ARTICLE VI

THE LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT

Section 1. The legislative power shall be vested in the Congress of the Philippines which shall consist
of a Senate and a House of Representatives, except to the extent reserved to the people by the
provision on initiative and referendum.

Section 2. The Senate shall be composed of twenty-four Senators who shall be elected at large by
the qualified voters of the Philippines, as may be provided by law.
1. G A R C I A VS C O M E L E C

FACTS:

In its Pambayang Kapasyahan Blg. 10, Serye 1993, the Sangguniang Bayan ng
Morong, Bataan agreed to the inclusion of the municipality of Morong as
part of the Subic Special Economic Zone in accord with Republic Act No.
7227. On May 24, 1993, petitioners filed a petition with the Sangguniang
Bayan of Morong to annul Pambayang Kapasyahan Blg. 10, Serye 1993. And
thus the respondents request to deny the petition for a local initiative
and referendum because the issues raised will just promote DIVISIVENESS,
COUNTER PRODUCTIVE and FUTILITY.

ISSUES RAISED BY PROBONENTS ACTIONS UNDERTAKEN BY THE SB OF

MORONG
I. Pawalang-bisa ang Pambayang I. By virtue of R.A. 7227,
Kapasyahan Blg. 10,Serye ng otherwise known as the
taong 1993. Bases Conversion
II. Palitan ito ng isang Development Act of 1992,
Kapasyahang Pag-anib sa SSEZ all actions of LGU’s
kung: correlating on the above
a. Ibabalik sa Morong ang issues are merely
pag-aaring Grande Island, recommendatory in nature
kabundukan at Naval when such provisions were
Reservation; already embodied in the
statute.
b. Ibase sa aring lupa ng LGU II. Corollary to the motion,
ang kikitain at mapapasok the Sangguniang Bayan of
na manggagawa nila sa Morong passed and approved
SSEZ; Pambayang Kapasyahan Blg.
18, Serye 1993, requesting
Congress of the
Philippines to amend
certain provisions of R.A.
7227,wherein it reasserted
its position embodied in
Pambayang Kapasyahan Blg.
08 and Blg. 12, Serye ng
taong 1992, (Attached and
marked as Annex “A”) which
tackled thesame issues
raised by the petitioners
particularly items a),b),
c), e), and g).
 c. Isama ang nasabing lupa sa
pagkukuwenta ng ‘IRA’ ng
Morong, Hermosa at
Dinalupihan;

d. Makapagtatag ng sariling III. Item d) is already acted

‘economic zones’ ang upon by BCDA Chairman
Morong, Hermosa at Arsenio Bartolome III in
Dinalupihan; its letter to His
Excellency President Fidel
V. Ramos, dated May 7,
1993 with clarifying
letter from BCDA Vice-
Chairman Rogelio L.
Singson regarding lands on
Mabayo and Minanga dated
June 3, 1993 that only
lands insidethe perimeter
fence are envisioned to be
part of SBMA.
e. Makapagtatag ng sariling
‘economic zones’ ang
Morong, Hermosa at
Dinalupihan;

f. Pabayaang bukas ang pinto IV. Item f), President Ramos

ng Morong patungong SSEZ in his marginal note over
at magbukas ng dalawang the letter request of
(2) pinto pa; Morong, Bataan Mayor
Bienvenido L. Vicedo, the
Sangguniang Bayan and
Congressman Payumo, when
the Resolution of
Concurrence to SBMA was
submitted last April 6,
1993, order the priority
implementation of
completion of Morong-
Dinalupihan (Tasik-Road)
Project, including the
Morong-Poblacion- Mabayo
Road to DPWH.
g. Konkretohin ang daang
Morong papunta sa Orani
atDinalupihan;

h. Pumili ng SBMA Chairman na

taga-ibang lugar.

On July 6, 1993, the COMELEC en banc deny the petition for local initiative
ON THE GROUND THAT ITS SUBJECT IS MERELY A RESOLTION and NOT AN OrDINANCE. Hence
this petition for certiorari.

ISSUE:
(1) Whether or not Pambayang Kapasyahan Blg. 10, serye 1993 of the
Sangguniang Bayan of Morong, Bataan is the proper subject for initiative.
HELD:
The Court grant the petition. The case at bench is of transcendental
significance because it involves an issue of first impression— delineating
the extent of the all important original power of the people to legislate.
Father Bernas explains that “in republican systems, there are generally
two kinds of legislative power, original and derivative. Original
legislative power is possessed by the sovereign people. Derivative
legislative power is that which has been delegated by the sovereign people
to legislative bodies and is subordinate to the original power of the
people.”
Our constitutional odyssey shows that up until 1987, our people have
not directly exercised legislative power, both the constituent power to
amend or revise the Constitution and the power to enact ordinary laws.
Section 1, Article VI of the 1935 Constitution delegated legislative power
to Congress, thus “the legislative power shall be vested in a Congress of
the Philippines, which shall consist of a Senate and a House of
Representatives.” Similarly, Section 1, Article VIII of the 1973
Constitution, as amended, provided that “the Legislative power shall be
vested in a Batasang Pambansa.”
As per the issue, We reject respondents’ narrow and literal reading
of the above provision for it will collide with the Constitution and will
subvert the intent of the lawmakers in enacting the provisions of the
Local Government Code of 1991 on initiative and referendum.
The Constitution clearly includes not only ordinances but resolutions
as appropriate subjects of a local initiative. Section 32 of Article VI
provides in luminous language: “The Congress shall, as early as possible,
provide for a system of initiative and referendum, and the exceptions
therefrom, whereby the people can directly propose and enact laws or
approve or reject any act or law or part thereof passed by the Congress,
or local legislative body.
Furthermore, on the period of interpellation in the Congress, Mr.
Albano clearly state that municipal resolutions are also subject for
initiative and referendum.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petition is GRANTED and COMELEC Resolution 93-
1623 dated July 6, 1993 and Resolution 93-1676 dated July 13, 1993 are
ANNULLED and SET ASIDE.

