LUTZ v. ARANETA 98 PHIL.

145 December 22, 1955

(CASE DIGEST)
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II
FUNDAMENTAL POWERS OF THE STATE
POLICE POWER

WALTER LUTZ, as Judicial Administrator of

the Intestate of the deceased Antonio Jayme
Ledesma, plaintiff-appellant v. J. ANTONIO
ARANETA, as collector of Internal Revenue,
defendant-apppelle
G.R No. L-7856. December 22, 1955
REYES, J.B L., J.:

FACTS:
Appelant in this case Walter Lutz in his capacity as the Judicial
Administrator of the intestate of the deceased Antonio Jayme
Ledesma, seeks to recover from the Collector of the Internal
Revenue the total sum of fourteen thousand six hundred sixty six
and forty cents (P 14, 666.40) paid by the estate as taxes, under
section 3 of Commonwealth Act No. 567, also known as the Sugar
Adjustment Act, for the crop years 1948-1949 and 1949-1950.
Commonwealth Act. 567 Section 2 provides for an increase of the
existing tax on the manufacture of sugar on a graduated basis, on
each picul of sugar manufacturer; while section 3 levies on the
owners or persons in control of the land devoted tot he cultivation
of sugarcane and ceded to others for consideration, on lease or
otherwise - "a tax equivalent to the difference between the money
value of the rental or consideration collected and the amount
representing 12 per centum of the assessed value of such land. It
was alleged that such tax is unconstitutional and void, being
levied for the aid and support of the sugar industry exclusively,
which in plaintiff's opinion is not a public purpose for which a
tax may be constitutionally levied. The action was dismissed by the
CFI thus the plaintiff appealed directly to the Supreme Court.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the tax imposition in the Commonwealth Act No. 567
are unconstitutional.

RULING:
Yes, the Supreme Court held that the fact that sugar production is
one of the greatest industry of our nation, sugar occupying a
leading position among its export products; that it gives
employment to thousands of laborers in the fields and factories;
that it is a great source of the state's wealth, is one of the
important source of foreign exchange needed by our government and
is thus pivotal in the plans of a regime committed to a policy of
currency stability. Its promotion, protection and advancement,
therefore redounds greatly to the general welfare. Hence it was
competent for the legislature to find that the general welfare
demanded that the sugar industry be stabilized in turn; and in the
wide field of its police power, the law-making body could provide
that the distribution of benefits therefrom be readjusted among its
components to enable it to resist the added strain of the increase
in taxes that it had to sustain.

The subject tax is levied with a regulatory purpose, to provide

means for the rehabilitation and stabilization of the threatened
sugar industry. In other words, the act is primarily a valid
exercise of police power.

US vs. Toribio
Sometime in the 1900s, Toribio applied for a license to have his carabao be slaughtered.
His request was denied because his carabao is found not to be unfit for work. He
nevertheless slaughtered his carabao without the necessary license. He was eventually
sued and was sentenced by the trial court. His counsel in one way or the other argued that
the law mandating that one should acquire a permit to slaughter his carabao is not a valid
exercise of police power.

ISSUE: Whether or not the said law is valid.

HELD: The SC ruled against Toribio. The SC explained that it is not a taking of the
property for public use, within the meaning of the constitution, but is a just and legitimate
exercise of the power of the legislature to regulate and restrain such particular use of the
property as would be inconsistent with or injurious to the rights of the publics. All property is
acquired and held under the tacit condition that it shall not be so used as to injure the equal
rights of others or greatly impair the public rights and interests of the community.

Ynot Vs IAC
G.R. No. 74457 March 20, 1987 RESTITUTO YNOT, petitioner, vs. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE
COURT, THE STATION COMMANDER, INTEGRATED NATIONAL POLICE, BAROTAC NUEVO, ILOILO
and THE REGIONAL DIRECTOR, BUREAU OF ANIMAL INDUSTRY, REGION IV, ILOILO CITY,
respondents.

On January 13, 1984, the petitioner transported six carabaos in a pump boat from Masbate to Iloilo when
the same was confiscated by the police station commander of Barotac Nuevo, Iloilo for the violation of
E.O. 626-A. A case was filed by the petitioner questioning the constitutionality of executive order and the
recovery of the carabaos. After considering the merits of the case, the confiscation was sustained and the
court declined to rule on the constitutionality issue. The petitioner appealed the decision to the
Intermediate Appellate Court but it also upheld the ruling of RTC.

Issue:

Is E.O. 626-A unconstitutional?

Ruling:

The Respondent contends that it is a valid exercise of police power to justify EO 626-A amending EO 626
in asic rule prohibiting the slaughter of carabaos except under certain conditions. The supreme court said
that The reasonable connection between the means employed and the purpose sought to be achieved by
the questioned measure is missing the Supreme Court do not see how the prohibition of the inter-
provincial transport of carabaos can prevent their indiscriminate slaughter, considering that they can be
killed anywhere, with no less difficulty in one province than in another. Obviously, retaining the carabaos
in one province will not prevent their slaughter there, any more than moving them to another province will
make it easier to kill them there

The Supreme Court found E.O. 626-A unconstitutional. The executive act defined the prohibition,
convicted the petitioner and immediately imposed punishment, which was carried out forthright. Due
process was not properly observed. In the instant case, the carabaos were arbitrarily confiscated by the
police station commander, were returned to the petitioner only after he had filed a complaint for recovery
and given a supersedeas bond of P12,000.00. The measure struck at once and pounced upon the
petitioner without giving him a chance to be heard, thus denying due process.

AGUSTIN VS. CA
Agustin is the owner of a Volkswagen Beetle Car. He is assailing the validity of Letter of
Instruction No 229 which requires all motor vehicles to have early warning devices
particularly to equip them with a pair of reflectorized triangular early warning devices.
Agustin is arguing that this order is unconstitutional, harsh, cruel and unconscionable to the
motoring public. Cars are already equipped with blinking lights which is already enough to
provide warning to other motorists. And that the mandate to compel motorists to buy a set of
reflectorized early warning devices is redundant and would only make manufacturers and
dealers instant millionaires.

ISSUE: Whether or not the said is EO is valid.

HELD: Such early warning device requirement is not an expensive redundancy, nor
oppressive, for car owners whose cars are already equipped with 1) blinking-lights in the
fore and aft of said motor vehicles, 2) battery-powered blinking lights inside motor
vehicles, 3) built-in reflectorized tapes on front and rear bumpers of motor vehicles, or 4)
well-lighted two (2) petroleum lamps (the Kinke) . . . because: Being universal among the
signatory countries to the said 1968 Vienna Conventions, and visible even under adverse
conditions at a distance of at least 400 meters, any motorist from this country or from any
part of the world, who sees a reflectorized rectangular early warning device installed on the
roads, highways or expressways, will conclude, without thinking, that somewhere along the
travelled portion of that road, highway, or expressway, there is a motor vehicle which is
stationary, stalled or disabled which obstructs or endangers passing traffic. On the other
hand, a motorist who sees any of the aforementioned other built-in warning devices or the
petroleum lamps will not immediately get adequate advance warning because he will still
think what that blinking light is all about. Is it an emergency vehicle? Is it a law enforcement
car? Is it an ambulance? Such confusion or uncertainty in the mind of the motorist will thus
increase, rather than decrease, the danger of collision.

City of Manila vs Judge

Perfecto Laguio
On 30 Mar 1993, Mayor Lim signed into law Ord 7783 entitled AN ORDINANCE
PROHIBITING THE ESTABLISHMENT OR OPERATION OF BUSINESSES PROVIDING
CERTAIN FORMS OF AMUSEMENT, ENTERTAINMENT, SERVICES AND FACILITIES IN
THE ERMITA-MALATE AREA, PRESCRIBING PENALTIES FOR VIOLATION THEREOF,
AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES. It basically prohibited establishments such as bars,
karaoke bars, motels and hotels from operating in the Malate District which was notoriously
viewed as a red light district harboring thrill seekers. Malate Tourist Development
Corporation avers that the ordinance is invalid as it includes hotels and motels in the
enumeration of places offering amusement or entertainment. MTDC reiterates that they do
not market such nor do they use women as tools for entertainment. MTDC also avers that
under the LGC, LGUs can only regulate motels but cannot prohibit their operation. The City
reiterates that the Ordinance is a valid exercise of Police Power as provided as well in the
LGC. The City likewise emphasized that the purpose of the law is to promote morality in the
City.

ISSUE: Whether or not Ordinance 7783 is valid.

HELD: The SC ruled that the said Ordinance is null and void. The SC noted that for an
ordinance to be valid, it must not only be within the corporate powers of the local
government unit to enact and must be passed according to the procedure prescribed by
law, it must also conform to the following substantive requirements:

(1) must not contravene the Constitution or any statute;

(2) must not be unfair or oppressive;

(3) must not be partial or discriminatory;

(4) must not prohibit but may regulate trade;

(5) must be general and consistent with public policy; and

(6) must not be unreasonable.

The police power of the City Council, however broad and far-reaching, is subordinate to the
constitutional limitations thereon; and is subject to the limitation that its exercise must be
reasonable and for the public good. In the case at bar, the enactment of the Ordinance was
an invalid exercise of delegated power as it is unconstitutional and repugnant to general
laws.
White Light Corp., vs City
of Manila
On 3 Dec 1992, then Mayor Lim signed into law Ord 7774 entitled An Ordinance
prohibiting short time admission in hotels, motels, lodging houses, pension houses and
similar establishments in the City of Manila. White Light Corp is an operator of mini hotels
and motels who sought to have the Ordinance be nullified as the said Ordinance infringes
on the private rights of their patrons. The RTC ruled in favor of WLC. It ruled that the
Ordinance strikes at the personal liberty of the individual guaranteed by the Constitution.
The City maintains that the ordinance is valid as it is a valid exercise of police power. Under
the LGC, the City is empowered to regulate the establishment, operation and maintenance
of cafes, restaurants, beerhouses, hotels, motels, inns, pension houses, lodging houses
and other similar establishments, including tourist guides and transports. The CA ruled in
favor of the City.

ISSUE: Whether or not Ord 7774 is valid.

HELD: The SC ruled that the said ordinance is null and void as it indeed infringes upon
individual liberty. It also violates the due process clause which serves as a guaranty for
protection against arbitrary regulation or seizure. The said ordinance invades private rights.
Note that not all who goes into motels and hotels for wash up rate are really there for
obscene purposes only. Some are tourists who needed rest or to wash up or to freshen
up. Hence, the infidelity sought to be avoided by the said ordinance is more or less
subjected only to a limited group of people. The SC reiterates that individual rights may be
adversely affected only to the extent that may fairly be required by the legitimate demands
of public interest or public welfare.
Mayor Bayani Alonte vs
Judge Maximo Savellano,
NBI & People of the
Philippines
Alonte was accused of raping JuvieLyn Punongbayan with accomplice Buenaventura
Concepcion. It was alleged that Concepcion befriended Juvie and had later lured her into
Alonetes house who was then the mayor of Bian, Laguna. The case was brought before
RTC Bian. The counsel and the prosecutor later moved for a change of venue due to
alleged intimidation. While the change of venue was pending, Juvie executed an affidavit of
desistance. The prosecutor continued on with the case and the change of venue was done
notwithstanding opposition from Alonte. The case was raffled to the Manila RTC under J
Savellano. Savellano later found probable cause and had ordered the arrest of Alonte and
Concepcion. Thereafter, the prosecution presented Juvie and had attested the voluntariness
of her desistance the same being due to media pressure and that they would rather
establish new life elsewhere. Case was then submitted for decision and Savellano
sentenced both accused to reclusion perpetua. Savellano commented that Alonte waived
his right to due process when he did not cross examine Juvie when clarificatory questions
were raised about the details of the rape and on the voluntariness of her desistance.

ISSUE: Whether or not Alonte has been denied criminal due process.

HELD: The SC ruled that Savellano should inhibit himself from further deciding on the case
due to animosity between him and the parties. There is no showing that Alonte waived his
right. The standard of waiver requires that it not only must be voluntary, but must be
knowing, intelligent, and done with sufficient awareness of the relevant circumstances and
likely consequences. Mere silence of the holder of the right should not be so construed as
a waiver of right, and the courts must indulge every reasonable presumption against waiver.
Savellano has not shown impartiality by repeatedly not acting on numerous petitions filed by
Alonte. The case is remanded to the lower court for retrial and the decision earlier
promulgated is nullified.

Balacuit v CFI G.R. No. L-38429 June 30, 1988

J. Gancayo

Facts:
Petitioners, theater owners, assailed the constitutionality of Ordinance No. 640 passed by the
Municipal Board of the City of Butuan on April 21, 1969. This called for a reduction to of
the ticket price given to minors from 7-12 years old. There was a fine from 200-600 pesos or a 2-6
month imprisonment
The complaint was issued in the trial court. A TRO was then issued to prevent the law from being
enforced. The respondent court entered its decision declaring the law valid.
Petitioners attack the validity and constitutionality of Ordinance No. 640 on the grounds that it is ultra
vires and an invalid exercise of police power. Petitioners contend that Ordinance No. 640 is not
within the power of' the Municipal Board to enact as provided for in Section 15(n) of Republic Act No.
523 where it states that the Muncipal board can only fix license fees for theaters and
not admission rates.
The respondent attempts to justify the enactment of the ordinance by invoking the general welfare
clause embodied in Section 15 (nn) of the cited law.

Issue:
Does this power to regulate include the authority to interfere in the fixing of prices of admission to
these places of exhibition and amusement whether under its general grant of power or under the
general welfare clause as invoked by the City?

Held: The ordinance is under neither and thus unconstitutional. Petition granted.

Ratio:
1. Kwong Sing v. City of Manila- the word "regulate" was interpreted to include the power to control,
to govern and to restrain, it would seem that under its power to regulate places of exhibitions and
amusement, the Municipal Board of the City of Butuan could make proper police regulations as to
the mode in which the business shall be exercised.
In this jurisdiction, it is already settled that the operation of theaters, cinematographs and other
places of public exhibition are subject to regulation by the municipal council in the exercise of
delegated police power by the local government.
People v. Chan- an ordinance of the City of Manila prohibiting first run cinematographs from selling
tickets beyond their seating capacity was upheld as constitutional for being a valid exercise of police
power.
The City of Butuan, apparently realizing that it has no authority to enact the ordinance in question
under its power to regulate embodied in Section 15(n), now invokes the police power as delegated to
it under the general welfare clause to justify the enactment of said ordinance
To invoke the exercise of police power, not only must it appear that the interest of the public
generally requires an interference with private rights, but the means adopted must be reasonably
necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose and not unduly oppressive upon individuals.

COJUANGCO V CA

28 AUG

GR No. 119398 | July 2, 1999 | J. Panganiban

Doctrine: To hold public officers personally liable for moral and exemplary damages and for
attorneys fees for acts done in the performance of official functions, the plaintiff must prove that
these officers exhibited acts characterized by evident bad faith, malice, or gross negligence. But even
if their acts had not been so tainted, public officers may still be held liable for nominal damages if
they had violated the plaintiffs constitutional rights.

Facts:

Petitioner Eduardo Cojuangco Jr. filed a Petition for Review under Rule 45 of the ROC seeking to set
aside CAs decision, after it reversed a favorable decision of the RTC that ordered the private
respondents to pay him moral and exemplary damages, attorneys fees and costs of the suit, and
denied his Motion for Reconsideration.

Cojuangco, a known businessman-sportsman owned several racehorses which he entered in

sweepstakes races. Several of his horses won the races on various dates, and won prizes together with
the 30% due for trainer/grooms. He sent letters of demand for the collection of the prizes due him
but private respondents PCSO and its then chairman Fernando Carrascoso Jr. consistently replied
that the demanded prizes are being withheld on advice of PCGG. Consequently, Cojuangco filed this
case before the Manila RTC but before the receipt summons, PCGG advised private respondents that
it poses no more objection to its remittance of the prized winnings. This was immediately
communicated to petitioners counsel Estelito Mendoza by Carrascoso but the former refused to
accept the prizes at this point, reasoning that the matter had already been brought to court.

The trial court ruled that the private respondents had no authority to withhold the subject racehorse
winnings since no writ of sequestration was issued by PCGG. Ordering the private respondents to
pay in solidum the claimed winnings, the trial court further held that, by not paying the winnings,
Carrascoso had acted in bad faith amounting to the persecution and harassment of petitioner and his
family. While the case was pending with the CA, the petitioner moved for partial execution pending
appeal to which the private respondents posed no objection to.

CA reversed the trial courts finding of bad faith, holding that the former PCSO chairman was merely
carrying out the instruction of the PCGG. It likewise noted that Carrascosos acts of promptly
replying to demands and not objecting to partial execution negated bad faith.

Issue:

W/N the award for damages against respondent Carrascoso is warranted by evidence the law

Held:

YES AND NO. Petitioner is only entitled to nominal damages.

Bad faith does not simply connote bad judgment or simple negligence. It imports a dishonest
purpose or some moral obliquity and conscious doing of a wrong, a breach of a known duty due to
some motive or interest of ill will that partakes of the nature of fraud. There is sufficient evidence on
record to support Respondent Courts conclusion that Carrascoso did not act in bad faith. His letters
to PCGG indicated his uncertainties as to the extent of the sequestration against the properties of the
plaintiff. There is also denying that plaintiff is a very close political and business associate of the
former President Marcos. Sequestration was also a novel remedy. Under these equivocalities,
Carrascoso could not be faulted in asking further instructions from the PCGG, on what to do and
more so, to obey the instructions given. Besides, EO2 has just been issued by President Aquino,
freezing all assets and properties in the Philippines (of) former President Marcos and/or his wife
their close friends, subordinates, business associates

The extant rule is that public officers shall not be liable by way of moral and exemplary damages for
acts done in the performance of official duties, unless there is a clear showing of bad faith, malice or
gross negligence. Attorneys fees and expenses of litigation cannot be imposed either, in the absence
of clear showing of any of the grounds provided therefor under the Civil Code. The trial courts award
of these kinds of damages must perforce be deleted.

Imelda Marcos vs
Sandiganbayan
Imelda was charged together with Jose Dans for Graft & Corruption for a dubious
transaction done in 1984 while they were officers transacting business with the Light
Railway Transit. The case was raffled to the 1 st Division of the Sandiganbayan. The division
was headed by Justice Garchitorena with J Balajadia and J Atienza as associate justices.
No decision was reached by the division by reason of Atienzas dissent in favor of Imeldas
innocence. Garchitorena then summoned a special division of the SB to include JJ Amores
and Cipriano as additional members. Amores then asked Garchitorena to be given 15 days
to send in his manifestation. On the date of Amores request, Garchitorena received
manifestation from J Balajadia stating that he agrees with J Rosario who further agrees with
J Atienza. Garchitorena then issued a special order to immediately dissolve the special
division and have the issue be raised to the SB en banc for it would already be pointless to
wait for Amores manifestation granted that a majority has already decided on Imeldas
favor. The SB en banc ruled against Imelda.

ISSUE: Whether or not due process has been observed.

HELD: The SC ruled that the ruling of the SB is bereft of merit as there was no strong
showing of Imeldas guilt. The SC further emphasized that Imelda was deprived of due
process by reason of Garchitorena not waiting for Amores manifestation. Such procedural
flaws committed by respondent Sandiganbayan are fatal to the validity of its decision
convicting petitioner. Garchitorena had already created the Special Division of five (5)
justices in view of the lack of unanimity of the three (3) justices in the First Division. At that
stage, petitioner had a vested right to be heard by the five (5) justices, especially the new
justices in the persons of Justices Amores and del Rosario who may have a different view of
the cases against her. At that point, Presiding Justice Garchitorena and Justice Balajadia
may change their mind and agree with the original opinion of Justice Atienza but the
turnaround cannot deprive petitioner of her vested right to the opinion of Justices Amores
and del Rosario. It may be true that Justice del Rosario had already expressed his opinion
during an informal, unscheduled meeting in the unnamed restaurant but as aforestated, that
opinion is not the opinion contemplated by law. But what is more, petitioner was denied the
opinion of Justice Amores for before it could be given, Presiding Justice Garchitorena
dissolved the Special Division.

El Banco Espaol-Filipino vs
Vicente Palanca
Engracio Palanca was indebted to El Banco and he had his parcel of land as security to his
debt. His debt amounted to P218,294.10. His property is worth 75k more than what he owe.
Due to the failure of Engracio to make his payments, El Banco executed an instrument to
mortgage Engracios property. Engracio however left for China and he never returned til he
died. Since Engracio is a non resident El Banco has to notify Engracio about their intent to
sue him by means of publication using a newspaper. The lower court further orderdd the
clerk of court to furnish Engracio a copy and that itd be sent to Amoy, China. The court
eventually granted El Banco petition to execute Engracios property. 7 years thereafter,
Vicente surfaced on behalf of Engracio as his administrator to petition for the annulment of
the ruling. Vicente averred that there had been no due process as Engracio never received
the summons.

ISSUE: Whether or not due process was not observed.

HELD: The SC ruled against Palanca. The SC ruled that the requisites for judicial due
process had been met. The requisites are;
1. There must be an impartial court or tribunal clothed with judicial power to hear and
decide the matter before it.

2. Jurisdiction must be lawfully acquired over the person of the defendant or over the
property subject of the proceedings.

3. The defendant must be given the opportunity to be heard.

4. Judgment must be rendered only after lawful hearing.

Galman vs. Sandiganbayan, 144 SCRA 43 (1986)

FACTS: Assassination of former Senator Benigno "Ninoy" Aquino, Jr. He was killed from his plane that
had just landed at the Manila International Airport. His brain was smashed by a bullet fired point-blank into
the back of his head by an assassin. The military investigators reported within a span of three hours that
the man who shot Aquino (whose identity was then supposed to be unknown and was revealed only days
later as Rolando Galman) was a communist-hired gunman, and that the military escorts gunned him down
in turn.

President was constrained to create a Fact Finding Board to investigate due to large masses of people
who joined in the ten-day period of national mourning yearning for the truth, justice and freedom.

The fact is that both majority and minority reports were one in rejecting the military version stating that
"the evidence shows to the contrary that Rolando Galman had no subversive affiliations. Only the soldiers
in the staircase with Sen. Aquino could have shot him; that Ninoy's assassination was the product of a
military conspiracy, not a communist plot. Only difference between the two reports is that the majority
report found all the twenty-six private respondents above-named in the title of the case involved in the
military conspiracy; " while the chairman's minority report would exclude nineteen of them.

Then Pres. Marcos stated that evidence shows that Galman was the killer.

Petitioners pray for issuance of a TRO enjoining respondent court from rendering a decision in the two
criminal cases before it, the Court resolved by nine-to-two votes 11 to issue the restraining order prayed
for. The Court also granted petitioners a five-day period to file a reply to respondents' separate comments
and respondent Tanodbayan a three-day period to submit a copy of his 84-page memorandum for the
prosecution.

But ten days later, the Court by the same nine-to-two-vote ratio in reverse, resolved to dismiss the petition
and to lift the TRO issued ten days earlier enjoining the Sandiganbayan from rendering its decision. The
same Court majority denied petitioners' motion for a new 5-day period counted from receipt of respondent
Tanodbayan's memorandum for the prosecution (which apparently was not served on them).

Thus, petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration, alleging that the dismissal did not indicate the legal
ground for such action and urging that the case be set for a full hearing on the merits that the people are
entitled to due process.

However, respondent Sandiganbayan issued its decision acquitting all the accused of the crime charged,
declaring them innocent and totally absolving them of any civil liability. Respondents submitted that with
the Sandiganbayan's verdict of acquittal, the instant case had become moot and academic. Thereafter,
same Court majority denied petitioners' motion for reconsideration for lack of merit.

Hence, petitioners filed their motion to admit their second motion for reconsideration alleging that
respondents committed serious irregularities constituting mistrial and resulting in miscarriage of justice
and gross violation of the constitutional rights of the petitioners and the sovereign people of the
Philippines to due process of law.

ISSUES:
(1) Whether or not petitioner was deprived of his rights as an accused.

(2) Whether or not there was a violation of the double jeopardy clause.

RULING: Petitioners' second motion for reconsideration is granted and ordering a re-trial of the said
cases which should be conducted with deliberate dispatch and with careful regard for the requirements of
due process.

Deputy Tanodbayan Manuel Herrera (made his expose 15 months later when former Pres. was no longer
around) affirmed the allegations in the second motion for reconsideration that he revealed that the
Sandiganbayan Justices and Tanodbayan prosecutors were ordered by Marcos to whitewash the Aquino-
Galman murder case. Malacaang wanted dismissal to the extent that a prepared resolution was sent to
the Investigating Panel. Malacaang Conference planned a scenario of trial where the former President
ordered then that the resolution be revised by categorizing the participation of each respondent; decided
that the presiding justice, Justice Pamaran, (First Division) would personally handle the trial. A conference
was held in an inner room of the Palace. Only the First Lady and Presidential Legal Assistant Justice
Lazaro were with the President. The conferees were told to take the back door in going to the room where
the meeting was held, presumably to escape notice by the visitors in the reception hall waiting to see the
President. During the conference, and after an agreement was reached, Pres. Marcos told them 'Okay,
mag moro-moro na lamang kayo;' and that on their way out of the room Pres. Marcos expressed his
thanks to the group and uttered 'I know how to reciprocate'.

Mayor Miguel Paderanga vs

Judge Cesar Azura
Paderanga was the mayor of Gingoog City, Misamis Oriental. He petitioned that J Azura
inhibits himself from deciding on pending cases brought before him on the grounds that they
have lost confidence in him, that he entertained tax suits against the city and had issued
TROs on the sales of properties when it is clearly provided for by law (Sec 74 PD 464) that
the remedy to stop auction is to pay tax, that J Azura is bias, oppressive and is abusive in
his power.
ISSUE: Whether or not J Azura should inhibit himself from the trial.
HELD: The SC ruled that Azura must. As decided in the Pimentel Case (21 SCRA 160), All
the foregoing notwithstanding, this should be a good occasion as any to draw attention of all
judges to appropriate guidelines in a situation where their capacity to try and decide fairly
and judiciously comes to the fore by way of challenge from any one of the parties. A judge
may not be legally prohibited from sitting in a litigation But when suggestion is made of
record that he might be induced to act in favor of one party or with bias or prejudice against
a litigant arising out of circumstances reasonably capable of inciting such a state of mind,
he should conduct a careful self-examination. He should exercise his discretion in a way
that the peoples faith in the courts of justice is not impaired. . .
The reminder is also apropos that next in importance to the duty of rendering a righteous
judgment is that of doing it in such a manner as will beget no suspicion of the fairness and
integrity of the judge .

Ang Tibay vs Court of

Industrial Relations
Teodoro Toribio owns and operates Ang Tibay, a leather company which supplies the
Philippine Army. Due to alleged shortage of leather, Toribio caused the lay off of a number of
his employees. However, the National Labor Union, Inc. (NLU) questioned the validity of
said lay off as it averred that the said employees laid off were members of NLU while no
members of the rival labor union (National Workers Brotherhood) were laid off. NLU claims
that NWB is a company dominated union and Toribio was merely busting NLU.
The case reached the Court of Industrial Relations (CIR) where Toribio and NWB won.
Eventually, NLU went to the Supreme Court invoking its right for a new trial on the ground of
newly discovered evidence. The Supreme Court agreed with NLU. The Solicitor General,
arguing for the CIR, filed a motion for reconsideration.
ISSUE: Whether or not the National Labor Union, Inc. is entitled to a new trial.
HELD: Yes. The records show that the newly discovered evidence or documents obtained
by NLU, which they attached to their petition with the SC, were evidence so inaccessible to
them at the time of the trial that even with the exercise of due diligence they could not be
expected to have obtained them and offered as evidence in the Court of Industrial
Relations. Further, the attached documents and exhibits are of such far-reaching
importance and effect that their admission would necessarily mean the modification and
reversal of the judgment rendered (said newly obtained records include books of
business/inventory accounts by Ang Tibay which were not previously accessible but already
existing).
The SC also outlined that administrative bodies, like the CIR, although not strictly bound by
the Rules of Court must also make sure that they comply to the requirements of due
process. For administrative bodies, due process can be complied with by observing the
following:
(1) The right to a hearing which includes the right of the party interested or affected to
present his own case and submit evidence in support thereof.
(2) Not only must the party be given an opportunity to present his case and to adduce
evidence tending to establish the rights which he asserts but the tribunal must consider the
evidence presented.
(3) While the duty to deliberate does not impose the obligation to decide right, it does
imply a necessity which cannot be disregarded, namely, that of having something to support
its decision. A decision with absolutely nothing to support it is a nullity, a place when directly
attached.
(4) Not only must there be some evidence to support a finding or conclusion but the
evidence must be substantial. Substantial evidence is more than a mere scintilla It means
such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a
conclusion.
(5) The decision must be rendered on the evidence presented at the hearing, or at least
contained in the record and disclosed to the parties affected.
(6) The administrative body or any of its judges, therefore, must act on its or his own
independent consideration of the law and facts of the controversy, and not simply accept the
views of a subordinate in arriving at a decision.
(7) The administrative body should, in all controversial questions, render its decision in
such a manner that the parties to the proceeding can know the various issues involved, and
the reasons for the decisions rendered. The performance of this duty is inseparable from
the authority conferred upon it.

Marcos II vs. CA
MARCOS II v. CA
GR No. 120880, June 5, 1997
293 SCRA 77

FACTS: Bongbong Marcos sought for the reversal of the ruling of the Court of Appeals to
grant CIR's petition to levy the properties of the late Pres. Marcos to cover the payment
of his tax delinquencies during the period of his exile in the US. The Marcos family was
assessed by the BIR, and notices were constructively served to the Marcoses, however
the assessment were not protested administratively by Mrs. Marcos and the heirs of the
late president so that they became final and unappealable after the period for filing of
opposition has prescribed. Marcos contends that the properties could not be levied to
cover the tax dues because they are still pending probate with the court, and
settlement of tax deficiencies could not be had, unless there is an order by the probate
court or until the probate proceedings are terminated.

ISSUE: Is the contention of Bongbong Marcos correct?

HELD: No. The deficiency income tax assessments and estate tax assessment are
already final and unappealable -and-the subsequent levy of real properties is a tax
remedy resorted to by the government, sanctioned by Section 213 and 218 of the
National Internal Revenue Code. This summary tax remedy is distinct and separate from
the other tax remedies (such as Judicial Civil actions and Criminal actions), and is not
affected or precluded by the pendency of any other tax remedies instituted by the
government.

The approval of the court, sitting in probate, or as a settlement tribunal over the
deceased is not a mandatory requirement in the collection of estate taxes. It cannot
therefore be argued that the Tax Bureau erred in proceeding with the levying and sale of
the properties allegedly owned by the late President, on the ground that it was required
to seek first the probate court's sanction. There is nothing in the Tax Code, and in the
pertinent remedial laws that implies the necessity of the probate or estate settlement
court's approval of the state's claim for estate taxes, before the same can be enforced
and collected. On the contrary, under Section 87 of the NIRC, it is the probate or
settlement court which is bidden not to authorize the executor or judicial administrator
of the decedent's estate to deliver any distributive share to any party interested in the
estate, unless it is shown a Certification by the Commissioner of Internal Revenue that
the estate taxes have been paid. This provision disproves the petitioner's contention
that it is the probate court which approves the assessment and collection of the estate
tax.

Nala v Barroso[G.R. No. 153087. August 7, 2003]YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.Facts:

On June 25, 2001, PO3 Alcoser applied for a search warrant against petitioner Nala, who was
referred to in the
application as Rumolo Nala alias Long
of Purok 4,
Poblacion, Kitaotao, Bukidnon

for illegal possession of firearms. On the same day, said search warrant was granted.

At around 6:30 in the morning of July 4, 2001, Alcoser and other police officers searched
petitioners house and
allegedly seized various firearms, ammunitions and explosives.

Petitioner questioned the validity of the search warrant and filed an Omnibus Motion to Quash but
was deniedby the judge.

Lower court found that probable cause was duly established from the deposition and examination of
witnessRuel Nalagon and the testimony of PO3 Alcoser who personally conducted a surveillance to
confirm theinformation given by Nalagon. The fact that the items seized were not exactly the
items listed in the warrantdoes not invalidate the same because the items seized bear a direct
relation to the crime of illegal possession of firearms.

Respondent judge also found that petitioner was sufficiently identified in the warrant although his
first name
was erroneously stated therein as Romulo and not Bernard, considering that the warrant was
couched in
terms that would make it enforceable against the person and residence of petitioner and no other.
Issues:
(1) Was petitioner sufficiently described in the search and seizure warrant?
YES.
(2) Was there probable cause for the issuance of a search and seizure warrant against petitioner?
NO.
(3) Whether or not the firearms and explosive allegedly found in petitioners residence are
admissible in evidence
against him even though said firearms were not listed in the search and seizure warrant.
Immaterial due to a voidsearch warrant.Held:
1.

The failure to correctly state in the search and seizure warrant the first name of petitioner, which
is Bernardand not Romulo or Rumolo, does not invalidate the warrant because the additional
description alias LolongNala who is said to be residing at Purok 4, Poblacion, Kitaotao, Bukidnon
sufficiently enabled the police officers
to locate and identify the petitioner. What is prohibited is a warrant against an unnamed party, and
not onewhich, as in the instant case, contains a descriptio personae that will enable the officer to
identify the accusedwithout difficulty.2.

Nowhere
in the affidavit and testimony of witness Ruel Nalagon nor in PO3 Macrino L. Alcosers applicat
ion forthe issuance of a search warrant was it mentioned that petitioner had no license to possess a
firearm. WhileAlcoser testified before the respondent judge that the firearms in the possession
of petitioner are not licensed,this does not qualify as
personal knowledge but only personal belief because neither he nor Nalagon
verified, much more secured, a certification from the appropriate government agency
that petitioner was notlicensed to possess a firearm. This could have been the best evidence
obtainable to prove that petitioner hadno license to possess firearms and ammunitions, but the
police officers failed to present the same. Hence, thesearch and seizure warrant issued on the
basis of the evidence presented is void.3.

The settled rule is that where entry into the premises to be searched was gained by virtue of a void
searchwarrant, prohibited articles seized in the course of the search are inadmissible against the
accused. Prohibitedarticles may be seized but only as long as the search is valid. In this case, it was
not because: 1) there was novalid search warrant; and 2) absent such a warrant, the right thereto
was not validly waived by the petitioner. In
short, the military officers who entered the petitioners premises had no ri
ght to be there and therefore had no
right either to seize the pistol and bullets.

The plain view doctrine finds no application here not only because the police officers had no
justificationto search the house of petitioner (their search warrant being void for lack of probable
cause), but alsobecause said officers failed to discharge the burden of proving that
subject articles were inadvertently
found in petitioners house.

Columbia Pictures
Entertainment, Inc. vs
Court of Appeals
In 1986, the Videogram Regulatory Board (VRB) applied for a warrant against Jose Jinco
(Jingco), owner of Showtime Enterprises for allegedly pirating movies produced and owned
by Columbia Pictures and other motion picture companies. Jingco filed a motion to quash
the search warrant but the same was denied in 1987. Subsequently, Jinco filed an Urgent
Motion to Lift the Search Warrant and Return the Articles Seized. In 1989, the RTC judge
granted the motion. The judge ruled that based on the ruling in the 1988 case
of 20th Century Fox Film Corporation vs CA, before a search warrant could be issued in
copyright cases, the master copy of the films alleged to be pirated must be attached in the
application for warrant.
ISSUE: Whether or not the 20th Century Fox ruling may be applied retroactively in this case.
HELD: No. In 1986, obviously the 1988 case of 20 th Century Fox was not yet promulgated.
The lower court could not possibly have expected more evidence from the VRB and
Columbia Pictures in their application for a search warrant other than what the law and
jurisprudence, then existing and judicially accepted, required with respect to the finding of
probable cause.
The Supreme Court also revisited and clarified the ruling in the 20 th Century Fox Case. It is
evidently incorrect to suggest, as the ruling in 20th Century Fox may appear to do, that in
copyright infringement cases, the presentation of master tapes of the copyright films is
always necessary to meet the requirement of probable cause for the issuance of a search
warrant. It is true that such master tapes are object evidence, with the merit that in this class
of evidence the ascertainment of the controverted fact is made through demonstration
involving the direct use of the senses of the presiding magistrate. Such auxiliary procedure,
however, does not rule out the use of testimonial or documentary evidence, depositions,
admissions or other classes of evidence tending to prove the factum probandum, especially
where the production in court of object evidence would result in delay, inconvenience or
expenses out of proportion to is evidentiary value.
In fine, the supposed pronouncement in said case regarding the necessity for the
presentation of the master tapes of the copy-righted films for the validity of search warrants
should at most be understood to merely serve as a guidepost in determining the existence
of probable cause in copy-right infringement cases where there is doubt as to the true
nexus between the master tape and the pirated copies. An objective and careful reading of
the decision in said case could lead to no other conclusion than that said directive was
hardly intended to be a sweeping and inflexible requirement in all or similar copyright
infringement cases

Maximo Soliven vs Ramon

Makasiar
Luis Beltran is among the petitioners in this case. He, together with others, was charged
with libel by the then president Corzaon Aquino. Cory herself filed a complaint-affidavit
against him and others. Makasiar averred that Cory cannot file a complaint affidavit
because this would defeat her immunity from suit. He grounded his contention on the
principle that a president cannot be sued. However, if a president would sue then the
president would allow herself to be placed under the courts jurisdiction and conversely she
would be consenting to be sued back. Also, considering the functions of a president, the
president may not be able to appear in court to be a witness for herself thus she may be
liable for contempt.
ISSUE: Whether or not such immunity can be invoked by Beltran, a person other than the
president.
HELD: No. The rationale for the grant to the President of the privilege of immunity from suit
is to assure the exercise of Presidential duties and functions free from any hindrance or
distraction, considering that being the Chief Executive of the Government is a job that, aside
from requiring all of the office-holders time, also demands undivided attention.
But this privilege of immunity from suit, pertains to the President by virtue of the office and
may be invoked only by the holder of the office; not by any other person in the Presidents
behalf. Thus, an accused like Beltran et al, in a criminal case in which the President is the
complainant cannot raise the presidential privilege as a defense to prevent the case from
proceeding against such accused.
Moreover, there is nothing in our laws that would prevent the President from waiving the
privilege. Thus, if so minded the President may shed the protection afforded by the privilege
and submit to the courts jurisdiction. The choice of whether to exercise the privilege or to
waive it is solely the Presidents prerogative. It is a decision that cannot be assumed and
imposed by any other person.

BACHE vs RUIZ
On 24 Feb 1970, Commissioner Vera of Internal Revenue, wrote a letter addressed to J
Ruiz requesting the issuance of a search warrant against petitioners for violation of Sec
46(a) of the NIRC, in relation to all other pertinent provisions thereof, particularly Sects 53,
72, 73, 208 and 209, and authorizing Revenue Examiner de Leon make and file the
application for search warrant which was attached to the letter. The next day, de Leon and
his witnesses went to CFI Rizal to obtain the search warrant. At that time J Ruiz was
hearing a certain case; so, by means of a note, he instructed his Deputy Clerk of Court to
take the depositions of De Leon and Logronio. After the session had adjourned, J Ruiz was
informed that the depositions had already been taken. The stenographer read to him her
stenographic notes; and thereafter, J Ruiz asked respondent Logronio to take the oath and
warned him that if his deposition was found to be false and without legal basis, he could be
charged for perjury. J Ruiz signed de Leons application for search warrant and Logronios
deposition. The search was subsequently conducted.
ISSUE: Whether or not there had been a valid search warrant.
HELD: The SC ruled in favor of Bache on three grounds.
1. J Ruiz failed to personally examine the complainant and his witness.
Personal examination by the judge of the complainant and his witnesses is necessary to
enable him to determine the existence or non-existence of a probable cause.
2. The search warrant was issued for more than one specific offense.
The search warrant in question was issued for at least four distinct offenses under the Tax
Code. As ruled in Stonehill Such is the seriousness of the irregularities committed in
connection with the disputed search warrants, that this Court deemed it fit to amend Section
3 of Rule 122 of the former Rules of Court that a search warrant shall not issue but upon
probable cause in connection with one specific offense. Not satisfied with this qualification,
the Court added thereto a paragraph, directing that no search warrant shall issue for more
than one specific offense.
3. The search warrant does not particularly describe the things to be seized.
The documents, papers and effects sought to be seized are described in the Search
Warrant
Unregistered and private books of accounts (ledgers, journals, columnars, receipts and
disbursements books, customers ledgers); receipts for payments received; certificates of
stocks and securities; contracts, promissory notes and deeds of sale; telex and coded
messages; business communications, accounting and business records; checks and check
stubs; records of bank deposits and withdrawals; and records of foreign remittances,
covering the years 1966 to 1970.
The description does not meet the requirement in Art III, Sec. 1, of the Constitution, and of
Sec. 3, Rule 126 of the Revised Rules of Court, that the warrant should particularly describe
the things to be seized.
A search warrant may be said to particularly describe the things to be seized when the
description therein is as specific as the circumstances will ordinarily allow or when the
description expresses a conclusion of fact not of law by which the warrant officer may be
guided in making the search and seizure or when the things described are limited to those
which bear direct relation to the offense for which the warrant is being issued.

Stonehill vs Diokno (20 SCRA 383)

Posted by taxcasesdigest on Tuesday, July 14, 2009
Labels: constitutional law, corporation, general warrant, search and seizure

Facts: Respondents issued, on different dates, 42 search warrants against petitioners personally,
and/or corporations for which they are officers directing peace officers to search the persons of
petitioners and premises of their offices, warehouses and/or residences to search for personal
properties books of accounts, financial records, vouchers, correspondence, receipts, ledgers,
journals, portfolios, credit journals, typewriters, and other documents showing all business
transactions including disbursement receipts, balance sheets and profit and loss statements and
Bobbins(cigarettes) as the subject of the offense for violations of Central Bank Act, Tariff and
Customs Laws, Internal Revenue Code, and Revised Penal Code.

Upon effecting the search in the offices of the aforementioned corporations and on the respective residences of
the petitioners, there seized documents, papers, money and other records. Petitioners then were subjected to
deportation proceedings and were constrained to question the legality of the searches and seizures as well as
the admissibility of those seized as evidence against them.
On March 20, 1962, the SC issued a writ of preliminary injunction and partially lifted the same on June 29,
1962 with respect to some documents and papers.

Held:

a. Search warrants issued were violative of the Constitution and the Rules, thus, illegal or being general
warrants. There is no probable cause and warrant did not particularly specify the things to be seized.
The purpose of the requirement is to avoid placing the sanctity of the domicile and the privacy of
communication and correspondence at the mercy of the whims, caprice or passion of peace officers.

b. Document seized from an illegal search warrant is not admissible in court as a fruit of a poisonous tee.
However, they could not be returned, except if warranted by the circumstances.

c. Petitioners were not the proper party to question the validity and return of those taken from the
corporations for which they acted as officers as they are treated as personality different from that of
the corporation.

PEOPLE
vs.
AMINUDIN163 SCRA 402FACTS
:
The police agents in Iloilo City received a tip from a reliable informer that the accused, Aminnudin, was
on a vessel bound for Iloilo and is carryingwith him marijuana. The said vessel was to arrive few days after
such tip.On the day of the arrival, the agents then waited at the port for thevessel. Upon
arrival of the vessel and when the suspect disembarked,
they i m m e d i a t e l y f r i s k e d h i m a n d s e a r c h e d h i s b a g w h i c h c o n t a i n
e d t h e marijuana. Subsequently, the Aminnudin was arrested.During the trial, the accused that alleged
that he was arbitrarily arrested and immediately handcuffed and that his bag was confiscated
without a searchwarrant.
ISSUE:
Is the marijuana found in the accused bag admissible evidence?
HELD
:
No. The police agents had enough time to secure a warrant to a r r e s t a n d s e a r c h t h e
accused but did not do so. In addition to this, thearrest did not fall into any of
the exceptions of a valid warrantless arrest b e c a u s e t h e a c c u s e d -
a p p e l l a n t w a s n o t , a t t h e m o m e n t o f h i s a r r e s t , committing a crime nor was it
shown that he was about to do so or that he had just done so.