R E M E D I A L LAW

GENERAL PRINCIPLES
1. Classification of courts in the Philippines:
a. Courts of general jurisdiction:
Those competent
to decide t h e i r own jurisdiction and to take cognizance of
all kinds of cases, unless otherwise provided by the law
or Rules. Example: Regional Trial Courts.
Courts of special or limited jurisdiction:
Those
which have no power to decide t h e i r own jurisdiction and
can only t r y c a s e s p e r m i t t e d b y s t a t u t e . E x a m p l e :
Municipal Trial Courts.
T h e J u v e n i l e a n d Domestic Relations C o u r t s had
the r a n k of C o u r t s of F i r s t Instance b u t were courts of
special jurisdiction. U n d e r B.P. Big. 129, they have been
integrated into t h e Regional Trial Courts as branches
thereof.
b. Courts of original jurisdiction:
Those courts in
which, u n d e r t h e law, actions or proceedings may
originally be commenced.
Courts of appellate jurisdiction:
Courts which have
the power to review on a p p e a l t h e decisions or orders of
a lower court.
c. Superior courts: Courts which have the power of
review or supervision over a n o t h e r and lower court.
Inferior courts: Those which, in relation to another
court, a r e lower in r a n k and subject to review and supervision by t h e l a t t e r .
While, in a generic sense, a court is considered an
inferior court in relation to the powers of another tribunal
higher in rank, in its technical sense and unless otherwise
intended, it was formerly provided t h a t the phrase

REMEDIAL LAW COMPENDIUM

"inferior court" referred to t h e t h e n municipal or city

courts (former Sec. 1, Rule 5, in relation to R.A. 3820
and R.A. 3828), now called Metropolitan, Municipal, and
Municipal Circuit Trial Courts. Note, also, t h a t u n d e r
Sec. 2, Rule 5, t h e t e r m "municipal t r i a l court" as used in
t h e s e r e v i s e d R u l e s i n c l u d e s all o t h e r c o u r t s o f t h e
s a m e r a n k . In legal circles, they a r e also called "courts
of the first level." In some official issuances, the Supreme
Court refers to t h e m as "first level courts."
However, the "inferior courts" whose decisions a r e
subject t o t h e a p p e l l a t e j u r i s d i c t i o n o f t h e S u p r e m e
Court (Sec. 17, R.A. 296) refer to all t h e courts lower
t h a n t h e S u p r e m e Court. The t e r m "lower courts" is now
used for t h a t purpose in t h e 1987 Constitution (Sec. 512],
Art. VIII), in lieu of "inferior courts" used in t h e 1935
and 1973 Constitutions.
d. Courts of record: Those whose proceedings are
enrolled and which are bound to keep a w r i t t e n record
of all trials and proceedings handled by t h e m (see Luzano
vs. Romero, et al, L-33245, Sept. 30, 1971).
Courts not of record: C o u r t s which a r e not required
to k e e p a w r i t t e n record or t r a n s c r i p t of p r o c e e d i n g s
held t h e r e i n .
P r i o r to t h e effectivity of R.A. 6031 on A u g u s t 4,
1969, inferior courts were not of record; but if a municipal
court of t h e capital of a province or a city court tried a
criminal case w h e r e i n the imposable p e n a l t y is
i m p r i s o n m e n t of more t h a n 6 m o n t h s b u t not exceeding
6 y e a r s and/or a fine of more t h a n P200 b u t not exceeding
P6.000, its proceedings were required to be recorded as
its decisions were appealable to t h e Court of Appeals or
t h e S u p r e m e Court (R.A. 296, as a m e n d e d by R.A. 2613
a n d R.A. 3828, Sec. 87[c], last paragraph).
However,
u n d e r R.A. 2613, a m e n d i n g Sec. 45, R.A. 296, all inferior
c o u r t s a r e now r e q u i r e d to record t h e i r proceedings a n d
a r e accordingly courts of record.
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GENERAL PRINCIPLES

e. Constitutional courts:
Those which owe t h e i r
creation and existence to the Constitution and, therefore,
cannot be legislated out of existence or deprived by law
of the jurisdiction and powers unqualifiedly vested in
them by the Constitution. The Supreme Court and the
Sandiganbayan are t h e only courts specifically provided
for in the Constitution. With regard to the latter, the
b e t t e r v i e w i s t h a t t h e S a n d i g a n b a y a n i s only a
c o n s t i t u t i o n a l l y - m a n d a t e d c o u r t since, a l t h o u g h its
existence is provided for in the Constitution, its creation
was by s t a t u t o r y e n a c t m e n t .
Statutory courts:
Those c r e a t e d , organized and
with j u r i s d i c t i o n exclusively d e t e r m i n e d by law.
Accordingly, all o t h e r c o u r t s i n t h e P h i l i p p i n e s a r e
statutory courts.
2. The Court of Tax Appeals created by R.A. 1125
has been held to be a p a r t of the judicial system vested
with special jurisdiction to act only on protests of private
p e r s o n s a d v e r s e l y affected b y t h e t a x , c u s t o m s o r
assessment laws (Ursal vs. CTA, et al., 101 Phil. 209).
On March 30, 2004, said law was amended by R.A.
9282 e x p a n d i n g t h e j u r i s d i c t i o n of t h e Court of Tax
Appeals (CTA) and elevating its rank to the level of a
collegiate court with special jurisdiction, of the same level
as t h e Court of Appeals, and consisting of a Presiding
Justice and 5 Associate Justices who shall sit en banc or
in 2 divisions of 3 justices each. The court shall, inter
alia, h a v e e x c l u s i v e a p p e l l a t e j u r i s d i c t i o n to review
decisions of t h e Commissioner of I n t e r n a l Revenue in
disputes arising from the tax law administered by the
Bureau of I n t e r n a l Revenue, the Regional Trial Courts in
local tax cases, the Commissioner of Customs in matters
administered by the Bureau of Customs, the Central Board
of Assessment Appeals in assessments of real property,
t h e S e c r e t a r y of F i n a n c e and t h e Secretary of Trade
and I n d u s t r y in m a t t e r s specified therein. The decision
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REMEDIAL LAW COMPENDIUM

of said court en banc may be reviewed by t h e Supreme

Court on certiorari p u r s u a n t to Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court (see Appendix CC).
3. The distinction obtaining in o t h e r j u r i s d i c t i o n s
between courts of law and courts of equity, and among
civil, criminal and probate courts, does not apply in t h e
Philippines wherein all courts are courts both of law and
equity (Rustia vs. Franco, 41 Phil. 280; Roa, et al. vs.
CA, et al., L 27294, June 28, 1983; Galman, et al. vs.
Sandiganbayan, et al., G.R. No. 72670, Sept. 12, 1986);
and Regional Trial Courts and, to a limited e x t e n t , t h e
lower courts, exercise jurisdiction, according to t h e case
involved, as civil, criminal or probate courts or courts of
land registration. Before B.P. Big. 129 became operative,
t h e r e w e r e special c o u r t s , s u c h a s t h e J u v e n i l e a n d
Domestic Relations Courts, t h e Circuit C r i m i n a l Courts
and t h e Courts of A g r a r i a n Relations, which w e r e courts
exercising only limited and special jurisdiction.
4. U n d e r our p r e s e n t s t a t u t o r y and j u r i s p r u d e n t i a l
taxonomy, jurisdiction is classified, based on its n a t u r e ,
as follows:
a. General jurisdiction, or t h e power to adjudicate
all controversies except those expressly withheld from the
p l e n a r y p o w e r s of t h e c o u r t ; a n d special or limited
jurisdiction, which r e s t r i c t s t h e court's jurisdiction only
to p a r t i c u l a r cases a n d subject to such limitations as may
be provided by t h e governing law.
b. Original jurisdiction, or t h e power of t h e court to
t a k e judicial cognizance of a case i n s t i t u t e d for judicial
action for the first time u n d e r conditions provided by law;
a n d appellate jurisdiction, or t h e a u t h o r i t y of a court
higher in r a n k to r e e x a m i n e t h e final order or j u d g m e n t
of a lower court which tried t h e case now elevated for
judicial review.
c. Exclusive jurisdiction, or t h e power to adjudicate
a case or proceeding to t h e exclusion of all o t h e r courts
4

GENERAL PRINCIPLES

at t h a t s t a g e ; and concurrent jurisdiction, sometimes

referred to as confluent or coordinate jurisdiction, which
is the power conferred upon different courts, whether of
the same or different r a n k s , to take cognizance at the
same stage of t h e s a m e case in the same or different
judicial territories.
Concurrent original jurisdiction between trial courts
of different r a n k s has in the main been eliminated by
B.P. Big. 129. For instance, there is no more concurrent
j u r i s d i c t i o n in adoption or g u a r d i a n s h i p proceedings
between inferior courts and the present Regional Trial
Courts as was provided by the Judiciary Act with respect
to the former Courts of First Instance, which Act also
provided for concurrence in criminal cases and special
civil actions. However, as among courts of the same rank,
it appears t h a t a p h a s e of concurrent original jurisdiction
still obtains in some instances as, for example, in civil
and criminal cases for libel or the settlement of the estate
of a n o n r e s i d e n t w i t h p r o p e r t i e s in different judicial
regions. Withal, in point of strict law, these situations
are m a t t e r s of venue except in^criminal cases for libel,
s i n c e i n c r i m i n a l p r o c e d u r e , v e n u e is, a s a r u l e ,
jurisdictional. For a discussion of other criminal cases
covered by t h e s a m e r u l e , see t h e P r e l i m i n a r y
Considerations in Criminal Procedure in Volume Two of
this work. Where such concurrence exists, the court first
taking cognizance of the case does so to the exclusion of
the o t h e r courts, although the Supreme Court may order
a t r a n s f e r of venue or place of trial to another court of
competent jurisdiction.
At any r a t e , B.P. Big. 129 provides for concurrent
original j u r i s d i c t i o n between the S u p r e m e Court and
either t h e Court of Appeals or the Regional Trial Courts,
or among all t h r e e courts in certain cases. To illustrate,
the S u p r e m e Court has concurrent original jurisdiction
with t h e Court of Appeals in petitions for the issuance of
writs of certiorari, prohibition and m a n d a m u s against
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REMEDIAL LAW COMPENDIUM

the Regional Trial Courts; with the Court of Appeals and

the Regional Trial Courts over the same petitions against
the inferior courts; and with the Regional Trial Courts
in actions affecting ambassadors, other public m i n i s t e r s
and consuls.
5. Also, u n d e r B.P. Big. 129, delegated jurisdiction
is provided for, i.e., t h e g r a n t of a u t h o r i t y to inferior
courts to hear and determine cadastral and land
registration cases u n d e r certain conditions (see Sec. 34,
infra); and special jurisdiction, which is t h e power of
inferior courts to h e a r and decide petitions for a writ of
habeas corpus or applications for bail in t h e absence of
all the Regional Trial J u d g e s in t h e province or city (see
Sec. 35, infra). T h i s l a t t e r t y p e of j u r i s d i c t i o n w a s
formerly included, with variations, in w h a t was known
as the interlocutory jurisdiction of inferior courts u n d e r
t h e Judiciary Act.
6. M e n t i o n m u s t also be m a d e of t h e territorial
jurisdiction of a court, which refers to t h e geographical
area within which its powers can be exercised. As
already stated, this a s s u m e s importance in criminal cases
wherein considerations of t h e territory vis-a-vis t h e locus
of t h e crime d e t e r m i n e not only t h e venue of t h e case
b u t t h e jurisdiction of t h e court; and, in civil cases, t h e
venue of real or mixed actions. In all cases, t h e S u p r e m e
Court and the Court of Appeals have national jurisdiction;
t h e Regional Trial C o u r t s have regional jurisdiction; a n d
t h e inferior courts have such t e r r i t o r i a l jurisdiction as
may be defined by t h e S u p r e m e Court p u r s u a n t to Sees,
25, 28 and 3 1 , B.P. Big. 129.
Other classifications of original jurisdiction are based
on t h e s u b j e c t - m a t t e r or t h e n a t u r e of t h e action being
t r i e d b y t h e c o u r t , s u c h a s civil, c r i m i n a l , p r o b a t e ,
a d m i r a l t y a n d maritime, juvenile and domestic relations,
a g r a r i a n , a n d land r e g i s t r a t i o n . Most of t h e s e different
a r e a s of jurisdiction a r e exercised by t h e r e g u l a r t r i a l
6

GENERAL PRINCIPLES

courts, since t h e special c o u r t s like t h e circuit c r i m i n a l

courts a n d t h e juvenile a n d domestic relations courts have
been abolished. With respect to t h e latter, domestic cases
are now generally h a n d l e d by t h e newly created Family
Courts, hereinafter discussed.
Other subjects of
controversies r e q u i r i n g special t r a i n i n g a n d knowledge,
such as t a x a t i o n , labor a n d s e c u r i t i e s , a r e h a n d l e d by
quasi-judicial agencies, subject to t h e power of judicial
review by t h e a p p e l l a t e c o u r t s .
7. Jurisdiction and venue are distinguished as
follows:
a. Jurisdiction is the authority to hear and
d e t e r m i n e a case; v e n u e is t h e place w h e r e t h e case is to
be h e a r d or t r i e d .
b. J u r i s d i c t i o n is a m a t t e r of s u b s t a n t i v e law; v e n u e ,
of p r o c e d u r a l law.
c. J u r i s d i c t i o n e s t a b l i s h e s a r e l a t i o n b e t w e e n t h e
court a n d t h e s u b j e c t - m a t t e r ; v e n u e , a r e l a t i o n b e t w e e n
plaintiff a n d d e f e n d a n t , o r p e t i t i o n e r and r e s p o n d e n t .
d. J u r i s d i c t i o n is fixed by law a n d c a n n o t be
conferred by t h e p a r t i e s ; v e n u e may be conferred by t h e
act or a g r e e m e n t of t h e p a r t i e s (Manila Railroad Co. vs.
Attorney-General, 20 Phil.
523).
In c r i m i n a l cases, t h e v e n u e of t h e crime goes into
the t e r r i t o r i a l j u r i s d i c t i o n of t h e court (Lopez vs. Paras,
L-25795, Oct. 29, 1966), hence w h e r e the c r i m i n a l action
is i n s t i t u t e d not in t h e place specified by t h e Rules a n d
declared by t h e s u b s t a n t i v e law as w i t h i n t h e t e r r i t o r i a l
jurisdiction of t h e t r i a l court, t h e motion to q u a s h should
be g r o u n d e d on lack of j u r i s d i c t i o n , a n d not i m p r o p e r
venue.
8. T h e a u t h o r i t y to decide a case and not t h e decision
r e n d e r e d t h e r e i n i s w h a t m a k e s u p jurisdiction. W h e r e
t h e r e is j u r i s d i c t i o n , t h e decision of all q u e s t i o n s a r i s i n g
in t h e case is b u t an exercise of jurisdiction (De la Cruz
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REMEDIAL LAW COMPENDIUM

vs. Moir,
Ramolete,
court may
same time

36 Phil. 213; Associated Labor Union vs.

L-23527, Mar. 31, 1965). Consequently, a
have jurisdiction over t h e case b u t at t h e
act in excess of such jurisdiction.

9. The e r r o r s which a c o u r t may c o m m i t in t h e

exercise of jurisdiction differ from e r r o r s of j u d g m e n t .
T h e f o r m e r is r e v i e w a b l e in an o r i g i n a l a c t i o n for
c e r t i o r a r i , while t h e l a t t e r i s c o r r e c t i b l e b y a p p e a l
(Henderson, et al. vs. Tan, etc., et al., 87 Phil. 466;
Maritime Co. of the Phil. vs. Paredes, L-24811, Mar. 3,
1967; Bulan vs. Masakayan, L-24428, June 26, 1968;
Palma vs. Q & S, Inc., L-20366, May 19, 1986). E r r o r s
of j u r i s d i c t i o n r e n d e r a j u d g m e n t void or, at l e a s t
voidable (see Sec. lfa] and fb], Rule 16; Rule 65), while
e r r o r s of j u d g m e n t are grounds for reversal only if it is
shown t h a t prejudice has been caused thereby (Banco
Espahol-Filipino vs. Palanca, 37 Phil. 821; Bimeda vs.
Perez, et al., 93 Phil. 636).
10. Requisites for t h e exercise of jurisdiction and
how the court acquires such jurisdiction:
a. Jurisdiction over the plaintiff or petitioner:
This
is acquired by t h e filing of t h e complaint, p e t i t i o n or
initiatory pleading before t h e court by t h e plaintiff or
petitioner.
b. Jurisdiction over the defendant or respondent:
This is acquired by the voluntary a p p e a r a n c e or
submission by the defendant or r e s p o n d e n t to the
c o u r t or by coercive p r o c e s s i s s u e d by t h e c o u r t to
him, generally by the service of s u m m o n s
(Sharuff vs.
Bubla, L-17029, Sept. 30,
1964; Aban vs. Enage,
L-30666, Feb. 25, 1983).
c. Jurisdiction over the subject-matter:
This is conferred by law and, unlike jurisdiction over t h e p a r t i e s ,
cannot be conferred on t h e court by t h e v o l u n t a r y act or
a g r e e m e n t of t h e p a r t i e s .

GENERAL PRINCIPLES

d. Jurisdiction over the issues of the case:

This is
d e t e r m i n e d a n d conferred by t h e p l e a d i n g s filed in t h e
case by t h e p a r t i e s , or by t h e i r a g r e e m e n t in a p r e - t r i a l
order or stipulation, or, at t i m e s , by t h e i r implied consent
as by t h e failure of a p a r t y to object to evidence on an
issue not covered by t h e p l e a d i n g s , as provided in Sec. 5,
Rule 10 (see Lazo, et al. vs. Republic Surety & Insurance
Co., Inc., L-27365, Jan. 30, 1970).
e. Jurisdiction over the res (or t h e p r o p e r t y or t h i n g
which is t h e subject of t h e litigation): This is acquired
by the a c t u a l or c o n s t r u c t i v e s e i z u r e by t h e court of t h e
thing in q u e s t i o n , t h u s placing it in custodia legis, as in
a t t a c h m e n t or g a r n i s h m e n t ; or by provision of law
which recognizes in t h e c o u r t t h e power to deal w i t h t h e
p r o p e r t y o r s u b j e c t - m a t t e r w i t h i n its t e r r i t o r i a l j u r i s diction, a s i n l a n d r e g i s t r a t i o n p r o c e e d i n g s o r s u i t s
involving civil s t a t u s or r e a l p r o p e r t y in t h e P h i l i p p i n e s
of a n o n r e s i d e n t d e f e n d a n t .
In two i n s t a n c e s , t h e c o u r t a c q u i r e s jurisdiction to
try t h e case, even if it h a s not a c q u i r e d jurisdiction over
the p e r s o n of a n o n r e s i d e n t d e f e n d a n t , as long as it h a s
jurisdiction over t h e res, as w h e n t h e action involves t h e
p e r s o n a l s t a t u s of t h e plaintiff or p r o p e r t y in t h e Philippines in w h i c h t h e d e f e n d a n t claims an i n t e r e s t (see
Sec. 15, Rule 14). In s u c h cases, t h e service of s u m m o n s
by p u b l i c a t i o n a n d notice to t h e d e f e n d a n t is m e r e l y
t o c o m p l y w i t h d u e p r o c e s s r e q u i r e m e n t s (Banco
Espanol-Filipino vs. Palanca, 37 Phil. 921; De Midgely
vs. Ferandos, et al., L-34314, May 13, 1975).
Under
Sec. 133 of t h e C o r p o r a t i o n C o d e , w h i l e a f o r e i g n
corporation doing b u s i n e s s in t h e P h i l i p p i n e s w i t h o u t a
license c a n n o t sue or i n t e r v e n e in any action here, it may
be sued or p r o c e e d e d a g a i n s t before our c o u r t s or
administrative tribunals.
11. As a g e n e r a l proposition, t h e jurisdiction of t h e
court is d e t e r m i n e d by t h e s t a t u t e in force at t h e t i m e of
t h e c o m m e n c e m e n t of t h e action (People vs. Paderna,
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REMEDIAL LAW COMPENDIUM

L-28518, Jan. 29, 1968; People vs. Mariano, et al.,

L-40527, June 30, 1976; Lee, et al. vs. Presiding Judge,
etc., et al, G.R. No. 68789, Nov. 10, 1986), unless such
s t a t u t e provides for its retroactive application, as w h e r e
it is a c u r a t i v e legislation (Atlas Fertilizer Corp. vs.
Navarro, etc., et al., G.R. No. 72074, April 30, 1987).
12. The settled rule is t h a t the jurisdiction of t h e
court over t h e subject-matter is d e t e r m i n e d by t h e alleg a t i o n s of t h e c o m p l a i n t (Edward J. Nell & Co. vs.
Cubacub, L-20843, June 23, 1965; Time, Inc. vs. Reyes,
et al., L-28882, May 31, 1971; Ganadin vs. Ramos, et
al., L-23547, Sept. 11, 1980), b u t t h i s rule is not w i t h o u t
exceptions. T h u s , it was held t h a t while t h e allegations
in the complaint make out a case for forcible e n t r y , w h e r e
tenancy is averred by way of defense and is proved to be
the real issue, t h e case should be dismissed for lack of
jurisdiction as t h e case should properly be filed w i t h t h e
t h e n C o u r t of A g r a r i a n R e l a t i o n s (Ignacio vs. CFI of
Bulacan, L-27897, Oct. 29, 1971).
However, w i t h t h e
integration of the courts of a g r a r i a n relations as b r a n c h e s
of t h e Regional Trial C o u r t s u n d e r B.P. Big. 129, t h e
case w a s r e q u i r e d to be filed w i t h t h e c o r r e s p o n d i n g
Regional T r i a l Court if it w a s w i t h i n t h e j u r i s d i c t i o n
thereof, for a s s i g n m e n t to t h e a p p r o p r i a t e b r a n c h . Also,
although the allegations in t h e complaint make out a case
cognizable by a Regional Trial Court, w h e r e , however,
the acts complained of are shown at the trial to be
interwoven with an unfair labor practice case, t h e action
should be dismissed since jurisdiction is vested in t h e
National Labor Relations Commission. This is so since
t h e Rules now p e r m i t a motion to dismiss based upon
facts not alleged in the complaint (Mindanao Rapid Co.,
Inc. vs. Omandam, et al., L-23058, Nov. 27, 1971, jointly
d e c i d i n g t h e r e i n L-23473, 23871, 24232, 24718 a n d
24956).
13. Where t h e complaint is for a c t u a l d a m a g e s of
P978, b u t t h e o t h e r claims for d a m a g e s a n d a t t o r n e y ' s
10

GENERAL PRINCIPLES

fees bring t h e t o t a l relief s o u g h t to more t h a n P 10,000

(which was t h e n t h e j u r i s d i c t i o n a l limit for civil cases in
the inferior courts), t h e t o t a l i t y of said claims p u t s t h e
case w i t h i n t h e j u r i s d i c t i o n of t h e t h e n C o u r t of F i r s t
Instance and the trial court erred in dismissing the
complaint upon its m e r e impression t h a t t h e o t h e r claims
were "bloated" for t h e p u r p o s e of invoking its jurisdiction,
w i t h o u t h e a r i n g a n d p r o o f of s u c h fact (Enerio vs.
Alampay, L-40010, May 26, 1975; Ratila vs. Tapucar,
L-45018, Jan. 24, 1977).
T h i s doctrine is still applicable
subject t o t h e i n c r e a s e d j u r i s d i c t i o n a l a m o u n t u n d e r
B.P. Big. 129 a n d s u b s e q u e n t legislation.
14. The j u r i s d i c t i o n of a court, w h e t h e r in c r i m i n a l
or civil c a s e s , once it a t t a c h e s c a n n o t be o u s t e d by
s u b s e q u e n t h a p p e n i n g s or e v e n t s a l t h o u g h of a charact e r w h i c h w o u l d h a v e p r e v e n t e d j u r i s d i c t i o n from
a t t a c h i n g in t h e first i n s t a n c e (Ramos, et al. vs. Central
Bank, L-29352, Oct. 4, 1971, a n d c a s e s t h e r e i n cited;
Dioquino vs. Cruz, et al., L-38579, Sept. 9, 1982) a n d it
r e t a i n s j u r i s d i c t i o n u n t i l it finally disposes of t h e case
(Republic vs. Pielago, et al., G.R. No. 72218, July 21,
1986).
15. The c o n s t i t u t i o n a l i t y of a s t a t u t e m u s t be questioned a t t h e e a r l i e s t o p p o r t u n i t y , except i n c r i m i n a l
cases w h e r e t h e q u e s t i o n may be r a i s e d at any s t a g e and,
in civil c a s e s , if t h e d e t e r m i n a t i o n of t h e q u e s t i o n is
necessary for t h e decision of t h e case, even if r a i s e d for
the first t i m e on a p p e a l . A c o n s t i t u t i o n a l question will
also be considered by t h e a p p e l l a t e court at any t i m e if it
involves t h e j u r i s d i c t i o n of t h e court a quo. The s a m e
rule applies to o r d i n a n c e s (San Miguel Brewery, Inc. vs.
Magno, L 21879, Sept. 9, 1967).
16. Basic in t h e law on procedure is t h e doctrine t h a t
the jurisdiction of a c o u r t over t h e s u b j e c t - m a t t e r of an
action is conferred only by t h e C o n s t i t u t i o n or t h e law
and t h a t t h e Rules of C o u r t yield to s u b s t a n t i v e law, in
11

