G.R. No. 159230. October 18, 2010.

B.E. SAN DIEGO, INC., petitioner, vs. COURT OF

APPEALS and JOVITA MATIAS, respondents.

Remedial Law; Res Judicata; An allegation of res judicata

necessarily constitutes an admission that the subject matter of the
pending suit (the accion publiciana) is the same as that in a
previous one (the ejectment case).Additionally, we agree with
B.E. San Diego that Matias can no longer question the identity of
the property it seeks to recover when she invoked res judicata as
ground to dismiss the accion publiciana that is the root of the
present petition. An allegation of res judicata necessarily
constitutes an admission that the subject matter of the pending
suit (the accion publiciana) is the same as that in a previous one
(the ejectment case). That Matias never raised the discrepancy in
the location stated in B.E. San Diegos title and the actual
location of the subject property in the ejectment suit bars her now
from raising the same. Thus, the issue of identity of the subject
matter of the case has been settled by Matias admission and
negates the defenses she raised against B.E. San Diegos
complaint.
Same; Same; Distinction between an Action for Ejectment and
Accion Publiciana.While there may be identity of parties and
subject matter, there is no identity of cause of action between the
two cases; an action for ejectment and accion publiciana, though
both referring to the issue of possession, differ in the following
manner: First, forcible entry should be filed within one year from
the unlawful dispossession of the real property, while accion
publiciana is filed a year after the unlawful dispossession of the
real property. Second, forcible entry is concerned with the
issue of the right to the physical possession of the real
property; in accion publiciana, what is subject of litigation
is the better right to possession over the real property.
Third, an action for forcible entry is filed in the municipal trial
court and is a summary action, while accion publiciana is a
plenary action in the RTC.

_______________
 *THIRD DIVISION.

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VOL. 633, OCTOBER 18, 2010 309

B.E. San Diego, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals

Land Titles; The settled doctrine in property law is that no

title to register land in derogation of that of the registered owner
shall be acquired by prescription or adverse possession.The
settled doctrine in property law is that no title to register land in
derogation of that of the registered owner shall be acquired by
prescription or adverse possession. Even if the possession is
coupled with payment of realty taxes, we cannot apply in Matias
case the rule that these acts combined constitute proof of the
possessors claim of title. Despite her claim of possession since
1954, Matias began paying realty taxes on the subject property
only in 1974when B.E. San Diego filed an ejectment case
against her husband/predecessor, Pedro Matias. Considering
these circumstances, we find Matias payment of realty taxes
suspect.
 Same; A sales application, in the absence of approval by the
Bureau of Lands or the issuance of a sales patent, remains simply
as an application that does not vest title in the applicant.Matias
cannot rely on the Miscellaneous Sales Application and the local
government permit issued in her favor; neither establishes a clear
right in favor of Matias over the subject property. A sales
application, in the absence of approval by the Bureau of Lands or
the issuance of a sales patent, remains simply as an application
that does not vest title in the applicant. The local government
permit contained only a statement of the local executive that the
case between the local government and B.E. San Diego was
decided by a trial court in favor of the former.
Same; Presidential Decree No. 1517; The tenants/occupants
who have a right not to be evicted from urban lands does not
include those whose presence on the land is merely tolerated and
without the benefit of contract, those who enter the land by force or
deceit, or those whose possession is under litigation.The CA
erroneously upheld Matias claim of possession based on PD Nos.
1517 and 2016. Matias is not a qualified beneficiary of these laws.
The tenants/occupants who have a right not to be evicted from
urban lands does not include those whose presence on the land is
merely tolerated and without the benefit of contract, those
who enter the land by force or deceit, or those whose
possession is under litigation. At the time of PD 1517s
enactment, there was already a pending ejectment suit between
B.E. San Diego and Pedro Matias over the subject property.
Occupants of the land whose presence therein is devoid of

310

310 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

B.E. San Diego, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals

any legal authority, or those whose contracts of lease were

already terminated or had already expired, or whose possession is
under litigation, are not considered tenants under the [PD Nos.
1517]. The RTC correctly ruled that Matias cannot be considered
a legitimate tenant who can avail the benefits of these laws no
matter how long her possession of the subject property was.

PETITION for review on certiorari of the decision and

resolution of the Court of Appeals.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
J.V. Natividad & Associates for petitioner.
Jason Christopher Rayos-Co for respondent.

