Laurel v. Garcia (G.R. No.

92013) the respondents is that the subject property is not

governed by our Civil Code, but rather by the laws of
FACTS: These two (2) petitions for prohibition seek to Japan where the property is located. They relied upon
enjoin respondents from proceeding with the bidding the rule of lex situs which is used in determining the
for the sale of the 3,179 square meters of land at 306 applicable law regarding the acquisition, transfer and
Roppongi, 5-Chrome Minato-ku Tokyo, Japan. The latter devolution of the title to a property.
case also, prays for a writ of mandamus to fully disclose
to the public the basis of their decision to push through ISSUES:
with the sale of the Roppongi property. The Roppongi 1. Can the Roppongi property and others of its kind be
case is one of the four properties in Japan acquired by alienated by the Philippine Government?
the Philippine government under the Reparation NO. There can be no doubt that the property is of public
Agreement entered into with Japan. The other three (3) dominion and the respondents have failed to show that
properties include Nampeidai Property (present site of it has become patrimonial.
the Philippine Embassy Chancery), Kobe Commercial
Property (commercial lot being used as a warehouse The property is correctly classified under Art 420 of the
and parking lot for consulate staff) and Kobe Residential Civil Code as property belonging to the State and
Property (resident lot which is now vacant).The intended for some public service. The fact that it has
Reparations Agreement provides that reparations not been used for actual Embassy service does not
valued at $550M would be payable in twenty (20) years automatically convert it to patrimonial property. Such
in accordance with annual schedules of procurements conversion happens only if property is withdrawn from
to be fixed by the Philippine and Japanese public use, through an abandonment of the intention to
governments. The procurements are to be divided into use the Roppongi property for public service and to
government sector and those for private parties in make it patrimonial property. Abandonment must be a
projects, the latter shall be made available only to certain and positive act based on correct legal premises.
Filipino citizens or to 100% Filipino-owned entities in The EO does not declare that the properties lost their
national development projects. public character, merely intending the properties to be
made available to foreigners and not to Filipinos alone,
The Roppongi property was acquired under the heading in case of sale, lease or other disposition. Furthermore,
“Government Sector” for the Chanceryof the Philippine it is based on the wrong premise that the Japan
Embassy until the latter was transferred to Nampeida properties can be sold to end-users, when in fact it
due to the need for major repairs. However, the cannot. Neither does the CARP Law re-classify the
Roppongi property has remained underdeveloped since properties into patrimonial properties, merely stating
that time. Although there was a proposal to lease the that sources of funds for its implementation be sourced
property with the provision to have buildings built at from proceeds of the disposition of the Government in
the expense of the lessee, the same was not acted foreign countries, but not that the Roppongi property
favorably upon by the government. Instead, President be withdrawn from being classified as a property of
Aquino issued EO No. 296 entitling non-Filipino citizens public dominion.
or entities to avail of separations’ capital goods and
services in the event of sale, lease or dispositions. CONFLICT OF LAW
Thereafter, amidst the oppositions by various sectors, Furthermore, the respondents’ argument that the
the Executive branch of the government pushed for the Japanese law and not our Civil Code shall apply is
sale of reparation properties, starting with the incorrect. There is no conflict of law in this situation
Roppongi lot. The property has twice been set for A conflict of law arises only when:
bidding at a minimum floor price of $225M. The first a. There is a dispute over the title or ownership of an
was a failure, while the second has been postponed and immovable, such that the capacity to take and transfer
later restrained by the SC. Amongst the arguments of immovables, the formalities of conveyance, the
1
essential validity and effect of the transfer, or the Transfer Certificate of Title 25545-25547 as patrimonial
interpretation and effect of a conveyance, are to be property of Manila for the purpose of selling these lots
determined. to the actual occupants thereof. The resolution was
then transmitted to the Congress. The bill was then
b. A foreign law on land ownership and its conveyance passed by Congress and approved by President, and
is asserted to conflict with a domestic law on the same became Republic Act 4118, converting the land from
matters. communal property to disposable and alienable land of
State.
Hence, the need to determine which law should apply.
Both elements does not exist in the case. The issues are To implement RA 4118, Land Authority requested City
not concerned with the validity of ownership or title. of Manila to deliver the City’s TCT 22547 in order to
There is no question that the property belongs to the obtain title thereto in the name of Land Authority. The
Philippines. The issue is the authority of the request was granted with the knowledge and consent of
government officials to validly dispose of property City mayor, cancelling TCT 22547 and issuing TCT 80876
belonging to the state and the validity of the in the name of Land Authority.
procedures adopted to effect the sale, which should be
governed by Philippine law The rule of lex situs does not City of Manila, for some reasons, brought an action to
apply. restrain, prohibit, and enjoin Land Authority and
Register of Deeds from implementing RA 4118, and
2. Does the Chief Executive, her officers and agents, praying for the declaration of RA 4118 as
have the authority and jurisdiction, to sell the Roppongi unconstitutional.
property?
NO. A law or a formal declaration to withdraw the Trial court declared RA 4118 to be unconstitutional and
Roppongi property from public domain to make it invalid on the ground that it deprived City of its
alienable and a need for legislative authority to allow property without due process of law and payment of
the sale of the property is needed. None has been just compensation.
enacted for this purpose.
Land Authority and Register of Deeds argued that the
3. W/N EO No. 296 is constitutional? land is a communal land, or a portion of public domain
The SC did not anymore pass upon its constitutionality. owned by State; that the land has not been used by City
of Manila for any public purpose; that it was originally a
RAFAEL S. SALAS vs. HON. HILARION U. JARENCIO communal land not because it was needed in
connection with its organisation as a municipality but
Facts: rather for the common use of its inhabitants; that the
City of Manila – owner in fee simple of a parcel of land City mayor merely enjoys the usufruct over said land
known as Lot 1, Block 557 of Cadastral Survey of City of and its exercise of acts of ownership by selling parts
Manila, containing an area of 9689.80 sqm. On various thereof did not necessarily convert the land into a
dates in 1927, City of Manila sold portions of the parcel patrimonial property of City of Manila nor divert the
of land. When the last sale was effected August 1924, State of its paramount title.
Transfer Certificate of Title 22547 covering the residue
of the land 7490.10 sam was issued in the name of City Issue:
of Manila. Whether the aforementioned land is a private or
patrimonial property of the City of Manila.
On September 1960, Municipal Board of Manila
adopted a resolution requesting the President to Held:
consider the feasibility of declaring the land under The land is public property.
