THIRD DIVISION

[G.R. No. 138322. October 2, 2001]

GRACE J. GARCIA, a.k.a. GRACE J. GARCIA-RECIO, petitioner, vs. REDERICK A. RECIO,

respondent.

DECISION

PANGANIBAN, J.:

A divorce obtained abroad by an alien may be recognized in our jurisdiction, provided such
decree is valid according to the national law of the foreigner. However, the divorce decree and
the governing personal law of the alien spouse who obtained the divorce must be proven. Our
courts do not take judicial notice of foreign laws and judgments; hence, like any other facts, both
the divorce decree and the national law of the alien must be alleged and proven according to our
law on evidence.

The Case

Before us is a Petition for Review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, seeking to nullify the
January 7, 1999 Decision and the March 24, 1999 Order of the Regional Trial Court of
Cabanatuan City, Branch 28, in Civil Case No. 3026AF. The assailed Decision disposed as
follows:

WHEREFORE, this Court declares the marriage between Grace J. Garcia and Rederick A.
Recio solemnized on January 12, 1994 at Cabanatuan City as dissolved and both parties can now
remarry under existing and applicable laws to any and/or both parties.

The assailed Order denied reconsideration of the above-quoted Decision.

The Facts

Rederick A. Recio, a Filipino, was married to Editha Samson, an Australian citizen, in Malabon,
Rizal, on March 1, 1987. They lived together as husband and wife in Australia. On May 18,
1989, a decree of divorce, purportedly dissolving the marriage, was issued by an Australian
family court.

On June 26, 1992, respondent became an Australian citizen, as shown by a Certificate of

Australian Citizenship issued by the Australian government. Petitioner -- a Filipina -- and
respondent were married on January 12, 1994 in Our Lady of Perpetual Help Church in
Cabanatuan City. In their application for a marriage license, respondent was declared as single
and Filipino.
Starting October 22, 1995, petitioner and respondent lived separately without prior judicial
dissolution of their marriage. While the two were still in Australia, their conjugal assets were
divided on May 16, 1996, in accordance with their Statutory Declarations secured in Australia.

On March 3, 1998, petitioner filed a Complaint for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage in the
court a quo, on the ground of bigamy -- respondent allegedly had a prior subsisting marriage at
the time he married her on January 12, 1994. She claimed that she learned of respondents
marriage to Editha Samson only in November, 1997.

In his Answer, respondent averred that, as far back as 1993, he had revealed to petitioner his
prior marriage and its subsequent dissolution. He contended that his first marriage to an
Australian citizen had been validly dissolved by a divorce decree obtained in Australia in 1989;
thus, he was legally capacitated to marry petitioner in 1994.

On July 7, 1998 -- or about five years after the couples wedding and while the suit for the
declaration of nullity was pending -- respondent was able to secure a divorce decree from a
family court in Sydney, Australia because the marriage ha[d] irretrievably broken down.

Respondent prayed in his Answer that the Complaint be dismissed on the ground that it stated no
cause of action. The Office of the Solicitor General agreed with respondent. The court marked
and admitted the documentary evidence of both parties. After they submitted their respective
memoranda, the case was submitted for resolution.

Thereafter, the trial court rendered the assailed Decision and Order.

Ruling of the Trial Court

The trial court declared the marriage dissolved on the ground that the divorce issued in Australia
was valid and recognized in the Philippines. It deemed the marriage ended, but not on the basis
of any defect in an essential element of the marriage; that is, respondents alleged lack of legal
capacity to remarry. Rather, it based its Decision on the divorce decree obtained by respondent.
The Australian divorce had ended the marriage; thus, there was no more marital union to nullify
or annul.

Hence, this Petition.

Issues

Petitioner submits the following issues for our consideration:

The trial court gravely erred in finding that the divorce decree obtained in Australia by the
respondent ipso facto terminated his first marriage to Editha Samson thereby capacitating him to
contract a second marriage with the petitioner.
2

The failure of the respondent, who is now a naturalized Australian, to present a certificate of
legal capacity to marry constitutes absence of a substantial requisite voiding the petitioners
marriage to the respondent

The trial court seriously erred in the application of Art. 26 of the Family Code in this case.

The trial court patently and grievously erred in disregarding Arts. 11, 13, 21, 35, 40, 52 and 53 of
the Family Code as the applicable provisions in this case.

The trial court gravely erred in pronouncing that the divorce decree obtained by the respondent
in Australia ipso facto capacitated the parties to remarry, without first securing a recognition of
the judgment granting the divorce decree before our courts.

The Petition raises five issues, but for purposes of this Decision, we shall concentrate on two
pivotal ones: (1) whether the divorce between respondent and Editha Samson was proven, and
(2) whether respondent was proven to be legally capacitated to marry petitioner. Because of our
ruling on these two, there is no more necessity to take up the rest.

The Courts Ruling

The Petition is partly meritorious.

First Issue:
Proving the Divorce Between Respondent and Editha Samson

Petitioner assails the trial courts recognition of the divorce between respondent and Editha
Samson. Citing Adong v. Cheong Seng Gee, petitioner argues that the divorce decree, like any
other foreign judgment, may be given recognition in this jurisdiction only upon proof of the
existence of (1) the foreign law allowing absolute divorce and (2) the alleged divorce decree
itself. She adds that respondent miserably failed to establish these elements.

Petitioner adds that, based on the first paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code, marriages
solemnized abroad are governed by the law of the place where they were celebrated (the lex loci
celebrationis). In effect, the Code requires the presentation of the foreign law to show the
conformity of the marriage in question to the legal requirements of the place where the marriage
was performed.
At the outset, we lay the following basic legal principles as the take-off points for our
discussion. Philippine law does not provide for absolute divorce; hence, our courts cannot grant
it. A marriage between two Filipinos cannot be dissolved even by a divorce obtained abroad,
because of Articles 15 and 17 of the Civil Code. In mixed marriages involving a Filipino and a
foreigner, Article 26 of the Family Code allows the former to contract a subsequent marriage in
case the divorce is validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to
remarry. A divorce obtained abroad by a couple, who are both aliens, may be recognized in the
Philippines, provided it is consistent with their respective national laws.

A comparison between marriage and divorce, as far as pleading and proof are concerned, can be
made. Van Dorn v. Romillo Jr. decrees that aliens may obtain divorces abroad, which may be
recognized in the Philippines, provided they are valid according to their national law. Therefore,
before a foreign divorce decree can be recognized by our courts, the party pleading it must prove
the divorce as a fact and demonstrate its conformity to the foreign law allowing it. Presentation
solely of the divorce decree is insufficient.

Divorce as a Question of Fact

Petitioner insists that before a divorce decree can be admitted in evidence, it must first comply
with the registration requirements under Articles 11, 13 and 52 of the Family Code. These
articles read as follows:

ART. 11. Where a marriage license is required, each of the contracting parties shall file
separately a sworn application for such license with the proper local civil registrar which shall
specify the following:

xxx xxx xxx

(5) If previously married, how, when and where the previous marriage was dissolved or
annulled;

xxx xxx x x x

ART. 13. In case either of the contracting parties has been previously married, the applicant
shall be required to

ART. 13. In case either of the contracting parties has been previously married, the applicant
shall be required to furnish, instead of the birth or baptismal certificate required in the last
preceding article, the death certificate of the deceased spouse or the judicial decree of the
absolute divorce, or the judicial decree of annulment or declaration of nullity of his or her
previous marriage. x x x.

ART. 52. The judgment of annulment or of absolute nullity of the marriage, the partition and
distribution of the properties of the spouses, and the delivery of the childrens presumptive
legitimes shall be recorded in the appropriate civil registry and registries of property; otherwise,
the same shall not affect their persons.
Respondent, on the other hand, argues that the Australian divorce decree is a public document --
a written official act of an Australian family court. Therefore, it requires no further proof of its
authenticity and due execution.

Respondent is getting ahead of himself. Before a foreign judgment is given presumptive

evidentiary value, the document must first be presented and admitted in evidence. A divorce
obtained abroad is proven by the divorce decree itself. Indeed the best evidence of a judgment is
the judgment itself. The decree purports to be a written act or record of an act of an official body
or tribunal of a foreign country.

Under Sections 24 and 25 of Rule 132, on the other hand, a writing or document may be proven
as a public or official record of a foreign country by either (1) an official publication or (2) a
copy thereof attested by the officer having legal custody of the document. If the record is not
kept in the Philippines, such copy must be (a) accompanied by a certificate issued by the proper
diplomatic or consular officer in the Philippine foreign service stationed in the foreign country in
which the record is kept and (b) authenticated by the seal of his office.

The divorce decree between respondent and Editha Samson appears to be an authentic one issued
by an Australian family court. However, appearance is not sufficient; compliance with the
aforementioned rules on evidence must be demonstrated.

Fortunately for respondents cause, when the divorce decree of May 18, 1989 was submitted in
evidence, counsel for petitioner objected, not to its admissibility, but only to the fact that it had
not been registered in the Local Civil Registry of Cabanatuan City. The trial court ruled that it
was admissible, subject to petitioners qualification. Hence, it was admitted in evidence and
accorded weight by the judge. Indeed, petitioners failure to object properly rendered the divorce
decree admissible as a written act of the Family Court of Sydney, Australia.

Compliance with the quoted articles (11, 13 and 52) of the Family Code is not necessary;
respondent was no longer bound by Philippine personal laws after he acquired Australian
citizenship in 1992. Naturalization is the legal act of adopting an alien and clothing him with the
political and civil rights belonging to a citizen. Naturalized citizens, freed from the protective
cloak of their former states, don the attires of their adoptive countries. By becoming an
Australian, respondent severed his allegiance to the Philippines and the vinculum juris that had
tied him to Philippine personal laws.

Burden of Proving Australian Law

Respondent contends that the burden to prove Australian divorce law falls upon petitioner,
because she is the party challenging the validity of a foreign judgment. He contends that
petitioner was satisfied with the original of the divorce decree and was cognizant of the marital
laws of Australia, because she had lived and worked in that country for quite a long time.
Besides, the Australian divorce law is allegedly known by Philippine courts; thus, judges may
take judicial notice of foreign laws in the exercise of sound discretion.
We are not persuaded. The burden of proof lies with the party who alleges the existence of a
fact or thing necessary in the prosecution or defense of an action. In civil cases, plaintiffs have
the burden of proving the material allegations of the complaint when those are denied by the
answer; and defendants have the burden of proving the material allegations in their answer when
they introduce new matters. Since the divorce was a defense raised by respondent, the burden of
proving the pertinent Australian law validating it falls squarely upon him.

It is well-settled in our jurisdiction that our courts cannot take judicial notice of foreign laws.
Like any other facts, they must be alleged and proved. Australian marital laws are not among
those matters that judges are supposed to know by reason of their judicial function. The power of
judicial notice must be exercised with caution, and every reasonable doubt upon the subject
should be resolved in the negative.

Second Issue: Respondents Legal Capacity to Remarry

Petitioner contends that, in view of the insufficient proof of the divorce, respondent was legally
incapacitated to marry her in 1994. Hence, she concludes that their marriage was void ab initio.

Respondent replies that the Australian divorce decree, which was validly admitted in evidence,
adequately established his legal capacity to marry under Australian law.

Respondents contention is untenable. In its strict legal sense, divorce means the legal
dissolution of a lawful union for a cause arising after marriage. But divorces are of different
types. The two basic ones are (1) absolute divorce or a vinculo matrimonii and (2) limited
divorce or a mensa et thoro. The first kind terminates the marriage, while the second suspends it
and leaves the bond in full force. There is no showing in the case at bar which type of divorce
was procured by respondent.

Respondent presented a decree nisi or an interlocutory decree -- a conditional or provisional

judgment of divorce. It is in effect the same as a separation from bed and board, although an
absolute divorce may follow after the lapse of the prescribed period during which no
reconciliation is effected.

Even after the divorce becomes absolute, the court may under some foreign statutes and
practices, still restrict remarriage. Under some other jurisdictions, remarriage may be limited by
statute; thus, the guilty party in a divorce which was granted on the ground of adultery may be
prohibited from marrying again. The court may allow a remarriage only after proof of good
behavior.

On its face, the herein Australian divorce decree contains a restriction that reads:

1. A party to a marriage who marries again before this decree becomes absolute (unless
the other party has died) commits the offence of bigamy.

This quotation bolsters our contention that the divorce obtained by respondent may have been
restricted. It did not absolutely establish his legal capacity to remarry according to his national
law. Hence, we find no basis for the ruling of the trial court, which erroneously assumed that the
Australian divorce ipso facto restored respondents capacity to remarry despite the paucity of
evidence on this matter.

We also reject the claim of respondent that the divorce decree raises a disputable presumption or
presumptive evidence as to his civil status based on Section 48, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court,
for the simple reason that no proof has been presented on the legal effects of the divorce decree
obtained under Australian laws.

Significance of the Certificate of Legal Capacity

Petitioner argues that the certificate of legal capacity required by Article 21 of the Family Code
was not submitted together with the application for a marriage license. According to her, its
absence is proof that respondent did not have legal capacity to remarry.

We clarify. To repeat, the legal capacity to contract marriage is determined by the national law of
the party concerned. The certificate mentioned in Article 21 of the Family Code would have
been sufficient to establish the legal capacity of respondent, had he duly presented it in court. A
duly authenticated and admitted certificate is prima facie evidence of legal capacity to marry on
the part of the alien applicant for a marriage license.

As it is, however, there is absolutely no evidence that proves respondents legal capacity to marry
petitioner. A review of the records before this Court shows that only the following exhibits were
presented before the lower court: (1) for petitioner: (a) Exhibit A Complaint; (b) Exhibit B
Certificate of Marriage Between Rederick A. Recio (Filipino-Australian) and Grace J. Garcia
(Filipino) on January 12, 1994 in Cabanatuan City, Nueva Ecija; (c) Exhibit C Certificate of
Marriage Between Rederick A. Recio (Filipino) and Editha D. Samson (Australian) on March 1,
1987 in Malabon, Metro Manila; (d) Exhibit D Office of the City Registrar of Cabanatuan
City Certification that no information of annulment between Rederick A. Recio and Editha D.
Samson was in its records; and (e) Exhibit E Certificate of Australian Citizenship of
Rederick A. Recio; (2) for respondent: (a) Exhibit 1 -- Amended Answer; (b) Exhibit 2
Family Law Act 1975 Decree Nisi of Dissolution of Marriage in the Family Court of Australia;
(c) Exhibit 3 Certificate of Australian Citizenship of Rederick A. Recio; (d) Exhibit 4
Decree Nisi of Dissolution of Marriage in the Family Court of Australia Certificate; and Exhibit
5 -- Statutory Declaration of the Legal Separation Between Rederick A. Recio and Grace J.
Garcia Recio since October 22, 1995.

Based on the above records, we cannot conclude that respondent, who was then a naturalized
Australian citizen, was legally capacitated to marry petitioner on January 12, 1994. We agree
with petitioners contention that the court a quo erred in finding that the divorce decree ipso
facto clothed respondent with the legal capacity to remarry without requiring him to adduce
sufficient evidence to show the Australian personal law governing his status; or at the very least,
to prove his legal capacity to contract the second marriage.

Neither can we grant petitioners prayer to declare her marriage to respondent null and void on
the ground of bigamy. After all, it may turn out that under Australian law, he was really
capacitated to marry petitioner as a direct result of the divorce decree. Hence, we believe that
the most judicious course is to remand this case to the trial court to receive evidence, if any,
which show petitioners legal capacity to marry petitioner. Failing in that, then the court a quo
may declare a nullity of the parties marriage on the ground of bigamy, there being already in
evidence two existing marriage certificates, which were both obtained in the Philippines, one in
Malabon, Metro Manila dated March 1, 1987 and the other, in Cabanatuan City dated January
12, 1994.

WHEREFORE, in the interest of orderly procedure and substantial justice, we REMAND the
case to the court a quo for the purpose of receiving evidence which conclusively show
respondents legal capacity to marry petitioner; and failing in that, of declaring the parties
marriage void on the ground of bigamy, as above discussed. No costs.

SO ORDERED.

Melo, (Chairman), Vitug, and Sandoval-Gutierrez, JJ., concur.

RECENT JURISPRUDENCE CIVIL LAW

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES v. CIPRIANO ORBECIDO III
GR. No. 154380, 5 October 2005, First Division (Quisumbing, J.)
Given a valid marriage between two Filipino citizens, where one party is later naturalized as a
foreign
citizen and obtains a valid divorce decree capacitating him or her to remarry, can the Filipino
spouse likewise
remarry under Philippine law?
On 24 May 1981, Cipriano Orbecido III married Lady Myros M. Villanueva and their
marriage was blessed with a son and a daughter, Kristoffer Simbortriz V. Orbecido and Lady
Kimberly V. Orbecido.
In 1986, his wife left for the United States bringing along their son Kristoffer. A few
years later, Cipriano discovered that his wife had been naturalized as an American citizen
and sometime in 2000, learned from his son that his wife had obtained a divorce decree. His
wife then married Innocent Stanley and is now currently living in San Gabriel, California with
her child by him.
Cipriano thereafter filed with the trial court a petition for authority to remarry invoking
Paragraph 2 of Article 26 of the Family Code (FC). No opposition was filed. Finding merit in
the petition, the court granted the same. The Republic, herein petitioner, through the Office of
the Solicitor General (OSG), sought reconsideration but it was denied. Hence, this petition.
ISSUE:
Whether or not respondent can remarry under Art. 26 of the Family Code
HELD: The petition is granted.
The OSG contends that par. 2 Art. 26 of FC is not applicable to the instant case because
it only applies to a valid mixed marriage; that is, a marriage celebrated between a Filipino citizen
and an alien. Furthermore, the OSG argues there is no law that governs the respondents
situation. The OSG posits that this is a matter of legislation and not of judicial determination.
The respondent admits that Art. 26 is not directly applicable to his case, but insists that
since his naturalized alien wife obtained a divorce decree which capacitated her to remarry, he is
likewise capacitated by operation of law pursuant to Section 12, Article II of the Constitution.
The Court noted that the petition for authority to remarry filed before the trial court
actually constituted a petition for declaratory relief. The requisites of a petition for declaratory
relief are: (1) there must be a justiciable controversy; (2) the controversy must be between
persons whose interests are adverse; (3) that the party seeking the relief has a legal interest in the
controversy; and (4) that the issue is ripe for judicial determination. This case satisfies all the
requisites for the grant of a petition for declaratory relief.
Article 26 does not appear to govern the situation presented by the case at hand. It
seems to apply only to cases where at the time of the celebration of the marriage, the parties are
a Filipino citizen and a foreigner. The instant case is one where at the time the marriage was
solemnized, the parties were two Filipino citizens, but later on, the wife was naturalized as an
American citizen and subsequently obtained a divorce granting her capacity to remarry, and
indeed she remarried an American citizen while residing in the USA
RECENT JURISPRUDENCE CIVIL LAW
Records of the proceedings of the FC deliberations showed that the intent of Paragraph
2 of Article 26, according to Judge Alicia Sempio-Diy, a member of the Civil Code Revision
Committee, is to avoid the absurd situation where the Filipino spouse remains married to the
alien spouse who, after obtaining a divorce, is no longer married to the Filipino spouse.
Paragraph 2 of Article 26 traces its origin to the 1985 case of Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr.,
which involved a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner where the Court held that a
divorce decree validly obtained by the alien spouse is valid in the Philippines, and consequently,
the Filipino spouse is capacitated to remarry under Philippine law.
In the 1998 case of Quita v. Court of Appeals, the parties were Filipino citizens when they
got married. The wife became a naturalized American citizen in 1954 and obtained a divorce in
the same year. The Court therein hinted, by way of obiter dictum, that a Filipino divorced by his
naturalized foreign spouse is no longer married under Philippine law and can thus remarry.
Thus, taking into consideration the legislative intent and applying the rule of reason, the
Court holds that Paragraph 2 of Article 26 should be interpreted to include cases involving
parties who, at the time of the celebration of the marriage were Filipino citizens, but later on,
one of them became naturalized as a foreign citizen and obtained a divorce decree. The Filipino
spouse should likewise be allowed to remarry as if the other party were a foreigner at the time of
the solemnization of the marriage. To rule otherwise would be to sanction absurdity and
injustice.
In view of the foregoing, the twin elements for the application of Paragraph 2 of Article
26 are as follows: (1) There is a valid marriage that has been celebrated between a Filipino
citizen
and a foreigner; and (2) A valid divorce is obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him
or her to remarry. The reckoning point is not the citizenship of the parties at the time of the
celebration of the marriage, but their citizenship at the time a valid divorce is obtained abroad by
the alien
spouse capacitating the latter to remarry.
In this case, when Ciprianos wife was naturalized as an American citizen, there was still
a valid marriage that had been celebrated between her and Cipriano. Then the naturalized alien
wife subsequently obtained a valid divorce capacitating her to remarry. Clearly, the twin
requisites for the application of Paragraph 2 of Article 26 are both satisfied. Thus Cipriano, the
divorced Filipino spouse, should be allowed to remarry.
However, the Court notes that the records are bereft of competent evidence duly
submitted by respondent concerning the divorce decree and the naturalization of respondents
wife. It is settled rule that one who alleges a fact has the burden of proving it and mere
allegation is not evidence. For his plea to prosper, the respondent must prove his allegation that
his wife was naturalized as an American citizen, must prove the divorce as a fact and
demonstrate its conformity to the foreign law allowing it, and that such foreign law must also be
proved as our courts cannot take judicial notice of foreign laws. Furthermore, the respondent
must also show that the divorce decree allows his former wife to remarry as specifically required
in Article 26. Otherwise, there would be no evidence sufficient to declare that he is capacitated
to enter into another marriage.
Nevertheless, the Court is unanimous in holding that Paragraph 2 of Article 26 of the FC
should be interpreted to allow a Filipino citizen, who has been divorced by a spouse who had
RECENT JURISPRUDENCE CIVIL LAW
acquired foreign citizenship and remarried, also to remarry. However, due to lack of sufficient
evidence submitted and on record, the Court is unable to declare, based on the respondents
bare allegations that his wife, who was naturalized as an American citizen, had obtained a
divorce
decree and had remarried an American, that the respondent is now capacitated to remarry. Such
declaration could only be made properly upon the respondents submission of the aforecited
evidence in his favor.

G.R. No. 133743 February 6, 2007

EDGAR SAN LUIS, Petitioner,

vs.
FELICIDAD SAN LUIS, Respondent.

x ---------------------------------------------------- x

G.R. No. 134029 February 6, 2007

RODOLFO SAN LUIS, Petitioner,

vs.
FELICIDAD SAGALONGOS alias FELICIDAD SAN LUIS, Respondent.

DECISION

YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:

Before us are consolidated petitions for review assailing the February 4, 1998 Decision 1 of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 52647, which reversed and set aside the September 12,
1995 2 and January 31, 1996 3 Resolutions of the Regional Trial Court of Makati City, Branch
134 in SP. Proc. No. M-3708; and its May 15, 1998 Resolution 4 denying petitioners motion for
reconsideration.
The instant case involves the settlement of the estate of Felicisimo T. San Luis (Felicisimo), who
was the former governor of the Province of Laguna. During his lifetime, Felicisimo contracted
three marriages. His first marriage was with Virginia Sulit on March 17, 1942 out of which were
born six children, namely: Rodolfo, Mila, Edgar, Linda, Emilita and Manuel. On August 11,
1963, Virginia predeceased Felicisimo.

Five years later, on May 1, 1968, Felicisimo married Merry Lee Corwin, with whom he had a
son, Tobias. However, on October 15, 1971, Merry Lee, an American citizen, filed a Complaint
for Divorce 5 before the Family Court of the First Circuit, State of Hawaii, United States of
America (U.S.A.), which issued a Decree Granting Absolute Divorce and Awarding Child
Custody on December 14, 1973. 6

On June 20, 1974, Felicisimo married respondent Felicidad San Luis, then surnamed Sagalongos,
before Rev. Fr. William Meyer, Minister of the United Presbyterian at Wilshire Boulevard, Los
Angeles, California, U.S.A. 7 He had no children with respondent but lived with her for 18 years
from the time of their marriage up to his death on December 18, 1992.

Thereafter, respondent sought the dissolution of their conjugal partnership assets and the
settlement of Felicisimos estate. On December 17, 1993, she filed a petition for letters of
administration 8 before the Regional Trial Court of Makati City, docketed as SP. Proc. No. M-
3708 which was raffled to Branch 146 thereof.

Respondent alleged that she is the widow of Felicisimo; that, at the time of his death, the
decedent was residing at 100 San Juanico Street, New Alabang Village, Alabang, Metro Manila;
that the decedents surviving heirs are respondent as legal spouse, his six children by his first
marriage, and son by his second marriage; that the decedent left real properties, both conjugal
and exclusive, valued at P30,304,178.00 more or less; that the decedent does not have any
unpaid debts. Respondent prayed that the conjugal partnership assets be liquidated and that
letters of administration be issued to her.

On February 4, 1994, petitioner Rodolfo San Luis, one of the children of Felicisimo by his first
marriage, filed a motion to dismiss 9 on the grounds of improper venue and failure to state a
cause of action. Rodolfo claimed that the petition for letters of administration should have been
filed in the Province of Laguna because this was Felicisimos place of residence prior to his
death. He further claimed that respondent has no legal personality to file the petition because she
was only a mistress of Felicisimo since the latter, at the time of his death, was still legally
married to Merry Lee.

On February 15, 1994, Linda invoked the same grounds and joined her brother Rodolfo in
seeking the dismissal 10 of the petition. On February 28, 1994, the trial court issued an Order 11
denying the two motions to dismiss.

Unaware of the denial of the motions to dismiss, respondent filed on March 5, 1994 her
opposition 12 thereto. She submitted documentary evidence showing that while Felicisimo
exercised the powers of his public office in Laguna, he regularly went home to their house in
New Alabang Village, Alabang, Metro Manila which they bought sometime in 1982. Further, she
presented the decree of absolute divorce issued by the Family Court of the First Circuit, State of
Hawaii to prove that the marriage of Felicisimo to Merry Lee had already been dissolved. Thus,
she claimed that Felicisimo had the legal capacity to marry her by virtue of paragraph 2, 13
Article 26 of the Family Code and the doctrine laid down in Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr. 14

Thereafter, Linda, Rodolfo and herein petitioner Edgar San Luis, separately filed motions for
reconsideration from the Order denying their motions to dismiss. 15 They asserted that paragraph
2, Article 26 of the Family Code cannot be given retroactive effect to validate respondents
bigamous marriage with Felicisimo because this would impair vested rights in derogation of
Article 256 16 of the Family Code.

On April 21, 1994, Mila, another daughter of Felicisimo from his first marriage, filed a motion to
disqualify Acting Presiding Judge Anthony E. Santos from hearing the case.

On October 24, 1994, the trial court issued an Order 17 denying the motions for reconsideration.
It ruled that respondent, as widow of the decedent, possessed the legal standing to file the
petition and that venue was properly laid. Meanwhile, the motion for disqualification was
deemed moot and academic 18 because then Acting Presiding Judge Santos was substituted by
Judge Salvador S. Tensuan pending the resolution of said motion.

Mila filed a motion for inhibition 19 against Judge Tensuan on November 16, 1994. On even date,
Edgar also filed a motion for reconsideration 20 from the Order denying their motion for
reconsideration arguing that it does not state the facts and law on which it was based.

On November 25, 1994, Judge Tensuan issued an Order 21 granting the motion for inhibition. The
case was re-raffled to Branch 134 presided by Judge Paul T. Arcangel.

On April 24, 1995, 22 the trial court required the parties to submit their respective position papers
on the twin issues of venue and legal capacity of respondent to file the petition. On May 5, 1995,
Edgar manifested 23 that he is adopting the arguments and evidence set forth in his previous
motion for reconsideration as his position paper. Respondent and Rodolfo filed their position
papers on June 14, 24 and June 20, 25 1995, respectively.

On September 12, 1995, the trial court dismissed the petition for letters of administration. It held
that, at the time of his death, Felicisimo was the duly elected governor and a resident of the
Province of Laguna. Hence, the petition should have been filed in Sta. Cruz, Laguna and not in
Makati City. It also ruled that respondent was without legal capacity to file the petition for letters
of administration because her marriage with Felicisimo was bigamous, thus, void ab initio. It
found that the decree of absolute divorce dissolving Felicisimos marriage to Merry Lee was not
valid in the Philippines and did not bind Felicisimo who was a Filipino citizen. It also ruled that
paragraph 2, Article 26 of the Family Code cannot be retroactively applied because it would
impair the vested rights of Felicisimos legitimate children.

Respondent moved for reconsideration 26 and for the disqualification 27 of Judge Arcangel but
said motions were denied. 28
Respondent appealed to the Court of Appeals which reversed and set aside the orders of the trial
court in its assailed Decision dated February 4, 1998, the dispositive portion of which states:

WHEREFORE, the Orders dated September 12, 1995 and January 31, 1996 are hereby
REVERSED and SET ASIDE; the Orders dated February 28 and October 24, 1994 are
REINSTATED; and the records of the case is REMANDED to the trial court for further
proceedings. 29

The appellante court ruled that under Section 1, Rule 73 of the Rules of Court, the term "place of
residence" of the decedent, for purposes of fixing the venue of the settlement of his estate, refers
to the personal, actual or physical habitation, or actual residence or place of abode of a person as
distinguished from legal residence or domicile. It noted that although Felicisimo discharged his
functions as governor in Laguna, he actually resided in Alabang, Muntinlupa. Thus, the petition
for letters of administration was properly filed in Makati City.

The Court of Appeals also held that Felicisimo had legal capacity to marry respondent by virtue
of paragraph 2, Article 26 of the Family Code and the rulings in Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr. 30 and
Pilapil v. Ibay-Somera. 31 It found that the marriage between Felicisimo and Merry Lee was
validly dissolved by virtue of the decree of absolute divorce issued by the Family Court of the
First Circuit, State of Hawaii. As a result, under paragraph 2, Article 26, Felicisimo was
capacitated to contract a subsequent marriage with respondent. Thus

With the well-known rule express mandate of paragraph 2, Article 26, of the Family Code of
the Philippines, the doctrines in Van Dorn, Pilapil, and the reason and philosophy behind the
enactment of E.O. No. 227, there is no justiciable reason to sustain the individual view
sweeping statement of Judge Arc[h]angel, that "Article 26, par. 2 of the Family Code,
contravenes the basic policy of our state against divorce in any form whatsoever." Indeed, courts
cannot deny what the law grants. All that the courts should do is to give force and effect to the
express mandate of the law. The foreign divorce having been obtained by the Foreigner on
December 14, 1992, 32 the Filipino divorcee, "shall x x x have capacity to remarry under
Philippine laws". For this reason, the marriage between the deceased and petitioner should not be
denominated as "a bigamous marriage.

Therefore, under Article 130 of the Family Code, the petitioner as the surviving spouse can
institute the judicial proceeding for the settlement of the estate of the deceased. x x x 33

Edgar, Linda, and Rodolfo filed separate motions for reconsideration 34 which were denied by the
Court of Appeals.

On July 2, 1998, Edgar appealed to this Court via the instant petition for review on certiorari. 35
Rodolfo later filed a manifestation and motion to adopt the said petition which was granted. 36

In the instant consolidated petitions, Edgar and Rodolfo insist that the venue of the subject
petition for letters of administration was improperly laid because at the time of his death,
Felicisimo was a resident of Sta. Cruz, Laguna. They contend that pursuant to our rulings in
Nuval v. Guray 37 and Romualdez v. RTC, Br. 7, Tacloban City, 38 "residence" is synonymous
with "domicile" which denotes a fixed permanent residence to which when absent, one intends to
return. They claim that a person can only have one domicile at any given time. Since Felicisimo
never changed his domicile, the petition for letters of administration should have been filed in
Sta. Cruz, Laguna.

Petitioners also contend that respondents marriage to Felicisimo was void and bigamous because
it was performed during the subsistence of the latters marriage to Merry Lee. They argue that
paragraph 2, Article 26 cannot be retroactively applied because it would impair vested rights and
ratify the void bigamous marriage. As such, respondent cannot be considered the surviving wife
of Felicisimo; hence, she has no legal capacity to file the petition for letters of administration.

The issues for resolution: (1) whether venue was properly laid, and (2) whether respondent has
legal capacity to file the subject petition for letters of administration.

The petition lacks merit.

Under Section 1, 39 Rule 73 of the Rules of Court, the petition for letters of administration of the
estate of Felicisimo should be filed in the Regional Trial Court of the province "in which he
resides at the time of his death." In the case of Garcia Fule v. Court of Appeals, 40 we laid down
the doctrinal rule for determining the residence as contradistinguished from domicile of the
decedent for purposes of fixing the venue of the settlement of his estate:

[T]he term "resides" connotes ex vi termini "actual residence" as distinguished from "legal
residence or domicile." This term "resides," like the terms "residing" and "residence," is elastic
and should be interpreted in the light of the object or purpose of the statute or rule in which it is
employed. In the application of venue statutes and rules Section 1, Rule 73 of the Revised
Rules of Court is of such nature residence rather than domicile is the significant factor. Even
where the statute uses the word "domicile" still it is construed as meaning residence and not
domicile in the technical sense. Some cases make a distinction between the terms "residence"
and "domicile" but as generally used in statutes fixing venue, the terms are synonymous, and
convey the same meaning as the term "inhabitant." In other words, "resides" should be viewed or
understood in its popular sense, meaning, the personal, actual or physical habitation of a person,
actual residence or place of abode. It signifies physical presence in a place and actual stay
thereat. In this popular sense, the term means merely residence, that is, personal residence, not
legal residence or domicile. Residence simply requires bodily presence as an inhabitant in a
given place, while domicile requires bodily presence in that place and also an intention to make
it ones domicile. No particular length of time of residence is required though; however, the
residence must be more than temporary. 41 (Emphasis supplied)

It is incorrect for petitioners to argue that "residence," for purposes of fixing the venue of the
settlement of the estate of Felicisimo, is synonymous with "domicile." The rulings in Nuval and
Romualdez are inapplicable to the instant case because they involve election cases. Needless to
say, there is a distinction between "residence" for purposes of election laws and "residence" for
purposes of fixing the venue of actions. In election cases, "residence" and "domicile" are treated
as synonymous terms, that is, the fixed permanent residence to which when absent, one has the
intention of returning. 42 However, for purposes of fixing venue under the Rules of Court, the
"residence" of a person is his personal, actual or physical habitation, or actual residence or place
of abode, which may not necessarily be his legal residence or domicile provided he resides
therein with continuity and consistency. 43 Hence, it is possible that a person may have his
residence in one place and domicile in another.

In the instant case, while petitioners established that Felicisimo was domiciled in Sta. Cruz,
Laguna, respondent proved that he also maintained a residence in Alabang, Muntinlupa from
1982 up to the time of his death. Respondent submitted in evidence the Deed of Absolute Sale 44
dated January 5, 1983 showing that the deceased purchased the aforesaid property. She also
presented billing statements 45 from the Philippine Heart Center and Chinese General Hospital
for the period August to December 1992 indicating the address of Felicisimo at "100 San
Juanico, Ayala Alabang, Muntinlupa." Respondent also presented proof of membership of the
deceased in the Ayala Alabang Village Association 46 and Ayala Country Club, Inc., 47 letter-
envelopes 48 from 1988 to 1990 sent by the deceaseds children to him at his Alabang address,
and the deceaseds calling cards 49 stating that his home/city address is at "100 San Juanico,
Ayala Alabang Village, Muntinlupa" while his office/provincial address is in "Provincial Capitol,
Sta. Cruz, Laguna."

From the foregoing, we find that Felicisimo was a resident of Alabang, Muntinlupa for purposes
of fixing the venue of the settlement of his estate. Consequently, the subject petition for letters of
administration was validly filed in the Regional Trial Court 50 which has territorial jurisdiction
over Alabang, Muntinlupa. The subject petition was filed on December 17, 1993. At that time,
Muntinlupa was still a municipality and the branches of the Regional Trial Court of the National
Capital Judicial Region which had territorial jurisdiction over Muntinlupa were then seated in
Makati City as per Supreme Court Administrative Order No. 3. 51 Thus, the subject petition was
validly filed before the Regional Trial Court of Makati City.

Anent the issue of respondent Felicidads legal personality to file the petition for letters of
administration, we must first resolve the issue of whether a Filipino who is divorced by his alien
spouse abroad may validly remarry under the Civil Code, considering that Felicidads marriage
to Felicisimo was solemnized on June 20, 1974, or before the Family Code took effect on August
3, 1988. In resolving this issue, we need not retroactively apply the provisions of the Family
Code, particularly Art. 26, par. (2) considering that there is sufficient jurisprudential basis
allowing us to rule in the affirmative.

The case of Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr. 52 involved a marriage between a foreigner and his Filipino
wife, which marriage was subsequently dissolved through a divorce obtained abroad by the
latter. Claiming that the divorce was not valid under Philippine law, the alien spouse alleged that
his interest in the properties from their conjugal partnership should be protected. The Court,
however, recognized the validity of the divorce and held that the alien spouse had no interest in
the properties acquired by the Filipino wife after the divorce. Thus:

In this case, the divorce in Nevada released private respondent from the marriage from the
standards of American law, under which divorce dissolves the marriage. As stated by the Federal
Supreme Court of the United States in Atherton vs. Atherton, 45 L. Ed. 794, 799:
"The purpose and effect of a decree of divorce from the bond of matrimony by a competent
jurisdiction are to change the existing status or domestic relation of husband and wife, and to free
them both from the bond. The marriage tie, when thus severed as to one party, ceases to bind
either. A husband without a wife, or a wife without a husband, is unknown to the law. When the
law provides, in the nature of a penalty, that the guilty party shall not marry again, that party, as
well as the other, is still absolutely freed from the bond of the former marriage."

Thus, pursuant to his national law, private respondent is no longer the husband of petitioner. He
would have no standing to sue in the case below as petitioners husband entitled to exercise
control over conjugal assets. As he is bound by the Decision of his own countrys Court, which
validly exercised jurisdiction over him, and whose decision he does not repudiate, he is estopped
by his own representation before said Court from asserting his right over the alleged conjugal
property. 53

As to the effect of the divorce on the Filipino wife, the Court ruled that she should no longer be
considered married to the alien spouse. Further, she should not be required to perform her marital
duties and obligations. It held:

To maintain, as private respondent does, that, under our laws, petitioner has to be
considered still married to private respondent and still subject to a wife's obligations under
Article 109, et. seq. of the Civil Code cannot be just. Petitioner should not be obliged to live
together with, observe respect and fidelity, and render support to private respondent. The latter
should not continue to be one of her heirs with possible rights to conjugal property. She should
not be discriminated against in her own country if the ends of justice are to be served. 54
(Emphasis added)

This principle was thereafter applied in Pilapil v. Ibay-Somera 55 where the Court recognized the
validity of a divorce obtained abroad. In the said case, it was held that the alien spouse is not a
proper party in filing the adultery suit against his Filipino wife. The Court stated that "the
severance of the marital bond had the effect of dissociating the former spouses from each other,
hence the actuations of one would not affect or cast obloquy on the other." 56

Likewise, in Quita v. Court of Appeals, 57 the Court stated that where a Filipino is divorced by his
naturalized foreign spouse, the ruling in Van Dorn applies. 58 Although decided on December 22,
1998, the divorce in the said case was obtained in 1954 when the Civil Code provisions were still
in effect.

The significance of the Van Dorn case to the development of limited recognition of divorce in the
Philippines cannot be denied. The ruling has long been interpreted as severing marital ties
between parties in a mixed marriage and capacitating the Filipino spouse to remarry as a
necessary consequence of upholding the validity of a divorce obtained abroad by the alien
spouse. In his treatise, Dr. Arturo M. Tolentino cited Van Dorn stating that "if the foreigner
obtains a valid foreign divorce, the Filipino spouse shall have capacity to remarry under
Philippine law." 59 In Garcia v. Recio, 60 the Court likewise cited the aforementioned case in
relation to Article 26. 61
In the recent case of Republic v. Orbecido III, 62 the historical background and legislative intent
behind paragraph 2, Article 26 of the Family Code were discussed, to wit:

Brief Historical Background

On July 6, 1987, then President Corazon Aquino signed into law Executive Order No. 209,
otherwise known as the "Family Code," which took effect on August 3, 1988. Article 26 thereof
states:

All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines in accordance with the laws in force in the
country where they were solemnized, and valid there as such, shall also be valid in this country,
except those prohibited under Articles 35, 37, and 38.

On July 17, 1987, shortly after the signing of the original Family Code, Executive Order No. 227
was likewise signed into law, amending Articles 26, 36, and 39 of the Family Code. A second
paragraph was added to Article 26. As so amended, it now provides:

ART. 26. All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines in accordance with the laws in force
in the country where they were solemnized, and valid there as such, shall also be valid in this
country, except those prohibited under Articles 35(1), (4), (5) and (6), 36, 37 and 38.

Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrated and a divorce
is thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry, the
Filipino spouse shall have capacity to remarry under Philippine law. (Emphasis supplied)

xxxx
Legislative Intent

Records of the proceedings of the Family Code deliberations showed that the intent of Paragraph
2 of Article 26, according to Judge Alicia Sempio-Diy, a member of the Civil Code Revision
Committee, is to avoid the absurd situation where the Filipino spouse remains married to the
alien spouse who, after obtaining a divorce, is no longer married to the Filipino spouse.

Interestingly, Paragraph 2 of Article 26 traces its origin to the 1985 case of Van Dorn v.
Romillo, Jr. The Van Dorn case involved a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a
foreigner. The Court held therein that a divorce decree validly obtained by the alien spouse
is valid in the Philippines, and consequently, the Filipino spouse is capacitated to remarry
under Philippine law. 63 (Emphasis added)

As such, the Van Dorn case is sufficient basis in resolving a situation where a divorce is validly
obtained abroad by the alien spouse. With the enactment of the Family Code and paragraph 2,
Article 26 thereof, our lawmakers codified the law already established through judicial
precedent.1awphi1.net

Indeed, when the object of a marriage is defeated by rendering its continuance intolerable to one
of the parties and productive of no possible good to the community, relief in some way should be
obtainable. 64 Marriage, being a mutual and shared commitment between two parties, cannot
possibly be productive of any good to the society where one is considered released from the
marital bond while the other remains bound to it. Such is the state of affairs where the alien
spouse obtains a valid divorce abroad against the Filipino spouse, as in this case.

Petitioners cite Articles 15 65 and 17 66 of the Civil Code in stating that the divorce is void under
Philippine law insofar as Filipinos are concerned. However, in light of this Courts rulings in the
cases discussed above, the Filipino spouse should not be discriminated against in his own
country if the ends of justice are to be served. 67 In Alonzo v. Intermediate Appellate Court, 68 the
Court stated:

But as has also been aptly observed, we test a law by its results; and likewise, we may add, by its
purposes. It is a cardinal rule that, in seeking the meaning of the law, the first concern of the
judge should be to discover in its provisions the intent of the lawmaker. Unquestionably, the law
should never be interpreted in such a way as to cause injustice as this is never within the
legislative intent. An indispensable part of that intent, in fact, for we presume the good motives
of the legislature, is to render justice.

Thus, we interpret and apply the law not independently of but in consonance with justice. Law
and justice are inseparable, and we must keep them so. To be sure, there are some laws that,
while generally valid, may seem arbitrary when applied in a particular case because of its
peculiar circumstances. In such a situation, we are not bound, because only of our nature and
functions, to apply them just the same, in slavish obedience to their language. What we do
instead is find a balance between the word and the will, that justice may be done even as the law
is obeyed.

As judges, we are not automatons. We do not and must not unfeelingly apply the law as it is
worded, yielding like robots to the literal command without regard to its cause and consequence.
"Courts are apt to err by sticking too closely to the words of a law," so we are warned, by Justice
Holmes again, "where these words import a policy that goes beyond them."

xxxx

More than twenty centuries ago, Justinian defined justice "as the constant and perpetual wish to
render every one his due." That wish continues to motivate this Court when it assesses the facts
and the law in every case brought to it for decision. Justice is always an essential ingredient of its
decisions. Thus when the facts warrants, we interpret the law in a way that will render justice,
presuming that it was the intention of the lawmaker, to begin with, that the law be dispensed with
justice. 69

Applying the above doctrine in the instant case, the divorce decree allegedly obtained by Merry
Lee which absolutely allowed Felicisimo to remarry, would have vested Felicidad with the legal
personality to file the present petition as Felicisimos surviving spouse. However, the records
show that there is insufficient evidence to prove the validity of the divorce obtained by Merry
Lee as well as the marriage of respondent and Felicisimo under the laws of the U.S.A. In Garcia
v. Recio, 70 the Court laid down the specific guidelines for pleading and proving foreign law and
divorce judgments. It held that presentation solely of the divorce decree is insufficient and that
proof of its authenticity and due execution must be presented. Under Sections 24 and 25 of Rule
132, a writing or document may be proven as a public or official record of a foreign country by
either (1) an official publication or (2) a copy thereof attested by the officer having legal custody
of the document. If the record is not kept in the Philippines, such copy must be (a) accompanied
by a certificate issued by the proper diplomatic or consular officer in the Philippine foreign
service stationed in the foreign country in which the record is kept and (b) authenticated by the
seal of his office. 71

With regard to respondents marriage to Felicisimo allegedly solemnized in California, U.S.A.,

she submitted photocopies of the Marriage Certificate and the annotated text 72 of the Family
Law Act of California which purportedly show that their marriage was done in accordance with
the said law. As stated in Garcia, however, the Court cannot take judicial notice of foreign laws
as they must be alleged and proved. 73

Therefore, this case should be remanded to the trial court for further reception of evidence on the
divorce decree obtained by Merry Lee and the marriage of respondent and Felicisimo.

Even assuming that Felicisimo was not capacitated to marry respondent in 1974, nevertheless,
we find that the latter has the legal personality to file the subject petition for letters of
administration, as she may be considered the co-owner of Felicisimo as regards the properties
that were acquired through their joint efforts during their cohabitation.

Section 6, 74 Rule 78 of the Rules of Court states that letters of administration may be granted to
the surviving spouse of the decedent. However, Section 2, Rule 79 thereof also provides in part:

SEC. 2. Contents of petition for letters of administration. A petition for letters of administration
must be filed by an interested person and must show, as far as known to the petitioner: x x x.

An "interested person" has been defined as one who would be benefited by the estate, such as an
heir, or one who has a claim against the estate, such as a creditor. The interest must be material
and direct, and not merely indirect or contingent. 75

In the instant case, respondent would qualify as an interested person who has a direct interest in
the estate of Felicisimo by virtue of their cohabitation, the existence of which was not denied by
petitioners. If she proves the validity of the divorce and Felicisimos capacity to remarry, but
fails to prove that her marriage with him was validly performed under the laws of the U.S.A.,
then she may be considered as a co-owner under Article 144 76 of the Civil Code. This provision
governs the property relations between parties who live together as husband and wife without the
benefit of marriage, or their marriage is void from the beginning. It provides that the property
acquired by either or both of them through their work or industry or their wages and salaries
shall be governed by the rules on co-ownership. In a co-ownership, it is not necessary that the
property be acquired through their joint labor, efforts and industry. Any property acquired during
the union is prima facie presumed to have been obtained through their joint efforts. Hence, the
portions belonging to the co-owners shall be presumed equal, unless the contrary is proven. 77
Meanwhile, if respondent fails to prove the validity of both the divorce and the marriage, the
applicable provision would be Article 148 of the Family Code which has filled the hiatus in
Article 144 of the Civil Code by expressly regulating the property relations of couples living
together as husband and wife but are incapacitated to marry. 78 In Saguid v. Court of Appeals, 79
we held that even if the cohabitation or the acquisition of property occurred before the Family
Code took effect, Article 148 governs. 80 The Court described the property regime under this
provision as follows:

The regime of limited co-ownership of property governing the union of parties who are not
legally capacitated to marry each other, but who nonetheless live together as husband and wife,
applies to properties acquired during said cohabitation in proportion to their respective
contributions. Co-ownership will only be up to the extent of the proven actual contribution of
money, property or industry. Absent proof of the extent thereof, their contributions and
corresponding shares shall be presumed to be equal.

xxxx

In the cases of Agapay v. Palang, and Tumlos v. Fernandez, which involved the issue of co-
ownership of properties acquired by the parties to a bigamous marriage and an adulterous
relationship, respectively, we ruled that proof of actual contribution in the acquisition of the
property is essential. x x x

As in other civil cases, the burden of proof rests upon the party who, as determined by the
pleadings or the nature of the case, asserts an affirmative issue. Contentions must be proved by
competent evidence and reliance must be had on the strength of the partys own evidence and not
upon the weakness of the opponents defense. x x x 81

In view of the foregoing, we find that respondents legal capacity to file the subject petition for
letters of administration may arise from her status as the surviving wife of Felicisimo or as his
co-owner under Article 144 of the Civil Code or Article 148 of the Family Code.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals reinstating and
affirming the February 28, 1994 Order of the Regional Trial Court which denied petitioners
motion to dismiss and its October 24, 1994 Order which dismissed petitioners motion for
reconsideration is AFFIRMED. Let this case be REMANDED to the trial court for further
proceedings.

[A.M. No. MTJ-00-1329. March 8, 2001]

HERMINIA BORJA-MANZANO, petitioner, vs. JUDGE ROQUE R. SANCHEZ, MTC,

Infanta, Pangasinan, respondent.

RESOLUTION

DAVIDE, JR., C.J.:

The solemnization of a marriage between two contracting parties who were both bound by a
prior existing marriage is the bone of contention of the instant complaint against respondent
Judge Roque R. Sanchez, Municipal Trial Court, Infanta, Pangasinan. For this act, complainant
Herminia Borja-Manzano charges respondent Judge with gross ignorance of the law in a sworn
Complaint-Affidavit filed with the Office of the Court Administrator on 12 May 1999.

Complainant avers that she was the lawful wife of the late David Manzano, having been married
to him on 21 May 1966 in San Gabriel Archangel Parish, Araneta Avenue, Caloocan City. Four
children were born out of that marriage. On 22 March 1993, however, her husband contracted
another marriage with one Luzviminda Payao before respondent Judge. When respondent Judge
solemnized said marriage, he knew or ought to know that the same was void and bigamous, as
the marriage contract clearly stated that both contracting parties were separated.

Respondent Judge, on the other hand, claims in his Comment that when he officiated the
marriage between Manzano and Payao he did not know that Manzano was legally married. What
he knew was that the two had been living together as husband and wife for seven years already
without the benefit of marriage, as manifested in their joint affidavit. According to him, had he
known that the late Manzano was married, he would have advised the latter not to marry again;
otherwise, he (Manzano) could be charged with bigamy. He then prayed that the complaint be
dismissed for lack of merit and for being designed merely to harass him.

After an evaluation of the Complaint and the Comment, the Court Administrator recommended
that respondent Judge be found guilty of gross ignorance of the law and be ordered to pay a fine
of P2,000, with a warning that a repetition of the same or similar act would be dealt with more
severely.

On 25 October 2000, this Court required the parties to manifest whether they were willing to
submit the case for resolution on the basis of the pleadings thus filed. Complainant answered in
the affirmative.

For his part, respondent Judge filed a Manifestation reiterating his plea for the dismissal of the
complaint and setting aside his earlier Comment. He therein invites the attention of the Court to
two separate affidavits of the late Manzano and of Payao, which were allegedly unearthed by a
member of his staff upon his instruction. In those affidavits, both David Manzano and
Luzviminda Payao expressly stated that they were married to Herminia Borja and Domingo
Relos, respectively; and that since their respective marriages had been marked by constant
quarrels, they had both left their families and had never cohabited or communicated with their
spouses anymore. Respondent Judge alleges that on the basis of those affidavits, he agreed to
solemnize the marriage in question in accordance with Article 34 of the Family Code.

We find merit in the complaint.

Article 34 of the Family Code provides:

No license shall be necessary for the marriage of a man and a woman who have lived together as
husband and wife for at least five years and without any legal impediment to marry each other.
The contracting parties shall state the foregoing facts in an affidavit before any person authorized
by law to administer oaths. The solemnizing officer shall also state under oath that he
ascertained the qualifications of the contracting parties and found no legal impediment to the
marriage.

For this provision on legal ratification of marital cohabitation to apply, the following requisites
must concur:

1. The man and woman must have been living together as husband and wife for at least five years
before the marriage;

2. The parties must have no legal impediment to marry each other;

3. The fact of absence of legal impediment between the parties must be present at the time of
marriage;

4. The parties must execute an affidavit stating that they have lived together for at least five years
[and are without legal impediment to marry each other]; and

5. The solemnizing officer must execute a sworn statement that he had ascertained the
qualifications of the parties and that he had found no legal impediment to their marriage.

Not all of these requirements are present in the case at bar. It is significant to note that in their
separate affidavits executed on 22 March 1993 and sworn to before respondent Judge himself,
David Manzano and Luzviminda Payao expressly stated the fact of their prior existing marriage.
Also, in their marriage contract, it was indicated that both were separated.

Respondent Judge knew or ought to know that a subsisting previous marriage is a diriment
impediment, which would make the subsequent marriage null and void. In fact, in his Comment,
he stated that had he known that the late Manzano was married he would have discouraged him
from contracting another marriage. And respondent Judge cannot deny knowledge of Manzanos
and Payaos subsisting previous marriage, as the same was clearly stated in their separate
affidavits which were subscribed and sworn to before him.

The fact that Manzano and Payao had been living apart from their respective spouses for a long
time already is immaterial. Article 63(1) of the Family Code allows spouses who have obtained
a decree of legal separation to live separately from each other, but in such a case the marriage
bonds are not severed. Else wise stated, legal separation does not dissolve the marriage tie,
much less authorize the parties to remarry. This holds true all the more when the separation is
merely de facto, as in the case at bar.

Neither can respondent Judge take refuge on the Joint Affidavit of David Manzano and
Luzviminda Payao stating that they had been cohabiting as husband and wife for seven years.
Just like separation, free and voluntary cohabitation with another person for at least five years
does not severe the tie of a subsisting previous marriage. Marital cohabitation for a long period
of time between two individuals who are legally capacitated to marry each other is merely a
ground for exemption from marriage license. It could not serve as a justification for respondent
Judge to solemnize a subsequent marriage vitiated by the impediment of a prior existing
marriage.

Clearly, respondent Judge demonstrated gross ignorance of the law when he solemnized a void
and bigamous marriage. The maxim ignorance of the law excuses no one has special
application to judges, who, under Rule 1.01 of the Code of Judicial Conduct, should be the
embodiment of competence, integrity, and independence. It is highly imperative that judges be
conversant with the law and basic legal principles. And when the law transgressed is simple and
elementary, the failure to know it constitutes gross ignorance of the law.

ACCORDINGLY, the recommendation of the Court Administrator is hereby ADOPTED, with

the MODIFICATION that the amount of fine to be imposed upon respondent Judge Roque
Sanchez is increased to P20,000.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 108763 February 13, 1997

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES,

vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and RORIDEL OLAVIANO MOLINA, respondents.

PANGANIBAN, J.:

The Family Code of the Philippines provides an entirely new ground (in addition to those
enumerated in the Civil Code) to assail the validity of a marriage, namely, "psychological
incapacity." Since the Code's effectivity, our courts have been swamped with various
petitions to declare marriages void based on this ground. Although this Court had
interpreted the meaning of psychological incapacity in the recent case of Santos vs. Court of
Appeals, still many judges and lawyers find difficulty in applying said novel provision in
specific cases. In the present case and in the context of the herein assailed Decision of the
Court of Appeals, the Solicitor General has labelled exaggerated to be sure but
nonetheless expressive of his frustration Article 36 as the "most liberal divorce
procedure in the world." Hence, this Court in addition to resolving the present case, finds
the need to lay down specific guidelines in the interpretation and application of Article 36
of the Family Code.

Before us is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 challenging the January 25,
1993 Decision 1 of the Court of Appeals 2 in CA-G.R. CV No. 34858 affirming in toto the
May 14, 1991 decision of the Regional Trial Court of La Trinidad, 3 Benguet, which
declared the marriage of respondent Roridel Olaviano Molina to Reynaldo Molina void ab
initio, on the ground of "psychological incapacity" under Article 36 of the Family Code.

The Facts

This case was commenced on August 16, 1990 with the filing by respondent Roridel O.
Molina of a verified petition for declaration of nullity of her marriage to Reynaldo Molina.
Essentially, the petition alleged that Roridel and Reynaldo were married on April 14, 1985
at the San Agustin Church 4 in Manila; that a son, Andre O. Molina was born; that after a
year of marriage, Reynaldo showed signs of "immaturity and irresponsibility" as a
husband and a father since he preferred to spend more time with his peers and friends on
whom he squandered his money; that he depended on his parents for aid and assistance,
and was never honest with his wife in regard to their finances, resulting in frequent
quarrels between them; that sometime in February 1986, Reynaldo was relieved of his job
in Manila, and since then Roridel had been the sole breadwinner of the family; that in
October 1986 the couple had a very intense quarrel, as a result of which their relationship
was estranged; that in March 1987, Roridel resigned from her job in Manila and went to
live with her parents in Baguio City; that a few weeks later, Reynaldo left Roridel and their
child, and had since then abandoned them; that Reynaldo had thus shown that he was
psychologically incapable of complying with essential marital obligations and was a highly
immature and habitually quarrel some individual who thought of himself as a king to be
served; and that it would be to the couple's best interest to have their marriage declared
null and void in order to free them from what appeared to be an incompatible marriage
from the start.

In his Answer filed on August 28, 1989, Reynaldo admitted that he and Roridel could no
longer live together as husband and wife, but contended that their misunderstandings and
frequent quarrels were due to (1) Roridel's strange behavior of insisting on maintaining her
group of friends even after their marriage; (2) Roridel's refusal to perform some of her
marital duties such as cooking meals; and (3) Roridel's failure to run the household and
handle their finances.

During the pre-trial on October 17, 1990, the following were stipulated:

1. That the parties herein were legally married on April 14, 1985 at the
Church of St. Augustine, Manila;

2. That out of their marriage, a child named Albert Andre Olaviano Molina
was born on July 29, 1986;

3. That the parties are separated-in-fact for more than three years;

4. That petitioner is not asking support for her and her child;

5. That the respondent is not asking for damages;

 6. That the common child of the parties is in the custody of the petitioner
wife.

Evidence for herein respondent wife consisted of her own testimony and that of her friends
Rosemarie Ventura and Maria Leonora Padilla as well as of Ruth G. Lalas, a social worker,
and of Dr. Teresita Hidalgo-Sison, a psychiatrist of the Baguio General Hospital and
Medical Center. She also submitted documents marked as Exhibits "A" to "E-1."
Reynaldo did not present any evidence as he appeared only during the pre-trial conference.

On May 14, 1991, the trial court rendered judgment declaring the marriage void. The
appeal of petitioner was denied by the Court of Appeals which affirmed in toto the RTC's
decision. Hence, the present recourse.

The Issue

In his petition, the Solicitor General insists that "the Court of Appeals made an erroneous
and incorrect interpretation of the phrase 'psychological incapacity' (as provided under
Art. 36 of the Family Code) and made an incorrect application thereof to the facts of the
case," adding that the appealed Decision tended "to establish in effect the most liberal
divorce procedure in the world which is anathema to our culture."

In denying the Solicitor General's appeal, the respondent Court relied 5 heavily on the trial
court's findings "that the marriage between the parties broke up because of their opposing
and conflicting personalities." Then, it added it sown opinion that "the Civil Code Revision
Committee (hereinafter referred to as Committee) intended to liberalize the application of
our civil laws on personal and family rights. . . ." It concluded that:

As ground for annulment of marriage, We view psychologically incapacity as

a broad range of mental and behavioral conduct on the part of one spouse
indicative of how he or she regards the marital union, his or her personal
relationship with the other spouse, as well as his or her conduct in the long
haul for the attainment of the principal objectives of marriage. If said
conduct, observed and considered as a whole, tends to cause the union to self-
destruct because it defeats the very objectives of marriage, then there is
enough reason to leave the spouses to their individual fates.

In the case at bar, We find that the trial judge committed no indiscretion in
analyzing and deciding the instant case, as it did, hence, We find no cogent
reason to disturb the findings and conclusions thus made.

Respondent, in her Memorandum, adopts these discussions of the Court of Appeals.

The petitioner, on the other hand, argues that "opposing and conflicting personalities" is
not equivalent to psychological incapacity, explaining that such ground "is not simply the
neglect by the parties to the marriage of their responsibilities and duties, but a defect in
their psychological nature which renders them incapable of performing such marital
responsibilities and duties."

The Court's Ruling

The petition is meritorious.

In Leouel Santos vs. Court of Appeals 6 this Court, speaking thru Mr. Justice Jose C. Vitug,
ruled that "psychological incapacity should refer to no less than a mental (nor physical)
incapacity . . . and that (t)here is hardly any doubt that the intendment of the law has been
to confine the meaning of 'psychological incapacity' to the most serious cases of personality
disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and
significance to the marriage. This psychologic condition must exist at the time the marriage
is celebrated." Citing Dr. Gerardo Veloso, a former presiding judge of the Metropolitan
Marriage Tribunal of the Catholic Archdiocese of Manila, 7 Justice Vitug wrote that "the
psychological incapacity must be characterized by (a) gravity, (b) juridical antecedence,
and (c) incurability."

On the other hand, in the present case, there is no clear showing to us that the
psychological defect spoken of is an incapacity. It appears to us to be more of a "difficulty,"
if not outright "refusal" or "neglect" in the performance of some marital obligations. Mere
showing of "irreconciliable differences" and "conflicting personalities" in no wise
constitutes psychological incapacity. It is not enough to prove that the parties failed to meet
their responsibilities and duties as married persons; it is essential that they must be shown
to be incapable of doing so, due to some psychological (nor physical) illness.

The evidence adduced by respondent merely showed that she and her husband could nor
get along with each other. There had been no showing of the gravity of the problem; neither
its juridical antecedence nor its incurability. The expert testimony of Dr. Sison showed no
incurable psychiatric disorder but only incompatibility, not psychological incapacity. Dr.
Sison testified: 8

COURT

Q It is therefore the recommendation of the psychiatrist based

on your findings that it is better for the Court to annul (sic) the
marriage?

A Yes, Your Honor.

Q There is no hope for the marriage?

A There is no hope, the man is also living with another woman.

 Q Is it also the stand of the psychiatrist that the parties are
psychologically unfit for each other but they are
psychologically fit with other parties?

A Yes, Your Honor.

Q Neither are they psychologically unfit for their professions?

A Yes, Your Honor.

The Court has no more questions.

In the case of Reynaldo, there is no showing that his alleged personality traits were
constitutive of psychological incapacity existing at the time of marriage celebration. While
some effort was made to prove that there was a failure to fulfill pre-nuptial impressions of
"thoughtfulness and gentleness" on Reynaldo's part of being "conservative, homely and
intelligent" on the part of Roridel, such failure of expectation is nor indicative of
antecedent psychological incapacity. If at all, it merely shows love's temporary blindness to
the faults and blemishes of the beloved.

During its deliberations, the Court decided to go beyond merely ruling on the facts of this
case vis-a-vis existing law and jurisprudence. In view of the novelty of Art. 36 of the Family
Code and the difficulty experienced by many trial courts interpreting and applying it, the
Court decided to invite two amici curiae, namely, the Most Reverend Oscar V. Cruz, 9 Vicar
Judicial (Presiding Judge) of the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic
Church in the Philippines, and Justice Ricardo C. Puno, 10 a member of the Family Code
Revision Committee. The Court takes this occasion to thank these friends of the Court for
their informative and interesting discussions during the oral argument on December 3,
1996, which they followed up with written memoranda.

From their submissions and the Court's own deliberations, the following guidelines in the
interpretation and application of Art. 36 of the Family Code are hereby handed down for
the guidance of the bench and the bar:

(1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to the plaintiff. Any
doubt should be resolved in favor of the existence and continuation of the marriage and
against its dissolution and nullity. This is rooted in the fact that both our Constitution and
our laws cherish the validity of marriage and unity of the family. Thus, our Constitution
devotes an entire Article on the Family, 11 recognizing it "as the foundation of the nation."
It decrees marriage as legally "inviolable," thereby protecting it from dissolution at the
whim of the parties. Both the family and marriage are to be "protected" by the state.

The Family Code 12 echoes this constitutional edict on marriage and the family and
emphasizes the permanence, inviolability and solidarity
(2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be (a) medically or clinically
identified, (b) alleged in the complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by experts and (d) clearly
explained in the decision. Article 36 of the Family Code requires that the incapacity must
be psychological not physical. although its manifestations and/or symptoms may be
physical. The evidence must convince the court that the parties, or one of them, was
mentally or physically ill to such an extent that the person could not have known the
obligations he was assuming, or knowing them, could not have given valid assumption
thereof. Although no example of such incapacity need be given here so as not to limit the
application of the provision under the principle of ejusdem generis, 13 nevertheless such root
cause must be identified as a psychological illness and its incapacitating nature explained.
Expert evidence may be given qualified psychiatrist and clinical psychologists.

(3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at "the time of the celebration" of the
marriage. The evidence must show that the illness was existing when the parties exchanged
their "I do's." The manifestation of the illness need not be perceivable at such time, but the
illness itself must have attached at such moment, or prior thereto.

(4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or

incurable. Such incurability may be absolute or even relative only in regard to the other
spouse, not necessarily absolutely against everyone of the same sex. Furthermore, such
incapacity must be relevant to the assumption of marriage obligations, not necessarily to
those not related to marriage, like the exercise of a profession or employment in a job.
Hence, a pediatrician may be effective in diagnosing illnesses of children and prescribing
medicine to cure them but may not be psychologically capacitated to procreate, bear and
raise his/her own children as an essential obligation of marriage.

(5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the party to assume
the essential obligations of marriage. Thus, "mild characteriological peculiarities, mood
changes, occasional emotional outbursts" cannot be accepted as root causes. The illness
must be shown as downright incapacity or inability, nor a refusal, neglect or difficulty,
much less ill will. In other words, there is a natal or supervening disabling factor in the
person, an adverse integral element in the personality structure that effectively
incapacitates the person from really accepting and thereby complying with the obligations
essential to marriage.

(6) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by Articles 68 up to 71 of the
Family Code as regards the husband and wife as well as Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the
same Code in regard to parents and their children. Such non-complied marital
obligation(s) must also be stated in the petition, proven by evidence and included in the text
of the decision.

(7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic
Church in the Philippines, while not controlling or decisive, should be given great respect
by our courts. It is clear that Article 36 was taken by the Family Code Revision Committee
from Canon 1095 of the New Code of Canon Law, which became effective in 1983 and
which provides:
 The following are incapable of contracting marriage: Those who are unable
to assume the essential obligations of marriage due to causes of psychological
nature. 14

Since the purpose of including such provision in our Family Code is to harmonize our civil
laws with the religious faith of our people, it stands to reason that to achieve such
harmonization, great persuasive weight should be given to decision of such appellate
tribunal. Ideally subject to our law on evidence what is decreed as canonically invalid
should also be decreed civilly void.

This is one instance where, in view of the evident source and purpose of the Family Code
provision, contemporaneous religious interpretation is to be given persuasive effect. Here,
the State and the Church while remaining independent, separate and apart from each
other shall walk together in synodal cadence towards the same goal of protecting and
cherishing marriage and the family as the inviolable base of the nation.

(8) The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor General
to appear as counsel for the state. No decision shall he handed down unless the Solicitor
General issues a certification, which will be quoted in the decision, briefly staring therein
his reasons for his agreement or opposition, as the case may be, to the petition. The
Solicitor General, along with the prosecuting attorney, shall submit to the court such
certification within fifteen (15) days from the date the case is deemed submitted for
resolution of the court. The Solicitor General shall discharge the equivalent function of the
defensor vinculi contemplated under Canon 1095.

In the instant case and applying Leouel Santos, we have already ruled to grant the petition.
Such ruling becomes even more cogent with the use of the foregoing guidelines.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed Decision is REVERSED and SET
ASIDE. The marriage of Roridel Olaviano to Reynaldo Molina subsists and remains valid.

SO ORDERED.

Narvasa, C.J., Davide, Jr., Bellosillo, Melo, Puno Francisco, Hermosisima, Jr., and Torres,
Jr., JJ., concur.

Regalado, Kapunan and Mendoza, JJ., concurs in the result.

FIRST DIVISION

[G.R. No. 165424, April 16, 2008]

LESTER BENJAMIN S. HALILI, Petitioner, VS. CHONA M. SANTOS-HALILI AND

THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES,

R E S OLUTIO N
CORONA, J.:

This petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court seeks to set aside the
January 26, 2004 decision[1] and September 24, 2004 resolution[2] of the Court of Appeals (CA) in
CA-G.R. CV No. 60010.

Petitioner Lester Benjamin S. Halili and respondent Chona M. Santos-Halili[3] were only 21 and
19 years of age, respectively, when they got married on July 4, 1995 at the City Hall of Manila.
After the wedding, they continued to live with their respective parents and never lived together
but maintained the relationship nonetheless.

A year after, the couple started bickering constantly. Petitioner stopped seeing respondent and
went on dates with other women. It was at this time that he started receiving prank calls telling
him to stop dating other women as he was already a married man.

Thereafter, petitioner filed in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasig City, Branch 158 a petition
for the declaration of nullity of the marriage on the ground that he was psychologically
incapacitated to fulfill his essential marital obligations to respondent.[4] He claimed that he
thought that the wedding performed at the City Hall of Manila was a "joke" and that the marriage
certificate he signed was "fake." He also pointed out that he and respondent never lived together
as husband and wife and never consummated the marriage.

The RTC granted the petition and declared petitioner psychologically incapacitated to fulfill the
essential marital obligations.

On appeal, the CA reversed and set aside the RTC decision and held that, taken in totality, the
evidence for petitioner failed to establish his psychological incapacity. Petitioner moved for
reconsideration. The same was denied. Hence, this petition.

The question before us is whether or not the totality of evidence presented is sufficient to prove
that petitioner suffered from psychological incapacity which effectively prevented him from
complying with his essential marital obligations.

We deny the petition.

Petitioner had the burden of proving the nullity of his marriage with respondent.[5] He failed to
discharge the burden.

The evidence for petitioner consisted of his own testimony and a psychological report written by
Dr. Natividad A. Dayan, Ph. D., a clinical psychologist, who also testified on the matters
contained therein.

According to Dr. Dayan, petitioner was suffering from a personality disorder characterized as "a
mixed personality disorder from self-defeating personality to dependent personality disorder
brought about by a dysfunctional family background." Petitioner's father was very abusive and
domineering. Although petitioner and his siblings were adequately supported by their father, a
very wealthy man, they lacked affirmation. Because of this, petitioner grew up without self-
confidence and very immature. He never really understood what it meant to have a family, much
less to be a husband. According to Dr. Dayan, this was very much evident in petitioner's
impulsive decision to get married despite having gone steady with respondent for only six
months.

Moreover, she added that both petitioner and respondent were psychologically incapacitated to
perform their essential marital obligations as they never lived together as husband and wife. They
also never consummated their marriage. Furthermore, they constantly fought. Their separation
was inevitable as they were both immature. Dr. Dayan then abruptly concluded that petitioner's
psychological incapacity was grave and incurable.

In this case, although petitioner was able to establish his immaturity, as evidenced by the
psychological report and as testified to by him and Dr. Dayan, the same hardly constituted
sufficient cause for declaring the marriage null and void on the ground of psychological
incapacity. It had to be characterized by gravity, juridical antecedence and incurability.[6]

In Republic v. CA and Molina,[7] we ruled that the psychological incapacity must be more than
just a "difficulty," a "refusal" or a "neglect" in the performance of some marital obligations. A
mere showing of irreconcilable differences and conflicting personalities does not equate to
psychological incapacity.[8] Proof of a natal or supervening disabling factor, an adverse integral
element in petitioner's personality structure that effectively incapacitated him from complying
with his essential marital obligations,[9] had to be shown. In this, petitioner failed.

The evidence adduced by petitioner merely showed that he and respondent had difficulty getting
along with each other as they constantly fought over petty things.[10] However, there was no
showing of the gravity and incurability of the psychological disorder supposedly inherent in
petitioner, except for the mere statement or conclusion to that effect in the psychological report.
The report, and even the testimonies given by petitioner and his expert witness at the trial,
dismally failed to prove that petitioner's alleged disorder was grave enough and incurable to
bring about his disability to assume the essential obligations of marriage.

Petitioner also made much of the fact that he and respondent never lived together as husband and
wife. This, however, fails to move us considering that there may be instances when, for
economic and practical reasons, a married couple might have to live separately though the
marital bond between them remains.[11] In fact, both parties were college students when they got
married and were obviously without the financial means to live on their own. Thus, their not
having lived together under one roof did not necessarily give rise to the conclusion that one of
them was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations. It is
worth noting that petitioner himself admitted that he and respondent continued the relationship
after the marriage ceremony. It was only when they started fighting constantly a year later that he
decided to file a petition to have the marriage annulled. It appears that petitioner just chose to
give up on the marriage too soon and too easily.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED. The January 26, 2004 decision and September
24, 2004 resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 60010 are AFFIRMED.

THIRD DIVISION

EDWARD KENNETH NGO TE, G.R. No. 161793

Petitioner,

Present:

- versus - YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.,

Chairperson,

AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,

ROWENA ONG GUTIERREZ YU- CHICO-NAZARIO,

TE,
NACHURA, and
Respondent,
PERALTA, JJ.

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES,

Promulgated:
Oppositor.

February 13, 2009

x------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
DECISION

NACHURA, J.:

Far from novel is the issue involved in this petition. Psychological incapacity, since its
incorporation in our laws, has become a clichd subject of discussion in our jurisprudence. The
Court treats this case, however, with much ado, it having realized that current jurisprudential
doctrine has unnecessarily imposed a perspective by which psychological incapacity should be
viewed, totally inconsistent with the way the concept was formulatedfree in form and devoid
of any definition.

For the resolution of the Court is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the
Rules of Court assailing the August 5, 2003 Decision of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R.
CV No. 71867. The petition further assails the January 19, 2004 Resolution denying the motion
for the reconsideration of the challenged decision.

The relevant facts and proceedings follow.

Petitioner Edward Kenneth Ngo Te first got a glimpse of respondent Rowena Ong
Gutierrez Yu-Te in a gathering organized by the Filipino-Chinese association in their college.
Edward was then initially attracted to Rowenas close friend; but, as the latter already had a
boyfriend, the young man decided to court Rowena. That was in January 1996, when petitioner
was a sophomore student and respondent, a freshman.

Sharing similar angst towards their families, the two understood one another and
developed a certain degree of closeness towards each other. In March 1996, or around three
months after their first meeting, Rowena asked Edward that they elope. At first, he refused,
bickering that he was young and jobless. Her persistence, however, made him relent. Thus, they
left Manila and sailed to Cebu that month; he, providing their travel money and she, purchasing
the boat ticket.

However, Edwards P80,000.00 lasted for only a month. Their pension house
accommodation and daily sustenance fast depleted it. And they could not find a job. In April
1996, they decided to go back to Manila. Rowena proceeded to her uncles house and Edward to
his parents home. As his family was abroad, and Rowena kept on telephoning him, threatening
him that she would commit suicide, Edward agreed to stay with Rowena at her uncles place.

On April 23, 1996, Rowenas uncle brought the two to a court to get married. He was
then 25 years old, and she, 20. The two then continued to stay at her uncles place where Edward
was treated like a prisonerhe was not allowed to go out unaccompanied. Her uncle also
showed Edward his guns and warned the latter not to leave Rowena. At one point, Edward was
able to call home and talk to his brother who suggested that they should stay at their parents
home and live with them. Edward relayed this to Rowena who, however, suggested that he
should get his inheritance so that they could live on their own. Edward talked to his father about
this, but the patriarch got mad, told Edward that he would be disinherited, and insisted that
Edward must go home.
 After a month, Edward escaped from the house of Rowenas uncle, and stayed with his
parents. His family then hid him from Rowena and her family whenever they telephoned to ask
for him.

In June 1996, Edward was able to talk to Rowena. Unmoved by his persistence that they
should live with his parents, she said that it was better for them to live separate lives. They then
parted ways.

After almost four years, or on January 18, 2000, Edward filed a petition before the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City, Branch 106, for the annulment of his marriage to
Rowena on the basis of the latters psychological incapacity. This was docketed as Civil Case
No. Q-00-39720.

As Rowena did not file an answer, the trial court, on July 11, 2000, ordered the Office of
the City Prosecutor (OCP) of Quezon City to investigate whether there was collusion between
the parties. In the meantime, on July 27, 2000, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) entered
its appearance and deputized the OCP to appear on its behalf and assist it in the scheduled
hearings.

On August 23, 2000, the OCP submitted an investigation report stating that it could not
determine if there was collusion between the parties; thus, it recommended trial on the merits.
 The clinical psychologist who examined petitioner found both parties psychologically
incapacitated, and made the following findings and conclusions:

BACKGROUND DATA & BRIEF MARITAL HISTORY:

EDWARD KENNETH NGO TE is a [29-year-old] Filipino male adult

born and baptized Born Again Christian at Manila. He finished two years in
college at AMA Computer College last 1994 and is currently unemployed. He is
married to and separated from ROWENA GUTIERREZ YU-TE. He presented
himself at my office for a psychological evaluation in relation to his petition for
Nullification of Marriage against the latter by the grounds of psychological
incapacity. He is now residing at 181 P. Tuazon Street, Quezon City.

Petitioner got himself three siblings who are now in business and one
deceased sister. Both his parents are also in the business world by whom he
[considers] as generous, hospitable, and patient. This said virtues are said to be
handed to each of the family member. He generally considers himself to be quiet
and simple. He clearly remembers himself to be afraid of meeting people. After
1994, he tried his luck in being a Sales Executive of Mansfield International
Incorporated. And because of job incompetence, as well as being quiet and loner,
he did not stay long in the job until 1996. His interest lie[s] on becoming a full
servant of God by being a priest or a pastor. He [is] said to isolate himself from
his friends even during his childhood days as he only loves to read the Bible and
hear its message.

Respondent is said to come from a fine family despite having a lazy father
and a disobedient wife. She is said to have not finish[ed] her collegiate degree
and shared intimate sexual moments with her boyfriend prior to that with
petitioner.

In January of 1996, respondent showed her kindness to petitioner and this

became the foundation of their intimate relationship. After a month of dating,
petitioner mentioned to respondent that he is having problems with his family.
Respondent surprisingly retorted that she also hates her family and that she
actually wanted to get out of their lives. From that [time on], respondent had
insisted to petitioner that they should elope and live together. Petitioner hesitated
because he is not prepared as they are both young and inexperienced, but she
insisted that they would somehow manage because petitioner is rich. In the last
week of March 1996, respondent seriously brought the idea of eloping and she
already bought tickets for the boat going to Cebu. Petitioner reluctantly agreed to
the idea and so they eloped to Cebu. The parties are supposed to stay at the house
of a friend of respondent, but they were not able to locate her, so petitioner was
compelled to rent an apartment. The parties tried to look for a job but could not
find any so it was suggested by respondent that they should go back and seek help
from petitioners parents. When the parties arrived at the house of petitioner, all
of his whole family was all out of the country so respondent decided to go back to
her home for the meantime while petitioner stayed behind at their home. After a
few days of separation, respondent called petitioner by phone and said she wanted
to talk to him. Petitioner responded immediately and when he arrived at their
house, respondent confronted petitioner as to why he appeared to be cold,
respondent acted irrationally and even threatened to commit suicide. Petitioner
got scared so he went home again. Respondent would call by phone every now
and then and became angry as petitioner does not know what to do. Respondent
went to the extent of threatening to file a case against petitioner and scandalize his
family in the newspaper. Petitioner asked her how he would be able to make
amends and at this point in time[,] respondent brought the idea of marriage.
Petitioner[,] out of frustration in life[,] agreed to her to pacify her. And so on
April 23, 1996, respondents uncle brought the parties to Valenzuela[,] and on that
very same day[,] petitioner was made to sign the Marriage Contract before the
Judge. Petitioner actually never applied for any Marriage License.

Respondent decided that they should stay first at their house until after
arrival of the parents of petitioner. But when the parents of petitioner arrived,
respondent refused to allow petitioner to go home. Petitioner was threatened in so
many ways with her uncle showing to him many guns. Respondent even
threatened that if he should persist in going home, they will commission their
military friends to harm his family. Respondent even made petitioner sign a
declaration that if he should perish, the authorities should look for him at his
parents[ ]and relatives[ ]houses. Sometime in June of 1996, petitioner was able to
escape and he went home. He told his parents about his predicament and they
forgave him and supported him by giving him military escort. Petitioner,
however, did not inform them that he signed a marriage contract with respondent.
When they knew about it[,] petitioner was referred for counseling. Petitioner[,]
after the counseling[,] tried to contact respondent. Petitioner offered her to live
instead to[sic] the home of petitioners parents while they are still studying.
Respondent refused the idea and claimed that she would only live with him if they
will have a separate home of their own and be away from his parents. She also
intimated to petitioner that he should already get his share of whatever he would
inherit from his parents so they can start a new life. Respondent demanded these
not knowing [that] the petitioner already settled his differences with his own
family. When respondent refused to live with petitioner where he chose for them
to stay, petitioner decided to tell her to stop harassing the home of his parents.
He told her already that he was disinherited and since he also does not have a job,
he would not be able to support her. After knowing that petitioner does not have
any money anymore, respondent stopped tormenting petitioner and informed
petitioner that they should live separate lives.

The said relationship between Edward and Rowena is said to be

undoubtedly in the wreck and weakly-founded. The break-up was caused by both
parties[] unreadiness to commitment and their young age. He was still in the
state of finding his fate and fighting boredom, while she was still egocentrically
involved with herself.

TESTS ADMINISTERED:

Revised Beta Examination

Bender Visual Motor Gestalt Test
Draw A Person Test
Rorschach Psychodiagnostic Test
Sachs Sentence Completion Test
MMPI

TEST RESULTS & EVALUATION:

Both petitioner and respondent are dubbed to be emotionally immature

and recklessly impulsive upon swearing to their marital vows as each of them was
motivated by different notions on marriage.

Edward Kenneth Ngo Te, the petitioner in this case[,] is said to be still
unsure and unready so as to commit himself to marriage. He is still founded to be
on the search of what he wants in life. He is absconded as an introvert as he is not
really sociable and displays a lack of interest in social interactions and mingling
with other individuals. He is seen too akin to this kind of lifestyle that he finds it
boring and uninteresting to commit himself to a relationship especially to that of
respondent, as aggravated by her dangerously aggressive moves. As he is more of
the reserved and timid type of person, as he prefer to be religiously attached and
spend a solemn time alone.

ROWENA GUTIERREZ YU-TE, the respondent, is said to be of the

aggressive-rebellious type of woman. She is seen to be somewhat exploitative in
her [plight] for a life of wealth and glamour. She is seen to take move on
marriage as she thought that her marriage with petitioner will bring her good
fortune because he is part of a rich family. In order to have her dreams realized,
she used force and threats knowing that [her] husband is somehow weak-willed.
Upon the realization that there is really no chance for wealth, she gladly finds her
way out of the relationship.

REMARKS:

Before going to marriage, one should really get to know himself and
marry himself before submitting to marital vows. Marriage should not be taken
out of intuition as it is profoundly a serious institution solemnized by religious
 and law. In the case presented by petitioner and respondent[,] (sic) it is evidently
clear that both parties have impulsively taken marriage for granted as they are still
unaware of their own selves. He is extremely introvert to the point of weakening
their relationship by his weak behavioral disposition. She, on the other hand[,] is
extremely exploitative and aggressive so as to be unlawful, insincere and
undoubtedly uncaring in her strides toward convenience. It is apparent that she is
suffering the grave, severe, and incurable presence of Narcissistic and Antisocial
Personality Disorder that started since childhood and only manifested during
marriage. Both parties display psychological incapacities that made marriage a
big mistake for them to take.

The trial court, on July 30, 2001, rendered its Decision declaring the marriage of the
parties null and void on the ground that both parties were psychologically incapacitated to
comply with the essential marital obligations. The Republic, represented by the OSG, timely
filed its notice of appeal.

On review, the appellate court, in the assailed August 5, 2003 Decision in CA-G.R. CV
No. 71867, reversed and set aside the trial courts ruling. It ruled that petitioner failed to prove
the psychological incapacity of respondent. The clinical psychologist did not personally examine
respondent, and relied only on the information provided by petitioner. Further, the psychological
incapacity was not shown to be attended by gravity, juridical antecedence and incurability. In
sum, the evidence adduced fell short of the requirements stated in Republic v. Court of Appeals
and Molina needed for the declaration of nullity of the marriage under Article 36 of the Family
Code. The CA faulted the lower court for rendering the decision without the required
certification of the OSG briefly stating therein the OSGs reasons for its agreement with or
opposition to, as the case may be, the petition. The CA later denied petitioners motion for
reconsideration in the likewise assailed January 19, 2004 Resolution.

Dissatisfied, petitioner filed before this Court the instant petition for review on certiorari.
On June 15, 2005, the Court gave due course to the petition and required the parties to submit
their respective memoranda.
 In his memorandum, petitioner argues that the CA erred in substituting its own judgment
for that of the trial court. He posits that the RTC declared the marriage void, not only because of
respondents psychological incapacity, but rather due to both parties psychological incapacity.
Petitioner also points out that there is no requirement for the psychologist to personally examine
respondent. Further, he avers that the OSG is bound by the actions of the OCP because the latter
represented it during the trial; and it had been furnished copies of all the pleadings, the trial court
orders and notices.

For its part, the OSG contends in its memorandum, that the annulment petition filed
before the RTC contains no statement of the essential marital obligations that the parties failed to
comply with. The root cause of the psychological incapacity was likewise not alleged in the
petition; neither was it medically or clinically identified. The purported incapacity of both parties
was not shown to be medically or clinically permanent or incurable. And the clinical
psychologist did not personally examine the respondent. Thus, the OSG concludes that the
requirements in Molina were not satisfied.

The Court now resolves the singular issue of whether, based on Article 36 of the Family
Code, the marriage between the parties is null and void.

I.

We begin by examining the provision, tracing its origin and charting the development of
jurisprudence interpreting it.

Article 36 of the Family Code provides:

 Article 36. A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the
celebration, was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential
marital obligations of marriage, shall likewise be void even if such incapacity
becomes manifest only after its solemnization.

As borne out by the deliberations of the Civil Code Revision Committee that drafted the
Family Code, Article 36 was based on grounds available in the Canon Law. Thus, Justice Flerida
Ruth P. Romero elucidated in her separate opinion in Santos v. Court of Appeals:

However, as a member of both the Family Law Revision Committee of the

Integrated Bar of the Philippines and the Civil Code Revision Commission of the
UP Law Center, I wish to add some observations. The letter dated April 15, 1985
of then Judge Alicia V. Sempio-Diy written in behalf of the Family Law and Civil
Code Revision Committee to then Assemblywoman Mercedes Cojuangco-
Teodoro traced the background of the inclusion of the present Article 36 in the
Family Code.

During its early meetings, the Family Law Committee had

thought of including a chapter on absolute divorce in the draft of a
new Family Code (Book I of the Civil Code) that it had been
tasked by the IBP and the UP Law Center to prepare. In fact, some
members of the Committee were in favor of a no-fault divorce
between the spouses after a number of years of separation, legal or
de facto. Justice J.B.L. Reyes was then requested to prepare a
proposal for an action for dissolution of marriage and the effects
thereof based on two grounds: (a) five continuous years of
separation between the spouses, with or without a judicial decree
of legal separation, and (b) whenever a married person would have
obtained a decree of absolute divorce in another country. Actually,
such a proposal is one for absolute divorce but called by another
name. Later, even the Civil Code Revision Committee took time to
discuss the proposal of Justice Reyes on this matter.

Subsequently, however, when the Civil Code Revision

Committee and Family Law Committee started holding joint
meetings on the preparation of the draft of the New Family Code,
they agreed and formulated the definition of marriage as
 a special contract of permanent partnership
between a man and a woman entered into in
accordance with law for the establishment of
conjugal and family life. It is an inviolable social
institution whose nature, consequences, and
incidents are governed by law and not subject to
stipulation, except that marriage settlements may fix
the property relations during the marriage within the
limits provided by law.

With the above definition, and considering the Christian

traditional concept of marriage of the Filipino people as a
permanent, inviolable, indissoluble social institution upon which
the family and society are founded, and also realizing the strong
opposition that any provision on absolute divorce would encounter
from the Catholic Church and the Catholic sector of our citizenry
to whom the great majority of our people belong, the two
Committees in their joint meetings did not pursue the idea of
absolute divorce and, instead, opted for an action for judicial
declaration of invalidity of marriage based on grounds available
in the Canon Law. It was thought that such an action would not
only be an acceptable alternative to divorce but would also solve
the nagging problem of church annulments of marriages on
grounds not recognized by the civil law of the State. Justice Reyes
was, thus, requested to again prepare a draft of provisions on such
action for celebration of invalidity of marriage. Still later, to avoid
the overlapping of provisions on void marriages as found in the
present Civil Code and those proposed by Justice Reyes on judicial
declaration of invalidity of marriage on grounds similar to the
Canon Law, the two Committees now working as a Joint
Committee in the preparation of a New Family Code decided to
consolidate the present provisions on void marriages with the
proposals of Justice Reyes. The result was the inclusion of an
additional kind of void marriage in the enumeration of void
marriages in the present Civil Code, to wit:

(7) those marriages contracted by any party

who, at the time of the celebration, was wanting in
the sufficient use of reason or judgment to
understand the essential nature of marriage or was
psychologically or mentally incapacitated to
discharge the essential marital obligations, even if
such lack or incapacity is made manifest after the
celebration.
 as well as the following implementing provisions:

Art. 32. The absolute nullity of a marriage

may be invoked or pleaded only on the basis of a
final judgment declaring the marriage void, without
prejudice to the provision of Article 34.

Art. 33. The action or defense for the

declaration of the absolute nullity of a marriage
shall not prescribe.

xxx xxx xxx

It is believed that many hopelessly broken marriages in our country today may
already be dissolved or annulled on the grounds proposed by the Joint Committee
on declaration of nullity as well as annulment of marriages, thus rendering an
absolute divorce law unnecessary. In fact, during a conference with Father Gerald
Healy of the Ateneo University, as well as another meeting with Archbishop
Oscar Cruz of the Archdiocese of Pampanga, the Joint Committee was informed
that since Vatican II, the Catholic Church has been declaring marriages null and
void on the ground of lack of due discretion for causes that, in other
jurisdictions, would be clear grounds for divorce, like teen-age or premature
marriages; marriage to a man who, because of some personality disorder or
disturbance, cannot support a family; the foolish or ridiculous choice of a spouse
by an otherwise perfectly normal person; marriage to a woman who refuses to
cohabit with her husband or who refuses to have children. Bishop Cruz also
informed the Committee that they have found out in tribunal work that a lot of
machismo among husbands are manifestations of their sociopathic personality
anomaly, like inflicting physical violence upon their wives, constitutional
indolence or laziness, drug dependence or addiction, and psychosexual anomaly.

In her separate opinion in Molina, she expounded:

At the Committee meeting of July 26, 1986, the draft provision read:

(7) Those marriages contracted by any party who, at the time of the
celebration, was wanting in the sufficient use of reason or judgment to understand
the essential nature of marriage or was psychologically or mentally incapacitated
to discharge the essential marital obligations, even if such lack of incapacity is
made manifest after the celebration.
 The twists and turns which the ensuing discussion took finally produced
the following revised provision even before the session was over:

(7) That contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration,
was psychologically incapacitated to discharge the essential marital obligations,
even if such lack or incapacity becomes manifest after the celebration.

Noticeably, the immediately preceding formulation above has dropped any

reference to wanting in the sufficient use of reason or judgment to understand the
essential nature of marriage and to mentally incapacitated. It was explained
that these phrases refer to defects in the mental faculties vitiating consent, which
is not the idea . . . but lack of appreciation of one's marital obligation. There
being a defect in consent, it is clear that it should be a ground for voidable
marriage because there is the appearance of consent and it is capable of
convalidation for the simple reason that there are lucid intervals and there are
cases when the insanity is curable . . . Psychological incapacity does not refer to
mental faculties and has nothing to do with consent; it refers to obligations
attendant to marriage.

My own position as a member of the Committee then was that

psychological incapacity is, in a sense, insanity of a lesser degree.

As to the proposal of Justice Caguioa to use the term psychological or

mental impotence, Archbishop Oscar Cruz opined in the earlier February 9, 1984
session that this term is an invention of some churchmen who are moralists but
not canonists, that is why it is considered a weak phrase. He said that the Code of
Canon Law would rather express it as psychological or mental incapacity to
discharge . . . Justice Ricardo C. Puno opined that sometimes a person may be
psychologically impotent with one but not with another.

One of the guidelines enumerated in the majority opinion for the

interpretation and application of Art. 36 is: Such incapacity must also be shown
to be medically or clinically permanent or incurable. Such incurability may be
absolute or even relative only in regard to the other spouse, not necessarily
absolutely against everyone of the same sex.

The Committee, through Prof. Araceli T. Barrera, considered the inclusion

of the phrase and is incurable but Prof. Esteban B. Bautista commented that this
would give rise to the question of how they will determine curability and Justice
Caguioa agreed that it would be more problematic. Yet, the possibility that one
may be cured after the psychological incapacity becomes manifest after the
marriage was not ruled out by Justice Puno and Justice Alice Sempio-Diy. Justice
Caguioa suggested that the remedy was to allow the afflicted spouse to remarry.

For clarity, the Committee classified the bases for determining void
marriages, viz.:
 1. lack of one or more of the essential requisites of marriage as
contract;
2. reasons of public policy;
3. special cases and special situations.

The ground of psychological incapacity was subsumed under special cases and
special situations, hence, its special treatment in Art. 36 in the Family Code as
finally enacted.

Nowhere in the Civil Code provisions on Marriage is there a ground for

avoiding or annulling marriages that even comes close to being psychological in
nature.

Where consent is vitiated due to circumstances existing at the time of the

marriage, such marriage which stands valid until annulled is capable of
ratification or convalidation.

On the other hand, for reasons of public policy or lack of essential

requisites, some marriages are void from the beginning.

With the revision of Book I of the Civil Code, particularly the provisions
on Marriage, the drafters, now open to fresh winds of change in keeping with the
more permissive mores and practices of the time, took a leaf from the relatively
liberal provisions of Canon Law.

Canon 1095 which states, inter alia, that the following persons are
incapable of contracting marriage: 3. (those) who, because of causes of a
psychological nature, are unable to assume the essential obligations of marriage
provided the model for what is now Art. 36 of the Family Code: A marriage
contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was psychologically
incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations of marriage, shall
likewise be void even if such incapacity becomes manifest only after its
solemnization.

It bears stressing that unlike in Civil Law, Canon Law recognizes only two
types of marriages with respect to their validity: valid and void. Civil Law,
however, recognizes an intermediate state, the voidable or annullable marriages.
When the Ecclesiastical Tribunal annuls a marriage, it actually declares the
marriage null and void, i.e., it never really existed in the first place, for a valid
sacramental marriage can never be dissolved. Hence, a properly performed and
consummated marriage between two living Roman Catholics can only be nullified
by the formal annulment process which entails a full tribunal procedure with a
Court selection and a formal hearing.
 Such so-called church annulments are not recognized by Civil Law as
severing the marriage ties as to capacitate the parties to enter lawfully into another
marriage. The grounds for nullifying civil marriage, not being congruent with
those laid down by Canon Law, the former being more strict, quite a number of
married couples have found themselves in limbofreed from the marriage bonds
in the eyes of the Catholic Church but yet unable to contract a valid civil marriage
under state laws. Heedless of civil law sanctions, some persons contract new
marriages or enter into live-in relationships.

It was precisely to provide a satisfactory solution to such anomalous

situations that the Civil Law Revision Committee decided to engraft the Canon
Law concept of psychological incapacity into the Family Codeand classified
the same as a ground for declaring marriages void ab initio or totally inexistent
from the beginning.

A brief historical note on the Old Canon Law (1917). This Old Code,
while it did not provide directly for psychological incapacity, in effect, recognized
the same indirectly from a combination of three old canons: Canon #1081
required persons to be capable according to law in order to give valid consent;
Canon #1082 required that persons be at least not ignorant of the major elements
required in marriage; and Canon #1087 (the force and fear category) required that
internal and external freedom be present in order for consent to be valid. This line
of interpretation produced two distinct but related grounds for annulment called
lack of due discretion and lack of due competence. Lack of due discretion
means that the person did not have the ability to give valid consent at the time of
the wedding and, therefore, the union is invalid. Lack of due competence means
that the person was incapable of carrying out the obligations of the promise he or
she made during the wedding ceremony.

Favorable annulment decisions by the Roman Rota in the 1950s and 1960s
involving sexual disorders such as homosexuality and nymphomania laid the
foundation for a broader approach to the kind of proof necessary for
psychological grounds for annulment. The Rota had reasoned for the first time in
several cases that the capacity to give valid consent at the time of marriage was
probably not present in persons who had displayed such problems shortly after the
marriage. The nature of this change was nothing short of revolutionary. Once the
Rota itself had demonstrated a cautious willingness to use this kind of hindsight,
the way was paved for what came after 1970. Diocesan Tribunals began to accept
proof of serious psychological problems that manifested themselves shortly after
the ceremony as proof of an inability to give valid consent at the time of the
ceremony.

Interestingly, the Committee did not give any examples of psychological incapacity for
fear that by so doing, it might limit the applicability of the provision under the principle of
ejusdem generis. The Committee desired that the courts should interpret the provision on a case-
to-case basis; guided by experience, the findings of experts and researchers in psychological
disciplines, and by decisions of church tribunals which, although not binding on the civil courts,
may be given persuasive effect since the provision itself was taken from the Canon Law. The
law is then so designed as to allow some resiliency in its application.

Yet, as held in Santos, the phrase psychological incapacity is not meant to comprehend
all possible cases of psychoses. It refers to no less than a mental (not physical) incapacity that
causes a party to be truly noncognitive of the basic marital covenants that concomitantly must be
assumed and discharged by the parties to the marriage which, as expressed by Article 68 of the
Family Code, include their mutual obligations to live together, observe love, respect and fidelity;
and render help and support. The intendment of the law has been to confine it to the most
serious of cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or
inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage. This interpretation is, in fact,
consistent with that in Canon Law, thus:

3.5.3.1. The Meaning of Incapacity to Assume. A sharp conceptual distinction

must be made between the second and third paragraphs of C.1095, namely
between the grave lack of discretionary judgment and the incapacity to assume the
essential obligation. Mario Pompedda, a rotal judge, explains the difference by an
ordinary, if somewhat banal, example. Jose wishes to sell a house to Carmela,
and on the assumption that they are capable according to positive law to enter
such contract, there remains the object of the contract, viz, the house. The house
is located in a different locality, and prior to the conclusion of the contract, the
house was gutted down by fire unbeknown to both of them. This is the hypothesis
contemplated by the third paragraph of the canon. The third paragraph does not
deal with the psychological process of giving consent because it has been
established a priori that both have such a capacity to give consent, and they both
know well the object of their consent [the house and its particulars]. Rather,
C.1095.3 deals with the object of the consent/contract which does not exist. The
contract is invalid because it lacks its formal object. The consent as a
psychological act is both valid and sufficient. The psychological act, however, is
directed towards an object which is not available. Urbano Navarrete summarizes
this distinction: the third paragraph deals not with the positing of consent but with
positing the object of consent. The person may be capable of positing a free act of
consent, but he is not capable of fulfilling the responsibilities he assumes as a
result of the consent he elicits.

Since the address of Pius XII to the auditors of the Roman Rota in 1941 regarding
psychic incapacity with respect to marriage arising from pathological conditions,
there has been an increasing trend to understand as ground of nullity different
from others, the incapacity to assume the essential obligations of marriage,
especially the incapacity which arises from sexual anomalies. Nymphomania is a
sample which ecclesiastical jurisprudence has studied under this rubric.

The problem as treated can be summarized, thus: do sexual anomalies always and
in every case imply a grave psychopathological condition which affects the higher
faculties of intellect, discernment, and freedom; or are there sexual anomalies that
are purely so that is to say, they arise from certain physiological dysfunction of
the hormonal system, and they affect the sexual condition, leaving intact the
higher faculties however, so that these persons are still capable of free human
acts. The evidence from the empirical sciences is abundant that there are certain
anomalies of a sexual nature which may impel a person towards sexual activities
which are not normal, either with respect to its frequency [nymphomania,
satyriasis] or to the nature of the activity itself [sadism, masochism,
homosexuality]. However, these anomalies notwithstanding, it is altogether
possible that the higher faculties remain intact such that a person so afflicted
continues to have an adequate understanding of what marriage is and of the
gravity of its responsibilities. In fact, he can choose marriage freely. The
question though is whether such a person can assume those responsibilities which
he cannot fulfill, although he may be able to understand them. In this latter
hypothesis, the incapacity to assume the essential obligations of marriage issues
from the incapacity to posit the object of consent, rather than the incapacity to
posit consent itself.

Ecclesiastical jurisprudence has been hesitant, if not actually confused, in this

regard. The initial steps taken by church courts were not too clear whether this
incapacity is incapacity to posit consent or incapacity to posit the object of
consent. A case c. Pinna, for example, arrives at the conclusion that the intellect,
under such an irresistible impulse, is prevented from properly deliberating and its
judgment lacks freedom. This line of reasoning supposes that the intellect, at the
moment of consent, is under the influence of this irresistible compulsion, with the
inevitable conclusion that such a decision, made as it was under these
circumstances, lacks the necessary freedom. It would be incontrovertible that a
decision made under duress, such as this irresistible impulse, would not be a free
act. But this is precisely the question: is it, as a matter of fact, true that the
intellect is always and continuously under such an irresistible compulsion? It
would seem entirely possible, and certainly more reasonable, to think that there
are certain cases in which one who is sexually hyperaesthetic can understand
perfectly and evaluate quite maturely what marriage is and what it implies; his
consent would be juridically ineffective for this one reason that he cannot posit
the object of consent, the exclusive jus in corpus to be exercised in a normal way
and with usually regularity. It would seem more correct to say that the consent
may indeed be free, but is juridically ineffective because the party is consenting to
an object that he cannot deliver. The house he is selling was gutted down by fire.

3.5.3.2. Incapacity as an Autonomous Ground. Sabattani seems to have seen

his way more clearly through this tangled mess, proposing as he did a clear
conceptual distinction between the inability to give consent on the one hand, and
the inability to fulfill the object of consent, on the other. It is his opinion that
nymphomaniacs usually understand the meaning of marriage, and they are usually
able to evaluate its implications. They would have no difficulty with positing a
free and intelligent consent. However, such persons, capable as they are of
eliciting an intelligent and free consent, experience difficulty in another sphere:
delivering the object of the consent. Anne, another rotal judge, had likewise
treated the difference between the act of consenting and the act of positing the
object of consent from the point of view of a person afflicted with nymphomania.
According to him, such an affliction usually leaves the process of knowing and
understanding and evaluating intact. What it affects is the object of consent: the
delivering of the goods.

3.5.3.3 Incapacity as Incapacity to Posit the Object of Consent. From the

selected rotal jurisprudence cited, supra, it is possible to see a certain progress
towards a consensus doctrine that the incapacity to assume the essential
obligations of marriage (that is to say, the formal object of consent) can coexist in
the same person with the ability to make a free decision, an intelligent judgment,
and a mature evaluation and weighing of things. The decision coram Sabattani
concerning a nymphomaniac affirmed that such a spouse can have difficulty not
only with regard to the moment of consent but also, and especially, with regard to
the matrimonium in facto esse. The decision concludes that a person in such a
condition is incapable of assuming the conjugal obligation of fidelity, although
she may have no difficulty in understanding what the obligations of marriage are,
nor in the weighing and evaluating of those same obligations.

Prior to the promulgation of the Code of Canon Law in 1983, it was not unusual
to refer to this ground as moral impotence or psychic impotence, or similar
expressions to express a specific incapacity rooted in some anomalies and
disorders in the personality. These anomalies leave intact the faculties of the will
and the intellect. It is qualified as moral or psychic, obviously to distinguish it
from the impotence that constitutes the impediment dealt with by C.1084.
Nonetheless, the anomalies render the subject incapable of binding himself in a
valid matrimonial pact, to the extent that the anomaly renders that person
incapable of fulfilling the essential obligations. According to the principle
affirmed by the long tradition of moral theology: nemo ad impossibile tenetur.

xxxx
3.5.3.5 Indications of Incapacity. There is incapacity when either or both of the
contractants are not capable of initiating or maintaining this consortium. One
immediately thinks of those cases where one of the parties is so self-centered
[e.g., a narcissistic personality] that he does not even know how to begin a union
with the other, let alone how to maintain and sustain such a relationship. A
second incapacity could be due to the fact that the spouses are incapable of
beginning or maintaining a heterosexual consortium, which goes to the very
substance of matrimony. Another incapacity could arise when a spouse is unable
to concretize the good of himself or of the other party. The canon speaks, not of
the bonum partium, but of the bonum conjugum. A spouse who is capable only of
realizing or contributing to the good of the other party qua persona rather than
qua conjunx would be deemed incapable of contracting marriage. Such would be
the case of a person who may be quite capable of procuring the economic good
and the financial security of the other, but not capable of realizing the bonum
conjugale of the other. These are general strokes and this is not the place for
detained and individual description.

A rotal decision c. Pinto resolved a petition where the concrete circumstances of

the case concerns a person diagnosed to be suffering from serious sociopathy. He
concluded that while the respondent may have understood, on the level of the
intellect, the essential obligations of marriage, he was not capable of assuming
them because of his constitutional immorality.

Stankiewicz clarifies that the maturity and capacity of the person as regards the
fulfillment of responsibilities is determined not only at the moment of decision
but also and especially during the moment of execution of decision. And when
this is applied to constitution of the marital consent, it means that the actual
fulfillment of the essential obligations of marriage is a pertinent consideration that
must be factored into the question of whether a person was in a position to assume
the obligations of marriage in the first place. When one speaks of the inability of
the party to assume and fulfill the obligations, one is not looking at matrimonium
in fieri, but also and especially at matrimonium in facto esse. In [the] decision of
19 Dec. 1985, Stankiewicz collocated the incapacity of the respondent to assume
the essential obligations of marriage in the psychic constitution of the person,
precisely on the basis of his irresponsibility as regards money and his apathy as
regards the rights of others that he had violated. Interpersonal relationships are
invariably disturbed in the presence of this personality disorder. A lack of
empathy (inability to recognize and experience how others feel) is common. A
sense of entitlement, unreasonable expectation, especially favorable treatment, is
usually present. Likewise common is interpersonal exploitativeness, in which
others are taken advantage of in order to achieve ones ends.

Authors have made listings of obligations considered as essential matrimonial

obligations. One of them is the right to the communio vitae. This and their
corresponding obligations are basically centered around the good of the spouses
and of the children. Serious psychic anomalies, which do not have to be
necessarily incurable, may give rise to the incapacity to assume any, or several, or
even all of these rights. There are some cases in which interpersonal relationship
is impossible. Some characteristic features of inability for interpersonal
relationships in marriage include affective immaturity, narcissism, and antisocial
traits.

Marriage and Homosexuality. Until 1967, it was not very clear under what rubric
homosexuality was understood to be invalidating of marriage that is to say, is
homosexuality invalidating because of the inability to evaluate the responsibilities
of marriage, or because of the inability to fulfill its obligations. Progressively,
however, rotal jurisprudence began to understand it as incapacity to assume the
obligations of marriage so that by 1978, Parisella was able to consider, with
charity, homosexuality as an autonomous ground of nullity. This is to say that a
person so afflicted is said to be unable to assume the essential obligations of
marriage. In this same rotal decision, the object of matrimonial consent is
understood to refer not only to the jus in corpus but also the consortium totius
vitae. The third paragraph of C.1095 [incapacity to assume the essential
obligations of marriage] certainly seems to be the more adequate juridical
structure to account for the complex phenomenon that homosexuality is. The
homosexual is not necessarily impotent because, except in very few exceptional
cases, such a person is usually capable of full sexual relations with the spouse.
Neither is it a mental infirmity, and a person so afflicted does not necessarily
suffer from a grave lack of due discretion because this sexual anomaly does not
by itself affect the critical, volitive, and intellectual faculties. Rather, the
homosexual person is unable to assume the responsibilities of marriage because
he is unable to fulfill this object of the matrimonial contract. In other words, the
invalidity lies, not so much in the defect of consent, as in the defect of the object
of consent.

3.5.3.6 Causes of Incapacity. A last point that needs to be addressed is the

source of incapacity specified by the canon: causes of a psychological nature.
Pompedda proffers the opinion that the clause is a reference to the personality of
the contractant. In other words, there must be a reference to the psychic part of
the person. It is only when there is something in the psyche or in the psychic
constitution of the person which impedes his capacity that one can then affirm that
the person is incapable according to the hypothesis contemplated by C.1095.3. A
person is judged incapable in this juridical sense only to the extent that he is
found to have something rooted in his psychic constitution which impedes the
assumption of these obligations. A bad habit deeply engrained in ones
consciousness would not seem to qualify to be a source of this invalidating
incapacity. The difference being that there seems to be some freedom, however
remote, in the development of the habit, while one accepts as given ones psychic
constitution. It would seem then that the law insists that the source of the
incapacity must be one which is not the fruit of some degree of freedom.
 Conscious of the laws intention that it is the courts, on a case-to-case basis, that should
determine whether a party to a marriage is psychologically incapacitated, the Court, in sustaining
the lower courts judgment of annulment in Tuason v. Court of Appeals, ruled that the findings of
the trial court are final and binding on the appellate courts.

Again, upholding the trial courts findings and declaring that its decision was not a
judgment on the pleadings, the Court, in Tsoi v. Court of Appeals, explained that when private
respondent testified under oath before the lower court and was cross-examined by the adverse
party, she thereby presented evidence in the form of testimony. Importantly, the Court, aware of
parallel decisions of Catholic marriage tribunals, ruled that the senseless and protracted refusal of
one of the parties to fulfill the marital obligation of procreating children is equivalent to
psychological incapacity.

The resiliency with which the concept should be applied and the case-to-case basis by
which the provision should be interpreted, as so intended by its framers, had, somehow, been
rendered ineffectual by the imposition of a set of strict standards in Molina, thus:

From their submissions and the Court's own deliberations, the following
guidelines in the interpretation and application of Art. 36 of the Family Code are
hereby handed down for the guidance of the bench and the bar:

(1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage

belongs to the plaintiff. Any doubt should be resolved in favor of the existence
and continuation of the marriage and against its dissolution and nullity. This is
rooted in the fact that both our Constitution and our laws cherish the validity of
marriage and unity of the family. Thus, our Constitution devotes an entire Article
on the Family, recognizing it as the foundation of the nation. It decrees
marriage as legally inviolable, thereby protecting it from dissolution at the
whim of the parties. Both the family and marriage are to be protected by the
state.
 The Family Code echoes this constitutional edict on marriage and the
family and emphasizes their permanence, inviolability and solidarity.

(2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be (a)

medically or clinically identified, (b) alleged in the complaint, (c) sufficiently
proven by experts and (d) clearly explained in the decision. Article 36 of the
Family Code requires that the incapacity must be psychologicalnot physical,
although its manifestations and/or symptoms may be physical. The evidence must
convince the court that the parties, or one of them, was mentally or psychically ill
to such an extent that the person could not have known the obligations he was
assuming, or knowing them, could not have given valid assumption thereof.
Although no example of such incapacity need be given here so as not to limit the
application of the provision under the principle of ejusdem generis, nevertheless
such root cause must be identified as a psychological illness and its incapacitating
nature fully explained. Expert evidence may be given by qualified psychiatrists
and clinical psychologists.

(3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at the time of the

celebration of the marriage. The evidence must show that the illness was existing
when the parties exchanged their I do's. The manifestation of the illness need
not be perceivable at such time, but the illness itself must have attached at such
moment, or prior thereto.

(4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically

permanent or incurable. Such incurability may be absolute or even relative only in
regard to the other spouse, not necessarily absolutely against everyone of the
same sex. Furthermore, such incapacity must be relevant to the assumption of
marriage obligations, not necessarily to those not related to marriage, like the
exercise of a profession or employment in a job. Hence, a pediatrician may be
effective in diagnosing illnesses of children and prescribing medicine to cure them
but may not be psychologically capacitated to procreate, bear and raise his/her
own children as an essential obligation of marriage.

(5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of
the party to assume the essential obligations of marriage. Thus, mild
characterological peculiarities, mood changes, occasional emotional outbursts
cannot be accepted as root causes. The illness must be shown as downright
incapacity or inability, not a refusal, neglect or difficulty, much less ill will. In
other words, there is a natal or supervening disabling factor in the person, an
adverse integral element in the personality structure that effectively incapacitates
the person from really accepting and thereby complying with the obligations
essential to marriage.

(6) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by

Articles 68 up to 71 of the Family Code as regards the husband and wife as well
 as Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the same Code in regard to parents and their
children. Such non-complied marital obligation(s) must also be stated in the
petition, proven by evidence and included in the text of the decision.

(7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial

Tribunal of the Catholic Church in the Philippines, while not controlling or
decisive, should be given great respect by our courts. It is clear that Article 36 was
taken by the Family Code Revision Committee from Canon 1095 of the New
Code of Canon Law, which became effective in 1983 and which provides:

The following are incapable of contracting marriage: Those who are

unable to assume the essential obligations of marriage due to causes of
psychological nature.

Since the purpose of including such provision in our Family Code is to

harmonize our civil laws with the religious faith of our people, it stands to reason
that to achieve such harmonization, great persuasive weight should be given to
decisions of such appellate tribunal. Ideally subject to our law on evidence
what is decreed as canonically invalid should also be decreed civilly void.

This is one instance where, in view of the evident source and purpose of
the Family Code provision, contemporaneous religious interpretation is to be
given persuasive effect. Here, the State and the Churchwhile remaining
independent, separate and apart from each othershall walk together in synodal
cadence towards the same goal of protecting and cherishing marriage and the
family as the inviolable base of the nation.

(8) The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the
Solicitor General to appear as counsel for the state. No decision shall be handed
down unless the Solicitor General issues a certification, which will be quoted in
the decision, briefly stating therein his reasons for his agreement or opposition, as
the case may be, to the petition. The Solicitor General, along with the prosecuting
attorney, shall submit to the court such certification within fifteen (15) days from
the date the case is deemed submitted for resolution of the court. The Solicitor
General shall discharge the equivalent function of the defensor vinculi
contemplated under Canon 1095.

Noteworthy is that in Molina, while the majority of the Courts membership concurred in
the ponencia of then Associate Justice (later Chief Justice) Artemio V. Panganiban, three justices
concurred in the result and another threeincluding, as aforesaid, Justice Romerotook pains
to compose their individual separate opinions. Then Justice Teodoro R. Padilla even emphasized
that each case must be judged, not on the basis of a priori assumptions, predelictions or
generalizations, but according to its own facts. In the field of psychological incapacity as a
ground for annulment of marriage, it is trite to say that no case is on all fours with another case.
The trial judge must take pains in examining the factual milieu and the appellate court must, as
much as possible, avoid substituting its own judgment for that of the trial court.

Predictably, however, in resolving subsequent cases, the Court has applied the aforesaid
standards, without too much regard for the laws clear intention that each case is to be treated
differently, as courts should interpret the provision on a case-to-case basis; guided by
experience, the findings of experts and researchers in psychological disciplines, and by decisions
of church tribunals.

In hindsight, it may have been inappropriate for the Court to impose a rigid set of rules,
as the one in Molina, in resolving all cases of psychological incapacity. Understandably, the
Court was then alarmed by the deluge of petitions for the dissolution of marital bonds, and was
sensitive to the OSGs exaggeration of Article 36 as the most liberal divorce procedure in the
world. The unintended consequences of Molina, however, has taken its toll on people who have
to live with deviant behavior, moral insanity and sociopathic personality anomaly, which, like
termites, consume little by little the very foundation of their families, our basic social
institutions. Far from what was intended by the Court, Molina has become a strait-jacket,
forcing all sizes to fit into and be bound by it. Wittingly or unwittingly, the Court, in
conveniently applying Molina, has allowed diagnosed sociopaths, schizophrenics,
nymphomaniacs, narcissists and the like, to continuously debase and pervert the sanctity of
marriage. Ironically, the Roman Rota has annulled marriages on account of the personality
disorders of the said individuals.

The Court need not worry about the possible abuse of the remedy provided by Article 36,
for there are ample safeguards against this contingency, among which is the intervention by the
State, through the public prosecutor, to guard against collusion between the parties and/or
fabrication of evidence. The Court should rather be alarmed by the rising number of cases
involving marital abuse, child abuse, domestic violence and incestuous rape.

In dissolving marital bonds on account of either partys psychological incapacity, the

Court is not demolishing the foundation of families, but it is actually protecting the sanctity of
marriage, because it refuses to allow a person afflicted with a psychological disorder, who cannot
comply with or assume the essential marital obligations, from remaining in that sacred bond. It
may be stressed that the infliction of physical violence, constitutional indolence or laziness, drug
dependence or addiction, and psychosexual anomaly are manifestations of a sociopathic
personality anomaly. Let it be noted that in Article 36, there is no marriage to speak of in the
first place, as the same is void from the very beginning. To indulge in imagery, the declaration
of nullity under Article 36 will simply provide a decent burial to a stillborn marriage.

The prospect of a possible remarriage by the freed spouses should not pose too much of a
concern for the Court. First and foremost, because it is none of its business. And second,
because the judicial declaration of psychological incapacity operates as a warning or a lesson
learned. On one hand, the normal spouse would have become vigilant, and never again marry a
person with a personality disorder. On the other hand, a would-be spouse of the psychologically
incapacitated runs the risk of the latters disorder recurring in their marriage.

Lest it be misunderstood, we are not suggesting the abandonment of Molina in this case.
We simply declare that, as aptly stated by Justice Dante O. Tinga in Antonio v. Reyes, there is
need to emphasize other perspectives as well which should govern the disposition of petitions for
declaration of nullity under Article 36. At the risk of being redundant, we reiterate once more
the principle that each case must be judged, not on the basis of a priori assumptions,
predilections or generalizations but according to its own facts. And, to repeat for emphasis,
courts should interpret the provision on a case-to-case basis; guided by experience, the findings
of experts and researchers in psychological disciplines, and by decisions of church tribunals.

II.

We now examine the instant case.

The parties whirlwind relationship lasted more or less six (6) months. They met in
January 1996, eloped in March, exchanged marital vows in May, and parted ways in June. The
psychologist who provided expert testimony found both parties psychologically incapacitated.
Petitioners behavioral pattern falls under the classification of dependent personality disorder,
and respondents, that of the narcissistic and antisocial personality disorder.

By the very nature of Article 36, courts, despite having the primary task and burden of
decision-making, must not discount but, instead, must consider as decisive evidence the
expert opinion on the psychological and mental temperaments of the parties.

Justice Romero explained this in Molina, as follows:

Furthermore, and equally significant, the professional opinion of a

psychological expert became increasingly important in such cases. Data about
the person's entire life, both before and after the ceremony, were presented to
these experts and they were asked to give professional opinions about a party's
mental capacity at the time of the wedding. These opinions were rarely challenged
and tended to be accepted as decisive evidence of lack of valid consent.
 The Church took pains to point out that its new openness in this area did
not amount to the addition of new grounds for annulment, but rather was an
accommodation by the Church to the advances made in psychology during the
past decades. There was now the expertise to provide the all-important
connecting link between a marriage breakdown and premarital causes.

During the 1970s, the Church broadened its whole idea of marriage from
that of a legal contract to that of a covenant. The result of this was that it could no
longer be assumed in annulment cases that a person who could intellectually
understand the concept of marriage could necessarily give valid consent to
marry. The ability to both grasp and assume the real obligations of a mature,
lifelong commitment are now considered a necessary prerequisite to valid
matrimonial consent.

Rotal decisions continued applying the concept of incipient psychological

incapacity, not only to sexual anomalies but to all kinds of personality disorders
that incapacitate a spouse or both spouses from assuming or carrying out the
essential obligations of marriage. For marriage . . . is not merely cohabitation or
the right of the spouses to each other's body for heterosexual acts, but is, in its
totality the right to the community of the whole of life; i.e., the right to a
developing lifelong relationship. Rotal decisions since 1973 have refined the
meaning of psychological or psychic capacity for marriage as presupposing the
development of an adult personality; as meaning the capacity of the spouses to
give themselves to each other and to accept the other as a distinct person; that
the spouses must be other oriented since the obligations of marriage are rooted
in a self-giving love; and that the spouses must have the capacity for
interpersonal relationship because marriage is more than just a physical reality
but involves a true intertwining of personalities. The fulfillment of the obligations
of marriage depends, according to Church decisions, on the strength of this
interpersonal relationship. A serious incapacity for interpersonal sharing and
support is held to impair the relationship and consequently, the ability to fulfill the
essential marital obligations. The marital capacity of one spouse is not considered
in isolation but in reference to the fundamental relationship to the other spouse.

Fr. Green, in an article in Catholic Mind, lists six elements necessary to

the mature marital relationship:

The courts consider the following elements crucial to the

marital commitment: (1) a permanent and faithful commitment to
the marriage partner; (2) openness to children and partner; (3)
stability; (4) emotional maturity; (5) financial responsibility; (6) an
ability to cope with the ordinary stresses and strains of marriage,
etc.
 Fr. Green goes on to speak about some of the psychological conditions that might
lead to the failure of a marriage:

At stake is a type of constitutional impairment precluding

conjugal communion even with the best intentions of the parties.
Among the psychic factors possibly giving rise to his or her
inability to fulfill marital obligations are the following: (1)
antisocial personality with its fundamental lack of loyalty to
persons or sense of moral values; (2) hyperesthesia, where the
individual has no real freedom of sexual choice; (3) the inadequate
personality where personal responses consistently fall short of
reasonable expectations.

xxxx

The psychological grounds are the best approach for

anyone who doubts whether he or she has a case for an annulment
on any other terms. A situation that does not fit into any of the
more traditional categories often fits very easily into the
psychological category.

As new as the psychological grounds are, experts are

already detecting a shift in their use. Whereas originally the
emphasis was on the parties' inability to exercise proper judgment
at the time of the marriage (lack of due discretion), recent cases
seem to be concentrating on the parties' incapacity to assume or
carry out their responsibilities and obligations as promised (lack
of due competence). An advantage to using the ground of lack of
due competence is that at the time the marriage was entered into
civil divorce and breakup of the family almost always is proof of
someone's failure to carry out marital responsibilities as promised
at the time the marriage was entered into.

Hernandez v. Court of Appeals emphasizes the importance of presenting expert testimony

to establish the precise cause of a partys psychological incapacity, and to show that it existed at
the inception of the marriage. And as Marcos v. Marcos asserts, there is no requirement that the
person to be declared psychologically incapacitated be personally examined by a physician, if the
totality of evidence presented is enough to sustain a finding of psychological incapacity. Verily,
the evidence must show a link, medical or the like, between the acts that manifest psychological
incapacity and the psychological disorder itself.
 This is not to mention, but we mention nevertheless for emphasis, that the presentation of
expert proof presupposes a thorough and in-depth assessment of the parties by the psychologist
or expert, for a conclusive diagnosis of a grave, severe and incurable presence of psychological
incapacity. Parenthetically, the Court, at this point, finds it fitting to suggest the inclusion in the
Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable
Marriages, an option for the trial judge to refer the case to a court-appointed psychologist/expert
for an independent assessment and evaluation of the psychological state of the parties. This will
assist the courts, who are no experts in the field of psychology, to arrive at an intelligent and
judicious determination of the case. The rule, however, does not dispense with the parties
prerogative to present their own expert witnesses.

Going back, in the case at bench, the psychological assessment, which we consider as
adequate, produced the findings that both parties are afflicted with personality disordersto
repeat, dependent personality disorder for petitioner, and narcissistic and antisocial personality
disorder for respondent. We note that The Encyclopedia of Mental Health discusses personality
disorders as follows

A group of disorders involving behaviors or traits that are characteristic of a

persons recent and long-term functioning. Patterns of perceiving and thinking are
not usually limited to isolated episodes but are deeply ingrained, inflexible,
maladaptive and severe enough to cause the individual mental stress or anxieties
or to interfere with interpersonal relationships and normal functioning.
Personality disorders are often recognizable by adolescence or earlier, continue
through adulthood and become less obvious in middle or old age. An individual
may have more than one personality disorder at a time.

The common factor among individuals who have personality disorders,

despite a variety of character traits, is the way in which the disorder leads to
pervasive problems in social and occupational adjustment. Some individuals with
personality disorders are perceived by others as overdramatic, paranoid,
obnoxious or even criminal, without an awareness of their behaviors. Such
qualities may lead to trouble getting along with other people, as well as
difficulties in other areas of life and often a tendency to blame others for their
problems. Other individuals with personality disorders are not unpleasant or
difficult to work with but tend to be lonely, isolated or dependent. Such traits can
lead to interpersonal difficulties, reduced self-esteem and dissatisfaction with life.

Causes of Personality Disorders Different mental health viewpoints

propose a variety of causes of personality disorders. These include Freudian,
genetic factors, neurobiologic theories and brain wave activity.

Freudian Sigmund Freud believed that fixation at certain stages of

development led to certain personality types. Thus, some disorders as described
in the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (3d ed., rev.) are
derived from his oral, anal and phallic character types. Demanding and dependent
behavior (dependent and passive-aggressive) was thought to derive from fixation
at the oral stage. Characteristics of obsessionality, rigidity and emotional
aloofness were thought to derive from fixation at the anal stage; fixation at the
phallic stage was thought to lead to shallowness and an inability to engage in
intimate relationships. However, later researchers have found little evidence that
early childhood events or fixation at certain stages of development lead to specific
personality patterns.

Genetic Factors Researchers have found that there may be a genetic

factor involved in the etiology of antisocial and borderline personality disorders;
there is less evidence of inheritance of other personality disorders. Some family,
adoption and twin studies suggest that schizotypal personality may be related to
genetic factors.

Neurobiologic Theories In individuals who have borderline personality,

researchers have found that low cerebrospinal fluid 5-hydroxyindoleacetic acid
(5-HIAA) negatively correlated with measures of aggression and a past history of
suicide attempts. Schizotypal personality has been associated with low platelet
monoamine oxidase (MAO) activity and impaired smooth pursuit eye movement.

Brain Wave Activity Abnormalities in electroencephalograph (EEG) have

been reported in antisocial personality for many years; slow wave is the most
widely reported abnormality. A study of borderline patients reported that 38
percent had at least marginal EEG abnormalities, compared with 19 percent in a
control group.

Types of Disorders According to the American Psychiatric Associations

Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (3d ed., rev., 1987), or
DSM-III-R, personality disorders are categorized into three major clusters:
 Cluster A: Paranoid, schizoid and schizotypal personality disorders.
Individuals who have these disorders often appear to have odd or eccentric habits
and traits.

Cluster B: Antisocial, borderline, histrionic and narcissistic personality

disorders. Individuals who have these disorders often appear overly emotional,
erratic and dramatic.

Cluster C: Avoidant, dependent, obsessive-compulsive and passive-

aggressive personality disorders. Individuals who have these disorders often
appear anxious or fearful.

The DSM-III-R also lists another category, personality disorder not

otherwise specified, that can be used for other specific personality disorders or
for mixed conditions that do not qualify as any of the specific personality
disorders.

Individuals with diagnosable personality disorders usually have long-term

concerns, and thus therapy may be long-term.

Dependent personality disorder is characterized in the following manner

A personality disorder characterized by a pattern of dependent and submissive

behavior. Such individuals usually lack self-esteem and frequently belittle their
capabilities; they fear criticism and are easily hurt by others comments. At times
they actually bring about dominance by others through a quest for overprotection.

Dependent personality disorder usually begins in early adulthood.

Individuals who have this disorder may be unable to make everyday decisions
without advice or reassurance from others, may allow others to make most of their
important decisions (such as where to live), tend to agree with people even when
they believe they are wrong, have difficulty starting projects or doing things on
their own, volunteer to do things that are demeaning in order to get approval from
other people, feel uncomfortable or helpless when alone and are often
preoccupied with fears of being abandoned.
and antisocial personality disorder described, as follows

Characteristics include a consistent pattern of behavior that is intolerant of the

conventional behavioral limitations imposed by a society, an inability to sustain a
job over a period of years, disregard for the rights of others (either through
exploitiveness or criminal behavior), frequent physical fights and, quite
commonly, child or spouse abuse without remorse and a tendency to blame
others. There is often a faade of charm and even sophistication that masks
disregard, lack of remorse for mistreatment of others and the need to control
others.

Although characteristics of this disorder describe criminals, they also may

befit some individuals who are prominent in business or politics whose habits of
self-centeredness and disregard for the rights of others may be hidden prior to a
public scandal.

During the 19th century, this type of personality disorder was referred to as
moral insanity. The term described immoral, guiltless behavior that was not
accompanied by impairments in reasoning.

According to the classification system used in the Diagnostic and

Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (3d ed., rev. 1987), anti-social personality
disorder is one of the four dramatic personality disorders, the others being
borderline, histrionic and narcissistic.

The seriousness of the diagnosis and the gravity of the disorders considered, the Court, in
this case, finds as decisive the psychological evaluation made by the expert witness; and, thus,
rules that the marriage of the parties is null and void on ground of both parties psychological
incapacity. We further consider that the trial court, which had a first-hand view of the witnesses
deportment, arrived at the same conclusion.

Indeed, petitioner, who is afflicted with dependent personality disorder, cannot assume the
essential marital obligations of living together, observing love, respect and fidelity and rendering
help and support, for he is unable to make everyday decisions without advice from others, allows
others to make most of his important decisions (such as where to live), tends to agree with people
even when he believes they are wrong, has difficulty doing things on his own, volunteers to do
things that are demeaning in order to get approval from other people, feels uncomfortable or
helpless when alone and is often preoccupied with fears of being abandoned. As clearly shown in
this case, petitioner followed everything dictated to him by the persons around him. He is
insecure, weak and gullible, has no sense of his identity as a person, has no cohesive self to
speak of, and has no goals and clear direction in life.

Although on a different plane, the same may also be said of the respondent. Her being
afflicted with antisocial personality disorder makes her unable to assume the essential marital
obligations. This finding takes into account her disregard for the rights of others, her abuse,
mistreatment and control of others without remorse, her tendency to blame others, and her
intolerance of the conventional behavioral limitations imposed by society. Moreover, as shown in
this case, respondent is impulsive and domineering; she had no qualms in manipulating petitioner
with her threats of blackmail and of committing suicide.

Both parties being afflicted with grave, severe and incurable psychological incapacity, the
precipitous marriage which they contracted on April 23, 1996 is thus, declared null and void.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition for review on certiorari is

GRANTED. The August 5, 2003 Decision and the January 19, 2004 Resolution of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 71867 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE, and the Decision, dated
July 30, 2001, REINSTATED.

THIRD DIVISION

G.R. No. 166562 March 31, 2009

BENJAMIN G. TING, Petitioner,
vs.
CARMEN M. VELEZ-TING, Respondent.

DECISION

NACHURA, J.:

Before us is a petition for review on certiorari seeking to set aside the November 17, 2003
Amended Decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA), and its December 13, 2004 Resolution2 in
CA-G.R. CV No. 59903. The appellate court, in its assailed decision and resolution, affirmed the
January 9, 1998 Decision3 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 23, Cebu City, declaring
the marriage between petitioner and respondent null and void ab initio pursuant to Article 36 of
the Family Code.4

The facts follow.

Petitioner Benjamin Ting (Benjamin) and respondent Carmen Velez-Ting (Carmen) first met in
1972 while they were classmates in medical school.5 They fell in love, and they were wed on
July 26, 1975 in Cebu City when respondent was already pregnant with their first child.

At first, they resided at Benjamins family home in Maguikay, Mandaue City.6 When their second
child was born, the couple decided to move to Carmens family home in Cebu City.7 In
September 1975, Benjamin passed the medical board examinations8 and thereafter proceeded to
take a residency program to become a surgeon but shifted to anesthesiology after two years. By
1979, Benjamin completed the preceptorship program for the said field9 and, in 1980, he began
working for Velez Hospital, owned by Carmens family, as member of its active staff,10 while
Carmen worked as the hospitals Treasurer.11

The couple begot six (6) children, namely Dennis, born on December 9, 1975; James Louis, born
on August 25, 1977; Agnes Irene, born on April 5, 1981; Charles Laurence, born on July 21,
1986; Myles Vincent, born on July 19, 1988; and Marie Corinne, born on June 16, 1991.12

On October 21, 1993, after being married for more than 18 years to petitioner and while their
youngest child was only two years old, Carmen filed a verified petition before the RTC of Cebu
City praying for the declaration of nullity of their marriage based on Article 36 of the Family
Code. She claimed that Benjamin suffered from psychological incapacity even at the time of the
celebration of their marriage, which, however, only became manifest thereafter. 13

In her complaint, Carmen stated that prior to their marriage, she was already aware that
Benjamin used to drink and gamble occasionally with his friends.14 But after they were married,
petitioner continued to drink regularly and would go home at about midnight or sometimes in the
wee hours of the morning drunk and violent. He would confront and insult respondent,
physically assault her and force her to have sex with him. There were also instances when
Benjamin used his gun and shot the gate of their house.15 Because of his drinking habit,
Benjamins job as anesthesiologist was affected to the point that he often had to refuse to answer
the call of his fellow doctors and to pass the task to other anesthesiologists. Some surgeons even
stopped calling him for his services because they perceived petitioner to be unreliable.
Respondent tried to talk to her husband about the latters drinking problem, but Benjamin refused
to acknowledge the same.16

Carmen also complained that petitioner deliberately refused to give financial support to their
family and would even get angry at her whenever she asked for money for their children. Instead
of providing support, Benjamin would spend his money on drinking and gambling and would
even buy expensive equipment for his hobby.17 He rarely stayed home18 and even neglected his
obligation to his children.19

Aside from this, Benjamin also engaged in compulsive gambling.20 He would gamble two or
three times a week and would borrow from his friends, brothers, or from loan sharks whenever
he had no money. Sometimes, Benjamin would pawn his wifes own jewelry to finance his
gambling.21 There was also an instance when the spouses had to sell their family car and even a
portion of the lot Benjamin inherited from his father just to be able to pay off his gambling
debts.22 Benjamin only stopped going to the casinos in 1986 after he was banned therefrom for
having caused trouble, an act which he said he purposely committed so that he would be banned
from the gambling establishments.23

In sum, Carmens allegations of Benjamins psychological incapacity consisted of the following

manifestations:

1. Benjamins alcoholism, which adversely affected his family relationship and his
profession;

2. Benjamins violent nature brought about by his excessive and regular drinking;

3. His compulsive gambling habit, as a result of which Benjamin found it necessary to

sell the family car twice and the property he inherited from his father in order to pay off
his debts, because he no longer had money to pay the same; and

4. Benjamins irresponsibility and immaturity as shown by his failure and refusal to give
regular financial support to his family.24

In his answer, Benjamin denied being psychologically incapacitated. He maintained that he is a

respectable person, as his peers would confirm. He said that he is an active member of social and
athletic clubs and would drink and gamble only for social reasons and for leisure. He also denied
being a violent person, except when provoked by circumstances.25 As for his alleged failure to
support his family financially, Benjamin claimed that it was Carmen herself who would collect
his professional fees from Velez Hospital when he was still serving there as practicing
anesthesiologist.26 In his testimony, Benjamin also insisted that he gave his family financial
support within his means whenever he could and would only get angry at respondent for lavishly
spending his hard-earned money on unnecessary things.27 He also pointed out that it was he who
often comforted and took care of their children, while Carmen played mahjong with her friends
twice a week.28
During the trial, Carmens testimony regarding Benjamins drinking and gambling habits and
violent behavior was corroborated by Susana Wasawas, who served as nanny to the spouses
children from 1987 to 1992.29 Wasawas stated that she personally witnessed instances when
Benjamin maltreated Carmen even in front of their children.30

Carmen also presented as witness Dr. Pureza Trinidad-Oate, a psychiatrist.31 Instead of the usual
personal interview, however, Dr. Oates evaluation of Benjamin was limited to the transcript of
stenographic notes taken during Benjamins deposition because the latter had already gone to
work as an anesthesiologist in a hospital in South Africa. After reading the transcript of
stenographic notes, Dr. Oate concluded that Benjamins compulsive drinking, compulsive
gambling and physical abuse of respondent are clear indications that petitioner suffers from a
personality disorder.32

To refute Dr. Oates opinion, petitioner presented Dr. Renato D. Obra, a psychiatrist and a
consultant at the Department of Psychiatry in Don Vicente Sotto Memorial Medical Center, as
his expert witness.33 Dr. Obra evaluated Benjamins psychological behavior based on the
transcript of stenographic notes, as well as the psychiatric evaluation report prepared by Dr.
A.J.L. Pentz, a psychiatrist from the University of Pretoria in South Africa, and his (Dr. Obras)
interview with Benjamins brothers.34 Contrary to Dr. Oates findings, Dr. Obra observed that
there is nothing wrong with petitioners personality, considering the latters good relationship
with his fellow doctors and his good track record as anesthesiologist.35

On January 9, 1998, the lower court rendered its Decision36 declaring the marriage between
petitioner and respondent null and void. The RTC gave credence to Dr. Oates findings and the
admissions made by Benjamin in the course of his deposition, and found him to be
psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential obligations of marriage. Specifically,
the trial court found Benjamin an excessive drinker, a compulsive gambler, someone who prefers
his extra-curricular activities to his family, and a person with violent tendencies, which character
traits find root in a personality defect existing even before his marriage to Carmen. The decretal
portion of the decision reads:

WHEREFORE, all the foregoing considered, judgment is hereby rendered declaring the marriage
between plaintiff and defendant null and void ab initio pursuant to Art. 36 of the Family Code. x
xx

xxxx

SO ORDERED.37

Aggrieved, petitioner appealed to the CA. On October 19, 2000, the CA rendered a Decision38
reversing the trial courts ruling. It faulted the trial courts finding, stating that no proof was
adduced to support the conclusion that Benjamin was psychologically incapacitated at the time
he married Carmen since Dr. Oates conclusion was based only on theories and not on
established fact,39 contrary to the guidelines set forth in Santos v. Court of Appeals40 and in Rep.
of the Phils. v. Court of Appeals and Molina.41
Because of this, Carmen filed a motion for reconsideration, arguing that the Molina guidelines
should not be applied to this case since the Molina decision was promulgated only on February
13, 1997, or more than five years after she had filed her petition with the RTC.42 She claimed that
the Molina ruling could not be made to apply retroactively, as it would run counter to the
principle of stare decisis. Initially, the CA denied the motion for reconsideration for having been
filed beyond the prescribed period. Respondent thereafter filed a manifestation explaining
compliance with the prescriptive period but the same was likewise denied for lack of merit.
Undaunted, respondent filed a petition for certiorari43 with this Court. In a Resolution44 dated
March 5, 2003, this Court granted the petition and directed the CA to resolve Carmens motion
for reconsideration.45 On review, the CA decided to reconsider its previous ruling. Thus, on
November 17, 2003, it issued an Amended Decision46 reversing its first ruling and sustaining the
trial courts decision.47

A motion for reconsideration was filed, this time by Benjamin, but the same was denied by the
CA in its December 13, 2004 Resolution.48

Hence, this petition.

For our resolution are the following issues:

I. Whether the CA violated the rule on stare decisis when it refused to follow the
guidelines set forth under the Santos and Molina cases;

II. Whether the CA correctly ruled that the requirement of proof of psychological
incapacity for the declaration of absolute nullity of marriage based on Article 36 of the
Family Code has been liberalized; and

III. Whether the CAs decision declaring the marriage between petitioner and respondent
null and void [is] in accordance with law and jurisprudence.

We find merit in the petition.

I. On the issue of stare decisis.

The principle of stare decisis enjoins adherence by lower courts to doctrinal rules established by
this Court in its final decisions. It is based on the principle that once a question of law has been
examined and decided, it should be deemed settled and closed to further argument.49 Basically, it
is a bar to any attempt to relitigate the same issues,50 necessary for two simple reasons: economy
and stability. In our jurisdiction, the principle is entrenched in Article 8 of the Civil Code.51

This doctrine of adherence to precedents or stare decisis was applied by the English courts and
was later adopted by the United States. Associate Justice (now Chief Justice) Reynato S. Punos
discussion on the historical development of this legal principle in his dissenting opinion in
Lambino v. Commission on Elections52 is enlightening:
The latin phrase stare decisis et non quieta movere means "stand by the thing and do not disturb
the calm." The doctrine started with the English Courts. Blackstone observed that at the
beginning of the 18th century, "it is an established rule to abide by former precedents where the
same points come again in litigation." As the rule evolved, early limits to its application were
recognized: (1) it would not be followed if it were "plainly unreasonable"; (2) where courts of
equal authority developed conflicting decisions; and, (3) the binding force of the decision was
the "actual principle or principles necessary for the decision; not the words or reasoning used to
reach the decision."

The doctrine migrated to the United States. It was recognized by the framers of the U.S.
Constitution. According to Hamilton, "strict rules and precedents" are necessary to prevent
"arbitrary discretion in the courts." Madison agreed but stressed that "x x x once the precedent
ventures into the realm of altering or repealing the law, it should be rejected." Prof. Consovoy
well noted that Hamilton and Madison "disagree about the countervailing policy considerations
that would allow a judge to abandon a precedent." He added that their ideas "reveal a deep
internal conflict between the concreteness required by the rule of law and the flexibility
demanded in error correction. It is this internal conflict that the Supreme Court has attempted to
deal with for over two centuries."

Indeed, two centuries of American case law will confirm Prof. Consovoy's observation although
stare decisis developed its own life in the United States. Two strains of stare decisis have been
isolated by legal scholars. The first, known as vertical stare decisis deals with the duty of lower
courts to apply the decisions of the higher courts to cases involving the same facts. The second,
known as horizontal stare decisis requires that high courts must follow its own precedents. Prof.
Consovoy correctly observes that vertical stare decisis has been viewed as an obligation, while
horizontal stare decisis, has been viewed as a policy, imposing choice but not a command.
Indeed, stare decisis is not one of the precepts set in stone in our Constitution.

It is also instructive to distinguish the two kinds of horizontal stare decisis constitutional stare
decisis and statutory stare decisis. Constitutional stare decisis involves judicial interpretations of
the Constitution while statutory stare decisis involves interpretations of statutes. The distinction
is important for courts enjoy more flexibility in refusing to apply stare decisis in constitutional
litigations. Justice Brandeis' view on the binding effect of the doctrine in constitutional litigations
still holds sway today. In soothing prose, Brandeis stated: "Stare decisis is not . . . a universal and
inexorable command. The rule of stare decisis is not inflexible. Whether it shall be followed or
departed from, is a question entirely within the discretion of the court, which is again called upon
to consider a question once decided." In the same vein, the venerable Justice Frankfurter opined:
"the ultimate touchstone of constitutionality is the Constitution itself and not what we have said
about it." In contrast, the application of stare decisis on judicial interpretation of statutes is more
inflexible. As Justice Stevens explains: "after a statute has been construed, either by this Court or
by a consistent course of decision by other federal judges and agencies, it acquires a meaning
that should be as clear as if the judicial gloss had been drafted by the Congress itself." This
stance reflects both respect for Congress' role and the need to preserve the courts' limited
resources.
In general, courts follow the stare decisis rule for an ensemble of reasons, viz.: (1) it legitimizes
judicial institutions; (2) it promotes judicial economy; and, (3) it allows for predictability.
Contrariwise, courts refuse to be bound by the stare decisis rule where (1) its application
perpetuates illegitimate and unconstitutional holdings; (2) it cannot accommodate changing
social and political understandings; (3) it leaves the power to overturn bad constitutional law
solely in the hands of Congress; and, (4) activist judges can dictate the policy for future courts
while judges that respect stare decisis are stuck agreeing with them.

In its 200-year history, the U.S. Supreme Court has refused to follow the stare decisis rule and
reversed its decisions in 192 cases. The most famous of these reversals is Brown v. Board of
Education which junked Plessy v. Ferguson's "separate but equal doctrine." Plessy upheld as
constitutional a state law requirement that races be segregated on public transportation. In
Brown, the U.S. Supreme Court, unanimously held that "separate . . . is inherently unequal."
Thus, by freeing itself from the shackles of stare decisis, the U.S. Supreme Court freed the
colored Americans from the chains of inequality. In the Philippine setting, this Court has likewise
refused to be straitjacketed by the stare decisis rule in order to promote public welfare. In La
Bugal-B'laan Tribal Association, Inc. v. Ramos, we reversed our original ruling that certain
provisions of the Mining Law are unconstitutional. Similarly, in Secretary of Justice v. Lantion,
we overturned our first ruling and held, on motion for reconsideration, that a private respondent
is bereft of the right to notice and hearing during the evaluation stage of the extradition process.

An examination of decisions on stare decisis in major countries will show that courts are agreed
on the factors that should be considered before overturning prior rulings. These are workability,
reliance, intervening developments in the law and changes in fact. In addition, courts put in the
balance the following determinants: closeness of the voting, age of the prior decision and its
merits.

The leading case in deciding whether a court should follow the stare decisis rule in constitutional
litigations is Planned Parenthood v. Casey. It established a 4-pronged test. The court should (1)
determine whether the rule has proved to be intolerable simply in defying practical workability;
(2) consider whether the rule is subject to a kind of reliance that would lend a special hardship to
the consequences of overruling and add inequity to the cost of repudiation; (3) determine
whether related principles of law have so far developed as to have the old rule no more than a
remnant of an abandoned doctrine; and, (4) find out whether facts have so changed or come to be
seen differently, as to have robbed the old rule of significant application or justification.53

To be forthright, respondents argument that the doctrinal guidelines prescribed in Santos and
Molina should not be applied retroactively for being contrary to the principle of stare decisis is
no longer new. The same argument was also raised but was struck down in Pesca v. Pesca,54 and
again in Antonio v. Reyes.55 In these cases, we explained that the interpretation or construction of
a law by courts constitutes a part of the law as of the date the statute is enacted. It is only when a
prior ruling of this Court is overruled, and a different view is adopted, that the new doctrine may
have to be applied prospectively in favor of parties who have relied on the old doctrine and have
acted in good faith, in accordance therewith under the familiar rule of "lex prospicit, non
respicit."
II. On liberalizing the required proof for the declaration of nullity of marriage under Article 36.

Now, petitioner wants to know if we have abandoned the Molina doctrine.

We have not.

In Edward Kenneth Ngo Te v. Rowena Ong Gutierrez Yu-Te,56 we declared that, in hindsight, it
may have been inappropriate for the Court to impose a rigid set of rules, as the one in Molina, in
resolving all cases of psychological incapacity. We said that instead of serving as a guideline,
Molina unintentionally became a straightjacket, forcing all cases involving psychological
incapacity to fit into and be bound by it, which is not only contrary to the intention of the law but
unrealistic as well because, with respect to psychological incapacity, no case can be considered
as on "all fours" with another.57

By the very nature of cases involving the application of Article 36, it is logical and
understandable to give weight to the expert opinions furnished by psychologists regarding the
psychological temperament of parties in order to determine the root cause, juridical antecedence,
gravity and incurability of the psychological incapacity. However, such opinions, while highly
advisable, are not conditions sine qua non in granting petitions for declaration of nullity of
marriage.58 At best, courts must treat such opinions as decisive but not indispensable evidence in
determining the merits of a given case. In fact, if the totality of evidence presented is enough to
sustain a finding of psychological incapacity, then actual medical or psychological examination
of the person concerned need not be resorted to.59 The trial court, as in any other given case
presented before it, must always base its decision not solely on the expert opinions furnished by
the parties but also on the totality of evidence adduced in the course of the proceedings.

It was for this reason that we found it necessary to emphasize in Ngo Te that each case involving
the application of Article 36 must be treated distinctly and judged not on the basis of a priori
assumptions, predilections or generalizations but according to its own attendant facts. Courts
should interpret the provision on a case-to-case basis, guided by experience, the findings of
experts and researchers in psychological disciplines, and by decisions of church tribunals.

Far from abandoning Molina, we simply suggested the relaxation of the stringent requirements
set forth therein, cognizant of the explanation given by the Committee on the Revision of the
Rules on the rationale of the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and
Annulment of Voidable Marriages (A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC), viz.:

To require the petitioner to allege in the petition the particular root cause of the psychological
incapacity and to attach thereto the verified written report of an accredited psychologist or
psychiatrist have proved to be too expensive for the parties. They adversely affect access to
justice o poor litigants. It is also a fact that there are provinces where these experts are not
available. Thus, the Committee deemed it necessary to relax this stringent requirement
enunciated in the Molina Case. The need for the examination of a party or parties by a
psychiatrist or clinical psychologist and the presentation of psychiatric experts shall now be
determined by the court during the pre-trial conference.60
But where, as in this case, the parties had the full opportunity to present professional and expert
opinions of psychiatrists tracing the root cause, gravity and incurability of a partys alleged
psychological incapacity, then such expert opinion should be presented and, accordingly, be
weighed by the court in deciding whether to grant a petition for nullity of marriage.

III. On petitioners psychological incapacity.

Coming now to the main issue, we find the totality of evidence adduced by respondent
insufficient to prove that petitioner is psychologically unfit to discharge the duties expected of
him as a husband, and more particularly, that he suffered from such psychological incapacity as
of the date of the marriage eighteen (18) years ago. Accordingly, we reverse the trial courts and
the appellate courts rulings declaring the marriage between petitioner and respondent null and
void ab initio.

The intendment of the law has been to confine the application of Article 36 to the most serious
cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give
meaning and significance to the marriage.61 The psychological illness that must have afflicted a
party at the inception of the marriage should be a malady so grave and permanent as to deprive
one of awareness of the duties and responsibilities of the matrimonial bond he or she is about to
assume.621avvphi1.zw+

In this case, respondent failed to prove that petitioners "defects" were present at the time of the
celebration of their marriage. She merely cited that prior to their marriage, she already knew that
petitioner would occasionally drink and gamble with his friends; but such statement, by itself, is
insufficient to prove any pre-existing psychological defect on the part of her husband. Neither
did the evidence adduced prove such "defects" to be incurable.

The evaluation of the two psychiatrists should have been the decisive evidence in determining
whether to declare the marriage between the parties null and void. Sadly, however, we are not
convinced that the opinions provided by these experts strengthened respondents allegation of
psychological incapacity. The two experts provided diametrically contradicting psychological
evaluations: Dr. Oate testified that petitioners behavior is a positive indication of a personality
disorder,63 while Dr. Obra maintained that there is nothing wrong with petitioners personality.
Moreover, there appears to be greater weight in Dr. Obras opinion because, aside from analyzing
the transcript of Benjamins deposition similar to what Dr. Oate did, Dr. Obra also took into
consideration the psychological evaluation report furnished by another psychiatrist in South
Africa who personally examined Benjamin, as well as his (Dr. Obras) personal interview with
Benjamins brothers.64 Logically, therefore, the balance tilts in favor of Dr. Obras findings.

Lest it be misunderstood, we are not condoning petitioners drinking and gambling problems, or
his violent outbursts against his wife. There is no valid excuse to justify such a behavior.
Petitioner must remember that he owes love, respect, and fidelity to his spouse as much as the
latter owes the same to him. Unfortunately, this court finds respondents testimony, as well as the
totality of evidence presented by the respondent, to be too inadequate to declare him
psychologically unfit pursuant to Article 36.
It should be remembered that the presumption is always in favor of the validity of marriage.
Semper praesumitur pro matrimonio.65 In this case, the presumption has not been amply rebutted
and must, perforce, prevail.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition for review on certiorari is GRANTED. The
November 17, 2003 Amended Decision and the December 13, 2004 Resolution of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 59903 are accordingly REVERSED and SET ASIDE.

SO ORDERED.

Republic of the Philippines

Supreme Court

Manila

SECOND DIVISION

CYNTHIA E. YAMBAO, G.R. No. 184063

Petitioner, Present:

- versus - CARPIO, J.,

REPUBLIC OF THE Chairperson,

PHILIPPINES and PATRICIO E.
YAMBAO, NACHURA,

Respondents. PERALTA,

ABAD, and

MENDOZA, JJ.

Promulgated:

January 24, 2011

x---------------------------------------x

DECISION

NACHURA, J.:
Before this Court is yet another tale of marital woe.

Petitioner Cynthia E. Yambao (petitioner) is assailing the Decision[1] dated April 16, 2008 and
the Resolution[2] dated August 4, 2008 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 89262.
The CA affirmed the decision[3] of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati City, which denied
petitioners Petition[4] for the annulment of her marriage to respondent Patricio E. Yambao
(respondent) on the ground of psychological incapacity.

Petitioner and respondent were married on December 21, 1968 at the Philamlife Church in
Quezon City.[5][6] before the RTC, Makati City, praying that the marriage be declared null and
void by reason of respondents psychological incapacity, pursuant to Article 36 of the Family
Code.[7] On July 11, 2003, after 35 years of marriage, petitioner filed a Petition

In her petition before the RTC, petitioner narrated that, since the beginning, her and respondents
married life had been marred by bickering, quarrels, and recrimination due to the latters inability
to comply with the essential obligations of married life.[8]

Petitioner averred that through all the years of their married life, she was the only one who
earned a living and took care of the children. Respondent, she alleged, did nothing but eat and
sleep all day, and spend time with friends. When respondent would find a job, he would not be
able to stay in it for long. Likewise, respondent went into several business ventures, which all
failed. In addition, respondent loved to gamble and would gamble away whatever money would
come his way.

Petitioner also claimed that, when their children were babies, respondent did not even help to
change their diapers or feed them, even while petitioner was recovering from her caesarean
operation, proffering the excuse that he knew nothing about children.[9] Later, respondent
became insecure and jealous and would get mad every time he would see petitioner talking to
other people, even to her relatives. When respondent started threatening to kill petitioner, she
decided to leave the conjugal abode and live separately from him.[10] She then consulted a
psychiatrist who concluded that respondent was indeed psychologically incapacitated to comply
with the essential marital obligations.[11]

In his Answer, respondent denied that he has refused to work. He claimed that he had been trying
to find a decent job, but was always unable to because of his old age and lack of qualifications.
He also claimed that he did not stay long in the jobs he had because the same could not support
the needs of his family, and yielded benefits that were not commensurate to the efforts he
exerted. He had ventured into small businesses but they failed due to various economic crises.
Respondent further claimed that he was not, in fact, contented with living with petitioners
relatives since his every move was being watched with eagle eyes.[12]

Respondent denied that he gambled, positing that since he had no income, he would not have the
funds for such activity. He alleged that even without a steady source of income, he still shared in
the payment of the amortization of their house in BF Homes, Paraaque City.
As to the care of their children, respondent countered that no fault should be attributed to him
because that is the duty of the household help.[13]

Respondent also denied that he threatened to kill petitioner, considering that there was never any
evidence that he had ever harmed or inflicted physical injury on petitioner to justify the latter
having a nervous breakdown.[14]

He further alleged that he never consulted any psychiatrist, and denied that he was
psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential obligations of marriage.[15]

On February 9, 2007, the RTC rendered a decision[16] dismissing the petition for lack of merit.
The RTC held that petitioners evidence failed to support her argument that respondent was
totally unaware of and incapacitated to perform his marital obligations such that the marriage
was void from the beginning. The court said that, even as petitioner claimed to be unhappy in the
marriage, it is incontrovertible that the union lasted for over thirty years and the parties were able
to raise three children into adulthood without suffering any major parenting problems. The court
also noted that respondent was faithful to petitioner and never physically abused her. Likewise,
when the parties lived with petitioners parents, respondent got along well enough with her
family.[17]

The RTC recognized that respondent did indeed have many faults, such as his indolence and utter
irresponsibility. However, the RTC said, respondents failure to find decent work was due to his
not having obtained a college degree and his lack of other qualifications. Likewise, respondents
failure in business could not be entirely attributed to him, since petitioner was a business partner
in some of these ventures.[18]

The RTC also rejected the supposed negative effect of respondents Dependent Personality
Disorder. The RTC said that, although the evidence tended to show that respondent would unduly
rely upon petitioner to earn a living for the family, there was no evidence to show that the latter
resented such imposition or suffered with the additional financial burdens passed to her by her
husband. On the contrary, the RTC averred that, despite a supposedly horrible married life,
petitioner was able to rise in the ranks in her company and buy properties with hardly any help
from respondent.[19]

The RTC concluded that while respondent might have been deficient in providing financial
support, his presence, companionship, and love allowed petitioner to accomplish many things.
Thus, respondent could be relied on for love, fidelity, and moral support, which are obligations
expected of a spouse under Article 68 of the Family Code.[20]

Lastly, the RTC rejected petitioners claim that she suffered through respondents overbearing
jealousy. It found that respondent only became jealous when he thought that petitioner was
cheating on him. The RTC determined that jealousy was not a character trait that contributed to
respondents psychological dysfunction; much less did it amount to psychological or mental
torture on petitioner.[21] Thus, the RTC concluded that the parties might have indeed entered
into a bad marriage, but this did not in itself prove that the marriage did not exist, given the 30
years they remained together through the various ups and downs of their volatile relationship.
[22]

Petitioners motion for reconsideration was denied on May 21, 2007.[23] Petitioner subsequently
filed a Notice of Appeal,[24] which was given due course by the RTC in an Order dated June 8,
2007.[25] She then appealed to the CA.

In a Decision[26] dated April 16, 2008, the CA affirmed the RTCs decision. The CA held that
petitioner failed to show that respondent was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the
essential obligations of marriage. It pointed out that respondent exerted efforts to find a source of
income to support his family. However, his failure to find a suitable job and the failure of his
business ventures were not mental but physical defects and, hence, could not be considered
psychological incapacity as contemplated under the law.

The CA also found that petitioners claims that she lived in misery during the marriage and that
respondent failed to keep his promises to her were not duly established. The CA held that the fact
that the parties lived together for 35 years and raised three children well, and the fact that
respondent never physically abused petitioner belied the formers psychological incapacity. The
CA also held that respondents refusal to care for the children was not psychological incapacity
but merely constituted refusal to perform the task, which is not equivalent to an incapacity or
inability.[27]

The appellate court also rejected petitioners allegation of respondents unbearable jealousy. It
said that the same must be shown as a manifestation of a disordered personality which would
make respondent completely unable to discharge the essential obligations of the marital state.[28]
The CA averred that a jealous attitude simply evinced respondents love for his wife, whom he
could not bear to lose to another man. Meanwhile, the CA construed the purported threats to kill
petitioner as emotional immaturity and not psychological incapacity.[29]

Lastly, the CA found the report of expert witness Dr. Edgardo Juan Tolentino (Dr. Tolentino) to
be unsupported by sufficient evidence since the findings therein were not corroborated by any
other witness. Moreover, the CA said, neither the report nor petitioners testimony established
that respondents psychological condition was grave enough to bring about the inability of the
latter to assume the essential obligations of marriage, so that the same was medically permanent
or incurable.[30]

Petitioners subsequent motion for reconsideration was denied in a resolution dated August 4,
2008.[31]

Petitioner is now before this Court in a last ditch effort to gain freedom from her marriage to
respondent. In her petition for review, petitioner submits the following assignment of errors:

I
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN HOLDING THAT PETITIONER
FAILED TO SHOW THAT RESPONDENT WAS PSYCHOLOGICALLY INCAPACITATED
TO COMPLY WITH THE ESSENTIAL OBLIGATIONS OF MARRIAGE

II

THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN HOLDING THAT RESPONDENT

WAS MERELY REFUSING TO COMPLY WITH THE ESSENTIAL OBLIGATIONS OF
MARRIAGE AND NOT DOWNRIGHT INCAPACITATED OR UNABLE

III

THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE

RESPONDENTS UNBEARABLE JEALOUSY CANNOT BE CONSIDERED A
CHARACTER TRAIT CONTRIBUTING TO PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY

IV

THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THERE WAS NO

SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE TO ESTABLISH THAT THE PSYCHOLOGICAL CONDITION OF
RESPONDENT WAS GRAVE ENOUGH, INCURABLE AND HAD NO ANTECEDENCE
(sic)[32]

Petitioner argues that respondents Dependent Personality Disorder was sufficiently established
by her testimony and that of her sister, which testimonies were both credible considering that
they have personal knowledge of the circumstances prior to and during the parties marriage. On
the other hand, respondents evidence consisted merely of his sole testimony, which were self-
serving and full of inconsistencies.[33] Petitioner points out that what the CA characterized as
respondents efforts in finding jobs were merely the result of short-lived bursts of industry,
failing to note that the jobs were few and very far between.[34] The rest of the time, respondent
did nothing but eat, sleep, and party with his friends.[35] Petitioner also alleges that respondent
was given the opportunity to finish his studies, first by his parents, and then by petitioner herself,
but he never took up these offers.[36]

Petitioner also highlighted respondents failure to earn his keep, participate in household chores,
or take care of their children. She argues that respondent had the obligation to help and
contribute to all the needs of the family, whether the same be in the form of material or physical
support.[37]

Petitioner also refutes the CAs conclusion that respondent was merely refusing to attend to his
familys needs. She insists that respondents inability is due to a psychological affliction, i.e.,
Dependent Personality Disorder, as attested to by the expert witness she presented during trial.
[38] Part of this same disorder, according to petitioner, is respondents jealous tendencies, which
the CA belittled and attributed to emotional immaturity.[39]
Finally, petitioner argues against the CAs finding that respondents laziness and dependence
could not be characterized as inability but just plain refusal. Petitioner contends that she has
complied with the guidelines laid down by the Court in Republic v. Court of Appeals and Molina.
She further contends that the framers of the Family Code never intended to give such a
suppressed definition of psychological incapacity, and, in fact, declared that a restrictive
definition would limit the applicability of the provision.[40] Moreover, she asserts that she has
proven that respondents unbearable jealousy and Dependent Personality Disorder manifested
themselves even before the marriage of the parties, although not in the same degree as when they
were already married.[41]

The petition has no merit and, perforce, must be denied.

Article 36 of the Family Code states:

Art. 36. A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was
psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations of marriage, shall
likewise be void even if such incapacity becomes manifest only after its solemnization.

Preliminarily, the Court reiterates its recent pronouncement that each case for declaration of
nullity under the foregoing provision must be judged, not on the basis of a priori assumptions,
predilections, or generalizations, but according to its own facts. And, to repeat for emphasis,
courts should interpret the provision on a case-to-case basis, guided by experience, the findings
of experts and researchers in psychological disciplines, and by decisions of church tribunals.[42]
Judicial understanding of psychological incapacity may be informed by evolving standards,
taking into account the particulars of each case, current trends in psychological and even
canonical thought, and experience.[43]

While the Court has not abandoned the standard set in Molina,[44] the Court has reiterated the
tenet that the factual milieu of each case must be treated as distinct and, as such, each case must
be decided based on its own set of facts.

In Santos v. Court of Appeals,[45] the Court held that psychological incapacity must be
characterized by (a) gravity (b) juridical antecedence, and (c) incurability. These guidelines do
not require that a physician examine the person to be declared psychologically incapacitated. In
fact, the root cause may be medically or clinically identified.[46] What is important is the
presence of evidence that can adequately establish the party's psychological condition. If the
totality of evidence presented is enough to sustain a finding of psychological incapacity, then
actual medical examination of the person concerned need not be resorted to.[47]

Hence, the issue in this case can be summed up, thus: Does the totality of petitioners evidence
establish respondents psychological incapacity to perform the essential obligations of marriage?

The Court holds that it does not.

The intendment of the law has been to confine the application of Article 36 to the most serious
cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give
meaning and significance to the marriage.[48] Thus, for a marriage to be annulled under Article
36 of the Family Code, the psychologically incapacitated spouse must be shown to suffer no less
than a mental (not physical) incapacity that causes him or her to be truly incognitive of the basic
marital covenants.[49] It is a malady so grave and so permanent as to deprive one of awareness
of the duties and responsibilities of the matrimonial bond one is about to assume.[50]

In this case, there is no showing that respondent was suffering from a psychological condition so
severe that he was unaware of his obligations to his wife and family. On the contrary,
respondents efforts, though few and far between they may be, showed an understanding of his
duty to provide for his family, albeit he did not meet with much success. Whether his failure was
brought about by his own indolence or irresponsibility, or by some other external factors, is not
relevant. What is clear is that respondent, in showing an awareness to provide for his family,
even with his many failings, does not suffer from psychological incapacity.

Article 36 contemplates incapacity or inability to take cognizance of and to assume basic marital
obligations and not merely difficulty, refusal, or neglect in the performance of marital obligations
or ill will.[51] This incapacity consists of the following: (a) a true inability to commit oneself to
the essentials of marriage; (b) this inability to commit oneself must refer to the essential
obligations of marriage: the conjugal act, the community of life and love, the rendering of mutual
help, the procreation and education of offspring; and (c) the inability must be tantamount to a
psychological abnormality.[52] It is not enough to prove that a spouse failed to meet his
responsibility and duty as a married person; it is essential that he must be shown to be incapable
of doing so due to some psychological illness.[53]

That respondent, according to petitioner, lack[ed] effective sense of rational judgment and
responsibility[54] does not mean he is incapable to meet his marital obligations. His refusal to
help care for the children, his neglect for his business ventures, and his alleged unbearable
jealousy may indicate some emotional turmoil or mental difficulty, but none have been shown to
amount to a psychological abnormality.

Moreover, even assuming that respondents faults amount to psychological incapacity, it has not
been established that the same existed at the time of the celebration of the marriage.

In his psychological report,[55] Dr. Tolentino merely said, [b]ecause ones personality or
character is formed early in life, it has a clear ANTECEDENT and it has an enduring pattern of
inner experience that deviates from the expectations of the individuals culture,[56] without
explaining this antecedent. Even petitioner, in her allegations, never explained how the alleged
psychological incapacity manifested itself prior to or at the time of the celebration of their
marriage.

Likewise militating against petitioners cause is the finding of the trial court, and the same was
affirmed by the CA, that respondent never committed infidelity or physically abused petitioner or
their children. In fact, considering that the children lived with both parents, it is safe to assume
that both made an impact in the childrens upbringing. And still, as found by the RTC and the
CA, the parties were able to raise three children into adulthood without any major parenting
problems.[57] Such fact could hardly support a proposition that the parties marriage is a nullity.

Respondent may not have turned out to be the ideal husband, or may have failed to meet
petitioners exacting standards. Yet this Court finds it impossible to believe that, as petitioner
alleges, there was nothing but heartache and strife in their over 35 years (prior to filing the
petition for declaration of nullity) of marriage.

To be sure, respondent, perhaps with a little more effort on his part, could have been more
helpful and could have made life that much easier for his wife. The fact that he did not, however,
does not mean that he is psychologically incapacitated to discharge his marital obligations, as to
give the Court a reason to declare the marriage null and void.

