HEARSAY RULE

People v Omicitin
FACTS: Mary Lou Omictin was engaged in illegal recruitment and was able to take 40k php from 3 unsuspecting victims
(Guevara, Caponpon, and Mago) and 16k php from another (Ambrosio). An entrapment operation was set in motion. After
receiving the marked money, Omictin was arrested by the accompanying NBI agents. Omictin was found guilty of violating
Section 6, in relation to Sec. 7(b), of Republic Act No. (RA) 8042 or the Migrant Workers and Overseas Filipinos Act of 1995.
Specifically, accused-appellant was charged with and adjudged guilty of illegal recruitment in large scale and three (3)
counts of Estafa. Aggrieved, Omictin appealed to the CA, raising in her Brief for the Accused-Appellant, the following
issues:
(1) Primo Guevarra was not the one who paid the accused, but Elisa Dotenes, who issued a check in favor of accused-
appellant in behalf of Guevarra. Thus, without the supporting testimony of Dotenes who was not presented by the
prosecution, Guevarra’s testimony is unsubstantiated and hearsay; and
(2) As to private complainant Ambrosio, there was no receipt presented to show payment to
accused-appellant, rendering his testimony uncorroborated and self-serving.

CA denied the appeal.

ISSUE: Whether or not without the supporting testimony of Dotenes who was not presented by
the prosecution, Guevarra’s testimony is unsubstantiated and hearsay.

HELD: No. The common objection known as "self-serving" is not correct because almost all testimonies are self-serving.
The proper basis for objection is "hearsay". Petitioner fails to take into account the distinction between self-serving
statements and testimonies made in court. Self-serving statements are those made by a party out of court advocating his
own interest; they do not include a party’s testimony as a witness in court. Self-serving statements are inadmissible
because the adverse party is not given the opportunity for cross-examination, and their admission would encourage
fabrication of testimony. This cannot be said of a party’s testimony in court made under oath, with full opportunity on the
part of the opposing party for cross-examination. Even assuming that the testimonies are selfserving, Omictin admitted
and established the fact that she was paid by Guevarra the amount of PhP 40,000 and Ambrosio the amount of PhP 16,000
through her testimony.

Camacho Reyes v Reyes

Razon v Tagitis
Doctrine:Even hearsay evidence can be admitted if it satisfies this basic minimum test.

Facts: The established facts show that Tagitis, a consultant for the World Bank and the Senior Honorary Counselor for the
Islamic Development Bank (IDB) Scholarship Programme, was last seen in Jolo, Sulu. Together with Arsimin
Kunnong (Kunnong),an IDB scholar, Tagitis arrived in Jolo by boat in the early morning of October 31, 2007 from a seminar
in Zamboanga City. When Kunnong returned from this errand, Tagitis was no longer around.

On November 4, 2007, Kunnong and Muhammad Abdulnazeir N. Matli, a UP professor of Muslim studies and Tagitis'
fellow student counselor at the IDB, reported Tagitis' disappearance to the Jolo Police Station.
More than a month later (on December 28, 2007),the respondent filed a Petition for the Writ of Amparo
(petition) with the CA through her Attorney-in-Fact, Atty. Felipe P. Arcilla.
Issue(s):Whether hearsay evidence may be admitted in Amparo cases

Ruling:The fair and proper rule, to our mind, is to consider all the pieces of evidence adduced in their totality, and to
consider any evidence otherwise inadmissible under our usual rules to be admissible if it is consistent with the admissible
evidence adduced. In other words, we reduce our rules to the most basic test of reason — i.e.,to the relevance of the
evidence to the issue at hand and its consistency with all other pieces of adduced evidence. Thus, even hearsay
evidence can be admitted if it satisfies this basic minimum test.
 We note in this regard that the use of flexibility in the consideration of evidence is not at all novel in the Philippine
legal system. In child abuse cases, Section 28 of the Rule on Examination of a Child Witness is expressly recognized as an
exception to the hearsay rule. This Rule allows the admission of the hearsay testimony of a child describing any act or
attempted act of sexual abuse in any criminal or non-criminal proceeding, subject to certain prerequisites and the right of
cross-examination by the adverse party. The admission of the statement is determined by the court in light of specified
subjective and objective considerations that provide sufficient indicia of reliability of the child witness. These requisites for
admission find their counterpart in the present case under the above-described conditions for the exercise of flexibility in
the consideration of evidence, including hearsay evidence, in extrajudicial killings and enforced disappearance cases.

Strictly speaking, we are faced here with a classic case of hearsay evidence — i.e., evidence whose probative value is
not based on the personal knowledge of the witnesses (the respondent, Mrs. Talbin and Col. Kasim himself) but on the
knowledge of some other person not on the witness stand (the informant).

To say that this piece of evidence is incompetent and inadmissible evidence of what it substantively states is to
acknowledge — as the petitioners effectively suggest — that in the absence of any direct evidence, we should simply
dismiss the petition. To our mind, an immediate dismissal for this reason is no different from a statement that
the Amparo Rule — despite its terms — is ineffective, as it cannot allow for the special evidentiary difficulties that are
unavoidably present in Amparo situations, particularly in extrajudicial killings and enforced disappearances.
The Amparo Rule was not promulgated with this intent or with the intent to make it a token gesture of concern for
constitutional rights. It was promulgated to provide effective and timely remedies, using and profiting from local and
international experiences in extrajudicial killings and enforced disappearances, as the situation may require. Consequently,
we have no choice but to meet the evidentiary difficulties inherent in enforced disappearances with the flexibility that
these difficulties demand.

Pp v Cachuela
FACTS: Ibañez went to Weapons System Corporation (WSC), and told Henessy Auron that he was the one who bought a
gun barrel at the company’s gun show in SM Megamall. Henessy arrived at WSC and rang the doorbell, but no one opened
the door. She went to the back of the office and called Zaldy Gabao. Zaldy answered from inside the store but Henessy did
not understand what he said. Henessy called Raymundo Sian, and informed him that Zaldy’s hands had been tied. After
one hour, the police arrived. When Henessy and the police entered the premises, they saw that Zaldy had been handcuffed
to the vault. Zaldy informed the police that the company’s gunsmith, Rex Dorimon, was inside the firing range. The police
entered the firing range, and saw the lifeless body of Rex. (NBI) received an information from an asset that the group of
Cachuela was involved in the robbery of WSC and in the killing of one of its employees. The NBI formed an entrapment
team. Upon their arrival, Melvin Nabilgas approached them and told them that he had been sent by Cachuela and Ibañez
to look for buyers of firearms. The police introduced themselves and told Nabilgas that they were conducting an
entrapment operation against the suspects of the robbery at WSC. Nabilgas surrendered to the police, and gave the names
of the other persons involved in the crime. Cachuela and informed him that Nabilgas had already talked to the buyers, and
that they would like to see the firearms being sold. NBI Special Investigator Allan Lino, Supervising Agent Jerry Abiera and
the asset went to the agreed place. Cachuela came and talked to them, and brought them inside his house where Cachuela
showed them several firearms. When the agents inquired from Cachuela whether the firearms had legal documentation,
the latter sensed that the meeting was a set-up. The NBI agents arrested Cachuela before he could make any move. The
agents recovered four (4) firearms from Cachuela’s house. The NBI conducted a follow-up operation on Ibañez whom the
asset also contacted. The NBI agents went to Imus and there met Ibañez whom they saw inside a Nissan California car.
Lino, Abiera and the asset entered the car, and asked Ibañez where the firearms were. Ibañez brought out two (2) firearms,
and showed them to the agents. The agents asked whether the guns had legal documentation; they then arrested Ibañez
when they sensed that he was already becoming suspicious. The agents recovered two guns from Ibañez. At the NBI Main
Office, Zaldy pointed to the appellants, during a police line-up, as the persons responsible for the robbery at WSC and for
the killing of Rex. Nabilgas also executed a handwritten confession implicating the appellants and Zaldy in the crime. The
prosecution filed an Information for robbery with homicide before the RTC against the appellants, Nabilgas and Zaldy.

RTC found the appellants guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the special complex crime of robbery with homicide, and
sentenced them to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua. Excepted from the conviction was Nabilgas whom the RTC
acquitted on ground of reasonable doubt.

The appellants filed an appeal with the CA. CA affirmed the RTC decision.
The CA held that the following pieces of circumstantial evidence showed that the appellants robbed WSC and killed Rex
during the course of this robbery:
(1) Ibañez visited WSC two days before the robbery and asked several questions from
Henessy;
(2) a robbery occurred at WSC where 53 firearms and several ammunitions worth P1,563,300.00 had been stolen;
(3) among the firearms stolen were a .9 mm Bernardelli with serial number T1102-03E000151 and a .45 Glock 30 with
serial number FML 245;
(4) Rex, a gunsmith working in WSC, was found dead at the firing range;
(5) Rex sustained gunshot wounds on different parts of his body;
(6) Cachuela and Ibañez were caught trying to sell the .9 mm Bernardelli, with serial number T1102-03E000151, and the .
45 Glock 30, with serial number FML 245, respectively, in separate entrapment operations; and
(7) Cachuela and Ibanez were unable to explain how they came into possession of the stolen firearms.

The CA ruled that the totality of these circumstances point to the appellants as the perpetrators of the special complex
crime of robbery with homicide. The CA likewise found unmeritorious the appellants’ argument that the firearms
confiscated from them were inadmissible in evidence, pointing out that the seizures were the result of lawful entrapment
operations. It further held that the appellants failed to impute any ill or improper motive against the police officers who
conducted the entrapment operations.

Issue(1): Whether or not the out of court identification by Zaldy was admissible?

Held(1): NO. In People v. Algarme, explains the procedure for out-of-court identification and the test to determine its
admissibility, as follows: In resolving the admissibility of and relying on out-of-court identification of suspects, courts have
adopted the totality of circumstances test where they consider the following factors, viz.: (1) the witness' opportunity to
view the criminal at the time of the crime; (2) the witness' degree of attention at that time; (3) the accuracy of any prior
description, given by the witness; (4) the level of certainty demonstrated by the witness at the identification; (5) the length
of time between the crime and the identification; and, (6) the suggestiveness of the identification procedure. Lino’s failure
to state relevant details surrounding the police line-up is a glaring omission that renders unreliable Zaldy’s out-ofcourt
identification. No way exists for the courts to evaluate the factors used in determining the admissibility and reliability of
out-of-court identifications, such as the level of certainty demonstrated by the witness at the identification; the length of
time between the crime and the identification; and the suggestiveness of the identification procedure. The absence of an
independent in-court identification by Zaldy additionally justifies our strict treatment and assessment of Lino’s testimony.

Issue(2):Whether or not Nabilgas’ extrajudicial confession is admissible in evidence?

Held(2):NO. Nabilgas’ extrajudicial confession is inadmissible in evidence against the appellants in view of the res inter
alios acta rule. This rule provides that the rights of a party cannot be prejudiced by an act, declaration, or omission of
another. Consequently, an extrajudicial confession is binding only on the confessant and is not admissible against his or her
co-accused because it is considered as hearsay against them. An exception to the res inter alios acta rule is an admission
made by a conspirator under Section 30, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court. This provision states that the act or declaration of
a conspirator relating to the conspiracy, and during its existence, may be given in evidence against the co-conspirator after
the conspiracy is shown by evidence other than such act or declaration. Thus, in order that the admission of a conspirator
may be received against his or her co-conspirators, it is necessary that: (a) the conspiracy be first proved by evidence other
than the admission itself; (b) the admission relates to the common object; and (c) it has been made while the declarant
was engaged in carrying out the conspiracy. This exception, however, does not apply in the present case since there was no
other piece of evidence presented, aside from the extrajudicial confession, to prove that Nabilgas conspired with the
appellants in committing the crime charged. Conspiracy cannot be presumed and must be shown as distinctly and
conclusively as the crime itself. Nabilgas, in fact, was acquitted by the trial court due to insufficiency of evidence to prove
his participation in the crime.

Miro v Vda de Erederos

Dela Llana v Biong

FACTS:On March 30, 2000, at around 11:00 p.m., Juan dela Llana was driving a 1997 Toyota Corolla car along North
Avenue, Quezon City. His sister, Dra. dela Llana, was seated at the front passenger seat while a certain Calimlim was at the
backseat. Juan stopped the car across the Veterans Memorial Hospital when the signal light turned red. A few seconds
after the car halted, a dump truck containing gravel and sand suddenly rammed the car’s rear end, violently pushing the
car forward. Due to the impact, the car’s rear end collapsed and its rear windshield was shattered. Glass splinters flew,
puncturing Dra. dela Llana. Apart from these minor wounds, Dra. dela Llana did not appear to have suffered from any
other visible physical injuries.