2
 without any obstacle from the respondents. Without
As a general rule, regardless of the source or costs.
classification of the land in the possession of
municipality, excepting those which it acquired in its THE PROVINCE OF ZAMBOANGA DEL NORTE vs.
own funds in its private or corporate capacity, such CITY OF ZAMBOANGA
property is held for the State for the benefit of its
inhabitants, whether it be for governmental or Facts:
proprietary purposes. The legal situation is the same if Prior to its incorporation as a chartered city, the
the State itself holds the property and puts it to a Municipality of Zamboanga used to be the provincial
different use. capital of the then Zamboanga Province. On October 12,
1936, Commonwealth Act 39 was approved converting
When it comes to property of municipality which it did the Municipality of Zamboanga into Zamboanga City.
not acquire in its private or corporate capacity with its Sec. 50 of the Act also provided that “Buildings and
own funds (the land was originally given to City by properties which the province shall abandon upon the
Spain), the legislature can transfer its administration transfer of the capital to another place will be acquired
and disposition to an agency of the National and paid for by the City of Zamboanga at a price to be
Government to be disposed of according to its fixed by the Auditor General.”
discretion. Here it did so in obedience to the
constitutional mandate of promoting social justice to Such properties include lots of capitol site, schools,
insure the well-being and economic security of the hospitals, leprosarium, high school playgrounds,
people. burleighs, and hydro-electric sites.

The property was not acquired by the City of Manila On June 6, 1952, Republic Act 711 was approved
with its own funds in its private or proprietary capacity. dividing the province of Zamboanga into two (2):
The land was part of the territory of City of Manila Zamboanga del Norte and Zamboanga del Sur. As to
granted by sovereign in its creation. Furthermore, City how the assets and obligations of the old province were
expressly recognised the paramount title of the State to be divided between the two new ones, Sec. 6 of that
over its land when it requested the President to law provided “Upon the approval of this Act, the funds,
consider the feasibility of declaring the lot as assets and other properties and the obligations of the
patrimonial property for selling. province of Zamboanga shall be divided equitably
between the Province of Zamboanga del Norte and the
There could be no more blatant recognition of the fact Province of Zamboanga del Sur by the President of the
that said land belongs to the State and was simply Philippines, upon the recommendation of the Auditor
granted in usufruct to the City of Manila for municipal General.”
purposes. But since the City did not actually use said
land for any recognized public purpose and allowed it to However, on June 17, 1961, Republic Act 3039 was
remain idle and unoccupied for a long time until it was approved amending Sec. 50 of Commonwealth Act 39
overrun by squatters, no presumption of State grant of by providing that, “All buildings, properties and assets
ownership in favor of the City of Manila may be belonging to the former province of Zamboanga and
acquiesced in to justify the claim that it is its own located within the City of Zamboanga are hereby
private or patrimonial property. transferred, free of charge, in favor of the said City of
Zamboanga.”
WHEREFORE, the appealed decision is hereby reversed,
and petitioners shall proceed with the free and This constrained Zamboanga del Norte to file on March
untrammeled implementation of Republic Act No. 4118 5, 1962, a complaint against defendants-appellants
Zamboanga City; that, among others, Republic Act 3039
3
be declared unconstitutional for depriving Zamboanga waters, promenades, and public works for public service
del Norte of property without due process and just paid for by said provinces, cities, or municipalities. All
compensation. other property possessed by any of them is patrimonial
and shall be governed by this Code, without prejudice
Lower court declared RA 3039 unconstitutional as it to the provisions of special laws.
deprives Zamboanga del Norte of its private properties.
Applying the above cited norm, all the properties in
Hence the appeal. question, except the two (2) lots used as High School
playgrounds, could be considered as patrimonial
Issue: properties of the former Zamboanga province. Even the
Whether RA 3039 is unconstitutional on the grounds capital site, the hospital and leprosarium sites, and the
that it deprives Zamboanga del Norte of its private school sites will be considered patrimonial for they are
properties. not for public use. They would fall under the phrase
“public works for public service” for it has been held
Held: that under the ejusdem generis rule, such public works
No. RA 3039 is valid. The properties petitioned by must be for free and indiscriminate use by anyone, just
Zamboanga del Norte is a public property. like the preceding enumerated properties in the first
paragraph of Art 424. The playgrounds, however, would
The validity of the law ultimately depends on the nature fit into this category.
of the 50 lots and buildings thereon in question. For, the
matter involved here is the extent of legislative control Law of Municipal Corporations
over the properties of a municipal corporation, of which On the other hand, applying the norm obtaining under
a province is one. The principle itself is simple: If the the principles constituting the law of Municipal
property is owned by the municipality (meaning Corporations, all those of the 50 properties in question
municipal corporation) in its public and governmental which are devoted to public service are deemed public;
capacity, the property is public and Congress has the rest remain patrimonial. Under this norm, to be
absolute control over it. But if the property is owned in considered public, it is enough that the property be held
its private or proprietary capacity, then it is patrimonial and, devoted for governmental purposes like local
and Congress has no absolute control. The municipality administration, public education, public health, etc.
cannot be deprived of it without due process and
payment of just compensation. Final Ruling
The controversy here is more along the domains of the
The capacity in which the property is held is, however, Law of Municipal Corporations — State vs. Province —
dependent on the use to which it is intended and than along that of Civil Law. If municipal property held
devoted. Now, which of two norms, i.e., that of the Civil and devoted to public service is in the same category as
Code or that obtaining under the law of Municipal ordinary private property, then that would mean they
Corporations, must be used in classifying the properties can be levied upon and attached; they can even be
in question? acquired thru adverse possession — all these to the
detriment of the local community. It is wrong to
Civil Code consider those properties as ordinary private property.
The Civil provide: ART. 423. The property of provinces,
cities, and municipalities is divided into property for Lastly, the classification of properties other than those
public use and patrimonial property; ART. 424. Property for public use in the municipalities as patrimonial under
for public use, in the provinces, cities, and Art. 424 of the Civil Code — is “… without prejudice to
municipalities, consists of the provincial roads, city the provisions of special laws.” For purpose of this
streets, municipal streets, the squares, fountains, public article, the principles, obtaining under the Law of
4
Municipal Corporations can be considered as “special
laws”. Hence, the classification of municipal property On September 23, 1968, the City Council of Cebu,
devoted for distinctly governmental purposes as public through Resolution No. 2193, approved on October 3,
should prevail over the Civil Code classification in this 1968, declared the terminal portion of M. Borces Street,
particular case. Mabolo, Cebu City, as an abandoned road, the same not
being included in the City Development Plan.
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby set Subsequently, on December 19, 1968, the City Council
aside and another judgment is hereby entered as of Cebu passed another resolution (Resolution No.
follows:. 2755) authorizing the Acting City Mayor to sell the land
through a public bidding. In pursuance to the said
(1) Defendant Zamboanga City is hereby ordered to resolution, the lot was awarded to Cebu Oxygen and
return to plaintiff Zamboanga del Norte in lump sum the Acetylene, being the highest bidder. Subsequently, a
amount of P43,030.11 which the former took back from deed of absolute sale was executed on March 3, 1969
the latter out of the sum of P57,373.46 previously paid by the City of Cebu via its Acting City Mayor to Cebu
to the latter; and Oxygen and Acetylene for a total consideration of
P10,800.00.
(2) Defendants are hereby ordered to effect payments
in favor of plaintiff of whatever balance remains of Issue: Whether or not Cebu Oxygen can validly own said
plaintiff’s 54.39% share in the 26 patrimonial land.
properties, after deducting therefrom the sum of
P57,373.46, on the basis of Resolution No. 7 dated Held: Yes. Under Cebu’s Charter (RA 3857), the city
March 26, 1949 of the Appraisal Committee formed by council “may close any city road, street or alley,
the Auditor General, by way of quarterly payments from boulevard, avenue, park or square. Property thus
the allotments of defendant City, in the manner withdrawn from public servitude may be used or
originally adopted by the Secretary of Finance and the conveyed for any purpose for which other real property
Commissioner of Internal Revenue. No costs. So belonging to the City may be lawfully used or
ordered. conveyed.” Since that portion of the city street subject
of Cebu Oxygen’s application for registration of title was
Cebu Oxygen & Acetylene, Inc vs Hon. Pascual Bercilles, withdrawn from public use, it follows that such
66 SCRA 481 withdrawn portion becomes patrimonial property which
can be the object of an ordinary contract.
Doctrine: Art. 422 of the New Civil states that property
of public dominion, when no longer intended for public Article 422 of the Civil Code expressly provides that
use or for public service, shall form part of the “Property of public dominion, when no longer intended
patrimonial property of the State. Thus, the abandoned for public use or for public service, shall form part of the
part of M. Borces Street, Mabolo, Cebu City can be patrimonial property of the State.”
conveyed to a private person or corporation like Cebu
Oxygen and Acetylene. VIUDA DE TAN TOCO v THE MUNICIPAL COUNCIL OF
ILOILO March 25, 1926 VILLAMOR, J.
Facts: Cebu Oxygen and Acetylene assailed the
judgment of Judge Pascual Bercilles dismissing their FACTS: The widow of Tan Toco sued the municipal
application to register the land once part of M. Borces council of Iloilo for the amount of P42,966.40, being the
Street, Mabolo Cebu. It upheld the argument of purchase price of two strips of land, one on Calle J. M.
Assistant Provincial Fiscal Jose Espeleta that the land Basa (592 sqm), and the other on Calle Aldiguer
belongs to the government, not an abandoned road or (59sqm), which the municipality of Iloilo had
land, and not alienable. appropriated for widening said street. CFI Iloilo ordered
5
the municipality to pay+int. Judgment was affirmed by houses, jails and other buildings owned by
the SC. Lack of funds->the municipality was unable to municipalities and the lots on which they stand shall be
pay->plaintiff had a writ of execution issue against the exempt from attachment and execution. But
property of the municipality-> by virtue of which the independent of express statutory exemption, as a
sheriff attached: two auto trucks used for street general proposition, property, real and personal, held
sprinkling, one police patrol automobile, the police by municipal corporations, in trust for the benefit of
stations on Mabini street, and in Molo and Mandurriao their inhabitants, and used for public purposes, is
and the concrete structures, with the corresponding exempt. It is generally held that property owned by a
lots, used as markets by Iloilo, Molo, and Mandurriao. municipality, where not used for a public purpose but
The provincial fiscal of Iloilo filed a motion with the CFI for quasi private purposes, is subject to execution on a
praying that: – the attachment on the said property be judgment against the municipality, and may be sold. In
dissolved – the said attachment be declared null and Corpus Juris, vol 23, page 355 Where property of a
void as being illegal and violative of the rights of the municipal or other public corporation is sough to be
municipality. Aug. 12, 1925: CFI declared the subjected to execution to satisfy judgments recovered
attachment levied upon the aforementioned property against such corporation, the question as to whether
of the defendant municipality null and void, thereby such property is leviable or not is to be determined by
dissolving the said attachment. From this order the the usage and purposes for which it is held xxx But
plaintiff has appealed by bill of exceptions. where a municipal corporation or country owns in its
proprietary, as distinguished from its public or
WON the property levied upon is exempt from governmental capacity, property not useful or used for
execution. a public purpose but for quasi private purposes, the
general rule is that such property may be seized and
Held: Yes A343 (now A423) of the Civil Code divides the sold under execution against the corporation, precisely
property of provinces and towns (municipalities) into as similar property of individuals is seized and sold. But
property for public use and patrimonial property. property held for public purposes is not subject to
According to A344 (now A424), provincial roads and execution merely because it is temporarily used for
foot-path, squares, streets, fountains and public waters, private purposes, although if the public use is wholly
drives and public improvements of general benefit built abandoned it becomes subject to execution. Whether
at the expense of the said towns or provinces, are or not property held as public property is necessary for
property for public use. All other property possessed by the public use is a political, rather than a judicial
the said towns and provinces is patrimonial and shall be question. In volume 1, page 467, Municipal
subject to the provisions of the Civil Code except as Corporations by Dillon The revenue of the public
provided by special laws. And, the principle governing corporation is the essential means by which it is
property of the public domain of the State is applicable enabled to perform its appointed work. Deprived of its
to property for public use of the municipalities as said regular and adequate supply of revenue, such a
municipal is similar in character. The principle is that the corporation is practically destroyed and the ends of its
property for public use of the State is not within the erection thwarted. Based upon considerations of this
commerce of man and, consequently, is inalienable and character, it is the settled doctrine of the law that only
not subject to prescription. Likewise, property for public the public property but also the taxes and public
of the municipality is not within the commerce of man revenues of such corporations cannot be seized under
so long as it is used by the public and, consequently, execution against them, either in the treasury or when
said property is also inalienable. in transit to it. Judgments rendered for taxes, and the
----------------------------- The rules based on jurisprudence proceeds of such judgments in the hands of officers of
& annotations: The American Law as expounded by the law, are not subject to execution unless so declared
Mcquilin in Municipal Corporations, volume 3, by statute. In the case of City of New Orleans vs.
paragraph 1160: States statutes often provide the court Louisiana Construction Co., Ltd., it was held that a wharf
6
(leased to Louisiana CC)for unloading sugar and municipality filed a petition for certiorari with the writ
molasses, open to the public, was property for the of preliminary injunction, asking that the order of the
public use of the City of New Orleans and was not trial court be reversed and that the attachment of the
subject to attachment for the payment of the debts of properties of the municipality be dissolved. The
the said city. In the case of Klein vs. City of New Orleans, municipality contended that the properties attached by
the US SC states that a public wharf on the banks of the the sheriff for purposes of execution are not subject to
Mississippi River was public property and not subject to levy because they are properties for public use.
execution for the payment of a debt of the City of New
Orleans where said wharf was located. ---------------------- Issue:
----- It is evident that the movable and immovable
property of a municipality, necessary for governmental May the fishery or municipal waters of the town of
purpose, may not be attached and sold for the payment Paoay or its usufruct may be levied upon and subject to
of a judgment against the municipality. The supreme execution? How about the revenue or income derived
reason for this rule is the character of the public use to from the renting of these fishery lots?
which such kind of property is devoted. The necessity
for government service justifies that the property of Held:
public of the municipality be exempt from execution.
No. There can be no question that properties for public
DISPOSITIVE: the judgment appealed is affirmed with use held by municipal corporation are not subject to
costs against the appellant. levy and execution. Properties for public use like trucks
used for sprinkling the streets, police patrol wagons,
Municipality of Paoay vs. Manaois police stations, public markets, together with the land
on which they stand are exempt from execution. Even
Facts: public revenues of municipal corporations destined for
the expenses of the municipality are also exempt from
The municipality of Paoay leased 6 fishery lots to the execution. The reason behind this exemption
Francisco V. Duque for a period of four years but the extended to properties for public use, and public
latter failed to comply with the terms of the lease municipal revenues is that they are held in trust for the
contract. Thus, the municipality approved a resolution people, intended and used for the accomplishment of
confiscating said lots and advertised its lease for public the purposes for which municipal corporations are
bidding. Teodoro Manaois, being the highest bidder, created, and that to subject said properties and public
was awarded the lease. However, Manaois was not able funds to execution would materially impede, even
to exercise his right to possession because Duque defeat and in some instances destroy said purpose.
continued to claim possession over the properties and,
despite the appeal to the Municipality of Paoay to put Property however, which is patrimonial and which is
him in possession and the efforts of the municipality to held by municipality in its proprietary capacity is treated
oust Duque, Duque succeeded in continuing in his by great weight of authority as the private asset of the
possession and keeping Manaois and his men out. town and may be levied upon and sold under an
ordinary execution. The same rule applies to municipal
Manaois filed a case against the Municipality of Paoay funds derived from patrimonial properties, for instance,
to recover the sum paid by him for the lease of the it has been held that shares of stocks held by municipal
fishery lots plus damages. The trial court ruled in his corporations are subject to execution. If this is true,
favor and a writ of execution and attachment were with more reason should income or revenue coming
issued to enforce the judgment. The municipality filed a from these shares of stock, in the form of interest or
petition asking for the dissolution of that attachment of dividends, be subject to execution.
levy of the properties but it was denied. Thus, the
7
The fishery or municipal waters of the town of Paoay, might do would be to let out or rent to private
Ilocos Norte, which had been parceled out or divided individuals the fishery rights over the lots into which the
into lots and later let out to private persons for fishing municipal waters had been parceled out or divided, and
purposes at an annual rental are clearly not subject to that is, after public bidding. Then, we shall have a
execution. In the first place, they do not belong to the situation rather anomalous to be sure, of a private
municipality. They may well be regarded as property of individual conducting public bidding, renting to the
State. What the municipality of Paoay hold is merely highest bidders fishery lots over municipal waters which
what may be considered the usufruct or the right to use are property of the State, and appropriating the results
said municipal waters, granted to it by section 2321 of to his own private use. The impropriety, if not illegality,
the Revised Administrative Code. of such a contingency is readily apparent. The situation
imagined implies the deprivation of the municipal
Now, is this particular usufruct of the municipality of corporation of a source of a substantial income,
Paoay over its municipal waters, subject to execution to expressly provide by law. Because of all this, we hold
enforce a judgment against the town? No. First, it is not that the right or usufruct of the town of Paoay over its
a usufruct based on or derived from an inherent right of municipal waters is not subject to execution.
the town. It is based merely on a grant made by the
Legislature. These marine waters are ordinarily for But we hold that the revenue or income coming from
public use, open to navigation and fishing by the the renting of these fishery lots is certainly subject to
people. The municipality of Paoay is not holding this execution. It may be profitable, if not necessary, to
usufruct or right of fishery in a permanent or absolute distinguish this kind of revenue from that derived from
manner so as to enable it to dispose of it or to allow it taxes, municipal licenses and market fees are provided
to be taken away from it as its property through for and imposed by the law, they are intended primarily
execution. The Legislature thru section 2321 of the and exclusively for the purpose of financing the
Administrative Code, as already stated, saw fit to grant governmental activities and functions of municipal
the usufruct of said marine waters for fishery purpose, corporations. Not so with the income derived from
to the towns bordering said waters. Said towns have no fisheries. In the first place, the usufruct over municipal
vested right over said marine waters. The Legislature, waters was granted by the Legislature merely to help or
for reasons it may deem valid or as a matter of public bolster up the economy of municipal government. This
policy, may at any time, repeal or modify said section kind of revenue is not indispensable for the
2321 and revoke this grant to coastal towns and open performance of governmental functions. In the second
these marine waters to the public. Or the Legislature place, the amount of this income is far from definite or
may grant the usufruct or right of fishery to the fixed. It depends upon the amounts which prospective
provinces concerned so that said provinces may operate bidders or lessees are willing to pay. In other words, too
or administer them by leasing them to private parties. many municipalities engaged in this business of letting
All this only goes to prove that the municipality of out municipal waters for fishing purposes, it is a sort of
Paoay is not holding this usufruct or right of fishery in a sideline, so that even without it the municipality may
permanent or absolute manner so as to enable it to still continue functioning and perform its essential
dispose of it or to allow it to be taken away from it as its duties as such municipal corporations.
property through execution.