SUBIC BAY METROPOLITAN AUTHORITY vs. COMELEC

FACTS:

On March 13, 1992, Congress enacted RA. 7227 (The Bases Conversion and Development Act of 1992), which created
the Subic Economic Zone. RA 7227 likewise created SBMA to implement the declared national policy of converting the
Subic military reservation into alternative productive uses.

On November 24, 1992, the American navy turned over the Subic military reservation to the Philippines government.
Immediately, petitioner commenced the implementation of its task, particularly the preservation of the sea-ports, airport,
buildings, houses and other installations left by the American navy.

On April 1993, the Sangguniang Bayan of Morong, Bataan passed Pambayang Kapasyahan Bilang 10, Serye 1993,
expressing therein its absolute concurrence, as required by said Sec. 12 of RA 7227, to join the Subic Special Economic
Zone and submitted such to the Office of the President.
On May 24, 1993, respondents Garcia filed a petition with the Sangguniang Bayan of Morong. The petitions are the
following:

a) to nullify Pambayang Kapasyang Blg. 10 for Morong to join the Subic Special Economic Zone,

b) to allow Morong to join provided conditions are met.

The Sangguniang Bayan ng Morong acted upon the petition by promulgating Pambayang Kapasyahan Blg. 18, Serye
1993, requesting Congress of the Philippines to amend certain provisions of RA 7227.

Not satisfied, respondents resorted to their power initiative under the LGC of 1991.

On July 6, 1993, COMELEC denied the petition for local initiative on the ground that the subject thereof was merely a
resolution and not an ordinance.

On February 1, 1995, the President issued Proclamation No. 532 defining the metes and bounds of the SSEZ including
therein the portion of the former naval base within the territorial jurisdiction of the Municipality of Morong.

On June 18, 19956, respondent Comelec issued Resolution No. 2845 and 2848, adopting a "Calendar of Activities for
local referendum and providing for the rules and guidelines to govern the conduct of the referendum.”

On July 10, 1996, SBMA instituted a petition for certiorari contesting the validity of Resolution No. 2848 alleging that
public respondent is intent on proceeding with a local initiative that proposes an amendment of a national law.

ISSUE:

 Whether or not the respondent COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in promulgating and
implementing Resolution No. 2848.

HELD:

 YES. COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion.

The process started by private respondents was an INITIATIVE but respondent Comelec made preparations for a
REFERENDUM only. In fact, the word "referendum" in the resolution is repeated at least 27 times,
but "initiative" is not mentioned at all. The Comelec labeled the exercise as a "Referendum"; the counting of
votes was entrusted to a "Referendum Committee"; the documents were called "referendum returns"; the
canvassers, "Referendum Board of Canvassers" and the ballots themselves bore the description "referendum". To
repeat, not once was the word "initiative" used in said body of Resolution No. 2848. And yet, this exercise is
unquestionably an INITIATIVE. As defined, initiative is the power of the people to propose bills and laws, and to
enact or reject them at the polls independent of the legislative assembly. On the other hand, referendum is the
right reserved to the people to adopt or reject any act or measure which has been passed by a legislative body and
which in most cases would without action on the part of electors become a law. In initiative and referendum,
the Comelec exercises administration and supervision of the process itself, akin to its powers over the conduct
of elections.

These law-making powers belong to the people, hence, the respondent Commission cannot control or change the
substance or the content of legislation. In the exercise of its authority, it may (in fact it should have done so already)
issue relevant and adequate guidelines and rules for the orderly exercise of these “people-power” features of our
Constitution.

Section 3. No person shall be a Senator unless he is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines and, on
the day of the election, is at least thirty-five years of age, able to read and write, a registered voter,
and a resident of the Philippines for not less than two years immediately preceding the day of the
election.

SJS vs. Dangerous Drugs Board and PDEA

Facts: Before the court are three consolidated petitions assailing the constitutionality of Section 36 of R.A.
9165 or the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002.

According to Aquilino Q. Pimintel, Jr., filed a petition for Certiorari and prohibition under Rule 65. in it he
seeks to nullify Sec.36(g) for being unconstitutional because they impose a qualification for candidates for
senators in addition to those already provided by the Constitution. He adds that there is no provision in the
Constitution authorizing the Congress or the COMELEC to expand the requirements of candidates for senator.

Meanwhile, Social Justice Society (SJS) a registered political party contends that Section 36 c,d,f and g are
unconstitutional as it constitutes undue delegation of legislative power when they unbridled discretion to
schools and employers to determine the manner of drug testing the provisions trench in the equal protection
clause as they can be used to harass a student or an employee deemed undesirable.

Lastly, petitioner Atty. Manuel J. Laserna, Jr., also seeks in his petition for certiorari and prohibition under
Rule 65 that Sec. C,d,f and g of RA 9165 be struck down for it infringes the Constitutional right to privacy , the
right against self-incrimination and for being contrary to the due process and equal protection guarantees.

