May 13 incident

From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

The May 13 Incident is a term for the Sino-Malay sectarian violences in Kuala
Lumpur (then part of the state of Selangor), Malaysia, which began on May 13, 1969.
The riots led to a declaration of a state of national emergency and suspension of
Parliament by the Malaysian government, while the National Operations Council
(NOC or Majlis Gerakan Negara, MAGERAN) was established to temporarily
govern the country between 1969 and 1971.

Officially, 196 people were killed between May 13 and July 31 as a result of the riots,
although journalists and other observers have stated much higher figures. Other
reports at the time suggest over 2,000[citation needed] were killed by rioters, police and
Malaysian Army rangers, mainly in Kuala Lumpur. Many of the dead were quickly
buried in unmarked graves in the Kuala Lumpur General Hospital grounds by soldiers
of Malaysian Engineers.

The government cited the riots as the main cause of its more aggressive affirmative
action policies, such as the New Economic Policy (NEP), after 1969.

On its formation in 1963, Malaysia, a federation incorporating Malaya (Peninsular

Malaysia), Singapore, North Borneo (Sabah) and Sarawak, suffered from a sharp
division of wealth between the Chinese, who were perceived to control a large portion
of the Malaysian economy, and the Malays, who were perceived to be more poor and
rural.

The 1964 Race Riots in Singapore contributed to the expulsion of that state from
Malaysia on 9 August 1965, and racial tension continued to simmer, with many
Malays dissatisfied by their newly independent government's perceived willingness to
placate the Chinese at their expense.

[edit] Ketuanan Melayu

Politics in Malaysia at this time were mainly Malay-based, with an emphasis on

special privileges for the Malays — other indigenous Malaysians, grouped together
collectively with the Malays under the title of "bumiputra" would not be granted a
similar standing until after the riots. There had been a recent outburst of Malay
passion for ketuanan Melayu — a Malay term for Malay supremacy or Malay
dominance — after the National Language Act of 1967, which in the opinion of some
Malays, had not gone far enough in the act of enshrining Malay as the national
language. Heated arguments about the nature of Malay privileges, with the mostly
Chinese opposition mounting a "Malaysian Malaysia" campaign had contributed to
the separation of Singapore on 9 August 1965, and inflamed passions on both sides.

[edit] 1969 general election

Main article: Malaysian general election, 1969

[edit] Run-up to polling day

The causes of the rioting can be analysed to have the same root as the 1964 riots in
Singapore, the event rooted from sentiments before the campaigning was bitterly
fought among various political parties prior to polling day on 10 May 1969, and party
leaders stoked racial and religious sentiments in order to win support. The Pan
Malaysian Islamic Party (PAS) accused the United Malays National Organisation
(UMNO) of selling the rights of the Malays to the Chinese, while the Democratic
Action Party (DAP) accused the Malaysian Chinese Association (MCA) of giving in
to UMNO. The DAP promoted the concept of a "Malaysian Malaysia", which would
deprive the Malays of their special rights under the Constitution of Malaysia. Both the
DAP and Singapore's People's Action Party (PAP) objected to Malay as the national
language and proposed multi-lingualism instead.[1] Senior Alliance politicians,
including Prime Minister Tunku Abdul Rahman, accused Singapore-based People's
Action Party of involvement in the campaign, as it had done during the 1964 general
election campaign (at the time when Singapore was part of the Malaysian federation
between 1963 and 1965).

The run-up to the election was also marred by two deaths: that of an UMNO election
agent, who was killed by a group of armed Chinese youths in Penang and that of a
member of the Labour Party of Malaya (LPM), who was killed in Kepong, Selangor.
[1]
There was a contrast in the handling of these two deaths. The UMNO worker was
buried without publicity, but the LPM casualty was honoured at a parade on May 9
when some 3000 LPM members marched from Kuala Lumpur to Kepong, violating
regulations and trying to provoke incidents with the police. The participants sang
Communist songs, waved red flags, and called upon the people to boycott the general
election.

[edit] Election results

Amidst tensions among the Malay and Chinese population, the general election was
held on 10 May 1969. Election day itself passed without any incidents, and the results
showed that the Alliance had gained a majority in Parliament at the national level,
albeit a reduced one, and in Selangor it had gained the majority by cooperating with
the sole independent candidate. The Opposition had tied with the Alliance for control
of the Selangor state legislature, a large setback in the polls for the Alliance. On the
night of 11th and 12th May, the Opposition celebrated their victory. In particular, a
large Gerakan procession welcomed the left-wing Gerakan leader V. David.[2]

On 12 May, thousands of Chinese marched through Kuala Lumpur, parading through

predominantly Malay areas, hurling insults which led to the incident.[1] The largely
Chinese opposition Democratic Action Party and Gerakan gained in the elections, and
secured a police permit for a victory parade through a fixed route in Kuala Lumpur.
However, the rowdy procession deviated from its route and headed through the Malay
district of Kampung Baru, jeering at the inhabitants.[3] Some demonstrators carried
brooms, later alleged to symbolise the sweeping out of the Malays from Kuala
Lumpur, while others chanted slogans about the "sinking" of the Alliance boat — the
coalition's logo.[4] The Gerakan party issued an apology on May 13 for their rally
goers' behaviour.

In addition, Malay leaders who were angry about the election results used the press to
attack their opponents, contributing to raising public anger and tension among the
Malay and Chinese communities.[citation needed] On 13 May, members of UMNO Youth
gathered in Kuala Lumpur, at the residence of Selangor Menteri Besar Dato' Harun
Haji Idris in Jalan Raja Muda, and demanded that they too should hold a victory
celebration. While UMNO announced a counter-procession, which would start from
the Harun bin Idris's residence. Tunku Abdul Rahman would later call the retaliatory
parade "inevitable, as otherwise the party members would be demoralised after the
show of strength by the Opposition and the insults that had been thrown at them."[3]

[edit] Rioting
Shortly before the UMNO procession began, the gathering crowd was reportedly
informed that Malays on their way to the procession had been attacked by Chinese in
Setapak, several miles to the north.[citation needed] Meanwhile, in the Kuala Lumpur area, a
Malay army officer was murdered by Chinese radicals as he and his spouse were
coming out from a movie theater in the predominantly Chinese area of Bukit
Bintang[citation needed]. A group of Malay protestors swiftly wreaked revenge by killing
two innocent passing Chinese motorcyclists, and the riot began.

The riot ignited the capital Kuala Lumpur and the surrounding area of Selangor —
according to Time, spreading throughout the city in 45 minutes.[5] Many people in
Kuala Lumpur were caught in the racial violence—dozens were injured and some
killed, houses and cars were burnt and wrecked, but except for minor disturbances in
Malacca, Perak, Penang and Singapore, where the populations of Chinese people were
similarly larger, the rest of the country remained calm. Although violence did not
occur in the rural areas, Time found that ethnic conflict had manifested itself in subtler
forms, with Chinese businessmen refusing to make loans available for Malay farmers,
or to transport agricultural produce from Malay farmers and fishermen.[6]

Incidents of violence continued to occur in the weeks after May 13, with the targets
now being not only Malay or Chinese but also Indian. It is argued that this showed
that "the struggle has become more clearly than ever the Malay extremists' fight for
total hegemony."[7]

According to police figures, 196 people died[8] and 149 were wounded. 753 cases of
arson were logged and 211 vehicles were destroyed or severely damaged. An
estimated 6,000 Kuala Lumpur residents — 90% of them Chinese[verification needed] —
were made homeless.[8] Various other casualty figures have been given, with one
thesis from a UC Berkeley academic, as well as Time, putting the total dead at ten
times the government figure.[7][9]

[edit] Declaration of emergency

The government ordered an immediate curfew throughout the state of Selangor.

Security forces comprising some 2000 Royal Malay Regiment soldiers and 3600
 police officers were deployed and took control of the situation. Over 300 Chinese
families were moved to refugee centres at the Merdeka Stadium and Tiong Nam
Settlement.

On May 14 and May 16, a state of emergency and accompanying curfew were
declared throughout the country, but the curfew was relaxed in most parts of the
country for two hours on May 18 and not enforced even in Kuala Lumpur within a
week.[citation needed]. On May 16 the National Operations Council (NOC) was established
by proclamation of the Yang di-Pertuan Agong (King of Malaysia) Sultan Ismail
Nasiruddin Shah, headed by Tun Abdul Razak. With Parliament suspended, the NOC
became the supreme decision-making body for the next 18 months. State and District
Operations Councils took over state and local governments.

The NOC implemented security measures to restore law and order in the country,
including the establishment of an unarmed Vigilante Corps, a territorial army, and
police force battalions. The restoration of order in the country was gradually achieved.
Curfews continued in most parts of the country, but were gradually scaled back. Peace
was restored in the affected areas within two months. In February 1971 parliamentary
rule was re-established.

In a report from the NOC, the riots was attributed in part to both the Malayan
Communist Party and secret societies:

The eruption of violence on May 13 was the result of an interplay of

“ forces... These include a generation gap and differences in interpretation
of the constitutional structure by the different races in the country...; the
incitement, intemperate statements and provocative behaviours of certain
racialist party members and supporters during the recent General
Election; the part played by the Malayan Communist Party (MCP) and
secret societies in inciting racial feelings and suspicion; and the anxious,
and later desperate, mood of the Malays with a background of Sino-
Malay distrust, and recently, just after the General Elections, as a result
of racial insults and threat to their future survival in their own country' ”
— Extract from The May 13 Tragedy, a report by the National Operations
 
Council, October 1969.[1]

[edit] Conspiracy theories

Immediately following the riot, conspiracy theories about the origin of the riots began
swirling. Many Chinese blamed the government, claiming it had intentionally planned
the attacks beforehand. To bolster their claims, they cited the fact that the potentially
dangerous UMNO rally was allowed to go on, even though the city was on edge after
two days of opposition rallies. Although UMNO leaders said none of the armed men
bused in to the rally belonged to UMNO, the Chinese countered this by arguing that
the violence had not spread from Harun Idris' home, but had risen simultaneously in
several different areas. The armed Malays were later taken away in army lorries, but
according to witnesses, appeared to be "happily jumping into the lorries as the names
of various villages were called out by army personnel".[10]
Despite the imposition of a curfew, the Malay soldiers who were allowed to remain
on the streets reportedly burned several more Chinese homes. The government denied
it was associated with these soldiers and said their actions were not condoned.[10]
However, Western observers such as Time suggested that "Whether or not the Malay-
controlled police force and emergency government have actually stirred up some of
the house-burning, spear-carrying mobs, they seem unwilling to clamp down on
them."[7]

In 2007, a book — May 13: Declassified Documents on the Malaysian Riots of 1969
by academic, former Democratic Action Party member and former Member of
Parliament Kua Kia Soong — was published by Suaram. Based on newly declassified
documents at the Public Records Office in London, the book alleged that contrary to
the official account that had blamed the violence on opposition parties, the riot had
been intentionally started by the "ascendent state capitalist class" in UMNO as a coup
d'etat to topple Tunku Abdul Rahman.[11][12]

[edit] Repercussions
[edit] Immediate effects

Immediately after the riot, the government assumed emergency powers and suspended
Parliament, which would reconvene again only in 1971. It also suspended the press
and established a National Operations Council. The NOC's report on the riots stated,
"The Malays who already felt excluded in the country's economic life, now began to
feel a threat to their place in the public services," and implied this was a cause of the
violence.[3]

Western observers such as Time attributed the racial enmities to a political and
economic system, which primarily benefited the upper classes:

The Chinese and Indians resented Malay-backed plans favoring the

“ majority, including one to make Malay the official school and
government language. The poorer, more rural Malays became jealous of
Chinese and Indian prosperity. Perhaps the Alliance's greatest failing was
that it served to benefit primarily those at the top. ... For a Chinese or
Indian who was not well-off, or for a Malay who was not well-connected,
there was little largesse in the system. Even for those who were favored,
hard feelings persisted. One towkay recently told a Malay official: "If it
weren't for the Chinese, you Malays would be sitting on the floor without
tables and chairs." Replied the official: "If I knew I could get every
damned Chinaman out of the country, I would willingly go back to sitting
on the floor."[13] ”
The riot led to the expulsion of Malay nationalist Mahathir Mohamad from UMNO
and propelled him to write his seminal work The Malay Dilemma, in which he posited
a solution to Malaysia's racial tensions based on aiding the Malays economically
through an affirmative action programme.
Tunku Abdul Rahman resigned as Prime Minister in the ensuing UMNO power
struggle, the new perceived 'Malay-ultra' dominated government swiftly moved to
placate Malays with the Malaysian New Economic Policy (NEP), enshrining
affirmative action policies for the bumiputra (Malays and other indigenous
Malaysians). Many of Malaysia's draconian press laws, originally targeting racial
incitement, also date from this period. The Constitution (Amendment) Act 1971
named Articles 152, 153, and 181, and also Part III of the Constitution as specially
protected, permitting Parliament to pass legislation that would limit dissent with
regard to these provisions pertaining to the social contract. (The social contract is
essentially a quid pro quo agreement between the Malay and non-Malay citizens of
Malaysia; in return for granting the non-Malays citizenship at independence, symbols
of Malay authority such as the Malay monarchy became national symbols, and the
Malays were granted special economic privileges.) With this new power, Parliament
then amended the Sedition Act accordingly. The new restrictions also applied to
Members of Parliament, overruling Parliamentary immunity; at the same time, Article
159, which governs Constitutional amendments, was amended to entrench the
"sensitive" Constitutional provisions; in addition to the consent of Parliament, any
changes to the "sensitive" portions of the Constitution would now have to pass the
Conference of Rulers, a body comprising the monarchs of the Malay states. At the
same time, the Internal Security Act, which permits detention without trial, was also
amended to stress "intercommunal harmony".[14]

