516 Export Corp.

, as well as the subsequent sale of the same to Sarmiento were both

SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED subject to the said mortgage.
Limpin, Jr. vs. Intermediate Appellate Court PETITION for review of the decision of the Intermediate Appellate Court.
No. L-70987. January 30, 1987.* The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
GREGORIO Y. LIMPIN, JR. and ROGELIO SARMIENTO, petitioners, vs. Danilo A. Basa for petitioners.
INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT and GUILLERMO PONCE, respondents. Sycip, Salazar, Feliciano & Hernandez Law Office and Eugenio C. Lindo for
Civil Actions; Execution of final and executory judgments.Courts have plenary private respondent.
authority and control over the execution of 518
_______________ 518
* FIRST DIVISION. SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Limpin, Jr. vs. Intermediate Appellate Court
517 NARVASA, J.:
Assailed in this petition for review is the decision of the Intermediate Appellate
VOL. 147, JANUARY 30, 1987 Court in A.C.-G.R. No. 02516, entitled Guillermo Ponce, versus Hon. Antonio P.
517 Solano, etc., et al.," the dispositive portion of which reads
Limpin, Jr. vs. Intermediate Appellate Court WHEREFORE, the orders dated October 16, 19831 and December 19, 1983 of
their final and executory judgments and orders. Once that authority is timely and the respondent court, so far as they deny the confirmation of the sale of the lots
properly invoked, it becomes the courts ministerial and mandatory function to formerly covered by TCT Nos. 92836 and 92837, are SET ASIDE and the
direct execution. The authority lasts until the judgments are fully satisfied, subject respondent court is hereby ORDERED to confirm the sale and issue a writ of
only to the time limitations prescribed therefor. With particular reference to the possession to the petitioner with respect to the aforesaid lots, subject to the
execution of a judgment in a mortgage foreclosure action, the authority to direct equity of redemption of the respondent Rogelio V. Sarmiento. Without costs.
and effect the same exists until the confirmation of the foreclosure sale (and SO ORDERED."
issuance and implementation of the writ of possession), confirmation being the f The conflict in claims resulting from the mortgage and subsequent sale to
inal act which disposes of the case. different persons of the same real property, and the execution sale thereof at a
Civil Actions; Instances when an error may be committed in the course of still later date at the instance of yet another party, is what is chiefly involved in
execution proceedings prejudicial to the rights of a party.These instances call the case at bar, as well as the matter of the remedies available to correct errors
for correction by a superior court, as where: 1) the writ of execution varies the in the execution of a final and executory judgment.
judgment; 2) there has been a change in the situation of the parties making On February 28, 1973, four lots covered by TCTs Nos. 92836, 92837, 92839 and
execution inequitable or unjust; 3) execution is sought to be enforced against 92840 of the Register of Deeds of Quezon City were mortgaged by the spouses
property exempt from execution; 4) it appears that the controversy has never Jose and Marcelina Aquino to Guillermo Ponce and his wife Adela (since
been submitted to the judgment of the court; 5) the terms of the judgment are not deceased) as security for a loan of P2,200,000.00. The mortgages were
clear enough and there remains room for interpretation thereof; or 6) it appears registered on March 1,1973. Two of the lots, those covered by TCTs Nos. 92836
that the writ of execution has been improvidently issued, or that it is defective in and 92837, were afterwards sold in 1978 by the Aquinos to the Butuan Bay
substance, or is issued against the wrong party, or that the judgment debt has Wood Export Corporation, which caused an adverse claim to be annotated on
been paid or otherwise satisfied, or the writ was issued without authority. the certificates of title on February 24,1978.2
Double Sales.A recorded mortgage is a right in rem, a lien on the property In 1979, Gregorio Y. Limpin, Jr. obtained a money judgment against Butuan Bay
whoever its owner may be. The recordation of the mortgage in this case put the Wood Export Corporation in Civil Case No. 10463 of the Court of First Instance
whole world, petitioners included, on constructive notice of its existence and of Davao. To
warned everyone who thereafter dealt with the property on which it was _______________
constituted that he would have to reckon with that encumbrance. Hence, Limpins 1 October 26,1983 is the correct date of the order referred to.
subsequent purchase of the interests and participation of Butuan Bay Wood 2 IAC Decision, Annex A", Petition; Rollo, pp. 2223.
519
 VOL. 147, JANUARY 30, 1987 dated July 20, 1977. The Trial Court denied Ponces motion for reconsideration,
519 whereupon he sought corrective relief by filing a special civil action for certiorari
Limpin, Jr. vs. Intermediate Appellate Court and mandamus in the Intermediate Appellate Court, impleading Limpin and
satisfy the judgment, the lots covered by TCTs Nos. 92836 and 92837 were Rogelio M. Sarmiente, Limpins vendee, as private respondents.5
levied upon on September 3, 1980 and sold at public auction to Limpin as the After hearing and submission by the parties of extensive memoranda as well as
highest bidder for the sum of P517.485.41 on October 6,1980. On order of the documentary evidence, the respondent Appellate Court rendered the questioned
trial court, the covering titles were cancelled and in their stead TCTs Nos. 285450 decision on February 28, 1985, setting aside the judgment of the Trial Court
and 285451 were issued to Limpin. On November 21, 1981, Limpin sold the two which denied the confirmation of the sale of the lots formerly covered by TCTs
lots to Rogelio M. Sarmiento. By virtue of said sale, TCTs Nos. 285450 and Nos. 92836 and 92837, and ordering said Court to confirm the same and issue a
285451 were cancelled on November 4, 1983, and replaced by TCTs Nos. writ of possession to Ponce with respect thereto, subject to Sarmientos equity of
307100 and 397124 in Sarmientos name.3 redemption.
On September 2,1980 (a day before Limpins levy on the two lots), Ponce filed Hence, this petition for review, filed by Limpin and Sarmiento.
suit against the Aquino spouses for judicial foreclosure of the mortgage over the The petition should be denied.
Aquinos four lots. The case was docketed as Civil Case No. Q-30726 of the The petitioners contention that the action of certiorari and mandamus (instituted
former Court of First Instance of Quezon City. On June 8,1982, judgment was by Ponce in the Intermediate Appellate Court) was not the proper remedy is not
rendered in favor of Ponce. After the judgment became final, the Trial Court, in well taken. The Appellate Court disposed of this preliminary issue as follows:
an order dated September 13, 1983, directed the sale at public auction of the Nor is there any merit in the argument of the respondents that petitioners
four (4) mortgaged lots to satisfy the judgment. On October 12, 1983, the four remedy is to appeal from the orders denying the motion for confirmation of the
lots, including those formerly covered by TCTs Nos. 92836 and 92837, were sold sale. The respondents claim that these orders are final orders and cite in support
to Ponce himself whose bid of P5,200,000.00 was the highest and exactly of their contention the decision in Domalante, vs. Martinez, 20 SCRA 1136
correspond to the judgment debt. On the same day, the sheriffs certificate of (1967), where it was held that An order of confirmation in court foreclosure
sale was registered.4 proceedings is a final order, not merely interlocutory. The right of appeal,
Ponce then moved for the confirmation of the sale and the issuance of a writ of therefore, has long been recognized. The Court was there speaking of an order
possession in his favor covering all the four lots. But the Trial Court, by order confirming the sale, as between the parties to a mortgage, not of an order, such
dated October 26,1983, confirmed only the sale of the lots covered by TCTs Nos. as the ones herein in question, denying confirmation because a third party, not a
02839 and 92840, refusing to confirm the sale or issue a writ of possession in party in the foreclosure proceedings, asserts a right to the properties sought to
regard to the lots covered by TCTs Nos. 92836 and 92837 on the ground that be foreclosed. Only a separate proceeding, such as the present case, could
those titles had already been cancelled and new ones issued to Gregorio F. possibly deter-
Limpin, by order of February 16, 1982 of the Court of First Instance of Davao City _______________
in Civil Case No. 10463, already referred to. 5 Id.
Ponce filed a motion for reconsideration and notified Limpin. Limpin however 521
refused to participate in the hearings con- VOL. 147, JANUARY 30, 1987
_______________ 521
3 Id., Rollo, p. 23. Limpin, Jr. vs. Intermediate Appellate Court
4 ld., Rollo,pp. 2324. mine the rights of such party. (See Rivero de Ortega v. Natividad, 71 Phil. 340
520 (1941).6
520 Certain it is that courts have plenary authority and control over the execution of
SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED their final and executory judgments and orders.7 Indeed, once that authority is
Limpin, Jr. vs. Intermediate Appellate Court timely and properly invoked, it becomes the courts ministerial and mandatory
tending that the Court had no jurisdiction over his person; but he did comment function to direct execution.8
that the mortgage over the lots covered by TCTs Nos. 92836 and 92837 had That authority lasts until the judgments are fully satisfied, subject only to the time
been released by Ponce by virtue of a Partial Release of Real Estate Mortgage limitations prescribed therefor.9 With particular reference to the execution of a
judgment in a mortgage foreclosure action, the authority to direct and effect the _______________
same exists until the confirmation of the foreclosure sale (and issuance and 11 Heirs of Pedro Guminpin vs. Court of Appeals, 120 SCRA 687; Fariscal Vda.
implementation of the writ of possession), confirmation being the final act which de Emnas, et al. vs. Emnas, et al., 95 SCRA 470; Quintos vs. Republic, 78 SCRA
disposes of the case.10 547; Soliven vs. WCC, 77 SCRA 518; Bilbao vs. Republic, 8 SCRA 177; Daquis
Certain it is too, that execution of final and executory judgments may no longer vs. Bustos, 94 Phil. 913; Contreras, et al. v. Felix, et al., 78 Phil. 540; Layda vs.
be contested and prevented, and no Legaspi, 39 PhiL 84; Dy Cay vs. Crossfield & OBrien, 38 Phil. 521; Molina vs. de
_______________ la Riva,et. al.,8 Phil. 569.
6 IAC Decision, pp. 45; Rollo, pp. 2526. 12 Pamantasan ng Lungsod ng Maynila vs. Hon. intermediate Appellate Court, et
7 Seavan Carrier Inc. vs. GTI Sportswear Corporation, 137 SCRA 580; Pelejo vs. al, G.R. No. 65439 (UDK-7316), July 31, 1986; De Guzman vs. Court of Appeals,
Court of Appeals, 116 SCRA 406; Caminong vs. Ubay, 96 SCRA 105; Ipekdjian 137 SCRA; Pastor, Jr. vs. Court of Appeals, 122 SCRA 885; Malacora vs. Court
Merchandising Co., vs. Court of Tax Appeals, et al., 8 SCRA 59; Santos vs. of Appeals, 117 SCRA 435; Imperial Insurance, Inc. vs. De los Angeles, 111
Acua, 100 Phil. 230; Miranda vs. Tiangco, 96 Phil. 526. SCRA 24; Windor Steel Manufacturing Co., Inc. vs. Court of Appeals, 102 SCRA
8 Garcia vs. Echiverri, 132 SCRA 631; Balintawak Construction Supply 275; Uytiepo vs. Aggabao, 35 SCRA 186; Manila Railroad Co., vs. Yatco, et al.,
Corporation vs. Valenzuela, 124 SCRA 331; Republic v. Reyes, 71 SCRA 450; 23 SCRA 735; Corpus vs. Alikpala, 22 SCRA 104; Silvestre, et al. vs. Torres, et
Carreon vs. Buissan, 70 SCRA 57; De Luna vs. Kayanan, 61 SCRA 49; al., 57 Phil. 885; Bank of the Philippine Islands vs. Green, 48 Phil. 284.
Buenaventura vs. Garcia, et al., 78 Phil. 759; Philippine Trust Co. vs. 13 Luna vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, 137 SCRA 7; Cabrias vs. Adil, 135
Santamaria, 53 Phil. 463. SCRA 354; Central Textile Mills, Inc. vs. United CMC Textile Workers Union
9 Sec. 6, Rule 39; Republic vs. Court of Appeals, 137 SCRA 220; Arnaldo vs. (TGWF), 94 SCRA 883; Ang vs. Navarro, 81 SCRA 458 citing City of Cebu vs.
Court of First Instance, 73 SCRA 26; David vs. Ejercito, 71 SCRA 484; Mendoza, 66 SCRA 174; Laurel vs. Abalos, 30 SCRA 281; De los Santos vs.
Development Bank of the Philippines vs. Tanada, 56 SCRA 470; Tan Ching Ji vs. Rodriguez, et al., 22 SCRA 451; Abellana vs. Dosdos, 13 SCRA 244 citing
Mapalo, 37 SCRA 510; Donnelly vs. Court of First Instance of Manila, 44 SCRA Candelaria vs. Canizares, 114 Phil. 672 in turn citing City of Butuan vs. Hon.
381; Philippine Refining Company, Inc. vs. Flores, 39 SCRA 577. Ortiz, 113 Phil. 636; Vda. de Albar vs. Carandang, 6 SCRA 211; Hernandez, et
10 Lonzame vs. Amores, 134 SCRA 386; Philippine National Bank vs. Adil, 118 al. vs. Clapis, et al., 98 Phil. 684; Ocampo vs. Sanchez, 97 Phil. 472; Ki Kim Tho
SCRA 110; Rural Bank of Oroquieta (Misamis Occidental) Inc. vs. Court of vs. Sanchez, 82 Phil. 776; Cunanan vs. Rodas, 78 Phil. 800; Amor vs. Jose, 77
Appeals, 101 SCRA 5; De Los Angeles vs. Court of Appeals, 61 SCRA 369; Phil. 703; Chua Lee vs. Mapa, 51 Phil. 624; Warner Barnes & Co. vs. Jaucian,
Ocampo vs. Domalanta, 20 SCRA 1136; Clemente vs. H.E. Heacock Co., 20 13 Phil. 4; Molina vs. De la Riva, 8 Phil. 569.
SCRA 115; Alto Insurance Co., Inc. vs. Eleuterio Limacaco, et al., 56 O.G. 3746. 523
522 VOL. 147, JANUARY 30, 1987
522 523
SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED Limpin, Jr. vs. Intermediate Appellate Court
Limpin, Jr. vs. Intermediate Appellate Court 1 3)
appeal should lie therefrom; otherwise, cases would be interminable, and there execution is sought to be enforced against property exempt from
would be negation of the overmastering need to end litigations,11 execution;14
There may, to be sure, be instances when an error may be committed in the 2 4)
course of execution proceedings prejudicial to the rights of a party. These it appears that the controversy has never been submitted to the
instances, rare though they may be, do call for correction by a superior court, as judgment of the court;15
where 3 5)
1 1) the terms of the j udgment are not clear enough and there remains room
the writ of execution varies the judgment12 for interpretation thereof;16 or,
2 2) 4 6)
there has been a change in the situation of the parties making execution it appears that the writ of execution has been improvidently issued, or
inequitable or unjust;13 that it is defective in substance, or is issued against the wrong party, or
 that the judgment debt has been paid or otherwise satisfied, or the writ The petitioners, to borrow the language of Justice Bautista Angelo, cannot adopt
was issued without authority;17 a posture of double-dealing without running af oul of the doctrine of estoppel.
In these exceptional circumstances, considerations of justice and equity dictate The principle of estoppel is in the interest of a sound administration of the laws. It
that there be some mode available to the party aggrieved of elevating the should deter those who are disposed to trifle with the courts by taking
question to a higher court. That mode of elevation may be either by appeal (writ inconsistent positions contrary to the elementary principles of right dealing and
of error or certiorari,18 or by a special civil action of certiorari, prohibition, or good faith. For this reason, this Court closes the door to the petitioners
mandamus.19 challenge against the jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals and will not even honor
The petitioners also question the jurisdiction of the Intermediate Appellate Court the question with a pronouncement."20
over their persons, alleging that they were not original parties to the action for Petitioner, however, is estopped, on ground of public policy, from invoking the
judicial foreclosure. It appears, however, that despite awareness of this plea of lack of jurisdiction after submitting itself to the jurisdiction of the Court of
ostensible defect, they fully participated without objection in the certiorari and Appeals and assailing its jurisdiction only after an adverse judgment was
mandamus proceedings before the respondent Appellate Court. Having thus rendered against the petitioner. * * *"21
voluntarily appeared and seen the The petitioners further argue that the Appellate Court erred in according
_______________ superiority to the mortgage rights of Ponce over the levy and sale in favor of
14 Section 12, Rule 39, Rules of Court; see also Articles 223, 231, 232, 243, petitioner Limpin and the subsequent sale of the property to petitioner Sarmiento.
247, 301,1708, 2026, Civil Code of the Philippines. The Appellate Court correctly ruled that the rights and interests of petitioners
15 Yulo vs. Powell, 36 Phil. 732. Limpin and Sarmiento to the property in
16 Imperial Insurance Inc. vs. De los Angeles, 111 SCRA 24; Heirs of Juan D. ________________
Francisco vs. Muoz Palma, 37 SCRA 753. 20 Crisostomo vs. Court of Appeals, 32 SCRA 54.
17 Luna vs. IAC, 137 SCRA 7; De Guzman vs. CA, 137 SCRA 730; See also 21 Summit Guaranty & Insurance Co., Inc. vs. Court of Appeals, 110 SCRA 241;
Feria, J., Civil Procedure, 1969 ed., pp. 54243 citing Amor vs. Jugo, et al., 77 see also Ong Ching vs. Ramolete, 51 SCRA 13, Manalo vs. Mariano, 69 SCRA
Phil. 703. 80, One Heart Sporting Club vs. Court of Appeals, 108 SCRA 416, and Paredes
18 Romero, Sr. vs. Court of Appeals, 40 SCRA 172. vs. Court of Appeals, 132 SCRA 501.
19 Vda. de Sayman vs. Court of Appeals, 121 SCRA 650; Gonzales vs. Sayo, 525
122 SCRA 607; Pasta, Jr. vs. Court of Appeals, 122 SCRA 885; Belfast Surety VOL. 147, JANUARY 30, 1987
and Insurance Co., Inc. vs. People, 111 SCRA 385; New Pacific Timber & Supply 525
Co., Inc. vs. Seneris, 101 SCRA 696; De Luna vs. Kayanan, 61 SCRA 49. Limpin,Jr. vs. Intermediate Appellate Court
524 question are subordinate to those of respondent Ponce, who holds a prior and
524 senior lien. According to said Court:
SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED "* * * This case is controlled by the decision in Santiago v. Dionisio, 92 Phil. 495
Limpin, Jr. us. Intermediate Appellate Court (1935). In the Santiago case, Ramon San Diego mortgaged his land to Eulalia
case through its final resolution, they cannot now be permitted to turn about and Resurreccion. Later he sold it to Apolonia Santiago. As the mortgage debt was
repudiate the Appellate Courts jurisdiction over them. not paid, Resurreccion had the mortgage foreclosed. The Supreme Court upheld
This Court has ruled: the sale to Dionisio, subject, however, to the equity of redemption of Santiago.
"* * * * And as we have previously quoted approvingly a party cannot invoke the The Court stated:
jurisdiction of a court to secure affirmative relief against his opponent and, after . . . [T]he effect of the failure to implead a subordinate lienholder or subsequent
obtaining or failing to obtain such relief, repudiate or question that same purchaser or both is to render the foreclosure ineffective as against them, with
jurisdiction. While the jurisdiction of a tribunal may be challenged at any time, the result that there remains in their favor the unforeclosed equity of
sound public policy bars the petitioners from so doing after having procured that redemption. But the foreclosure is valid as between the parties to the suit. (Ibid;
jurisdiction themselves, speculating on the fortunes of litigation. 2 Morans Rules of Court, 3rd ed., p. 239)
*** Applied to this case, this means that the sale to Ponce, as the highest bidder in
the foreclosure sale of the two lots in question should have been confirmed,
subject to Limpins (and now Sarmientos equity to redemption. As held in could not effect the rights of the mortgagee; and the fact that the foreclosure of
Santiago v. Dionisio supra, the registration of the lands, first in the name of the mortgage and the consequent public auction sale have been effected long
Limpin and later of Sarmiento, was premature. At most what they were entitled to after the annotation of the adverse claim is of no moment, because the
was the registration of their equity of redemption. 22 foreclosure sale retroacts to the date of registration of the mortgage."26
Moreover: Anent the claim that respondent Ponce executed a deed of partial release of his
The superiority of the mortgagees lien over that of a subsequent judgment mortgage on July 20, 1977, the evidence discloses that Ponce and Jose Aquino,
creditor is now expressly provided in Rule 39, Section 16 of the Revised Rules of the mortgagor, there-
Court, which states with regard to the effect of levy on execution that it shall _______________
create a lien in favor of a judgment creditor over the right title and interest of the 25 Bank of Phil. Islands vs. Noblejas, 105 PhiL 418; Gonzalo Puyat & Sons, Inc.
judgment debtor in such property at the time of the levy, subject to the liens or vs. Philippine National Bank, 4 SCRA 1257.
encumbrances then existing."23 26 Bank of Philippine Islands vs. Noblejas, supra, citing Cruz vs. Sandoval, 69
It is well settled that a recorded mortgage is a right in rem, a lien on the property Phil. 736; and Lopez vs. Vijandre, 72 Phil. 56.
