A BUDDHIST MANUAL or Psychological Ethics. PRON Tne Pars DHAMMA-SANGANI€Pali Text Society Cranslation Heries F20. 41 A BUDDHIST MANUAL of PSYCHOLOGICAL ETHICS. Being a Translation, now made for the First Time, from the Original Pali, of the First Book in the Abksdhamma Pitaka entitled DHAMMA-SANGANI COMPENDIUM OF BTATES OR PHENOMENA Third Edition With Introductory Essay and Notes by CAROLINE A. ¥. RHYS DAVEDS, D.Lirr., M.A. Published by THE PALI TEXT SOCIETY OXFORD 1997Fist published 2), 1900 Second Edition. Se 1923 Third Edition 5 sa Reprinted . Se 197 ISBN 0 86013 062 2 UNESCO COLLECTION OF REPRESENTATIVE WORKS. This Buddhist text has been accepted in the series of transia- tions from the literature’of Burma, India, The Khmer Republic, Laos, Sri Lanka, and Thailand, jointly sponsored by the United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organisation (UNESC6),.and the National Commissions for Uriesco in these ‘ep ° countries. Alll Rights reserved. No part of this work may be reproduced or uansmitted in any form or by any means analogue, digital, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise or stored in any retrieval system of any nature without the written permission of the Pali Text Society Limited of 73 Lime Walk, Headington, Oxford, OX3 TAD, UK. © The Pali Text Society Limited 1997 Printed and bound in Great Britain by Antony Rowe Ltd, Chippenham, Wiltshire.| i I To EDWARD T. STURDY, cs WHOSE GENEROUS ASSISTANCE THE EDITION OF THE COMMENTARY HAG BEEN RENDERED ACCESSIBLE TO SCHOLARS, A TRANSLATION OF TUE TEXT TO READENS GENERALLY, THIS VOLUME IS DEDICATED WITH THE CORDIAL REGARD GF HIS FRIEND, THE TRANSLATOR.PREFACE TO THE THIRD EDITION The original edition of A Buddhist Manual of Paychological Ethice was published in 1900 by the Royal" Aaiatio Society as vol. XH in the Oriental Translation Fund, New Series. Before this dete neither Dhammasangani nor any of the other six Abhidbamma works hed been translated into English. The R.AS. therefore must command the respect and gratitude of everyone interested in this area of Pali canonical literature for ita pioneer venture in publishing Mrs Rhys Davids’s translation, end thus not only opening up a field at that time virtually un- troddea and unexplored by westerners, but also making more widely known both her name and her considerable powers. That this venture was well justified may be judged by the publication of 2 2nd edn. in 1923, also by the R.A.S., and of this 3rd edn, produced by the Pali Text Society with the gracious approval and esvent of the R.AS. . ‘The ind edn., slightly revised by Mrs Rhys Davids, was re-set in'a smaller type than thet used in the original edn. Consequently the pagination differed. It is hoped, however, that all inconsis- tenciesin the numbering of the page-references have now been removed. In addition, it must be stated that es this 3rd edn. isa photocopy of the 2nd it retsins its pagination except in one particular now to be explained : Between 1900 and 1923 Mrs Rhys Davids came to realize that the 2nd edn. must begin “ as the Ist edn. should have begun, with the real beginning of the Abhidhamma-Pitaka, i.e. with the Matika or Table of Contents” (2nd edn. p. ix). Unfortu- nately, however, though this integral part of Dhammasangeni was included in the 2nd edn., it was paginated in roman figures (p. ev-exiii) thus running on from the end of the Introductory Essay as though it were part of that. In order to rectify this anomaly without re-paginating the 364 pages of translation and indexes that follow, we have ventured to call these Matika pages MI-M9. . Moreover, it has seemed advisable to replace Mrs Rhys Davids's Preface to the Second Edition by this brief! biographicalsketch of the book together with the few paragraphs that follow. She was always in favour of advance, not of standing still, and since the publication of the 2nd edn., just over 60 years ago, great strides have been made in Abhidharnma studies. To keep pace with these developments wo have decided to utilize the space at our disposal fors rather more precise and instructive anslysis of the significance of Dbammesaigani than could be presented half a century ago. J. B. Horner. London, 1973. In any consideration of Abhidhamma studies the term to be examined before all others is matika ”. The reason for this lies in the method adopted throughout the Abhidhamms-Pijaka of examining the nature snd behaviour of the many states, ments] and materiel, which in accord with the fundamental principles of anicca, dukicha and anata are shown to arise and pass away throughout the whole continuity of process which existence is demonstrated to be. The method is above all analytical, and in order that the syatem of analysis may be searching and precise it is confined to operating within the terms of reference of indi- vidual and pre-stated plans. Theso plans, or matrices, are the points of growth from which complete structural argumentscon- cerning particular states, or conditioned things, are developed in absolute terms. Consequently matika, although frequently rendered in translation as table of contents, should not be con- sidered only in that senso ; its more cogent purpose is to declare the nucleus, or to indicate the course upon which a subsequent analytical structure is to be developed. Moreover, in their ancient and traditional role as specific passages for recitation, the mitikas provide the leamer with a stable source of essential material on which to exercise practice and gain understanding. Each of the seven books of the Abhidhamma Pitaka is con- sidered to have its own mtiki, and these have been commented upon at some length in Mohavicchedani (P.T.S. edition 1961).ix This work isconsidered to have been compiled by a certain Kassapa Thera at the request of his pupils. The text, classified in Burma as one of the nine “little-finger” manuals, was probably written in the early thirteenth century at the Naga- pana Vibira in the Cola country of southern India. It is a most valuable work in that it ummarizes the whole of tho Abbi- dhamma Pitaka, book by book, from Dhammasafganl to Patthina, The matikas concerned are in this instance, however, viewed mainly as tables of contents and should in certain cases heconsidered as standing outside the fundamental texts in 60 far as inonly four works can there be shown to be eactions specifi- cally entitled “ matika ”, existing internally as part of the text, though there are many uddesas also which are indeed lists of contents, These internal matikis are : (1) that of Dhammasa- geoi, which commences that volume ; (2) a short matika fol- lowing the uddese of Rapakkchsndha in the same work ; (3) one following immediately on the sixteenfold classification of the nidinas in the Abhidhammebhajaniya section of Paticca- sameppéda in Vibhanga ; (4) aseries of fiveshort matikis at the Deginning of Dhatukathd, end (5) a rather more lengthy matika at the beginning of Puggalapaiifiatti. Of these five the first, i.e. the initial section of Dhammeseagani, is by far the most impor- tant, its influence being felt strongly throughout the whole of the Abhidhamma-Pitska. Not only are the definitions and expansions of the classifications of this matiki the material used in the detailed analysis of states in Dhammasangant itself, but they form the basis on which a large proportion of subsequent discussion is built in the remaining books of the Pitaka. ‘The matika of Dhammasagani consists of two main sections. Thefirst of these is the tikamatika, which comprises twenty-two groups of threefold designations. The second is the duka- métiki comprising one hundred groups of twofold designations ; thisis followed by a subsidiary section known as the euttanta- dukemitila, consisting of forty-two groups of twofold designa- tions. Although all one hundred and sixty-four groups are im- portant, itisthe twenty-two tikes and one hundred dukes which formthe dominant basis of Abhidhamma analysis.x In examining the Dhammasadgani matika the main feature to be recognized in what might at first sight appear to be a be- wildering and almost. tandom system of classification isthat each individual tika and duke ié to be regarded as a quite separateand unique atandpoiat from which every mental state or material quality that is cognizable in any way may be examined in terms of detailed analysis. Thus each of the one hundred and twenty- two groups represents a discrete mode by which those atates or qualities on the occasions of theit arising present themselves and can be recognized by virtue of the duty they perform, the qualities they exhibit, the effects they produce, their nature, origins, etc. ( sce, however, the matika has been stated, and thereby the terms of reference for future discussion established, it becomes the purpose of Dhammasangani to elucidate fully, in the greatest possible detail, the structure and content of those states and qualities in the absolute earegories of Abbidhamma argument. Examples of some of the categories concemed are : consciousness (citta}, mental concomitants (cetasikaé), aggre- gates-(khandha), bases (Ayatand), elements (dhiti), the four great material essentials (mabSbhata), ete:: Within the framework of these categories, and strictly in agcord with the terms of reference provided. by the individual components of each tika or duka, analysis is conducted. In consequence of the entire range of possible mental states and material qualities capable of being expressed under the heading of any one group of tikas or dukas, Dhammasatgani accordingly confines itself initially to the fullest possible analysis, in the terms summarized above, of the first tika, viz. states that are good, bad, indeterminate (i.e. cannot be classified as either good or bad), and this it does with great deliberation in the opening 983 sections of the present translation. Because of the particular tika adopted for this initial examination it establishes in the course of the process of expansion and analysis the formal group designations by which the now fully analysed states may be recognized: e.g. good states concerning the sensuous tiniverse (kamavacara), the universe of form (riipavacars), the formless universe (aripivacara), the higher ideal (lokuttara), greedy,a hateful and ignorant atates, resultant conditions, material form, ete, Asa result of this it is possible in the following 312 sections to classify clearly and comprehensively in the terms of thoes group designations the distribution of all mental states and material qualities within the internal subdivisions of the re- maining twenty-one tikes and one hundred dukes. 80 far as Abhidhamma as a whole is concerned the analysis of states conducted by Dhammasaigant is but the beginning of a process, for although it establishes the terminology by which the states it isolates may be identified, their extent and limitation are continued in subsequent volumes. It is not the purpose here to discuss these works in detail, but in order to emphasize the importence of the tikas and dukas it might be well to show something of what occurs in some of the volumes. In Vibbanga, for example, fourteen of the eighteen divisions include asection entitled “ Interrogation” (pafih§ pucchaka) where the subject of each vibhatiga—the subjects also being drawn from Dhamma- safgani—is assessed in terms of the twenty-two tikes and one hundred dukas, Thus in Khandhavibhanga each of the five aggregates: matter, feeling, perception, mental concomitants and consciousness, is expressed in terms of the tikes and dukas, whereas in Dhammasadgani the tikas and dukes are used to isolate and establish the make-up of the khandhas. The same process obtains with regard to such other vibbatigas as bases, elements, truths, controlling faculties, stations of mindfulsess, etc. The purpose of this is to make clear that not only cra-tho individual} tikes and dukas be shown to express the presentation and modes of action of the many states comprising the khan- dhas, etc., but that those same states can themselves. he expressed separately in terms of tikas and dukas in order to show their behaviour, suitability, unsuitability, their associa tion with good or bad roots, ability to produce desirable or un- desirable resultant, whether they ere helpful or unhelpful to Progress, whether they are defilements, fetters, ties, testds, floods, etc, . In Dhatukatha the purpose is a detailed elucidation of the bases (ayatana), and here again itis carried out on the same basisxi as Dhammasadgani and Vibhaiga, making the tikas and dukes a most important feature of the method. The most elaborate use, however, of the Dhammasafgant matiké occurs in the massive final work of the Abhidhamma Piteka. This is Patjhina, where the whole structure of the relationship between states in their arising and passing away is displayed not merely in terms of the individual tikas and dukas but coupled with the combinations and permutations of the twenty-four paccayas (hetu-—avigata). In this manner then the matika of Dhemmasahgani operates first as a means of exploring fully all those states and qualities inherent in experience, mental and material. Secondly it acts as a series of focal points at which the ultimate value of any state may be assessed. Thirdly it-provides the structure upon. which the relationship between states may be realized, not statically as isolated factors, but in their normal process of coming to be and passing away. Thus to those observant practisers concerned seriously with matters relevant to progress towards ultimate perfection and penetrative wisdom, to whom “seeing danger in the slightest fault” refers not only to moral practice but to the building vp of rightness of view, the mitika of Dhammasaigani and its full development therein, and in succeeding works, is of paramount importance. If the teaching of Enlightened Ones is that there should be an abandoning of evil states, a practising of good states and a purification of the mind, then it is evident that in the final analysis a proper knowledge of the qualities and behaviour of all relevant states must be known, in order that purity of mind in its fullest sense of attaining to rightness of view may beachieved. This the matikas of Dhammasangani and the succeeding works are designed to provide. RE. Iecrepex. Waltham St. Lawrence, 1973.n kifci dhammem abhijeati sjjhattam athavapi bahiddha.” Sutra Novara, 917, “Api khvaham avuso imasmim yeva vyamamatte kalevare Afimhi samanake lokam paifapemi . . Samvurra-Nnciva, i, 6 A, ny, 48. “Kulliipamam vo bhikkbave #jinantebi dhammi pi vo pabitebba, peg-eva edhammi. Massnmta-Nrxava, i, 135. “We shall find that every important philosophical reforma- tion, after a time of too highly strained metaphysical dogmatism or unsatisfying scepticism, has been begun by some man who saw the necessity of looking deeper into the mental constitution.” G. Croom Roarxrsos.CONTENTS. INTRODUCTORY ESSAY . . xxi 1. The Manual and the History of Paychology (p. xxi), IL The Date of the Manual (p. xxiv). III. On the Commentaries and the Importance of the AtthasdlinI {p. xxvi). IV. On the Method and Argument of the Manual (p. ‘xxxii). V. On the Chief Subject of Tnguiry—D h am m i (p. xxxvii) VI On the Inquiry inty Rupam and the Buddhist Theory of Sense (p. xlviii}, VII. On the Buddhist Philosophy of Mind and Theory of Intelicction (p. Ixx). VIIT. On the Buddhist Notions of “Good, Bad, and Indetermingte" (p.xc), THE TABLE OF CONTENTS (Matika). A. Abhidhamma B. Suttanta . BOOK L MI -. M7 THE UPRISING OF MIND (Cittuppida-kandam). Part I. GOOD STATES OF CONSCIOUSNESS. Cuarter I. ‘The Eight Main Types of Thought relating to the Sensuous Universe (Kamavacara-attha-mahacittani) CuarTer II. Good in relation to the Universe of Form (ri pavacara- kusalam). So Methods for inducing Jhina: I. The Eight Artifices. U. The Stations of Mastery (p. 53). HI. The Three First Deliverances (p.58). 1V. The Four Jhinas of the Sublime States (p.59). V. The Jhina of Foul Things (p. 63). Cuarter JIT. Good in relation to the Universe of the Formless (aripaivecara-kusalam). The Four Jbanas connected with Formless Existence (eat tari arGpajjbanani) . 2... 40Page Cuarter TV. Degrees of Efficacy in Good relating to the Thre Realms. 69 Cuarter V. Thought engaged upon the Higher Ideal (lokuttaram cittam) . . . .) . ee OT J. The First Path. II. The Second Path (p. 87). III, The Third Path (p83), IV.-‘The Fourth Path (p. 88}. Pant IT, BAD STATES OF CONSCIOUSNESS. Cuarter VI The Twelve Bad Thoughts (vidase akusala- cittani) 90 Part Tl. INDETERMINATE STATES OF CONSCIOUSNESS. Cuarter 1. On Effect, or Result (vipako) . . oie . ‘A, Good Karms. B. Bod Karma (p. 141) Cuarter IT. Inoperative-thoughts (kiriya) . . . 2 6 BOOK IL MATERIAL FORM (ri pakendsm). Introductory . . . . . . . . 13 Cuarter J. Exposition of Material Form under Single Concepts (ekaka-niddeso). . . . 156 Cuarter Il. Categories of Material Form under Dual aspects— positiveand negative(duvidbena rapasangabo) 158 Curren IIL Categories of Material Form under Triple Aspects. Exposition of the Triplets 2. 0. +s = 202 Cuarter IV. Categories of Material Form under Fourfold Aspects - » 24Cnarter V. Category of Materiel Form under a Fivefold Aspect - Cuarrer VI. Category of Material Form under a Sixfold Aspect Carrer VIL. Category of Materia! Form under a Sevenfold Aspect Cuarrer VIII. Category of Materiel Form under an Eightfold Aspect Cuarter IX. Category of "’aterial Form-under a Ninefold Aspect « Carter X. Category of Material Form under a Tenfold Aspect. Cxteren XI. Category of Materiel Form under an Elevenfold Aspect BOOK IIT. THE DIVISION ENTITLED “DEPOSITION ” (nikkbepakendam). Parr I. Cusrren I. The Group of Triplets (tikam) . Cuarrer Il. The Group on Root-condition (hetu-gocchakam) Cuarrer IIL The Short Intermediate Set of Pairs tea i i anters- dukam) 2. : Cuarrer IV. The Asava Group (Ssava-gocchakam). Czarren V. ‘The Group of the Fetters (samyojana gocchakem) Cuarren VIL The Group of the Tics @antha gocchakam) Caarten VII, The Group of the Floods (ogha-gocchakam) 230xvi . PAO Caartzr Vil. The Group of the Bonds (yo ga-gocchakam) 286 Cuarter IX. The Group of the Hindrances (nIvarana- gocchakam) . . | 1, 87 Cuarten X. The Group on Perversion (parimisa-gocchakam) 293 Crarrer XI. The Great Intermediate Set of Pairs (aahantara- @ukemp . 2... 88 Cuarrer XII. The Group of the Graspings(upadana-gocchakam) 299 Caaprer XII. The Group on the Vices (kilesa-gocchakam) 303 Cuapter XIV. . The Supplementery Set of Pairs (pitthiduks m) 307 Parr II. The Suttanta Pairs of Terms (suttantika-dukam) 314 Arpenpix J. On the Supplementary Digest appended to the Dhamma- Sangani, and entitled, in the Commentary, the AtthskathakagdamorAtthuddharo. 336 . Arrenpix IJ. On the term Unconditioned Element (asankhata CC a Inpexes. . . . . - . 346,ABBREVIATIONS. 1, BUDDHIST CANONICAL BOOKS. A-—Anguttara-NikB ya, C.—Cullavegga. D.—Digha-Nikays. Dhp—Dhammapada, Db.K.—Dhitu-Katha, Dbh.S~ Ihamma-Ssngapi. Jat —Jatska, K.—Sismese (Kambodian) edition of the tex t. E ath Vatthu, tre, Pointe of Controversy M.—Mejjbima-Nikay. PP.—Puggala-Paniatti, Pts—Petisambhidamagga. S.—Samyutte- 2, OTHER BOOKS. Abb.S.—Abhidhammettha- Sangaha. Asl.—Atthasilini, trs. The Expositor. Compendinm of Philosophy, trs. of AbhS. Div.—Divyavadina. IPTS.—Journal of the Pali Text Society. JRAS.—Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society. MBV.—Mehi-Bodbi-Vansa. Meh.—Mahi-Vamse. Mil_—Milinda-Paiha, Npk—Nettipakarana. Pss.B.—Paalins of the Brethren, trs. Theragithi. SBE.—Secred Books of the East. Sum—Sumengala-Vilasini. Vis.M—Visuddbi Magga, (By “ printed text”, or simply “text”, is always meant, unless otherwise stated, the edition of the Dhamma-Sangani, " published in 1885 by the Pali Text Society.INTRODUCTORY ESSAY. L The Manual and the History of Paychology. Ir the sands of Egypt or the ruins of Greece itself wore to give up, among their buried things thet aro now and again being restored to us, a copy of some manual with which the young Socrates was put through the mill of current academic doctrine, the discovery would be hailed, especially by scholars of historical insight, as a contribution of peculiar interest. The contonts would no doubt yield no new matter of philosophic tradition. But they would certainly teach something respecting such points as pre-Aristotelian logical methods, and the procedure followed in one or more schools for rendering students conversant with the concepts in psychology, ethics and metaphysic accepted or debated by the culture of the age. Readers whose sympathies aro not confined to’ the shores of the Mediterranean and Algean seas will feel a stir of interest, similar in kind if fainter in degree, on becoming more closely acquainted with the Buddhist textbook entitled Dhamma-Sangani. Tho edition of the Pali text, prepared for the Pali Text Society by Professor Dr. Ed. Miller, and published in 1885, hes 20 far failed to clicit any critical discussion among Pali scholars. A cursory inspection may have revealed little but what seemed dry, prolix and sterile, Such was, at least, the verdict of a younger worker, now, alas! no more among us! Closer study of the work will, I believe, prove less ungrateful, more especially if the conception of it as a student's manual be kept well in view. The method of the book is explicative, deductive ; 3 its object 1 H.C.-Warten, Buddhism in Translations, xviii. Indian Buddhism, p. 3.| xxii was, not to-add to the Dhamma, but to unfold the orthodox import of terms in use among the body of the faithful, and, by organizing and systematizing the aggregate of doctrinal concepts, to render the learner's intellect both clear and efficient. Even a superficial inspection of the Manual should yield great promise to anyone interested in the history of psychology When in the year 1893 my attention was first drawn to it, and the desirability of a translation pointed out by Professor Rhys Davids, I was at once attracted by the amount of psychological material embedded in its pages. Buddhist philosophy is ethical first and last. This is beyond dispute But among ethical systems there is a world of difference in the degree of importance attached to the psychological prolegomena of ethics. In ethical problems we are on a basis of psychology of conation or will, with its co-elficients of feeling and intelligence. And in the history of human ideas, in so far as it clusters about those problems, we find this dependence is sometimes made prominent, sometimes slurred over. ‘Treated superficially, if suggestively and picturesquely, in Plato, the nature and functions of that faculty in mari, whereby he ig constituted an ethical and political “ animal”, are by Aristotle analyzed at length. But the “Buddhists wero, in a way, more advanced in the psychology of their ethics than Aristotle—in a way, that is, which would now be called scientific. Rejecting the assumption of ‘a psyche and of its higher manifestations or noiis, they were content to resolve the consciousness of the Ethical Man, os they found it, into a complex continuum of subjective phenomena. They analyzed this continuum, as 1 CEG. C. Robertson, Elements of General Philosophy, pp. 191, 197; Philosophical Remains, p. 3; A. Bain, Morai Science—The Psychological’ Data of Ethics. “ Every ethical system involves a psychology of conduct, and depends for its development upon ite idea of what conduct actually is” (C. Douglas, The Philosophy of J. S. Mill, p. 251).xxiii we might, exposing it, as it were, by transverse section, But their treatment was genetic. The distinguishable groups of dhamm i—apprtoximately, statea or mental psychoses—— “arise” in every case in consciousness, in obedience to certain laws of causation, psychical and moral !—that is, ultimately, as the outcome of antecedent states of consciousness, There is no exact equivalent in Pali, any more than there is in Aristotle, for the relatively modern term “ consciousness ”, yet is the psychological standpoint of the Buddhist philosophy virtually es thoroughgoing in its perceptual basis as that of sorkeley. It was not solipsism any more than Berkeley's immaterialism was solipsistic. It postulated other perci- pients? as Berkeley did, together with, not a Divine cause or source of percepts, but the implicit Monism of early thought veiled by a deliberate Agnosticism. And just as Berkeley,- approaching philosophical questiona through psychology, “ was the first man to begin a perfectly scientific doctrine of sense-perception asa psychologist,” *s0 Buddhism, from a quite early stage of its development, set itself to analyze and classify mental processes with remarkable insight and sagacity. And on the results of that psychological analysis it sought to base the whole rationale of its practical doctrine and discipline. From studying the processes of attention, and the natare of sensation, the range and depth of feeling and the plasticity of the will in desire and in control, it organized its system of personal self-culture. Germany has already a history of psychology half completed on the old lines of the assumed monopoly of ancient thought by a small area of the inhabited world. England has not yet got so far. Is it too much to hope that, when such a work is put forth, the greater labour of a wider and juster initiative will have been undertaken, and the 1 Called by Commentators the citta-niyema and kamma-niyama. 2 Cf. eg. below, p. 250(1045]. 3 GC. Robertson, op. cit., p. 154.| | xxiv development of early psychological thought in tho East have been assigned its due place in this branch of historical research ? I, The Date of the Manual. We can fortunately fix the date of the Dhamrha-Sangani within a limit that, for an Indian book, may be considered narrow. Hts aim is to systematize or formulate certain doctrines, or at least to enumerate and define a number of seattered terms or categories of terms, occurring in the great books of dialogues and sundry discourse entitled the Nikiyas of the Sutta Pitaka. ‘The whole point of view, psychological and philosophical, adopted in them is, in our Manual, taken for granted. The technical terms used in them are used in it as if its hesrers, subsequently its readers, would at once recognize them. No one acquainted with those books, and with the Dhamma-Sanganj, will hesitate in placing the latter, . in point of time, after the Nikayas. On the other hand, the kind’ of ‘questions raised in our Manual are on a diferent plane altogether from those raised in the fifth book in the Abhidhamma-Pitaka, viz. the Katha- Vatthu, which we know to have been composed by Tissa at Patna, in the middle of tho third century nc’ The Dhamma-Sengapi does not attempt to desl with any such advanced opinions and highly-claborated points of doctrine as are put forward by those supposed opponents of the orthodox philosophy who are the interlocutors in the Kathi- Vatthu. It remains altogether, or almost altogether, at the old standpoint of the Nikdyas- as regards doctrine, differing only in method of treatment. The Kathi-Vatthu raises new questions belonging to a later stage in the development of the faith. The Dhamma-Ssngani is therefore younger than the “3 Atthasaling, p. 3 Mabi-Bodhi-Vamsa, p. 110; KV. Cy., Points of Controversy, p. 7.xxv Nikayas, and older than the Kathé-Vatthu. If we date it half-way between the two, that is, during the first third of the fourth century B.c. (contemporary, therefore, with the childhood of Aristotle, b. 384), we shall be on the safe side. But [ami disposed to think that the interval between the completion of the Nikiyes and the compilation of the Dhamma-Sengani is less than that between the latter work and the Katha Vatthu ; and that our manual should therefore be dated rather at the middle than at the end of the fourth century £.C., or even earlier. However that may be, it is important for the historian of psychology to remember that the ideas it eystematizes are, of course, older. Practically all of them go back to the time of the Sangha’s carly editorial work. Some of them ere older still, The history of the text of our Manus! belongs to that of the canonical texts taken collectively. There are, however, two interesting references to it, apart from the general narrative, in the Maha Vamea, which show, at least, that the Dhamma-Sangayi was by no means laid on the shelf among later Buddhists, King Kassepa V. of Ceylon (4.0. 923-39) had a copy of it engraved on gold plates studded with jewels, and took it in procession with great honour to a vihara he had built, and there offered flowers before it Another King of Ceylon, Vijaya Bahu I. (a.p. 1063-1120), shut himself up every morning for a time against his people in the Hall of Exhortation, and there made a translation of the Dhemma-Sangani, no doubt from Pali into Sinhalese I can testify to the seriousness of the task, and feel a keen sympathy with my royal piedecessor, and envy withal for his proximity in time and place to the seat of orthodox tradition. Nothing, unfortunately, is now known, so far as T have been able to ascertain, of his work, in which the translator was very likely aided by the best scholarship of ® Mab., chap. }, vv. 50, 51, 56. * Thid) chap. bx, v.17.xxvi 4 the day, and which might have saved me from many a doubt and difficulty. It On the Commentaries and the Importance of the Althasdlini. twill be seen from Appendix I. that the last part of tho text of our Manual is a supplement added to it by way of commentary, or rather of interpretation and digest. It is, perhaps, not surprising that so much of this kind of material ha. survived within the four corners of the Pitakas. We have the old Commentary embedded in the Vinaya, and the Parivira added as a sort of supplementary examination paper to it.” Then there is the Niddega, a whole book of commentary, en texts now included in the Sutta Nipita, and there are passages clearly of a commentarial nature scattered through the Nikyas, Lastly, there are the interesting fragments of commentaries tacked the one on to the Dhamma-Sangani itself (below, p. 331), the other on to the Vibhanga. As these older incorporated commentaries are varied both in form and in method, it is evident that commentary of different kinds had @ very carly beginning. And the probability is very great that the tradition is not so far wrong when it tells us that commentaries on all the principal canonical books wero handed down in schools of the Order along with the texts themselves, This is not to maintain that all of the Commentaries were 80 handed down in all the schools, nor that each of them was exactly tho samo im each of the schools where it was taught. But wherever Commentaries were so handed down, tradition tells us that they were compiled, and subsequently written, in the dialect of the district where the schoo! was situated. From two places, one in India and the other in Ceylon, we have works purporting to give in Pali the substance of such ancient traditional comment as had been handed down in the local vernacular. One of these is the ‘Atthasilini,ss xxvii Buddhaghosa’s reconstruction, in Pali, of the Commentary on our present work, as handed down in Sinhalese at the achool of the Great Monastery, the Maha-Vihara at Anuridhapura in Ceylon. The Maha-Vamaa, indeed, says (p. 251) that he wrote this workat Gaya, in North India, before he came to Anuradhapura. ‘This, however, must be # mistake, if it refers to the work as we have it. For in that work he frequently quotes from and refers to another work which he certainly wrote after his arrival in Ceylon, namely, the Visuddhi-Magga, and once or twice he refers to the Samanta-Pasadika, which he also wrote in Ceylon. ‘The Saddhamma-Sangaha ! has two apparently inconsistent statements which suggest a solution. The first is that he wrote, at the Vihara at Gaya, a work called the Uprising of Knowledge (Nanodaya), and a Commentsry on the Dhamma- Sangani, called the Atthssilini, and began to write one on the Parittas. Then it was that he was urged to go, and actually did go, to Ceylon to obtain better materials for his work. The second is that, after he had arrived there and had written seven other works, he then wrote the Attbasilini, When the same. author makes two such statementa as these, and in close conjunction, he may well mean to say that a work already written in the one place was revised or rewritten in the other. Dhammakitti, the author of the Saddhamma-Sangaha, adds the interesting fact that Buddhaghosa, in revising his Atthasdlint, relied, not on the Mahé-Atthakatha in Sinhalese, but on another Commentary in that language called the Maha-Paccari. We know, namely, that at the time when Buddhaghosa wrote—that is, in the early part of the fifth century a.p.— the Commentaries handed down in the schools had been, at varions times and places, already put together into treatises 1 Journal of the Pali Text Society, 1888, pp. 53, 56.xxviii and written books in the native dialects. And we know the names of several of thoso then existing. Theso are: 1. The Commentary of the dwellers in the « North Minster “’—the Uttara Vihdra-—at, Anuridhapwra) 2. The Mila-, or Mahd-Atthakatha, or simply " The Atthakathé”, of tho dwellers in the “ Great Minster "—the Maha-Vihita—also at Anuradha pura? 3. The Anda-Atthakathi, handed down at Kéincipura (Congevaran), in South India. 4. The Mabi-Paccari, or Great Raft, said to be so called from ity having been composed cna raft somewhere in Ceylon.? 5. The Kurundi Atthaksthd, so calle becauso it was Composed at the Kurundavelu Vihara in Ceylon.4 6. Thi Sankhepa-Atthakatha or Short Commentary, which, as being mentioned together with the Andha Commentary,’ may possibly be also South Indian... = Buddhaghosa himself says in the introdnetory verses to the Atthasalini:° “Twill set forth, rejoicing in what I reveal, the explanation of the meaning of that Abhidhamma as it was chanted forth by Mahé-Kassapa and the rest (at the first Council), and re-cKanted Inter (at the second Council) by the Arahats, and by Mahinda brought to this wondrous isle and turned into ‘the language of the dwellers therein. Rejecting now the tongue of the men of Tambapanni? and tuming it into that pure tongue which harmonizes with the texts [I will set it forth) showing the opinion of the dwellers in the Great Minster, undefiled by and unmixed with the views of the + IPTS., 1882, pp. 115, 116. English in Turnour's Maha- Vamea, pp. xxvii, xxvii. 2 Sum. 180, 182; Saddhamma-Sangaha, 55; MBY. 134-6, 2 Papaiica Sidani on MI. i, 13; Saddhainma-Sangaha, 55. + Saddhamma-Sangaha, 55. * Vijesinba in the JRAS,, 1870 (vol. v, N.S.), p. 298: * Origin of the Buddhist Arthakathas.” : AsL, p. 1. v. 13 ef seq. * Taprobane = Ceylon.XXIX sects, and adducing also what ought to be adduced from the Nikdyes and the Commentaries.” + Tt would be most interesting if the book as wo have it had been written at Gaya in North India, or even if wo could discriminate between the portion thero written and the additions and alterations made in Cevlon. But this we can no longer hope to do. The numerous stories of Ceylon Theras occurring in the book are almost certainly due to the author's residence in Ceylon. And we cannot be certain that these and the reference to his own book, written in Ceylon, are the only additions. We cannot, therefore, take the opinions expressed in the book as evidence of Buddhist opinion as held in Gayé. That may, in great part, be so. But we cannot tell in which part. In the course of his work Buddhaghosa quotes often from the Nikiyss without mentioning the source of his quotations ; snd also from the Vibhanga? and the Maha-Pakaraya * (that is the Patthins), giving their names. Besides these Pitake texts, he quotes or refers to the following authorities :-— 1. His own Samants-Pasddika, e.g. pp. 97-8. 2. His own Visuddhi-Magga, pp. 168, 183, 186, 187 (twice), 190, 198.4 3. The Maha-Atthakatha, pp. 80, 86, 107. 4. The Atthakathicariya, pp. 85, 123, 217. 5. The Atthakatha, pp. 108, 113, 188, 267, 313. 6. The Atthakatha’s, pp. 99, 188. 7. The Agamatthakatha’s, p. 86. iRgamatthakathasu, perhaps “from the commen- taries on the Nikiyas”. See note 5 below; ef, Expositor, 3. See its index for list of references to commentaries, * For instance, pp. 165-70, 176, 178. 2 For instance, pp. 7, 9, 87, 212, 409. « The apparent references at pp. 195, 196 are not to the book. The reading in the printed text is igamanatthaka- thisu, But this is not intelligible. And as we have igamatthakathasu at p. 2, v. 17, it is probable wexax ad Acariyinam saminatthakatha, p. 90. . Pordnd, pp. 84, 111, 291, 299, 313. 10. The Thera (that is Nagusena), pp. 112, 121, 129. 11. Nigasenatthera, p. 114, 12. Ayasma Nagasena, p. 119. 13. Ayastnd Nagasenatthera, p. 142 14. Thera Nagasens, p. 120. 15. Digha-bhinaka, pp. 151, 399 (cf. p. 407). - 16. Majjhima-bhinaka, p. 420. 17. Vitanda-vadi, pp. 3, 90, 92, 241. 18. Petaka, Petakopadesa, p. 165, I do not claim to have exhausted the passages in the Atthasdlin quoted from these authorities, er to be able to define precisely each work—what, for instance, is the distinction between 5 and 6, and whether 4 was not identical with either. Nor is it clear who were Poripa or Ancients, though it seems likely, from the passages quoted, that they were Buddhist thinkers of an earlier age but of a later date than that of our Manual, inasmuch as one of the citations shows that the “Door-theory” of cognition was already developed (see below, p. Ixi, ete.) From thi distizict references to 3 and to 7,.it seems possible that the ao-called “Great Commentary” (3) dealt not so much with any particular book, or group of books, as with the doctrines of the Pitakas in general. The foregoing notes may prove useful when the times aro ready for a full inquiry into the history of the Buddhist Commentaries With respect to the extent to which the Atthasilint itself has been quoted in the following pages, it may be judged that the scholastic teaching of eight centuries ry must so read also here, whe commentaries on the Nikiyas ”. +I may add that a Tika, or sub-commentary on tho Atthasilini, written by a Siamess scholar, Napakitti, of unknown date, was edited in Siphalese characters by Kodagoda Pafiflisekhara of Kalutara, in Ceyloo, and published there in 1890. the meaning clearly is “‘in the EE ED | | | ! |xxxi later is a very fallacious guide in the interpretation of original doctrines, and that we should but darken counsel if we sought light on Aristotle from mediaeval exegesis of the age of Duns Scotus. Without admitting that the course of Buddhist and that of Western culture coincide sufficiently to warrant such a parallel, it may readily be granted that Buddhaghosa must not be accepted en bloc. The distance between the con- structive genius of Gotama and his apostles as compared With the succeeding ages of epigoni needs no deprecia’ ry criticism on the labours of the exegesists to make itself feit forcibly enough Buddhaghesa's philology is doubtless crude, and he is apt to leave eruces unexplained, concerning which an Occidental is most in the dark: Nevertheless, to me his work is not only highly suggestive, but also a mine of historic interest. To put it aside is to lose the historical Perspective of the course of Buddhist philosophy. It is to regard the age of Gotama and of his early Church as con- stituting @ wondrous “freak” in the evolution of human ideas, instead of watching to see how the philosophical tradition implanted in that Church (itself based on earlier culture) had in the lapse of centuries been carefully handed down by the schools of Theras, the while the folklore that did duty for natural science had more or Jess fossilized, and the study of the conscious processes of the mind (and of atheistic doctrine) had been elaborated. This is, however, a point of view that demands a fuller examination than can here be given it. I will now only main- tain that it is even more suggestive to have at hand the best tradition of the Buddhist schools at the fullness of their maturity for the understanding of a work like the Dhamma- Sengani than for the study of the Dialogues. Our Manual is itself a book of reference to earlier books, and presents us with many terms and formule taken out of that setting of occasion and of discourse enshrined in which we meet them EF * Cf. Dr. Neumann in Die Reden Gotamo Buddhos, p. xv et eq.Xxxii in the Nikiyas. The great scholar who comments-on them had those Nikiyas, both as to letter and spirit, well pigeon- holed in memory, and cherished both with the most reverent loyalty, That this is so, as well as the fact that wo are bred ona culture so diferent in mould and methods (let alone the circumstances of its development) from that inherited by him, must lend his interpretations an importance and a suggestiveness far greater than that: which the writings of any Christian commentator on the Greek philosophy can possess for us. TV. On the Method and Argument of the Manual. The title given to my translation is not in any way a faithful rendering of the canonical name of the Manual. This is admitted on my title-page. ‘There is nothing very intelligible for us in the expression "Compendium of States”, or “Compendium of Phenomena”. Whether the Buddhist might find it so or not, there is for him at all events a strong and ancient essociation of ideas attaching to tho title Dhamma-Sangani which for us is entirely non- existent. I have, therefore, let go the letter, in order to indicate what appears to me the real import of the work. Namely, that it is, in the first place, manual or textbook, and not a treatise or disquisition, elaborated and rendered attractive and edifying after the manner of most of the Sutta Pitaka. And then, that its subject is ethics, but that the inquiry is conducted from psychological standpoint, and, indeed, is in great part an analysis of the psychological end psycho-physical dats of ethics. I do not mean to sssert that the work was compiled solely for academic use. No such specialized function is assigned it in the Commentary. Buddhaghosa only maintains that, ~ together with the rest of the Abhidhamma,’ it was the 1 But including the Matiki only’of the later Katha Vatthu. CE. Dialogues of the Buddha, p. xi; Asl., p. 1. ixxxili ” épeissima verba of the Buddha not attempting to upset the mythical tradition thet i was the special modo he adopted in teaching the doctrina to the “ hosts of devas come from all parts of the sixteon world-systems, he having placed his - mother (reincarnate as a devi) at their head because of the glory of hee wisdom". Whether this myth had grown up to account for the formal, unpicturesquo. style of the Abhidhamesa, on the ground that the devas were above the need of illustration and rhetoric of an earthly kind, I do not know. The Commentary frequently refers to the peculiar difference im style i: m that employed in the Suttanta as consisting in the Abhidhamma being nippariy aya - desana-teaching which is not accompanied — by explanation or disquisition? And the definition it gives, at the outset, of the term Abhidhamma shows that this Pitalea, and a fortior’ the Dhamma-Sangani, was con- ‘sidered as a subject of study more advanced than the other Pitakas, and intended to serve as the complement and crown, of the leamer's earlier courses? Acquaintance with the doctrine is, as I have said, taken for granted. The object is not so much to extend kmowledge as to ensure mutual consistency in the intension of ethical notions, and to systematize and formulate the theories and practical mechanism of intellectual and moral progress scattered in profusion throughout the Suttas. 2 Ash. pa. * eg, Ast 403. The meaning of this expression ig illustrated by its use on p. 317 of the Cy.: na nippariyayena dighamripdyatanam; ic. “that which is long is only figuatively a visual object {is really tactile object). * Asi, p.2 Translated by Mr. A.C. Taylor, JRAS. 1894. Ch. Bxpasitor, 24. ‘ Professar Edmund Hardy, in his Introduction to the fifth volume of the Anguttara Nikiya, expresses the belief that the Dhamma-Samgani is “ entirely dependent upon the Anguttare ”. For my past, I have found no reason to limit the Manual’s dependence on the Suttantas to any one book. Buddbaghosa does not specially connect the two works.XXXIV, It is interesting to note the methods adopted to carry out this object. The work was in the first instance inculcated by way of oral teaching respecting a quantity of matter which had been already learnt in tho same way. . And the memory, no longer borne along by the interest of narrative or by the thread of an argument, had to be assisted by other devices. First of these is the catechetical method. Questions, according to Buddhist analysis, are put on five several grounds : + To throw light on what is not known ; ‘To discuss what is known ; To clear up doubts ; To get assent (i.e. the premises in an argument granted) ; 2 To (give a starting-point from which to) set out the content of a statement. The last is selected as the special motive of the catechizing hero resorted to. It is literally the wish to discourse or expound (kathetukainyata), but the meaning is more clearly brought out by the familiar formula quoted, viz.: “Four in number, brethren, are theso stations in mindfulness. Now which are the four?” Thus it was held that the questions in the Manual are analytic or” explicative, having the object of unfolding and thereby of deliminating the implications of a mass of notions which a study’ of the Suttas, if unaided, might leave insufficiently co-ordinated in the mind. ‘And the memory, helped by the interrogative stimulus, was yet further assisted by the symmetrical form of both question and answer, as well as by the generic uniformity in the matter of the questions. Throughout Book I, in the case of each inquiry which opens up a new subject, the answer is set cut on a definite plan called uddesa, or “argument”, and is rounded off invariably by the ap pana, 5, 56; cf. Sum. ¥, i, 68; cf. the different grounds in A. iii, 193, and the four ways of answering, D. iii, 221; Ai 197 ; ii, 46. 2A favourite method in the Dialogues. The Cy. quotes as an instance M. i, 232.”xxv or emphatic summing up: “all these (whatever they may stand for on other occasions or in other avatems) on this occasion = 7," The uddega is succeeded by the nid-. desa or exposition, ic. analytical question and answer on the details of the opening argument, ‘This is indicated formally by the initial adverb ta tth a—what here (in this connexion) is @...6...¢? Again, the work is in great part planned with careful regard to logical relation. The Buddhists had not cluborated the intellectual vehicle of genus and species as the Grecks did, hence they had not the convenience of a logic of Definition.” There is scarcely an answer in any of these Niddesas but may perhaps be judged to suffer in precision and hucidity from lack of it. Thoy substitute for definition proper what J. §. Mill might have called predication of aquipollent terms—in- other words, the method of the dictionary. In this way precision of mesning is not to be expected, sinco nearly all so-called synonyms do but mutually overlap in meaning without coinciding; and hence the only way to ensure no part of the connotation being left out is to lump tagether a number of approximate equivalents, and gather that the term in question is defined by such properties as the aggregate possesses in common. If this is the rationale of the Buddhist method, the inclusion, in the answer, of the very term which is to be defined becomes no longer the fallacy it is in Western logic. Indeed, where there is no pursuit of exact science, nor of sciences involving “ physical division “, but only a system of research into the intangible products and processes of mind and character, involving aspects and phases, i.e. logical division, I am not sure that a good case might not be made out for Buddhist method. It is less rigid, and lends itself better, perhaps, to a field of thought where “a difference in aspects és a difference in things ”:! However that may be, the absence of a development of * Professor J. Ward, Ency. Brit, 9th ed., “ Paychology.”XEXvi the relation of Particular and Universal, of Ono’ and All, is met by a great attention to degree of Plurality. Number plays a great part in Buddhist classes and categories? Whether this was inherited from a more ancient lore, such as Pythagoras is said to have drawn from, or whether this feature was artificially developed for mnemonic purposes, 1 do not know. Probably there is truth in both alternatives. But of ali numbers none plays so great a part in aiding methodological coherency and logical consistency as that of duality. I refer, of course, especially to its application in the case of the corrolatives, Positive and Negative. Throughout most of Bock II the learner is greatly aided by being questioned on positive terms and their opposites, taken simply and also in combination with other similazly dichotomized pairs. Tho opposite is not always a con- tradictory. Room is then left in the “universe of discourse ” fot a third cless, which in its turn comes into question. Thus the whole of Book I is a development of the triplet ‘of questions with which Book III begins (a-kusalam being really the contrary of kusalasm, though formally its contradictory): What is A? What is B? What is (ab), i.e, non-A and non-B? (The other Indian alternative : What is AB? finds here no special treatment.) In Book III there is no obvious ground of logic or method for the serial order ot limits observed in the “ Clusters” ox Groups, and the interpolated sets of “Pairs” of miscellaneous questions, Nevertheless, a uniform method of catechizing characterizes the former. Finally, there is, in the way of mnemonic and intellectual aid, the simplifying and unifying effect attained by causing all the questions (exclusive of sub-inquiries) to refer to the one category of dhamma. There is, it is true, a whole Book of questions referring to rapam, but this constitutes a very much elaborated sub- 1 CL especially not only Book II of this work, but also the whole of the Anguttara. ~xxxvil inquiry on material “form” as one subspecies of a species of dhamma—rpino dhammi, asdistinguished from all the rest, which ere a-ripino dhamma. This. will appear more clearly if the argument of the work is very concisely stated. ~ Te will bo seen that the Matika, or table of subjects of all the questions, refers in detait only to Book JIL. Book THI, in fact, contains the entire wark considered as an inquiry (not necessarily exhaustive) into the conorete, or, as one might say, the applied ethics of Buddhism. In it many, if not all, fundameni«l concepts are taken'as already defined and granted. Henco Books I and IT sre introductory and, as it were, of the nature of inquiry inte data. Book IL is psycho-physical; Book I is psychological. ‘Together they constitute a very elaborate development, and, again, a sub- development of the first triplet of questions in Book ITT, viz. dhammé which are good, ie. make good karma, those which are bad, and those which make no karma (the indeterminates). Now, of these last same are simply and solely results 1 of good or bad dhammi, and some are not so, but are states of mind agd expressions of mind entailing no moral result (on the agent)? Some, again, while making no karma, are of neither of these two species, but are dhamma which might be called cither unmoral (tGpam)® or else super-moral (unconditioned element or Nirvana). These are held to constitute a third and fourth species of the third class of dhamm called indeterminate. But the former of the two alone receives detailed and systematic treatment. Hence the whole Manual is shown to be, as it professes to be, a compendium, or, more literally, a co-enumeration of dhamma, The method of treatment or procedure termed Abhidhamma (for Abhidhamma is treatment rather than matter) is, ' Book I, Pe. TIL, Chep. I. Thid., Chap. II. ~ 3 Book If. * Appendix I.XXXVIiL according to the Matika, held to end at the end of the chapter entitled Pitthi-dukam or Supplementary Sct of Pairs. The last thirty-seven pairs of questions * and answers, ‘on the other hand, are entitled Suttantika-dukam They are of a miscellaneous character, and are in many cases not logically opposed. Buddhaghosa has nothing to say by way of explaining thcir inclusion, nor the prineiple determining their choieo or number. Nor is it casy to deduce any explanation from the nature or the treatment of them. The name Suttantika means that they are pairs of terma met with in the Suttas. This is true and verifiable, But I, for one, cannot venture to predicate anything further respecting them. ¥ On the Chief Subject of Inquiry—D ham ma. If I have called Buddhist ethics psychological, especially as the subject is treated in this work, it is much in the same way in which I should call Plato's psychology ethical. Neither the founders of Buddhism nor of Platonic Socratism had elaborated any organic system of psychology or of ethics respectively: Yet it is hardly overstating the case for either school of thought to say that, whereas the latter psychologized from an ethical standpoint, the former built their ethical doctrine on a basis of psychological principles. For, whatever the far-reaching term dhammo may in our Manual have precisely signified to the early Buddhists, it invariably elicits, throughout Book I, a reply in terns of subjective consciousness. The discussion in the Com- mentary, which I have reproduced below, p. 2, n. 3, on dhammirammanam, leaves it practically beyond doubt that dhammo, when thus related to mano, is as a visual object to visual perception namely, mental object in general. It thus is shown to be equivalent to Herbart’s Vorstellung, to Locke's idea—‘ whatsoever is the "ss 11296-1366.xxxix, immediate object of perception, thought, ot under- standing "~and to Professor Ward's “‘ presentation "2 The d ham mai in question always prove to be, whatever their ethical value, factors of cittam used evidently in its widest sense, i.e. concrete mental process or state. Again, the analysis of rGpam in Book II; as, a species of “indeterminate” dhamma, is almost wholly a study in the pheaorena of sensation and of the human organism as sentient. Finally, in Book IIE the questions on various dbhamma are for the most part answered ir terms of the four mental skandhas, of the cittani dealt with in Book I, ‘and of the springs of action as shown in their effect on will. Thus the whole inquiry in its most generalized expression eomes practically to this: Given man as a moral being, whatdo we find to be the content of his consciousness ? Now this term dhamnio is, as readers are already ware, suseptible. of more than one interpretation, Even when used for the body of ethical doctrine it was applied with varying extension, i.e. either to- the whole doctrine, or to the Suttanta as opposed to Vinaya and Abhidhamma, ot to such doctrimes as the Four Truths and the Causal Formula. But whaterer in this connexion is the denotation, the con. notation is easy to fix. That this is not the case where the term has, s to speak, a secular or “profane” meanisig is seen in the warious renderings and discussions of it.? Tho tate H. C. Wawen, in particular; has described the difficulties, frst of determining what the word, in this or that connexion, was intended to convey, and then of discovering any word or words adegzate to’ serve as equivalent to it. One step towards a aslution may be made if we can get at a Buddhist survey of tie meauings of dhammo from the Buddhists’ ' Ency. Be, 9th ed, art.“ Psychology ”. * CL eg. Oldenberg, Buddha, ete., 6th ell, p. 288; Warren, Buddhism smTranslations, pp. 116, 364; Kern’ Ind. Buddhiom, -p,51,n. 3; Neumann, Reden des Gotamo, pp. 13, 23, 91; Gogerly, Ceylon Fried, 1874, p. 21; M. & W. Geiger, Jali’ Dhamma, p. doext own philosophical point of view. And this we are now enabled to do in consequence of tho editing of the Atthasilinl. In it we read Buddhaghosa’s analysis of the term, the various meanings it conveyed to Buddhists of the Sfth century 4.D., and his judgment; which would be held as authoritative, of the special significance it possessed in the questions of the Dhamma-sangani. “Tho word dhammo,” runs the passage (p. 38), “is met with {as meaning} doctrine {pariyatti), condition or cause (hetu), virtue or good quality (g uno), absenco of essence or of living soul (nissatto-nijjivata),” ete Ithistrative texts are then given of cach meaning, those referring to the last being the beginning of the answer in our Manual numbered [121]: “Now at that time there are states"; and, further, the passage from the Satipatthinasutta': “ Concerning dhammas he abides watchful over dhammas.” And it is with the fourth and last-named meaning of dhammo that the term is said to bo used in the questions of the Manual. Again, a little later (p. 40), ho gives a more positive expression to this particular meaning by saying that dhammo, so employed, signifies “ that which has the mark of bearing its own nature” (or character or “condition—sabhiva- dharano); io, that which is not dependent on any more ultimate nature? This, to us, somewhat obscure characterization may very likely,in view of the context, mean that dha mmo as phenomenon is without substratum, is not a quality cohering in a substance. “‘ Phenomenon” is certainly our nearest equivalent to the negative definition of nissatta-nijjivam, and this is actually the rendering given to dh am mo (when employed in this sense in the Sutta just quoted) by Dr. Neumann: “Da wacht ein Ménch bei den Erscheinungen...” If I have used states, or states of consciousness, instead of phenomena, it is merely 1D. (outtanta 22); M. i, 61. . 2 Cf. Pap. Sid. i; p. 17; ‘attano lakkhanam dharenti ti dhamma. Herein dhammo = dhatu, Compendium, 255.xii because, in the modern tradition of British psychology, “states of consciousness” is exactly equivalent to such phenomena as are mental, or, at least, conscious, And, further, because this use of “states” has beon taken up into that psychological tradition on the very same grounds as prompted this Buddhist interpretation of dh amma— the ground of non-committal, not to say negation, with respect to any psychical substance or entity. That we have, in this country pre-eminently, gone to work after the manner of electrical science with respect to us subject-matter, and psychologized without a psyche, is, of course, due to the influence of Hume. In selecting a term so characteristic of the British tradition us “ state: of mind or consciousness, I am not concerned to justify its use in the face of a tendency to substitute terms more expressive of a dynamic conception of mental operations, or of otherwise altered standpoints. The Buddhists seem to have held, es our psychology has held, that for purposes of analysis it was justifiable to- break up the mental con- tinuum of the moral individuality into this or that congeries of states or mental phenomena. In and through these they sought to trace the working of moral causation. To look beneath or behind them for a “ thing in itself” they held to be a dangerous superstition. With Goethe they said: “Suche nichts hinter den Phinomenen; sie selbst sind die Lchre!” And, in view of this coincidence of implication and emphasis, “states of mind” or “of consciousness ” seemed best to fit dha mm a when the reply was made in terms of mental phenomena. In ihe book on Material Form, the standpoint is no doubt shifted to a relatively more objective consideration of the moral being and his contact with a world considered as external. But then the word dha mma (and my rendering of it) is also superseded by r & pam. It is only when we cume to the more synthetic matter of Book UE that dhamm4 strains the scope of the termalii T have selected if “ states ” be taken as strictly states of mind or of consciousness, It is true that the Buddhist view of things so far resembles the Berkeleian that all phenomena, ‘or things or sequences or elements, or however else we may render dhamma, may be regarded as in the last resort “ states of mind’, albeit they were not held as being, all of them, such and no more. This in its turn may seem a straining of the significance which the term possessed ior early Buddhists ina more general inquiry such as that of Book ITI. Yet consider the definitions of dhamima, worthy of Berkeley himself, in $§ 1044-5. ‘The difficulty lay in the choice of another term; and none being satisfactory, I retained, for want of a better, the same rendering, which is, after all, indefinite enough to admit of its connoting other congeries of things or aspects beside consciousness. : sO The fundamental importance in Buddhist philosophy of this Phenomenalism or Non-substantialism as a protest against the prevailing Animism, which, beginning with projecting the self into objects, saw in that projected seli a noumenal quasi-divine substance, has by this time been more or less admitted. The testimony of the canonical books leaves no doubt on the matter, from Gotama’s second sermon to his first converts, and his first Dialogue in the “ Long Collection”, to the first book of the Kathi Vatthu.! There are other episodes in the books whero the belief in a permanent spiritual essence is, together with a number of other speculations, waived aside as subjects caleulated to waste time and energy. But in the portions referred to the doctrine of repudiation is more positive, and may be summed up in one of the refrains of the Majjhima Nikaya: Suiifiam idam attena vi attaniyena va ti—Void is this of soul or of aught of the nature of soul!? The force of the often -repeated 1 Cf. Rhys Davids" American Lectures, pp. 38, 2 Or“ self” or “spirit” (attena). Ai, 297; ii, 263 (lege sufifiam); cf.S. iv, 54; and KV. 67,579. Cf. the “Emptiness concept”, below, p. 30,0. 1. | t | i & ixiii “ This is not mine, this is not I, this is not my Self”, is not intended to make directly for goodness but for truth and insight. “And since neither self nor aught belonging to eel, brethren, can really and truly be accepted, is not the heretical position which holds: This is the world and this is the self, and {shall continue to be in the future, permanent, immutable, eternal, of a nature that knows no change, yea, I shall abide to eternity!—is not this simply and entirely a doctrine of foots 272 And now that the 'ster or scholastic doctrine, as shown in the writings of the greatest of the Buddhist scholastics, becomes accessible; it ig seen how carefully and conscientiously this snti-substantialist position had been cherished and uphekt. Half-way to the age of the Commentators, the Milinda-paiiho places tho question of soul-theory at the head of the problems discussed. Then turning to Buddhaghosa, we find the much more emphatic negation of the Sumangala Vilisini (p. 194): “Of aught within called self which looks forward or looks around, ete., there is none!” matcked in the Atthasdlini, not only by the above-given definition of dham mas, but also by the equally or even more emphatic affirmation respecting them, given in my n 1 to p, 33: “There is no permanent entity or self which acquires the states... these are to be understood as ultimates Gabhavatthena). There is no other essence or existence or personality or individual whatever.” Again, attestion is drawn in the notes to his often-reiterated com- ment that when a disposition or cmotion is referred to cittam, eg. nandirago cittassa,® the repudiation of am ego is thereby implied. Once more, the thoughts and acts which are tainted with “ Asavas” or with corruptions ate said to be so in virtue of their being centred in the soul 13 i, 138. * p 255,n, 2; also pp. 119, n.3; 275,n.2. etc; and of. p. 198,n,3. See also on dhratu, p. Ixxxv.xiv “or self,’ and those which have attained that “ideal Better” and have no “beyond” {an-uttara) are intorpreted as having transcended or rejected tho soul or self.? To appreciate the relative consistency with which the Buddhists tried to govern their philosophy, both in subject and in treatment, in accordance with this fundamental principle, we must open a book of Western psychology, more or less contemporary, such as the De Anima, and note the sharply contrasted position taken up at the outset. “The object of our inquiry,” Aristotle says in his opening sentences, “ is to study and asccieain the nature and essence of the Psyche, as well as its accident . .. It may be well to distinguish .. . the geaus to which the Psyche belongs, and determine what it is... whether it is a something and an essence, or quantity or quality . . . whether it is among entities in potentiality, or whether rather it is a reality . . Now, the knowledge of anything in itself seems to be useful towards a right conception of the causes of the accidents in substances . . . But the knowledge of tho accidents con- tributes largely in its turn towards knowing what the thing essentially is... Thus the essence is the proper beginning for every demonstration...” The whole standpoint which the Buddhists brought into question, and decided to be untenable as a basis of sound doctrine, is here accepted and taken as granted. A phenomenon, of series of phenomena, is, on being held up for investigation, immediately and unhesitatingly looked upon under one of two aspects : either it must be a substance, essence, reality, or it belongs to one of those nine other “ Categorics “—quantity, quality, ete-—which constitute the phenomenon an attribute or group of attributes cohering in a substance. It is true that Aristotle was too progressive and original a thinker to stop here. In his theory of mind as ei8us ot “form”, in itself mere potentiality, but becoming actuality Vp. 27nd; p.303,n. 1.xlv as implicato in, and as energizing body, he endeavoured to transform tho animism of current standpoints into a more rational conception. And in applying hia theory he goes far virtually to resolve mind into phenomenal process (De An., III, chaps. vii, viii). But he did not, or would not, wrench himself radically out of the primitive soil and plant his thought on a fresh basis, as the Buddbist dared to do. ence Creek thought abode, for all his rationalizing, saturated with substantialist methods, till it was found acceptable by and was brought up into an ecclesiastical philosophy which, from its Patristic stage, had inherited a tradition steeped in animistic standpoints. Modern science, however, has been gradually training the popular mind to a phenomenalistic point of view, and joining hands in psychology with the anti-substantialist traditjon of Hume. So that tho way is being paved for a more general appreciation of the earnest effort made by Buddhism—an effort stupendous and astonishing if we consider its date and the forces against it—to sever the growth of philosophic and religious thought from its ancestral stem and rear it in a purely rational soil. But the philosophic elaboration of soul-theory into Sub- stantialism is complicated and strengthened by a deeply important factor, on which I have already touched. This factor is the exploitation by philosophy, not of primitive Weltanschauung, but of a fundamental fact in intellectual procedure and intellectual economy. I refer to the process of assimilating an indefinite number of particular impressions, on the ground of a common resemblance, into a “ generic idea” or general notion, and of referring to each assimilated product by means of a common name. Every act of cognition, of coming-to-know anything, is reducible to this compound function of discerning the particular and of assimilating it into something relatively general. And this process, in its most abstract’ terms, is cognizing Unity in Diversity, the One through and beneath the Many.xivi Now no one, even slightly conversant with the history of philosophy, can have failed to note the connexion thero has ever been set up between the concept of substratum and phenomena on tho one hand, and that of the Ono and the Many on the other. They have become blended together, though they spring from distinct roots. And so essontial, in every advanco made by the intellect to extend knowledge and to reorganize its acquisitions, is tho co-ordinating and economizing efficacy of this faculty of generalizing, that its alliance with any other deep-rooted traditional product of mind must prove a mighty stay. A fact in the growth of religious and of philosophic thought which so springs out of the very working and growth of thought in general as this tendency to unify must seem to rest on unshakeable foundations. And when this implicit logic of intellectual procedure, this subsuming the particular under tho general, has been rendered: explicit in a formal system: of definition and’ predication and syllogism, such as was worked out by the Greeks, the breach of alliance becomes much harder. For the progress in positive knowledge, as organized by tho logical methods, is brought into harmony with Progress in religious and philosophic thought. This advance in the West is still in force, except in so far as psychological advance, and scientific progress generally, tell on the traditional logic and philosophy. Psychological analysis, for instance, shows that we may confuse the effective registration of our knowledge with the actual . disposition of the originals. That is to say, this perceiving and judging, by way of generalizing and unifying, is the only way by which we aro able to master the infinite diversities and approximate uniformities of phenomena. And it is true that through such procedure great results are attained. Conceptions are widened and deepened. Laws are discovered and then taken up under moro general Jaws, Knowledge groups all phenomena under a few aspects of all butxbvii supreme genorality. Unification of knowledge is everywhere considered as the ideal aim of intellect. But, after all, this is only the ideal method and economy of intellect. The stenographer’s ideal is to compress ” recorded matter into the fewest symbols by which he can reproduce faithfully. Limitations of time and faculty constrain us to become mental stenographers. Wo simplify concrete reality by abstractions, we compress it by generalizations, And the abstract and general terms become symbols which perhaps are not adequately the mirrors of the real and the true. Now whatever be our view as to the reality of an external world outside our perception of it, psychology teaches us to distinguish our fetches of abstraction and generalization for what they are psychologically—i.e. for effective mental shorthand—whatever they may represent besides. The logical form-of Universal in term and in proposition is as much 8 token of our weakness in realizing the Particular as of our strength in constructing what is at best an abstract and hypothetical whole. The philosophical concept of the One is pregnant with powerful associations. To what extent is it simply as a mathematical symbol in a hypothetical cosmos of carefully selected data, whence the infinite concrete is eliminated lest it “should flow in over us”? and over- whelm us? Now, the Buddhistic phenomenalism had also both the one and the other member of this great alliance of Noumenon and Unity to contend with. But the alliance had, so far at least as we know or can infer, not yet‘ been, welded together bya logical organon, or by any develop- ment in inductive science. Gotama and his apostles were, to some extent, conversant the best culture of their age, yet when they shape their discourse according to anything 2 Infra,-"§1345: “Yam... papaki aknsala dhamma anvassaveyyum.” Cf Maudsley, Body and Will, p. 225.xlviii we should call logic, they fall into it rather than wield it after the conscious fashion of Plato or Aristotle. .Nor is there, in the books, any clear method practised of definition according to genus and species, or of mutual exclusion among concepts, Thus freer in harness, the Buddhist revolutionary philosophy may be said to have attompted a relatively less impracticablo task. The devclopment of a science and art of logic in Indi, as wo know it, was lator in time; and though Buddhist thinkers helped in that development, it coincided precisely with the decline of Buddhistic non-substantialism, with the renascence of Pantheistic thought, VI. On the Inquiry into Riipam (Form), and the Buddhist Theory of Sense. Taking dha min, then, to mean phenomena considered - as knowledge—in other words, as actually or potentially states of consciousness—we may next look moro closely into that which tho catechism brings out respecting rapam (Book II and_§583) considered as a species of dhamma, By this procedure we shall best place ourselves. at the threshold, so to speak, of the Buddhist position, both as to its psychology and its view of things in general, and be thus better Ied up to the ethical import of the questions in the Srst part. Tho entire universe of dha mm is classed with respect to ripam in questions 1091, 1092 (Book III). They are there shown to be either ripino, having form, or a-ripino, not having form. The positive category comprises the four great phenomena {four elements) and all their derivatives”. The negative term refers to what we should call modes or phases of consciousness, or subjective experience—that is, to “ the skandhas of feeling, perception, 1 Ci, the writer's art.“ Logic” (Buddhist): Ency. Religion and Ethics.xlix synergies, and cognition as well as to “ unconditioned element". (The skandhas are also “elements "—that is, irreducible but phenomenal factors (see p. 119, n.3), real although phenomenal.! Rapam would thus appear at first sight to be a name for the external world, or for the extended universe, as contrasted with the unextended, mental, psychical, or subjective universe. Personally, I do not find, so fer, that the Eastern and Western concepts can be so easily made to coincide. It will be better before, and indeed without, as yet, arriving at any such conclusive judgment to inquire into the application made of the term in the Manual generally. We find riipam used in three, at least, of the various meanings assigned to it in the lexicons. It occurs first, and very frequently, as the general name for the objects of the sense of sight. It may then stand as simply ripam (§ 617, “this which is visible object”, as opposed to § 621," etc. “ this which is ‘sound’, ‘odour’,” ete.). More usually it is spoken of as riipirammanam, object of sight (p. 1), or as riipayatanam, sphere (province, Gebiet) ‘of sights or things seen (pp. 158, 167 et seq.) It includes both sensations of colour and lustre and the complex sensations of form. Used in this connexion, it is nearest to its popular meaning of “‘ shape”, “ visible likeness”, and its specialization is, of course, only due to the psychological fact that sight is the spokesman and interpreter of all the senses, so that “I see” often stands for “I perceive or discern through two or more modes of sensation”. On this point it is worth while pointing out an interesting flash of psychological discrimination in the Commentary. It will be noticed in the various kinds of rupayatanam enumerated in § 617 (p. 168,n. }) that, after pure visual sensations have been instanced, different magnitudes and forms are added, such as “long”, “ short”, Cf. Compendium of Philosophy, p. 255.1 ‘ etc. On these Buddhaghosa remarks: “ Hére, inasmuch as wo are able to tell ‘long’, ‘ short’, etc., by touch, while wo cannot so discern ‘blue’, ete., therefore ‘long’, ‘short’, and the rest are not objects of vision excopt figuratively (literally, not without explanation, cf. p. xxxili, n. 2). 4, B, placed in such a relation to C, D, is only by customary usage spoken of as something seen” (Asl. 316).!- This may not bring us up to Berkeley, but it is a farther step in that direction than Aristotle's miere hint—“ There is a movement which is perceptible both by Touch and Sight "—when he is alluding to magnitudes, etc, being “common sensibles”, ie. perceptible by more than one sense? - . To resume: Riipam, in its wider senso (as “all form”), may"be due to the popular generalization and repre~ sentative function’ of’ thé sense of sight, expressed in Tennyson's lines “For knowledge ia of things we see... And thus, even as philosophical concept, it may, loosely speaking, have stood for “things seen”, as contrasted with the unseen world of dhamma ardpino. But this is by-no means an adequate rendering of the term in its more careful and technical use in the second Book of our Manusl. For, as may there be seen, much of the content of “ form” is explicitly declared to be invisible? Rii pam occurs next, and, with almost equal frequency, together with its opposite, ard pam, to signify those two other worlds, realms or planes‘ of temporal existence, + The symbols are my own adaptation, not a literal rendering In the account of tho “external senses” or Indriyas given in the (later) Sinkhya textbooks, Professor Garbe points out that the objects of sight are limited to colour (ri pa), exclusive of form (Garbe, Die Samthya-Philosophic, p. 258). ? De Anim, II, vi. 2 CE. §§ 597 et seq., 657, 658, 751, 752, etc. * To the employment of “universe” for avacara m exception may be taken, since the latter term means only awhich Buddhism accepted along with other current mythology, and which, taken together with the lowest, or serisuous plarie of existence, exhaust the possible modes of rebirth. These avacaras, or loci of form and non-form, are described in terms of vague localization (§§ 1280-5) but it is not easy to realize how far existence.of either sort was conceived with anything like precision. Including the “upper” grades of the world of sensuous existence, they were more popularly known as heaven or Bagga (svarga), ic. the Bright. Their inhabitants were devas, distinguished into hosts variously named. Like the heaven of the West or the Near East, they were located “ above ", “upert”, i.e. above each next lower world (ef. below, § 1281,n. 4)! Unlike thet heaven, life in them was temporal, not eternal, - Bat the Dhammu-sengani throws no few light on the Kind of states they were supposed to be. Nor does Baddhagho& here figure as"sn Eastern Dante, essaying ether dogmatically or as in a dream, lable oracles’ as were hinted at by a Paul “ caught up te ‘d heaven ... whether in the body or out of the body T cannot tell—God knoweth ”, or the ecstatic visions of a John in lonely exile. The Atthasdlini is not free from ee “universe of discourse”, or “of thought”, than of any physically conceived actuality. It seemed to fit Dé Morgan's dehnition cl denial may take place”, the universe of form, for-instance, cither as a vague, vast concept “in” time and effort; or as a state of mind, a rapt abstraction—in either case a universe of thought" for the time ben ‘ The simplest (possible the oldest) Sutta-statement of the four whereabouts of rebirth other than human is in 73. Ct. the writer's “ Buddhist Theory of Rebirth ”; Quest Review, Jan., 1922.li divagations on matters of equally secondary importanco to the carnest Buddhist.t Yet it has nothing to tell of a mode of being endowed with raps, yet without the kama, or sensuous impulses held to be bound up with raps, when the term is used in its wider sense? Nor does it enlighten us on the more impalpable denizens of a plane of being where rapa itself is not, and for which no terms seem held appropriate save such as express high fetches of abstract thought? We must go back, after all, to the Nikiyas foc such brief hints ay we can find, We do hear, at least, in the Digha Nkiys, of beings in one of the middle cizcles of the Form heavens termed Radiant (Abhassara) as “made of mind, feeding on joy, radiating light, traversing the firmament, continuing in beauty "4 Were it not that we miss here the unending melody sounding throurh each circle of the Western poct’s Paradise we might welt apply this description to Dante's “anime liete”, who, like incandescent spheres :— “Fiammando forte a guisa di comete, E come cerchi in tempra ” oriuoli Si giran.” 5 1 CE ea, on a similar subject, Sum.V. i, 110. Buddhaghoss. fells us, it is trae (see Ast, p. 352), that the food of the Nlewas wha inbabited the highest sphere of the sensuous world was of the maximum degree of refinement, leading perhaps to the jnference that in the two superior planes it was not required. 2 See § 595: “All form is that which is... related, or which belongs to the universe of sense, not to that of form, ‘or to that of the formless.” 2 See the four Aruppas, pp. 65-3. «Di, 17, Again we read (D. i, 195), that of the three possible “ personalities” of current tradition, one was made of mind, having form, and a complete organism, and one was without fom and made of consciousness, or perception (ari pt saahamayo). In BM. i, HOC, devi ripino manomayS sre distinguished [rom devi ardpino safifimays. S There is no fack of music in some of the lower Indian heavens, Cf. eg. BL. §,-252 on Sakka the god enjoying the music in bis sensuous paradise, And see Viméne ‘Vatthu, passim,hit Liker to those brilliant visions tho heavens of Form seam to have been than to the “quiet air” and “ the moadow of fresh verduro " on that slope of Limbo where “Gonti v' eran con occhi tardi ¢ gravi”, who . “ Parlavan rado, con voci soavi”. Yet the rare, sweet utterances of these devas of Europe, discoursing with “the Master of these who kaow”, may better have accorded with the Buddhist conception ‘of the temotest worlds os inhabited by “beings made of mind” than the choric dances of the-spheres above. Among these shadowy beings, however, we are far from the fully bodied out ides of the “all form” and tho “ skandha of form” of the second and third Books of the Manual. It may bo that the worlds of ri ps and arf pa were 60 called in popular tradition because in the former, visible, and in the latter, invisible beings resided.1_ But there is no lack of information concerning the attributes of form in the “ sensuous universe” of kimavacaram. If tho list given of these in the first chapter of Book II be consulted, it will be seen that I have not followed the reading of the PTS. edition when it states that all form is kimavaecaram eva, riipa- Vacaram eva, that is, is both related to the universe of senso and also to that of form. The Siamese edition reads kamavacaram eva, na ripavacaram eva. It may seem at first sight illogical to say that form is not related to the universe of form. But the better logic is really on the side of the Siamese. In §§ 1281-4 of my translation * The Suttas leave us in no doubt as to the presence of nraterial conditions in the Brahma sphere of the Ripa world and its devas. CL. Kindred Sayings, i, 173: The shoulder, knee, atms of its ruler and bis robe. He assumed a relatively grosser body to enable him to visit the “lower ” heavens. Dialogues, ii, 244, 264. Whether a yet grosser one was needed for earth-visits is not stated. Because of this glimpse of sublimated matter in the Ripa world I called it, in Maung Tin's Expositor, the realm of attenuated matter. But no good term is forthcoming. Cf. note, p. cili,liv a it is seen that the a vacaras wore mutually exclusive as to their contents, To belong to the universe of form involved exclusion from that of sense. But in the inquiry into “all form” we are clearly occupied with facts about this present world and about women and monas we know them—-in s word, with the world of sense. Hence the “‘ all form” of Book IT is clearly not the form of the ripaivacaram. It is not used with the same implications. Further than this, further than the vague nvacara- geography gathered already from other sources, the Manual does not bring us, nor the Commentary either. We come, then, to ripam in the sensuous plane of being, or at lesst to such portion of that plane as is con- cerned with human beings; to sabbam ripam and to its distribution .in each human economy, termed ripakkhandho. Under it are comprised four ultimate primary, or underivable, constituents and twenty-three secondary, dependent, or derived modes. Thus :— Ripam | ag No upadé Upada = (a) The Tangible = (a) The Five Senses, (to. earthy or (0) The Four Objects of Sense solid, (excluding Tangibles), lambent {c) The Three Organic Faculties, or fiery, (@) The Two Modes of Intimation, gaseous (e) The Element of Space, or serial (f) Three Qualities of Form, elements, (9) Three Phases in the Evolution or: great of Form, phenomena), (h) Impermanence of Form, (8) The Fluid (i) Nutriment. (or moist) element. To enter with any fullness of discussion into thisen ly classification, eo rich in interesting suggestions, would occupy itself a volume. In an introduction of mere notes I will offer only a few general considerations. We are probably first impressed by the psychological aspect taken of a subject thet might seem to lend itself to purely objective consideration. The main constituents of the material world, classified in the East as we know them to havo been classified, contemporancously, in the West, are set down in terms of Subjective or conscious experience. The a po- dkitu is not called explicitly the Intangible; virturlly, however, it and the other three “Great Phenomena", or literally “Great things that have Become”, are regarded from the point of view of how they affect us by way of sense. We might add, how they affect us most fundamentally by way of sense. In the selection of Touch among the senses the Indian tradition joins hands-with Demokritus. But of this no more at present. . Again, in the second table, or secondary forms, the same standpoint is predominant, We have the action and reaction of sense-object and sense, the distinctive expressions of sex and of personality generally, and the phenomena of orgonic life, as “sensed” or inferred, comprehended under the * Better in Greck +4 yeqvépeva, ot in German die vier grossen Gewcordenen. In the Compendium (1910), 8. Z. Aung and I ayzee to use the term “ Great essenCtial”. P.M. Tin, in the Expositor, follows suit. How the Buddhist logic exactly reconciled the anomaly of &podhatu as underived and yet as inaccessible to that sense which comes into contact with the underived is not, in the Manuel, clearly made out. In hot water, as the Cy. says, there is hest, gas, and solid, and hence we feel it. Yeu by the definition there must be in fivid a something underived from these three elements, The Buddbist Sensstionalism was opposed to the view taken in the Upanishad, where the senses are derived from prajia (rendered by Professor Deussen “ consciousness ”), and again from the World Soul. In the Garbha Up., however, sight is spoken of as fire. The Buddhist view was subsequently again opposed by the Sinkhya philosophy, but not by the Nyaya.Wi most general terms. ‘Two modes of form alone are treated objectively: space and food. And of theso, too, the sspect taken has close reference to the conscious personality. Aka 80 is really 0 ko, room, or opportunity, for life and movement. Food, though described as to its varieties in objective terms, is referred to rather in the abstract sense of nutrition and nutriment than as nutritive mater. (Cf. p. 186, n. 3.) Or we may be more especially struck by the curious selection and classification exercised in regard to the items of the catalogue of form. Now, the compilers of this or of any of the canonical books were not interested in rapam on psychological grounds as such. Their object was not what we should term scientific. They were not inquiring into forms, either as objective existences or as mental constructions, with any curiosity respecting the macrocosm, its parts, or its order. They were not concerned with problems of primordial Ay, of firss ceuses, or of organic evolution, in the spirit which has been operative in Western thought from Thales (claimed by Europe) to Darwin. For thom, as for tho leaders of that other rival movement in our own culture, the tradition of Socrates and Plato, man was, first and last, the subject supremely worth thinking about. And man was worth thinking about as a moral being. The physical universe was the background and accessory, the support and the “fuel ” (up&dinam), of the evolution of the moral life. That universe was necessary to man (at least during his sojourn on the physical plane), but it was only in so far as it affected his ethical life that he could profitably study it. The Buddhist, like the Socratic view, was that of primitive man— “What is the good of it "transformed and sublimated by the evolution of the moral ideal. The early questioning : Is such and ‘such good for life-preservation, for race- preservation, for fun? or is it bad? or is it indeterminate? becomes, in evolved ethics: Does it make for my perfection,Wii for others’ perfection, for noblest enjoyment t does it make for the contrary ? does it make for neither ? And tho advance in moral evolution which was attempted by Buddhist philosophy, coming as it did in an age of metaphysical dogmatism and withal of ecepticiam, brought with it the felt need of looking deeper into those data of mental procedure on which dogmatic speculation and ethical convictions were alike founded. Viewed in this light, the category of raipam ot of ripakkhandho becomes fairly intelligible, both as to the selection and classification of subject matter and as to the standpoint from which it is regarded. As a learner of ethical doctrine pursuing either the lower or the higher ideal, the Buddhist was coucerned with the external world just as far as it directly and inevitably affected his moral welfare and that of other moral beings, that is to say, of all conscious animate beings. To this extent did he receive instruction concerning it. Tn the fisst place, the great ultimate phenomena of his physical world were one and the same as the basis of his own physical being. That had form; so had this. That was built up of the fort elements ; so was this. That came into being, persisted, then dissolved ; this wes his destiny, too, as 8 temporary collocation or body, “subject to exasion, abrasion, dissolution, and disintegration.”* And al. that side of life which we call mind or consciousness, similarly con- ceived as collocations or aggregates, was bound up therein and on that did it depend. , Hete, then, was 2 vital kinship, a common basis of physical being which it behoved the student of man to recognize and take into account, so as to hold an intelligent and con- sistent attitude towards it. The bhikkhu sekho?® 1 G. Croom Robertson, Philosophical Remains, p. 3. *D. i, 76, eg. 2 ‘The brother in orders undergoing training, M. i, 4.Iii “who has not attained, who is aspiring after, the unsurpassable goal’, has to know, inter alia, earth, water, fire, air, each for what it is, both as external and as part of himself must Inow “ unity” (ok atte m) for what it is; ust indrige in no conceits of fancy (ma maiiiii) about it or them, and must so regard them that of him it may one day be said by the wise: parifiidtam tassal—“‘he knows it thoroughl To this point we shall return. That the elements are considered under the aspect of their tangibility involves for the Buddhist the further inquiry into the sensitive agency by which they affect him as tangibles, and so into the problem of sensation and sense-perception in general. On this subject the Dhamma-sangani yields a positive and valuable contribution to our knowledge of the history of psychology in India in the fourth century’a.c. It may contain no matter additional to that which is reproduced in Hardy's Manual of Budhism (pp. 399-404, 419-23). But Hardy drew directly from relatively modem sources, aud though it is interesting to see how far and how faithfully the original tradition has been kept intact in theso exegetical works, we tum gladly to the stronger attractions of the first academic formulation of a theory of sense which ancient India has hitherto preserved for us. There is no such analysis of sensation—full, sober, positive, so far as it goes—put forward. in any Indian book of an equally early date. The pre- Buddhistic Upanishads (and those, too, of later date) yield only poetic adumbrations, sporadic aphorisms on the work of the senses. The Nyaya doctrine of pratyaksha or perception, the Jaina Satras, the elaboration of the Vedanta and Sankhya doctrines are, of course, of far later date. It may not, therefore, be uncalled for if I digress at some length on the Buddhist position in this matter and look for parallel theories in the West rather than in India itself. 1 Mi, pp. 185 et seg. ; pp. £21 et seq.dix Tho theory of action and reaction between the five special ! senses and their several objects is given in pp. 172-90 and 197-200 of my translation. It may be summarized as follows : A. The Senses. First, a general statement relating each sense in turn (a) to the four elements, ic. to “ Nature”, (6) ty the individual orgonism, snd affirming its invisibility and its power of impact. Secondly, an analysis of the sensory process, in each case, into (a) A personal agency oz apparatus capable of reacting to an impact not itself ; (8) An impingeing “form, or form producing a reaction of one specific kind ; (c) Impact between (2) and (2), with reference to the time-dimension ?; . (2) Resultant modification of the mental continuum, . Wiz. in the first place, contact (of a specific sort); then hedonistic result, or intellectual result, or, presumably both. The modification is twicé stated in each case, emphasis being laid on the mutual impact, first as causing the modification, then as constituting the object of attention in the modified consciousness of the Person affected. B. The Sense-objects. First, a general statement, releting each kind of vense- object in turn to nature, describing some of the typical varieties, and affirming its invisibility, except in the case of visual objects,? and its power of producing impact. 1 They sre called “special” in modern psychology to dis- tinguish them from organic, general, or systemic sense, which works without specially adapted peripheral organs, * Not as in any way constracting space-percepts, but as pertinent to the question of karma and rebirth. > This insistence on the invisibility of all the senses, as well as on that of all sense-objects except sights or visual forms, is to me only explicable on the ground that ri pa m recurring in each question and each answer, and signifying, whatever elseIx Secondly, an analysis of the sensory process in each caso as under A, but, as it were, from the side of the senso-object, thus + (a) A mode of form or senso-object, capable of producing impact en a special apparatus of the individual organism ; (4) The impact of that apparatus ; (c) The reaction or complementary impact of the sense- object ; (d) Resultant modification of the mental continuum, viz in the first place contact (of a specific sort); then hedonistic result, or intellectual . sult, or, presumably, both. The modification is twice stated, in each case emphasis being laid on the mutual impact, first as causing the modification, then as constituting the object of attention in the modified consciousness thus affected. If we, for purposes of comparison, cortsult Greek views om sense-perception before Aristotle—say, down to 350 3.¢. we shall find nothing to equal this for sobriety, consistency, and thoroughness. The surviving fragments of Empedoklean writings on the subject read beside it like airy fancies; nor do the intact utterances of Plato bring us anything more scientific, Very possibly in Demokritus we might have found ite match, had we more of him than a few quotations. And there is reason to surmise as much, or even more, in the case of Alkm:eon. ‘Let me not, however, be understood to be reading into the Buddhist theory more than is actually there. In its sober, analytical prose, it is no less archaic, naive, and inadequate as explanation than any pre-Aristotelian theory of the Greeks. The comment of Dr. Siebeck on Empedokles applies equally it meant, in populsr idiom, things seen, it was necessary, ia philosophic usage, to indicate that the term, though referring to sense, did not, with one exception, connote things scen. ‘Thus, even solid and fiery objects were, quié tangibles, not visible. ‘They were not visible to the kAyo, or skin-sensibility. They spelt visible only to the eye. * See n. 1 to § 617.Iki to it:* “It sufficed him to have indicated the possibility of the external world penetrating the senso-organs, as though this were tantamount to an explanation of sensation. The whole working out of his theory is an attempt to translate in terms of a detailed aud consecutive physiological process the primitive, naive view of cognition.” Theory of this calibre was, im Greece, divided between impact: (Alkmeon, Empedokles, with respect to sight, Demokritus, Plato, who, to impact, adds a comningling of sense and object) and access (efflux and pote theory of Empedokles) as the essential part of the process. The Buddhist explanation contiues itself to impact? But neither East nor West, with the possible exception of Alkmaon, had yet gripped the notion of a conducting medium. In Aristotle all is changed. “Eidéla” which collide, and “ aporrhow ” which penetrate, have been thrown aside for an examination into “ metaxu”. And we find the point of view similarly shifted -in Buddhaghosa’s tinje, though how long before him this advance had been made wo do not know. Because of the eye and the visible shape, eye-consciousness arises ; the collision (sangati) of the three is contact (phasso, or, as we should’say, sensation)? So the early Suita. According to the commentator, the eye itself {and each sense-organ) does not touch the object; it is phasso that touches it, gud drammanam, that is, mental object. Hence phesso appears as pure psychic medium or process, working psycho-physically through the active sense-organ. Nor was there, in the earlier thought of East and West, any clear dualistic distinction drawn between mind and matter, between physical (and physiological) motion or stimulus on the one hand, and consequent or concomitant mental modification on the other, in an act of sense-pereeption. 1 Geschichte der Psychologie, i, 107. ? Acccss comes later into prominence with the development of the “ Door-theory”. See following section. ML * Sum. ¥.bdi The Greek explanations are what would now be called materialistic. The Buddhist description may bo interpreted either way. It is true that in the Milinda-paitho, written some three or four centuries later than our Manual, the action. and reaction of sense and senso-object ate compared in realistic metaphor to the elash of two cymbals and tho butting of two goats! But, being metaphorical, this account brings us really no further. The West, while it retained the phraseology characterizing the earlier theory of sense, ceased to imply any direct physical impact or contact when speaking of being “struck” by sights, sounds, or ideas. How far, and how early, was this also the case in the East ? The Buddhist theory, with an unconscious parallelism, discerned, in the word for a material sensation: “‘ touch,” or “contact”, a psychical complement getting at and trans- forming the external object, making it a mental presentation. If dhamma aro concciyed, as in the Manual, as actual or potential states of consciousness, and ripam is con- ccived as a species of dhammaé, it follows that both the ripam, which is “ external” and comes into contact with the riipam which is “of the self”, and also this latter ripam are regarded in the light of the two mental factors necessary to constitute the third factor, viz. an act of sensory consciousness, actual or potential. Such may have been the psychological aspect adumbrated, groped after—not to go further—in the Dhamma-sangani itself. That the traditional interpretation of this impact- theory grew psychological with the progress of culture in the schools of Buddhism seems to be indicated by such a comment in the Atthasilini as: “ strikes (impinges) on form is a term for the eye (ie. the visual sense) being receptive of the object of consciousness.” ? This seems to bea clear attempt to resolve 1 Milindapanho, p. 60.- SBE., vol. xxxv, pp. 92, 93. CI. below, p.4, n.2. 3 Ast 309. Cakkhum drammanam sampaticcha- yaminam eva ripamhi patibaifiati nima.Axiii the old metaphor, or, it may be, the old physical concept, into terms of subjective experience. Again, when alluding to the simile of the cymbals and the yams, ‘ve are told by Buddhaghosa to interpret “oye” by “visual cognition ” and to take the “concussion” in the sense of function. Once more he tells us that when feeling arises through contact the real causal antecedent is mental, though apparently external.? Without pussuing this problem further, we cannot leave the subject of sense and sensati n without a word of comment and comparison on the prominence given in the Buddhist theory to the notion of “contact” and the sense of touch, As with us, both terms are from the same stem. But phasso (contact), on the one hand, is generalized to include all receptive experience, Sensory as well as ideational,> and to represent the essential antecedent and condition of all feeling (or sensation = vedana). On the other hand, phusati, photthabbam (to touch, the tangible) are specialized to express the activity of one of the senses. Now, the functioning of the tactile sense (termed body- sensibility or simply body, k ay 0 , pp. 166, 167) is described in precisely the same terms as each of the other four senses, Nevertheless, it is plain, from tho significant application of the term tangible, or object of touch, alluded to already— Jet alone the use of “contact” in a wider sense—that the Buddhists regarded Touch es giving us Imowledge of things “without” in a more fundamental way than the other senses could. By the table of the contents of r& pam given above, we have seen that it is only through Touch that a knowledge of the underived elements of the world of sense could be obtained, the fluid or moist clement alone excepted. This interesting point in the psychology of early Buddhism may possibly be formulated somewhere in the Abhidhamma 2 See below, p.4, n.2. 2 See below, p. 6, n. 3._ hiv Pitaka, I should feel more hopeful in’ thjs respect had the compilers been, in tho first instance, not ethical thinkers, but impelled by the scientific curiosity of a Domokritus. The latter, as is well known, rogarded all sensation as either bare touch or developments of touch—a view borne out to a great oxtent by modern biological research. ‘This was, perhaps, a corollary of his atomistic philosophy. Yet that Demokritus was no mere. deductive system-spinner, but an inductive observer, is shown in the surviving quotation of his dictum, that"we should proceed, in our inferences, “ from phenomena to that which is not manifest.” Now, as the Buddhist view of rfipam calls three of the four elements “ underived” and “the tangible”, while it calls tho senses and all other sense-objects “derived from that tangible” and from fluid, one might almost claim that their position with respect to Touch was in effect parallel to that of Demokritus. The Commentary does not assist us to any clear conclusion on this matter. But, in addition to the remark quoted above, in which visual magnitudes are pronounced to be really tactile sensations, it has one interesting illustration of our proverb, “ Seeing is believing, but Touch is the real thing.” Tt likens the four senses, excluding touch, to the striking of four balls of cotton-wool on anvils by other lumps of cotton. But‘in Touch, as it were, a hammer smites through the wool, getting at the bare anvil? Further considerations on the Buddhist theory of sense, taking us beyond bate sensation to the working up of such material into concrete acts of perception, I propose to consider briefly in the following section. The-remaining heads of the riipa-skandha are very concisely treated in the Niddesa- answers (pp. 190-7), and, save in tho significance of their selection, call for no special treatment. 2 Asl. 263; below, n. 1 to $443, I have corrected this passage in accordance with $. Z. Aung’s criticism. Compendium, 232.Tew C. The Three Organie Faculties. It is not quite clear why senses and sense-objects should be followed by three indriyas—by three only and just these three. The senses themselves are often termed indriyas, and not only in Buddhism. In the indriyas of sex, however, and the phenomena of nutrition, the riipa-skandha, in-both the self and other sclves, is certainly catalogued under two aspects as general and.as impressive as that of sense. In fact, the whole organism as modifiable by the “sabbam ripam” without, may be said to be summed up under these three aspects. They fit fairly well into our division of the receptive side of the organism, considered, psycho- physically, as general and special sensibility. From his ethical standpoint the learner did well to take the life in which he shared into account under its impressive aspects of sense, sex and nutrition. And this not only in so far as he was receptive. The very term indriyam, which is best paralleled by the Greek Svvayus, or faculty—ie. “ powers in us, and in all other things, by which we do as we do” \~ and which is interpreted to this effect by Buddhaghosa,? points to the active, self-expressive side of existence. And there is in later exegesis a felt awareness of the importance of faculties as controllers and preservers of the organism.* Both as recipient, then, and as agent, the learner of the Dharma had to acquire and maintain a certain attitude with respect to these aspects of the ripa-skandha. D, E. Intimation and Space. The same considerations apply to the next two kinds of riipam, with which we may bracket the next after them. The two modes of “intimation” or self-expression exhaust the active side of life as such, constituting, as one might say, a2 world of sub-derivative or tertiary form, and calling 1 Republic, v. 477. 2 As, p. 119 and passim. 2 Compendiuan, 228.levi quite especially for modification by theory and practic (dassanonaca bhavaniya ca). And the element of spaco, strange as it looks, at first sight, to find it listed just here, was of account for the Buddhist only as a necessary datum or postulate for his sentient and active life. The vacua of the body, as well as its plena, had to be reckoned in with tho rdpa-skandha; likewise the space without by which bodies were delimitated, and which, yielding room for movement, afforded us the three dimensions." ‘The grounds for excluding space from the four elements and for calling it “derived remain in obscurity. In th Maha Rahulovada-Sutta (cited below) it is ranked immediately after, and apparently as co-ordinate with, the other four. And it was so ranked, oftener-than not, by Indian thought generally. Yet in another Sutta of the same Nikiya—the Maha Hatthipadopama - Sutta — Siriputta describes four elements, leaving out Ak aso. Eliminated for somo reason from the Underived, when the Dbamma-sangapi was compiled, it was logically necessary to include it under Derived Ripam. That it was so included because it was held to be & meptgl construction or a “ pure form of intuition”, is scarcely tenable. . Ff, G, H. Qualities of Form. And yet the ‘hext seven items of derived form are apparently to be eccepted rather as concepts or aspects of form than as objective properties or “ primary qualities” of it. Be that as it may, all the seven are so many common 1 See below, n. 1 to§$ 438; also M. i, 423. In the former passage space is described as if external to the organism in the latter Gotama admonishes his son respecting the internal Akdso. On the interesting point put forward by von Schroeder of a connexion between Akaga and the Pytha- gorean cAcar, see Professor Garbe in the Vienna Oriental Journal, xiii, Neo. 4, 1899. The former scholar refers io the cranking of space as a fifth element, as ® schwankend uberlieferte Bezeichnung. Tt was so for Buddhism (D. iii, 247; M. ili, 239, 240).lyvii facts about rOpam, both ss “sabbam” and as skandhs. The Three Qualities * indicated the ideal efficiency for moral ends to which the ripa-ckandha, or any form serving such an end, should be brought. Tho Three Phases in the organic evolution of form and the great fact of Impermanence applied everywhere and always to, all form. And as such all hed to be borne in mind, all had to co-operate in shaping theory and practice. 1 Nutriment. Concerning, lastly, the &h Aro, or support, of the riipa- skandha, the hygiene and ethics of diet are held worthy of rational discussion in the Sutta Pitaks.? Wehave now gone with more or less details into the divisions of rapam im the “sensuous universe”, with a view of seeing how far it coincided with any general philosophical concept in use among ourselves. For me it does not-fit well with any, and the vague term “form”, implicated as it is, like rilpam, with “things wo see”, is perhaps the most serviceable, ts inclusion of faculties and abstract notions 85 integral factors prevent, its coinciding with matter”, or “the Extended ”, or “the External World”. If we turn to the list of attributes given in Chapter I of Book II, Til pam appears as preeminently the unmoral (as to both cause and effect) and the non-mental, It was “ favourable ”” to immoral states, as the chief constituent of a world that had to be mastered end transcended by moral culture, but the immoral states exploiting it were of the other four skandhas, Tt inchuded the phenomena of sense, but rather on their physkal pre-mental side than as foll-fledged facts of con- sciousness. And it was sharply distinguished, as a constituent “collocation” or “ aggregate ” (skandha, rasi), in the total 2 Lightness, plasticity, widldiness, § 639-41. ? Cheg. M. 3, Suttas 54, 55, 65, 66,70. There was also the philowphical aspect of ahiro as cause, or basis. See my Buddhist Psychology, 1944, p. 61.Ixviti aggregate of tho individual organism from the threo collocations called cotasika (feelings, perceptions, con- formations, or aynergics), and from that called citta (consciousness, thought, cognition). The attabh&ve, or personality, minus all mental and moral characteristics, is tiipam. As auch it is ono with ali ri pam not of its own com- position. It is ‘in touch" with the general impersonal ri par, as well ns with the mental and moral constituents of other personalities by way of their ripam. That this intercommunication was held to be possible on tho basis, and in virtue of, this common structure was probably sa implicit in the Buddhist doctcine as it was explicit in many of the early Greck philosophers. There are no open allusions to“ like being known by like ” in the Pitakas as a consciously held and deliberately stated principlé or ground of the impressibility of the sentient organism. {fortiori no such statement occurs in our Manual. But the phrase, recurring in the case of each of the special senses, “ derived from the four Great Phenomena,” may not have been inserted without this implication. | Without further evidence, however, I should not be inclined to attach philosophical significance in this direction to it. But, on tho one hand, we have an interesting hint in the Commentary that such # principle was held by Buddhist scholars. “ Where there is difference of kind (or creature), we read, there is no sensory stimulus. According to the Ancients, ‘Sensory stimulus is of similar kinds, not of different kinds.’ ” And again: “ The solid, both within and without, becomes the condition of the sense of touch in the laying hold of the object of perception—in discerning the tangible”? It is 313. Bhita visese hi sati pasido’va na uppajjati inam bhitanam hi paside, na visaminanan ti” 2 Ibid. 385, Ajjhattika-bahira pathavi etassa kayapssidassa Srammanagshane . . . photthabbajanane paccayo hoti.Ixix cue that Buddheghosa is discoursing, not on this question, but on what would now be called the specific energy, or specialized functioning, of nerve. Neverthelcas, it seems inferable from the quotations that the principle was established. And we know, also, how widely accepted (and also contested)? this same principle “H ywarcus tod épotou 1 Suoi was in Greece, from Empedokles to Plats end to Plotinus,? thinkers, all of them, who were affected, through Pythagorisin or elsewise, by the East. The vivid deseription by Buddheghosa (ef. below, vn. 173-4) of the presence in the seat of vision of tl... Jour elements is very sugzestive of Plato's account of sight in the “'Timmus”, where the principle is admitted. Whether as a principle, or merely as an empirical fact, the oneness of man's ripaskandha with the sabbam ripam without was thoroughly sdmitted, and carefally taught as orthodox doctrine. And with regard to this kinship, I repeat, a certain philosophical attitude, both theoretical and practical, was inculeated as generally binding. That attitude is, in one of the Majjhima discoursss; led up to and defined as follows: All good states (dha mm) whatever are included in the Four Noble Truths concerning II. Now the First Noble Truth unfolds the nature of Ill: that it lies in using the five skandhas for GraspingS And the first of ? CE. Aristotle's discussion, De An., i, 2 5. 7 CE the passage, Enn. i, 6, 9, reproduced by Goethe: 06 ip de aibrore cicew Gpluduis pier Ippacedipe pop yepeyncrus. 3 BL i, 184, ef seq. * See below, § 157. * Tbid., p. 323. T have retained the meaning of Grasping” as dictated by Buddhaghosa for the group of the Four Kinds of Graspiug. Dr. Neumann renders upadanak- khandho by “clement of the impulse to live” (Le bens trieb; an expression doubtlessly prompted Ly Schopen- hauer’s philosophy). It would be very desirable to learn from the Papaiica-siidani (Buddhaghosa’s -“ Conunentary on the Majjhima Nikiya”), whether. the Commentator interprets the term to the same efiect in both passages. He adheres to itdxx the five in that of rapam. Now rapam comprises the four Great Phenomena and all their derivatives. And the first of the four is Earth (tho solid element). Then the solid within, or “ belonging to the self”, is catalogued, with the injunction that i is to be regarded as i really is with right wisdom (yathibhitam sammapaiiiays datthabbam).' And this means that—while recognizing his kinship with the element to the full—tho good student should not identify himself with it so asto see in it a permanent unchanging substance as which he should persist amid transient phenomena. Ho was to refiect, “ This is not mine, it is not J, it is not the soul of me!” “ It is void of a Self.” * And so for the other three elements. In their mightiest manifestations—in the earthquake as in the flood, in con- agration as in tempest—they aro but temporal, phenomenal ; subject to change and decay. Much more is this true of them when collocated in the human organism. So far from losing himself in his meditation in the All, in Nature, in “cosmic emotion” of any kind, he had to realize that the ripam in which he participated was but one of tho five factors of that life which, in so far as it engulfed and mastered him and bore him drifting along, was the great Ill, the source of pain and delusion. From each of those five factors he had to detach himself in thought, and attain that position of mastery and emancipation whereby alone a better idéal self could emerge——temporary as s phenomenal collocation, yet aiming at the eternal. And the practical result of cultivating “this earth-culture” and the rest, ss Gotama called it in teaching his son, wes that “the mind was no longer entranced by the consideration of things as affecting in Vis. Magga, p. 569. Dhammadinni, the woman-apostle, explains upadanam, used with a similar context, as meaning “passionate desite in ‘the five skandhas-of-grasping ” (ML. i, 300). * 1M. ii, 272f 0 | ? See above, p. xliif, where. the context leaves no doubt as to what the reflection is meant to emphasize.best "him pleasantly or disagrecably ” but “ the equanimity which is based on that which is good was established And he thereat is glad—and rightly so—" for thus far he has wrought - a great work [8 ‘Theso seem to me some of the moro essential features in the Buddhist Dhamma concerning Rapa, VIL On the Buddhist Philosophy of Mind and Theory of Intellection, Tt would havo been the groatest possible gain to our know. ledge of the extent to which Buddhism has developed any clear psychological data from its ethics, had it occurred to the compilers of the Dhamma-Sangani to introduce an analysis of the other four skandhas parallel to that of the skandha of form. It is true that the whole work, except the béok on rdpam, is an inquiry into arGpino dhammé, ie. incorporeal, ummaterial phenomena, but there is no separate treatment of them divided up as such. Some glimpses we obtain incidentally, most of which have been pointed out in the footnotes to the translation. And it may prove useful to summarize briefly such contribution as may lie therein to the psychology of Buddhism. And, first, it is very difficult to say to what extent, if at all, such psychological matter as we find is distinctively and originally Buddhist, or how much was merely adopted from contemporary culture and incorporated with tho Dhamma. Into this problem I do not-here propose to inquire farther. If there be any originality, any new departure in the psychology scattered about the Nikiyas, it is more likely to be in aspect and treatment than in new matter. Buddhism preached a doctrine of regenerate personality, to be sought after and developed by and out of the personal resources of the individual. This development, in the case of the * © Ibid 192.ixxai religieux, was to be largely effected through a system of intellectual self-culturs. ‘Thrown back upon himself, he developed introspection, the study of consciousness. But, again, his doctrine imposed on him the study of psychical states without the psyche. Nature without and nature within met, ho was taught, acted and reacted, and the result told on the organism in a natural, orderly, necessary way.t But there was no one adjusting the machinery? The Buddhist might have approved of Leibniz’s amendment of Locke's “ Nihil est in intelleetu quod nor prius fuerit in sensu” in the “nisi ipse intellectus “. Dut he would not thereby have exalted v nam, cittam, or mano to any hypostatic permanence as prior or as immanent. He would only admit the arising of consciousness as a potential reaction to stimul of sense or “ ideas” (dhamma). Psychological earnestness, then, and psychological inguiry into mental phenomena, coexisting apart from and in opposition to, the usual assumption of a psychical entity : such are the only distinctively Buddhist features which may, in the absence of more positive evidence than we yet possess, be claimed in such analysis of mind as appears in Buddhist ethics. additional phrase Of the results of this earnest spirit of inquiry into mental phenomena, in so far as they may be detached from ethical doctrine, and assigned their due place in the history of human ideas, it will be impossible, for several years, to prepare any adequate treatment. Much of the Abhidhamma Pitaka, and even some of the Sutta Pitoka, still remains unedited? Of the former collection nothing has be2n translated with the exception of the attempt in this volume. And, since Buddhist psychology has an evolution to show covering nearly a thousand years, we ¢ have to await fresh materials Y CE Mil. 57-61, 7 Sum. V.i, 194. 2 This is happily now (1923) no longer the case, with the sole exception of most of the metrical legends of the Apadina.bxxiti from the yet unedited works of Buddhaghosa, the Buddhist Sanskrit texts, and such works as the Netti-pakarana, Professor Hardy’s edition of which is now in the press.t Meanwhile there is an increasing store of accessible material which might be sifted by the historical investigator, . There are, for instance, in the Dhamma-Sangani several Passages suggesting that Buddhist scholars, in con: templating the consciousness or personality as affected by phenomena considered as external, were keenly alive to the distinction between the happening of the expected and the happening of the unexpected, between instinctive reaction of the mind and the organism generally, on occasion of senso, and the deliberate confronting of external phenomena with e carefully adjusted intelligence. Modern psychology has ‘largely occupied itself with this distinction, and -with the problems of consciousness and subconseiousness, of volition and of memory, involved in it. The subject of attention, involuntary and voluntary, figures prominently jn the poychological literature of the last two decades. But it ia not till the centuries of post-Aristotelian and of neo-Platonic thought that we sce the distinction emerging in Western psychology contemporaneously with the develop- ment of the notion of consciousness. Tn the history of Buddhist thought, too, the distinetion Goes nod appear to have become explicitly and consciously made till the age of the writing of the Pali editions of the Commentaries (fifth century). A corresponding explicitness in the notion of consciousness and sclf-consciousness, or at least in the use of some equivalent terms, has yet to be traced. Buddhism is so emphatically a philosophy, both in theory and practice, of the conscious will, with all that } Published by the PTS. in 1901. 2 CE. Siebeck, op. cit., ii, pp. 200, 353, 398, * In the Maha Nidina Sutta Gotama discourses on sili conscire by way of néma-riipa. Sce in Grimblot's “ Sept Suttas”, Pp. 255. +ixxiv this involves of attention and concentration, that we hardly look to find terms discriminating such notions from among other mental characteristics. We ate reminded instead of Matthew Amold’s well-known remark that as, at Soli, no one spoke of solecisms, so in England we had to import the term Philistine. Bul, whereas it is the Atthasilini, written from tho standpoint of a later elaboration of thought, that makes explicit what it holds to be the intention of the classic manual, the latter work lends itself without straining to such interpretation. 1 pass over Buddhnghosa's comments on the limitations and the movements of attention, repreduced below (pp. 198, n. 2; 200, n. 1), as derived very possibly from though? nearer to his own times. Again, with respect to the residual unspecified factors in good and bad thoughts— the “or-whatever-other states”! —among which the Com- mentator names, a3. a constant, manasikira, or attention —this specifying may be considered as later claborstion.? But when the Commentary refers the curious alternative emphasis in the description of the sensory act® to just this distinction between a percipient who is prepared or unprepared for the stimulus, it seems possible that he is indeed giving 1 See below, p. 4, n. 2; -also Asl., pp. 168, 250, ete. The definition given of manasikira in the “ ye-va-panaka” passage of the Commentary (p. 133) is difficult to grasp fully, partly because, here and there, the reading seems doubtful in accuracy, partly because of the terms of the later Buddhist psychology employed, which it, would first be necessary to discuss. But I gather that manasikara may be set going in the first, middle, or last stage of an act of cognition—i.e. on the irammanam or initial presentation, the vithi (or ivajjanam), and the javanam; that in this connexion it is concerned with the first of the three; that it involves memory, association of the presentation with [mental] “associates”, aud confronting the presentation. And that it is constructive and directing activity of mind, being compared to a charioteer. CL Compendium, pp. 95, 282. 2 See preface to 2nd ed. above, > Below, § 599, nn. 1, 2.Ixxy us the original interpretation. Again, the remarkable distinction drawn, in the case of every typo of good or bad thoughts, “relating to the sensuous universe,” i.e. to the average moral consciousness, between thoughts which are prompted by a conscious motive,! and such as are not, seems to me to indicate a groping after the distinction betweon instinctive or spontaneous intellection, on the one hand, and deliberate, purposive, or motivated thought on the other. Taken in isoletion, there is insufficient material here to establish this alternative state of mind es a dominant feature in Buddhist psychology. Taken in conjunction with the general mental attitude and intellectual culture involved in Buddhist ethical doctrine and continually inculeated in the canonical books, and emphasized as it is by later writings, the position gains in significence. The doctrine of karma, inherited and adopted from earlier and contemporary thought, never made the Buddhist fatalistic. He recognized the tremendous vis @ tergo expressed in Watts’s doggerel :— . “For ’tis their nature to.” But he had unlimited faith in the saving powor of nurture, He faced the grim realities of life with candour, and tolerated -no mask. ‘This honesty, to which we usually add a mistaken view of the course of thought and action he prescribed in consequence of the honesty, gains him the name of Pessimist. But the hope that was in him of what might be done to better nature through nurture, even in this present life, by human effort and goodwill, reveals him es a strong Optimist with an unshaken ideal of the joy springing from things made perfect. He even tried to “ pitchfork nature” in one or two respects, though opposed to asceticism generally—simply to make the Joy more easily attainable by those who dared to “come out”. * CE. below, p. 32, n. 1. The thoughts which are not called Sasunkhirena ae by the Cy. ruled as being a-sankharena, though nob explicitly ssid to be so (asl TW) -Ixxvi And this regenerating nurture resolves itself, theoretically, -into a power of discrimination ; practically, into an oxerciso of selection. Tho individual learner, pervious by way of is “fivefold door” to an inflooding tide of impressions penetrating to the sixth “door”, ie. the co-ordinating “mind”, was to regulate the ‘natural alertness of reception and perception by tho special kind of attention termed yoniso manasikdra, ot thorough attention, and by the clear-eyed insight referred to already as ya thab hatam sammappaiAdys datthabbam, or the higher wisdom of regarding “things as in themselves th y really aro"—to adopt Matthew Arnold's term. The stream of phenomena, whether of social life, of nature, or of his own social and organic growth, was not so much to be ignored by him as to be marked, measuced and classed according to the criteria of ono who has chosen to “follow his own uttermost ”,! and has recognized the power of that stream to imperil his enterpriso, and its lack of power to give an equivalent satisfaction? The often-recurring subject of sati-sampajaiiiam; or that “mindful and aware” attitude, which evokes satire in robust, if superficial criticism, is the expansion“and ethical application of this psychological state-of prepared and pre-adjusted sense or voluntary attention? The student was not to be taken by surprise —" evil states of covetousness and repining flowing in over him dwelling unprepared "—until he had “The nobler msstory learned Where inward vision over impulse reigns.” Then indeed he might dwell at case, strong in his emancipation. 2 Settham upanamam udeti attano uttarim bhajetha (A. i, 126). 2 CE M. i, 85-90, on kaminam asvidaii ca jidinavail ca nissaranaii ca... yathabhitam pajanitva. 2 Sce below on guarding the door of the senses, §§ 1315-8. Also note on D. i, 70, in Dialogues of the Buddha, p. 81. * George Eliot, Brother and Sister.[xxvii Stop by step with his progress in the cultivation of attention, he was also practising himself in that faculty of solection which it were perhaps moro accurate not to. distinguish: from attention. Alertness is never long, and, indeed, never strictly, attending to anything and everything at once, Wo are reminded of Condillac’s definition of attention as only an “exclusive sensation”, From the multitude of excitations flowing in upon us, one of them is, more or less frequently, selected, the rest being, for a time, either wholly excluded or perceived subconsciously. And this selective instinct, varying in strength, appears not only in connexion with sense-impressions, but also in our more persisting tendencies and interests, as well as in a general Gisposition to concentration or to distraction. Buddhism, in its carnest and hopeful system of self-culture, set itself strenuously against a disteait habit of mind, calling it tatra-tatrabhinandini%— the theré-and-there dalliance", as it were of the butterfly. And it adopted and adapted that discipline in the concentration (sa mad bi), both physical and psychical, both perceptual and conceptual, for which India is unsurpassed. It appreciated the special practice of rapt, absorbed, concentrated” thought called Dhyana or Jhina, not as an end in itself, but as a symbol and vehicle of that habit of selection and single-minded effort which governed “ life according to the Higher Ideal", Tt did not hold with the robust creed, which gropes, it may be, after a yet stronger ideal :— “Greift nur hinein ins volle Menschenleben, Und wo jhr's packt, da ist es interessant.” “Full life” of the actual sort, viewed from the Buddhist standpoint, was too much compact of Vanity Fair, shambles and cemetery, to be worth the plunge. -Ft had, on the other hand, great faith in experimenting on nature by a » Cl. Hafiding’s criticism of Condillac in Outlines of Psychology, London, 1891, p. 120. * M.i, 299, and in many other suttas.Lexviit judicious pruning of everything it judged might wreck or hinder the evolution of a life of finer, higher quality. If we, admitting this intention, look on the frequent injunctions respecting what “‘ was to bo put away” (pahatabbam)! from the life of each disciple, whether by insight or by culture, whether by gentle or by forcible restraint,? not as 50 much mere self-mortification and crippling of energy, but as expressions of selective culture for the better “forcing” of somewhat tender growths, we may, if wo still would criticize, appraise more sympathetically. If have dwelt ab some length on a side of Buddhist psychological ethics which is not thrown into obvious relief in our Manual, it was because I wished to connect that side with the specially characteristic feature in Buddhist psychology where it approximates to the trend of ovr own modern tradition. There, on the one hand, we have a philosophy manifestly looking deeper into the mental con- stitation than auy other in the Bast, and giving especial heed to just those mental activities—attention and feeling, conation and choice—which ‘seem most to imply a subject, or subjective unity sho attends, feels, wills, and chooses. And yet this same philosophy is emphatically ono that attempts to “extrude the Ego”. If, on the other hand, we leap over upwards of 2,000 years and consider one of the most notable contributions to our national psychology, we find that its two most salient features are a revival of the admission of an Ego or Subject of mental states, which had been practically extruded, and a theory of the ultimate nature of mental procedure set out entirely in terms of attention and feeling? And yet the divergence between the two conclusions, ® See e.g. below, § 1002 et seq. > CE the Sabbasava Sutta ‘and passim, M. i, especially the Vitakkasanthana Sutta. * refer to Professor Ward’s “ Psychology": Ency. Brit., 9th ed.Ixxix widely romoved though they ero by time and space, is not to charp as at first appears. Tho modern thinker, while he finds it more honest not to euppress the fact that all . psychologists, not excepting Humo, do, implicitly or explicitly, assume the conception of “a mind or conscious subject, is careful to “extrude” metaphysical dogma. That every- thing mental is referred to a Self or Subject is, for him, a psychological conception which may be kept, as free from the metaphysical conception of a soul, mind-atom, or mind- stuff so is that of tho individual organism in biology. In much the same way the Buddhists were content to adopt the term attabhavo (self-hood or personality—for which Buddhaghosa half apologizes ')—ajjhattikam (belonging to the self, subjective *) and the like, as well as to speak of cittam, mano and vififidnem where we might say “the mind”. It is true that by the two former terms they meant the totality of the five skandhas; that is to say, both mind and body, but this is not the case with the three last named. And if there. was one thing which moved the Master to quit his wonted screnity and wield the lash of sco and upbraiding, and his followers to use emphatic repudiation, it was just the reading into this convenient generalization’ of mind or personality that “ metaphysical conception of a soul, mind-atom, or mind-stuff” which is put aside by the modem psychologist, And I believe that the jealous way in which the Buddhists guarded their doctrine in this matter arose, not from the wish to assimilate mind to matter, or the whole personality to a machine, but from the too great danger that lay in the unchecked use of atta ahankara, attabhavo, even as 8 mere psychological datum, in that it afforded a » See below, p. 159,n.3. 2 Ibid, p. 169.0. 1. 2Svayam (this one) is nearly always substituted for atta as 2 nominative, the latter term usually appearing in oblique cases.lxxx foothold to the prevailing animism. ‘They were as Protestants in rogard to the crucifix. They femembered with Ste. Bouve : “Ta sauvageris est toujours MA A deux pos, ot, dée quion lache pied, elle recommence.” What, thon, was their view of mind, as merely phenomenal, in relation to the riipa-skandha or non-mental part of the human individual? We have considered their doctrine of external phenomena impinging on and modifying the internal or personal riipam by way of sense. Have we any clue to their theory of the propagation of the modifications, alleged in their statement? to take place in relation to those factors of personality which were ari p ino, and not derived from material elements—the elements (dh itu’ s), namely, or skandhas of feeling, perception, synergies, and cognition ? How did they regard that process of co-ordination by which, taking sensuous experience as the more obvious slarling-point in mental experience, sensations are classed and made to cohere into groups or percepts, and are revived as memories, and are further co-ordinated into concepts or abstract ideas ? And finally, and at back of all this, who feels, or attends, or wills? : Now the Dhamma-Sangani does not place questions of this kind in the mouth of the catechist. In so far as it is psychological (not psycho-physical or ethical), it is so strictly phenomenological that its treatment is restricted to the analysis of certain broadly defined states of mind, felt or inferred to have arisen in consequence of certain other mental states as conditions. There is no reference anywhere to a “ subjective factor ” or agent who has the ci t ta m or thought, with all its associated factors of attention, feeling, conception, and volition. Even in the case of Jhina, where the book is dealing with more active modes of regulated attention, involving a maximum of constructive thought with a minimum of receptive sense, the agent, es conscious subject, is kept in * See answers in §§ 600, 604, etc.Ixxxi | the background. It was claimed by leading disciples to be perfectly practised Jhina when self-referenco was climinatod ; cf. eg. 8. ili, 235-7, Tho inflexion of the verb! alone implies a given peraonsl agent, and the Commentary even feels it incumbent to point him out. It is thia psychologizing without a psyche that impressed me from the first, and seemed to bring the work, for all its remoteness in other respects, nearer to our own Experiential school of, and since, Locke than anything we find in Greck traditions. It is true that each of the four formless skandhas is defined or described, and this is done in connexion with the very first question of the book. But’ the answers are given, not in terms of respective function or of mutual relation, but of cither synonyms or of modes or constituent parts. For instance, feeling (vod an) is resolved. into three modes,? Pereeptiom (8 Hifi 4) is taken“as practically self-evident and not xeally described at all, the complexes or synergies (sankh ara) are resolved into modes or factors, cognition (vine m) is described by synonyms. Again, whereas the skandhas are enumerated in the order in which, I believe, they are unvaryingly met with, there is nothing, in text or Commentary, from which we can infer that this order corresponds to any theory of genetic procedure in an act of cognition. In other words, we are not shown. that feeling calls up perception or that the sankharas aro a necessary link in the evolution of perception into conception or reasoning If we can infer anything in the nature of SO ; Bhaveti,vihurati (cultivates, abides); p. 43 et seg. 7 See pp. 3-9, 25-7. An attempt to define each skandhe is given in §. iii, 86 £ 3 Described with some fullness in the Cy. See my note s.v. “CE the argument by Dr. Neumann, “ Buddhistische Anthologie", xxii, xxiv. If I have rendered sankhara by “syntbeses”, it is not because I see any coincidence between the Buddhist notion and the Kantian Synthesis der Wahrnch- mungen. Still less am I persuaded that Unlerscheidungen is * virtually “equivaleat term. Like the “confections” ofLexxii causalsucceasion at all, it is such that the order of tho skandhas | as enumerated is upset. Thus, taking tho first answer (and that is typical for tho wholo of Book I when new ground is broken into): certain sense-impression evokes, through “contact”, 8 complex state of mind or psychosis calied & thought or cittam. Born of this contact and the “ appro- priate” cittam, now (ic. in answer 3) called, in terms of its synonym, representative intellection (ma novia ana dhAtu), feeling, we aro told, is engendered. Perception js called up likewise and, apparently, simultaneously. So is volition (cetana)—of she sankhara-skandha. And “associated with” the cittam come all the rest of the constituent dhammas, both sankharas, as well as specific modes or different aspects? of the fecling and the thought already specified. In a word, we get contact evoking the fifth skandhs, and, as the common-co-ordinate resultant, the genesis or excitement of the other three. This is entirely in keeping with the many passeges in the Nikdyas, where the concussion of sense and object are said to result in vifiidpam = cittam = the fifth skandha. “Eyo”, for instance, and “form”, in mutual’ “contact”, ‘result in “visual cognition ”. In the causal chain of that ancicnt formula, the Paticcs- samup pads, on the other hand, we find quite another order of genesis, sankhiras inducing consciousness, and contact alone inducing feeling. This mysterious old rune must not - - further complicate our problem. I merely allude to it as not in the least supporting the view that the order of statement, \ the least supporting the view ———————e—— Rhys Davids and the Gestaltungen of Professor Oldenberg, I used syntheses simply ss, more or less, sn etymological equivalent, and waited for more light. The new rendering “ synergies“. is etymologically as literal (sam-sky) as confections. I may here add that I have used intellection consciousness, cognition intercbange- ably as comprehending the whole process of knowing or coming to know. 1 eg. ease. 2 eg. the “ faculties ” of mind (ideation) and of pleasure. 3 Given below on p. 323[1336].Ixxxiii in the skandhas, implies order of happening, What we may more surely gather from the canon is that, as our own psychological thought has now conceived it, the, lot ua say, given individual “‘auends to or cognizes (vijanati) changes in the sensory continuum, and, in consequence, co-efficients of consciousness arise, emotional, volitional, intel- fectual”. All this isin our Menual called a cittuppado— 8 genesis, an uprising of mind, Of mind or of thinking. There seems to be a breadth and looseness of impliertion about cit tam fairly parallel to the popular vagueness of the English term. Tt ie true that the Commentary does not sanction the interpretation of contact and all the rest (I refer to the type given in the frst answer) as so many attributes of tho thought which “has arisen". The sun rising, it says, is not different from its fiery glory, etc., arising But the ci ttam arising is a ™mere expression to fix the occasion for the induction of the whole concrete psychosis, and connotes no more and no less than it does as a particular constituent of that complex? ‘This isa useful hint. On the other hand, when we consider the synonymous terms for cittam, given in answer 6, and compare tho various characteristics of these terms scattered through the Commentary, we find a considerable wealth of content and an inclusion of process and product similar to that of our “thought”. Yor example, “citta m means mental object or Presentation (Arammana m); ? Professor Ward, op. * Asl. 113. I gather, however, that the adjective ceta- sikam hed a wider and « narrower denotaticn, As wider, it meant “not bodily", as on p. 6. In the latter it served to distinguish three of the incorporeal skandhas from the fourth, ie cittem, as on pp. 265, 316—cittacetasika dhamma. Or are we to take the Commentator’s use of kayikam here to refer to those three skandhas, ns is often the case (p. 43, n, 3)? Mardly, since this makes the two Meanings of cota sikam selt-eonteadictory. ‘In later ALLS dhamma the cetasikas came to he used for the sankharas. CE. Compendium, pt. ii; also pp. 124, 193,Ixxxiv that is to say, ho thinks; that is to say, he attends to a thought.” Heneo my translation might well have run: When & good thought... . has arisen . . . as the object of this or that eense, ete. Again, cit ta mis defined asa process of connecting (bandh&nam) the last (things) as they keep arising in consciousness with that which preceded them.? Further, it is a co-ordinating, relating, of synthesizing (gandahanam);* and, again, it has the property of initiative action (puro carikam). For, when the sense- impression gets to the “door” of tho senses, cittam confronts it before the rest of the mé :tal congeries.* The sensations are, by cit tam, wrought up into that concrete stream of consciousness which they evoke. - - Here we bave cittam covering both thinking and thovght or idea. When we turn to its synonym or quasi- synonym m ano we find, so far as I can discover, that only activity, or else spring, source or nidus of activity, is the aspect taken. ‘The faculty of ideation (manindriyam), for instance,® while expressly declared to be an equivalent (vevacanam) ofcittam, and, like it, to be that which attends or cognizes (vi jana ti), is also called a measuring the mental object—-declared above to be cittam.® Inalater passage (ibid. 129) it is assigned the function of accepting, receiving, analogous, perhaps, to our technical expression “ ggsimilating ” (gam paticchanam). In thus apprais- ing or approving, it hs all sensory objects for its field, as welt as its more especial province of dhammas.? These, when thus 1 Tid. 63. 2 As, pp. 112, 113. 2 Cf the cbaracteristic_s amvidahanam—of cetand in my note, p. 8. «The figure of the city-guardian, given in Mil. 62, is quoted by tho Oy. 4 See below, p. 16, and Asl. 123. . * Tt is at the same time said to result in (establishing) fact or conformity (bathabhavo), and to succeed sense- perception as such. 7 See p. 3, 0.2.* bexxv distinguished, I take to mean idess, including images and general notions. And itis probably only in order to distinguish between mind in this abstract functioning and mind as cognition in its 12st comprehensive senso that wo aco tho two terms held apart in the sentence: “Cittam cognizes the dhammes which are the objects of mano, just as it cognizes the visual forms, etc., which are the objects of the senses,’ } When cittam is thus occupied with tho abstract functioning of me no*—when, that is, we are roflecting on ps-& experience, in memory or ratiocination—thon the more specific term is, I gather, not cittam, but manoviii - Hana m (corresponding to cakkhuvifilfapam, etc). This, in the Commentarial psychology, cortainly stands for 8 further stage, « higher “ power ” of intellection, for “ repro- sentative cognition ”, its specific activity being distinguishod as investigating (santirana m), and as fixing or deter- mining (votthappanam). The afix dhatu, whether appended to mano or to manovifiii'dyem, probably stands for 9 slight distinction in aspect of the intellectual process. It may be intended to indicate cither of these two stages as an irreducible element, a psychological ultimate, an activity regarded as its own spring or source or basis. Adopted from without by Buddhism, it seems to have been jealously guarded from houmenal implications by the orthodox. Buddhaghosa, indeed, seems to substitute the warning against its abuse for the reasou why it had come to be used. According to him, the various lists of dhammas (e.g. in the first answer), when considered ‘under the aspect of phenomena, of “emptiness”, of non-essence, may be grouped as together forming two classes of dh&tu.* Moreover, cach special VASL, p12, oo * Cf. the expression suddha-manodvaro in my note, Pp. 3. And on what follows, ef. pp. 129, 132, nn. + Viz, manovifiidpadhatu and dhammadhatu see Asl. 153, and below, p. 24 n.3. The term “element” is similarly used in our own psychology.Iaxxvi sense can be so considered (cakkhu-dhatu, ete; 800 pp. 214, 215), and so may each kind of sonse-object. For, with respect to senso, or the apprehension of form, they are 60 many phenomonal ultimates—the two terms, so to speak, in each sensory relation. How far dhatu corresponds to vatthu—how far the one is a psychological, the other a physical, conception ? of source or base—is not easily determined. But it is interesting to note that the Commentator only alludes to a basis of thought (cittassa vatthu), that is to the heart (hadaya-vatthu), when the catechizing is in terms of mano-dhatu.? His only comment on “ heart”, when it is included in the description of cittam (answer [6}), is to say that, whereas it stands for cit tam, it simply represents the inwardness (intimité) of thought? But in. the subsequent comment he has a remark of great interest, namely, that the “heart-basis” is the place whither all the “‘door-objects” come, and where they are assimilated, or received. In this matter the Buddhist philosophy carties on the old Upanishad lore about tho heart, just as Aristotle 1 CE below, pp. 214, 215, with 209-211.” 2 Asl. 261; below, p. 129, a, > Asi. 140: “ He In the passage (8. i, 207)—' I will either tear out your mind or break your heart '"—the heart in the breast is spoken of. In the passage (M. i, 32)—'Methinks he planes with a heart that knows heart’ (like an expert)!—the mind is meant. In the passage—'The vakkam is the heart’—heart is meant es basis. But Acre citShagr is-spoken of as heart in the sense of inwerlness (ab Vhdptara t-is interesting to note that, in enumerating the. rupaskatMiha in the Visuddhi Magga, Buddhaghosa's sole departure from conformity with the Dhamma-Sangani is the inclusion of hadays-vatthu after “life”. On the reticence of the canon to recognize heart as seat of mind, see S. Z. Aung, Compendium, 278. The other term, “that which is clear” (pandaram), is an ethical metaphor. The mind is ssid to be naturally pure, but defiled by incoming corruptions. (Cf. A. i, p. 10.) ; * Cf. Kaushitaki Up. 3, 2; Pris. Up. 3, 1,5; samam nayati. thought (hadayan ti cittam)..lxxxvii claborated the dictum of Empodokles that perception and reasoning were carried on in ““ the blood round the heart”, Tt is possible that this ancient and widely recsived tradition of the heart (rather than the brain, for instance) as the seat of the soul or the mind is latent in the question put by Mahakotthita, a member of the Order, to Sariputta, the leading apostle:* “Inasmuch as these five indriyas (senses) are, in province and in gratification, mutually independent, what process of reference is there,? and who ie it that is gratified by them in common?” So apparently thinka Dr. Neumann, who rondera -Siriputta’s answer— The mind (mano) "—by Herz. This association must, however, not bo pressed. For in another version of this dialogue more recontly edited, Gotara himself being the person consulted, his interlocutor goes on to.ask'(S. v, 217£): What is the Potisaranam of mano—of recollection (sati}— of emancipstion—of Nirvana ?* So that the meaning of tho first question may simply be that as emancipation looks to, or makes for, Nirvana, and recollection or mindfulness for emancipation, and ideation or thinking refers or looks to 1M. i, 295, . *Kim patiseranam. The word is a crux, and may bear more than one meaning. Cf. Vinaya Texts (SBE. xvii. ii, p. 364, n.; Dialogues of the Buddha, i, p. 122, n. Dr. Neumann renders it by Hort, following Childers.” Cf. the light throwa by the Commentaries, Bud. Psychology, 1914, 69. It is worthy of note that, in connexion with the heresy of identifying the self with the physical organism generally (below, P_ 259), the Cy. makes no allusion to heart, or other part of the ri pam, in connexion with views (2) or (4). These apparently resembled Augustine’s belief: “the soul is wholly present both in the entire body and in each part of it. With regard to view (3), is it possible that Plotinus heard it at Alexandria, or on his Eastern trip? For he, too, held that the body was “in the soul ” Ffrmeated by it ss air is by fire (Enn. iv). Buddhaghosa’s Ulustrative metaphor, in Pts. i, 143£., is “‘as a flower being “iu its own perfume”, J regret that space fails me to reproduce his analysis of theeo twenty soul-hypotheses. * 8. ¥, p. 218. In the replies mano is referred to sati, eati to vimutti, and this to Nirvana,re ie Ixxxviii memory,! 80 sensation doponds on thinking, on mental construction (to bocome effective as knowledge). It is, indeed, far moro likely that Buddhist teaching mado little of and passed lightly over this question of a physical basis of thought or mind, It was too closely involved with tho animistic point of view—how closely wo may see, for instance, in the Brihadaranyaka Upanishad, When King Milinda puts a similar question respecting the eubject of sensations,? he does so from so obviously animistic a stand- point that the sage, instead of discussing mano, or heart, with him, a. gues against any ono central subjective factor whatever, and resolves the process of cognition into a number of “ connate ” activities. The method itself of ranking mental activity as though it were a sixth kind of sense seems to point in the samo direction, and reminds us of Hume's cortention, that when ho tried to “catch himself” ‘he always “ tumbled on some particular perception”, Indeed, if was, in words attributed to Gotama himself, the lesser blunder in tho averago man to call “this four-elementish body” his soul than to identify the self with “what is called cittam, that is mano, that is viiiiapam”. For, whercas tho body was a collocation that might hold together for many years, “ mind by day and by night is ever arising as one thing, ceasing as another !””* Impermanence of conscious phenomena was ono of the two grounds of tho Buddhist attack. So far it wes on all fours with Hume. The other ground was the presence of law, or necessary sequence in mentsl procedure. The Soul was conceived as an entity, not only above change, an absolute constant, but slso as an entirely free agent. Both grounds, de it noted, are laid down on psychological evidence—on 1 Cf the interesting inquiry into. the various modes of association in remembering, given in Mil., pp. 78, 79, and 77, 78. 2°Mil. 54. He calls it veda gii (knower), and, when cross- examined, abbhantare jivo (the living principle within). 2 8. ii, pp. 94-6. es -_Ixxxix tho testimony of consciousness. And both grounds were put forward by Gotama in his second sermon! Tho standard formula for the latter only—that of an entirely free (and therefore God-like) agency—is reproduced in our Manual? And it is interesting to seo the same argument clothed in fresh dress in the dialogue with Milinda referred to above. The point made is this: that if any one of the skandhas could be identified with a self or soul it would, as not subject to the conditions of phenomena, act through any other faculty it chose. It would be a principle, not only of the nature of what we should call will, but also of genuino free will? Soul and Free Will, for the Buddhist, stand or fall together. But, he said, what wo actually find is no such free agency. We only find certain organs (doors), with definite functions, natural sequence, the line of least resistance and association. Hence we conclude there is no transcendent ““knower ” about us. Here I must leave the Buddhist philosophy of mind and theory of intellection. We are. only at the threshold of its problems, and it is hence not strange if we find them as beffing as, let us say, our own confused usage of many psychological terms—feoling, will, mind—about which we ourselves greatly differ, would prove to an inquiting Buddhist. If I have not attempted to go into the crux of the sankhara- skandha, it is because neither tho Manual nor its Commentary brings us any nearer to a satisfactory hypothesis. For future discussion, however, the frequent enumerations of that skandha’s content, varying with ever changing mood, should Prove pertinent. In every direction there is very much to be done. And each addition to the texts edited brings new light, Nor can philosophic interest fail in tho long run to accumulate about a system of thought which at that early time of day 138, 300; S. ili, 66; of. iv, 34. 2 p. 257 ef seq. : ak: the writer's article on the Vedalla Suttas, JRAS., April, 1894. : * Mil, loc. cit.| I xe took up a task requiring such vigour and audacity—the task, namely, of opposing the prevailing metaphysic, not because problems of mind did not appeal to the founders of that aystem, but because further analysis of mind seemed to reveal a realm of law-governed phenomenal sequence, for which tho ready hypothesis of an unconditioned permanent Self super grammaticam was too cheap a solution, Vil. ge “2. - . On the Buddhist Notions of « Cad Darbnd ‘Trideterminate”. By way of dhamma, rdpam and cittam, by way of Buddhist phenomenology and psychology, we come at last to the ethical purport of the questions in the Manual. Given a human being known to us by way of these phenomenal states, what is implied when we aay that some of them are good, some bad, others neither? The Dhamma-Sangani does not, to dur loss be it said, define any one of these concepts. All it does is to show us the content of a number of “ thoughts” known as one or the other of theso three species of dhamma. In a subsequent passage (pp. 345-8) it uses the substantival form of “ good” (kusslata; another form is kosallam) in, thageinso of skill or proficiency as applied to various kinds ee theoretical or practical. Now if we turn to the later expression of old tradition in the Commentaries, we find, on tho one hand, an analysis of the meaning of “good”; on tho other, the rejection of precisely that sense of skill, and of that slone out of four possible meanings, with respect to “ good ” as used in Book I. K usalam, we read,! may mean (a) wholesome, (b) virtuous, (0) skilful, (2) felicifie, or productive of happy result. Tho illustrations make these clear statements clearcr. E.g. of (a): “Is it good for you, sir, is it wholesome?"? Of (8) ‘Vala 2 The two adjectives are kusalam, andmayam. Childers Diet, s.v. Kacci, refers this question to the Dasaratha Jitaka, in Fausball’s Ten Jatakas,’ It is not in his edition of the complete Jataka.xei “What, sir, is good behaviour in act? Sire, it is conduct that is blameloss (ane vajjo)”.? Of (c) “You are good at knowing all about the make of s chariot"? Again: “The _ four girlpupils are good at singing and dancing”? Of (d) “Good states, brethren, are acquired through good karma having been wrought and stored up.” « OF these four, (c) is alone ruled out as not applicable to the eight types of good thoughts constituting dhamma kusala. In so far, then, a8 we suffer the Buddhist culture of the fifth century to interpret the canon for us, “ good," in the earlier ethics, meant that which ensures soundness, physical and moral, ss well as that which is felicific. The further question immediately suggests itself, whether Buddhism held that these two attributes were at bottom identical. Are certain “states” intriniically good, ic. virtuous and right, independently of their results? Or is “good”, in the long-run at least, felicitous result, and only on that account so called? Are Buddhists, in a word. Intuitionists, or are they Utilitarians? Or is not a decidedly eclectic standpoint revealed in tho comprehensive interprota- tion given of kvsalam? These are, however, somewhat modern—I am tempted to say, somewhat British—distinctions to seck in an ancient theory of morals. They do not appear to have troubled Buddhism, early or late. ‘The Buddhist might possibly have replied that be could not conceive of any thought, word, or deed as being intrinsically good and yet bad in its results, and that the distinction drawn by the Commentator was simply one of aspects.“ If pressed, however, we can almost imagine the Buddhist well content with the relative or dependent good of Utilitarianism, so closely is his ethics bound up with cause and efiect. Good, for him, is good with respect to karma —that is, to pleasurable effect or ewdemonia, But in the former work we find numerous lists for exerciso in the contemplative life, with or without tho rapt musing called hans. In the exercises calculated to bring out re-birth in the world of Form, it was chiefly necessary to ponder on things of this life in such a way a8 to get rid of all appetite and impulse in connexion with them, and to cultivate an attitude of the purest disinterestedness towards all worldly attractions. If the Formless sphere were the object of aspiration, it was then necessary, by the severest fetches of abstraction, to eliminate not only all sense-impression, but also all sensory images whatever, and to endeavour to realize conditions and relations other than those obtaining in actual experience.? Thus, in either method, a foretaste of the mode of re-becoming aspired after was attempted. But besides and beyond the sort of moral consciousness characterizing these exercises which were calculated to promote a virtuous and happy existence in any one of the three worlds, there were. the special conditions of intellect and emotion termed lok’uttaram cittam2 Those exercises were open to the lay pupil and the bhikkhu alike. There was nothing especially “holy ", nothing esoteric, about the practice of Jhana. The diligent upasaka or 1 See helow, p. 65. ° . ? In translating the formula of the Third Aruppa or meditation on Nothingness, I might have drawn attention to Kant's development of the concept of None or Nothing, in the Kritik der, reinen Vernunft (end of Div. i of Transe. Logic). Some great adepts were credited with the power of actually partaking in other existences while yet in this, notably Maha Moggallina (e.g. M. i). Gotaina tells of another in the Kevaddha Sutta (D. i, 215), but tells it as a “ story”. - 2 P.74 et seq. Cf. n. 2 0n p.74, and M. i, 455.xevili upisiké, pursuing a temporary course of .such religous and philosophic discipline as the rising schools of Buddhism afforded, might be expected to avail himself or herself of it more or less. But those “good” dhammas alluded to were thoso which characterized tho Four Paths, or Four Stages, of the way, to the full “emancipation” of Nirvana. Tf Thave rendered lokuttaram cittam by“ thought engaged upon the higher iden!” instead of selecting a term more literally accurate, it is becauso thero ii , ina way, less of the “ supramundane" or “‘ transcendent”, as we usually understand these expressions, about this eit tam than about the aspicing moods described above. For this sort of con- sciousness was that of the man or woman who regarded not heaven nor re-birth, but one thing only as “needful: the full and perfect efflorescence of mind and character to bo brought about, if it might be, here and now. Tho Dhamma-Sangani never quits its severely dry and formal style to descant on the characteristics and methods of that progress to tho Ideal, every stop in which is elsewhere said to be more wonderful and excellent than the last, with a wealth of oulogy besides. Edifying discourse it left to tho Suttanta Books. But no rhetoric could more effectively describe the sepatateness and uncompromising other-ness of that Kigher quest than the one word A-pariydpannam —-Unincinded—by which reference is made to it in Book ITI. Yet for all this world of difference in the quo vadis of aspiration, there is a great deal of common ground covered by the moral consciousness in each case, as the respective expositions show. That of the Arahat in spe differs oaly in two sets of additional features conferring greater richness of contont, and in tho loftisr quality of other features not in themselves additional. This quality is dus: to mental awakening or enlightenment (sambodhi). And the added factors are three consti- tuents of the 1 Noble Eightfold Path of cond t t (which are, 1S. iv, 225 §.xeix more obviously, modes of overt activity than of consciousmess) and the progressive stages in the attainment of the sublime knowledge or insight termed a fii A+ Our Wostern languages, aro scarcely rich enoug! to ring the change on the words signifying “to know" as those of India did on jia and vid, dS, and pas, Our religious ideals have tended to be emotional in excess of our intellectual enthusiasm. ‘ Absence of dullness” has not ranked with us es a cardinal virtue or fundamental cause of good. Hence it is dificult to reproduce the Pali s0 as to give improssivencss to a term like aiid as compared with the moro general term fay am,? (which. usually, though not always, implies less advanced insight), with which the “first type of good thought” is said to bo associated. But I must pass on. As a compilation dealing” with poritive culture, undertaken for a positive end, it is only consistent that the Manual should deal briefly with the subject of bad states of consciousness. It is true that skusalam, as a means leading to unhappy result, was not conceived as negatively as its logical form might lead us to suppose. Bad karma was a “ piling up”, no lese than its opposite. Nevertheless, to a great extent, the difference between bad types of thought and good is described in terms of the contradictories of the factors in the one kind and in the other. Nor ate the negatives always on the side of evil. The three cardinal sources of misery ate positive in form. And the five “ Path-factors ” go to constitute what was called the Base Eightfold Path? We come, finally, to the third ethical category of a-vyikatam, the Inexplicit or Indeterminate. The subject is difficult, if interesting, bringing us as it does within closer range of the Buddhist view of moral causation. The ——- ? Viz, Anaifidtaifiassamitindriyam, a a driyam, aifatavindriyam, pp. 76, 88, 6, 140. Cf. Dh. 53. , 168 ; iti, 1095 yi; 1 18.323; 334; A. ii, 220, ete.hall-mark of Indotorminato thought is said to bo “absence of result” 1—that is, of pleasant or painful result. And there are said to be four specics of such thought : (1) vipa ko, > or thought which is a result; (2) kirivy a, or consciousness leading to no result; (3) form, as outside moral causation ; (4) unconditioned element (or, in lator records, Nirvana), as above or beyond the further efficacy of moral causation. OF these four, the third has been dealt with already; the fourth I cannot discuss here and now.? It is conceivable that the earlier Buddhists considered their summum bonum a subject too ineffably sublime and mysterious for logical and analytical discussion. Two instances, at least, occur to mo in tho Nikayas? where the talk wag cut short, in the one case by Gotama himself, in the other by the woman- apostle Dhammadinna, whea the interlocutor brought up Nirvana for discussion of this sort, This is possibly the reason why,.in a work like our Manual, the concept is presented—in all but the commentarial appendixes—under the quasi-metaphysical term “unconditioned element”. It is classed here as a species of Indeterminate, because, although it was the outcome of the utmost carrying power ‘of good karma, it could,-as a state of mind and character, itself work no good effect for that individual mind and character. These represented pure effect. The Arahat could afford to live wholly on withdrawn capital and to use it up. His conduct, speech, and thought are, of course, necessarily “ good”, but good with no “ heaping-np ” potency. Of the other two Indeterminates, it is not easy to say whether they represent aspects only of states considered with respect to moral efficacy, or whether they represent divisions in a more rigid and artificial view of moral causation than we should, at the present day, be prepared to maintain. To explain: every thought, word, and deed (morally considered) 1 Asli. 3), * See Appendix 28. v, 218; M.ci is for us at once the effect of certain antecedents and the cause, or partof the cause, of subsequent manifostations of character. It js a link, both held and holding. But in vipako wo have dhammas considered, with respect to causo, merely 2s eficets; in kiriy&! wo have dhammas considered, with respect to efiect, as having none. And the fact that both are divided off from Good and Bad—that is te say, from conduct or consciousness considered a8 causally effective—and. are called Indeterminate, seems to point, not to aspects only, but to that artificial view alluded to. Yet in this matter I confess to the greater wisdom of ‘‘ fearing to tread ” with the angels, rather than of rushing in with the fools. Life presented itsclf to the Buddhist much as the Surrey heath appeared to the watchful eye of a Darwin—as a teeming soil, a khettam,? where swarmed the seeds of previous karmas waiting for “room”, for opportunity to come to effect. And in considering the seed as itself an effect, they were not, to that extent, concerned with that sced as a cause, [capable of producing not only its own flower and fruit, but other seed] in its turn. However that may have been, one thing is clear, and for us suggestive. Moral experience as result pure and. simple was not in itself uninteresting to the Buddhists. In dealing with good and bad dhammas they show us a ficld of the straggle for moral life, the sowing of potential well-being or ofill. Butin the Avydkatas either we are outside the struggle and concerned with the unmoral R di pam, orwe walk among the sheaves of harvest. From the Western standpoint the struggle covers the whole field of temporal life. Good and 1 Inoperative consciousness (8.2. Aung). I am indebted to the Rev. Sumangala, of Ceylon, for information very kindly given concerning ‘the term kiriyaorkriya. He defines it as “action ineffective as to result", and kiriya- cittam as“ mind in relation to action ineffective as to result”. He adds a full analysis of the various modes of kiriy& taught by Buddhists at the present day. . ® Origin of Species, p. 56. A. i, 223 224. CI. Asi. 360.cit bad “war in the members” even of its Arahants. The ideal of the Buddhist, held as realizable under temporal conditions, was to walk among his sheaves “ beyond the Good and the Bad”! The Good consisted in giving hostages to the future. Ilis realized ideal was to be releasing them,? and, in a span of final, but glorious existence, to bo tasting of the finest fruit of tiving—the peace of insight, the joy of emancipation. ‘This was life supremely worth living, for “leben heisst In Freiheit leben und mit freiam Geist!” > The Good, to take his own metaphor, was as a raft bearing him across tho stream of danger. After that he was to leave it and goon. ‘‘ And yo, brethren, learn by the parable of the raft that yo must put away good conditions, let alone bad.” * it is not easy for us, who have learnt from Plato to call our Absolute the Good and our Ideal a’ summum bonum, to sympathize readily with this moral standpoint. Critics seg in it an aspiration towards moral stultification and self- complacent.egoism. Yet there is little fear but that in the long run faller knowledge wilt bring deeper insight into what in Buddhism is really worthy of admiration for alt timo. If it is now accused of weakening the concopt of individuality by rejecting soul, and, at the same time, of fostering egoistic morality, it is just possible that criticism is here at fault. On the ruins of the animistic view, Buddhism had to recon- struct a new personality, wholly phenomenal, impermanent, law-detormined, yet none the less able, and alone able, by indomitable faith and will, to work out a personal salvation, personal perfection. Bearing this in mind and surveying the history of its altruistic missionary labours, we cannot 2 Ci. Nietzsche on Buddhism in “ Der Antichrist”, 2 CA. i, 108. 3 A. Plungst, “ An Giordano Bruno.” + Seo the third quotation above, p. vii, and “ puffle’ ca papaii ca bahitva . .. bhikkba- vaccati”, §. i, 182; Dhp., ver. 267.iii rashly cast egoistic morality at it to much effect. Nor has it much to fear from chargesof stultification, quietism, pessimism, and the like. We are misled to a certain extent by the very thoroughness of its methods of getting at the moral life by way of psychical training. We see, as in our Manual and other canonical records, elaborate systems for analyzing and cultivating the intellectual faculties, the will, and feeling, and we take these as substitutes for overt moral activity, as ends when they are but means. And if the Dhemma- Sangayi seems to somo calculated to foster introspective thought toa morbid exteus, it must not be forgotten that it is not Buddhist philosophy alone which tesches that, for all the natural tendency to spend and bo spent in efforts to cope, by thought and achievement, with the world without, “it is in this little fathom-long mortal frame with its thinkings and its notions that the world”? itsclf and the whole problem of its misery and ef the victory over it lies hid. Jf I have succeeded to any extent in connecting the contents of this Manual with the rest of the Buddhist Pitakas, it is because I had at my disposal the mass of material accumulated in my husband's MS. Pali dictionary. Besides this, the selection of material for Sections II and II] of my Introduction in his work. Besides this, I owe him a debt of gratitude indefinitely great for advice and criticism generally. 1 See second quotation above, p. xii Note to p. liii—Professor Sthcherbatzky hes given from later Buddhist sources this solution of the Kapaloka crux: Jn an older dual division of worlds into Ripa {corporeal mental life) and Ariipa (incorporeal mental life), the Kamaloka {life where sense-desires are operative) was a sub-division of Rapaloka. This subdivision came to be raised to a main division. Hence the three divisions. This seems to me # plausible hypothesis Ancient eschatology was vague and careless enough (we are no Detter even now) to let this disorderly division stand.(THE Sections. 1-983. 1. 984-6. 2. 987-9. 3. 990-2. 4. 993-4. 5. 995-8. 6. 999-1001. 7. 10024. 8 1905-12, 9. 1013-15. 10. 3016-18. 31. 1019-2, 12. 13. 1025-7, 14, MATIKA TABLE OF CONTENTS) A, ABHIDHAMMA. States that are good, bad, indeterminate. States that aro associated with pleasant fecling, painful feeling, neutral fecling. States that are results; that have resultant quality; that are neither. States that are grasped at and favourable to grasping ; that are not grasped at but are favourable to grasping; that are ncither. States that are vitiated and vicious; that are not vitiated but are vicious ; that are neither. States that have applied and sustained thinking; ‘sustained thinking only ; neither. States that are accompanied by zest; by happiness; by indifference. States that are to be put away by vision; by culture; by neither. States the moral roots of which are to be put away by vision; by culture; by neither. States going to building up; going to pulling down; going to neither. States of one im training; of the adept; of one who is neither. States that are limited, sublime, infinite. States that have a limited object ; a sublime object ; neither. States that are base; of medium worth; excellent.Sections, 1028-30. 1031-4. 1035-7. 1038-46. 1041-3. 1044-6. 1047-9. 1050-2. 18. 19. 20. 21, 1053-72. 1073, 1074. 1075, 1076. 1077, 1078. 2079, 1080. M2 States that are of a wrongfulness fixed as to consequences; that are of a righteousness fixed as to consequences; that do not entail fixed consequences. States that have the Path as object; whose moral root is the Path; whose dominant influence is the Path. States that have arisen; that have not arisen; that are bound to arise. States that are past; present; future. States that have the past as their object ; the present ...; the futuro as their object. States that belong to one's se!{; are external to one’s self ; are belonging or external to one’s self. ° States that have for an object one’s self; au object external to one’s self; an object that is both. States that are visible and reacting ; invisible and reacting ; neither. Here end the triplets. States that are moral roots ; not moral roots. States concomitant with a moral root; not 80 concomitant. States associated with a moral root; dis- sociated from a moral root. States that are both moral roots and eon- comitant with a moral root; states of mind that are the latter bul not the former. States that aro both moral roots and associated with moral roots; states of mind that are tho latter but not the Sermer.Sections. 1081, 1082. 1083, 1084. 1085, 1086, 1087. 1088. 1083, 1090. 1091, 1692, 1093, 1034. 1096-1102. 1103, lies. 1108, 1406. 1107, 1108. 1169, IILO. 1121, bn. 1413-24. 1125, 1196, 1127, 1428. M3 States that are not moral roots, but are either concomitant with moral roots or not. This is the moral root group. States that are causally related; not causally related. States that are conditioned’; unconditioned. States that are visible; invisible. States that are reactions ; not reactions. States that have material form; that ara immaterial. States that are mundane ; supramundane. States that may be cognized in a given way ; that may not be cognized in that given way. . This ts the shart intermediate set of pairs. States that are fsavas; are not asavas. States that have dsavas, have not dsavas. States that are associated with asavas; dis- sociated from fisavas. States that both are and have asaves; that have dsavas but are not dsavas. States that are both dsavas and asscciated with dsavas; thet are associated with asavas but are not dsavas, States thet are dissociated from dsavas, but may have or may not have asavas. ” This ix the Asava group. States that ere fetters; are not fetters. States that are favourable to fetters; are not 50. States that are associated with fetters; are dissociated from fetters.Sections. 1129, 1230. 1131, 1132. 1133, 1134, 1135-40. 114, 1142. 1143, 1244, 1145, 1146. M47, 148. 1149, 1150. 1151; 11510. 1152-73. 1174-6. 1177, 1178. 1179, 1180. 1181, 1182. M4 States that are both fetters and favourablo to fotters ; that are tho latter but not the former. States that are both fetters and associated with fetters; that are the latter but not the former. States that are dissociated from fetters, but may bo favourable to fetters-or unfavour- able. This is the Fetter Group. States that are ties; aro not ties. States that are favourable to ties; are not so. States that are associated with ties; dis- sociated from ties. States that are both ties and favourable to ties; that are the latter but not the former. States that are both ties and associated with ties; are the latter but not the former. States that are dissociated from ties; but may or may not be favourable to ties. This is the Ties group.. Here follow the Floods group, the Yokes group, the Hindrances group. Each follows the same order of treatment as the three preceding groups. States that are perversions; are not perversions. States that are perverted ; unperverted. States that are associated with perversion ; dissociated from perversion. States that are both. perversions and perverted; are the latter but not the former.