Aristotle: from Politics, c.

340 BCE
Ideas to Consider:
1. View of man in nature
2. Necessity, purpose, and formation of govt.
3. Best form of govt.
4. Limitations on govt.
Book I:
Our purpose is to consider what form of political community is best of all for those who are most
able to realize their ideal of life. Three alternatives are conceivable: The members of a state
must either have (1) all things or (2) nothing in common, or (3) some things in common and
some not. That they should have nothing in common is clearly impossible, for the constitution is
a community, and must at any rate have a common place---one city will be in one place, and the
citizens are those who share in that one city. But should a well ordered state have all things, as
far as may be, in common, or some only and not others? For the citizens might conceivably
have wives and children and property in common, as Socrates proposes in the Republic of
Plato. Which is better, our present condition, or the proposed new order of society?
Should the citizens of the perfect state have their possessions in common or not? Three cases
are possible: (1) the soil may be appropriated, but the produce may be thrown for consumption
into the common stock; this is the practice of some nations. Or (2), the soil may be common,
and may be cultivated in common, but the produce divided among individuals for their private
use; this is a form of common property which is said to exist among certain barbarians. Or the
soil and the produce may be alike common. When the farmers are not the owners, the case will
be different and easier to deal with; but when they till the ground for themselves the question of
ownership will give a world of trouble. If they do not share equally enjoyments and toils, those
who labor much and get little will necessarily complain of those who labor little and receive or
consume much. These are only some of the disadvantages which attend the community of
property; the present arrangement, if improved as it might be by good customs and laws, would
be far better.
Property should be in a certain sense common, but, as a general rule, private; for, when
everyone has a distinct interest, men will not complain of one another, and they will make more
progress, because every one will be attending to his own business. And yet by reason of
goodness, and in respect of use, 'Friends,' as the proverb says, "will have all things common."
Even now there are traces. For, although every man has his own property, some things he will
place at the disposal of his friends, while of others he shares the use with them. Again, how
immeasurably greater is the pleasure, when a man feels a thing to be his own; for surely the
love of self is a feeling implanted by nature and not given in vain, although selfishness is rightly
censured. No one, when men have all things in common, will any longer set an example of
liberality or do any liberal action; for liberality consists in the use which is made of property.
Such legislation may have a specious appearance of benevolence; men readily listen to it, and
are easily induced to believe that in some wonderful manner everybody will become
everybody's friend, especially when some one is heard denouncing the evils now existing in
states, suits about contracts, convictions for perjury, flatteries of rich men and the like, which are
said to arise out of the possession of private property. These evils, however, are due to a very
different cause---the wickedness of human nature.
Book III:
He who would inquire into the essence and attributes of various kinds of governments must first
of all determine "What is a state?" A state is composite, like any other whole made up of many
parts; these are the citizens, who compose it. It is evident, therefore, that we must begin by
asking, who is the citizen, and what is the meaning of the term? For here again there may be a
difference of opinion. He who is a citizen in a democracy will often not be a citizen in an
oligarchy. Leaving out of consideration those who have been made citizens, or who have
obtained the name of citizen any other accidental manner, we may say, first, that a citizen is not
a citizen because he lives in a certain place, for resident aliens and slaves share in the place;
nor is he a citizen who has no legal right except that of suing and being sued; for this right may
be enjoyed under the provisions of a treaty. But the citizen whom we are seeking to define is a
citizen in the strictest sense, against whom no such exception can be taken, and his special
characteristic is that he shares in the administration of justice, and in offices. He who has the
power to take part in the deliberative or judicial administration of any state is said by us to be a
citizens of that state; and, speaking generally, a state is a body of citizens sufficing for the
purposes of life.
Like the sailor, the citizen is a member of a community. Now, sailors have different functions, for
one of them is a rower, another a pilot, and a third a look-out man...Similarly, one citizen differs
from another, but the salvation of the community is the common business of them all. This
community is the constitution; the virtue of the citizen must therefore be relative to the
constitution of which he is a member. A constitution is the arrangement of magistracies in a
state, especially of the highest of all. The government is everywhere sovereign in the state, and
the constitution is in fact the government. For example, in democracies the people are supreme,
but in oligarchies, the few; and, therefore, we say that these two forms of government also are
different: and so in other cases.
First, let us consider what is the purpose of a state, and how many forms of government there
are by which human society is regulated. We have already said, in the first part of this treatise,
when discussing household management and the rule of a master, that man is by nature a
political animal. And therefore, men, even when they do not require one another's help, desire
to live together; not but that they are also brought together by their common interests in
proportion as they severally attain to any measure of well-being. This is certainly the chief end,
both of individuals and of states. And also for the sake of mere life (in which there is possibly
some noble element so long as the evils of existence do not greatly overbalance the good)
mankind meet together and maintain the political community....
The words constitution and government have the same meaning, and the government, which is
the supreme authority in states, must be in the hands of one, or of a few, or of the many. The
true forms of government, therefore, are those in which the one, or the few, or the many, govern
with a view to the common interest; but governments which rule with a view to the private
interest, whether of the one or of the few, or of the many, are perversions. Of forms of
government in which one rules, we call that which regards the common interests, monarchy;
that in which more than one, but not many, rule, aristocracy (and it is so called, either because
the rulers are the best men, or because they have at heart the best interests of the state and of
the citizens). But when the citizens at large administer the state for the common interest, the
government is called a polity. And there is a reason for this use of language.
Of the above-mentioned forms, the perversions are as follows: of monarchy, tyranny; of
aristocracy, oligarchy; of polity, democracy. For tyranny is a kind of monarchy which has in view
the interest of the monarch only; oligarchy has in view the interest of the wealthy; democracy, of
the needy: none of them the common good of all. Tyranny, as I was saying, is monarchy
exercising the rule of a master over the political society; oligarchy is when men of property have
the government in their hands; democracy, the opposite, when the indigent, and not the men of
property, are the rulers....Then ought the good to rule and have supreme power? But in that
case everybody else, being excluded from power, will be dishonored. For the offices of a state
are posts of honor; and if one set of men always holds them, the rest must be deprived of them.
Then will it be well that the one best man should rule? Nay, that is still more oligarchical, for the
number of those who are dishonored is thereby increased....The discussion of the first question
shows nothing so clearly as that laws, when good, should be supreme; and that the magistrate
or magistrates should regulate those matters only on which the laws are unable to speak with
precision owing to the difficulty of any general principle embracing all particulars.
 Book VII:
Now it is evident that the form of government is best in which every man, whoever he is, can act
best and live happily....If we are right in our view, and happiness is assumed to be virtuous
activity, the active life will be the best, both for every city collectively, and for individuals. In what
remains the first point to be considered is what should be the conditions of the ideal or perfect
state; for the perfect state cannot exist without a due supply of the means of life...In size and
extent it should be such as may enable the inhabitants to live at once temperately and liberally
in the enjoyment of leisure. And so states require property, but property, even though living
beings are included in it, is no part of a state; for a state is not a community of living beings only,
but a community of equals, aiming at the best life possible.
Let us then enumerate the functions of a state, and we shall easily elicit what we want: First,
there must be food; secondly, arts, for life requires many instruments; thirdly, there must be
arms, for the members of a community have need of them, and in their own hands, too, in order
to maintain authority both against disobedient subjects and against external assailants; fourthly,
there must be a certain amount of revenue, both for internal needs, and for the purposes of war;
fifthly, or rather first, there must be a care of religion which is commonly called worship; sixthly,
and most necessary of all there must be a power of deciding what is for the public interest, and
what is just in men's dealings with one another. These are the services which every state may
be said to need. For a state is not a mere aggregate of persons, but a union of them sufficing for
the purposes of life; and if any of these things be wanting, it is as we maintain impossible that
the community can be absolutely self-sufficing. A state then should be framed with a view to the
fulfillment of these functions. There must be farmers to procure food, and artisans, and a warlike
and a wealthy class, and priests, and judges to decide what is necessary and expedient.