We call this activity of municipalities in renting
Second, if this were to be allowed and this right sold on municipal waters for fishing purposes as a business for
execution, the buyer would immediately step into the the reasons that the law itself allowed said
shoes of the judgment-debtor municipality. Such buyer municipalities to engage in it for profit. And it is but just
presumably buys only the right of the municipality. He that a town so engaged should pay and liquidate
does not buy the fishery itself nor the municipal waters obligations contracted in connection with said fishing
because that belongs to the State. All that the buyer business, with the income derived therefrom.
8
 proper, without detriment to servitudes and subject to
In conclusion, we hold that the fishery lots numbering special laws and ordinances. xxx
about forty in the municipality of Paoay, mentioned at
Hence, the ownership of land extends to the surface as
the beginning of this decision are not subject to
well as to the subsoil under it. Therefore, Ibrahim owns
execution. For this reason, the levy and attachment the property as well as the sub-terrain area of the land
made by the Provincial Sheriff of Ilocos Norte of theses where the underground tunnels were constructed.
fishery lots is void and the order of the Court of First
Instance of Pangasinan insofar as it failed to dissolve the On the issue of just compensation, the Supreme Court
attachment made on these lots is reversed. However, also said that Ibrahim should be paid a just
the amount of P1,712.01 in the municipal treasury of compensation.
Paoay representing the rental paid by Demetrio Tabije
Ibrahim could have dug upon their property and built
on fishery lots let out by the municipality of Paoay is a motorized deep wells but was prevented from doing so
proper subject of levy, and the attachment made by the authorities because of the construction of the
thereon by the Sheriff is valid. tunnels underneath the surface of the land.

Ibrahim still had a legal interest in the sub-terrain

NPC v Ibrahim
portion insofar as they could have excavated the same
for the construction of the deep wells. It has been
Facts: shown that the underground tunnels have deprived the
 Ibrahim owns a parcel of land located in Lanao del plaintiffs of the lawful use of the land and considerably
Norte. reduced its value.
 In 1978, NAPOCOR took possession of the sub-
terrain area of the land and constructed It was held that: If the government takes property
underground tunnels on the said property. without expropriation and devotes the property to
 The tunnels were apparently being used by public use, after many years, the property owner may
NAPOCOR in siphoning the water of Lake Lanao demand payment of just compensation in the event
and in the operation of NAPOCOR’s Agus projects. restoration of possession is neither convenient nor
 In 1991, Maruhom (one of the co-heirs of Ibrahim) feasible. This is in accordance with the principle that
requested Marawi City Water District for a permit persons shall not be deprived of their property except
to construct or install a motorized deep well on by competent authority and for public use and always
the parcel of land but it was rejected on the upon payment of just compensation.
grounds that the construction would cause danger
to lives and property by reason of the presence of
the underground tunnels. Manila International Airport Authority vs CAGR No.
 Maruhom demanded NAPOCOR to pay damages 155650, July 20, 2006, 495 SCRA 591
and to vacate the sub-terrain portion of the land.
Facts: Manila International Airport Authority (MIAA) is
Issue: WON Ibrahim is the rightful owner of the sub- the operator of the Ninoy International Airport located
terrain area of the land. at Paranaque City. The Officers of Paranaque City sent
If yes, are they entitled to the payment of just
notices to MIAA due to real estate tax delinquency.
compensation.
MIAA then settled some of the amount. When MIAA
Held: YES. The sub-terrain portion of the property failed to settle the entire amount, the officers of
belongs to Ibrahim. Paranaque city threatened to levy and subject to
auction the land and buildings of MIAA, which they did.
The Supreme Court cited Article 437 of the Civil Code MIAA sought for a Temporary Restraining Order from
which provides that: The owner of a parcel of land is the the CA but failed to do so within the 60 days
owner of its surface and of everything under it, and he
reglementary period, so the petition was dismissed.
can construct thereon any works or make any
plantations and excavations which he may deem MIAA then sought for the TRO with the Supreme Court
a day before the public auction, MIAA was granted with

9
the TRO but unfortunately the TRO was received by the dominion the land and buildings of MIAA are outside
Paranaque City officers 3 hours after the public auction. the commerce of man. To subject them to levy and
MIAA claims that although the charter provides that the public auction is contrary to public policy. Unless the
title of the land and building are with MIAA still the President issues a proclamation withdrawing the airport
ownership is with the Republic of the Philippines. MIAA land and buildings from public use, these properties
also contends that it is an instrumentality of the remain to be of public dominion and are inalienable. As
government and as such exempted from real estate tax. long as the land and buildings are for public use the
That the land and buildings of MIAA are of public ownership is with the Republic of the Philippines.
dominion therefore cannot be subjected to levy and
auction sale. On the other hand, the officers of Chavez vs. PEA- Amari
Paranaque City claim that MIAA is a government owned
and controlled corporation therefore not exempted to Doctrine:
real estate tax. In the hands of the government agency tasked and
authorized to dispose of alienable or disposable lands of
Issues: Whether or not MIAA is an instrumentality of the public domain, these lands are still public, not
the government and not a government owned and private lands.
controlled corporation and as such exempted from tax.
Whether or not the land and buildings of MIAA are part Facts:
of the public dominion and thus cannot be the subject On November 20, 1973, the government, through the
of levy and auction sale. Commissioner of Public Highways, signed a contract
with the Construction and Development Corporation of
Ruling: Under the Local government code, government the Philippines (CDCP) to reclaim certain foreshore and
owned and controlled corporations are not exempted offshore areas of Manila Bay. The contract also included
from real estate tax. MIAA is not a government owned the construction of Phases I and II of the Manila-Cavite
and controlled corporation, for to become one MIAA Coastal Road. CDCP obligated itself to carry out all the
should either be a stock or non stock corporation. MIAA works in consideration of fifty percent of the total
is not a stock corporation for its capital is not divided reclaimed land. On February 4, 1977, then President
into shares. It is not a non stock corporation since it has Ferdinand E. Marcos issued Presidential Decree
no members. MIAA is an instrumentality of the No. 1084 creating PEA. PD No. 1084 tasked PEA “to
government vested with corporate powers and reclaim land, including foreshore and submerged
government functions. Under the civil code, property areas,” and “to develop, improve, acquire,
may either be under public dominion or private x x x lease and
ownership. Those under public dominion are owned by sell any and all kinds of lands.” On the same date, then
the State and are utilized for public use, public service President Marcos issued Presidential Decree No. 1085
and for the development of national wealth. The ports transferring to PEA the “lands reclaimed in the
included in the public dominion pertain either to foreshore and offshore of the Manila Bay” under the
seaports or airports. When properties under public Manila-Cavite Coastal Road and Reclamation Project
dominion cease to be for public use and service, they (MCCRRP).On January 19, 1988, then President Corazon
form part of the patrimonial property of the State. The C. Aquino issued Special Patent No.
