LEGAL OR INTESTATE SUCCESSION

1. General Provisions (Arts. 960 962)

A. Causes of Intestacy (Art. 960)

B. W&S 6.4 Preference of Testacy over Intestacy (Rodriguez v Borja, 17 SCRA 418)

Facts: Fr. Celestino Rodriguez was born in Rizal. He was a parish priest of Hagonoy, Bulacan from 1930 until
he died in February 12, 1963. Private respondents delivered to the Clerk of Court of Bulacan a purported will of
Fr. Rodriguez on March 4, 1963. On March 8, petitioners filed for leave of court to allow them to examine the
alleged will but before the court could act on the petition, the same was withdrawn on March 11.
On March 12, petitioners filed before the CFI Rizal for the settlement of intestate estate of Fr. Rodriguez
alleging that he was a resident of Paranaque, Rizal and died without leaving a will; while private respondents
filed for the probate of the will on CFI Bulacan.
Petitioners contend that since the intestate proceedings in CFI Rizal was filed at 8am on March 12 while the
petition for probate was filed in CFI Bulacan at 11am on the same date, CFI Bulacan has no jurisdiction to
entertain the probate. Private respondents contend that the court acquired jurisdiction upon delivery of the will
to the Clerk of Court on March 4.
CFI Bualcan denied the motion to dismiss the probate on the ground that a difference of few hours did not
entitle one proceeding to preference over the other.
Issue: Whether CFI Bulacan has no jurisdiction to probate the alleged will of Fr. Rodriguez?
Held: Yes. The jurisdiction of the Court of First Instance of Bulacan became vested upon the delivery of the
will, even if no petition for its allowance was filed until later, because upon the will being deposited the court
could, motuproprio, have taken steps to fix the time and place for proving the will, and issued the corresponding
notices conformably to what is prescribed by section 3, Rule 76, of the Revised Rules of Court.
The estate proceedings having been initiated in the Bulacan Court of First Instance ahead of any other, that
court is entitled to assume jurisdiction to the exclusion of all other courts, even if it were a case of wrong venue.
In our system of civil law, intestate succession is only subsidiary or subordinate to the testate, since intestacy
only takes place in the absence of a valid operative will. Therefore, as ruled in Castro, et al. vs. Martinez, 10
Phil. 307, "only after final decision as to the nullity of testate succession could an intestate succession be
instituted in the form of pre-established action". The institution of intestacy proceedings in Rizal may not thus
proceed while the probate of the purported will of Father Rodriguez is pending.

C. Intestacy Based on the Presumed Will of the Decedent

D. The Rules of Proximity and Equal Division (Art. 962)

W&S 7.4 De los Santos v de la Cruz, 37 SCRA 555

FACTS:Pelagis de la Cruz died intestate and without issue. She had a niece named Marciana who is the mother of herein
defendant, Maximo. Gertrudes, who is Pelagias grandniece, and several co-heirs including Maximo, entered into an
Extrajudicial Partition Agreement purposely for the distribution of Pelagias estate. They agreed to adjudicate three lots of
Maximo, in addition to his share, on condition that the latter would undertake the development and subdivision of the
estate which was the subject matter of the Agreement. Due to Maximos failure to comply with his obligation, Gertrudes
filed a complaint for specific performance. In Maximos answer, he stated that Ertrudes had no cause of action against
him because the said agreement was void with respect to her, for the reason that she was not an heir of Pelagia and was
included in the agreement by mistake. The lower court held that Maximo, being a party to the extrajudicial partition
agreement, was estopped from raising in issue the right of the plaintiff to inherit from Pelagia, hence, he must abide by the
terms of the agreement, Maximo filed a Motion for New Trial but was denied. Hence, this petition.

ISSUE: Whether Gertrudes de los Santos, a grandniece of the decedent, is an heir of the latter

RULING: The court is convinced that she is not. Plaintiff-appellee being a mere grandniece of Pelagia de la Cruz, she could not
inherit from the latter by right of representation.

ART. 972. The right of representation takes place in the direct descending line, but never in the ascending.In the
collateral line, it takes place only in favor of the children of brothers or sisters, whether they be of the full or half
blood.

Much less could plaintiff-appellee inherit in her own right.

ART. 962. In every inheritance, the relative nearest in degree excludes the more distant ones, saving the right of
representation when it properly takes place. ... .

Applying these two (2) provisions, this Court, in Linart y Pavia vs. Ugarte y Iturralde, 5 Phil., 176 (1905), said,

... [I]n an intestate succession a grandniece of the deceased and not participate with a niece in the inheritance,
because the latter being a nearer relative, the more distant grandniece is excluded. In the collateral line the right of
representation does not obtain beyond sons and daughters of the brothers and sisters, which would have been the
case if Pablo Linart, the father of the plaintiff, had survived his deceased uncle.

In the present case, the relatives "nearest in degree" to Pelagia de la Cruz are her nephews and nieces, one of whom is defendant-
appellant. Necessarily, plaintiff-appellee, a grandniece is excluded by law from the inheritance.

Thus, they did not confer upon her the right to institute this action. The express purpose of the extrajudicial partition agreement, as
admitted by the parties in the stipulation of facts, was to divide the estate among the heirs of Pelagia de la Cruz.

W&S 8.4 Bagunu v Piedad, 347 SCRA 571

FACTS: Augusto H. Piedad died intestate without any direct descendants or ascendants. The trial court
awarded the entire estate to respondent PastoraPiedad. PastoraPiedad is the maternal aunt of
Augusto. Petitioner Ofelia Hernando Bagunu moved to intervene in Special Proceedings No. 3652, entitled "In
the Matter of the Intestate Proceedings of the Estate of Augusto H. Piedad. She contends that she has a right
to succession given that she is the daughter of the first cousin of Augusto H. Piedad. She contends that the
proceedings were tainted with procedural infirmities, including an incomplete publication of the notice of
hearing, lack of personal notice to the heirs and creditors, and irregularity in the disbursements of allowances
and withdrawals by the administrator of the estate. The RTC denied the motion, prompting petitioner to raise
her case to the Court of Appeals. Respondent sought the dismissal of the appeal on the thesis that the issues
brought up on appeal only involved pure questions of law. Finding merit in that argument, the CA dismissed the
appeal, citing Section 2(c) of Rule 41 of the 1997 Revised Rules on Civil Procedure which would require
all appeals involving nothing else but questions of law to be raised before the Supreme Court by petition for
review on certiorari in accordance with Rule 45 thereof and consistently with Circular 2-90 of the Court. Still
unsatisfied, petitioner contested the resolution of the appellate court in the instant petition for review on
certiorari. The Supreme Court set aside the alleged procedural decrepitude, there was none and took on the
basic substantive issue

ISSUE: Can petitioner Ofelia Bagunu, a collateral relative of the fifth civil degree, inherit alongside respondent
PastoraPiedad, a collateral relative of the third civil degree?

RULING: No. The rule on proximity is a concept that favors the relatives nearest in degree to the decedent
and excludes the more distant ones except when and to the extent that the right of representation can apply.
Thus, Article 962 of the Civil Code provides:
"ART. 962. In every inheritance, the relative nearest in degree excludes the more distant ones, saving
the right of representation when it properly takes place.

Right of representation is proper only in the descending, never in the ascending line.
In the collateral line, the right of representation may only take place in favor of the children of brothers
or sisters of the decedent when such children survive with their uncles or aunts The right of representation
does not apply to "other collateral relatives within the fifth civil degree" (to which group both petitioner and
respondent belong) who are sixth in the order of preference following, firstly, the legitimate children and
descendants, secondly, the legitimate parents and ascendants, thirdly, the illegitimate children and
descendants, fourthly, the surviving spouse, and fifthly, the brothers and sisters/nephews and nieces, of the
decedent. Among collateral relatives, except only in the case of nephews and nieces of the decedent
concurring with their uncles or aunts, the rule of proximity, expressed in Article 962, aforequoted, of the Code,
is an absolute rule. In determining the degree of relationship of the collateral relatives to the decedent, Article
966 of the Civil Code gives direction.
"Article 966. x xx
"In the collateral line, ascent is made to the common ancestor and then descent is made to the person
with whom the computation is to be made. Thus, a person is two degrees removed from his brother,
three from his uncle, who is the brother of his father, four from his first cousin and so forth."
Respondent PastoraPiedad, being a relative within the third civil degree, of the late Augusto
H. Piedad excludes petitioner Ofelia Bagunu, a relative of the fifth degree, from succeeding abintestato to the
estate of the decedent.
The provisions of Article 1009 and Article 1010 of the Civil Code
"Article 1009. Should there be neither brothers nor sisters nor children of brothers or sisters, the other
collateral relatives shall succeed to the estate. "The latter shall succeed without distinction of lines
or preference among them by reason of relationship by the whole blood." "Article 1010. The right to
inherit abintestato shall not extend beyond the fifth degree of relationship in the collateral line."
Invoked by petitioner do not at all support her cause. The law means only that among the
other collateral relatives (the sixth in the line of succession), no preference or distinction shall be observed "by
reason of relationship by the whole blood." In fine, a maternal aunt can inherit alongside a paternal uncle, and
a first cousin of the full blood can inherit equally with a first cousin of the half blood, but an uncle or an aunt,
being a third-degree relative, excludes the cousins of the decedent, being in the fourth-degree of relationship;
the latter, in turn, would have priority in succession to a fifth-degree relative. The Supreme Court denied the
instant petition
W&S 9.4 Heirs of Uriarte v Court of Appeals, 284 SCRA 511

FACTS: Private respondent Benedicto Estrada is the son of AgatonicaArreza, whose parents were Pedro
Arreza and Ursula Tubil. Upon the death of Pedro Arreza, Ursula married Juan Arnaldo by whom she had
another daughter, the decedent Justa. Private respondent Benedicto Estrada is thus the nephew of Justa
by her half-sister Agatonica.
Petitioners are the widow, sons and daughters of PascasioUriarte. Pascasio was one of the sons of
PrimitivaArnaldo and ConradoUriarte. His mother, PrimitivaUriarte, was the daughter of Domingo Arnaldo and
Catalina Azarcon. Domingo Arnaldo and Justas father, Juan Arnaldo, were brothers. Petitioners are thus
grandchildren, the relatives within the fifth degree of consanguinity, of Justa by her cousin
PrimitivaArnaldoUriarte.
Benedicto Estrada brought this case for the partition of the land left by JustaArnaldo-Sering. He claimed to be
the sole surviving heir of Justa; while petitioners claimed that Benedicto has no right over the property as he
was not an heir. The trial court sustained petitioners contention. On appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed.
ISSUE: Who among the petitioners and the private respondent is entitled to Justas estate as her nearest
relatives within the meaning of Art. 962 of the Civil Code.
RULING: In this case, Benedicto Estrada is the son of Agatonica, the half-sister of Justa. He is thus a third
degree relative of Justa. On the other hand, Petitioners are the sons and daughters of Justas cousin. They are
thus fifth degree relatives of Justa. Applying the principle that the nearest excludes the farthest, then Benedicto
is the lawful heir of Justa. The fact that his mother is only a half-sister of Justa is of no moment.
A nephew is considered a collateral relative who may inherit if no descendant, ascendant, or spouse survive
the decedent. That private respondent is only a half-blood relative is immaterial. This alone does not disqualify
him from being his aunts heir. WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED.

Exceptions to the Rules of Proximity and Equal Division

2. Relationship (Arts. 963 969)

3. Right of Representation (Arts. 970 977)

A. Concept of Representation

B. Availability and Scope

C. Basic Principles of Representation

W&S 10.4 De la Puerta v Court of Appeals, 181 SCRA 861

FACTS:
Deceased: DomingaRevuelta. leaving her properties to her three surviving children: Alfredo, Vicente and
Isabel (all De la Puerta)
Petitioner: Isabel- was given the free portion in addition to her legitime and was appointed executrix of the will.
Oppositors: Alfredo and Vicente- their mother was already senile at the time of the execution of the will and
did not fully comprehend its meaning.
Alfredo died. Vincente became lone oppositor. Then Vicente also died later on.
Intervenor: Carmelita (acknowledged natural child of Vicente) - filed a motion for the payment to her of a
monthly allowance.
 ISSUE: May Carmelita de la Puerta claim support and successional rights to the estate of DomingaRevuelta.
RULING: No. The first reason is that Vicente de la Puerta did not predecease his mother; and the second is
that Carmelita is a spurious child. No right of representation was involved, nor could it be invoked by Carmelita
upon her father's death, which came after his own mother's death. It would have been different if Vicente was
already dead when DomingaRevuelta died. Carmelita could then have inherited from her in representation of
her father Vicente, assuming the private respondent was a lawful heir.
As a spurious child of Vicente, Carmelita is barred from inheriting from Dominga because of Article 992 of the
Civil Code, which lays down the barrier between the legitimate and illegitimate families. This article provides
quite clearly:
Art. 992. An illegitimate child has no right to inherit abintestato from the legitimate children and relatives
of his father or mother; nor shall such children or relatives inherit in the same manner from the
illegitimate child.

