Montano v.
The Insular Government
ISABELO MONTANO Y MARCIAL vs. THE INSULAR GOVERNMENT, ET AL.
Facts: :
Isabelo Montano presented a petition to the Court of Land Registration for the inscription of a piece of
land in the barrio of Libis, municipality of Caloocan, used as a fishery having a superficial area of 10,805
square meters, and bounded as set out in the petition; its value according to the last assessment being
$505.05, United States currency. This petition was opposed by the Solicitor-General in behalf of the
Director of Lands, and by the entity known asObras Pias de la Sagrada Mitra, the former on the ground
that the land in question belonged to the Government of the United States, and the latter, that it was the
absolute owner of all the dry land along the eastern boundary of the said fishery. The Court of Land
Registration in its decision of December 1, 1906, dismissed the said oppositions without costs and
decreed, after a general entry by default, the adjudication and registration of the property described in the
petition, in favor of Isabelo Montano y Marcial. From this decision only counsel for the Director of Public
Lands appealed to this court. and precisely Isabelo Montano sought title thereon on the strength of 10
years' occupation pursuant to paragraph 6, section 5 of Act 926 of the Philippine Commission
Issue:
Whether or not the land in question can be acquired by Montano
Held:
Accordingly, "government land" and "public domain" are not synonymous items. The first includes not
only the second, but also other lands of the Government already reserved or devoted to public use or
subject to private right. In other words, the Government owns real estate which is part of the "public
lands" and other real estate which is not part thereof. Government property was of two kinds first, that
of public use or service, said to be of public ownership, and second, that of having a private character or
use. (Civil Code, arts. 339 and 340.) Lands of the first class, while they retain their public character are
inalienable. Those of the second are not. Therefore, there is much real property belonging to the
Government which is not affected by statutes for the settlement, prescription or sale of public lands.
Examples in point are properties occupied by public buildings or devoted to municipal or other
governmental uses.
It is settled that the general legislation of Congress in respect to public lands does not extend to tide lands.
It provided that the scrip might be located on the unoccupied and unappropriated public lands. As said
inNewhall vs. Sanger(92 U.S. 761, 763.) A marshland which is inundated by the rise of tides belong to
the State and is not susceptible to appropriation by occupation, has no application in the present case
inasmuch as in said case the land subject matter of the litigation was not yet titled
Laurel vs Garcia
GR 92013 July 25, 1990.
Facts:
Petitioners seek to stop the Philippine Government to sell the Roppongi Property, which is located in
Japan. It is one of the properties given by the Japanese Government as reparations for damage done by the
latter to the former during the war.
Petitioner argues that under Philippine Law, the subject property is property of public dominion. As such,
it is outside the commerce of men. Therefore, it cannot be alienated.
Respondents aver that Japanese Law, and not Philippine Law, shall apply to the case because the property
is located in Japan. They posit that the principle of lex situs applies.
Issues and Held:
1. WON the subject property cannot be alienated.
The answer is in the affirmative.
Under Philippine Law, there can be no doubt that it is of public dominion unless it is convincingly shown
that the property has become patrimonial. This, the respondents have failed to do. As property of public
dominion, the Roppongi lot is outside the commerce of man. It cannot be alienated.
2. WON Philippine Law applies to the case at bar.
The answer is in the affirmative.
We see no reason why a conflict of law rule should apply when no conflict of law situation exists. A
conflict of law situation arises only when: (1) There is a dispute over the title or ownership of an
immovable, such that the capacity to take and transfer immovables, the formalities of conveyance, the
essential validity and effect of the transfer, or the interpretation and effect of a conveyance, are to be
determined; and (2) A foreign law on land ownership and its conveyance is asserted to conflict with a
domestic law on the same matters. Hence, the need to determine which law should apply.
In the instant case, none of the above elements exists.
The issues are not concerned with validity of ownership or title. There is no question that the property
belongs to the Philippines. The issue is the authority of the respondent officials to validly dispose of
property belonging to the State. And the validity of the procedures adopted to effect its sale. This is
governed by Philippine Law. The rule of lex situs does not apply.
The assertion that the opinion of the Secretary of Justice sheds light on the relevance of the lex situs rule
is misplaced. The opinion does not tackle the alienability of the real properties procured through
reparations nor the existence in what body of the authority to sell them. In discussing who are capable of
acquiring the lots, the Secretary merely explains that it is the foreign law which should determine who can
acquire the properties so that the constitutional limitation on acquisition of lands of the public domain to
Filipino citizens and entities wholly owned by Filipinos is inapplicable.
GEMINIANO v. CA
Lessor in good faith and Builders in Good faith are not synonymous. Article 1678 may apply to
the formers case and Art 448 may apply to the latters case. If a person knew that his stay would
likely end or that he knew somehow that he is not the owner of the land then he is not a BPS in
good faith.
FACTS:
The lot in question was originally owned by the mother of the petitioner. Petitioner sold their
unfinished bungalow to the respondents for P6,000, with a promise to sell the lot to the latter.
The property was later leased to the respondents for 7 years starting November 1978 for P40 a
month as evidenced by their written lease contract. The respondents built their house and
introduced some improvements in the lot. In 1985 petitioners mother refused receiving monthly
rentals. It turned out that the lot in question was subject to litigation which resulted to its
acquisition by Maria Lee which was sold to Salcedo, who further sold to Dionisio spouses. The
property eventually came back to the petitioner when the Dinisio spouses executed a Deed of
Quitclaim over the said property in favor of the petitioners. As such, the lot was registered in the
latters names. (petitioners never lost possession of the land because Lee and company never
issued a writ of possession against them).
In 1993, petitioners wrote a letter to respondents demanding them to vacate the premises and
when the latter refused, petitioners filed in court. Respondents claim that they should be entitled
to buy the land because of the promise of the petitioners to sell them the land and because they
were builders in Good faith. The courts now are deciding which one to use: Art. 448 regarding
builders and land owners in good faith or Art. 1678 regarding lessee in good faith who can be
reimbursed half of the expenses of the improvements if the LO chooses to appropriate them and
that such lessee have the right to retain in the premises until fully reimbursed.
ISSUES:
1) Whether or not the respondents were builders in Good faith?
2) Whether Art 448 or 1678 should be applied?
RULING:
1) No, they were not builders in good faith. The respondents knew that their stay would end after
the lease contract expires. They cant bank on the promise, which was not in writing, of the
petitioners that the latter will sell the land to them. According to 1403, an agreement for the sale
of real property or an interest therein is unenforceable, unless some note or memorandum thereof
be produced. Other than the alleged promise by petitioner, respondents had no other evidence to
prove their claim.
2) They are mere lessees in good faith; therefore Art 1678 may apply if the lessor chooses to
appropriate the improvements. But since the petitioners refused to exercise that option, the
private respondents cant compel them to reimburse the one-half value of the house and
improvements. Neither can they retain the premises until reimbursement is made. The private
respondents sole right then is to remove the improvements without causing any more
impairment upon the property leased than is necessary.
Nazareno v. CA 15, 1970, while Maximino, Sr. died on
GR No. 138842, 18 Oct 2000 December 18, 1980.
Facts: - They had five children, namely, Natividad,
- Maximino Nazareno, Sr. and Aurea Poblete Romeo, Jose, Pacifico, and Maximino, Jr.
were husband and wife. Aurea died on April Natividad and Maximino, Jr. are petitioners in
this case, while the estate of Maximino, Sr., 1) Whether the restoration of the titles to the lots in
Romeo, and his wife Eliza Nazareno are the question to the estate of Maximino Sr. was proper
respondents. 2) Whether it was the intention of Maximino, Sr. to
- After the death of Maximino, Sr., Romeo filed give the subject lots to Natividad
an intestate case and was appointed
administrator of his father's estate. Held:
- In the course of the intestate proceedings, 1) Yes. The Nazareno spouses transferred their
Romeo discovered that his parents had properties to their children by fictitious sales in
executed several deeds of sale conveying a order to avoid the payment of inheritance taxes.
number of real properties in favor of his Facts & circumstances indicate badges of a
sister, Natividad. simulated sale w/c make the Jan 29, 1970 sale
- One of the deeds involved six lots in Quezon void & of no effect. Natividad never acquired
City which were allegedly sold by Maximino, ownership over the property because the Deed of
Sr., with the consent of Aurea, to Natividad Sale in her favor is also void for being w/o
on January 29, 1970. By virtue of these consideration.
deeds, TCTs were issued to Natividad for lots 2) Yes. It cannot be denied that Maximino, Sr.
3-B, 3, 10, 11, 13 & 14 intended to give the six Quezon City lots to
- Unknown to Romeo, Natividad sold Lot 3-B, Natividad. As Romeo testified, their parents
w/c had been occupied by Romeo, his wife, & executed the Deed of Sale in favor of Natividad
Maximino, Jr., to Maximino, Jr. because the latter was the only "female and the
- Romeo filed the present case for annulment of only unmarried member of the family." She was
sale w/ damages against Natividad & thus entrusted with the real properties in behalf of
Maximino Jr. on the ground that both sales her siblings. As she herself admitted, she intended
were void for lack of consideration to convey Lots 10 and 11 to Jose in the event the
- Romeo presented the Deed of Partition & latter returned from abroad. There was thus an
Distribution executed by Maximino Sr. & implied trust constituted in her favor. Art. 1449 of
Aurea in 1962 & duly signed by all of their the Civil Code states:
children, except Jose, who was then abroad.
However, this deed was not carried out. In There is also an implied trust when a donation is
1969, their parents instead offered to sell to made to a person but it appears that although the
them the lots legal estate is transmitted to the donee, he
- He testified that, although the deeds of sale nevertheless is either to have no beneficial interest
executed by his parents in their favor stated or only a part thereof.
that the sale was for a consideration, they
never really paid any amount for the supposed There being an implied trust, the lots in question
sale. The transfer was made in this manner in are therefore subject to collation in accordance
order to avoid the payment of inheritance with Art. 1061 which states:
taxes.
- Allegedly, it was only Natividad who bought Every compulsory heir, who succeeds with other
the lots in question because she was the only compulsory heirs, must bring into the mass of the
one financially able to do so estate any property or right which he may have
- The trial court rendered a decision declaring received from the decedent, during the lifetime of
the nullity of the Deed of Sale dated January the latter, by way of donation, or any other
29, 1970, except as to Lots 3, 3-B, 13 and 14 gratuitous title, in order that it may be computed
which had passed on to third persons. in the determination of the legitime of each heir,
- On appeal to the Court of Appeals, the and in the account of the partition.
decision of the trial court was modified in the
sense that titles to Lot 3 (in the name of As held by the trial court, the sale of Lots 13 and
Romeo Nazareno) and Lot 3-B (in the name 14 to Ros-Alva Marketing, Corp. will have to be
of Maximino Nazareno, Jr.), as well as to Lots upheld for it is an innocent purchaser for value
10 and 11 were cancelled and ordered restored which relied on the title of Natividad. (calo)
to the estate of Maximino Nazareno, Sr.
Hence, the present petition.
Issue:
