SABINA EXCONDE vs. DELFIN CAPUNO, ET AL.

G.R. No. L-10134

June 29, 1957

Facts:

Dante Capuno was a member of the Boy Scouts organization and a student of
Balintawak Elementary school. On March 31, they were instructed by the schools
supervisor to attend a parade in honor of Dr. Jose Rizal. From school, Dante and
other students boarded the jeep that was going to take them to the parade. Dante
then drove the jeep, while the driver sat by his side. They have not gone too far when
the jeep turned turtle resulting to the death of two of its passengers, Amado Ticzon
and Isidore Caperi.

Issue:
Whether or not Delfin capuno may be held jointly and severally liable with his
son Dante Capuno, for the civil liability of his tortuous act?

Held:

Yes. Under Art 1903, of the Spanish Civil Code paragraph 1, and 5 which
provides: the father and in case of his death or incapacity, the mother, are liable for
any damages caused by the minor children who live with them. xxx Finally, teachers
or directors of arts and trades are liable for any damages caused by their pupils or
apprentices while they are under their custody. But the provision applies only to an
institution of arts and trades and not to any academic educational institution. Dante
was then a student of Balintawak Elem School and as part of his extra-curricular
activity; he attended the parade upon instruction of City schools supervisor. It was
in connection with the parade that the accident took place
Clear that neither the head of the school nor the city supervisor could be held liable
for the negligent act of Dante because he was not then a student of an institution of
arts and trades

Civil liability of father (in case of death or incapacity, the mother) for any
damages caused by minor children is a necessary consequence of the parental
authority they exercise over them which imposes upon the parents the duty of
supporting them, keeping them in their company, educating them and instructing
them in proportion to their means, while on the other hand, gives them the right to
correct and punish them in moderation. The only way they could relieve themselves
of liability is if they prove that they exercised all the diligence of a good father of a
family to prevent the damage.
Maria Teresa Cuadra vs Alfonso Monfort
G.R. No. L-24101
Sept. 30, 1970

Facts:

Maria Teresa Cuadra and Maria Teresa Monfort were both classmates in
Mabini Elementary School Bacolod City. In July 1962, their teacher assigned the class
to weed the school premises. While they were doing so, MT Monfort found a
headband and she jokingly shouted it as an earthworm and thereafter tossed it at
MT Cuadra who was hit in her eye. MT Cuadras eye got infected. She was brought
to the hospital; her eyes were attempted to be surgically repaired but she
nevertheless got blind in her right eye. MT Cuadras parents sued Alfonso Monfort
(MT Monforts dad) based on Article 2180 of the Civil Code. The lower court ruled
that Monfort should pay for actual damages (cost of hospitalization), moral damages
and attorneys fees.

Issue:

Whether or not Monfort is liable under Article 2180.

Held:

No. Article 2180 provides that the father, in case of his incapacity or death,
the mother, is responsible for the damages caused by the minor children who live in
their company. The basis of this vicarious, although primary, liability is fault or
negligence, which is presumed from that which accompanied the causative act or
omission. The presumption is merely prima facie and may therefore be rebutted.
This is the clear and logical inference that may be drawn from the last paragraph of
Article 2180, which states that the responsibility treated of in this Article shall
cease when the persons herein mentioned prove that they observed all the diligence
of a good father of a family to prevent damage.

In the case at bar there is nothing from which it may be inferred that Alfonso
Monfort could have prevented the damage by the observance of due care, or that he
was in any way remiss in the exercise of his parental authority in failing to foresee
such damage, or the act which caused it. On the contrary, his child was at school,
where it was his duty to send her and where she was, as he had the right to expect
her to be, under the care and supervision of the teacher. And as far as the act which
caused the injury was concerned, it was an innocent prank not unusual among
children at play and which no parent, however careful, would have any special
reason to anticipate much less guard against. Nor did it reveal any mischievous
propensity, or indeed any trait in the childs character which would reflect
unfavorably on her upbringing and for which the blame could be attributed to her
parents.

Benigno Gutierrez v CA
G.R. No. L-31611
November 29, 1976

Facts:

The workers of petitioner Gutierrez, under the supervision of co-petitioner

Balisalisa whom he had engaged as project engineer of the construction job, started
digging up Severino Street, at first by manual labor and later by means of a crane to
speed up the excavation. The earth and mud dug up were scooped by the crane and
dumped against the exterior side of the adobe stone fence of the A. Mabini
Elementary School along the street. When the pile of earth and mud reached the
height of the fence, the crane's steel scooper was used to press them down. Because
of heavy stress thus placed on the fence, a portion of it gave way and collapsed on
March 21, 1964 between 2:30 and 3:00 o'clock in the afternoon.

Respondents' daughter Edna was then playing with other children inside the school
grounds. When the adobe wall collapsed, she was hit and pinned down by the falling
debris of the adobe stone wall and was buried underneath the piled up earth and
mud which caved in. While she was rushed to the hospital, it was in vain for she died
moments after the tragic mishap.

Issue:

Whether or not the contractor and project engineer are NOT jointly and
severally liable for the gross negligence of their crane operators as there is no
employee and employer relationship between them.

Held:
 No. Respondent court correctly held that the defense of alleged non-existence
of employer-employee relationship was never raised in the lower court and could
not be raised or entertained for the first time on appeal.

Court correctly quoted with approval the basis of the trial court's award for
moral and exemplary damages: "(T)hus, the negligence of the defendants has been
clearly established by the evidence. Indeed, no evidence is necessary to show that
the defendants were negligent in the performance of their obligation. They ought to
have known that it was not the right thing to do to pile up the big volume of earth
excavated against the wall, which was fragile, being made only of adobe stones held
together by weak mortar and without reinforcements. The collapse, therefore, of the
said wall could reasonably be expected by any person of ordinary prudence, if not
intelligence. The danger not only to the wall but also to anybody on the other side of
the wall, being a school ground, could have been anticipated by the defendants
herein and yet they failed to take the necessary precautions to avoid the same, For
this omission on their part, they should be held responsible for moral and exemplary
damages. This is more so with respect to the contractor, Benigno C. Gutierrez, in
order that other contractors similarly situated should be more careful in the
performance of their contracts. It is a matter of public knowledge that there are
important public works projects of the government that have been awarded to
contractors, who are not reliable, if not irresponsible. To cite only a few, like the
Nagtahan Bridge and the underpass and overpass complex near the City Hall, which
had been awarded to the same contractor, but who abandoned the same. Unless
something is done to prevent repetition of these acts of negligence on the part of the
contractors, public welfare will suffer".

Philippine Rabbit Bus Lines, Inc. vs Phil-American Forwarders

G.R. No. L-25142
March 25, 1975

Facts:

Pangalangan and Philippine Rabbit alleged that on 24 November 1962,

Fernando Pineda drove recklessly the freight truck owned by his employer
Philippine-American Forwarders along the national highway at Sto. Tomas,
Pampanga. It bumped the Philippine Rabbit bus driven by Felix Pangalangan. As a
result of the accident, Pangalangan was injured and the damaged bus cannot be used
for seventy-nine (79) days, causing loss of income amounting to PhP8,665.81 to
Philippine Rabbit.

Philippine Rabbit and Pangalangan as plaintiffs, filed a case for damages

against the defendants Philippine-American Forwarders, its manager Archimedes
Balingit and the driver Fernando Pineda for damages and lost income sustained by
Philippine Rabbit and the injuries sustained by Pangalangan. Balingit stated in
defense that he is not Pinedas employer and he asked for the dismissal of the
plaintiffs
case as they had no cause of action against him. The CFI Tarlac held only PAFI and
Pineda liable for damages and injuries sustained and dismissed Balingits liability.
As a result, Philippine Rabbit and Pangalangan appealed the trial courts decision to
the Supreme Court.

Issue:

Whether the trial court was right in dismissing the liability of PAFI manager
Archimedes Balingit to the damage sustained by them?

Held:

The trial courts decision on appeal is AFFIRMED and costs against plaintiff-
appellants. The Supreme Court held that based on the allegations of the complaint
of appellants Philippine Rabbit and Pangalangan, Balingit has no liability based on
tort or quasi-delict as manager of Phil-American Forwarders, Inc. in connection with
the vehicular accident because he may be regarded as an employee of Phil-American
Forwarders, Inc. The Supreme Court interpreted the term manager (directores,
Spanish) is used in the sense of employer, as it may be gathered from the articles
context.

The Supreme Court disregarded the appellants argument raised on appeal that the
doctrine of piercing the corporate veil be used against PAFI, Archimedes Balingit and
his wife. Since that issue was not raised in the trial court below, it cannot be raised
also on appeal. The case has to be decided based on allegations stated in the
pleadings (complaint) of the appellants, where it was assumed that Balingit and his
wife has a separate legal personality from that of Philippine-American Forwarders,
Inc.

ERNESTO PLEYTO vs MARIA D. LOMBOY

G.R. No. 148737
June 16, 2004

Facts:

Ricardo Lomoboy died while his daughter herein respondent Carmela Lomboy,
suffered injuires requiring hospitalization, as a result of the head-n-collision
between the bus owned by petitioner Philippine Rabbit Bus Lines, Inc. , driven by
petitioner Ernesto Pleyto, and the car where Ricardo and Carmela, among others,
were passengers. Hence, the heirs of the late Ricardo Lomboy, herein respondents,
filed an action for damages against petitioners. After due trial, the RTC of Dagupan
City rendered judgment in favor of the respondents and ordered the petitioners to
pay the respondents civil indemnity, loss of earning capacity, actual and moral
damages.

Issue:

Whether or not Pleyto is negligent and thus making PRBL Bus liable.

Held:

Yes. Pleyto violated traffic rules and regulations when he overtook the
tricycle despite the presence of an oncoming car in the other lane. Article 2185 of
the Civil Code lays down the presumption that a person driving a motor vehicle has
been negligent if at the time of the mishap, he was violating any traffic regulation.
As found by both the Court of Appeals and the trial court, petitioners failed to present
any convincing proof rebutting such presumption.

A driver abandoning his proper lane for the purpose of overtaking another vehicle
in an ordinary situation has the duty to see to it that the road is clear and not to
proceed if he cannot do so in safety. When a motor vehicle is approaching or
rounding a curve, there is special necessity for keeping to the right side of the road
and the driver does not have the right to drive on the left hand side relying upon
having time to turn to the right if a car approaching from the opposite direction
comes into view.

PRBL liable for Pleytos negligence pursuant to Article 2180 in relation to Article 2176
of the Civil Code. Under Article 2180, when an injury is caused by the negligence of
a servant or an employee, the master or employer is presumed to be negligent either
in the selection or in the supervision of that employee. This presumption may be
overcome only by satisfactorily showing that the employer exercised the care and
the diligence of a good father of a family in the selection and the supervision of its
employee.
In fine, when the employee causes damage due to his own negligence while
performing his own duties, there arises the juris tantum presumption that the
employer is negligent, rebuttable only by proof of observance of the diligence of a
good father of a family. Thus, in the selection of prospective employees, employers
are required to examine them as to their qualifications, experience and service
records. With respect to the supervision of employees, employers must formulate
standard operating procedures, monitor their implementation and impose
disciplinary measures for breaches thereof. These facts must be shown by concrete
proof, including documentary evidence.

YHT Realty Corporation vs The Court of Appeals

G.R. No. 126780
February 17, 2005
Facts:

Peaches McLoughlin would always stay at Tropicana Hotel every time he is

here in thePhilippines and would rent a safety deposit box. The safety deposit box
could only be openedthrough the use of 2 keys, one of which is given to the registered
guest, and the other remaining inthe possession of the management of the hotel.

McLoughlin allegedly placed the following in his safety deposit box 2 envelopes
containingUS Dollars, one envelope containing Australian Dollars, Letters, credit
cards, bankbooks and [Link] 12 December 1987, before leaving for a brief
trip, McLoughlin took some items from thesafety box which includes the ff: envelope
containing Five Thousand US Dollars (US$5,000.00), theother envelope containing
Ten Thousand Australian Dollars (AUS$10,000.00), his passports and hiscredit
cards.

The other items were left in the deposit box. Upon arrival, he found out that a
fewdollars were missing and the jewelry he bought was likewise [Link],
he confronted Lainez and Paiyam who admitted that Tan opened the safetydeposit
box with the key assigned to him. McLoughlin went up to his room where Tan was
stayingand confronted her. Tan admitted that she had stolen McLouglins key and
was able to open thesafety deposit box with the assistance of Lopez, Paiyam and
Lainez. Lopez also told McLoughlinthat Tan stole the key assigned to McLouglin
while the latter was [Link] insisted that it must be the hotel who must
assume responsibility for the loss hesuffered. Lopez refused to accept responsibility
relying on the conditions for renting the safetydeposit box entitled Undertaking For
the Use of Safety Deposit Box.

Issue:

Whether or not the Undertaking for the Use of Safety Deposit Box
admittedly executed by privaterespondent is null and void.

Held:

Yes, it is null and void. Art. 2003[1] is controlling. This is an expression of

public policy that the hotel business like common carriers are imbued with public
interest. This responsibility cannot be waived away by any contrary stipulation in
so-called "undertakings" that ordinarily appear in prepared forms imposed by hotel
keepers on guests for their signature.
The CA (former case) even ruled before that hotelkeepers are liable even though the
effects are not delivered to them or their employees, but it is enough that the effects
are within the hotel or inn.
Pars. 2 and 4 of the undertaking manifestly contravene Art. 2003 of the NCC.
Meanwhile, the defense that Art. 2002 exempts the hotel-keeper from liability if the
loss is due to the acts of the guest, family or visitors falls because the hotel is guilty
of negligence as well. This provision presupposes that the hotel-keeper is not guilty
of concurrent negligence or has not contributed in any degree to the occurrence of
the loss.
Marcelo Macalinao, Et Al., vs. Eddie Medecielo Ong
G.R. No. 146635
December 14, 2005

Facts:

April 1992: Sebastian instructed Macalinao, Ong and 2 other truck helpers to
deliver a heavy piece of machinery to Sebastians manufacturing plant in Angat,
Bulacan
While delivering, the Genetrons Isuzu Elf truck driven by Ong bumped the front
portion of a private jeepney. Both vehicles incurred severe damages while the
passengers sustained physical injuries as a consequence of the collision.
Macalinao was brought to Sta. Maria District Hospital for first aid treatment then to
Philippine Orthopedic Center then to Capitol Medical Center and lastly, to Philippine
General Hospital due to financial considerations. His body was paralyzed and
immobilized from the neck down. He filed against Ong and Sebastian. A criminal
case for reckless imprudence resulting to serious physical injuries was instituted
but was not ensued.
November 7 1992: Macalinao died and was substituted by his parents.
RTC: Ong negligent and Sebastian failed to exercise the diligence of a good father of
a family in the selection and supervision of Ong thus ordering them jointly liable to
pay actual, moral, and exemplary damages as well as civil indemnity for Macalinaos
death.

Issue:

Whether or not Ong may be held liable under the doctrine of Res Ipsa Loquitur.

Held:

Yes. Photographs clearly shows that the road where the mishap occurred is
marked by a line at the center separating the right from the left lane
While ending up at the opposite lane is not conclusive proof of fault in automobile
collisions, the position of the two vehicles gives rise to the conclusion that it was the
Isuzu truck which hit the private jeepney rather than the other way around.

Based on the angle at which it stopped, the private jeepney obviously swerved to the
right in an unsuccessful effort to avoid the Isuzu truck. Since respondents failed to
refute the contents of the police blotter, the statement therein that the Isuzu truck
hit the private jeepney and not the other way around is deemed established.

