MOST REV. PEDRO ARIGO, et. al., Petitioners, vs. SCOTT H. SWIFT, et. al., Respondents.

G.R. No. 206510 September 16, 2014

FACTS:

The USS Guardian is an Avenger-class mine countermeasures ship of the US Navy. In December 2012, the US Embassy in
the Philippines requested diplomatic clearance for the said vessel to enter and exit the territorial waters of the Philippines and to arrive
at the port of Subic Bay for the purpose of routine ship replenishment, maintenance, and crew liberty. On January 6, 2013, the ship left
Sasebo, Japan for Subic Bay, arriving on January 13, 2013 after a brief stop for fuel in Okinawa, Japan

On January 15, 2013, the USS Guardian departed Subic Bay for its next port of call in Makassar, Indonesia. On January 17,
2013 at 2:20 a.m. while transiting the Sulu Sea, the ship ran aground on the northwest side of South Shoal of the Tubbataha Reefs, about
80 miles east-southeast of Palawan. No one was injured in the incident, and there have been no reports of leaking fuel or oil.

Petitioners claim that the grounding, salvaging and post-salvaging operations of the USS Guardian cause and continue to cause
environmental damage of such magnitude as to affect the provinces of Palawan, Antique, Aklan, Guimaras, Iloilo, Negros Occidental,
Negros Oriental, Zamboanga del Norte, Basilan, Sulu, and Tawi-Tawi, which events violate their constitutional rights to a balanced and
healthful ecology.

ISSUES:

Whether or not petitioners have legal standing.

Whether or not US respondents may be held liable for damages caused by USS Guardian.

Whether or not the waiver of immunity from suit under VFA applies in this case.

HELD:

First issue: YES

Petitioners have legal standing

Locus standi is a right of appearance in a court of justice on a given question. Specifically, it is a partys personal and
substantial interest in a case where he has sustained or will sustain direct injury as a result of the act being challenged, and calls for
more than just a generalized grievance. However, the rule on standing is a procedural matter which this Court has relaxed for non-
traditional plaintiffs like ordinary citizens, taxpayers and legislators when the public interest so requires, such as when the subject matter
of the controversy is of transcendental importance, of overreaching significance to society, or of paramount public interest

In the landmark case of Oposa v. Factoran, Jr., we recognized the public right of citizens to a balanced and healthful
ecology which, for the first time in our constitutional history, is solemnly incorporated in the fundamental law. We declared that the
right to a balanced and healthful ecology need not be written in the Constitution for it is assumed, like other civil and polittcal rights
guaranteed in the Bill of Rights, to exist from the inception of mankind and it is an issue of transcendental importance with
intergenerational implications. Such right carries with it the correlative duty to refrain from impairing the environment.

On the novel element in the class suit filed by the petitioners minors in Oposa, this Court ruled that not only do ordinary
citizens have legal standing to sue for the enforcement of environmental rights, they can do so in representation of their own and future
generations.

Second issue: YES.

The US respondents were sued in their official capacity as commanding officers of the US Navy who had control and
supervision over the USS Guardian and its crew. The alleged act or omission resulting in the unfortunate grounding of the USS Guardian
on the TRNP was committed while they were performing official military duties. Considering that the satisfaction of a judgment against
said officials will require remedial actions and appropriation of funds by the US government, the suit is deemed to be one against the
US itself. The principle of State immunity therefore bars the exercise of jurisdiction by this Court over the persons of respondents Swift,
Rice and Robling.

During the deliberations, Senior Associate Justice Antonio T. Carpio took the position that the conduct of the US in this case,
when its warship entered a restricted area in violation of R.A. No. 10067 and caused damage to the TRNP reef system, brings the matter
within the ambit of Article 31 of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). He explained that while historically,
warships enjoy sovereign immunity from suit as extensions of their flag State, Art. 31 of the UNCLOS creates an exception to this rule
in cases where they fail to comply with the rules and regulations of the coastal State regarding passage through the latters internal
waters and the territorial sea.

In the case of warships, as pointed out by Justice Carpio, they continue to enjoy sovereign immunity subject to the following
exceptions:

Article 30: Non-compliance by warships with the laws and regulations of the coastal State

If any warship does not comply with the laws and regulations of the coastal State concerning passage through the territorial sea
and disregards any request for compliance therewith which is made to it, the coastal State may require it to leave the territorial sea
immediately.

Article 31: Responsibility of the flag State for damage caused by a warship or other government ship operated for non-commercial
purposes

The flag State shall bear international responsibility for any loss or damage to the coastal State resulting from the non-
compliance by a warship or other government ship operated for non-commercial purposes with the laws and regulations of the coastal
State concerning passage through the territorial sea or with the provisions of this Convention or other rules of international law.

Article 32: Immunities of warships and other government ships operated for non-commercial purposes

With such exceptions as are contained in subsection A and in articles 30 and 31, nothing in this Convention affects the
immunities of warships and other government ships operated for non-commercial purposes. A foreign warships unauthorized entry into
our internal waters with resulting damage to marine resources is one situation in which the above provisions may apply.

But what if the offending warship is a non-party to the UNCLOS, as in this case, the US?

According to Justice Carpio, although the US to date has not ratified the UNCLOS, as a matter of long-standing policy the US
considers itself bound by customary international rules on the traditional uses of the oceans as codified in UNCLOS.

Moreover, Justice Carpio emphasizes that the US refusal to join the UNCLOS was centered on its disagreement with
UNCLOS regime of deep seabed mining (Part XI) which considers the oceans and deep seabed commonly owned by mankind,
pointing out that such has nothing to do with its the US acceptance of customary international rules on navigation.

The Court also fully concurred with Justice Carpios view that non-membership in the UNCLOS does not mean that the US
will disregard the rights of the Philippines as a Coastal State over its internal waters and territorial sea. We thus expect the US to bear
international responsibility under Art. 31 in connection with the USS Guardian grounding which adversely affected the Tubbataha
reefs. Indeed, it is difficult to imagine that our long-time ally and trading partner, which has been actively supporting the countrys
efforts to preserve our vital marine resources, would shirk from its obligation to compensate the damage caused by its warship while
transiting our internal waters. Much less can we comprehend a Government exercising leadership in international affairs, unwilling to
comply with the UNCLOS directive for all nations to cooperate in the global task to protect and preserve the marine environment as
provided in Article 197 of UNCLOS

Article 197: Cooperation on a global or regional basis

States shall cooperate on a global basis and, as appropriate, on a regional basis, directly or through competent international
organizations, in formulating and elaborating international rules, standards and recommended practices and procedures consistent with
this Convention, for the protection and preservation of the marine environment, taking into account characteristic regional features.

In fine, the relevance of UNCLOS provisions to the present controversy is beyond dispute. Although the said treaty upholds
the immunity of warships from the jurisdiction of Coastal States while navigating the latters territorial sea, the flag States shall be
required to leave the territorial sea immediately if they flout the laws and regulations of the Coastal State, and they will be liable for
damages caused by their warships or any other government vessel operated for non-commercial purposes under Article 31.

Third issue: NO.

The waiver of State immunity under the VF A pertains only to criminal jurisdiction and not to special civil actions such as the
present petition for issuance of a writ of Kalikasan. In fact, it can be inferred from Section 17, Rule 7 of the Rules that a criminal case
against a person charged with a violation of an environmental law is to be filed separatel.

The Court considered a view that a ruling on the application or non-application of criminal jurisdiction provisions of the VFA
to US personnel who may be found responsible for the grounding of the USS Guardian, would be premature and beyond the province
of a petition for a writ of Kalikasan.
 The Court also found unnecessary at this point to determine whether such waiver of State immunity is indeed absolute. In the
same vein, we cannot grant damages which have resulted from the violation of environmental laws. The Rules allows the recovery of
damages, including the collection of administrative fines under R.A. No. 10067, in a separate civil suit or that deemed instituted with
the criminal action charging the same violation of an environmental law.

G.R. No. 209271

International Service for the Acquisition of Agri-Biotech Applications, Inc. v. Greenpeace Southeast Asia (Philippines)

International Service for the Acquisition of Agri-Biotech Applications, Inc. v. Greenpeace Southeast Asia (Philippines), G.R. Nos.
209271, 209276, 209301 & 209430 (December 8, 2015)

Supreme Court of the Philippines

The Supreme Court of the Philippines upheld a lower court decision invalidating an administrative order governing import and release
of genetically-modified organisms (GMOs) in the Philippines. The Court addressed a range of issues, from standing and mootness to
application of the precautionary principle. On the procedural claims by the petitioners that the case was moot and academic because
all field trials had been suspended, the Supreme Court found the paramount public interest in the case and the fact that the legal issues
were capable of repetition yet evading review justified the Courts review of the case. Page 38. The Court also noted the petitioners
were warranted in seeking judicial review because the biotechnology administrative framework does not provide a speedy, or adequate
remedy. Page 40.

The decision explains the current controversy over GMOs and, in particular, genetically-modified food crops for human consumption.
Drawing on research and case studies from around the world, and the testimony of expert witnesses, the Supreme Court found there to
be no consensus on the safety of Bt talong to humans and the environment, stating [t]hese divergent views of local scientists reflect the
continuing international debate on GMOs and the varying degrees of acceptance of GM technology by states . . . . Page 69. The Court
also cautioned that the uncertainties generated by conflicting scientific findings or limited research [are] not diminished by extensive
use at present of GM technology in agriculture. Page 70.

Turning to the existing biosafety regulation in the Philippines, the Supreme Court found Administrative Order (DAO) 08-2002 deficient
because it lacks provisions for meaningful, participatory, and transparent public consultation prior to field trials and contains no
mechanisms requiring applicants seeking to import or release GMOs to comply with international biosafety standards. Pages 89-91.
The Court also found that officials should have complied with environmental impact assessment (EIA) procedures prior to approving
release of Bt talong. Pages 91-92.

Invoking the precautionary principle, the Supreme Court blocked further field trials of Bt talong until regulatory systems governing the
import and release of GMOs are strengthened. When these features - uncertainty, the possibility of irreversible harm, and the possibility
of serious harm - coincide, the case for the precautionary principle is strongest. When in doubt, cases must be resolved in favor of the
constitutional right to a balanced and healthful ecology. Page 100. The Court proceeded to nullify DAO 08-2002 and enjoined
applications for contained use, field testing, propagation and commercialization, and importation of any GMOs until a new
administrative order is adopted. Page 102.

Oposa vs. Factoran Case Digest (G.R. No. 101083, July 30, 1993)

FACTS:

The plaintiffs in this case are all minors duly represented and joined by their parents. The first complaint was filed as a taxpayer's class
suit at the Branch 66 (Makati, Metro Manila), of the Regional Trial Court, National capital Judicial Region against defendant
(respondent) Secretary of the Department of Environment and Natural Reasources (DENR). Plaintiffs alleged that they are entitled to
the full benefit, use and enjoyment of the natural resource treasure that is the country's virgin tropical forests. They further asseverate
that they represent their generation as well as generations yet unborn and asserted that continued deforestation have caused a distortion
and disturbance of the ecological balance and have resulted in a host of environmental tragedies.

Plaintiffs prayed that judgement be rendered ordering the respondent, his agents, representatives and other persons acting in his behalf
to cancel all existing Timber License Agreement (TLA) in the country and to cease and desist from receiving, accepting, processing,
renewing or approving new TLAs.

Defendant, on the other hand, filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that the complaint had no cause of action against him and that it
raises a political question.
The RTC Judge sustained the motion to dismiss, further ruling that granting of the relief prayed for would result in the impairment of
contracts which is prohibited by the Constitution.

Plaintiffs (petitioners) thus filed the instant special civil action for certiorari and asked the court to rescind and set aside the dismissal
order on the ground that the respondent RTC Judge gravely abused his discretion in dismissing the action.

ISSUES:

(1) Whether or not the plaintiffs have a cause of action.

(2) Whether or not the complaint raises a political issue.

(3) Whether or not the original prayer of the plaintiffs result in the impairment of contracts.

RULING:

First Issue: Cause of Action.

Respondents aver that the petitioners failed to allege in their complaint a specific legal right violated by the respondent Secretary for
which any relief is provided by law. The Court did not agree with this. The complaint focuses on one fundamental legal right -- the right
to a balanced and healthful ecology which is incorporated in Section 16 Article II of the Constitution. The said right carries with it the
duty to refrain from impairing the environment and implies, among many other things, the judicious management and conservation of
the country's forests. Section 4 of E.O. 192 expressly mandates the DENR to be the primary government agency responsible for the
governing and supervising the exploration, utilization, development and conservation of the country's natural resources. The policy
declaration of E.O. 192 is also substantially re-stated in Title XIV Book IV of the Administrative Code of 1987. Both E.O. 192 and
Administrative Code of 1987 have set the objectives which will serve as the bases for policy formation, and have defined the powers
and functions of the DENR. Thus, right of the petitioners (and all those they represent) to a balanced and healthful ecology is as clear
as DENR's duty to protect and advance the said right.

A denial or violation of that right by the other who has the correlative duty or obligation to respect or protect or respect the same gives
rise to a cause of action. Petitioners maintain that the granting of the TLA, which they claim was done with grave abuse of discretion,
violated their right to a balance and healthful ecology. Hence, the full protection thereof requires that no further TLAs should be renewed
or granted.

After careful examination of the petitioners' complaint, the Court finds it to be adequate enough to show, prima facie, the claimed
violation of their rights.

Second Issue: Political Issue.

Second paragraph, Section 1 of Article VIII of the constitution provides for the expanded jurisdiction vested upon the Supreme Court.
It allows the Court to rule upon even on the wisdom of the decision of the Executive and Legislature and to declare their acts as invalid
for lack or excess of jurisdiction because it is tainted with grave abuse of discretion.

Third Issue: Violation of the non-impairment clause.

The Court held that the Timber License Agreement is an instrument by which the state regulates the utilization and disposition of forest
resources to the end that public welfare is promoted. It is not a contract within the purview of the due process clause thus, the non-
impairment clause cannot be invoked. It can be validly withdraw whenever dictated by public interest or public welfare as in this case.
The granting of license does not create irrevocable rights, neither is it property or property rights.

Moreover, the constitutional guaranty of non-impairment of obligations of contract is limit by the exercise by the police power of the
State, in the interest of public health, safety, moral and general welfare. In short, the non-impairment clause must yield to the police
power of the State.

The instant petition, being impressed with merit, is hereby GRANTED and the RTC decision is SET ASIDE.

G.R. No. 199199 August 27, 2013

MARICRIS D. DOLOT, CHAIRMAN OF THE BAGONG ALYANSANG MAKABAYAN-SORSOGON, PETITIONER vs.

HON. RAMON PAJE, IN HIS CAPACITY AS THE SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENT AND NATURAL
RESOURCES, REYNULFO A. JUAN, REGIONAL DIRECTOR, MINES AND GEOSCIENCES BUREAU, DENR, HON. RAUL R.
LEE, GOVERNOR, PROVINCE OF SORSOGON, ANTONIO C. OCAMPO, JR., VICTORIA A. AJERO, ALFREDO M. AGUILAR,
AND JUAN M. AGUILAR, ANTONES ENTERPRISES, GLOBAL SUMMIT MINES DEV'T CORP., AND TR ORE,
RESPONDENTS.

DECISION

This is a petition for review on certiorari1 under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court assailing the Order2 dated September 16, 2011
and Resolution3 dated October 18, 2011 issued by the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Sorsogon, Branch 53. The assailed issuances
dismissed Civil Case No. 2011-8338 for Continuing Mandamus, Damages and Attorneys Fees with Prayer for the Issuance of a
Temporary Environment Protection Order.

Antecedent Facts

On September 15, 2011, petitioner Maricris D. Dolot (Dolot), together with the parish priest of the Holy Infant Jesus Parish
and the officers of Alyansa Laban sa Mina sa Matnog (petitioners), filed a petition for continuing mandamus, damages and attorneys
fees with the RTC of Sorsogon, docketed as Civil Case No. 2011-8338.4 The petition contained the following pertinent allegations: (1)
sometime in 2009, they protested the iron ore mining operations being conducted by Antones Enterprises, Global Summit Mines
Development Corporation and TR Ore in Barangays Balocawe and Bon-ot Daco, located in the Municipality of Matnog, to no avail; (2)
Matnog is located in the southern tip of Luzon and there is a need to protect, preserve and maintain the geological foundation of the
municipality; (3) Matnog is susceptible to flooding and landslides, and confronted with the environmental dangers of flood hazard,
liquefaction, ground settlement, ground subsidence and landslide hazard; (4) after investigation, they learned that the mining operators
did not have the required permit to operate; (5) Sorsogon Governor Raul Lee and his predecessor Sally Lee issued to the operators a
small-scale mining permit, which they did not have authority to issue; (6) the representatives of the Presidential Management Staff and
the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR), despite knowledge, did not do anything to protect the interest of the
people of Matnog;5 and (7) the respondents violated Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7076 or the Peoples Small-Scale Mining Act of 1991,
R.A. No. 7942 or the Philippine Mining Act of 1995, and the Local Government Code.6 Thus, they prayed for the following reliefs: (1)
the issuance of a writ commanding the respondents to immediately stop the mining operations in the Municipality of Matnog; (2) the
issuance of a temporary environment protection order or TEPO; (3) the creation of an inter-agency group to undertake the rehabilitation
of the mining site; (4) award of damages; and (5) return of the iron ore, among others.7

The case was referred by the Executive Judge to the RTC of Sorsogon, Branch 53 being the designated environmental court.8
In the Order9 dated September 16, 2011, the case was summarily dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.

The petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration but it was denied in the Resolution10 dated October 18, 2011. Aside from
sustaining the dismissal of the case for lack of jurisdiction, the RTC11 further ruled that: (1) there was no final court decree, order or
decision yet that the public officials allegedly failed to act on, which is a condition for the issuance of the writ of continuing mandamus;
(2) the case was prematurely filed as the petitioners therein failed to exhaust their administrative remedies; and (3) they also failed to
attach judicial affidavits and furnish a copy of the complaint to the government or appropriate agency, as required by the rules.12

Petitioner Dolot went straight to this Court on pure questions of law.

Issues

The main issue in this case is whether the RTC-Branch 53 has jurisdiction to resolve Civil Case No. 2011-8338. The other
issue is whether the petition is dismissible on the grounds that: (1) there is no final court decree, order or decision that the public officials
allegedly failed to act on; (2) the case was prematurely filed for failure to exhaust administrative remedies; and (3) the petitioners failed
to attach judicial affidavits and furnish a copy of the complaint to the government or appropriate agency.

Ruling of the Court

Jurisdiction and Venue

In dismissing the petition for lack of jurisdiction, the RTC, in its Order dated September 16, 2011, apparently relied on SC
Administrative Order (A.O.) No. 7 defining the territorial areas of the Regional Trial Courts in Regions 1 to 12, and Administrative
Circular (Admin. Circular) No. 23-2008,13 designating the environmental courts "to try and decide violations of environmental laws x
x x committed within their respective territorial jurisdictions."14 Thus, it ruled that its territorial jurisdiction was limited within the
boundaries of Sorsogon City and the neighboring municipalities of Donsol, Pilar, Castilla, Casiguran and Juban and that it was "bereft
of jurisdiction to entertain, hear and decide [the] case, as such authority rests before another co-equal court."15

Such reasoning is plainly erroneous. The RTC cannot solely rely on SC A.O. No. 7 and Admin. Circular No. 23-2008 and
confine itself within its four corners in determining whether it had jurisdiction over the action filed by the petitioners.
None is more well-settled than the rule that jurisdiction, which is the power and authority of the court to hear, try and decide a case, is
conferred by law.16 It may either be over the nature of the action, over the subject matter, over the person of the defendants or over the
issues framed in the pleadings.17 By virtue of Batas Pambansa (B.P.) Blg. 129 or the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980, jurisdiction
over special civil actions for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus is vested in the RTC. Particularly, Section 21(1) thereof provides that
the RTCs shall exercise original jurisdiction

in the issuance of writs of certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto, habeas corpus and injunction which may be
enforced in any part of their respective regions. (Emphasis ours)

A.O. No. 7 and Admin. Circular No. 23-2008 was issued pursuant to Section 18 of B.P. Blg. 129, which gave the Court authority
to define the territory over which a branch of the RTC shall exercise its authority. These administrative orders and circulars issued by
the Court merely provide for the venue where an action may be filed. The Court does not have the power to confer jurisdiction on any
court or tribunal as the allocation of jurisdiction is lodged solely in Congress.18 It also cannot be delegated to another office or agency
of the Government.19 Section 18 of B.P. Blg. 129, in fact, explicitly states that the territory thus defined shall be deemed to be the
territorial area of the branch concerned for purposes of determining the venue of all suits, proceedings or actions. It was also clarified
in Office of the Court Administrator v. Judge Matas20 that

Administrative Order No. 3 [defining the territorial jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Courts in the National Capital Judicial
Region] and, in like manner, Circular Nos. 13 and 19, did not per se confer jurisdiction on the covered regional trial courts or its branches,
such that non-observance thereof would nullify their judicial acts. The administrative order merely defines the limits of the administrative
area within which a branch of the court may exercise its authority pursuant to the jurisdiction conferred by Batas Pambansa Blg. 129.21

The RTC need not be reminded that venue relates only to the place of trial or the geographical location in which an action or
proceeding should be brought and does not equate to the jurisdiction of the court. It is intended to accord convenience to the parties, as
it relates to the place of trial, and does not restrict their access to the courts.22 Consequently, the RTCs motu proprio dismissal of Civil
Case No. 2011-8338 on the ground of lack of jurisdiction is patently incorrect.

At most, the error committed by the petitioners in filing the case with the RTC of Sorsogon was that of improper venue. A.M.
No. 09-6-8-SC or the Rules of Procedure for Environmental Cases (Rules) specifically states that a special civil action for continuing
mandamus shall be filed with the "[RTC] exercising jurisdiction over the territory where the actionable neglect or omission occurred x
x x."23 In this case, it appears that the alleged actionable neglect or omission occurred in the Municipality of Matnog and as such, the
petition should have been filed in the RTC of Irosin.24 But even then, it does not warrant the outright dismissal of the petition by the
RTC as venue may be waived.25 Moreover, the action filed by the petitioners is not criminal in nature where venue is an essential
element of jurisdiction.26 In Gomez-Castillo v. Commission on Elections,27 the Court even expressed that what the RTC should have
done under the circumstances was to transfer the case (an election protest) to the proper branch. Similarly, it would serve the higher
interest of justice28 if the Court orders the transfer of Civil Case No. 2011 8338 to the RTC of Irosin for proper and speedy resolution,
with the RTC applying the Rules in its disposition of the case.

At this juncture, the Court affirms the continuing applicability of Admin. Circular No. 23-2008 constituting the different "green
courts" in the country and setting the administrative guidelines in the raffle and disposition of environmental cases. While the designation
and guidelines were made in 2008, the same should operate in conjunction with the Rules.

A.M. No. 09-6-8-SC: Rules of Procedure for Environmental Cases

In its Resolution dated October 18, 2011, which resolved the petitioners motion for reconsideration of the order of dismissal,
the RTC further ruled that the petition was dismissible on the following grounds: (1) there is no final court decree, order or decision yet
that the public officials allegedly failed to act on; (2) the case was prematurely filed for failure to exhaust administrative remedies; and
(3) there was failure to attach judicial affidavits and furnish a copy of the complaint to the government or appropriate agency.29 The
respondents, and even the Office of the Solicitor General, in behalf of the public respondents, all concur with the view of the RTC.

The concept of continuing mandamus was first introduced in Metropolitan Manila Development Authority v. Concerned
Residents of Manila Bay.30 Now cast in stone under Rule 8 of the Rules, the writ of continuing mandamus enjoys a distinct procedure
than that of ordinary civil actions for the enforcement/violation of environmental laws, which are covered by Part II (Civil Procedure).
Similar to the procedure under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court for special civil actions for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus, Section
4, Rule 8 of the Rules requires that the petition filed should be sufficient in form and substance before a court may take further action;
otherwise, the court may dismiss the petition outright. Courts must be cautioned, however, that the determination to give due course to
the petition or dismiss it outright is an exercise of discretion that must be applied in a reasonable manner in consonance with the spirit
of the law and always with the view in mind of seeing to it that justice is served.31

Sufficiency in form and substance refers to the contents of the petition filed under Rule 8, Section 1:
When any agency or instrumentality of the government or officer thereof unlawfully neglects the performance of an act which the law
specifically enjoins as a duty resulting from an office, trust or station in connection with the enforcement or violation of an environmental
law rule or regulation or a right therein, or unlawfully excludes another from the use or enjoyment of such right and there is no other
plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, the person aggrieved thereby may file a verified petition in the proper
court, alleging the facts with certainty, attaching thereto supporting evidence, specifying that the petition concerns an environmental
law, rule or regulation, and praying that judgment be rendered commanding the respondent to do an act or series of acts until the
judgment is fully satisfied, and to pay damages sustained by the petitioner by reason of the malicious neglect to perform the duties of
the respondent, under the law, rules or regulations. The petition shall also contain a sworn certification of non-forum shopping.1wphi1

On matters of form, the petition must be verified and must contain supporting evidence as well as a sworn certification of non-forum
shopping. It is also necessary that the petitioner must be one who is aggrieved by an act or omission of the government agency,
instrumentality or its officer concerned. Sufficiency of substance, on the other hand, necessitates that the petition must contain
substantive allegations specifically constituting an actionable neglect or omission and must establish, at the very least, a prima facie
basis for the issuance of the writ, viz: (1) an agency or instrumentality of government or its officer unlawfully neglects the performance
of an act or unlawfully excludes another from the use or enjoyment of a right; (2) the act to be performed by the government agency,
instrumentality or its officer is specifically enjoined by law as a duty; (3) such duty results from an office, trust or station in connection
with the enforcement or violation of an environmental law, rule or regulation or a right therein; and (4) there is no other plain, speedy
and adequate remedy in the course of law.32

The writ of continuing mandamus is a special civil action that may be availed of "to compel the performance of an act specifically
enjoined by law."33 The petition should mainly involve an environmental and other related law, rule or regulation or a right therein.
The RTCs mistaken notion on the need for a final judgment, decree or order is apparently based on the definition of the writ of
continuing mandamus under Section 4, Rule 1 of the Rules, to wit:

(c) Continuing mandamus is a writ issued by a court in an environmental case directing any agency or instrumentality of the government
or officer thereof to perform an act or series of acts decreed by final judgment which shall remain effective until judgment is fully
satisfied. (Emphasis ours)

The final court decree, order or decision erroneously alluded to by the RTC actually pertains to the judgment or decree that a court
would eventually render in an environmental case for continuing mandamus and which judgment or decree shall subsequently become
final.

Under the Rules, after the court has rendered a judgment in conformity with Rule 8, Section 7 and such judgment has become final, the
issuing court still retains jurisdiction over the case to ensure that the government agency concerned is performing its tasks as mandated
by law and to monitor the effective performance of said tasks. It is only upon full satisfaction of the final judgment, order or decision
that a final return of the writ shall be made to the court and if the court finds that the judgment has been fully implemented, the satisfaction
of judgment shall be entered in the court docket.34 A writ of continuing mandamus is, in essence, a command of continuing compliance
with a final judgment as it "permits the court to retain jurisdiction after judgment in order to ensure the successful implementation of
the reliefs mandated under the courts decision."35

The Court, likewise, cannot sustain the argument that the petitioners should have first filed a case with the Panel of Arbitrators (Panel),
which has jurisdiction over mining disputes under R.A. No. 7942.

Indeed, as pointed out by the respondents, the Panel has jurisdiction over mining disputes.36 But the petition filed below does not
involve a mining dispute. What was being protested are the alleged negative environmental impact of the small-scale mining operation
being conducted by Antones Enterprises, Global Summit Mines Development Corporation and TR Ore in the Municipality of Matnog;
the authority of the Governor of Sorsogon to issue mining permits in favor of these entities; and the perceived indifference of the DENR
and local government officials over the issue. Resolution of these matters does not entail the technical knowledge and expertise of the
members of the Panel but requires an exercise of judicial function. Thus, in Olympic Mines and Development Corp. v. Platinum Group
Metals Corporation,37 the Court stated

Arbitration before the Panel of Arbitrators is proper only when there is a disagreement between the parties as to some provisions of the
contract between them, which needs the interpretation and the application of that particular knowledge and expertise possessed by
members of that Panel. It is not proper when one of the parties repudiates the existence or validity of such contract or agreement on the
ground of fraud or oppression as in this case. The validity of the contract cannot be subject of arbitration proceedings. Allegations of
fraud and duress in the execution of a contract are matters within the jurisdiction of the ordinary courts of law. These questions are legal
in nature and require the application and interpretation of laws and jurisprudence which is necessarily a judicial function.38 (Emphasis
supplied in the former and ours in the latter)
Consequently, resort to the Panel would be completely useless and unnecessary.

The Court also finds that the RTC erred in ruling that the petition is infirm for failure to attach judicial affidavits. As previously stated,
Rule 8 requires that the petition should be verified, contain supporting evidence and must be accompanied by a sworn certification of
non-forum shopping. There is nothing in Rule 8 that compels the inclusion of judicial affidavits, albeit not prohibited. It is only if the
evidence of the petitioner would consist of testimony of witnesses that it would be the time that judicial affidavits (affidavits of witnesses
in the question and answer form) must be attached to the petition/complaint.39

Finally, failure to furnish a copy of the petition to the respondents is not a fatal defect such that the case should be dismissed. The RTC
could have just required the petitioners to furnish a copy of the petition to the respondents. It should be remembered that "courts are not
enslaved by technicalities, and they have the prerogative to relax compliance with procedural rules of even the most mandatory character,
mindful of the duty to reconcile both the need to speedily put an end to litigation and the parties right to an opportunity to be heard."40

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Order dated September 16, 2011 and Resolution dated October 18, 2011 issued by the
Regional Trial Court of Sorsogon, Branch 53, dismissing Civil Case No. 2011-8338 are NULLIFIED AND SET ASIDE. The Executive
Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Sorsogon is DIRECTED to transfer the case to the Regional Trial Court of Irosin, Branch 55, for
further proceedings with dispatch. Petitioner Maricris D. Dolot is also ORDERED to furnish the respondents with a copy of the petition
and its annexes within ten (10) days from receipt of this Decision and to submit its Compliance with the RTC of Irosin.

G.R. No.s 171947-48, December 18, 2008

Concerned Citizens vs MMDA Ponente: Velasco

Facts:

January 29, 1999, concerned residents of Manila Bay filed a complaint before the RTC Imus, Cavite against several government agencies
for the clean-up, rehabilitation and protection of the Manila Bay/ The complaint alleged that the water quality of Manila Bay is no longer
within the allowable standards set by law (esp. PD 1152, Philippine environment Code).

DENR testified for the petitioners and reported that the samples collected from the beaches around Manila Bay is beyond the safe level
for bathing standard of the DENR. MWSS testified also about MWSS efforts to reduce pollution along the bay. Philippine Ports
Authority presented as evidence its Memorandum Circulars on the study on ship-generated waste treatment and disposal as its Linis
Dagat project.

RTC ordered petitioners to Clean up and rehabilitate Manila Bay.

The petitioners appealed arguing that the Environment Code relate only to the cleaning of the specific pollution incidents and do not
cover cleaning in general. Raising the concerns of lack of funds appropriated for cleaning, and asserting that the cleaning of the bay is
not a ministerial act which can be compelled by mandamus.

CA sustained the RTC stressing that RTC did not require the agencies to do tasks outside of their usual basic functions.

Issue:

(1) Whether PD 1152 relate only to the cleaning of specific pollution incidents.

(2) Whether the cleaning or rehabilitation of the Manila Bay is not ministerial act of petitioners that can be compelled by mandamus.

Held:

(1) The cleaning of the Manila bay can be compelled by mandamus.

Petitioners obligation to perform their duties as defined by law, on one hand, and how they are to carry out such duties, on the other,
are two different concepts. While the implementation of the MMDAs mandated tasks may entail a decision-making process, the
enforcement of the law or the very act of doing what the law exacts to be done is ministerial in nature and may be compelled by
mandamus.

The MMDAs duty in the area of solid waste disposal, as may be noted, is set forth not only in the Environment Code (PD 1152) and
RA 9003, but in its charter as well. This duty of putting up a proper waste disposal system cannot be characterized as discretionary, for,
as earlier stated; discretion presupposes the power or right given by law to public functionaries to act officially according to their
judgment or conscience.

(2) Secs. 17 and 20 of the Environment Code

The disputed sections are quoted as follows:

Section 17. Upgrading of Water [Link] the quality of water has deteriorated to a degree where its state will adversely affect
its best usage, the government agencies concerned shall take such measures as may be necessary to upgrade the quality of such water to
meet the prescribed water quality standards.

Section 20. Clean-up [Link] shall be the responsibility of the polluter to contain, remove and clean-up water pollution incidents
at his own expense. In case of his failure to do so, the government agencies concerned shall undertake containment, removal and clean-
up operations and expenses incurred in said operations shall be charged against the persons and/or entities responsible for such pollution.

Sec. 17 does not in any way state that the government agencies concerned ought to confine themselves to the containment, removal, and
cleaning operations when a specific pollution incident occurs. On the contrary, Sec. 17 requires them to act even in the absence of a
specific pollution incident, as long as water quality has deteriorated to a degree where its state will adversely affect its best usage.
This section, to stress, commands concerned government agencies, when appropriate, to take such measures as may be necessary to
meet the prescribed water quality standards. In fine, the underlying duty to upgrade the quality of water is not conditional on the
occurrence of any pollution incident.

G.R. Nos. 171947-48 February 15, 2011

METROPOLITAN MANILA DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY, DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENT AND NATURAL

CONCERNED RESIDENTS OF MANILA BAY, represented and joined by DIVINA V. ILAS, SABINIANO ALBARRACIN,
MANUEL SANTOS, JR., DINAH DELA PEA, PAUL DENNIS QUINTERO, MA. VICTORIA LLENOS, DONNA CALOZA,
FATIMA QUITAIN, VENICE SEGARRA, FRITZIE TANGKIA, SARAH JOELLE LINTAG, HANNIBAL AUGUSTUS BOBIS,
FELIMON SANTIAGUEL, and JAIME AGUSTIN R. OPOSA, Respondents.

RESOLUTION

On December 18, 2008, this Court rendered a Decision in G.R. Nos. 171947-48 ordering petitioners to clean up, rehabilitate and preserve
Manila Bay in their different capacities. The fallo reads:

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The September 28, 2005 Decision of the CA in CA-G.R. CV No. 76528 and SP No. 74944 and
the September 13, 2002 Decision of the RTC in Civil Case No. 1851-99 are AFFIRMED but with MODIFICATIONS in view of
subsequent developments or supervening events in the case. The fallo of the RTC Decision shall now read:

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered ordering the abovenamed defendant-government agencies to clean up, rehabilitate, and
preserve Manila Bay, and restore and maintain its waters to SB level (Class B sea waters per Water Classification Tables under DENR
Administrative Order No. 34 [1990]) to make them fit for swimming, skin-diving, and other forms of contact recreation.

In particular

(1) Pursuant to Sec. 4 of EO 192, assigning the DENR as the primary agency responsible for the conservation, management,
development, and proper use of the countrys environment and natural resources, and Sec. 19 of RA 9275, designating the DENR as the
primary government agency responsible for its enforcement and implementation, the DENR is directed to fully implement its
Operational Plan for the Manila Bay Coastal Strategy for the rehabilitation, restoration, and conservation of the Manila Bay at the earliest
possible time. It is ordered to call regular coordination meetings with concerned government departments and agencies to ensure the
successful implementation of the aforesaid plan of action in accordance with its indicated completion schedules.

(2) Pursuant to Title XII (Local Government) of the Administrative Code of 1987 and Sec. 25 of the Local Government Code of 1991,
the DILG, in exercising the Presidents power of general supervision and its duty to promulgate guidelines in establishing waste
management programs under Sec. 43 of the Philippine Environment Code (PD 1152), shall direct all LGUs in Metro Manila, Rizal,
Laguna, Cavite, Bulacan, Pampanga, and Bataan to inspect all factories, commercial establishments, and private homes along the banks
of the major river systems in their respective areas of jurisdiction, such as but not limited to the Pasig-Marikina-San Juan Rivers, the
NCR (Paraaque-Zapote, Las Pias) Rivers, the Navotas-Malabon-Tullahan-Tenejeros Rivers, the Meycauayan-Marilao-Obando
(Bulacan) Rivers, the Talisay (Bataan) River, the Imus (Cavite) River, the Laguna De Bay, and other minor rivers and waterways that
eventually discharge water into the Manila Bay; and the lands abutting the bay, to determine whether they have wastewater treatment
facilities or hygienic septic tanks as prescribed by existing laws, ordinances, and rules and regulations. If none be found, these LGUs
shall be ordered to require non-complying establishments and homes to set up said facilities or septic tanks within a reasonable time to
prevent industrial wastes, sewage water, and human wastes from flowing into these rivers, waterways, esteros, and the Manila Bay,
under pain of closure or imposition of fines and other sanctions.

(3) As mandated by Sec. 8 of RA 9275, the MWSS is directed to provide, install, operate, and maintain the necessary adequate waste
water treatment facilities in Metro Manila, Rizal, and Cavite where needed at the earliest possible time.

(4) Pursuant to RA 9275, the LWUA, through the local water districts and in coordination with the DENR, is ordered to provide, install,
operate, and maintain sewerage and sanitation facilities and the efficient and safe collection, treatment, and disposal of sewage in the
provinces of Laguna, Cavite, Bulacan, Pampanga, and Bataan where needed at the earliest possible time.

(5) Pursuant to Sec. 65 of RA 8550, the DA, through the BFAR, is ordered to improve and restore the marine life of the Manila Bay. It
is also directed to assist the LGUs in Metro Manila, Rizal, Cavite, Laguna, Bulacan, Pampanga, and Bataan in developing, using
recognized methods, the fisheries and aquatic resources in the Manila Bay.

(6) The PCG, pursuant to Secs. 4 and 6 of PD 979, and the PNP Maritime Group, in accordance with Sec. 124 of RA 8550, in coordination
with each other, shall apprehend violators of PD 979, RA 8550, and other existing laws and regulations designed to prevent marine
pollution in the Manila Bay.

(7) Pursuant to Secs. 2 and 6-c of EO 513 and the International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships, the PPA is
ordered to immediately adopt such measures to prevent the discharge and dumping of solid and liquid wastes and other ship-generated
wastes into the Manila Bay waters from vessels docked at ports and apprehend the violators.

(8) The MMDA, as the lead agency and implementor of programs and projects for flood control projects and drainage services in Metro
Manila, in coordination with the DPWH, DILG, affected LGUs, PNP Maritime Group, Housing and Urban Development Coordinating
Council (HUDCC), and other agencies, shall dismantle and remove all structures, constructions, and other encroachments established
or built in violation of RA 7279, and other applicable laws along the Pasig-Marikina-San Juan Rivers, the NCR (Paraaque-Zapote, Las
Pias) Rivers, the Navotas-Malabon-Tullahan-Tenejeros Rivers, and connecting waterways and esteros in Metro Manila. The DPWH,
as the principal implementor of programs and projects for flood control services in the rest of the country more particularly in Bulacan,
Bataan, Pampanga, Cavite, and Laguna, in coordination with the DILG, affected LGUs, PNP Maritime Group, HUDCC, and other
concerned government agencies, shall remove and demolish all structures, constructions, and other encroachments built in breach of RA
7279 and other applicable laws along the Meycauayan-Marilao-Obando (Bulacan) Rivers, the Talisay (Bataan) River, the Imus (Cavite)
River, the Laguna De Bay, and other rivers, connecting waterways, and esteros that discharge wastewater into the Manila Bay.

In addition, the MMDA is ordered to establish, operate, and maintain a sanitary landfill, as prescribed by RA 9003, within a period of
one (1) year from finality of this Decision. On matters within its territorial jurisdiction and in connection with the discharge of its duties
on the maintenance of sanitary landfills and like undertakings, it is also ordered to cause the apprehension and filing of the appropriate
criminal cases against violators of the respective penal provisions of RA 9003, Sec. 27 of RA 9275 (the Clean Water Act), and other
existing laws on pollution

(9) The DOH shall, as directed by Art. 76 of PD 1067 and Sec. 8 of RA 9275, within one (1) year from finality of this Decision, determine
if all licensed septic and sludge companies have the proper facilities for the treatment and disposal of fecal sludge and sewage coming
from septic tanks. The DOH shall give the companies, if found to be non-complying, a reasonable time within which to set up the
necessary facilities under pain of cancellation of its environmental sanitation clearance.

(10) Pursuant to Sec. 53 of PD 1152, Sec. 118 of RA 8550, and Sec. 56 of RA 9003, the DepEd shall integrate lessons on pollution
prevention, waste management, environmental protection, and like subjects in the school curricula of all levels to inculcate in the minds
and hearts of students and, through them, their parents and friends, the importance of their duty toward achieving and maintaining a
balanced and healthful ecosystem in the Manila Bay and the entire Philippine archipelago.

(11) The DBM shall consider incorporating an adequate budget in the General Appropriations Act of 2010 and succeeding years to
cover the expenses relating to the cleanup, restoration, and preservation of the water quality of the Manila Bay, in line with the countrys
development objective to attain economic growth in a manner consistent with the protection, preservation, and revival of our marine
waters

(12) The heads of petitioners-agencies MMDA, DENR, DepEd, DOH, DA, DPWH, DBM, PCG, PNP Maritime Group, DILG, and also
of MWSS, LWUA, and PPA, in line with the principle of "continuing mandamus," shall, from finality of this Decision, each submit to
the Court a quarterly progressive report of the activities undertaken in accordance with this Decision.

SO ORDERED.
The government agencies did not file any motion for reconsideration and the Decision became final in January 2009.

The case is now in the execution phase of the final and executory December 18, 2008 Decision. The Manila Bay Advisory Committee
was created to receive and evaluate the quarterly progressive reports on the activities undertaken by the agencies in accordance with
said decision and to monitor the execution phase.

In the absence of specific completion periods, the Committee recommended that time frames be set for the agencies to perform their
assigned tasks. This may be viewed as an encroachment over the powers and functions of the Executive Branch headed by the President
of the Philippines.

This view is misplaced.

The issuance of subsequent resolutions by the Court is simply an exercise of judicial power under Art. VIII of the Constitution, because
the execution of the Decision is but an integral part of the adjudicative function of the Court. None of the agencies ever questioned the
power of the Court to implement the December 18, 2008 Decision nor has any of them raised the alleged encroachment by the Court
over executive functions.

While additional activities are required of the agencies like submission of plans of action, data or status reports, these directives are but
part and parcel of the execution stage of a final decision under Rule 39 of the Rules of Court. Section 47 of Rule 39 reads

Section 47. Effect of judgments or final [Link] effect of a judgment or final order rendered by a court of the Philippines, having
jurisdiction to pronounce the judgment or final order, may be as follows:

xxx

(c) In any other litigation between the same parties of their successors in interest, that only is deemed to have been adjudged in a former
judgment or final order which appears upon its face to have been so adjudged, or which was actually and necessarily included therein
or necessary thereto. (Emphasis supplied.)

It is clear that the final judgment includes not only what appears upon its face to have been so adjudged but also those matters "actually
and necessarily included therein or necessary thereto." Certainly, any activity that is needed to fully implement a final judgment is
necessarily encompassed by said judgment.

Moreover, the submission of periodic reports is sanctioned by Secs. 7 and 8, Rule 8 of the Rules of Procedure for Environmental cases:

Sec. 7. [Link] warranted, the court shall grant the privilege of the writ of continuing mandamus requiring respondent to perform
an act or series of acts until the judgment is fully satisfied and to grant such other reliefs as may be warranted resulting from the wrongful
or illegal acts of the respondent. The court shall require the respondent to submit periodic reports detailing the progress and execution
of the judgment, and the court may, by itself or through a commissioner or the appropriate government agency, evaluate and monitor
compliance. The petitioner may submit its comments or observations on the execution of the judgment.

Sec. 8. Return of the [Link] periodic reports submitted by the respondent detailing compliance with the judgment shall be contained
in partial returns of the writ. Upon full satisfaction of the judgment, a final return of the writ shall be made to the court by the respondent.
If the court finds that the judgment has been fully implemented, the satisfaction of judgment shall be entered in the court docket.
(Emphasis supplied.)

With the final and executory judgment in MMDA, the writ of continuing mandamus issued in MMDA means that until petitioner-
agencies have shown full compliance with the Courts orders, the Court exercises continuing jurisdiction over them until full execution
of the judgment.

There being no encroachment over executive functions to speak of, We shall now proceed to the recommendation of the Manila Bay
Advisory Committee.

Several problems were encountered by the Manila Bay Advisory Committee.2 An evaluation of the quarterly progressive reports has
shown that (1) there are voluminous quarterly progressive reports that are being submitted; (2) petitioner-agencies do not have a uniform
manner of reporting their cleanup, rehabilitation and preservation activities; (3) as yet no definite deadlines have been set by petitioner
DENR as to petitioner-agencies timeframe for their respective duties; (4) as of June 2010 there has been a change in leadership in both
the national and local levels; and (5) some agencies have encountered difficulties in complying with the Courts directives.

In order to implement the afore-quoted Decision, certain directives have to be issued by the Court to address the said concerns.

Acting on the recommendation of the Manila Bay Advisory Committee, the Court hereby resolves to ORDER the following:
(1) The Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR), as lead agency in the Philippine Clean Water Act of 2004, shall
submit to the Court on or before June 30, 2011 the updated Operational Plan for the Manila Bay Coastal Strategy

The DENR is ordered to submit summarized data on the overall quality of Manila Bay waters for all four quarters of 2010 on or before
June 30, 2011.

The DENR is further ordered to submit the names and addresses of persons and companies in Metro Manila, Rizal, Laguna, Cavite,
Bulacan, Pampanga and Bataan that generate toxic and hazardous waste on or before September 30, 2011.

(2) On or before June 30, 2011, the Department of the Interior and Local Government (DILG) shall order the Mayors of all cities in
Metro Manila; the Governors of Rizal, Laguna, Cavite, Bulacan, Pampanga and Bataan; and the Mayors of all the cities and towns in
said provinces to inspect all factories, commercial establishments and private homes along the banks of the major river systemssuch
as but not limited to the Pasig-Marikina-San Juan Rivers, the National Capital Region (Paranaque-Zapote, Las Pinas) Rivers, the
Navotas-Malabon-Tullahan-Tenejeros Rivers, the Meycauayan-Marilao-Obando (Bulacan) Rivers, the Talisay (Bataan) River, the Imus
(Cavite) River, and the Laguna De Bayand other minor rivers and waterways within their jurisdiction that eventually discharge water
into the Manila Bay and the lands abutting it, to determine if they have wastewater treatment facilities and/or hygienic septic tanks, as
prescribed by existing laws, ordinances, rules and regulations. Said local government unit (LGU) officials are given up to September
30, 2011 to finish the inspection of said establishments and houses.

In case of non-compliance, the LGU officials shall take appropriate action to ensure compliance by non-complying factories, commercial
establishments and private homes with said law, rules and regulations requiring the construction or installment of wastewater treatment
facilities or hygienic septic tanks.

The aforementioned governors and mayors shall submit to the DILG on or before December 31, 2011 their respective compliance reports
which will contain the names and addresses or offices of the owners of all the non-complying factories, commercial establishments and
private homes, copy furnished the concerned environmental agency, be it the local DENR office or the Laguna Lake Development
Authority.

The DILG is required to submit a five-year plan of action that will contain measures intended to ensure compliance of all non-complying
factories, commercial establishments, and private homes.

On or before June 30, 2011, the DILG and the mayors of all cities in Metro Manila shall consider providing land for the wastewater
facilities of the Metropolitan Waterworks and Sewerage System (MWSS) or its concessionaires (Maynilad and Manila Water, Inc.)
within their respective jurisdictions.

(3) The MWSS shall submit to the Court on or before June 30, 2011 the list of areas in Metro Manila, Rizal and Cavite that do not have
the necessary wastewater treatment facilities. Within the same period, the concessionaires of the MWSS shall submit their plans and
projects for the construction of wastewater treatment facilities in all the aforesaid areas and the completion period for said facilities,
which shall not go beyond 2037.

On or before June 30, 2011, the MWSS is further required to have its two concessionaires submit a report on the amount collected as
sewerage fees in their respective areas of operation as of December 31, 2010

(4) The Local Water Utilities Administration is ordered to submit on or before September 30, 2011 its plan to provide, install, operate
and maintain sewerage and sanitation facilities in said cities and towns and the completion period for said works, which shall be fully
implemented by December 31, 2020.

(5) The Department of Agriculture (DA), through the Bureau of Fisheries and Aquatic Resources, shall submit to the Court on or before
June 30, 2011 a report on areas in Manila Bay where marine life has to be restored or improved and the assistance it has extended to the
LGUs in Metro Manila, Rizal, Cavite, Laguna, Bulacan, Pampanga and Bataan in developing the fisheries and aquatic resources in
Manila Bay. The report shall contain monitoring data on the marine life in said areas. Within the same period, it shall submit its five-
year plan to restore and improve the marine life in Manila Bay, its future activities to assist the aforementioned LGUs for that purpose,
and the completion period for said undertakings.

The DA shall submit to the Court on or before September 30, 2011 the baseline data as of September 30, 2010 on the pollution loading
into the Manila Bay system from agricultural and livestock sources.

(6) The Philippine Ports Authority (PPA) shall incorporate in its quarterly reports the list of violators it has apprehended and the status
of their cases. The PPA is further ordered to include in its report the names, make and capacity of the ships that dock in PPA ports. The
PPA shall submit to the Court on or before June 30, 2011 the measures it intends to undertake to implement its compliance with paragraph
7 of the dispositive portion of the MMDA Decision and the completion dates of such measures.
The PPA should include in its report the activities of its concessionaire that collects and disposes of the solid and liquid wastes and other
ship-generated wastes, which shall state the names, make and capacity of the ships serviced by it since August 2003 up to the present
date, the dates the ships docked at PPA ports, the number of days the ship was at sea with the corresponding number of passengers and
crew per trip, the volume of solid, liquid and other wastes collected from said ships, the treatment undertaken and the disposal site for
said wastes.

(7) The Philippine National Police (PNP) Maritime Group shall submit on or before June 30, 2011 its five-year plan of action on the
measures and activities it intends to undertake to apprehend the violators of Republic Act No. (RA) 8550 or the Philippine Fisheries
Code of 1998 and other pertinent laws, ordinances and regulations to prevent marine pollution in Manila Bay and to ensure the successful
prosecution of violators.

The Philippine Coast Guard shall likewise submit on or before June 30, 2011 its five-year plan of action on the measures and activities
they intend to undertake to apprehend the violators of Presidential Decree No. 979 or the Marine Pollution Decree of 1976 and RA 9993
or the Philippine Coast Guard Law of 2009 and other pertinent laws and regulations to prevent marine pollution in Manila Bay and to
ensure the successful prosecution of violators.

(8) The Metropolitan Manila Development Authority (MMDA) shall submit to the Court on or before June 30, 2011 the names and
addresses of the informal settlers in Metro Manila who, as of December 31, 2010, own and occupy houses, structures, constructions and
other encroachments established or built along the Pasig-Marikina-San Juan Rivers, the NCR (Paraaque-Zapote, Las Pias) Rivers, the
Navotas-Malabon-Tullahan-Tenejeros Rivers, and connecting waterways and esteros, in violation of RA 7279 and other applicable laws.
On or before June 30, 2011, the MMDA shall submit its plan for the removal of said informal settlers and the demolition of the aforesaid
houses, structures, constructions and encroachments, as well as the completion dates for said activities, which shall be fully implemented
not later than December 31, 2015.

The MMDA is ordered to submit a status report, within thirty (30) days from receipt of this Resolution, on the establishment of a sanitary
landfill facility for Metro Manila in compliance with the standards under RA 9003 or the Ecological Solid Waste Management Act.

On or before June 30, 2011, the MMDA shall submit a report of the location of open and controlled dumps in Metro Manila whose
operations are illegal after February 21, 2006,3 pursuant to Secs. 36 and 37 of RA 9003, and its plan for the closure of these open and
controlled dumps to be accomplished not later than December 31, 2012. Also, on or before June 30, 2011, the DENR Secretary, as
Chairperson of the National Solid Waste Management Commission (NSWMC), shall submit a report on the location of all open and
controlled dumps in Rizal, Cavite, Laguna, Bulacan, Pampanga and Bataan.

On or before June 30, 2011, the DENR Secretary, in his capacity as NSWMC Chairperson, shall submit a report on whether or not the
following landfills strictly comply with Secs. 41 and 42 of RA 9003 on the establishment and operation of sanitary landfills, to wit:

National Capital Region 1. Navotas SLF (PhilEco), Brgy. Tanza (New Site), Navotas City 2. Payatas Controlled Dumpsite, Barangay
Payatas, Quezon City

Region III 3. Sitio Coral, Brgy. Matictic, Norzagaray, Bulacan 4. Sitio Tiakad, Brgy. San Mateo, Norzagaray, Bulacan 5. Brgy. Minuyan,
San Jose del Monte City, Bulacan 6. Brgy. Mapalad, Santa Rosa, Nueva Ecija 7. Sub-zone Kalangitan, Clark Capas, Tarlac Special
Economic Zone

Region IV-A 8. Kalayaan (Longos), Laguna 9. Brgy. Sto. Nino, San Pablo City, Laguna 10. Brgy. San Antonio (Pilotage SLF), San
Pedro, Laguna 11. Morong, Rizal 12. Sitio Lukutan, Brgy. San Isidro, Rodriguez (Montalban), Rizal (ISWIMS) 13. Brgy. Pintong
Bukawe, San Mateo, Rizal (SMSLFDC)

On or before June 30, 2011, the MMDA and the seventeen (17) LGUs in Metro Manila are ordered to jointly submit a report on the
average amount of garbage collected monthly per district in all the cities in Metro Manila from January 2009 up to December 31, 2010
vis--vis the average amount of garbage disposed monthly in landfills and dumpsites. In its quarterly report for the last quarter of 2010
and thereafter, MMDA shall report on the apprehensions for violations of the penal provisions of RA 9003, RA 9275 and other laws on
pollution for the said period.

On or before June 30, 2011, the DPWH and the LGUs in Rizal, Laguna, Cavite, Bulacan, Pampanga, and Bataan shall submit the names
and addresses of the informal settlers in their respective areas who, as of September 30, 2010, own or occupy houses, structures,
constructions, and other encroachments built along the Meycauayan-Marilao-Obando (Bulacan) Rivers, the Talisay (Bataan) River, the
Imus (Cavite) River, the Laguna de Bay, and other rivers, connecting waterways and esteros that discharge wastewater into the Manila
Bay, in breach of RA 7279 and other applicable laws. On or before June 30, 2011, the DPWH and the aforesaid LGUs shall jointly
submit their plan for the removal of said informal settlers and the demolition of the aforesaid structures, constructions and
encroachments, as well as the completion dates for such activities which shall be implemented not later than December 31, 2012.
(9) The Department of Health (DOH) shall submit to the Court on or before June 30, 2011 the names and addresses of the owners of
septic and sludge companies including those that do not have the proper facilities for the treatment and disposal of fecal sludge and
sewage coming from septic tanks.

The DOH shall implement rules and regulations on Environmental Sanitation Clearances and shall require companies to procure a
license to operate from the DOH.

The DOH and DENR-Environmental Management Bureau shall develop a toxic and hazardous waste management system by June 30,
2011 which will implement segregation of hospital/toxic/hazardous wastes and prevent mixing with municipal solid waste.

On or before June 30, 2011, the DOH shall submit a plan of action to ensure that the said companies have proper disposal facilities and
the completion dates of compliance.1avvphi1

(10) The Department of Education (DepEd) shall submit to the Court on or before May 31, 2011 a report on the specific subjects on
pollution prevention, waste management, environmental protection, environmental laws and the like that it has integrated into the school
curricula in all levels for the school year 2011-2012.

On or before June 30, 2011, the DepEd shall also submit its plan of action to ensure compliance of all the schools under its supervision
with respect to the integration of the aforementioned subjects in the school curricula which shall be fully implemented by June 30, 2012.

(11) All the agencies are required to submit their quarterly reports electronically using the forms below. The agencies may add other
key performance indicators that they have identified.

G.R. No. 158290 October 23, 2006

HILARION M. HENARES, JR., VICTOR C. AGUSTIN, ALFREDO L. HENARES, DANIEL L. HENARES, ENRIQUE BELO
HENARES, and CRISTINA BELO HENARES, petitioners,

vs. LAND TRANSPORTATION FRANCHISING AND REGULATORY BOARD and DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION
AND COMMUNICATIONS, respondents.

RESOLUTION

Petitioners challenge this Court to issue a writ of mandamus commanding respondents Land Transportation Franchising and
Regulatory Board (LTFRB) and the Department of Transportation and Communications (DOTC) to require public utility vehicles
(PUVs) to use compressed natural gas (CNG) as alternative fuel.

Citing statistics from the Metro Manila Transportation and Traffic Situation Study of 1996,1 the Environmental Management Bureau
(EMB) of the National Capital Region,2 a study of the Asian Development Bank,3 the Manila Observatory4 and the Department of
Environment and Natural Resources5 (DENR) on the high growth and low turnover in vehicle ownership in the Philippines, including
diesel-powered vehicles, two-stroke engine powered motorcycles and their concomitant emission of air pollutants, petitioners attempt
to present a compelling case for judicial action against the bane of air pollution and related environmental hazards.

Petitioners allege that the particulate matters (PM) complex mixtures of dust, dirt, smoke, and liquid droplets, varying in sizes and
compositions emitted into the air from various engine combustions have caused detrimental effects on health, productivity,
infrastructure and the overall quality of life. Petitioners particularly cite the effects of certain fuel emissions from engine combustion
when these react to other pollutants. For instance, petitioners aver, with hydrocarbons, oxide of nitrogen (NOx) creates smog; with
sulfur dioxide, it creates acid rain; and with ammonia, moisture and other compounds, it reacts to form nitric acid and harmful nitrates.
Fuel emissions also cause retardation and leaf bleaching in plants. According to petitioner, another emission, carbon monoxide (CO),
when not completely burned but emitted into the atmosphere and then inhaled can disrupt the necessary oxygen in blood. With
prolonged exposure, CO affects the nervous system and can be lethal to people with weak hearts.6

Petitioners add that although much of the new power generated in the country will use natural gas while a number of oil and coal-fired
fuel stations are being phased-out, still with the projected doubling of power generation over the next 10 years, and with the
continuing high demand for motor vehicles, the energy and transport sectors are likely to remain the major sources of harmful
emissions. Petitioners refer us to the study of the Philippine Environment Monitor 20027, stating that in four of the country's major
cities, Metro Manila, Davao, Cebu and Baguio, the exposure to PM10, a finer PM which can penetrate deep into the lungs causing
serious health problems, is estimated at over US$430 million.8 The study also reports that the emissions of PMs have caused the
following:

Over 2,000 people die prematurely. This loss is valued at about US$140 million.

Over 9,000 people suffer from chronic bronchitis, which is valued at about US$120 million.
 Nearly 51 million cases of respiratory symptom days in Metro Manila (averaging twice a year in Davao and Cebu, and five to six
times in Metro Manila and Baguio), costs about US$170 million. This is a 70 percent increase, over a decade, when compared with the
findings of a similar study done in 1992 for Metro Manila, which reported 33 million cases.9

Petitioners likewise cite the University of the Philippines' studies in 1990-91 and 1994 showing that vehicular emissions in Metro
Manila have resulted to the prevalence of chronic obstructive pulmonary diseases (COPD); that pulmonary tuberculosis is highest
among jeepney drivers; and there is a 4.8 to 27.5 percent prevalence of respiratory symptoms among school children and 15.8 to 40.6
percent among child vendors. The studies also revealed that the children in Metro Manila showed more compromised pulmonary
function than their rural counterparts. Petitioners infer that these are mostly due to the emissions of PUVs.

To counter the aforementioned detrimental effects of emissions from PUVs, petitioners propose the use of CNG. According to
petitioners, CNG is a natural gas comprised mostly of methane which although containing small amounts of propane and butane,10 is
colorless and odorless and considered the cleanest fossil fuel because it produces much less pollutants than coal and petroleum;
produces up to 90 percent less CO compared to gasoline and diesel fuel; reduces NOx emissions by 50 percent and cuts hydrocarbon
emissions by half; emits 60 percent less PMs; and releases virtually no sulfur dioxide. Although, according to petitioners, the only
drawback of CNG is that it produces more methane, one of the gases blamed for global warming.11

Asserting their right to clean air, petitioners contend that the bases for their petition for a writ of mandamus to order the LTFRB to
require PUVs to use CNG as an alternative fuel, lie in Section 16,12 Article II of the 1987 Constitution, our ruling in Oposa v.
Factoran, Jr.,13 and Section 414 of Republic Act No. 8749 otherwise known as the "Philippine Clean Air Act of 1999."

Meantime, following a subsequent motion, the Court granted petitioners' motion to implead the Department of Transportation and
Communications (DOTC) as additional respondent.

In his Comment for respondents LTFRB and DOTC, the Solicitor General, cites Section 3, Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court and
explains that the writ of mandamus is not the correct remedy since the writ may be issued only to command a tribunal, corporation,
board or person to do an act that is required to be done, when he or it unlawfully neglects the performance of an act which the law
specifically enjoins as a duty resulting from an office, trust or station, or unlawfully excludes another from the use and enjoyment of a
right or office to which such other is entitled, there being no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.15
Further citing existing jurisprudence, the Solicitor General explains that in contrast to a discretionary act, a ministerial act, which a
mandamus is, is one in which an officer or tribunal performs in a given state of facts, in a prescribed manner, in obedience to a
mandate of legal authority, without regard to or the exercise of his own judgment upon the propriety or impropriety of an act done.

The Solicitor General also notes that nothing in Rep. Act No. 8749 that petitioners invoke, prohibits the use of gasoline and diesel by
owners of motor vehicles. Sadly too, according to the Solicitor General, Rep. Act No. 8749 does not even mention the existence of
CNG as alternative fuel and avers that unless this law is amended to provide CNG as alternative fuel for PUVs, the respondents cannot
propose that PUVs use CNG as alternative fuel.

The Solicitor General also adds that it is the DENR that is tasked to implement Rep. Act No. 8749 and not the LTFRB nor the DOTC.
Moreover, he says, it is the Department of Energy (DOE), under Section 2616 of Rep. Act No. 8749, that is required to set the
specifications for all types of fuel and fuel-related products to improve fuel compositions for improved efficiency and reduced
emissions. He adds that under Section 2117 of the cited Republic Act, the DOTC is limited to implementing the emission standards
for motor vehicles, and the herein respondents cannot alter, change or modify the emission standards. The Solicitor General opines
that the Court should declare the instant petition for mandamus without merit.

Petitioners, in their Reply, insist that the respondents possess the administrative and regulatory powers to implement measures in
accordance with the policies and principles mandated by Rep. Act No. 8749, specifically Section 218 and Section 21.19 Petitioners
state that under these laws and with all the available information provided by the DOE on the benefits of CNG, respondents cannot
ignore the existence of CNG, and their failure to recognize CNG and compel its use by PUVs as alternative fuel while air pollution
brought about by the emissions of gasoline and diesel endanger the environment and the people, is tantamount to neglect in the
performance of a duty which the law enjoins.

Lastly, petitioners aver that other than the writ applied for, they have no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary
course of law. Petitioners insist that the writ in fact should be issued pursuant to the very same Section 3, Rule 65 of the Revised Rules
of Court that the Solicitor General invokes.

In their Memorandum, petitioners phrase the issues before us as follows:

I. WHETHER OR NOT THE PETITIONERS HAVE THE PERSONALITY TO BRING THE PRESENT ACTION

II. WHETHER OR NOT THE PRESENT ACTION IS SUPPORTED BY LAW

IV. WHETHER OR NOT THE RESPONDENT CAN BE COMPELLED TO REQUIRE PUBLIC UTILITY VEHICLES TO USE
COMPRESSED NATURAL GAS THROUGH A WRIT OF MANDAMUS20

Briefly put, the issues are two-fold. First, Do petitioners have legal personality to bring this petition before us? Second, Should
mandamus issue against respondents to compel PUVs to use CNG as alternative fuel?

According to petitioners, Section 16,21 Article II of the 1987 Constitution is the policy statement that bestows on the people the right
to breathe clean air in a healthy environment. This policy is enunciated in Oposa.22 The implementation of this policy is articulated in
Rep. Act No. 8749. These, according to petitioners, are the bases for their standing to file the instant petition. They aver that when
there is an omission by the government to safeguard a right, in this case their right to clean air, then, the citizens can resort to and
exhaust all remedies to challenge this omission by the government. This, they say, is embodied in Section 423 of Rep. Act No. 8749.

Petitioners insist that since it is the LTFRB and the DOTC that are the government agencies clothed with power to regulate and
control motor vehicles, particularly PUVs, and with the same agencies' awareness and knowledge that the PUVs emit dangerous levels
of air pollutants, then, the responsibility to see that these are curbed falls under respondents' functions and a writ of mandamus should
issue against them.

The Solicitor General, for his part, reiterates his position that the respondent government agencies, the DOTC and the LTFRB, are not
in a position to compel the PUVs to use CNG as alternative fuel. The Solicitor General explains that the function of the DOTC is
limited to implementing the emission standards set forth in Rep. Act No. 8749 and the said law only goes as far as setting the
maximum limit for the emission of vehicles, but it does not recognize CNG as alternative engine fuel. The Solicitor General avers that
the petition should be addressed to Congress for it to come up with a policy that would compel the use of CNG as alternative fuel.

Patently, this Court is being asked to resolve issues that are not only procedural. Petitioners challenge this Court to decide if what
petitioners propose could be done through a less circuitous, speedy and unchartered course in an issue that Chief Justice Hilario G.
Davide, Jr. in his ponencia in the Oposa case,24 describes as "inter-generational responsibility" and "inter-generational justice."

Now, as to petitioners' standing. There is no dispute that petitioners have standing to bring their case before this Court. Even
respondents do not question their standing. This petition focuses on one fundamental legal right of petitioners, their right to clean air.
Moreover, as held previously, a party's standing before this Court is a procedural technicality which may, in the exercise of the Court's
discretion, be set aside in view of the importance of the issue raised. We brush aside this issue of technicality under the principle of the
transcendental importance to the public, especially so if these cases demand that they be settled promptly.

Undeniably, the right to clean air not only is an issue of paramount importance to petitioners for it concerns the air they breathe, but it
is also impressed with public interest. The consequences of the counter-productive and retrogressive effects of a neglected
environment due to emissions of motor vehicles immeasurably affect the well-being of petitioners. On these considerations, the legal
standing of the petitioners deserves recognition.

Our next concern is whether the writ of mandamus is the proper remedy, and if the writ could issue against respondents.

Under Section 3, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, mandamus lies under any of the following cases: (1) against any tribunal which
unlawfully neglects the performance of an act which the law specifically enjoins as a duty; (2) in case any corporation, board or
person unlawfully neglects the performance of an act which the law enjoins as a duty resulting from an office, trust, or station; and (3)
in case any tribunal, corporation, board or person unlawfully excludes another from the use and enjoyment of a right or office to which
such other is legally entitled; and there is no other plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.

In University of San Agustin, Inc. v. Court of Appeals,25 we said,

It is settled that mandamus is employed to compel the performance, when refused, of a ministerial duty, this being its main
objective. It does not lie to require anyone to fulfill contractual obligations or to compel a course of conduct, nor to control or review
the exercise of discretion. On the part of the petitioner, it is essential to the issuance of a writ of mandamus that he should have a clear
legal right to the thing demanded and it must be the imperative duty of the respondent to perform the act required. It never issues in
doubtful cases. While it may not be necessary that the duty be absolutely expressed, it must however, be clear. The writ will not issue
to compel an official to do anything which is not his duty to do or which is his duty not to do, or give to the applicant anything to
which he is not entitled by law. The writ neither confers powers nor imposes duties. It is simply a command to exercise a power
already possessed and to perform a duty already imposed. (Emphasis supplied.)

In this petition the legal right which is sought to be recognized and enforced hinges on a constitutional and a statutory policy already
articulated in operational terms, e.g. in Rep. Act No. 8749, the Philippine Clean Air Act of 1999. Paragraph (a), Section 21 of the Act
specifically provides that when PUVs are concerned, the responsibility of implementing the policy falls on respondent DOTC. It
provides as follows:

SEC 21. Pollution from Motor Vehicles. - a) The DOTC shall implement the emission standards for motor vehicles set pursuant to and
as provided in this Act. To further improve the emission standards, the Department [DENR] shall review, revise and publish the
standards every two (2) years, or as the need arises. It shall consider the maximum limits for all major pollutants to ensure substantial
improvement in air quality for the health, safety and welfare of the general public.

Paragraph (b) states: b) The Department [DENR] in collaboration with the DOTC, DTI and LGUs, shall develop an action plan for the
control and management of air pollution from motor vehicles consistent with the Integrated Air Quality Framework . . . . (Emphasis
supplied.)

There is no dispute that under the Clean Air Act it is the DENR that is tasked to set the emission standards for fuel use and the task of
developing an action plan. As far as motor vehicles are concerned, it devolves upon the DOTC and the line agency whose mandate is
to oversee that motor vehicles prepare an action plan and implement the emission standards for motor vehicles, namely the LTFRB.

In Oposa26 we said, the right to a balanced and healthful ecology carries with it the correlative duty to refrain from impairing the
environment. We also said, it is clearly the duty of the responsible government agencies to advance the said right.

Petitioners invoke the provisions of the Constitution and the Clean Air Act in their prayer for issuance of a writ of mandamus
commanding the respondents to require PUVs to use CNG as an alternative fuel. Although both are general mandates that do not
specifically enjoin the use of any kind of fuel, particularly the use of CNG, there is an executive order implementing a program on the
use of CNG by public vehicles. Executive Order No. 290, entitled Implementing the Natural Gas Vehicle Program for Public
Transport (NGVPPT), took effect on February 24, 2004. The program recognized, among others, natural gas as a clean burning
alternative fuel for vehicle which has the potential to produce substantially lower pollutants; and the Malampaya Gas-to-Power Project
as representing the beginning of the natural gas industry of the Philippines. Paragraph 1.2, Section 1 of E.O. No. 290 cites as one of its
objectives, the use of CNG as a clean alternative fuel for transport. Furthermore, one of the components of the program is the
development of CNG refueling stations and all related facilities in strategic locations in the country to serve the needs of CNG-
powered PUVs. Section 3 of E.O. No. 290, consistent with E.O. No. 66, series of 2002, designated the DOE as the lead agency (a) in
developing the natural gas industry of the country with the DENR, through the EMB and (b) in formulating emission standards for
CNG. Most significantly, par. 4.5, Section 4 tasks the DOTC, working with the DOE, to develop an implementation plan for "a
gradual shift to CNG fuel utilization in PUVs and promote NGVs [natural gas vehicles] in Metro Manila and Luzon through the
issuance of directives/orders providing preferential franchises in present day major routes and exclusive franchises to NGVs in newly
opened routes" A thorough reading of the executive order assures us that implementation for a cleaner environment is being
addressed. To a certain extent, the instant petition had been mooted by the issuance of E.O. No. 290.

Regrettably, however, the plain, speedy and adequate remedy herein sought by petitioners, i.e., a writ of mandamus commanding the
respondents to require PUVs to use CNG, is unavailing. Mandamus is available only to compel the doing of an act specifically
enjoined by law as a duty. Here, there is no law that mandates the respondents LTFRB and the DOTC to order owners of motor
vehicles to use CNG. At most the LTFRB has been tasked by E.O. No. 290 in par. 4.5 (ii), Section 4 "to grant preferential and
exclusive Certificates of Public Convenience (CPC) or franchises to operators of NGVs based on the results of the DOTC surveys."

Further, mandamus will not generally lie from one branch of government to a coordinate branch, for the obvious reason that neither is
inferior to the other.27 The need for future changes in both legislation and its implementation cannot be preempted by orders from this
Court, especially when what is prayed for is procedurally infirm. Besides, comity with and courtesy to a coequal branch dictate that
we give sufficient time and leeway for the coequal branches to address by themselves the environmental problems raised in this
petition.

In the same manner that we have associated the fundamental right to a balanced and healthful ecology with the twin concepts of "inter-
generational responsibility" and "inter-generational justice" in Oposa,28 where we upheld the right of future Filipinos to prevent the
destruction of the rainforests, so do we recognize, in this petition, the right of petitioners and the future generation to clean air. In
Oposa we said that if the right to a balanced and healthful ecology is now explicitly found in the Constitution even if the right is
"assumed to exist from the inception of humankind, it is because of the well-founded fear of its framers [of the Constitution] that
unless the rights to a balanced and healthful ecology and to health are mandated as state policies by the Constitution itself, thereby
highlighting their continuing importance and imposing upon the state a solemn obligation to preserve the first and protect and advance
the second, the day would not be too far when all else would be lost not only for the present generation, but also for those to come. .

It is the firm belief of this Court that in this case, it is timely to reaffirm the premium we have placed on the protection of the
environment in the landmark case of Oposa. Yet, as serious as the statistics are on air pollution, with the present fuels deemed toxic as
they are to the environment, as fatal as these pollutants are to the health of the citizens, and urgently requiring resort to drastic
measures to reduce air pollutants emitted by motor vehicles, we must admit in particular that petitioners are unable to pinpoint the law
that imposes an indubitable legal duty on respondents that will justify a grant of the writ of mandamus compelling the use of CNG for
public utility vehicles. It appears to us that more properly, the legislature should provide first the specific statutory remedy to the
complex environmental problems bared by herein petitioners before any judicial recourse by mandamus is taken.

WHEREFORE, the petition for the issuance of a writ of mandamus is DISMISSED for lack of merit.

Laguna Lake Development Authority v CA

GR No. 110120 March 16, 1994

FACTS:

The LLDA Legal and Technical personnel found that the City Government of Caloocan was maintaining an open dumpsite at the
Camarin area without first securing an Environmental Compliance Certificate (ECC) from the Environmental Management
Bureau (EMB) of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources, as required under Presidential Decree N o. 1586,
and clearance from LLDA as required under Republic Act N o. 4850 and issued a CEASE and DESIST ORDER (CDO) for the City
Government of Caloocan to stop the use of the dumpsite.

ISSUES:

1. Does the LLDA and its amendatory laws, have the authority to entertain the complaint against the dumping of garbage in
the open dumpsite in Barangay Camarin authorized by the City Government of Caloocan?

2. Does the LLDA have the power and authority to issue a "cease and desist" order?

APPLICABLE LAWS:

Executive Order N o. 927 series of 1983 which provides, thus: Sec. 4. Additional Powers and Functions. The authority shall have
the following powers and functions: (d) Make, alter or modify orders requiring the discontinuance of pollution specifying the
conditions and the time within which such discontinuance must be accomplished

As a general rule, the adjudication of pollution cases generally pertains to the Pollution Adjudication Board (PAB), except in
cases w here the special law provides for another forum

RULING:

1. YES, LLDA has authority. It must be recognized in this regard that the LLDA, as a specialized administrative agency, is
specifically mandated under Republic Act No. 4850 and its amendatory law s to carry out and make effective the declared
national policy of promoting and accelerating the development and balanced growth of the Laguna Lake area and the
surrounding provinces of Rizal and Laguna and the cities of San Pablo, Manila, Pasay, Quezon and Caloocan with due regard
and adequate provisions for environmental management and control, preservation of the quality of human life and ecological
systems, and the prevention of undue ecological disturbances, deterioration and pollution. Under such a broad grant and power and
authority, the LLDA, by virtue of its special charter, obviously has the responsibility to protect the inhabitants of the Laguna Lake
region from the deleterious effects of pollutants emanating from the discharge of wastes from the surrounding areas.

2. YES, pursuant to EO 927 Section 4. While it is a fundamental rule that an administrative agency has only such powers as are
expressly granted to it by law , it is likewise a settled rule that an administrative agency has also such powers as are necessarily
implied in the exercise of its ex press powers. In the exercise, therefore, of its express powers under its charter as a
regulatory and quasi-judicial body with respect to pollution cases in the Laguna Lake region, the authority of the LLDA to
issue a "cease and desist order" is, perforce, implied. NOTE: HOWEVER, writs of mandamus and injunction are beyond the
power of the LLDA to issue.