REMEDIAL LAW COMPENDIUM

this case, the Judiciary Act and B.P. Big. 129, both as
a m e n d e d , a n d of w h i c h j u r i s d i c t i o n is only a p a r t .
J u r i s d i c t i o n c a n n o t be fixed by t h e a g r e e m e n t of t h e
parties; it cannot be acquired t h r o u g h , or waived, enl a r g e d or d i m i n i s h e d by, any act or omission of t h e
p a r t i e s ; neither can it be conferred by the acquiescence
of t h e court (De Jesus, et al. vs. Garcia, et al., L-26816,
Feb. 28, 1967; Calimlim, et al. vs. Ramirez, et al.,
L-34363, Nov. 19, 1982). Jurisdiction m u s t exist as a
m a t t e r of law (People vs. Casiano, L-15309, Feb. 16,
1961). Consequently, questions of jurisdiction may be
raised for t h e first time on a p p e a l even if such issue
w a s not r a i s e d in t h e l o w e r c o u r t (Government vs.
American Surety Co., 11 Phil. 203; Vda. de Roxas vs.
Rafferty, 37 Phil. 957; People vs. Que Po Lay, 94 Phil.
640). A court can motu proprio dismiss a case which is
outside its jurisdiction (Sec. 1, Rule 9).
17. N e v e r t h e l e s s , in some c a s e s , t h e p r i n c i p l e of
estoppel by laches h a s been availed of by our a p p e l l a t e
courts to bar a t t a c k s on jurisdiction a n d t h i s principle
h a s been applied to both civil a n d criminal cases, t h u s :
a.
In t h e early case of Santiago, et al. vs. Valenzuela
(78 Phil. 397), it was held t h a t if a motion to dismiss t h e
appeal, on t h e ground t h a t said a p p e a l was perfected out
of time, is filed for t h e first time w i t h t h e appellate court
after t h e a p p e l l a n t had paid t h e docket fee and t h e cost
of p r i n t i n g t h e record on appeal, and after the filing of
a p p e l l a n t ' s brief, t h e a p p e l l a t e court should deny t h e
motion as t h e appellee may be considered in estoppel by
his failure to object on time.
This doctrine was subsequently abandoned in
Miranda vs. Guanzon (92 Phil. 168) since t h e "requirem e n t r e g a r d i n g t h e perfection of an a p p e a l w i t h i n t h e
r e g l e m e n t a r y period is not only m a n d a t o r y b u t j u r i s dictional," a ruling subsequently r e i t e r a t e d in Garganta
vs. CA (105 Phil. 412), Valdez vs. Ocumen (106 Phil.
12

GENERAL PRINCIPLES

929), Galima vs. CA (L-21046, J a n . 3 1 , 1966), Antique

Sawmills, Inc. vs. Zayco (L-20051, May 30, 1966), Roque
vs. Vdo. de Del Rosario (L-24873, Sept. 23, 1966) and
Arellano, et al. vs. CA, et al. (L-31856, Nov. 24, 1972).
b. In t h e l a t e r case, however, of Tijam vs. Sibonghanoy, et al. (L-21450, April 15, 1968), t h e co-defendant
surety c o m p a n y n e v e r r a i s e d t h e issue of j u r i s d i c t i o n in
the Court of F i r s t I n s t a n c e d e s p i t e s e v e r a l o p p o r t u n i t i e s
to do so a n d , a l t h o u g h t h e claim being for only 1*1,908,
the case w a s w i t h i n t h e exclusive original jurisdiction
of the m u n i c i p a l court. It w a s only after t h e court of
Appeals h a d affirmed t h e decision of t h e t r i a l court in
favor o f t h e p l a i n t i f f b u t b e f o r e t h e f i n a l i t y o f t h i s
decision of t h e C o u r t of A p p e a l s t h a t t h e co-defendant
surety c o m p a n y filed its motion to d i s m i s s on t h e ground
of lack of o r i g i n a l j u r i s d i c t i o n of t h e t r i a l court. Denying
said m o t i o n , t h e S u p r e m e C o u r t s t a t e d : "Were w e t o
sanction s u c h c o n d u c t on its p a r t , we would in effect be
declaring as useless all t h e proceedings had in t h e p r e s e n t
case since it w a s commenced on J u l y 19, 1948 a n d compel
the j u d g m e n t c r e d i t o r s to go up t h e i r Calvary once more.
The inequity a n d u n f a i r n e s s of t h i s is not only p a t e n t
but revolting." I t f u r t h e r s t a t e d t h a t "after v o l u n t a r i l y
s u b m i t t i n g a c a u s e a n d e n c o u n t e r i n g an a d v e r s e decision
on t h e m e r i t s , it is too l a t e for t h e loser to q u e s t i o n t h e
jurisdiction or p o w e r of t h e court . . . it is not r i g h t for
a p a r t y who h a s affirmed a n d invoked t h e jurisdiction
of a court in a p a r t i c u l a r m a t t e r to s e c u r e an affirmative
relief, t o a f t e r w a r d s d e n y t h a t s a m e j u r i s d i c t i o n t o
escape a p e n a l t y , " citing Pindangan, etc. vs. Dans, et al.
(L-14591, S e p t . 26, 1962), Young Men's Labor Union,
etc. vs. CIR, et al. (L-20307, Feb. 26, 1965) a n d Mejia
vs. Lucas (100 Phil. 277). See also Capilitan vs. De la
Cruz, (L-29536-37, F e b . 28, 1974), Summit Guaranty vs.
CA, et al. (G.R. No. 51139, Dec. 14, 1981), Tajonera, et
al. vs. Lumaroza, et al. (L-48907 & L-49035, Dec. 19,
1981),
Nieva vs. Manila Banking Corp.
(L-30811,
13

REMEDIAL LAW COMPENDIUM

Sept. 2, 1983), Florendo, et al. vs. Coloma, et al. (G.R.

No. 6 0 5 4 4 , May 19, 1984), a n d Medijia vs. Patcho
(L-30310, Oct. 23, 1984).
c. In Rodriguez vs. CA (L-29264, Aug. 29, 1969), the
action involved property worth more t h a n P200.000, at
t h a t time within the exclusive appellate jurisdiction of the
Supreme Court. Despite several opportunities to raise t h a t
issue in the Court of Appeals where the appeal was taken,
defendant did not challenge t h e appellate jurisdiction of
t h e court and did so only after decision w a s r e n d e r e d
therein against him. He raised the issue of jurisdiction,
for the nullification of the decision of the Court of Appeals,
when t h e case was on appeal in the Supreme Court. The
S u p r e m e C o u r t denied his plea u n d e r t h e doctrine of
estoppel by laches.
d. The same ruling was applied in Crisostomo vs.
CA, et al. (L-27166, Mar. 25, 1970) and Libudan vs. Gil
(L-21163, May 17, 1972) u n d e r t h e j u s t i f i c a t i o n t h a t
"the principle of estoppel is in t h e i n t e r e s t of a sound
administration of t h e laws," citing the Tijam case. The
S u p r e m e Court pointed out t h a t the doctrine of laches is
"based upon grounds of public policy which requires, for
the peace of society, the discouragement of stale claims"
and "is principally a question of t h e inequity or unfairn e s s of p e r m i t t i n g a r i g h t or claim to be enforced or
asserted."
e. In Sarmiento vs. Salud (L-25211, Aug. 18, 1972),
t h e S u p r e m e Court, in resolving t h e motion for reconsideration filed t h e r e i n , held t h a t while it is t r u e t h a t
a record on a p p e a l m u s t show on its face t h a t it was
perfected on time and such r e q u i r e m e n t is jurisdictional
in n a t u r e , nevertheless if t h e record on appeal does not
comply with this r e q u i r e m e n t but the motion to dismiss
the appeal is filed more t h a n 6 months after t h e appellee
filed his brief, t h e motion should be denied.
The same ruling was applied in Dequito vs. Lopez
(L-27757, Mar. 28, 1968) involving virtually t h e same set
14

GENERAL PRINCIPLES

of facts. These r u l i n g s would still apply in cases w h e r e i n

a record on a p p e a l is r e q u i r e d , as w h e r e multiple a p p e a l s
are allowed or in special p r o c e e d i n g s .
f. In Vera vs. People (L-31218, F e b . 18, 1970), it
was held t h a t while a j u d g m e n t is null a n d void w h e r e it
was p r o m u l g a t e d w h e n t h e p r e s i d i n g j u d g e h a d a l r e a d y
ceased to hold office, since t h e accused failed to raise t h a t
issue in t h e t r i a l court a n d only did so after t h e C o u r t of
Appeals h a d r e n d e r e d a j u d g m e n t a d v e r s e to h i m , it
would be an injustice if all t h e proceedings h a d in t h e
case would be s e t aside since, after all, t h e court t h a t
r e n d e r e d s e n t e n c e w a s one o f c o m p e t e n t j u r i s d i c t i o n .
The case of Carillo vs. Allied Workers' Association of the
Philippines (L-23689, J u l y 3 1 , 1968) w a s cited in s u p p o r t
of this ruling.
g. In People vs. Casuga (L-37642, Oct. 22, 1973),
the accused was convicted of grave slander, which
offense w a s w i t h i n t h e c o n c u r r e n t j u r i s d i c t i o n of t h e
then C o u r t s o f F i r s t I n s t a n c e a n d t h e m u n i c i p a l c o u r t s
of c a p i t a l s of p r o v i n c e s or t h e City C o u r t s . I n s t e a d of
appealing to t h e t h e n C o u r t of A p p e a l s or t h e S u p r e m e
Court, as would h a v e b e e n p r o p e r , he a p p e a l e d to t h e
Court of F i r s t I n s t a n c e w h i c h affirmed said conviction.
On his s u b s e q u e n t challenge to t h e a p p e l l a t e jurisdiction
exercised by t h e C o u r t of F i r s t I n s t a n c e , t h e S u p r e m e
Court held t h a t t h e a c c u s e d , h a v i n g t a k e n his a p p e a l
to the C o u r t of F i r s t I n s t a n c e , is in estoppel to challenge
the a p p e l l a t e j u r i s d i c t i o n of t h e said court.
h. In People vs. Tamani ( L - 2 2 1 6 0 - 6 1 , J a n . 2 1 ,
1974), a l t h o u g h t h e a p p e a l of t h e accused w a s demonstrably filed out of t i m e , t h e S u p r e m e C o u r t n e v e r t h e l e s s
reviewed t h e case a n d r e n d e r e d a j u d g m e n t on t h e m e r i t s
thereof, while declaring in t h e same decision t h e dismissal
of the appeal, in view of t h e fact t h a t t h e filing of t h e
appeal out of t i m e w a s due to t h e fault of t h e defense
counsel a n d t h e f u r t h e r c o n s i d e r a t i o n t h a t t h e briefs for
the p a r t i e s h a d a l r e a d y b e e n filed.
16

REMEDIAL LAW COMPENDIUM

i.
The d o c t r i n e laid down in Tijam vs. Sibonghanoy, supra, has been r e i t e r a t e d in many succeeding
cases and is still good case law. The rule up to now is
t h a t a p a r t y ' s active participation in all s t a g e s of a case
before the trial court, which includes invoking t h e court's
a u t h o r i t y to g r a n t affirmative relief, effectively estops
such p a r t y from l a t e r c h a l l e n g i n g t h e j u r i s d i c t i o n of
t h e s a i d c o u r t (Gonzaga, et al. vs. CA, et al., G.R.
No. 144025, Dec. 27, 2002).
j.
See, moreover, the summary in Figueroa vs. People
of the Philippines (G.R. No. 147406, J u l y 14, 2008) which
apparently presents the prevailing position of the Supreme
Court on the issue of when a litigant is estopped by laches
from assailing t h e jurisdiction of a court, in light of its
other and subsequent holdings on the m a t t e r .
18. J u r i s d i c t i o n over a person may also be acquired
even if he was never impleaded nor s u m m o n e d in t h e
action as a d e f e n d a n t if he t h e r e a f t e r v o l u n t a r i l y
s u b m i t t e d himself to t h e jurisdiction of t h e court. T h u s ,
w h e r e t h e spouses v o l u n t a r i l y signed t h e compromise
agreement to guarantee the payment by the original
impleaded defendants, and t h a t compromise a g r e e m e n t
was approved and made the basis of the j u d g m e n t
r e n d e r e d by t h e court, said spouses a r e bound by t h e
j u d g m e n t as they are in estoppel to deny t h e very a u t h o rity which they invoked. By v o l u n t a r i l y e n t e r i n g into
t h e compromise a g r e e m e n t , they effectively s u b m i t t e d
t h e m s e l v e s to t h e jurisdiction of t h e court (Rodriguez,
et al. vs. Alikpala, et al., L 38314, June 25, 1974).
19. S i n c e a C o u r t o f F i r s t I n s t a n c e ( n o w , t h e
R e g i o n a l T r i a l C o u r t ) is a c o u r t of g e n e r a l o r i g i n a l
jurisdiction, w h e t h e r a p a r t i c u l a r m a t t e r should be
resolved by it in t h e exercise of its g e n e r a l jurisdiction,
or in its limited j u r i s d i c t i o n as a p r o b a t e or land
r e g i s t r a t i o n court, is not a j u r i s d i c t i o n a l q u e s t i o n b u t
a p r o c e d u r a l q u e s t i o n i n v o l v i n g a m o d e of p r a c t i c e
16

GENERAL PRINCIPLES

which, therefore, m a y be waived (Manalo vs. Mariano,

et al., L-33850, Jan. 22, 1976; Santos vs. Banayo,
L-31854, Sept. 9, 1982). P a r e n t h e t i c a l l y , S e c . 2 of
P.D. 1529 h a s e l i m i n a t e d t h e d i s t i n c t i o n b e t w e e n t h e
general jurisdiction of a Regional T r i a l C o u r t a n d t h e
limited jurisdiction conferred upon it by t h e former law
when acting as a c a d a s t r a l c o u r t (Ligon vs. CA, et al.,
G.R. No. 107751, June 1, 1995). However, t h e holding
t h a t such s i t u a t i o n s p r e s e n t only p r o c e d u r a l , a n d not
jurisdictional, q u e s t i o n s still a p p l i e s .
20. Q u e s t i o n s involving o w n e r s h i p of or title to real
property should be l i t i g a t e d in an o r d i n a r y civil action
or in t h e proceeding w h e r e t h e i n c i d e n t properly belongs,
before a court of g e n e r a l j u r i s d i c t i o n a n d not before a
land r e g i s t r a t i o n c o u r t (Santos vs. Aquino, L-32949,
Nov. 28, 1980).
2 1 . Statutes regulating the procedure of the courts
will be c o n s t r u e d as applicable to actions p e n d i n g a n d
u n d e t e r m i n e d at t h e t i m e of t h e i r p a s s a g e , b u t not to
actions which h a v e a l r e a d y become final a n d executory
(Borre, et al. vs. CA, et al., G.R. No. 57204, Mar. 14,
1988). P r o c e d u r a l laws a r e r e t r o s p e c t i v e in t h a t sense
and to t h a t e x t e n t (People vs. Sumilang, 77 Phil. 764;
Liam Law vs. Olympic Sawmill Co., et al., L-30771,
May 26, 1984; Yakult Philippines, et al. vs. CA, et al.,
G.R. No. 91856, Oct. 5, 1990). T h u s , t h e provision of
B.P. Big. 129 which e l i m i n a t e d t h e need for a record on
appeal was given retroactive effect to authorize the giving
o f due c o u r s e t o a n a p p e a l , w h i c h s h o u l d h a v e b e e n
perfected in 1982 w i t h t h e r e q u i r e d record on appeal, by
relieving t h e a p p e l l a n t of t h e need therefor in line w i t h
the change of p r o c e d u r e u n d e r B.P. Big. 129 (Alday vs.
Camilon, G.R. No. 60316, Jan. 31, 1983; Ouano vs. CA,
et al., L-44823, June 27, 1985; De Guzman, et al. vs.
CA, et al, G.R. No. 52733, July 23, 1985; Lagunzad vs.
CA, et al, G.R. No. 52007, Sept. 24, 1987; Mun. Gov't of

17

REMEDIAL LAW COMPENDIUM

Coron vs. Carino, et al., G.R. No. 65896, Sept. 24, 1987;
Sarmiento vs. Gatmaitan, et al., L-38173, Nov. 12, 1987).
However, new court rules apply to p e n d i n g cases
only with reference to proceedings t h e r e i n which t a k e
place after t h e d a t e of t h e i r effectivity. They do not
apply to the extent t h a t in t h e opinion of t h e court t h e i r
application would not be feasible or would work injustice,
in which event the former procedure shall apply. T h u s ,
where t h e application of the Rule on S u m m a r y Procedure
will m e a n t h e dismissal of the appeal of t h e p a r t y , t h e
s a m e should not apply since, after all, t h e p r o c e d u r e
t h e y a v a i l e d of w a s also allowed u n d e r t h e R u l e s of
Court
(Laguio, et al. vs. Garnet, et al., G.R. No. 74903,
Mar. 21, 1980).
22. S u b s t a n t i v e law is t h a t p a r t of t h e law which
c r e a t e s r i g h t s concerning life, liberty or property, or t h e
p o w e r s of i n s t r u m e n t a l i t i e s for t h e a d m i n i s t r a t i o n of
p u b l i c affairs (Primicias vs. Ocampo, 81 Phil. 650).
Procedural law refers to the adjective laws which prescribe
rules a n d forms of procedure in order t h a t courts may be
able to a d m i n i s t e r justice (Lopez vs. Gloria, 40 Phil. 33).
S u b s t a n t i v e law c r e a t e s , defines a n d r e g u l a t e s r i g h t s ,
as opposed to "adjective or remedial law" which prescribes
t h e method of enforcing t h e r i g h t s or obtaining r e d r e s s
for t h e i r i n v a s i o n (Black's Law Dictionary, 6th Ed.,
p. 1429; citations omitted).
Procedure is t h e mode of proceeding by which a legal
r i g h t is enforced, as d i s t i n g u i s h e d from t h e law which
gives or defines t h e right, a n d which, by m e a n s of t h e
proceeding, t h e court is to a d m i n i s t e r . This t e r m is commonly opposed to t h e s u m of legal principles c o n s t i t u t i n g
t h e s u b s t a n c e of t h e law, and denotes t h e body of rules,
w h e t h e r of practice or pleading, whereby rights are
effectuated t h r o u g h t h e successful a p p l i c a t i o n of t h e
proper remedies (op. cit., pp. 1367-1368; id.).

GENERAL PRINCIPLES

In d e t e r m i n i n g w h e t h e r a r u l e p r e s c r i b e d by t h e
S u p r e m e C o u r t abridges, e n l a r g e s or modifies any
substantive right, the test is whether the rule really
r e g u l a t e s p r o c e d u r e , t h a t is, t h e judicial process for
enforcing rights and duties recognized by the substantive
law a n d for j u s t l y a d m i n i s t e r i n g r e m e d y a n d r e d r e s s for
a d i s r e g a r d or infraction of t h e m . If t h e r u l e t a k e s a w a y
a vested r i g h t , it is not p r o c e d u r a l . If t h e r u l e c r e a t e s a
right, s u c h as t h e r i g h t to a p p e a l , it may be classified as
a s u b s t a n t i v e m a t t e r ; b u t if it operates as a means of
implementing an existing right,
then the rule deals
merely with procedure (Fabian vs. Desierto, etc., et al.,
G.R. No. 129742, Sept. 16, 1998).
It is, t h e r e f o r e , t h e n a t u r e a n d t h e p u r p o s e of t h e
law w h i c h d e t e r m i n e s w h e t h e r i t i s s u b s t a n t i v e o r
procedural, a n d not its place in t h e s t a t u t e or its inclusion
in a code. T h u s , for i n s t a n c e , A r t s . 539 and 1674 of t h e
Civil Code a n d Sec. 85, R.A. 296 provided injunctive r u l e s
i n e j e c t m e n t cases i n t h e t r i a l a n d a p p e l l a t e s t a g e s , b u t
these have b e e n properly incorporated with modifications
as Sees. 8 a n d 9, r e s p e c t i v e l y , of Rule 70 of t h e 1964
Rules of C o u r t (now, Sec. 15 of revised Rule 70). T h e s e
s u b s e q u e n t a m e n d a t o r y provisions on injunctions were
proper since t h e m e r e fact t h a t those provisions on injunctions w e r e formerly included in a s u b s t a n t i v e s t a t u t e
or code does not c o n v e r t t h e m into or d e t r a c t from t h e
fact t h a t t h e y a r e p r o c e d u r a l laws, c o n t r a r y t o common
m i s i m p r e s s i o n . I n fact, t h e r e a r e m a n y such p r o c e d u r a l
rules found in t h e Civil Code or, for t h a t m a t t e r , in o t h e r
codes o r b a s i c a l l y s u b s t a n t i v e l a w s b u t t h e y d o n o t
t h e r e b y lose t h e i r c h a r a c t e r a s p r o c e d u r a l laws.
T h i s m a t t e r is being clarified a n d e m p h a s i z e d h e r e
in view of t h e C o n s t i t u t i o n a l provision t h a t t h e r u l e s
which t h e S u p r e m e C o u r t is a u t h o r i z e d to p r o m u l g a t e
shall not d i m i n i s h , i n c r e a s e or modify s u b s t a n t i v e r i g h t s
(Sec. 5 [5], Art. VIII, 1987 Constitution). The improbable
position t h a t a clearly p r o c e d u r a l provision becomes a
19

REMEDIAL LAW COMPENDIUM

s u b s t a n t i v e law by the mere fact t h a t it is included in a

c o m p i l a t i o n , codification o r s t a t u t o r y e n a c t m e n t o f
s u b s t a n t i v e r i g h t s , a l t h o u g h only to i n d i c a t e t h e
r e m e d i a l c o m p l e m e n t for t h e e n f o r c e m e n t t h e re o f ,
would effectively s u b v e r t the Constitutional i n t e n t and
d i m i n i s h t h e scope and e x t e n t of t h e r u l e - m a k i n g
power of t h e S u p r e m e Court.

20

I.

CIVIL P R O C E D U R E

A. PRELIMINARY CONSIDERATIONS
1. The s t u d y of civil p r o c e d u r e includes o r d i n a r y
civil a c t i o n s , s p e c i a l c i v i l a c t i o n s a n d p r o v i s i o n a l
r e m e d i e s . Special civil actions a r e governed by specific
and individual rules supplemented by the general
provisions on civil a c t i o n s .
2. Definition of t e r m s :
a. Cause of action: The delict or wrongful act or
omission c o m m i t t e d by t h e d e f e n d a n t in v i o l a t i o n of
the p r i m a r y r i g h t s of t h e plaintiff (Racoma vs. Fortich,
et al, L-29380, June 10, 1971).
b. Right of action: T h e r e m e d i a l r i g h t or r i g h t to
relief g r a n t e d by law to a p a r t y to i n s t i t u t e an action
a g a i n s t a p e r s o n who h a s c o m m i t t e d a delict or w r o n g
against him.
T h e c a u s e of a c t i o n is t h e delict or w r o n g , while
the r i g h t of action is t h e r i g h t to sue as a consequence
of t h a t delict. T h e q u e s t i o n as to w h e t h e r t h e plaintiff
has a c a u s e of action is d e t e r m i n e d by t h e a v e r m e n t s
in the pleading regarding the acts committed by the
defendant; w h e t h e r s u c h acts give him a r i g h t of action
is d e t e r m i n e d by t h e s u b s t a n t i v e law. T h e r e can be no
r i g h t of a c t i o n w i t h o u t a c a u s e of a c t i o n b e i n g first
e s t a b l i s h e d (see Espanol vs. The Chairman, etc. of the
PVA, L-44616, June 29, 1985).
A r i g h t of action is t h e r i g h t to p r e s e n t l y enforce a
c a u s e of a c t i o n a r e m e d i a l r i g h t affording r e d r e s s
for t h e i n f r i n g e m e n t of a legal r i g h t belonging to some
definite person; a c a u s e of action consists of t h e operative
facts which give rise to s u c h r i g h t of action. The r i g h t
of a c t i o n does n o t a r i s e u n t i l t h e p e r f o r m a n c e of all
conditions p r e c e d e n t to t h e action, a n d may be t a k e n
away by the r u n n i n g of the s t a t u t e of limitations,
21

REMEDIAL LAW COMPENDIUM

t h r o u g h an estoppel, or by other circumstances which do

not affect t h e cause of action.
There may be several
rights of action and one cause of action, a n d r i g h t s may
accrue at different times from the same cause (1 Am JUT 2d,
Sec. 2, p. 541).
c. Relief: The redress, protection, a w a r d or coercive
m e a s u r e which t h e plaintiff p r a y s t h e court to r e n d e r in
his favor as a consequence of t h e delict committed by t h e
defendant.
d. Remedy: The procedure or type of action which
may be availed of by t h e plaintiff as t h e m e a n s to obtain
t h e relief desired.
e. Subject-matter:
The t h i n g , wrongful act, cont r a c t or property which is directly involved in t h e action,
c o n c e r n i n g which t h e w r o n g h a s b e e n done a n d w i t h
respect to which t h e controversy h a s a r i s e n (Yusingco,
et al. vs. Ong Ring Lian, L-26523, Dec. 24, 1971).
T h u s , in a case for breach of contract, t h e contract
violated is t h e subject-matter; t h e breach by t h e obligor
is t h e cause of action; the right of action is t h e consequent
s u b s t a n t i v e r i g h t on t h e p a r t jof t h e obligee to sue for
r e d r e s s ; t h e relief is t h e d a m a g e s or rescission or t h e act
which the plaintiff asks the court to order; and t h e remedy
is t h e t y p e of action which m a y be a v a i l e d of by t h e
plaintiff, which may be an action e i t h e r for d a m a g e s ,
for rescission or for specific performance.
The s u b j e c t - m a t t e r of a given case is d e t e r m i n e d not
by t h e n a t u r e of t h e action t h a t a p a r t y is e n t i t l e d to
bring b u t by t h e n a t u r e a n d c h a r a c t e r of t h e p l e a d i n g s
a n d issues s u b m i t t e d by t h e p a r t i e s (Viray vs. CA, et al.,
G.R. No. 92481, Nov. 9, 1990).
3.

Classification of actions:

a. Real action: One b r o u g h t for t h e protection of

r e a l r i g h t s , land, t e n e m e n t s or h e r e d i t a m e n t s or one
founded on privity of e s t a t e only (Paper Industries Corp.
22

PRELIMINARY CONSIDERATIONS

of the Phil. vs. Samson, et al., L-80175, Nov. 28, 1975).

Example: Accion
reivindicatoria.
Personal action: O n e which is not founded upon t h e
privity of real r i g h t s or r e a l p r o p e r t y . Example: Action
for a s u m of money.
Mixed action: O n e b r o u g h t for protection or recovery
of r e a l p r o p e r t y a n d a l s o for an a w a r d for d a m a g e s
sustained.
Example: Accion publiciana w i t h a claim for
damages.
For p u r p o s e s of v e n u e , a mixed action is governed
by t h e r u l e s of v e n u e in r e a l actions.
b. Action in rem: O n e which is not directed only
a g a i n s t p a r t i c u l a r p e r s o n s b u t a g a i n s t t h e t h i n g itself
and t h e object of which is to b a r indifferently all who
might b e m i n d e d t o m a k e a n y objection a g a i n s t t h e r i g h t
sought t o b e enforced, h e n c e t h e j u d g m e n t t h e r e i n i s
binding theoretically upon t h e whole world. Example:
Expropriation.
Action in personam: O n e which is directed a g a i n s t
p a r t i c u l a r p e r s o n s on t h e b a s i s of t h e i r p e r s o n a l liability
to establish a claim against t h e m and the j u d g m e n t
wherein is b i n d i n g only upon t h e p a r t i e s impleaded or
their successors in i n t e r e s t . Example: Action for b r e a c h
of contract.
Action quasi in rem: O n e directed a g a i n s t p a r t i c u l a r
persons b u t t h e p u r p o s e of which is to b a r a n d bind not
only said p e r s o n s b u t a n y o t h e r p e r s o n who claims any
interest in the property or right subject of the suit.
Example: J u d i c i a l foreclosure of a m o r t g a g e
(Ocampo
vs. Domalanta, L-21011, Aug. 30, 1967).
A proceeding for a t t a c h m e n t of p r o p e r t y is in rem if
t h e d e f e n d a n t does n o t a p p e a r in court, a n d in personam
if he a p p e a r s (Banco EspaAol-Filipino vs. Palanca,
supra).