BRION, ** J.:
BRION, ** J.:
Petitioner B.E. San Diego, Inc. (B.E. San Diego) filed
before the Court a petition for review on certiorari1
assailing the September 25, 2002 decision2 of the Court of
Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 50213. The CA decision
reversed the June 22, 1995 decision3 of the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Malabon, Branch 74, in Civil Case No.
1421-MN.4 The RTC in turn granted the complaint for
recovery of possession5 instituted by B.E. San Diego
against private respondent Jovita Matias (Matias).

_______________

** Designated Acting Chairperson of the Third Division, per Special

Order No. 906 dated October 13, 2010.
1Rollo, pp. 3-24.
2 Penned by Associate Justice Delilah Vidallon-Magtolis, with
Associate Justice Renato C. Dacudao and Associate Justice Mario L.
Guaria concurring, id., at pp. 29-35.
3 Penned by Judge (now CA Associate Justice) Bienvenido L. Reyes,
records, pp. 329-338.
4Also assailed in the present petition is the May 20, 2003 resolution of
the CA, denying B.E. San Diegos motion for reconsideration of the
September 25, 2002 decision, Rollo, p. 37.
 5Records, pp. 2-4.

311

VOL. 633, OCTOBER 18, 2010 311

B.E. San Diego, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals

The Facts

B.E. San Diego alleged that it is the registered owner of

a parcel of land (subject property) located in Hernandez
Street, Catmon, Malabon, covered by Transfer Certificate
of Title (TCT) No. T-134756 of the Register of Deeds of
Caloocan, and delineated as Lot No. 3, Block No. 13, with
an area of 228 square meters. B.E. San Diego claimed that
Matias has been occupying the subject property for over a
year without its authority or consent. As both its oral and
written demands to vacate were left unheeded, B.E. San
Diego filed a complaint for the recovery of possession
of the subject property against Matias on March 15, 1990
before the RTC.6
In her answer to the complaint, Matias alleged that she
and her family have been living on the subject property
since the 1950s on the basis of a written permit issued by
the local government of Malabon in 1954.7 Matias stated
the local government of Malabon in 1954.7 Matias stated
that she and her family have introduced substantial
improvements on the subject property and have been
regularly paying realty taxes thereon. She further claimed
that she is a legitimate beneficiary of Presidential Decree
(PD) No. 15178 and PD No. 2016,9 which classified the
subject property as part of the Urban Land Reform Zone
(ULRZ) and an Area for Priority Development (APD).

_______________

6Id., at pp. 2-4.

7Payahag dated December 24, 1954, id., at p. 277.
8 Entitled Proclaiming Urban Land Reform in the Philippines and
Providing for the Implementing Machinery Thereof, Section 6 of which
grants preferential rights to landless tenants/occupants to acquire land
within urban land reform areas.
9 Entitled Prohibiting the Eviction of Occupant Families from Land
Identified and Proclaimed as Areas for Priority Development (APD) or as
Urban Land Reform Zones and Exempting Such Land from Payment of
Real Property Taxes, Section 2 of which prohibits the eviction of qualified
tenants/occupants.

312
312 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
B.E. San Diego, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals

More importantly, she questioned B.E. San Diegos

claim over the subject property by pointing out that the
title relied on by B.E. San Diego (TCT No. T-134756) covers
a property located in Barrio Tinajeros, Malabon, while the
subject property is actually located in Barrio Catmon,
Malabon. Matias thus claimed that the property she is
occupying in Barrio Catmon is different from the property
that B.E. San Diego seeks to recover in the possessory
action before the RTC.10
The RTC found no issue as to the identity of the
property, ruling that the property covered by B.E. San
Diegos TCT No. T-134756, located in Barrio Tinajeros, is
the same property being occupied by Matias, located in
Barrio Catmon. The RTC took judicial notice of the fact
that Barrio Catmon was previously part of Barrio
Tinajeros. It found that the Approved Subdivision Plan and
tax declarations showed that the subject property is located
in Barrio Catmon, Malabon. The RTC thus declared that
B.E. San Diego sufficiently proved its right to recover
possession of the subject property on the basis of its TCT
No. T-134756. As opposed to B.E. San Diegos clear right, it
found Matias claimed of possession over the subject
property as a long-time occupant and as a beneficiary of PD
Nos. 1517 and 2016 unfounded.11
On appeal, the CA disagreed with the RTCs findings. It
considered the discrepancy in the location significant and
declared that this should have prompted the RTC to
require an expert witness from the concerned government
agency to explain the matter. Since it was undisputed that
Matias was in actual possession of the subject property at
the time of the filing of the complaint, the CA declared that
her possession should have been upheld under Article 538
of the Civil Code.12

_______________

10Records, pp. 12-16.