court held that the land and buildings of MIAA are part 3517, granting and transferring to PEA “the parcels of
of the public dominion. Since the airport is devoted for land so reclaimed under the
public use, for the domestic and international travel and Manila-Cavite Coastal Road and Reclamation Project.
transportation. Even if MIAA charge fees, this is for On April 9, 1988, the Register of Deeds issued TCT Nos.
support of its operation and for regulation and does not 7309, 7311, and 7312, in the name of PEA, covering the
change the character of the land and buildings of MIAA three reclaimed islands known as the “Freedom Islands”
as part of the public dominion. As part of the public located at the southern portion of the Manila-Cavite
10
Coastal Road, Parañaque City. On April 25, 1995, PEA alienation of natural resources other than agricultural
entered into a Joint Venture Agreement with AMARI, a lands of the public domain. PEA may reclaim these
private corporation, to develop the Freedom Islands. submerged areas. Thereafter, the government can
Petitioner assails the sale to AMARI of lands of the classify there claimed lands as alienable or disposable,
public domain as a blatant violation of Section 3, Article and further declare them no longer needed for public
XII of the 1987 Constitution prohibiting the sale of service. Still, the transfer of such reclaimed alienable e
alienable lands of the public domain to private lands of the public domain to AMARI will be void in view
corporations. On March 30, 1999, PEA and AMARI of Section 3, Article XII of the 1987Constitution which
signed the Amended Joint Venture Agreement. On May prohibits private corporations from acquiring any kind
28, 1999, the Office of the President under the of alienable land of the public domain.
administration of then President Joseph E. Estrada Issue:
approved the Amended JVA. Whether or not the July 9, 2002 ruling of the Supreme
Several motions for reconsideration of the Supreme Court should be reversed.
Court’s July 9, 2002 decision
which declared the amended JVA null and void ab initio Held:
were filed. The conclusions of said decision were No. Amari cannot claim good faith because even before
summarized by the Court as follows: The 157.84 Amari signed the Amended JVA on March 30, 1999,
hectares of reclaimed lands comprising the Freedom petitioner had already filed the instant case on April 27,
Islands, now covered by certificates of title in the name 1998 questioning precisely the qualification of Amari to
of PEA, are alienable lands of the public domain. PEA acquire the Freedom Islands. Even before the filing of
may lease these lands to private corporations but may this petition, two Senate Committees had already
not sell or transfer ownership of these lands to private approved on September 16, 1997 Senate Committee
corporations. PEA may only sell these lands to Report No. 560 which concluded that the Freedom
Philippine citizens, subject to the ownership limitations Islands are inalienable lands of the public domain. Thus,
in the 1987 Constitution and existing laws. The 592.15 Amari signed the Amended JVA knowing and assuming
hectares of submerged areas of Manila Bay remain all the attendant risks, including the annulment of the
inalienable natural resources of the public domain until Amended JVA. Amari has also not paid to PEA the full
classified as alienable or disposable lands open to reimbursement cost incurred by PEA in reclaiming the
disposition and declared no longer needed for public Freedom Islands. Moreover, Amari does not claim to
service. The government can make such classification have even initiated the reclamation of the 592.15
and declaration only after PEA has reclaimed these hectares of submerged areas covered in the Amended
submerged areas. Only then can these lands qualify as JVA, or to have started to construct any permanent
agricultural lands of the public domain, which are the infrastructure on the Freedom Islands. In short, Amari
only natural resources the government can alienate. In does not claim to have introduced any physical
their present state, the 592.15 hectares of submerged improvement or development on the reclamation
areas are inalienable and outside the commerce of man. project that is the subject of the Amended JVA.PEA
Since the Amended JVA seeks to transfer to AMARI, a cannot claim that it is “similarly situated” as the Bases
private corporation, ownership of 77.34 hectares of the Conversion Development Authority (BCDA) which under
Freedom Islands, such transfer is void for being contrary R.A. No. 7227 is tasked to sell portions of the Metro
to Section 3, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution which Manila military camps and other military reservations is
prohibits private corporationsfrom acquiring any kind of incorrect. PEA took the place of DENR as the
alienable land of the public domain. Since the Amended government agency charged with leasing or selling
JVA also seeks to transfer to AMARI ownership of reclaimed lands of the public domain. The reclaimed
290.156hectares of still submerged areas of Manila Bay, lands being leased or sold by PEA are not private lands,
such transfer is void for being contrary to Section 2, in the same manner that DENR, when it disposes of
Article XII of the 1987 Constitution which prohibits the other alienable lands, does not dispose of private lands
11
but alienable lands of the public domain. Only when known under the name of Luneta Extension, situated in
qualified private parties acquire these lands will the the district of Ermita.]
lands become private lands. In the hands of the
government agency tasked and authorized to dispose of - The registration was subject, however, to the
alienable or disposable lands of the public domain, encumbrances mentioned in Article 39 of the Land
these lands are still public, not private lands. To allow Registration Act as may be subsisting and "sujeto a las
vast areas of reclaimed lands of the public domain to be disposiciones y condiciones inipuestas en la Ley No.
transferred to PEA as private lands will sanction a gross 1360; y sujeto tambien a los contratos de venta,
violation of the constitutional ban on private celebratlos y oborgados por ta Ciudad de Manila a favor
corporations from acquiring any kind of alienable land del Army and Navy Club y la Manila Lodge No. 761.
of the public domain. PEA will simply turn around and Benevolent and Protective Order of Elks, fechadosen 29
transfer several hundreds of hectares of these de Diciembre de 1908 y 16 de Enero de 1909."
reclaimed and still to be reclaimed lands to a single
private corporation in only one transaction. This scheme [Translation: Subject to the dispositions and conditions
will effectively nullify the constitutional ban in Section provided by Act No. 1360; and subject also to contracts
3, Article XII of the1987 Constitution. of sale celebrated and entered into by the City of
Manila in favor of the Army and Navy Club and Manila
MANILA LODGE NO. 761 BENEVELONT & PROTECTIVE Lodge No. 761 Benevolent and Protective Order of Elks
ORDER OF THE ELKS V CA (BPOE for short), dated 29th of December 1908 and
16th of January 1909.]