Now, since we are here speaking of the best form of government, i.e., that under which the state
will be most happy (and happiness, as has been already said, cannot exist without virtue), it
clearly follows that in the state which is best governed and possesses men who are just
absolutely, and not merely relatively to the principle of the constitution, the citizens must not
lead the life of mechanics or tradesmen, for such a life is ignoble, and inimical to virtue. Neither
must they be farmers, since leisure is necessary both for the development of virtue and the
performance of political duties. Again, there is in a state a class of warriors, and another of
councillors, who advise about the expedient and determine matters of law, and these seem in
an especial manner parts of a state. Now, should these two classes be distinguished, or are
both functions to be assigned to the same persons? It remains therefore that both functions
should be entrusted by the ideal constitution to the same persons, not, however, at the same
time, but in the order prescribed by nature, who has given to young men strength and to older
men wisdom. Besides, the ruling class should be the owners of property, for they are citizens,
and the citizens of a state should be in good circumstances; whereas mechanics or any other
class which is not a producer of virtue have no share in the state.
Since every political society is composed of rulers and subjects let us consider whether the
relations of one to the other should interchange or be permanent. For the education of the
citizens will necessarily vary with the answer given to this question. Now, if some men excelled
others in the same degree in which gods and heroes are supposed to excel mankind in general,
so that the superiority of the governors was undisputed and patent to their subjects, it would
clearly be better that the one class should rule and the other serve. But since this is
unattainable, and kings have no marked superiority over their subjects, such as Scylax affirms
to be found among the Indians, it is obviously necessary on many grounds that all the citizens
alike should take their turn of governing and being governed. Equality consists in the same
treatment of similar persons, and no government can stand which is not founded upon justice....
We conclude that from one point of view governors and governed are identical, and from
another different. And therefore their education must be the same and also different. For he who
would learn to command well must, as men say, first of all learn to obey....Since the end of
individuals and of states is the same, the end of the best man and of the best constitution must
also be the same; it is therefore evident that there ought to exist in both of them the virtues of
leisure; for peace, as has been often repeated, is the end of war, and leisure of toil. But leisure
and cultivation may be promoted, not only by those virtues which are practiced in leisure, but
also by some of those which are useful to business. For many necessaries of life have to be
supplied before we can have leisure. Therefore a city must be temperate and brave, and able to
endure: for truly, as the proverb says, "There is no leisure for slaves," and those who cannot
face danger like men are the slaves of any invader.
Since the legislator should begin by considering how the frames of the children whom he is
rearing may be as good as possible, his first care will be about marriage---at what age should
his citizens marry, and who are fit to marry? The union of male and female when too young is
bad for the procreation of children; it also conduces to temperance not to marry too soon; for
women who marry early are apt to be wanton; and in men too the bodily frame is stunted if they
marry while the seed is growing (for there is a time when the growth of the seed, also, ceases,
or continues to but a slight extent). Women should marry when they are about eighteen years of
age, and men at seven and thirty; then they are in the prime of life, and the decline in the
powers of both will coincide. The constitution of an athlete is not suited to the life of a citizen, or
to health, or to the procreation of children, any more than the valetudinarian or exhausted
constitution, but one which is in a mean between them. A man's constitution should be inured to
labor, but not to labor which is excessive or of one sort only, such as is practiced by athletes; he
should be capable of all the actions of a freeman. These remarks apply equally to both parents.
Women who are with child should be careful of themselves; they should take exercise and have
a nourishing diet. Their minds, however, unlike their bodies, they ought to keep quiet, for the
offspring derive their natures from their mothers as plants do from the earth. As to adultery, let it
be held disgraceful, in general, for any man or woman to be found in any way unfaithful when
they are married, and called husband and wife.
As to the exposure and rearing of children, let there be a law that no deformed child shall live,
but that on the ground of an excess in the number of children, if the established customs of the
state forbid this (for in our state population has a limit), no child is to be exposed, but when
couples have children in excess, let abortion be procured before sense and life have begun.
The Directors of Education, as they are termed, should be careful what tales or stories the
children hear, for all such things are designed to prepare the way for the business of later life,
and should be for the most part imitations of the occupations which they will hereafter pursue in
earnest. Indeed, there is nothing which the legislator should be more careful to drive away than
indecency of speech; for the light utterance of shameful words leads soon to shameful actions.
The young especially should never be allowed to repeat or hear anything of the sort. And since
we do not allow improper language, clearly we should also banish pictures or speeches from the
stage which are indecent. Let the rulers take care that there be no image or picture representing
unseemly actions, except in the temples of those Gods at whose festivals the law permits even
ribaldry, and whom the law also permits to be worshiped by persons of mature age on behalf of
themselves, their children, and their wives. And therefore youth should be kept strangers to all
that is bad, and especially to things which suggest vice or hate.