In the first week of May 2000, Dra. dela Llana began to feel mild to moderate pain on the left side of her neck and shoulder.
The pain became more intense as days passed by. Her injury became more severe. Her health deteriorated to the extent
that she could no longer move her left arm. On June 9, 2000, she consulted with Dr. Rosalinda Milla, a rehabilitation
medicine specialist, to examine her condition. Dr. Milla told her that she suffered from a whiplash injury, an injury caused
by the compression of the nerve running to her left arm and hand. Dr. Milla required her to undergo physical therapy to
alleviate her condition. Dra. dela Llana’s condition did not improve despite three months of extensive physical therapy.

She then consulted other doctors, namely, Drs. Willie Lopez, Leonor Cabral-Lim and Eric Flores, in search for a cure. Dr.
Flores, a neuro-surgeon, finally suggested that she undergo a cervical spine surgery to release the compression of her
nerve. On October 19, 2000, Dr. Flores operated on her spine and neck, between the C5 and the C6 vertebrae. The
operation released the impingement of the nerve, but incapacitated Dra. dela Llana from the practice of her profession
since June 2000 despite the surgery.

Dra. dela Llana, on October 16, 2000, demanded from Rebecca compensation for her injuries, but Rebecca refused to pay.
Thus, on May 8, 2001, Dra. dela Llana sued Rebecca for damages before the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City (RTC). She
alleged that she lost the mobility of her arm as a result of the vehicular accident and claimed ₱150,000.00 for her medical
expenses (as of the filing of the complaint) and an average monthly income of ₱30,000.00 since June 2000. She further
prayed for actual, moral, and exemplary damages as well as attorney’s fees.

At the trial, Dra. dela Llana presented herself as an ordinary witness and Joel as a hostile witness. Dra. dela Llana reiterated
that she lost the mobility of her arm because of the vehicular accident. To prove her claim, she identified and
authenticated a medical certificate dated November 20, 2000 issued by Dr. Milla. The medical certificate stated that Dra.
dela Llana suffered from a whiplash injury. It also chronicled her clinical history and physical examinations. Meanwhile, Joel
testified that his truck hit the car because the truck’s brakes got stuck.

In defense, Rebecca testified that Dra. dela Llana was physically fit and strong when they met several days after the
vehicular accident. She also asserted that she observed the diligence of a good father of a family in the selection and
supervision of Joel.

The RTC ruled in favor of Dra. dela Llana and held that the proximate cause of Dra. dela Llanas whiplash injury to be Joel's
reckless driving.

The CA reversed the ruling

ISSUE:Whether or not the medical certificate has probative value for being hearsay.

RULING:The medicial certificate has no probative value for being hearsay. It is the basic rule that evidence, whether oral or
documentary, is hearsay if its probative value is not based on the personal knowledge of the witness but on the knowledge
of another person who is not on the witness stand. Hearsay evidence, whether onjected to or not, cannot be given
credence except in very unusual circumstance that is not found in the present case.

Furthermore, admissibility of evidence depends on it relevance and competence, while the weight of evidence pertains to
evidence already admitted and its tendency to convince and persuade. Thus, a particular item of evidence may be
admissible, but its evidentiary weight depends on judicial evaluation within the quidelines provided by the Rules of Court.
Under the Rules of Court, there is a substantial difference between an ordinary witness and an expert witness. The opinion
of an ordinary witness may be received in eivdence reagrding: (a) the identity of a person about whom he has adequate
knowledge; (b) a handwriting with which he has sufficient familiarity; and (c) the mental sanity of a person with whom he
is sufficiently acquainted.1âwphi1 Furthermore, the witness may also testify on his impressions of the emotion, behavior,
condition or appearance of a person. On the other hand, the opinion of an expert witness may be received in evidence on
a matter requiring special knowledge, skill, experience or training which he shown to possess.

WHEREFORE, presmises considered, the assailed Decision dated February 11, 2008 and Resolution dated March 31, 2008
of the Court of Appeals are hereby AFFIRMED and the petition is hereby DENIED for lack of merit.

People v Rodina

Rosit v Davao Doctors Hospital

Principle:An affidavit is merely hearsay evidence where its affiant/maker did not take the witness stand.

Facts:Dr. Rolando G. Gestuvo performed a surgery on Nilo Rosit who had a motorcycle accident in Jan. 15, 1999 and
suffered a fractured jaw.
During the operation, Dr. Gestuvo used a metal plate fastened to the jaw with metal screws to immobilize the mandible. As
the operation required the smallest screws available, Dr. Gestuvo cut the screws on hand to make them smaller. Dr.
Gestuvo knew that there were smaller titanium screws available in Manila, but did not so inform Rosit supposing that the
latter would not be able to afford the same.

Following the procedure, Rosit could not properly open and close his mouth and was in pain. X-rays done on Rosit two (2)
days after the operation showed that the fracture in his jaw was aligned but the screws used on him touched his molar.
Given the X-ray results, Dr. Gestuvo referred Rosit to a dentist. The dentist who checked Rosit, Dr. Pangan, opined that
another operation is necessary and that it is to be performed in Cebu
In Cebu, the dentist removed the plate and screws installed by Dr. Gestuvo and replaced them with smaller titanium plate
and screws. The molar hit by with the screw and some bone fragments were removed. When he returned to Davao, Rosit
demanded reimbursement from Dr. Gestuvo but the latter refused thus he filed a civil suit against the doctor.

The Davao court ordered Dr. Gestuvo to reimburse the actual expenses incurred by Rosit amounting to P140,199.13,
reimbursement of filing fees, attorney’s fees, moral and exemplary damages.
Dr. Gestuvo took the case to the Court of Appeals who ruled in his favor.
CA ruled that the res ipsa loquitur principle is not applicable and that the testimony of an expert witness is necessary for a
finding of negligence. The appellate court also gave credence to Dr. Pangan's letter stating the opinion that Dr. Gestuvo did
not commit gross negligence in his emergency management of Rosit's fractured mandible.

Issue:Won Dr. Pangan's Affidavit is not admissible?

Ruling:No. The appellate court's Decision absolving Dr. Gestuvo of negligence was also anchored on a letter signed by Dr.
Pangan who stated the opinion that Dr. Gestuvo did not commit gross negligence in his emergency management of Mr.
Rosit's fractured mandible.Clearly, the appellate court overlooked the elementary principle against hearsay evidence.An
affidavit is merely hearsay evidence where its affiant/maker did not take the witness stand. Here, Dr. Pangan never took
the witness stand to affirm the contents of his affidavit. Thus, the affidavit is inadmissible and cannot be given any weight.
The CA, therefore, erred when it considered the affidavit of Dr. Pangan, more so for considering the same as expert
testimony.Moreover, even if such affidavit is considered as admissible and the testimony of an expert witness, the Court is
not bound by such testimony. Courts are not bound by expert testimonies. They may place whatever weight they choose
upon such testimonies in accordance with the facts of the case. The relative weight and sufficiency of expert testimony is
peculiarly within the province of the trial court to decide, considering the ability and character of the witness, his actions
upon the witness stand, the weight and process of the reasoning by which he has supported his opinion, his possible bias
in favor of the side for whom he testifies, and any other matters which serve to illuminate his statements. The opinion of
an expert should be considered by the court in view of all the facts and circumstances of the case. The problem of the
evaluation of expert testimony is left to the discretion of the trial court whose ruling thereupon is not reviewable in the
absence of an abuse of that discretion.Thus, the belief of Dr. Pangan whether Dr. Gestuvo is guilty of negligence or not will
not bind the Court. The Court must weigh and examine such testimony and decide for itself the merits thereof. Dr.
Gestuvo's negligence is clearly demonstrable by the doctrines of res ipsa loquitur and informed consent.

EXCEPTIONS
> DYING DECLARATION
People v Cerilla
People of the Philippines v Falabrica Serenas

Marturillas v People
DOCTRINE:To be admissible, a dying declaration must 1) refer to the cause and circumstances surrounding the declarant’s
death; 2) be made under the consciousness of an impending death; 3) be made freely and voluntarily without coercion or
suggestions of improper influence; 4) be offered in a criminal case, in which the death of the declarant is the subject of
inquiry; and 5) have been made by a declarant competent to testify as a witness, had that person been called upon to
testify.

The law, however, does not require the declarant to state explicitly a perception of the inevitability of death. The
perception may be established from surrounding circumstances, such as the nature of the declarant’s injury and conduct
that would justify a conclusion that there was a consciousness of impending death. Even if the declarant did not make an
explicit statement of that realization, the degree and seriousness of the words and the fact that death occurred shortly
afterwards may be considered as sufficient evidence that the declaration was made by the victim with full consciousness of
being in a dying condition.

FACTS:"Lito Santos, a forty-three-year old farmer and resident of Barangay Gatungan, Bunawan District, Davao City,
testified that about 6:00 o’clock in the afternoon of November 4, 1998, he saw his neighbor and ‘kumpare’ Artemio
Pantinople arrive on board a jeepney from Bunawan, Davao City. Artemio was carrying a truck battery, some corn bran and
rice. They talked for a while concerning their livelihood afterwhich, Artemio proceeded to connect the battery to the
fluorescent lamps in his store. Artemio’s store was located about five (5) meters away from Lito’s house."After installing the
battery to the fluorescent lamps, Artemio sat for a while on a bench located in front of his store. Then, Cecilia Santos, Lito’s
wife, called him and Artemio for supper. Artemio obliged. Lito, opting to eat later, served Artemio and Cecilia the food.
After eating, Artemio returned to the bench and sat on it again together with his tree (3) children, namely: Janice, Saysay
and Pitpit."Lito was eating supper in their kitchen when he heard a gunshot. From a distance of about ten (10) meters, he
also noticed smoke and fire coming from the muzzle of a big gun. Moments later, he saw Artemio clasping his chest and
staggering backwards to the direction of his (Lito’s) kitchen. Artemio shouted to him, ‘Tabangi ko Pre, gipusil ko ni kapitan,’
meaning ‘Help me, Pre, I was shot by the captain.’ However, Lito did not approach Artemio right after the shooting incident
because Cecilia warned him that he might also be shot."Lito did not see the person who shot Artemio because his
attention was then focused on Artemio."Shortly, Lito saw Ernita Pantinople, the wife of Artemio, coming from her house
towards the direction where Artemio was sprawled on the ground. Ernita was hysterical, jumping and shouting, ‘Kapitan,
bakit mo binaril and aking asawa.’ She also repeatedly cried for help."Lito then went out of their house and approached
Artemio who was lying dead near a banana trunk more than five (5) meters from his house. Some of their neighbors,
namely: Antenero, Loloy Libre and Lapis answered Ernita’s call for help and approached them."When the shooting incident
happened about 7:30 in the evening of November 4, 1998, Lito’s house was illumined by a lamp. Their kitchen has no
walls. It is an open-type kitchen giving him an unobstructed view of Artemio who was about five (5) meters away from
where he was positioned at that time. Although there was a gemilina tree growing in the space in between his house and
the store of Artemio, the same did not block his view of Artemio. Likewise, the coconut trees and young banana plants
growing at the scene of the crime did not affect his view."At the same instance, Ernita was also in their kitchen preparing
milk for her baby. Her baby was then lying on the floor of their kitchen. When she was about to put the bottle into the
baby’s mouth, she suddenly heard the sound of a gunburst followed by a shout, ‘Help me Pre, I was shot by the captain.’
She immediately pushed open the window of their kitchen and saw appellant wearing a black jacket and camouflage pants
running towards the direction of the back portion of Lito’s house. From there, appellant crossed the street and
disappeared."Ernita saw appellant carrying with him a long firearm which looked like an M-14 rifle. Ernita also sensed that
appellant had some companions with him because she heard the crackling sound of the dried leaves around the place.
Ernita had a clear view of appellant at that time because their place was well-illumined by the full moon that night and by
the two (2) fluorescent lamps in their store which were switched on at the time of the incident."Ernita immediately went
out of their house and ran towards Artemio. Artemio tried to speak to her but he could not do so because his mouth was
full of blood. Upon seeing the pitiful sight of her husband, Ernita shouted several times, ‘Kapitan, ngano nimo gipatay and
akong bana.’ She also repeatedly called her neighbors for help but only Lito Santos, Eufemio Antenero, Norman Libre and
some residents of Poblacion Gatungan responded to her calls and approached them. She noted that no member of the
CFO and CAFGU came to help them. Also, no barangay tanod came to offer them to help."Armed with the information that
appellant was the one responsible for the shooting of Artemio, PO2 Operario proceeded to the house of appellant and
informed him that he was a suspect in the killing of Artemio. He then invited appellant to go with him to the police station
and also to bring along with him his M-14 rifle. Appellant did not say anything. He just got his M-14 rifle and went with the
police to the police station where he was detained the whole night of November 4, 1998. Appellant did not also give any
statement to anybody about the incident. The following day, appellant was transferred by the police to Tibungco Police
Station where he was detained.After the fatal shooting of deceased, Celestino Marturillas was subjected to paraffin testing
by the PNP Crime Laboratory in Davao City at 10:30 a.m. November 5, 1998. The next day, November 6, 1998, the PNP
Crime Laboratory released Physical Sciences Report No. C-074-98 regarding the paraffin test results which found Petitioner
NEGATIVE for gunpowder nitrates

The CA affirmed the findings of the RTC that the guilt of petitioner had been established beyond reasonable doubt.
According to the appellate court, he was positively identified as the one running away from the crime scene immediately
after the gunshot. This fact, together with the declaration of the victim himself that he had been shot by the captain,
clearly established the latter’s complicity in the crime.No ill motive could be ascribed by the CA to the prosecution
witnesses. Thus, their positive, credible and unequivocal testimonies were accepted as sufficient to establish the guilt of
petitioner beyond reasonable doubt.