11Id., at pp. 336-339.
12 Art. 538. Possession as a fact cannot be recognized at the same
time in two different personalities except in the cases of co-possession.
Should a question arise regarding the fact of possession, the present
possessor shall be preferred; if there are two possessors,

313
 VOL. 633, OCTOBER 18, 2010 313
B.E. San Diego, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals

The CA also upheld Matias possession based on PD Nos.

1517 and 2016.13
As its motion for reconsideration of the CAs judgment
was denied,14 B.E. San Diego filed the present petition for
review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.

The Petition for Review on Certiorari

B.E. San Diego contends that the CA erred in reversing

the RTCs finding on the sole basis of a discrepancy, which
it claims has been explained and controverted by the
evidence it presented. It assails the CA decision for failing
to consider the following evidence which adequately show
that the property covered by its TCT No. T-134756 is the
same property occupied by Matias:
a. TCT No. T-134756 issued in the name of B.E. San
Diego, covering a property delineated as Lot No. 3,
Block No. 13;
b. Approved Subdivision Plan showing Lot No. 3, Block
No. 3 is situated in Barrio Catmon, Malabon;
 c. Tax Declaration No. B-005-00296 issued in the name
of B.E. San Diego, referring to a property covered by
TCT No. T-134756;
d. Testimonial evidence of B.E. San Diegos witness that
the property described in TCT No. T-134756 is the
same property occupied by Matias; and
e. Judicial notice taken by the RTC of Malabon, based
on public and common knowledge, that Barrio Cat-

_______________

the one longer in possession; if the dates of the possession are the same,
the one who presents a title; and if all these conditions are equal, the
thing shall be placed in judicial deposit pending determination of its
possession or ownership through proper proceedings.

13Rollo, pp. 33-34.

14Supra note 4.

314

314 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

B.E. San Diego, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals
 mon was previously part of Barrio Tinajeros,
Malabon.
B. E. San Diego also alleges that Matias is estopped
from alleging that the property she is occupying is different
from the property covered by its TCT No. T-134756. Matias
previously moved to dismiss its complaint for recovery of
possession of the subject property (accion publiciana),
raising res judicata as ground.15 She alleged that the
accion publiciana16 is barred by the judgment in an earlier
ejectment case,17 as both involved the same parties, the
same subject matter, and the same cause of action. The
ejectment case involved a parcel of land covered by TCT
No. T-134756, located at Hernandez Street, Barrio Catmon,
Malabon; Matias never questioned the identity and location
of the property in that case.18 B.E. San Diego thus contends
that Matias, by raising the ground of res judicata, has
impliedly admitted there is no difference in the subject
matter of the two actions and, thus, could no longer
question the identity and location of the subject property.
In controverting B.E. San Diegos petition, Matias relies
on the same points that the CA discussed in its decision.

The Courts Ruling

The Court finds the petition meritorious.

 From the errors raised in the petition, what emerges as
a primary issue is the identity of the subject matter of
the

_______________

15Records, pp. 61-63.

16Civil Case No. 1421-MN.
17Civil Case No. 668-87 is one of the four ejectment cases instituted by
B.E. San Diego against the Matias family before the Metropolitan Trial
Court of Malabon, Branch 56.
18The RTC denied Matias motion to dismiss in its Order dated March
5, 1991, records, pp. 95-96. The CA dismissed Matias certiorari petition
(CA-G.R. No. 26172) assailing the denial of her motion to dismiss in its
Order dated October 10, 1991, id., at p. 124.