Certainly, the marriage was beset by difficulties, or as petitioner puts it, marred by bickerings,
quarrels, and recrimination. It is a fact, however, that all marriages suffer through the same
trials at one point or another, with some going through more rough patches than others. The
Court concedes that petitioner and respondents marriage, as characterized by the former, may
indeed be problematic, even tumultuous. However, that they had gone through 35 years together
as husband and wife is an indication that the parties can, should they choose to do so, work
through their problems.

WHEREFORE, the foregoing premises considered, the petition is DENIED. The Decision
dated April 16, 2008 and the Resolution dated August 4, 2008 of the Court of Appeals in CA-
G.R. CV No. 89262 are AFFIRMED.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

THIRD DIVISION

G.R. No. 94053 March 17, 1993

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,

vs.
GREGORIO NOLASCO, respondent.

The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.

Warloo G. Cardenal for respondent.

RESOLUTION
FELICIANO, J.:

On 5 August 1988, respondent Gregorio Nolasco filed before the Regional Trial Court of
Antique, Branch 10, a petition for the declaration of presumptive death of his wife Janet Monica
Parker, invoking Article 41 of the Family Code. The petition prayed that respondent's wife be
declared presumptively dead or, in the alternative, that the marriage be declared null and void. 1

The Republic of the Philippines opposed the petition through the Provincial Prosecutor of
Antique who had been deputized to assist the Solicitor-General in the instant case. The Republic
argued, first, that Nolasco did not possess a "well-founded belief that the absent spouse was
already dead," 2 and second, Nolasco's attempt to have his marriage annulled in the same
proceeding was a "cunning attempt" to circumvent the law on marriage. 3

During trial, respondent Nolasco testified that he was a seaman and that he had first met Janet
Monica Parker, a British subject, in a bar in England during one of his ship's port calls. From that
chance meeting onwards, Janet Monica Parker lived with respondent Nolasco on his ship for six
(6) months until they returned to respondent's hometown of San Jose, Antique on 19 November
1980 after his seaman's contract expired. On 15 January 1982, respondent married Janet Monica
Parker in San Jose, Antique, in Catholic rites officiated by Fr. Henry van Tilborg in the Cathedral
of San Jose.

Respondent Nolasco further testified that after the marriage celebration, he obtained another
employment contract as a seaman and left his wife with his parents in San Jose, Antique.
Sometime in January 1983, while working overseas, respondent received a letter from his mother
informing him that Janet Monica had given birth to his son. The same letter informed him that
Janet Monica had left Antique. Respondent claimed he then immediately asked permission to
leave his ship to return home. He arrived in Antique in November 1983.

Respondent further testified that his efforts to look for her himself whenever his ship docked in
England proved fruitless. He also stated that all the letters he had sent to his missing spouse at
No. 38 Ravena Road, Allerton, Liverpool, England, the address of the bar where he and Janet
Monica first met, were all returned to him. He also claimed that he inquired from among friends
but they too had no news of Janet Monica.

On cross-examination, respondent stated that he had lived with and later married Janet Monica
Parker despite his lack of knowledge as to her family background. He insisted that his wife
continued to refuse to give him such information even after they were married. He also testified
that he did not report the matter of Janet Monica's disappearance to the Philippine government
authorities.

Respondent Nolasco presented his mother, Alicia Nolasco, as his witness. She testified that her
daughter-in-law Janet Monica had expressed a desire to return to England even before she had
given birth to Gerry Nolasco on 7 December 1982. When asked why her daughter-in-law might
have wished to leave Antique, respondent's mother replied that Janet Monica never got used to
the rural way of life in San Jose, Antique. Alicia Nolasco also said that she had tried to dissuade
Janet Monica from leaving as she had given birth to her son just fifteen days before, but when
she (Alicia) failed to do so, she gave Janet Monica P22,000.00 for her expenses before she left
on 22 December 1982 for England. She further claimed that she had no information as to the
missing person's present whereabouts.

The trial court granted Nolasco's petition in a Judgment dated 12 October 1988 the dispositive
portion of which reads:

Wherefore, under Article 41, paragraph 2 of the Family Code of the Philippines
(Executive Order No. 209, July 6, 1987, as amended by Executive Order No. 227,
July 17, 1987) this Court hereby declares as presumptively dead Janet Monica
Parker Nolasco, without prejudice to her reappearance. 4

The Republic appealed to the Court of Appeals contending that the trial court erred in declaring
Janet Monica Parker presumptively dead because respondent Nolasco had failed to show that
there existed a well founded belief for such declaration.

The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's decision, holding that respondent had sufficiently
established a basis to form a belief that his absent spouse had already died.

The Republic, through the Solicitor-General, is now before this Court on a Petition for Review
where the following allegations are made:

1. The Court of Appeals erred in affirming the trial court's finding that there
existed a well-founded belief on the part of Nolasco that Janet Monica Parker was
already dead; and

2. The Court of Appeals erred in affirming the trial Court's declaration that the
petition was a proper case of the declaration of presumptive death under Article
41, Family Code. 5

The issue before this Court, as formulated by petitioner is "[w]hether or not Nolasco has a well-
founded belief that his wife is already dead." 6

The present case was filed before the trial court pursuant to Article 41 of the Family Code which
provides that:

Art. 41. A marriage contracted by any person during the subsistence of a previous
marriage shall be null and void, unless before the celebration of the subsequent
marriage, the prior spouse had been absent for four consecutive years and the
spouse present had a well-founded belief that the absent spouse was already
dead. In case of disappearance where there is danger of death under the
circumstances set forth in the provision of Article 391 of the Civil Code, an
absence of only two years shall be sufficient.

For the purpose of contracting the subsequent marriage under the preceding
paragraph, the spouse present must institute a summary proceeding as provided in
 this Code for the declaration of presumptive death of the absentee, without
prejudice to the effect of reappearance of the absent spouse. (Emphasis supplied).

When Article 41 is compared with the old provision of the Civil Code, which it superseded, 7 the
following crucial differences emerge. Under Article 41, the time required for the presumption to
arise has been shortened to four (4) years; however, there is need for a judicial declaration of
presumptive death to enable the spouse present to remarry. 8 Also, Article 41 of the Family Code
imposes a stricter standard than the Civil Code: Article 83 of the Civil Code merely requires
either that there be no news that such absentee is still alive; or the absentee is generally
considered to be dead and believed to be so by the spouse present, or is presumed dead under
Article 390 and 391 of the Civil Code. 9 The Family Code, upon the other hand, prescribes as
"well founded belief" that the absentee is already dead before a petition for declaration of
presumptive death can be granted.

As pointed out by the Solicitor-General, there are four (4) requisites for the declaration of
presumptive death under Article 41 of the Family Code:

1. That the absent spouse has been missing for four consecutive years, or two
consecutive years if the disappearance occurred where there is danger of death
under the circumstances laid down in Article 391, Civil Code;

2. That the present spouse wishes to remarry;

3. That the present spouse has a well-founded belief that the absentee is dead; and

4. That the present spouse files a summary proceeding for the declaration of
presumptive death of the absentee. 10

Respondent naturally asserts that he had complied with all these requirements. 11

Petitioner's argument, upon the other hand, boils down to this: that respondent failed to prove
that he had complied with the third requirement, i.e., the existence of a "well-founded belief" that
the absent spouse is already dead.

The Court believes that respondent Nolasco failed to conduct a search for his missing wife with
such diligence as to give rise to a "well-founded belief" that she is dead.

United States v. Biasbas, 12 is instructive as to degree of diligence required in searching for a

missing spouse. In that case, defendant Macario Biasbas was charged with the crime of bigamy.
He set-up the defense of a good faith belief that his first wife had already died. The Court held
that defendant had not exercised due diligence to ascertain the whereabouts of his first wife,
noting that:

While the defendant testified that he had made inquiries concerning the
whereabouts of his wife, he fails to state of whom he made such inquiries. He did
not even write to the parents of his first wife, who lived in the Province of
 Pampanga, for the purpose of securing information concerning her whereabouts.
He admits that he had a suspicion only that his first wife was dead. He admits that
the only basis of his suspicion was the fact that she had been absent. . . . 13

In the case at bar, the Court considers that the investigation allegedly conducted by respondent in
his attempt to ascertain Janet Monica Parker's whereabouts is too sketchy to form the basis of a
reasonable or well-founded belief that she was already dead. When he arrived in San Jose,
Antique after learning of Janet Monica's departure, instead of seeking the help of local
authorities or of the British Embassy, 14 he secured another seaman's contract and went to
London, a vast city of many millions of inhabitants, to look for her there.

Q After arriving here in San Jose, Antique, did you exert efforts to
inquire the whereabouts of your wife?

A Yes, Sir.

Court:

How did you do that?

A I secured another contract with the ship and we had a trip to

London and I went to London to look for her I could not find her
(sic). 15 (Emphasis supplied)

Respondent's testimony, however, showed that he confused London for Liverpool and this casts
doubt on his supposed efforts to locate his wife in England. The Court of Appeal's justification of
the mistake, to wit:

. . . Well, while the cognoscente (sic) would readily know the geographical
difference between London and Liverpool, for a humble seaman like Gregorio the
two places could mean one place in England, the port where his ship docked
and where he found Janet. Our own provincial folks, every time they leave home
to visit relatives in Pasay City, Kalookan City, or Paraaque, would announce to
friends and relatives, "We're going to Manila." This apparent error in naming of
places of destination does not appear to be fatal. 16

is not well taken. There is no analogy between Manila and its neighboring cities, on one hand,
and London and Liverpool, on the other, which, as pointed out by the Solicitor-General, are
around three hundred fifty (350) kilometers apart. We do not consider that walking into a major
city like Liverpool or London with a simple hope of somehow bumping into one particular
person there which is in effect what Nolasco says he did can be regarded as a reasonably
diligent search.

The Court also views respondent's claim that Janet Monica declined to give any information as to
her personal background even after she had married respondent 17 too convenient an excuse to
justify his failure to locate her. The same can be said of the loss of the alleged letters respondent
had sent to his wife which respondent claims were all returned to him. Respondent said he had
lost these returned letters, under unspecified circumstances.

Neither can this Court give much credence to respondent's bare assertion that he had inquired
from their friends of her whereabouts, considering that respondent did not identify those friends
in his testimony. The Court of Appeals ruled that since the prosecutor failed to rebut this
evidence during trial, it is good evidence. But this kind of evidence cannot, by its nature, be
rebutted. In any case, admissibility is not synonymous with credibility. 18 As noted before, there
are serious doubts to respondent's credibility. Moreover, even if admitted as evidence, said
testimony merely tended to show that the missing spouse had chosen not to communicate with
their common acquaintances, and not that she was dead.

Respondent testified that immediately after receiving his mother's letter sometime in January
1983, he cut short his employment contract to return to San Jose, Antique. However, he did not
explain the delay of nine (9) months from January 1983, when he allegedly asked leave from his
captain, to November 1983 when be finally reached San Jose. Respondent, moreover, claimed he
married Janet Monica Parker without inquiring about her parents and their place of residence. 19
Also, respondent failed to explain why he did not even try to get the help of the police or other
authorities in London and Liverpool in his effort to find his wife. The circumstances of Janet
Monica's departure and respondent's subsequent behavior make it very difficult to regard the
claimed belief that Janet Monica was dead a well-founded one.

In Goitia v. Campos-Rueda, 20 the Court stressed that:

. . . Marriage is an institution, the maintenance of which in its purity the public is

deeply interested. It is a relationship for life and the parties cannot terminate it at
any shorter period by virtue of any contract they make. . . . . 21 (Emphasis
supplied)

By the same token, the spouses should not be allowed, by the simple expedient of agreeing that
one of them leave the conjugal abode and never to return again, to circumvent the policy of the
laws on marriage. The Court notes that respondent even tried to have his marriage annulled
before the trial court in the same proceeding.

In In Re Szatraw, 22 the Court warned against such collusion between the parties when they find
it impossible to dissolve the marital bonds through existing legal means.

While the Court understands the need of respondent's young son, Gerry Nolasco, for maternal
care, still the requirements of the law must prevail. Since respondent failed to satisfy the clear
requirements of the law, his petition for a judicial declaration of presumptive death must be
denied. The law does not view marriage like an ordinary contract. Article 1 of the Family Code
emphasizes that.

. . . Marriage is a special contract of permanent union between a man and a

woman entered into in accordance with law for the establishment of conjugal and
family life. It is the foundation of the family and an inviolable social institution
 whose nature, consequences, and incidents are governed by law and not subject to
stipulation, except that marriage settlements may fix the property relations during
the marriage within the limits provided by this Code. (Emphasis supplied)

In Arroyo, Jr. v. Court of Appeals, 23 the Court stressed strongly the need to protect.

. . . the basic social institutions of marriage and the family in the preservation of
which the State bas the strongest interest; the public policy here involved is of the
most fundamental kind. In Article II, Section 12 of the Constitution there is set
forth the following basic state policy:

The State recognizes the sanctity of family life and shall protect
and strengthen the family as a basic autonomous social
institution. . . .

The same sentiment bas been expressed in the Family Code of the Philippines in
Article 149:

The family, being the foundation of the nation, is a basic social

institution which public policy cherishes and protects.
Consequently, family relations are governed by law and no custom,
practice or agreement destructive of the family shall be recognized
or given effect. 24

In fine, respondent failed to establish that he had the well-founded belief required by law that his
absent wife was already dead that would sustain the issuance of a court order declaring Janet
Monica Parker presumptively dead.

WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Court of Appeals dated 23 February 1990, affirming the trial
court's decision declaring Janet Monica Parker presumptively dead is hereby REVERSED and
both Decisions are hereby NULLIFIED and SET ASIDE. Costs against respondent.

SECOND DIVISION

EDUARDO P. MANUEL, G.R. No. 165842

Petitioner,
 Present:

PUNO, J., Chairman,

AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, -
versus - CALLEJO, SR.,

TINGA, and

CHICO-NAZARIO,* JJ.

Promulgated:

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,

Respondent. November 29, 2005

x-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x

DECISION

CALLEJO, SR., J.:

Before us is a petition for review on certiorari of the Decision[1] of the Court of Appeals

(CA) in CA-G.R. CR No. 26877, affirming the Decision[2] of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of

Baguio City, Branch 3, convicting Eduardo P. Manuel of bigamy in Criminal Case No. 19562-R.
 Eduardo was charged with bigamy in an Information filed on November 7, 2001, the

accusatory portion of which reads:

 That on or about the 22nd day of April, 1996, in the City of Baguio,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused EDUARDO P. MANUEL, being then previously and legally married to
RUBYLUS [GAA] and without the said marriage having been legally dissolved,
did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously contract a second
marriage with TINA GANDALERA-MANUEL, herein complainant, who does
not know the existence of the first marriage of said EDUARDO P. MANUEL to
Rubylus [Gaa].

CONTRARY TO LAW. [3]

The prosecution adduced evidence that on July 28, 1975, Eduardo was married to Rubylus

Gaa before Msgr. Feliciano Santos in Makati, which was then still a municipality of the

Province of Rizal.[4] He met the private complainant Tina B. Gandalera in Dagupan City

sometime in January 1996. She stayed in Bonuan, Dagupan City for two days looking for a

friend. Tina was then 21 years old, a Computer Secretarial student, while Eduardo was 39.

Afterwards, Eduardo went to Baguio City to visit her. Eventually, as one thing led to another,

they went to a motel where, despite Tinas resistance, Eduardo succeeded in having his way with

her. Eduardo proposed marriage on several occasions, assuring her that he was single. Eduardo

even brought his parents to Baguio City to meet Tinas parents, and was assured by them that

their son was still single.

 Tina finally agreed to marry Eduardo sometime in the first week of March 1996. They

were married on April 22, 1996 before Judge Antonio C. Reyes, the Presiding Judge of the RTC

of Baguio City, Branch 61.[5] It appeared in their marriage contract that Eduardo was single.
 The couple was happy during the first three years of their married life. Through their

joint efforts, they were able to build their home in Cypress Point, Irisan, Baguio City. However,

starting 1999, Manuel started making himself scarce and went to their house only twice or thrice

a year. Tina was jobless, and whenever she asked money from Eduardo, he would slap her.[6]

Sometime in January 2001, Eduardo took all his clothes, left, and did not return. Worse, he

stopped giving financial support.

Sometime in August 2001, Tina became curious and made inquiries from the National

Statistics Office (NSO) in Manila where she learned that Eduardo had been previously married.

She secured an NSO-certified copy of the marriage contract.[7] She was so embarrassed and

humiliated when she learned that Eduardo was in fact already married when they exchanged their

own vows.[8]

For his part, Eduardo testified that he met Tina sometime in 1995 in a bar where she

worked as a Guest Relations Officer (GRO). He fell in love with her and married her. He

informed Tina of his previous marriage to Rubylus Gaa, but she nevertheless agreed to marry

him. Their marital relationship was in order until this one time when he noticed that she had a

love-bite on her neck. He then abandoned her. Eduardo further testified that he declared he

was single in his marriage contract with Tina because he believed in good faith that his first

marriage was invalid. He did not know that he had to go to court to seek for the nullification of

his first marriage before marrying Tina.

 Eduardo further claimed that he was only forced to marry his first wife because she

threatened to commit suicide unless he did so. Rubylus was charged with estafa in 1975 and

thereafter imprisoned. He visited her in jail after three months and never saw her again. He

insisted that he married Tina believing that his first marriage was no longer valid because he had

not heard from Rubylus for more than 20 years.

After trial, the court rendered judgment on July 2, 2002 finding Eduardo guilty beyond

reasonable doubt of bigamy. He was sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of from six (6) years

and ten (10) months, as minimum, to ten (10) years, as maximum, and directed to indemnify the

private complainant Tina Gandalera the amount of P200,000.00 by way of moral damages, plus

costs of suit.[9]

The trial court ruled that the prosecution was able to prove beyond reasonable doubt all the

elements of bigamy under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code. It declared that Eduardos

belief, that his first marriage had been dissolved because of his first wifes 20-year absence, even

if true, did not exculpate him from liability for bigamy. Citing the ruling of this Court in People

v. Bitdu,[10] the trial court further ruled that even if the private complainant had known that

Eduardo had been previously married, the latter would still be criminally liable for bigamy.

Eduardo appealed the decision to the CA. He alleged that he was not criminally liable for

bigamy because when he married the private complainant, he did so in good faith and without
any malicious intent. He maintained that at the time that he married the private complainant, he

was of the honest belief that his first marriage no longer subsisted. He insisted that conformably

to Article 3 of the Revised Penal Code, there must be malice for one to be criminally liable for a

felony. He was not motivated by malice in marrying the private complainant because he did so

only out of his overwhelming desire to have a fruitful marriage. He posited that the trial court

should have taken into account Article 390 of the New Civil Code. To support his view, the

appellant cited the rulings of this Court in United States v. Pealosa[11] and Manahan, Jr. v.

Court of Appeals.[12]

The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) averred that Eduardos defense of good faith

and reliance on the Courts ruling in United States v. Enriquez[13] were misplaced; what is

applicable is Article 41 of the Family Code, which amended Article 390 of the Civil Code.

Citing the ruling of this Court in Republic v. Nolasco,[14] the OSG further posited that as

provided in Article 41 of the Family Code, there is a need for a judicial declaration of

presumptive death of the absent spouse to enable the present spouse to marry. Even assuming

that the first marriage was void, the parties thereto should not be permitted to judge for

themselves the nullity of the marriage;

 the matter should be submitted to the proper court for resolution. Moreover, the OSG

maintained, the private complainants knowledge of the first marriage would not afford any relief

since bigamy is an offense against the State and not just against the private complainant.

However, the OSG agreed with the appellant that the penalty imposed by the trial court

was erroneous and sought the affirmance of the decision appealed from with modification.

On June 18, 2004, the CA rendered judgment affirming the decision of the RTC with

modification as to the penalty of the accused. It ruled that the prosecution was able to prove all

the elements of bigamy. Contrary to the contention of the appellant, Article 41 of the Family

Code should apply. Before Manuel could lawfully marry the private complainant, there should

have been a judicial declaration of Gaas presumptive death as the absent spouse. The appellate

court cited the rulings of this Court in Mercado v. Tan[15] and Domingo v. Court of Appeals[16]

to support its ruling. The dispositive portion of the decision reads:

WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing, the Decision promulgated on

July 31, 2002 is hereby MODIFIED to reflect, as it hereby reflects, that accused-
appellant is sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of two (2) years, four (4)
months and one (1) day of prision correccional, as minimum, to ten (10) years of
prision mayor as maximum. Said Decision is AFFIRMED in all other respects.

SO ORDERED.[17]
 Eduardo, now the petitioner, filed the instant petition for review on certiorari, insisting

that:

THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR OF LAW

WHEN IT RULED THAT PETITIONERS FIRST WIFE CANNOT BE
LEGALLY PRESUMED DEAD UNDER ARTICLE 390 OF THE CIVIL CODE
AS THERE WAS NO JUDICIAL DECLARATION OF PRESUMPTIVE DEATH
AS PROVIDED FOR UNDER ARTICLE 41 OF THE FAMILY CODE.

II

THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR OF LAW

WHEN IT AFFIRMED THE AWARD OF PHP200,000.00 AS MORAL
DAMAGES AS IT HAS NO BASIS IN FACT AND IN LAW.[18]

The petitioner maintains that the prosecution failed to prove the second element of the

felony, i.e., that the marriage has not been legally dissolved or, in case his/her spouse is absent,

the absent spouse could not yet be presumed dead under the Civil Code. He avers that when he

married Gandalera in 1996, Gaa had been absent for 21 years since 1975; under Article 390

of the Civil Code, she was presumed dead as a matter of law. He points out that, under the first

paragraph of Article 390 of the Civil Code, one who has been absent for seven years, whether or

not he/she is still alive, shall be presumed dead for all purposes except for succession, while the

second paragraph refers to the rule on legal presumption of death with respect to succession.
 The petitioner asserts that the presumptive death of the absent spouse arises by operation

of law upon the satisfaction of two requirements: the

 specified period and the present spouses reasonable belief that the absentee is dead. He

insists that he was able to prove that he had not heard from his first wife since 1975 and that he

had no knowledge of her whereabouts or whether she was still alive; hence, under Article 41 of

the Family Code, the presumptive death of Gaa had arisen by operation of law, as the two

requirements of Article 390 of the Civil Code are present. The petitioner concludes that he

should thus be acquitted of the crime of bigamy.

The petitioner insists that except for the period of absences provided for in Article 390 of

the Civil Code, the rule therein on legal presumptions remains valid and effective. Nowhere

under Article 390 of the Civil Code does it require that there must first be a judicial declaration

of death before the rule on presumptive death would apply. He further asserts that contrary to the

rulings of the trial and appellate courts, the requirement of a judicial declaration of presumptive

death under Article 41 of the Family Code is only a requirement for the validity of the

subsequent or second marriage.

The petitioner, likewise, avers that the trial court and the CA erred in awarding moral

damages in favor of the private complainant. The private complainant was a GRO before he

married her, and even knew that he was already married. He genuinely loved and took care of

her and gave her financial support. He also pointed out that she had an illicit relationship with a

lover whom she brought to their house.

 In its comment on the petition, the OSG maintains that the decision of the CA affirming

the petitioners conviction is in accord with the law, jurisprudence and the evidence on record.

To bolster its claim, the OSG cited the ruling of this Court in Republic v. Nolasco.[19]

The petition is denied for lack of merit.

Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code, which defines and penalizes bigamy, reads:

Art. 349. Bigamy. The penalty of prision mayor shall be imposed upon
any person who shall contract a second or subsequent marriage before the former
marriage has been legally dissolved, or before the absent spouse has been
declared presumptively dead by means of a judgment rendered in the proper
proceedings.

The provision was taken from Article 486 of the Spanish Penal Code, to wit:

El que contrajere Segundo o ulterior matrimonio sin hallarse

legtimamente disuelto el anterior, ser castigado con la pena de prision mayor.
xxx

The reason why bigamy is considered a felony is to preserve and ensure the juridical tie of

marriage established by law.[20] The phrase or before the absent spouse had been declared
presumptively dead by means of a judgment rendered in the proper proceedings was

incorporated in the Revised Penal Code because the drafters of the law were of the impression

that in consonance with the civil law which provides for the presumption of death after an

absence of a number of years, the judicial declaration of presumed death like annulment of

marriage should be a justification for bigamy.[21]

For the accused to be held guilty of bigamy, the prosecution is burdened to prove the

felony: (a) he/she has been legally married; and (b) he/she contracts a subsequent marriage

without the former marriage having been lawfully dissolved. The felony is consummated on the

celebration of the second marriage or subsequent marriage.[22] It is essential in the prosecution

for bigamy that the alleged second marriage, having all the essential requirements, would be

valid were it not for the subsistence of the first marriage.[23] Viada avers that a third element of

the crime is that the second marriage must be entered into with fraudulent intent (intencion

fraudulente) which is an essential element of a felony by dolo.[24] On the other hand, Cuello

Calon is of the view that there are only two elements of bigamy: (1) the existence of a marriage

that has not been lawfully dissolved; and (2) the celebration of a second marriage. It does not

matter whether the first marriage is void or voidable because such marriages have juridical

effects until lawfully dissolved by a court of competent jurisdiction.[25] As the Court ruled in

Domingo v. Court of Appeals[26] and Mercado v. Tan,[27] under the Family Code of the

Philippines, the judicial declaration of nullity of a previous marriage is a defense.

 In his commentary on the Revised Penal Code, Albert is of the same view as Viada

and declared that there are three (3) elements of bigamy: (1) an undissolved marriage; (2) a

new marriage; and (3) fraudulent intention constituting the felony of the act.[28] He explained

that:

This last element is not stated in Article 349, because it is undoubtedly

incorporated in the principle antedating all codes, and, constituting one of the
landmarks of our Penal Code, that, where there is no willfulness there is no
crime. There is no willfulness if the subject
believes that the former marriage has been dissolved; and this must be supported
by very strong evidence, and if this be produced, the act shall be deemed not to
constitute a crime. Thus, a person who contracts a second marriage in the
reasonable and well-founded belief that his first wife is dead, because of the many
years that have elapsed since he has had any news of her whereabouts, in spite of
his endeavors to find her, cannot be deemed guilty of the crime of bigamy,
because there is no fraudulent intent which is one of the essential elements of the
crime.[29]

As gleaned from the Information in the RTC, the petitioner is charged with bigamy, a

felony by dolo (deceit). Article 3, paragraph 2 of the Revised Penal Code provides that there is

deceit when the act is performed with deliberate intent. Indeed, a felony cannot exist without

intent. Since a felony by dolo is classified as an intentional felony, it is deemed voluntary.[30]

Although the words with malice do not appear in Article 3 of the Revised Penal Code, such

phrase is included in the word voluntary.[31]

 Malice is a mental state or condition prompting the doing of an overt act without legal

excuse or justification from which another suffers injury.[32] When the act or omission defined

by law as a felony is proved to have been done or committed by the accused, the law presumes it

to have been intentional.[33] Indeed, it is a legal presumption of law that every man intends the

natural or probable consequence of his voluntary act in the absence of proof to the contrary, and

such presumption must prevail unless a reasonable doubt exists from a consideration of the

whole evidence.[34]

For one to be criminally liable for a felony by dolo, there must be a confluence of both an

evil act and an evil intent. Actus non facit reum, nisi mens sit rea.[35]

In the present case, the prosecution proved that the petitioner was married to Gaa in 1975,

and such marriage was not judicially declared a nullity; hence, the marriage is presumed to

subsist.[36] The prosecution also proved that the petitioner married the private complainant in

1996, long after the effectivity of the Family Code.

The petitioner is presumed to have acted with malice or evil intent when he married the

private complainant. As a general rule, mistake of fact or good faith of the accused is a valid

defense in a prosecution for a felony by dolo; such defense negates malice or criminal intent.

However, ignorance of the law is not an excuse because everyone is presumed to know the law.

Ignorantia legis neminem excusat.

 It was the burden of the petitioner to prove his defense that when he married the private

complainant in 1996, he was of the well-grounded belief

 that his first wife was already dead, as he had not heard from her for more than 20 years

since 1975. He should have adduced in evidence a decision of a competent court declaring the

presumptive death of his first wife as required by Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code, in

relation to Article 41 of the Family Code. Such judicial declaration also constitutes proof that

the petitioner acted in good faith, and would negate criminal intent on his part

when he married the private complainant and, as a consequence, he could not be held guilty of

bigamy in such case. The petitioner, however, failed to discharge his burden.

The phrase or before the absent spouse has been declared presumptively dead by means

of a judgment rendered on the proceedings in Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code was not an

aggroupment of empty or useless words. The requirement for a judgment of the presumptive

death of the absent spouse is for the benefit of the spouse present, as protection from the pains

and the consequences of a second marriage, precisely because he/she could be charged and

convicted of bigamy if the defense of good faith based on mere testimony is found incredible.

The requirement of judicial declaration is also for the benefit of the State. Under Article

II, Section 12 of the Constitution, the State shall protect and strengthen the family as a basic

autonomous social institution. Marriage is a social institution of the highest importance. Public

policy, good morals and the interest of society require that the marital relation should be

surrounded with every safeguard and its severance only in the manner prescribed and the causes

specified by law.[37] The laws regulating civil marriages are necessary to serve the interest,

safety, good order, comfort or general welfare of the community and the parties can waive
nothing essential to the validity of the proceedings. A civil marriage anchors an ordered society

by encouraging stable relationships over transient ones; it enhances the welfare of the

community.

In a real sense, there are three parties to every civil marriage; two willing spouses and an

approving State. On marriage, the parties assume new relations to each other and the State

touching nearly on every aspect of life and death. The consequences of an invalid marriage to

the parties, to innocent parties and to society, are so serious that the law may well take means

calculated to ensure the procurement of the most positive evidence of death of the first spouse or

of the presumptive death of the absent spouse[38] after the lapse of the period provided for under

the law. One such means is the requirement of the declaration by a competent court of the

presumptive death of an absent spouse as proof that the present spouse contracts a subsequent

marriage on a well-grounded belief of the death of the first spouse. Indeed, men readily believe

what they wish to be true, is a maxim of the old jurists. To sustain a second marriage and to

vacate a first because one of the parties believed the other to be dead would make the existence

of the marital relation determinable, not by certain extrinsic facts, easily capable of forensic

ascertainment and proof, but by the subjective condition of individuals.[39] Only with such proof

can marriage be treated as so dissolved as to permit second marriages.[40] Thus, Article 349 of

the Revised Penal Code has made the dissolution of marriage dependent not only upon the

personal belief of parties, but upon certain objective facts easily capable of accurate judicial

cognizance,[41] namely, a judgment of the presumptive death of the absent spouse.

 The petitioners sole reliance on Article 390 of the Civil Code as basis for his acquittal

for bigamy is misplaced.

Articles 390 and 391 of the Civil Code provide

Art. 390. After an absence of seven years, it being unknown whether or

not, the absentee still lives, he shall be presumed dead for all purposes, except for
those of succession.

The absentee shall not be presumed dead for the purpose of opening his
succession till after an absence of ten years. If he disappeared after the age of
seventy-five years, an absence of five years shall be sufficient in order that his
succession may be opened.

Art. 391. The following shall be presumed dead for all purposes,
including the division of the estate among the heirs:

(1) A person on board a vessel lost during a sea voyage, or an

aeroplane which is missing, who has not been heard of for four years
since the loss of the vessel or aeroplane;

(2) A person in the armed forces who has taken part in war, and has
been missing for four years;

(3) A person who has been in danger of death under other

circumstances and his existence has not been known for four years.
 The presumption of death of the spouse who had been absent for seven years, it being

unknown whether or not the absentee still lives, is created by law and arises without any

necessity of judicial declaration.[42] However, Article 41 of the Family Code, which amended

the foregoing rules on presumptive death, reads:

Art. 41. A marriage contracted by any person during the subsistence of a

previous marriage shall be null and void, unless before the celebration of the
subsequent marriage, the prior spouse had been absent for four consecutive years
and the spouse present had a well-founded belief that the absent spouse was
already dead. In case of disappearance where there is danger of death under the
circumstances set forth in the provisions of Article 391 of the Civil Code, an
absence of only two years shall be sufficient.

For the purpose of contracting the subsequent marriage under the

preceding paragraph, the spouse present must institute a summary proceeding as
provided in this Court for the declaration of presumptive death of the absentee,
without prejudice to the effect of reappearance of the absent spouse.[43]

With the effectivity of the Family Code,[44] the period of seven years under the first

paragraph of Article 390 of the Civil Code was reduced to four consecutive years. Thus, before

the spouse present may contract a subsequent marriage, he or she must institute summary

proceedings for the declaration of the presumptive death of the absentee spouse,[45] without

prejudice to the effect of the reappearance of the absentee spouse. As explained by this Court in

Armas v. Calisterio:[46]
 In contrast, under the 1988 Family Code, in order that a subsequent
bigamous marriage may exceptionally be considered valid, the following
conditions must concur, viz.: (a) The prior spouse of the contracting party must
have been absent for four consecutive years, or two years where there is danger of
death under the circumstances stated in Article 391 of the Civil Code at the time
of disappearance; (b) the spouse present has a well-founded belief that the absent
spouse is already dead; and (c) there is, unlike the old rule, a judicial declaration
of presumptive death of the absentee for which purpose the spouse present can
institute a summary proceeding in court to ask for that declaration. The last
condition is consistent and in consonance with the requirement of judicial
intervention in subsequent marriages as so provided in Article 41, in relation to
Article 40, of the Family Code.

The Court rejects petitioners contention that the requirement of instituting a petition for

declaration of presumptive death under Article 41 of the Family Code is designed merely to

enable the spouse present to contract a valid second marriage and not for the acquittal of one

charged with bigamy. Such provision was designed to harmonize civil law and Article 349 of the

Revised Penal Code, and put to rest the confusion spawned by the rulings of this Court and

comments of eminent authorities on Criminal Law.

As early as March 6, 1937, this Court ruled in Jones v. Hortiguela[47] that, for purposes

of the marriage law, it is not necessary to have the former spouse judicially declared an absentee

before the spouse present may contract a subsequent marriage. It held that the declaration of

absence made in accordance with the provisions of the Civil Code has for its sole purpose the

taking of the necessary precautions for the administration of the estate of the absentee. For the

celebration of civil marriage, however, the law only requires that the former spouse had been

absent for seven consecutive years at the time of the second marriage, that the spouse present
does not know his or her former spouse to be living, that such former spouse is generally reputed

to be dead and the spouse present so believes at the time of the celebration of the marriage.[48]

In In Re Szatraw,[49] the Court declared that a judicial declaration that a person is presumptively

dead, because he or she had been unheard from in seven years, being a presumption juris tantum

only, subject to contrary proof, cannot reach the stage of finality or become final; and that proof

of actual death of the person presumed dead being unheard from in seven years, would have to

be made in another proceeding to have such particular fact finally determined. The Court ruled

that if a judicial decree declaring a person presumptively dead because he or she had not been

heard from in seven years cannot become final and executory even after the lapse of the

reglementary period within which an appeal may be taken, for such presumption is still

disputable and remains subject to contrary proof, then a petition for such a declaration is useless,

unnecessary, superfluous and of no benefit to the petitioner. The Court stated that it should not

waste its valuable time and be made to perform a superfluous and meaningless act.[50] The

Court also took note that a petition for a declaration of the presumptive death of an absent spouse

may even be made in collusion with the other spouse.

In Lukban v. Republic of the Philippines,[51] the Court declared that the words proper

proceedings in Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code can only refer to those authorized by law

such as Articles 390 and 391 of the Civil Code which refer to the administration or settlement of

the estate of a deceased person. In Gue v. Republic of the Philippines,[52] the Court rejected the

contention of the petitioner therein that, under Article 390 of the Civil Code, the courts are

authorized to declare the presumptive death of a person after an absence of seven years. The

Court reiterated its rulings in Szatraw, Lukban and Jones.

 Former Chief Justice Ramon C. Aquino was of the view that the provision of Article 349

or before the absent spouse has been declared presumptively dead by means of a judgment

reached in the proper proceedings is erroneous and should be considered as not written. He

opined that such provision presupposes that, if the prior marriage has not been legally dissolved

and the absent first spouse has not been declared presumptively dead in a proper court

proceedings, the subsequent marriage is bigamous. He maintains that the supposition is not true.

[53] A second marriage is bigamous only when the circumstances in paragraphs 1 and 2 of

Article 83 of the Civil Code are not present.[54] Former Senator Ambrosio Padilla was,

likewise, of the view that Article 349 seems to require judicial decree of dissolution or judicial

declaration of absence but even with such decree, a second marriage in good faith will not

constitute bigamy. He posits that a second marriage, if not illegal, even if it be annullable,

should not give rise to bigamy.[55] Former Justice Luis B. Reyes, on the other hand, was of the

view that in the case of an absent spouse who could not yet be presumed dead according to the

Civil Code, the spouse present cannot be charged and convicted of bigamy in case he/she

contracts a second marriage.[56]

The Committee tasked to prepare the Family Code proposed the amendments of Articles

390 and 391 of the Civil Code to conform to Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code, in that, in a

case where a spouse is absent for the requisite period, the present spouse may contract a

subsequent marriage only after securing a judgment declaring the presumptive death of the

absent spouse to avoid being charged and convicted of bigamy; the present spouse will have to

adduce evidence that he had a well-founded belief that the absent spouse was already dead.[57]
Such judgment is proof of the good faith of the present spouse who contracted a subsequent

marriage; thus, even if the present spouse is later charged with bigamy if the absentee spouse

reappears, he cannot be convicted of the crime. As explained by former Justice Alicia Sempio-

Diy:

Such rulings, however, conflict with Art. 349 of the Revised Penal
Code providing that the present spouse must first ask for a declaration of
presumptive death of the absent spouse in order not to be guilty of bigamy in case
he or she marries again.

The above Article of the Family Code now clearly provides that for the
purpose of the present spouse contracting a second marriage, he or she must file a
summary proceeding as provided in the Code for the declaration of the
presumptive death of the absentee, without prejudice to the latters reappearance.
This provision is intended to protect the present spouse from a criminal
prosecution for bigamy under Art. 349 of the Revised Penal Code because with
the judicial declaration that the missing spouses presumptively dead, the good
faith of the present spouse in contracting a second marriage is already established.
[58]

Of the same view is former Dean Ernesto L. Pineda (now Undersecretary of Justice) who

wrote that things are now clarified. He says judicial declaration of presumptive death is now

authorized for purposes of

 remarriage. The present spouse must institute a summary proceeding for declaration of

presumptive death of the absentee, where the ordinary rules of procedure in trial will not be

followed. Affidavits will suffice, with possible clarificatory examinations of affiants if the Judge

finds it necessary for a full grasp of the facts. The judgment declaring an absentee as

presumptively dead is without prejudice to the effect of reappearance of the said absentee.

Dean Pineda further states that before, the weight of authority is that the clause before

the absent spouse has been declared presumptively dead x x x should be disregarded because of

Article 83, paragraph 3 of the Civil Code. With the new law, there is a need to institute a

summary proceeding for the declaration of the presumptive death of the absentee, otherwise,

there is bigamy.[59]

According to Retired Supreme Court Justice Florenz D. Regalado, an eminent authority on

Criminal Law, in some cases where an absentee spouse is believed to be dead, there must be a

judicial declaration of presumptive death, which could then be made only in the proceedings for

the settlement of his estate.[60] Before such declaration, it was held that the remarriage of the

other spouse is bigamous even if done in good faith.[61] Justice Regalado opined that there were

contrary views because of the ruling in Jones and the provisions of Article 83(2) of the Civil

Code, which, however, appears to have been set to rest by Article 41 of the Family Code, which

requires a summary hearing for the declaration of presumptive death of the absent spouse before

the other spouse can remarry.

 Under Article 238 of the Family Code, a petition for a declaration of the presumptive

death of an absent spouse under Article 41 of the Family Code may be filed under Articles 239 to

247 of the same Code.[62]

On the second issue, the petitioner, likewise, faults the trial court and the CA for awarding

moral damages in favor of the private complainant. The petitioner maintains that moral damages

may be awarded only in any of the cases provided in Article 2219 of the Civil Code, and bigamy

is not one of them. The petitioner asserts that the appellate court failed to apply its ruling in

People v. Bondoc,[63] where an award of moral damages for bigamy was disallowed. In any

case, the petitioner maintains, the private complainant failed to adduce evidence to prove moral

damages.

The appellate court awarded moral damages to the private complainant on its finding that

she adduced evidence to prove the same. The appellate court ruled that while bigamy is not

included in those cases enumerated in Article 2219 of the Civil Code, it is not proscribed from

awarding moral damages against the petitioner. The appellate court ruled that it is not bound by

the following ruling in People v. Bondoc:

... Pero si en dichos asuntos se adjudicaron daos, ello se debi indedublamente

porque el articulo 2219 del Cdigo Civil de Filipinas autoriza la adjudicacin de
daos morales en los delitos de estupro, rapto, violacin, adulterio o
concubinato, y otros actos lascivos, sin incluir en esta enumeracin el delito de
 bigamia. No existe, por consiguiente, base legal para adjudicar aqu los daos
de P5,000.00 arriba mencionados.[64]

The OSG posits that the findings and ruling of the CA are based on the evidence and the

law. The OSG, likewise, avers that the CA was not bound by its ruling in People v. Rodeo.

The Court rules against the petitioner.

Moral damages include physical suffering, mental anguish, fright, serious anxiety,

besmirched reputation, wounded feelings, moral shock, social humiliation, and similar injury.

Though incapable of pecuniary computation, moral damages may be recovered if they are the

proximate result of the defendants wrongful act or omission.[65] An award for moral damages

requires the confluence of the following conditions: first, there must be an injury, whether

physical, mental or psychological, clearly sustained by the claimant; second, there must be

culpable act or omission factually established; third, the wrongful act or omission of the

defendant is the proximate cause of the injury sustained by the claimant; and fourth, the award

of damages is predicated on any of the cases stated in Article 2219 or Article 2220 of the Civil

Code.[66]

Moral damages may be awarded in favor of the offended party only in criminal cases

enumerated in Article 2219, paragraphs 1, 3, 4, 5 and 7 of the Civil Code and analogous cases,

viz.:
 Art. 2219. Moral damages may be recovered in the following and
analogous cases.