On the other hand, the CA also rejected his defenses of denial and alibi. It held that they were necessarily suspect,
especially when established by friends or relatives, and should thus be subjected to the strictest scrutiny. At any rate, his
alibi and denial cannot prevail over the positive testimonies of the prosecution witnesses found to be more credible.

Hence, this Petition.

ISSUE:Whether or not the allegation that the victim had uttered , “Tabangi ko pre, gipusil ko ni kapitan” should be
considered as his dying declaration.

RULING:Having established that the victim indeed uttered those words, the question to be resolved is whether they can be
considered as part of the dying declaration of the victim.

Rule 130, Section 37 of the Rules of Court, provides:"The declaration of a dying person, made under the consciousness of
impending death, may be received in any case wherein his death is the subject of inquiry, as evidence of the cause and
surrounding circumstances of such death."

Generally, witnesses can testify only to those facts derived from their own perception. A recognized exception, though, is a
report in open court of a dying person’s declaration made under the consciousness of an impending death that is the
subject of inquiry in the case.37

Statements identifying the assailant, if uttered by a victim on the verge of death, are entitled to the highest degree of
credence and respect.38 Persons aware of an impending death have been known to be genuinely truthful in their words
and extremely scrupulous in their accusations. 39 The dying declaration is given credence, on the premise that no one who
knows of one’s impending death will make a careless and false accusation. 40 Hence, not infrequently, pronouncements of
guilt have been allowed to rest solely on the dying declaration of the deceased victim. 41To be admissible, a dying
declaration must 1) refer to the cause and circumstances surrounding the declarant’s death; 2) be made under the
consciousness of an impending death; 3) be made freely and voluntarily without coercion or suggestions of improper
influence; 4) be offered in a criminal case, in which the death of the declarant is the subject of inquiry; and 5) have been
made by a declarant competent to testify as a witness, had that person been called upon to testify. 42
The statement of the deceased certainly concerned the cause and circumstances surrounding his death. He pointed to the
person who had shot him. As established by the prosecution, petitioner was the only person referred to as kapitan in their
place.43It was also established that the declarant, at the time he had given the dying declaration, was under a
consciousness of his impending death.True, he made no express statement showing that he was conscious of his
impending death. The law, however, does not require the declarant to state explicitly a perception of the inevitability of
death.44The perception may be established from surrounding circumstances, such as the nature of the declarant’s injury
and conduct that would justify a conclusion that there was a consciousness of impending death. 45Even if the declarant did
not make an explicit statement of that realization, the degree and seriousness of the words and the fact that death
occurred shortly afterwards may be considered as sufficient evidence that the declaration was made by the victim with full
consciousness of being in a dying condition. 46Also, the statement was made freely and voluntarily, without coercion or
suggestion, and was offered as evidence in a criminal case for homicide. In this case, the declarant was the victim who, at
the time he uttered the dying declaration, was competent as a witness.As found by the CA, the dying declaration of the
victim was complete, as it was "a full expression of all that he intended to say as conveying his meaning. It [was] complete
and [was] not merely fragmentary. Testified to by his wife and neighbor, his dying declaration was not only admissible in
evidence as an exception to the hearsay rule, but was also a weighty and telling piece of evidence.

People v Tabarnero

People v Rarugal
Doctrine: Hearsay Rule-Exception-- Rule 130, Section 37 of the Rules of Court provides: SEC. 37. Dying declaration. — The
declaration of a dying person, made under the consciousness of an impending death, may be received in any case wherein
his death is the subject of inquiry, as evidence of the cause and surrounding circumstances of such death.
The Rules of Court states that a dying declaration is admissible as evidence if the following circumstances are present: "(a)
it concerns the cause and the surrounding circumstances of the declarant’s death; (b) it is made when death appears to be
imminent and the declarant is under a consciousness of impending death; (c) the declarant would have been competent to
testify had he or she survived; and (d) the dying declaration is offered in a case in which the subject of inquiry involves the
declarant’s death." In this case, the statement of Florendo made to his brother Renato has complied with the requisites of
a dying declaration. It is important to note that Florendo, after being stabbed by appellant twice on the chest, went home
and under labored breathing, told Renato that it was appellant who had stabbed him. Clearly, the statement made was an
expression of the cause and the surrounding circumstances of his death, and under the consciousness of impending death.
There being nothing in the records to show that Florendo was incompetent, he would have been competent to testify had
he survived.25 It is enough to state that the deceased was at the time competent as a witness. 26 Lastly, the dying
declaration is offered in an inquiry the subject of which involves his death. We reproduce the statement of the RTC.

Facts: Before this Court is the appeal of the June 30, 2008 Decision 1 of the Court of Appeals in a case, entitled People of
the Philippines v. Ramil Rarugal that found appellant Ramil Rarugal alias "Amay Bisaya" guilty beyond reasonable doubt for
the crime of murder.Based on the testimonies of witnesses presented by the prosecution, the RTC found that on the night
of October 19, 1998 at around 9:45 p.m., while victim Arnel Florendo (Florendo) was cycling along Sampaguita Street,
Barangay Capari, Novaliches, Quezon City, appellant, with the use of a long double-bladed weapon, stabbed Florendo;
thus, forcibly depriving him of his bicycle. Immediately thereafter, appellant hurriedly fled the scene. This incident was
witnessed by Roberto Sit-Jar, who positively identified appellant in court.Florendo arrived home bleeding. He was quickly
attended to by his siblings, including his brother Renato. When Renato recounted the events of that night to the court, he
testified that Florendo told him and his other relatives that it was appellant who had stabbed him. They then took
Florendo to Tordesillas Hospital but had to transfer him to Quezon City General Hospital, due to the unavailability of blood.
It was there that Florendo diedIn his defense, appellant denied that he stabbed Florendo since he was at that time working
as a farm administrator for the town mayor in Pangasinan. He said he was living with his cousin in Urbiztondo, Pangasinan
on October 19, 1998, where he had been staying since 1997. He stated that during the period 1997 to 1998, he did not visit
Manila at any point. On cross-examination, appellant stated that he was arrested in front of his house in Novaliches,
Quezon City.10

Lower Court Decisions:

1. RTC found appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of murder
2. Court of Appeals affirmed with modification that the appellant RAMIL RARUGAL is hereby ordered to pay the heirs of
the victim the amount of P27,896.00 as actual damages and the amount of P25,000.00 as exemplary damages. The said
Decision in all other respect STANDS.
Hence, this appeal.

Issue: WON the statement of the witness is a hearsay and inadmissible as evidence?

Ruling: Although the statement is a hearsay, the same is ADMISSIBLE as evidence being an EXCEPTION to the general rule.

We affirm the June 30, 2008 decision of the Court of Appeals, with modification respecting the award of damages.The
victim was still alive after the stabbing incident. He had time to reach his house and confide in his brother, witness Renato,
that it was appellant who had stabbed him.

Rule 130, Section 37 of the Rules of Court provides:SEC. 37. Dying declaration. — The declaration of a dying person, made
under the consciousness of an impending death, may be received in any case wherein his death is the subject of inquiry, as
evidence of the cause and surrounding circumstances of such death.

The Court has stated in People v. Maglian:The Rules of Court states that a dying declaration is admissible as evidence if the
following circumstances are present: "(a) it concerns the cause and the surrounding circumstances of the declarant’s
death; (b) it is made when death appears to be imminent and the declarant is under a consciousness of impending death;
(c) the declarant would have been competent to testify had he or she survived; and (d) the dying declaration is offered in a
case in which the subject of inquiry involves the declarant’s death." x x x. (Citation omitted.)

We agree with the Court of Appeals that the statement of Florendo made to his brother Renato has complied with the
requisites of a dying declaration. It is important to note that Florendo, after being stabbed by appellant twice on the chest,
went home and under labored breathing, told Renato that it was appellant who had stabbed him. Clearly, the statement
made was an expression of the cause and the surrounding circumstances of his death, and under the consciousness of
impending death. There being nothing in the records to show that Florendo was incompetent, he would have been
competent to testify had he survived.25 It is enough to state that the deceased was at the time competent as a witness.

Lastly, the dying declaration is offered in an inquiry the subject of which involves his death. We reproduce the statement of
the RTC:Moreover, the victim did not immediately die after he was stabbed by the appellant. The victim, apparently
conscious that he could die of his wound, identified his assailant as the appellant Ramil Rarugal. Under the rules,
statement made by a person under the consciousness of an impending death is admissible as evidence of the
circumstances of his death. The positive identification made by the victim before he died, under the consciousness of an
impending death is a strong evidence indicating the liability of herein appellant. It is of no moment that the victim died
seven days from the stabbing incident and after receiving adequate care and treatment, because the apparent proximate
cause of his death, the punctures in his lungs, was a consequence of appellant’s stabbing him in the chest.

>DECLARATION AGAINST INTEREST

Parel v Prudencio

Doctrine:“The theory under which declarations against interest are received in evidence notwithstanding they are
hearsay is that the necessity of the occasion renders the reception of such evidence advisable and, further that the
reliability of such declaration asserts facts which are against his own pecuniary or moral interest.”

Facts:On February 27, 1992, Simeon Prudencio (respondent) filed a complaint for recovery of possession and damages
against petitioner with the RTC Baguio alleging that: he is the owner of a two-storey residential house located at No. 61
Forbes Park National Reservation near Department of Public Service (DPS) compound, Baguio City; such property was
constructed solely from his own funds and declared in his name under Tax Declaration No. 47048; he commenced the
construction of said house in 1972 until its completion three years later; when the second floor of said house became
habitable in 1973, he allowed petitioner’s parents, Florentino (now deceased) and Susan Parel, to move therein and
occupy the second floor while the construction of the ground floor was on-going to supervise the construction and to
safeguard the materials; when the construction of the second floor was finished in 1975, respondent allowed petitioner’s
parents and children to transfer and temporarily reside thereat; it was done out of sheer magnanimity as petitioner’s
parents have no house of their own and since respondent’s wife is the older sister of Florentino, petitioner’s father; in
November 1985, respondent wrote Florentino a notice for them to vacate the said house as the former was due for
retirement and he needed the place to which petitioner’s parents heeded when they migrated to U.S. in 1986; however,
without respondent’s knowledge, petitioner and his family unlawfully entered and took possession of the ground floor of
respondent’s house; petitioner’s refusal to vacate the house despite repeated demands prompted respondent to file the
instant action for recovery of possession. Respondent also asked petitioner for a monthly rental of P3,000.00 from April
1988 and every month thereafter until the latter vacates the said premises and surrender possession thereof; and for
moral and exemplary damages, attorney’s fees and cost of suit.

Petitioner filed his Answer with Counterclaim alleging that: his parents are the co-owners of the said residential house, i.e.,
the upper story belongs to respondent while the ground floor pertains to petitioner’s parents; he is occupying the ground
floor upon the instruction of his father, Florentino, with respondent’s full knowledge; his parents spent their own resources
in improving and constructing the said two-storey house as co-owners thereof; the late Florentino was an awardee of the
land on which the house stands and as a co-owner of the house, he occupied the ground floor thereof; the demand to
vacate was respondent’s attempt to deprive petitioner’s parents of their rights as co-owner of the said house; that
respondent had filed ejectment case as well as criminal cases against them involving the subject house which were all
dismissed. Petitioner asked for the dismissal of the complaint and prayed for damages and attorney’s fees.

Issue:Whether petitioner was able to prove by preponderance of evidence that his father was a co-owner of the subject
two-storey residential house.

Ruling:RTC: declares that the house erected at No. 61 DPS Compound, Baguio City is owned in common by the late
Florentino Parel and herein plaintiff Simeon Prudencio and as such the plaintiff cannot evict the defendant as heirs of the
deceased Florentino Parel from said property, nor to recover said premises from herein defendant.

CA:reversed the trial court and declared respondent as the sole owner of the subject house and ordered petitioner to
surrender possession of the ground floor thereof to respondent immediately.

SC: AFFIRMED the CA decision

We agree with the CA that respondent had shown sufficient evidence to support his complaint for recovery of possession
of the ground floor of the subject house as the exclusive owner thereof. Respondent presented the affidavit dated
September 24, 1973 executed by Florentino and sworn to before the Assistant City Assessor of Baguio City, G.F. Lagasca,
which reads:

I, FLORENTINO PAREL, 42 years of age, employee, and residing at Forbes Park, Reservation No. 1, after having been sworn
to according to law depose and say:

That he is the occupant of a residential building located at Forbes Park, Reservation No. 1, Baguio City which is the subject
of an advicement addressed to him emanating from the Office of the City Assessor, Baguio City, for assessment and
declaration for taxation purposes;

That I am not the owner of the building in question;

That the building in question is owned by Mr. Simeon B. Prudencio who is presently residing at 55 Hyacinth, Roxas District,
Quezon City.

Further, affiant say not.

Section 38 of Rule 130 of the Rules of Court provides: SEC. 38. Declaration against interest. – The declaration made by a
person deceased, or unable to testify, against the interest of the declarant, if the fact asserted in the declaration was at the
time it was made so far contrary to the declarant's own interest, that a reasonable man in his position would not have
made the declaration unless he believed it to be true, may be received in evidence against himself or his successors-in-
interest and against third persons. The theory under which declarations against interest are received in evidence
notwithstanding they are hearsay is that the necessity of the occasion renders the reception of such evidence advisable
and, further that the reliability of such declaration asserts facts which are against his own pecuniary or moral interest.

The affiant, Florentino, who died in 1989 was petitioner’s father and had adequate knowledge with respect to the subject
covered by his statement. In said affidavit, Florentino categorically declared that while he is the occupant of the residential
building, he is not the owner of the same as it is owned by respondent who is residing in Quezon City. It is safe to presume
that he would not have made such declaration unless he believed it to be true, as it is prejudicial to himself as well as to his
children’s interests as his heirs. A declaration against interest is the best evidence which affords the greatest certainty of
the facts in dispute. Notably, during Florentino’s lifetime, from 1973, the year he executed said affidavit until 1989, the year
of his death, there is no showing that he had revoked such affidavit even when a criminal complaint for trespass to
dwelling had been filed by respondent against him (Florentino) and petitioner in 1988 regarding the subject house which
the trial court dismissed due to the absence of evidence showing that petitioner entered the house against the latter’s will
and held that the remedy of respondent was to file an action for ejectment; and even when a complaint for unlawful
detainer was filed against petitioner and his wife also in 1988 which was subsequently dismissed on the ground that
respondent’s action should be an accion publiciana which is beyond the jurisdiction of the Municipal Trial Court.Moreover,
the building plan of the residential house dated January 16, 1973 was in the name of respondent and his wife. It was
established during petitioner’s cross-examination that the existing structure of the two-storey house was in accordance
with said building plan. Notably, respondent has been religiously paying the real estate property taxes on the house
declared under his name since 1974. In fact, petitioner during his cross-examination admitted that there was no occasion
that they paid the real estate taxes nor declared any portion of the house in their name.

Lazaro v Agustin

People v Toledo
Facts: Sisenando Holgado and Filomeno Morales had disputes about the occupation of certain land situated in the
municipality of Pinamalayan, Province of Mindoro. On the morning of June 15, 1927, the two men happened to meet. The
argument was renewed, and they agreed to fight. They did engage in a bolo duel with a fatal result for Filomeno Morales,
who was killed almost instantly. Sisenando Holgado was also seriously wounded but was able to proceed to a neighboring
house. From there Sisenando Holgado was taken to the municipal building where he made a sworn statement before the
municipal president, in which he declared that only he and Filomeno Morales fought. About one month later, Sisenando
Holgado died from the wounds received in the fight.

For the prosecution was presented the witness Justina Villanueva, the querida of Filomeno Morales, who testified to the
presence and participation of Eugenio Toledo. Her testimony was partially corroborated by that of the witness Justina
Llave. On the other hand, the theory for the defense was that Toledo was in another place when the fight between
Morales and Holgado occurred and that his only participation was on meeting Holgado, who was his landlord or master, in
helping him to a nearby house. To this effect is the testimony of the accused and of Conrado Holgado, the son of Sisenando
Holgado. The defense also relied upon the affidavit of Sisenando Holgado, Exhibit 1, which was identified by the municipal
president of Pinamalayan.

Issue: Whether or not the exhibit (exhibit 1) considered hearsay and is it admissible as evidence in court.
Ruling: Yes the affidavit is considered hearsay because the one who made it was not presented in court under oath to
testify on his written statement. This is the general rule. The exhibit is admissible as evidence the reason being that it is
one of the accepted exceptions of the hearsay rule. This is called the Declaration Against interest, the dead man’s statute.
Sec. 38 of the Rules of Court exemplifies this rule.

Sec.38 Declaration against interest.- The declaration made by a person deceased, or unable to testify, against the interest
of the declarant, if the fact asserted in the declaration was at the time it was made so far contrary to declarant’s own
interest, that a reasonable man in his position would not have made the declaration unless he believed it to be true, may
be received in evidence against himself or his successors in interest and against third persons.

In order for a statement to be admissible (in this case made as an exhibit) it must comply the following requisites:
1) That the declarant is dead or unable to testify;
2) That it relates to a fact against the interest of the declarant;
3) That at the time he maid said declaration the declarant was aware that the same was contrary to his aforesaid
interest; and
4) That the declarant had no motive to falsify and believed such declaration to be true.

In the case it bar, it is clear as day that the declarant made the statement before the municipal president before he died
and that it was clearly against his interest because it had the effect of exonerating Eugenio Toledo from liability. Declarant
was also aware of this fact and knows this to be true because otherwise, he wouldn’t have made such a statement. Here
the declarant is deceased and his statements were made under oath. They also read in such a way as to ring with the truth.
When Sisenando Holgado declared "When we fought, there was nobody present," it was at the end of just such a rambling
statement as a wounded man would be expected to make. When Sisenando Holgado declared "I met one of my workers
named Eugenio Toledo, who accompanied me to the house of Dalmacio Manlisic," he did so in response to a question by
the municipal president. Exhibit 1 should have been received not as conclusive evidence of innocence, but as evidence to
be taken into consideration in connection with the other proven facts.

Fuentes v CA

Dantis v Mahinang
Facts:The case draws its origin from a complaint 4 for quieting of title and recovery of possession with damages filed by
petitioner Rogelio Dantis (Rogelio) against respondent Julio Maghinang, Jr. (Julio, Jr.) before the RTC, docketed as Civil Case
No. 280-M-2002. Rogelio alleged that he was the registered owner of a parcel of land covered by Transfer Certificate of
Title (TCT) No. T-125918, with an area of 5,657 square meters, located in Sta. Rita, San Miguel, Bulacan; that he acquired
ownership of the property through a deed of extrajudicial partition of the estate of his deceased father, Emilio Dantis
(Emilio), dated December 22, 1993; that he had been paying the realty taxes on the said property; that Julio, Jr. occupied
and built a house on a portion of his property without any right at all; that demands were made upon Julio, Jr. that he
vacate the premises but the same fell on deaf ears; and that the acts of Julio, Jr. had created a cloud of doubt over his title
and right of possession of his property. He, thus, prayed that judgment be rendered declaring him to be the true and real
owner of the parcel of land covered by TCT No. T-125918; ordering Julio, Jr. to deliver the possession of that portion of the
land he was occupying; and directing Julio, Jr. to pay rentals from October 2000 and attorney’s fees of P100,000.00.

He added that he was constrained to institute an ejectment suit against Julio, Jr. before the Municipal Trial Court of San
Miguel, Bulacan (MTC), but the complaint was dismissed for lack of jurisdiction and lack of cause of action.

In his Answer, Julio, Jr. denied the material allegations of the complaint. By way of an affirmative defense, he claimed that
he was the actual owner of the 352 square meters (subject lot) of the land covered by TCT No. T-125918 where he was
living; that he had been in open and continuous possession of the property for almost thirty (30) years; the subject lot was
once tenanted by his ancestral relatives until it was sold by Rogelio’s father, Emilio, to his father, Julio Maghinang, Sr. ( Julio,
Sr.); that later, he succeeded to the ownership of the subject lot after his father died on March 10, 1968; and that he was
entitled to a separate registration of the subject lot on the basis of the documentary evidence of sale and his open and
uninterrupted possession of the property
Defendant Julio Maghinang, Jr., presented by plaintiff as adverse witness, testified that he has no title over the property he
is occupying. He has not paid realty taxes thereon. He has not paid any rental to anybody. He is occupying about 352
square meters of the lot. He presented an affidavit executed on September 3, 1953 by Ignacio Dantis, grandfather of
Rogelio Dantis and the father of Emilio Dantis. The latter was, in turn, the father of Rogelio Dantis. The affidavit, according
to affiant Ignacio Dantis, alleged that Emilio Dantis agreed to sell 352 square meters of the lot to Julio Maghinang on
installment. Defendant was then 11 years old in 1952.

Defendant Julio Maghinang, Jr. likewise testified for the defendant’s case as follows: He owns that house located at Sta.
Rita, San Miguel, Bulacan, on a 352 square meter lot. He could not say that he is the owner because there is still question
about the lot. He claimed that his father, Julio Maghinang (Sr.), bought the said lot from the parents of Rogelio Dantis. He
admitted that the affidavit was not signed by the alleged vendor, Emilio Dantis, the father of Rogelio Dantis. The receipt he
presented was admittedly a mere photocopy. He spent P50,000.00 as attorney’s fees. Since 1953, he has not declared the
property as his nor paid the taxes thereon because there is a problem. 6

On March 2, 2005, the RTC rendered its decision declaring Rogelio as the true owner of the entire 5,657-square meter lot
located in Sta. Rita, San Miguel, Bulacan, as evidenced by his TCT over the same. The RTC did not lend any probative value
on the documentary evidence of sale adduced by Julio, Jr. consisting of: 1) an affidavit allegedly executed by Ignacio Dantis
(Ignacio), Rogelio’s grandfather, whereby said affiant attested, among others, to the sale of the subject lot made by his son,
Emilio, to Julio, Sr. (Exhibit “3”)7; and 2) an undated handwritten receipt of initial downpayment in the amount of P100.00
supposedly issued by Emilio to Julio, Sr. in connection with the sale of the subject lot ( Exhibit “4”).8 The RTC ruled that
even if these documents were adjudged as competent evidence, still, they would only serve as proofs that the purchase
price for the subject lot had not yet been completely paid and, hence, Rogelio was not duty-bound to deliver the property
to Julio, Jr. The RTC found Julio, Jr. to be a mere possessor by tolerance. Julio, Jr. moved for a reconsideration of the March
2, 2005 Decision, but the motion was denied by the RTC in its May 3, 2005 Order. Feeling aggrieved, Julio, Jr. appealed the
decision to the CA.
On January 25, 2010, the CA rendered the assailed decision in CA-G.R. CV NO. 85258, finding the appeal to be impressed
with merit. It held that Exhibit “4” was an indubitable proof of the sale of the 352-square meter lot between Emilio and
Julio, Sr. It also ruled that the partial payment of the purchase price, coupled with the delivery of the res, gave efficacy to
the oral sale and brought it outside the operation of the statute of frauds. Finally, the court a quo declared that Julio, Jr.
and his predecessors-in-interest had an equitable claim over the subject lot which imposed on Rogelio and his
predecessors-in-interest a personal duty to convey what had been sold after full payment of the selling price.