Issue: whether or not Section 36 c,d,f and g are unconstitutional

Ruling: Section 36 f and g are unconstitutional. Pimintel’s contention that Sec 36 (g) should be declared
unconstitutional is well taken. It is basic that if a law or an administration rule violates any norm of the
Constitution, that issuance is null and void and has no effect. The Constitution is the basic law to which all laws
must conform. While Sec 36 (f) should be declared unconstitutional because the Court finds no valid
justification for mandatory drug testing for person accused of crimes because drug testing in this case would
violate a persons’ right to privacy guaranteed under Sec 2, Art 3 of the Constitution. Worse still, the accused
persons are veritably forced to incriminate themselves.

In the case of students, the constitutional viability of the mandatory, random and suspicionless drug testing
from students emanates primarily from the waiver by the students of their right to privacy when they seek
entry to the school andfrom their voluntarily submitting their persons to theparental authority of school
authorities.

In the case of private and public employee, the constitutional soundness of the mandatory, random and
suspicionless drug testing proceeds from reasonableness of the drug test policy and requirement .

Section 4. The term of office of the Senators shall be six years and shall commence, unless otherwise
provided by law, at noon on the thirtieth day of June next following their election. No Senator shall
serve for more than two consecutive terms. Voluntary renunciation of the office for any length of time
shall not be considered as an interruption in the continuity of his service for the full term of which he
was elected.

Borja V. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and CAPCO, JR

Facts:

Private respondent Jose T. Capco, Jr. was elected vice-mayor of Pateros on January 18, 1988 for a term
ending June 30, 1992. On September 2, 1989, he succeeded as mayor upon the death of Cesar Borja, the
incumbent. On May 11, 1992, he ran and was elected and was [Link] mayor. Summing up, he served for
two term, 1992-1995 & 1995-1998, after he had succeeded as mayor.
On March 27, 1998, private respondent Capco filed a certificate of candidacy for mayor of Pateros for May
1998 elections. Petitioner Benjamin U. Borja, Jr., who was also a candidate for mayor, sought Capcos
disqualification on the grounds that the latter have already served as mayor for three consecutive terms by June
30, 1998 and which should make him ineligible to be a candidate for the same public office.
On April 30, 1998, the Second Division of the Commission on Elections ruled in favor of petitioner and
declared private respondent Capco disqualified from running for reelection as mayor of Pateros. However, on
motion of private respondent, the COMELEC en banc, ruled in favor of Capco, qualifying him to run for mayor
on the said election.

ISSUE:
Whether or not a term granted by operation of law is counted as a one whole term

HELD:
No. The court upheld that the three – term limit refers to the term of office for which the local official was
elected. With referral to Article X Section 8 which provides:
The term of elective officials, except barangay officials, which shall be determined by law, shall be three
years and no such official shall serve for more than three consecutive terms. Voluntary renunciation of the
office for any length of time shall not be considered asn interruption in the continuity of his service for the full
term which he was elected
The court emphasized that Capco’s Mayoral position at the first instance was merely by operation of law
upon the death of the incumbent. This cleared that he was not elected for that position, thus, it should not be
counted as one term. Therefore, the private respondent is eligible to serve and perform his functions prescribed
by the same public office.
To add, Article X Sec. 8 of the Constitution was enacted for the following objectives: (1) To prevent
establishment of political dynasties, (2) to enhance the freedom of choice of the people. Capco was held to be
eligible with the understanding of the Constitutional Commission that while the people should be protected
from evils that a monopoly of political power may bring about, care should be taken that their freedom of
choice is not duly curtailed.
Section 5. (1) The House of Representatives shall be composed of not more than two hundred and
fifty members, unless otherwise fixed by law, who shall be elected from legislative districts
apportioned among the provinces, cities, and the Metropolitan Manila area in accordance with the
number of their respective inhabitants, and on the basis of a uniform and progressive ratio, and those
who, as provided by law, shall be elected through a party-list system of registered national, regional,
and sectoral parties or organizations.

(2) The party-list representatives shall constitute twenty per centum of the total number of
representatives including those under the party list. For three consecutive terms after the ratification
of this Constitution, one-half of the seats allocated to party-list representatives shall be filled, as
provided by law, by selection or election from the labor, peasant, urban poor, indigenous cultural
communities, women, youth, and such other sectors as may be provided by law, except the religious
sector.

(3) Each legislative district shall comprise, as far as practicable, contiguous, compact, and adjacent
territory. Each city with a population of at least two hundred fifty thousand, or each province, shall
have at least one representative.

(4) Within three years following the return of every census, the Congress shall make a
reapportionment of legislative districts based on the standards provided in this section.

VETERANS FEDERATION PARTY VS COMELEC

FACTS:

May 11, 1998 - First election for Party-list representation was held. Total of 123 Party-list ran for the said
election. However, on June 26, 1998, Comelec en banc proclaimed 13 partylist (which had at least 2% of the
total votes), then Sept 8 1998 after passing the results, the Philippine Coconut Planters Federation was
entitled for the partylist position too in the HOR for garnering suffiecient votes too. TOTAL OF 14 PARTYLIST.

It became a precedence, other partylist (PAG-ASA) filed petition and therefore was granted by COMELEC 2ND
division as per Omnibus Election code BP811 resolving and granting the petition and motion for intervention
to those similarly situated. Accordingly, another 38 partylist were proclaimed representatives.

ISSUE:

>> IS THE FILLING UP OF 20% MEMBERSHIP IN THE HOR MANDATORY?

