the RTC The Liquidator received the order on September 16, 1992. On September 30, 1992
he moved for reconsideration, but his motion was denied by the court on October 2,
1992. He received the order denying his Motion for Reconsideration on October 5,
On July 5, 1985, the Pacific Banking Corporation (PaBC) was placed under 1992. On October 14, 1992 he filed a Notice of Appeal from the orders of
receivership by the Central Bank of the Philippines pursuant to Resolution No. 699 September 16, 1992 and October 2, 1992. As in the case of the Union, however, the
of its Monetary Board. A few months later, it was placed under liquidation1 and a judge ordered the Notice of Appeal stricken off the record on the ground that it had
Liquidator was appointed.2 been filed without authority of the Central Bank and beyond 15 days. In his order of
October 28, 1992, the judge directed the execution of his September 11, 1992 order
On April 7, 1986, the Central Bank filed with the Regional Trial Court of Manila granting the Stockholders/ Investors' claim.
Branch 31, a petition entitled "Petition for Assistance in the Liquidation of Pacific
Banking Corporation." 3 The petition was approved, after which creditors filed their II.
claims with the court.

Proceedings in the Court of Appeals

On May 17, 1991, a new Liquidator, Vitaliano N. Nañagas,4 President of the
Philippine Deposit Insurance Corporation (PDIC), was appointed by the Central
Bank. The Liquidator filed separate Petitions for Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus in
the Court of Appeals to set aside the orders of the trial court denying his appeal
from the orders granting the claims of Union and of the Stockholders/Investors. The
On March 13, 1989 the Pacific Banking Corporation Employees Organization (Union two Divisions of the Court of Appeals, to which the cases were separately raffled,
for short), petitioner in G.R. No. 109373, filed a complaint-in-intervention seeking rendered conflicting rulings.
 2
In its decision of November 17, 1992 in CA-G.R. SP No. 27751 (now G.R. No. 1. The Petition for Assistance in the Liquidation of the Pacific
09373) the Fifth Division8 held in the case of the Union that the proceeding before Banking Corporation s a Special Proceeding case and/or one which
the trial court was a special proceeding and, therefore, the period for appealing allows multiple appeals, in which case the period of appeal is 30
from any decision or final order rendered therein is 30 days. Since the notice of days and not 15 days from receipt of the order/judgment
appeal of the Liquidator was filed on the 30th day of his receipt of the decision appealed from.
granting the Union's claims, the appeal was brought on time. The Fifth Division,
therefore, set aside the orders of the lower court and directed the latter to give due
2. Private respondents are not creditors of PaBC but are plain
course to the appeal of the Liquidator and set the Record on Appeal he had filed for
stockholders whose right to receive payment as such would accrue
hearing.
only after all the creditors of the insolvent bank have been paid.

On the other hand, on December 16, 1993, the Fourteenth Division9 ruled in CA-
3. The claim of private respondents in the amount of
G.R. SP No. 29351 (now G.R. No. 112991) in the case of the Stockholders/Investors
US$22,531,632.18 is not in the nature of foreign investment as it
that a liquidation proceeding is an ordinary action. Therefore, the period for
is understood in law.
appealing from any decision or final order rendered therein is 15 days and that since
the Liquidator's appeal notice was filed on the 23rd day of his receipt of the order
appealed from, deducting the period during which his motion for reconsideration 4. The claim of private respondents has not been clearly
was pending, the notice of appeal was filed late. Accordingly, the Fourteenth established and proved.
Division dismissed the Liquidator's petition.
5. The issuance of a writ of execution against the assets of PaBC
III. was made with grave abuse of discretion.

Present Proceedings The petitions in these cases must be dismissed.

The Union and the Liquidator then separately filed petitions before this Court. First. As stated in the beginning, the principal question in these cases is whether a
petition for liquidation under §29 of Rep. Act No. 265 is in the nature of a special
proceeding. If it is, then the period of appeal is 30 days and the party appealing
In G.R. No. 109373 the Union contends that:
must, in addition to a notice of appeal, file with the trial court a record on appeal in
order to perfect his appeal. Otherwise, if a liquidation proceeding is an ordinary
1. The Court of Appeals acted without jurisdiction over the subject action, the period of appeal is 15 days from notice of the decision or final order
matter or nature of the suit. appealed from.

2. The Court of Appeals gravely erred in taking cognizance of the BP Blg. 129 provides:
petition for certiorari filed by Nañagas who was without any legal
authority to file it.
§39. Appeals. — The period for appeal from final orders,
resolutions, awards, judgments, or decisions of any court in all
3. The Court of Appeals erred in concluding that the case is a cases shall be fifteen (15) days counted from the notice of the
special proceeding governed by Rules 72 to 109 of the Revised final order, resolution, award, judgment or decision appealed
Rules of Court. from: Provided, however, that in habeas corpus cases the period
for appeal shall be forty-eight (48) hours from the notice of the
judgment appealed from.
4. The Court of Appeals erred seriously in concluding that the
notice of appeal filed by Nañagas was filed on time.
No record on appeal shall be required to take an appeal. In lieu
thereof, the entire record shall be transmitted with all the pages
5. The Court of Appeals erred seriously in declaring that the
prominently numbered consecutively, together with an index of
second notice of appeal filed on December 23, 1991 by the
the contents thereof.
Solicitor General is a superfluity.