23

REMEDIAL LAW COMPENDIUM

c.
Transitory action: One t h e v e n u e of which is
dependent generally upon t h e residence of t h e p a r t i e s
regardless of w h e r e t h e cause of action arose. Example:
Personal action.
Local action: One which is required by t h e Rules to
be i n s t i t u t e d in a p a r t i c u l a r place in t h e absence of an
a g r e e m e n t to t h e contrary. Example: Real action.
The classification of actions into real, personal
or mixed is based on t h e subject-matter thereof. With
respect to t h e binding effect of t h e relief s o u g h t or t h e
j u d g m e n t t h e r e i n , actions a r e classified into actions in
rem, quasi in rem or in personam. Hence, a real action
may be in personam, or a personal action may be in rem
(see Hernandez, et al. vs. Rural Bank of Lucena, Inc.,
L-29791, Jan. 10, 1978). T r a n s i t o r y or local actions a r e
so d e n o m i n a t e d on t h e basis of t h e permissible v e n u e s
thereof.
4. In Yu vs. Pacleb, etc. (G.R. No. 172172, Feb. 24,
2009), the Supreme Court cited this extended discussion
on classification of civil action: The settled rule is t h a t the
a i m a n d object of an action d e t e r m i n e its c h a r a c t e r .
W h e t h e r a proceeding is rem, or in personam, or quasi in
rem is determined by its nature^ind purpose, and by these
only. A proceeding in personam is a proceeding
enforce
personal rights and obligations brought against the person
and is based on t h e jurisdiction of the person, although it
may involve his right to, or the exercise of ownership of,
specific property, or seek to compel him to control or dispose
of it in accordance with the m a n d a t e of t h e court. The
purpose of a proceeding in personam is to impose, t h r o u g h
the j u d g m e n t of a court, some responsibility or liability to
compel a defendant to specifically perform some act or
actions to fasten a pecuniary liability on him. An action
in personam is said to be one which has for its object a
j u d g m e n t a g a i n s t t h e person, as d i s t i n g u i s h e d from a
j u d g m e n t against the property to d e t e r m i n e its s t a t e . It
24

PRELIMINARY CONSIDERATIONS

has been held t h a t an action in personam is a proceeding

to enforce p e r s o n a l r i g h t s or obligations, such action is
brought a g a i n s t t h e person.
X

On t h e o t h e r h a n d , a proceeding quasi in rem is one

brought a g a i n s t p e r s o n s seeking to subject t h e property
of such persons to t h e discharge of t h e claims assailed. In
an a c t i o n quasi in rem, an i n d i v i d u a l is n a m e d as
defendant and t h e p u r p o s e of t h e proceeding is to subject
his i n t e r e s t s t h e r e i n to t h e obligations or loans b u r d e n i n g
the property. Actions quasi in rem deal with t h e s t a t u s ,
ownership or liability of a p a r t i c u l a r p r o p e r t y b u t which
are intended to operate on t h e s e questions only as between
particular p a r t i e s to t h e proceedings a n d not to a s c e r t a i n
or cut off t h e r i g h t s or i n t e r e s t s of all possible c l a i m a n t s .
The j u d g m e n t s t h e r e i n a r e binding only upon t h e p a r t i e s
who joined in t h e action.

25

B. J U R I S D I C T I O N OF THE S U P R E M E COURT
U N D E R THE 1987 C O N S T I T U T I O N
Article VI (Legislative D e p a r t m e n t )
"Sec. 30. No law s h a l l be p a s s e d i n c r e a s i n g t h e
appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court as
provided i n t h i s C o n s t i t u t i o n w i t h o u t i t s advice a n d
concurrence."
Article VII (Executive D e p a r t m e n t )
"Sec. 4. (last par.) The S u p r e m e Court, s i t t i n g en
banc, shall be t h e sole judge of all contests r e l a t i n g to
t h e election, r e t u r n s a n d qualifications of t h e P r e s i d e n t
or V i c e - P r e s i d e n t , a n d may p r o m u l g a t e r u l e s for t h e
purpose."
X

"Sec. 18. ( t h i r d p a r . ) T h e S u p r e m e C o u r t m a y
review, in an a p p r o p r i a t e proceeding filed by any citizen,
t h e sufficiency of t h e factual basis of t h e p r o c l a m a t i o n of
m a r t i a l law or t h e suspension of t h e privilege of t h e w r i t
or the extension thereof, and must promulgate its decision
t h e r e o n w i t h i n t h i r t y days from its filing."
Article VIII (Judicial D e p a r t m e n t )
"Sec. 2. The Congress shall have t h e power to define,
prescribe, a n d apportion t h e jurisdiction of t h e v a r i o u s
c o u r t s b u t may not deprive t h e S u p r e m e C o u r t of its
jurisdiction over cases e n u m e r a t e d in Section 5 hereof.
No law shall be p a s s e d reorganizing t h e J u d i c i a r y
when it u n d e r m i n e s the security of t e n u r e of its
Members."
X

"Sec. 5. The S u p r e m e Court shall have t h e following

powers:

26

JURISDICTION OF THE SUPREME COURT

UNDER THE 1987 CONSTITUTION

(1) Exercise o r i g i n a l j u r i s d i c t i o n over c a s e s affecting

ambassadors, o t h e r public m i n i s t e r s a n d consuls, a n d
over petitions for certiorari, prohibition, mandamus,
quo warranto, a n d habeas corpus.
(2) Review, revise, r e v e r s e , modify, or affirm on a p p e a l
or certiorari, as t h e law or t h e Rules of C o u r t may
provide, final j u d g m e n t s a n d o r d e r s of lower c o u r t s
in:
(a) All c a s e s i n w h i c h t h e c o n s t i t u t i o n a l i t y o r
validity of a n y t r e a t y , i n t e r n a t i o n a l or executive a g r e e m e n t , law, p r e s i d e n t i a l decree,
p r o c l a m a t i o n , o r d e r , i n s t r u c t i o n , o r d i n a n c e , or
r e g u l a t i o n is in q u e s t i o n .
(b) All cases involving t h e legality of any tax, impost,
a s s e s s m e n t , or toll, or a n y p e n a l t y imposed in
relation thereto.
(c) All cases in which t h e j u r i s d i c t i o n of any lower
court is in i s s u e .
(d) All c r i m i n a l cases in which t h e p e n a l t y imposed
is reclusion perpetua or h i g h e r .
(e) All cases in which only an e r r o r or question of
law is involved.
(3) Assign t e m p o r a r i l y j u d g e s of lower courts to o t h e r
stations as public interest may require. Such
t e m p o r a r y a s s i g n m e n t s h a l l not exceed six m o n t h s
w i t h o u t t h e c o n s e n t of t h e j u d g e concerned.
(4) O r d e r a c h a n g e of v e n u e or place of t r i a l to avoid a
m i s c a r r i a g e of j u s t i c e .
(5) P r o m u l g a t e r u l e s c o n c e r n i n g t h e p r o t e c t i o n a n d
enforcement of constitutional rights, pleading,
practice, a n d p r o c e d u r e in all courts, t h e admission
to t h e practice of law, t h e I n t e g r a t e d Bar, a n d legal
a s s i s t a n c e to t h e u n d e r p r i v i l e g e d . Such r u l e s shall
provide a simplified a n d inexpensive procedure for

27

REMEDIAL LAW COMPENDIUM

t h e speedy disposition of cases, shall be uniform for

all courts of t h e same grade, and shall not diminish,
i n c r e a s e , or modify s u b s t a n t i v e r i g h t s . R u l e s of
procedure of special courts and quasi-judicial bodies
s h a l l r e m a i n effective u n l e s s d i s a p p r o v e d by t h e
S u p r e m e Court.
(6) Appoint all officials and employees of t h e J u d i c i a r y
in accordance with the Civil Service Law."
Article IX (Constitutional Commissions)
A. Common Provisions
"Sec. 7. Each Commission shall decide by a majority
vote of all its M e m b e r s any case or m a t t e r b r o u g h t before
it w i t h i n sixty days from t h e d a t e of its submission for
decision or r e s o l u t i o n . A c a s e or m a t t e r is d e e m e d
s u b m i t t e d for decision or resolution upon t h e filing of
t h e last pleading, brief, or m e m o r a n d u m r e q u i r e d by
the rules of t h e Commission or by t h e Commission itself.
Unless otherwise provided by this Constitution or by law,
any decision, order or ruling of each Commission may be
b r o u g h t to t h e S u p r e m e C o u r t on certiorari by t h e
a g g r i e v e d p a r t y w i t h i n t h i r t y d a y s from r e c e i p t of a
copy thereof."
NOTES
1. See, in t h i s connection, t h e notes u n d e r Sec. 7,
Rule 56.
2. Considering t h e provisions of B.P. Big. 129, t h e
fact t h a t a p p e a l s from t h e S e c u r i t i e s a n d E x c h a n g e
Commission and in n a t u r a l i z a t i o n a n d d e n a t u r a l i z a t i o n
cases should now be t a k e n to t h e Court of Appeals, and
all d e c i s i o n s o f t h e c o n s t i t u t i o n a l c o m m i s s i o n s a r e
reviewable on original actions of certiorari, all a p p e a l s
in civil cases to t h e S u p r e m e Court can now be b r o u g h t
only on p e t i t i o n for review on c e r t i o r a r i (cf. Sec. 17,
28

JURISDICTION OF THE SUPREME COURT

UNDER THE 1987 CONSTITUTION

R.A. 296, as a m e n d e d by R.A. 5440; Santos, et al. vs.

CA, et al., G.R. No. 56614, July 28, 1987). Moreover, as
hereafter explained, Sec. 9 of B.P. Big. 129 w a s a m e n d e d
by R.A. 7902 to f u r t h e r v e s t a p p e l l a t e jurisdiction in t h e
Court of Appeals over j u d g m e n t s , final o r d e r s , a w a r d s or
r e s o l u t i o n s o f t h e Civil S e r v i c e C o m m i s s i o n a n d t h e
C e n t r a l Board of A s s e s s m e n t A p p e a l s .

29

C. THE J U D I C I A R Y REORGANIZATION ACT

OF 1 9 8 0
ORGANIZATION
1. The Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980 (Batas
Pambansa Big. 129) took effect upon its a p p r o v a l on
August 14, 1981 (Sec. 48). However, the t r a n s i t o r y prov i s i o n (Sec. 44) d e c l a r e d t h a t i t s p r o v i s i o n s " s h a l l
immediately be carried out in accordance with an
Executive Order to be issued by the President. The
Court of Appeals, the Courts of First I n s t a n c e , the
Circuit Criminal Courts, the Juvenile and Domestic
Relations Courts, t h e C o u r t s of A g r a r i a n Relations, t h e
City C o u r t s , t h e Municipal C o u r t s a n d t h e M u n i c i p a l
Circuit C o u r t s shall continue to function as p r e s e n t l y
c o n s t i t u t e d a n d organized u n t i l t h e completion of t h e
reorganization provided in t h i s Act as declared by t h e
P r e s i d e n t . Upon such declaration, t h e said courts shall
be deemed automatically abolished a n d t h e i n c u m b e n t s
thereof shall cease to hold office. The cases p e n d i n g in
the old C o u r t s shall be t r a n s f e r r e d to t h e a p p r o p r i a t e
C o u r t s c o n s t i t u t e d p u r s u a n t to t h i s Act, t o g e t h e r w i t h
t h e p e r t i n e n t functions, records, e q u i p m e n t , p r o p e r t y
and t h e necessary personnel." The constitutionality of
t h i s Act w a s u p h e l d by t h e S u p r e m e C o u r t en banc,
w i t h one dissent, in De la Liana, et al. vs. Alba, et al.
(G.R. No. 57883, M a r . 12, 1982).
2. The Court of Appeals was replaced by the
I n t e r m e d i a t e Appellate Court consisting of a P r e s i d i n g
J u s t i c e a n d 49 Associate Appellate J u s t i c e s , which shall
sit in 10 divisions each composed of 5 m e m b e r s , except
o n l y for t h e p u r p o s e o f e x e r c i s i n g a d m i n i s t r a t i v e ,
ceremonial or o t h e r non-adjudicatory functions in which
i n s t a n c e s it may sit en banc (Sees. 3 a n d 4).

30

JUDICIARY REORGANIZATION ACT OF 1980

However, under Executive Order No. 33 (July 28,1986),

a m e n d i n g B . P . B i g . 129, t h e C o u r t o f A p p e a l s w a s
r e - c r e a t e d , c o n s i s t i n g of a P r e s i d i n g J u s t i c e a n d 50
Associate J u s t i c e s , which shall exercise its powers,
functions and duties t h r o u g h 17 divisions, each composed
of 3 m e m b e r s . It m a y s i t en banc for t h e p u r p o s e of
e x e r c i s i n g a d m i n i s t r a t i v e , c e r e m o n i a l o r o t h e r nonadjudicatory functions (Sees. 3 a n d 4, as a m e n d e d ) .
A majority of t h e a c t u a l m e m b e r s of t h e C o u r t s h a l l
constitute a q u o r u m for its sessions en banc. T h r e e (3)
m e m b e r s s h a l l c o n s t i t u t e a q u o r u m for t h e sessions of a
division. The u n a n i m o u s vote of t h e t h r e e m e m b e r s of a
division s h a l l be n e c e s s a r y for t h e p r o n o u n c e m e n t of a
decision or final resolution, which s h a l l be r e a c h e d in
c o n s u l t a t i o n before t h e w r i t i n g of t h e opinion by a n y
m e m b e r o f t h e division. I n t h e e v e n t t h a t t h e t h r e e
m e m b e r s do not r e a c h a u n a n i m o u s vote, t h e P r e s i d i n g
Justice s h a l l r e q u e s t t h e Raffle C o m m i t t e e of t h e Court
for t h e d e s i g n a t i o n of t w o a d d i t i o n a l J u s t i c e s to s i t
temporarily w i t h t h e m , forming a special division of five
m e m b e r s a n d t h e c o n c u r r e n c e of a m a j o r i t y of s u c h
division shall be n e c e s s a r y for t h e p r o n o u n c e m e n t of a
decision or final r e s o l u t i o n . T h e d e s i g n a t i o n of s u c h
a d d i t i o n a l J u s t i c e s s h a l l b e m a d e s t r i c t l y b y raffle
(Sec. 11, as a m e n d e d ) .
E x e c u t i v e O r d e r N o . 33 r e p e a l e d Sec. 8 of B . P .
Big. 129 which h a d provided for grouping of divisions
to h a n d l e specific classes of cases (Sec. 4). It f u r t h e r
provided t h a t t h e t e r m " I n t e r m e d i a t e Appellate Court,
Presiding Appellate Justice and Associate Appellate
Justice(s)" used in B.P. Big. 129 or in any o t h e r law or
executive order s h a l l h e r e a f t e r m e a n Court of Appeals,
Presiding J u s t i c e a n d Associate Justice(s), respectively
(Sec. 8).
Additionally, effective F e b r u a r y 2, 1997, B.P. Big. 129
w a s f u r t h e r a m e n d e d by R.A. 8 2 4 6 (Appendix G),
p u r s u a n t to which t h e C o u r t of Appeals shall consist of
31

REMEDIAL LAW COMPENDIUM

a Presiding J u s t i c e and 68 Associate J u s t i c e s , and shall

be composed of 23 divisions of 3 members each, with the
first 17 divisions stationed in Manila, the 18th to 20th
divisions in Cebu City, and the 21st to 23rd divisions in
Cagayan de Oro City.
3. The Courts of First Instance, the Circuit Criminal
Courts, the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Courts and
the Courts of Agrarian Relations have been i n t e g r a t e d
into the Regional Trial Courts for each of the 13 Judicial
Regions which replaced the former 16 Judicial Districts,
each Regional Trial Court to consist of t h e n u m b e r of
branches provided in Section 14 of t h e Act.
4. The city courts and municipal courts in the
National Capital Judicial Region have been merged into
a Metropolitan Trial Court of M e t r o M a n i l a a n d were
converted into branches thereof (Sec. 27). The S u p r e m e
Court shall constitute other Metropolitan Trial Courts
in such other metropolitan a r e a s as may be established
by law a n d whose t e r r i t o r i a l j u r i s d i c t i o n s h a l l be coextensive with t h e cities a n d municipalities comprising
such metropolitan a r e a (Sec. 28).
5. The city courts in other cities which do not now
or hereafter form p a r t of a m e t r o p o l i t a n a r e a shall be
known as Municipal Trial Courts, with t h e corresponding
n u m b e r of b r a n c h e s (Sec. 29), and t h e municipal courts,
w h e t h e r of an ordinary municipality or of a capital of a
province or s u b - p r o v i n c e b u t not c o m p r i s e d w i t h i n a
metropolitan area and a municipal circuit, shall likewise
be known as Municipal Trial Courts with the corresponding n u m b e r of b r a n c h e s (Sec. 30). The municipal
circuit courts shall be known as Municipal Circuit Trial
Courts and t h e S u p r e m e Court may further reorganize
the same (Sec. 31).
6. Excepted from t h e coverage of t h e Act a r e t h e
Supreme Court and the Sandiganbayan, but these
32

JUDICIARY REORGANIZATION ACT OF 1980

courts have been affected by t h e jurisdictional c h a n g e s

introduced t h e r e i n . The provisions of t h e J u d i c i a r y Act
of 1948 (R.A. 296, as amended), R.A. 5179, as a m e n d e d ,
the Rules of Court and all other s t a t u t e s , letters of
instructions and g e n e r a l o r d e r s or p a r t s thereof,
inconsistent with t h e provisions of this Act a r e repealed
or modified accordingly.
7. No mention is m a d e of t h e Court of Tax Appeals
since t h e Act is basically on t h e m a t t e r of jurisdictional
changes. However, a p p e a l s from its j u d g m e n t s or final
orders, which used to be governed by R.A. 1125, were l a t e r
required to be t a k e n to t h e Court of Appeals p u r s u a n t to
Revised A d m i n i s t r a t i v e Circular No. 1-95 of t h e S u p r e m e
Court, which t h e r e a f t e r w a s adopted as Rule 43 of these
revised Rules. See, however, t h e more recent changes in
R.A. 9282 (Appendix CC).
JURISDICTION
I.

I n t e r m e d i a t e Appellate C o u r t (now, t h e Court of

Appeals):

"Sec. 9. Jurisdiction. The I n t e r m e d i a t e Appellate

Court shall exercise:
(1) Original j u r i s d i c t i o n to issue w r i t s of mandamus, prohibition, certiorari, habeas corpus, and quo
warranto, and auxiliary w r i t s or processes, w h e t h e r
or not in aid of its appellate jurisdiction;
(2) Exclusive o r i g i n a l j u r i s d i c t i o n over actions
for a n n u l m e n t of j u d g m e n t s of Regional Trial Courts;
and
(3) Exclusive appellate jurisdiction over all final
j u d g m e n t s , decisions, resolutions, orders or a w a r d s
of Regional T r i a l Courts a n d quasi-judicial agencies,
i n s t r u m e n t a l i t i e s , b o a r d s , or commissions, except
those falling w i t h i n t h e appellate jurisdiction of t h e
S u p r e m e Court in accordance with t h e Constitution,
33

REMEDIAL LAW COMPENDIUM

the provisions of this Act, and of s u b p a r a g r a p h (1) of

t h e t h i r d p a r a g r a p h and s u b p a r a g r a p h (4) of t h e
fourth p a r a g r a p h of Section 17 of t h e Judiciary Act
of 1948.
The I n t e r m e d i a t e Appellate Court shall have the
power to try cases a n d conduct h e a r i n g s , receive
evidence and perform any and all acts necessary to
resolve factual issues raised in cases falling within
its original and appellate jurisdiction, including the
power to g r a n t and conduct new trials and further
proceedings.
These provisions shall not apply to decisions and
interlocutory o r d e r s issued u n d e r t h e Labor Code
of t h e P h i l i p p i n e s a n d by t h e C e n t r a l B o a r d of
Assessment Appeals."
The second p a r a g r a p h of Sec. 9 above set forth was
s u b s e q u e n t l y a m e n d e d by Sec. 5 of E x e c u t i v e O r d e r
No. 33 to read as follows:
"The Court of Appeals shall have t h e power to
receive evidence and perform any and all acts
necessary to resolve factual issues raised in (a) cases
falling within its original jurisdiction, such as actions
for a n n u l m e n t of j u d g m e n t s of regional t r i a l courts,
as provided in p a r a g r a p h (2) hereof; a n d in (b) cases
falling w i t h i n its a p p e l l a t e j u r i s d i c t i o n w h e r e i n a
motion for new t r i a l based only on t h e g r o u n d of
newly discovered evidence is g r a n t e d by it."
However, effective March 18, 1995, Sec. 9 was further
amended by R.A. 7902 (Appendix F) and now provides:
"SEC. 9. Jurisdiction. The Court of Appeals
shall exercise:
"(1) Original jurisdiction to issue writs of mandamus, prohibition, certiorari, habeas corpus, and quo
warranto, and auxiliary writs or processes, w h e t h e r
or not in aid of its appellate jurisdiction;
34

JUDICIARY REORGANIZATION ACT OF 1980

"(2) Exclusive original jurisdiction over actions

for a n n u l m e n t of j u d g m e n t s of Regional Trial Courts;
and
"(3) Exclusive appellate jurisdiction over all final
j u d g m e n t s , decisions, resolutions, orders or a w a r d s
of Regional Trial C o u r t s a n d quasi-judicial agencies,
i n s t r u m e n t a l i t i e s , b o a r d s or commissions, including
t h e Securities a n d Exchange Commission, t h e Social
Security Commission, t h e Employees Compensation
Commission a n d t h e Civil Service Commission, except
those falling w i t h i n t h e appellate jurisdiction of t h e
S u p r e m e Court in accordance with t h e Constitution,
t h e Labor Code of t h e Philippines u n d e r P r e s i d e n t i a l
Decree No. 442, as a m e n d e d , t h e provisions of this
Act, a n d of s u b p a r a g r a p h (1) of t h e t h i r d p a r a g r a p h
a n d s u b p a r a g r a p h (4) of t h e f o u r t h p a r a g r a p h of
Section 17 of t h e J u d i c i a r y Act of 1948.
"The C o u r t of A p p e a l s shall have t h e power to
try cases a n d conduct h e a r i n g s , receive evidence and
perform any a n d all acts necessary to resolve factual
issues raised in cases falling w i t h i n its original a n d
a p p e l l a t e jurisdiction, including t h e power to g r a n t
a n d conduct new t r i a l s or further proceedings. Trials
or h e a r i n g s in t h e C o u r t of A p p e a l s m u s t be cont i n u o u s a n d m u s t b e c o m p l e t e d w i t h i n t h r e e (3)
m o n t h s unless extended by t h e Chief Justice."
NOTES
1. Unlike t h e provisions of Sec. 30 of t h e J u d i c i a r y
Act, B . P . Big. 129 v e s t e d t h e I n t e r m e d i a t e A p p e l l a t e
Court w i t h original jurisdiction to issue w r i t s of m a n damus, prohibition, certiorari, habeas corpus, a n d all other
auxiliary w r i t s a n d processes w h e t h e r or not in aid of its
appellate jurisdiction a n d added t h e special civil action of
quo w a r r a n t o to such original jurisdiction. F u r t h e r m o r e ,
the I n t e r m e d i a t e Appellate Court had exclusive original
35

REMEDIAL LAW COMPENDIUM

jurisdiction over actions for the a n n u l m e n t of j u d g m e n t s

of the Regional Trial Courts. The latter, however, r e t a i n
t h e i r j u r i s d i c t i o n over a c t i o n s for t h e a n n u l m e n t of
j u d g m e n t s of t h e i n f e r i o r c o u r t s (Sec. 19), i.e., t h e
Metropolitan, Municipal and Municipal Circuit Trial
Courts (Sec. 25).
2. Amendatory of previous legislation, t h e appellate
jurisdiction of the t h e n Intermediate Appellate Court over
quasi-judicial agencies, or t h e so-called a d m i n i s t r a t i v e
t r i b u n a l s , was extended to and included t h e Securities
and Exchange Commission and the different boards
w h i c h took t h e place of t h e q u o n d a m P u b l i c S e r v i c e
Commission, i.e., the Boards of T r a n s p o r t a t i o n , Communications, and Power and Waterworks, whose decisions
were theretofore appealable to the S u p r e m e Court. Cases
involving petitions for naturalization and denaturalization
are now exclusively appealable to t h e Court of Appeals.
3. However, by specific provisions of Sec. 9 of this
Act, t h e S u p r e m e C o u r t r e t a i n e d exclusive a p p e l l a t e
jurisdiction over t h e decisions of the two constitutional
commissions, i.e., Commission on E l e c t i o n s a n d Commission on Audit (see 1973 Constitution, Art. XII-C and
D). U n d e r the 1987 Constitution, this exclusive appellate
j u r i s d i c t i o n w a s m a d e t o i n c l u d e t h e Civil S e r v i c e
Commission (Sec. 7, Art. IX-A). Also, likewise specifically
excluded from t h e appellate jurisdiction of t h e I n t e r m e diate Appellate Court were decisions a n d interlocutory
orders u n d e r t h e Labor Code, such as those p r o m u l g a t e d
by the Secretary of Labor and Employment and the
National Labor Relations Commission, those of the Central
Board of Assessment Appeals, and t h e 5 types of cases
which fall within t h e exclusive appellate jurisdiction of
the Supreme Court under the 1973 Constitution (Sec. 5[2],
Art. X ) a n d r e p r o d u c e d i n t h e 1987 C o n s t i t u t i o n
(Sec. 5[2J, Art. VIII), as amplified in t h e provisions of t h e
Judiciary Act specified by said Sec. 9.

36

JUDICIARY REORGANIZATION ACT OF 1980

F u r t h e r m o r e , in view of t h e exclusionary provision

in said Sec. 9, t h e I n t e r m e d i a t e Appellate Court a p p e a r e d
to have no a p p e l l a t e jurisdiction over t h e cases in t h e
specified p a r a g r a p h s of Sec. 17 of t h e J u d i c i a r y Act, i.e.,
those involving constitutional, tax or jurisdictional
questions even if t h e s a m e also involve questions of fact
or mixed questions of fact a n d law which were appealable
to t h e C o u r t of Appeals u n d e r Sec. 17 of t h e J u d i c i a r y
Act, as a m e n d e d . It is believed t h a t despite t h e p r e s e n t
formulation of said Sec. 9(3) of B.P. Big. 129, t h e former
rule, vesting t h e Court of Appeals with appellate jurisdiction in t h e aforestated cases w h e n e v e r a factual issue
is involved, should still apply.
As indicated earlier, with t h e a m e n d m e n t s introduced
by R.A. 7902, t h e dispositions of t h e Civil Service Commission a n d t h e C e n t r a l Board of A s s e s s m e n t Appeals
are now w i t h i n t h e exclusive appellate jurisdiction of the
Court of Appeals.
4. While the I n t e r m e d i a t e Appellate Court was
authorized to receive evidence on factual issues on appeal,
this evidentiary h e a r i n g c o n t e m p l a t e s "incidental facts"
which were not touched upon or fully h e a r d by t h e trial
court, a n d not a n o r i g i n a l a n d full t r i a l o f t h e m a i n
factual issue which properly p e r t a i n s to t h e t r i a l court
(Lingner & Fisher GMBH vs. IAC, et al., G.R. No. 63557,
Oct. 28, 1983). T h i s p o w e r to c o n d u c t n e w t r i a l s or
f u r t h e r p r o c e e d i n g s is not obligatory on t h e a p p e l l a t e
court and it may r e m a n d the case to the trial court
for t h a t p u r p o s e (De la Cruz, etc. vs. IAC, et al., G.R.
No. 72981, Jan. 29, 1988).
5. The exclusive appellate jurisdiction of t h e Court
of Appeals provided for in Sec. 9(3) of B.P. Big. 129 over
final orders or rulings of quasi-judicial i n s t r u m e n t a l i t i e s ,
boards or commissions refers to those which resulted from
proceedings w h e r e i n t h e a d m i n i s t r a t i v e body involved
exercised quasi-judicial functions. S u c h quasi-judicial
37

REMEDIAL LAW COMPENDIUM

action or discretion involves the investigation of facts,

holding of hearings, drawing conclusions therefrom as a
basis for official action, and exercising discretion of a
judicial n a t u r e . Quasi-judicial adjudication r e q u i r e s a
determination of rights, privileges and duties resulting
in a decision or order which applies to a specific situation.
Rules and regulations of general applicability issued by
the administrative body to implement its purely administrative policies and functions, or those which a r e merely
incidents of its i n h e r e n t a d m i n i s t r a t i v e functions, a r e
not included in t h e appealable orders c o n t e m p l a t e d in
said provision, unless otherwise specifically provided by
other laws governing the m a t t e r . Controversies arising
from s u c h o r d e r s a r e w i t h i n t h e c o g n i z a n c e o f t h e
Regional Trial Courts (Lupangco, et al. vs. CA, et al.,
G.R. No. 77372, April 29, 1988).
6. It was formerly held t h a t t h e 30-day period to
a p p e a l t o t h e I n t e r m e d i a t e A p p e l l a t e C o u r t from a
decision or final o r d e r of t h e S e c u r i t i e s a n d E x c h a n g e
Commission, p u r s u a n t t o i t s r u l e s i s s u e d c o n s e q u e n t
to Sec. 6, P . D . 902-A, h a d n o t b e e n affected by B . P .
Big. 129 w h i c h p r o v i d e s for a 15-day a p p e a l p e r i o d
from decisions of courts of justice. The Securities a n d
Exchange Commission is not a court; it is an administrative agency. Repeals by implication a r e not favored
(Gimenez Stockbrokerage & Co., Inc. vs. SEC, et al.,
G.R. No. 68568, Dec. 26, 1984).
7. The aforesaid doctrine was t a k e n into account by
the S u p r e m e Court in an appeal from a decision of t h e
Insurance Commission to the t h e n I n t e r m e d i a t e Appellate
Court since Sec. 416(7) of t h e I n s u r a n c e Code (P.D. 612,
as amended) provides for a 30-day period for a p p e a l from
notice of a final order, ruling, or decision of t h e Commission. The S u p r e m e Court noted t h a t if t h e provisions
of R.A. 5434 were to be applied, p u r s u a n t to P a r . 22(c) of
t h e I n t e r i m Rules which g o v e r n s a p p e a l s from q u a s i -

38

JUDICIARY REORGANIZATION ACT OF 1980

judicial bodies, Sec. 2 thereof provides t h a t t h e a p p e a l

should be filed w i t h i n 15 days from notice of t h e ruling,
award, order, decision, or j u d g m e n t or from t h e d a t e of
its last publication if required by law, or in case a motion
for reconsideration is filed w i t h i n t h e period for appeal,
t h e n w i t h i n 10 days from notice or such publication of
the resolution d e n y i n g t h e motion for r e c o n s i d e r a t i o n .
Nevertheless, in line w i t h t h e ruling in Gimenez, since
the I n s u r a n c e Commission is likewise an a d m i n i s t r a t i v e
body, a p p e a l s from its final orders, decisions, resolutions,
or a w a r d s m a y not necessarily be deemed modified by
Sec. 3 9 o f B . P . Big. 129 w h i c h l i m i t s t h e p e r i o d t o
a p p e a l to 15 d a y s (Midland Ins. Corp. vs. IAC, et al.,
G.R. No. 71905, Aug. 13, 1986; see also Zenith Ins. Corp.
vs. IAC, et al, G.R. No. 73336, Sept. 24, 1986; Malayan
Ins. Co., Inc. vs. Arnaldo, et al., G.R. No. 67835, Oct. 12,
1987).
8. T h e foregoing doctrines, however, a r e no longer
controlling in view of C i r c u l a r No. 1-91 i s s u e d by t h e
S u p r e m e C o u r t o n F e b r u a r y 27, 1991 w h i c h provided
t h a t a p p e a l s from quasi-judicial agencies s h a l l be t a k e n
to t h e C o u r t of A p p e a l s w i t h i n 15 days from notice or last
p u b l i c a t i o n o f t h e j u d g m e n t o r final o r d e r . T h i s w a s
more r e c e n t l y f u r t h e r amplified by Revised A d m i n i s t r a t i v e C i r c u l a r No. 1-95 which took effect on J u n e 1,
1995, a n d h a s now been formulated as Rule 43 of these
revised Rules.
9. It will also be recalled t h a t appeals from the
decisions, o r d e r s or r u l i n g s of t h e t h r e e c o n s t i t u t i o n a l
commissions, i.e., Civil Service Commission, Commission
on Elections a n d Commission on Audit, may be brought to
t h e S u p r e m e C o u r t on c e r t i o r a r i w i t h i n 30 days from
receipt thereof unless otherwise provided by the Constit u t i o n or by law (Sec. 7, Art. IX-A, 1987 Constitution).
However, as earlier stated, Sec. 9 of B.P. Big. 129 which
originally c o n t a i n e d t h e s a m e j u r i s d i c t i o n a l r u l e w a s
subsequently a m e n d e d by R.A. 7902, effective March 18,
39

REMEDIAL LAW COMPENDIUM

1995, to provide t h a t a p p e a l s from t h e Civil Service

Commission should be t a k e n to the Court of Appeals.
10. In the l a n d m a r k decision in St. Martin Funeral
Home vs. NLRC, et al. (G.R. No. 130866, Sept. 16, 1998),
the Supreme Court clarified t h a t ever since appeals from
t h e NLRC to the S u p r e m e Court were eliminated, t h e
legislative i n t e n d m e n t is t h a t the special civil action of
certiorari was and still is t h e proper vehicle for judicial
review of decisions of the NLRC. All references in t h e
amended Sec. 9 of B.P. Big. 129 to supposed appeals from
t h e NLRC t o t h e S u p r e m e C o u r t a r e i n t e r p r e t e d a n d
declared to mean and refer to petitions u n d e r Rule 65.
Consequently, all such petitions should be initially filed
in the Court of Appeals in strict observance of t h e rule on
hierarchy of courts. The concurrent original jurisdiction
of t h e S u p r e m e C o u r t c a n be a v a i l e d of only u n d e r
compelling and exceptional circumstances.
11. On a different r a t i o n a l e , t h e S u p r e m e C o u r t
ruled in Fabian vs. Desierto, etc., et al. (G.R. No. 129742,
S e p t . 16, 1998) t h a t a p p e a l s from t h e Office of t h e
O m b u d s m a n in administrative disciplinary cases should
be t a k e n to the Court of Appeals via a verified petition for
review u n d e r Rule 43. Striking down as unconstitutional
Sec. 27, R.A. 6770 ( O m b u d s m a n Act of 1989) w h i c h
a u t h o r i z e d s u c h a p p e a l t o t h e S u p r e m e C o u r t "in
accordance with Rule 45," it was pointed out t h a t
appeals u n d e r Rule 45 apply only to j u d g m e n t s or final
orders of the courts e n u m e r a t e d u n d e r Sec. 1 thereof, a n d
not to those of quasi-judicial agencies. F u r t h e r m o r e , t h a t
provision of R.A. 6770 violates the proscription in Sec. 30,
A r t . VI of t h e 1987 C o n s t i t u t i o n a g a i n s t a law which
increases the appellate jurisdiction of t h e S u p r e m e Court
without its advice and consent.
II.

Regional Trial Courts:

"SEC. 19. Jurisdiction in civil cases. R e g i o n a l
40

JUDICIARY REORGANIZATION ACT OF 1980

Trial C o u r t s s h a l l exercise exclusive original jurisdiction:

(1) In all civil actions in which t h e subject of t h e
litigation is incapable of pecuniary estimation;
(2) In all civil actions which involve t h e t i t l e
to, or possession of, r e a l p r o p e r t y , or any i n t e r e s t
t h e r e i n , w h e r e t h e a s s e s s e d value o f t h e p r o p e r t y
involved exceeds Twenty t h o u s a n d pesos (P20.000.00)
or, for civil actions in M e t r o Manila, where such value
exceeds Fifty t h o u s a n d p e s o s (P50.000.00) except
actions for forcible e n t r y into a n d unlawful d e t a i n e r
of l a n d s or buildings, original jurisdiction over which
is conferred upon the Metropolitan Trial Courts,
Municipal Trial C o u r t s a n d Municipal Circuit Trial
Courts;
(3) In all a c t i o n s in a d m i r a l t y a n d m a r i t i m e
jurisdiction w h e r e t h e d e m a n d or claim exceeds One
h u n d r e d t h o u s a n d pesos (F100.000.00) or, in Metro
M a n i l a , w h e r e s u c h d e m a n d or claim exceeds Two
h u n d r e d t h o u s a n d pesos (P200.000.00);
(4) In all m a t t e r s of probate, both t e s t a t e and
intestate, where the gross value of the estate
exceeds One h u n d r e d t h o u s a n d pesos (P 100,000.00)
or, in p r o b a t e m a t t e r s in M e t r o Manila, w h e r e such
gross value exceeds Two h u n d r e d t h o u s a n d pesos
(P200,000.00);
(5) I n a l l a c t i o n s i n v o l v i n g t h e c o n t r a c t o f
m a r r i a g e a n d m a r i t a l relations;
(6) In all cases not w i t h i n t h e exclusive jurisd i c t i o n o f a n y c o u r t , t r i b u n a l , p e r s o n o r body
exercising [jurisdiction of any court, t r i b u n a l , person
or body exercising] judicial or quasi-judicial
functions;*
(7) In a l l civil a c t i o n s s p e c i a l p r o c e e d i n g s *
'The bracketed portion in Par. (6) appears to be a typographical
error by repetition, while the indicated portion in Par. (7) should have a
conjunction between "civil actions" and "special proceedings."

41

REMEDIAL LAW COMPENDIUM

falling within t h e exclusive original jurisdiction of a

Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court a n d of t h e
Court of Agrarian Relations as now provided by law;
and
(8) In all o t h e r c a s e s in w h i c h t h e d e m a n d ,
exclusive of i n t e r e s t , d a m a g e s of w h a t e v e r k i n d ,
attorney's fees, litigation expenses and costs or the
value of t h e p r o p e r t y in controversy exceeds One
h u n d r e d t h o u s a n d pesos (PlOO.OOO.OO) or, in such
o t h e r cases i n M e t r o M a n i l a , w h e r e t h e d e m a n d ,
exclusive of t h e abovementioned items exceeds Two
h u n d r e d t h o u s a n d pesos (P200.000.00)." (As amended by R.A. 7691)
X

"Sec. 2 1 . Original jurisdiction in other cases.