While not constituting direct proof of Ongs negligence, the foregoing pieces of
evidence justify the application of res ipsa loquitur, a Latin phrase which literally
means the thing or the transaction speaks for itself.
Res ipsa loquitur
Recognizes that parties may establish prima facie negligence without direct proof,
thus, it allows the principle to substitute for specific proof of negligence.
Permits the plaintiff to present along with proof of the accident, enough of the
attending circumstances to invoke the doctrine, create an inference or presumption
of negligence and thereby place on the defendant the burden of proving that there
was no negligence on his part
based on the theory that defendant in charge of the instrumentality which causes
the injury either knows the cause of the accident or has the best opportunity of
ascertaining it while the plaintiff has no such knowledge, and is therefore compelled
to allege negligence in general terms and rely upon the proof of the happening of the
accident in order to establish negligence
can be invoked only when under the circumstances, direct evidence is absent and not
readily available grounded upon the fact that the chief evidence of the true cause,
whether culpable or innocent, is practically accessible to the defendant but
inaccessible to the injured person.

MERCURY DRUG CORPORATION vs. SPOUSES HUANG

G.R. No. 172122
June 22, 2007

Facts:

Petitioner Mercury Drug is the registered owner of a Mitsubishi truck, with

petitioner del Rosario as driver. Respondents Richard and Carmen Huang are parents
of respondent Stephen Huang, who owned a Sedan. The two vehicles got into an
accident as they were traversing a highway. The Sedan was on the left innermost
lane while the truck was on the next lane to its right, when the latter swerved to its
left and slammed in the front right side of the car. As a consequence, the car was
wrecked and Stephen Huang incurred massive injuries and became paralyzed. The
parents of Stephen faulted Del Rosario for committing gross negligence and reckless
imprudence, and Mercury Drug for failing to exercise the diligence of a good father
of a family in the selection and supervision of its driver. The RTC found the
petitioners jointly and severally liable for damages. The CA affirmed, hence this
appeal.

Issue:

Wheter or not Mercury Drug is liable as employer of Del Rosario.

Held:

Yes Mercury Drug is liable.

Mercury Drug is jointly and solidarily liable with Del Rosario, as the employer of
the
latter. In order to be relieved of such liability, Mercury should show that it exercised
the diligence of a good father of a family, both in the selection and supervision of
the employee in the performance of his duties. Mercury failed in both respects.

In selecting employees, the employer is required to examine them as to their

qualifications, experience and service records. With respect to supervision, the
employer should formulate standard operating procedures, monitor their
implementation and impose disciplinary measures for their breach. To establish
such, concrete proof, such as documentary evidence must be submitted by him.

In the case at bar, it was shown that Del Rosario didn't take driving tests and
psychological exams when he applied for the position of a Truck Man. In addition,
Mercury didn't present Del Rosario's NBI and police clearances. Next, the last
seminar attended by the driver occurred a long 12 years before the accident
occurred. Lastly, Mercury didn't have a backup driver for long trips. When the
accident happened Del Rosario has been out on the road for more than 13 hours.

As to negligence with regard to supervision over its employees, Mercury didn't

impose any sanction on Del Rosario when the latter reported to the former about
the incident. Hence, Mercury didn't exercise due diligence.

E. MERRITT vs. GOVERNMENT OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS

G.R. No. 11154
March 21, 1916

Facts:

The plaintiff, riding on a motorcycle, was going toward the western part of
Calle Padre Faura. Upon crossing Taft Avenue and was ten feet from the
southwestern intersection of said streets, the General Hospital ambulance, upon
reaching said avenue, instead of turning toward the south turned unexpectedly and
struck the plaintiff. The plaintiff was taken to the General Hospital on the very same
day as he was so severely injured.

The trial court ordered the Government of the Philippine Islands to pay damages.

The Attorney-General on behalf of the defendant urges that the Government of the
Philippine Islands is not liable for the damages sustained by the plaintiff as a result
of the collision, even if it be true that collision was due to the negligence of the
chauffeur.

Issue:

Whether or not the Government of the Philippine Islands may be held liable
for the act done by the chauffeur.

Held:
 The Government of the Philippine Islands is not liable.

The substantive law touching the defendant's liability for the negligent acts
of its officers, agents, and employees can be found in paragraph 5 of article 1903 of
the civil Code, which reads:

"The state is liable in this sense when it acts through a special agent, but not
when the damage should have been caused by the official to whom properly it
pertained to do the act performed, in which case the provisions of the preceding
article shall be applicable."

The state by virtue of such provision of law, is not responsible for the damages
suffered by private individuals in consequence of acts performed by its employees
in the discharge of the functions pertaining to their office, because neither fault nor
even negligence can be presumed on the part of the state in the organization of
branches of the public service and in the appointment of its agents.

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES vs HON. PERFECTO R. PALACIO

G.R. No. L-20322
May 29, 1968

Facts:

In April 1960, a certain Ildefenso Ortiz sued the Irrigation Service Unit (ISU)
which was under the Department of Public Works because ISU, without the consent
of Ortiz, encroached upon his land by allegedly inducing the Handong Irrigation
Assoc. to do so. The basis of the suit was that ISU, though created by the government,
is engaged in private business (selling of irrigation pumps/construction materials in
installment) and being such has opened itself to suit thereby waiving immunity from
suit. Judge Palacio of CFI Camarines Sur ruled in favor of Ortiz so did the Court of
Appeals. The CA also ordered the issuance of the order of garnishment against the
deposit/trust funds in ISUs account in the PNB (such fund were generated from the
installment payments ISU received).

Issue:

Whether or not such deposits may be garnished.

Held:

No. ISUs activity of selling irrigation pumps is not intended to earn profit or
financial gain. It is actually just to replenish the funds used in purchasing said
irrigation pumps (the original funds were from FTA from US). The CA ruled that ISU,
by selling irrigation pumps is engaged in private business, hence it waived its
immunity from suit and had also ordered the garnishment of ISUs deposits in PNB.
But then again, as based in Merritt vs Insular Government, the waiver of said
immunity does not make the government liable. This would only lead to a
disbursement of fund without any proper appropriation as required by law.

There is also no showing that the ISUs alleged inducement of Handong is

authorized by the State hence the government cannot be liable under Article 2180 of
the Civil Code.

NATIONAL IRRIGATION ADMINISTRATION vs SPOUSES FONTANILLA

G.R. No. L-61045
December 1, 198
Facts:

Hugo Garcia, a driver of the National Irrigation Administration, while driving

at a high speed along the Marikina National Road of San Jose City, bumped the son
of the spouses Jose Fontanilla and Virginia Fontanilla., which caused the death of the
spouses son. The driver did not even stop to check what the pick-up bumped into
and just went on travelling at a high speed until they reached their destination. The
spouses Fontanilla filed a suit for damages against Garcia and the National Irrigation
Administration, as Garcias employer. NIA was ordered to pay the Fontanillas, the
amounts of 12,000 for the death of the victim; 3,389 for hospitalization and burial
expenses; 30,000 as moral damages; 8,000 as exemplary damages, and attys fees
of 20% of the total award. Hence, this Motion for Reconsideration.

The Sol-Gen maintains that on the strength of Presidential Decree No. 552
(which amended certain provisions of RA Aact 3601, the law creating the NIA) and
the case of Angat River Irrigation System, et al. vs. Angat River Workers Union, et
al. the NIA does not perform solely and primarily proprietary functions but is an
agency of the government tasked with governmental functions, and is therefore not
liable for the tortious act of its driver Hugo Garcia, who was not its special agent.

Issue:

Whether or not NIA, a government agency, may be held liable for the damages
caused by the negligent act of its driver who was not its special agent.

Whether or not the award of moral damages, exemplary damages and

attorney's fees is
legally proper in a complaint for damages based on quasi-delict which
resulted in the death of the son of herein petitioners.