This section shall not apply in appeals in special proceedings and

On the other hand, in G.R. No. 112991 the Liquidator contends that:
in other cases wherein multiple appeals are allowed under
applicable provisions of the Rules of Court.
 3
The Interim Rules and Guidelines to implement BP Blg. 129 provides: or right of a party or a particular fact." Contrary to the submission
of the petitioner, the petition is not intended to establish the fact
of insolvency of the bank. The insolvency of the bank had already
19. Period of Appeals. —
been previously determined by the Central Bank in accordance
with Section 9 of the CB Act before the petition was filed. All that
(a) All appeals, except in habeas corpus cases needs to be done is to liquidate the assets of the bank and thus
and in the cases referred to in paragraph (b) the assistance of the respondent court is sought for that purpose.
hereof, must be taken within fifteen (15) days
from notice of the judgment, order, resolution or
It should be pointed out that this petition filed is not among the
award appealed from.
cases categorized as a special proceeding under Section 1, Rule
72 of the Rules of Court, nor among the special proceedings that
(b) In appeals in special proceedings in may be appealed under Section 1, Rule 109 of the Rules.
accordance with Rule 109 of the Rules of Court
and other cases wherein multiple appeals are
We disagree with the foregoing view of the Fourteenth Division. Rule 2 of the Rules
allowed, the period of appeals shall be thirty
of Court provide:
(30) days, a record on appeal being required.

§1. Action defined. — Action means an ordinary suit in a court of

The Fourteenth Division of the Court of Appeals held that the proceeding is an
justice, by which the party prosecutes another for the
ordinary action similar to an action for interpleader under Rule 63. 10 The Fourteenth
enforcement or protection of a right, or the prevention or redress
Division stated:
of a wrong.

The petition filed is akin to an interpleader under Rule 63 of the

§2. Special Proceeding Distinguished. — Every other remedy,
Rules of Court where there are conflicting claimants or several
including one to establish the status or right of a party or a
claims upon the same subject matter, a person who claims no
particular fact, shall be by special proceeding.
interest thereon may file an action for interpleader to compel the
claimants to "interplead" and litigate their several claims among
themselves. (Section I Rule 63). Elucidating the crucial distinction between an ordinary action and a special
proceeding, Chief Justice Moran states:" 11
An interpleader is in the category of a special civil action under
Rule 62 which, like an ordinary action, may be appealed only Action is the act by which one sues another in a court of justice for
within fifteen (15) days from notice of the judgment or order the enforcement or protection of a right, or the prevention or
appealed from. Under Rule 62, the preceding rules covering redress of a wrong while special proceeding is the act by which
ordinary civil actions which are not inconsistent with or may serve one seeks to establish the status or right of a party, or a particular
to supplement the provisions of the rule relating to such civil fact. Hence, action is distinguished from special proceeding in that
actions are applicable to special civil actions. This embraces Rule the former is a formal demand of a right by one against another,
41 covering appeals from the regional trial court to the Court of while the latter is but a petition for a declaration of a status, right
Appeals. or fact. Where a party litigant seeks to recover property from
another, his remedy is to file an action. Where his purpose is to
seek the appointment of a guardian for an insane, his remedy is a
xxx xxx xxx
special proceeding to establish the fact or status of insanity calling
for an appointment of guardianship.
Thus, under Section 1 Rule 2 of the Rules of Court, an action is
defined as "an ordinary suit in a court of justice by which one
Considering this distinction, a petition for liquidation of an insolvent corporation
party prosecutes another for the enforcement or protection of a
should be classified a special proceeding and not an ordinary action. Such petition
right or the prevention or redress of a wrong." On the other hand,
does not seek the enforcement or protection of a right nor the prevention or redress
Section 2 of the same Rule states that "every other remedy
of a wrong against a party. It does not pray for affirmative relief for injury arising
including one to establish the status or right of a party or a
from a party's wrongful act or omission nor state a cause of action that can be
particular fact shall be by special proceeding."
enforced against any person.

To our mind, from the aforequoted definitions of an action and a

What it seeks is merely a declaration by the trial court of the corporation's
special proceeding, the petition for assistance of the court in the
insolvency so that its creditors may be able to file their claims in the settlement of
liquidation of an asset of a bank is not "one to establish the status
 4
the corporation's debts and obligations. Put in another way, the petition only seeks Verily, the import of the final character of an Order of allowance or
a declaration of the corporation's debts and obligations. Put in another way, the disallowance of a particular claim cannot be overemphasized. It is
petition only seeks a declaration of the corporation's state of insolvency and the the operative fact that constitutes a liquidation proceeding a "case
concomitant right of creditors and the order of payment of their claims in the where multiple appeals are allowed by law." The issuance of an
disposition of the corporation's assets. Order which, by its nature, affects only the particular claims
involved, and which may assume finality if no appeal is made
therefrom, ipso factocreates a situation where multiple appeals
Contrary to the rulings of the Fourteenth Division, liquidation proceedings do not
are allowed.
resemble petitions for interpleader. For one, an action for interpleader involves
claims on a subject matter against a person who has no interest therein. 12 This is
not the case in a liquidation proceeding where the Liquidator, as representative of A liquidation proceeding is commenced by the filing of a single
the corporation, takes charge of its assets and liabilities for the benefit of the petition by the Solicitor General with a court of competent
creditors.13 He is thus charged with insuring that the assets of the corporation are jurisdiction entitled, "Petition for Assistance in the Liquidation
paid only to rightful claimants and in the order of payment provided by law. of e.g., Pacific Banking Corporation. All claims against the
insolvent are required to be filed with the liquidation court.
Although the claims are litigated in the same proceeding, the
Rather, a liquidation proceeding resembles the proceeding for the settlement of
treatment is individual. Each claim is heard separately. And the
state of deceased persons under Rules 73 to 91 of the Rules of Court. The two have
Order issued relative to a particular claim applies only to said
a common purpose: the determination of all the assets and the payment of all the
claim, leaving the other claims unaffected, as each claim is
debts and liabilities of the insolvent corporation or the estate. The Liquidator and
considered separate and distinct from the others. Obviously, in the
the administrator or executor are both charged with the assets for the benefit of the
event that an appeal from an Order allowing or disallowing a
claimants. In both instances, the liability of the corporation and the estate is not
particular claim is made, only said claim is affected, leaving the
disputed. The court's concern is with the declaration of creditors and their rights and
others to proceed with their ordinary course. In such case, the
the determination of their order of payment.
original records of the proceeding are not elevated to the appellate
court. They remain with the liquidation court. In lieu of the original
Furthermore, as in the settlement of estates, multiple appeals are allowed in record, a record of appeal is instead required to be prepared and
proceedings for liquidation of an insolvent corporation. As the Fifth Division of the transmitted to the appellate court.
Court of Appeals, quoting the Liquidator, correctly noted:
Inevitably, multiple appeals are allowed in liquidation proceedings.
A liquidation proceeding is a single proceeding which consists of a Consequently, a record on appeal is necessary in each and every
number of cases properly classified as "claims." It is basically a appeal made. Hence, the period to appeal therefrom should be
two-phased proceeding. The first phase is concerned with the thirty (30) days, a record on appeal being required. (Record pp.
approval and disapproval of claims. Upon the approval of the 162-164).
petition seeking the assistance of the proper court in the
liquidation of a close entity, all money claims against the bank are
In G.R. No. 112991 (the case of the Stockholders/Investors), the Liquidator's notice
required to be filed with the liquidation court. This phase may end
of appeal was filed on time, having been filed on the 23rd day of receipt of the order
with the declaration by the liquidation court that the claim is not
granting the claims of the Stockholders/Investors. However, the Liquidator did not
proper or without basis. On the other hand, it may also end with
file a record on appeal with the result that he failed to perfect his appeal. As already
the liquidation court allowing the claim. In the latter case, the
stated a record on appeal is required under the Interim Rules and Guidelines in
claim shall be classified whether it is ordinary or preferred, and
special proceedings and for cases where multiple appeals are allowed. The reason
thereafter included Liquidator. In either case, the order allowing or
for this is that the several claims are actually separate ones and a decision or final
disallowing a particular claim is final order, and may be appealed
order with respect to any claim can be appealed. Necessarily the original record on
by the party aggrieved thereby.
appeal must remain in the trial court where other claims may still be pending.