(Because of the 3 seat limit RA 7941 mandates = there are only 25 nominees, there should be 52 partylist who
should actually sit in the HOR)

HELD : NO. it is not mandatory. It acts only as a ceiling for the party-list seats in the HOR. The Constitution
vested Congress with the broad power to define and prescribe the mechanics of the party-list system of representatives.
In the exercise of its constitutional prerogative, Congress deemed it necessary to require parties participating in the
system to obtain at least 2% of the total votes cast for the party list system to be entitled to a party-list seat. Congress
wanted to ensure that only those parties having a sufficient number of constituents deserving of representation are
actually represented in Congress.

>> IS THE 2% THRESHOLD REQUIREMENT AND THE 3-SEAT LIMIT PROVIDED IN RA7941 CONSITUTIONAL?

HELD : AFFIRMATIVE.

2% THRESHOLD – Congress wanted to ensure that only those parties, org, and coalitions having a sufficient
number of constitutients deserving of representation are actually represented in Congress.

3-SEAT LIMIT – to promote and encourage a multi-party system of representation.

>> HOW SHOULD THE ADDITIONAL SEATS OF THE PARTY BE DETERMINED?

HELD: A party that wins at least 6% of the total votes cast will be entitled to three seats, another party that
gets 4% shall be entitled to two seats, and 1 that gets 2% shall get one seat only. – PROPORTIONAL
REPRESENTATION.

WHEREFORE, the petitions were partially GRANTED. They only proclaimed 14 sitting party-list representatives
(2 for APEC and 1 each for the remaining 12 qualified parties). The COMELEC committed grave abuse of
discretion in ruling the 38 respondents are each entitled for a seat in the HOR because it violated 2
requirments of RA7941: the 2% threshold and the proportional representation.

BANAT VS. COMELEC

Digest

Note: read Veterans Federation Vs. Comelec first

Facts:

Barangay Association for National Advancement and Transparency (BANAT) filed a Petition to Proclaim
the Full Number of Party list Representatives Provided by the Constitution because the Comelec is bound to
implement the Veterans vs. Comelec ruling and now questions its constitutionality, applying the Panganiban
Formula in allocating party-list seats. Sec 11 of Republic Act no. 7941 (party list system act) provides the
parties, organizations, and coalitions receiving at least two percent (2%) of the total votes cast for the party
list system shall be entitled to one seat each: provided, that those garnering more than two percent of the
votes shall be entitled to additional seats in proportion to their total number of votes: provided finally, that
each party, organization, or coalition shall be entitled to not more than three seats.

May 2007 elections proclaimed 13 parties as winners using Veterans ruling, where in a total of
16,723,121 votes those who garnered atleast 2% of the total votes or 334,462 are the winners and are
guaranteed to have 1 seat. Under the rule BUHAY partylist which garnered the most number of votes
designated as the “first party” and additional vote will follow the formula below. Petitioner contends that in
Section 5, Article VI of the constitution states “party list representatives shall constitute twenty percent of the
total number of representatives including those under the partylist and harmonize it with sec 11 of RA 7941,
petitioners now ask this court for relief of the correct interretation and implementation of RA 7941.

Issue: 1. Whether or not the 20% allocation for party list representation in section 5(2), Art VI of the
constitution is mandatory or merely a ceiling

2. is the 2% threshold prescribed in RA 7941 to qualify for one seat constitutional, How shall the
partylist representative seat be allocated?

3. Can major political parties participate in the party-list elections?

Ruling

The petitions have partial merit. We maintain that a Philippine-style party-list election has at least four
inviolable parameters as clearly stated in Veterans. For easy reference, these are:
 First, the twenty percent allocation — the combined number of all party-list congressmen shall not
exceed twenty percent of the total membership of the House of Representatives, including those
elected under the party list;

Second, the two percent threshold — only those parties garnering a minimum of two percent of the
total valid votes cast for the party-list system are "qualified" to have a seat in the House of
Representatives;

Third, the three-seat limit — each qualified party, regardless of the number of votes it actually
obtained, is entitled to a maximum of three seats; that is, one "qualifying" and two additional seats;

Fourth, proportional representation— the additional seats which a qualified party is entitled to shall be
computed "in proportion to their total number of votes."

However, because the formula in Veterans has flaws in its mathematical interpretation of the term
"proportional representation," the Court is compelled to revisit the formula for the allocation of additional
seats to party-list organizations.

Section 5. (1) The House of Representatives shall be composed of not more than two hundred and fifty
members, unless otherwise fixed by law, xxx

(2) The party-list representatives shall constitute twenty per centum of the total number of representatives
including those under the party-list. xxx

The first paragraph of Section 11 of R.A. No. 7941 reads:

Section 11. Number of Party-List Representatives. — The party-list representatives shall constitute twenty per
centum (20%) of the total number of the members of the House of Representatives including those under the
party-list.

Since the 14th Congress of the philippines has 220 district representatives, there are 55 seats available to party
list representatives.

In matters of seat Allocation

RA 7941 Section 11. Number of Party-List Representatives. — x x x

In determining the allocation of seats for the second vote, the following procedure shall be observed:

(a) The parties, organizations, and coalitions shall be ranked from the highest to the lowest based on the
number of votes they garnered during the elections.

(b) The parties, organizations, and coalitions receiving at least two percent (2%) of the total votes cast for the
party-list system shall be entitled to one seat each: Provided, That those garnering more than two percent
(2%) of the votes shall be entitled to additional seats in proportion to their total number of votes: Provided,
finally, That each party, organization, or coalition shall be entitled to not more than three (3) seats.