Held:

Yes, NIA is a government agency with a juridical personality separate and

distinct from the government. It is not a mere agency of the government but a
corporate body performing proprietary functions.

In this case, the Court primarily considered the fact that NIA is exercising
proprietary functions. Next to that, it considered the fact that NIA had been vested
with a corporate personality separate and distinct from the Government and that it
has capacity to sue and be sued in court.

Art. 2176 thus provides:

Whoever by act omission causes damage to another, there being fault
or negligence, is obliged to pay for damage done. Such fault or
negligence, if there is no pre-existing cotractual relation between the
parties, is called a quasi-delict and is governed by the provisions of
this Chapter Paragraphs 5 and 6 of Art. 21 80 read as follows:
Employers shall be liable for the damages caused by their employees
and household helpers acting within the scope of their assigned tasks,
even the though the former are not engaged in any business or
industry. The State is responsible in like manner when it acts through a special
agent.; but not when the damage has been caused by the official to
whom the task done properly pertains, in which case what is provided in Art. 2176
shall be applicable.
The liability of the State has two aspects. namely:
1. Its public or governmental aspects where it is liable for the tortious
acts of special agents only.
2. Its private or business aspects (as when it engages in private
enterprises) where it becomes liable as an ordinary employer. (p. 961,
Civil Code of the Philippines; Annotated, Paras; 1986 Ed. ).
In this jurisdiction, the State assumes a limited liability for the damage caused by
the
tortious acts or conduct of its special agent.

Under the aforequoted paragrah 6 of Art. 2180, the State has voluntarily assumed
liability for acts done through special agents. The State's agent, if a public official,
must not only be specially commissioned to do a particular task but that such task
must be foreign to said official's usual governmental functions. If the State's agent
is
not a public official, and is commissioned to perform non-governmental functions,
then the State assumes the role of an ordinary employer and will be held liable as
such for its agent's tort. Where the government commissions a private individual for
a special governmental task, it is acting through a special agent within the meaning
of the provision. (Torts and Damages, Sangco, p. 347, 1984 Ed.)

Certain functions and activities, which can be performed only by the government,
are more or less generally agreed to be "governmental" in character, and so the State
is immune from tort liability. On the other hand, a service which might as well be
provided by a private corporation, and particularly when it collects revenues from
it,
the function is considered a "proprietary" one, as to which there may be liability for
the torts of agents within the scope of their employment.

The National Irrigation Administration is an agency of the government exercising

proprietary functions, by express provision of Rep. Act No. 3601
Indubitably, the NIA is a government corporation with juridical personality and not
a mere agency of the government. Since it is a corporate body performing
nongovernmental
functions, it now becomes liable for the damage caused by the
accident resulting from the tortious act of its driver-employee. In this particular
case,
the NIA assumes the responsibility of an ordinary employer and as such, it becomes
answerable for damages. This assumption of liability, however, is predicated upon
the existence of negligence on the part of respondent NIA. The negligence referred
to here is the negligence of supervision.

It should be emphasized that the accident happened along the Maharlika National
Road within the city limits of San Jose City, an urban area. Considering the fact that
the victim was thrown 50 meters away from the point of impact, there is a strong
indication that driver Garcia was driving at a high speed. This is confirmed by the
fact that the pick-up suffered substantial and heavy damage as above-described and
the fact that the NIA group was then "in a hurry to reach the campsite as early as
possible", as shown by their not stopping to find out what they bumped as would
have been their normal and initial reaction.

Evidently, there was negligence in the supervision of the driver for the reason that
they were travelling at a high speed within the city limits and yet the supervisor of
the group, Ely Salonga, failed to caution and make the driver observe the proper and
allowed speed limit within the city. Under the situation, such negligence is further
aggravated by their desire to reach their destination without even checking whether
or not the vehicle suffered damage from the object it bumped, thus showing
imprudence and reckelessness on the part of both the driver and the supervisor in
the group.

Considering the foregoing, respondent NIA is hereby directed to pay herein

petitioners-spouses the amounts of P12,000.00 for the death of Francisco
Fontanilla; P3,389.00 for hospitalization and burial expenses of the aforenamed
deceased; P30,000.00 as moral damages; P8,000.00 as exemplary damages and
attorney's fees of 20% of the total award.

QUEZON CITY GOVERNMENT vs FULGENCIO DACARA

G.R. No. 150304
June 15, 2005

Facts:

Dacara Jr.s car turned turtle upon hitting a rammed into a pile of earth/street
diggings found at Matahimik St., Quezon City, which was then being repaired by
the Quezon City government. As a result, Dacarra Jr., his son who was likewise
on board the car, sustained bodily injuries and the vehicle suffered extensive
damage for it turned turtle when it hit the pile of earth. Fulgencio Dacara in
behalf of his minor children filed a complaint for damages against Quezon City
and Engr. Ramir Tiamzon before RTC. He prayed for damages.
The LGU contended that the fault is with the driver, since the LGU have out up
warning signs. The trial court ruled that the LGU is [Link] CA agreed with the
RTC's finding that petitioners' negligence was the proximate cause of the damage
suffered by respondent.

Issue:

Whether or not the Quezon City Government is liable for damages due to the
injuries suffered by Dacara Jr.

Held:

YES. The provisions of Article 2189 of the New Civil Code capsulizes the
responsibility of the city government relative to the maintenance of roads and
bridges since it exercises the control and supervision over the same.

Maintaining that they were not negligent, petitioners insist that they placed
all the necessary precautionary signs to alert the public of a roadside construction.
They argue that the driver, Fulgencio Dacara Jr., of respondent's car was
overspeeding, and that his own negligence was therefore the sole cause of the
incident.

The Court found petitioner, Quezon City, negligent.

"Contrary to the testimony of the witnesses for the defense that there were signs,
gasera which was buried so that its light could not be blown off by the wind and
barricade, none was ever presented to stress the point that sufficient and adequate
precautionary signs were placed at Matahimik Street. If indeed signs were placed
thereat, how then could it be explained that according to the report even of the
policeman which for clarity is quoted again, none was found at the scene of the
accident.

Negligence of QC is the proximate cause

Proximate cause is defined as any cause that produces injury in a natural and
continuous sequence, unbroken by any efficient intervening cause, such that the
result would not have occurred otherwise.15 Proximate cause is determined from
the facts of each case, upon a combined consideration of logic, common sense, policy
and precedent.16

Negligence of a person whether natural or juridical over a particular set of events is

transfixed by the attending circumstances so that the greater the danger known or
reasonably anticipated, the greater is the degree of care required to be observed.

The provisions of Article 2189 of the New Civil Code capsulizes the responsibility of
the city government relative to the maintenance of roads and bridges since it
exercises the control and supervision over the same. Failure of the defendant to
comply with the statutory provision found in the subject-article is tantamount to
negligence per se which renders the City government liable. Harsh application of the
law ensues as a result thereof but the state assumed the responsibility for the
maintenance and repair of the roads and bridges and neither exception nor
exculpation from liability would deem just and equitable.

Petitioners belatedly point out that Fulgencio Jr. was driving at the speed of 60
kilometers per hour (kph) when he met the accident. This speed was allegedly well
above the maximum limit of 30 kph allowed on "city streets with light traffic, when
not designated 'through streets,'" as provided under the Land Transportation and
Traffic Code (Republic Act 4136). Thus, petitioners assert that Fulgencio Jr., having
violated a traffic regulation, should be presumed negligent pursuant to Article 2185
of the Civil Code.

These matters were, however, not raised by petitioners at any time during the trial.
It is evident from the records that they brought up for the first time the matter of
violation of RA 4136 in their Motion for Reconsideration of the CA Decision dated
February 21, 2001. It is too late in the day for them to raise this new issue. It is well-
settled that points of law, theories or arguments not brought out in the original
proceedings cannot be considered on review or appeal.