W&S 11.4 Sayson v Court of Appeals, 205 SCRA 321

FACTS:Eleno and Rafaela Sayson has 5 children namely: Mauricio, Rosario, Basilisa, Remedios and
Teodoro. Teodoro married Isabel Bautista. When they died, their properties were left in the possession of
private respondents Delia, Edmundo and DoribelSayson, who claim to be their children.
Mauricio, Rosario, Basilisa and Remedios together with Juana Bautista, Isabel's mother, herein petitioners,
filed a complaint for partition and accounting of the intestate estate of Teodoro and Isabel. Delia, Edmundo and
Doribel opposed alleging successional rights to the disputed esate as the decedent's lawful descendants.
Respondents filed against the petitioners for the accounting and partition of intestate estate of Eleno and
Rafaela that they were entitled to inherit Teodoro's share in his parents' estate by right of representation.
Delia and Edmundo were legally adopted by Teodoro and Isabel. Doribel was their legitimate daughter.
ISSUE: Whether the private respondents are entitled to the share of their father Toribio in his parents' estate
by right of representation?
HELD: Yes. As the legitimate daughter of Teodoro and thus the granddaughter of Eleno and Rafaela, Doribel
has a right to represent her deceased father in the distribution of the intestate estate of her grandparents.
Under Article 981, she is entitled to the share her father would have directly inherited had he survived, which
shall be equal to the shares of her grandparents' other children.
Delia and Edmundo have no right of representation. While it is true that the adopted child shall be deemed to
be a legitimate child and have the same right as the latter, these rights do not include the right of
representation. The relationship created by the adoption is between only the adopting parents and the adopted
child and does not extend to the blood relatives of either party.
In sum, we agree with the lower courts that Delia and Edmundo as the adopted children and Doribel as the
legitimate daughter of TeodoroSayson and Isabel Bautista, are their exclusive heirs and are under no
obligation to share the estate of their parents with the petitioners. The Court of Appeals was correct, however,
in holding that only Doribel has the right of representation in the inheritance of her grandparents' intestate
estate, the other private respondents being only the adoptive children of the deceased Teodoro.

D. Representation in the Direct Descending Line (Art. 972)

Representation in the Collateral Line
 W&S 12.4 Nephews and Nieces Exclude Uncles and Aunts (Abellana-Bacayo v Ferraris-Borromeo,14 SCRA
986)

Facts:Melodia Ferraris was a resident of Cebu City until 1937 when she transferred to Intramuros, Manila. She
was known to have resided there continuously until 1944. Thereafter, up to the filing on December 22, 1960 of
the petition for the summary settlement of her estate, she has not been heard of and her whereabouts are still
unknown. More than ten (10) years having elapsed since the last time she was known to be alive, she was
declared presumptively dead for purposes of opening her succession and distributing her estate among her
heirs.

Melodia Ferraris left properties in Cebu City, consisting of one-third (1/3) share in the estate of her aunt, Rosa
Ferraris, valued at P6,000.00, more or less, and which was adjudicated to her in Special Proceeding No. 13-V
of the same court.

The deceased Melodia Ferraris left no surviving direct descendant, ascendant, or spouse, but was survived
only by collateral relatives, namely, FilomenaAbellana de Bacayo, an aunt and half-sister of decedent's father,
Anacleto Ferraris; and by Gaudencia, Catalina, Conchita, and Juanito, all surnamed Ferraris, her nieces and
nephew, who were the children of Melodia's only brother of full blood, Arturo Ferraris, who pre-deceased her
(the decedent). These two classes of heirs claim to be the nearest intestate heirs and seek to participate in the
estate of said Melodia Ferraris.

Issue: Who among the Aunt or Nephew and Niece are entitled to succeed?

Ruling:Nephews and Nieces.A decedents uncles and aunts may not succeed abintestato so long as nephews
and nieces of the decedent survive and are willing and qualified to succeed.The absence of brothers, sisters,
nephews and nieces of the decedent is a precondition to the other collaterals (uncles, cousins, etc.) being
called to the succession. (Art. 1009, Civil Code). e decedent (three degrees) since in the collateral line to which
both kinds of relatives belong, degrees are counted by first ascending to the common ancestor and then
descending to the heir (Civil Code, Art. 966). Nephews and nieces alone do not inherit by right of
representation (i.e., per stirpes) unless concurring with brothers or sisters of the deceased.

Representation of Illegitimate Brothers and Sisters

E. Capacity of the Representative (Art. 973)

F. Division per stirpes (Art. 974)

G. Nephews and Nieces concurring with Uncles and Aunts (Art. 975)

H. A repudiator may represent but not represented (Art. 976)

I. Representation in Testamentary Succession and Intestacy Compared

4. Order of Intestate Succession

A. Principle of Concurrence of Heirs and the Problem in Partial Intestacy

Order of Intestate Succession to a Legitimate Child
Order of Intestate Succession to an Illegitimate Child
Their Differences

B. Descending Direct Line (Arts. 978 984)

 Preference of the Descending Line (Art. 978)
Successional Rights of the Adopted Child (Art. 979, see also Art. 189, Family Code)
Children inherit in their own right (Art. 980)
Right of Representation of Legitimate Descendants (Arts. 981 and 982)
Legitimate and Illegitimate Children concurring (Art. 983)
Estate of an Adopted Child (Art. 984; see Art. 190, Family Code)

C. Ascending Direct Line (Arts. 985 987)

Ascendants as secondary intestate heirs (Art. 985)
Parents as sole intestate heirs (Art. 986)
Succession of other ascendants (Art. 987)

D. Illegitimate Children (Arts. 988 994)

Illegitimate Children inheriting alone (Art. 988)
Illegitimate Children as Concurring Intestate Heirs

W&S 13.4 Illegitimate Children Exclude Brothers and Sisters (del Prado v Santos, 18 SCRA 68)

FACTS:
1. Anastacio C. del Prado, died intestate in the on August 11, 1958; at the time of his death, Anastacio C. del
Prado was single;
2. Plaintiff Eugenio C. del Prado is a legitimate brother of the late Anastacio C. del Prado;
3. Defendant Aurea S. Santos was legally married to Deogracias Demetria in 1945, but has been in fact
separated from him;
4. The deceased Anastacio C. del Prado and defendant Aurea S. Santos cohabited with each other without
the benefit of matrimony; as a result of that cohabitation, the late Anastacio C. del Prado and defendant
Aurea S. Santos had one son the minor Jesus S. del Prado who was born on December 19, 1957,
and whom Anastacio C. del Prado admitted to be his son in the latter's birth certificate;
5. After the death of Anastacio C. del Prado his estate consisting, among others, of a parcel of land was
adjudicated to the minor Jesus del Prado.
ISSUE: Whether the brother has a better right to the aforesaid parcel of land left by the late Anastacio C. del
Prado, plaintiff or the minor Jesus S. del Prado.
RULING: Since Anastacio C. del Prado died in 1958 the new Civil Code applies (Article 2263). Illegitimate
children other than natural are entitled to successional rights (Article 287). Where, as in this case, the
deceased died intestate, without legitimate descendants or ascendants, then his illegitimate child shall succeed
to his entire estate (Article 988), to the exclusion of appellant who is only a collateral relative.

Representation of Illegitimate Children (Arts. 989 and 990)

Concurring with Legitimate Parents and ascendants (Art. 991)
The Barrier (Art. 992)
W&S 14.4 Cuartico v Cuartico, 52 O.G.1489

DOCTRINE: The instant case explains the reason for the barrier in Art. 992. The reason behind the absolute prohibition
on intestate succession is obviously the intervening antagonism and incompatibility between members of the natural
family and those of the legitimate family.
PARTIES: Decedent: Patricia Cavecilla; Petitioners-Appellants:Tranquilino, Cipriano, Luis, Demetrio, Pancrasio all
surnamed Cuartico (Father: MacarioCuartico, Mother: Maria Clavecilla) Oppositors-Appellees: Siblings of appellants
father Macario (Father: ElenoCuartico, Mother: Susana Germodo) Relation: Daughters of Juan Clavecilla from three
different women: 1. Maria Clavecilla(appellants mother, daughter of Sinforosa Romano who later on married Benigno
Martinez, disproved by appellees claiming that she is merely a maid of Juan Clavecilla), 2. Patricia Clavecilla(decedent,
half-sister of appellees, presumed half-sister of appellants mother, daughter of Susana Germodo who later on married
 father of oppositors), 3. RomanaClavecilla(daughter of BonifaciaCardete who is allegedly legally and validly married to
Juan Clavecilla in Cebu).
FACTS: Patricia Clavecilla died single and abintestato leaving an inheritance of 6 parcels of land and houses.Petitioners,
claiming to be natural nephews of the decedent and their mother to be the natural sister, moved that they be declared the
exclusive heirs of the late Patricia. The oppositors filed a similar motion claiming that they are natural half-sisters of the
decedent- having the same mother, Susana Germodo. After trial, the court declared both petitioners and oppositors as
legal heirs of the decedent. The petitioners were unsatisfied with the ruling, hence this appeal.
ISSUE: Who is entitled to succeed abintestato to the inheritance left by the decedent?
RULING: The Court ruled that the State shall succeed. The Court found that neither the appellants nor the appellees
are entitled to succeed the inheritance left by Patricia.
RATIONALE: The appellees tried to prove that Maria Cavacellia was neither a natural nor an adulterous child of Juan
Clavecilla but was merely a maid of the latter. There was no objection, however, from the appellees that Maria was legally
and validly married to their brother MacarioCuartico. Patricia and the appellees, having the same mother- Susana
Germodo, it is presumed that the appellees are natural half-sisters of the decedent whereas the appellants are entitled to
inherit from Patricia as well, in representation of their father Macario. As there is no dispute on that aspect, the Court
began with an inquiry of the marriage of appellees parents, ElenoCuartico and Susan Germodo. It was proved that the
two were legally and validly married in a certificate adduced by the appellees as evidence. It is evident, therefore, that the
appellees were the legitimate children of said couple and were seeking to inherit ab intestate from their half-sister which is
not countenanced under Art. 943 of the Old Civil Code (which provision was reproduced as Art. 992 of the NCC)
Art. 992. An illegitimate child has no right to inherit abintestato from the legitimate children and relatives of his
father or mother; nor shall such children or relatives inherit in the same manner from the illegitimate children.
The reason behind the absolute prohibition on intestate succession is obviously the intervening antagonism and
incompatibility between members of the natural family and those of the legitimate family.
As to the appellants seeking to succeed by reason of their alleged status as natural nephews of the decedent, the appellees
has already discredited this claim by proving that Maria was only a maid of Juan Clavecilla and. therefore, could have not
been a relative to the decedent. Also, assuming that Maria and Patricia are indeed daughters of Juan Clavecilla, neither
one of them could be recognized as natural daughters since, at the time of their birth, Juan was legally and validly married
to BonifaciaCardente, mother of Romana.

W&S 15.4 Vda. de Crisologo v Court of Appeals, 137 SCRA 233

MAINPOINT:
Art. 992 Illegitimate child has no right to inherit ab intestate from the legitimate children and relatives of his
father or mother; nor shall such children or relatives inherit in the same manner from the illegitimate child.

FACTS:
The petitioners filed an action against the private respondent for ownership, annulment of sale, and delivery of
possession of various properties, with writ of preliminary injunction and damages. Claiming to be legal heirs
of the vendor, they sought the annulment of four deeds of sale covering seventeen (17) parcels of land and a
residential house executed by LutgardaCapiao in favor of respondent Mallillin.
Basis of their cause of action in the complaint:

That Julia Capiao maintained extra-marital relations with one VictorianoTaccad; begot with him one
child and/or forced heir, named Lutgarda (Leogarda) Capiao.
 That LeogardaCapiao married Raymundo Zipagan, both of whom died at Cauayan, Isabela in 1970 and
1964, respectively, without any children and/or immediate forced heirs.
That LeogardaCapiao having died without any will, intestate succession took place and the herein
petitioners, as relatives within the fifth civil degree to Leogarda were consequently instituted as
Lutgarda's legal heirs and were legally entitled to inherit all the properties which were hers by virtue of
the extra- judicial partition.
That based on the family tree diagram, their common ancestor was Pablo Capiao.

ISSUE: THE RELATIVES OF JULIA CAPIAO, NAMELY: THE PLAINTIFFS IN THIS CASE, CAN THEY
INHERIT FROM LUTGARDA CAPIAO, THE ORIGINAL OWNER OF THE PROPERTIES IN QUESTION?

RULING: Cannot, because the legitimate relatives of Julia Capiao cannot inherit from an illegitimate child of
the latter, because that is the clear and unmistakable provision of Article 992 of the New Civil Code. Neither
can LutgardaCapiao inherit from the legitimate relatives of Julia Capiao who are the plaintiffs in the instant
case.
Deceased LutgardaLeogarda is undoubtedly an illegitimate child. In fact, her surname is Capiao and not
Taccad, retaining the surname or family name of her mother Julia Capiao.
[This petition before the SC was dismissed, not on the issue of illegitimacy, but on procedural matters i.e. the
trial court dismissed the appeal filed by the petitioners because such was filed out of time, and the CA also
dismissed the petition for mandamus also filed by the petitioners because it has no appellate jurisdiction]

W&S 16.4 Cacho v Udan, 13 SCRA 693

Facts: One Silvina G. Udan, single, and a resident of San Marcelino, Zambales, died leaving a purported will naming her
son, Francisco G. Udan, and one WenceslaCacho, as her sole heirs, share and share alike. WenceslaCacho, filed a petition
to probate said Will in the Court of First Instance of Zambales.

Francisco G. Udan died, prompting John G. Udan and Rustico G. Udan, both legitimate brothers of the testatrix Silvina G.
Udan, to file their respective oppositions on the ground that the will was not attested and executed as required by law, that
the testatrix was incapacitated to execute it; and that it was procured by fraud or undue influence. The CFIofZambales
issued an Order disallowing these two oppositions for lack of interest in the estate and directing the Fiscal to study the
advisability of filing escheat proceedings

Issue: Whether the oppositor brothers, John and RusticoUdan, may claim to be heirs intestate of their legitimate sister, the
late SilvinaUdan

Ruling: NO. ART. 988 and ART. 1003 decree that collateral relatives of one who died intestate inherit only in the absence
of descendants, ascendants, and illegitimate children. Albeit the brothers and sisters can concur with the widow or
widower under Article 1101, they do, not concur, but are excluded by the surviving children, legitimate or illegitimate
(Art. 1003).

Francisco Udan was the illegitimate son of the late Silvina is not denied by the oppositor; and he is so acknowledged to be
in the testament, where said Francisco is termed "son" by the testatrix. As the latter was admittedly single, the son must be
necessarily illegitimate
 The death of Francisco two years after his mother's demise does not improve the situation of appellants. The rights
acquired by the former are only transmitted by his death to his own heirs at law not to the appellants, who are legitimate
brothers of his mother, for the reason that, the legitimate relatives of the mother cannot succeed her illegitimate child. This
is clear from Article 992 of the Civil Code.

W&S 1.5 Corpus v Corpus, 85 SCRA 567

FACTS:
Teodoro R. Yangco was the son of Luis Rafael Yangco and Ramona Arguelles, the widow of Tomas Corpus. Before her
union with Luis Rafael Yangco, Ramona had begotten five children with Tomas Corpus, two of whom were Pablo Corpus
and Jose Corpus.

Yangco died in Manila on April 20, 1939 at the age of 77 years. His will dated August 29, 1934 was probated in the CFI
of Manila.

Yangco had no forced heirs. At the time of his death, his nearest relatives were
(1) his half-brother, Luis R. Yangco,
(2) his half-sister, Paz Yangco, the wife of Miguel Ossorio
(3) Amalia Corpus, Jose A. V. Corpus, and Ramon L. Corpus, the children of his half-brother, Pablo Corpus, and
(4) Juana (Juanita) Corpus, the daughter of his half-brother Jose Corpus (Juanita died in October, 1944 at Palauig,
Zambales)

Pursuant to the order of the probate court, a project of partition dated November 26, 1945 was submitted by the
administrator and the legatees named in the will.

That project of partition was opposed by the estate of Luis R. Yangco whose counsel contended that an intestacy should
be declared because the will does not contain an institution of heir.

It was also opposed by Atty. Roman A. Cruz, who represented Juanita Corpus, Pedro Martinez and Juliana de Castro.
Juanita Corpus was already dead when Atty. Cruz appeared as her counsel. Atty. Cruz alleged in his opposition that the
proposed partition was not in conformity with the will because the testator intended that the estate should be "conserved"
and not physically partitioned.

The Probate court in its order of December 26, 1946 approved the project of partition.

From that order, a compromise agreement was entered into by the heirs and legatees. Herein appellant Tomas Corpus
signed that compromise settlement as the sole heir of Juanita Corpus.
Pursuant to the compromise agreement, Tomas Corpus Signed a receipt dated October 24, 1947 wherein he acknowledge
that he received from the Yangco estate the sum of two thousand pesos (P2,000) "as settlement in full of my share of the
compromise agreement as per understanding with Judge Roman Cruz, the attorney in this case"

2 years later or On September 20, 1949, the legatees executed an agreement for the settlement and physical partition of the
Yangco estate. The probate court approved that agreement and noted that the 1945 project of partition was pro tanto
modified. Consequently, controversies arose from such modified partition.

Another 2 years had passed or On October 5, 1951, Tomas Corpus, as the sole heir of Juanita corpus, filed an action in the
CFI Manila to recover her supposed share in Yangco intestate estate. He alleged in his complaint that the dispositions in
his Yangcos will sing perpetual prohibitions upon alienation rendered it void under article 785 of the old Civil Code and
that the 1949 partition is invalid and, therefore, the decedent's estate should be distributed according to the rules on
intestacy.

CFI Manila: dismissed the action on the ground of res judicata and laches.

CA: certified appeal should be filed directly to the SC because it involves real property valued at more than P50k (old
judiciary law).

ISSUES:
1. WN Tomad Corpus has cause of action for the recovery of the supposed hereditary share of his mother, Juanita.
2. WN Half brother who are legitimate had the right to succeed to the estate of an illegitimate child under the rules of
intestacy.

RULING:
1. No. Tomas Corpus has no cause of action for the recovery of the supposed hereditary share of his mother, Juanita
Corpus, as a legal heir, in Yangcos estate, since TeodoroYanco was illegitimate and since Juanita Corpus was the
legitimate child of Jose Corpus (himself a legitimate child). Juanita Corpus was not a legal heir of Yangco because there
is no reciprocal succession between legitimate and illegitimate relatives. The trial court did not err in dismissing the
complaint of Tomas Corpus. Basis of the trial court is Art 943. The rule in Article 943 is now found in article 992 of the
Civil Code which provides that an illegitimate child has no right to inherit abintestato from the legitimate children and
relatives of his father or mother, nor shall such children or relatives inherit in the same manner from the illegitimate
child. That rule is based on the theory that the illegitimate child is disgracefully looked upon by the legitimate family
while the legitimate family is, in turn, hated by the illegitimate child. The law does not recognize the blood tie and seeks
to avoid further grounds of resentment.

2. No. Under articles 944 and 945 of the Spanish Civil Code, if an acknowledged natural or legitimated child should die
without issue, either legitimate or acknowledged, the father or mother who acknowledged such child shall succeed to its
entire estate; and if both acknowledged it and are alive, they shall inherit from it share and share alike. In default of
natural ascendants, natural and legitimated children shall be succeeded by their natural brothers and sisters in accordance
with the rules established for legitimate brothers and sisters. Hence, Teodoro R. Yangcoshalf brothers on the Corpus
 side, who were legitimate, had no right to succeed to his estate under the rules of in-testacy. Following the rule in article
992, formerly article 943, it was held that the legitimate relatives of the mother cannot succeed her illegitimate child. x xx

W&S 2.5 Manuel v Ferrer, 247 SCRA 476

FACTS:
1. Antonio Manuel is married to Beatiz Guiling with whom he has children who are the petitioners in this case.
2. During his marriage with Beatriz, Antonio had an extra-marital affair with one Ursula Bautista. From this
relationship, Juan Manuel was born.
3. Juan Manuel, the illegitimate son of Antonio, married Esperanza Gamba. In consideration of the marriage,
a donation propter nuptias over a parcel of land was executed in favor of Juan Manuel by Laurenciana
Manuel (no relationship to Antonio was mentioned). Two other parcels of land were later bought by Juan
and registered in his name. The couple were not blessed with a child of their own. Their desire to have one
impelled the spouses to take private respondent Modesta Manuel-Baltazar into their fold and so raised her
as their own "daughter".
4. Juan Manuel executed in favor of Estanislaoa Manuel a Deed of Sale Con Pacto de Retro over a one-half
(1/2) portion of one of the lands he bought. Juan Manuel died intestate on 21 February 1990. Two years
later, Esperanza Gamba also passed away.
5. Modesta executed an Affidavit of Self-Adjudication claiming for herself all three parcels of land owned by
Manuel and executed later on a Deed of Renunciation and Quitclaim in favor of Estanislaoa Manuel.
6. Petitioners filed a complaint which sought the declaration of nullity of the aforesaid instruments. Petitioners
argue that they are the legal heirs over one-half of Juan's intestate estate (while the other half would
pertain to Juan's surviving spouse) under the provision of the last paragraph of Article 994 of the Civil
Code.
7. Respondents, in turn, submit that Article 994 should be read in conjunction with Article 992 of the Civil
Code, which reads: An illegitimate child has no right to inherit abintestato from the legitimate children and
relatives of his father or mother; nor shall such children or relative inherit in the same manner from the
illegitimate child.
ISSUE: Whether the petitioners are the legal heirs over one-half of Juan's intestate estate.
RULING: No. Although Modesta, a ward (ampon), without the benefit of formal (judicial) adoption, is neither a
compulsory nor a legal heir. The Supreme Court must hold, nevertheless, that the complaint of petitioners
seeking the nullity of the Affidavit of Self-Adjudication executed by Modesta, the three (3) TCT's issued to her
favor, as well as the Deed of Renunciation and Quitclaim in favor of Estanislaoa Manuel, was properly
dismissed by the trial court. Petitioners, not being the real "parties-in-interest" 14 in the case, had neither the
standing nor the cause of action to initiate the complaint.
DOCTRINE: Article 992, a basic postulate, enunciates what is so commonly referred to in the rules on
succession as the "principle of absolute separation between the legitimate family and the illegitimate family."
The doctrine rejects succession abintestato in the collateral line between legitimate relatives, on the one hand,
and illegitimate relatives, on other hand, although it does not totally disavow such succession in the direct line.
Since the rule is predicated on the presumed will of the decedent, it has no application, however, on
testamentary dispositions.

W&S 3.5 Leonardo v Court of Appeals, 120 SCRA 980

W&S 4.5 Diaz v Intermediate Appellate Court, 150 SCRA 645; 182 SCRA 427

FACTS: 1. FelisaPamutiJardin is a niece of SimonaPamutiVda. deSantero who together with Felisa's mother Juliana were
the only legitimate children of the spouses Felipe Pamuti and Petronila Asuncion;
2. Juliana married Simon Jardin and out of their union were born FelisaPamuti and another child who died during infancy;
3. SimonaPamutiVda. deSantero is the widow of PascualSantero and the mother of Pablo Santero;
4. Pablo Santero was the only legitimate son of his parents PascualSantero and SimonaPamutiVda. deSantero;
5. PascualSantero died in 1970; Pablo Santero in 1973 and SimonaSantero in 1976;
 6. Pablo Santero, at the time of his death was survived by his mother SimonaSantero and his six minor natural children to
wit: four minor children with Anselma Diaz and two minor children with FelixbertaPacursa.

IAC: Declared FelisaPamuti-Jardin to be the sole legitimate heir to the intestate estate of the late SimonaPamutiVda.
deSantero and this was opposed by the petitioners who are the illegitimate children of Pablo Santero.

Petitioners claim that the amendment of Articles 941 and 943 of the old Civil Code (Civil Code of Spain) by Articles 990
and 992 of the new Civil Code (Civil Code of the Philippines) constitute a substantial and not merely a formal change,
which grants illegitimate children certain successional rights. They also averred illegitimate children have the right to
represent their parents in the inheritance of their legitimate grandparents.

ISSUE: Who are the legal heirs of SimonaPamutiVda.deSantero her niece FelisaPamuti-Jardin or her grandchildren
(the natural children of Pablo Santero)?

RULING: FelisaPamuti-Jardin. Articles 902, 989, and 990 clearly speak of successional rights of illegitimate children,
which rights are transmitted to their descendants upon their death. The descendants (of these illegitimate children) who
may inherit by virtue of the right of representation may be legitimate or illegitimate. In whatever manner, one should not
overlook the fact that the persons to be represented are themselves illegitimate. The three named provisions are very clear
on this matter.
The record reveals that from the commencement of this case the only parties who claimed to be the legitimate heirs of the
late SimonaPamutiVda. deSantero are FelisaPamutiJardin and the six minor natural or illegitimate children of Pablo
Santero. Since petitioners herein are barred by the provisions of Article 992, the respondent Intermediate Appellate Court
did not commit any error in holding FelisaPamutiJardin to be the sole legitimate heir to the intestate estate of the late
SimonaPamutiVda. deSantero.
The right of representation is not available to illegitimate descendants of legitimate children in the inheritance of a
legitimate grandparent. It may be argued, as done by petitioners, that the illegitimate descendant of a legitimate child is
entitled to represent by virtue of the provisions of Article 982, which provides that "the grandchildren and other
descendants shall inherit by right of representation." Such a conclusion is erroneous. It would allow intestate succession
by an illegitimate child to the legitimate parent of his father or mother, a situation which would set at naught the
provisions of Article 992. Article 982 is inapplicable to instant case because Article 992 prohibits absolutely a
succession abintestato between the illegitimate child and the legitimate children and relatives of the father or
mother.It may not be amiss to state that Article 982 is the general rule and Article 992 the exception.
Article 992 of the New Civil Code provides a barrier or iron curtain in that it prohibits absolutely a succession abintestato
between the illegitimate child and the legitimate children and relatives of the father or mother of said illegitimate child.
They may have a natural tie of blood, but this is not recognized by law for the purpose of Article 992. Between the
legitimate family and the illegitimate family there is presumed to be an intervening antagonism and incompatibility.
The term relatives, although used many times in the Code, is not defined by it. In accordance therefore with the canons of
statutory interpretation, it should be understood to have a general and inclusive scope, inasmuch as the term is a general
one. Thus, the word "relatives" is a general term and when used in a statute it embraces not only collateral
relatives but also all the kindred of the person spoken of, unless the context indicates that it was used in a more
restrictive or limited sense is not so in the case at bar. The Court concluded that until Article 992 is suppressed or at
least amended to clarify the term "relatives" there is no other alternative but to apply the law literally.

W&S 5.5 Suntay III v Cojuangco-Suntay, 621 SCRA 142

FACTS: (Grandparents) Cristina Aguinaldo-Suntay (Cristina), married to Dr. Federico Suntay (Federico), died intestate.
their only son, Emilio Aguinaldo Suntay (Emilio I), predeceased both Cristina and Federico. At the time of her death,
Cristina was survived by her husband, Federico, and several grandchildren, including herein petitioner Emilio A.M.
Suntay III (Emilio III) and respondent Isabel Cojuangco-Suntay
 Emilio I was married to Isabel Cojuangco, and they begot three children, namely: herein respondent, Isabel; Margarita;
and Emilio II(first family) which marriage got annulled. Thereafter, Emilio I had two children out of wedlock, Emilio III
and Nenita Suntay Taedo (Nenita), by two different women (grabe sya), Concepcion Mendoza and Isabel Santos,
respectively.
Parenthetically, after the death of Emilio I, Federico filed a petition for visitation rights over his grandchildren. It was
altogether stopped because of a manifestation filed by respondent Isabel, articulating her sentiments on the unwanted
visits of her grandparents.
After her spouses death, Federico, after the death of his spouse, Cristina, or on September 27, 1993, adopted their
illegitimate grandchildren, Emilio III and Nenita
Respondent filed a petition for the issuance of letters of administration in her favor. Federico filed his opposition. Being
the surviving spouse of Cristina, he is capable of administering her estate and he should be the one appointed as its
administrator; that as part owner of the mass of conjugal properties left by Cristina, he must be accorded legal preference
in the administration. Federico filed a Manifestation nominating his adopted son, Emilio III, as administrator of the
decedents estate on his behalf which was granted by TC when Federico died. Aggrieved, respondent filed an appeal
before the CA, which reversed and set aside the decision of the RTC, revoked the Letters of Administration issued to
Emilio III. In marked contrast, the CA zeroed in on Emilio IIIs status as an illegitimate child of Emilio I and, thus, barred
from representing his deceased father in the estate of the latters legitimate mother, the decedent. That he cannot be
appointed for the ff reasons:
i. The appointment of Emilio III was subject to a suspensive condition, i.e., Federicos appointment as administrator of the
estate
ii. As between the legitimate offspring (respondent) and illegitimate offspring (Emilio III) of decedents son, Emilio I,
respondent is preferred, being the "next of kin" referred to by Section 6, Rule 78 of the Rules of Court
iii. Jurisprudence has consistently held that Article 992 of the Civil Code bars the illegitimate child from inheriting ab
intestato from the legitimate children and relatives of his father or mother.
ISSUE: Whether or not the illegitimate child may inherit from the grandparent, who treated the former like his own son,
notwithstanding Article 992 of the Civil Code.
RULING: ART 992 does not apply. Illegitimate may inherit who is treated as a son. Love first descends, for the decedent,
Cristina, did not distinguish between her legitimate and illegitimate grandchildren. Neither did her husband, Federico,
who, in fact, legally raised the status of Emilio III from an illegitimate grandchild to that of a legitimate child. The
peculiar circumstances of this case, painstakingly pointed out by counsel for petitioner, overthrow the legal presumption
in Article 992 of the Civil Code that there exist animosity and antagonism between legitimate and illegitimate descendants
of a deceased.

Succession to an Illegitimate Child (Art. 993 and 994)

E. Surviving Spouse (Arts. 995 1002)

Surviving Spouse as a concurring Intestate Heir
Qualifications to the succession rights of a Surviving Spouse
Disqualification arising from void and voidable marriages (See Arts. 35, 37, 38, 41. 42, 43, 44, 45, 50, Family
Code)
Disqualification by reason of legal separation (See Arts. 55 and 63, Family Code)
Non-applicability of Article 900
Intestate Share and Legitime of the Spouse concurring with one Legitimate Child
W&S 7.5 Santillon v Miranda, 14 SCRA 563

FACTS:Pedro Santillon died without testament leaving his wife, Perfecta Miranda andone son, Claro.Four years after Pedros death,
Claro filed a petition for letters of administration whichwas opposed by his mother and spouses Benito Miranda and Rosario Corrales.
Thecourt appointed commissioners to draft a project of partition and distribution of allproperties of Pedro. Claro then filed a motion to declare share
 of heirs and to resolveconflicting claims of the parties invoking Art.892 of the New Civil Code insisting thatafter deducting from the conjugal
properties (conjugal share of Perfecta), theremaining must be divided as follows: for her and for him. On the other hand,Perfecta claimed
besides her conjugal half, she was entitled under Art. 996 of the NCCto another of the remaining half. After due notice and hearing, the court
held thatPerfecta is entitled to shares and the remaining share for Claro after deducting theshare of the widow as co-owner of the conjugal
properties. Hence, this appeal.

