G.R. No.

171019 February 23, 2007

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Appellee,

DECISION

GARCIA, J.:

Under consideration is this appeal by Rafael Sta. Maria y Indon from the Decision1 dated
November 22, 2005 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 00802, denying his
earlier appeal from and affirming the May 5, 2004 decision2 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Bulacan, Branch 20, which found him guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of violation of
Section 5,3 Article II of Republic Act No. 9165, otherwise known as the Comprehensive
Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002.

The indicting Information,4 docketed in the RTC as Criminal Case No. 3364-M-2002, alleges:

That on or about the 29th day of November, 2002, in the municipality of San Rafael, province of
Bulacan, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused, without authority of law and legal justification, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously sell, trade, deliver, give away, dispatch in transit and transport dangerous drug
consisting of one (1) heat sealed transparent plastic sachet containing methylampetamine
hydrochloride weighing 0.041 gram.

Contrary to law.

Duly arraigned on January 23, 2003, appellant pleaded "Not Guilty" to the crime charged. Trial
ensued thereafter.

The prosecutions version of events which led to appellants arrest and subsequent prosecution
under the aforementioned Information is as follows:

On November 27, 2002, at around 10:00 oclock in the morning, P/Chief Insp. Noli Pacheco,
Chief of the Provincial Drug Enforcement Group of the Bulacan Provincial Office based at Camp
Alejo Santos, Malolos, Bulacan received an intelligence report about the illegal drug activities in
Sitio Gulod, Barangay Pantubig, San Rafael, Bulacan of a certain "Fael," who later turned out to
be appellant Rafael Sta. Maria. P/Chief Insp. Pacheco formed a surveillance team to look for a
police asset to negotiate a drug deal with appellant. In the morning of November 29, 2002, the
surveillance team reported to P/Chief Insp. Pacheco that a confidential asset found by the team
had already negotiated a drug deal for the purchase of 200 worth of shabu from appellant at the
latters house at No. 123 Sitio Gulod, Barangay Pantubig, San Rafael, Bulacan between 7:00 and
7:30 in the evening of November 29, 2002. The surveillance team then prepared for a buy-bust
operation, with PO3 Enrique Rullan as team leader, and PO1 Rhoel Ventura, who was provided
with two (2) marked 100-bills, as poseur-buyer. At the appointed time and place, PO1 Ventura
and the confidential informant proceeded to appellants house and knocked at the door.
Appellant opened the door and the confidential informant introduced to him PO1 Ventura as a
prospective buyer. PO1 Ventura later handed the two (2) marked 100-bills to appellant who, in
turn, gave him a plastic sachet of shabu. Thereupon, PO1 Ventura sparked his cigarette lighter,
which was the pre-arranged signal to the other members of the buy-bust team that the sale was
consummated. Appellant was arrested and the two marked 100-bills recovered from him. Also
arrested on that occasion was one Zedric dela Cruz who was allegedly sniffing shabu inside
appellants house and from whom drug paraphernalia were recovered. Upon laboratory
examination of the item bought from appellant, the same yielded positive for methylampetamine
hydrochloride or shabu weighing 0.041 gram.
The defense gave an entirely different account of what allegedly transpired prior to and at the
time of appellants arrest on that evening of November 29, 2002. 1aw phi 1.net

Appellant testified that on November 29, 2002, he was at home with a certain Zedric dela Cruz
who was allegedly offering him a cellphone for sale and collecting payment on a loan of his wife.
At that time, his wife was out of the house to pay their electric bill. While waiting for his wife, he
and Zedric watched television when they heard the barking of dogs. Immediately, three (3) men
suddenly barged into the house and announced that they were police officers while three other
men stayed outside the house. The police officers frisked him and Zedric and searched the
house. He tried to complain about what they were doing but the police officers got mad and
accused him of selling shabu. He replied that he does not know anything about drugs.
Afterwards, he and Zedric were brought out of the house and handcuffed. While on board the
police vehicle, the police officers warned them to cooperate. The police officers also asked him to
be their asset and when he said that he does not know anything about it, they told him that they
could file a case against him. The police officers also offered to buy drugs from him but he
refused the offer because he knows that it is only a plan for them to arrest him.

In a decision5 dated May 5, 2004, the trial court found appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt
of the offense charged, and accordingly sentenced him, thus:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered as follows:

1). xxx

2). xxx

3). In Criminal Case No. 3264-M-2002, the Court finds accused RAFAEL STA. MARIA Y
INDON guilty beyond reasonable doubt of Violation of Section 5, Article II of Republic Act
9165. He is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of life imprisonment and is ordered to
pay a fine of Five Hundred Thousand Pesos (500,000.00).