Indeed, both the trial and the appellate courts' findings, which are amply
substantiated by the evidence on record, clearly point to petitioners' negligence as
the proximate cause of the damages suffered by respondent's car. No adequate
reason has been given to overturn this factual conclusion.
MUNICIPALITY OF SAN JUAN, METRO MANILA vs COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. 121920
August 9, 2005

Facts:

Under a "Contract For Water Service Connections, between the Metropolitan

Waterworks and Sewerage System (MWSS) and Kwok Cheung as sole proprietor of
K.C. Waterworks System Construction (KC, for short), the former engaged the
services of the latter to install water service connections.
The agreement provides: The CONTRACTOR agrees to install water service
connections,
transfer location of tapping to the nearest main, undertake separation of service
connection, change rusted connections, within the service area of the MWSS
specified in each job order covered by this Contract, from the water main up to the
installation of the verticals. Tapping of the service pipe connection and mounting of
water meter shall be undertaken exclusively or solely by the MWSS;

That same day, KC dispatched five (5) of its workers under Project Engineer
Ernesto Battad, Jr. to conduct the digging operations in the specified place. The
workers dug a hole one (1) meter wide and 1.5 meters deep, after which they refilled
the excavated portion of the road with the same gravel and stone excavated
from the area. At that time, only of the job was finished in view of the fact that
the
workers were still required to re-excavate that particular portion for the
tapping of pipes for the water connections to the concessionaires.

Meanwhile, between 10 oclock and 11 oclock in the evening of 31 May 1988, Priscilla
Chan was driving her Toyota Crown car with Plate No. PDK 991 at a speed of thirty
(30) kilometers per hour on the right side of Santolan Road towards the direction of
Pinaglabanan, San Juan, Metro Manila. With her on board the car and seated on the
right front seat was Assistant City Prosecutor Laura Biglang-awa. The road was
flooded as it was then raining hard. Suddenly, the left front wheel of the car fell on
a manhole where the workers of KC had earlier made excavations. As a result, the
humerus on the right arm of Prosecutor Biglang-awa was fractured. Consequent to
the foregoing incident, Biglang-awa filed before the Regional Trial Court at Pasig,
Metro Manila a complaint for damages against MWSS, the Municipality of San Juan
and a number of San Juan municipal officials.

Issue:

Whether or not the municipality is liable.

Held:

Yes. Jurisprudence teaches that for liability to arise under Article 2189of the
Civil Code,
ownership of the roads, streets, bridges, public buildings and other public works, is
not a controlling factor, it being sufficient that a province, city or municipality has
control or supervision thereof. It is argued, however, that under Section 149, [1][z]
of the Local Government Code, petitioner has control or supervision only over
municipal and not national roads, like Santolan Road. Regulate the drilling and
excavation of the ground for the laying of gas, water, sewer, and other pipes; the
building and repair of tunnels, sewers, drains and other similar structures; erecting
of poles and the use of crosswalks, curbs and gutters therein, and adopt measures to
ensure public safety against open canals, manholes, live wires and other similar
hazards to life and property, and provide just compensation or relief for persons
suffering from them. Doubtless, the term "regulate" found in the aforequoted
provision of Section 149 can only mean that petitioner municipality exercises the
power of control, or, at the very least, supervision over all excavations for the laying
of gas, water, sewer and other pipes within its territory. The [petitioner] cannot
validly shirk from its obligation to maintain and insure the safe condition of the road
merely because the permit for the excavation may have
been issued by a government entity or unit other than the Appellant San Juan or that
the excavation may have been done by a contractor under contract with a public
entity like the Appellee MWSS. It is the duty of the municipal authorities to exercise
an active vigilance over the streets; to see that they are kept in a reasonably safe
condition for public travel.
They cannot fold their arms and shut their eyes and say they have no notice. (Todd
versus City of Troy, 61 New York 506). (Words in bracket supplied).
Mercado vs. Court of Appeals
G.R. No. 87584
May 30, 1960

Facts:

Augusto Mercado and Manuel Quisumbing, Jr. are both pupils of the Lourdes
Catholic School, Kanlaon, Quezon City. A pitogo (an empty nutshell used by children
as a piggy bank) belonged to Augusto Mercado but he lent it to Benedicto Lim and in
turn Benedicto lent it to Renato Legaspi. Renato was not aware that the pitogo
belonged to Augusto. Manuel Quisumbing, Jr. thought it was Benedictos, so when
Augusto attempted to get the pitogo from Renato, Manuel, Jr. told him not to do so
because Renato was better at putting the chain into the holes of the pitogo. Augusto
resented his remark and pushed Manuel, Jr., which started the fight. After successive
blows to Manuel, Jr., Augusto cut him on the right cheek with a
piece of razor. Manuel, Jr. and his father filed a complaint against Ciriaco Mercado,
Augustos
father.

Issue:

Whether or not the teacher or head of the school should be held responsible
instead of
the father?

Held:

NO. CHILDREN WERE NOT IN THEIR CUSTODY.

Petitioner rests his claim on the last paragraph of Art. 2180 of the Civil Code:
Lastly, teachers or heads of establishments of arts and trades shall be liable for
damages caused by their pupils and students or apprentices, so long as they remain
in their custody.
That clause contemplates a situation where the pupil lives and boards with the
teacher, such that the control, direction and influence on the pupil supersedes those
of the parents. In these circumstances the control or influence over the conduct and
actions of the pupil would pass from the father and mother to the teacher; and so
would the
responsibility for the torts of the pupil. Such a situation does not appear in the case
at bar; the pupils appear to go to school during school hours and go back to their
homes with their parents after school is over.
Ylarde vs Aquino
G.R. No. L-33722
July 29, 1988

Facts:

June 11 1951: Juanito Chan, son of Chan Lin Po and Remedios Diala, drove and
operated a motor vehicle (a truck) along Rizal Ave Ext, Manila in a reckless and
imprudent manner thereby causing to hit Nicolas Paras, 65 yo, and ran over his head,
crushing it, resulting to his instantaneous death; facs revealed that the truck was
registered in the name of Lim Koo.
At the initial stage of the criminal trial, Petitioner, Estanislawa Canlas (widow of
Nicolas, representing also 5 minor children), made a reservation to file a separate
civil action. TC: Juanito is guilty, serve sentence of 1yr-8mos, plus 5K indeminity.
CA: modified, 1yr not less than 4 yrs of imprisonment, indemnity also [Link]
the civil action, same facts were alleged. Defendants disclaimed liability by
establishing that Juanito is married and is no longer a minor living in the company
of his parents, and that he is also not an employee of Lim Koo. Thus, Neither Juanitos
parents can be made liable under vicarious liability (2180 of the NCC) nor the owner
of vehicle be the subsidiary liable under 103 of the RPC. Civil action: dismissed, since
petitioner already tried to execute the indemnity adjudged in the crim action and
Juanito already served subsidiary imprisonment by virtue of his inability to pay
indemnity. Petitioner insists on the liability of parents and truck owner. MR denied,
hence this petition.

Issue:

Whether or not Respondents can be made liable over the civil liability of
Juanito?

Held:

NO. 2180 par 5 of the NCC (primary liab-vicarious liab) only applies if the offender
is a
MINOR LIVING in the COMPANY of his PARENTS. In this case, Juanito was already
married and lives independently from his parents. 103 of the RPC (subsidiary liab)
only attaches if EER between the owner and offender is established and that the act
happened while he was discharging his duties (as employee). In this case, no
evidence was presented to establish such relationship.
Salvosa [Link]
G.R. No. 70458
October 5, 1988

Facts:

Petitioner Baguio Colleges Foundation (BCF) is an academic institution and an

institution of arts and trade. Petitioner Benjamin Salvosa is the President and
Chairman of the Board of BCF. The Baguio Colleges Foundation ROTC Unit had Jimmy
B. Abon as its duly appointed armorer. As armorer of the ROTC Unit, Abon received
his appointment from the AFP. Not being an employee of the BCF, he also received
his salary and orders from the AFP. Abon was also a commerce student of the BCF.
On 3 March 1977, at around 8:00 p.m., in the parking space of BCF, Abon shot
Napoleon Castro a student of the University of Baguio with an unlicensed firearm
which the former took from the armory of the ROTC Unit of the BCF. As a result,
Castro died and Abon was prosecuted for, and convicted of the crime of Homicide by
Military Court. The heirs of Castro sued for damages. TC sentenced Abon, Salvosa
and BCF, jointly and severally liable to pay the heirs of Castro. CA affirmed with
modification in the amount of damages.