315

VOL. 633, OCTOBER 18, 2010 315

B.E. San Diego, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals

casewhether the subject property that Matias

occupies is the same as the property covered by B.E.
San Diegos title. Our reading of the records discloses
that the two are one and the same.
B.E. San Diegos TCT No. T-134756 refers to a property
located in Barrio Tinajeros, Malabon, but the subject
property sought to be recovered from Matias is in Barrio
Catmon, Malabon. In ruling for Matias, the CA declared
that this discrepancy should have been explained by an
expert witness, which B.E. San Diego failed to present.
The Court, however, does not find the testimony of an
expert witness necessary to explain the discrepancy. The
RTC declared that the discrepancy arose from the fact that
Barrio Catmon was previously part of Barrio Tinajeros.
The RTC has authority to declare so because this is a
matter subject of mandatory judicial notice. Section 1 of
Rule 129 of the Rules of Court19 includes geographical
divisions as among matters that courts should take judicial
notice of. Given that Barrio Tinajeros is adjacent to Barrio
Catmon,20 we find it likely that, indeed, the two barrios
previously formed one geographical unit.
Even without considering judicial notice of the
geographical divisions within a political unit, sufficient
evidence exists supporting the RTCs finding that the
subject property B.E. San Diego seeks to recover is the
Barrio Catmon property in
_______________

19 RULES OF COURT, Rule 129, Section 1. Judicial notice, when

mandatory.A court shall take judicial notice, without the introduction of
evidence, of the existence and territorial extent of states, their political
history, forms of government and symbols of nationality, the law of
nations, the admiralty and maritime courts of the world and their seals,
the political constitution and history of the Philippines, the official acts of
the legislative, executive and judicial departments of the Philippines, the
laws of nature, the measure of time, and the geographical divisions.
20 Malabon City map at http://www.kabeetmaps.com/flash/detail.php?
name_id=1124592.

316

316 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

B.E. San Diego, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals

Matias possession. TCT No. T-134756 identifies a property

in Barrio Tinajeros as Lot No. 3, Block No. 13. Although
B.E. San Diegos tax declaration refers to a property in
Barrio Catmon, it nevertheless identifies it also as Lot No.
3, Block No. 13, covered by the same TCT No. T-134756.
Indeed, both title and the tax declaration share the same
boundaries to identify the property. With this evidence, the
trial court judge can very well ascertain the facts to resolve
the discrepancy, and dispense with the need for the
testimony of an expert witness.21
Additionally, we agree with B.E. San Diego that Matias
can no longer question the identity of the property it seeks
to recover when she invoked res judicata as ground to
dismiss the accion publiciana that is the root of the present
petition. An allegation of res judicata necessarily
constitutes an admission that the subject matter of the
pending suit (the accion publiciana) is the same as that in
a previous one (the ejectment case).22 That Matias never
raised the discrepancy in the location stated in B.E. San
Diegos title and the actual location of the subject property
in the ejectment suit bars her now from raising the same.
Thus, the issue of identity of the subject matter of the case
has been settled by Matias admission and negates the
defenses she raised against B.E. San Diegos complaint.

_______________

21Expert witnesses are not allowed to give opinion evidence if from the
other evidence available, the judge can be put in possession of the facts.
Such evidence, if permitted, would result in the substitution of the
judgment of experts for that of the court, R. Francisco, Evidence (1994
ed.), pp. 351-352, citing McBain, California Evidence Manual, p. 278.
22 For res judicata to apply, there must be (1) a former judgment or
order that is final and executory, (2) rendered by a court that has
jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties, (3) the former
judgment or order was resolved on the merits, and (4) there is identity of
parties, subject matter, and cause of action between the first and second
actions, see Agustin v. de los Santos, G.R. No. 168139, January 20, 2009,
576 SCRA 576, 586.

317

VOL. 633, OCTOBER 18, 2010 317

B.E. San Diego, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals

We then proceed to resolve the core issue of the accion

publicianawho between the parties is entitled
possession of the subject property. Notably, the
judgment in the ejectment suit that B.E. San Diego
previously filed against Matias is not determinative of this
issue and will not prejudice B.E. San Diegos claim.23 While
there may be identity of parties and subject matter, there
is no identity of cause of action between the two cases; an
action for ejectment and accion publiciana, though both
referring to the issue of possession, differ in the following
manner:

First, forcible entry should be filed within one year from the
unlawful dispossession of the real property, while accion
publiciana is filed a year after the unlawful dispossession of the
real property. Second, forcible entry is concerned with the
issue of the right to the physical possession of the real
property; in accion publiciana, what is subject of litigation
is the better right to possession over the real property.
Third, an action for forcible entry is filed in the municipal trial
court and is a summary action, while accion publiciana is a
plenary action in the RTC.24