FACTS
- On June 26, 1905 the Philippine Commission enacted - On July 13, 1911, the City of Manila conveyed 5,543.07
Act No. 1360 which authorized the City of Manila to square meters of the reclaimed area to the Manila
reclaim a portion of Manila Bay. The reclaimed area was Lodge No. 761, BPOE on the basis of which a transfer
to form part of the Luneta extension. The Act provided certificate of title was issued to the latter over the
that the reclaimed area "shall be the property of the "parcela de terreno que es parte de la Luneta Extension,
City of Manila" and that the City of Manila is authorized Situada en el Distrito de la Ermita."
to set aside a tract of the reclaimed land formed by the - At the back of this title was an annotated document
Luneta extension at the north end for a hotel site, and which in part reads as follows:
to lease the same, with the approval of the Governor "que la citada ciudad de Manila tendra derecho a su
General, to a responsible person or corporation for a opcion de recompray la expresada propiedad para fines
term not to exceed 99 years. puldicos solamente, en cualquier tiempo despues de
cincuenta anos desde el 13 de Julio de 1911, previo
Subsequently, the Philippine Commission passed on pago a la entidad compradora, o a sus sucesores del
May 18, 1907 Act No. 1657, amending Act No. 1360, so precio de la venta de la misma propiedad, mas el valor
as to authorize the City of Manila either to lease or to que entoces tengan las mejores."
sell the portion set aside as a hotel site. - In January 1963 the BPOE petitioned the CFI of Manila,
Branch IV, for the cancellation of the right of the City
- The total area reclaimed was a little over 25 hectares. Manila to repurchase the property. This petition
The City of Manila applied for the registration of the was granted on February 15, 1963.
reclaimed area, and on January 20, 1911, original - On November 19, 1963 the BPOE sold for the sum of
certificate of title was issued in the name of the City of P4,700,000 the land together with all the improvements
Manila. The title described the registered land as "un thereon to the Tarlac Development Corporation (TDC,
terreno conocido con el nombre de Luneta Extension, for short) which paid P1,700,000 as down payment and
situado en el distrito de la Ermita." [Translation: A land mortgaged to the vendor the same realty to secure the
payment of the balance to be paid in quarterly
12
installments. At the time of the sale, there was no 1. NO. We hold that it is of public dominion, intended
annotation of any subsisting lien on the title to the for public use. Reasoning Firstly, if the reclaimed area
property. On December 12, 1963 TCT No. 73444 was was granted to the City of Manila as its patrimonial
issued to TDC over the subject land still described as property, the City could, by virtue of its ownership,
"Una parcela de terreno, que es parte de la Luneta dispose of the whole reclaimed area without need of
Extension, situada en el Distrito de Ermita." authorization to do so from the lawmaking body. Thus
- In June 1964 the City of Manila filed with the CFI of Article 348 of the Civil Code of Spain provides that
Manila a petition for the reannotation of its right to "ownership is the right to enjoy and dispose of a thing
repurchase. The court, after hearing, issued an order, without further limitations than those established by
dated November 19, 1964, directing the Regrister of law." The right to dispose (jus disponendi) of one's
Deeds of the City of Manila to reannotate in toto the property is an attribute of ownership. Act No. 1360, as
entry regarding the right of the City of Manila to amended, however, provides by necessary implication,
repurchase the property after fifty years. From this that the City of Manila could not dispose of the
order TDC and BPOE appealed to this Court which on reclaimed area without being authorized by the
July 31, 1968 affirmed the trial court's order of lawmaking, body. Thus the statute provides that "the
reannotation, but reserved to TDC the right to bring City of Manila is hereby authorized to set aside a tract
another action for the clarification of its rights. at the north end, for a hotel site, and to lease the same
- After trial the court a quo rendered on July 14, 1972 its x x x should the municipal board x x x deem it advisable,
decision finding the subject land to be part of the it is hereby authorized x x x to sell said tract of land x x
"public park or plaza" and, therefore, part of the public x." If the reclaimed area were patrimonial property of
domain. The court consequently declared that the sale the City, the latter could dispose of it without need of
of the subject land by the City of Manila to Manila the authorization provided by the statute, and the
Lodge No. 761, BPOE, was null and void; that plaintiff authorization to set aside, lease, or sell given by the
TDC was a purchaser thereof in good faith and for value statute would indeed be superfluous. To so construe
from BPOE and can enforce its rights against the latter; the statute as to render the term "authorize," which is
and that BPOE is entitled to recover from the City of repeatedly used by the statute, superfluous would
Manila whatever consideration it had paid the latter. violate the elementary rule of legal hermeneutics that
- In its decision promulgated on June 30, 1975, the CA effect must be given to every word, clause, and
concurred in the findings and conclusions of the lower sentence of the statute and that a statute should be so
court. interpreted that no part thereof becomes inoperative or
superflous. To authorizemeans to empower, to give a
ISSUES right to act. Act No. 1360 furthermore qualifies the verb
1. WON the property subject of the action was "authorize" with the adverb "hereby," which means "by
patrimonial property of the City of Manila and not a means of this statue or section." Hence without the
park or plaza authorization expressly given by Act No. 1360, the City
2. WON the City of Manila is estopped from questioning of Manila could not lease or sell even the northern
the validity of the sale it executed on July 13, 1911 portion; much less could it dispose of the whole
conveying the subject property to the Manila Lodge No. reclaimed area. Consequently, the reclaimed area was
761, BPOE granted to the City of Manila, not as its patrimonial
3. WON the CA has departed from the accepted and property. At most, only the northern portion reserved
usual course of judicial proceedings in that it did not as a hotel site could be said to be patrimonial property,
make its own findings but simply recited those of the for, by express statutory provision it could be disposed
lower court\ of, and the title thereto would revert to the City should
the grantee fail to comply with the terms provided by
HELD the statute.

13
- Secondly. the reclaimed area is an "extension to the - Fifthly, Article 344 of the Civil Code of Spain provides
Luneta in the City of Manila." If the reclaimed area is an that property of public use, in provinces and in towns,
extension of the Luneta, then it is of the same nature or comprises the provincial and town roads, the squares,
character as the old Luneta. Anent this matter, it has streets, fountains, and public waters, the promenades,
been said that a power to extend or continue an act or and public works of general service paid for by such
business cannot authorize a transaction that is totally towns or provinces." A park or plaza, such as the
distinct. It is not disputed that the old Luneta is a public extension to the Luneta, is undoubtedly comprised in
park or plaza and it is so considered by Section 859 of said article.
the Revised Ordinances of the City of Manila. - We have demonstrated that the Luneta extension was
intended to be property of the City of Manila for public
Hence the "extension to the Luneta" must be also a use. But, could not said property later on be converted,
public park or plaza and for public use. TDC, however, as the petitioners contend, to patrimonial property? It
contends that the subject property cannot be could be. But this Court has already said, in Ignacio v.
considered an extension of the old Luneta because it is The Director of Lands that it is only the executive and
outside of the limits of the old Luneta when extended possibly the legislative department that has the
to the sea. This is a strained interpretation of the term authority and the power to make the declaration that
"extension," for an "extension" it has been held, said Property is no longer required for public use, and
"signifies enlargement in any direction-in length, until such declaration is made the property must
breadth, or circumstances. continue to form part of the public domain.
- Thirdly, the reclaimed area was formerly a part of the In the case at bar, there has been no such explicit or
Manila Bay. A bay is nothing more than an inlet of the unequivocal declaration. It should be noted that courts
sea. Pursuant to Article 1 of the Law of Waters of 1866, are undoubtedly not primarily called upon, and are not
bays, roadsteads, coast sea, inlets and shores are parts in a position, to determine whether any public land is
of the national domain open to public use. These are still needed for the purposes specified in Article 4 of the
also property of public ownership devoted to public Law of Waters.
use, according to Article 339 of the Civil Code of Spain.
When the shore or part of the bay is reclaimed, it does 2. NO. Ratio The Government is never estopped by
not lose its character of being property for public use. mistakes or errors on the part of its agents and estoppel
- Fourthly, Act 1360, as amended, authorized the lease does not apply to a municipal corporation to validate a
or sale of the northern portion of the reclaimed area as contract that is prohibited by law or its against public
a hotel site. The subject property is not that northern policy. Reasoning The sale of July 13, 1911 executed by
portion authorized to be leased or sold; the subject the City of Manila to Manila Lodge was certainly a
property is the southern portion. Hence, applying the contract prohibited by law. Estoppel cannot be urged
rule of expresio unius est exlusio alterius, the City of even if the City of Manila accepted the benefits of such
Manila was not authorized to sell the subject property. contract of sale and the Manila Lodge No. 761 had
The application of this principle of statutory performed its part of the agreement, for to apply the
construction becomes the more imperative in the case doctrine of estoppel against the City of Manila in this
at bar inasmuch as not only must the public grant of the case would be tantamount to enabling it to do indirectly
reclaimed area to the City of Manila be, as above what it could not do directly. The sale of the subject
stated, strictly construed against the City of Manila, but property executed by the City of Manila to the Manila
also because a grant of power to a municipal Lodge No. 761, BPOE, was void and inexistent for lack of
corporation, as happens in this case where the city is subject matter. [a park is outside the commerce of man]
authorized to lease or sell the northern portion of the It suffered from an incurable defect that could not be
Luneta extension, is strictly limited to such as are ratified either by lapse of time or by express ratification.
expressly or impliedly authorized or necessarily The Manila Lodge No. 761 therefore acquired no right
incidental to the objectives of the corporation. by virtue of the said sale. Hence to consider now the
14
contract inexistent as it always has been, cannot be an a building constructed on a portion of said government
impairment of the obligations of contracts, for there land. In November that same year, a part thereof was
was in contemplation of law, no contract at all. The occupied by Andok's Litson Corporation and Marites'
inexistence of said sale can be set up against anyone Carinderia.
who asserts a right arising from it, not only against the
first vendee, the Manila Lodge No. 761, BPOE, but also In 1993, by means of a Deed of Exchange of Real
against all its Successors, including the TDC, which are Property, Villarico acquired a 74.30 square meter
not protected by law. The doctrine of bone fide portion of the same area owned by the government.
purchaser without notice, being claimed by the TDC, The property was registered in his name as T.C.T. No.
does not apply where there is a total absence of title in 74430 in the Registry of Deeds of Parañaque City.
the vendor, and the good faith of the purchaser TDC
cannot create title where none exists. The restoration In 1995, Villarico filed with the RTC a complaint for
or restitution of what has been given is in order. accion publiciana against respondents. He alleged inter
alia that respondents' structures on the government
3. NO. We have shown in our discussion of the first land closed his "right of way" to the Ninoy Aquino
issue that the decision of the trial court is fully in Avenue; and encroached on a portion of his lot covered
accordance with law. It follows that when such decision by T.C.T. No. 74430.
was affirmed by the CA, the affirmance was likewise in
accordance with law. Hence, no useful purpose will be ISSUE
served in further discussing this issue. Whether or not Villarico has a right of way to the NAA

Disposition The petitions are denied for lack of merit HELD

and the decision of the CA is affirmed, at petitioners' It is not disputed that the lot on which petitioner's
cost. alleged "right of way" exists belongs to the state or
property of public dominion. Property of public
Villarico v. Sarmiento dominion is defined by Article 420 of the Civil Code as
442 SCRA 110, 115 2004 follows:

FACTS "ART. 420. The following things are property of public

dominion:
Teofilo C. Villarico is the owner of a lot in La Huerta, (1) Those intended for public use such as roads, canals,
Parañaque City, Metro Manila with an area of 66 square rivers, torrents, ports and bridges constructed by the
meters and covered by Transfer Certificate of Title State, banks, shores, roadsteads, and other of similar
(T.C.T.) No. 95453 issued by the Registry of Deeds, same character.
city. (2) Those which belong to the State, without being for
public use, and are intended for some public service or
Villarico’s lot is separated from the Ninoy Aquino for the development of the national wealth."
Avenue (highway) by a strip of land belonging to the
government. As this highway was elevated by 4 meters Public use is "use that is not confined to privileged
and therefore higher than the adjoining areas, the individuals, but is open to the indefinite public."6
DPWH constructed stairways at several portions of this Records show that the lot on which the stairways were
strip of public land to enable the people to have access built is for the use of the people as passageway to the
to the highway. highway. Consequently, it is a property of public
dominion.
Sometime in 1991, Vivencio Sarmiento, his daughter
Bessie Sarmiento and her husband Beth Del Mundo had
15
Property of public dominion is outside the commerce of
man and hence it: (1) cannot be alienated or leased or
otherwise be the subject matter of contracts; (2) cannot
be acquired by prescription against the State; (3) is not
subject to attachment and execution; and (4) cannot be
burdened by any voluntary easement.

Considering that the lot on which the stairways were

constructed is a property of public dominion, it can not
be burdened by a voluntary easement of right of way in
favor of Villarico. In fact, its use by the public is by mere
tolerance of the government through the DPWH.
Villarico cannot appropriate it for himself. Verily, he can
not claim any right of possession over it. This is clear
from Article 530 of the Civil Code which provides:
"ART. 530. Only things and rights which are susceptible
of being appropriated may be the object of possession."

16