Issue:

Whether or not Salvosa and BCF can be held solidarity liable with Abon for
damages under Article 218012 of the Civil Code, as a consequence of the tortious act
of Abon.

Held:

No. Abon cannot be considered to have been "at attendance in the school," or
in the custody of BCF, when he shot Castro. Logically, therefore, Salvosa and BCF
cannot under Art. 2180 of the Civil Code be held solidarity liable with Abon for
damages resulting from his acts.

Rationale behind Art. 2180: So long as the student remains in the custody of a
teacher, the latter "stands, to a certain extent, in loco parentis [as to the student]
and
[is] called upon to exercise reasonable supervision over the conduct of the [student].
Amadoras vs. CA
GR No. L47745
April 15, 1988

Facts:

Alfredo Amadora, while in the auditorium of the school, was mortally hit by a
gun by Pablito Daffon resulting to the formers death. Daffon was convicted of
homicide through reckless imprudence. The victims parents, herein petitioners,
filed a civil action for damages against Colegio de San Jose-Recoletos, its rectors,
high school principal, dean of boys, the physics teacher together with Daffon and 2
other students. Complaints against the students were dropped. Respondent Court
absolved the defendants completely and reversed CFI Cebus decision for the
following reasons: 1. Since the school was an academic institution of learning and
not a school of arts and trades 2. That students were not in the custody of the school
since the semester has already ended 3. There was no clear identification of the fatal
gun, and 4. In any event, defendants exercised the necessary diligence through
enforcement of the school regulations in maintaining discipline. Petitioners on othe
other hand claimed their son was under school custody because he went to school to
comply with a requirement for graduation (submission of Physics reports).

Issue:

Whether or not Collegio de San Jose-Recoletos should be held liable.

Held:

No. The time Alfredo was fatally shot, he was in the custody of the authorities
of the school notwithstanding classes had formally ended when the incident
happened. It was immaterial if he was in the school auditorium to finish his physics
requirement. What was important is that he was there for a legitimate purpose. On
the other hand, the rector, high school principal and the dean of boys cannot be held
liable because none of them was the teacher-in-charge as defined in the provision.
Each was exercising only a general authority over the students and not direct control
and influence exerted by the teacher placed in-charge of particular classes.

In the absence of a teacher- in charge, dean of boys should probably be held liable
considering that he had earlier confiscated an unlicensed gun from a student and
later returned to him without taking disciplinary action or reporting the matter to
the higher authorities. Though it was clear negligence on his part, no proof was
shown to necessarily link this gun with the shooting incident.

Collegio San Jose-Recoletos cannot directly be held liable under the provision
because only the teacher of the head of school of arts and trade is made responsible
for the damage caused by the student. Hence, under the facts disclosed, none of the
respondents were held liable for the injury inflicted with Alfredo resulting to his
death.

REYNALDO PASCO vs COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF BULACAN

G.R. No. L-54357
April 25, 1988

Facts:

On August 24, 1979 at about 5:00 o'clock in the afternoon, petitioner, together
with two companions, while walking inside the campus of the private respondent
Araneta University, after attending classes in said university, was accosted and
mauled by a group of Muslim students led by Abdul Karim Madidis alias "Teng." Said
Muslim group were also students of the Araneta University. Petitioner was
subsequently stabbed by Abdul and as a consequence he was hospitalized at the
Manila Central University (MCU) Hospital where he underwent surgery to save his
life.

On October 5, 1979, petitioner, assisted by his father Pedro Pasco, filed a complaint
for damages against Abdul Karim Madidis and herein private respondent Gregorio
Araneta University which was docketed as Civil Case No. SM-1027. Said school was
impleaded as a party defendant based on the aforementioned provision of the Civil
Code.
Issue:

Whether the provision of the penultimate paragraph of Article 2180 of the

Civil Code is equally applicable to academic institutions.

Held:

No. Article 2180 states, teachers or heads of establishments of arts and

trades shall be liable for damages caused by their pupils and students or apprentices,
so long as they remain in their custody.

Theres no necessity of discussing the applicability of the Article to

educational institutions (which are not schools of arts and trades) for the issue in
this petition is actually whether or not, under the article, the school or the university
itself (as distinguished from the teachers or heads) is liable.

St. Marys Academy vs Carpitanos

G.R. No. 143363
February 6, 2002

Facts:

The case is about St. Marys liability for damages arising from an accident that
resulted in the death of a student who had joined a campaign to visit the public
schools in Dipolog City to solicit enrollment. Sherwin Capistranos was part of the
campaigning group. On the day of the incident, Sherwin rode a Mitsubishi Jeep
owned by Vicencio Villanueva. It was driven by James Daniel II then 15 years old and
a student of the same school. James Daniel was driving the car recklessly so it turned
turtle. Actually it was the detachment of the steering that caused it. Sherwin
Capistranos died as a result of the injuries he sustained from the accident. William
Carpitanos and Lucia Carpitanos filed on June 9, 1995 a case claiming damages for
their son Sherwin Carpitanos against James Daniel Sr. and Guada Daniel, the vehicle
owner, Vivencio Villanueva and St. Marys Academy before the RTC of Dipolog City.
St. Marys Academy was ordered to pay the complainants for damages. In case of the
insolvency of St. Marys Academy, James Daniel and Guada Daniel were also ordered
to pay Capistrano. Daniel is only subsidiarily liable. James Daniel was a minor during
the commission of the tort and was under the special parental authority of James
Daniel II. He was adjudged to have subsidiary liability with his parents.

Issue:

Whether the St. Marys should be liable for damages for the death of Sherwin
Capistranos.

Whether the Capistranos are entitled to the award of moral damages.

Held:

No to both issues.

Under Article 218 of the Family Code, the following shall have special parental
authority over a minor child while under their supervision, instruction or custody:
1.
The school, its administrators and teachers. 2. the individual, entity or institution
engaged in child care. This special parental authority and responsibility applies to
all
authorized activities inside or outside the premises of the school, entity or
institution.

Under Article 219 of the Family Code, if the person under custody is a minor,
those
exercising special parental authority are principally and solidarily liable for
damages
caused by the acts or omissions of the unemancipated minor under their
supervision, instruction or custody. In this case, there was no finding that the act
or omission considered negligent was the proximate cause of the injury caused
because the negligence, must have a causal connection to the accident. Daniel
spouses and Villanueva admitted that the immediate cause of the accident was not
the negligence of the petitioner or the reckless driving of James Daniel II, but the
detachment of the steering wheel guide of the Jeep. There was no evidence that the
petitioner school allowed the minor James Daniel II to drive the Jeep of respondent
Vicencio Villanueva. IT was Ched Villanueva who had custody, control and
possession of the Jeep. The negligence of petitioner St. Marys Academy was only a
remote cause of the accident. Between the remote cause and the injury, there
intervened the negligence of the minors parents or the detachment of the steering
wheel guide of the jeep. St. Marys cannot be held liable for moral damages. Though
incapable of pecuniary estimation, moral damages may be recovered if they are the
proximate result of the defendants wrongful act or omission. In this case the cause
was not attributable to St. Marys Academy.