The second phase involves the approval by the Court of the

Because of the Liquidator's failure to perfect his appeal, the order granting the
distribution plan prepared by the duly appointed liquidator. The
claims of the Stockholders/Investors became final. Consequently. the Fourteenth
distribution plan specifies in detail the total amount available for
Division's decision dismissing the Liquidator's Petition for Certiorari,Prohibition
distribution to creditors whose claim were earlier allowed. The
and Mandamus must be affirmed albeit for a different reason.
Order finally disposes of the issue of how much property is
available for disposal. Moreover, it ushers in the final phase of the
liquidation proceeding — payment of all allowed claims in On the other hand, in G.R. No. 109373 (case of the Labor Union), we find that the
accordance with the order of legal priority and the approved Fifth Division correctly granted the Liquidator's Petition for Certiorari. Prohibition
distribution plan. and Mandamus. As already noted, the Liquidator filed a notice of appeal and a
 5
motion for extension to file a record on appeal on December 10, 1991, i.e., within Time to submit Record on Appeal filed were jointly signed by Solicitor Reynaldo I.
30 days of his receipt of the order granting the Union's claim. Without waiting for Saludares in behalf of the OSG and by lawyers of the PDIC. 17
the resolution of his motion for extension, he filed on December 20, 1991 within the
extension sought a record on appeal. Respondent judge thus erred in disallowing
WHEREFORE, in G.R. No. 109373 and G.R. No 112991, the decisions appealed from
the notice on appeal and denying the Liquidator's motion for extension to file a
are AFFIRMED.
record on appeal.

The Fifth Division of the Court of Appeals correctly granted the Liquidator's Petition
for Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus and its decision should, therefore, be
affirmed.

Second. In G.R. No. 109373, The Union claims that under §29 of Rep. Act No. 265,
the court merely assists in adjudicating the claims of creditors, preserves the assets
of the institution, and implements the liquidation plan approved by the Monetary
Board and that, therefore, as representative of the Monetary Board, the Liquidator
cannot question the order of the court or appeal from it. It contends that since the
Monetary Board had previously admitted PaBC's liability to the laborers by in fact
setting aside the amount of P112,234,292.44 for the payment of their claims, there
was nothing else for the Liquidator to do except to comply with the order of the
court.

The Union's contention is untenable. In liquidation proceedings, the function of the

trial court is not limited to assisting in the implementation of the orders of the
Monetary Board. Under the same section (§29) of the law invoked by the Union, the
court has authority to set aside the decision of the Monetary Board "if there is a
convincing proof that the action is plainly arbitrary and made in bad faith." 14 As this
Court held in Rural Bank of Buhi, Inc. v. Court of Appeals: 15

There is no question, that the action of the monetary Board in this

regard may be subject to judicial review. Thus, it has been held
that the Court's may interfere with the Central Bank's exercise of
discretion in determining whether or not a distressed bank shall be
supported or liquidated. Discretion has its limits and has never
been held to include arbitrariness, discrimination or bad faith
(Ramos v. Central Bank of the Philippines, 41 SCRA 567 [1971]).

In truth, the Liquidator is the representative not only of the Central Bank but also of
the insolvent bank. Under §§28A-29 of Rep. Act No. 265 he acts in behalf of the
bank "personally or through counsel as he may retain, in all actions or proceedings
or against the corporation" and he has authority "to do whatever may be necessary
for these purposes." This authority includes the power to appeal from the decisions
or final orders of the court which he believes to be contrary to the interest of the
bank.

Finally the Union contends that the notice of appeal and motion for extension of
time to file the record on appeal filed in behalf of the Central Bank was not filed by
the office of the Solicitor General as counsel for the Central Bank. This contention
has no merit. On October 22, 1992, as Assistant Solicitor General Cecilio O.
Estoesta informed the trial court in March 27, 1992, the OSG had previously
authorized lawyers of the PDIC to prepare and sign pleadings in the
case. 16 Conformably thereto the Notice of Appeal and the Motion for Additional
 6
SECOND DIVISION

The Factual Antecedents

RAMON S. CHING AND PO WING PROPERTIES, INC., G.R. No. 192828
Petitioners,
Present:
Sometime between November 25, 2002 and December 3, 2002,[5] the
- versus - CARPIO, J.,
respondents filed a Complaint[6] against the petitioners and Stronghold Insurance
Chairperson,
BRION, Company, Global Business Bank, Inc. (formerly PhilBank), Elena Tiu Del Pilar, Asia
HON. JANSEN R. RODRIGUEZ, in his capacity as PEREZ,
Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, ARANAL-SERENO, and Atlantic Resources Ventures, Inc., Registers of Deeds ofManila and Malabon, and all
Branch 6, JOSEPH CHENG, JAIME CHENG, MERCEDES REYES, JJ.
IGNE AND LUCINA SANTOS, substituted by her son, persons claiming rights or titles from Ramon Ching (Ramon) and his successors-in-
EDUARDO S. BALAJADIA,
Respondents. interest.
Promulgated:

November 28, 2011

The Complaint, captioned as one for "Disinheritance, Declaration of Nullity

x------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x of Agreement and Waiver, Affidavit of Extra-Judicial Settlement, Deed of Absolute

Sale, Transfer Certificates of Title with Prayer for [the] Issuance of [a] Temporary

RESOLUTION Restraining Order and [a] Writ of Preliminary Injunction," was docketed as Civil

Case No. 02-105251 and raffled to Branch 8 of the Regional Trial Court of Manila

REYES, J.: (RTC).

The Case In the Complaint, the respondents alleged the following as causes of

action:

Before us is a Petition for Review on Certiorari[1] under Rule 45 of the Rules

of Court assailing the December 14, 2009 Decision[2] and July 8, 2010 First Cause of Action. They are the heirs of Lim San, also known as

Resolution[3] of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 99856. The dispositive Antonio Ching / Tiong Cheng / Ching Cheng Suy (Antonio). Respondents Joseph

portion of the assailed Decision reads: Cheng (Joseph) and Jaime Cheng (Jaime) are allegedly the children of Antonio with

his common-law wife, respondent Mercedes Igne (Mercedes). Respondent Lucina

WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing premises, judgment is
Santos (Lucina) claimed that she was also a common-law wife of Antonio. The
hereby rendered by us DENYING the petition filed in this case
and AFFIRMING the assailed Orders dated March 15, 2007 and respondents averred that Ramon misrepresented himself as Antonio's and Lucina's
May 16, 2007 issued by the respondent Judge of the Regional Trial
Court (RTC), Branch 6, in Manila in Civil Case No. 02-105251.[4] son when in truth and in fact, he was adopted and his birth certificate was merely

simulated. On July 18, 1996, Antonio died of a stab wound. Police investigators

The assailed Resolution denied the petitioners' Motion for Reconsideration. identified Ramon as the prime suspect and he now stands as the lone accused in a
 7
criminal case for murder filed against him. Warrants of arrest issued against Fourth Cause of Action. Antonio's 40,000 shares in Po Wing, which

him have remained unserved as he is at large. From the foregoing circumstances constitute 60% of the latter's total capital stock, were illegally transferred by Ramon

and upon the authority of Article 919 [7]

of the New Civil Code (NCC), the to his own name through a forged document of sale executed after Antonio died. Po

respondents concluded that Ramon can be legally disinherited, hence, prohibited Wing owns a ten-storey building in Binondo. Ramon's claim that he bought the

from receiving any share from the estate of Antonio. stocks from Antonio before the latter died is baseless. Further, Lucina's shares in Po

Wing had also banished into thin air through Ramon's machinations.

Second Cause of Action. On August 26, 1996, prior to the conclusion of

the police investigations tagging Ramon as the prime suspect in the murder of Fifth Cause of Action. On October 29, 1996, Ramon executed an Affidavit

Antonio, the former made an inventory of the latter's estate. Ramon misrepresented of Extra-Judicial Settlement of Estate[10] adjudicating solely to himself Antonio's

that there were only six real estate properties left by Antonio. The respondents entire estate to the prejudice of the respondents. By virtue of the said instrument,

alleged that Ramon had illegally transferred to his name the titles to the said new Transfer Certificates of Title (TCTs) covering eight real properties owned by

properties. Further, there are two other parcels of land, cash and jewelries, plus Antonio were issued in Ramon's name. Relative to the Po Wing shares, the Register

properties in Hongkong, which were in Ramon's possession. of Deeds of Manila had required Ramon to post a Surety Bond conditioned to answer

for whatever claims which may eventually surface in connection with the said

Third Cause of Action. Mercedes, being of low educational attainment, stocks. Co-defendant Stronghold Insurance Company issued the bond in Ramon's

was sweet-talked by Ramon into surrendering to him a Global Business Bank, Inc. behalf.

(Global Bank) Certificate of Time Deposit of P4,000,000.00 in the name of Antonio,

and the certificates of title covering two condominium units in Binondo which were Sixth Cause of Action. Ramon sold Antonio's two parcels of land in

purchased by Antonio using his own money but which were registered in Ramon's Navotas to co-defendant Asia Atlantic Business Ventures, Inc. Another parcel of

name. Ramon also fraudulently misrepresented to Joseph, Jaime and Mercedes that land, which was part of Antonio's estate, was sold by Ramon to co-defendant Elena

they will promptly receive their complete shares, exclusive of the stocks in Po Wing Tiu Del Pilar at an unreasonably low price. By reason of Ramon's lack of authority to

Properties, Inc. (Po Wing), from the estate of Antonio. Exerting undue influence, dispose of any part of Antonio's estate, the conveyances are null and void ab initio.

Ramon had convinced them to execute an Agreement [8]

and a Waiver [9]
on August

20, 1996. The terms and conditions stipulated in the Agreement and Waiver, Since Ramon is at large, his wife, Belen Dy Tan Ching, now manages

specifically, on the payment by Ramon to Joseph, Jaime and Mercedes of the Antonio's estate. She has no intent to convey to the respondents their shares in the

amount of P22,000,000.00, were not complied with. Further, Lucina was not estate of Antonio.

informed of the execution of the said instruments and had not received any amount

from Ramon. Hence, the instruments are null and void. The respondents thus prayed for the following in their Complaint:
 8
1. x x x a temporary restraining order be issued restraining the
defendant RAMON CHING and/or his attorney-in-fact Belen Dy Tan The petitioners filed with the RTC a Motion to Dismiss[12] alleging forum
Ching from disposing, selling or alienating any property that
belongs to the estate of the deceased ANTONIO CHING; shopping, litis pendentia, res judicata and the respondents as not being the real

parties in interest.
xxx

4. x x x
On July 30, 2004, the RTC issued an Omnibus Order [13] denying the
a.) Declaring that the defendant RAMON CHING
who murdered his father ANTONIO CHING petitioners' Motion to Dismiss.
disqualified as heir and from inheriting to (sic)
the estate of his father;

b.) Declaring the nullity of the defendant RAMON The respondents filed an Amended Complaint[14] dated April 7, 2005
CHING transfer (sic) of the six [6] parcels of
land from the name of his father ANTONIO impleading Metrobank as the successor-in-interest of co-defendant Global Bank. The
CHING to his name covered by TCT No. x x x;
Amended Complaint also added a seventh cause of action relative to the
c.) Declaring the nullity of the AGREEMENT and existence of a Certificate of Premium Plus Acquisition (CPPA) in the amount
WAIVER executed by plaintiffs x x x in favor of x
x x RAMON CHING for being patently immoral, of P4,000,000.00 originally issued by PhilBank to Antonio. The respondents prayed
invalid, illegal, simulated and (sic) sham;
that they be declared as the rightful owners of the CPPA and that it be immediately
d.) Declaring the nullity of the transfer of the
shares of stocks at (sic) PO WING from the released to them. Alternatively, the respondents prayed for the issuance of a hold
names of ANTONIO CHING and LUCINA SANTOS
to the defendant ANTONIO CHING's name for order relative to the CPPA to preserve it during the pendency of the case.
having been illegally procured through the
falsification of their signatures in the document
purporting the transfer thereof;
On April 22, 2005, the petitioners filed their Consolidated Answer with
e.) Declaring the nullity and to have no force Counterclaim.[15]
and effect the AFFIDAVIT OF SETTLEMENT OF
ESTATE executed by x x x RAMON CHING for
being contrary to law and existing
jurisprudence; On October 28, 2005, the RTC issued an Order[16] admitting the

f.) Declaring the nullity of the DEED OF SALES respondents' Amended Complaint. The RTC stressed that Metrobank had already
(sic) executed by x x x RAMON CHING (i) over
two (2) parcels of land x x x to defendant ASIA filed Manifestations admitting that as successor-in-interest of Global Bank, it now
ATLANTIC BUSINESS VENTURES, Inc.; and (ii)
possesses custody of Antonio's deposits. Metrobank expressed willingness to abide
one (1) parcel of land x x x sold to x x x ELENA
TIU DEL PILAR for having illegally procured the
by any court order as regards the disposition of Antonio's deposits. The petitioners'
ownership and titles of the above properties;
Motion for Reconsideration filed to assail the aforecited Order was denied by the
x x x.[11]
RTC on May 3, 2006.

On May 29, 2006, the petitioners filed their Consolidated Answer with

Counterclaim to the respondents' Amended Complaint.

 9
Complaint, can be fully settled after a trial on the merits.
And at this stage, it has not been sufficiently established
whether or not there is a will.[20] (Emphasis supplied.)
On August 11, 2006, the RTC issued a pre-trial order.[17]

The above Order, and a subsequent Order dated May 16, 2007 denying the
On January 18, 2007, the petitioners filed a Motion to Dismiss[18] the respondents'
petitioners' Motion for Reconsideration, became the subjects of a petition
Amended Complaint on the alleged ground of the RTC's lack of jurisdiction over the
for certiorari filed with the CA. The petition, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 99856,
subject matter of the Complaint. The petitioners argued that since the
raised the issue of whether or not the RTC gravely abused its discretion when it
Amended Complaint sought the release of the CPPA to the respondents, the latter's
denied the petitioners' Motion to Dismiss despite the fact that the Amended
declaration as heirs of Antonio, and the propriety of Ramon's disinheritance, the suit
Complaint sought to establish the status or rights of the respondents which subjects
partakes of the nature of a special proceeding and not an ordinary action for
are within the ambit of a special proceeding.
declaration of nullity. Hence, jurisdiction pertains to a probate or intestate court and

not to the RTC acting as an ordinary court.

On December 14, 2009, the CA rendered the now assailed

Decision[21] denying the petition for certiorari on grounds:

On March 15, 2007, the RTC issued an Order[19] denying the petitioners' Motion to

Dismiss on grounds:
Our in-depth assessment of the condensed allegations supporting
the causes of action of the amended complaint induced us to infer
In the case at bar, an examination of the Complaint that nothing in the said complaint shows that the action of
would disclose that the action delves mainly on the the private respondents should be threshed out in a special
question of ownership of the properties described in the proceeding, it appearing that their allegations were
Complaint which can be properly settled in an ordinary civil substantially for the enforcement of their rights against the
action. And as pointed out by the defendants, the action seeks to alleged fraudulent acts committed by the petitioner Ramon
declare the nullity of the Agreement, Waiver, Affidavit of Extra- Ching. The private respondents also instituted the said
Judicial Settlement, Deed of Absolute Sale, Transfer Certificates of amended complaint in order to protect them from the
Title, which were all allegedly executed by defendant Ramon Ching consequence of the fraudulent acts of Ramon Ching by
to defraud the plaintiffs. The relief of establishing the status seeking to disqualify Ramon Ching from inheriting from
of the plaintiffs which could have translated this action into Antonio Ching as well as to enjoin him from disposing or
a special proceeding was nowhere stated in the Amended alienating the subject properties, including the P4 Million
Complaint. With regard [to] the prayer to declare the deposit with Metrobank. The intestate or probate court has no
plaintiffs as the rightful owner[s] of the CPPA and that the jurisdiction to adjudicate such issues, which must be submitted to
same be immediately released to them, in itself poses an the court in the exercise of its general jurisdiction as a regional
issue of ownership which must be proved by plaintiffs by trial court. Furthermore, we agree with the trial court that
substantial evidence. And as emphasized by the plaintiffs, the the probate court could not take cognizance of the prayer
Amended Complaint was intended to implead Metrobank as a co- to disinherit Ramon Ching, given the undisputed fact that
defendant. there was no will to be contested in a probate court.