Issue:Whether or not there is a perfected contract of sale between Emilio and Julio, Sr. The determination of this issue will
settle the rightful ownership of the subject lot.

Ruling:The petition is meritorious.Supreme Court relied in an age-old rule in civil cases that he who alleges a fact has the
burden of proving it and a mere allegation is not evidence. SC said Rogelio was able to establish a prima facie case in his
favor tending to show his exclusive ownership of the parcel of land under TCT No. T-125918 with an area of 5,657 square
meters, which included the 352-square meter subject lot. From the records, it appears that TCT No. T-125918 is a
derivative of TCT No. T-256228, which covered a bigger area of land measuring 30,000 square meters registered in the
name of Emilio Dantis; that Emilio died intestate on November 13, 1952; that Emilio’s five heirs, including Rogelio,
executed an extra-judicial partition of estate on December 22, 1993 and divided among themselves specific portions of the
property covered by TCT No. T-256228, which were already set apart by metes and bounds; that the land known as Lot 6-
D-1 of the subdivision plan Psd-031421-054315 with an area of 5,657 sq. m. went to Rogelio, the property now covered by
TCT No. T-125918; and that the property was declared for realty tax purpose in the name of Rogelio for which a tax
declaration was issued in his name; and that the same had not been transferred to anyone else since its issuance.
Jurisprudence dictates that an affidavit is merely hearsay evidence where its affiant/maker did not take the witness stand.
The sworn statement of Ignacio is of this kind. The affidavit was not identified and its averments were not affirmed by
affiant Ignacio. Accordingly, Exhibit “3” must be excluded from the judicial proceedings being an inadmissible hearsay
evidence. It cannot be deemed a declaration against interest for the matter to be considered as an exception to the
hearsay rule because the declarant was not the seller (Emilio), but his father (Ignacio).
A secondary evidence is admissible only upon compliance with Rule 130, Section 5, which states that: when the original
has been lost or destroyed, or cannot be produced in court, the offeror, upon proof of its execution or existence and the
cause of its unavailability without bad faith on his part, may prove its contents by a copy, or by a recital of its contents in
some authentic document, or by the testimony of witnesses in the order stated. Accordingly, the offeror of the secondary
evidence is burdened to satisfactorily prove the predicates thereof, namely: (1) the execution or existence of the original;
(2) the loss and destruction of the original or its non-production in court; and (3) the unavailability of the original is not
due to bad faith on the part of the proponent/offeror. Proof of the due execution of the document and its subsequent loss
would constitute the basis for the introduction of secondary evidence.

>ACT OR DECLARATION ABOUT PEDIGREE

People v Mangotara

Tison v CA

>FAMILY REPUTATION

>COMMON REPUTATION

>PART OF RES GESTAE

People of the Philippines v Romy Fallones Y Labana

People v Villarico
Doctrine: the Court observed that the familiarity of the witness with the assailant erased any doubt that the witness could
have erred; and noted that a witness related to the victim had a natural tendency to remember the faces of the person
involved in the attack on the victim, because relatives, more than anybody else, would be concerned with seeking justice for
the victim and bringing the malefactor before the law.”
“The test of admissibility of evidence as a part of the res gestae is whether the act, declaration, or exclamation is
so intimately interwoven or connected with the principal fact or event that it characterizes as to be regarded a part of the
principal fact or event itself, and also whether it clearly negatives any premeditation or purpose to manufacture
testimony.”
“A declaration or an utterance is thus deemed as part of the res gestae that is admissible in evidence as an
exception to the hearsay rule when the following requisites concur: (a) the principal act, the res gestae, is a startling
occurrence; (b) the statements were made before the declarant had time to contrive or devise; and (c) the statements must
concern the occurrence in question and its immediately attending circumstances.”

Facts:The victim Haide Cagatan was shot twice. the fatal wound that caused his death was that one at back of his left
shoulder which penetrated through his neck. the victim’s sister in law, his mother , and his father all testified in court .
Remedios(sister in law of the victim) said that she saw the four accused aiming their firearms towards the direction of their
kitchen, the victim was there at that time cooking their food. She also said that one of the accused even pointed a gun at
her upon seeing her witnessing what they were about to do. His father also testified that he saw the 4 accused near their
kitchen after he heard several gunshots. the victim according to his mother after the shooting incident managed to crawl
to him saying that he was shot by Berting, one of the accused. all of the accused in their defense presented different alibis
saying that they were all not at the scene of the crime when it happened. the RTC convicted the accused of homicide but
on appeal the CA raised it to murder. the 4 accused in this appeal raised the issue that the their identity as the perpetrators
of the crime was never established with reasonable certainty because the prosecution failed to present direct evidence
from an eyewitness.

Issue:Won the identity of the accused was proven.

Ruling:Yes.The close relationship of Remedios and Francisco with the victim as well as their familiarity with the accused
who were their neighbors assured the certainty of their identification as Haide's assailants. In Marturillas v. People,[27] the
Court observed that the familiarity of the witness with the assailant erased any doubt that the witness could have erred;
and noted that a witness related to the victim had a natural tendency to remember the faces of the person involved in the
attack on the victim, because relatives, more than anybody else, would be concerned with seeking justice for the victim
and bringing the malefactor before the law.[28]
The statement of Haide to his mother that he had just been shot by the group of Berting - uttered in the immediate
aftermath of the shooting where he was the victim - was a true part of the res gestae. The statement was admissible
against the accused as an exception to the hearsay rule under Section 42, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court, which provides:

Section 42. Part of the res gestae. - Statements made by a person while a startling occurrence is taking place or
immediately prior or subsequent thereto with respect to the circumstances thereof, may be given in evidence as part of
the res gestae. So, also, statements accompanying an equivocal act material to the issue, and giving it a legal significance,
may be received as part of the res gestae. (36 a)

The term res gestae refers to "those circumstances which are the undesigned incidents of a particular litigated act and
which are admissible when illustrative of such act." [31] In a general way, res gestae includes the circumstances, facts, and
declarations that grow out of the main fact and serve to illustrate its character and which are so spontaneous and
contemporaneous with the main fact as to exclude the idea of deliberation and fabrication. [32] The rule on res gestae
encompasses the exclamations and statements made by either the participants, victims, or spectators to a crime
immediately before, during, or immediately after the commission of the crime when the circumstances are such that the
statements were made as a spontaneous reaction or utterance inspired by the excitement of the occasion and there was
no opportunity for the declarant to deliberate and to fabricate a false statement. [33]

The test of admissibility of evidence as a part of the res gestae is whether the act, declaration, or exclamation is so
intimately interwoven or connected with the principal fact or event that it characterizes as to be regarded a part of the
principal fact or event itself, and also whether it clearly negatives any premeditation or purpose to manufacture testimony.
[34]
A declaration or an utterance is thus deemed as part of the res gestae that is admissible in evidence as an exception to
the hearsay rule when the following requisites concur: (a) the principal act, the res gestae, is a startling occurrence; (b) the
statements were made before the declarant had time to contrive or devise; and (c) the statements must concern the
occurrence in question and its immediately attending circumstances. [35]

We find that the requisites concurred herein. Firstly, the principal act - the shooting of Haide - was a startling occurrence.
Secondly, his statement to his mother about being shot by the group of Berting was made before Haide had time to
contrive or to devise considering that it was uttered immediately after the shooting. And, thirdly, the statement directly
concerned the startling occurrence itself and its attending circumstance (that is, the identities of the assailants). Verily, the
statement was reliable as part of the res gestae for being uttered in spontaneity and only in reaction to the startling
occurrence.

In the face of the positive identification of all the four accused, it did not matter whether only one or two of them had
actually fired the fatal shots. Their actions indicated that a conspiracy existed among them. Indeed, a conspiracy exists
when two or more persons come to an agreement concerning the commission of a felony and decide to commit it. [36]
Direct proof of a previous agreement among the accused to commit the crime is not necessary, [37] for conspiracy may be
inferred from the conduct of the accused at the time of their commission of the crime that evinces a common
understanding among them on perpetrating the crime. [38] Thus, the concerted acts of the four manifested their agreement
to kill Haide, resulting in each of them being guilty of the crime regardless of whether he actually fired at the victim or not.
It is axiomatic that once conspiracy is established, the act of one is the act of all; [39] and that all the conspirators are then
liable as co-principals.[40]

But did not the fact that the name Berting without any surname being too generic open the identification of the accused as
the assailants to disquieting doubt about their complicity?

We hold that there was no need for a surname to be attached to the nickname Berting in order to insulate the
identification by Haide from challenge. The victim's res gestae statement was only one of the competent and reliable
pieces of identification evidence. As already shown, the accused were competently incriminated also by Remedios and
Francisco in a manner that warranted the logical inference that they, and no others, were the assailants. Also, that Berting
was the natural nickname for a person whose given name was Gilberto, like herein accused Gilberto, Sr. and Gilberto, Jr.,
was a matter of common knowledge in the Philippines. In fine, the pieces of identification evidence, including Haide's res
gestae statement, collaborated to render their identification unassailable.

Juanito Talidano v Falcon Maritime

Zarate v People
Doctrine: Section 42, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court provides for the exceptions to the Hearsay Rule, which includes
statements given as part of the res gestae.The pertinent provision reads:
SEC. 42. Part of the res gestae. - - Statements made by a person while a startling occurrence is taking place, or
immediately prior or subsequent thereto with respect to the circumstances thereof, may be given in evidence as part of
the res gestae. So, also, statements accompanying an equivocal act material to the issue, and giving it amlegal significance,
may be received as part of the res gestae. A declaration made spontaneously after a startling occurrence is deemed as
part of the res gestaewhen (1) the principal act, the res gestaeis a startling occurrence; (2) the statements were made
before the declarant had time to contrive or devise; and (3) the statements concern the occurrence in question and its
immediately attending circumstances.

It is well settled that positive identification, where categorical and consistent and not attended by any showing of ill motive
on the part of the eyewitnesses testifying on the matter, prevails over alibi and denial which, if not substantiated by clear
and convincing evidence, are negative and self-serving evidence undeserving weight in law. For this reason, the defense of
alibi and denial cannot prosper in the light of the positive identification by complainant Guiritan that it was petitioner who
stabbed
him.

It is also a well-settled doctrine that findings oftrial courts on the credibility of witnesses deserve a high degree of respect.
If found positive and credible by the trial court, the testimony of a lone eyewitness, like complainant Guiritan, is sufficient
to support a conviction.

