Cruz vs Secretary of DENR
Natural Resources and Environmental Law; Constitutional Law; IPRA; Regalian Doctrine
GR. No. 135385, Dec. 6, 2000
FACTS:
Petitioners Isagani Cruz and Cesar Europa filed a suit for prohibition and mandamus as citizens and
taxpayers, assailing the constitutionality of certain provisions of Republic Act No. 8371, otherwise
known as the Indigenous Peoples Rights Act of 1997 (IPRA) and its implementing rules and regulations
(IRR). The petitioners assail certain provisions of the IPRA and its IRR on the ground that these amount
to an unlawful deprivation of the States ownership over lands of the public domain as well as minerals
and other natural resources therein, in violation of the regalian doctrine embodied in section 2, Article
XII of the Constitution.
ISSUE:
Do the provisions of IPRA contravene the Constitution?
HELD:
No, the provisions of IPRA do not contravene the Constitution. Examining the IPRA, there is nothing in
the law that grants to the ICCs/IPs ownership over the natural resources within their ancestral domain.
Ownership over the natural resources in the ancestral domains remains with the State and the rights
granted by the IPRA to the ICCs/IPs over the natural resources in their ancestral domains merely gives
them, as owners and occupants of the land on which the resources are found, the right to the small
scale utilization of these resources, and at the same time, a priority in their large scale development
and exploitation.
Additionally, ancestral lands and ancestral domains are not part of the lands of the public domain.
They are private lands and belong to the ICCs/IPs by native title, which is a concept of private land title
that existed irrespective of any royal grant from the State. However, the right of ownership and
possession by the ICCs/IPs of their ancestral domains is a limited form of ownership and does not
include the right to alienate the same.
DUMLAO VS COMELEC
Patricio Dumlao was the former governor of Nueva Vizcaya. He has already retired from his office and he has been
receiving retirement benefits therefrom.
In 1980, he filed for reelection to the same office. Meanwhile, Batas Pambansa Blg. 52 was enacted. This law
provides, among others, that retirees from public office like Dumlao are disqualified to run for office. Dumlao assailed
the law averring that it is class legislation hence unconstitutional. In general, Dumlao invoked equal protection in the
eye of the law.
His petition was joined by Atty. Romeo Igot and Alfredo Salapantan, Jr. These two however have different issues. The
suits of Igot and Salapantan are more of a taxpayers suit assailing the other provisions of BP 52 regarding the term
of office of the elected officials, the length of the campaign, and the provision which bars persons charged for crimes
from running for public office as well as the provision that provides that the mere filing of complaints against them
after preliminary investigation would already disqualify them from office.
ISSUE: Whether or not Dumlao, Igot, and Salapantan have a cause of action.
HELD: No. The SC pointed out the procedural lapses of this case for this case should have never been merged.
Dumlaos issue is different from Igots. They have separate issues. Further, this case does not meet all the requisites
so that itd be eligible for judicial review. There are standards that have to be followed in the exercise of the function
of judicial review, namely: (1) the existence of an appropriate case; (2) an interest personal and substantial by the
party raising the constitutional question; (3) the plea that the function be exercised at the earliest opportunity; and (4)
the necessity that the constitutional question be passed upon in order to decide the case.
In this case, only the 3rd requisite was met.
The SC ruled however that the provision barring persons charged for crimes may not run for public office and that the
filing of complaints against them and after preliminary investigation would already disqualify them from office as null
and void.
The assertion that BP 52 is contrary to the safeguard of equal protection is neither well taken. The constitutional
guarantee of equal protection of the laws is subject to rational classification. If the groupings are based on reasonable
and real differentiations, one class can be treated and regulated differently from another class. For purposes of public
service, employees 65 years of age, have been validly classified differently from younger employees. Employees
attaining that age are subject to compulsory retirement, while those of younger ages are not so compulsorily retirable.
In respect of election to provincial, city, or municipal positions, to require that candidates should not be more than 65
years of age at the time they assume office, if applicable to everyone, might or might not be a reasonable
classification although, as the Solicitor General has intimated, a good policy of the law should be to promote the
emergence of younger blood in our political elective echelons. On the other hand, it might be that persons more than
65 years old may also be good elective local officials.
Retirement from government service may or may not be a reasonable disqualification for elective local officials. For
one thing, there can also be retirees from government service at ages, say below 65. It may neither be reasonable to
disqualify retirees, aged 65, for a 65-year old retiree could be a good local official just like one, aged 65, who is not a
retiree.
But, in the case of a 65-year old elective local official (Dumalo), who has retired from a provincial, city or municipal
office, there is reason to disqualify him from running for the same office from which he had retired, as provided for in
the challenged provision.
John Hay Peoples Alternative Coalition v Lim
OSMENA V COMELEC
FACTS:
Petitioners argue that RA 7056, in providing for desynchronized elections violates
the Constitution:
1. Republic Act 7056 violates the mandate of the Constitution for the holding of
synchronized national and local elections on the second Monday of May 1992;
2. Republic Act 7056, particularly the 2nd paragraph of Section 3 thereof, providing
that all incumbent provincial, city and municipal officials shall hold over beyond June
30, 1992 and shall serve until their successors shall have been duly elected and
qualified violates Section 2, Article XVIII (Transitory Provision) of the Constitution;
3. The same paragraph of Section 3 of Republic Act 7056, which in effect, shortens
the term or tenure of office of local officials to be elected on the 2nd Monday of
November, 1992 violates Section 8, Article X of the Constitution;
4. Section 8 of Republic Act 7056, providing for the campaign periods for
Presidential, Vice-Presidential and Senatorial elections, violates the provision of
Section 9, Article IX under the title Commission on Elections of the Constitution;
5. The so-called many difficult if not insurmountable problems mentioned in
Republic Act 7056 to synchronized national and local elections set by the
Constitution on the second Monday of May, 1992, are not sufficient, much less, valid
justification for postponing the local elections to the second Monday of November
1992, and in the process violating the Constitution itself. If, at all, Congress can
devise ways and means, within the parameters of the Constitution, to eliminate or
at least minimize these problems and if this, still, is not feasible, resort can be made
to the self-correcting mechanism built in the Constitution for its amendment or
revision.
On the other hand, the SolGen, counsel for COMELEC, prays for the denial of this
petition arguing that the question is political in nature and that the petitioners lack
legal standing to file the petition and what they are asking for is an advisory opinion
from the court, there being no justiciable controversy to resolve. On the merits, the
SolGen contends that Republic Act 7056 is a valid exercise of legislative power by
Congress and that the regular amending process prescribed by the Constitution
does not apply to its transitory provisions.
PROCEDURAL ISSUE: WON the Court has competence to take cognizance of the
instant petition?
HELD: Yes.
What is involved here is the legality, not the wisdom of RA 7056. Hence, contrary to
SolGens contention, the issue in this case is justiciable rather than political. And
even if the question were political in nature, it would still come within the Courts
power considering the expanded jurisdiction conferred by Article VIII, Section 1 of
the 1987 Constitution, which includes the authority to determine whether grave
abuse of discretion amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction has been committed
by any branch or instrumentality of the government. Regarding the challenge to the
petitioners standing, the Supreme Court held that even if the petitioners have no
legal standing, the Court has the power to brush aside technicalities considered the
transcendental importance of the issue being raised herein.
MAIN ISSUE: WON RA 7056 is unconstitutional?
HELD: Yes. It is unconstitutional.
The Supreme Court held that the law contravenes Article XVIII, Sections 2 and 5 of
the 1987 Constitution which provides for the synchronization of national and local
elections. The said law, on the other hand, provides for the de-synchronization of
election by mandating that there be two separate elections in 1992. The term of
synchronization in the mentioned constitutional provision was used synonymously
as the phrase holding simultaneously since this is the precise intent in terminating
their Office Tenure on the same day or occasion. This common termination date will
synchronize future elections to once every three years.
R.A. No. 7056 also violated Sec. 2, Art. XVIII of the 1987 Constitution which provides
that the local official first elected under the Constitution shall serve until noon of
June 30, 1992. But under Sec. 3 of RA 7056, these incumbent local officials shall
hold over beyond June 30, 1992 and shall serve until their successors shall have
been duly elected and qualified. The Supreme Court, quoting Corpus Juris
Secundum, states that it is not competent for the legislature to extend the term of
officers by providing that they shall hold over until their successors are elected and
qualified where the constitution has in effect or by clear implication prescribed the
term and when the Constitution fixes the day on which the official term shall begin,
there is no legislative authority to continue the office beyond that period, even
though the successors fail to qualify within the time.
R.A. No. 7056 also violated the clear mandate of Sec. 8, Art. X of 1987 Constitution
which fixed the term of office of all elective local officials, except barangay officials,
to three (3) years. If the local election will be held on the second Monday of
November 1992 under RA 7056, those to be elected will be serving for only two
years and seven months, that is, from November 30, 1992 to June 30, 1995, not
three years.
The law was also held violative of Sec. 9, Article IX of the Constitution by changing
the campaign period. RA 7056 provides for a different campaign period, as follows:
a) For President arid Vice-Presidential elections one hundred thirty (130) days before
the day of election.
b) For Senatorial elections, ninety (90) days before the day of the election, and
c) For the election of Members of the House of Representatives and local elective
provincial, city and municipal officials forty-five (45) days before the day of the
elections.
ENRILE V SENATE ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL
Facts: On January 20, 1995, Sen. Aquilino Pimentel filed with the Senate Electoral Tribunal (SET) an
election protest against Sen. Juan Ponce Enrile and other senatorial candidates who won in the May
1995 senatorial elections.
On June 30, 1995, the petitioner, Sen. Enrile, filed his answer in counter-protest. Issues having joined,
the SET required the parties to submit the list of pilot precincts number not more than 25% of the
total precints involved.
On Aug. 21, 1997, SET held a press conference at the Supreme Court Session Hall announcing the
partial and tentative results of the revision of ballots in the pilot precincts without resolving the
protest. In the tabulation presented, the petitioners name dropped to the 15 th position in the
senatorial race.
On September 24, 1997, petitioner filed a Motion to Set Aside Partial Results in Sen. Pimentels Protest
and to Conduct Another Appreciation of Ballots in the Presence of All Parties. Respondent and Sen.
Coseteng filed separate comments alleging petitioners motion is premature considering the SET has
not resolved respondents election protest.
Nevertheless, the SET denied petitioners motion holding no sufficient basis to discard the partial
tabulation. The SET also denied petitioners motion for reconsideration.
A petition for Certiorari assailed for having been issued with grave abuse of discretion the resolution
that denied petitioners Motion to Annul/Set Aside Partial Results in Pimentels Protest and to conduct
another Appreciation of Ballots in the Presence of All Parties.
Issue: Whether or not there is still useful purpose that can serve in passing upon merits of said
petition.
Held: The Court finds the petition becoming moot and academic. The tenure of the contested
senatorial position subject to respondents protest expired on June 30, 1998. The case became moot
considering there is no more actual controversy between the parties and has no useful purpose that
can serve in passing upon any merit.
Where issues have become moot and academic, justiciable controversies are lost, thereby rendering
the resolution of no practical use or value.
G.R. No. L-53622 April 25, 1980
JOVITO R. SALONGA, petitioner,
vs.
CAPTAIN ROLANDO HERMOSO, TRAVEL PROCESSING CENTER, and GENERAL FABIAN VER, respondents.
FERNANDO, C.J.:
This is not the first time petitioner Jovito R. Salonga came to this Tribunal by way of a mandamus proceeding to
compel the issuance to him of a certificate of eligibility to travel. In the first case, Salonga v. Madella, 1 the case
became moot and academic as the Office of the Solicitor General, in its answer to the petition, stated that the travel
eligibility certificate was not denied and, as a matter of fact, had been granted. Nonetheless, a brief separate opinion
was filed, concurring in the resolution, and worded thus: "Clearly this petition had assumed a moot and academic
character. Its dismissal is thus indicated. May I just add these few words as my response to the plea of petitioner in
his Manifestation and Reply dated October 28, 1978. This is how I would view the matter not only where petitioner is
concerned but in all other similar cases. Respondent Travel Processing Center should discharge its injunction
conformably to the mandate of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights on the right to travel. One of the highlights
of the keynote address of President Marcos in the Manila World Law Conference in celebration of the World Peace
Through Law Day on August 21, 1977 was the lifting of 'the ban on international travel.' There should be fidelity to
such a pronouncement. It is the experience of the undersigned in his lectures abroad the last few years, in the United
States as well as in Malaysia, Singapore and Australia, that respect accorded constitutional rights under the present
emergency regime had elicited the commendation of members of the bench, the bar, and the academe in foreign
lands. It is likewise worthy of notice that in his keynote address to the International Law Association, President
Marcos made reference to martial law being instituted in accordance with law and that the Constitution had been
applied in appropriate cases. As an agency of the executive branch, therefore, the Travel Processing Center should
ever be on its guard, lest the impression be created that such declarations amount, to paraphrase Justice Jackson, to
no more than munificent bequests in a pauper's will. Petitioner, to my mind, is justified, the more so in the light of the
Answer of Acting Solicitor General Vicente Mendoza, to an affirmative response to his prayer in his Manifestation and
Reply 'that under the circumstances mentioned in the Petition, Petitioner is entitled to travel abroad, and that it is in
recognition of this right that Respondents have issued his Certificate of Eligibility to Travel, as mentioned in the
Answer. 2
The present petition is likewise impressed with a moot and academic aspect. In the motion to dismiss of the Solicitor
General dated April 21, 1980, it was stated that the certificate of eligibility to travel had been granted petitioner. A
xeroxed copy was enclosed. A resolution for dismissal is, therefore, in order.
From the docket of this Court, it appears that other petitions of this character had been filed in the past, namely,
Santos v. The Special Committee on Travel Abroad, 3 Pimentel v. Travel Processing Center, 4 and Gonzales v.
Special Committee on Travel. 5 In the aforesaid cases, as in this and the earlier Salonga petition, there was no
occasion to pass on the merits of the controversy as the certificates of eligibility to travel were granted. The necessity
for any ruling was thus obviated. Nonetheless, in view of the likelihood that in the future this Court may be faced
again with a situation like the present which takes up its time and energy needlessly, it is desirable that respondent
Travel Processing Center should exercise the utmost care to avoid the impression that certain citizens desirous of
exercising their constitutional right to travel could be subjected to inconvenience or annoyance. In the address of
President and Prime Minister Ferdinand E. Marcos before the American Newspaper Publishers Association last
Tuesday April 22, 1980, emphasized anew the respect accorded constitutional rights The freedom to travel is
certainly one of the most cherished. He cited with approval the ringing affirmation of Willoughby, who, as he noted
was "partial to the claims of liberty." 6 Burdick 7 and Willis, 8 both of whom were equally convinced that there be no
erosion to human rights even in times of martial law, likewise received from President Marcos the accolade of his
approval. It would appear, therefore, that in case of doubt of the Officer-in-Charge of the Travel Processing Center,
the view of General Fabian Ver should immediately be sought. It goes without saying that the petition for such
certificate of eligibility to travel be filed at the earliest opportunity to facilitate the granting thereof and preclude any
disclaimer as to the person desiring to travel being in any way responsible for any delay.
WHEREFORE, the petition is dismissed for being moot and academic.
FACTS: During the time of Martial Law, Jovito Salonga filed a case for mandamus against Rolando Hermoso of the
Travel Processing Center to compel the latter to issue a certificate of eligibility to travel in favor of Salonga.
ISSUE: Whether or not the right to travel may be prohibited during martial law.
HELD: No. This issue became moot and academic because it appears that Hermoso did issue and did not deny
Salongas request for a certificate of eligibility to travel.
The issuance of the certificate was in pursuant to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights on the Right to Travel.
The Philippines, even though it is under martial law, shall in no instance facilitate the erosion of human rights. The
Travel Processing Center should exercise the utmost care to avoid the impression that certain citizens desirous of
exercising their constitutional right to travel could be subjected to inconvenience or annoyance this is to avoid such
similar cases to face the Court which needlessly expire the Courts effort and time.
SALONGA vs PAO
G.R. No. L-59524 February 18, 1985
Facts: The petitioner invokes the constitutionally protected right to life and liberty guaranteed by the due process
clause, alleging that no prima facie case has been established to warrant the filing of an information for subversion
against him. Petitioner asks the Court to prohibit and prevent the respondents from using the iron arm of the law to
harass, oppress, and persecute him, a member of the democratic opposition in the Philippines.
The case roots backs to the rash of bombings which occurred in the Metro Manila area in the months of August,
September and October of 1980. Victor Burns Lovely, Jr, one of the victims of the bombing, implicated petitioner
Salonga as one of those responsible.
On December 10, 1980, the Judge Advocate General sent the petitioner a Notice of Preliminary Investigation
in People v. Benigno Aquino, Jr., et al. (which included petitioner as a co-accused), stating that the preliminary
investigation of the above-entitled case has been set at 2:30 oclock p.m. on December 12, 1980 and that petitioner
was given ten (10) days from receipt of the charge sheet and the supporting evidence within which to file his counter-
evidence. The petitioner states that up to the time martial law was lifted on January 17, 1981, and despite assurance
to the contrary, he has not received any copies of the charges against him nor any copies of the so-called supporting
evidence.
The counsel for Salonga was furnished a copy of an amended complaint signed by Gen. Prospero Olivas, dated 12
March 1981, charging Salonga, along with 39 other accused with the violation of RA 1700, as amended by PD 885,
BP 31 and PD 1736. On 15 October 1981, the counsel for Salonga filed a motion to dismiss the charges against
Salonga for failure of the prosecution to establish a prima facie case against him. On 2 December 1981, Judge Ernani
Cruz Pano (Presiding Judge of the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Branch XVIII, Quezon City) denied the motion. On
4 January 1982, he (Pano) issued a resolution ordering the filing of an information for violation of the Revised Anti-
Subversion Act, as amended, against 40 people, including Salonga. The resolutions of the said judge dated 2
December 1981 and 4 January 1982 are the subject of the present petition for certiorari. It is the contention of
Salonga that no prima facie case has been established by the prosecution to justify the filing of an information against
him. He states that to sanction his further prosecution despite the lack of evidence against him would be to admit that
no rule of law exists in the Philippines today.
Issues: 1. Whether the above case still falls under an actual case
2. Whether the above case dropped by the lower court still deserves a decision from the Supreme Court
Held: 1. No. The Court had already deliberated on this case, a consensus on the Courts judgment had been
arrived at, and a draft ponencia was circulating for concurrences and separate opinions, if any, when on January 18,
1985, respondent Judge Rodolfo Ortiz granted the motion of respondent City Fiscal Sergio Apostol to drop the
subversion case against the petitioner. Pursuant to instructions of the Minister of Justice, the prosecution restudied its
evidence and decided to seek the exclusion of petitioner Jovito Salonga as one of the accused in the information filed
under the questioned resolution.
The court is constrained by this action of the prosecution and the respondent Judge to withdraw the draft ponencia
from circulating for concurrences and signatures and to place it once again in the Courts crowded agenda for further
deliberations.
Insofar as the absence of a prima facie case to warrant the filing of subversion charges is concerned, this decision
has been rendered moot and academic by the action of the prosecution.
2. Yes. Despite the SCs dismissal of the petition due to the cases moot and academic nature, it has on several
occasions rendered elaborate decisions in similar cases where mootness was clearly apparent.
The Court also has the duty to formulate guiding and controlling constitutional principles, precepts, doctrines, or rules.
It has the symbolic function of educating bench and bar on the extent of protection given by constitutional guarantees.
In dela Camara vs Enage (41 SCRA 1), the court ruled that:
The fact that the case is moot and academic should not preclude this Tribunal from setting forth in
language clear and unmistakable, the obligation of fidelity on the part of lower court judges to the
unequivocal command of the Constitution that excessive bail shall not be required.
In Gonzales v. Marcos (65 SCRA 624) whether or not the Cultural Center of the Philippines could validly be created
through an executive order was mooted by Presidential Decree No. 15, the Centers new charter pursuant to the
Presidents legislative powers under martial law. Nevertheless, the Court discussed the constitutional mandate on the
preservation and development of Filipino culture for national Identity. (Article XV, Section 9, Paragraph 2 of the
Constitution).
In the habeas corpus case of Aquino, Jr., v. Enrile, 59 SCRA 183), the fact that the petition was moot and academic
did not prevent this Court in the exercise of its symbolic function from promulgating one of the most voluminous
decisions ever printed in the Reports.
CHAVEZ v PEA
The Public Estates Authority (PEA) is the central implementing agency tasked to undertake reclamation projects
nationwide. It took over the leasing and selling functions of the DENR (Department of Environmental and Natural
Resources) insofar as reclaimed or about to be reclaimed foreshore lands are concerned.
PEA sought the transfer to the Amari Coastal Bay and Development Corporation, a private corporation, of the
ownership of 77.34 hectares of the Freedom Islands. PEA also sought to have 290.156 hectares of submerged areas
of Manila Bay to Amari.
ISSUE: Whether or not the transfer is valid.
HELD: No. To allow vast areas of reclaimed lands of the public domain to be transferred to Amari as private lands will
sanction a gross violation of the constitutional ban on private corporations from acquiring any kind of alienable land of
the public domain.
The Supreme Court affirmed that the 157.84 hectares of reclaimed lands comprising the Freedom Islands, now
covered by certificates of title in the name of PEA, are alienable lands of the public domain. The 592.15 hectares of
submerged areas of Manila Bay remain inalienable natural resources of the public domain. The transfer (as
embodied in a joint venture agreement) to AMARI, a private corporation, ownership of 77.34 hectares of the Freedom
Islands, is void for being contrary to Section 3, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution which prohibits private corporations
from acquiring any kind of alienable land of the public domain. Furthermore, since the Amended JVA also seeks to
transfer to Amari ownership of 290.156 hectares of still submerged areas of Manila Bay, such transfer is void for
being contrary to Section 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution which prohibits the alienation of natural resources
other than agricultural lands of the public domain.
OPOSA VS. FACTORAN Case Digest (G.R. No. 101083, July 30, 1993)
FACTS:
The plaintiffs in this case are all minors duly represented and joined by their parents. The first
complaint was filed as a taxpayer's class suit at the Branch 66 (Makati, Metro Manila), of the Regional
Trial Court, National capital Judicial Region against defendant (respondent) Secretary of the
Department of Environment and Natural Reasources (DENR). Plaintiffs alleged that they are entitled to
the full benefit, use and enjoyment of the natural resource treasure that is the country's virgin tropical
forests. They further asseverate that they represent their generation as well as generations yet unborn
and asserted that continued deforestation have caused a distortion and disturbance of the ecological
balance and have resulted in a host of environmental tragedies.
Plaintiffs prayed that judgement be rendered ordering the respondent, his agents, representatives and
other persons acting in his behalf to cancel all existing Timber License Agreement (TLA) in the country
and to cease and desist from receiving, accepting, processing, renewing or approving new TLAs.
Defendant, on the other hand, filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that the complaint had no cause
of action against him and that it raises a political question.
The RTC Judge sustained the motion to dismiss, further ruling that granting of the relief prayed for
would result in the impairment of contracts which is prohibited by the Constitution.
Plaintiffs (petitioners) thus filed the instant special civil action for certiorari and asked the court to
rescind and set aside the dismissal order on the ground that the respondent RTC Judge gravely abused
his discretion in dismissing the action.
ISSUES:
(1) Whether or not the plaintiffs have a cause of action.
(2) Whether or not the complaint raises a political issue.
(3) Whether or not the original prayer of the plaintiffs result in the impairment of contracts.
RULING:
First Issue: Cause of Action.
Respondents aver that the petitioners failed to allege in their complaint a specific legal right violated
by the respondent Secretary for which any relief is provided by law. The Court did not agree with this.
The complaint focuses on one fundamental legal right -- the right to a balanced and healthful ecology
which is incorporated in Section 16 Article II of the Constitution. The said right carries with it the duty
to refrain from impairing the environment and implies, among many other things, the judicious
management and conservation of the country's forests. Section 4 of E.O. 192 expressly mandates the
DENR to be the primary government agency responsible for the governing and supervising the
exploration, utilization, development and conservation of the country's natural resources. The policy
declaration of E.O. 192 is also substantially re-stated in Title XIV Book IV of the Administrative Code of
1987. Both E.O. 192 and Administrative Code of 1987 have set the objectives which will serve as the
bases for policy formation, and have defined the powers and functions of the DENR. Thus, right of the
petitioners (and all those they represent) to a balanced and healthful ecology is as clear as DENR's
duty to protect and advance the said right.
A denial or violation of that right by the other who has the correlative duty or obligation to respect or
protect or respect the same gives rise to a cause of action. Petitioners maintain that the granting of
the TLA, which they claim was done with grave abuse of discretion, violated their right to a balance
and healthful ecology. Hence, the full protection thereof requires that no further TLAs should be
renewed or granted.
After careful examination of the petitioners' complaint, the Court finds it to be adequate enough to
show, prima facie, the claimed violation of their rights.
Second Issue: Political Issue.
Second paragraph, Section 1 of Article VIII of the constitution provides for the expanded jurisdiction
vested upon the Supreme Court. It allows the Court to rule upon even on the wisdom of the decision of
the Executive and Legislature and to declare their acts as invalid for lack or excess of jurisdiction
because it is tainted with grave abuse of discretion.
Third Issue: Violation of the non-impairment clause.
The Court held that the Timber License Agreement is an instrument by which the state regulates the
utilization and disposition of forest resources to the end that public welfare is promoted. It is not a
contract within the purview of the due process clause thus, the non-impairment clause cannot be
invoked. It can be validly withdraw whenever dictated by public interest or public welfare as in this
case. The granting of license does not create irrevocable rights, neither is it property or property
rights.
Moreover, the constitutional guaranty of non-impairment of obligations of contract is limit by the
exercise by the police power of the State, in the interest of public health, safety, moral and general
welfare. In short, the non-impairment clause must yield to the police power of the State.
The instant petition, being impressed with merit, is hereby GRANTED and the RTC decision is SET
ASIDE.
AGAN VS PIATCO EN BANC
G.R. No. 155001. May 5, 2003 En Banc [Non-legislative power of Congress; Police Power; Delegation of
emergency powers]
FACTS:
On October 5, 1994, AEDC submitted an unsolicited proposal to the Government through the
DOTC/MIAA for the development of NAIA International Passenger Terminal III (NAIA IPT III).
DOTC constituted the Prequalification Bids and Awards Committee (PBAC) for the implementation of
the project and submitted with its endorsement proposal to the NEDA, which approved the project.
On June 7, 14, and 21, 1996, DOTC/MIAA caused the publication in two daily newspapers of an
invitation for competitive or comparative proposals on AEDCs unsolicited proposal, in accordance with
Sec. 4-A of RA 6957, as amended.
On September 20, 1996, the consortium composed of Peoples Air Cargo and Warehousing Co., Inc.
(Paircargo), Phil. Air and Grounds Services, Inc. (PAGS) and Security Bank Corp. (Security Bank)
(collectively, Paircargo Consortium) submitted their competitive proposal to the PBAC. PBAC awarded
the project to Paircargo Consortium. Because of that, it was incorporated into Philippine International
Airport Terminals Co., Inc.
AEDC subsequently protested the alleged undue preference given to PIATCO and reiterated its
objections as regards the prequalification of PIATCO.
On July 12, 1997, the Government and PIATCO signed the Concession Agreement for the Build-
Operate-and-Transfer Arrangement of the NAIA Passenger Terminal III (1997 Concession
Agreement). The Government granted PIATCO the franchise to operate and maintain the said terminal
during the concession period and to collect the fees, rentals and other charges in accordance with the
rates or schedules stipulated in the 1997 Concession Agreement. The Agreement provided that the
concession period shall be for twenty-five (25) years commencing from the in-service date, and may
be renewed at the option of the Government for a period not exceeding twenty-five (25) years. At the
end of the concession period, PIATCO shall transfer the development facility to MIAA.
Meanwhile, the MIAA which is charged with the maintenance and operation of the NAIA Terminals I and
II, had existing concession contracts with various service providers to offer international airline airport
services, such as in-flight catering, passenger handling, ramp and ground support, aircraft
maintenance and provisions, cargo handling and warehousing, and other services, to several
international airlines at the NAIA.
On September 17, 2002, the workers of the international airline service providers, claiming that they
would lose their job upon the implementation of the questioned agreements, filed a petition for
prohibition. Several employees of MIAA likewise filed a petition assailing the legality of the various
agreements.
During the pendency of the cases, PGMA, on her speech, stated that she will not honor (PIATCO)
contracts which the Executive Branchs legal offices have concluded (as) null and void.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the State can temporarily take over a business affected with public interest.
RULING:
Yes. PIATCO cannot, by mere contractual stipulation, contravene the Constitutional
provision on temporary government takeover and obligate the government to pay
reasonable cost for the use of the Terminal and/or Terminal Complex.
Article XII, Section 17 of the 1987 Constitution provides:
Section 17. In times of national emergency, when the public interest so requires, the State may, during
the emergency and under reasonable terms prescribed by it, temporarily take over or direct the
operation of any privately owned public utility or business affected with public interest.
The above provision pertains to the right of the State in times of national emergency, and in the
exercise of its police power, to temporarily take over the operation of any business affected with public
interest. The duration of the emergency itself is the determining factor as to how long the temporary
takeover by the government would last. The temporary takeover by the government extends only to
the operation of the business and not to the ownership thereof. As such the government is not
required to compensate the private entity-owner of the said business as there is no
transfer of ownership, whether permanent or temporary. The private entity-owner affected by the
temporary takeover cannot, likewise, claim just compensation for the use of the said business and its
properties as the temporary takeover by the government is in exercise of its police power and not of its
power of eminent domain.
Article XII, section 17 of the 1987 Constitution envisions a situation wherein the exigencies of the times
necessitate the government to temporarily take over or direct the operation of any privately owned
public utility or business affected with public interest. It is the welfare and interest of the public which
is the paramount consideration in determining whether or not to temporarily take over a particular
business. Clearly, the State in effecting the temporary takeover is exercising its police power. Police
power is the most essential, insistent, and illimitable of powers. Its exercise therefore must not be
unreasonably hampered nor its exercise be a source of obligation by the government in the absence of
damage due to arbitrariness of its exercise. Thus, requiring the government to pay reasonable
compensation for the reasonable use of the property pursuant to the operation of the business
contravenes the Constitution.
OPLE v TORRES
Facts: Administrative Order No 308, otherwise known as Adoption of a National Computerized
Identification Reference System was issued by President Fidel Ramos on 12 December 1996. Senator
Blas Ople filed a petition to invalidate the said order for violating the right to privacy. He contends that
the order must be invalidated on two constitutional grounds, (1) that it is a usurpation of the power to
legislate; and (2) that it intrudes the citizens right to privacy.
Issue: Whether or not Senator Ople has standing to maintain suit?
Decision: Petitioner, Senator Ople is a distinguished member of the Senate. As a Senator, petitioner is
possessed of the requisite standing to bring suit raising the issue that the issue of Administrative
Order No 308 is a usurpation of legislative power. Oples concern that the Executive branch not to
trespass on the lawmaking domain of Congress is understandable. The blurring demarcation line
between the power of legislature to make laws and the power of executive to execute laws will disturb
their delicate balance and cannot be allowed.
TATAD v SECRETARY OF ENERGY
Considering that oil is not endemic to this country, history shows that the government has always been finding ways
to alleviate the oil industry. The government created laws accommodate these innovations in the oil industry. One
such law is the Downstream Oil Deregulation Act of 1996 or RA 8180. This law allows that any person or entity may
import or purchase any quantity of crude oil and petroleum products from a foreign or domestic source, lease or own
and operate refineries and other downstream oil facilities and market such crude oil or use the same for his own
requirement, subject only to monitoring by the Department of Energy. Tatad assails the constitutionality of the law.
He claims, among others, that the imposition of different tariff rates on imported crude oil and imported refined
petroleum products violates the equal protection clause. Tatad contends that the 3%-7% tariff differential unduly
favors the three existing oil refineries and discriminates against prospective investors in the downstream oil industry
who do not have their own refineries and will have to source refined petroleum products from abroad.3% is to be
taxed on unrefined crude products and 7% on refined crude products.
ISSUE: Whether or not RA 8180 is constitutional.
HELD: The SC declared the unconstitutionality of RA 8180 because it violated Sec 19 of Art 12 of the Constitution. It
violated that provision because it only strengthens oligopoly which is contrary to free competition. It cannot be denied
that our downstream oil industry is operated and controlled by an oligopoly, a foreign oligopoly at that. Petron, Shell
and Caltex stand as the only major league players in the oil market. All other players belong to the lilliputian league.
As the dominant players, Petron, Shell and Caltex boast of existing refineries of various capacities. The tariff
differential of 4% therefore works to their immense benefit. Yet, this is only one edge of the tariff differential. The other
edge cuts and cuts deep in the heart of their competitors. It erects a high barrier to the entry of new players. New
players that intend to equalize the market power of Petron, Shell and Caltex by building refineries of their own will
have to spend billions of pesos. Those who will not build refineries but compete with them will suffer the huge
disadvantage of increasing their product cost by 4%. They will be competing on an uneven field. The argument that
the 4% tariff differential is desirable because it will induce prospective players to invest in refineries puts the cart
before the horse. The first need is to attract new players and they cannot be attracted by burdening them with heavy
disincentives. Without new players belonging to the league of Petron, Shell and Caltex, competition in our
downstream oil industry is an idle dream.
RA 8180 is unconstitutional on the ground inter alia that it discriminated against the new players insofar as it placed
them at a competitive disadvantage vis--vis the established oil companies by requiring them to meet certain
conditions already being observed by the latter.
BIRAOGO VS PTC
FACT:
E.O No. 1 establishing the Philippine Truth Commission (PTC) of 2010 was signed by President Aquino.
The said PTC is a mere branch formed under the Office of the President tasked to investigate reports of
graft and corruption committed by third-level public officers and employees, their co-principals,
accomplices and accessories during the previous administration and submit their findings
and recommendations to the President, Congress and the Ombudsman. However, PTC is not a quasi-
judicial body, it cannot adjudicate, arbitrate, resolve, settle or render awards in disputes between
parties. Its job is to investigate, collect and asses evidences gathered and make recommendations. It
has subpoena powers but it has no power to cite people in contempt or even arrest. It cannot
determine for such facts if probable cause exist as to warrant the filing of an information in our courts
of law.
Petitioners contends the Constitutionality of the E.O. on the grounds that.
It violates separation of powers as it arrogates the power of Congress to create a public office and
appropriate funds for its operation;
The provisions of Book III, Chapter 10, Section 31 of the Administrative Code of 1987 cannot legitimize
E.O. No. 1 because the delegated authority of the President to structurally reorganize the Office of the
President to achieve economy, simplicity, and efficiency does not include the power to create an
entirely new office was inexistent like the Truth Commission;
The E.O illegally amended the Constitution when it made the Truth Commission and vesting it the
power duplicating and even exceeding those of the Office of the Ombudsman and the DOJ.
It violates the equal protection clause.
ISSUE:
WHETHER OR NOT the said E.O is unconstitutional.
RULING:
Yes, E.O No. 1 should be struck down as it is violative of the equal protection clause. The Chief
Executives power to create the Ad hoc Investigating Committee cannot be doubted. Having been
constitutionally granted full control of the Executive Department, to which respondents belong, the
President has the obligation to ensure that all executive officials and employees faithfully comply with
the law. With AO 298 as mandate, the legality of the investigation is sustained. Such validity is not
affected by the fact that the investigating team and the PCAGC had the same composition, or that the
former used the offices and facilities of the latter in conducting the inquiry.
CREBA v ERC and COMELEC
MACALINTAL v COMELEC
Romulo Macalintal, as a lawyer and a taxpayer, questions the validity of the Overseas Absentee Voting Act of 2003
(R.A. 9189). He questions the validity of the said act on the following grounds, among others:
1. That the provision that a Filipino already considered an immigrant abroad can be allowed to participate in
absentee voting provided he executes an affidavit stating his intent to return to the Philippines is void because it
dispenses of the requirement that a voter must be a resident of the Philippines for at least one year and in the place
where he intends to vote for at least 6 months immediately preceding the election;
2. That the provision allowing the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) to proclaim winning candidates
insofar as it affects the canvass of votes and proclamation of winning candidates for president and vice-president, is
unconstitutional because it violates the Constitution for it is Congress which is empowered to do so.
ISSUE: Whether or not Macalintals arguments are correct.
HELD: No.
1. There can be no absentee voting if the absentee voters are required to physically reside in the Philippines
within the period required for non-absentee voters. Further, as understood in election laws, domicile and resident are
interchangeably used. Hence, one is a resident of his domicile (insofar as election laws is concerned). The domicile is
the place where one has the intention to return to. Thus, an immigrant who executes an affidavit stating his intent to
return to the Philippines is considered a resident of the Philippines for purposes of being qualified as a voter
(absentee voter to be exact). If the immigrant does not execute the affidavit then he is not qualified as an absentee
voter.
2. The said provision should be harmonized. It could not be the intention of Congress to allow COMELEC to
include the proclamation of the winners in the vice-presidential and presidential race. To interpret it that way would
mean that Congress allowed COMELEC to usurp its power. The canvassing and proclamation of the presidential and
vice presidential elections is still lodged in Congress and was in no way transferred to the COMELEC by virtue of RA
9189.
GUANZON v DE VILLA
TELEBAP vs COMELEC Case Digest
Telecommunications And Broadcast Attorneys Of The Phils. Vs. COMELEC
289 SCRA 337
G.R. No. 132922
April 21, 1998
Facts: Petitioner Telecommunications and Broadcast Attorneys of the Philippines, Inc. (TELEBAP) is an organization
of lawyers of radio and television broadcasting companies. It was declared to be without legal standing to sue in this
case as, among other reasons, it was not able to show that it was to suffer from actual or threatened injury as a result
of the subject law. Petitioner GMA Network, on the other hand, had the requisite standing to bring the constitutional
challenge. Petitioner operates radio and television broadcast stations in the Philippinesaffected by the enforcement
of Section 92, B.P. No. 881.
Petitioners challenge the validity of Section 92, B.P. No. 881 which provides:
Comelec Time- The Commission shall procure radio and television time to be known as the Comelec Time which
shall be allocated equally and impartially among the candidates within the area of coverage of all radio and television
stations. For this purpose, the franchise of all radio broadcasting and television stations are hereby amended so as
to provide radio or television time, free of charge, during the period of campaign.
Petitioner contends that while Section 90 of the same law requires COMELEC to procure print space in newspapers
and magazines with payment, Section 92 provides that air time shall be procured by COMELEC free of charge. Thus
it contends that Section 92 singles out radio and television stations to provide free air time.
Petitioner claims that it suffered losses running to several million pesos in providing COMELEC Time in connection
with the 1992 presidential election and 1995 senatorial election and that it stands to suffer even more should it be
required to do so again this year. Petitioners claim that the primary source of revenue of the radio and television
stations is the sale of air time to advertisers and to require these stations to provide free air time is to authorize unjust
taking of private property. According to petitioners, in 1992 it lost P22,498,560.00 in providing free air time for one
hour each day and, in this years elections, it stands to lost P58,980,850.00 in view of COMELECs requirement that it
provide at least 30 minutes of prime time daily for such.
Issue:
Whether of not Section 92 of B.P. No. 881 denies radio and television broadcast companies the equal protection of
the laws.
Whether or not Section 92 of B.P. No. 881 constitutes taking of property without due process of law and without just
compensation.
Held: Petitioners argument is without merit. All broadcasting, whether radio or by television stations, is licensed by
the government. Airwave frequencies have to be allocated as there are more individuals who want to broadcast that
there are frequencies to assign. Radio and television broadcasting companies, which are given franchises, do not
own the airwaves and frequencies through which they transmit broadcast signals and images. They are merely given
the temporary privilege to use them. Thus, such exercise of the privilege may reasonably be burdened with the
performance by the grantee of some form of public service. In granting the privilege to operate broadcast stations and
supervising radio and television stations, the state spends considerable public funds in licensing and supervising
them.
The argument that the subject law singles out radio and television stations to provide free air time as against
newspapers and magazines which require payment of just compensation for the print space they may provide is
likewise without merit. Regulation of the broadcast industry requires spending of public funds which it does not do in
the case of print media. To require the broadcast industry to provide free air time for COMELEC is a fair exchange
for what the industry gets.
As radio and television broadcast stations do not own the airwaves, no private property is taken by the requirement
that they provide air time to the COMELEC.
UMALI VS. GUINGONA [305 SCRA 533; G.R. No. 131124; 21 Mar 1999]
Facts: Osmundo Umali the petitioner was appointed Regional Director of the Bureau of Internal
Revenue by Pres Fidel V. Ramos. He assigned him in Manila, November 29, 1993 to March 15, 1994
and Makati, March 16, 1994 to August 4, 1994. On August 1, 1994, President Ramos received a
confidential memorandum against the petitioner for alleged violations of internal revenue laws, rules
and regulations during his incumbency as Regional Director, more particularly the following
malfeasance, misfeasance and nonfeasance. upon receipt of the said confidential memorandum,
former President authorized the issuance of an Order for the preventive suspension of the petitioner
and immediately referred the Complaint against the latter to the Presidential Commission on Anti-
Graft and Corruption (PCAGC), for investigation. Petitioner was duly informed of the charges against
him. And was directed him to send in his answer, copies of his Statement of Assets, and Liabilities for
the past three years (3), and Personal Data Sheet. Initial hearing was set on August 25, 1994, at 2:00
p.m., at the PCAGC Office. On August 23, the petitioner filed his required answer. After evaluating the
evidence on record, the PCAGC issued its Resolution of September 23, 1994, finding a prima facie
evidence to support six (6) of the twelve (12) charges against petitioner. On October 6, 1994, acting
upon the recommendation of the PCAGC, then President Ramos issued Administrative Order No. 152
dismissing petitioner from the service, with forfeiture of retirement and all benefits under the law.
Issues:
(1) Whether or Not AO No. 152 violated petitioner's Right to Security of Tenure.
(2) Whether or Not Petitioner was denied due process of law
(3) Whether or Not the PCAGC is a validly Constituted government agency and whether the petitioner
can raise the issue of constitutionality belatedly in its motion for reconsideration of the trial courts
decision.
(4) Whether or Not the ombudsman's resolution dismissing the charges against the petitioner is still
basis for the petitioner's dismissal with forfeiture of benefits as ruled in AO No. 152
Held: Petitioner maintains that as a career executive service officer, he can only be removed for cause
and under the Administrative Code of 1987, 6 loss of confidence is not one of the legal causes or
grounds for removal. Consequently, his dismissal from office on the ground of loss confidenceviolated
his right to security of tenure, petitioner theorized. After a careful study, we are of the
irresistible conclusion that the Court of Appeals ruledcorrectly on the first three Issue. To be sure,
petitioner was not denied the right to due process before the PCAGC. Records show that the petitioner
filed his answer and other pleadings with respect to his alleged violation of internal revenue laws and
regulations, and he attended the hearings before the investigatory body. It is thus decisively clear that
his protestation of non-observance of due process is devoid of any factual or legal basis. Neither can it
be said that there was a violation of what petitioner asserts as his security of tenure. According to
petitioner, as a Regional Director of Bureau of Internal Revenue, he is CESO eligible entitled to security
of tenure. However, petitioner's claim of CESO eligibility is anemic of evidentiary support. It was
incumbent upon him to prove that he is a CESO eligible but unfortunately, he failed to adduce
sufficient evidence on the matter. His failure to do so is fatal. As regards the issue of constitutionality
of the PCAGC, it was only posed by petitioner in his motion for reconsideration before the Regional
Trial Court of Makati. It was certainly too late to raise for the first time at such late stage of the
proceedings. As to last issue, It is worthy to note that in the case under consideration, the
administrative action against the petitioner was taken prior to the institution of the criminal case. The
charges included in Administrative Order No. 152 were based on the results of investigation conducted
by the PCAGC and not on the criminal charges before the Ombudsman. In sum, the petition is
dismissable on the ground that the Issue posited by the petitioner do not constitute a valid legal basis
for overturning the finding and conclusionarrived at by the Court of Appeals. However, taking into
account the antecedent facts and circumstances aforementioned, the Court, in the exercise of its
equity powers, has decided to consider the dismissal of the charges against petitioner before the
Ombudsman, the succinct and unmistakable manifestation by the Commissioner of the Bureau of
Internal Revenue that his office is no longer interested in pursuing the case, and the position taken by
the Solicitor General, that there is no more basis for Administrative Order No. 152, as effective and
substantive supervening events that cannot be overlooked.
G.R. No. 191618: November 23, 2010
ATTY. ROMULO B. MACALINTAL, Petitioner, v. PRESIDENTIAL ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL, Respondent.
Nachura, J.:
FACTS:
Atty. Romulo Macalintal questions the constitutionality of the Presidential Electoral Tribunal(PET) as an illegal and
unauthorized progeny of Section 4,Article VII of the Constitution.
ISSUES:
Whether the creation of the Presidential Electoral Tribunal is unconstitutional for being a violation of paragraph 7,
Section 4 of Article VII of the 1987 Constitution
Whether the designation of members of the supreme court as members of the presidential electoral tribunal is
unconstitutional for being a violation of Section 12, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution
HELD:
Constitutional Law
First Issue:
Petitioner, a prominent election lawyer who has filed several cases before this Court involving constitutional and
election law issues, including, among others, the constitutionality of certain provisions of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9189
(The Overseas Absentee Voting Act of 2003),cannot claim ignorance of: (1) the invocation of our jurisdiction under
Section 4, Article VII of the Constitution; and (2) the unanimous holding thereon. Unquestionably, theoverarching
frameworkaffirmed inTecson v. Commission on Electionsis that the Supreme Court has original jurisdiction to decide
presidential and vice-presidential election protests while concurrentlyacting as an independent Electoral Tribunal.
Verba legisdictates that wherever possible, the words used in the Constitution must be given their ordinary meaning
except where technical terms are employed, in which case the significance thus attached to them prevails. However,
where there is ambiguity or doubt, the words of the Constitution should be interpreted in accordance with the intent of
its framers orratio legis et anima. A doubtful provision must be examined in light of the history of the times, and the
condition and circumstances surrounding the framing of the Constitution. Last,ut magis valeat quam pereat the
Constitution is to be interpreted as a whole.
By the same token, the PET is not a separate and distinct entity from the Supreme Court, albeit it has functions
peculiar only to the Tribunal. It is obvious that the PET was constituted in implementation of Section 4, Article VII of
the Constitution, and it faithfully complies not unlawfully defies the constitutional directive. The adoption of a separate
seal, as well as the change in the nomenclature of the Chief Justice and the Associate Justices into Chairman and
Members of the Tribunal, respectively, was designed simply to highlight the singularity and exclusivity of the Tribunals
functions as a special electoral court. the PET, as intended by the framers of the Constitution, is to be an
institutionindependent,but not separate, from the judicial department,i.e., the Supreme Court.
Second Issue:
It is also beyond cavil that when the Supreme Court, as PET, resolves a presidential or vice-presidential election
contest, it performs what is essentially a judicial power. In the landmark case ofAngara v. Electoral
Commission,Justice Jose P. Laurel enucleated that "it would be inconceivable if the Constitution had not provided for
a mechanism by which to direct the course of government along constitutional channels." In fact,Angarapointed out
that "[t]he Constitution is a definition of the powers of government." And yet, at that time, the 1935 Constitution did not
contain the expanded definition of judicial power found in Article VIII, Section 1, paragraph 2 of the present
Constitution.
DENIED
SERRANO VS. GALLANT MARITIME SERVICES, INC.
FACTS:
Petitioner Antonio Serrano was hired by respondents Gallant Maritime Services, Inc. and Marlow
Navigation Co., Inc., under a POEA-approved contract of employment for 12 months, as Chief Officer,
with the basic monthly salary of US$1,400, plus $700/month overtime pay, and 7 days paid vacation
leave per month.
On the date of his departure, Serrano was constrained to accept a downgraded employment contract
upon the assurance and representation of respondents that he would be Chief Officer by the end of
April 1998.
Respondents did not deliver on their promise to make Serrano Chief Officer.
Hence, Serrano refused to stay on as second Officer and was repatriated to the Philippines, serving
only two months and 7 days, leaving an unexpired portion of nine months and twenty-three days.
Upon complaint filed by Serrano before the Labor Arbiter (LA), the dismissal was declared illegal.
On appeal, the NLRC modified the LA decision based on the provision of RA 8042.
Serrano filed a Motion for Partial Reconsideration, but this time he questioned the constitutionality of
the last clause in the 5th paragraph of Section 10 of RA 8042.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the subject clause violates Section 10, Article III of the Constitution on non-
impairment of contracts;
2. Whether or not the subject clause violate Section 1, Article III of the Constitution, and Section 18,
Article II and Section 3, Article XIII on labor as a protected sector.
HELD:
On the first issue.
The answer is in the negative. Petitioners claim that the subject clause unduly interferes with the
stipulations in his contract on the term of his employment and the fixed salary package he will receive
is not tenable.
The subject clause may not be declared unconstitutional on the ground that it impinges on the
impairment clause, for the law was enacted in the exercise of the police power of the State to regulate
a business, profession or calling, particularly the recruitment and deployment of OFWs, with the noble
end in view of ensuring respect for the dignity and well-being of OFWs wherever they may be
employed.
On the second issue.
The answer is in the affirmative.
To Filipino workers, the rights guaranteed under the foregoing constitutional provisions translate to
economic security and parity.
Upon cursory reading, the subject clause appears facially neutral, for it applies to all OFWs. However, a
closer examination reveals that the subject clause has a discriminatory intent against, and an invidious
impact on, OFWs at two levels:
First, OFWs with employment contracts of less than one year vis--vis OFWs with employment
contracts of one year or more;
Second, among OFWs with employment contracts of more than one year; and
Third, OFWs vis--vis local workers with fixed-period employment;
The subject clause singles out one classification of OFWs and burdens it with a peculiar disadvantage.
Thus, the subject clause in the 5th paragraph of Section 10 of R.A. No. 8042 is violative of the right of
petitioner and other OFWs to equal protection.
The subject clause or for three months for every year of the unexpired term, whichever is less in the
5th paragraph of Section 10 of Republic Act No. 8042 is DECLARED UNCONSTITUTIONAL.
Zandueta v. Dela Costa
FACTS
Prior to the promulgation of Commonwealth Act No.145, the petitioner, the Honorable Francisco Zandueta was
discharging the office of judge of first instance, Ninth Judicial District, comprising solely the City of Manila, and was
presiding over the Fifth Branch of the Court of First Instance of said city, by virtue of an ad interim appointment issued
by the President of the Philippines in his favor on June 2, 1936, and confirmed by the Commission on Appointments
of the National Assembly-On November 7, 1936, the date on which Commonwealth Act No. 145, otherwise known as
the Judicial Reorganization Law, took effect, the petitioner received from the President of the Commonwealth a new
ad interim appointment as judge of first instance, this time of the Fourth Judicial District, with authority to preside over
the Courts of First Instance of Manila and Palawan-The National Assembly adjourned without its Commission on
Appointments having acted on said ad interimappointment-Another ad interim appointment to the same office was
issued in favor of said petitioner, pursuant to which he took a new oath-After his appointment and qualification as
judge of first instance of the Fourth Judicial District, the petitioner, acting as executive judge, performed several
executive acts-On May 19, 1938, the Commission on Appointments of the National Assembly disapproved the
aforesaid ad interim appointment of said petitioner-On August 1, 1938, the President of the Philippines appointed the
herein respondent, Honorable Sixto de la Costa, judge of first instance of the Fourth Judicial District, with authority to
preside over the Fifth Branch of the Court of First Instance of Manila and the Court of First Instance of Palawan, and
his appointment was approved by the Commission on Appointments
ISSUE
WON the petitioner may question the validity of Commonwealth Act No. 145 to entitle him to repossess the office
occupied by him prior to the appointment issued in his favor by virtue of the assailed statute
HELD
When a judge of first instance, presiding over a branch of a Court of First Instance of a judicial district by virtue of a
legal and valid appointment, accepts another appointment to preside over the same branch of the same Court of First
Instance, in addition to another court of the same category, both of which belong to a new judicial district formed by
the addition of another Court of First Instance to the old one, enters into the discharge of the functions of his new
office and receives the corresponding salary, he abandons his old office and cannot claim to repossess it or question
the constitutionality of the law by virtue of which his new appointment has been issued.
The rule of equity, sanctioned by jurisprudence, is that when a public official voluntarily accepts an appointment to an
office newly created or reorganized by law, which new office is incompatible with the one formerly occupied by him
, qualifies for the discharge of the functions thereof by taking the necessary oath, and enters into the performance
of his duties by executing acts inherent in said newly created or reorganized office and receiving the corresponding
salary, he will be considered to have abandoned the office he was occupying by virtue of his former appointment
(46Corpus Juris, 947, sec. 55), and he cannot question the constitutionality of the law by virtue of which he was last
appointed (11 American Jurisprudence, 166, par. 121;id., 767, par. 123). He is excepted from said rule only when his
non-acceptance of the new appointment may affect public interest or when he is compelled to accept it by reason of
legal exigencies. In the case under consideration, the petitioner was free to accept or not the ad interim appointment
issued by the President of the Commonwealth in his favor, in accordance with said Commonwealth Act No. 145. If the
petitioner believed that Commonwealth Act No.145 is unconstitutional, he should have refused to accept the
appointment offered him or, at least, he should have accepted it with reservation, had he believed that his duty of
obedience to the laws compelled him to do so, and afterwards resort to the power entrusted with the final
determination of the question whether a law is unconstitutional or not.-The petitioner, being aware of his constitutional
and legal rights and obligations, by implied order of the law(art. 2, Civil Code), accepted the office and entered into
the performance of the duties inherent therein, after taking the necessary oath, thereby acting with full knowledge that
if he voluntarily accepted the office to which he was appointed, he would later be stopped from questioning the
validity of said appointment by alleging that the law, by virtue of which his appointment was issued, is
unconstitutional. The petition for quo warranto instituted is denied and the same is dismissed with costs to the
petitioner.
TARROSA V SINGSON
Gabriel Singson was appointed as the Governor of the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas by then president Fidel Ramos.
Jesus Armando Tarrosa, as a taxpayer, opposed the said appointment and he argued that Singson cannot perform
such position without confirmation by the Commission on Appointments. Tarrosa invoked Section 6 of Republic Act
No. 7653 which provides that the Governor of the BSP if appointed is subject to the confirmation of the COA.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Governor of the BSP is subject to COAs confirmation.
HELD: No. The Supreme Court ruled that Congress exceeded its legislative powers in requiring the confirmation by
the COA of the appointment of the Governor of the BSP. An appointment to the said position is not among the
appointments which have to be confirmed by the COA cited in Section 16 of Article 7 of the Constitution. Congress
cannot by law expand the confirmation powers of the Commission on Appointments and require confirmation of
appointment of other government officials not expressly mentioned in the first sentence of Section 16 of Article 7 of
the Constitution.