The dangerous drug and drug paraphernalia submitted as evidence in these cases are hereby
ordered to be transmitted to the Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency (PDEA).

SO ORDERED.

From the aforesaid decision, appellant went directly to this Court. Pursuant to our
pronouncement in People v. Mateo,6 which modified the pertinent provisions of the Rules
of Court insofar as they provide for direct appeals from the RTC to the Supreme Court in
cases where the penalty imposed is death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, the
Court transferred the appeal to the CA for appropriate action and disposition, whereat it
was docketed as CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 00802.

On November 22, 2005, the CA promulgated the herein assailed Decision7 denying the
appeal and affirming that of the trial court, to wit:

xxx The Court sees no reason to disturb the finding of trial court. The evidence presented
by the prosecution proves to a moral certainty appellants guilt of the crime of selling
illegal drugs. What is material is proof that the transaction or sale actually took place,
coupled with the presentation in court of the substance seized as evidence.

WHEREFORE, the appeal is DENIED. The decision of the Regional Trial Court is hereby
AFFIRMED. Costs de oficio.

SO ORDERED.
The case is again with this Court following its elevation from the CA, together with the
case records.

In his Brief, appellant contends that the trial court erred in convicting him because his
guilt was not proven beyond reasonable doubt. He maintains that instigation, not
entrapment, preceded his arrest. He also faults the appellate court in not finding that the
evidence adduced by the prosecution was obtained in violation of Sections 21 and 86 of
Republic Act No. 9165.

It is appellants submission that what transpired on that fateful evening of November 29,
2002 was instigation and not a valid buy-bust operation. He would make much of the fact
that the transaction between him and the police informant occurred on November 27,
2002, while the buy-bust operation took place on November 29, 2002. To appellant, the
informant, by pretending that he was in need of shabu, instigated or induced him to
violate the anti-dangerous drugs law. He adds that the prosecution was not able to prove
that at the time of the police surveillance, he was indeed looking for buyers of shabu, and
that were it not for the inducement of the informant that the latter would buy shabu, he
would not have produced the same on November 29, 2002.

We are not persuaded.

In entrapment, the entrapper resorts to ways and means to trap and capture a lawbreaker
while executing his criminal plan. In instigation, the instigator practically induces the
would-be-defendant into committing the offense, and himself becomes a co-principal. In
entrapment, the means originates from the mind of the criminal. The idea and the resolve
to commit the crime come from him. In instigation, the law enforcer conceives the
commission of the crime and suggests to the accused who adopts the idea and carries it
into execution. The legal effects of entrapment do not exempt the criminal from liability.
Instigation does.8

Here, the mere fact that the agreement between appellant and the police informant for the
purchase and sale of illegal drugs was made on November 27, 2002, while the buy-bust
operation was conducted on November 29, 2002, is of no moment. Without more, it does
not prove that said informant instigated appellant into committing the offense. If at all, the
earlier agreement and the subsequent actual sale suggest that appellant was habitually
dealing in illegal drugs.

It is no defense to the perpetrator of a crime that facilities for its commission were
purposely placed in his way, or that the criminal act was done at the "decoy solicitation"
of persons seeking to expose the criminal, or that detectives feigning complicity in the act
were present and apparently assisting its commission. Especially is this true in that class
of cases where the offense is one habitually committed, and the solicitation merely
furnishes evidence of a course of conduct.9

As here, the solicitation of drugs from appellant by the informant utilized by the police
merely furnishes evidence of a course of conduct. The police received an intelligence
report that appellant has been habitually dealing in illegal drugs. They duly acted on it by
utilizing an informant to effect a drug transaction with appellant. There was no showing
that the informant induced appellant to sell illegal drugs to him.

It is a basic rule in evidence that each party must prove his affirmative allegation.10 In this
case, apart from appellants self-serving declaration that he was instigated into
committing the offense, he did not present any other evidence to prove the same.

A perusal of the records readily reveals that the police operatives who took part in the
buy-bust operation, namely, PO1 Alexander Ancheta, PO1 Rhoel Ventura and PO3 Enrique
Rullan, clearly and convincingly testified on the circumstances that led to appellants
arrest. In a credible manner, they narrated in open court the details of the buy-bust
operation they conducted on November 29, 2002 in Sitio Gulod, Barangay Pantubig, San
Rafael, Bulacan. We thus quote with approval the trial courts findings on this matter:

PO1 Ancheta, PO1 Ventura and PO2 Rullan testified on the aforementioned circumstances
concerning the drug buy-bust operation that led to the arrest of accused Sta. Maria,
following the purchase from him of 200 worth of shabu by PO1 Ventura posing as
poseur-buyer. The testimonies of these officers, as summarized above, are essentially
clear credible and convincing. Notwithstanding minor inconsistencies, their declarations
in Court dovetail and corroborated one another on material points, and are generally
consistent with the narrations contained in their "Joint Affidavit of Arrest" (Exh. "D")
executed on December 2, 2002. More significantly, there is no credible showing that the
aforementioned police officers were impelled by any improper motive or intention in
effecting the arrest of accused Sta. Maria and in testifying against him in Court.

The Court also takes judicial notice of the fact that accused Sta. Maria had other criminal
cases before other branches of this Court for involvement in drug activities. He was
charged with and convicted by Branch 21 of this Court of Violation of Section 16, Article III
of the Republic Act of 6425, as amended, also known as the "Dangerous Drugs Act of
1972," following a voluntary plea of guilty in Criminal Case No. 341-M-2001. He was
likewise charged with Violation of Sections 15 and 16 of the same law before Branch 81
under Criminal Cases Nos. 59-M-2000 and 60-M-2000, which were dismissed on mere
technicality because of non-appearance of the arresting officers.

The Court is not persuaded by the defense of denial interposed by accused Sta. Maria.
According to him, the police officers just barged into his house on November 29, 2002
while he was watching television together with co-accused Dela Cruz. He said, he was
frisked and his place searched, and he was arrested for no reason at all by the police
officers.

The Court rules that the version bandied about by accused Sta. Maria is purely self-
serving. It cannot prevail over the positive declarations of the police officers regarding the
drug buy-bust operation and purchase from him of shabu. To reiterate, there is no
showing that said police officers were actuated by any ill or improper motive or intention
in effecting the arrest of the accused Sta. Maria and in testifying against him in Court.
(See People v. Dela Cruz, 229 SCRA 754; People v. Persiano, 233 SCRA 393). 11

Appellant would next argue that the evidence against him was obtained in violation of
Sections 21 and 86 of Republic Act No. 9165 because the buy-bust operation was made
without any involvement of the Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency (PDEA). Prescinding
therefrom, he concludes that the prosecutions evidence, both testimonial and
documentary, was inadmissible having been procured in violation of his constitutional
right against illegal arrest.

The argument is specious.

Section 86 of Republic Act No. 9165 reads:

SEC. 86. Transfer, Absorption, and Integration of All Operating Units on Illegal Drugs into
the PDEA and Transitory Provisions. The Narcotics Group of the PNP, the Narcotics
Division of the NBI and the Customs Narcotics Interdiction Unit are hereby abolished;
however they shall continue with the performance of their task as detail service with the
PDEA, subject to screening, until such time that the organizational structure of the
Agency is fully operational and the number of graduates of the PDEA Academy is
sufficient to do the task themselves: Provided, That such personnel who are affected shall
have the option of either being integrated into the PDEA or remain with their original
mother agencies and shall, thereafter, be immediately reassigned to other units therein by
the head of such agencies. Such personnel who are transferred, absorbed and integrated
in the PDEA shall be extended appointments to positions similar in rank, salary, and other
emoluments and privileges granted to their respective positions in their original mother
agencies.

The transfer, absorption and integration of the different offices and units provided for in
this Section shall take effect within eighteen (18) months from the effectivity of this Act:
Provided, That personnel absorbed and on detail service shall be given until five (5) years
to finally decide to join the PDEA.

Nothing in this Act shall mean a diminution of the investigative powers of the NBI and the
PNP on all other crimes as provided for in their respective organic laws: Provided,
however, That when the investigation being conducted by the NBI, PNP or any ad hoc
anti-drug task force is found to be a violation of any of the provisions of this Act, the
PDEA shall be the lead agency. The NBI, PNP or any of the task force shall immediately
transfer the same to the PDEA: Provided, further, That the NBI, PNP and the Bureau of
Customs shall maintain close coordination with the PDEA on all drug related matters.

Cursory read, the foregoing provision is silent as to the consequences of failure on the
part of the law enforcers to transfer drug-related cases to the PDEA, in the same way that
the Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR) of Republic Act No. 9165 is also silent on
the matter. But by no stretch of imagination could this silence be interpreted as a
legislative intent to make an arrest without the participation of PDEA illegal nor evidence
obtained pursuant to such an arrest inadmissible.

It is a well-established rule of statutory construction that where great inconvenience will

As we see it, Section 86 is explicit only in saying that the PDEA shall be the "lead agency"
in the investigations and prosecutions of drug-related cases. Therefore, other law
enforcement bodies still possess authority to perform similar functions as the PDEA as
long as illegal drugs cases will eventually be transferred to the latter. Additionally, the
same provision states that PDEA, serving as the implementing arm of the Dangerous
Drugs Board, "shall be responsible for the efficient and effective law enforcement of all
the provisions on any dangerous drug and/or controlled precursor and essential chemical
as provided in the Act." We find much logic in the Solicitor Generals interpretation that it
is only appropriate that drugs cases being handled by other law enforcement authorities
be transferred or referred to the PDEA as the "lead agency" in the campaign against the
menace of dangerous drugs. Section 86 is more of an administrative provision. By having
a centralized law enforcement body, i.e., the PDEA, the Dangerous Drugs Board can
enhance the efficacy of the law against dangerous drugs. To be sure, Section 86 (a) of the
IRR emphasizes this point by providing:

(a) Relationship/Coordination between PDEA and Other Agencies The PDEA shall be the
lead agency in the enforcement of the Act, while the PNP, the NBI and other law
enforcement agencies shall continue to conduct anti-drug operations in support of the
PDEA xxx. Provided, finally, that nothing in this IRR shall deprive the PNP, the NBI, other
law enforcement personnel and the personnel of the Armed Forces of the Philippines
(AFP) from effecting lawful arrests and seizures in consonance with the provisions of
Section 5, Rule 113 of the Rules of Court.
Appellant next argues that the prosecution failed to show compliance with Section 21 of
Republic Act No. 9165 regarding the custody and disposition of the evidence against him.

Appellant demands absolute compliance with Section 21 and insists that anything short
of the adherence to its letter, renders the evidence against him inadmissible. Pertinently,
Section 21 of the law provides:

SEC. 21. Custody and Disposition of Confiscated, Seized, and/or Surrendered Dangerous
Drugs, Plant Sources of Dangerous Drugs, Controlled Precursors and Essential
Chemicals, Instruments/Paraphernalia and/or Laboratory Equipment. The PDEA shall
take charge and have custody of all dangerous drugs, plant sources of dangerous drugs,
controlled precursors and essential chemicals, as well as instruments/paraphernalia
and/or laboratory equipment so confiscated, seized and/or surrendered, for proper
disposition in the following manner:

(1) The apprehending team having initial custody and control of the drugs shall,
immediately after seizure and confiscation, physically inventory and photograph the same
in the presence of the accused or the person/s from whom such items were confiscated
and/or seized, or his/her representative or counsel, a representative from the media and
the Department of Justice (DOJ), and any elected public official who shall be required to
sign the copies of the inventory and be given a copy thereof.

Regrettably, the pertinent implementing rules, Section 21 of the IRR, states:

Section 21. a. xxx Provided further, that non-compliance with these requirements under
justifiable grounds, as long as the integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items
are properly preserved by the apprehending officer/team, shall not render void and invalid
such seizures of and custody over said items.

It is beyond quibbling then that the failure of the law enforcers to comply strictly with
Section 21 was not fatal. It did not render appellants arrest illegal nor the evidence
adduced against him inadmissible.

The law excuses non-compliance under justifiable grounds. However, whatever justifiable
grounds may excuse the police officers involved in the buy-bust operation in this case
from complying with Section 21 will remain unknown, because appellant did not question
during trial the safekeeping of the items seized from him. Indeed, the police officers
alleged violations of Sections 21 and 86 of Republic Act No. 9165 were not raised before
the trial court but were instead raised for the first time on appeal. In no instance did
appellant least intimate at the trial court that there were lapses in the safekeeping of
seized items that affected their integrity and evidentiary value. Objection to evidence
cannot be raised for the first time on appeal; when a party desires the court to reject the
evidence offered, he must so state in the form of objection. Without such objection he
cannot raise the question for the first time on appeal.13

To recapitulate, the challenged buy-bust operation, albeit made without the participation
of PDEA, did not violate appellants constitutional right to be protected from illegal arrest.
There is nothing in Republic Act No. 9165 which even remotely indicate the intention of
the legislature to make an arrest made without the participation of the PDEA illegal and
evidence obtained pursuant to such an arrest inadmissible. Moreover, the law did not
deprive the PNP of the power to make arrests.

WHEREFORE, the appeal is DENIED and the appealed decision of the CA, affirmatorary of
that of the trial court, is AFFIRMED.

No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.

CANCIO C. GARCIA
Associate Justice

WE CONCUR: