Halklk and Poplizm: OfficialRational versus Popular in the

context of Turkish Exceptionalism

Toygar Baykan
University of Sussex
[email protected]

SEI Working Paper No 137

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Abstract
Although the concept of populism is widely used in the literature on Turkish politics, except
for in a few studies, it is hard to come across a rigorous theoretical-conceptual approach to
the term. The existence of two equivalents for the word populism in Turkish, halklk and
poplizm, exacerbates this ambiguity. This paper discusses the reasons for these two usages
in Turkish, explores the academic debates over the lack of rigorous conceptual-theoretical
approaches to the concept, and compares these with the uses of the concept in the literature
on Turkish politics. It is argued that the distinction between halklk and poplizm is based
on the field of binary oppositions embedded in the social sciences in the Turkish context,
grounded in turn on a wider enframing differentiating model from reality. Since
Turkish politics is often evaluated as a unique realization of the Western ideal, few incentives
remain for evaluating it either from a comparative perspective or as an incidence of a wider
universal political phenomenon. Such enframing has caused a particularistic approach to
Turkish politics and an underdevelopment of conceptual-theoretical discussions of
populism/halklk/poplizm. Nevertheless, the use of populism as a signifier of Turkish
exceptionalism is no coincidence; it is implicit in the fundamental dichotomy between the
Western liberal-democratic representative ideal and the derivative reality of populism
developed in most of the general theoretical literature on populism. It is therefore argued
that, particularly in the Turkish context, the analytical leverage provided by the concept of
populism creates more problems than it promises to solve and has become a hindrance to
understanding.

Halklk and Poplizm: Official-Rational versus Popular in the context of Turkish

Exceptionalism1
Toygar Baykan
University of Sussex
[email protected]

1. Introduction
Social scientists interested in politics of Turkey over the last century cannot fail to notice the
super-abundance of the concept of populism in the literature, or its application to seemingly
very different phases and actors. Compounding this conceptual ambiguity is the existence of
two synonyms for the word populism in modern Turkish: halklk (from halk, meaning
public/community, derived from the Arabic) and poplizm (a Latinate loanword from the
French).2 This range of uses of the term in such divergent contexts may be explained by the
difficulties and ambiguities already inherent to the concept itself, explored below.
Nevertheless, this fact does not excuse the rarityor in most of the cases absenceof
adequate theoretical-conceptual discussion of the term or its implications for analyses of
Turkish politics.

In this essay, I briefly introduce my theoretical tools for the examination of the concept of
populism and give a brief account of general academic approaches to it. In order to provide a
case-specific historical context, I follow this with a brief account of the main outlines of
modern Turkish politics. Afterwards, I examine the halklk of the early-Republican period,
political and economic approaches to the concept, and the relationship between centre-right,
patronage and populism in the literature on Turkish politics. In the final part, I locate the
distinction between halklk and poplizm in a wider social-scientific rationality constructed
upon certain binary oppositions. In conclusion, I draw attention to the location of the concept
of populism in Turkish politics as an indicator of a wider process of epistemological
1

I thank my supervisors Paul Taggart, Aleks Szczerbiak and Cristobal Rovira Caltwasser as well as two
anonymous reviewers, from whose recommendations and contributions I benefitted greatly. All errors are
mine.
2
In the online dictionary of the official Turkish Language Institution (Trk Dil Kurumu), the term halklk is
defined as the point of view and stance which sees no difference between individuals in terms of their rights
and rejects privilege within society, poplizm. Nevertheless, the definition of the poplizm by the same
dictionary has other, more negative connotations: 1. Politics implemented through the dramatization of the
political situation to appeal to the people; 2. To flatter the people. See http://www.tdk.gov.tr/ (accessed:
29.6.2014).

enframing, as understood by Timothy Mitchell (1989, 1990, 1991). The enframing which
emerges around two equivalents of the concept in the Turkish context also strongly highlights
the problem of enframing embedded in the majority of the conceptualizations of populism
in general academic debates. In conclusion, I argue that the supposed analytical leverage
provided by the concept of populism actually creates more problems than it promises to solve;
particularly in the context of the Turkish social sciences, where applications of the concept
tend to reproduce a belief in Turkish exceptionalism and a problematic normative and
analytical bias.
2. Theoretical approach and the concept of populism

Enframing in social sciences

Mitchell defines enframing as a variety of modern practices that seem to resolve the world's
shifting complexity into two simple and distinct dimensions. Such practices give rise to the
effect of a purely material world, opposed to and given order by what now appears as a freestanding, non-material realm of meaning (1990, 566). He defines these techniques as
method[s] of order and truth (1989, 236). He also analyses the distinction between state and
society as the structural effect of various practices of enframing and reveals the contribution
of social scientific literature to producing this effect (1991). As we shall see, enframing or
differentiating meaning and reality has been, implicitly or explicitly, the essential
dynamic behind the uses of the concept of populism in Turkey as well as in general academic
discussions.

Conceptualising populism: from Shils to current attempts

Of course, a large body of literature deploys the word populism rather unsystematically to
describe political actors opportunistic, pragmatist, and demagogical styles and tactics.3 The
first systematic evaluation of the concept of populism, however, belongs to Edward Shils. His
analysis of the American security policies of the Cold War era, first published in 1956,
defines the essential tendency of populism as the belief that the will of the people as such is
supreme over every other standard, over the autonomy of institutions and over the will of
other strata (1996, 98). For Shils, populism also identifies the will of the people with justice
3

See Tim Houwen (2011, 2633). Houwen reveals a comprehensive history of the concept, illustrating the
descriptive and pejorative uses of the concept by politicians, the media, and social scientists.

and morality (98), and he defines one of its main characteristics as hostility towards
parliamentary-representative politics (101103).

Students of populism usually acknowledge the constitutive centrality of Ernest Gellner and
Ghita Ionescus edited book, an outcome of a 1967 conference on the concept at the London
School of Economics, which illustrates the diversity of the social and historical contexts and
political actors that scholars have identified with the term. According to the editors, no one is
quite clear just what [populism] is. It bobs up everywhere, but in many and contradictory
shapes (1969, 1). The second part of the book deals with the theoretical issues around the
concept, and indeed reveals a striking diversity. According to Peter Worsley, for instance, it is
preferable to understand populism as an emphasis, a dimension of political culture in
general, not simply as a particular kind of overall ideological system or type of organization
(245). Worsley also underlines the importance of the tendency towards direct participation
in the identification of populism (2467). On the other hand, Peter Wiles, while also listing
many minor empirical properties of populism (1969, 167168), defines it chiefly as any
creed or movement based on the following major premise: virtue resides in the simple people,
who are the overwhelming majority, and in their collective traditions (166). Another
treatment of the concept again argues that populism is a response to the particular problems of
modernization (Stewart 1969, 180).

This diversity and discord among the theoretical approaches to the concept in its first and
prominent systematic elaborations has, more or less, persisted. A later systematic and
comprehensive study of the concept by Margaret Canovan demonstrates the persistence of the
difficulties and highlights the hurdles in defining some limited common characteristics out of
the divergent political manifestations of populism. Canovan argues that we need not a single
essentialist definition but a typology of populism (1981, 13). Nevertheless, she cannot avoid
defining two universally present characteristics of populism although she admits the
vagueness of these components: exaltation of the people and anti-elitism (294). She also
underlines populists tendency to direct popular democracy and their distrust of politicians
(292). She argues that populism can be encountered as an ideology, movement, or political
technique (298299).

Paul Taggarts later, oft-cited, and systematic evaluation of the concept has also underlined
the lack of a consensus on the universal properties of populism and the difficulty of agreeing
6

on an authoritative definition. Nevertheless, he identifies several features of the concept and

defines it as a reaction against the ideas, institutions and practices of representative politics
which celebrates an implicit or explicit heartland as a response to a sense of crisis; however,
lacking universal key values, it is chameleonic, taking on attributes of its environment, and, in
practice, is episodic (Taggart 2000, 5).

It seems possible at this point to separate the main body of the literature into two main
divergent approaches. The first eclectic and multi-domain approach evaluates populism as
the political outcome of the overlap of certain social and economic conditions, and this
approach can be clearly seen in the contributions to and influence of Ionescu and Gellners
book. A second, narrower, single-domain approach tends to confine its understanding of
populism to the study of political discourses and strategies.

Kurt Weylands position, for example, is somewhat exceptional in the literature and derives
from the study of Latin America, focusing on the organisational-strategic dimension of
politics. Weyland underlines the weaknesses of the multi-domain approaches to the concept,
highlighting in particular the insufficiency of associating populism with import substitution
economies (2001, 10) and the unexpected implementation of neoliberal policies by populist
leaders in Latin America after the 1980s (17). Weyland thus tries to decouple the concept
from its economic and discursive implications; populism is best defined as a political
strategy through which a personalistic leader seeks or exercises government power based on
direct, unmediated, uninstitutionalized support from large numbers of mostly unorganized
followers (14). It is interesting that Weyland also associates populism with the absence of
representative, organisational mechanisms between leader and followers and emphasizes the
importance of direct relationships for populist strategies.

Another example of a single-domain approach to populism stems from the study of the radical
right in Europe. Cas Mudde (2004) has defined populism as an ideology that considers
society to be ultimately separated into two homogeneous and antagonistic groups, the pure
people versus the corrupt elite, and which argues that politics should be an expression of
the volont gnrale (general will) of the people (543). Mudde argues that populism is what
Freeden (1996) calls a thin-centered ideology, usually found in combination with other,
perhaps fuller, ideologies like communism, nationalism, and socialism (Mudde 2004, 544).
However, he also defines populism in contradistinction to two persistent adversaries:
7

elitism and pluralism (543544). Similar to Shils, Mudde also notes that populism is
inherently hostile to the idea and institutions of liberal democracy or constitutional
democracy (561).

While it should be underlined that attempts to decouple populism from its economic
implications are not theoretically uniformWeyland treats populism as a special
organisational strategy while Mudde evaluates it as an ideology, for exampleit is
nevertheless possible to identify what seems to be a common feature of both the multi- and
single-domain definitions of populism examined so far; most define populist movements,
ideologies, actors, and contexts as manifestation of a sub-type of politics in opposition to
the Western liberal representative democratic model.

This duality reveals the widespread enframing process in the literature on populism. To a
certain extent, populism has always been seen as a derivative form of politics, a deviation
from the Western European ideal of representative democracy. This is why populism has
always been diagnosed either on the geographical and cultural margins of Europe or in the
internal political periphery of Western European democracies. Populism has been seen as the
slightly disturbing realization of the Western European ideal of representative democracy in
the margins of European influence such as America, Russia, Latin America and the Middle
East, or on the internal political fringes of Western European democracies, namely on the
radical right. In short, on the one hand there is the orderly and rational Western European
ideal of representative politics (meaning) and on the other the grotesque and popular deviation
from this meaning: populism (reality). According to the narrative, populism is not the
antagonistic other of representative democracy but the deviation from the norm; it is the name
given to the unintended consequences of the diffusion and consolidation of the ideal of
representative democracy in the political, geographical, and cultural margins of Western
Europe.
In opposition to the exclusive definition of populism as a subtype of politics, however,
Ernesto Laclau has, in his recent work, adopted the more inclusive stance towards populism
as politics itself. Laclaus analysis aims not to define a limited concept but to illustrate how
populism corresponds to a social logic which can be observed across many different
phenomena (2007, xi). For Laclau, all political interventions are to a certain extent populist
(154); indeed, the simplification and imprecision of populism are no worse than that inherent
8

in other sedimentary/institutional rationales called politics by a certain kind of social scientific

rationality, and such distortions are in fact what distinguishes politics from
administration in Laclaus own vocabulary (1718). Thus, adopting the perspective of
Laclaus work, populism as the articulation of differences and re-interpretation of these
articulated differences as simple antagonisms defined by imprecise boundaries is politics par
excellence.

Figure 1: A map of theoretical-conceptual approaches to populism

It seems, then, that the theoretical-conceptual sophistication of the definition of populism

increases as one diverges from the unsystematic, eclectic, and in-between positions and
adopts a perspective which takes populism to be clearly either a sub-type of politics or as
politics itself. Of course, it is important to be aware of the danger of being overly
schematic, and there are also many insightful approaches to the populism in between the
abovementioned poles. Nevertheless, whether the concept is used to denote the opportunistic,
demagogic and pragmatist inclinations of politicians, the political regimes or actors of a
certain socio-economic model and historical era in the underdeveloped world, or to imply a
universal dimension of representative politics in general, it should also be noted that the
studies with more theoretical-conceptual strength tend to be either comparative works or
evaluations of single incidents contextualised as a part of a more generalizable socio-political
experience.

However, even if we avoid the theoretically-conceptually weaker positions in between the two
more rigorous approaches, it should be clear that the use of the concept of populism as a
special sub-type of politics entails a strong normative implication in favour of Western
European liberal representative politics. Nevertheless, a fundamentally critical perspective has
its own lacunae too. As underlined by Ben Stanley, Laclaus use of the concept as identical to
politics itself leads to the disappearance of the analytical particularity and operational
usefulness of the concept (2008, 97). In the following sections, I will present the various uses
of the term in literature on Turkish politics and point out their convergences as well as
divergences with the general academic debates on populism.
3. Historical overview4

After the defeat of the Ottoman Empire in the World War I, only the Anatolian peninsula
remained under the control of the non-Arabic Muslim majority of the Empire. However, even
this territory had been divided into regions of political influence and shared among the
Western powers. Occupation of the western parts of this territory by the Greek army in 1919
was a decisive moment in the post-World War I history of the region. The occupation
encountered an organized resistance which was led by the nationalist military and
bureaucratic cadres and provincial landed and commercial power holders. The decisive
victory of the nationalist forces over the Greek army in Anatolia brought Mustafa Kemal to
the leadership of a nationalist coalition. After the war, he became the founding figure of the
new Republican regime in Turkey in 1923. Subsequent years brought the emergence and
consolidation of the one-party state of the Kemalist Republican Peoples Party (Cumhuriyet
Halk Partisi, or CHP). This Kemalist ruling elite carried out drastic political, cultural, and
social reforms giving new momentum to the modernization process begun in the late-Ottoman
period. Until smet nns decision to transition to multiparty politics in 1945, the CHP
regime remained an authoritarian and modernizing political engine without significant mass
support. In economic terms, this era was characterised by statist policies, particularly after
1930. This era between 1923 and 1945 has been usually called the early-Republican period
by students of modern Turkish politics and society.

For general outlines of modern Turkish history, see Sina Akin (2007), Feroz Ahmad (2003), and Erik Zrcher
(2004). For the economic aspects of the same period, see Korkut Boratav (2005) and alar Keyder (2003). The
following general framework of modern Turkish history mainly relies on these works.

10

As a consequence of the unpopularity of the ruling CHP, the transition to multiparty politics
brought with it the rule of Democrat Party (Demokrat Parti, or DP) between 1950 and 1960.
The economic policies of the era were characterised by limited liberalisation which relied on
the loosening of import regulations and heavily subsidized rural development. The first
significant experience of Turkey with multiparty politics came to a bitter end when the army
seized the power on the 27th of May 1960 on the grounds of the worsening economic situation
and the authoritarian tendencies of the government. After the military coup, the period until
1980 had been characterised by rising leftist movements and unstable coalition governments
between centre-right and left parties, such as the Justice Party (Adalet Partisi, AP) and CHP,
particularly in the second half of the 1970s. In economic terms, the 1960s and 1970s were
characterized by import substitution accompanied by widespread implementation of
redistributive policies.
The military coup on the 12th of September 1980 was viewed as a response to rising economic
problems and political instability. The coup was followed by the reinstitution of electoral
politics in 1983 which led to the rise of the Motherland Party (Anavatan Partisi, or ANAP)
with a liberal economic and political agenda. The 1990s in particular brought the rise of
political Islam. In these years, Turkish politics produced various weak coalition governments
of the Islamist, centre-right and left parties until the coming to power of the Justice and
Development Party (Adalet ve Kalknma Partisi, or AKP) in 2002. Since then, Turkey has
been ruled by a single-party government of the conservative, post-Islamist AKP and its
neoliberal economic agenda.
4. Populism in the literature on Turkish Politics: Defining Turkish exceptionalism

This section of the paper will evaluate three main themes of Turkish politics in which the use
of the term populism is a more-or-less well-established pattern and demonstrates some
stability. These themes can be classified as i) early-Republican ideological engineering, ii) the
political framework of the import substitution regime in the multi-party era, and iii) patronage
and the centre-right. At first glance, these themes sound quite distinct, particularly the
analyses of the early-Republican and multi-party eras in Turkey. Nevertheless, as I will
illustrate, apart from the common use of the term populism, there is considerable similarity in
the different works analytical approaches to their problematic and the binary oppositions they
use. As I will illustrate, all these works, implicitly or explicitly, define some form of Turkish
11

exceptionalism by positioning political experience in Turkey in contradistinction to the

Western European liberal representative model.
i. Halklk in the early-Republican period

In his illustration of the emergence of populist ideas in the pre-republican period, Zafer
Toprak (1977) refers to the anxieties of Ottoman intellectuals about emerging social
distinctions. He draws attention to the solidarist-corporatist ideas of the intellectuals of the
late-Ottoman period as a panacea to widening social fissures (14). He also underlines how
these tendencies were inherited by the early-Republican elite and intellectuals. According to
Toprak, for early-Republican elite, the principle of halklk referred to the idea and project of
creating a homogenous nation without social classes (2729). According to him, the solidarist
and corporatist late-Ottoman and early-Republican principle of halklk represents
intellectual populism in Turkey (Toprak 1992, 62). On the other hand, he argues that, with
the beginning of multiparty politics in Turkey in 1945, populism became a political element,
or, political populism, and enabled the political participation of the masses in public affairs
(62).
In line with Toprak, lhan Tekeli underlines the solidarist-corporatist use of the principle of
halklk in the early-Republican period as a way of providing popular base to the new regime
and overcoming social and cultural differences within society (1983, 1932). Tekeli and
Gencay aylan, in referring to an influential ideologue of the era, Recep Peker, define the
halklk of the period as a principle implemented by the elite against the people for the
people (1978, 80). Subsequently, they evaluate the halklk of the DP as a refutation of the
early-Republican perspective. Tekeli and aylan define the halklk of the DP programme in
1950s as from the people, with the people, and for the people (89). They argue that the DP
never imposed any change from above and did not insist on any reform which was not
appreciated by the people (91).
A crucial study on halklk in the early-Republican era by Asm Karamerliolu also
underlines the lack of mass support for the regime in those years. An experiment attempted by
the Kemalist elite resulted in the foundation of an opposition party, the Free Republican Party
(Serbest Cumhuriyet Frkas, SCF). According to Karamerliolu, the unexpected success of
this party showed the fragility and weakness of the new regime (2006, 52). The result of these
12

developments was a reconsideration of the principle of halklk and the establishment of

Peoples Houses (halkevleri) for the education of adults (52). In his evaluation of these
attempts at popularizing the regime in the early-Republican period, Karamerliolu points out
the antidemocratic and state-centred character of the process. He also argues that, to a certain
extent, the term halk had been used as a substitute for the term millet (nation) by the earlyRepublican elites due to the latter terms religious connotations (44). Thus, for him, halklk
in Turkey emerged as a state policy in the service of eliminating the spontaneous movements
of the masses (14). Karamerliolu thus considers early-Republican halklk as a hindrance
to democracy from the very beginning; the single party halklk in Turkey had
overwhelmingly elitist, jacobinist, bureaucratic, anti-liberal and anti-democratic qualities
(49). Nevertheless, he also notes the transformation in the multiparty era and argues that
early-Republican halklk later became a genuinely bottom-up phenomenon as a part of the
import substitution regime in the 1960s and 1970s.

Thus the importance attached to the halklk by early-Republican intelligentsia is not

surprising. According to the general secretary of the CHP of the period, Recep Peker, the
Republic of Turkey is a halk entity (1984, 54). The main property of this principle of
halklk, according to Peker, was the denouncement of any privilege for any social class or
status except the differences stemming from the different occupational positions. Peker also
argues that the halk mentality considers the nation as an indivisible whole, and that the
principle of halklk is thus entirely contrary to Western ideas of class struggle (55).
smail Arar underlines very similar features in his study of the exposition of the principle of
halklk by Mustafa Kemal himself in the Program of Halklk of 1920. He emphasizes that
Mustafa Kemal saw the principle of halklk as an instrument for overcoming social class
distinctions and for achieving national homogeneity in the young Republic, and that he
closely identified Republicanism with halklk (1963, 11). Likewise, Cezmi Eraslan, in his
comprehensive study, emphasizes the same identification of Republicanism with halklk
among the early-Republican elite (2003, 144). Nevertheless, he goes beyond this
identification and argues that not only Republicanism but also the unconditional sovereignty
of the nation and democracy were seen as identical to halklk (261267).

It seems that early-Republican halklk is mainly a solidarist-corporatist ideological narrative

created by Kemalist elite to serve the project of building a homogenous nation. Paul Dumont
13

underlines this point: [halklk] also had a much more specific meaning: a vision of a
Turkish nation constituted not of classes but of solidary, closely interdependent occupational
groups (1984, 31). It seems, then, that there is considerable overlap between halklk and
nationalism. Nevertheless, more significantly, halklk was identified as an adaptation of the
practices of Western democracies and their representative institutions and ideas to the
circumstances of Turkey by the early-Republican elite.

ii. Political economy and populism

A different approach to the concept can be found in the studies of political economists of
Turkey. Korkut Boratavs seminal article on the economic regime of Turkey between 1962
and 1976 triggered much-needed debate on the concept of populism in Turkey and has had an
enduring influence. His analysis of the economy and political regime of the period is that the
combination of the import substitution economy, a loose employment regime in the public
sector, high salaries for the workers, and state subsidies for the agricultural sector shaped a
populist political framework (1983). To Boratav, the distinguishing feature of this
framework was the conciliation between the ruling class and working classes (1983, 15). In
other words, this economic approach to populism reinforces the subordination of the working
classes to the bourgeois order through the redistributive effects created by import substitution.
The importance of the import substitution economy and cross-class coalitions in the definition
of the populist regime can also be found in contributions by Haldun Glalp (1984) and Nuri
Karacan (1983/84 and 1984) to the debate around populism initiated by Boratav. An
exceptional study here belongs to Galip Yalman (1985), who illustrates the conceptual
ambiguity with regard to the use of the populism and particularly in the Boratav-KaracanGlalp debate. He argues that the concept of populism does not provide sufficient analytical
leverage to the researcher since it substitutes vague concepts like elite and hegemonic
bloc for concrete and well-defined social classes, and he goes so far as to propose
abandoning the concept altogether (65).
A more precise political economic approach to populism can be seen in alar Keyders oftcited study (2003). Keyder accurately distinguishes halklk from poplizm and affiliates the
former with the corporatist desires of the early-Republican elite (153), and the latter with the
multi-class appeal of the DP. Keyder argues that in historical perspective, the official
halklk of the single-party state has encountered the poplizm of the Democrat Party which
14

was genuinely attractive for the masses (275, emphasis mine). Keyder sees populism with a
cross-class political ideology under the hegemony of the bourgeoisie which is also embraced
by the masses and is employed mainly by the centre-right tradition in Turkey (170). He argues
that the concept and strategy of populism have hindered the development of social-classbased understanding of society (280281). A similar approach can be seen in the study of
Reat Kasaba on the DP period in Turkey, in which he defines populism as a supra-class
appeal to the masses (1993, 45). In short, there is a strong tendency in the political economy
literature on Turkey to highlight the supra-class nature of populism vis-a-vis the supposedly
class-based political distinctions in Western liberal democracies.

iii. Patronage, the centre-right, and populism

There is also a strong tendency in the literature on Turkish politics to evaluate the concept of
populism as closely associated to that of patronage. In his highly influential approach to the
DP era in Turkey, lkay Sunar considers patronage one of the fundamental properties of
populism (1983, 2077). Sunar strictly differentiates early-Republican halklk from the
poplizm of the DP in the 1950s. He argues that this difference was a result of the lack of
mass support for the CHP in the early-Republican era (2079). According to Sunar, while
early-Republican halklk was a top-down project of transforming society and it ignored the
aspirations of the masses, the poplizm of the DP was shaped by the existing values and
expectations of society (2081).
In another study, Sunar argues that, the democratization of Turkey developed between the
early bureaucratization of the state and later industrialization of society (2008, 161).
According to his analysis, the main legacy of this early bureaucratization had been, on the one
hand, a Westernist, secularist, authoritarian and etatist-nationalist bureaucratic
alliance which consist of military-bureaucratic elites, bureaucratic cadres and
bureaucratic constituency of urban intelligentsia (162). The other legacyone in contrast
to the bureaucratic uniformitywas a traditional, heterogeneous and disjointed society
dominated by a large stratum of petty producers prevalent in agriculture, commerce and
industry (162). According to Sunar, these were the circumstances of Turkeys early
democratization which shaped the DPs early struggle for electoral support and power, in
which the main instruments of its success were populism and patronage (164). He argues
that the DP introduced an inclusionary populism instead of the exclusionary variant
15

developed by the early-Republican elite, which he explains through patronage relations in

which goods, services, and public posts are provided by politicians to supporters in return for
votes (165). Thus, Sunar argues that patronage and populism, has been the prominent
feature of Turkish politics since the DPs coming to power (168).
In their analysis of Turkish politics through a similar distinction between state elite and
political elite, Metin Heper and Fuat Keyman argue that while the former has always
favoured rational planning, the latter has always depended on political patronage to gain
support (1998, 25960). In the view of authors, while the state elite in Turkey represents a
strong state (political prudence), the political elite represents the weak state (political
responsiveness) (260). In other words, this tension between state elite and political elite (thus
between strong state and weak state) also reflects the tension between planning and
patronage. On the one hand, Turkish politics in the early-Republican era between 1923 and
1945 was dominated by the state elite and their visionary, long-term views. The authors argue
that during this era, the founders of the Republic, Atatrk and non, emerged as the
defenders of the long-term interests of the community and, thus, as the proponents of a strong
state. Consequently, the socio-economic policies they pursued were strongly coloured by their
high politics (260). On the other hand, political patronage in return for electoral support has
been dominant in Turkish politics since 1945 and has been one of the main components of the
centre-right political tradition including the DP of the 1950s, the AP of the 1960s and 1970s,
and the True Path Party (Doru Yol Partisi, DYP) of the 1990s. According to the authors,
politicians in this tradition presented themselves as the proponents of the national will
against the states will, and as the protectors of the masses against the state elite (261). The
authors also contend that the multiparty system in Turkey had a corrosive effect on strong
state qualities and consolidated attempts at political patronage by allocating state resources
and enlarging public sector employment to respond to the local and particular demands of
the constituencies (262). According to the authors, the perennial leader of the centre-right in
Turkey, Sleyman Demirel, embraced a populist and majoritarian conception of democracy,
with non-mediated mass political participation (265).

Similarly, in his study on the politics of the post-1983 period in Turkey, Heper sets up a
distinction between rationalist democracy and the populist democracy advocated by the
centre-right tradition in Turkey (1990, 322). In a similar fashion, Ersin Kalaycolu, in his
study of the relationship between patronage and democracy, argues that political parties
16

stand out as the penultimate political institution of populist patronage (2001, 63). He argues
that, in Turkey, democracy is essentially populism practiced through clientelistic networks
(67). Thus, according to Kalaycolu, there is a particular contradiction between good
governance and popular government in Turkey (67).

The studies analysed above can be seen as the bases of the descriptive uses of the concept of
populism by many other studies on the centre-right. For instance Nuray Mert evaluates the
conservative politics since its beginning as a poplist opposition to the halklk of the earlyRepublican regime (2001, 46). Similarly Seyfi n argues that centre-right tradition in
Turkey has consolidated populism in Turkey (1995). In his study he uses various different
terms such as Turkish populism, legal populism and cultural populism to examine the
Turkish politics in the multiparty era (101). In line with these evaluations, Necat Erder argues
that by the 1950s, the era of populist rule in Turkey has begun its tendency towards
satisfying, persuading, or detaining the masses (1998, 17). It must be also noted that the
concept is widely used in the literature on the AKP. Very surprisingly, while some analyses
seek to determine the non-populist character of the AKP, others emphasize the populism
of the party as a factor in its rise and electoral achievements.5 It is also common to see the
concept of populism used to classify and/or examine divergent political actors, movements
and events such as the Islamist6 and nationalist discourses of the 1990s,7 and the secularist
protest meetings in 2007.8

Nevertheless, some works on Turkish politics with a more rigorous theoretical and conceptual
approach to populism should also be acknowledged. Necmi Erdoan (1998) deploys a
discourse theory approach to avoid the common binary oppositions in the literature,
particularly that between a populist centre-right and a bureaucratic centre-left. This
enables him to overcome the widespread truisms in the Turkish political science that leftist
and socialist movements have always had an elitist tendency. Thus he is able to reveal the role
of populist discourse in the mobilisation of the masses by CHP and Revolutionary Path
5

For instance Ahmet Yldz (2008, 43) and Burhanettin Duran (2008, 82) refer to the non-populist politics of the
AKP, while Ziya ni talks about a controlled populism (2012, 137). In contrast, Jenny B. White (2008, 373),
Da (2008, 30), and Takn (2008, 59) all mention the populism of the party.
6
See Mehran Kamrava (1998), Ali Yaar Sarbay (1993), Toprak (2005), and White (2002) for the identification
of the Islamist Welfare Party (Refah Partisi, RP) as populist. Cihan Tual defines Islamism as religio-moral
populism (2002, 85).
7
See Ebru Bulut (2006).
8
See Kabir Tambar (2009) for the analysis of the Republic Rallies as secular populism.

17

(Devrimci Yol, DEV-YOL, a radical leftist organisation) in the second half of the 1970s
(1998). The works of Tanel Demirel on the centre-right DP and AP are also significant since
these studies underline the conceptual ambiguity in most of the studies on populism in
Turkey. In line with the definition of Weyland (2001), Demirel refrains from defining DP and
AP as populist because of the highly institutionalized organizations of these parties (2004,
130 and 2011, 129). Deniz Yldrms study (2009) also mounts a remarkable conceptual
discussion of populism. Nevertheless, he considers redistributive strategies as an inseparable
property of populism in addition to the rhetoric of the bureaucratic elite versus people
(85), and it is fair to say that he adopts an eclectic and economistic point of view. Mine Eder
(2004) also discusses the concept in length. However she embraces a very loose definition of
the concept and therefore considers the entire Republican history as populism.9

Despite a recent critical tendency which adopts post-colonial and post-structuralist

approaches10 as well as relational perspectives on political parties and politics in general,11
most studies which apply the concept of populism to Turkish politics rely on binary
oppositions. One of the most important and common of these is the distinction between
halklk and poplizm. It should certainly be noted that the early-Republican elites
understanding of halklk itself was characterised by a top-down perspective which sees
society as a classless, national, corporatist homogeneity in explicit contradistinction to
Western societies with their concrete class distinctions and liberal-representative democratic
institutions. Later analyses of the concept also underline the bureaucratic, solidaristcorporatist, statist, and elitist character of the early-Republican halklk as against the
plurality of society. The analyses of multiparty politics through the concept of populism rely
mainly on similar binary oppositions. To most of these analyses, there is, on the one hand, the
bureaucratic, official, statist elite and their rational high politics, and, on the other, the
populist political elite and their popular and responsive but short-sighted policies. To a great
extent, political-economic approaches to multiparty politics reproduce the same binary
oppositions. On the one hand there are proper, democratic, Western-style class politics and on
the other, there are a-la-turca, supra-class, populist politics of the centre-right, which depend
9

Joint studies by Tanl Bora and Erdoan (2004) and Bora and Nergis Canefe (2009) also draw attention to the
conceptual ambiguity of the term populism and embrace a certain theoretical stance.
10
See the works of Meltem Ahska (2010), Alev nar (2006), Yael Navaro-Yashin (2002) and Esra zyrek
(2006) as prominent examples of this tendency.
11
For a fresh approach to the political parties which avoids such binary oppositions, see Elise Massicard and
Nicole F. Watts edited book (2013), and particularly their introduction. See also Berna Turam (2011) for a
similar critique of the dominant approaches in Turkish social sciences.

18

on import substitution and/or redistributive social policies and/or patronage networks and
clientelism. I have also drawn attention to the widespread descriptive and unsystematic uses
of the concept in the literature on Turkish politics, while noting exceptional works with more
satisfying theoretical-conceptual approaches. As can be seen in figure 2, the use of the term in
the literature on Turkish politics can be mapped, and works which deal with the term
explicitly are clustered close to the centre. The comparison of this map with figure 1 on the
uses of the term in wider academic discourse graphically reveals the dominance of multidomain and descriptive understandings of the concept in the literature on Turkish politics.

Figure 2: A map of the uses of populism in the literature on Turkish politics

It seems, then, that the majority of scholars are quite clear about the populist dimension
inherent in Turkish politics, but very few of their accounts pay attention to the conceptual
ambiguities of the term, including the linguistic distinction between halklk and poplizm.
Yet the term continues to be used widely in the literature without recourse to a satisfying
conceptual-theoretical discussion. In the next part, I will briefly examine a seminal work on
Turkish politics as a route to rectifying this absence.

5. Enframing and populism in the literature on Turkish Politics

In his highly influential study, erif Mardin underlines the great difference between the very
homogenous Ottoman official world under the rule of the Sultans and the highly segmented
19

structure of Ottoman Anatolia (1973, 171). Mardin asserts that this distinction between
centre and periphery rooted in the Ottoman social formation has been very resilient
throughout Ottoman and Republican Turkish history. In his important analyses of multiparty
politics in Turkey, Mardin argues that the electoral platform of the opposition, especially as
seen in Democrat Party political propaganda, in newspapers, and in the media, established the
lines of a debate between real populists and bureaucrats (185). Also, Mardin defines the
contradiction between DP and CHP in a similar vein, whereby the latter represented the
bureaucratic centre, whereas the Democrat Party represented the democratic periphery
(186). 12 This centre-periphery approach has dominated the analyses of Turkish politics
since its publication in 1973 (Hale and zbudun 2010, xviii).13 Yet what makes Mardins
approach to Turkish politics so powerful? Apart from the economy and elegance of his theory,
I think the answer would be very much related to the potential answers to the problematic of
populism in the literature on Turkish politics.

I would argue that the distinction between halklk and poplizm analyzed above is a
significant embodiment of a wider enframing process. It can be argued that Turkish politics
have been the subject of a fundamental enframing in the distinction between the lived
political experience of Turkey (reality) and an imagined Western model (meaning/framework)
in social scientific narratives. According to the narrative of the early-Republican elite and the
later analyses of the era, political modernity in the West was, at first, appropriated by the early
Kemalist halklk.14 In this sense, halklk appears as the appropriation of Western notions of
democracy and republicanism in early-Republican Turkey. Thus, the first enframing is a
distinction between the Western model and the halk practices of the early-Republican elite.
Later on, with the beginning of multiparty politics, the first appropriation of representative
and democratic ideas by Kemalism itself began to be criticized as an imitation of the Western
12

In his analysis of Argentinian politics, Pierre Ostiguy (2009) skilfully grasps the effects of a very similar and
persistent contradiction in the political culture of the country. Ostiguy starts from similar binary oppositions
embedded in the political culture and symbolism of the country. Nevertheless he avoids an essentialist reading
of this contradiction and uses a two dimensional political space. Thus, he has been able to illustrate the relative
location of different political actors as well as gradual transitivity among them along the two axes of
Argentinian politics, namely left and right and high and low.
13
To see the longevity of the effects of Mardins approach on the analyses on political parties in Turkey, see
Feride Acar (1991), Kemal Karpat (1991), Avner Levi (1991) and Sarbay (1991). These studies, on the one hand,
identify the CHP with the forces and tendencies of the centre, namely the state elite and bureaucratic
authoritarian tendencies, and, on the other, the main adversaries of this tradition, the centre-right political
parties, namely the DP, AP, ANAP and DYP, with the forces of the periphery and populism.
14
In his lectures on the Turkish Revolution, Recep Peker argues that our revolution is original and not a copy
at all (1984, 34). This particularistic understanding of the early-Republican regime by the elite of the era is also
highlighted by Eraslan (2003, 202203).

20

model and was re-appropriated by the poplizm of centre-right politics in Turkey. Thus, the
second enframing in Turkish politics is the distinction between the imitative, unrealistic,
elitist and official halklk of the early-Republican period and the supposedly authentic or
real poplizm of the post-1945 centre-right. In other words, there are two competing claims
to legitimacy through authenticity in Turkish politics and hence two competing yet
complementary ways of constructing Turkish exceptionalism. To a considerable extent,
these claims have been constructed and consolidated by social scientific narratives on Turkey.
The distinction between halklk and poplizm also inscribes itself in the domain of binary
oppositions illustrated throughout this essay: centre vs. periphery, state elite vs. political elite,
centre-left vs. centre-right, military bureaucratic authoritarianism vs. conservative popular
majoritarianism, secular politics vs. religious politics, rationalist democracy vs. populist
democracy, high politics vs. responsiveness, modernity vs. tradition, and, last but not least,
state vs. society.15 It would be fair to argue that these binary oppositions are related to the two
competing method[s] of order and truth: an official-rational one signified by halklk and
a popular one signified by poplizm. A general illustration of these different yet
interconnected enframing processes can be seen in figure 3.

Figure 3: Enframing and populism.

15

For a remarkable critique of the discourse on state and civil society in post-1980 Turkey, see Navaro-Yashin
(1998).

21

This understandingthat is, the distinction between Western model and Turkish reality
entails an assumption of the inevitable particularity of the realization of the model in Turkey.
Since Turkish politics is evaluated as a unique realization of the Western ideal, few incentives
remain for evaluating it from a comparative perspective. Most scholars have done little more
than underline the differences of Turkish politics from an abstractand largely imaginary
Western model. This situation can be defined as the underlying cause of the lack of a wider
comparative understanding and hence the lack of a rigorous theoretical-conceptual approach
to populism in the majority of the works in the field. The frequent descriptive or eclectic uses
of the concept as a multi-domain phenomenon also reveal the reluctance to undertake a truly
empirical comparative evaluation of Turkish politics or to understand it as a part of a wider
and international political experience. In short, a particular mode of enframing in the literature
on Turkish politics has caused a particularistic approach to Turkish politics and therefore an
underdevelopment of conceptual-theoretical discussions in the field.
Nevertheless, this explanation does not shed light on the use of the term populism as the
signifier of the Turkish particularity or exceptionalism. At this point it is necessary to
remember the fundamental enframing process inherent in the general academic debates on the
concept. The dichotomy that the concept of populism relies uponbetween the Western
liberal representative ideal and the derivative reality of populismhas created strong
incentives for the Turkish scholars to apply the concept to Turkish politics. In other words,
there is an embedded enframing in the literature on populism, although some definitions are
more conducive to non-particularistic thinking, like those of Weyland (2001), Mudde (2004),
and particularly Laclau (2007). It should also be noted that work referring to these scholars
can by no means be located in the mainstream of the literature on Turkish politics.

Finally, the existence of a normative hierarchy among Western liberal representative politics,
the halklk of the early-Republican period, and multiparty-era poplizm should also be
emphasized. Depending on scholars ideological stance (and albeit in an implicit manner), the
gradual modulation of the model through its different implementations is either praised or
condemned. Nevertheless, this modulation itself has often been recognized by scholars across
the ideological spectrum as deviation from an original model. The discussion over whether
the consequences of this are desirable or not hardly changes the effects of the final cognitive
consensus or the hierarchies brought by this recognition. It seems that this enframing process
itself leads to a virtual yet influential normative hierarchy which, regardless of whether an
22

individual seeks to condemn the imagined model or the experienced reality, primarily serves
as a tool of political legitimacy. Hence, at least in the Turkish context, the analytical leverage
promised by the concept of populism actually entails more problems than it promises to solve.
Ultimately, it reproduces a belief in Turkish exceptionalism in the Turkish social sciences and
traps researchers in the normative and analytical bias outlined above.

6. Conclusion

This critical literature review has examined a range of key studies on Turkish politics which
either examine or deploy the concept of populism. It has revealed the profound impact of a
process of enframing in the social scientific literature on Turkish politics which ultimately
relies on the distinction between a Western European ideal of representative democracy and
its Turkish implementation. The common distinction between halklk and poplizm has
highlighted the specific problems consequent on assuming the Western model as an abstract
fixed point in the social scientific literature on Turkish politics against which its Turkish
implementation is either lionized or held to account. This enframing has permitted a
problematic belief in the exceptionality of the Turkish reality, whose foremost consequence
has been a lack of a comparative perspective or a rigorous theoretical-conceptual approach in
the majority of the studies on halklk and poplizm. But this problem has also been caused
and compounded by a deeper binary opposition in the general academic debates over the
concept of populism; that between Western liberal representative democracies and the
tendency to direct and popular participation supposedly definitive of populism. This
convergence between the conceptual framework of general academic debates and the
literature on Turkish politics highlights a broad, fundamental enframing process underlying
the concept of populism itself. In most of the studies in the theoretical literature, populism
appears as the slightly disturbing realization or misinterpretation of the ideals of
representative liberal democracy in the geographical and political margins of Western Europe.
According to the literature, populism is not antagonistic to the model but it is a deviation from
the ideal: a derivative politics. Hence, it can be concluded that the concept of populism entails
more problems than it promises to solve and has become a hindrance to understanding,
particularly in the Turkish context.

23

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Working Papers in Contemporary European Studies

1.

Vesna Bojicic and David Dyker

Sanctions on Serbia: Sledgehammer or Scalpel

June 1993

2.

Gunther Burghardt
The Future for a European Foreign and Security Policy

August 1993

3.

Xiudian Dai, Alan Cawson, Peter Holmes

February 1994
Competition, Collaboration & Public Policy: A Case Study of the
European HDTV Strategy

4.

Colin Crouch
February 1994
The Future of Unemployment in Western Europe? Reconciling Demands
for Flexibility, Quality and Security

5.

John Edmonds
February 1994
Industrial Relations - Will the European Community Change Everything?

6.

Olli Rehn
July 1994
The European Community and the Challenge of a Wider Europe

7.

Ulrich Sedelmeier
October 1994
The EUs Association Policy towards Central Eastern Europe: Political
and Economic Rationales in Conflict

8.

Mary Kaldor
February 1995
Rethinking British Defence Policy and Its Economic Implications

9.

Alasdair Young
December 1994
Ideas, Interests and Institutions: The Politics of Liberalisation in the
ECs Road Haulage Industry

10.

Keith Richardson
Competitiveness in Europe: Cooperation or Conflict?

11.

Mike Hobday
June 1995
The Technological Competence of European Semiconductor Producers

12.

Graham Avery
July 1995
The Commissions Perspective on the Enlargement Negotiations

13.

Gerda Falkner
September 1995
The Maastricht Protocol on Social Policy: Theory and Practice

14.

Vesna Bojicic, Mary Kaldor, Ivan Vejvoda

Post-War Reconstruction in the Balkans

December 1994

November 1995

29

15.

Alasdair Smith, Peter Holmes, Ulrich Sedelmeier,

March 1996
Edward Smith, Helen Wallace, Alasdair Young
The European Union and Central and Eastern Europe: Pre-Accession
Strategies

16.

Helen Wallace
From an Island off the North-West Coast of Europe

17.

Indira Konjhodzic
June 1996
Democratic Consolidation of the Political System in Finland, 1945-1970:
Potential Model for the New States of Central and Eastern Europe?

18.

Antje Wiener and Vince Della Sala

December 1996
Constitution Making and Citizenship Practice - Bridging the Democracy
Gap in the EU?

19.

Helen Wallace and Alasdair Young

Balancing Public and Private Interests Under Duress

20.

S. Ran Kim
April 1997
Evolution of Governance & the Growth Dynamics of the Korean
Semiconductor Industry

21.

Tibor Navracsics
A Missing Debate?: Hungary and the European Union

22.

Peter Holmes with Jeremy Kempton

September 1997
Study on the Economic and Industrial Aspects of Anti-Dumping Policy

23.

Helen Wallace
January 1998
Coming to Terms with a Larger Europe: Options for Economic
Integration

24.

Mike Hobday, Alan Cawson and S Ran Kim

January 1998
The Pacific Asian Electronics Industries: Technology Governance
and Implications for Europe

25.

Iain Begg
August 1998
Structural Fund Reform in the Light of Enlargement
CENTRE ON EUROPEAN POLITICAL ECONOMY Working Paper No. 1

26.

Mick Dunford and Adrian Smith

August 1998
Trajectories of Change in Europes Regions: Cohesion,
Divergence and Regional Performance
CENTRE ON EUROPEAN POLITICAL ECONOMY Working Paper No. 2

27.

Ray Hudson
August 1998
What Makes Economically Successful Regions in Europe Successful?
Implications for Transferring Success from West to East
CENTRE ON EUROPEAN POLITICAL ECONOMY Working Paper No. 3

March 1996

December 1996

June 1997

30

28.

Adam Swain
August 1998
Institutions and Regional Development: Evidence from Hungary and
Ukraine
CENTRE ON EUROPEAN POLITICAL ECONOMY Working Paper No. 4

29.

Alasdair Young
October 1998
Interpretation and Soft Integration in the Adaptation of the European
Communitys Foreign Economic Policy
CENTRE ON EUROPEAN POLITICAL ECONOMY Working Paper No. 5

30.

Rilka Dragneva
March 1999
Corporate Governence Through Privatisation: Does Design Matter?

31.

Christopher Preston and Arkadiusz Michonski

March 1999
Negotiating Regulatory Alignment in Central Europe: The Case of the
Poland EU European Conformity Assessment Agreement

32.

Jeremy Kempton, Peter Holmes, Cliff Stevenson

September 1999
Globalisation of Anti-Dumping and the EU
CENTRE ON EUROPEAN POLITICAL ECONOMY Working Paper No. 6

33.

Alan Mayhew
March 2000
Financial and Budgetary Implications of the Accession of Central
and East European Countries to the European Union.

34.

Aleks Szczerbiak
May 2000
Public Opinion and Eastward Enlargement - Explaining Declining
Support for EU Membership in Poland

35.

Keith Richardson
Big Business and the European Agenda

36.

Aleks Szczerbiak and Paul Taggart

October 2000
Opposing Europe: Party Systems and Opposition to the Union, the Euro
and Europeanisation
OPPOSING EUROPE RESEARCH NETWORK Working Paper No. 1
Alasdair Young, Peter Holmes and Jim Rollo
November 2000
The European Trade Agenda After Seattle

37.

September 2000

38.

Sawomir Tokarski and Alan Mayhew

Impact Assessment and European Integration Policy

39.

Alan Mayhew
December 2000
Enlargement of the European Union: an Analysis of the Negotiations
with the Central and Eastern European Candidate Countries

40.

Pierre Jacquet and Jean Pisani-Ferry

January 2001
Economic Policy Co-ordination in the Eurozone: What has been achieved?
What should be done?

December 2000

31

41.

Joseph F. Francois and Machiel Rombout

February 2001
Trade Effects From The Integration Of The Central And East European
Countries Into The European Union

42.

Peter Holmes and Alasdair Young

February 2001
Emerging Regulatory Challenges to the EU's External Economic Relations

43.

Michael Johnson
March 2001
EU Enlargement and Commercial Policy: Enlargement and the Making
of Commercial Policy

44.

Witold Orowski and Alan Mayhew

May 2001
The Impact of EU Accession on Enterprise, Adaptation and Institutional
Development in the Countries of Central and Eastern Europe

45.

Adam Lazowski
May 2001
Adaptation of the Polish legal system to European Union law: Selected aspects

46.

Paul Taggart and Aleks Szczerbiak

May 2001
Parties, Positions and Europe: Euroscepticism in the EU Candidate
States of Central and Eastern Europe
OPPOSING EUROPE RESEARCH NETWORK Working Paper No. 2

47.

Paul Webb and Justin Fisher

May 2001
Professionalizing the Millbank Tendency: the Political Sociology of New
Labour's Employees

48.

Aleks Szczerbiak
Europe as a Re-aligning Issue in Polish Politics?: Evidence from
the October 2000 Presidential Election
OPPOSING EUROPE RESEARCH NETWORK Working Paper No. 3

49.

Agnes Batory
September 2001
Hungarian Party Identities and the Question of European Integration
OPPOSING EUROPE RESEARCH NETWORK Working Paper No. 4

50.

Karen Henderson
September 2001
Euroscepticism or Europhobia: Opposition attitudes to the EU in the
Slovak Republic
OPPOSING EUROPE RESEARCH NETWORK Working Paper No. 5

51.

Paul Taggart and Aleks Szczerbiak

April 2002
The Party Politics of Euroscepticism in EU Member and Candidate States
OPPOSING EUROPE RESEARCH NETWORK Working Paper No. 6.

52.

Alan Mayhew
April 2002
The Negotiating Position of the European Union on Agriculture, the
Structural Funds and the EU Budget.

June 2001

32

53.

Aleks Szczerbiak
May 2002
After the Election, Nearing The Endgame: The Polish Euro-Debate in
the Run Up To The 2003 EU Accession Referendum
OPPOSING EUROPE RESEARCH NETWORK Working Paper No. 7.

54.

Charlie Lees
June 2002
'Dark Matter': institutional constraints and the failure of party-based
Euroscepticism in Germany
OPPOSING EUROPE RESEARCH NETWORK Working Paper No. 8

55.

Pinar Tanlak
October 2002
Turkey EU Relations in the Post Helsinki phase and the EU
harmonisation laws adopted by the Turkish Grand National Assembly
in August 2002

56.

Nick Sitter
October 2002
Opposing Europe: Euro-Scepticism, Opposition and Party Competition
OPPOSING EUROPE RESEARCH NETWORK Working Paper No. 9

57.

Hans G. Nilsson
November 2002
Decision Making in EU Justice and Home Affairs: Current Shortcomings
and Reform Possibilities

58.

Adriano Giovannelli
Semipresidentialism: an emerging pan-European model

November 2002

59.

Daniel Naurin
Taking Transparency Seriously

December 2002

60.

Lucia Quaglia
March 2003
Euroscepticism in Italy and centre Right and Right wing political parties
OPPOSING EUROPE RESEARCH NETWORK Working Paper No. 10

61.

Francesca Vassallo
Another Europeanisation Case: British Political Activism

62.

Kieran Williams, Aleks Szczerbiak, Brigid Fowler

March 2003
Explaining Lustration in Eastern Europe: a Post-Communist Politics
Approach

63.

Rasa Spokeviciute
The Impact of EU Membership of The Lithuanian Budget

64.

Clive Church
May 2003
The Contexts of Swiss Opposition to Europe
OPPOSING EUROPE RESEARCH NETWORK Working Paper No. 11

65.

Alan Mayhew
The Financial and Budgetary Impact of Enlargement and Accession

March 2003

March 2003

May 2003

33

66.

Przemysaw Biskup
June 2003
Conflicts Between Community and National Laws: An Analysis of the
British Approach

67.

Eleonora Crutini
Evolution of Local Systems in the Context of Enlargement

68.

Professor Jim Rollo

August 2003
Agriculture, the Structural Funds and the Budget After Enlargement

69.

Aleks Szczerbiak and Paul Taggart

October 2003
Theorising Party-Based Euroscepticism: Problems of Definition,
Measurement and Causality
EUROPEAN PARTIES ELECTIONS AND REFERENDUMS NETWORK Working Paper
No. 12

70.

Nicolo Conti
November 2003
Party Attitudes to European Integration: A Longitudinal Analysis of the
Italian Case
EUROPEAN PARTIES ELECTIONS AND REFERENDUMS NETWORK Working Paper
No. 13

71.

Paul Lewis
November 2003
The Impact of the Enlargement of the European Union on Central
European Party Systems
EUROPEAN PARTIES ELECTIONS AND REFERENDUMS NETWORK Working Paper
No. 14

72.

Jonathan P. Aus
December 2003
Supranational Governance in an Area of Freedom, Security and
Justice: Eurodac and the Politics of Biometric Control

73.

Juraj Buzalk
Is Rural Populism on the decline? Continuities and Changes in
Twentieth Century Europe: The case of Slovakia

74.

Anna Slodka
Eco Labelling in the EU: Lessons for Poland

75.

Pasquale Tridico
Institutional Change and Economic Performance in Transition
Economics: The case of Poland

76.

Arkadiusz Domagala
August 2004
Humanitarian Intervention: The Utopia of Just War?
The NATO intervention in Kosovo and the restraints of Humanitarian Intervention

77.

Marisol Garcia, Antonio Cardesa Salzmann &Marc Pradel

The European Employment Strategy: An Example of European
Multi-level Governance

August 2003

February 2004

May 2004

May 2004

September 2004

34

78.

Alan Mayhew
October 2004
The Financial Framework of the European Union, 20072013: New
Policies? New Money?

79.

Wojciech Lewandowski
The Influence of the War in Iraq on Transatlantic Relations

80.

Susannah Verney
October 2004
The End of Socialist Hegemony: Europe and the Greek Parliamentary
Election of 7th March 2004
EUROPEAN PARTIES ELECTIONS AND REFERENDUMS NETWORK Working Paper
No. 15

81.

Kenneth Chan
November 2004
Central and Eastern Europe in the 2004 European Parliamentary
Elections: A Not So European Event
EUROPEAN PARTIES ELECTIONS AND REFERENDUMS NETWORK Working Paper
No. 16

82.

Lionel Marquis
December 2004
The Priming of Referendum Votes on Swiss European Policy
EUROPEAN PARTIES ELECTIONS AND REFERENDUMS NETWORK Working Paper
No. 17

83.

Lionel Marquis and Karin Gilland Lutz

December 2004
Thinking About and Voting on Swiss Foreign Policy: Does Affective
and Cognitive Involvement Play a Role?
EUROPEAN PARTIES ELECTIONS AND REFERENDUMS NETWORK Working Paper
No. 18

84.

Nathaniel Copsey and Aleks Szczerbiak

March 2005
The Future of Polish-Ukrainian Relations: Evidence from the June 2004
European Parliament Election Campaign in Poland

85.

Ece Ozlem Atikcan

May 2006
Citizenship or Denizenship: The Treatment of Third Country Nationals
in the European Union

86.

Aleks Szczerbiak
May 2006
Social Poland Defeats Liberal Poland?: The September-October 2005
Polish Parliamentary and Presidential Elections

87.

Nathaniel Copsey
Echoes of the Past in Contemporary Politics: the case of
Polish-Ukrainian Relations

88.

Lyukba Savkova
November 2006
Spoilt for Choice, Yet Hard to Get: Voters and Parties at the Bulgarian
2005 Parliamentary Election

October 2004

October 2006

35

89.

Tim Bale and Paul Taggart

First Timers Yes, Virgins No: The Roles and Backgrounds
of New Members of the European Parliament

November 2006

90.

Lucia Quaglia
November 2006
Setting the pace? Private financial interests and European financial
market integration

91.

Tim Bale and Aleks Szczerbiak

Why is there no Christian Democracy in Poland
(and why does this matter)?

92.

Edward Phelps
December 2006
Young Adults and Electoral Turnout in Britain: Towards a Generational
Model of Political Participation

93.

Alan Mayhew
A certain idea of Europe: Can European integration survive
eastern enlargement?

94 .

Sen Hanley, Aleks Szczerbiak, Tim Haughton

May 2007
and Brigid Fowler
Explaining the Success of Centre-Right Parties in Post-Communist
East Central Europe: A Comparative Analysis

95.

Dan Hough and Michael Ko

Territory and Electoral Politics in Germany

96.

Lucia Quaglia
July 2007
Committee Governance in the Financial Sector in the European Union

97.

Lucia Quaglia, Dan Hough and Alan Mayhew

You Cant Always Get What You Want, But Do You Sometimes Get
What You Need? The German Presidency of the EU in 2007

98.

Aleks Szczerbiak
November 2007
Why do Poles love the EU and what do they love about it?: Polish
attitudes towards European integration during the first three years
of EU membership

99.

Francis McGowan
January 2008
The Contrasting Fortunes of European Studies and EU Studies: Grounds
for Reconciliation?

100.

Aleks Szczerbiak
January 2008
The birth of a bi-polar party system or a referendum on a polarising
government: The October 2007 Polish parliamentary election

December 2006

April 2007

May 2007

August 2007

36

101.

Catharina Srensen
January 2008
Love me, love me not A typology of public euroscepticism
EUROPEAN PARTIES ELECTIONS AND REFERENDUMS NETWORK Working Paper
No. 19

102.

Lucia Quaglia
February 2008
Completing the Single Market in Financial services: An Advocacy
Coalition Framework

103.

Aleks Szczerbiak and Monika Bil

May 2008
When in doubt, (re-)turn to domestic politics?
The (non-) impact of the EU on party politics in Poland
EUROPEAN PARTIES ELECTIONS AND REFERENDUMS NETWORK Working Paper
No. 20

104.

John Palmer
July 2008
Beyond EU Enlargement-Creating a United European Commonwealth

105.

Paul Blokker
September 2008
Constitutional Politics, Constitutional Texts and Democratic Variety in
Central and Eastern Europe

106.

Edward Maxfield
September 2008
A New Right for a New Europe? Basescu, the Democrats & Romanias centre-right

107.

Emanuele Massetti
November 2008
The Scottish and Welsh Party Systems Ten Years after Devolution: Format,
Ideological Polarization and Structure of Competition

108.

Stefano Braghiroli
Home Sweet Home: Assessing the Weight and Effectiveness
of National Parties Interference on MEPs everyday Activity

December 2008

109.

Christophe Hillion and Alan Mayhew

The Eastern Partnership something new or window-dressing

January 2009

110.

John FitzGibbon
September 2009
Irelands No to Lisbon: Learning the Lessons from the
failure of the Yes and the Success of the No Side
EUROPEAN PARTIES ELECTIONS AND REFERENDUMS NETWORK Working Paper
No. 21

111.

Emelie Lilliefeldt
September 2009
Political parties and Gender Balanced Parliamentary Presence in Western Europe: A
two-step Fuzzy-set Qualitative Comparative Analysis

112.

Valeria Tarditi
January 2010
THE SCOTTISH NATIONAL PARTYS CHANGING ATTITUDE TOWARDS THE EUROPEAN UNION
EUROPEAN PARTIES ELECTIONS AND REFERENDUMS NETWORK Working Paper No. 22

37

113.

Stijn van Kessel

February 2010
Swaying the disgruntled floating voter. The rise of populist parties in contemporary
Dutch politics.

114.

Peter Holmes and Jim Rollo

April 2010
EU Internal Market: Shaping a new Commission Agenda 2009-2014.

115.

Alan Mayhew
June 2010
The Economic and Financial Crisis: impacts on an emerging economy Ukraine

116.

Dan Keith
The Portuguese Communist Party Lessons in Resisting Change

117.

Ariadna Ripoll Servent

June 2010
The European Parliament and the Returns directive: The end of radical
contestation; the start of consensual constraints?

118.

Paul Webb, Tim Bale and Paul Taggart

October 2010
Deliberative Versus Parliamentary Democracy in the UK: An Experimental Study

119.

Alan Mayhew, Kai Oppermann and Dan Hough

April 2011
German foreign policy and leadership of the EU You cant always get what
you want but you sometimes get what you need

120.

Tim Houwen
The non-European roots of the concept of populism

121.

Cas Mudde
August 2011
Sussex v. North Carolina: The Comparative Study of Party Based Euroscepticism
EUROPEAN PARTIES ELECTIONS AND REFERENDUMS NETWORK Working Paper
No. 23

122.

Marko Stojic
August 2011
The Changing Nature of Serbian Political Parties Attitudes Towards Serbian EU
Membership
EUROPEAN PARTIES ELECTIONS AND REFERENDUMS NETWORK Working Paper
No. 24

123.

Dan Keith
September 2011
When life gives you lemons make lemonade: Party organisation and the adaptation
of West European Communist Parties

124.

Marianne Sundlister Skinner

October 2011
From Ambiguity to Euroscepticism? A Case Study of the Norwegian Progress Partys
Position on the European Union
EUROPEAN PARTIES ELECTIONS AND REFERENDUMS NETWORK Working Paper No. 25

125.

Amy Busby
October 2011
Youre not going to write about that are you?: what methodological issues arise
when doing ethnography in an elite political setting?

June 2010

June 2011

38

126.

Robin Kolodny
November 2011
The Bidirectional Benefits of Political Party Democracy Promotion: The Case of the
UKs Westminster Foundation for Democracy

127.

Tapio Raunio
February 2012
Whenever the EU is involved, you get problems: Explaining the European policy of
The (True) Finns
EUROPEAN PARTIES ELECTIONS AND REFERENDUMS NETWORK Working Paper No. 26

128. Alan Mayhew

Reforming the EU budget to support economic growth

March 2012

129. Aleks Szczerbiak

March 2012
Poland (Mainly) Chooses Stability and Continuity: The October 2011 Polish
Parliamentary Election
130.

Lee Savage
April 2012
A product of their bargaining environment: Explaining government duration in
Central and Eastern Europe

131.

Paul Webb
August 2012
Who is willing to participate, and how? Dissatisfied democrats, stealth democrats and
populists in the UK

132.

Dan Keith and Francis McGowan

Radical left parties and immigration issues

133.

Aleks Szczerbiak
March 2014
Explaining patterns of lustration and communist security service file access in post1989 Poland

134.

Andreas Kornelakis
April 2014
The Evolution of National Social Dialogue in Europe under the Single Market, 19922006

135.

Aleksandra Moroska-Bonkiewicz and Bartek Pytlas

June 2014
European Issues as a Domestic Proxy: The Case of the German Federal Election
2013
EUROPEAN PARTIES ELECTIONS AND REFERENDUMS NETWORK Working Paper
No. 27

136.

Cristina Ares Castro-Conde

June 2014
From Measuring Party Positions on European Integration to Comparing Party
Proposals on EU Affairs: the Case of the 2011 Spanish General Election
EUROPEAN PARTIES ELECTIONS AND REFERENDUMS NETWORK Working Paper
No. 27

137.

Toygar Baykan

February 2014

August 2014

Halklk and Poplizm: Official-Rational versus Popular in the context of

Turkish Exceptionalism
39

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40