FACTS: This is a petition for certiorari of the decision of CA affirming the decision of RTC finding Zarate guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of frustrated homicide. About 10:00 p.m. of April 1, 1994, Good Friday, Ernesto
Guiritan, a homosexual and beautician, was seated alone on a bench outside the Sta. Rita Church. The church was just
across the public plaza of Gingoog City separated by Cabilto Street. Arthur Zarate approached Guiritan and asked him for a
cigarette. When Guiritan could not produce one, Zarate immediately stabbed Guiritan with a switchblade knife and ran
away. Feeling pain and sensing that he was profusely bleeding, Guiritan walked a short distance and called for help.
Eduardo Remigoso and Mario Binasbas came to his aid. Guiritan asked them to bring him to the hospital. Guiritan was
brought to the Gingoog District Hospital. Zarates condition was critical because he sustained a 2.5 centimeter stab wound
at the epigastric area, penetrating and perforating the proximal third jejunum (upper part of the small intestine) and
middle third transverse colon through and through, which would have caused his death if not for the immediate medical
intervention. He also sustained a deep laceration on his penis. Blood transfusion was required; otherwise, he would have
died of hypovolemic shock. At 5:00 a.m. of April 2, 1994, Dr. Babanto operated on Guiritan and repaired the affected
jejunum and transverse colon, and sutured his penis. The operation ended at 7:30 a.m. Senior Police Officer (SPO1)
Orlando Alecha went to the hospital to investigate and take the ante-mortem statement of Guiritan, who, at that
time, was lying down and feeling weak. When Guiritan was giving his answers, SPO1 Alecha had to put his ear near
Guiritans mouth because Guiritan was catching his breath. Guiritan stated that he felt as if he would die from his wound
and that Ating Arthur Zaratewas the one who stabbed him. The inquiry was conducted in the presence of Dr. Babanto.
The statement was signed by Guiritan and Dr. Babanto. Guiritan was confined in the hospital for three weeks. He was
discharged on April 21, 1994. Guiritan testifiedthat he recognized Zarate because he used to see him during the town
fiestas of Consuelo, Magsaysay, Misamis Oriental playing hantak. Guiritans friend named Maximo, who was a parlor
proprietor, told him Zarates name. Moreover, a month before the incident, Guiritan had an accidental sexual affair with
Zarate, who hereafter asked him for money, but Guiritan had no money at that time. On the other hand, Zarate put up
the defense of alibi. He declared that he came to know Guiritan only in court. Zarate testified that at 10:00 p.m. of April 1,
1994, he was near his house helping decorate the altar for the Station of the Cross that would be held at dawn the next
day. The Station of the Cross was set up at the corner of his house. On the altars side was the big cross. He asked flowers
from neighbors and put the flowers on the altar. The farthest distance he had gone to gather flowers was only about 12
meters from the altar. The task was finished at midnight. He named 41persons who were present when the Station of the
Cross was being prepared. The onlookers stayed watching the altar decoration from 10:00 p.m. to midnight. Geronima
Cuerdocorroborated Zarates testimony. She admitted that Zarates mother was her second degree cousin. She testified that
on April 1, 1994, she requested Zarate to help in preparing the Station of the Cross. There were about 20 persons present
when the altar was being prepared. The trial court did not find Zarate guilty of frustrated murder as charged, absent
proof of evident premeditation and/or treachery that was alleged in the Information. Instead, Zarate was found guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of frustrated homicide. CA affirmed the decision of RTC. Hence this petition.
ISSUE:WON the Court erred in finding the prtitioner guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of frustrated homicide on
sole basis of an ante-mortem statement and treated is as part of res gestae.

RULING: Section 42, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court provides for the exceptions to the Hearsay Rule, which includes
statements given as part of the res gestae.The pertinent provision reads:

SEC. 42. Part of the res gestae. - - Statements made by a person while a startling occurrence is taking place, or
immediately prior or subsequent thereto with respect to the circumstances thereof, may be given in evidence as part of
the res gestae. So, also, statements accompanying an equivocal act material to the issue, and giving it a legal significance,
may be received as part of the res gestae.

A declaration made spontaneously after a startling occurrence is deemed as part of the res gestae when (1) the principal
act, the res gestae is a startling occurrence; (2) the statements were made before the declarant had time to contrive or
devise; and(3) the statements concern the occurrence in question and its immediately attending circumstances.

In this case, Guiritan lost consciousness when he was brought to the hospital and regained consciousness the following
morning after the operation. The hospital records showed that the operation started at 5:00 a.m. and ended at 7:30 a.m.
Of April 2, 1994. SPO1 Alecha testified that it was also in the morning of April 2, 1994 that he took thestatement of
Guiritan, who stated that it was petitioner who stabbed him. SPO1 Alecha testified that he had to put his ear near
Guiritans mouth so that he could hear Guiritans answers as he was catching his breath. The foregoing circumstances reveal
that the statement was taken a few hours afterthe operation when he regained consciousness. His statements were still
the reflex product of immediate sensual impressions so that it was the shocking event speaking through him, and he
did not have the opportunity to concoct or contrive the story. Thus, his statement is admissible as part of the res
gestae.

Thus, apart from the written statement, Guiritan, who survived the stabbing incident, positively identified appellant in
open court and testified that petitioner was the one who stabbed him and that he knew petitioner even before
the stabbing
incident. Conviction of the accused may be had on the basis of the credible and positive testimony of a single witness. It is
well settled that positive identification, where categorical and consistent and not attended by any showing of ill motive on
the part of the eyewitnesses testifying on the matter, prevails over alibi and denial which, if notsubstantiated by clear and
convincing evidence, are negative and self-serving evidence undeserving weight in law. For this reason, the defense of alibi
and denial cannot prosper in the light of the positive identification by complainant Guiritan that it was petitioner who
stabbed him. It is also a well-settled doctrine that findings of trial courts on the credibility of witnesses deserve a high
degree of respect. If found positive and credible by the trial court, the testimony of a lone eyewitness, like complainant
Guiritan, is sufficient to support a conviction. Thus, trial court correctly found petitioner guilty of the crime of
frustrated homicide instead of the charge of frustrated murder, absent any proof of treachery or evident premeditation
alleged in the Information to qualify the crime to frustrated murder.

>ENTRIES IN OFFICIAL RECORDS

Rizalina M. Gemina v Atty. Isidro Madamba

Africa v Caltex
Doctrine:The reports in question do not constitute an exception to the hearsay rule: the facts stated therein were not
acquired by the reporting officers through official information, not having been given by the informants pursuant to any
duty to do so.

Facts:The action is for damages under Articles 1902 and 1903 of the old Civil Code. It appears that in the afternoon of
March 18, 1948 a fire broke out at the Caltex service station at the corner of Antipolo street and Rizal Avenue, Manila. It
started while gasoline was being hosed from a tank truck into the underground storage, right at the opening of the
receiving tank where the nozzle of the hose was inserted. The fire spread to and burned several neighboring houses,
including the personal properties and effects inside them.
Issue(s):Whether reports on the fire prepared by the Manila Police and Fire Departments and by a certain Captain Tinio of
the Armed Forces of the Philippines are admissible.

Ruling: There are three requisites for admissibility under the rule just mentioned: (a) that the entry was made by a public
officer, or by another person specially enjoined by law to do so; (b) that it was made by the public officer in the
performance of his duties, or by such other person in the performance of a duty specially enjoined by law; and (c) that the
public officer or other person had sufficient knowledge of the facts by him stated, which must have been acquired by him
personally or through official information. (Moran, Comments on the Rules of Court, Vol. 3 [1957] p. 383.) Of the three
requisites just stated, only the last need be considered here. Obviously the material facts recited in the reports as to the
cause and circumstances of the fire were not within the personal knowledge of the officers who conducted the
investigation. Was knowledge of such facts, however, acquired by them through official information? As to some facts the
sources thereof are not even identified. Others are attributed to Leopoldo Medina, referred to as an employee at the gas
station where the fire occurred; to Leandro Flores, driver of the tank truck from which gasoline was being transferred at
the time to the underground tank of the station; and to respondent Mateo Boquiren, who could not, according to
Exhibit V-Africa, give any reason as to the origin of the fire. To qualify their statements as "official information acquired by
the officers who prepared the reports, the persons who made the statements not only must have personal knowledge of
the facts stated but must have the duty to give such statements for record. The reports in question do not constitute an
exception to the hearsay rule: the facts stated therein were not acquired by the reporting officers through official
information, not having been given by the informants pursuant to any duty to do so.

Barcelon, Roxas Securities Inc. v CIR

>COMMERCIAL LIST AND THE LIKE

Manila Electric Company v Hon. Quisumbing

PNOC Shipping Corp v CA

Facts:This is a civil case for damages arising from a sea collision incident when plaintiff's tanker hit respondent's fishing
boat, causing the boat to sink.The lower court and CA ruled in favor of respondent on the basis of documentary exhibits
presented, mainly the price quotations. These price quotations were issued personally to Del Rosario who requested for
them from dealers of equipment similar to the ones lost at the collision of the two vessels. However, these are not
published in any list, register, periodical or other compilation nor containing data of everyday professional need and relied
upon in the work of the occupation.T

Issue:Are price quotations considered commercial list, thus can be admissible in evidence?

Held:NO. Price quotations are not within the purview of commercial lists as these are not standard handbooks or
periodicals, containing data of everyday professional need and relied upon in the work of the occupation.These are simply
letters responding to the queries of Del Rosario.

The price quotations are ordinary private writings which under the Revised Rules of Court should have been proffered
along with the testimony of the authors thereof. Del Rosario could not have testified on the veracity of the contents of the
writings even though he was the seasoned owner of a fishing fleet because he was not the one who issued the price
quotations.

A document is a commercial list if:

(1) it is a statement of matters of interest to persons engaged in an occupation;

(2) such statement is contained in a list, register, periodical or other published compilation; (3) said compilation is
published for the use of persons engaged in that occupation, and

(4) it is generally used and relied upon by persons in the same occupation.
>LEARNED TREATIES

>TESTIMONY OR DEPOSITIONS AT A FORMER PROCEEDINGS

Republic v Sandiganbayan
Manliclic v Calaunan
Francisco v People

OPINION RULE
>OPINION OF EXPERT WITNESS
Felizardo S Obando and Juan S Obando v People of the Philippines
Doctrine: Expert opinions are not ordinarily conclusive. Theyare generally regarded as purely advisory in character. The
courts may place whatever weight they choose upon and may reject them, if they find them inconsistent with the facts in
the case or otherwise unreasonable. When faced with conflicting expert opinions, as in this case, courts give more weight
and credence to that which is more complete, thorough, and scientific. The value of the opinion of a handwriting expert
depends not upon his mere statements of whether a writing is genuine or false, but upon the assistance he may afford in
pointing out distinguishing marks, characteristics and discrepancies in and between genuine and false specimens of writing
which would ordinarily escape notice or detection from an unpracticed observer.

FACTS: This is a petition for review on certiorari filed by the petitioners to annul the resolution of the CA. Sometime in
1964, Alegria Strebel Vda. de Figueras (Alegria), together with Eduardo and Francisco Figueras, sons of her husband Jose
Figueras by previous marriage, filed apetition for the intestate proceedings of the estate of Jose Figueras. Alegria was
named administratrix of Jose’s estate without opposition from her stepsons. While the settlement of Jose’s estate was still
pending considerations in the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Alegria died in May 1979. Eduardo was issued new Letters of
Administration with the duty to administer both Jose’s and Alegria’s estates. Fritz Strebel, as brother of Alegria, came forth
claimingpart of Alegria’s estate as Alegria died without issue which the Figueras brothers made no opposition.
Subsequently, the Figueras brothers and Fritz Strebel were served with copies of a Petition for Probate of the alleged last
will and testament of Alegria filed by petitioner Felizardo Obando.In his petition, petitioner Felizardo asked to be
named as executor of Alegria’s last will and testament, which bequeathed Alegria’s rights and interest in the real
properties left by the Figueras couple, as well as personal properties, including all her pieces of jewelry to petitioners
Felizardo and Juan, and their families. The Figueras brothers opposed the probate of the alleged will, as well as
petitioner Felizardo’s prayer for the issuance of a letter of administration, on the ground that the alleged will was done
either under duress or the same was a forgery.

RTC denied Felizardo's petition to be named as executor. He then appealed and CA eversed the decision of RTC. Eduardo
and Fritz still opposed the probate of the alleged Alegria’s will, insisting that the will was a forgery. Subsequently, these
conflicting parties agreed to submit the alleged will to the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI)for examination and
comparison with the common standard signatures of Alegria. Then, NBI Document Examiner Zenaida Torressubmitted her
report dated March 26, 1990, with the findings that the questioned and standard sample signatures of Alegria S. Vda. De
Figueras were NOT written by one and same person. On the other hand, PNP Document Examiner Cruzstated that there
was a wide range of variations existing between the questioned signatures made in 1978 and the standardsignatures
executed in 1974, 1976 and 1978, indicating that there was a radical change in the physical condition of the writer wherein
the muscle and nerves were affected resulting in the loss of muscular control. And then, he found they were similar and
showed that they were written by one person. By reason of the forged will which was the basis of the CA in
appointing Felizardo as co-administrator of the Figueras estates, petitioners had taken possession of the pieces of
jewelry, furniture and other personal properties enumerated in the alleged will, as well as the rentals of the
Figuerasresidence in Gilmore Street, Quezon City being leased to the Community of Learners. And since the latter could
not account for these properties which were under his possessionwhen the probate court required him to do so, they
sued him for Estafa thru Falsification of Public Document since the alleged will which petitioner Felizardo submitted for
probate was foundto be forged. An information was filed to RTC charging petitioners Felizardo S. Obando and Juan S.
Obando, together with the persons who signed in the alleged will, namely, Cipriano C.Farrales, Mercedes B. Santos,
Victorino Cruz, and Franklin A. Cordon, with the crime of estafa thru falsification of public document.

RTC rendered decision and holds the accused FELIZARDO S. OBANDO and JUAN S. OBANDO GUILTY of violating Article 315,
paragraph 1, sub-paragraph (b) of the Revised PenalCode, in relation to Article 172, paragraph 1, Revised Penal Code, their
culpability having been proven beyond reasonable doubt.Finding no evidence of culpability in their persons,
accused MERCEDES B. SANTOS and VICTORINO CRUZ are hereby ACQUITTED. With respect to accused FRANKLIN A.
CORDON, this case against him is hereby ordered ARCHIVED, to be revived upon his apprehension. CA affirmed intoto the
decision of RTC.

Hence this petition.

ISSUE: Whether or not conflicting expert testimonies, coupled with the positive evidence as to the due execution
and authenticity of the will should favor the appellants.

RULING: Expert opinions are not ordinarily conclusive. They are generally regarded as purely advisory in character. The
courts may place whatever weight they choose upon and may reject them, if they find them inconsistent with the facts in
the case or otherwise unreasonable. When faced with conflicting expert opinions, as in this case, courts give more weight
and credence to that which is more complete, thorough, and scientific.The value of the opinion of a handwriting expert
depends not upon his mere statements of whether a writing is genuine or false, but upon the assistance he may afford in
pointing out distinguishing marks, characteristics and discrepancies in and between genuine and false specimens of writing
which would ordinarily escape notice or detection from an unpracticed observer.
We agree with the RTC and the CA in giving more weight and credence to the testimony of Torres as the
examination conducted by Torres was complete, thorough and scientific. We find that the RTC had the opportunity
to examine the relevant documents and make comparisons thereof. Infact, upon our own comparison of the questioned
signatures and the standard signatures taking into consideration inconspicuous differences noted by Torres on the
questioned and standard signatures, we find that the questioned signatures showed substantial differences with that of
the standard signatures of Alegria. The petition is denied and the Resolution of CA is hereby affirmed.

Tabao v People
DOCTRINE:Section 49, Rule 130 of the Revised Rules of Court states that the opinion of a witness on a matter requiring
special knowledge, skill, experience or training, which he is shown to possess, may be received in evidence. The use of the
word may signifies that the use of opinion of an expert witness is permissive and not mandatory on the part of the
courts. Allowing the testimony does not mean, too, that courts are bound by the testimony of the expert witness. The
testimony of an expert witness must be construed to have been presented not to sway the court in favor of any of the
parties, but to assist the court in the determination of the issue before it, and is for the court to adopt or not to adopt
depending on its appreciation of the attendant facts and the applicable law.

FACTS: The evidence for the prosecution reveals the following facts: At around 10:00 p.m. of January 21, 1993, the
petitioner was driving his Toyota Corolla car bearing plate number PCH-111 along Governor Forbes corner G. Tuazon
Streettowards Nagtahan when it suddenly ramped on an island divider, bumping Rochelle Lanete who was crossing the
street. As a result of the impact, Rochelle was thrown into the middle of the road on her back.[1] Thereafter, Leonardo
Mendez speeding blue Toyota Corona car with plate number PES-764 ran over Rochelles body. Bystanders armed with
stones and wooden clubs followed Mendez car until it stopped near the Nagtahan Flyover. [2] Francisco Cielo, a newspaper
delivery boy, pleaded with the bystanders not to hurt Mendez. Cielo went inside Mendez car, sat beside him, got his drivers
license, and ordered him to move the car backwards. Mendez followed his order, but his car hit the center island twice
while backing up.[3] Cielo went out of the car and approached the sprawled body of Rochelle; he and the petitioner brought
Rochelles body inside Mendez car. The three of them (the petitioner, Cielo and Mendez) brought Rochelle to
the UST Hospital,[4] where she died on February 6, 1993 due to septicemia secondary to traumatic injuries.[5]

The defense presented a different version of the incident.

The petitioner narrated that at around 10:00 p.m. of January 21, 1993, he was driving along Governor Forbes corner G.
Tuazon Street when his car ramped on an island at the foot of the Nagtahan Flyover. He tried to move the car backwards,
but failed to do so. He alighted from his car and then saw that its two rear wheels had been elevated. [6] He returned inside
his car to turn off its engine; he then noticed that many people were approaching his car. [7] He again alighted from his
vehicle and saw a person lying on the road. [8] He looked at his left side and saw a car that was running fast like a wind pass
by. He approached the person lying on the road, and noticed that she was still breathing and moaning. Afterwards, he saw
Mendez car backing up; he carried the victim towards that car. [9] Thereafter, he, Mendez and Cielo brought the victim to
the UST Hospital.[10]Mendez, for his part, testified that at around 9:00 to 9:30 p.m. of January 21, 1993, he left his girlfriends
house in Blumentritt, Sta. Cruz, Manila. As he was driving along Governor Forbes corner G. Tuazon Street on his way
home, he saw a vehicle that had ramped on an island divider. Suddenly, another vehicle overtook his car from the right and
cut his lane. He slowed down his car when he saw a rug-like object fall from the car that overtook him, [11] and stopped
when he realized that what had fallen was a persons body. When he moved his car backwards to help this person, many
people approached his car. He alighted from his car and inquired from them what had happened. The people replied that
someone was run over; some of them pointed to him as the culprit. He denied having run over the victim when they tried
to hurt him. The petitioner carried the victim and placed her inside Mendez car. Thereafter, the two of them brought the
victim to the UST Hospital.[12]

The RTC, in its decision dated September 15, 2003, found that it was very clear that both accused are responsible for the
death of Rochelle Lanete, and convicted the two (2) accused of the crime charged. It found that the petitioners car first hit
the victim, causing her to be thrown into the road on her back, and that Mendez car ran over her as she was lying down. It
held that the two failed to observe the necessary precaution and due care in operating their respective vehicles, to wit: the
petitioner was not attentive to his driving such that he failed to see the island divider and bumped Rochelle; Mendez was
driving his car too fast at nighttime such that he was unable to avoid running over her as her body lay prone on the street.

The CA, in its decision dated July 27, 2007, agreed with the factual findings of the RTC, and affirmed its decision with the
modification

ISSUE:Whether the CA violated Section 49, Rule 130 of the Revised Rules of Court when it disregarded the testimony of
defense witness Police Senior Inspector Danilo Cornelio who testified that the petitioners car could not have bumped the
victim because the latter’s body was not thrown in line with the car, but on its side.

RULING: The petitioner argues that P/Sr. Insp. Cornelio is highly qualified in the field of traffic accident investigation, and as
such, his statements are backed-up by [the] principles of applied physics, engineering, and mathematics.

The petitioners arguments fail to convince us.

Section 49, Rule 130 of the Revised Rules of Court states that the opinion of a witness on a matter requiring special
knowledge, skill, experience or training, which he is shown to possess, may be received in evidence. The use of the word
may signifies that the use of opinion of an expert witness is permissive and not mandatory on the part of the
courts. Allowing the testimony does not mean, too, that courts are bound by the testimony of the expert witness. The
testimony of an expert witness must be construed to have been presented not to sway the court in favor of any of the
parties, but to assist the court in the determination of the issue before it, and is for the court to adopt or not to adopt
depending on its appreciation of the attendant facts and the applicable law. It has been held of expert testimonies:

Although courts are not ordinarily bound by expert testimonies, they may place whatever weight they may
choose upon such testimonies in accordance with the facts of the case. The relative weight and sufficiency of expert
testimony is peculiarly within the province of the trial court to decide, considering the ability and character of the
witness, his actions upon the witness stand, the weight and process of the reasoning by which he has supported his
opinion, his possible bias in favor of the side for whom he testifies, the fact that he is a paid witness, the relative
opportunities for study and observation of the matters about which he testifies, and any other matters which deserve
to illuminate his statements. The opinion of the expert may not be arbitrarily rejected; it is to be considered by the court in
view of all the facts and circumstances in the case and when common knowledge utterly fails, the expert opinion may
be given controlling effect.The problem of the credibility of the expert witness and the evaluation of his
testimony is left to the discretion of the trial court whose ruling thereupon is not reviewable in the absence
of abuse of discretion.

We emphasize that P/Sr. Insp. Cornelio was not an eyewitness to the incident; his testimony was merely based on
the Traffic Accident Report prepared by SPO4 Edgar Reyes who himself did not witness the incident. At any rate, nowhere
in P/Sr. Insp. Cornelios testimony did he conclusively state that the petitioner could not have been involved in the incident.

Equitable Card network Inc v Joesefa Brromeo Capistrano

Gamido v CA
Doctrine: Opinion Rule Topic --
I-connect lang ni sya sa topic gyud under Rule 130 Section 50 (b) kay ang legal basis in this case is Rule 132 nga dili
Opinion Rule but Authentication and Proof of Documents. =)

Under Rule 132, §22 of the Revised Rules on Evidence, it is not required that the person identifying the handwriting of
another must have seen the latter write the document or sign it. It is enough, if the witness "has seen writing purporting to
be his [the subject's] upon which the witness has acted or been charged, and has thus acquired knowledge of the
handwriting of such person."
In this case, De la Cruz has been record custodian at Malacañang for so many years; it is inconceivable he had not acquired
familiarity with the signature not only of President Marcos but of other Presidents under whom he had served.

Facts:
This is a petition for review on certiorari of the decision of the Court of Appeals which affirmed with modification1
petitioner Maximino B. Gamido's conviction by the Regional Trial Court on eleven counts of having forged the signature of
the Chief Executive. Specifically, petitioner was accused in 11 cases of forging the signature of the President of the
Philippines.

The prosecution was made under Art. 161 of the Revised Penal Code which provides as follows:

Art. 161. Counterfeiting the great seal of the Government of the Philippine Islands, forging the signature
or stamp of the Chief Executive. — The penalty of reclusion temporal shall be imposed upon any person
who shall forge the Great Seal of the Government of the Philippine Islands or the signature or stamp of
the Chief Executive.

On September 27, 1985, upon the invitation of Atty. Quirino Sagario, CIO Hearing Officer, petitioner appeared and
presented the 11 documents, claiming that President Ferdinand E. Marcos had signed them in his (petitioner's) presence.

The lone witness for the prosecution, Melquiades T. de la Cruz, Presidential Staff Director of the Malacañang Records Office
(MRO), testified that there were no copies of the documents on file in his office and that the signatures thereon did not
appear to be those of the former President.
For his part, petitioner said that he was the Executive Director of the Presidential Regional Assistant Monitoring Services,
or PRAMS, having been appointed by then President Marcos and that his appointment and the related documents, subject
of the prosecution, had been signed by the former President in petitioner's presence.

Lower Court Decision:

RTC- finding the petitioner guilty.

On appeal, Petitioner contends that Melquiades T. dela Cruz was incompetent to testify as to whether the signatures on
the documents, purporting to be those of President Marcos, were forgeries because there is no showing that he had
witnessed President Marcos signing his name.
Issue: WON the de la Cruz familiarity of the Pesident’s signature will suffice as evidence?

Ruling: Yes, as an EXCEPTION to the General Opinion Rule under under Rule 130 Section 50 (b).
(Giconnect ra nako sa topic gyud sa Opinion Rule kay ang gitackle ane nga case and yaha ruling about Authentication and
Proof of documents man under Rule 132. )

Here, he petition has no merit.

What dela Cruz said that is that he was familiar with the signature of President Marcos and that the signatures on the
documents in question were not those of President Marcos. This is sufficient to establish the signatures as forgeries. Under
Rule 132, §22 of the Revised Rules on Evidence, it is not required that the person identifying the handwriting of another
must have seen the latter write the document or sign it. It is enough, if the witness "has seen writing purporting to be his
[the subject's] upon which the witness has acted or been charged, and has thus acquired knowledge of the handwriting of
such person." De la Cruz has been record custodian at Malacañang for so many years; it is inconceivable he had not
acquired familiarity with the signature not only of President Marcos but of other Presidents under whom he had served.