Despite the opposition of the DAP and PPP, the Alliance government passed the
amendments, having maintained the necessary two-thirds Parliamentary majority.[14]
In Britain, the laws were condemned, with The Times of London stating they would
"preserve as immutable the feudal system dominating Malay society" by "giving this
archaic body of petty constitutional monarchs incredible blocking power"; the move
was cast as hypocritical, given that Deputy Prime Minister Tun Abdul Razak had
spoken of "the full realisation that important matters must no longer be swept under
the carpet..."[15]

The Rukunegara, the de facto Malaysian pledge of allegiance, was another reaction to
the riot. The pledge was introduced on August 31, 1970 as a way to foster unity
among Malaysians.

[edit] Legacy

The state of emergency that was declared shortly after the incident has never been
lifted, an action that has been cited by academic lawyers as a reason for diminished
civil rights in the country due to the legislative powers granted to the executive during
a state of emergency.[16]

Many political analysts attributed the Malay "crutch mentality" syndrome to have
arisen from May 13, and a direct result of the affirmative NEP programme. This had
resulted to abnormally large proportion of younger generation of Malays not being
able to compete not only internationally but also nationally.

[edit] Aftermath
The National Operations Council governed the country in lieu of the elected
government.

The May 13 Incident led to affirmative action policies, such as the New Economic
Policy (NEP), after 1969 and the creation of Kuala Lumpur as a Federal Territory out
of Selangor state in 1974, five years later.

[edit] Political references

Malaysian politicians have often cited the May 13 incident when warning of the
potential consequences of racial rhetoric, or as a bogeyman to blanket off discussion
on any issues that challenge the status quo. In the 1990 general election and 1999
general election, May 13 was cited in Barisan Nasional campaign advertisements and
in speeches by government politicians. Such usage of the incident in political
discourse has been criticised; the Tunku stated: "For the PM (Dr Mahathir Mohamad)
to repeat the story of the May 13 as a warning of what would have happened if the
government had not taken appropriate action is like telling ghost stories to our
children to prevent them from being naughty… The tale should not be repeated
because it shows us to be politically immature…"[citation needed]

In 2004, during the UMNO general assembly Badruddin Amiruldin , the current
deputy permanent chairman, waved a book on May 13 during his speech and stated
"No other race has the right to question our privileges, our religion and our leader".
He also stated that doing so would be similar to "stirring up a hornet's nest". The next
day, Dr Pirdaus Ismail of the UMNO Youth was quoted as saying "Badruddin did not
pose the question to all Chinese in the country ... Those who are with us, who hold the
same understanding as we do, were not our target. In defending Malay rights, we
direct our voice at those who question them." Deputy Internal Security Minister Noh
Omar dismissed the remarks as a lesson in history and said that Badruddin was merely
reminding the younger generation of the blot on the nation's history.
by Zainon Ahmad

[email protected]

WHEN in 1968 the Alliance began preparations for a renewal of its mandate which was due to end in 1969,
little did it suspect what the results would unlock.

As far as it was concerned, the 1969 general election was to be a routine affair, and there was no doubt in
the mind of Alliance leaders that it would win as decisively as it did in 1964.

After all, the cancer that was Singapore had been cast off in 1965, the economy was happily humming, the
Indonesian confrontation had just ended and diplomatic relations with the Southeast Asian giant re-
established, and the opposition was weak and fragmented.

The Alliance boasted that it could easily win more than two thirds of the 144 seats in the Dewan Rakyat or
about two thirds of the 104 Peninsular Malaysia seats, capture Kelantan, and retain control of all the other
state legislatures.

But that confidence was shattered in the early hours of May 11, 1969 when the results of the May 10
elections were known.

The Alliance had won only 66 seats, down from the 89 it won in 1964. It also lost Penang, failed to capture
Kelantan, and came close to losing Perak, Selangor, Kedah and Terengganu.

The Opposition was surprised, too. The DAP, which reconstituted itself from the People’s Action Party (PAP),
won 13 seats when the Singapore-based party had only one in 1964. PAS got 12 seats, an increase of three;
PPP won four, an increase of two; while the new party Gerakan won eight.

Even though the Alliance had not lost power – and Sabah and Sarawak had yet to decide – the Malays were
alarmed.

They felt that the government they had dominated all this while was going to collapse.

During the Alliance meeting held to assess the results, a number of Malay representatives blamed the losses
on the MCA which saw 20 of its 33 candidates defeated. Hurt and weak, the MCA announced on May 13 that
it would not participate in the government at federal and state levels.

What appeared as punishment of the MCA by Umno became an additional factor contributing to further racial
tensions and anxieties.

Opposition supporters, especially the Chinese and Indians who had voted for the DAP and Gerakan were
jubilant. And they showed it.

They celebrated their “victories” by marching through Kuala Lumpur and in their exuberance shouted
insulting epithets at Malays living near the city fringes. They even showed vulgar gestures at Malay women.

On May 12, Gerakan got police permission for 1,000 party members and supporters to hold their own
demonstrations that evening.

Word got around quickly and the number swelled to 4,000 which later broke up into smaller groups that
conducted their own “demonstrations” away from the restrain of party leaders.

They, too, taunted the Malays with insults, using similar words that had been hurled by the previous day’s
demonstrators, such as: “Melayu balik kampung, kita sudah berkuasa sekarang” (“Malays, return to your
villages, we are now in power”) and “Hey Sakai bolih balik ke hutan” (“Hey Sakai, you can return to the
jungle”).

Meanwhile, groups of Malays from outside Kuala Lumpur gathered at Selangor Mentri Besar Datuk Harun
Idris’ house in Kampung Baru. They urged Harun to lead a victory demonstration to show they had not lost
power.

Before long, it was announced a demonstration would begin from Harun’s house at 7.30pm on May 13.

Violence started at about 6pm that day when about 100 Malays from Gombak made their way through
Setapak – the scene of the previous evening’s demonstrations – carrying banners and shouting slogans.

Soon, street clashes broke out between them and Chinese and Indian youths. Parang, sticks and iron pipes
were used.

Most of the Malay demonstrators made it to Harun’s house where exaggerated versions of what happened
had already reached the 5,000 people gathered there.

They were in an ugly mood. When some Chinese and Indians in a passing bus made some taunting remarks
at them, the vehicle was attacked. By 6.40pm, the first three Chinese lay dead beside the road.

Word of what happened in Setapak and Kampung Baru spread and within hours the whole city was engulfed
in communal rioting the size of which had never been experienced by the country before.

The worst of the rioting burned itself out during that first night.

On May 14, a state of Emergency was declared and Parliament was suspended indefinitely. On May 16,
Prime Minister Tunku Abdul Rahman set up the National Operations Council (NOC) to rule the country by
decree with his deputy, Tun Abdul Razak Hussein, as director of operations.

Sporadic small clashes continued after May 14 and they fizzled out only after about a month. The last serious
outbreak was between Malays and Indians on June 28 in Kuala Lumpur in which five people were killed.

In January 1970, Tun Razak set up a National Consultative Council to find ways to promote and strengthe
racial harmony so that normalcy would return and Parliament restored.

On Sept 21, the Tunku retired as prime minister, depressed and sad that the racial harmony he had

devoted much of his political life to strengthen had collapsed under his watch.

Tun Razak succeeded Tunku as the country’s second prime minister, and eventually the NOC came to an end
after 21 months, and Parliament convened again on Feb 23, 1971.
Tunku Abdul Rahman and Tun Abdul Razak Hussein, and their wives pose at a Hari Raya open
house at Razak's Sri Taman house in 1973. Razak succeeded Tunku in 1970 as prime minister.

  ***********

Why did it happen?

It was bound to happen and was waiting to happen.

Much of the underlying causes could have been resolved early, and some of the symptoms could have been
heeded to nip the problem before it conflagrated.

In fact, even as early as the 1959 general election when there was much racial tension within the Alliance
and outside of it, some observed that the country’s worst enemy was not the communists in the jungles but
communalism in the cities.

Beginning with the communist terrorist activities against the Malays after the Japanese surrender, to the
Malayan Union where the non-Malays were happy with the rights they got, to the Federation of Malaya
where they lost much of these rights and the Malays had their special rights entrenched, communalism
festered.

It reared its ugly head prior to the 1955 general election, during the drafting of the national constitution,
and prior to the 1959 elections.

The various rights – Malay special rights, citizenship rights, language, culture and education – were publicly
debated when the People’s Action Party (PAP) participated in Malaysian politics after Singapore joined
Malaysia in 1963.

Because the Alliance participated in the Singapore elections in 1963, the PAP participated in the federal
elections in 1964 and told the Chinese not to vote for MCA for betraying them to the Malays.

Preparations were made to defeat the PAP in the Singapore elections scheduled for 1967. Malaysian radio
and televisions accused the PAP of undermining racial harmony, while Singapore radio and television called
for a “Malaysian Malaysia”, meritocracy and the removal of quotas.

Following the 1965 ouster of Singapore from Malaysia, much of the discussion on these issues were
somewhat muffled. But all stops were pulled during the five week campaign period before polling day on
May 10, 1969.

Bloody incidents were also not new to the country. Beginning with the January 1957 incident in Penang
where four people were killed, there were minor clashes between small groups of Malays and Chinese long
before 1969.

But the foretaste of the communal violence to come erupted in November 1967 in Penang where political
demonstrations eventually spread to Perak and Kedah, resulting in 25 people being killed.

Meanwhile, the DAP and the newly formed Gerakan grew into formidable rivals. Where the Alliance thought
the general election was a walkover, it suddenly had to contend with these two parties which attracted
Chinese and Indian voters in droves.

During the long campaign period, the DAP spoke quite unreservedly about a Malaysian Malaysia. It targeted
the MCA for letting down the Chinese with the passing of the National Language Act 1967 and for accepting
the use of Malay as the sole medium of instruction in school.

Gerakan felt strongly that the special Malay rights and the language policy in schools were inequitable to
other races.

The MCA and MIC had to defend the Alliance stand, while Umno had to fend off PAS’s allegations that it was
“selling out the Malays to the immigrant races”.

The Labour Party, allegedly communist infiltrated, did not participate in the elections but were busy
organising demonstrations against the government. Just a fortnight before polling day, an Umno member
was murdered, allegedly by a Labour Party member. Tensions ran high but was quickly contained.

Ten days later, police shot dead a Labour Party member for resisting arrest in Kuala Lumpur. The party
applied for a police permit to hold a funeral procession on May 10 – polling day.

Permission, however, was granted for May 9. About 10,000 people took part and they flouted every police
instruction, including the routes they were supposed to take.

They passed through the heart of Kuala Lumpur and clogged up traffic on almost every street. They carried
the Red Flag and portraits of Mao-zedong and sang The East is Red.

They provoked Malay bystanders with shouts of “Malai si” (“Death to the Malays!”) and “Hutang darah
dibayar darah” (“Blood debts will be repaid with blood”).

It was to the credit of the Royal Malaysian Police that nothing ugly happened that day. But it set the stage
and primed the mood for what was to happen following the “celebrations” on May 11 and 12.

While it is a dark blot in the nation’s history,  Malaysians –  old and young – will never be allowed to forget
May 13. Mostly, it is used to scare people away from public discussions and debate on such subjects as
citizenship, education, culture and religion.

We are constantly reminded of the incident so that we will refrain from questioning the regime in place,
from saying things about it or doing things that may be construed as undermining racial harmony and
national unity.

Many are agreed that Malaysians should also treat May 13 as a lasting reminder of the danger of
disregarding the Merdeka Constitution and of playing about with the sensitivities, customs and traditions of
the country’s various ethnic groups.

**********
Watershed elections of 1969
by Wong Chin Huat
The results of the May 10, 1969 elections are flashed on a king-size scoreboard erected in
Padang Selangor Club, now Dataran Merdeka, before a 30,000-strong crowd. The Alliance was
trumped by the Opposition.

by Wong Chin Huat

[email protected]

TECHNICALLY, the 1969 general election was the first national elections for Malaysia. Prior to that,
Singapore, Sabah, Sarawak and Malaya had had their respective elections separately from 1963 to 1964.

Electorally, this explained part of the uncertainty over the outcome of the 1969 elections – 40 out of 144
representatives would be elected from East Malaysia. But, the actual uncertainty was smaller because Tun
Mustapha Datu Harun’s United Sabah National Organisation (Usno) won 10 out of 16 seats unopposed for
the Alliance on nomination day.

If winning a two-third parliamentary majority or 96 seats was the minimum goal for the Alliance, then it
needed only to win another 86 seats, from the peninsula (104 seats), Sarawak (24) and Sabah (6). By
1969, the peninsula’s political landscape had changed significantly from 1964.

