Kuroda v. Jalandoni, G.R. No.

L-2662, March 26, 1949

MORAN, C.J.:

I. THE FACTS

Petitioner Shigenori Kuroda, the Commanding General of the Japanese Imperial Forces in
the Philippines during the Japanese occupation, was charged before the Philippine Military
Commission of war crimes. He questioned the constitutionality of E.O. No. 68 that created the
National War Crimes Office and prescribed rules on the trial of accused war criminals. He contended
the Philippines is not a signatory to the Hague Convention on Rules and Regulations covering Land
Warfare and therefore he is charged of crimes not based on law, national and international.

II. THE ISSUES

Was E.O. No. 68 valid and constitutional?

III. THE RULING

[The Court DENIED the petition and upheld the validity and constitutionality of E.O. No. 68.]
YES, E.O. No. 68 valid and constitutional.
Article 2 of our Constitution provides in its section 3, that
The Philippines renounces war as an instrument of national policy and adopts the generally
accepted principles of international law as part of the law of the nation.

In accordance with the generally accepted principle of international law of the present day including the
Hague Convention the Geneva Convention and significant precedents of international jurisprudence
established by the United Nation all those person military or civilian who have been guilty of planning
preparing or waging a war of aggression and of the commission of crimes and offenses consequential
and incidental thereto in violation of the laws and customs of war, of humanity and civilization are held
accountable therefor. Consequently in the promulgation and enforcement of Execution Order No. 68
the President of the Philippines has acted in conformity with the generally accepted and policies of
international law which are part of the our Constitution.

Petitioner argues that respondent Military Commission has no jurisdiction to try petitioner for acts
committed in violation of the Hague Convention and the Geneva Convention because the Philippines
is not a signatory to the first and signed the second only in 1947. It cannot be denied that the rules
and regulation of the Hague and Geneva conventions form, part of and are wholly based on the
generally accepted principals of international law. In facts these rules and principles were accepted
by the two belligerent nations the United State and Japan who were signatories to the two
Convention. Such rule and principles therefore form part of the law of our nation even if the
Philippines was not a signatory to the conventions embodying them for our Constitution has been
deliberately general and extensive in its scope and is not confined to the recognition of rule and
principle of international law as contained in treaties to which our government may have been or
shall be a signatory.
CO KIM CHAN v. VALDEZ TAN KEH
75 PHIL 113

FACTS:
The respondent judge refused to take cognizance of the case and to continue the proceedings
in petitioners case on the ground that the proclamation issued on October 23, 1944 by General
Douglas MacArthur had invalidated and nullified all judicial proceedings and judgments of court
during the Japanese occupation. Respondent contends that the lower courts have no
jurisdiction to continue pending judicial proceedings and that the government established during
the Japanese occupation was no de facto government.

ISSUE:

1. Do the judicial acts and proceedings of the court during the Japanese occupation remain
good and valid?
2. Did the proclamation of MacArthur invalidated all judgments and judicial acts and
proceedings of said court?
3. May the present courts continue those proceedings pending in said courts?

HELD:
It is evident that the Philippine Executive Commission was a civil government established by
military forces and thus a de facto government of the second kind. Legislative, as well as
judicial, acts of de facto governments, which are not of political complexion, remain valid after
reoccupation. It is presumed that the proclamation of General MacArthur did not specifically
refer to judicial processes thus it has not invalidated all the judgments and proceedings of the
courts during the Japanese regime. The existence of the courts depend upon the laws which
create and confer upon them their jurisdiction. Such laws, not political in nature, are not
abrogated by a change of sovereignty and continue in force until repealed by legislative acts. It
is thus obvious that the present courts have jurisdiction to continue proceedings in cases not of
political complexion.
ICHONG VS HERNANDEZ

Facts:

Driven by aspirations for economic independence and national security, the Congress enacted
Act No. 1180 entitled An Act to Regulate the Retail Business. The main provisions of the Act,
among others, are:

(1) Prohibition against persons, not citizens of the Philippines, and against associations, among
others, from engaging directly or indirectly in the retail trade; and

(2) Prohibition against the establishment or opening by aliens actually engaged in the retail
business of additional stores or branches of retail business.

Lao H. Ichong, in his own behalf and on behalf of other alien residents, corporations and
partnerships adversely affected by the said Act, brought an action to obtain a judicial
declaration, and to enjoin the Secretary of Finance, Jaime Hernandez, and all other persons
acting under him, particularly city and municipal treasurers, from enforcing its provisions.
Petitioner attacked the constitutionality of the Act, contending that:

It denies to alien residents the equal protection of the laws and deprives of their liberty and
property without due process of law.

The subject of the Act is not expressed or comprehended in the title thereof.

The Act violates international and treaty obligations of the Republic of the Philippines.

Issue/s:

Whether or not a law may invalidate or supersede treaties or generally accepted principles.

Discussions:

A generally accepted principle of international law, should be observed by us in good faith. If a

Yes, a law may supersede a treaty or a generally accepted principle. In this case, the Supreme
Court saw no conflict between the raised generally accepted principle and with RA 1180. The
equal protection of the law clause does not demand absolute equality amongst residents; it
merely requires that all persons shall be treated alike, under like circumstances and conditions
both as to privileges conferred and liabilities enforced; and, that the equal protection clause is
not infringed by legislation which applies only to those persons falling within a specified class, if
it applies alike to all persons within such class, and reasonable grounds exist for making a
distinction between those who fall within such class and those who do not.
Gonzales vs. Hechanova 9 SCRA 230

FACTS:
Exec. Secretary Hechanova authorised the importation of foreign rice to be purchased from
private sources. Gonzales filed a petition opposing the said implementation because RA No.
3542 which allegedly repeals or amends RA No. 2207, prohibits the importation of rice and corn
"by the Rice and Corn Administration or any other government agency."
Respondents alleged that the importation permitted in RA 2207 is to be authorized by the
President of the Philippines, and by or on behalf of the Government of the Philippines. They add
that after enjoining the Rice and Corn administration and any other government agency from
importing rice and corn, S. 10 of RA 3542 indicates that only private parties may import rice
under its provisions. They contended that the government has already constitute valid executive
agreements with Vietnam and Burma, that in case of conflict between RA 2207 and 3542, the
latter should prevail and the conflict be resolved under the American jurisprudence.

ISSUE:
W/N the executive agreements may be validated in our courts.

RULING:
No. The Court is not satisfied that the status of said tracts as alleged executive agreements has
been sufficiently established. Even assuming that said contracts may properly considered as
executive agreements, the same are unlawful, as well as null and void, from a constitutional
viewpoint, said agreements being inconsistent with the provisions of Republic Acts Nos. 2207
and 3452. Although the President may, under the American constitutional system enter into
executive agreements without previous legislative authority, he may not, by executive
agreement, enter into a transaction which is prohibited by statutes enacted prior thereto.

Under the Constitution, the main function of the Executive is to enforce laws enacted by
Congress. He may not interfere in the performance of the legislative powers of the latter, except
in the exercise of his veto power. He may not defeat legislative enactments that have acquired
the status of law, by indirectly repealing the same through an executive agreement providing for
the performance of the very act prohibited by said laws.