There was thus no necessity for a handwriting expert testify on the genuineness of the challenged signatures. As this Court
has once observed, the authenticity of signatures "is not a highly technical issue in the same sense that questions
concerning, e.g., quantum physics or topology or molecular biology, would constitute matters of a highly technical nature.
The opinion of a handwriting expert on the genuineness of a questioned signature is certainly much less compelling upon a
judge than an opinion rendered by a specialist on a highly technical issue. The signatures on a questioned document can
be sighted by a judge who can and should exercise independent judgment on the issue of authenticity of such signatures."
17 Here, as the trial court observed, "the forgeries were not only established by the evidence, but they are also as clearly
discernible to the naked eye or mere ocular inspection, as they are conspicuously evident from their appearance. . . . "
Republic v Molina
DOCTRINE:“The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be (a) medically or clinically identified, (b) alleged in the
complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by experts and (d) clearly explained in the decision.”

FACTS: Roridel and Reynaldo were married on April 14, 1985 and begot a son. After a year of marriage, Reynaldo showed
signs of "immaturity and irresponsibility" as a husband and a father since 1) he preferred to spend more time with his
peers and friends on whom he squandered his money; 2) he depended on his parents for aid and assistance; and 3) he was
never honest with his wife in regard to their finances, resulting in frequent quarrels between them. When Reynaldo was
relieved from his job, Roridel had been the sole breadwinner of the family. In October 1986 the couple had a very intense
quarrel, as a result of which their relationship was estranged. In March 1987, Roridel resigned from her job in Manila and
went to live with her parents in Baguio City. A few weeks later, Reynaldo left Roridel and their child, and had since then
abandoned them. Reynaldo admitted that he and Roridel could no longer live together as husband and wife, but
contended that their misunderstandings and frequent quarrels were due to (1) Roridel's strange behavior of insisting on
maintaining her group of friends even after their marriage; (2) Roridel's refusal to perform some of her marital duties such
as cooking meals; and (3) Roridel's failure to run the household and handle their finances. On 16 August 1990, Roridel filed
a petition for declaration of nullity of her marriage to Reynaldo Molina. Evidence for Roridel consisted of her own
testimony, that of two of her friends, a social worker, and a psychiatrist of the Baguio General Hospital and Medical Center.
Reynaldo did not present any evidence as he appeared only during the pre-trial conference. RTC declared the marriage
void. The Solicitor General appealed to the Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals denied the appeals and affirmed in toto
the RTC’s decision. Hence, this petition.
ISSUE: W/N psychological incapacity on the part of Reynaldo has been established

HELD: The marriage between Roridel and Reynaldo subsists and remains valid. What constitutes psychological incapacity is
not mere showing of irreconcilable differences and conflicting personalities. It is indispensable that the parties must
exhibit inclinations which would not meet the essential marital responsibilities and duties due to some psychological
illness. Reynaldo’s action at the time of the marriage did not manifest such characteristics that would comprise grounds
for psychological incapacity. The evidence shown by Roridel merely showed that she and her husband cannot get along
with each other and had not shown gravity of the problem neither its juridical antecedence nor its incurability. In addition,
the expert testimony by Dr Sison showed no incurable psychiatric disorder but only incompatibility which is not considered
as psychological incapacity.
8 Guidelines (Psychological Incapacity)
1. The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to the plaintiff.
2. The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be (a) medically or clinically identified, (b) alleged in the complaint,
(c) sufficiently proven by experts and (d) clearly explained in the decision.
3. The incapacity must be proven to be existing at "the time of the celebration" of the marriage.
4. Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or incurable
5. Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the party to assume the essential obligations of
marriage.
6. The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by Articles 68 up to 71 of the Family Code as regards the
husband and wife as well as Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the same Code in regard to parents and their children.
7. Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church in the Philippines, while not
controlling or decisive, should be given great respect by our courts.
8. The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor General to appear as counsel for the state.

Marcos v Marcos
>OPINION OF ORDINARY WITNESS
Hernandez v Santos
Doctrine: Under Section 50, Rule 103 of the Rules of Court, an ordinary witness may give his opinion on the mental sanity
of a person with whom he is sufficiently acquainted.

Facts: Lulu is the only child of spouses Felix Hernandez and Maria San Juan Hernandez. Unfortunately, the latter died due
to complications during childbirth. After Maria's death, Felix left Lulu in the care of her maternal uncle, Sotero C. San Juan.
Felix remarried The unio.n produced three children, the petitioners in this case. Meanwhile, as the only child of Maria and
the sole testate heir of Sotero, Lulu inherited valuable real properties from the San Juan family (conservatively estimated at
₱50 million in 1997). Sometime in 1957, Lulu went to live with her father and his new family. She was then 10 years old
and studying at La Consolacion College. However, due to her "violent personality," Lulu stopped schooling when she
reached Grade 5.

In 1968, upon reaching the age of majority, Lulu was given full control of her estate. 3 Nevertheless, because Lulu did not
even finish her elementary education, Felix continued to exercise actual administration of Lulu’s properties. Upon Felix's
death in 1993, petitioners took over the task of administering Lulu's properties. Unfortunately, the petitioners took
advantage of the situation. Lulu sought the assistance of her maternal first cousin, respondent Jovita San Juan-Santos,
after learning that petitioners had been dissipating her estate. Hence, the petition.
In the case at hand, petitioners claim that the opinions of Lulu's attending physician regarding her mental state were
inadmissible in evidence as they were not experts in psychiatry. Respondent therefore failed to prove that Lulu's illnesses
rendered her an incompetent. She should have been presumed to be of sound mind and/or in full possession of her
mental capacity. For this reason, Lulu should be allowed to live with them since under Articles 194 to 196 of the Family
Code, legitimate brothers and sisters, whether half-blood or full-blood are required to support each other fully.

Respondent, on the other hand, reiterated her arguments before the courts a quo. She disclosed that Lulu had been
confined in Recovery.com, a psychosocial rehabilitation center and convalescent home care facility in Quezon City, since
2004 due to violent and destructive behavior. She also had delusions of being physically and sexually abused by "Boy
Negro" and imaginary pets she called "Michael" and "Madonna." The medical reports stated Lulu had unspecified mental
retardation with psychosis but claimed significant improvements in her behavior.
Issue: Whether or not the person is an incompetent who requires the appointment of a judicial guardian over her person
and property.

Ruling;Yes, Lulu is required to have a guardian. Under Section 50, Rule 103 of the Rules of Court, an ordinary witness may
give his opinion on the mental sanity of a person with whom he is sufficiently acquainted. Lulu's attending physicians spoke
and interacted with her. Such occasions allowed them to thoroughly observe her behavior and conclude that her
intelligence level was below average and her mental stage below normal. Their opinions were admissible in evidence.

Furthermore, where the sanity of a person is at issue, expert opinion is not necessary. The observations of the trial judge
coupled with evidence establishing the person's state of mental sanity will suffice. Here, the trial judge was given ample
opportunity to observe Lulu personally when she testified before the RTC.

Under Section 2, Rule 92 of the Rules of Court, persons who, though of sound mind but by reason of age, disease, weak
mind or other similar causes are incapable of taking care of themselves and their property without outside aid, are
considered as incompetents who may properly be placed under guardianship. The RTC and the CA both found that Lulu
was incapable of taking care of herself and her properties without outside aid due to her ailments and weak mind. Thus,
since determining whether or not Lulu is in fact an incompetent would require a reexamination of the evidence presented
in the courts a quo, it undoubtedly involves questions of fact.

CHARACTER EVIDENCE
>CHARACTER EVIDENCE NOT GENERALLY ADMISSIBLE; EXCEPTION
People of the Philippines v Noel Lee

RULE 131 BURDEN OF PROOF AND PRESUMPTIONS

> BURDEN OF PROOF
Republic v Sandinganbayan, Eduardo M Cojuanco
Dr. Genevieve L. Huang v Philippine Hoteliers Inc
People v Tan
Dultan Pandaraganao A. Ilupa v Macalindog S Abdullah
The Board of Commissioners of the Bureau of Immigration and Departaion v Jung Keun Park
Olazo v Hon. Tinga

People of the Philippines v Noel Causay

Doctrine:When self-defense is invoked, the burden of evidence shifts to the accused to show that the killing was legally
justified.Thus, the accused must prove these requisites for self-defense: (1) unlawful aggression on the part of the victim;
(2) lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the accused; and (3) employment of reasonable means to prevent and
repel aggression.

FACTS: This is an appeal from the decision of CA affirmingthe decision of RTC in finding the accused-appellant Noel Cuasay
guilty of murder qualified by treachery. That on or about the 15 th day of October 1997, at around 1:00 o’clock in
themorning, in Barangay Estrella, Municipality of Naujan, Province of Oriental Mindoro, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused with treachery, without any justifiable cause and with the
deliberate intent to take the life of EDUARDO ANSULI alias "EDDIE ANSULI" did then and there willfully, unlawfully,
feloniously and suddenly attack, assault and stab the said EDUARDO ANSULI with a sharp-pointed instrument thereby
inflicting upon the latter mortal wound on the chest, causing his untimely demise.
That in the commission of the aforecited offense, the qualifying circumstance of treachery was attendant. However, the
accused-appellant pleaded “not guilty” to the charge. Thus, the prosecution presented Rizon Reyes,a councilperson of
Barangay Estrella, Naujan, Oriental Mindoro and an eyewitness to the crime. Reyes testified that on October 15, 1997,
around 1:00 a.m., he, Eduardo Ansuli, Bronson Albufera, and Rimon Martinez were playing mahjong at the wake of a
certain Rosalina Petalpo. Barangay tanods were also present at the wake,
about three meters from the mahjong table. At the table, Reyes was seated across Ansuli while accused-appellant and a
certain Johnson Suarez were seated at the right side of Ansuli, watching the game. While Ansuli was picking a mahjong tile,
Reyes saw accused-appellant about to stab Ansuli soReyes shouted "huwag." Accused-appellant, however,suddenly
stabbed Ansuli with a Swiss-type knife, hitting the latter on the right breast. Accused-appellant thereafter fled towards the
residence of barangaycaptain Librado Teves of BarangayEstrella, Naujan, Oriental Mindoro while Ansuli ranto his house.
Around 6:00 a.m. of the following day, Ansuli’s dead body was found by the side of the road, approximately 50 meters from
the location of the wake. In the same morning, the barangay captain of Nag-iba surrendered accused-appellant to the
authorities. Another witness, Flor Paglinawan, a councilperson of Barangay Estrella, testified that when she and
accusedappellant were in the terrace of the house of the barangay captain of Nag-iba, accused-appellant admitted to her
that he stabbed the victim. Accused-appellant,on the other hand, claimed killing Ansuli in self-defense. He alleged that the
victim suspected him of stealing PhP 20 and because of that, the victim boxed him three times. The victim allegedly
scolded him, saying "Putang ina mo. Ang yabang mo manyapat may dala ka lang balisong." Accused-appellant allegedly
replied, "Pinsan, hindi ko naman ipinagyayabang ito. Ginagamit ko ito sa pangingisda." Accused-appellant claimed that the
victim called him "patay gutom at pulubi" and boxed him at the right shoulder. Thus, he stabbed the victim with his fan
knife then ran to the house of the barangay captain.

RTC rendered decision finding herein accused Noel Cuasay y Borillo alias "Aping" guilty beyond reasonabledoubt as
principal by direct participation of the crime of Murder qualified by treachery which is punishable under Article 248 of the
Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 7659. Notice of Appeal was filed. CA affirmed the decision of RTC.

ISSUE:Whether or not the burden of proof in fiding the accused-appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt is satisfied.

RULING: It is important to note that accused-appellant admitted stabbing the victim but claimed that he did it in
selfdefense. When self-defense is invoked, the burden of evidence shifts to the accused to show that the killing was legally
justified. Thus, the accused must provethese requisites for self-defense: (1) unlawful aggression on the part of the victim;
(2) lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the accused; and (3) employment of reasonable means to prevent and
repel aggression. In this case, the trial court found that accused-appellant failed to prove the requisites of self-defense.
Accused-appellant alone testified regarding the alleged fist blows thrown at him by the victim. There was no other
testimony to that effect. For accused-appellant’s defense to stand, his testimonymust be credible.
We held that treachery exists when the offender commits any of the crimes against the person, employing means,
methods or forms in the execution thereof which tend directly or specially to ensure its execution, without risk to himself
arising from the defense which the offended party might make.In the case at bar, the victim was unarmed and
unsuspecting when accused-appellant suddenly stabbed him. Treachery was clearly present in accused-appellant’s
method.

>CONCLUSIVE PRESUMPTIONS
>DISPUTABLE PRESUMPTIONS
Insigne v Abra Valley Colleges
Travel-On v CA