Book VIII:
The citizen should be molded to suit the form of government under which he lives. And since the
whole city has one end, it is manifest that education should be one and the same for all, and
that it should be public, and not private. Neither must we suppose that any one of the citizens
belongs to himself, for they all belong to the state, and are each of them a part of the state, and
the care of each part is inseparable from the care of the whole. The customary branches of
education are in number four; they are---(1) reading and writing, (2) gymnastic exercises, (3)
music, to which is sometimes added (4) drawing. Of these, reading and writing and drawing are
regarded as useful for the purposes of life in a variety of ways, and gymnastic exercises are
thought to infuse courage. Concerning music a doubt may be raised.---in our own day most men
cultivate it for the sake of pleasure, but originally it was included in education, because nature
herself, as has been often said, requires that we should be able, not only to work well, but to
use leisure well; for, what ought we to do when at leisure? Clearly we ought not to be amusing
ourselves, for then amusement would be the end of life. But if this is inconceivable, we should
introduce amusements only at suitable times, and they should be our medicines, for the emotion
which they create in the soul is a relaxation, and from the pleasure we obtain rest.....

In this except from Politics, Aristotle analyzed what constitution was best and the nature of the
political community and the polis. He concluded that power should rest in the hands of the
middle-class.
In all states there are three sections of the community—the very well-off, the very badly-off, and
those in between. Seeing therefore that it is agreed that moderation and a middle position are
best, it is clear that in the matter of possessions to own a middling amount is best of all. This
condition is most obedient to reason, and following reason is just what is difficult both for the
exceedingly rich, handsome, strong, and well-born, and for the downtrodden. The former
commits deeds of violence on a large scale, the latter are delinquent and wicked in petty ways.
The misdeeds of the one class are due to [pride], the misdeeds of the other to rascality….
It is clear then that the political partnership which operates through the middle class is best, and
also that those cities have every chance of being well-governed in which the middle class is
large, stronger if possible than the other two together, or at any rate stronger than one of them.
… For this reason, it is a happy state of affairs when those who take part in the life of the state
have a moderate but adequate amount of property; for where one set of people possesses a
great deal and the other nothing, the result is either extreme democracy or a tyranny due to the
excesses of the other two….
The superiority of the middle type of constitution is clear also from the fact that it alone is free
from fighting among factions. Where the middle element is large, there least of all arise faction
and counter-faction among citizens. And for the same reason the larger states are free from
danger of spitting; they are strong in the middle. … Democracies too are safer than oligarchies
in this respect and longer lasting thanks to their middle class, which is always more numerous
and more politically important in democracies than in oligarchies.
From these considerations it is evident that the polis belongs to the class of things that exist by
nature, and that man is by nature an animal intended to live in a polis. He who is without a polis,
by reason of his own nature and not some accident, is either a poor sort of being, or a being
higher than man: he is the man of whom Homer wrote in denunciation: “Clanless and lawless
and hearthless is he.” The man who is such by nature [i.e., unable to join in the society of the
polis] at once plunges into a passion for war; he is in the position of a solitary advanced piece in
a game of [chess].
The reason why man is a being meant for political association, in a higher degree than bees or
other gregarious animals can ever associate, is evident. Nature, according to our theory, makes
nothing in vain; and man alone of the animals is furnished with the faculty of language. The
mere making of sounds serves to indicate pleasure and pain, is thus a faculty that belongs to
animals in general: their nature enables them to attain the point at which they have perceptions
of pleasure and pain, and can signify those perceptions to one another. But language serves to
declare what is advantageous and what is the reverse, and it therefore serves to declare what is
just and what is unjust. It is the peculiarity of man, in comparison with the rest of the animal
world, that he alone possesses a perception of good and evil, of the just and unjust, and of other
similar qualities; and it is association in [common perception of] these things which makes a
family a polis.
We now proceed to add that [though the individual and the family are prior in the order of time]
the polis is prior in the order of nature to the family and the individual.
Source: From: Thatcher, ed., Vol. II: The Greek World, pp. 364-382; The Politics of Aristotle, trans.
Benjamin Jowett, (New York: Colonial Press, 1900)