As regards the issue of disinheritance, the court notes that during The petition at bench apparently cavils the subject amended
the Pre-trial of this case, one of the issues raised by the complaint and complicates the issue of jurisdiction by reiterating
defendants Ramon Ching and Po Wing Properties is: Whether or the grounds or defenses set up in the petitioners' earlier
not there can be disinheritance in intestate succession? Whether pleadings. Notwithstanding, the jurisdiction of the court over
or not defendant Ramon Ching can be legally disinherited from the the subject matter is determined by the allegations of the
estate of his father? To the mind of the Court, the issue of complaint without regard to whether or not the private
disinheritance, which is one of the causes of action in the respondents (plaintiffs) are entitled to recover upon all or
 10
some of the causes of action asserted therein. In this
regard, the jurisdiction of the court does not depend upon The petitioners argue that only a probate court has the authority to
the defenses pleaded in the answer or in the motion to
dismiss, lest the question of jurisdiction would almost determine (a) who are the heirs of a decedent; (b) the validity of a waiver
entirely depend upon the petitioners
ofhereditary rights; (c) the status of each heir; and (d) whether the property in the
(defendants).[22] Hence, we focus our resolution on the issue of
jurisdiction on the allegations in the amended complaint and not inventory is conjugal or the exclusive property of the deceased spouse.[26]Further,
on the defenses pleaded in the motion to dismiss or in the
subsequent pleadings of the petitioners. the extent of Antonio's estate, the status of the contending parties and the

In fine, under the circumstances of the present case, there being no respondents' alleged entitlement as heirs to receive the proceeds of Antonio's CPPA
compelling reason to still subject the action of the
petitioners in a special proceeding since the nullification of now in Metrobank's custody are matters which are more appropriately the subjects
the subject documents could be achieved in the civil
case, the lower court should proceed to evaluate the evidence of of a special proceeding and not of an ordinary civil action.
the parties and render a decision thereon upon the issues that it
defined during the pre-trial in Civil Case No. 02-
105251.[23] (emphasis supplied)
The respondents opposed[27] the instant petition claiming that the

petitioners are engaged in forum shopping. Specifically, G.R. Nos. 175507 [28]
and
The petitioners' Motion for Reconsideration was denied by the CA through a 183840,[29] both involving the contending parties in the instant petition were filed by
Resolution[24] issued on July 8, 2010. the petitioners and are currently pending before this Court. Further, in Mendoza v.

Hon. Teh,[30] the SC declared that whether a particular matter should be resolved by
The Issue the RTC in the exercise of its general jurisdiction or its limited probate jurisdiction,

is not a jurisdictional issue but a mere question of procedure. Besides, the

The instant Petition for Review on Certiorari[25] is anchored on the issue of: petitioners, having validly submitted themselves to the jurisdiction of the RTC and

having actively participated in the trial of the case, are already estopped from
WHETHER OR NOT THE RTC SHOULD HAVE GRANTED THE challenging the RTC's jurisdiction over the respondents' Complaint and Amended
MOTION TO DISMISS FILED BY THE PETITIONERS ON THE Complaint.[31]
ALLEGED GROUND OF THE RTC'S LACK OF JURISDICTION OVER

THE SUBJECT MATTER OF THE AMENDED COMPLAINT, TO WIT, The Court's Ruling
(A) FILIATIONS WITH ANTONIO OF RAMON, JAIME AND JOSEPH;

(B) RIGHTS OF COMMON-LAW WIVES, LUCINA AND MERCEDES, We resolve to deny the instant petition.
TO BE CONSIDERED AS HEIRS OF ANTONIO; (C) DETERMINATION

OF THE EXTENT OF ANTONIO'S ESTATE; AND (D) OTHER The petitioners failed to comply with a lawful order of this Court directing
MATTERS WHICH CAN ONLY BE RESOLVED IN A SPECIAL them to file their reply to the respondents' Comment/Opposition to the instant
PROCEEDING AND NOT IN AN ORDINARY CIVIL ACTION. Petition. While the prescribed period to comply expired on March 15, 2011, the
 11
petitioners filed their Manifestation that they will no longer file a reply only on RTC and the CA that while the respondents in their Complaint and Amended

October 10, 2011 or after the lapse of almost seven months. Complaint sought the disinheritance of Ramon, no will or any instrument supposedly

effecting the disposition of Antonio's estate was ever mentioned. Hence, despite the

Further, no reversible errors were committed by the RTC and the CA when prayer for Ramon's disinheritance, Civil Case No. 02-105251 does not partake of the

they both ruled that the denial of the petitioners' second motion to dismiss Civil nature of a special proceeding and does not call for the probate court's exercise of

Case No. 02-105251 was proper. its limited jurisdiction.

Even without delving into the procedural allegations of the respondents The petitioners also argue that the prayers in the Amended Complaint,

that the petitioners engaged in forum shopping and are already estopped from seeking the release in favor of the respondents of the CPPA under Metrobank's

questioning the RTC's jurisdiction after having validly submitted to it when the latter custody and the nullification of the instruments subject of the complaint, necessarily

participated in the proceedings, the denial of the instant Petition is still in require the determination of the respondents' status as Antonio's heirs.

order. Although the respondents' Complaint and Amended Complaint sought, among

others, the disinheritance of Ramon and the release in favor of the respondents of It bears stressing that what the respondents prayed for was that they be

the CPPA now under Metrobank's custody, Civil Case No. 02-105251 remains to be declared as the rightful owners of the CPPA which was in Mercedes' possession prior

an ordinary civil action, and not a special proceeding pertaining to a settlement to the execution of the Agreement and Waiver. The respondents also prayed for the

court. alternative relief of securing the issuance by the RTC of a hold order relative to the

CPPA to preserve Antonio's deposits with Metrobank during the pendency of the

An action for reconveyance and annulment of title with damages is a civil case. It can thus be said that the respondents' prayer relative to the CPPA was

action, whereas matters relating to settlement of the estate of a deceased person premised on Mercedes' prior possession of and their alleged collective ownership of

such as advancement of property made by the decedent, partake of the nature of a the same, and not on the declaration of their status as Antonio's heirs. Further, it

special proceeding, which concomitantly requires the application of specific rules as also has to be emphasized that the respondents were parties to the execution of the

provided for in the Rules of Court.[32] A special proceeding is a remedy by which a Agreement[35] and Waiver[36] prayed to be nullified. Hence, even without the

party seeks to establish a status, a right, or a particular fact.[33] It is distinguished necessity of being declared as heirs of Antonio, the respondents have the standing

from an ordinary civil action where a party sues another for the enforcement or to seek for the nullification of the instruments in the light of their claims that there

protection of a right, or the prevention or redress of a wrong. [34]

To initiate a special was no consideration for their execution, and that Ramon exercised undue influence

proceeding, a petition and not a complaint should be filed. and committed fraud against them. Consequently, the respondents then claimed

that the Affidavit of Extra-Judicial Settlement of Antonios estate executed by

Under Article 916 of the NCC, disinheritance can be effected only through a Ramon, and the TCTs issued upon the authority of the said affidavit, are null and

will wherein the legal cause therefor shall be specified. This Court agrees with the void as well. Ramon's averment that a resolution of the issues raised shall first
 12
require a declaration of the respondents' status as heirs is a mere defense which is general jurisdiction, cannot be restrained from taking cognizance of respondents'

not determinative of which court shall properly exercise jurisdiction. Complaint and Amended Complaint as the issues raised and the prayers indicated

therein are matters which need not be threshed out in a special proceeding.

In Marjorie Cadimas v. Marites Carrion and Gemma Hugo,[37] the Court

declared: WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED. The petitioners' (a)

Opposition to the respondents' Motion to Admit Substitution of Party;[38] and (b)

It is an elementary rule of procedural law that jurisdiction of the
court over the subject matter is determined by the allegations of Manifestation[39] through counsel that they will no longer file a reply to the
the complaint irrespective of whether or not the plaintiff is entitled
to recover upon all or some of the claims asserted therein. As a respondents' Comment/Opposition to the instant petition are NOTED.
necessary consequence, the jurisdiction of the court cannot be
made to depend upon the defenses set up in the answer or upon
the motion to dismiss, for otherwise, the question of jurisdiction
would almost entirely depend upon the defendant. What
determines the jurisdiction of the court is the nature of the action
pleaded as appearing from the allegations in the complaint. The
averments in the complaint and the character of the relief sought SO ORDERED.
are the matters to be consulted.

In sum, this Court agrees with the CA that the nullification of the

documents subject of Civil Case No. 02-105251 could be achieved in an ordinary

civil action, which in this specific case was instituted to protect the respondents

from the supposedly fraudulent acts of Ramon. In the event that the RTC will find

grounds to grant the reliefs prayed for by the respondents, the only consequence

will be the reversion of the properties subject of the dispute to the estate of

Antonio. Civil Case No. 02-105251 was not instituted to conclusively resolve the

issues relating to the administration, liquidation and distribution of Antonio's

estate, hence, not the proper subject of a special proceeding for the settlement of

the estate of a deceased person under Rules 73-91 of the Rules of Court.

The respondents' resort to an ordinary civil action before the RTC may not

be strategically sound, because a settlement proceeding should thereafter still

follow, if their intent is to recover from Ramon the properties alleged to have been

illegally transferred in his name. Be that as it may, the RTC, in the exercise of its
 13
SECOND DIVISION
On February 12, 1997, Rolando Ting (petitioner) filed with the Regional Trial Court

ROLANDO TING, G.R. No. 168913 (RTC) of Cebu an application for registration of title to the same lot. The application

Petitioner, was docketed as LRC No. 1437-N.[1]

Present:

- versus - QUISUMBING, J., Chairperson, The herein respondents, heirs of Diego Lirio, namely: Flora A. Lirio, Amelia
CARPIO,
CARPIO MORALES, L. Roska, Aurora L. Abejo, Alicia L. Dunque, Adelaida L. David, Efren A. Lirio and
HEIRS OF DIEGO LIRIO, namely: FLORA A. TINGA, and
LIRIO, AMELIA L. ROSKA, AURORA L. ABEJO, VELASCO, JR., JJ. Jocelyn Anabelle L. Alcover, who were afforded the opportunity to file an opposition
ALICIA L. DUNQUE, ADELAIDA L. DAVID,
to petitioners application by Branch 21 of the Cebu RTC, filed their Answer[2] calling
EFREN A. LIRIO and JOCELYN ANABELLE L.
ALCOVER,
attention to the December 10, 1976 decision in LRC No. N-983 which had become
Respondents. Promulgated:
final and executory on January 29, 1977 and which, they argued, barred the filing of

March 14, 2007 petitioners application on the ground of res judicata.

x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -- - - - - - - - - - x

After hearing the respective sides of the parties, Branch 21 of the Cebu
DECISION
RTC, on motion of respondents, dismissed petitioners application on the ground

of res judicata. [3]

CARPIO MORALES, J.:

Hence, the present petition for review on certiorari which raises the sole issue of
In a Decision of December 10, 1976 in Land Registration Case (LRC) No. N-983,
whether the decision in LRC No. N-983 constitutes res judicata in LRC No. 1437-N.
then Judge Alfredo Marigomen of the then Court of First Instance of Cebu, Branch 7,

granted the application filed by the Spouses Diego Lirio and Flora Atienza for
Petitioner argues that although the decision in LRC No. N-983 had become final and
registration of title to Lot No. 18281 (the lot) of the Cebu Cadastral 12 Extension,
executory on January 29, 1977, no decree of registration has been issued by the
Plan Rs-07-000787.
Land Registration Authority (LRA);[4] it was only on July 26, 2003 that the extinct

decision belatedly surfaced as basis of respondents motion to dismiss LRC No. 1437-

The decision in LRC No. N-983 became final and executory on January 29, N;[5] and as no action for revival of the said decision was filed by respondents after

1977. Judge Marigomen thereafter issued an order of November 10, 1982directing the lapse of the ten-year prescriptive period, the cause of action in the dormant

the Land Registration Commission to issue the corresponding decree of registration judgment pass[d] into extinction.[6]

and the certificate of title in favor of the spouses Lirio.

Petitioner thus concludes that an extinct judgment cannot be the basis

of res judicata.[7]
 14
Explaining his position that the December 10, 1976 Decision in LRC No. N-983 had

The petition fails. become extinct, petitioner advances that the LRA has not issued the decree of

registration, a certain Engr. Rafaela Belleza, Chief of the Survey Assistance Section,

Section 30 of Presidential Decree No. 1529 or the Property Registration Decree Land Management Services, Department of Environment and Natural Resources

provides: (DENR), Region 7, Cebu City having claimed that the survey of the Cebu

Cadastral Extension is erroneous and all resurvey within the Cebu Cadastral
SEC. 30. When judgment becomes final; duty to cause issuance of extension must first be approved by the Land Management Services of
decree. The judgment rendered in a land registration
proceeding becomes final upon the expiration of thirty days[8] to
be counted from the date of receipt of notice of the judgment. An
appeal may be taken from the judgment of the court as in
ordinary civil cases.

the DENR, Region 7, Cebu City before said resurvey may be used in court; and that
After judgment has become final and executory, it shall devolve
the spouses Lirio did not comply with the said requirement for they instead
upon the court to forthwith issue an order in accordance with
Section 39 of this Decree to the Commissioner for the issuance of submitted to the court a mere special work order.[11]
the decree of registration and the corresponding certificate of title
in favor of the person adjudged entitled to registration. (Emphasis
supplied)
There is, however, no showing that the LRA credited the alleged claim of

Engineer Belleza and that it reported such claim to the land registration court for
In a registration proceeding instituted for the registration of a private land, with or
appropriate action or reconsideration of the decision which was its duty.
without opposition, the judgment of the court confirming the title of the applicant or Petitioners insist that the duty of the respondent land registration
officials to issue the decree is purely ministerial. It is ministerial in
oppositor, as the case may be, and ordering its registration in his name constitutes, the sense that they act under the orders of the court and the
decree must be in conformity with the decision of the court and
when final, res judicata against the whole world.[9] It becomes final when no appeal with the data found in the record, and they have no discretion in
the matter. However, if they are in doubt upon any point in
within the reglementary period is taken from a judgment of confirmation and
relation to the preparation and issuance of the decree, it is
registration.[10] their duty to refer the matter to the court. They act, in this
respect, as officials of the court and not as administrative
officials, and their act is the act of the court. They are
specifically called upon to extend assistance to courts in
The land registration proceedings being in rem, the land registration courts approval ordinary and cadastral land registration
proceedings.[12] (Emphasis supplied)
in LRC No. N-983 of spouses Diego Lirio and Flora Atienzas application for

registration of the lot settled its ownership, and is binding on the whole world

including petitioner. As for petitioners claim that under Section 6, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court

reading:
 15
SEC. 6. Execution by motion or by independent action. A final and ownership by a person of a parcel of land is sought to be
executory judgment or order may be executed on motion within established. After the ownership has been proved and
five (5) years from the date of its entry. After the lapse of such confirmed
time, and before it is barred by the statute of
limitations, a judgment may be enforced by action. The revived
judgment may also be enforced by motion within five (5) years
from the date of its entry and thereafter by action by judicial declaration, no further proceeding to enforce
before it is barred by the statute of limitations[,] said ownership is necessary, except when the adverse or
losing party had been in possession of the land and the
winning party desires to oust him therefrom.

Furthermore, there is no provision in the Land Registration Act

similar to Sec. 6, Rule 39, regarding the execution of a judgment
in a civil action, except the proceedings to place the winner in
possession by virtue of a writ of possession. The decision in a land
registration case, unless the adverse or losing party is in
possession, becomes final without any further action, upon the
expiration of the period for perfecting an appeal.

x x x x (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

the December 10, 1976 decision became extinct in light of the failure of

respondents and/or of their predecessors-in-interest to execute the same within the

prescriptive period, the same does not lie. WHEREFORE, the petition is, in light of the foregoing discussions, DENIED.

Costs against petitioner, Rolando Ting.

Sta. Ana v. Menla, et al.[13] enunciates the raison detre why Section 6, Rule 39 does

not apply in land registration proceedings, viz:

SO ORDERED.
THAT THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN ORDERING THAT THE
DECISION RENDERED IN THIS LAND REGISTRATION CASE
ON NOVEMBER 28, 1931 OR TWENTY SIX YEARS AGO, HAS NOT
YET BECOME FINAL AND UNENFORCEABLE.

We fail to understand the arguments of the appellant in support of

the above assignment, except in so far as it supports his theory
that after a decision in a land registration case has become final, it
may not be enforced after the lapse of a period of 10 years,
except by another proceeding to enforce the judgment or decision.
Authority for this theory is the provision in the Rules of Court to
the effect that judgment may be enforced within 5 years by
motion, and after five years but within 10 years, by an action
(Sec. 6, Rule 39.) This provision of the Rules refers to civil
actions and is not applicable to special proceedings, such
as a land registration case. This is so because a party in a
civil action must immediately enforce a judgment that is
secured as against the adverse party, and his failure to act
to enforce the same within a reasonable time as provided
in the Rules makes the decision unenforceable against the
losing party. In special proceedings the purpose is to
establish a status, condition or fact; in land registration
proceedings, the