The court ruled that the Section 11(b) of RA no. 7941 is unconstitutional, because it is mathematicaly
impossible to achieve the amaximum number of available party list seats, when the available seat exceeds 50.
The court therefore strike down the two percent thresold only for the distribution of additional seats to
present an unwranted obastable to full implementation of Sec 5(2) Article VI of the constitution

In determining the allocation of seats for party-list representatives under Section 11 of R.A. No. 7941, the
following procedure shall be observed:

1. The parties, organizations, and coalitions shall be ranked from the highest to the lowest based on
the number of votes they garnered during the elections.

2. The parties, organizations, and coalitions receiving at least two percent (2%) of the total votes cast
for the party-list system shall be entitled to one guaranteed seat each.

3. Those garnering sufficient number of votes, according to the ranking in paragraph 1, shall be entitled
to additional seats in proportion to their total number of votes until all the additional seats are
allocated.

4. Each party, organization, or coalition shall be entitled to not more than three (3) seats.

In Matters of participation of Major Political Parties in partylist elections

The Constitutional Commission adopted a multi-party system that allowed all political parties to
participate in the party list elections- in the dialogue between the framers they clearly point out the want to
open up the political system to a pluralistic society, they allowed Major Political parties but only through their
sectoral wing. Neither the constitution nor RA No. 7941 prohibits them from participating in the party list
system, however by a vote of 8-7, the court decided to continue the ruling in Veterans disallowing them from
doing so, directly or diretly

G.R. No. 147529 June 26, 2001

ANG BAGONG BAYANI-OFW LABOR PARTY VS COMELEC

Constitutional Provision: Sec. 5, Art. 6

Special Law: RA 7941

FACTS: Onset of 2001 Election, registered parties and organizations filed their respective Manifestations, stating
their intention to participate in the party-list elections. Unfortunately, other parties were denied and also filed
Motion for reconsideration together with their manifestations beyond the deadline. The COMELEC approved the
Manifestations of 151 parties and organizations but denied several in its Omnibus Resolution No. 3785. In the
meantime, Ang Bagong Bayani-OFW Labor Party filed a petition assailing the Comelec Omnibus Resolution No.
3785, and on April 17, 2001, Bayan Muna also filed petition challenging the same the said resolution. The Court
ordered the consolidation of the two petitions and it added that the COMELEC may proceed with the counting
and canvassing of votes cast of the party-list elections, but barred the proclamation of any winner therein, until
further orders of the court.
Petitioners contend that: 1. the “inclusion of political parties in the party-list system is the most objectionable
portion of the questioned resolution” 2. the respondent do not belong to the “marginalized and underrepresented
sector, Hence should be disqualified.
However, OSG submits that the Constitution and RA 7941 allow political parties to participate in party-list
elections. It argues that party-list is open to all “registered national, regional and sectoral parties of org.”, and
claiming even the super-rich and overrepresented can participate in the party-list elections.
ISSUE:
1. WON Political Parties may participate in the party-list elections
2. WON the party-list system is exclusive to “marginalize and underrepresented sectors and organizations.
3. WON Comelec committed grave abuse of discretion in promulgating Omnibus Election No. 3785.
HELD:
1. Yes, Under Constitution and RA 7941, private respondents cannot be disqualified from the party-list
elections, merely on the ground that they are political parties. Pursuant to:
a. Sec 5, Art 6 provides that member of the House of representative may be elected through a party-list
system of registered national, regional, and sectoral parties or organizations.
b. Sec 7 and 8 of Art 9, political parties may be register under the party list system.
c. Sec 2 of RA 7941 also provides for a party-list system of registered national, regional, and sectoral
parties or organizations.
d. Sec 3 of RA 7941 expressly states that a party is either a “political party or a sectoral party or a coalition
of parties”
e. Sec. 11 of RA 7941 leaves no doubt as the participation of political parties in the part-list system.
Therefore, political parties even the major ones-may participate in the party-list elections.

2. The political parties may participate in the party-list elections but it DOES NOT MEAN THAT
“ANY POLITICAL PARTIES OR ORGANIZATIONS OR MATTER MAY DO SO”. The
character of parties must be consistent with the purpose of the party-list system. In RA 7941, it mandates a
state policy of promoting proportional representation by means of Filipino-style party-list system, which
will enable to the election to the House of Rep of Fil. Citizens, 1. Who belong to marginalized and
underrepresented sectors, organizations and parties; and 2. Who lack-well defined constituencies;
but 3. Who could contribute to the formulation and enactment of appropriate legislation that will
benefit the nation as a whole. The key-words in this policy are “proportional representation, marginalized
and underrepresented and lack of well-defined constituencies”.

