1.

Stonehill vs. Diokno, 20 SCRA 383 , June 19, 1967

Case Title : HARRY S. STONEHILL, ROBERT P. BROOKS, JOHN J. BROOKS
and KARL BECK, petitioners, vs. HON. JOSE W. DIOKNO, in his capacity as
SECRETARY OF JUSTICE; JOSE LUKBAN, in his capacity as Acting Director,
National Bureau of Investigation; SPECIAL PROSECUTORS PEDRO D.
CENZON, EFREN I. PLANA and MANUEL VILLAREAL, JR., and ASST. FISCAL
MANASES G. REYES; JUDGE AMADO ROAN, Municipal Court of Manila;
JUDGE ROMAN CANSINO, Municipal Court of Manila; JUDGE HERMOGENES
CALUAG, Court of First Instance of Rizal-Quezon City Branch and JUDGE
DAMIAN JIMENEZ, Municipal Court of Quezon City, [Link]
Nature : ORIGINAL ACTION in the Supreme Court. Certiorari, prohibition.
mandamus and injunction.
Syllabi Class : Constitutional Law|Search
warrants|Corporations|Evidence|Abandonment of Moncado ruling|Search
and Seizure
Syllabi:
1. Constitutional Law; Search warrants; Corporations; Only party
affected may contest legality of seizure effected by search warrants.+
2. Constitutional Law; Evidence; When illegally seized evidence is
admissible.+
3. Constitutional Law; Requisites for issuing search warrants.+
4. Constitutional Law; General search warrants.+
5. Constitutional Law; Why general warrants are outlawed.+
6. Constitutional Law; Provision of Revised Rules of Court.+
7. Constitutional Law; Warrants not describing particularly the things to
be seized.+
8. Constitutional Law; Evidence; Abandonment of Moncado
ruling; Illegally seized documents are not admissible in evidence.+
9. Constitutional Law; Search and Seizure; Lack of standard of
petitioners cannot affect illegality of search and seizure.+
10. Constitutional Law; Provision on search and seizure is derived from
Federal Constitution.+
11. Constitutional Law; Ownership of properties seized entitles petitioners
to bring motion to return and suppress and gives them standing as persons
aggrieved by unlawful search and seizure.+
12. Constitutional Law; Control of premises searched gives "standing".+

Docket Number: No. L-19550

Counsel: Paredes, Poblador, Cruz & Nazareno, Meer, Meer & Meer, Juan T.
David, Solicitor General Arturo A. Alafriz, Assistant Solicitor General Pacifico
P. de Castro, Assistant Solicitor General Frine C. Zaballero, Solicitor Camilo
D, Quiason, Solicitor C. Padua

Ponente: CONCEPCION

Dispositive Portion:
We hold, therefore, that the doctrine adopted in the Moncado case must be,
as it is hereby, abandoned; that the warrants for the search of three (3)
residences of herein petitioners, as specified in the Resolution of June 29,
1962, are null and void; that the searches and seizures therein made are
illegal; that the writ of preliminary injunction heretofore issued, in
connection with the documents, papers and other effects thus seized in said
residences of herein petitioners is hereby made permanent; that the writs
prayed for are granted, insofar as the documents, papers and other effects
so seized in the aforementioned residences are concerned; that the
aforementioned motion for Reconsideration and Amendment should be, as it
is hereby, denied; and that the petition herein is dismissed and the writs
prayed for denied, as regards the documents, papers and other effects
seized in the twenty-nine (29) places, offices and other premises
enumerated in the same Resolution, without special pronouncement as to
[Link] granted in part and denied in part; motion for reconsideration
denied.

Citation Ref:
80 Phil. 1 |

VOL. 20, JUNE 19, 1967

383

Stonehill vs. Diokno

No. L-19550. June 19, 1967.

HARRY S. STONEHILL, ROBERT P. BROOKS, JOHN J. BROOKS and KARL BECK, petitioners, vs. HON. JOSE
W. DIOKNO, in his capacity as SECRETARY OF JUSTICE; JOSE LUKBAN, in his capacity as Acting Director,
National Bureau of Investigation; SPECIAL PROSECUTORS PEDRO D. CENZON, EFREN I. PLANA and
MANUEL VILLAREAL, JR., and ASST. FISCAL MANASES G. REYES; JUDGE AMADO ROAN, Municipal Court
of Manila; JUDGE ROMAN CANSINO, Municipal Court of Manila; JUDGE HERMOGENES CALUAG, Court of
First Instance of Rizal-Quezon City Branch and JUDGE DAMIAN JIMENEZ, Municipal Court of Quezon City,
respondents.

Constitutional Law; Search warrants; Corporations; Only party affected may contest legality of seizure
effected by search [Link] of certain corporations, from which documents, papers and
things were seized by means of search warrants, have no cause of action to assail the legality of the
seizures because said corporations have personalities distinct and separate from those of said officers.
The legality of a seizure can be contested only by the party whose rights have been impaired thereby.
The objection to an unlawful search is purely personal and cannot be availed of by third parties.

Same; Evidence: When illegally seized evidence is [Link] of certain corporations cannot
validly object to the use in evidence against them of the documents, papers and things seized from the
offices and premises of the corporations since the right to object to their admission in evidence belongs
exclusively to the corporations, to which the seized effects

384

384

SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Stonehill vs. Diokno

belong, and may not be invoked by the corporate officers in proceedings against them in their individual
capacity.

Same; Requisites for issuing search [Link] Constitution provides that no warrant shall issue but
upon probable cause, to be determined by the judge, and that the warrant shall particularly describe the
things to be seized.

Same; General search [Link] warrants, issued upon applications stating that the natural and
juridical persons therein named had committed a violation of Central Bank laws, tariff and customs laws,
Tax Code and Revised Penal Code do not satisfy the constitutional requirements because no specific
offense had been alleged in said applications. It was impossible for the judges, who issued the warrants,
to have found the existence of probable cause, which presupposes the introduction of competent proof
that the party against whom it is sought has performed particular acts or committed specific omissions
in violation of a specific penal provision.

Same; Why general warrants are [Link] search warrants are outlawed because they place
the sanctity of the domicile and the privacy of communication and correspondence at the mercy of the
whims, caprice or passion of peace officers.

Same; Provision of Revised Rules of [Link] prevent the issuance of general warrants, the Supreme
Court amended the Old Rules of Court by providing in the Revised Rules of Court that "no search
warrant shall issue for more than one specific offense".

Same; Warrants not describing particularly the things to be [Link] warrants authorizing the
seizure of books of accounts and records "showing all the business transactions" of certain persons,
regardless of whether the transactions were legal or illegal, contravene the explicit command of the Bill
of Rights that the things to be seized should be particularly described and defeat its major objective of
eliminating general warrants.

Same; Evidence; Abandonment of Moncado ruling; Illegally seized documents are not admissible in
[Link] Moncado ruling, that illegally seized documents, papers and things are admissible in
evidence, must be abandoned. The exclusion of such evidence is the only practical means of enforcing
the constitutional injunction against unreasonable searches and seizures. The non-exclusionary rule is
contrary to the letter and spirit of the prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures. If there is
competent evidence to establish probable cause of the commission of a given crime by the party against
whom the warrant is intended, then there is no reason why the applicant should not comply with the
constitutional requirements If he has no such evidence, then it is not possible for the judge to find that
there is a probable cause, and, hence, no justifica-

385

VOL. 20, JUNE 19, 1967

385

Stonehill vs. Diokno

tion for the issuance of the warrant. The only possible explanation for the issuance in that case is the
necessity of fishing for evidence of the commission of a crime. Such a fishing expedition is indicative of
the absence of evidence to establish a probable cause.

CASTRO, J., concurring and dissenting:

Constitutional Law; Search and Seizure; Lack of standard of petitioners cannot affect illegality of search
and seizure. That the petitioners have no legal standing to ask for the suppression of the papers,
things, and effects seized from places other than their residences, cannot in any manner affect, alter, or
otherwise modify the intrinsic nullity of the search warrants and the intrinsic illegality of the searches
and seizures made thereunder. Whether or not petitioners possess legal standing, the said warrants are
void and remain void, and the searches and seizures were illegal and remain illegal. No inference can be
drawn from the words of the Constitution that "legal standing", or the lack of it, is a determinant of the
nullity or validity of a Search warrant or of the lawfulness or illegality of a search or seizure.

Same; Provision on search and seizure is derived from Federal [Link] constitutional
provision on searches and seizures was derived almost verbatim from the Fourth Amendment to the
United States Constitution. In the many years of judicial construction and interpretation of the said
constitutional provision, our courts have invariably regarded as doctrinal the pronouncements made on
the Fourth Amendment by federal courts, especially the Federal Supreme Court and the Federal Circuit
Courts of Appeals. The U.S. doctrines and pertinent cases on standing to move for the suppression or
return of documents, papers and effects, which are the fruits of an unlawful search and seizure, may be
summarized as follows: (a) ownership of documents, papers, and effects gives "standing"; (b) ownership
and/or control or possessionactual or constructiveof premises searched gives "standing"; and (c)
the "aggrieved person" doctrine where the search warrant and the sworn application for search warrant
are "primarily" directed solely and exclusively 'against the "aggrieved person", gives "standing". An
examination of the search warrants in this case will readily show that, excepting three, all were directed
against the petitioners personally. In some of them, the petitioners were named personally, followed by
the designation, "The President and/or General Manager" of the particular corporation. The three
warrants excepted named three corporate defendants. But the "office/house/warehouse/premises"
mentioned in the said three warrants were also the same "office/house/warehouse/premises" declared
to be owned by or under the control of the petitioners in all the other search

386

386

SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Stonehill vs. Diokno

warrants directed against the petitioners and/or "the President and/or General Manager" of the
particular corporation. The searches and seizures were to be made, and were actually made, in the
"office/house/warehouse/premises" owned by or under the control of the petitioners.

Same; Ownership of properties seized entitles petitioners to bring motion to return and suppress and
gives them standing as persons aggrieved by unlawful search and seizure. Ownership of the properties
seized alone entitles the petitioners to bring a motion to return and suppress, and gives them standing
as persons aggrieved by an unlawful search and seizure regardless of their location at the time of
seizure. Under the constitutional provision against unlawful searches and seizures, a person places
himself or his property within a constitutionally protected area, be it his home or his office, his hotel
room or his automobile.

Same; Control of premises searched gives "standing". Independent of ownership or other personal
interest in the records and documents seized, the petitioners have standing to move for return and
suppression by virtue of their proprietary or leasehold interest in many of the premises searched. These
proprietary and leasehold interests have been sufficiently set forth in their motion for reconsideration
and need not be recounted here. It has never been held that a person with requisite interest in the
premises searched must own the property seized in order to have standing in a motion to return and
suppress.

ORIGINAL ACTION in the Supreme Court. Certiorari, prohibition. mandamus and injunction.

The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.

Paredes, Poblador, Cruz & Nazareno and Meer, Meer & Meer and Juan T. David for petitioners.

Solicitor General Arturo A. Alafriz, Assistant Solicitor General Pacifico P. de Castro, Assistant Solicitor
General Frine C. Zaballero, Solicitor Camilo D, Quiason and Solicitor C. Padua for respondents.

CONCEPCION, C.J.:

Upon application of the officers of the government named on the margin1hereinafter referred to as
Respondents-

_______________
1 Hon. Jose W. Diokno, in his capacity as Secretary of Justice, Jose Lukban, in his capacity as Acting
Director, National Bureau of Investigation, Special Prosecutors Pedro D. Cenzon, Efren I. Plana and
Manuel Villareal, Jr., and Assistant Fiscal Maneses G. Reyes. City of Manila.

387

VOL. 20, JUNE 19, 1967

387

Stonehill vs. Diokno

Prosecutorsseveral judges2hereinafter referred to as Respondents-Judgesissued, on different

dates,3 a total of 42 search warrants against petitioners herein4 and/or the corporations of which they
were officers,5 directed to any peace officer, to search the persons above-named and/ or the premises
of their offices, warehouses and/or residences, and to seize and take possession of the following
personal property to wit:

"Books of accounts, financial records, vouchers, correspondence, receipts, ledgers, journals, portfolios,
credit journals, typewriters, and other documents and/or papers showing all business transactions
including disbursements receipts, balance sheets and profit and loss statements and Bobbins (cigarette
wrappers)."

as "the subject of the offense; stolen or embezzled and proceeds or fruits of the offense," or "used or
intended to be used as the means of committing the offense," which is described in the applications
adverted to above as "violation of Central Bank Laws, Tariff and Customs Laws, Internal Revenue (Code)
and the Revised Penal Code." Alleging that the aforementioned search warrants are null and void, as
contravening the Constitution and the Rules of Courtbecause, inter alia: (1) they do not describe with
particularity the documents, books and things

________________

2 Hon. Amado Roan, Judge of the Municipal (now City) Court of Manila, Hon. Roman Cansino, Judge of
the Municipal (now City) Court of Manila, Hon. Hermogenes Caluag, Judge of the Court of First Instance
of Rizal, Quezon City Branch, Hon. Eulogio Mencias, Judge of the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Pasig
Branch, and Hon, Damian Jimenez, Judge of the Municipal (now City) Court of Quezon City.

3 Covering the period from March 3 to March 9, 1962.

4 Harry S, Stonehill, Robert P. Brooks, John J. Brooks and Karl Beck.

5 U.S. Tobacco Corporation, Atlas Cement Corporation, Atlas Development Corporation, Far East
Publishing Corporation (Evening News), Investment Inc., Industrial Business Management Corporation,
General Agricultural Corporation, American Asiatic Oil Corporation, Investment Management
Corporation, Holiday Hills, Inc., Republic Glass Corporation, Industrial and Business Management
Corporation, United Housing Corporation, The Philippine Tobacco-Flue-Curing and Redrying
Corporation, Republic Real Estate Corporation and Merconsel Corporation.

388

388

SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Stonehill vs. Diokno

to be seized; (2) cash money, not mentioned in the warrants, were actually seized; (3) the warrants were
issued to fish evidence against the aforementioned petitioners in deportation cases filed against them;
(4) the searches and seizures were made in an illegal manner; and (5) the documents, papers and cash
money seized were not delivered to the courts that issued the warrants, to be disposed of in accordance
with lawon March 20, 1962, said petitioners filed with the Supreme Court this original action for
certiorari, prohibition, mandamus and injunction, and prayed that, pending final disposition of the
present case, a writ of preliminary injunction be issued restraining RespondentsProsecutors, their agents
and/or representatives from using the effects seized as aforementioned, or any copies thereof, in the
deportation cases already adverted to, and that, in due course, thereafter, decision be rendered
quashing the contested search warrants and declaring the same null and void, and commanding the
respondents, their agents or representatives to return to petitioners herein, in accordance with Section
3, Rule 67, of the Rules of Court, the documents, papers, things and cash moneys seized or confiscated
under the search warrants in question.

In their answer, respondents-prosecutors alleged6 (1) that the contested search warrants are valid and
have been issued in accordance with law; (2) that the defects of said warrants, if any, were cured by
petitioners' consent; and (3) that, in any event, the effects seized are admissible in evidence against
herein petitioners, regardless of the alleged illegality of the aforementioned searches and seizures.

On March 22, 1962, this Court issued the writ of preliminary injunction prayed for in the petition.
However, by resolution dated June 29, 1962. the writ was partially lifted or dissolved, insofar as the
papers, documents and things seized from the offices of the corporations above mentioned are
concerned; but, the injunction was maintained as regards the papers, documents and things found and
seized in the residences of petitioners herein.7

_______________

6 Inter alia,.

7 "Without prejudice to explaining the reasons for this order in the decision to be rendered in the case,
the writ of

389
VOL. 20, JUNE 19, 1967

389

Stonehill vs. Diokno

Thus, the documents, papers, and things seized under the alleged authority of the warrants in question
may be split into two (2) major groups, namely: (a) those found and seized in the off ices of the
aforementioned corporations, and (b) those found and seized in the residences of petitioners herein.

As regards the first group, we hold that petitioners herein have no cause of action to assail the legality
of the contested warrants and of the seizures made in pursuance thereof, for the simple reason that
said corporations have

________________

preliminary injunction issued by us in this case against the use of the papers, documents and things from
the following premises: (1) The office of the U.S. Tobacco Corp. at the Ledesma Bldg., Arzobispo St.,
Manila; (2) 932 Gonzales, Ermita, Manila; (3) office at Atlanta St. bounded by Chicago, 15th & 14th Sts.,
Port Area, Manila; (4) 527 Rosario St, Mla.; (5) Atlas Cement Corp. and/or Atlas Development Corp.,
Magsaysay Bldg., San Luis, Ermita, Mla.; (6) 205 13th St., Port Area, Mla.; (7) No. 224 San Vicente St,
Mla.; (8) Warehouse No. 2 at Chicago & 23rd Sts., Mla.; (9) Warehouse at 23rd St., between Muelle de
San Francisco & Boston, Port Area, Mla.; (10) Investment Inc., 24th St. & Boston; (11) IBMC, Magsaysay
Bldg., San Luis, Mla.; (12) General Agricultural Corp., Magsaysay Bldg., San Luis, Manila; (13) American
Asiatic Oil Corp., Magsaysay Bldg., San Luis, Manila; (14) Room 91, Carmen Apts., Dewey Blvd., Manila;
(15) Warehouse Railroad St. between 17 & 12 Sts., Port Area, Manila; (16) Rm. 304, Army & Navy Club,
Manila, South Blvd.; (17) Warehouse Annex Bldg., 18th St., Port Area, Manila; (18) Rm. 81 Carmen Apts.,
Dewey Blvd., Manila; (19) Holiday Hills, Inc., Trinity Bldg,, San Luis, Manila; (20) No. 2008 Dewey Blvd.;
(21) Premises of 24th St. & Boston, Port Area, Manila; (22) Republic Glass Corp., Trinity Bldg., San Luis.
Manila; (23) IBMC, 2nd Floor, Trinity Bldg., San Luis, Manila; (24) IBMC, 2nd Flr., Gochangco Blg., 610 San
Luis, Manila; (25) United Housing Corp., Trinity Bldg., San Luis, Manila; (26) Republic Real Estate Corp.,
Trinity Bldg., San Luis, Manila; (27) 1437 Colorado St., Malate, Manila; (28) Phil. Tobacco Flue-Curing,
Magsaysay Bldg., San Luis, Manila and (29) 14 Baldwin St., Sta. Cruz, Manila, in the hearing of
Deportation Cases Nos. R-953 and 955 against petitioners, before the Deportation Board, is hereby
lifted. The preliminary injunction shall continue as to the papers, documents and things found in the
other premises namely: in those of the residences of petitioners, as follows: (1) 13 Narra Road, Forbes
Park, Makati, Rizal; (2) 15 Narra Road, Forbes Park, Makati, Rizal; and (3) 8 Urdaneta Avenue, Urdaneta
Village, Makati, Rizal."

390

390

SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Stonehill vs. Diokno

their respective personalities, separate and distinct from the personality of herein petitioners,
regardless of the amount of shares of stock or of the interest of each of them in said corporations, and
whatever the offices they hold therein may be.8 Indeed, it is well settled that the legality of a seizure
can be contested only by the party whose rights have been impaired thereby,9 and that the objection to
an unlawful search and seizure is purely personal and cannot be availed of by third parties.10
Consequently, petitioners herein may not validly object to the use in evidence against them of the
documents, papers and things seized from the offices and premises of the corporations adverted to
above, since the right to object to the admission of said papers in evidence belongs exclusively to the
corporations, to whom the seized effects belong, and may not be invoked by the corporate officers in
proceedings against them in their individual capacity.11 Indeed, it has been held:

"x x x that the Government's action in gaining possession of papers belonging to the corporation did not
relate to nor did it affect the personal defendants. If these papers were unlawfully seized and thereby
the constitutional rights of or any one were invaded, they were the rights of the corporation and not the
rights of the other defendants, Next, it is clear that a question of the lawfulness of a seizure can be
raised only by one whose rights have been invaded. Certainly, such a seizure, if unlawful, could not
affect the constitutional rights of defendants whose property had not been seized or the privacy of
whose homes had not been disturbed; nor could they claim for them-selves the benefits of the Fourth
Amendment, when its violation, if any, was with reference to the rights of another. Remus vs. United
States (C.C.A.) 291 F. 501, 511. It follows, therefore, that the question of the admissibility of the
evidence based on an alleged unlawful search and seizure does not extend to the personal defendants
but embraces only the corporation whose property was taken. x x x." (A. Guckenheimer & Bros. Co. vs
United. States, [1925] 3 F. 2d. 786, 789, Italics supplied.)

________________

8 Newingham, et al. vs. United States, 4 F. 2d. 490.

9 Lesis vs. U.S., 6 F. 2d. 22.

10 In re Dooley (1931) 48 F 2d. 121; Rouda vs. U.S., 10 F. 2d 916; Lusco vs. U.S. 287 F. 69; Ganci vs. U.S.,
287 F 60 Moris vs. U.S., 26 F. 2d 444.

11 U.S. vs. Gass, 17 F. 2d. 997; People vs. Rubio, 57 Phil. 384, 394.

391

VOL. 20, JUNE 19, 1967

391

Stonehill vs. Diokno

With respect to the documents, papers and things seized in the residences of petitioners herein, the
aforementioned resolution of June 29, 1962, lifted the writ of preliminary injunction previously issued
by this Court,12 thereby, in effect, restraining herein Respondents-Prosecutors from using them in
evidence against petitioners herein.

In connection with said documents, papers and things, two (2) important questions need be settled,
namely: (1) whether the search warrants in question, and the searches and seizures made under the
authority thereof, are valid or not, and (2) if the answer to the preceding question is in the negative,
whether said documents, papers and things may be used in evidence against petitioners herein.

Petitioners maintain that the aforementioned search warrants are in the nature of general warrants and
that, accordingly, the seizures effected upon the authority thereof are null and void. In this connection,
the Constitution13 provides:

"The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable
searches and seizures shall not be violated, and no warrants shall issue but upon probable cause, to be
determined by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the
witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or
things to be seized."

Two points must be stressed in connection with this constitutional mandate, namely: (1) that no warrant
shall issue but upon probable cause, to be determined by the judge in the manner set forth in said
provision; and (2) that the warrant shall particularly describe the things to be seized.

None of these requirements has been complied with in the contested warrants. Indeed, the same were
issued upon applications stating that the natural and juridical persons therein named had committed a
"violation of Central Bank Laws, Tariff and Customs Laws, Internal Revenue (Code) and Revised Penal
Code." In other words, no specific offense had been alleged in said applications. The averments thereof
with respect to the offense committed were abstract. As a consequence, it was impossible for the

________________

12 On March 22, 1962.

13 Section 1, paragraph 3, of Article III thereof.

392

392

SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Stonehill vs. Diokno

judges who issued the warrants to have found the existence of probable cause, for the same
presupposes the introduction of competent proof that the party against whom it is sought has
performed particular acts, or committed specific omissions, violating a given provision of our criminal
laws. As a matter of fact, the applications involved in this case do not allege any specific acts performed
by herein petitioners. It would be a legal heresy, of the highest order, to convict anybody of a "violation
of Central Bank Laws, Tariff and Customs Laws, Internal Revenue (Code) and Revised Penal Code,"as
alleged in the aforementioned applicationswithout reference to any determinate provision of said
laws or codes.

To uphold the validity of the warrants in question would be to wipe out completely one of the most
fundamental rights guaranteed in our Constitution, for it would place the sanctity of the domicile and
the privacy of communication and correspondence at the mercy of the whims, caprice or passion of
peace officers. This is precisely the evil sought to be remedied by the constitutional provision above
quotedto outlaw the so-called general warrants. It is not difficult to imagine ,what would happen, in
times of keen political strife, when the party in power feels that the minority is likely to wrest it, even
though by legal means,

Such is the seriousness of the irregularities committed in connection with the disputed search warrants,
that this Court deemed it fit to amend Section 3 of Rule 122 of the former Rules of Court14 by providing
in its counterpart, under the Revised Rules of Court15 that "a search warrant

________________

14 Reading: x x x A search warrant shall not issue but upon probable cause to be determined by the
judge or justice of the peace after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the
witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or
things to be seized.

15 x x x A search warrant shall not issue but upon probable cause in connection with one specific offense
to be determined by the judge or justice of the peace after examination under oath or affirmation of the
complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched
and persons or things to be seized.

393

VOL. 20, JUNE 19, 1967

393

Stonehill vs. Diokno

shall not issue but upon probable cause in connection with one specific offense." Not satisfied with this
qualification, the Court added thereto a paragraph, directing that "no search warrant shall issue for
more than one specific offense."

The grave violation of the Constitution made in the application for the contested search warrants was
compounded by the description therein made of the effects to be searched for and seized to wit:

"Books of accounts, financial records, vouchers, journals, correspondence, receipts, ledgers, portfolios,
credit journals, typewriters, and other documents and/or papers showing all business transactions
including disbursement receipts, balance sheets and related profit and loss statements."
Thus, the warrants authorized the search for and seizure of records pertaining to all business
transactions of petitioners herein, regardless of whether the transactions were legal or illegal. The
warrants sanctioned the seizure of all records of the petitioners and the aforementioned corporations,
whatever their nature, thus openly contravening the explicit command of our Bill of Rightsthat the
things to be seized be particularly describedas well as tending to defeat its major objective: the
elimination of general warrants.

Relying upon Moncado vs. People's Court (80 Phil. 1), Respondents-Prosecutors maintain that, even if
the searches and seizures under consideration were unconstitutional, the documents, papers and things
thus seized are admissible in evidence against petitioners herein. Upon mature deliberation, however,
we are unanimously of the opinion that the position taken in the Moncado case must be abandoned.
Said position was in line with the American common law rule, that the criminal should not be allowed to
go free merely "because the constable has blundered,"16 upon the theory that the constitutional
prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures is protected by means other than the exclusion
of evidence unlawfully obtained,17 such as the

_______________

No search warrant shall issue for more than one specific offense. (Sec. 3, Rule 126.)

16 People vs. Defore, 140 NE 585.

17 Wolf vs. Colorado, 93 L. ed. 1782.

394

394

SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Stonehill vs. Diokno

common-law action for damages against the searching officer, against the party who procured the
issuance of the search warrant and against those assisting in the execution of an illegal search, their
criminal punishment, resistance, without liability to an unlawful seizure, and such other legal remedies
as may be provided by other laws.

However, most common law jurisdictions have already given up this approach and eventually adopted
the exclusionary rule, realizing that this is the only practical means of enforcing the constitutional
injunction against unreasonable searches and seizures. In the language of Judge Learned Hand:

"As we understand it, the reason for the exclusion of evidence competent as such, which has been
unlawfully acquired, is that exclusion is the only practical way of enforcing the constitutional privilege. In
earlier times the action of trespass against the offending official may have been protection enough; but
that is true no longer. Only in case the prosecution which itself controls the seizing officials, knows that
it cannot profit by their wrong, will that wrong be repressed."18
In fact, over thirty (30) years before, the Federal Supreme Court had already declared:

"If letters and private documents can thus be seized and held and used in evidence against a citizen
accused of an offense, the protection of the 4th Amendment, declaring his rights to be secure against
such searches and seizures, is of no value, and, so far as those thus placed are concerned, might as well
be stricken from the Constitution. The efforts of the courts and their officials to bring the guilty to
punishment, praiseworthy as they are, are not to be aided by the sacrifice of those great principles
established by years of endeavor and suffering which have resulted in their embodiment in the
fundamental law of the land."19

This view was, not only reiterated, but. also, broadened in subsequent decisions of the same Federal
Court.20 After

_______________

18 Pugliese (1945) 133 F. 2d. 497.

19 Weeks vs. United States (1914) 232 U.S. 383, 58 L. ed. 652, 34 S. Ct. 341; italics supplied.

20 Gouled vs. United States (1921) 255 US 298, 65 L. ed. 647, 41 S. Ct. 261; Olmstead vs. United States
(1928) 277 US 438, 72 L. ed. 944, 48 S. Ct. 564, Wolf vs. Colorado, 338 US 25, 93 L. ed. 1782, 69 S. Ct.
1359; Elkins vs. United States, 364 US 206, 4 L. ed. 2d. 1669, 80 S. Ct. 1437 (1960) ; Mapp vs. Ohio
(1961), 367 US 643, 6 L, ed. 2d, 1081, 81 S. Ct. 1684.

395

VOL. 20, JUNE 19, 1967

395

Stonehill vs. Diokno

reviewing previous decisions thereon, said Court held, in Mapp vs. Ohio (supra.) :

"x x x Today we once again examine the Wolf's constitutional documentation of the right of privacy free
from unreasonable state intrusion, and after its dozen years on our books, are led by it to close the only
courtroom door remaining open to evidence secured by official lawlessness in flagrant abuse of that
basic right, reserved to all persons as a specific guarantee against that very same unlawful conduct. We
hold that all evidence obtained by searches and seizures in violation of the Constitution is, by that same
authority, inadmissible in a State court.

"Since the Fourth Amendment's right of privacy has been declared enforceable against the States
through the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth, it is enforceable against them by the same sanction
of exclusion as it used against the Federal Government. Were it otherwise, then just as without the
Weeks rule the assurance against unreasonable federal searches and seizures would be 'a form of
words,' valueless and underserving of mention in a perpetual charter of inestimable human liberties, so
too, without that rule the freedom from state invasions of privacy would be so ephemeral and so neatly
severed from its conceptual nexus with the freedom from all brutish means of coercing evidence as not
to permit this Court's high regard as a freedom 'implicit in the concept of ordered liberty.' At the time
that the Court held in Wolf that the amendment was applicable to the States through the Due Process
Clause, the cases of this Court as we have seen, had steadfastly held that as to federal officers the
Fourth Amendment included the exclusion of the evidence seized in violation of its provisions. Even
Wolf 'stoutly adhered' to that proposition. The right to privacy, when conceded operatively enforceable
against the States, was not susceptible of destruction by avulsion of the sanction upon which its
protection and enjoyment had always been deemed dependent under the Boyd, Weeks and
Silverthorne Cases. Therefore, in extending the substantive protections of due process to all
constitutionally unreasonable searchesstate or federalit was logically and constitutionally necessary
that the exclusion doctrinean essential part of the right to privacybe also insisted upon as an
essential ingredient of the right newly recognized by the Wolf Case. In short, the admission of the new
constitutional right by Wolf could not consistently tolerate denial of its most important constitutional
privilege, namely, the exclusion of the evidence which an accused had been forced to give by reason of
the unlawful seizure. To hold otherwise is to grant the right but in reality to withhold its privilege and
enjoyment. Only last year the Court itself recognized that the purpose of the exclusionary rule 'is to
deterto compel respect for the constitutional guaranty

396

396

SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Stonehill vs. Diokno

in the only effectively available wayby removing the incen-tive to disregard it' x x x.

"The ignoble shortcut to conviction left open to the State tends to destroy the entire system of
constitutional restraints on which the liberties of the people rest. Having once recognized that the right
to privacy embodied in the Fourth Amendment is enforceable against the States, and that the right to be
secure against rude invasions of privacy by state officers is, therefore constitutional in origin. we can no
longer permit that right to remain an empty promise. Because it is enforceable in the same manner and
to like effect as other basic rights secured by its Due Process Clause', we can no longer permit it to be
revocable at the whim of any police officer who, in the name of law enforcement itself, chooses to
suspend its enjoyment. Our decision, founded on reason and truth, gives to the individual no more than
that which the Constitution guarantees him, to the police officer no less than that to which honest law
enforce-ment is entitled, and, to the courts, that judicial integrity so necessary in the true administration
of justice." (italics ours.)

Indeed, the non-exclusionary rule is contrary, not only to the letter, but also, to the spirit of the
constitutional injunction against unreasonable searches and seizures. To be sure, if the applicant for a
search warrant has com-petent 'evidence to establish probable cause of the commission of a given
crime by the party against 'whom the warrant is intended, then there is no reason why the applicant
should not comply with the requirements of the fundamental law. Upon the other hand, if he has no
such competent evidence, then it is not possible for the Judge to find that there is probable cause, and,
hence, no justification for the issuance of the warrant. The only possible explanation (not 'justification)
for its issuance is the necessity of fishing evidence of the commission of a crime. But, then, this fishing
expedition is indicative of the absence of evidence to establish a probable cause.

Moreover, the theory that the criminal prosecution of those who secure an illegal search warrant and/or
make unreasonable searches or seizures would suffice to protect the constitutional guarantee under
consideration, overlooks the fact that violations thereof are, in general, committed by agents of the
party in power, for, certainly, those belonging to the minority could not possibly abuse a power they do
not have. Regardless of the handicap under which the minority usuallybut, understandablyfinds
itself

397

VOL. 20, JUNE 19, 1967

397

Stonehill vs. Diokno

in prosecuting agents of the majority, one must not lose sight of the fact that the psychological and
moral effect of the possibility21 of securing their conviction, is watered down by the pardoning power of
the party for whose benefit the illegality had been committed.

In their Motion for Reconsideration and Amendment of the Resolution of this Court dated June 29,
1962, petitioners allege that Rooms Nos. 81 and 91 of Carmen Apartments, House No. 2008, Dewey
Boulevard, House No. 1436, Colorado Street, and Room No. 304 of the Army-Navy Club, should be
included among the premises considered in said Resolution as residences of herein petitioners, Harry S.
Stonehill, Robert P. Brook, John J. Brooks and Karl Beck, respectively, and that, furthermore, the records,
papers and other effects seized in the offices of the corporations above referred to include personal
belongings of said petitioners and other effects under their exclusive possession and control, for the
exclusion of which they have a standing under the latest rulings of the federal courts of the United
States.22

We note, however, that petitioners' theory, regarding their alleged possession of and control over the
aforementioned records, papers and effects, and the alleged "personal" nature thereof, has been
advanced, not in their petition or amended petition herein, but in the Motion for Reconsideration and
Amendment of the Resolution of June 29, 1962. In other words. said theory would appear to be a
readjustment of that followed in said petitions, to suit the approach intimated in the Resolution sought
to be reconsidered and amended. Then, too, some of the affidavits or copies of alleged affidavits
attached to said motion for reconsideration, or submitted in support thereof, contain either inconsistent
allegations, or allegations inconsistent with the theory now advanced by petitioners herein.

Upon the other hand, we are not satisfied that the allegations of said petitions and motion for
reconsideration, and

________________
21 Even if remote.

22 Particularly, Jones vs. U.S. 362 U.S. 257; Alioto vs. U.S., 216 Fed. Supp. 48; U.S. vs. Jeffries, 72 S. Ct.
93; Villano vs. U.S., 300 Fed. 2d 680; and Henzel vs. U.S., 296 Fed. 2d 650.

398

398

SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Stonehill vs. Diokno

the contents of the aforementioned affidavits and other papers submitted in support of said motion,
have sufficiently established the facts or conditions contemplated in the cases relied upon by the
petitioners; to warrant application of the views therein expressed, should we agree thereto. At any rate,
we do not deem it necessary to express our opinion thereon, it being best to leave the matter open for
determination in appropriate cases in the future.

We hold, therefore, that the doctrine adopted in the Moncado case must be, as it is hereby, abandoned;
that the warrants for the search of three (3) residences of herein petitioners, as specified in the
Resolution of June 29, 1962, are null and void; that the searches and seizures therein made are illegal;
that the writ of preliminary injunction heretofore issued, in connection with the documents, papers and
other effects thus seized in said residences of herein petitioners is hereby made permanent; that the
writs prayed for are granted, insofar as the documents, papers and other effects so seized in the
aforementioned residences are concerned; that the aforementioned motion for Reconsideration and
Amendment should be, as it is hereby, denied; and that the petition herein is dismissed and the writs
prayed for denied, as regards the documents, papers and other effects seized in the twenty-nine (29)
places, offices and other premises enumerated in the same Resolution, without special pronouncement
as to costs.

It is so ordered.

Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Makalintal, Bengzon, J.P., Zaldivar and Sanchez, JJ., concur.

Castro, .J., concurring and dissenting:

From my analysis of the opinion written by Chief Justice Roberto Concepcion and from the import of the
deliberations of the Court on this case, I gather the following distinct conclusions:

1. All the search warrants served by the National Bureau of Investigation in this case are general
warrants and are therefore proscribed by, and in violation of, paragraph 3 of section 1 of Article III (Bill
of Rights) of the Constitution;

399
VOL. 20, JUNE 19, 1967

399

Stonehill vs. Diokno

2. All the searches and seizures conducted under the authority of the said search warrants were
consequently illegal;

3. The non-exclusionary rule enunciated in Moncado vs. People, 80 Phil. 1, should be, and is declared,
abandoned;

4. The search warrants served at the three residences of the petitioners are expressly declared null and
void: the searches and seizures therein made are expressly declared illegal; and the writ of preliminary
injunction heretofore issued against the use of the documents, papers and effects seized in the said
residences is made permanent; and

5. Reasoning that the petitioners have not in their pleadings satisfactorily demonstrated that they have
legal standing to move for the suppression of the documents, papers and effects seized in the places
other than the three residences adverted to above, the opinion written by the Chief Justice refrains from
expressly declaring as null and void the such warrants- served at such other places and as illegal the
searches and seizures made therein, and leaves "the matter open for determination in appropriate cases
in the future."

It is precisely the position taken by the Chief Justice summarized in the immediately preceding
paragraph (numbered 5) with which I am not in accord.

I do not share his reluctance or unwillingness to expressly declare, at this time, the nullity of the search
warrants served at places other than the three residences, and the illegality of the searches and seizures
conducted under the authority thereof. In my view even the exacerbating passions and prejudices
inordinately generated by the environmental political and moral developments of this case should not
deter this Court from forthrightly laying down the law not only for this case but as well for future cases
and future generations. All the search warrants, without exception, in this case are admittedly general,
blanket and roving warrants and are therefore admittedly and indisputably outlawed by the
Constitution; and the searches and seizures made were therefore unlawful. That the peti-

400

400

SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Stonehill vs. Diokno

tioners, let us assume in gratia argumente, have no legal standing to ask for the suppression of the
papers, things and effects seized from places other than their residences, to my mind, cannot in any
manner affect, alter or otherwise modify the intrinsic nullity of the search warrants and the intrinsic
illegality of the searches and seizures made thereunder. Whether or not the petitioners possess legal
standing the said warrants are void and remain void, and the searches and seizures were illegal and
remain illegal. No inference can be drawn from the words of the Constitution that "legal standing" or
the lack of it is a determinant of the nullity or validity of a search warrant or of the lawfulness or
illegality of a search or seizure.

On the question of legal standing, I am of the conviction that, upon the pleadings submitted to this
Court the petitioners have the requisite legal standing to move for the suppression and return of the
documents, papers and effects that were seized from places other than their family residences.

Our constitutional provision on searches and seizures was derived almost verbatim from the Fourth
Amendment to the United States Constitution. In the many years of judicial construction and
interpretation of the said constitutional provision, our courts have invariably regarded as doctrinal the
pronouncement made on the Fourth Amendment by federal courts, especially the Federal Supreme
Court and the Federal Circuit Courts of Appeals.

The U.S. doctrines and pertinent cases on standing to move for the suppression or return of documents,
papers and effects which are the fruits of an unlawful search and seizure, may be summarized as
follows; (a) ownership of documents, papers and effects gives "standing;" (b) ownership and/or control
or possessionactual or constructiveof premises searched gives "standing"; and (c) the "aggrieved
person" doctrine where the search warrant and the sworn application for search warrant are "primarily"
directed solely and exclusively against the "aggrieved person," gives "standing."

401

VOL. 20, JUNE 19, 1967

401

Stonehill vs. Diokno

An examination of the search warrants in this case will readily show that, excepting three, all were
directed against the petitioners personally. In some of them, the petitioners were named personally,
followed by the designation, "the President and/or General Manager" of the particular corporation. The
three warrants excepted named three corporate defendants. But the "office/house/
warehouse/premises" mentioned in the said three warrants were also the same
"office/house/warehouse/premises" declared to be owned by or under the control of the petitioners in
all the other search warrants directed against the petitioners and/or "the President and/or General
Manager" of the particular corporation. (see pages 5-24 of Petitioners' Reply of April 2, 1962). The
searches and seizures were to be made, and were actually made, in the
"office/house/warehouse/premises" owned by or under the control of the petitioners.

Ownership of matters seized gives "standing"

Ownership of the properties seized alone entitles the petitioners to bring a motion to return and
suppress, and gives them standing as persons aggrieved by an unlawful search and seizure regardless of
their location at the time of seizure. Jones vs. United States, 362 U.S. 257, 261 (1960) (narcotics stored
In the apartment of a friend of the defendant); Henzel vs. United States, 296 F. 2d. 650, 652-53 (5th Cir.
1961), (personal and corporate papers of corporation of which the defendant was president), United
States vs. Jeffers, 342 U.S. 48 (1951) (narcotics seized in an apartment not belonging to the defendant);
Pielow vs. United States, 8 F. 2d 492, 493 (9th Cir. 1925) (books seized from the defendant's sister but
belonging to the defendant); Cf. Villano vs. United States, 310 F. 2d 680, 683 (10th Cir. 1962) (papers
seized in desk neither owned by nor in exclusive possession of the def endant).

In a very recent case (decided by the U.S. Supreme Court on December 12, 1966), it was held that under
the constitutional provision against unlawful searches and seizures. a person places himself or his
property within a

402

402

SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Stonehill vs. Diokno

constitutionally protected area, be it his home or his office, his hotel room or his automobile:

"Where the argument falls is in its misapprehension of the fundamental nature and scope of Fourth
Amendment protection. What the Fourth Amendment protects is the security a man relies upon when
he places himself or his property with-in a constitutionally protected area, be it his home or his office,
his hotel room or his automobile. There he is protected from unwarranted governmental intrusion. And
when he puts something in his filing cabinet, in his desk drawer, or in his pocket, he has the right to
know it will be secure from an unreasonable search or an unreasonable seizure. So it was that the
Fourth Amendment could not tolerate the warrantless search of the hotel room in Jeffers, the purloining
of the petitioner's private papers in Gouled, or the surreptitious electronic surveilance in Silverman.
Countless other cases which have come to this Court over the years have involved a myriad of differing
factual contexts in which the protections of the Fourth Amendment have been appropriately invoked.
No doubt, the future will bring countless others. By nothing we say here do we either foresee or
foreclose factual situations to which the Fourth Amendment may be applicable." (Hoffa vs. U.S., 87 S. Ct.
408 (December 12, 1966). See also U.S, vs. Jeffers, 342 U.S. 48, 72 S. Ct. 93 (November 13, 1951). (Italics
supplied).

Control of premises searched gives "standing."

Independent of ownership or other personal interest in the records and documents seized, the
petitioners have standing to move for return and suppression by virtue of their proprietary or leasehold
interest in many of the premises searched. These proprietary and leasehold interests have been
sufficiently set forth in their motion for reconsideration and need not be recounted here, except to
emphasize that the petitioners paid rent, directly or in-directly, for practically all the premises searched
(Room 91, 84 Carmen Apts.; Room 304, Army & Navy Club; Premises 2008, Dewey Boulevard; 1436
Colorado Street); maintained personal offices within the corporate offices (IBMC, USTC); had made
improvements or furnished such offices; or had paid for the filing cabinets in which the papers were
stored (Room 204, Army & Navy Club) ; and individually, or through their respective spouses, owned the
controlling stock of the corporations involved. The petitioners' proprietary interest in most, if not all, of
the premises searched therefore independently gives
403

VOL. 20, JUNE 19, 1967

403

Stonehill vs. Diokno

them standing to move for the return and suppression of the books, papers and effects seized
therefrom.

In Jones vs. United States, supra, the U.S. Supreme Court delineated the nature and extent of the
interest in the searched premises necessary to maintain a motion to suppress. After reviewing what it
considered to be the unduly technical standard of the then prevailing circuit court decisions, the
Supreme Court said (362 U.S. 266) :

"We do not lightly depart from this course of decisions by the lower courts. We are persuaded,
however, that it is unnecessary and ill-advised to import into the law surrounding the constitutional
right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures subtle distinctions, developed and refined by
the common law in evolving the body of private property law which, more than almost any other branch
of law, has been shaped by distinctions whose validity is largely historical. Even in the area from which
they derive, due consideration has led to the discarding of those distinctions in the homeland of the
common law. See Occupiers' Liability Act, 1957, 5 and 6 Eliz. 2, c, 31, carrying out Law Reform
Committee, Third Report, Cmd. 9305. Distinctions such as those between 'lessee,' 'licensee,' 'invitee,'
'guest,' often only of gossamer strength, ought not be determinative in fashioning procedures ultimately
referable to constitutional safeguards. See also Chapman vs. United States, 354 U.S. 610, 616-17 (1961).

It has never been held that a person with requisite interest in the premises searched must own the
property seized in order to have standing in a motion to return and suppress, In Alioto vs. United States,
216 F. Supp. 48 (1963), a bookkeeper for several corporations from whose apartment the corporate
records were seized successfully moved for their return. In United States vs. Antonelli, Fireworks Co., 53
F. Supp. 870, 873 (W. D. N. Y. 1943), the corporation's president successfully moved for the return and
suppression as to him of both personal and corporate documents seized from his home during the
course of an illegal search:

"The lawful possession by Antonelli of documents and property," either his own or the corporation's was
entitled to protection against unreasonable search and seizure. Under the circumstances in the case at
bar, the search and seizure were unreasonable and unlawful. The motion for the return of seized articles
and the suppression of the evidence so obtained should be granted." (Italics supplied).

404

404

SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Stonehill vs. Diokno

Time was when only a person who had property interest in either the place searched or the articles
seized had the necessary standing to invoke the protection of the exclusionary rule. But in MacDonald
vs. United States, 335 U.S. 461 (1948), Justice Robert Jackson, joined by Justice Felix Frankfurter,
advanced the view that "even a guest may expect the shelter of the rooftree he is under against criminal
intrusion." This view finally became the official view of the U.S. Supreme Court and was articulated in
United States vs. Jeffers, 432 U.S. 48 (1951). Nine years later, in 1960, in Jones vs. United States, 362
U.S. 257, 267, the U.S. Supreme Court went a step further. Jones was a mere guest in the apartment
unlawfully searched, but the Court nonetheless declared that the exclusionary rule protected him as
well. The concept of "person aggrieved by an unlawful search and' seizure" was enlarged to include
"anyone legitimately on premises where the search occurs."

Shortly after the U.S. Supreme Court's Jones decision, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held
that the defendant organizer, sole stockholder and president of a corporation had standing in a mail
fraud prosecution against him to demand the return and suppression of corporate property. Henzel vs.
United States, 296 F. 2d 650, 652 (5th Cir. 1961), supra. The court concluded that the defendant had
standing on two independent grounds: Firsthe had a suff icient interest in the property seized, and
secondhe had an adequate interest in the premises searched (just like in the case at bar). A postal
inspector had unlawfully searched the corporation's premises and had seized most of the corporation's
books and records. Looking to Jones, the court observed:

"Jones clearly tells us, therefore, what is not required to qualify one as a 'person aggrieved by an
unlawful search and seizure.' It tells us that appellant should not have been precluded from objecting to
the Postal Inspector's search and seizure of the corporation's books and records merely because the
appellant did not show ownership or possession of the books and records or a substantial possessory
interest in the invaded premises xxx." (Henzel vs. United States, 296 F. 2d at 651).

Henzel was soon followed by Villano vs. United States, 310 F. 2d 680. 683, (10th Cir. 1962). In Villano,

405

VOL. 20, JUNE 19, 1967

405

Stonehill vs. Diokno

police officers seized two notebooks from a desk in the defendant's place of employment; the
defendant did not claim ownership of either; he asserted that several employees (including himself)
used the notebooks. The Court held that the employee had a protected interest and that there also was
an invasion of privacy. Both Henzel and Villano considered also the fact that the search and seizure were
"directed at" the moving defendant. Henzel vs. United States, 296 F. 2d at 682; Villano vs. United States,
310 F. 2d at 683.

In a case in which an attorney closed his law office, placed his files in storage and went to Puerto Rico,
the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit recognized his standing to move to quash as unreasonable
search and seizure under the Fourth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution a grand jury subpoena duces
tecum directed to the custodian of his files. The Government contended that the petitioner had no
standing because the books and papers were physically in the possession of the custodian, and because
the subpoena was directed against the custodian. The court rejected the contention, holding that

"Schwimmer legally had such possession, control and unrelinquished personal rights in the books and
papers as not to enable the question of unreasonable search and seizure to be escaped through the
mere procedural device of compelling a third-party naked possessor to produce and deliver them."
Schwimmer vs. United States, 232 F. 2d 855, 861 (8th Cir. 1956).

Aggrieved person doctrine where the search warrant is primarily directed against said person gives
"standing."

The latest United States decision squarely in point is United States vs. Birrell, 242 F. Supp. 191 (1965,
U.S.D.C., S.D.N.Y.). The defendant had stored with an attorney certain files and papers,' which attorney,
by the name of Dunn, was not, at the time of the seizing of the records, Birrell's attorney.* Dunn,, in
turn, had stored most of the records at his home in the country and on a farm which, according to
Dunn's affidavit, was under his (Dunn's) "control and management." The papers

________________

* Attorney-client relationship played no part in the decision of the case.

406

406

SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Stonehill vs. Diokno

turned out to be private, personal and business papers together with corporate books and records of
certain unnamed corporations in which Birrell did not even claim ownership. (All of these type records
were seized in the case at bar), Nevertheless, the search in Birrell was held invalid by the court which
held that even though Birrell did not own the premises where the records were stored, he had
"standing" to move for the return of all the papers and properties seized. The court, relying on Jones vs.
U. S., supra; U.S. vs. Antonelli Fireworks Co., 53 F. Supp. 870, Aff'd 155 F. 2d 631: Henzel vs. U.S. supra;
and Schwimmer vs. U.S., supra, pointed out that

"It is overwhelmingly established that the searches here in question were directed solely and exclusively
against Birrell. The only person suggested in the papers as having violated the law was Birrell. The first
search warrant described the records as having been used 'in committing a violation of Title 18, United
States Code, Section 1341, by the use of the mails by one Lowell M. Birrell, x x x.' The second search
warrant was captioned: 'United States of America vs. Lowell M, Birrell." (p. 198)

"Possession (actual or constructive), no less than ownership, gives standing to move to suppress. Such
was the rule even before Jones." (p, 199)
"If, as thus indicated, Birrell had at least constructive possession of the records stored with Dunn, it
matters not whether he had any interest in the premises searched." See also Jeffers v, United States, 88
U.S. Appl. D.C. 58, 187 F. 2d 498 (1950), affirmed 432 U.S. 48, 72 S. Ct. 93, 96 L. Ed. 459 (1951).

The ruling in the Birrell case was reaffirmed on motion for reargument; the United States did not appeal
from this decision. The factual situation in Birrell is strikingly similar to the case of the present
petitioners; as in Birrell, many personal and corporate papers were seized from premises not
petitioners' family residences; as in Birrell, the searches were "PRIMARILY DIRECTED SOLELY AND
EXCLUSIVELY" against the petitioners. Still both types of documents were suppressed in Birrell because
of the illegal search. In the case at bar, the petitioners connection with the premises raided is much
closer than in Birrell.

Thus, the petitioners have full standing to move for the quashing of all the warrants regardless whether
these

407

VOL 20, JUNE 19, 1907

407

Stonehill vs. Diokno

were directed against residences in the narrow sense of the word, as long as the documents were
personal papers of the petitioners or (to the extent that they were corporate papers) were held by them
in a personal capacity or under their personal control.

Prescinding from the foregoing, this Court, at all events, should order the return to the petitioners all
personal and private papers and effects seized, no matter where these were seized, whether from their
residences or corporate offices or any other place or places. The uncontradicted sworn statements of
the petitioners in their various pleadings submitted to this Court indisputably show that amongst the
things seized from the corporate offices and other places were personal and private papers and effects
belonging to the petitioners.

If there should be any categorization of the documents, "papers and things which where the objects of
the unlawful searches and seizures, I submit that the grouping should be: (a) personal or private papers
of the petitioners wherever they were unlawfully seized, be it their family residences, offices,
warehouses and/or premises owned and/or controlled and/or possessed (actually or constructively) by
them as shown in all the search warrants and in the sworn applications filed in securing the void search
warrants, and (b) purely corporate papers belonging to corporations. Under such categorization or
grouping, the determination of which unlawfully seized papers, documents and things are
personal/private of the petitioners or purely corporate papers will have to be left to the lower courts
which issued the void search warrants in ultimately effecting the suppression and/or return of the said
documents.
'And as unequivocally indicated by the authorities above cited, the petitioners likewise have clear legal
standing to move for the suppression of purely corporate papers as "President and/or General
Manager" of the corporations involved as specifically mentioned in the void search warrants.

Finally, I must articulate my persuasion that although the cases cited in my disquisition were criminal
prosecutions, the great clauses of the constitutional proscription

408

408

SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Stonehill vs. Diokno

on illegal searches and seizures do not withhold the mantle of their protection from cases not criminal in
origin or nature.

Writs granted in part and denied in part; motion for reconsideration denied.

Copyright 2017 Central Book Supply, Inc. All rights reserved. Stonehill vs. Diokno, 20 SCRA 383, No. L-
19550 June 19, 1967