Firstly, a few opposition parties had faded out from the electoral arena. The People’s Action Party (PAP), for
one, had retreated to Singapore after the island state was expelled from Malaysia in 1965, but the
Democratic Action Party (DAP) continued its struggle here.

The once powerful Labour Party chose to boycott the elections to protest the mass arrests of its leaders.
Meanwhile, former MCA president Lim Chong Eu had abandoned his United Democratic Party to form in
1968 a new centre-left party, Gerakan, with former Labour leaders like Tan Chee Khoon and university
professors like Syed Hussin Al-Atas and Wang Gungwu.

Secondly, old coalitions disintegrated and a new one was made. The Socialist Front (SF), which

contested the 1959 and 1964 elections had collapsed due to the disputes over language and other issues
between the Labour Party and Partai Rakyat (PR), leaving the latter to contest six seats on its own. The
Malaysian Solidarity Convention (MSC), sponsored by the PAP, had died a natural death with the separation
of Singapore from Malaysia.

Three parties competing for largely non-Malay support – the DAP, Gerakan and the People’s Progressive
Party – had, however, reached an electoral pact to ensure a multi-cornered contest. In 1964,

failure to put up a single candidate had cost the Opposition seven seats or 6.7% of the peninsula’s 104
seats. The Alliance won these seats instead despite more than half of the voters rejecting it.

The 1969 elections was dominated by communal sentiments over the questions of language,

education and equality. The Alliance lost supporters to PAS and the three non-Malay opposition parties
coming from two ends of the political spectrum.

Such competition is in fact not uncommon for the “centrist party” in multi-ethnic societies. In 1971,
Zambia’s multi-ethnic ruling party Unip which led the country to independence found itself attacked by two
opposition parties which represented competing ethnic interests. Unip’s defeat in five of eleven by-elections
alarmed President Kaunda who in the end chose to ban opposition parties altogether and turned Zambia into
a de jure one-party state.

Very interestingly, the attrition of Malay support was much higher than that of the non-Malays. Malay
opposition parties’ vote shares in the peninsula increased drastically from about 15% in 1964 to 25% in
1969 while the support for non-Malay opposition parties remained roughly the same at 26% in both
elections. Thanks to the electoral system, however, PAS seats increased from nine to 12 seats only while
the non-Malay opposition parties from eight to 25.

The opposition parties’ gain at state level was more shocking to the Alliance Party which not only

continued to lose to PAS in Kelantan, but also to political infant Gerakan in Penang. No party commanded an
absolute majority in two other states. The Alliance held only 14 out of 24 seats in Selangor and 19 out of 40
in Perak. Some quarters became anxious that non-Malays would become mentris besar.

Two days after the announcement of the result, ethnic riots broke out in Kuala Lumpur on May 13 and soon
spread to other areas. The official explanation blamed the riots on the opposition’s victory parades but
declassified British intelligence have since pointed to other causes.

The riots prompted the declaration of Emergency Rule and the suspension of Parliament. Uncompleted
elections in Sabah, Sarawak and a Malacca constituency were suspended. A selected circle of politicians,
bureaucrats and security officers formed the National Operations Council (NOC) and ruled the country by
decree until 1971. 

Harshly attacked by young Malay nationalists in Umno including Dr Mahathir Mohamad, Tunku stepped down
in 1970 on ceremonial grounds, saying he did not want to serve as premier for the next Yang di-Pertuan
Agong who was his nephew. In reality, many observers noted that the power had long passed into the
hands of his deputy and successor Tun Abdul Razak.

The 1969 ethnic riots, officially attributed to inter-ethnic socio-economic disparity and political division,
warranted sea changes in Malaysian society, in economy and politics. On the first front, the New Economic
Policy (NEP) was introduced to achieve its twin goals of poverty eradication  and restructuring of society.
The attrition of Malay support for Umno had clearly sent a powerful message.

To curb so-called “politicking”, once parliamentary rule was restored, the Constitution was immediately
amended to place four sensitive issues, namely the special status of bumiputras (Article 153), national
language (Article 152), the position of Malay Rulers (Article 181) and citizenship (Part II), beyond public
discussion. Local elections, suspended since 1965, were permanently abolished in 1973.

Tun Razak’s coup de grace in consolidating Umno’s dominance was the formation of coalition governments
at state and local levels in 1970 and 1971, followed by the expansion of the Alliance into Barisan Nasional
(BN) by 1974.

The co-optation started with Sarawak after the resumption of elections in East Malaysia in mid-1970. Like
Perak and Selangor, Sarawak had a hung assembly (totaling 48 seats), with two possible coalitions: a 23-
seat coalition of Muslim- and Chinese-based parties or a 32-seat Dayak-Chinese coalition.

The federal government broke the deal for the former which resulted in a 35-seat coalition of a Muslim-
dominated Sarawak Alliance (15 seats), Chinese-majority Sarawak United People’s Party (SUPP) (12 seats)
and the Dayak-based Parti Pesaka (8 seats). SNAP, whose former leader was the first Chief Minister
Stephen Kalong Ningkan, was left in the cold with twelve seats. In return also for its support in Parliament,
SUPP was rewarded with a federal ministership.

The Sarawak formula was soon tried out in the peninsula. Despite holding a two-third majority, Penang’s
ruling party Gerakan decided to share its state power with the Alliance in February 1972 in return for federal
support and aid. This caused a break-up of the Gerakan party, producing the short-lived Pekemas party led
by Dr Tan Chee Khoon.
The Alliance’s third coalition government was formed in Perak, at state and municipal levels, with the
People’s Progressive Party (PPP) which ruled Ipoh. Nominally, PPP remained an opposition party at the
federal level.

PPP’s gain, by being coopted, was perhaps the least of all the co-opted parties’ but it feared not having any
other alternatives. As state governments started taking over municipal councils, it feared the loss of its
power base in Ipoh.

Finally, on New Year’s Day of 1973, the Alliance and PAS sealed the last coalition agreement. PAS gained a
number of federal and state positions while Umno benefited from two state executive council seats in
Kelantan. On July 1, 1974, the Alliance and its new coalition partners officially re-engineered their coalition
into the Barisan Nasional (BN). This brilliant project killed three birds with one stone.

» it effectively eliminated nearly all political competition as the opposition seat share in Parliament shrunk
from 37.5% to 15.3% with only the DAP and SNAP remaining as Opposition.

» the proliferation of parties within the BN left Umno in a stronger position vis-a-vis its partners than in the
Alliance era.

» the proliferation has also provided differentiation, leading some voters to believe in the diversity of choices
and alternatives within BN.

Compared to some leaders in the developing world who banned opposition parties, Tun Razak was a political
genius. He understood the importance of government legitimacy. In his own words, “the view we take is
that democratic government is the best and most acceptable form of government. So long as the form is
preserved, the substance can be changed to suit conditions of a particular country”.

Wong Chin Huat is reading electoral system at University of Essex for his PhD and lectures in Arts at Monash
University – Sunway Campus. He is co-editing a book on the 2004

general election with Prof Noraini Othman at Ikmas, UKM.

WHEN in 1968 the Alliance began preparations for a renewal of its mandate which was due to end in
1969, little did it suspect what the results would unlock.

As far as it was concerned, the 1969 general election was to be a routine affair, and there was no doubt
in the mind of Alliance leaders that it would win as decisively as it did in 1964.

After all, the cancer that was Singapore had been cast off in 1965, the economy was happily humming,
the Indonesian confrontation had just ended and diplomatic relations with the Southeast Asian giant re-
established, and the opposition was weak and fragmented.

The Alliance boasted that it could easily win more than two thirds of the 144 seats in the Dewan Rakyat
or about two thirds of the 104 Peninsular Malaysia seats, capture Kelantan, and retain control of all the
other state legislatures.

But that confidence was shattered in the early hours of May 11, 1969 when the results of the May 10
elections were known.

The Alliance had won only 66 seats, down from the 89 it won in 1964. It also lost Penang, failed to
capture Kelantan, and came close to losing Perak, Selangor, Kedah and Terengganu.

The Opposition was surprised, too. The DAP, which reconstituted itself from the People’s Action Party
(PAP), won 13 seats when the Singapore-based party had only one in 1964. PAS got 12 seats, an
increase of three; PPP won four, an increase of two; while the new party Gerakan won eight.

Even though the Alliance had not lost power – and Sabah and Sarawak had yet to decide – the Malays
were alarmed. They felt that the government they had dominated all this while was going to collapse.

During the Alliance meeting held to assess the results, a number of Malay representatives blamed the
losses on the MCA which saw 20 of its 33 candidates defeated. Hurt and weak, the MCA announced on
May 13 that it would not participate in the government at federal and state levels.

What appeared as punishment of the MCA by Umno became an additional factor contributing to further
racial tensions and anxieties. Opposition supporters, especially the Chinese and Indians who had voted
for the DAP and Gerakan were jubilant. And they showed it.

They celebrated their “victories” by marching through Kuala Lumpur and in their exuberance shouted
insulting epithets at Malays living near the city fringes. They even showed vulgar gestures at Malay
women.

On May 12, Gerakan got police permission for 1,000 party members and supporters to hold their own
demonstrations that evening.

Word got around quickly and the number swelled to 4,000 which later broke up into smaller groups that
conducted their own “demonstrations” away from the restrain of party leaders.

They, too, taunted the Malays with insults, using similar words that had been hurled by the previous
day’s demonstrators, such as: “Melayu balik kampung, kita sudah berkuasa sekarang” (“Malays, return
to your villages, we are now in power”) and “Hey Sakai bolih balik ke hutan” (“Hey Sakai, you can return
to the jungle”).

Meanwhile, groups of Malays from outside Kuala Lumpur gathered at Selangor Mentri Besar Datuk
Harun Idris’ house in Kampung Baru. They urged Harun to lead a victory demonstration to show they
had not lost power.

Before long, it was announced a demonstration would begin from Harun’s house at 7.30pm on May 13.
Violence started at about 6pm that day when about 100 Malays from Gombak made their way through
Setapak – the scene of the previous evening’s demonstrations – carrying banners and shouting
slogans.

Soon, street clashes broke out between them and Chinese and Indian youths. Parang, sticks and iron
pipes were used.

Most of the Malay demonstrators made it to Harun’s house where exaggerated versions of what
happened had already reached the 5,000 people gathered there.
They were in an ugly mood. When some Chinese and Indians in a passing bus made some taunting
remarks at them, the vehicle was attacked. By 6.40pm, the first three Chinese lay dead beside the road.

Word of what happened in Setapak and Kampung Baru spread and within hours the whole city was
engulfed in communal rioting the size of which had never been experienced by the country before. The
worst of the rioting burned itself out during that first night.

On May 14, a state of Emergency was declared and Parliament was suspended indefinitely. On May 16,
Prime Minister Tunku Abdul Rahman set up the National Operations Council (NOC) to rule the country
by decree with his deputy, Tun Abdul Razak Hussein, as director of operations.

Sporadic small clashes continued after May 14 and they fizzled out only after about a month. The last
serious outbreak was between Malays and Indians on June 28 in Kuala Lumpur in which five people
were killed.

In January 1970, Tun Razak set up a National Consultative Council to find ways to promote and
strengthen racial harmony so that normalcy would return and Parliament restored.

On Sept 21, the Tunku retired as prime minister, depressed and sad that the racial harmony he had
devoted much of his political life to strengthen had collapsed under his watch.

Tun Razak succeeded Tunku as the country’s second prime minister, and eventually the NOC came to
an end after 21 months, and Parliament convened again on Feb 23, 1971.

Why did it happen?

IT was bound to happen and was waiting to happen.

Much of the underlying causes could have been resolved early, and some of the symptoms could have
been heeded to nip the problem before it conflagrated.

In fact, even as early as the 1959 general election when there was much racial tension within the
Alliance and outside of it, some observed that the country’s worst enemy was not the communists in the
jungles but communalism in the cities.

Beginning with the communist terrorist activities against the Malays after the Japanese surrender, to the
Malayan Union where the non-Malays were happy with the rights they got, to the Federation of Malaya
where they lost much of these rights and the Malays had their special rights entrenched, communalism
festered.

It reared its ugly head prior to the 1955 general election, during the drafting of the national constitution,
and prior to the 1959 elections.

The various rights – Malay special rights, citizenship rights, language, culture and education – were
publicly debated when the People’s Action Party (PAP) participated in Malaysian politics after Singapore
joined Malaysia in 1963.

Because the Alliance participated in the Singapore elections in 1963, the PAP participated in the federal
elections in 1964 and told the Chinese not to vote for MCA for betraying them to the Malays.

Preparations were made to defeat the PAP in the Singapore elections scheduled for 1967. Malaysian
radio and televisions accused the PAP of undermining racial harmony, while Singapore radio and
television called for a “Malaysian Malaysia”, meritocracy and the removal of quotas.

Following the 1965 ouster of Singapore from Malaysia, much of the discussion on these issues were
somewhat muffled. But all stops were pulled during the five week campaign period before polling day on
May 10, 1969.

Bloody incidents were also not new to the country. Beginning with the January 1957 incident in Penang
where four people were killed, there were minor clashes between small groups of Malays and Chinese
long before 1969.
But the foretaste of the communal violence to come erupted in November 1967 in Penang where
political demonstrations eventually spread to Perak and Kedah, resulting in 25 people being killed.

Meanwhile, the DAP and the newly formed Gerakan grew into formidable rivals. Where the Alliance
thought the general election was a walkover, it suddenly had to contend with these two parties which
attracted Chinese and Indian voters in droves.

During the long campaign period, the DAP spoke quite unreservedly about a Malaysian Malaysia. It
targeted the MCA for letting down the Chinese with the passing of the National Language Act 1967 and
for accepting the use of Malay as the sole medium of instruction in school.

Gerakan felt strongly that the special Malay rights and the language policy in schools were inequitable
to other races.

The MCA and MIC had to defend the Alliance stand, while Umno had to fend off PAS’s allegations that it
was “selling out the Malays to the immigrant races”.

The Labour Party, allegedly communist infiltrated, did not participate in the elections but were busy
organising demonstrations against the government. Just a fortnight before polling day, an Umno
member was murdered, allegedly by a Labour Party member. Tensions ran high but was quickly
contained.

Ten days later, police shot dead a Labour Party member for resisting arrest in Kuala Lumpur. The party
applied for a police permit to hold a funeral procession on May 10 – polling day.

Permission, however, was granted for May 9.About 10,000 people took part and they flouted every
police instruction, including the routes they were supposed to take.

They passed through the heart of Kuala Lumpur and clogged up traffic on almost every street. They
carried the Red Flag and portraits of Mao-zedong and sang The East is Red.

They provoked Malay bystanders with shouts of “Malai si” (“Death to the Malays!”) and “Hutang darah
dibayar darah” (“Blood debts will be repaid with blood”).

It was to the credit of the Royal Malaysian Police that nothing ugly happened that day. But it set the
stage and primed the mood for what was to happen following the “celebrations” on May 11 and 12.

While it is a dark blot in the nation’s history, Malaysians – old and young – will never be allowed to
forget May 13. Mostly, it is used to scare people away from public discussions and debate on such
subjects as citizenship, education, culture and religion.

We are constantly reminded of the incident so that we will refrain from questioning the regime in place,
from saying things about it or doing things that may be construed as undermining racial harmony and
national unity.

Many are agreed that Malaysians should also treat May 13 as a lasting reminder of the danger of
disregarding the Merdeka Constitution and of playing about with the sensitivities, customs and traditions
of the country’s various ethnic groups. - 26 July 2007

 
Read this extract from Biografi Politik Tunku Abdul Rahman

Peristiwa berdarah 13 Mei adalah kemuncak masalah perkauman yang menguasai

politik Malaysia, terutamanya di Malaysia Barat. Masalah perkauman ini tidak mahu
dan tidak dapat diselesaikan dengan sebaiknya sebelum merdeka, kemudian
berpanjangan dan bertambah rumit untuk diselesaikan selepas pembentukan Malaysia.
Kejadian inilah yang menjatuhkan Tunku Abdul Rahman sebagai wira negara.

Tunku Abdul Rahman tidak dapat menyelesaikan soal perkauman di Malaysia dengan
menyingkirkan Singapura. Persoalan itu terus menghambat politik negara yang
tercetus akibat perkembangan sebelum tahun 1969. Walaupun Lee Kwan Yew telah
meninggalkan Malaysia, tetapi beliau telah meletakkan asas konsep "Malaysian
Malaysia" yang menjadi pegangan semua parti pembangkang bukan melayu,
terutamanya yang dipimpin dan dianggotai oleh kaum cina.
Maksud konsep tersebut ialah;
"The ideal of a free, democratic and socialist Malaysia, based on the principles of
RACIAL EQUALITY, and social and economic justice, and founded on the
institutions of parliamentary democracy."
DAP Setapak Declaration 29 July 1967.

Malah, Lee Kwan Yew telah meninggalkan bekas setiausaha akhbarnya iaitu Lim Kit
Siang, satu-satunya ahli PAP di Dewan Rakyat, untuk meneruskan perjuangannya
dalam parti DAP yang ditubuhkannya pada Mac 1966.

Seterusnya, soal-soal yang bersifat perkauman terus menjadi modal kepada parti
pembangkang untuk meraih undi orang ramai. Walaupun hak keistimewaan kaum
Melayu telah termaktub dalam perlembagaan, tetapi kata-kata Lee Kwan Yew tetap
terpahat di hati mereka.

Katanya,
"According to history, Malays began to migrate to Malaysia in noticeable numbers
only about 700 years ago. Of the 39 percent of Malays in Malaysia today, about one-
third of them are comparatively new immigrants like the secretary-general of UMNO,
Dato' Syed Jaafar Albar, who came to Malaya from Indonesia just before the war at
the age of more than thirty. Therefore it is wrong and illogical for a particular racial
group to think that they are more justified to be called Malaysians and that the others
become Malaysian only through their favour."

Inilah yang terjadi dalam kempen pilihan raya tahun 1969. Seperti juga tahun 1959
dan tahun 1964, isu-isu kontroversi seperti kedudukan istimewa orang Melayu dalam
perkhidmatan awam menjadi modal kempen mereka. Bukan mereka tidak memahami
peruntukan perlembagaan tetapi perkara itu digunakan untuk menjatuhkan Perikatan
dan kuasa politik orang Melayu. Orang Melayu yang jumlahnya kecil daripada orang
bukan Melayu kelihatan begitu mudah untuk dikalahkan. Menjelang tahun 1969,
orang Melayu di seluruh negara hanya berjumlah 39 peratus, sedangkan orang bukan
Melayu berjumlah sekali ganda daripada orang Melayu.

Kempen-kempen menjelang pilihan raya tahun 1969 dijalankan bukan sahaja

mengenengahkan isu-isu sensitif, tetapi hal-hal peribadi, dan serangan fizikal telah
dilakukan oleh para pembangkang. Misalnya, PAS telah mengedarkan gambar Tunku
Abdul Rahman dan Khir Johari yang sedang meminum arak bersama-sama dengan
beberapa pemimpin Cina. Di pihak pembangkang Cina pula seperti di Pulau Pinang,
mereka telah menampal poster-poster yang menaikkan kemarahan orang Melayu.
Mereka juga menyerang pekerja UMNO dalam demonstrasi mereka mengakibatkan
dua orang terbunuh. Di Kuala Lumpur pula, mereka menulis slogan-slogan yang
menaikkan sentimen perkauman. Seorang pekerja Parti Buruh Malaya telah ditembak
mati oleh polis (seorang Melayu) kerana enggan berhenti menulis slogan anti-Melayu.
Tindakan anggota polis itu telah menimbulkan kemarahan orang Cina radikal. Bara
api perkauman mula terasa bahangnya menjelang hari pilihan raya pada 10 Mei 1969.