B.E. San Diego anchors it right to possess based on its

ownership of the subject property, as evidenced by its title.
Matias, on the other hand, relies on (1) the 1954 permit she
secured from the local government of Malabon, (2) the
Miscellaneous Sales Application, (3) the tax declarations
and realty tax payments she made annually beginning
1974, (4) her standing as beneficiary of PD Nos. 1517 and
2016, and (5) her long possession of the subject property
since 1954 up to the
_______________

23The Metropolitan Trial Court (MTC) of Malabon, Branch 56, granted

B.E. San Diegos ejectment complaint against Matias (see Rollo, pp. 41-
44). The RTC of Malabon, Branch 72, reversed the MTCs decision after
finding that B.E. San Diegos complaint failed to allege that it had prior
physical possession of the property (see records, pp. 64-66).
24Regis v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 153914, July 31, 2007, 528 SCRA
611, 620; see also Custodio v. Corrado, G.R. No. 146082, July 30, 2004,
435 SCRA 500.

318

318 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

B.E. San Diego, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals

present. Unfortunately for Matias, her evidence does not

establish a better right of possession over B.E. San Diegos
ownership.
The settled doctrine in property law is that no title to
register land in derogation of that of the registered owner
shall be acquired by prescription or adverse possession.25
Even if the possession is coupled with payment of realty
taxes, we cannot apply in Matias case the rule that these
acts combined constitute proof of the possessors claim of
title.26 Despite her claim of possession since 1954, Matias
began paying realty taxes on the subject property only in
1974when B.E. San Diego filed an ejectment case against
her husband/predecessor, Pedro Matias.27 Considering
these circumstances, we find Matias payment of realty
taxes suspect.
Matias cannot rely on the Miscellaneous Sales
Application and the local government permit issued in her
favor; neither establishes a clear right in favor of Matias
over the subject property. A sales application, in the
absence of approval by the Bureau of Lands or the issuance
of a sales patent, remains simply as an application that
does not vest title in the applicant.28 The local government
permit contained only a statement of the local executive
that the case between the local government and B.E. San
Diego was decided by a trial court in favor of the former.29

_______________

25PD No. 1529, Section 47.

26Although tax declarations or realty tax payment of property are not
conclusive evidence of ownership, nevertheless, they are good indicia of
possession in the concept of owner for no one in his right mind would be
paying taxes for a property that is not in his actual or at least constructive
possession. They constitute at least proof that the holder has a claim of
title over the property, Director of Lands v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No.
103949, June 17, 1999, 308 SCRA 317, 324-325, citing Republic v. Court of
Appeals, 258 SCRA 712 (1996).
27Civil Case No. 3667.
28Javier v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 101177, March 28, 1994, 231
SCRA 498, 507.
29Supra note 7.

319

VOL. 633, OCTOBER 18, 2010 319

B.E. San Diego, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals

The CA erroneously upheld Matias claim of possession

based on PD Nos. 1517 and 2016. Matias is not a qualified
beneficiary of these laws. The tenants/occupants who have
a right not to be evicted from urban lands does not include
those whose presence on the land is merely tolerated and
without the benefit of contract, those who enter the
land by force or deceit, or those whose possession is
under litigation. 30 At the time of PD 1517s enactment,
there was already a pending ejectment suit between B.E.
San Diego and Pedro Matias over the subject property.
Occupants of the land whose presence therein is devoid of
any legal authority, or those whose contracts of lease were
already terminated or had already expired, or whose
possession is under litigation, are not considered tenants
under the [PD Nos. 1517].31 The RTC correctly ruled that
Matias cannot be considered a legitimate tenant who can
avail the benefits of these laws no matter how long her
possession of the subject property was.
WHEREFORE, we GRANT the petition for review on
certiorari, and REVERSE the September 25, 2002 decision
and May 20, 2003 resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-
G.R. CV No. 50213. The June 22, 1995 decision of the
Regional Trial Court of Malabon in Civil Case No. 1421-
MN is REINSTATED. Costs against the respondent.
SO ORDERED.

Nachura,*** Villarama, Jr., Mendoza**** and Sereno,

JJ., concur.

Petition granted, judgment and resolution reversed.

_______________
 30 Estreller v. Ysmael, G.R. No. 170264, March 13, 2009, 581 SCRA
247, 256.
31Ibid.
*** Designated Additional Member of the Third Division, per Special
Order No. 907 dated October 13, 2010.
**** Designated Additional Member of the Third Division, per Special
Order No. 911 dated October 15, 2010.

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