*Proportional Representation- refers to representation of the marginalized and underrepresented as

exemplified by the enumeration in Sec. 5 of RA 7941 namely, “labor, peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor, indigenous cultural
communities, elderly, handicapped, women, youth, veterans, overseas works and professionals.
*Marginalized and underrepresented- It must factually and truly represent the marginalized and
underrepresented mentioned in Sec. 5 of RA 7941
*Lack of well-defined constituency- refers to the absence of traditionally identifiable electoral group, like
voters of congressional district or territorial unit of government.
In the end, the role of the COMELEC is to see to it that only those Filipinos are “marginalize and
underrepresented” become members of Congress under the party-list system. The marginalize and
underrepresented sectors enumerated in Sec 5 of RA 7941 is not exclusive, it demonstrates the clear intent
of law that not all sectors can be represented under the party-list system. In the case at bar, the OSG claiming
even the super-rich and overrepresented can participate in the party-list elections desecrated the spirit of the party-
list system.
3. Yes, it manifest that COMELEC failed to appreciate fully the clear policy of the law and the Constitution.
What is needed under the present circumstance is the factual determination of whether respondents have
the necessary qualifications to participate in the party-list election pursuant to the Consti and law.
Guidelines for Screening Party-list Participants:
 1. The parties or org. must represent the marginalized and underrepresented in Sec. 5 of RA 7941
2. Political parties who wish to participate must comply with this policy
3. The religious sector may not be represented
4. The party or organization must not be dq under Sec 6 of RA 7941
5. The party or organization must not be an adjunct of or a project organized or an entity funded or assisted
by the gov.
6. Its nominees must likewise comply with the requirements of the law
7. Not only the candidate party or org. must represent marginalized and underrepresented sectors. So also
must its nominees
8. While lacking a well-defined political constituency, the nominee must likewise be able to contribute to the
formulation and enactment of appropriate legislation that will benefit the nation as a whole.
Sema vs COMELEC

G.R. No. 177597 July 16, 2008

Facts:

The Petitioner was a congressional candidate for the legislative district of S. Kabunsuan with the 1 st
district of Cotobato. Later, Sema was vying that Cotabato City should be a separate legislative district
and that votes there should be excluded in the voting. She alleges that under the Constitution, upon
creation of a province (S. Kabunsuan) that province automatically gains a legislative representation
and since S. Kabunsuan excludes Cotabato City.

Cotabato City is part of the province of Maguindanao, while the Province of Maguindanao is part of
ARMM however because Cotabato City voted against its inclusion in a plebiscite held in 1989, it is not
part of ARMM. Maguindanao has two legislative districts: The 1st legislative district comprises of
Cotabato City and 8 other municipalities. And when RA No. 9054 was passed, amending ARMM’s
Organic Act and consigning it with the power to create provinces, municipalities, cities and
barangays. Pursuant to this law, the ARMM Regional Assembly created Shariff Kabunsuan; Muslim
Mindanao Autonomy Act 201, which comprised of the municipalities of the 1 st district of Maguindanao
with the exception of Cotabato City.

For the purposes of the 2007 elections, COMELEC initially stated that the 1st district is now only made
of Cotabato City (because of MMA 201). But it later amended this stating that status quo should be
retained; however, just for the purposes of the elections, the first district should be called Shariff
Kabunsuan with Cotabato City – this is also while awaiting a decisive declaration from Congress as to
Cotabato’s status as a legislative district (or part of any).
Then on May 14, 2007, the petitioner, then candidate—prayed for the nullification of COMELEC
Resolution No. 7902 and the exclusion of the votes cast in Cotabato City. Sema contended that
Shariff Kabunsuan is entitled to one representative in Congress under Section 5 (3), Article VI of the
Constitution and Section 3 of the Ordinance appended to the Constitution and that COMELEC acted
without or in excess of its jurisdiction in issuing Resolution No. 7902, which maintains the status quo
in Maguindanao’s first legislative district despite the former’s prior directive in Resolution no 7902.
Sema further alleged that the COMELEC usurped the Congress’ power in creating legislative districts.

While the Respondent, COMELEC, maintained that the legislative district is still there and that regardless of S.
Kabunsuan being created, the legislative district is not affected and so is its representation

Issue:
Whether or not the ARMM Regional Assembly can create the Province of Shariff Kabunsuan and the
constitutionality of R.A. No. 9054.

Ruling:

There is no provision in the Constitution that conflicts with the delegation to the power of the regional
legislative bodies to create municipalities and barangays, provided Section 10, Article X of the
Constitution is followed. However, the creation of provinces and cities is another matter as provided in
Section 5 (3), Article VI of the Constitution.

A province cannot be created without a legislative district because it will violate Section 5 (3), Article
VI of the Constitution as well as Section 3 of the Ordinance appended to the Constitution.
Subsequently, it was held that COMELEC Resolution No. 7902, preserving the geographic and
legislative district of the First District of Maguindanao with Cotabato City, is valid as it merely complies
with Section 5 of Article VI and Section 20 of Article X of the Constitution.

WHEREFORE, we declare Section 19, Article VI of Republic Act No. 9054 UNCONSTITUTIONAL insofar as it
grants to the Regional Assembly of the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao the power to create provinces
and cities. Thus, we declare VOID Muslim Mindanao Autonomy Act No. 201 creating the Province of Shariff
Kabunsuan. Consequently, we rule that COMELEC Resolution No. 7902 is VALID.

Section 6. No person shall be a Member of the House of Representatives unless he is a natural-born

citizen of the Philippines and, on the day of the election, is at least twenty-five years of age, able to
read and write, and, except the party-list representatives, a registered voter in the district in which he
shall be elected, and a resident thereof for a period of not less than one year immediately preceding
the day of the election.

Aquino [Link]

FACTS:

On March 20, 1995, petitioner Agapito A. Aquino filed his Certificate of Candidacy for the position of
Representative for the new Second Legislative District of Makati City.

On April 24, 1995, MOVE MAKATI, a duly registered political party, and Mateo Bedon, chairma of LAKAS-NUCD-
UMDP of Barangay Cembo, Makati City filed a petition to disqualify Agapito A. Aquino on the ground that the latter
lacked the residence qualification as a candidate for congressman under Section 6 ART. VI.

On April 25, 1995, a day after said petition for disqualification was filed, petitioner filed another certificate of
candidacy amending the certificate dated March 20, 1995. This time, petitioner stated in Item 8 of his certificate that he
had resided in the constituency where he sought to be elected for one (l) year and thirteen (13) days. On May 2, 1995,
petitioner filed his Answer dated April 29, 1995 praying for the dismissal of the disqualification case, On May 7, 1995,
Move Makati and Mateo Bedon filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the May 6, 1995 resolution with the COMELEC en
banc. May 8, 1995, elections were held in Makati City where 3 candidates vied for the congressional seat in the Second
District, petitioner got a total of 38,547 votes as against another candidate, Agusto Syjuco, who obtained 35,910 votes.
On May 10, 1995, private respondents Move Makati and Bedon filed an Urgent Motion Ad Cautelum to Suspend
Proclamation of petitioner. Thereafter, they filed an Omnibus Motion for Reconsideration of the COMELEC's Second
Division resolution dated May 6, 1995 and a 2nd Urgent Motion Ad Cautelum to Suspend Proclamation of petitioner.
 On June 1, 1995 petitioner filed a “motion to file supplemental memorandum and motion to resolve urgent
motion to resolve motion to lift suspension proclamation” wherein he manifested his intention to raise, the issue of
whether or not the determination of the qualifications of petitioner after the elections is lodged exclusively in the House
of Representatives Electoral Tribunal pursuant to Section 17, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution.

June 2, 1995, the COMELEC en banc issued a Resolution reversing the resolution of the Second Division dated
May 6, 1995 GRANTED, Agapito A. Aquino is declared ineligible and thus disqualified as a candidate for the Office of
Representative of the Second Legislative District of Makati City in the May 8, 1995 elections, for lack of the
constitutional qualification of residence

ISSUE

1. Whether “residency” in the certificate of candidacy actually connotes “domicile” to warrant the disqualification of
Aquino from the position in the electoral district.

2. whether or not it is proven that Aquino has established domicile of choice and not just residence in the district he was
running in.

HELD

Yes, the term “residence” has always been understood as synonymous with “domicile” not only under the previous
constitutions but also under the 1987 Constitution. The Court cited the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission
wherein this principle was applied.

No, Aquino has not established domicile of choice in the district he was running in. The SC agreed with the Comelec’s
contention that Aquino should prove that he established a domicile of choice and not just residence. The Constitution
requires a person running for a post in the HR one year of residency prior to the elections in the district in which he
seeks election to. Aquino’s certificate of candidacy in a previous May 11, 1992 election indicates that he was a resident
and a registered voter of San Jose, Concepcion, Tarlac for more than 52 years prior to that election. His birth certificate
indicated that Conception as his birthplace and his COC also showed him to be a registered voter of the same district.
Thus his domicile of origin up to the filing of his COC was in Conception, Tarlac. Aquino’s connection to the new Second
District of Makati City is an alleged lease agreement of a condominium unit in the area. The intention not to establish a
permanent home in Makati City is evident in his leasing a condominium unit instead of buying one. The short length of
time he claims to be a resident of Makati and the fact of his stated domicile in Tarlac and his claims of other residences
in Metro Manila indicate that his sole purpose in transferring his physical residence is not to acquire a new, residence or
domicile but only to qualify as a candidate for Representative of the Second District of Makati City. Aquino’s assertion
that he has transferred his domicile from Tarlac to Makati is a bare assertion which is hardly supported by the facts in
the case at bench, To successfully effect a change of domicile, petitioner must prove an actual removal or an actual
change of domicile, a bona fide intention of abandoning the former place of residence and establishing a new one and
definite acts which correspond with the purpose. Aquino was thus rightfully disqualified by the Commission on Elections
due to his lack of one year residence in the district. Aquino was thus rightfully disqualified by the Commission on
Elections due to his lack of one year residence in the district.

The instant petition is DISMISSED. Order restraining respondent Comelec from proclaiming the candidate
garnering the next highest number of votes in the congressional elections of Second district of Makati City made
permanent.

Section 7. The Members of the House of Representatives shall be elected for a term of three years
which shall begin, unless otherwise provided by law, at noon on the thirtieth day of June next
following their election. No Member of the House of Representatives shall serve for more than three
consecutive terms. Voluntary renunciation of the office for any length of time shall not be considered
as an interruption in the continuity of his service for the full term for which he was [Link]

Section 8. Unless otherwise provided by law, the regular election of the Senators and the Members of
the House of Representatives shall be held on the second Monday of [Link]

Section 9. In case of vacancy in the Senate or in the House of Representatives, a special election
may be called to fill such vacancy in the manner prescribed by law, but the Senator or Member of the
House of Representatives thus elected shall serve only for the unexpired [Link]

Section 10. The salaries of Senators and Members of the House of Representatives shall be
determined by law. No increase in said compensation shall take effect until after the expiration of the
full term of all the Members of the Senate and the House of Representatives approving such
[Link]

Section 11. A Senator or Member of the House of Representatives shall, in all offenses punishable by
not more than six years imprisonment, be privileged from arrest while the Congress is in session. No
Member shall be questioned nor be held liable in any other place for any speech or debate in the
Congress or in any committee [Link] 11

Nicanor Jimenez, Et. Al, plaintiff and appellants vs. Bartolome Cabangbang, defendant and appellee

August 3, 1966

Facts:

An ordinary civil action for recovery was filed by Nicanor Jimenez, Carlos Albert, Jose Lukban, of several sum of
money by way of damages for publication of an allegedly libelous letter of Cabangbang. Cabangbang was a
member of the House of representative and chairman of committee on national defense. The letter contains
the alleged (3) operational plan for propaganda for a presidential candidate, a coup d’etat and a modification
plan regarding the government. The letter was also published in the newspaper of general circulation

Issue:

Whether or not the publication in question is a privileged communication?

