Special Civil Actions Guide
Special Civil Actions Guide
(1) Although both types of actions are governed by the rules for ordinary civil actions,
there are certain rules that are applicable only to specific special civil actions (Sec. 3[a],
Rule 1). The fact that an action is subject to special rules other than those applicable to
ordinary civil actions is what makes a civil action special.
(2) An ordinary civil action must be based on a cause of action (Sec. 1, Rule 2). This
means that the defendant must have performed an act or omitted to do an act in
violation of the rights of another (Sec. 2, Rule 2). These definitions do not fit the
requirements of a cause of action in certain special civil actions. The cause of action as
defined and required of an ordinary civil action finds no application to the special civil
action of declaratory declaratory relief. In finds no application also in a complaint for
interpleader. In this action, the plaintiff may file a complaint even if he has sustained no
actual transgression of his rights. In fact, he actually has no interest in the subject
matter of the action. This is not so in an ordinary civil action.
(3) Ordinary civil actions may be filed initially in either the MTC of the RTC depending
upon the jurisdictional amount or the nature of the action involved. On the other hand,
there are special civil actions which can only be filed in an MTC like the actions for
forcible entry and unlawful detainer. There are also special civil actions which cannot be
commenced in the MTC, foremost of which are the petitions for certiorari, prohibition,
and mandamus.
(4) The venue in ordinary civil actions is determined by either the residence of the
parties where the action is personal or by the location of the property where the action
is real. This dichotomy does not always apply to a special civil action. For instance, the
venue in a petition for quo warranto iw where the Supreme Court or the Court of
Appeals sits if the petition is commenced in any of these courts and without taking into
consideration where the parties reside. It is only when the petition is lodged with the
RTC that the residence is considered in venue analysis. While in ordinary civil actions
the residences of both the plaintiff and the defendant are factored in the determination,
a petition for quo warranto failed in the RTC merely looks into the residence of the
respondent, not that of the petitioner. But if it is the Solicitor General who commences
the action, another special rule is followed because the petition may only be
commenced in the RTC in Manila, in the Court of Appeals or in the Supreme Court.
(5) While ordinary civil actions when filed are denominated as complaints, some
special civil actions are not denominated as such but petitions.
1. Interpleader;
2. Expropriation;
3. Foreclosure of real estate mortgage;
4. Partition; and
5. Forcible entry and unlawful detainer.
(1) The subject matter of a petition for declaratory relief raises issues which are not
capable of pecuniary estimation and must be filed with the Regional Trial Court (Sec.
19[1], BP 129; Sec. 1, Rule 63). It would be error to file the petition with the Supreme
Court which has no original jurisdiction to entertain a petition for declaratory relief
(Untied Residents of Dominican Hill vs. Commission on the Settlement of Land
Problems, 353 SCRA 782; Ortega vs. Quezon City Government, 469 SCRA 388).
(2) Interpleader is a special civil action filed by a person against whom two conflicting
claims are made upon the same subject matter and over which he claims no interest, to
compel the claimants to interplead and to litigate their conflicting claims among
themselves (Sec. 1).
(1) There must be two or more claimants with adverse or conflicting interests to a
property in the custody or possession of the plaintiff;
(2) The plaintiff in an action for interpleader has no claim upon the subject matter of
the adverse claims or if he has an interest at all, such interest is not disputed by the
claimants;
(3) The subject matter of the adverse claims must be one and the same; and
When to file
(1) Whenever conflicting claims upon the same subject matter are or may be made
against a person who claims no interest whatever in the subject matter, or an interest
which in whole or in part is not disputed by the claimants, he may bring an action
against the conflicting claimants to compel them to interplead and litigate their several
claims among themselves (Sec. 1).
(2) The subject matter in a petition for declaratory relief is any of the following:
(a) Deed;
(b) Will;
(d) Statute;
(f) Ordinance; or
(3) The petition for declaratory relief is filed before there occurs any breach or violation
of the deed, contract, statute, ordinance or executive order or regulation. It will not
prosper when brought after a contract or a statute has already been breached or
violated. If there has already been a breach, the appropriate ordinary civil action and
not declaratory relief should be filed.
(2) Those who may sue under the contract should be those with interest under the
contract like the parties, the assignees and the heirs as required by substantive law
(Art. 1311, Civil Code).
(1) The subject matter must be a deed, will, contract or other written instrument,
statute, executive order or regulation or ordinance;
(2) The terms of said document or the validity thereof are doubtful and require judicial
construction;
(4) There must be actual justiciable controversy or the ripening seeds of one( there is
threatened litigation the immediate future); there must be allegation of any threatened,
imminent and inevitable violation of petitioners right sought to be prevented by the
declaratory relief sought;
(6) The issue must be ripe for judicial determination e.g. administrative remedies
already exhausted;
(7) The party seeking the relief has legal interest in the controversy; and
(b) The controversy must be between persons whose interests are adverse;
(c) The party seeking the relief must have legal interest in the controversy; and
(d) The issue is ripe for judicial determination (Republic vs. Orbecido III, 472 SCRA
114).
(a) A decision would not terminate the uncertainty or controversy which gave rise to
the action; or
(b) The declaration or construction is not necessary and proper under the
circumstances as when the instrument or the statute has already been breached (Sec.
5).
(4) In declaratory relief, the court is given the discretion to act or not to act on the
petition. It may therefore choose not to construe the instrument sought to be construed
or could refrain from declaring the rights of the petitioner under the deed or the law. A
refusal of the court to declare rights or construe an instrument is actually the functional
equivalent of the dismissal of the petition.
(5) On the other hand, the court does not have the discretion to refuse to act with
respect to actions described as similar remedies. Thus, in an action for reformation of
an instrument, to quiet or to consolidate ownership, the court cannot refuse to render a
judgment (Sec. 5).
(1) If before final termination of the case, a breach should take place, the action may
be converted into ordinary action to avoid multiplicity of suits (Republic vs. Orbecido,
G.R. No. 154380, Oct. 5, 2005).
(2) Ordinary civil action plaintiff alleges that his right has been violated by the
defendant; judgment rendered is coercive in character; a writ of execution may be
executed against the defeated party.
(3) Special civil action of declaratory relief an impending violation is sufficient to file a
declaratory relief; no execution may be issued; the court merely makes a declaration.
Reformation of an instrument
(1) It is not an action brought to reform a contract but to reform the instrument
evidencing the contract. It presupposes that there is nothing wrong with the contract
itself because there is a meeting of minds between the parties. The contract is to be
reformed because despite the meeting of minds of the parties as to the object and
cause of the contract, the instrument which is supposed to embody the agreement of
the parties does not reflect their true agreement by reason of mistake, inequitable
conduct or accident. The action is brought so the true intention of the parties may be
expressed in the instrument (Art. 1359, CC).
(2) The instrument may be reformed if it does not express the true intention of the
parties because of lack of skill of the person drafting the instrument (Art. 1363, CC). If
the parties agree upon the mortgage or pledge of property, but the instrument states
that the property is sold absolutely or with a right of repurchase, reformation of the
instrument is proper (Art. 1365, CC).
(3) Where the consent of a party to a contract has been procured by fraud, inequitable
conduct or accident, and an instrument was executed by the parties in accordance with
the contract, what is defective is the contract itself because of vitiation of consent. The
remedy is not to bring an action for reformation of the instrument but to file an action
for annulment of the contract (Art. 1359, CC).
(4) Reformation of the instrument cannot be brought to reform any of the following:
(b) Wills; or
Consolidation of ownership
(1) The concept of consolidation of ownership under Art. 1607, Civil Code, has its origin
in the substantive provisions of the law on sales. Under the law, a contract of sale may
be extinguished either by legal redemption (Art. 1619) or conventional redemption (Art.
1601). Legal redemption (retracto legal) is a statutory mandated redemption of a
property previously sold. For instance, a co-owner of a property may exercise the right
of redemption in case the shares of all the other co-owners or any of them are sold to a
third person (Art. 1620). The owners of adjoining lands shall have the right of
redemption when a piece of rural land with a size of one hectare or less is alienated
(Art. 1621). Conventional redemption (pacto de retro) sale is one that is not mandated
by the statute but one which takes place because of the stipulation of the parties to the
sale. The period of redemption may be fixed by the parties in which case the period
cannot exceed ten (10) years from the date of the contract. In the absence of any
agreement, the redemption period shall be four (4) years from the date of the contract
(Art. 1606). When the redemption is not made within the period agreed upon, in case
the subject matter of the sale is a real property, Art. 1607 provides that the
consolidation of ownership in the vendee shall not be recorded in the Registry of
Property without a judicial order, after the vendor has been duly heard.
(2) The action brought to consolidate ownership is not for the purpose of consolidating
the ownership of the property in the person of the vendee or buyer but for the
registration of the property. The lapse of the redemption period without the seller a
retro exercising his right of redemption, consolidates ownership or title upon the person
of the vendee by operation of law. Art. 1607 requires the filing of the petition to
consolidate ownership because the law precludes the registration of the consolidated
title without judicial order (Cruz vs. Leis, 327 SCRA 570).
(1) This action is brought to remove a cloud on title to real property or any interest
therein. The action contemplates a situation where the instrument or a record is
apparently valid or effective but is in truth and in fact invalid, ineffective, voidable or
unenforceable, and may be prejudicial to said title to real property. This action is then
brought to remove a cloud on title to real property or any interest therein. It may also
be brought as a preventive remedy to prevent a cloud from being cast upon title to real
property or any interest therein (Art. 476).
(2) The plaintiff need not be in possession of the real property before he may bring the
action as long as he can show that he has a legal or an equitable title to the property
which is the subject matter of the action (Art. 477).
(1) A judgment or final order or resolution of the Commission on Elections and the
Commission on Audit may be brought by the aggrieved party to the Supreme Court on
certiorari under Rule 65 (Sec. 2). The filing of a petition for certiorari shall not stay the
execution of the judgment or final order or resolution sought to be reviewed, unless the
SC directs otherwise upon such terms as it may deem just (Sec. . To prevent the
execution of the judgment, the petitioner should obtain a temporary restraining order or
a writ of preliminary injunction because the mere filing of a petition does not interrupt
the course of the principal case.
(2) Decisions of the Civil Service Commission shall be appealed to the Court of Appeals
which has exclusive appellate jurisdiction over all judgments or final orders of such
commission (RA 7902).
(3) The petition shall be filed within thirty (30) days from notice of the judgment or
final order or resolution sought to be reviewed. The filing of a motion for new trial or
reconsideration of said judgment or final order or resolution, if allowed under the
procedural rules of the Commission concerned, shall interrupt the period herein fixed. If
the motion is denied, the aggrieved party may file the petition within the remaining
period, but which shall not be less than five (5) days in any event, reckoned from notice
of denial (Sec. 3).
(4) Note that petition for review from decisions of quasi-judicial agencies to the CA
should be within 15 days and does not stay the decision appealed. Petition for review
from decisions of the RTC decided in its appellate jurisdiction filed to the CA should be
filed within 15 days and stays execution, unless the case is under the rules of Summary
Procedure. Special civil actions of certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus, from Comelec
and COA should be filed within 30 days, and does not stay the decision appealed.
Bottomline: Decisions of quasi-judicial bodies are not stayed by appeal alone. Decisions
of regular courts are stayed on appeal. Although in petition for review on certiorari to
the SC via Rule 45, there is no express provision on effect of appeal on execution.
(2) The not less than 5 days provision for filing a pleading applies only to:
(c) filing an special civil action for certiorari from a decision of the Comelec or CoA after
denial of a MfR or MNT. It does not apply to filing appeal from decisions of other
entities after denial of a MfR or MNT. In such cases, either the parties have a fresh 15
days, or the balance.
(1) Sec. 7, Art. IX-A of the Constitution reads, unless otherwise provided by the
Constitution or by law, any decision, order or ruling of each commission may be
brought to the Supreme Court on certiorari by the aggrieved party within 30 days from
receipt of a copy thereof. The provision was interpreted by the Supreme Court to refer
to certiorari under Rule 65 and not appeal by certiorari under Rule 45 (Aratuc vs.
COMELEC, 88 SCRA 251; Dario vs. Mison, 176 SCRA 84) . To implement the above
constitutional provision, the SC promulgated Rule 64.
(1) Certiorari is a remedy for the correction of errors of jurisdiction, not errors of
judgment. It is an original and independent action that was not part of the trial that had
resulted in the rendition of the judgment or order complained of. More importantly, sine
the issue is jurisdiction, an original action for certiorari may be directed against an
interlocutory order of the lower court prior to an appeal from the judgment (New
Frontier Sugar Corp. vs. RTC of Iloilo, GR 165001, Jan. 31, 2007).
(2) Where the error is not one of jurisdiction, but of law or fact which is a mistake of
judgment, the proper remedy should be appeal. Hence, if there was no question of
jurisdiction involved in the decision and what was being questioned was merely the
findings in the decision of whether or not the practice of the other party constitutes a
violation of the agreement, the matter is a proper subject of appeal, not certiorari
(Centro Escolar University Faculty and Allieid Workers Union vs. CA, GR 165486, May
31, 2006).
(3) Filing of petition for certiorari does not interrupt the course of the principal action
nor the running of the reglementary periods involved in the proceeding, unless an
application for a restraining order or a writ of preliminary injunction to the appellate
court is granted (Sec. 7). Neither does it interrupt the reglementary period for the filing
of an answer nor the course of the case where there is no writ of injunction (People vs.
Almendras, 401 SCRA 555).
(6) Exceptions to the rule that certiorari is not available when the period for appeal has
lapsed and certiorari may still be invoked when appeal is lost are the following:
(b) When public welfare and the advancement of public policy dictates;
(d) When the writs issued are null and void; and
(e) When the questioned order amounts to an oppressive exercise of judicial authority
(Chua vs. CA, 344 SCRA 136).
Requisites
Injunctive relief
(1) The court in which the petition is filed may issue orders expediting the proceedings,
and it may also grant a temporary restraining order or a writ of preliminary injunction
for the preservation of the rights of the parties pending such proceedings. The petition
shall not interrupt the course of the principal case unless a temporary restraining order
or a writ of preliminary injunction has been issued against the public respondent from
further proceeding in the case (Sec. 7).
(2) The public respondent shall proceed with the principal case within ten (10) days
from the filing of a petition for certiorari with a higher court or tribunal, absent a
Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) or a Writ of Preliminary Injunction, or upon its
expiration. Failure of the public respondent to proceed with the principal case may be a
ground for an administrative charge (AM 07-7-12-SC, Dec. 12, 2007).
(1) The remedies of appeal and certiorari are mutually exclusive and not alternative or
successive. The antithetic character of appeal and certiorari has been generally
recognized and observed save only on those rare instances when appeal is satisfactorily
shown to be an inadequate remedy. Thus, a petitioner must show valid reasons why
the issues raised in his petition for certiorari could not have been raised on appeal
(Banco Filipino Savings and Mortgage Bank vs. CA, 334 SCRA 305) .
(2) When there is urgency to decide upon the question and any further delay would
prejudice the interests of the government or of the petitioner;
(4) When order is a patent nullity, as where the court a quo has no jurisdiction or there
was no due process;
(5) When questions have been duly raised and passed upon by the lower court;
(8) In a criminal case, where relief from order of arrest is urgent and the granting of
such relief by the trial court is improbable;
(9) Where the proceedings was ex parte or in which the petitioner had no opportunity
to object;
(10) When petitioner is deprived of due process and there is extreme urgency for
urgent relief; and
(11) When issue raised is one purely of law or public interest is involved;
(1) The primary relief will be annulment or modification of the judgment, order or
resolution or proceeding subject of the petition. It may also include such other
incidental reliefs as law and justice may require (Sec. 1). The court, in its judgment may
also award damages and the execution of the award for damages or costs shall follow
the procedure in Sec. 1, Rule 39 (Sec. 9).
(1) The Court may impose motu propio, based on res ipsa loquitur, other disciplinary
sanctions or measures on erring lawyers for patently dilatory an unmeritorious petition
for certiorari (AM 07-7-12-SC, Dec. 12, 2007). The court may dismiss the petition if it
finds the same patently without merit or prosecuted manifestly for delay, or if the
questions raised therein are too unsubstantial to require consideration. In such event,
the court may award in favor of the respondent treble costs solidarily against the
petitioner and counsel, in addition to subjecting counsel to administrative sanctions
under Rules 139 and 139-B.
(1) Quo warranto is a demand made by the state upon some individual or corporation
to show by what right they exercise some franchise or privilege appertaining to the
state which, according to the Constitution and laws they cannot legally exercise by
virtue of a grant and authority from the State (44 Am. Jur. 88-89).
(2) It is a special civil action commenced by a verified petition against (a) a person who
usurps a public office, position or franchise; (b) a public officer who performs an act
constituting forfeiture of a public office; or (c) an association which acts as a
corporation within the Philippines without being legally incorporated or without lawful
authority to do so (Sec. 1).
(1) Quo warranto is commenced by a verified petition brought in the name of the
Government of the Republic of the Philippines by the Solicitor General, or in some
instances, by a public prosecutor (Secs. 2 and 3). When the action is commenced by
the Solicitor General, the petition may be brought in the Regional Trial Court of the City
of Manila, the Court of Appeals or the Supreme Court (Sec. 7).
(2) An action for the usurpation of a public office, position or franchise may be
commenced by a verified petition brought in the name of the Republic of the Philippines
thru the Solicitor General against:
(a) A person who usurps, intrudes into, or unlawfully holds or exercises a public office,
position or franchise;
(b) A public officer who does or suffers an act which, by the provision of law,
constitutes a ground for the forfeiture of his office;
(c) An association which acts a corporation within the Philippines without being legally
incorporated or without lawful authority so to act (Sec. 1).
(1) The petition may be commenced by a private person in his own name where he
claims to be entitled to the public office or position alleged to have been usurped or
unlawfully held or exercised by another (Sec. 5). Accordingly, the private person may
maintain the action without the intervention of the Solicitor General and without need
for any leave of court (Navarro vs. Gimenez, 10 Phil. 226; Cui vs. Cui, 60 Phil. 37) . In
bringing a petition for quo warranto, he must show that he has a clear right to the
office allegedly being held by another (Cuevas vs. Bacal, 347 SCRA 338) . It is not
enough that he merely asserts the right to be appointed to the office.
(1) When the respondent is found guilty of usurping, intruding into, or unlawfully
holding or exercising a public office, position or franchise, judgment shall be rendered
that such respondent be ousted and altogether excluded therefrom, and that the
petitioner or relator, as the case may be, recover his costs. Such further judgment may
be rendered determining the respective rights in and to the public office, position or
franchise of the parties to the action as justice requires (Sec. 9).
(1) If the petitioner is adjudged to be entitled to the office, he may sue for damages
against the alleged usurper within one (1) year from the entry of judgment establishing
his right to the office in question (Sec. 11).
(1) Expropriation is an exercise of the States power of eminent domain wherein the
government takes a private property for public purpose upon payment of just
compensation.
(a) State with certainty the right of the plaintiff to expropriation and the purpose
thereof;
(c) Join as defendants all persons owning or claiming to own, or occupying, any part of
the property or interest therein showing as far as practicable the interest of each
defendant. If the plaintiff cannot with accuracy identify the real owners, averment to
that effect must be made in the complaint (Sec. 1).
When plaintiff can immediately enter into possession of the real property, in
relation to RA 8974
(1) Except for the acquisition of right-of-way, site or location for any national
government infrastructure project through expropriation, the expropriator shall have the
right to take or enter upon the possession of the real property involved if he deposits
with the authorized government depositary an amount equivalent to the assessed value
of the property for purposes of taxation to be held by such bank subject to the orders
of the court. such deposit shall be in money, unless in lieu thereof the court authorizes
the deposit of a certificate of deposit of a government bank of the Philippines payable
on demand to the authorized government depositary (Sec. 2, Rule 67).
(1) For the acquisition of right-of-way, site or location for any national government
infrastructure project through expropriation, upon the filing of the filing of the
complaint, and after due notice to the defendant, the implementing agency shall
immediately pay the owner of the property the amount equivalent to the sum of (1)
100 percent of the value of the property based on the current relevant zonal valuation
of the BIR; and (2) the value of the improvements and/or structures as determined
under Sec. 7 of RA 8974 (Sec. 4, RA 8974).
(1) Omnibus Motion Rule Subject to the provisions of Sec. 1, Rule 9, a motion
attacking a pleading, order, judgment or proceeding shall include all objections then
available, and all objections not so included shall be deemed waived (Sec. 8, Rule 15).
(2) If a defendant has no objection or defense to the action or the taking of his
property, he may file and serve a notice of appearance and a manifestation to that
effect, specifically designating or identifying the property in which he claims to be
interested, within the time stated in the summons. Thereafter, he shall be entitled to
notice of all proceedings affecting the same.
If a defendant has any objection to the filing of or the allegations in the complaint, or
any objection or defense to the taking of his property, he shall serve his answer within
the time stated in the summons. The answer shall specifically designate or identify the
property in which he claims to have an interest, state the nature and extent of the
interest claimed, and adduce all his objections and defenses to the taking of his
property. No counterclaim, cross-claim or third-party complaint shall be alleged or
allowed in the answer or any subsequent pleading.
A defendant waives all defenses and objections not so alleged but the court, in the
interest of justice, may permit amendments to the answer to be made not later than
ten (10) days from the filing thereof. However, at the trial of the issue of just
compensation, whether or not a defendant has previously appeared or answered, he
may present evidence as to the amount of the compensation to be paid for his
property, and he may share in the distribution of the award (Sec. 3)..
Order of Expropriation
(1) If the objections to and the defenses against the right of the plaintiff to expropriate
the property are overruled, or when no party appears to defend as required by this
Rule, the court may issue an order of expropriation declaring that the plaintiff has a
lawful right to take the property sought to be expropriated, for the public use or
purpose described in the complaint, upon the payment of just compensation to be
determined as of the date of the taking of the property or the filing of the complaint,
whichever came first.
A final order sustaining the right to expropriate the property may be appealed by any
party aggrieved thereby. Such appeal, however, shall not prevent the court from
determining the just compensation to be paid.
After the rendition of such an order, the plaintiff shall not be permitted to dismiss or
discontinue the proceeding except on such terms as the court deems just and equitable
(Sec. 4).
(1) The order of expropriation merely declares that the plaintiff has the lawful to
expropriate the property but contains no ascertainment of the compensation to be paid
to the owner of the property. So upon the rendition of the order of expropriation, the
court shall appoint not more than three (3) commissioners to ascertain the just
compensation for the property. Objections to the appointment may be made within 10
days from service of the order of appointment (Sec. 5). The commissioners are entitled
to fees and their fees shall be taxed as part of the costs of the proceedings, and all
costs shall be paid by the plaintiff except those costs of rival claimants litigating their
claims (Sec. 12).
(2) Where the principal issue is the determination of just compensation, a hearing
before the commissioners is indispensable to allow the parties to present evidence on
the issue of just compensation. Although the findings of the commissioners may be
disregarded and the trial court may substitute its own estimate of the value, the latter
may do so only for valid reasons, that is where the commissioners have applied illegal
principles to the evidence submitted to them, where they have disregarded a clear
preponderance of evidence, or where the amount allowed is either grossly inadequate
or excessive.
(1) Appointment. Upon the rendition of the order of expropriation, the court shall
appoint not more than three (3) competent and disinterested persons as commissioners
to ascertain and report to the court the just compensation for the property sought to be
taken. The order of appointment shall designate the time and place of the first session
of the hearing to be held by the commissioners and specify the time within which their
report shall be submitted to the court.
Copies of the order shall be served on the parties. Objections to the appointment of any
of the commissioners shall be filed with the court within ten (10) days from service, and
shall be resolved within thirty (30) days after all the commissioners shall have received
copies of the objections (Sec. 5).
(2) Proceedings. Before entering upon the performance of their duties, the
commissioners shall take and subscribe an oath that they will faithfully perform their
duties as commissioners, which oath shall be filed in court with the other proceedings in
the case. Evidence may be introduced by either party before the commissioners who
are authorized to administer oaths on hearings before them, and the commissioners
shall, unless the parties consent to the contrary, after due notice to the parties to
attend, view and examine the property sought to be expropriated and its surroundings,
and may measure the same, after which either party may, by himself or counsel, argue
the case. The commissioners shall assess the consequential damages to the property
not taken and deduct from such consequential damages the consequential benefits to
be derived by the owner from the public use or purpose of the property taken, the
operation of its franchise by the corporation or the carrying on of the business of the
corporation or person taking the property. But in no case shall the consequential
benefits assessed exceed the consequential damages assessed, or the owner be
deprived of the actual value of his property so taken (Sec. 6).
(3) Report. The court may order the commissioners to report when any particular
portion of the real estate shall have been passed upon by them, and may render
judgment upon such partial report, and direct the commissioners to proceed with their
work as to subsequent portions of the property sought to be expropriated, and may
from time to time so deal with such property. The commissioners shall make a full and
accurate report to the court of all their proceedings, and such proceedings shall not be
effectual until the court shall have accepted their report and rendered judgment in
accordance with their recommendations. Except as otherwise expressly ordered by the
court, such report shall be filed within sixty (60) days from the date the commissioners
were notified of their appointment, which time may be extended in the discretion of the
court. Upon the filing of such report, the clerk of the court shall serve copies thereof on
all interested parties, with notice that they are allowed ten (10) days within which to file
objections to the findings of the report, if they so desire (Sec. 7).
(4) Action upon the report. Upon the expiration of the period of ten (10) days referred
to in the preceding section, or even before the expiration of such period but after all the
interested parties have filed their objections to the report or their statement of
agreement therewith, the court may, after hearing, accept the report and render
judgment in accordance therewith; or, for cause shown, it may recommit the same to
the commissioners for further report of facts; or it may set aside the report and appoint
new commissioners; or it may accept the report in part and reject it in part; and it may
make such order or render such judgment as shall secure to the plaintiff the property
essential to the exercise of his right of expropriation, and to the defendant just
compensation for the property so taken (Sec. .
(1) After payment of the just compensation as determined in the judgment, the plaintiff
shall have the right to enter upon the property expropriated and to appropriate the
same for the public use or purpose defined in the judgment or to retain possession
already previously made in accordance with Sec. 2, Rule 67.
(2) Title to the property expropriated passes from the owner to the expropriator upon
full payment of just compensation (Federated Realty Corp. vs. CA, 477 SCRA 707).
(2) A mortgage contract may have a provision in which the mortgage is a security for
past, present and future indebtedness. This clause known as a dragnet clause or
blanket mortgage clause has its origins in American jurisprudence. The Supreme Court
ruled that mortgages given to secure future advancements are valid and legal contracts
(Prudential Bank vs. Alviar, 464 SCRA 353).
(1) If after the trial, the court finds that the matters set forth in the complaint are true,
it shall render a judgment containing the following matters:
(a) An ascertainment of the amount due to the plaintiff upon the mortgage debt or
obligation, including interest and other charges as approved by the court, as well as
costs;
(c) An order that the amount found due be paid to the court or to the judgment obligee
within the period of not less than 90 days nor more than 120 days from the entry of
judgment; and
(d) An admonition that in default of such payment the property shall be sold at public
auction to satisfy the judgment (Sec. 2).
(2) The judgment of the court on the above matters is considered a final adjudication of
the case and hence, is subject to challenge by the aggrieved party by appeal or by
other post-judgment remedies.
(3) The period granted to the mortgagor for the payment of the amount found due by
the court is not just a procedural requirement but s substantive right given by law to
the mortgagee as his first chance to save his property from final disposition at the
foreclosure sale (De Leon vs. Ibaez, 95 Phil. 119).
(1) The confirmation of the sale shall divest the rights in the property of all parties to
the action and shall vest their rights in the purchaser, subject to such rights of
redemption as may be allowed by law (Sec. 3). The title vests in the purchaser upon a
valid confirmation of the sale and retroacts to the date of sale (Grimalt vs. Vasquez, 36
Phil. 396).
(2) The import of Sec. 3 includes one vital effect: The equity of redemption of the
mortgagor or redemptioner is cut-off and there will be no further redemption, unless
allowed by law (as in the case of banks as mortgagees). The equity of redemption
starts from the ninety-day period set in the judgment of the court up to the time before
the sale is confirmed by an order of the court. once confirmed, no equity of redemption
may further be exercised.
(3) The order of confirmation is appealable and if not appealed within the period for
appeal becomes final. Upon the finality of the order of confirmation or upon the
expiration of the period of redemption when allowed by law, the purchaser at the
auction sale or last redemptioner, if any, shall be entitled to the possession of the
property and he may secure a writ of possession, upon, motion, from the court which
ordered the foreclosure unless a third party is actually holding the same adversely to
the judgment obligor (Sec. 3).
(1) The proceeds of the sale of the mortgaged property shall, after deducting the costs
of the sale, be paid to the person foreclosing the mortgage, and when there shall be
any balance or residue after paying off the mortgage debt due, the same shall be paid
to junior encumbrancers in the order of their priority. If there be any further balance
after paying them or if there be no junior encumbrancers, the same shall be paid to the
mortgagor or any person entitled thereto (Sec. 4).
Deficiency judgment
(1) If there be a balance due to the plaintiff after applying the proceeds of the sale, the
court, upon motion, shall render judgment against the defendant for any such balance.
Execution may issue immediately if the balance is all due the plaintiff shall be entitled to
execution at such time as the remaining balance shall become due and such due date
shall be stated in the judgment (Sec. 6). Note that the deficiency judgment is in itself a
judgment hence, also appealable.
(2) No independent action need be filed to recover the deficiency from the mortgagor.
The deficiency judgment shall be rendered upon motion of the mortgagee. The motion
must be made only after the sale and after it is known that a deficiency exists. Before
that, any court order to recover the deficiency is void (Govt. of PI vs. Torralba, 61 Phil.
689). It has been held that the mortgagor who is not the debtor and who merely
executed the mortgage to secure the principal debtors obligation, is not liable for the
deficiency unless he assumed liability for the same in the contract (Philippine Trust Co.
vs. Echaus Tan Siua, 52 Phil. 852). Since a deficiency judgment cannot be obtained
against the mortgagore who is not the debtor in the principal obligation, mortgagee
may have to file a separate suit against the principal debtor.
Instances when court cannot render deficiency judgment
(1) Where the debtor-mortgagor is a non-resident and who at the time of the filing of
the action for foreclosure and during the pendency of the proceedings was outside the
Philippines, it is believed that a deficiency judgment under Sec. 6 would not be
procedurally feasible. A deficiency judgment is by nature in personam and jurisdiction
over the person is mandatory. Having been outside the country, jurisdiction over his
person could not have been acquired.
(2) Instances when a co-owner may not demand partition at any time:
(a) There is an agreement among the co-owners to keep the property undivided for a
certain period of time but not exceeding ten years (Arft. 494);
(b) When partition is prohibited by the donor or testator for a period not exceeding 20
years (Art. 494);
(d) When the property is not subject to a physical division and to do so would render it
unserviceable for the use for which it is intended (Art. 495);
(e) When the condition imposed upon voluntary heirs before they can demand partition
has not yet been fulfilled (Art. 1084).
(1) The action shall be brought by the person who has a right to compel the partition of
real estate (Sec. 1) or of an estate composed of personal property, or both real and
personal property (Sec. 13). The plaintiff is a person who is supposed to be a co-owner
of the property or estate sought to be partitioned. The defendants are all the co-
owners. All the co-owners must be joined. Accordingly, an action will not lie without the
joinder of all co-owners and other persons having interest in the property (Reyes vs.
Cordero, 46 Phil. 658). All the co-owners, therefore, are indispensable parties.
(1) The plaintiff shall state in his complaint, the nature and extent of his title, an
adequate description of the real estate of which partition is demanded, and shall join as
defendants all other persons interested in the property (Sec. 1). He must also include a
demand for the accounting of the rents, profits and other income from the property
which he may be entitled to (Sec. . These cannot be demanded in another action
because they are parts of the cause of action for partition. They will be barred if not set
up in the same action pursuant to the rule against splitting a single cause of action.
(1) During the trial, the court shall determine whether or not the plaintiff is truly a co-
owner of the property, that there is indeed a co-ownership among the parties, and that
a partition is not legally proscribed thus may be allowed. If the court so finds that the
facts are such that a partition would be in order, and that the plaintiff has a right to
demand partition, the court will issue an order of partition.
(2) The court shall order the partition of the property among all the parties in interest,
if after trial it finds that the plaintiff has the right to partition (Sec. 2). It was held that
this order of partition including an order directing an accounting is final and not
interlocutory and hence, appealable; thus, revoking previous contrary rulings on the
matter. A final order decreeing partition and accounting may be appealed by any party
aggrieved thereby.
(3) Partition by agreement. The order of partition is one that directs the parties or co-
owners to partition the property and the parties may make the partition among
themselves by proper instruments of conveyance, if they agree among themselves. If
they do agree, the court shall then confirm the partition so agreed upon by all of the
parties, and such partition, together with the order of the court confirming the same,
shall be recorded in the registry of deeds of the place in which the property is situated
(Sec. 2). There always exists the possibility that the co-owners are unable to agree on
the partition. If they cannot partition the property among themselves, the next stage in
the action will follow, the appointment of commissioners.
Sec. 3. Commissioners to make partition when parties fail to agree. If the parties are
unable to agree upon the partition, the court shall appoint not more than three (3)
competent and disinterested persons as commissioners to make the partition,
commanding them to set off to the plaintiff and to each party in interest such part and
proportion of the property as the court shall direct.
Sec. 4. Oath and duties of commissioners. Before making such partition, the
commissioners shall take and subscribe an oath that they will faithfully perform their
duties as commissioners, which oath shall be filed in court with the other proceedings in
the case. In making the partition, the commissioners shall view and examine the real
estate, after due notice to the parties to attend at such view and examination, and shall
hear the parties as to their preference in the portion of the property to be set apart to
them and the comparative value thereof, and shall set apart the same to the parties in
lots or parcels as will be most advantageous and equitable, having due regard to the
improvements, situation and quality of the different parts thereof.
Sec. 7. Action of the court upon commissioners report. Upon the expiration of the
period of ten (10) days referred to in the preceding section, or even before the
expiration of such period but after the interested parties have filed their objections to
the report or their statement of agreement therewith, the court may, upon hearing,
accept the report and render judgment in accordance therewith; or, for cause shown,
recommit the same to the commissioners for further report of facts; or set aside the
report and appoint new commissioners; or accept the report in part and reject it in part;
and may make such order and render such judgment as shall effectuate a fair and just
partition of the real estate, or of its value, if assigned or sold as above provided,
between the several owners thereof.
(1) The judgment shall state definitely, by metes and bounds and adequate description,
the particular portion of the real estate assigned to each party, the effect of the
judgment shall be to vest in each party to the action in severalty the portion of the real
estate assigned to him.
(2) If the whole property is assigned to one of the parties upon his paying to the others
the sum or sums ordered by the court, the judgment shall state the fact of such
payment and of the assignment of the real estate to the party making the payment,
and the effect of the judgment shall be to vest in the party making the payment the
whole of the real estate free from any interest on the part of the other parties to the
action.
(3) If the property is sold and the sale confirmed by the court, the judgment shall state
the name of the purchaser or purchasers and a definite description of the parcels of real
estate sold to each purchaser, and the effect of the judgment shall be to vest the real
estate in the purchaser or purchasers making the payment or payments, free from the
claims of any of the parties to the action.
(4) A certified copy of the judgment shall in either case be recorded in the registry of
deeds of the place in which the real estate is situated, and the expenses of such
recording shall be taxed as part of the costs of the action (Sec. 11).
(1) The provisions of this Rule shall apply to partitions of estates composed of personal
property, or of both real and personal property, in so far as the same may be applicable
(Sec. 13).
Prescription of action
(1) Prescription of action does not run in favor of a co-owner or co-heir against his co-
owner or co-heirs as long as there is a recognition of the co-ownership expressly or
impliedly (Art. 494).
(2) The action for partition cannot be barred by prescription as long as the co-
ownership exists (Aguirre vs. CA, 421 SCRA 310).
(3) But while the action to demand partition of a co-owned property does not prescribe,
a co-owner may acquire ownership thereof by prescription where there exists a clear
repudiation of the co-ownership and the co-owners are apprised of the claim of adverse
and exclusive ownership.
(1) The actions for forcible entry and unlawful detainer belong to the class of actions
known by the generic name accion interdictal (ejectment) where the issue is the right
of physical or material possession of the subject real property independent of any claim
of ownership by the parties involved (Mendoza vs. CA, 452 SCRA 117 [2005]).
(b) Unlawful Detainer (desahuico), where one illegally withholds possession after the
expiration or termination of his right to hold possession under any contract, express or
implied.
(1) The actions of forcible entry and unlawful detainer are within the exclusive and
original jurisdiction of the MTC, MeTC and MCTC (Sec. 33[2], BP 129; RA 7691) and
shall be governed by the rules on summary procedure irrespective of the amount of
damages or rental sought to be recovered (Sec. 3, Rule 70).
(2) In actions for forcible entry, two allegations are mandatory for the MTC to acquire
jurisdiction: (a) plaintiff must allege his prior physical possession of the property; and
(b) he must also allege that he was deprived of his possession by force, intimidation,
strategy, threat or stealth. If the alleged dispossession did not occur by any of these
means, the proper recourse is to file not an action for forcible entry but a plenary action
to recover possession (Benguet Corp. Cordillera Caraballo Mission, GR 155343, Sept. 2,
2005).
(3) Both actions must be brought within one year from the date of actual entry on the
land, in case of forcible entry, and from the date of last demand, in case of unlawful
detainer (Valdez vs. CA, GR 132424, May 2, 2006).
(4) Jurisdiction is determined by the allegations of the complaint. The mere raising of
the issue of tenancy does not automatically divest the court of jurisdiction because the
jurisdiction of the court is determined by the allegations of the complaint and is not
dependent upon the defenses set up by the defendant (Marino, Jr. vs. Alamis, 450
SCRA 198 [2005]).
Who may institute the action and when; against whom the action may be
maintained
(1) Subject to the provisions of the next succeeding section, a person deprived of the
possession of any land or building by force, intimidation, threat, strategy, or stealth, or
a lessor, vendor, vendee, or other person against whom the possession of any land or
building is unlawfully withheld after the expiration or termination of the right to hold
possession, by virtue of any contract, express or implied, or the legal representatives or
assigns of any such lessor, vendor, vendee, or other person, may, at any time within
one (1) year after such unlawful deprivation or withholding of possession, bring an
action in the proper Municipal Trial Court against the person or persons unlawfully
withholding or depriving of possession, or any person or persons claiming under them,
for the restitution of such possession, together with damages and costs (Sec. 1).
(2) Unless otherwise stipulated, such action by the lessor shall be commenced only
after demand to pay or comply with the conditions of the lease and to vacate is made
upon the lessee, or by serving written notice of such demand upon the person found on
the premises, or by posting such notice on the premises if no person be found thereon,
and the lessee fails to comply therewith after fifteen (15) days in the case of land or
five (5) days in the case of buildings (Sec. 2).
Pleadings allowed
(1) The only pleadings allowed to be filed are the complaint, compulsory counterclaim
and cross-claim pleaded in the answer, and the answers thereto. All pleadings shall be
verified (Sec. 4).
(1) The court may, from an examination of the allegations in the complaint and such
evidence as may be attached thereto, dismiss the case outright on any of the grounds
for the dismissal of a civil action which are apparent therein. If no ground for dismissal
is found, it shall forthwith issue summons (Sec. 5).
(1) Unless there exists a stipulation to the contrary, an unlawful detainer case shall be
commenced only after the demand to pay or comply with the conditions of the lease
and to vacate is made upon the lessee (Sec. 2). The requirement for a demand implies
that the mere failure of the occupant to pay rentals or his failure to comply with the
conditions of the lease does not ipso facto render his possession of the premises
unlawful. It is the failure to comply with the demand that vests upon the lessor a cause
of action.
(2) The demand may be in the form of a written notice served upon the person found
in the premises. The demand may also be made by posting a written notice on the
premises if no person can be found thereon (Sec. 2). It has been ruled, however, that
the demand upon a tenant may be oral (Jakihaca vs. Aquino, 181 SCRA 67). Sufficient
evidence must be adduced to show that there was indeed a demand like testimonies
from disinterested and unbiased witnesses.
(1) The court may grant preliminary injunction, in accordance with the provisions of
Rule 58, to prevent the defendant from committing further acts of dispossession against
the plaintiff. A possessor deprived of his possession through forcible entry or unlawful
detainer may, within five (5) days from the filing of the complaint, present a motion in
the action for forcible entry or unlawful detainer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary
mandatory injunction to restore him in his possession. The court shall decide the motion
within thirty (30) days from the filing thereof (Sec. 15).
(1) The assertion by the defendant of ownership over the disputed property does not
serve to divest the inferior court of its jurisdiction. The defendant cannot deprive the
court of jurisdiction by merely claiming ownership of the property involved (Rural Bank
of Sta. Ignacia vs. Dimatulac, 401 SCRA 742; Perez vs. Cruz, 404 SCRA 487) . If the
defendant raises the question of ownership and the issue of possession cannot be
resolved without deciding the question of ownership, the issue of ownership shall be
resolved only to determine the issue of possession (Sec. 3, RA 7691).
(2) When the defendant raises the issue of ownership, the court may resolve the issue
of ownership only under the following conditions:
(a) When the issue of possession cannot be resolved without resolving the issue of
ownership; and
(b) The issue of ownership shall be resolved only to determine the issue of possession
(Sec. 16).
Such judgment would not bar an action between the same parties respecting title to the
land or building. The resolution of the MeTC on the ownership of the property is merely
provisional or interlocutory. Any question involving the issue of ownership should be
raised and resolved in a separate action brought specifically to settle the question with
finality (Roberts vs. Papio, GR 166714, Feb. 9, 2007).
(1) Defendant must take the following steps to stay the execution of the judgment:
(b) File a supersedeas bond to pay for the rents, damages and costs accruing down to
the time of the judgment appealed from; and
(c) Deposit periodically with the RTC, during the pendency of the appeal, the adjudged
amount of rent due under the contract or if there be no contract, the reasonable value
of the use and occupation of the premises (Sec. 19).
(b) Where supervening events occur subsequent to the judgment bringing about a
material change in the situation of the parties which makes execution inequitable; and
(c) Where there is no compelling urgency for the execution because it is not justified by
the circumstances.
(1) Forcible entry and unlawful detainer actions are summary in nature designed to
provide for an expeditious means of protecting actual possession or the right to
possession of the property involved (Tubiano vs. Riazo, 335 SCRA 531). These action
shall both fall under the coverage of the Rules of Summary Procedure irrespective of
the amount of damages or unpaid rental sought to be recovered (Sec. 3).
(a) Motion to dismiss the complaint except on the ground of lack of jurisdiction over the
subject matter, or failure to comply with section 12;
(c) Motion for new trial, or for reconsideration of a judgment, or for reopening of trial;
(e) Motion for extension of time to file pleadings, affidavits or any other paper;
(f) Memoranda;
(g) Petition for certiorari, mandamus, or prohibition against any interlocutory order
issued by the court;
(j) Reply;
(l) Interventions
Contempt (Rule 71)
(1) Contempt is a disregard of, or disobedience to the rules or orders of a judicial body,
or an interruption of its proceedings by disorderly behavior or insolent language, in its
presence or so near thereto as to disturb the proceedings or to impair the respect due
to such body (17 C.J.S. 4).
(3) The reason for the power to punish for contempt is that respect of the courts
guarantees the stability of their institution. Without such guarantee, said institution
would be resting on shaky foundation (Cornejo vs.Tan, 85 Phil. 772).
(4) It is inherent in all courts; its existence is essential to the preservation of order in
judicial proceedings and to the enforcement of judgments, orders and mandates of the
courts, and consequently, to the due administration of justice (Perkins vs. Director of
Prisons, 58 Phil. 271).
(b) Coercion to compel the contemnor to do what the law requires him to uphold the
power of the Court, and also to secure the rights of the parties to a suit awarded by the
Court (Regalado vs. Go, GR 167988, Feb. 6, 2007).
(1) Civil or Criminal, depending on the nature and effect of the contemptuous act.
(1) The penalty for direct contempt depends upon the court which the act was
committed;
(a) If the act constituting direct contempt was committed against an RTC or a court of
equivalent or higher rank, the penalty is a fine not exceeding 2,000 pesos or
imprisonment not exceeding 10 days, or both;
(b) If the act constituting direct contempt was committed against a lower court, the
penalty is a fine not exceeding 200 pesos or imprisonment not exceeding one (1) day,
or both (Sec. 1);
(c) If the contempt consists in the refusal or omission to do an act which is yet within
the power of the respondent to perform, he may be imprisoned by order of the court
concerned until he performs it (Sec. .
(2) A person adjudged in direct contempt may not appeal therefrom. His remedy is a
petition for certiorari or prohibition directed against the court which adjudged him in
direct contempt (Sec. 2). Pending the resolution of the petition for certiorari or
prohibition, the execution of the judgment for direct contempt shall be suspended. The
suspension however shall take place only if the person adjudged in contempt files a
bond fixed by the court which rendered the judgment. This bond is conditioned upon
his performance of the judgment should the petition be decided against him.
(a) Where the act was committed against an RTC or a court of equivalent or higher
rank, he may be punished by a fine not exceeding 30,000 pesos or imprisonment not
exceeding 6 months, or both;
(b) Where the act was committed against a lower court, he may be punished by a fine
not exceeding 5,000 pesos or imprisonment not exceeding one month, or both. Aside
from the applicable penalties, if the contempt consists in the violation of a writ of
injunction, TRO or status quo order, he may also be ordered to make complete
restitution to the party injured by such violation of the property involved or such
amount as may be alleged and proved (Sec. 7);
(c) Where the act was committed against a person or entity exercising quasi-judicial
functions, the penalty imposed shall depend upon the provisions of the law which
authorizes a penalty for contempt against such persons or entities.
(2) The person adjudged in indirect contempt may appeal from the judgment or final
order of the court in the same manner as in criminal cases. The appeal will not however
have the effect of suspending the judgment if the person adjudged in contempt does
not file a bond in an amount fixed by the court from which the appeal is taken. This
bond is conditioned upon his performance of the judgment or final order if the appeal is
decided against (Sec. 11).
(1) Proceedings for indirect contempt may be initiated motu proprio by the court
against which the contempt was committed by an order or any other formal charge
requiring the respondent to show cause why he should not be punished for contempt.
In all other cases, charges for indirect contempt shall be commenced by a verified
petition with supporting particulars and certified true copies of documents or papers
involved therein, and upon full compliance with the requirements for filing initiatory
pleadings for civil actions in the court concerned. If the contempt charges arose out of
or are related to a principal action pending in the court, the petition for contempt shall
allege that fact but said petition shall be docketed, heard and decided separately,
unless the court in its discretion orders the consolidation of the contempt charge and
the principal action for joint hearing and decision (Sec. 4).
(1) After a charge in writing has been filed, and an opportunity given to the respondent
to comment thereon within such period as may be fixed by the court and to be heard
by himself or counsel, a person guilty of any of the following acts may be punished for
indirect contempt:
(b) Misbehavior an officer of a court in the performance of his official duties or in his
official transactions;
(c) Any abuse of or any unlawful interference with the processes or proceedings of a
court not constituting direct contempt under section 1 of this Rule;
(d) Any improper conduct tending, directly or indirectly, to impede, obstruct, or degrade
the administration of justice;
(2) Failure by counsel to inform the court of the death of his client constitutes indirect
contempt within the purview of Sec. 3, Rule 71, since it constitutes an improper
conduct tending to impede the administration of justice.
(1) When the contempt consists in the refusal or omission to do an act which is yet in
the power of the respondent to perform, he may be imprisoned by order of the court
concerned until he performs it (Sec. . Indefinite incarceration may be resorted to
where the attendant circumstances are such that the non-compliance with the court
order is an utter disregard of the authority of the court which has then no other
recourse but to use its coercive power. When a person or party is legally and validly
required by a court to appear before it for a certain purpose, and when that
requirement is disobeyed, the only remedy left for the court is to use force to bring the
person or party before it.
(2) The punishment is imposed for the benefit of a complainant or a party to a suit who
has been injured aside from the need to compel performance of the orders or decrees
of the court, which the contemnor refuses to obey although able to do so. In effect, it is
within the power of the person adjudged guilty of contempt to set himself free.
(1) The rules on contempt apply to contempt committed against persons or entities
exercising quasi-judicial functions or in case there are rules for contempt adopted for
such bodies or entities pursuant to law, Rule 71 shall apply suppletorily (Sec. 12).
(2) Quasi-judicial bodies that have the power to cite persons for indirect contempt can
only do so by initiating them in the proper RTC. It is not within their jurisdiction and
competence to decide the indirect contempt cases. The RTC of the place where
contempt has been committed shall have jurisdiction over the charges for indirect
contempt that may be filed (Sec. 12).