Keputusan pilihan raya tersebut memeranjatkan banyak pihak, terutama pemimpin-

pemimpin Melayu. Perikatan telah kehilangan sepuluh peratus undinya dan hampir
separuh kerusi negeri dan parlimen yang dicapainya dalam pilihan raya
sebelumnya.Ternyata pihak pembangkang bukan sahaja memenangi lebih banyak
kerusi sejak 1955 tetapi juga kekuatan mereka semakin terserlah. Dalam setiap kali
pilihan raya diadakan, peratus dan jumlah kerusi Perikatan merosot, kecuali sedikit
pertambahan pada tahun 1964. Pertambahan kerusi pembangkang jelas di kawasan-
kawasan yang mempunyai penduduk Cina yang ramai seperti di Pulau Pinang; Ipoh &
Taiping, Perak; Bukit Bintang, Kuala Lumpur; Kepong, Selangor; Melaka dan Negeri
Sembilan. Di Pulau Pinang, Parti Gerakan telah berjaya membentuk kerajaan negeri
selepas mengalahkan Perikatan dengan teruk sekali. Sementara di Perak dan Selangor
pula, DAP dan PPP mendapat kerusi yang cukup untuk melemahkan Perikatan. Di
Kelantan, PAS terus dapat mengekalkan penguasaannya sejak tahun 1959.
Kemenangan pembangang dijangka akan menjadi lebih kuat lagi apabila pilihan raya
negeri dan parlimen diadakan di Sabah dan Sarawak pada bulan Jun 1969.

Penyokong-penyokong Gerakan dan DAP telah mengadakan beberapa perarakan di

jalan raya untuk menyambut kemenangan mereka pada 11 dan 12 Mei 1969. Pihak
polis memberi kebenaran kerana tidak menduga, kebenaran itu disalahgunakan.

Mengapakah mereka perlu berarak? Ini semata-mata untuk menunjukkan kemampuan

mereka melemahkan Perikatan dalam pilihan raya tersebut. Perarakan itu juga sebagai
manifestasi kebanggaan kerana dapat mengatasi kuasa politik orang Melayu.

Menurut seorang pengkaji:

"Although, technically speaking, the Alliance had won, the opposition parties were
elated at the improvement of their position, and on 11 and 12 May the DAP and
Gerakan held 'victory' parades in Kuala Lumpur, some of which did not have police
permission, which were followed by numerous smaller processions. Some of the DAP
and Gerakan supporters went to the house of Dato' Harun bin Idris, Menteri Besar of
Selangor, and Chairman of UMNO Selangor Branch, and told him to quit as he was
no longer Menteri Besar.... This unruly mob slowly wound its way through town, past
Kampung Bahru, the largest Malay residential area in Kuala Lumpur, where some
thirty thousand Malays lived, hurling abuse and insults as it went, such as 'MELAYU
SUDAH JATUH', 'KUALA LUMPUR SEKARANG CINA PUNYA', 'INI NEGERI
BUKAN MELAYU PUNYA, KITA MAHU HALAU SEMUA MELAYU' and the
like."

Rasa terhina dan marah terhadap ejekan orang bukan Melayu itu telah mendorong
orang Melayu membuat tindak balas. Pada petang 13 Mei 1969, sekumpulan orang
Melayu telah berkumpul di rumah Menteri Besar Selangor, untuk mengadakan
perarakan menunjukkan bantahan mereka terhadap penghinaan orang Cina sehari
yang lepas. Ini kemudian diikuti oleh beratus-ratus orang Melayu dari beberapa
tempat lain. Sokongan itu dibuat kerana mereka percaya bidang kuasa dan kedudukan
politik orang Melayu telah dicabar oleh orang Cina.

Mereka berarak dengan tenang pada mulanya, walaupun semangat mereka membara.
Tetapi,

"...immediately after this procession got under way disturbances involving Malays
and Chinese broke out. Very soon after that, rioting occurred in several parts of Kuala
Lumpur and it was very clear that the government had a very serious emergency on its
hands. Malays and Chinese indulged in an orgy of killing, looting and burning. The
police did their best to control the situation in an even-handed way, but as the rioting
got out of hand, the army had to be called in, and police and army reinforcements
were summoneded from outside. The situation by then had become increasingly
uncontrollable, and a curfew was declared at 8.00 pm on 13 May."

Seorang pengkaji telah seolah-olah menyalahkan orang Melayu dalam hal ini.
Menurutnya, dengan berbekalkan parang dan senjata lain, mereka bergerak di
kawasan-kawasan yang didiami orang Cina, terutama di sekitar Kuala Lumpur. Oleh
sebab kediaman Dato' Harun di Kampung Baru, maka perarakan itu telah bergerak
menuju Jalan Chow Kit dan sekitarnya. Perasaan yang membara telah menyebabkan
mereka membunuh, membakar, merosakkan apa sahaja yang berkaitan dengan orang
Cina; maka terjadilah pertumpahan darah yang memakan korban yang banyak.
Pergaduhan itu dengan mudah merebak sehingga tidak dapat dikawal. Kedatangan
tentera yang kebanyakannya orang Melayu, dikatakan telah menyebabkan pergaduhan
itu semakin memuncak. Ini kerana mereka bertindak terhadap orang cina.

Sebenarnya, dalam pergaduhan itu sangat sukar untuk ditafsirkan siapa yang bersalah
dan siapa yang benar. Kemarahan orang Melayu kerana dicabar oleh orang cina dan
tindak balas terhadap orang cina kerana kemarahan yang tidak dapat dikawal oleh
orang Melayu. Orang Melayu yang bertolak ansur selama ini berasa tergugat dengan
cabaran terbuka orang cina dalam perarakan pada 11 dan 12 Mei. Keadaan juga
menjadi lebih rumit kerana wujudnya unsur-unsur kongsi gelap, dan anasir komunis
yang turut mengambil kesempatan daripada ketegangan kaum itu.

Pergaduhan telah berlaku selama dua hari dengan hebatnya antara kedua-dua kaum itu
di beberapa tempat di sekitar Kuala Lumpur.

"On 14 May, intermitten shooting occurred in different parts of the town and roving
gangs of Malays and Chinese. Several hundred strong, fought savagely with each
other using any weapons they could lay their hands on. As London Times
correspondent reported, in street after street were overturned and burnt cars,
motorcycles and scooters, with no evidence of the fate that befell their passengers.
The bloodshed continued on 15 May, and there was firing between the army and
armed youth. Clouds of dense black smoke continued to rise from burning houses,
shops and markets, and the roads were littered with debris and barricades... Rioting,
arson and looting continued for several days before the situation was brought under
control..."