whoever its owner may be.24 The recordation of the mortgage in this case put the 527
whole world, peti- VOL. 147, JANUARY 30, 1987
_______________ 527
22 Rollo,p.24. Limpin, Jr. vs. Intermediate Appellate Court
23 Cabral vs. Evangelista, 28 SCRA 1005. after executed separate affidavits dated December 1, 1983, stating that the said
24 Philippine National Bank vs. Mallorca, 21 SCRA 694. partial release was void, not only for want of consideration but also for lack of the
526 signatures of Ponces two sons who at the time of the execution of the document,
526 were co-mortgagees as successors and heirs of Mrs. Adela Ponce. Moreover,
SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED the Deed of Partial Release was not registered but had simply been attached,
Limpin, Jr. vs. Intermediate Appellate Court together with the Deed of Sale of the lands to Butuan Bay Wood Export
tioners included, on constructive notice of its existence and warned everyone Corporation, to said corporations affidavit of adverse claim, the last being the
who thereafter dealt with the property on which it was constituted that he would document which was actually registered, on February 4, 1978 as already stated.
have to reckon with that encumbrance. Hence, Limpins subsequent purchase of Thus the mortgage in favor of Ponce and his late wife was still subsisting, when
the interests and participation of Butuan Bay Wood Export Corporation in the the notice of levy in favor of Limpin was annotated on the original of OCTs Nos.
lots covered by TCTs Nos. 92836 and 92837, as well as the sale of the same to 92836 and 92837, and even when the execution sale in favor of Limpin pursuant
Sarmiento on November 21, 1981, were both subject to said mortgage. On the to the levy was registered. Said annotation was cancelled only on November 25,
other hand, Ponces purchase of the lots mortgaged to him at the foreclosure 1981, after the properties had been sold on execution to Limpin on OctoberG,
sale on October 12, 1983, was subject to no prior lien or encumbrance, and 1981.
could in no way be affected or prejudiced by a subsequent or junior lien, such as The petitioners finally assert that respondent Ponce did not have a right of action
that of Limpin.25 Petitioner Sarmiento having acquired no better right than his for foreclosure over the lots in question in the Trial Court, much less to pursue
predecessor-in-interest, petitioner Limpin, his title must likewise fail. this case, first in the respondent Intermediate Appellate Court and now, before
The fact that at the time Ponce foreclosed the mortgage on October 21, 1983, this Court, because as early as August 18,1976, he and his wife had donated the
the lots had already been bought by Limpin and subsequently sold to Sarmiento lots to the Doa Josefa Edralin Marcos Foundation and the donation had been
is of no consequence, since the settled doctrine is that the effects of the accepted on August 31, 1976. However, that donation was never registered, a
foreclosure sale retroact to the date of registration of the mortgage, i.e., March fact that the petitioners admit. Even if this Court were inclined to take up that
1,1973 in the present case. issue now, though raised only for the first time, it is obvious that no resolution
"* * * It is well to note that the mortgage in favor of the late Ramon Eugenio was thereof could possibly improve the petitioners position as against that of the
annotated on November 13,1952 at the back of the certificates of title in private respondent or the latters transferee.
controversy, while the adverse claim was only annotated on the same certificate WHEREFORE, the petition is denied, with costs against petitioners.
more than one year later, on December 21, 1953. Hence, the adverse claim SO ORDERED.
 Yap (Chairman), Melencio-Herrera, Gutierrez, Jr., ** Cruz
_______________
** Feliciano, J., took no part. Gutierrez, J., was designated to sit in the First
Division.
528
528
SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
People vs. Pilapil
and Gancayco, JJ., concur.
Petition denied.
Notes.An order of execution is not merely interlocutory but final in
character because its purpose is to enforce a decision on the merits rendered in
the main case. (Allied Free Workers Union vs. Estipona, 3 SCRA 780.)
Execution contemplates the usual situation where a judgment is susceptible
of enforcement the moment It acquires the character of finality. (Uy Tina vs. Avila,
20 SCRA 37.)
It is the trial courts ministerial duty to issue a writ of execution for the
enforcement of a final and executory judgment even if the Presiding Judge
entertains doubts as to its validity. (Republic vs. Angeles, 20 SCRA 608.)
o0o
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