Held:

Although Cabangbang as a member of the house of representative enjoys the privilege from arrest during
attendance in session for any speech or debate therein, the said letter or publication does not belong to the
category provided in Art. 6 Sec. 15 (presumably, the 1935 Constitution). The open letter to the President,
dated Nov. 14, 1958, when the congress is not in session and Cabangbang caused the said letter to be
published in several newspaper of general circulation. It is obvious that, inn thus causing the communication
to be published, he was not performing his official duty and the said communication is not absolutely
privileged.

The letter in question is not sufficient to support the action for damages. Although the letter says that
plaintiffs are under the control of unnamed persons, it should be noted that defendant are unwitting tools of
the plan of which they may have absolutely no knowledge. The defendant’s letter clearly implies that the
plaintiffs were not among the “planners” of the said coup d’etat, for, otherwise, they could not be “tools”,
much less, unwittingly on their part, of said “planners”. The order appealed from is hereby affirmed (the
order was granting of the dismissal of the civil case by the lower court)

Section 12. All Members of the Senate and the House of Representatives shall, upon assumption of
office, make a full disclosure of their financial and business interests. They shall notify the House
concerned of a potential conflict of interest that may arise from the filing of a proposed legislation of
which they are [Link]

Section 13. No Senator or Member of the House of Representatives may hold any other office or
employment in the Government, or any subdivision, agency, or instrumentality thereof, including
government-owned or controlled corporations or their subsidiaries, during his term without forfeiting
his seat. Neither shall he be appointed to any office which may have been created or the emoluments
thereof increased during the term for which he was [Link]

Section 14. No Senator or Member of the House of Representatives may personally appear as
counsel before any court of justice or before the Electoral Tribunals, or quasi-judicial and other
administrative bodies. Neither shall he, directly or indirectly, be interested financially in any contract
with, or in any franchise or special privilege granted by the Government, or any subdivision, agency,
or instrumentality thereof, including any government-owned or controlled corporation, or its
subsidiary, during his term of office. He shall not intervene in any matter before any office of the
Government for his pecuniary benefit or where he may be called upon to act on account of his office.

Puyat vs De Guzman

FACTS:

On May 14, 1979 an election for Directors of the International Pipe Industries Corporation (II), a private corporation was
held. Eugenio Puyat and his group were elected as Directors against the Acero Group.

On May 25, 1979, the Acero Group instituted a quo warranto proceeding before the Security Exchange
Commission (SEC) questioning the results of the election. The Acero Group claimed that the stockholder’s
votes were not properly counted.

During a scheduled conference between the Puyat and Acero Group, Justice Estanislao A. Fernandez, a
member of the Interim Batasang Pambansa entered his appearance as counsel for respondent Acero. Puyat
group then objected citing Section 14 of Art. VIII of the Constitution: “No Assemblyman could appear as
counsel before…..any administrative body”. The cited Constitutional prohibition being clear, Assemblyman
Fernandez did not continue his appearance for Acero.

However, on May 31, 2017, Assemblyman Fernandez filed a Urgent Motion for Intervention in the SEC Case
alleging that he has a legal interest in the matter in litigation for he owns ten (10) IPI Shares.

The said shares were bought by Fernandez on May 15, 2017 (after the contested election) and the Deed of
Sale was notarized and registered on May 30, 1979., (a day before the hearing).
Consequently, the SEC granted leave to intervene on the basis of Fernandez’ ownership of the said ten (10)
shares.

.
ISSUE:

Whether or Not Assemblyman Fernandez as stockholder of IPI may intervene in the SEC without violating
Section 11 of Art. VIII of the 1987 Constitution.

RULING:

Assemblyman Fernandez shall be barred from appearing before the SEC under the guise that he is not
appearing as counsel.

The Court ruled that the intervention of Assemblyman Fernandez falls within the ambit of the prohibition
contained in Section 11, Art. VIII of the Constitution.

The “intervention” was just an afterthought to enable him to appear actively in the proceedings in some other
capacity.

Ordinarily, by virtue of Motion to Intervention Fernandez cannot be said to be appearing as counsel. However,
certain salient circumstances militate against the intervention of Assemblyman Fernandez in the SEC Cases.

 He acquired the ten (10) shares “after the fact”, that is after the contested election of Directors and
after the filing of the quo warranto proceeding and a day before the scheduled hearing.

 Before he moved to intervene, he had appeared as counsel for Acero and when it was objected, he
instead decided to “intervene” in the ground of legal interest in the matter.

 He appeared as counsel before the Court of First Instance for co-defendant of Acero.

The Court ruled that there has been an indirect appearance as counsel by Assemblyman Fernandez before
SEC, an administrative body.

Section 15. The Congress shall convene once every year on the fourth Monday of July for its regular
session, unless a different date is fixed by law, and shall continue to be in session for such number of
days as it may determine until thirty days before the opening of its next regular session, exclusive of
Saturdays, Sundays, and legal holidays. The President may call a special session at any [Link]