ISSUE:The manner of division of share of the estate of an intestate decedent when the onlysurvivors are the spouse and one legitimate child

RULING:Intestate proceedings in the New Civil Codes chapter on legal or intestatesuccession, the only article applicable is Art.
996. Our conclusion (equal shares) seemsa logical inference from the circumstance that whereas Article 834 of the Spanish CivilCode form which
Art. 996 was taken, contained two paragraphs governing twocontingencies, the first, where the widow or widower survives with legitimate
children(general rule), and the second, where the widow or widower survives with only one child(exception), Art. 996 omitted to provide for the
second situation, thereby indicating thelegislatorsdesire to promulgate just one general rule applicable to both situations.

Surviving spouse concurring with a legitimate child entitled to one-half of the intestate estate.
When an intestacy occurs, a surviving spouse concurring with only onelegitimate child of the deceased is entitled to one-half of the estate of
thedeceased spouse under Art. 996 of the Civil Code

Spouse concurring with Grandchildren

Spouse inherits the right of redemption
W&S 8.5 Verdad v Court of Appeals, 256 SCRA 593

FACTS: The petitioner, ZosimaVerdad, is the purchaser of a 248-square meter residential lot (identified to be
Lot No. 529, Ts-65 of the ButuanCadastre, located along Magallanes Street, now Marcos M. Calo St., Butuan
City). Private respondent, Socorro Cordero Vda. de Rosales, seeks to exercise a right of legal redemption over
the subject property and traces her title to the late MacariaAtega, her mother-in-law, who died intestate on
March 8 1956. During her lifetime, Macaria contracted two marriages: the first with Angel Burdeos and the
second, following the latters death, with Canuto Rosales. At the time of her own death, Macaria was survived
by her son Ramon A. Burdeos and her grandchild (by her daughter Felicidad A. Burdeos) Estela Lozada of the
first marriage and her children of the second marriage, namely, David Rosales, Justo Rosales, Romulo
Rosales, and Aurora Rosales.
Socorro Rosales is the widow of David Rosales who himself, some time after Macarias death, died
intestate without an issue. In an instrument, dated June 14 1982, the heirs of Ramon Burdeos, namely, his
widow Manuela Legaspi Burdeos and children Felicidad and Ramon, Jr., sold to petitioner ZosimaVerdad (their
interest on) the disputed lot supposedly for the price of P55,460.00. In a duly notarized deed of sale, dated 14
November 1982, it would appear, however, that the lot was sold for only P23,000.00. Petitioner explained that
the second deed was intended merely to save on the tax on capital gains. Socorro discovered the sale on
March 30, 1987 while she was at the City Treasurers Office. On March 31 1987, she sought the intervention of
the LupongTagapayapa of Barangay 9, Princess Urduja, for the redemption of the property. She tendered the
sum of P23,000.00 to Zosima. The latter refused to accept the amount for being much less than the lots
current value of P80,000.00. No settlement having been reached before the LupongTagapayapa, private
respondents, on October 16, 1987, initiated against petitioner an action for Legal Redemption with Preliminary
Injunction before the Regional Trial Court of Butuan City.
On June 29, 1990, following the reception of evidence, the trial court handed down its decision holding,
in fine, that private respondents right to redeem the property had already lapsed. An appeal to the Court of
 Appeals was interposed by private respondents. The appellate court reversed the decision of the trial court,
and declaring plaintiff-appellant, Socorro C. Rosales, entitled to redeem the inheritance rights .

ISSUE: Whether Socorro is entitled to redeem the inheritance rights.

RULING: Yes. The court ruled that the right of redemption was timely exercised by private respondents.
Concededly, no written notice of the sale was given by the Burdeos heirs (vendors) to the co-owners required
under Article 1623 of the Civil Code.
ART. 1623. The right of legal pre-emption or redemption shall not be exercised except within thirty
days from the notice in writing by the prospective vendor, or by the vendor, as the case may be. The deed of
sale shall not be recorded in the Registry of Property, unless accompanied by an affidavit of the vendor that he
has given written notice thereof to all possible redemptioners.

Hence, the thirty-day period of redemption had yet to commence when private respondent
Rosales sought to exercise the right of redemption on March 31, 1987, a day after she discovered the
sale from the Office of the City Treasurer of Butuan City, or when the case was initiated, on October
16, 1987, before the trial court.
The written notice of sale is mandatory. This Court has long established the rule that notwithstanding
actual knowledge of a co-owner, the latter is still entitled to a written notice from the selling co-owner in order to
remove all uncertainties about the sale, its terms and conditions, as well as its efficacy and status. All given,
we find no error in the appellate courts finding that private respondents are entitled to the redemption of the
subject property.

F. Collateral Relatives (Arts. 1003 1010)

Classification of Collateral Relatives
Successional Rights of Collateral Relatives
Full-Blood and Half-Blood Relationship
Right of Representation of Collaterals

G. The State (Arts. 1011 1014)

The State as an Intestate Heir by Default
Escheat Proceedings (See Section 1, Rule 91, Rules of Court)
Beneficiary of the Estate
Reversion of the Estate

5. Provisions Common to Testate and Intestate Succession

A. Right of Accretion (Arts. 1015 1023)

Causes of Vacancy in the Inheritance; Testamentary and Intestate Succession
Remedies for filling the Vacancy in Testamentary and Intestate Succession
Definition of the Right of Accretion (Art. 1015)
Prohibition of Accretion
Renunciation of Accretion
Requisites of Accretion
Concept of earmarking (Art. 1017)
Element of co-ownership
Accretion in Intestacy (Art. 1018)
Proportionate Sharing of Accrued Property (Art. 1019)
Accretion carries with it the Obligations (Art. 1020)
 Accretion among Compulsory Heirs (Art. 1021)
Intestacy Following a Failure of Accretion in Testamentary Succession (Art. 1022)
Accretion among Legatees, Devisees and Usufructuaries (Art. 1023)