(1) A criminal offense resulting in physical injuries;

(2) Quasi-delicts causing physical injuries;

(3) Seduction, abduction, rape, or other lascivious acts;

(4) Adultery or concubinage;

(5) Illegal or arbitrary detention or arrest;

(6) Illegal search;

(7) Libel, slander or any other form of defamation;

(8) Malicious prosecution;

(9) Acts mentioned in article 309;

(10) Acts and actions referred to in articles 21, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 32,
34 and 35.

The parents of the female seduced, abducted, raped, or abused, referred

to in No. 3 of this article, may also recover moral damages.

The spouse, descendants, ascendants, and brothers and sisters may bring
the action mentioned in No. 9 of this article in the order named.

Thus, the law does not intend that moral damages should be awarded in all cases where the

aggrieved party has suffered mental anguish, fright, moral anxieties, besmirched reputation,

wounded feelings, moral shock, social humiliation and similar injury arising out of an act or

omission of another, otherwise, there would not have been any reason for the inclusion of
specific acts in Article 2219[67] and analogous cases (which refer to those cases bearing analogy

or resemblance, corresponds to some others or resembling, in other respects, as in form,

proportion, relation, etc.)[68]

Indeed, bigamy is not one of those specifically mentioned in Article 2219 of the Civil

Code in which the offender may be ordered to pay moral damages to the private

complainant/offended party. Nevertheless, the petitioner is liable to the private complainant for

moral damages under Article 2219 in relation to Articles 19, 20 and 21 of the Civil Code.

According to Article 19, every person must, in the exercise of his rights and in the

performance of his act with justice, give everyone his due, and observe honesty and good faith.

This provision contains what is commonly referred to as the principle of abuse of rights, and sets

certain standards which must be observed not only in the exercise of ones rights but also in the

performance of ones duties. The standards are the following: act with justice; give everyone his

due; and observe honesty and good faith. The elements for abuse of rights are: (a) there is a legal

right or duty; (b) exercised in bad faith; and (c) for the sole intent of prejudicing or injuring

another.[69]

Article 20 speaks of the general sanctions of all other provisions of law which do not

especially provide for its own sanction. When a right is exercised in a manner which does not

conform to the standards set forth in the said provision and results in damage to another, a legal

wrong is thereby committed for which the wrongdoer must be responsible.[70] If the provision
does not provide a remedy for its violation, an action for damages under either Article 20 or

Article 21 of the Civil Code would be proper. Article 20 provides that every person who,

contrary to law, willfully or negligently causes damage to another shall indemnify the latter for

the same. On the other hand, Article 21 provides that any person who willfully causes loss or

injury to another in a manner that is contrary to morals, good customs or public policy shall

compensate the latter for damages. The latter provision

 is adopted to remedy the countless gaps in the statutes which leave so many victims of

moral wrongs helpless, even though they have actually suffered material and moral injury should

vouchsafe adequate legal remedy for that untold number of moral wrongs which it is impossible

for human foresight to prove for specifically in the statutes. Whether or not the principle of

abuse of rights has been violated resulting in damages under Article 20 or Article 21 of the Civil

Code or other applicable provisions of law depends upon the circumstances of each case.[71]

In the present case, the petitioner courted the private complainant and proposed to marry

her. He assured her that he was single. He even brought his parents to the house of the private

complainant where he and his parents made the same assurance that he was single. Thus, the

private complainant agreed to marry the petitioner, who even stated in the certificate of marriage

that he was single. She lived with the petitioner and dutifully performed her duties as his wife,

believing all the while that he was her lawful husband. For two years or so until the petitioner

heartlessly abandoned her, the private complainant had no inkling that he was already married to

another before they were married.

Thus, the private complainant was an innocent victim of the petitioners chicanery and

heartless deception, the fraud consisting not of a single act alone, but a continuous series of acts.

Day by day, he maintained the appearance of being a lawful husband to the private complainant,

who
 changed her status from a single woman to a married woman, lost the consortium,

attributes and support of a single man she could have married lawfully and endured mental pain

and humiliation, being bound to a man who it turned out was not her lawful husband.[72]

The Court rules that the petitioners collective acts of fraud and deceit before, during and

after his marriage with the private complainant were willful, deliberate and with malice and

caused injury to the latter. That she did not sustain any physical injuries is not a bar to an award

for moral damages. Indeed, in Morris v. Macnab,[73] the New Jersey Supreme Court ruled:

xxx The defendant cites authorities which indicate that, absent physical
injuries, damages for shame, humiliation, and mental anguish are not recoverable
where the actor is simply negligent. See Prosser, supra, at p. 180; 2 Harper &
James, Torts, 1031 (1956). But the authorities all recognize that where the wrong
is willful rather than negligent, recovery may be had for the ordinary, natural, and
proximate consequences though they consist of shame, humiliation, and mental
anguish. See Spiegel v. Evergreen Cemetery Co., 117 NJL 90, 94, 186 A 585
(Sup. Ct. 1936); Kuzma v. Millinery Workers, etc., Local 24, 27 N.J. Super, 579,
591, 99 A.2d 833 (App. Div. 1953); Prosser, supra, at p. 38. Here the defendants
conduct was not merely negligent, but was willfully and maliciously wrongful. It
was bound to result in shame, humiliation, and mental anguish for the plaintiff,
and when such result did ensue the plaintiff became entitled not only to
compensatory but also to punitive damages. See Spiegel v. Evergreen Cemetery
Co., supra; Kuzma v Millinery Workers, etc., Local 24, supra. CF. Note,
Exemplary Damages in the Law of Torts, 70 Harv. L. Rev. 517 (1957). The
plaintiff testified that because of the defendants bigamous marriage to her and the
attendant publicity she not only was embarrassed and ashamed to go out but
couldnt sleep but couldnt eat, had terrific headaches and lost quite a lot of
weight. No just basis appears for judicial interference with the jurys reasonable
allowance of $1,000 punitive damages on the first count. See Cabakov v.
Thatcher, 37 N.J. Super 249, 117 A.2d 298 (App. Div.[74] 1955).
 The Court thus declares that the petitioners acts are against public policy as they

undermine and subvert the family as a social institution, good morals and the interest and general

welfare of society.

Because the private complainant was an innocent victim of the petitioners perfidy, she is

not barred from claiming moral damages. Besides, even considerations of public policy would

not prevent her from recovery. As held in Jekshewitz v. Groswald:[75]

Where a person is induced by the fraudulent representation of another to

do an act which, in consequence of such misrepresentation, he believes to be
neither illegal nor immoral, but which is in fact a criminal offense, he has a right
of action against the person so inducing him for damages sustained by him in
consequence of his having done such act. Burrows v. Rhodes, [1899] 1 Q.B. 816.
In Cooper v. Cooper, 147 Mass. 370, 17 N.E. 892, 9 Am. St. Rep. 721, the court
said that a false representation by the defendant that he was divorced from his
former wife, whereby the plaintiff was induced to marry him, gave her a remedy
in tort for deceit. It seems to have been assumed that the fact that she had
unintentionally violated the law or innocently committed a crime by cohabiting
with him would be no bar to the action, but rather that it might be a ground for
enhancing her damages. The injury to the plaintiff was said to be in her being led
by the promise to give the fellowship and assistance of a wife to one who was not
her husband and to assume and act in a relation and condition that proved to be
false and ignominious. Damages for such an injury were held to be recoverable in
Sherman v. Rawson, 102 Mass. 395 and Kelley v. Riley, 106 Mass. 339, 343, 8
Am. Rep. 336.

Furthermore, in the case at bar the plaintiff does not base her cause of
action upon any transgression of the law by herself but upon the defendants
misrepresentation. The criminal relations which followed, innocently on her part,
were but one of the incidental results of the defendants fraud for which damages
may be assessed.

[7] Actions for deceit for fraudulently inducing a woman to enter into the
marriage relation have been maintained in other jurisdictions. Sears v. Wegner,
150 Mich. 388, 114 N.W. 224, 17 L.R. A. (N.S.) 819; Larson v. McMillan, 99
Wash. 626, 170 P. 324; Blossom v. Barrett, 37 N.Y. 434, 97 Am. Dec. 747; Morril
v. Palmer, 68 Vt. 1, 33 A. 829, 33 L.R.A. 411. Considerations of public policy
would not prevent recovery where the circumstances are such that the plaintiff
was conscious of no moral turpitude, that her illegal action was induced solely by
the defendants misrepresentation, and that she does not base her cause of action
upon any transgression of the law by herself. Such considerations
 distinguish this case from cases in which the court has refused to lend its
aid to the enforcement of a contract illegal on its face or to one who has
consciously and voluntarily become a party to an illegal act upon which the cause
of action is founded. Szadiwicz v. Cantor, 257 Mass. 518, 520, 154 N.E. 251, 49
A. L. R. 958.[76]

Considering the attendant circumstances of the case, the Court finds the award of

P200,000.00 for moral damages to be just and reasonable.

IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the petition is DENIED. The assailed

decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED. Costs against the petitioner.

SECOND DIVISION

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, G.R. No. 159614

Petitioner,

Present:

- versus - PUNO, J., Chairman,

AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,

CALLEJO, SR.,

THE HONORABLE COURT OF TINGA, and

APPEALS (TENTH DIVISION) CHICO-NAZARIO, JJ.

and ALAN B. ALEGRO,

Respondents.

Promulgated:

December 9, 2005

x--------------------------------------------------x

DECISION

CALLEJO, SR., J.:

On March 29, 2001, Alan B. Alegro filed a petition in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of

Catbalogan, Samar, Branch 27, for the declaration of presumptive death of his wife, Rosalia

(Lea) A. Julaton.

In an Order[1] dated April 16, 2001, the court set the petition for hearing on May 30,

2001 at 8:30 a.m. and directed that a copy of the said order be published once a week for three
(3) consecutive weeks in the Samar Reporter, a newspaper of general circulation in the Province

of Samar, and
 that a copy be posted in the courts bulletin board for at least three weeks before the next

scheduled hearing. The court also directed that copies of the order be served on the Solicitor

General, the Provincial Prosecutor of Samar, and Alan, through counsel, and that copies be sent

to Lea by registered mail. Alan complied with all the foregoing jurisdictional requirements.[2]

On May 28, 2001, the Republic of the Philippines, through the Office of the Solicitor

General (OSG), filed a Motion to Dismiss[3] the petition, which was, however, denied by the

court for failure to comply with Rule 15 of the Rules of Court.[4]

At the hearing, Alan adduced evidence that he and Lea were married on January 20, 1995

in Catbalogan, Samar.[5] He testified that, on February 6, 1995, Lea arrived home late in the

evening and he berated her for being always out of their house. He told her that if she enjoyed

the life of a single person, it would be better for her to go back to her parents.[6] Lea did not

reply. Alan narrated that, when he reported for work the following day, Lea was still in the

house, but when he arrived home later in the day, Lea was nowhere to be found.[7] Alan thought

that Lea merely went to her parents house in Bliss, Sto. Nio, Catbalogan, Samar.[8] However,

Lea did not return to their house anymore.

Alan further testified that, on February 14, 1995, after his work, he went to the house of

Leas parents to see if she was there, but he was told that she was not there. He also went to the

house of Leas friend, Janeth Bautista, at Barangay Canlapwas, but he was informed by Janettes
brother-in-law, Nelson Abaenza, that Janeth had left for Manila.[9] When Alan went back to the

house of his parents-in-law, he learned from his father-in-law that Lea had been to their house

but that she left without notice.[10] Alan sought the help of Barangay Captain Juan Magat, who

promised to help him locate his wife. He also inquired from his friends of Leas whereabouts but

to no avail.[11]

Sometime in June 1995, he decided to go to Manila to look for Lea, but his mother asked

him to leave after the town fiesta of Catbalogan, hoping that Lea may come home for the fiesta.

Alan agreed.[12] However, Lea did not show up. Alan then left for Manila on August 27, 1995.

He went to a house in Navotas where Janeth, Leas friend, was staying. When asked where Lea

was, Janeth told him that she had not seen her.[13] He failed to find out Leas whereabouts

despite his repeated talks with Janeth. Alan decided to work as a part-time taxi driver. On his

free time, he would look for Lea in the malls but still to no avail. He returned to Catbalogan in

1997 and again looked for his wife but failed.[14]

On June 20, 2001, Alan reported Leas disappearance to the local police station.[15] The

police authorities issued an Alarm Notice on July 4, 2001.[16] Alan also reported Leas

disappearance to the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) on July 9, 2001.[17]

Barangay Captain Juan Magat corroborated the testimony of Alan. He declared that on

February 14, 1995, at 2:00 p.m., Alan inquired from him if Lea passed by his house and he told

Alan that she did not. Alan also told him that Lea had disappeared. He had not seen Lea in the
barangay ever since.[18] Leas father, who was his compadre and the owner of Radio DYMS,

told him that he did not know where Lea was.[19]

After Alan rested his case, neither the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor nor the Solicitor

General adduced evidence in opposition to the petition.

On January 8, 2002, the court rendered judgment granting the petition. The fallo of the

decision reads:

WHEREFORE, and in view of all the foregoing, petitioners absent

spouse ROSALIA JULATON is hereby declared PRESUMPTIVELY DEAD for
the purpose of the petitioners subsequent marriage under Article 41 of the Family
Code of the Philippines, without prejudice to the effect of reappearance of the said
absent spouse.

SO ORDERED.[20]

The OSG appealed the decision to the Court of Appeals (CA) which rendered judgment on

August 4, 2003, affirming the decision of the RTC.[21] The CA cited the ruling of this Court in

Republic v. Nolasco.[22]

The OSG filed a petition for review on certiorari of the CAs decision alleging that

respondent Alan B. Alegro failed to prove that he had a well-founded belief that Lea was already

dead.[23] It averred that the respondent failed to exercise reasonable and diligent efforts to
locate his wife. The respondent even admitted that Leas father told him on February 14, 1995

that Lea had been to their house but left without notice. The OSG pointed out that the

respondent reported his wifes disappearance to the local police and also to the NBI only after

the petitioner filed a motion to dismiss the petition. The petitioner avers that, as gleaned from

the evidence, the respondent did not really want to find and locate Lea. Finally, the petitioner

averred:

In view of the summary nature of proceedings under Article 41 of the

Family Code for the declaration of presumptive death of ones spouse, the degree
of due diligence set by this Honorable Court in the above-mentioned cases in
locating the whereabouts of a missing spouse must be strictly complied with.
There have been times when Article 41 of the Family Code had been resorted to
by parties wishing to remarry knowing fully well that their alleged missing
spouses are alive and well. It is even possible that those who cannot have their
marriages x x x declared null and void under Article 36 of the Family Code resort
to Article 41 of the Family Code for relief because of the x x x summary nature of
its proceedings.

It is the policy of the State to protect and strengthen the family as a basic
social institution. Marriage is the foundation of the family. Since marriage is an
inviolable social institution that the 1987 Constitution seeks to protect from
dissolution at the whim of the parties. For respondents failure to prove that he
had a well-founded belief that his wife is already
 dead and that he exerted the required amount of diligence in searching for
his missing wife, the petition for declaration of presumptive death should have
been denied by the trial court and the Honorable Court of Appeals.[24]

The petition is meritorious.

Article 41 of the Family Code of the Philippines reads:

Art. 41. A marriage contracted by any person during the subsistence of a

previous marriage shall be null and void, unless before the celebration of the
subsequent marriage, the prior spouse had been absent for four consecutive years
and the spouse present had a well-founded belief that the absent spouse was
already dead. In case of disappearance where there is danger under the
circumstances set forth in the provisions of Article 391 of the Civil Code, an
absence of only two years shall be sufficient.

For the purpose of contracting the subsequent marriage under the

preceding paragraph, the spouse present must institute a summary proceeding as
provided in this Code for the declaration of presumptive death of the absentee,
without prejudice to the effect of reappearance of the absent spouse.[25]

The spouse present is, thus, burdened to prove that his spouse has been absent and that he

has a well-founded belief that the absent spouse is already dead before the present spouse may

contract a subsequent marriage. The law does not define what is meant by a well-grounded

belief. Cuello Callon writes that es menester que su creencia sea firme se funde en motivos

racionales.[26]

Belief is a state of the mind or condition prompting the doing of an overt act. It may be

proved by direct evidence or circumstantial evidence which may tend, even in a slight degree, to

elucidate the inquiry or assist to a determination probably founded in truth. Any fact or
circumstance relating to the character, habits, conditions, attachments, prosperity and objects of

life which usually control the conduct of men, and are the motives of their actions, was, so far as

it tends to explain or characterize their disappearance or throw light on their intentions,[27]

competence evidence on the ultimate question of his death.

The belief of the present spouse must be the result of proper and honest to goodness

inquiries and efforts to ascertain the whereabouts of the absent spouse and whether the absent

spouse is still alive or is already dead. Whether or not the spouse present acted on a well-founded

belief of death of the absent spouse depends upon the inquiries to be drawn from a great many

circumstances occurring before and after the disappearance of the absent spouse and the nature

and extent of the inquiries made by present spouse.[28]

Although testimonial evidence may suffice to prove the well-founded belief of the present

spouse that the absent spouse is already dead, in Republic v. Nolasco,[29] the Court warned

against collusion between the parties when they find it impossible to dissolve the marital bonds

through existing legal means. It is also the maxim that men readily believe what they wish to

be true.

In this case, the respondent failed to present a witness other than Barangay Captain Juan

Magat. The respondent even failed to present Janeth Bautista or Nelson Abaenza or any other

person from whom he allegedly made inquiries about Lea to corroborate his testimony. On the

other hand, the respondent admitted that when he returned to the house of his parents-in-law on
February 14, 1995, his father-in-law told him that Lea had just been there but that she left

without notice.

The respondent declared that Lea left their abode on February 7, 1995 after he chided her

for coming home late and for being always out of their house, and told her that it would be better

for her to go home to her parents if she enjoyed the life of a single person. Lea, thus, left their

conjugal abode and never returned. Neither did she communicate with the respondent after

leaving the conjugal abode because of her resentment to the chastisement she received from him

barely a month after their marriage. What is so worrisome is that, the respondent failed to make

inquiries from his parents-in-law regarding Leas whereabouts before filing his petition in the

RTC. It could have enhanced the credibility of the respondent had he made inquiries from his

parents-in-law about Leas whereabouts considering that Leas father was the owner of Radio

DYMS.

The respondent did report and seek the help of the local police authorities and the NBI to

locate Lea, but it was only an afterthought. He did so only after the OSG filed its notice to

dismiss his petition in the RTC.

In sum, the Court finds and so holds that the respondent failed to prove that he had a

well-founded belief, before he filed his petition in the RTC, that his spouse Rosalia (Lea) Julaton

was already dead.

 IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision of

the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 73749 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE.

Consequently, the Regional Trial Court of Catbalogan, Samar, Branch 27, is ORDERED to

DISMISS the respondents petition.

THIRD DIVISION

ANGELITA VALDEZ, G.R. No. 180863

Petitioner,

Present:

YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.,

Chairperson,

- versus - CHICO-NAZARIO,

VELASCO, JR.,

NACHURA, and

PERALTA, JJ.

Promulgated:

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES,

Respondent. September 8, 2009

x------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x

DECISION

NACHURA, J.:

Before this Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court assailing the Decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Camiling, Tarlac dated
November 12, 2007 dismissing petitioner Angelita Valdezs petition for the declaration of
presumptive death of her husband, Sofio Polborosa (Sofio).

The facts of the case are as follows:

Petitioner married Sofio on January 11, 1971 in Pateros, Rizal. On December 13, 1971,
petitioner gave birth to the spouses only child, Nancy. According to petitioner, she and Sofio
argued constantly because the latter was unemployed and did not bring home any money. In
March 1972, Sofio left their conjugal dwelling. Petitioner and their child waited for him to return
but, finally, in May 1972, petitioner decided to go back to her parents home in Bancay 1st,
Camiling, Tarlac. Three years passed without any word from Sofio. In October 1975, Sofio
showed up at Bancay 1st. He and petitioner talked for several hours and they agreed to separate.
They executed a document to that effect. That was the last time petitioner saw him. After that,
petitioner didnt hear any news of Sofio, his whereabouts or even if he was alive or not.

Believing that Sofio was already dead, petitioner married Virgilio Reyes on June 20,
1985. Subsequently, however, Virgilios application for naturalization filed with the United
States Department of Homeland Security was denied because petitioners marriage to Sofio was
subsisting. Hence, on March 29, 2007, petitioner filed a Petition before the RTC of Camiling,
Tarlac seeking the declaration of presumptive death of Sofio.

The RTC rendered its Decision on November 12, 2007, dismissing the Petition for lack of
merit. The RTC held that Angelita was not able to prove the well-grounded belief that her
husband Sofio Polborosa was already dead. It said that under Article 41 of the Family Code, the
present spouse is burdened to prove that her spouse has been absent and that she has a well-
founded belief that the absent spouse is already dead before the present spouse may contract a
subsequent marriage. This belief, the RTC said, must be the result of proper and honest-to-
goodness inquiries and efforts to ascertain the whereabouts of the absent spouse.

The RTC found that, by petitioners own admission, she did not try to find her husband
anymore in light of their mutual agreement to live separately. Likewise, petitioners daughter
testified that her mother prevented her from looking for her father. The RTC also said there is a
strong possibility that Sofio is still alive, considering that he would have been only 61 years old
by then, and people who have reached their 60s have not become increasingly low in health and
spirits, and, even assuming as true petitioners testimony that Sofio was a chain smoker and a
drunkard, there is no evidence that he continues to drink and smoke until now.
 Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration. She argued that it is the Civil Code that
applies in this case and not the Family Code since petitioners marriage to Sofio was celebrated
on January 11, 1971, long before the Family Code took effect. Petitioner further argued that she
had acquired a vested right under the provisions of the Civil Code and the stricter provisions of
the Family Code should not be applied against her because Title XIV of the Civil Code, where
Articles 384 and 390 on declaration of absence and presumption of death, respectively, can be
found, was not expressly repealed by the Family Code. To apply the stricter provisions of the
Family Code will impair the rights petitioner had acquired under the Civil Code.

The RTC denied the Motion for Reconsideration in a Resolution dated December 10,
2007.

Petitioner now comes before this Court seeking the reversal of the RTC Decision and
Motion for Reconsideration.

In its Manifestation and Motion, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) recommended
that the Court set aside the assailed RTC Decision and grant the Petition to declare Sofio
presumptively dead. The OSG argues that the requirement of well-founded belief under Article
41 of the Family Code is not applicable to the instant case. It said that petitioner could not be
expected to comply with this requirement because it was not yet in existence during her marriage
to Virgilio Reyes in 1985. The OSG further argues that before the effectivity of the Family Code,
petitioner already acquired a vested right as to the validity of her marriage to Virgilio Reyes
based on the presumed death of Sofio under the Civil Code. This vested right and the
presumption of Sofios death, the OSG posits, could not be affected by the obligations created
under the Family Code.
 Next, the OSG contends that Article 390 of the Civil Code was not repealed by Article 41
of the Family Code. Title XIV of the Civil Code, the OSG said, was not one of those expressly
repealed by the Family Code. Moreover, Article 256 of the Family Code provides that its
provisions shall not be retroactively applied if they will prejudice or impair vested or acquired
rights.

The RTC Decision, insofar as it dismissed the Petition, is affirmed. However, we must
state that we are denying the Petition on grounds different from those cited in the RTC Decision.

Initially, we discuss a procedural issue. Under the Rules of Court, a party may directly
appeal to this Court from a decision of the trial court only on pure questions of law. A question of
law lies, on one hand, when the doubt or difference arises as to what the law is on a certain set of
facts; on the other hand, a question of fact exists when the doubt or difference arises as to the
truth or falsehood of the alleged facts. Here, the facts are not disputed; the controversy merely
relates to the correct application of the law or jurisprudence to the undisputed facts.

The RTC erred in applying the provisions of the Family Code and holding that petitioner
needed to prove a well-founded belief that Sofio was already dead. The RTC applied Article 41
of the Family Code, to wit:

Art. 41. A marriage contracted by any person during subsistence of a

previous marriage shall be null and void, unless before the celebration of the
subsequent marriage, the prior spouse had been absent for four consecutive years
and the spouse present has a well-founded belief that the absent spouse was
already dead. In case of disappearance where there is danger under the
circumstances set forth in the provisions of Article 391 of the Civil Code, an
absence of only two years shall be sufficient.
 For the purpose of contracting a subsequent marriage under the preceding
paragraph, the spouse present must institute a summary proceeding as provided in
this Code for the declaration of presumptive death of the absentee, without
prejudice to the effect of reappearance of the absent spouse.

It is readily apparent, however, that the marriages of petitioner to Sofio and Virgilio on
January 11, 1971 and June 20, 1985, respectively, were both celebrated under the auspices of the
Civil Code.
 The pertinent provision of the Civil Code is Article 83:

Art. 83. Any marriage subsequently contracted by any person during the
lifetime of the first spouse of such person with any person other than such first
spouse shall be illegal and void from its performance, unless:

(1) The first marriage was annulled or dissolved; or

(2) The first spouse had been absent for seven consecutive years at the
time of the second marriage without the spouse present having news of the
absentee being alive, of if the absentee, though he has been absent for less than
seven years, is generally considered as dead and believed to be so by the spouse
present at the time of contracting such subsequent marriage, or if the absentee is
presumed dead according to Articles 390 and 391. The marriage so contracted
shall be valid in any of the three cases until declared null and void by a competent
court.

Article 390 of the Civil Code states:

Art. 390. After an absence of seven years, it being unknown whether or

not the absentee still lives, he shall be presumed dead for all purposes, except for
those of succession.

The absentee shall not be presumed dead for the purpose of opening his
succession till after an absence of ten years. If he disappeared after the age of
seventy-five years, an absence of five years shall be sufficient in order that his
succession may be opened.

The Court, on several occasions, had interpreted the above-quoted provision in this
wise:
 For the purposes of the civil marriage law, it is not necessary to have the former
spouse judicially declared an absentee. The declaration of absence made in
accordance with the provisions of the Civil Code has for its sole purpose to enable
the taking of the necessary precautions for the administration of the estate of the
absentee. For the celebration of civil marriage, however, the law only requires that
the former spouse has been absent for seven consecutive years at the time of the
second marriage, that the spouse present does not know his or her former spouse
to be living, that such former spouse is generally reputed to be dead and the
spouse present so believes at the time of the celebration of the marriage.

Further, the Court explained that presumption of death cannot be the subject of court proceedings
independent of the settlement of the absentees estate.

In re Szatraw is instructive. In that case, petitioner contracted marriage with a Polish

national in 1937. They lived together as husband and wife for three years. Sometime in 1940, the
husband, on the pretext of visiting some friends, left the conjugal abode with their child and
never returned. After inquiring from friends, petitioner found that her husband went to Shanghai,
China. However, friends who came from Shanghai told her that the husband was not seen there.
In 1948, petitioner filed a petition for the declaration of presumptive death of her husband
arguing that since the latter had been absent for more than seven years and she had not heard any
news from him and about her child, she believes that he is dead. In deciding the case, the Court
said:

The petition is not for the settlement of the estate of Nicolai Szatraw,
because it does not appear that he possessed property brought to the marriage and
because he had acquired no property during his married life with the petitioner.
The rule invoked by the latter is merely one of evidence which permits the court
to presume that a person is dead after the fact that such person had been unheard
from in seven years had been established. This presumption may arise and be
invoked and made in a case, either in an action or in a special proceeding, which
is tried or heard by, and submitted for decision to, a competent court.
Independently of such an action or special proceeding, the presumption of
death cannot be invoked, nor can it be made the subject of an action or
special proceeding. In this case, there is no right to be enforced nor is there a
 remedy prayed for by the petitioner against her absent husband. Neither is there a
prayer for the final determination of his right or status or for the ascertainment of
a particular fact (Hagans v. Wislizenus, 42 Phil. 880), for the petition does not
pray for a declaration that the petitioner's husband is dead, but merely asks for a
declaration that he be presumed dead because he had been unheard from in seven
years. If there is any pretense at securing a declaration that the petitioner's
husband is dead, such a pretension cannot be granted because it is unauthorized.
The petition is for a declaration that the petitioner's husband is presumptively
dead. But this declaration, even if judicially made, would not improve the
petitioner's situation, because such a presumption is already established by law. A
judicial pronouncement to that effect, even if final and executory, would still
be a prima facie presumption only. It is still disputable. It is for that reason
that it cannot be the subject of a judicial pronouncement or declaration, if it
is the only question or matter involved in a case, or upon which a competent
court has to pass. The latter must decide finally the controversy between the
parties, or determine finally the right or status of a party or establish finally a
particular fact, out of which certain rights and obligations arise or may arise; and
once such controversy is decided by a final judgment, or such right or status
determined, or such particular fact established, by a final decree, then the
judgment on the subject of the controversy, or the decree upon the right or status
of a party or upon the existence of a particular fact, becomes res judicata, subject
to no collateral attack, except in a few rare instances especially provided by law. It
is, therefore, clear that a judicial declaration that a person is presumptively
dead, because he had been unheard from in seven years, being a presumption
juris tantum only, subject to contrary proof, cannot reach the stage of finality
or become final. Proof of actual death of the person presumed dead because he
had been unheard from in seven years, would have to be made in another
proceeding to have such particular fact finally determined. If a judicial decree
declaring a person presumptively dead, because he had not been heard from in
seven years, cannot become final and executory even after the lapse of the
reglementary period within which an appeal may be taken, for such presumption
is still disputable and remains subject to contrary proof, then a petition for such a
declaration is useless, unnecessary, superfluous and of no benefit to the petitioner.

In Lukban v. Republic, petitioner Lourdes G. Lukban contracted marriage with Francisco

Chuidian on December 10, 1933. A few days later, on December 27, Francisco left Lourdes after
a violent quarrel. She did not hear from him after that day. Her diligent search, inquiries from
his parents and friends, and search in his last known address, proved futile. Believing her
husband was already dead since he had been absent for more than twenty years, petitioner filed a
petition in 1956 for a declaration that she is a widow of her husband who is presumed to be dead
and has no legal impediment to contract a subsequent marriage. On the other hand, the
antecedents in Gue v. Republic are similar to Szatraw. On January 5, 1946, Angelina Gues
husband left Manila where they were residing and went to Shanghai, China. From that day on, he
had not been heard of, had not written to her, nor in anyway communicated with her as to his
whereabouts. Despite her efforts and diligence, she failed to locate him. After 11 years, she asked
the court for a declaration of the presumption of death of Willian Gue, pursuant to the provisions
of Article 390 of the Civil Code of the Philippines.

In both cases, the Court reiterated its ruling in Szatraw. It held that a petition for judicial
declaration that petitioner's husband is presumed to be dead cannot be entertained because it is
not authorized by law.

From the foregoing, it can be gleaned that, under the Civil Code, the presumption of
death is established by law and no court declaration is needed for the presumption to arise. Since
death is presumed to have taken place by the seventh year of absence, Sofio is to be presumed
dead starting October 1982.

Consequently, at the time of petitioners marriage to Virgilio, there existed no

impediment to petitioners capacity to marry, and the marriage is valid under paragraph 2 of
Article 83 of the Civil Code.

Further, considering that it is the Civil Code that applies, proof of well-founded belief
is not required. Petitioner could not have been expected to comply with this requirement since
the Family Code was not yet in effect at the time of her marriage to Virgilio. The enactment of
the Family Code in 1988 does not change this conclusion. The Family Code itself states:
 Art. 256. This Code shall have retroactive effect insofar as it does not
prejudice or impair vested or acquired rights in accordance with the Civil Code or
other laws.

To retroactively apply the provisions of the Family Code requiring petitioner to exhibit
well-founded belief will, ultimately, result in the invalidation of her second marriage, which
was valid at the time it was celebrated. Such a situation would be untenable and would go against
the objectives that the Family Code wishes to achieve.

In sum, we hold that the Petition must be dismissed since no decree on the presumption of
Sofios death can be granted under the Civil Code, the same presumption having arisen by
operation of law. However, we declare that petitioner was capacitated to marry Virgilio at the
time their marriage was celebrated in 1985 and, therefore, the said marriage is legal and valid.

WHEREFORE, the foregoing premises considered, the Petition is DENIED.

THIRD DIVISION
LOLITA D. ENRICO, G.R. No. 173614

Petitioner,

Present:

YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.

Chairperson,
- versus -
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,

CHICO-NAZARIO,

NACHURA, and

REYES, JJ.
HEIRS OF SPS. EULOGIO B.
MEDINACELI AND TRINIDAD CATLI-
MEDINACELI, REPRESENTED BY
VILMA M. ARTICULO,

Respondents.
Promulgated:

September 28, 2007

x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x

DECISION

CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
 The instant Petition for Certiorari filed under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure assails the Order, dated 3 May 2006 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Aparri,
Cagayan, Branch 6, in Civil Case No. II-4057, granting reconsideration of its Order, dated 11
October 2005, and reinstating respondents Complaint for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage.

On 17 March 2005, respondents, heirs of Spouses Eulogio B. Medinaceli (Eulogio) and

Trinidad Catli-Medinaceli (Trinidad) filed with the RTC, an action for declaration of nullity of
marriage of Eulogio and petitioner Lolita D. Enrico. Substantially, the complaint alleged, inter
alia, that Eulogio and Trinidad were married on 14 June 1962, in Lal-lo, Cagayan. They begot
seven children, herein respondents, namely: Eduardo, Evelyn, Vilma, Mary Jane, Haizel,
Michelle and Joseph Lloyd. On 1 May 2004, Trinidad died. On 26 August 2004, Eulogio
married petitioner before the Municipal Mayor of Lal-lo, Cagayan. Six months later, or on 10
February 2005, Eulogio passed away.

In impugning petitioners marriage to Eulogio, respondents averred that the same was
entered into without the requisite marriage license. They argued that Article 34 of the Family
Code, which exempts a man and a woman who have been living together for at least five years
without any legal impediment from securing a marriage license, was not applicable to petitioner
and Eulogio because they could not have lived together under the circumstances required by said
provision. Respondents posited that the marriage of Eulogio to Trinidad was dissolved only
upon the latters death, or on 1 May 2004, which was barely three months from the date of
marriage of Eulogio to petitioner. Therefore, petitioner and Eulogio could not have lived
together as husband and wife for at least five years. To further their cause, respondents raised the
additional ground of lack of marriage ceremony due to Eulogios serious illness which made its
performance impossible.
 In her Answer, petitioner maintained that she and Eulogio lived together as husband and
wife under one roof for 21 years openly and publicly; hence, they were exempted from the
requirement of a marriage license. From their union were born Elvin Enrico and Marco Enrico,
all surnamed Medinaceli, on 28 October 1988 and 30 October 1991, respectively. She further
contended that the marriage ceremony was performed in the Municipal Hall of Lal-lo, Cagayan,
and solemnized by the Municipal Mayor. As an affirmative defense, she sought the dismissal of
the action on the ground that it is only the contracting parties while living who can file an action
for declaration of nullity of marriage.

On 11 October 2005, the RTC issued an Order, granting the dismissal of the Complaint for
lack of cause of action. It cited A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC, dated 7 March 2003, promulgated by the
Supreme Court En Banc as basis. The RTC elucidated on its position in the following manner:

The Complaint should be dismissed.

1) Administrative Matter No. 02-11-10-SC promulgated by the Supreme Court

which took effect on March 15, 2003 provides in Section 2, par. (a) that a petition
for Declaration of Absolute Nullity of a Void Marriage may be filed solely by the
husband or the wife. The language of this rule is plain and simple which states
that such a petition may be filed solely by the husband or the wife. The rule
is clear and unequivocal that only the husband or the wife may file the
petition for Declaration of Absolute Nullity of a Void Marriage. The reading
of this Court is that the right to bring such petition is exclusive and this right
solely belongs to them. Consequently, the heirs of the deceased spouse cannot
substitute their late father in bringing the action to declare the marriage null and
void. (Emphasis supplied.)

The dispositive portion of the Order, thus, reads:

 WHEREFORE, [the] Motion to Dismiss raised as an affirmative defense
in the answer is hereby GRANTED. Accordingly, the Complaint filed by the
[respondents] is hereby DISMISSED with costs de officio.

Respondents filed a Motion for Reconsideration thereof. Following the filing by petitioner
of her Comment to the said motion, the RTC rendered an Order dated 3 May 2006, reversing its
Order of 11 October 2005. Hence, the RTC reinstated the complaint on the ratiocination that the
assailed Order ignored the ruling in Nial v. Bayadog, which was on the authority for holding
that the heirs of a deceased spouse have the standing to assail a void marriage even after the
death of the latter. It held that Section 2(a) of A.M. No. 02-11-20-SC, which provides that a
petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriage may be filed solely by the husband or
the wife, applies only where both parties to a void marriage are still living. Where one or both
parties are deceased, the RTC held that the heirs may file a petition to declare the marriage void.
The RTC expounded on its stance, thus:

The questioned Order disregarded the case of Nial vs. Bayadog, 328 SCRA 122
(March 14, 2000) in which the Supreme Court, First Division, held that the heirs
of a deceased person may file a petition for the declaration of his marriage after
his death. The Order subject of this motion for reconsideration held that the case
of Nial vs. Bayadog is now superseded by the new Rule on Declaration of
Absolute Nullity of Marriages (hereinafter referred to as the Rule) because the
Supreme Court has rejected the case of Nial vs. Bayadog by approving the Rule
on Nullity of Void Marriages. The Order further held that it is only the husband
or the wife who is (sic) the only parties allowed to file an action for declaration of
nullity of their marriage and such right is purely personal and is not transmissible
upon the death of the parties.

It is admitted that there seems to be a conflict between the case of Nial

vs. Bayadog and Section 2(a) of the Rule. In view of this, the Court shall try to
reconcile the case of Nial vs. Bayadog and the Rule. To reconcile, the Court will
have to determine [the] basic rights of the parties. The rights of the legitimate
heirs of a person who entered into a void marriage will be prejudiced particularly
with respect to their successional rights. During the lifetime of the parent[,] the
heirs have only an inchoate right over the property of the said parents. Hence,
during the lifetime of the parent, it would be proper that it should solely be the
parent who should be allowed to file a petition to declare his marriage void.
However, upon the death of the parent his heirs have already a vested right over
whatever property left by the parent. Such vested right should not be frustrated
by any rules of procedure such as the Rule. Rules of Procedure cannot repeal
rights granted by substantive law. The heirs, then, have a legal standing in Court.

If the heirs are prohibited from questioning the void marriage entered by
their parent, especially when the marriage is illegal and feloniously entered into, it
will give premium to such union because the guilty parties will seldom, if ever at
all, ask for the annulment of the marriage. Such void marriage will be given a
semblance of validity if the heirs will not be allowed to file the petition after the
death of the parent.

For these reasons, this Court believes that Sec. 2(a) of the Rules on
Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Marriage is applicable only when both parties
to a (sic) void marriage are still living. Upon the death of anyone of the guilty
party to the void marriage, his heirs may file a petition to declare the the (sic)
marriage void, but the Rule is not applicable as it was not filed b the husband or
the wife. It shall be the ordinary rule of civil procedure which shall be applicable.

Perforce, the decretal portion of the RTC Order of 3 May 2006 states:

In view of the foregoing, the Court grants the motion for reconsideration
dated October 31, 2005 and reinstate this case.
 Aggrieved, petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the foregoing Order;
however, on 1 June 2006, the RTC denied the said motion on the ground that no new matter was
raised therein.

Hence, the instant Petition under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure on the
sole question of whether the case law as embodied in Nial, or the Rule on Declaration of
Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages, as specified in A.M.
No. 02-11-10-SC of the Supreme Court applies to the case at bar.

At the outset, we note that petitioner took an abbreviated route to this Court,
countenancing the hierarchy of courts.

We have earlier emphasized that while the Supreme Court has the concurrent jurisdiction
with the Court of Appeals and the RTCs (for writs enforceable within their respective regions), to
issue writs of mandamus, prohibition or certiorari, the litigants are well advised against taking a
direct recourse to this Court. Instead, they should initially seek the proper relief from the lower
courts. As a court of last resort, this Court should not be burdened with the task of dealing with
causes in the first instance. Where the issuance of an extraordinary writ is concurrently within
the competence of the Court of Appeals or the RTC, litigants must observe the principle of
hierarchy of courts. However, it cannot be gainsaid that this Court has the discretionary power to
brush aside procedural lapses if compelling reasons, or the nature and importance of the issues
raised, warrant the immediate exercise of its jurisdiction. Moreover, notwithstanding the
dismissibility of the instant Petition for its failure to observe the doctrine on the hierarchy of
courts, this Court will proceed to entertain the case grounded as it is on a pure question of law.
 Petitioner maintains that A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC governs the instant case. A contrario,
respondents posit that it is Nial which is applicable, whereby the heirs of the deceased person
were granted the right to file a petition for the declaration of nullity of his marriage after his
death.

We grant the Petition.

In reinstating respondents Complaint for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage, the RTC

acted with grave abuse of discretion.

While it is true that Nial in no uncertain terms allowed therein petitioners to file a
petition for the declaration of nullity of their fathers marriage to therein respondent after the
death of their father, we cannot, however, apply its ruling for the reason that the impugned
marriage therein was solemnized prior to the effectivity of the Family Code. The Court in Nial
recognized that the applicable law to determine the validity of the two marriages involved therein
is the Civil Code, which was the law in effect at the time of their celebration. What we have
before us belongs to a different milieu, i.e., the marriage sought to be declared void was entered
into during the effectivity of the Family Code. As can be gleaned from the facts, petitioners
marriage to Eulogio was celebrated in 2004.

The Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of

Voidable Marriages as contained in A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC is explicit in its scope, to wit:
 Section 1. Scope. This Rule shall govern petitions for declaration of
absolute nullity of void marriages and annulment of voidable marriages under the
Family Code of the Philippines.

The Rules of Court shall apply suppletorily. (Emphasis supplied.)

The categorical language of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC leaves no room for doubt. The
coverage extends only to those marriages entered into during the effectivity of the Family Code
which took effect on 3 August 1988.

Moreover, A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC took effect on 15 March 2003, following its
publication in a newspaper of general circulation. Thus, contrary to the opinion of the RTC,
there is no need to reconcile the provisions of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC with the ruling in Nial,
because they vary in scope and application. As has been emphasized, A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC
covers marriages under the Family Code of the Philippines, and is prospective in its application.
The marriage of petitioner to Eulogio was celebrated on 26 August 2004, and it squarely falls
within the ambit of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC.

Hence, in resolving the issue before us, we resort to Section 2(a) of A.M. No. 02-11-10-
SC, which provides:

Section 2. Petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriages.

 (a) Who may file. A petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void
marriage may be filed solely by the husband or the wife. (n) (Emphasis
supplied.)

There is no ambiguity in the Rule. Absolute sententil expositore non indiget. When the
language of the law is clear, no explanation of it is required. Section 2(a) of A.M. No. 02-11-10-
SC, makes it the sole right of the husband or the wife to file a petition for declaration of
absolute nullity of void marriage.

The Rationale of the Rules on Annulment of Voidable Marriages and Declaration of

Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages, Legal Separation and Provisional Orders explicates on
Section 2(a) in the following manner, viz:

1. Only an aggrieved or injured spouse may file petitions for annulment of

voidable marriages and declaration of absolute nullity of void marriages. Such
petitions cannot be filed by the compulsory or intestate heirs of the spouses
or by the State. [Section 2; Section 3, paragraph a]

Only an aggrieved or injured spouse may file a petition for annulment

of voidable marriages or declaration of absolute nullity of void marriages.
Such petition cannot be filed by compulsory or intestate heirs of the spouses
or by the State. The Committee is of the belief that they do not have a legal
right to file the petition. Compulsory or intestate heirs have only inchoate
rights prior to the death of their predecessor, and hence can only question the
validity of the marriage of the spouses upon the death of a spouse in a
proceeding for the settlement of the estate of the deceased spouse filed in the
regular courts. On the other hand, the concern of the State is to preserve
marriage and not to seek its dissolution. (Emphasis supplied.)
 Respondents clearly have no cause of action before the court a quo. Nonetheless, all is
not lost for respondents. While A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC declares that a petition for declaration of
absolute nullity of void marriage may be filed solely by the husband or the wife, it does not mean
that the compulsory or intestate heirs are already without any recourse under the law. They can
still protect their successional right, for, as stated in the Rationale of the Rules on Annulment of
Voidable Marriages and Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages, Legal Separation and
Provisional Orders, compulsory or intestate heirs can still question the validity of the marriage
of the spouses, not in a proceeding for declaration of nullity, but upon the death of a spouse in a
proceeding for the settlement of the estate of the deceased spouse filed in the regular courts.

WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED. Civil Case No. II-4057 filed before the
Regional Trial Court of Aparri, Cagayan, Branch 6, is ORDERED DISMISSED without
prejudice to challenging the validity of the marriage of Lolita D. Enrico to Eulogio B.
Medinaceli in a proceeding for the settlement of the estate of the latter. No costs.

Republic of the Philippines

Supreme Court

Manila

THIRD DIVISION

JUAN DE DIOS CARLOS, G.R. No. 179922

 Petitioner,
Present:

- versus - YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.,

Chairperson,

AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
FELICIDAD SANDOVAL, also CHICO-NAZARIO,
known as FELICIDAD S. VDA. NACHURA, and
DE CARLOS or FELICIDAD REYES, JJ.
SANDOVAL CARLOS or
FELICIDAD SANDOVAL VDA.
DE CARLOS, and TEOFILO Promulgated:
CARLOS II,
Respondents. December 16, 2008

x--------------------------------------------------x

DECISION

REYES, R.T., J.:

ONLY a spouse can initiate an action to sever the marital bond for marriages solemnized
during the effectivity of the Family Code, except cases commenced prior to March 15, 2003.
The nullity and annulment of a marriage cannot be declared in a judgment on the pleadings,
summary judgment, or confession of judgment.

We pronounce these principles as We review on certiorari the Decision of the Court of

Appeals (CA) which reversed and set aside the summary judgment of the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) in an action for declaration of nullity of marriage, status of a child, recovery of property,
reconveyance, sum of money, and damages.
The Facts

The events that led to the institution of the instant suit are unveiled as follows:

Spouses Felix B. Carlos and Felipa Elemia died intestate. They left six parcels of land
to their compulsory heirs, Teofilo Carlos and petitioner Juan De Dios Carlos. The lots are
particularly described as follows:

Parcel No. 1

Lot No. 162 of the MUNTINLUPA ESTATE SUBDIVISION, Case No. 6137 of
the Court of Land Registration.

Exemption from the provisions of Article 567 of the Civil Code is specifically
reserved.

Area: 1 hectare, 06 ares, 07 centares.

Parcel No. 2

A parcel of land (Lot No. 159-B), being a portion of Lot 159, situated in the Bo.
of Alabang, Municipality of Muntinlupa, Province of Rizal, x x x containing an
area of Thirteen Thousand Four Hundred Forty One (13,441) square meters.

Parcel No. 3

A parcel of land (Lot 159-B-2 of the subd. plan [LRC] Psd-325903, approved as a
non-subd. project), being a portion of Lot 159-B [LRC] Psd- Alabang, Mun. of
Muntinlupa, Metro Manila, Island of Luzon. Bounded on the NE, points 2 to 4 by
Lot 155, Muntinlupa Estate; on the SE, point 4 to 5 by Lot 159-B-5; on the S,
points 5 to 1 by Lot 159-B-3; on the W, points 1 to 2 by Lot 159-B-1 (Road
widening) all of the subd. plan, containing an area of ONE HUNDRED THIRTY
(130) SQ. METERS, more or less.
 PARCEL No. 4

A parcel of land (Lot 28-C of the subd. plan Psd-13-007090, being a portion of
Lot 28, Muntinlupa Estate, L.R.C. Rec. No. 6137), situated in the Bo. of Alabang,
Mun. of Muntinlupa, Metro Manila. Bounded on the NE, along lines 1-2 by Lot
27, Muntinlupa Estate; on the East & SE, along lines 2 to 6 by Mangangata River;
and on the West., along line 6-1, by Lot 28-B of the subd. plan x x x containing an
area of ONE THUSAND AND SEVENTY-SIX (1,076) SQUARE METERS.

PARCEL No. 5

PARCELA DE TERRENO No. 50, Manzana No. 18, de la subd. de Solocan.

Linda por el NW, con la parcela 49; por el NE, con la parcela 36; por el SE, con la
parcela 51; y por el SW, con la calle Dos Castillas. Partiendo de un punto
marcado 1 en el plano, el cual se halla a S. gds. 01'W, 72.50 mts. Desde el punto 1
de esta manzana, que es un mojon de concreto de la Ciudad de Manila, situado on
el esquina E. que forman las Calles Laong Laan y Dos. Castillas, continiendo un
extension superficial de CIENTO CINCUENTA (150) METROS CUADRADOS.

PARCEL No. 6

PARCELA DE TERRENO No. 51, Manzana No. 18, de la subd. De Solocon.

Linda por el NW, con la parcela 50; por el NE, con la parcela 37; por el SE, con la
parcela 52; por el SW, con la Calle Dos Castillas. Partiendo de un punto Marcado
1 en el plano, el cual se halla at S. 43 gds. 01'E, 82.50 mts. Desde el punto 1 de
esta manzana, que es un mojon de concreto de la Ciudad de Manila, situado on el
esquina E. que forman las Calles Laong Laan y Dos. Castillas, continiendo una
extension superficial de CIENTO CINCUENTA (150) METROS CUADRADOS.

During the lifetime of Felix Carlos, he agreed to transfer his estate to Teofilo. The
agreement was made in order to avoid the payment of inheritance taxes. Teofilo, in turn,
undertook to deliver and turn over the share of the other legal heir, petitioner Juan De Dios
Carlos.
 Eventually, the first three (3) parcels of land were transferred and registered in the name
of Teofilo. These three (3) lots are now covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No.
234824 issued by the Registry of Deeds of Makati City; TCT No. 139061 issued by the Registry
of Deeds of Makati City; and TCT No. 139058 issued by the Registry of Deeds of Makati City.

Parcel No. 4 was registered in the name of petitioner. The lot is now covered by TCT No.
160401 issued by the Registry of Deeds of Makati City.

On May 13, 1992, Teofilo died intestate. He was survived by respondents Felicidad and
their son, Teofilo Carlos II (Teofilo II). Upon Teofilos death, Parcel Nos. 5 & 6 were registered
in the name of respondent Felicidad and co-respondent, Teofilo II. The said two (2) parcels of
land are covered by TCT Nos. 219877 and 210878, respectively, issued by the Registry of Deeds
of Manila.

In 1994, petitioner instituted a suit against respondents before the RTC in Muntinlupa
City, docketed as Civil Case No. 94-1964. In the said case, the parties submitted and caused the
approval of a partial compromise agreement. Under the compromise, the parties acknowledged
their respective shares in the proceeds from the sale of a portion of the first parcel of land. This
includes the remaining 6,691-square-meter portion of said land.

On September 17, 1994, the parties executed a deed of extrajudicial partition, dividing
the remaining land of the first parcel between them.
 Meanwhile, in a separate case entitled Rillo v. Carlos, 2,331 square meters of the second
parcel of land were adjudicated in favor of plaintiffs Rillo. The remaining 10,000-square meter
portion was later divided between petitioner and respondents.

The division was incorporated in a supplemental compromise agreement executed on

August 17, 1994, with respect to Civil Case No. 94-1964. The parties submitted the
supplemental compromise agreement, which was approved accordingly.

Petitioner and respondents entered into two more contracts in August 1994. Under the
contracts, the parties equally divided between them the third and fourth parcels of land.

In August 1995, petitioner commenced an action, docketed as Civil Case No. 95-135,
against respondents before the court a quo with the following causes of action: (a) declaration of
nullity of marriage; (b) status of a child; (c) recovery of property; (d) reconveyance; and (e) sum
of money and damages. The complaint was raffled to Branch 256 of the RTC in Muntinlupa.

In his complaint, petitioner asserted that the marriage between his late brother Teofilo and
respondent Felicidad was a nullity in view of the absence of the required marriage license. He
likewise maintained that his deceased brother was neither the natural nor the adoptive father of
respondent Teofilo Carlos II.

Petitioner likewise sought the avoidance of the contracts he entered into with respondent
Felicidad with respect to the subject real properties. He also prayed for the cancellation of the
certificates of title issued in the name of respondents. He argued that the properties covered by
such certificates of title, including the sums received by respondents as proceeds, should be
reconveyed to him.
 Finally, petitioner claimed indemnification as and by way of moral and exemplary
damages, attorneys fees, litigation expenses, and costs of suit.

On October 16, 1995, respondents submitted their answer. They denied the material
averments of petitioners complaint. Respondents contended that the dearth of details regarding
the requisite marriage license did not invalidate Felicidads marriage to Teofilo. Respondents
declared that Teofilo II was the illegitimate child of the deceased Teofilo Carlos with another
woman.

On the grounds of lack of cause of action and lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter,
respondents prayed for the dismissal of the case before the trial court. They also asked that their
counterclaims for moral and exemplary damages, as well as attorneys fees, be granted.

But before the parties could even proceed to pre-trial, respondents moved for summary
judgment. Attached to the motion was the affidavit of the justice of the peace who solemnized
the marriage. Respondents also submitted the Certificate of Live Birth of respondent Teofilo II.
In the certificate, the late Teofilo Carlos and respondent Felicidad were designated as parents.

On January 5, 1996, petitioner opposed the motion for summary judgment on the ground
of irregularity of the contract evidencing the marriage. In the same breath, petitioner lodged his
own motion for summary judgment. Petitioner presented a certification from the Local Civil
Registrar of Calumpit, Bulacan, certifying that there is no record of birth of respondent Teofilo
II.
 Petitioner also incorporated in the counter-motion for summary judgment the testimony
of respondent Felicidad in another case. Said testimony was made in Civil Case No. 89-2384,
entitled Carlos v. Gorospe, before the RTC Branch 255, Las Pias. In her testimony, respondent
Felicidad narrated that co-respondent Teofilo II is her child with Teofilo.

Subsequently, the Office of the City Prosecutor of Muntinlupa submitted to the trial court
its report and manifestation, discounting the possibility of collusion between the parties.

RTC and CA Dispositions

On April 8, 1996, the RTC rendered judgment, disposing as follows:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, defendants (respondents) Motion

for Summary Judgment is hereby denied. Plaintiffs (petitioners) Counter-Motion
for Summary Judgment is hereby granted and summary judgment is hereby
rendered in favor of plaintiff as follows:

1. Declaring the marriage between defendant Felicidad Sandoval and

Teofilo Carlos solemnized at Silang, Cavite on May 14, 1962, evidenced by the
Marriage Certificate submitted in this case, null and void ab initio for lack of the
requisite marriage license;

2. Declaring that the defendant minor, Teofilo S. Carlos II, is not the
natural, illegitimate, or legally adopted child of the late Teofilo E. Carlos;

3. Ordering defendant Sandoval to pay and restitute to plaintiff the

sum of P18,924,800.00 together with the interest thereon at the legal rate from
date of filing of the instant complaint until fully paid;

4. Declaring plaintiff as the sole and exclusive owner of the parcel of

land, less the portion adjudicated to plaintiffs in Civil Case No. 11975, covered by
TCT No. 139061 of the Register of Deeds of Makati City, and ordering said
 Register of Deeds to cancel said title and to issue another title in the sole name of
plaintiff herein;

5. Declaring the Contract, Annex K of complaint, between plaintiff

and defendant Sandoval null and void, and ordering the Register of Deeds of
Makati City to cancel TCT No. 139058 in the name of Teofilo Carlos, and to issue
another title in the sole name of plaintiff herein;

6. Declaring the Contract, Annex M of the complaint, between

plaintiff and defendant Sandoval null and void;

7. Ordering the cancellation of TCT No. 210877 in the names of

defendant Sandoval and defendant minor Teofilo S. Carlos II and ordering the
Register of Deeds of Manila to issue another title in the exclusive name of
plaintiff herein;

8. Ordering the cancellation of TCT No. 210878 in the name of

defendant Sandoval and defendant Minor Teofilo S. Carlos II and ordering the
Register of Deeds of Manila to issue another title in the sole name of plaintiff
herein.

Let this case be set for hearing for the reception of plaintiffs evidence on
his claim for moral damages, exemplary damages, attorneys fees, appearance
fees, and litigation expenses on June 7, 1996 at 1:30 o'clock in the afternoon.

SO ORDERED.

Dissatisfied, respondents appealed to the CA. In the appeal, respondents argued, inter
alia, that the trial court acted without or in excess of jurisdiction in rendering summary judgment
annulling the marriage of Teofilo, Sr. and Felicidad and in declaring Teofilo II as not an
illegitimate child of Teofilo, Sr.

On October 15, 2002, the CA reversed and set aside the RTC ruling, disposing as follows:
 WHEREFORE, the summary judgment appealed from is REVERSED and
SET ASIDE and in lieu thereof, a new one is entered REMANDING the case to
the court of origin for further proceedings.

SO ORDERED.

The CA opined:

We find the rendition of the herein appealed summary judgment by the

court a quo contrary to law and public policy as ensconced in the aforesaid
safeguards. The fact that it was appellants who first sought summary judgment
from the trial court, did not justify the grant thereof in favor of appellee. Not
being an action to recover upon a claim or to obtain a declaratory relief, the
rule on summary judgment apply (sic) to an action to annul a marriage. The mere
fact that no genuine issue was presented and the desire to expedite the
disposition of the case cannot justify a misinterpretation of the rule. The first
paragraph of Article 88 and 101 of the Civil Code expressly prohibit the
rendition of decree of annulment of a marriage upon a stipulation of facts or a
confession of judgment. Yet, the affidavits annexed to the petition for summary
judgment practically amount to these methods explicitly proscribed by the law.

We are not unmindful of appellees argument that the foregoing safeguards

have traditionally been applied to prevent collusion of spouses in the matter of
dissolution of marriages and that the death of Teofilo Carlos on May 13, 1992 had
effectively dissolved the marriage herein impugned. The fact, however, that
appellees own brother and appellant Felicidad Sandoval lived together as
husband and wife for thirty years and that the annulment of their marriage is the
very means by which the latter is sought to be deprived of her participation in the
estate left by the former call for a closer and more thorough inquiry into the
circumstances surrounding the case. Rather that the summary nature by which the
court a quo resolved the issues in the case, the rule is to the effect that the material
facts alleged in the complaint for annulment of marriage should always be proved.
Section 1, Rule 19 of the Revised Rules of Court provides:

Section 1. Judgment on the pleadings. Where an answer

fails to tender an issue, or otherwise admits the material allegations
of the adverse party's pleading, the court may, on motion of that
party, direct judgment on such pleading. But in actions for
annulment of marriage or for legal separation, the material facts
 alleged in the complaint shall always be proved. (Underscoring
supplied)

Moreover, even if We were to sustain the applicability of the rules on

summary judgment to the case at bench, Our perusal of the record shows that the
finding of the court a quo for appellee would still not be warranted. While it may
be readily conceded that a valid marriage license is among the formal requisites of
marriage, the absence of which renders the marriage void ab initio pursuant to
Article 80(3) in relation to Article 58 of the Civil Code the failure to reflect the
serial number of the marriage license on the marriage contract evidencing the
marriage between Teofilo Carlos and appellant Felicidad Sandoval, although
irregular, is not as fatal as appellee represents it to be. Aside from the dearth of
evidence to the contrary, appellant Felicidad Sandovals affirmation of the
existence of said marriage license is corroborated by the following statement in
the affidavit executed by Godofredo Fojas, then Justice of the Peace who
officiated the impugned marriage, to wit:

That as far as I could remember, there was a marriage

license issued at Silang, Cavite on May 14, 1962 as basis of the
said marriage contract executed by Teofilo Carlos and Felicidad
Sandoval, but the number of said marriage license was
inadvertently not placed in the marriage contract for the reason that
it was the Office Clerk who filled up the blanks in the Marriage
Contract who in turn, may have overlooked the same.

Rather than the inferences merely drawn by the trial court, We are of the
considered view that the veracity and credibility of the foregoing statement as
well as the motivations underlying the same should be properly threshed out in a
trial of the case on the merits.

If the non-presentation of the marriage contract the primary evidence of

marriage is not proof that a marriage did not take place, neither should
appellants non-presentation of the subject marriage license be taken as proof that
the same was not procured. The burden of proof to show the nullity of the
marriage, it must be emphasized, rests upon the plaintiff and any doubt should be
resolved in favor of the validity of the marriage.

Considering that the burden of proof also rests on the party who disputes
the legitimacy of a particular party, the same may be said of the trial courts
rejection of the relationship between appellant Teofilo Carlos II and his putative
father on the basis of the inconsistencies in appellant Felicidad Sandovals
statements. Although it had effectively disavowed appellants prior claims
regarding the legitimacy of appellant Teofilo Carlos II, the averment in the answer
that he is the illegitimate son of appellees brother, to Our mind, did not altogether
foreclose the possibility of the said appellants illegitimate filiation, his right to
prove the same or, for that matter, his entitlement to inheritance rights as such.
 Without trial on the merits having been conducted in the case, We find
appellees bare allegation that appellant Teofilo Carlos II was merely purchased
from an indigent couple by appellant Felicidad Sandoval, on the whole,
insufficient to support what could well be a minors total forfeiture of the rights
arising from his putative filiation. Inconsistent though it may be to her previous
statements, appellant Felicidad Sandovals declaration regarding the illegitimate
filiation of Teofilo Carlos II is more credible when considered in the light of the
fact that, during the last eight years of his life, Teofilo Carlos allowed said
appellant the use of his name and the shelter of his household. The least that the
trial court could have done in the premises was to conduct a trial on the merits in
order to be able to thoroughly resolve the issues pertaining to the filiation of
appellant Teofilo Carlos II.

On November 22, 2006, petitioner moved for reconsideration and for the inhibition of the
ponente, Justice Rebecca De Guia-Salvador. The CA denied the twin motions.

Issues

In this petition under Rule 45, petitioner hoists the following issues:

1. That, in reversing and setting aside the Summary Judgment under the
Decision, Annex A hereof, and in denying petitioners Motion for reconsideration
under the Resolution, Annex F hereof, with respect to the nullity of the impugned
marriage, petitioner respectfully submits that the Court of Appeals committed a
grave reversible error in applying Articles 88 and 101 of the Civil Code, despite
the fact that the circumstances of this case are different from that contemplated
and intended by law, or has otherwise decided a question of substance not
theretofore decided by the Supreme Court, or has decided it in a manner probably
not in accord with law or with the applicable decisions of this Honorable Court;

2. That in setting aside and reversing the Summary Judgment and, in lieu
thereof, entering another remanding the case to the court of origin for further
proceedings, petitioner most respectfully submits that the Court of Appeals
 committed a serious reversible error in applying Section 1, Rule 19 (now Section
1, Rule 34) of the Rules of Court providing for judgment on the pleadings, instead
of Rule 35 governing Summary Judgments;

3. That in reversing and setting aside the Summary Judgment and, in lieu
thereof, entering another remanding the case to the court of origin for further
proceedings, petitioner most respectfully submits that the Court of Appeals
committed grave abuse of discretion, disregarded judicial admissions, made
findings on ground of speculations, surmises, and conjectures, or otherwise
committed misapplications of the laws and misapprehension of the facts.
(Underscoring supplied)

Essentially, the Court is tasked to resolve whether a marriage may be declared void ab
initio through a judgment on the pleadings or a summary judgment and without the benefit of a
trial. But there are other procedural issues, including the capacity of one who is not a spouse in
bringing the action for nullity of marriage.

Our Ruling

I. The grounds for declaration of absolute nullity of marriage must be proved.

Neither judgment on the pleadings nor summary judgment is allowed. So is confession of
judgment disallowed.

Petitioner faults the CA in applying Section 1, Rule 19 of the Revised Rules of Court,
which provides:

SECTION 1. Judgment on the pleadings. Where an answer fails to

tender an issue, or otherwise admits the material allegations of the adverse partys
pleading, the court may, on motion of that party, direct judgment on such
 pleading. But in actions for annulment of marriage or for legal separation, the
material facts alleged in the complaint shall always be proved.

He argues that the CA should have applied Rule 35 of the Rules of Court governing
summary judgment, instead of the rule on judgment on the pleadings.

Petitioner is misguided. The CA did not limit its finding solely within the provisions of the
Rule on judgment on the pleadings. In disagreeing with the trial court, the CA likewise
considered the provisions on summary judgments, to wit:

Moreover, even if We are to sustain the applicability of the rules on

summary judgment to the case at bench, Our perusal of the record shows that the
finding of the court a quo for appellee would still not be warranted. x x x

But whether it is based on judgment on the pleadings or summary judgment, the CA was
correct in reversing the summary judgment rendered by the trial court. Both the rules on
judgment on the pleadings and summary judgments have no place in cases of declaration of
absolute nullity of marriage and even in annulment of marriage.

With the advent of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC, known as Rule on Declaration of Absolute
Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages, the question on the
application of summary judgments or even judgment on the pleadings in cases of nullity or
annulment of marriage has been stamped with clarity. The significant principle laid down by the
said Rule, which took effect on March 15, 2003 is found in Section 17, viz.:
 SEC. 17. Trial. (1) The presiding judge shall personally conduct the trial
of the case. No delegation of evidence to a commissioner shall be allowed except
as to matters involving property relations of the spouses.

(2) The grounds for declaration of absolute nullity or annulment of

marriage must be proved. No judgment on the pleadings, summary judgment, or
confession of judgment shall be allowed. (Underscoring supplied)

Likewise instructive is the Courts pronouncement in Republic v. Sandiganbayan. In that

case, We excluded actions for nullity or annulment of marriage from the application of summary
judgments.

Prescinding from the foregoing discussion, save for annulment of marriage

or declaration of its nullity or for legal separation, summary judgment is
applicable to all kinds of actions. (Underscoring supplied)

By issuing said summary judgment, the trial court has divested the State of its lawful
right and duty to intervene in the case. The participation of the State is not terminated by the
declaration of the public prosecutor that no collusion exists between the parties. The State
should have been given the opportunity to present controverting evidence before the judgment
was rendered.

Both the Civil Code and the Family Code ordain that the court should order the prosecuting
attorney to appear and intervene for the State. It is at this stage when the public prosecutor sees
to it that there is no suppression of evidence. Concomitantly, even if there is no suppression of
evidence, the public prosecutor has to make sure that the evidence to be presented or laid down
before the court is not fabricated.
 To further bolster its role towards the preservation of marriage, the Rule on
Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages reiterates the duty of the public prosecutor,
viz.:

SEC. 13. Effect of failure to appear at the pre-trial. (a) x x x

(b) x x x If there is no collusion, the court shall require the public

prosecutor to intervene for the State during the trial on the merits to prevent
suppression or fabrication of evidence. (Underscoring supplied)

Truly, only the active participation of the public prosecutor or the Solicitor General
will ensure that the interest of the State is represented and protected in proceedings for
declaration of nullity of marriages by preventing the fabrication or suppression of evidence.

II. A petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriage may be filed solely
by the husband or wife. Exceptions: (1) Nullity of marriage cases commenced before the
effectivity of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC; and (2) Marriages celebrated during the effectivity of
the Civil Code.

Under the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of
Voidable Marriages, the petition for declaration of absolute nullity of marriage may not be filed
by any party outside of the marriage. The Rule made it exclusively a right of the spouses by
stating:
 SEC. 2. Petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriages.

(a) Who may file. A petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void
marriage may be filed solely by the husband or the wife. (Underscoring supplied)

Section 2(a) of the Rule makes it the sole right of the husband or the wife to file a
petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriage. The rationale of the Rule is
enlightening, viz.:

Only an aggrieved or injured spouse may file a petition for annulment of

voidable marriages or declaration of absolute nullity of void marriages. Such
petition cannot be filed by compulsory or intestate heirs of the spouses or by the
State. The Committee is of the belief that they do not have a legal right to file the
petition. Compulsory or intestate heirs have only inchoate rights prior to the
death of their predecessor, and, hence, can only question the validity of the
marriage of the spouses upon the death of a spouse in a proceeding for the
settlement of the estate of the deceased spouse filed in the regular courts. On the
other hand, the concern of the State is to preserve marriage and not to seek its
dissolution. (Underscoring supplied)

The new Rule recognizes that the husband and the wife are the sole architects of a
healthy, loving, peaceful marriage. They are the only ones who can decide when and how to
build the foundations of marriage. The spouses alone are the engineers of their marital life. They
are simultaneously the directors and actors of their matrimonial true-to-life play. Hence, they
alone can and should decide when to take a cut, but only in accordance with the grounds
allowed by law.

The innovation incorporated in A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC sets forth a demarcation line
between marriages covered by the Family Code and those solemnized under the Civil Code. The
Rule extends only to marriages entered into during the effectivity of the Family Code which took
effect on August 3, 1988.

The advent of the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages marks the
beginning of the end of the right of the heirs of the deceased spouse to bring a nullity of
marriage case against the surviving spouse. But the Rule never intended to deprive the
compulsory or intestate heirs of their successional rights.

While A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC declares that a petition for declaration of absolute nullity of
marriage may be filed solely by the husband or the wife, it does not mean that the compulsory
or intestate heirs are without any recourse under the law. They can still protect their
successional right, for, as stated in the Rationale of the Rules on Annulment of Voidable
Marriages and Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages, compulsory or intestate
heirs can still question the validity of the marriage of the spouses, not in a proceeding for
declaration of nullity but upon the death of a spouse in a proceeding for the settlement of the
estate of the deceased spouse filed in the regular courts.

It is emphasized, however, that the Rule does not apply to cases already commenced
before March 15, 2003 although the marriage involved is within the coverage of the Family
Code. This is so, as the new Rule which became effective on March 15, 2003 is prospective in
its application. Thus, the Court held in Enrico v. Heirs of Sps. Medinaceli, viz.:

As has been emphasized, A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC covers marriages under

the Family Code of the Philippines, and is prospective in its application.
(Underscoring supplied)
 Petitioner commenced the nullity of marriage case against respondent Felicidad in 1995.
The marriage in controversy was celebrated on May 14, 1962. Which law would govern
depends upon when the marriage took place.

The marriage having been solemnized prior to the effectivity of the Family Code, the
applicable law is the Civil Code which was the law in effect at the time of its celebration. But
the Civil Code is silent as to who may bring an action to declare the marriage void. Does this
mean that any person can bring an action for the declaration of nullity of marriage?

We respond in the negative. The absence of a provision in the Civil Code cannot be
construed as a license for any person to institute a nullity of marriage case. Such person must
appear to be the party who stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment in the suit, or the
party entitled to the avails of the suit. Elsewise stated, plaintiff must be the real party-in-interest.
For it is basic in procedural law that every action must be prosecuted and defended in the name
of the real party-in-interest.

Interest within the meaning of the rule means material interest or an interest in issue to be
affected by the decree or judgment of the case, as distinguished from mere curiosity about the
question involved or a mere incidental interest. One having no material interest to protect cannot
invoke the jurisdiction of the court as plaintiff in an action. When plaintiff is not the real party-
in-interest, the case is dismissible on the ground of lack of cause of action.

Illuminating on this point is Amor-Catalan v. Court of Appeals, where the Court held:
 True, under the New Civil Code which is the law in force at the time the
respondents were married, or even in the Family Code, there is no specific
provision as to who can file a petition to declare the nullity of marriage;
however, only a party who can demonstrate proper interest can file the same.
A petition to declare the nullity of marriage, like any other actions, must be
prosecuted or defended in the name of the real party-in-interest and must be
based on a cause of action. Thus, in Nial v. Badayog, the Court held that the
children have the personality to file the petition to declare the nullity of marriage
of their deceased father to their stepmother as it affects their successional rights.

xxxx

In fine, petitioners personality to file the petition to declare the nullity of

marriage cannot be ascertained because of the absence of the divorce decree and
the foreign law allowing it. Hence, a remand of the case to the trial court for
reception of additional evidence is necessary to determine whether respondent
Orlando was granted a divorce decree and whether the foreign law which granted
the same allows or restricts remarriage. If it is proved that a valid divorce decree
was obtained and the same did not allow respondent Orlandos remarriage, then
the trial court should declare respondents marriage as bigamous and void ab
initio but reduced the amount of moral damages from P300,000.00 to P50,000.00
and exemplary damages from P200,000.00 to P25,000.00. On the contrary, if it is
proved that a valid divorce decree was obtained which allowed Orlando to
remarry, then the trial court must dismiss the instant petition to declare nullity of
marriage on the ground that petitioner Felicitas Amor-Catalan lacks legal
personality to file the same. (Underscoring supplied)

III. The case must be remanded to determine whether or not petitioner is a real-
party-in-interest to seek the declaration of nullity of the marriage in controversy.

In the case at bench, the records reveal that when Teofilo died intestate in 1992, his only
surviving compulsory heirs are respondent Felicidad and their son, Teofilo II. Under the law on
succession, successional rights are transmitted from the moment of death of the decedent and the
compulsory heirs are called to succeed by operation of law.
 Upon Teofilos death in 1992, all his property, rights and obligations to the extent of the
value of the inheritance are transmitted to his compulsory heirs. These heirs were respondents
Felicidad and Teofilo II, as the surviving spouse and child, respectively.

Article 887 of the Civil Code outlined who are compulsory heirs, to wit:

(1) Legitimate children and descendants, with respect to their legitimate parents
and ascendants;

(2) In default of the foregoing, legitimate parents and ascendants, with respect to
their legitimate children and descendants;

(3) The widow or widower;

(4) Acknowledged natural children, and natural children by legal fiction;

(5) Other illegitimate children referred to in Article 287 of the Civil Code.

Clearly, a brother is not among those considered as compulsory heirs. But although a
collateral relative, such as a brother, does not fall within the ambit of a compulsory heir, he still
has a right to succeed to the estate. Articles 1001 and 1003 of the New Civil Code provide:

ART. 1001. Should brothers and sisters or their children survive with the
widow or widower, the latter shall be entitled to one-half of the inheritance and
the brothers and sisters or their children to the other half.

ART. 1003. If there are no descendants, ascendants, illegitimate children,

or a surviving spouse, the collateral relatives shall succeed to the entire estate of
the deceased in accordance with the following articles. (Underscoring supplied)
 Indeed, only the presence of descendants, ascendants or illegitimate children excludes
collateral relatives from succeeding to the estate of the decedent. The presence of legitimate,
illegitimate, or adopted child or children of the deceased precludes succession by collateral
relatives. Conversely, if there are no descendants, ascendants, illegitimate children, or a
surviving spouse, the collateral relatives shall succeed to the entire estate of the decedent.

If respondent Teofilo II is declared and finally proven not to be the legitimate,

illegitimate, or adopted son of Teofilo, petitioner would then have a personality to seek the
nullity of marriage of his deceased brother with respondent Felicidad. This is so, considering
that collateral relatives, like a brother and sister, acquire successional right over the estate if the
decedent dies without issue and without ascendants in the direct line.

The records reveal that Teofilo was predeceased by his parents. He had no other
siblings but petitioner. Thus, if Teofilo II is finally found and proven to be not a legitimate,
illegitimate, or adopted son of Teofilo, petitioner succeeds to the other half of the estate of his
brother, the first half being allotted to the widow pursuant to Article 1001 of the New Civil
Code. This makes petitioner a real-party-interest to seek the declaration of absolute nullity of
marriage of his deceased brother with respondent Felicidad. If the subject marriage is found
to be void ab initio, petitioner succeeds to the entire estate.

It bears stressing, however, that the legal personality of petitioner to bring the nullity of
marriage case is contingent upon the final declaration that Teofilo II is not a legitimate, adopted,
or illegitimate son of Teofilo.

If Teofilo II is proven to be a legitimate, illegitimate, or legally adopted son of Teofilo,

then petitioner has no legal personality to ask for the nullity of marriage of his deceased brother
and respondent Felicidad. This is based on the ground that he has no successional right to be
protected, hence, does not have proper interest. For although the marriage in controversy may be
found to be void from the beginning, still, petitioner would not inherit. This is because the
presence of descendant, illegitimate, or even an adopted child excludes the collateral relatives
from inheriting from the decedent.

Thus, the Court finds that a remand of the case for trial on the merits to determine the
validity or nullity of the subject marriage is called for. But the RTC is strictly instructed to
dismiss the nullity of marriage case for lack of cause of action if it is proven by evidence
that Teofilo II is a legitimate, illegitimate, or legally adopted son of Teofilo Carlos, the
deceased brother of petitioner.

IV. Remand of the case regarding the question of filiation of respondent Teofilo II is
proper and in order. There is a need to vacate the disposition of the trial court as to the
other causes of action before it.

Petitioner did not assign as error or interpose as issue the ruling of the CA on the remand of
the case concerning the filiation of respondent Teofilo II. This notwithstanding, We should not
leave the matter hanging in limbo.

This Court has the authority to review matters not specifically raised or assigned as error
by the parties, if their consideration is necessary in arriving at a just resolution of the case.
 We agree with the CA that without trial on the merits having been conducted in
the case, petitioners bare allegation that respondent Teofilo II was adopted from an indigent
couple is insufficient to support a total forfeiture of rights arising from his putative filiation.
However, We are not inclined to support its pronouncement that the declaration of respondent
Felicidad as to the illegitimate filiation of respondent Teofilo II is more credible. For the
guidance of the appellate court, such declaration of respondent Felicidad should not be afforded
credence. We remind the CA of the guaranty provided by Article 167 of the Family Code to
protect the status of legitimacy of a child, to wit:

ARTICLE 167. The child shall be considered legitimate although the

mother may have declared against its legitimacy or may have been sentenced as
an adulteress. (Underscoring supplied)

It is stressed that Felicidads declaration against the legitimate status of Teofilo II is

the very act that is proscribed by Article 167 of the Family Code. The language of the law is
unmistakable. An assertion by the mother against the legitimacy of her child cannot affect the
legitimacy of a child born or conceived within a valid marriage.

Finally, the disposition of the trial court in favor of petitioner for causes of action
concerning reconveyance, recovery of property, and sum of money must be vacated. This has to
be so, as said disposition was made on the basis of its finding that the marriage in controversy
was null and void ab initio.

WHEREFORE, the appealed Decision is MODIFIED as follows:

 1. The case is REMANDED to the Regional Trial Court in regard to the action on
the status and filiation of respondent Teofilo Carlos II and the validity or nullity of
marriage between respondent Felicidad Sandoval and the late Teofilo Carlos;

2. If Teofilo Carlos II is proven to be the legitimate, or illegitimate, or legally

adopted son of the late Teofilo Carlos, the RTC is strictly INSTRUCTED to
DISMISS the action for nullity of marriage for lack of cause of action;

3. The disposition of the RTC in Nos. 1 to 8 of the fallo of its decision is

VACATED AND SET ASIDE.

The Regional Trial Court is ORDERED to conduct trial on the merits with dispatch and
to give this case priority in its calendar.

No costs.

THIRD DIVISION

[G.R. No. 179620, August 26, 2008]

MANUEL G. ALMELOR, PETITIONER, VS. THE HON. REGIONAL TRIAL COURT

OF LAS PIAS CITY, BRANCH 254, AND LEONIDA T. ALMELOR, RESPONDENT.

DECISION

REYES, R.T., J.:

MARRIAGE, in its totality, involves the spouses' right to the community of their whole lives. It
likewise involves a true intertwining of personalities.[1]

This is a petition for review on certiorari of the Decision[2] of the Court of Appeals (CA) denying
the petition for annulment of judgment and affirming in toto the decision of the Regional Trial
Court (RTC), Las Pias, Branch 254. The CA dismissed outright the Rule 47 petition for being
the wrong remedy.

The Facts

Petitioner Manuel G. Almelor (Manuel) and respondent Leonida Trinidad (Leonida) were
married on January 29, 1989 at the Manila Cathedral.[3] Their union bore three children: (1)
Maria Paulina Corinne, born on October 20, 1989; (2) Napoleon Manuel, born on August 9,
1991; and (3) Manuel Homer, born on July 4, 1994.[4] Manuel and Leonida are both medical
practitioners, an anesthesiologist and a pediatrician, respectively.[5]

After eleven (11) years of marriage, Leonida filed a petition with the RTC in Las Pias City to
annul their marriage on the ground that Manuel was psychologically incapacitated to perform his
marital obligations. The case, docketed as LP-00-0132 was raffled off to Branch 254.

During the trial, Leonida testified that she first met Manuel in 1981 at the San Lazaro Hospital
where they worked as medical student clerks. At that time, she regarded Manuel as a very
thoughtful person who got along well with other people. They soon became sweethearts. Three
years after, they got married.[6]

Leonida averred that Manuel's kind and gentle demeanor did not last long. In the public eye,
Manuel was the picture of a perfect husband and father. This was not the case in his private life.
At home, Leonida described Manuel as a harsh disciplinarian, unreasonably meticulous, easily
angered. Manuel's unreasonable way of imposing discipline on their children was the cause of
their frequent fights as a couple.[7] Leonida complained that this was in stark contrast to the
alleged lavish affection Manuel has for his mother. Manuel's deep attachment to his mother and
his dependence on her decision-making were incomprehensible to Leonida.[8]

Further adding to her woes was his concealment to her of his homosexuality. Her suspicions
were first aroused when she noticed Manuel's peculiar closeness to his male companions. For
instance, she caught him in an indiscreet telephone conversation manifesting his affection for a
male caller.[9] She also found several pornographic homosexual materials in his possession.[10]
Her worse fears were confirmed when she saw Manuel kissed another man on the lips. The man
was a certain Dr. Nogales.[11] When she confronted Manuel, he denied everything. At this point,
Leonida took her children and left their conjugal abode. Since then, Manuel stopped giving
support to their children.[12]

Dr. Valentina del Fonso Garcia, a clinical psychologist, was presented to prove Leonida's claim.
Dr. del Fonso Garcia testified that she conducted evaluative interviews and a battery of
psychiatric tests on Leonida. She also had a one-time interview with Manuel and face-to-face
interviews with Ma. Paulina Corrinne (the eldest child).[13] She concluded that Manuel is
psychologically incapacitated.[14] Such incapacity is marked by antecedence; it existed even
before the marriage and appeared to be incurable.

Manuel, for his part, admitted that he and Leonida had some petty arguments here and there. He,
however, maintained that their marital relationship was generally harmonious. The petition for
annulment filed by Leonida came as a surprise to him.

Manuel countered that the true cause of Leonida's hostility against him was their professional
rivalry. It began when he refused to heed the memorandum[15] released by Christ the King
Hospital. The memorandum ordered him to desist from converting his own lying-in clinic to a
primary or secondary hospital.[16] Leonida's family owns Christ the King Hospital which is
situated in the same subdivision as Manuel's clinic and residence.[17] In other words, he and her
family have competing or rival hospitals in the same vicinity.

Manuel belied her allegation that he was a cruel father to their children. He denied maltreating
them. At most, he only imposed the necessary discipline on the children.

He also defended his show of affection for his mother. He said there was nothing wrong for him
to return the love and affection of the person who reared and looked after him and his siblings.
This is especially apt now that his mother is in her twilight years.[18] Manuel pointed out that
Leonida found fault in this otherwise healthy relationship because of her very jealous and
possessive nature.[19]

This same overly jealous behavior of Leonida drove Manuel to avoid the company of female
friends. He wanted to avoid any further misunderstanding with his wife. But, Leonida instead
conjured up stories about his sexual preference. She also fabricated tales about pornographic
materials found in his possession to cast doubt on his masculinity.[20]

To corroborate his version, he presented his brother, Jesus G. Almelor. Jesus narrated that he
usually stayed at Manuel's house during his weekly trips to Manila from Iriga City. He was a
witness to the generally harmonious relationship between his brother Manuel and sister-in-law,
Leonida. True, they had some quarrels typical of a husband and wife relationship. But there was
nothing similar to what Leonida described in her testimony.[21]

Jesus further testified that he was with his brother on the day Leonida allegedly saw Manuel
kissed another man. He denied that such an incident occurred. On that particular date,[22] he and
Manuel went straight home from a trip to Bicol. There was no other person with them at that
time, except their driver.[23]

Manuel expressed his intention to refute Dr. del Fonso Garcia's findings by presenting his own
expert witness. However, no psychiatrist was presented.

RTC Disposition

By decision dated November 25, 2005, the RTC granted the petition for annulment, with the
following disposition:
WHEREFORE, premised on the foregoing, judgment is hereby rendered:

1. Declaring the marriage contracted by herein parties on 29 January 1989 and all its effects
under the law null and void from the beginning;
 2. Dissolving the regime of community property between the same parties with forfeiture of
defendant's share thereon in favor of the same parties' children whose
legal custody is awarded to plaintiff with visitorial right afforded to defendant;
3. Ordering the defendant to give monthly financial support to all the children; and
4. Pursuant to the provisions of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC:

a. Directing the Branch Clerk of this Court to enter this Judgment upon its finality in
the Book of Entry of Judgment and to issue an Entry of Judgment in accordance
thereto; and
b. Directing the Local Civil Registrars of Las Pias City and Manila City to cause
the registration of the said Entry of Judgment in their respective Books of
Marriages.

Upon compliance, a decree of nullity of marriage shall be issued.

SO ORDERED.[24] (Emphasis supplied)

The trial court nullified the marriage, not on the ground of Article 36, but Article 45 of the
Family Code. It ratiocinated:
x x x a careful evaluation and in-depth analysis of the surrounding circumstances of the
allegations in the complaint and of the evidence presented in support thereof (sic) reveals that in
this case (sic) there is more than meets the eyes (sic).

Both legally and biologically, homosexuality x x x is, indeed, generally incompatible with hetero
sexual marriage. This is reason enough that in this jurisdiction (sic) the law recognizes marriage
as a special contract exclusively only between a man and a woman x x x and thus when
homosexuality has trespassed into marriage, the same law provides ample remedies to correct the
situation [Article 45(3) in relation to Article 46(4) or Article 55, par. 6, Family Code]. This is of
course in recognition of the biological fact that no matter how a man cheats himself that he is not
a homosexual and forces himself to live a normal heterosexual life, there will surely come a time
when his true sexual preference as a homosexual shall prevail in haunting him and thus
jeopardizing the solidity, honor, and welfare of his own family.[25]
Manuel filed a notice of appeal which was, however, denied due course. Undaunted, he filed a
petition for annulment of judgment with the CA.[26]

Manuel contended that the assailed decision was issued in excess of the lower court's
jurisdiction; that it had no jurisdiction to dissolve the absolute community of property and forfeit
his conjugal share in favor of his children.

CA Disposition

On July 31, 2007, the CA denied the petition, disposing as follows:

WHEREFORE, the present Petition for Annulment of Judgment is hereby DENIED. The Court
AFFIRMS in toto the Decision (dated November 25, 2005) of the Regional Trial Court (Branch
254), in Las Pias City, in Civil Case No. LP-00-0132. No costs.[27]
The CA stated that petitioner pursued the wrong remedy by filing the extraordinary remedy of
petition for annulment of judgment. Said the appellate court:
It is obvious that the petitioner is questioning the propriety of the decision rendered by the lower
Court. But the remedy assuming there was a mistake is not a Petition for Annulment of Judgment
but an ordinary appeal. An error of judgment may be reversed or corrected only by appeal.

What petitioner is ascribing is an error of judgment, not of jurisdiction, which is properly the
subject of an ordinary appeal.

In short, petitioner admits the jurisdiction of the lower court but he claims excess in the exercise
thereof. "Excess" assuming there was is not covered by Rule 47 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure. The Rule refers the lack of jurisdiction and not the exercise thereof.[28]
Issues

Petitioner Manuel takes the present recourse via Rule 45, assigning to the CA the following
errors:

I
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT TREATING THE PETITION
FOR ANNULMENT OF JUDGMENT AS A PETITION FOR REVIEW IN VIEW OF THE
IMPORTANCE OF THE ISSUES INVOLVED AND IN THE INTEREST OF JUSTICE;

II

THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN UPHOLDING THE DECISION OF

THE TRIAL COURT AS REGARDS THE ORDER DECLARING THE MARRIAGE AS NULL
AND VOID ON THE GROUND OF PETITIONER'S PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY;

III

THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN UPHOLDING THE DECISION OF

THE TRIAL COURT AS REGARDS THE ORDER TO FORFEIT THE SHARE OF
PETITIONER IN HIS SHARE OF THE CONJUGAL ASSETS.[29]
Our Ruling

I. The stringent rules of procedures may be relaxed to serve the demands of substantial justice
and in the Court's exercise of equity jurisdiction

Generally, an appeal taken either to the Supreme Court or the CA by the wrong or inappropriate
mode shall be dismissed.[30] This is to prevent the party from benefiting from one's neglect and
mistakes. However, like most rules, it carries certain exceptions. After all, the ultimate
purpose of all rules of procedures is to achieve substantial justice as expeditiously as possible.[31]

Annulment of judgment under Rule 47 is a last remedy. It can not be resorted to if the ordinary
remedies are available or no longer available through no fault of petitioner.[32] However, in
Buenaflor v. Court of Appeals,[33] this Court clarified the proper appreciation for technical rules
of procedure, in this wise:
Rules of procedures are intended to promote, not to defeat, substantial justice and,
therefore, they should not be applied in a very rigid and technical sense. The exception is
that while the Rules are liberally construed, the provisions with respect to the rules on the
manner and periods for perfecting appeals are strictly applied. As an exception to the
exception, these rules have sometimes been relaxed on equitable considerations. Also, in
some cases the Supreme Court has given due course to an appeal perfected out of time where a
stringent application of the rules would have denied it, but only when to do so would serve the
demands of substantial justice and in the exercise of equity jurisdiction of the Supreme Court.[34]
(Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
For reasons of justice and equity, this Court has allowed exceptions to the stringent rules
governing appeals.[35] It has, in the past, refused to sacrifice justice for technicality.[36]

After discovering the palpable error of his petition, Manuel seeks the indulgence of this Court to
consider his petition before the CA instead as a petition for certiorari under Rule 65.

A perusal of the said petition reveals that Manuel imputed grave abuse of discretion to the lower
court for annulling his marriage on account of his alleged homosexuality. This is not the first
time that this Court is faced with a similar situation. In Nerves v. Civil Service Commission,[37]
petitioner Delia R. Nerves elevated to the CA a Civil Service Commission (CSC) decision
suspending her for six (6) months. The CSC ruled Nerves, a public school teacher, is deemed to
have already served her six-month suspension during the pendency of the case. Nevertheless, she
is ordered reinstated without back wages. On appeal, Nerves stated in her petition, inter alia:

1. This is a petition for certiorari filed pursuant to Article IX-A, Section 7 of the
Constitution of the Philippines and under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.

2. But per Supreme Court Revised Administrative Circular No. 1-95 (Revised Circular No.
1-91) petitioner is filing the instant petition with this Honorable Court instead of the
Supreme Court.[38] (Underscoring supplied)

The CA dismissed Nerves' petition for certiorari for being the wrong remedy or the
inappropriate mode of appeal.[39] The CA opined that "under the Supreme Court Revised
Administrative Circular No. 1-95 x x x appeals from judgments or final orders or resolutions of
CSC is by a petition for review."[40]

This Court granted Nerves petition and held that she had substantially complied with the
Administrative Circular. The Court stated:

That it was erroneously labeled as a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court is
only a minor procedural lapse, not fatal to the appeal. x x x
More importantly, the appeal on its face appears to be impressed with merit. Hence, the Court of
Appeals should have overlooked the insubstantial defects of the petition x x x in order to do
justice to the parties concerned. There is, indeed, nothing sacrosanct about procedural rules,
which should be liberally construed in order to promote their object and assist the parties in
obtaining just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action or proceeding. As it has
been said, where the rigid application of the rules would frustrate substantial justice, or bar the
vindication of a legitimate grievance, the courts are justified in exempting a particular case from
the operation of the rules.[41] (Underscoring supplied)
Similarly, in the more recent case of Tan v. Dumarpa,[42] petitioner Joy G. Tan availed of a wrong
remedy by filing a petition for review on certiorari instead of a motion for new trial or an
ordinary appeal. In the interest of justice, this Court considered the petition, pro hac vice, as a
petition for certiorari under Rule 65.

This Court found that based on Tan's allegations, the trial court prima facie committed grave
abuse of discretion in rendering a judgment by default. If uncorrected, it will cause petitioner
great injustice. The Court elucidated in this wise:
Indeed, where as here, there is a strong showing that grave miscarriage of justice would result
from the strict application of the Rules, we will not hesitate to relax the same in the interest of
substantial justice.[43] (Underscoring supplied)
Measured by the foregoing yardstick, justice will be better served by giving due course to the
present petition and treating petitioner's CA petition as one for certiorari under Rule 65,
considering that what is at stake is the validity or non-validity of a marriage.

In Salazar v. Court of Appeals,[44] citing Labad v. University of Southeastern Philippines, this

Court reiterated:
x x x The dismissal of appeals on purely technical grounds is frowned upon. While the right to
appeal is a statutory, not a natural right, nonetheless it is an essential part of our judicial system
and courts should proceed with caution so as not to deprive a party of the right to appeal, but
rather, ensure that every party-litigant has the amplest opportunity for the proper and just
disposition of his cause, free from the constraints of technicalities.[45]
Indeed, it is far better and more prudent for a court to excuse a technical lapse and afford the
parties a review of the case on the merits to attain the ends of justice.[46]

Furthermore, it was the negligence and incompetence of Manuel's counsel that prejudiced his
right to appeal. His counsel, Atty. Christine Dugenio, repeatedly availed of inappropriate
remedies. After the denial of her notice of appeal, she failed to move for reconsideration or new
trial at the first instance. She also erroneously filed a petition for annulment of judgment rather
than pursue an ordinary appeal.

These manifest errors were clearly indicative of counsel's incompetence. These gravely worked
to the detriment of Manuel's appeal. True it is that the negligence of counsel binds the client.
Still, this Court has recognized certain exceptions: (1) where reckless or gross negligence of
counsel deprives the client of due process of law; (2) when its application will result in outright
deprivation of the client's liberty and property; or (3) where the interest of justice so require.[47]

The negligence of Manuel's counsel falls under the exceptions. Ultimately, the reckless or gross
negligence of petitioner's former counsel led to the loss of his right to appeal. He should not be
made to suffer for his counsel's grave mistakes. Higher interests of justice and equity demand
that he be allowed to ventilate his case in a higher court.

In Apex Mining, Inc. v. Court of Appeals,[48] this Court explained thus:

It is settled that the negligence of counsel binds the client. This is based on the rule that any act
performed by a counsel within the scope of his general or implied authority is regarded as an act
of his client. However, where counsel is guilty of gross ignorance, negligence and dereliction of
duty, which resulted in the client's being held liable for damages in a damage suit, the client is
deprived of his day in court and the judgment may be set aside on such ground. In the instant
case, higher interests of justice and equity demand that petitioners be allowed to present evidence
on their defense. Petitioners may not be made to suffer for the lawyer's mistakes. This Court
will always be disposed to grant relief to parties aggrieved by perfidy, fraud, reckless
inattention and downright incompetence of lawyers, which has the consequence of
depriving their clients, of their day in court.[49] (Emphasis supplied)
Clearly, this Court has the power to except a particular case from the operation of the rule
whenever the demands of justice require it. With more conviction should it wield such power in a
case involving the sacrosanct institution of marriage. This Court is guided with the thrust of
giving a party the fullest opportunity to establish the merits of one's action.[50]

The client was likewise spared from counsel's negligence in Government Service Insurance
System v. Bengson Commercial Buildings, Inc.[51] and Ancheta v. Guersey-Dalaygon.[52] Said the
Court in Bengson:
But if under the circumstances of the case, the rule deserts its proper office as an aid to justice
and becomes a great hindrance and chief enemy, its rigors must be relaxed to admit exceptions
thereto and to prevent a miscarriage of justice. In other words, the court has the power to except
a particular case from the operation of the rule whenever the purposes of justice require it.[53]
II. Concealment of homosexuality is the proper ground to annul a marriage, not
homosexuality per se.

Manuel is a desperate man determined to salvage what remains of his marriage. Persistent in his
quest, he fought back all the heavy accusations of incapacity, cruelty, and doubted masculinity
thrown at him.

The trial court declared that Leonida's petition for nullity had "no basis at all because the
supporting grounds relied upon can not legally make a case under Article 36 of the Family
Code." It went further by citing Republic v. Molina:[54]
Indeed, mere allegations of conflicting personalities, irreconcilable differences, incessant
quarrels and/or beatings, unpredictable mood swings, infidelities, vices, abandonment, and
difficulty, neglect, or failure in the performance of some marital obligations do not suffice to
establish psychological incapacity.[55]
If so, the lower court should have dismissed outright the petition for not meeting the guidelines
set in Molina. What Leonida attempted to demonstrate were Manuel's homosexual tendencies by
citing overt acts generally predominant among homosexual individuals.[56] She wanted to prove
that the perceived homosexuality rendered Manuel incapable of fulfilling the essential marital
obligations.

But instead of dismissing the petition, the trial court nullified the marriage between Manuel and
Leonida on the ground of vitiated consent by virtue of fraud. In support of its conclusion, the
lower court reasoned out:
As insinuated by the State (p. 75, TSN, 15 December 2003), when there is smoke surely there is
fire. Although vehemently denied by defendant, there is preponderant evidence enough to
establish with certainty that defendant is really a homosexual. This is the fact that can be
deduced from the totality of the marriage life scenario of herein parties.

Before his marriage, defendant knew very well that people around him even including his own
close friends doubted his true sexual preference (TSN, pp. 35-36, 13 December 2000; pp. 73-75,
15 December 2003). After receiving many forewarnings, plaintiff told defendant about the rumor
she heard but defendant did not do anything to prove to the whole world once and for all the
truth of all his denials. Defendant threatened to sue those people but nothing happened after that.
There may have been more important matters to attend to than to waste time and effort filing
cases against and be effected by these people and so, putting more premiums on defendant's
denials, plaintiff just the same married him. Reasons upon reasons may be advanced to either
exculpate or nail to the cross defendant for his act of initially concealing his homosexuality to
plaintiff, but in the end, only one thing is certain - even during his marriage with plaintiff, the
smoke of doubt about his real preference continued and even got thicker, reason why obviously
defendant failed to establish a happy and solid family; and in so failing, plaintiff and their
children became his innocent and unwilling victims.

Yes, there is nothing untoward of a man if, like herein defendant, he is meticulous over even
small details in the house (sic) like wrongly folded bed sheets, etc. or if a man is more
authoritative in knowing what clothes or jewelry shall fit his wife (pp. 77-81, TSN, 15 December
2003); but these admissions of defendant taken in the light of evidence presented apparently
showing that he had extra fondness of his male friends (sic) to the extent that twice on separate
occasions (pp. 4-7, TSN, 14 February 2001) he was allegedly seen by plaintiff kissing another
man lips-to-lips plus the homosexual magazines and tapes likewise allegedly discovered
underneath his bed (Exhibits "L" and "M"), the doubt as to his real sex identity becomes
stronger. The accusation of plaintiff versus thereof of defendant may be the name of the game in
this case; but the simple reason of professional rivalry advanced by the defendant is certainly not
enough to justify and obscure the question why plaintiff should accuse him of such a very
untoward infidelity at the expense and humiliation of their children and family as a whole.[57]
Evidently, no sufficient proof was presented to substantiate the allegations that Manuel is a
homosexual and that he concealed this to Leonida at the time of their marriage. The lower court
considered the public perception of Manuel's sexual preference without the corroboration of
witnesses. Also, it took cognizance of Manuel's peculiarities and interpreted it against his
sexuality.

Even assuming, ex gratia argumenti, that Manuel is a homosexual, the lower court cannot
appreciate it as a ground to annul his marriage with Leonida. The law is clear - a marriage may
be annulled when the consent of either party was obtained by fraud,[58] such as concealment of
homosexuality.[59] Nowhere in the said decision was it proven by preponderance of evidence that
Manuel was a homosexual at the onset of his marriage and that he deliberately hid such fact to
his wife.[60] It is the concealment of homosexuality, and not homosexuality per se, that vitiates
the consent of the innocent party. Such concealment presupposes bad faith and intent to defraud
the other party in giving consent to the marriage.
Consent is an essential requisite of a valid marriage. To be valid, it must be freely given by both
parties. An allegation of vitiated consent must be proven by preponderance of evidence. The
Family Code has enumerated an exclusive list of circumstances[61] constituting fraud.
Homosexuality per se is not among those cited, but its concealment.

This distinction becomes more apparent when we go over the deliberations[62] of the Committees
on the Civil Code and Family Law, to wit:
Justice Caguioa remarked that this ground should be eliminated in the provision on the grounds
for legal separation. Dean Gupit, however, pointed out that in Article 46, they are talking only of
"concealment," while in the article on legal separation, there is actuality. Judge Diy added that in
legal separation, the ground existed after the marriage, while in Article 46, the ground existed at
the time of the marriage. Justice Reyes suggested that, for clarity, they add the phrase "existing at
the time of the marriage" at the end of subparagraph (4). The Committee approved the
suggestion.[63]
To reiterate, homosexuality per se is only a ground for legal separation. It is its concealment that
serves as a valid ground to annul a marriage.[64] Concealment in this case is not simply a blanket
denial, but one that is constitutive of fraud. It is this fundamental element that respondent failed
to prove.

In the United States, homosexuality has been considered as a basis for divorce. It indicates that
questions of sexual identity strike so deeply at one of the basic elements of marriage, which is
the exclusive sexual bond between the spouses.[65] In Crutcher v. Crutcher,[66] the Court held:
Unnatural practices of the kind charged here are an infamous indignity to the wife, and which
would make the marriage relation so revolting to her that it would become impossible for her to
discharge the duties of a wife, and would defeat the whole purpose of the relation. In the natural
course of things, they would cause mental suffering to the extent of affecting her health.[67]
However, although there may be similar sentiments here in the Philippines, the legal overtones
are significantly different. Divorce is not recognized in the country. Homosexuality and its
alleged incompatibility to a healthy heterosexual life are not sanctioned as grounds to sever the
marriage bond in our jurisdiction. At most, it is only a ground to separate from bed and board.

What was proven in the hearings a quo was a relatively blissful marital union for more than
eleven (11) years, which produced three (3) children. The burden of proof to show the nullity of
the marriage rests on Leonida. Sadly, she failed to discharge this onus.

The same failure to prove fraud which purportedly resulted to a vitiated marital consent was
found in Villanueva v. Court of Appeals.[68] In Villanueva, instead of proving vitiation of consent,
appellant resorted to baseless portrayals of his wife as a perpetrator of fraudulent schemes. Said
the Court:
Factual findings of the Court of Appeals, especially if they coincide with those of the trial court,
as in the instant case, are generally binding on this Court. We affirm the findings of the Court of
Appeals that petitioner freely and voluntarily married private respondent and that no threats or
intimidation, duress or violence compelled him to do so, thus -

Appellant anchored his prayer for the annulment of his marriage on the ground that he did not
freely consent to be married to the appellee. He cited several incidents that created on his mind a
reasonable and well-grounded fear of an imminent and grave danger to his life and safety. x x x

The Court is not convinced that appellant's apprehension of danger to his person is so
overwhelming as to deprive him of the will to enter voluntarily to a contract of marriage. It is not
disputed that at the time he was allegedly being harassed, appellant worked as a security guard in
a bank. Given the rudiments of self-defense, or, at the very least, the proper way to keep himself
out of harm's way. x x x

Appellant also invoked fraud to annul his marriage, as he was made to believe by appellee that
the latter was pregnant with his child when they were married. Appellant's excuse that he could
not have impregnated the appellee because he did not have an erection during their tryst is flimsy
at best, and an outright lie at worst. The complaint is bereft of any reference to his inability to
copulate with the appellee. x x x

xxxx

x x x The failure to cohabit becomes relevant only if it arises as a result of the perpetration of any
of the grounds for annulling the marriage, such as lack of parental consent, insanity, fraud,
intimidation, or undue influence x x x. Since the appellant failed to justify his failure to cohabit
with the appellee on any of these grounds, the validity of his marriage must be upheld.[69]
Verily, the lower court committed grave abuse of discretion, not only by solely taking into
account petitioner's homosexuality per se and not its concealment, but by declaring the marriage
void from its existence.

This Court is mindful of the constitutional policy to protect and strengthen the family as the basic
autonomous social institution and marriage as the foundation of the family.[70] The State and the
public have vital interest in the maintenance and preservation of these social institutions against
desecration by fabricated evidence.[71] Thus, any doubt should be resolved in favor of the validity
of marriage.

III. In a valid marriage, the husband and wife jointly administer and enjoy their community
or conjugal property

Article 96 of the Family Code, on regimes of absolute community property, provides:

Art. 96. The administration and enjoyment of the community property shall belong to both
spouses jointly. In case of disagreement, the husband's decision shall prevail, subject to recourse
to the court by the wife for a proper remedy, which must be availed of within five years from the
date of the contract implementing such decision.

In the event that one spouse is incapacitated or otherwise unable to participate in the
administration of the common properties, the other spouse may assume sole powers of
administration. These powers do not include the powers of disposition or encumbrance without
the authority of the court or the written consent of the other spouse. In the absence of such
authority or consent, the disposition or encumbrance shall be void. However, the transaction
shall be construed as a continuing offer on the part of the consenting spouse and the third person,
and may be perfected as a binding contract upon the acceptance by the other spouse or
authorization by the court before the offer is withdrawn by either or both offerors.
A similar provision, Article 124[72] prescribes joint administration and enjoyment in a regime of
conjugal partnership. In a valid marriage, both spouses exercise administration and enjoyment of
the property regime, jointly.

In the case under review, the RTC decreed a dissolution of the community property of Manuel
and Leonida. In the same breath, the trial court forfeited Manuel's share in favor of the children.
Considering that the marriage is upheld valid and subsisting, the dissolution and forfeiture of
Manuel's share in the property regime is unwarranted. They remain the joint administrators of the
community property.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The appealed Decision is REVERSED and SET
ASIDE and the petition in the trial court to annul the marriage is DISMISSED.

THIRD DIVISION

G.R. No. L-53880 March 17, 1994

ENRICO L. PACETE, CLARITA DE LA CONCEPCION, EMELDA C. PACETE,

EVELINA C. PACETE and EDUARDO C. PACETE, petitioners,
vs.
HON. GLICERIO V. CARRIAGA, JR. and CONCEPCION (CONCHITA) ALANIS
PACETE, respondents.

Juan G. Sibug and Rodolfo B. Quiachon for petitioners.

Julio F. Andres, Jr. for private respondent.

VITUG, J.:

The issue in this petition for certiorari is whether or not the Court of First Instance (now
Regional Trial Court) of Cotabato, Branch I, in Cotabato City, gravely abused its discretion in
denying petitioners' motion for extension of time to file their answer in Civil Case No. 2518, in
declaring petitioners in default and in rendering its decision of 17 March 1980 which, among
other things, decreed the legal separation of petitioner Enrico L. Pacete and private respondent
Concepcion Alanis and held to be null and void ab initio the marriage of Enrico L. Pacete to
Clarita de la Concepcion.

On 29 October 1979, Concepcion Alanis filed with the court below a complaint for the
declaration of nullity of the marriage between her erstwhile husband Enrico L. Pacete and one
Clarita de la Concepcion, as well as for legal separation (between Alanis and Pacete), accounting
and separation of property. In her complaint, she averred that she was married to Pacete on 30
April 1938 before the Justice of the Peace of Cotabato, Cotabato; that they had a child named
Consuelo who was born on 11 March 1943; that Pacete subsequently contracted (in 1948) a
second marriage with Clarita de la Concepcion in Kidapawan, North Cotabato; that she learned
of such marriage only on 01 August 1979; that during her marriage to Pacete, the latter acquired
vast property consisting of large tracts of land, fishponds and several motor vehicles; that he
fraudulently placed the several pieces of property either in his name and Clarita or in the names
of his children with Clarita and other "dummies;" that Pacete ignored overtures for an amicable
settlement; and that reconciliation between her and Pacete was impossible since he evidently
preferred to continue living with Clarita.

The defendants were each served with summons on 15 November 1979. They filed a motion for
an extension of twenty (20) days from 30 November 1979 within which to file an answer. The
court granted the motion. On 18 December 1979, appearing through a new counsel, the
defendants filed a second motion for an extension of another thirty (30) days from 20 December
1979. On 07 January 1980, the lower court granted the motion but only for twenty (20) days to
be counted from 20 December 1979 or until 09 January 1980. The Order of the court was mailed
to defendants' counsel on 11 January 1980. Likely still unaware of the court order, the
defendants, on 05 February 1980, again filed another motion (dated 18 January 1980) for an
extension of "fifteen (15) days counted from the expiration of the 30-day period previously
sought" within which to file an answer. The following day, or on 06 February 1980, the court
denied this last motion on the ground that it was "filed after the original period given . . . as first
extension had expired." 1

The plaintiff thereupon filed a motion to declare the defendants in default, which the court
forthwith granted. The plaintiff was then directed to present her evidence. 2 The court received
plaintiff's evidence during the hearings held on 15, 20, 21 and 22 February 1980.

On 17 March 1980, the court 3 promulgated the herein questioned decision, disposing of the case,
thus

WHEREFORE, order is hereby issued ordering:

1. The issuance of a Decree of Legal Separation of the marriage between, the

plaintiff, Concepcion (Conchita) Alanis Pacete and the herein defendants, Enrico
L. Pacete, in accordance with the Philippine laws and with consequences, as
provided for by our laws;

2. That the following properties are hereby declared as the conjugal properties of
the partnership of the plaintiff, Concepcion (Conchita) Alanis Pacete and the
defendant, Enrico L. Pacete, half and half, to wit:

1. The parcel of land covered by TCT No. V-815 which is a parcel of land situated
in the barrio of Langcong, Municipality of Matanog (previously of Parang),
province of Maguindanao (previously of Cotabato province) with an area of
45,265 square meters registered in the name of Enrico Pacete, Filipino, of legal
age, married to Conchita Alanis as shown in Exhibits "B" and "B-1" for the
plaintiff.
2. A parcel of land covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-20442, with an
area of 538 square meters and covered by Tax Declaration No. 2650 (74) in the
name of Enrico Pacete, situated in the Poblacion of Kidapawan, North Cotabato,
together with all its improvements, which parcel of land, as shown by Exhibits
"K-1" was acquired by way of absolute deed of sale executed by Amrosio
Mondog on January 14, 1965.

3. A parcel of land covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-20424 and

covered by Tax Declaration No. 803 (74), with an area of 5.1670 hectares, more
or less, as shown by Exhibit "R", the same was registered in the name of Enrico
Pacete and the same was acquired by Enrico Pacete last February 17, 1967 from
Ambag Ampoy, as shown by Exhibit "R-1", situated at Musan, Kidapawan, North
Cotabato.

4. A parcel of land situated at Lanao, Kidapawan, North Cotabato, with an area of

5.0567 hectares, covered by Tax Declaration No. 4332 (74), as shown by Exhibit
"S", and registered in the name of Enrico Pacete.

5. A parcel of land covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-9750, situated at

Lika, Mlang, North Cotabato, with an area of 4.9841 hectares and the same is
covered by Tax Declaration No. 803 (74) and registered in the name of Enrico
Pacete and which land was acquired by Enrico Pacete from Salvador Pacete on
September 24, 1962, as shown by Exhibit "Q-1".

6. A parcel of land covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-9944, with an

area of 9.9566 and also covered by Tax Declaration No. 8608 (74) and registered
in the name of the defendant Enrico L. Pacete which Enrico L. Pacete acquired
from Sancho Balingcos last October 22, 1962, as shown by Exhibit "L-1" and
which parcel of land is situated at (Kialab), Kiab, Matalam, North Cotabato.

7. A parcel of land covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-9227, situated at

Kiab, Matalam, North Cotabato, with an area of 12.04339 hectares, more or less,
and also covered by Tax Declaration No. 8607 (74) both in the name of the
defendant Enrico L. Pacete which he acquired last October 15, 1962 from Minda
Bernardino, as shown by Exhibit "M-1".

8. A parcel of land covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-9228, situated at

Kiab, Matalam, North Cotabato, with an area of 10.8908 hectares, registered in
the name of Enrico Pacete and also covered by Tax Declaration No. 5781 (74) in
the name of Enrico Pacete and which parcel of land he acquired last September
25, 1962 from Conchita dela Torre, as shown by Exhibit "P-1".

9. A parcel of land covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-10301, situated

at Linao, Matalam, North Cotabato, with an area of 7.2547 hectares, registered in
the name of Enrico Pacete and also covered by Tax Declaration No. 8716 (74)
also in the name of Enrico Pacete which Enrico Pacete acquired from Agustin
Bijo last July 16, 1963, as shown by Exhibit "N-1".

10. A parcel of land covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 12728 in the
name of the defendant, Enrico L. Pacete, with an area of 10.9006 hectares,
situated at Linao, Matalam, North Cotabato and is also covered by Tax
Declaration No. 5745 (74) in the name of Enrico Pacete, as shown on Exhibit "O"
and which Enrico Pacete acquired last December 31, 1963 from Eliseo Pugni, as
shown on Exhibit "0-1".

3. Ordering the Cancellation of Original Certificate of Title No. P-34243 covering

Lot No. 1066, issued in the name of Evelina Pacete, situated at Kiab, Matalam,
North Cotabato, and ordering the registration of the same in the joint name of
Concepcion (Conchita) Alanis Pacete and Enrico L. Pacete as their conjugal
property, with address on the part of Concepcion (Conchita) Alanis Pacete at
Parang, Maguindanao and on the part of Enrico L. Pacete at Kidapawan, North
Cotabato.

4. Ordering likewise the cancellation of Original Certificate of Title No. V-20101,

covering Lot No. 77, in the name of Eduardo C. Pacete, situated at New Lawaan,
Mlang, North Cotabato, and the issuance of a new Transfer Certificate of Title in
the joint name of (half and half) Concepcion (Conchita) Alanis Pacete and Enrico
L. Pacete.

5. Ordering likewise the cancellation of Original Certificate of Title No. P-29890,

covering Lot 1068, situated at Kiab, Matalam, North Cotabato, with an area of
12.1031 hectares, in the name of Emelda C. Pacete and the issuance of a new
Transfer Certificate of Title in the joint name (half and half) of Concepcion
(Conchita) Alanis Pacete and Enrico L. Pacete; and declaring that the fishpond
situated at Barrio Tumanan, Bislig, Surigao Del Sur, with an area of 48 hectares
and covered by Fishpond Lease Agreement of Emelda C. Pacete, dated July 29,
1977 be cancelled and in lieu thereof, the joint name of Concepcion (Conchita)
Alanis Pacete and her husband, Enrico L. Pacete, be registered as their joint
property, including the 50 hectares fishpond situated in the same place, Barrio
Timanan, Bislig, Surigao del Sur.

6. Ordering the following motor vehicles to be the joint properties of the conjugal
partnership of Concepcion (Conchita) Alanis Pacete and Enrico L. Pacete, viz:

a. Motor vehicle with Plate No. T-RG-783; Make, Dodge; Motor No. T137-
20561; Chassis No. 83920393, and Type, Mcarrier;

b. Motor vehicle with Plate No. T-RG-784; Make, Dodge; Motor No. T214-
229547; Chassis No. 10D-1302-C; and Type, Mcarrier;
 c. Motor vehicle with Plate No. J-PR-818; Make, Ford; Motor No. GRW-116188;
Chassis No. HOCC-GPW-1161-88-C; Type, Jeep;

d. Motor vehicle with Plate No. TH-5J-583; Make, Ford: Motor No. F70MU5-
11111; Chassis No. HOCC-GPW-1161188-G; Type, Stake;

e. Motor vehicle with Plate No. TH-5J-584; Make, Hino; Motor No. ED300-
45758; Chassis No. KB222-22044; Type, Stake; and

f. Motor vehicle with Plate No. TH-5J-585; Make, Ford: Motor No. LTC-780-Dv;
Chassis No. 10F-13582-K; Type, Stake.

7. Ordering the defendant Enrico L. Pacete to pay the plaintiff the sum of
P46,950.00 which is the share of the plaintiff in the unaccounted income of the
ricemill and corn sheller for three years from 1971 to 1973.

8. Ordering the defendant, Enrico L. Pacete, to reimburse the plaintiff the

monetary equipment of 30% of whether the plaintiff has recovered as attorney's
fees;

9. Declaring the subsequent marriage between defendant Enrico L. Pacete and

Clarita de la Concepcion to be void ab initio; and

10. Ordering the defendants to pay the costs of this suit. 4

Hence, the instant special civil action of certiorari.

Under ordinary circumstances, the petition would have outrightly been dismissed, for, as also
pointed out by private respondents, the proper remedy of petitioners should have instead been
either to appeal from the judgment by default or to file a petition for relief from judgment. 5 This
rule, however, is not inflexible; a petition for certiorari is allowed when the default order is
improperly declared, or even when it is properly declared, where grave abuse of discretion
attended such declaration. 6 In these exceptional instances, the special civil action of certiorari to
declare the nullity of a judgment by default is available. 7 In the case at bench, the default order
unquestionably is not legally sanctioned. The Civil Code provides:

Art. 101. No decree of legal separation shall be promulgated upon a stipulation of

facts or by confession of judgment.

In case of non-appearance of the defendant, the court shall order the prosecuting
attorney to inquire whether or not a collusion between the parties exists. If there is
no collusion, the prosecuting attorney shall intervene for the State in order to take
care that the evidence for the plaintiff is not fabricated.

The provision has been taken from Article 30 of the California Civil Code, 8 and it is, in
substance, reproduced in Article 60 of the Family Code. 9
Article 101 reflects the public policy on marriages, and it should easily explain the mandatory
tenor of the law. In Brown v. Yambao, 10 the Court has observed:

The policy of Article 101 of the new Civil Code, calling for the intervention of the
state attorneys in case of uncontested proceedings for legal separation (and of
annulment of marriages, under Article 88), is to emphasize that marriage is more
than a mere contract; that it is a social institution in which the state is vitally
interested, so that its continuation or interruption can not be made to depend upon
the parties themselves (Civil Code, Article 52; Adong vs. Cheong Gee, 43 Phil.
43; Ramirez v. Gmur, 42 Phil. 855; Goitia v. Campos, 35 Phil. 252). It is
consonant with this policy that the inquiry by the Fiscal should be allowed to
focus upon any relevant matter that may indicate whether the proceedings for
separation or annulment are fully justified or not.

Article 103 of the Civil Code, now Article 58 of the Family Code, further mandates that an
action for legal separation must "in no case be tried before six months shall have elapsed since
the filing of the petition," obviously in order to provide the parties a "cooling-off" period. In this
interim, the court should take steps toward getting the parties to reconcile.

The significance of the above substantive provisions of the law is further underscored by the
inclusion of the following provision in Rule 18 of the Rules of Court:

Sec. 6. No defaults in actions for annulments of marriage or for legal separation.

If the defendant in an action for annulment of marriage or for legal separation
fails to answer, the court shall order the prosecuting attorney to investigate
whether or not a collusion between the parties exists, and if there is no collusion,
to intervene for the State in order to see to it that the evidence submitted is not
fabricated.

The special prescriptions on actions that can put the integrity of marriage to possible jeopardy
are impelled by no less than the State's interest in the marriage relation and its avowed intention
not to leave the matter within the exclusive domain and the vagaries of the parties to alone
dictate.

It is clear that the petitioner did, in fact, specifically pray for legal separation. 11 That other
remedies, whether principal or incidental, have likewise been sought in the same action cannot
dispense, nor excuse compliance, with any of the statutory requirements aforequoted.

WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari is hereby GRANTED and the proceedings below,
including the Decision of 17 March 1980 appealed from, are NULLIFIED and SET ASIDE. No
costs.

EN BANC

G.R. No. 11263 November 2, 1916

ELOISA GOITIA DE LA CAMARA, plaintiff-appellant,
vs.
JOSE CAMPOS RUEDA, defendant-appellee.

Eduardo Gutierrez Repide and Felix Socias for appellant.

Sanz, Opisso and Luzuriaga for appellee.

TRENT, J.:

This is an action by the wife against her husband for support outside of the conjugal domicile.
From a judgment sustaining the defendant's demurrer upon the ground that the facts alleged in
the complaint do not state a cause of action, followed by an order dismissing the case after the
plaintiff declined to amend, the latter appealed.

It was urged in the first instance, and the court so held, that the defendant cannot be compelled to
support the plaintiff, except in his own house, unless it be by virtue of a judicial decree granting
her a divorce or separation from the defendant.

The parties were legally married in the city of Manila on January 7, 1915, and immediately
thereafter established their residence at 115 Calle San Marcelino, where they lived together for
about a month, when the plaintiff returned to the home of her parents. The pertinent allegations
of the complaint are as follows:

That the defendant, one month after he had contracted marriage with the plaintiff,
demanded of her that she perform unchaste and lascivious acts on his genital organs; that
the plaintiff spurned the obscene demands of the defendant and refused to perform any
act other than legal and valid cohabitation; that the defendant, since that date had
continually on other successive dates, made similar lewd and indecorous demands on his
wife, the plaintiff, who always spurned them, which just refusals of the plaintiff
exasperated the defendant and induce him to maltreat her by word and deed and inflict
injuries upon her lips, her face and different parts of her body; and that, as the plaintiff
was unable by any means to induce the defendant to desist from his repugnant desires and
cease from maltreating her, she was obliged to leave the conjugal abode and take refuge
in the home of her parents.

Marriage in this jurisdiction is a contract entered into in the manner and with the solemnities
established by General Orders No. 68, in so far as its civil effects are concerned requiring the
consent of the parties. (Garcia vs. Montague, 12 Phil. Rep., 480, citing article 1261 of Civil
Code.) Upon the termination of the marriage ceremony, a conjugal partnership is formed
between the parties. (Sy Joc Lieng vs. Encarnacion, 16 Phil. Rep., 137.) To this extent a marriage
partakes of the nature of an ordinary contract. But it is something more than a mere contract. It is
a new relation, the rights, duties, and obligations of which rest not upon the agreement of the
parties but upon the general law which defines and prescribes those rights, duties, and
obligations .Marriage is an institution, in the maintenance of which in its purity the public is
deeply interested. It is a relation for life and the parties cannot terminate it at any shorter period
by virtue of any contract they may make .The reciprocal rights arising from this relation, so long
as it continues, are such as the law determines from time to time, and none other. When the legal
existence of the parties is merged into one by marriage, the new relation is regulated and
controlled by the state or government upon principles of public policy for the benefit of society
as well as the parties. And when the object of a marriage is defeated by rendering its continuance
intolerable to one of the parties and productive of no possible good to the community, relief in
some way should be obtainable. With these principles to guide us, we will inquire into the status
of the law touching and governing the question under consideration.

Articles 42 to 107 of the Civil Code are not in force in the Philippine Islands (Benedicto vs. De
la Rama, 3 Phil .Rep., 34). Articles 44 to 78 of the Law of Civil Marriage of 1870, in force in the
Peninsula, were extended to the Philippine Islands by royal decree on April 13, 1883 (Ebreo vs.
Sichon, 4 Phil. Rep., 705). Articles 44, 45, and 48 of this law read:

ART. 44. The spouses are obliged to be faithful to each other and to mutually assist each
other.

ART. 45. The husband must live with and protect his wife. (The second paragraph deals
with the management of the wife's property.)

ART. 48. The wife must obey her husband, live with him, and follow him when he
charges his domicile or residence.

Notwithstanding the provisions of the foregoing paragraph, the court may for just cause
relieve her from this duty when the husband removes his residence to a foreign country.

And articles 143 and 149 of the Civil Code are as follows:

ART. 143. The following are obliged to support each other reciprocally to the whole
extent specified in the preceding article.

1. The consorts.

xxxxxxxxx

ART. (149) 49. The person obliged to give support may, at his option, satisfy it, either by
paying the pension that may be fixed or by receiving and maintaining in his own home
the person having the right to the same.

Article 152 of the Civil Code gives the instances when the obligation to give support shall cease.
The failure of the wife to live with her husband is not one of them.

The above quoted provisions of the Law of Civil Marriage and the Civil Code fix the duties and
obligations of the spouses. The spouses must be faithful to, assist, and support each other. The
husband must live with and protect his wife. The wife must obey and live with her husband and
follow him when he changes his domicile or residence, except when he removes to a foreign
country. But the husband who is obliged to support his wife may, at his option, do so by paying
her a fixed pension or by receiving and maintaining her in his own home. May the husband, on
account of his conduct toward his wife, lose this option and be compelled to pay the pension? Is
the rule established by article 149 of the Civil Code absolute? The supreme court of Spain in its
decision of December 5, 1903, held:.

That in accordance with the ruling of the supreme court of Spain in its decisions dated
May 11, 1897, November 25, 1899, and July 5, 1901, the option which article 149 grants
the person, obliged to furnish subsistence, between paying the pension fixed or receiving
and keeping in his own house the party who is entitled to the same, is not so absolute as
to prevent cases being considered wherein, either because this right would be opposed to
the exercise of a preferential right or because of the existence of some justifiable cause
morally opposed to the removal of the party enjoying the maintenance, the right of
selection must be understood as being thereby restricted.

Whereas the only question discussed in the case which gave rise to this appeal was
whether there was any reason to prevent the exercise of the option granted by article 149
of the Civil Code to the person obliged to furnish subsistence, to receive and maintain in
his own house the one who is entitled to receive it; and inasmuch as nothing has been
alleged or discussed with regard to the parental authority of Pedro Alcantara Calvo,
which he ha not exercised, and it having been set forth that the natural father simply
claims his child for