CHILD LEARNING CENTER, INC vs Tagorio

G.R. No. 150920
November 25, 2005
Facts:

During the school year 1990-1991, Timothy Tagorio was a Grade IV student at Marymount
School, an academic institution operated and maintained by Child Learning Center, Inc.
(CLC). Between 1-2pm of March 5, 1991, Timothy entered the boys CR at the 3rd floor of
the school to answer the call of nature. However, he found himself locked inside and
unable to get out. Timothy started to panic and so he banged and kicked the door and
yelled several times for help. When no helped arrived, he decided to open the window to
call for help. In the process of opening the window, Timothy went right through and fell
down 3 stories. He was hospitalized and given medical treatment for serious multiple
physical injuries. Sps. Basilio and Herminia Tagorio, parents of Timothy, filed an action
under Art. 2176 of CC against the CLC, the members of its Board of Directors (Sps. Edgardo
and Sylvia Limon, Alfonso Cruz, Carmelo Narciso, Luningning Salvador), and the
Administrative Officer of Marymount School, Ricardo Pilao.

In its defense, CLC maintained that there was nothing defective about the locking
mechanism of the door and that the fall of Timothy was not due to its fault or negligence.
It further maintained that it had exercised the due care and diligence of a good father of
a family to ensure the safety, well-being and convenience of its students. Court a quo
found in favor of respondents and ordered petitioners CLC and Sps. Limon to pay
respondents jointly and severally actual, compensatory, moral, and exemplary damages,
as well as attorneys fee. The trial court disregarded the corporate fiction of CLC and held
the Spouses Limon personally liable because they were the ones who actually managed
the affairs of the CLC. CA affirmed the decision in toto. MR denied. Hence, this petition
for certiorari.

Issue:

Whether the argument of petitioner that it exercised the due diligence of a good father
in the selection and supervision of employees is decisive in this case.

Held:

No. Due diligence in the selection and supervision of employees is applicable

where the employer is being held responsible for the acts or omissions of others
under Article 2180 of the Civil Code. In this case, CLCs liability is under Article 2176
of the Civil Code, premised on the fact of its own negligence in not ensuring that all
its doors are properly maintained, hence, the defense of such due diligence is not
applicable.
JOSEPH SALUDAGA vs FAR EASTERN UNIVERSITY
G.R. No. 179337
April 30, 2008

Facts:

Joseph Saludaga was a sophomore law student of respondent Far Eastern

University (FEU) when he was shot by Alejandro Rosete (Rosete), one of the security
guards on duty at the school premises on August 18, 1996. Petitioner was rushed to
FEU-Dr. Nicanor Reyes Medical Foundation (FEU-NRMF) due to the wound he
sustained.6 Meanwhile, Rosete was brought to the police station where he explained
that the shooting was accidental. He was eventually released considering that no
formal complaint was filed against him.

Saludaga thereafter filed a complaint for damages against respondents on the ground
that they breached their obligation to provide students with a safe and secure
environment and an atmosphere conducive to learning. Respondents, in turn, filed a
Third-Party Complaint7 against Galaxy Development and Management Corporation
(Galaxy), the agency contracted by respondent FEU to provide security services
within its premises and Mariano D. Imperial (Imperial), Galaxy's President, to
indemnify them for whatever would be adjudged in favor of petitioner, if any; and
to pay attorney's fees and cost of the suit. On the other hand, Galaxy and Imperial
filed a Fourth-Party Complaint against AFP General Insurance. On November 10,
2004, the trial court rendered a decision in favor of petitioner.

Issue:

Whether or not Saludaga may claim damages from FEU for breach of student-
school contract for a safe learning environment.

Whether FEUs liability is based on quasi-delict or on contract.

Held:

Yes. FEUs liability is based on contract, not quasi-delict.

Quasi-delict vicarious liability between Galaxy Agency and security guard Rosete
Quasi-delict but SC held that there is no vicarious liability between FEU and Rosete
Quasi-delict damage to FEU due to the negligence of Galaxy Agency in supplying
FEU with an unqualified guard (Imperial, the president of Galaxy is solidarily liable
with the agency)

It is undisputed that Saludaga was enrolled as a sophomore law student in

FEU. As such, there was created a contractual obligation between the two parties.
On Saludaga's part, he was obliged to comply with the rules and regulations of the
school. On the other hand, FEU, as a learning institution is mandated to impart
knowledge and equip its students with the necessary skills to pursue higher
education or a profession. At the same time, it is obliged to ensure and take adequate
steps to maintain peace and order within the campus.

It is settled that in culpa contractual, the mere proof of the existence of the
contract and the failure of its compliance justify, prima facie, a corresponding right
of relief. In the instant case when Saludaga was shot inside the campus by no less
the security guard who was hired to maintain peace and secure the premises, there
is a prima facie showing that FEU failed to comply with its obligation to provide a
safe and secure environment to its students.

In order to avoid liability, however, FEU alleged that the shooting incident
was a fortuitous event because they could not have reasonably foreseen nor avoided
the accident caused by Rosete as he was not their employee; and that they complied
with their obligation to ensure a safe learning environment for their students by
having exercised due diligence in selecting the security services of Galaxy.

After a thorough review of the records, the SC found that FEU failed to
discharge the burden of proving that they exercised due diligence in providing a safe
learning environment for their students. They failed to prove that they ensured that
the guards assigned in the campus met the requirements stipulated in the Security
Service Agreement. Certain documents about Galaxy were presented during trial;
however, no evidence as to the qualifications of Rosete as a security guard for the
university was offered. FEU also failed to show that they undertook steps to
ascertain and confirm that the security guards assigned to them actually possess the
qualifications required in the Security Service Agreement.

Consequently, FEU's defense of force majeure must fail. In order for force
majeure to be considered, FEU must show that no negligence or misconduct was
committed that may have occasioned the loss. An act of God cannot be invoked to
protect a person who has failed to take steps to forestall the possible adverse
consequences of such a loss. When the effect is found to be partly the result of a
person's participation - whether by active intervention, neglect or failure to act - the
whole occurrence is humanized and removed from the rules applicable to acts of
God.

Article 1170 of the Civil Code provides that those who are negligent in the
performance of their obligations are liable for damages. Accordingly, for breach of
contract due to negligence in providing a safe learning environment, respondent FEU
is liable to petitioner for damages.
St. Francis High School vs. CA
G.R. No. 82465
February 25, 1991

Facts:

Ferdinand Castillo, then a freshman student of Section 1-C at the St. Francis
High School, wanted to join a school picnic undertaken by Class I-B and Class I-C at
Talaan Beach, Sariaya, Quezon. Ferdinand's parents, respondents spouses Dr.
Romulo Castillo and Lilia Cadiz Castillo, because of short notice, did not allow their
son to join but merely allowed him to bring food to the teachers for the picnic, with
the directive that he should go back home after doing so. However, because of
persuasion of the teachers, Ferdinand went on with them to the beach.

During the picnic and while the students, including Ferdinand, were in the
water, one of the female teachers was apparently drowning. Some of the students,
including Ferdinand, came to her rescue, but in the process, it was Ferdinand himself
who drowned. His body was recovered but efforts to resuscitate him ashore failed.
Thereupon, the Castillo spouses filed a complaint against the St. Francis High School,
represented by the spouses Fernando Nantes and Rosario Lacandula, Benjamin
Illumin (its principal), and the teachers: Tirso de Chaves, Luisito Vinas, Connie
Arquio, Nida Aragones, Yoly Jaro, and Patria Cadiz, for Damages which respondents
allegedly incurred from the death of their 13-year old son, Ferdinand Castillo.

The TC found in favor of the Castillo spouses and against petitioners-teachers

Arquio, de Chaves, Vinas, Aragones, Jaro and Cadiz. On the other hand, the TC
dismissed. the case against the St. Francis High School, Benjamin Illumin and Aurora
Cadorna. While it is alleged that when defendants Yoly Jaro and Nida Aragones
arrived at the picnic site, the drowning incident had already occurred, such fact does
not and cannot excuse them from their liability. In fact, it could be said that by
coming late, they were remiss in their duty to safeguard the
students. Benjamin Illumin had himself not consented to the picnic and in fact he did
not join it. Defendant Aurora Cadorna had then her own class to supervise and in
fact she was not amongst those allegedly invited by defendant Connie Arquio to
supervise class I-C to which Ferdinand
Castillo belongs.

Issue:

Whether or not there was negligence attributable to the school officials which
will
warrant the award of damages to the Castillo spouses;

Whether or not Art. 2180, in relation to Art. 2176 of the New Civil Code is
applicable to
the case at bar;

Whether or not the award of exemplary and moral damages is proper under
the
circumstances surrounding the case at bar.

Held:

No. There was no negligence attributable to the school officials which will
warrant the award of damages to the Castillo spouses. The school officials are
neither guilty of their own negligence or guilty of the negligence of those under
them. Consequently, they are not liable for damages. No. Art. 2180, in relation to
Art. 2176 of the New Civil Code is not applicable to the case at bar.
Before an employer may be held liable for the negligence of his employee, the act or
omission which caused damage or prejudice must have occurred while an employee
was in the performance of his assigned tasks. In the case at bar, the
teachers/petitioners were not in the actual performance of their assigned tasks. The
incident happened not within the school premises, not on a school day and most
importantly while the teachers and students were holding a purely private affair, a
picnic. It is clear from the beginning that the incident happened while some members
of the I-C class of St. Francis High School were having a picnic at Talaan Beach. This
picnic had no permit from the school head or its principal, Benjamin Illumin because
this picnic is not a school sanctioned activity neither is it considered as an extra-
curricular activity. Mere knowledge by petitioner/principal Illumin of the planning
of the picnic by the students and their teachers does not in any way or in any manner
show acquiescence
or consent to the holding of the same.

No. The award of exemplary and moral damages is improper under the
circumstances surrounding the case at bar. No negligence could be attributable to
the petitioners-teachers to warrant the award of damages to the respondents-
spouses. Petitioners Connie Arquio the class adviser of I-C, the section where
Ferdinand belonged, did her best and exercised diligence of a good father of a family
to prevent any untoward incident or damages to all the students who joined the
picnic. With these facts in mind, no moral nor exemplary damages may be awarded
in favor of respondents-spouses. The case at bar does not fall under any of the
grounds to grant moral damages.

PSBA vs. Court of Appeals

G.R. No. 84698
February 4, 1992

Facts:
 Carlitos Bautista was a third year commerce student in PSBA. In Aug 30, 1985,
he was stabbed while on the 2nd floor of the school, causing his death. It was
established that the assailants were not students of PSBA. The parents of Carlitos
filed a damage suit against PSBA and its school authorities for the death of their
child. Petitioners filed a motion to dismiss, alleging that since they are presumably
sued under Article 2180 of the Civil Code, the complaint states no cause of action
against them, as jurisprudence on the subject is to the effect that academic
institutions, such as the PSBA, are beyond the ambit of the rule in the afore-stated
article. RTC dismissed the MTD. CA affirmed. The CA ratiocinated as follows:
Article 2180 (formerly Article 1903) of the Civil Code is an adoption from the old
Spanish Civil Code. The comments of Manresa and learned authorities on its meaning
should give way to present day changes. The law is not fixed and flexible (sic); it
must be dynamic. In fact, the greatest value and significance of law as a rule of
conduct in (sic) its flexibility to adopt to changing social conditions and its capacity
to meet the new challenges of progress. Construed in the light of modern day
educational system, Article 2180 cannot be construed in its narrow concept as held
in the old case of Exconde vs. Capuno and Mercado vs. Court of Appeals; hence,
the ruling in the Palisoc case that it should apply to all kinds of educational
institutions, academic or [Link] any rate, the law holds the teachers and
heads of the school staff liable unless they relieve themselves of such liability
pursuant to the last paragraph of Article 2180 by "proving that they observed all the
diligence to prevent damage." This can only be done at a trial on the merits of the
case.

Issue:

Whether or not PSBA and its school authorities are vicariously liable for the
death of
Carlitos Bautista inside its premises.

Held:

NO, THEY ARE NOT LIABLE. Article 2180, in conjunction with Article 2176 of the
Civil Code, establishes the rule of in loco parentis. This Court discussed this doctrine
in the afore-cited cases of Exconde, Mendoza, Palisoc and, more recently, in Amadora
vs. Court of Appeals. 6 In all such cases, it had been stressed that the law (Article
2180) plainly provides that the damage should have been caused or inflicted by
pupils or students of he educational institution sought to be held liable for the acts
of its pupils or students while in its custody. However, this material situation does
not exist in the present case for, as earlier indicated, the assailants of Carlitos were
not students of the PSBA, for whose acts the school could be made liable.
Soliman vs. Tuazon
G.R. No. 66207
May 18, 1992

Facts:

Petitioner Soliman Jr. filed a civil complaint for damages against respondents
Republic Central Colleges, R.L. Security Agency, and Solomon, a security guard at
Republic. The complaint alleges that one morning, while Soliman was in the
premises of Republic, as he was still a regular enrolled student, Solomon with intent
to kill attacked and shot him in the abdomen. It is further alleged that such wound
would have caused his death, were it not for timely medical assistance, and because
of this he may not be able to attend his regular classes and perform his usual work
from three to four months. Republic Colleges filed a motion to dismiss, contending
that Soliman had no action against it. It averred that it should be free from liability
because it was not the employer of the security guard. Moreover, Article 2180 (7th
paragraph) did not apply, since such holds teachers and heads responsible only for
damages caused by their pupils and students/apprentices. The MTD was granted by
the judge. Hence this instant petition.

Issue:

Whether or not Republic Central Colleges may be held liable for damages.

Held:

REPUBLIC CENTRAL COLLEGES MAY NOT BE HELD LIABLE FOR DAMAGES

UNDER ARTICLE 2180 (AS AN EMPLOYER). HOWEVER, IT MAY BE LIABLE ON THE
BASIS OF AN IMPLIED CONTRACT. Petition GRANTED. Order REVERSED AND SET
ASIDE. Case REMANDED to the court a quo for further proceedings.

Under Article 2180 of the NCC, employers shall be liable for the damages
caused by their employees and household helpers acting within the scope of
their assigned tasks, even though the former are not engaged in any business
or industry. Also, teachers or heads of establishments of arts and trades shall be
liable for damages caused by their pupils, their students or apprentices, so long as
they remain in their custody. There is no basis to hold Republic liable under Article
2180. The employer of security guard Solomon was R.L. Security Agency Inc. Where
the security agency, as here, recruits, hires and assigns the work of its watchmen or
security guards, the agency is the employer of such guards or watchmen. Liability
for illegal or harmful acts committed by the security guards attaches to the employer
agency, and not to the clients or customers of such agency. The fact that a client
company may give instructions or directions to the security
guards assigned to it, does not, by itself, render the client responsible as an
employer. Solomon was neither a pupil nor a student of Republic. Hence, the
provision with liable for damages.
Nevertheless, Republic may be held liable on the basis of an implied contract
between it and Soliman, because of its obligation to maintain peace and order within
the campus premises and to prevent the breakdown thereof. Should this be the case,
the school may still avoid liability by proving that the breach of its contractual
obligation to the students was not due to its negligence, here statutorily defined to
be the omission of that degree of diligence which is required by the nature of
obligation and corresponding to the circumstances of person, time and place.
Respondent trial judge was in serious error when he supposed that petitioner could
have no cause of action other than one based on Article 2180 of the Civil Code.
Respondent trial judge should not have granted the motion to dismiss but rather
should have, in the interest of justice, allowed petitioner to prove acts constituting
breach of an obligation ex contractu or ex lege on the part of respondent Colleges.