Regional Trial Courts shall exercise original jurisdiction:
(1) In t h e issuance of w r i t s of certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto, habeas corpus, and
injunction which may be enforced in any p a r t of t h e i r
respective regions; and
(2) In actions affecting a m b a s s a d o r s a n d o t h e r
public ministers and consuls."
"Sec. 2 2 . Appellate jurisdiction. R e g i o n a l T r i a l
Courts shall exercise appellate jurisdiction over all cases
decided by M e t r o p o l i t a n Trial C o u r t s , M u n i c i p a l T r i a l
Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts in t h e i r respective t e r r i t o r i a l j u r i s d i c t i o n s . S u c h cases s h a l l be
decided on t h e b a s i s of t h e e n t i r e m e m o r a n d a a n d / o r
briefs as may be s u b m i t t e d by t h e p a r t i e s or required by
the Regional Trial Courts. The decisions of t h e Regional
Trial Courts in such cases shall be appealable by petition
for review to t h e I n t e r m e d i a t e Appellate C o u r t which
may give it due course only w h e n t h e p e t i t i o n s h o w s
prima facie t h a t the lower court h a s committed an error of
fact or law t h a t will w a r r a n t a reversal or modification of
42

JUDICIARY REORGANIZATION ACT OF 1980

the decision or j u d g m e n t s o u g h t to be reviewed."

"Sec. 2 3 . Special jurisdiction to try special cases.
The S u p r e m e C o u r t m a y d e s i g n a t e c e r t a i n b r a n c h e s of
the Regional T r i a l C o u r t s to h a n d l e exclusively criminal
cases, j u v e n i l e a n d d o m e s t i c r e l a t i o n s cases, a g r a r i a n
cases, u r b a n land reform cases which do not fall u n d e r
t h e j u r i s d i c t i o n of q u a s i - j u d i c i a l bodies a n d a g e n c i e s ,
and/or s u c h o t h e r special cases a s t h e S u p r e m e C o u r t
may d e t e r m i n e in t h e i n t e r e s t of a speedy a n d efficient
a d m i n i s t r a t i o n of justice."
NOTES
1. R.A. 7 6 9 1 , w h i c h took effect on April 15, 1994
(see Appendix N), e x p a n d e d t h e j u r i s d i c t i o n of t h e
metropolitan, municipal and municipal circuit trial
c o u r t s i n civil a n d c r i m i n a l c a s e s , t h e a m e n d e d civil
jurisdiction being set out hereinafter. In Administrative
Circular No. 09-94 (see Appendix O), t h e S u p r e m e Court,
by w a y of g u i d e l i n e s in t h e i m p l e m e n t a t i o n of s a i d
a m e n d a t o r y Act, m a d e t h e clarification t h a t :
"2. T h e e x c l u s i o n o f t h e t e r m ' d a m a g e s o f
whatever kind' in determining the jurisdictional
a m o u n t u n d e r S e c t i o n 19(8) a n d Section 33(1) of
B.P. Big. 129, as a m e n d e d by R.A. No. 7691, applies
t o cases w h e r e t h e d a m a g e s a r e merely incidental
to or a c o n s e q u e n c e of t h e m a i n c a u s e of a c t i o n .
However, in cases w h e r e t h e claim for d a m a g e s is t h e
m a i n c a u s e of action, or one of t h e causes of action,
the a m o u n t of such claim shall be considered in
d e t e r m i n i n g t h e jurisdiction of t h e court."
T h i s j u r i s d i c t i o n a l r u l e w a s a p p l i e d i n Ouano vs.
PGTT International Investment Corp. (G.R. No. 134230,
July 17, 2002).
On t h e m a t t e r of t h e jurisdictional a m o u n t in civil
cases, R.A. 7691 additionally provides:
43

REMEDIAL LAW COMPENDIUM

"Sec. 5. After five (5) years from t h e effectivity of

t h i s Act, the jurisdictional a m o u n t s m e n t i o n e d in
Sec. 19(3), (4), a n d (8); a n d Sec. 33(1) of B a t a s
P a m b a n s a Big. 129 as a m e n d e d by t h i s Act, shall
b e a d j u s t e d t o Two h u n d r e d t h o u s a n d p e s o s
(P200.000.00). Five (5) years thereafter, such jurisdictional amounts shall be adjusted further to Three
h u n d r e d t h o u s a n d pesos (P300,000.00): Provided,
h o w e v e r , T h a t i n t h e case o f M e t r o M a n i l a , t h e
abovementioned jurisdictional amounts shall be
a d j u s t e d after five (5) y e a r s from t h e effectivity
of t h i s Act to F o u r h u n d r e d t h o u s a n d pesos
(P400.000.00)."
2. The j u r i s d i c t i o n of t h e R e g i o n a l T r i a l C o u r t s
differs from t h a t of the former Courts of F i r s t Instance
in t h e following respects:
a. While u n d e r t h e J u d i c i a r y Act, all a c t i o n s in
a d m i r a l t y a n d m a r i t i m e j u r i s d i c t i o n w e r e exclusively
cognizable by t h e Court of F i r s t I n s t a n c e r e g a r d l e s s of
t h e v a l u e of t h e p r o p e r t y involved or t h e a m o u n t of
p l a i n t i f f s claim (Sec. 44[d]), they a r e now w i t h i n t h e
exclusive jurisdiction of t h e Regional Trial Courts only if
t h e value or claim exceeds P 100,000 or, in M e t r o Manila,
P200,000, otherwise jurisdiction is vested in t h e inferior
courts (Sec. 33).
b . T h e J u d i c i a r y Act v e s t e d t h e C o u r t s o f F i r s t
I n s t a n c e w i t h exclusive j u r i s d i c t i o n in all m a t t e r s of
probate, w h e t h e r t e s t a t e or i n t e s t a t e (Sec. 44[e]). The
Regional Trial Courts now have such exclusive jurisdiction
if t h e gross value of t h e e s t a t e exceeds P 100,000 or, in
Metro Manila, P200.000, otherwise t h e proceedings a r e
cognizable by t h e inferior courts (Sec. 33).
c. Actions for a n n u l m e n t of m a r r i a g e a n d all o t h e r
special cases and proceedings not otherwise provided for
were exclusively cognizable by the Courts of First Instance
u n d e r t h e J u d i c i a r y Act (Sec. 44[e]) or, u n d e r special
44

JUDICIARY REORGANIZATION ACT OF 1980

legislation, by the Juvenile and Domestic Relations

Courts. The J u v e n i l e a n d Domestic Relations C o u r t s a n d
the C o u r t s of A g r a r i a n Reform h a v i n g been i n t e g r a t e d
into t h e R e g i o n a l T r i a l C o u r t s , t h e l a t t e r s h a l l h a v e
exclusive original jurisdiction over said cases and
proceedings b u t t h e y shall continue to apply t h e special
rules of procedure u n d e r t h e p r e s e n t laws provided for
domestic r e l a t i o n s cases a n d a g r a r i a n cases, u n l e s s t h e
same a r e s u b s e q u e n t l y a m e n d e d by such law or rules of
court as may be p r o m u l g a t e d (Sec. 24).
3. The w r i t s of certiorari, prohibition, m a n d a m u s ,
quo w a r r a n t o , habeas corpus, a n d injunction issued by
the Regional Trial Courts are enforceable within
their respective regions, while u n d e r t h e J u d i c i a r y Act
(Sec. 44[hJ), t h e s e could be enforced only w i t h i n t h e
respective provinces a n d districts u n d e r t h e jurisdiction
of the C o u r t s of F i r s t I n s t a n c e .
4. The concurrent jurisdiction between the Courts
of First I n s t a n c e a n d t h e inferior c o u r t s in cases provided
for u n d e r t h e J u d i c i a r y Act h a s b e e n e l i m i n a t e d . The
Regional T r i a l C o u r t s s h a l l exercise exclusive original
jurisdiction i n g u a r d i a n s h i p a n d adoption cases which,
u n d e r t h e a m e n d m e n t s of t h e J u d i c i a r y Act by R.A. 643
and R.A. 644, w e r e w i t h i n t h e confluent j u r i s d i c t i o n of
the inferior c o u r t s . T h e c o n c u r r e n t j u r i s d i c t i o n b e t w e e n
t h e C o u r t s of F i r s t I n s t a n c e a n d t h e City C o u r t s over
the cases s t a t e d in Sec. 3, R.A. 6967, i.e., p e t i t i o n s for
change of n a m e of n a t u r a l i z e d citizens, cancellation or
correction of t y p o g r a p h i c a l e r r o r s in t h e city r e g i s t r y ,
a n d e j e c t m e n t c a s e s w h e r e t h e i s s u e of o w n e r s h i p is
involved, h a s l i k e w i s e b e e n e l i m i n a t e d . S a i d law i s
d e e m e d r e p e a l e d by B . P . Big. 129 (Lee vs. Presiding
Judge, etc., et al., G.R. No. 8789, Nov. 10, 1986).
5. The c o n c u r r e n t jurisdiction b e t w e e n t h e Courts
of First Instance and inferior courts having been
abolished, t h e decisions of t h e inferior courts in all cases
45

REMEDIAL LAW COMPENDIUM

are now appealable to the Regional Trial Courts, except

c a d a s t r a l a n d land r e g i s t r a t i o n cases decided b y t h e
inferior courts in t h e exercise of delegated jurisdiction
(Sec. 34).
6. Admiralty jurisdiction regulates maritime m a t t e r s
and cases, such as contracts relating to t h e t r a d e a n d
b u s i n e s s of t h e sea a n d e s s e n t i a l l y fully m a r i t i m e in
character, like maritime services, t r a n s a c t i o n s or casualties (see Macondray & Co. vs. Delgado Bros., Inc., 107
Phil. 781; Delgado Bros., Inc. vs. Home Insurance Co.,
L16131, Mar. 27, 1961; Elite Shirt Factory, Inc. vs.
Cornejo, L-26718, Oct. 31, 1961; Negre vs. Cabahug
Shipping & Co., L-19609, April 29, 1966).
7. Civil actions in which the subject of t h e litigation
is i n c a p a b l e of p e c u n i a r y e s t i m a t i o n h a v e i n v a r i a b l y
been w i t h i n t h e exclusive o r i g i n a l j u r i s d i c t i o n of t h e
courts of general jurisdiction, i.e., t h e former C o u r t s of
F i r s t I n s t a n c e , now t h e Regional T r i a l C o u r t s . T h u s ,
actions for s u p p o r t which will require t h e d e t e r m i n a t i o n
of t h e civil s t a t u s or t h e r i g h t to s u p p o r t of t h e plaintiff,
those for t h e a n n u l m e n t of decisions of lower courts, or
those for t h e rescission or reformation of c o n t r a c t s a r e
incapable of pecuniary estimation.
a. Where t h e action supposedly for a s u m of money
required t h e d e t e r m i n a t i o n of w h e t h e r t h e plaintiff had
complied w i t h t h e condition p r e c e d e n t in t h e c o n t r a c t
which, if complied with, would entitle him to t h e a w a r d
of t h e a m o u n t c l a i m e d , t h e a c t i o n is one for specific
p e r f o r m a n c e a n d not for a s u m of m o n e y , h e n c e t h e
relief sought was incapable of pecuniary e s t i m a t i o n and
w a s w i t h i n t h e j u r i s d i c t i o n of t h e t h e n C o u r t of F i r s t
I n s t a n c e (Ortigas & Co. vp. Herrera, et al., L-36098,
Jan. 21, 1983).
b. An action to compel t h e obligor to complete t h e
construction of a house is one for specific performance

46

JUDICIARY REORGANIZATION ACT OF 1980

and is incapable of pecuniary estimation, hence jurisdiction is vested in t h e Regional Trial Court. Where t h e
complaint in said case, however, contains an a l t e r n a t i v e
p r a y e r for t h e p a y m e n t to t h e obligee of a s u m n o t
exceeding t h e p r e s e n t jurisdictional a m o u n t of F100,000,
or in M e t r o Manila, P200.000, in lieu of t h e completion of
the construction, jurisdiction is in t h e inferior court as
such a l t e r n a t i v e p r a y e r m a k e s t h e action one for a s u m
of money (see Cruz vs. Tan, 87 Phil. 627).
c. An action for P1.250 and/or for t h e foreclosure of
a c h a t t e l m o r t g a g e of p e r s o n a l t y w o r t h F15,340 (now, it
s h o u l d be m o r e t h a n PIOO.OOO or, in M e t r o M a n i l a ,
P200.000) w a s u n d e r t h e j u r i s d i c t i o n of t h e C o u r t of
F i r s t I n s t a n c e b e c a u s e o f t h e l a t t e r a l t e r n a t i v e relief
s o u g h t (Good Development Corp. vs. Tutaan, et al.,
L-41641, Sept. 30,1976). Jurisdiction was likewise vested
in t h e C o u r t of F i r s t I n s t a n c e w h e r e none of t h e claims
of t h e p a r t n e r s h i p ' s c r e d i t o r s exceeded P2.000 b u t t h e
suit also s o u g h t t h e nullification of a contract executed
by and b e t w e e n t h e former p a r t n e r s , as t h e l a t t e r cause
of action is not capable of pecuniary e s t i m a t i o n (Singson,
et al. vs. Isabela Sawmill Co., et al., L-27343, Feb. 28,
1979).
d. W h e r e t h e case h i n g e s u p o n t h e correct interp r e t a t i o n of t h e r e n e w a l clause of a lease contract, t h e
action is not for unlawful d e t a i n e r b u t one which is not
capable of p e c u n i a r y e s t i m a t i o n a n d is, therefore, outside
the jurisdiction of t h e inferior court (Vda. de Murga vs.
Chan, L-24680, Oct. 7, 1968). B u t w h e r e t h e ejectment
case w a s decided a g a i n s t t h e defendants because of nonp a y m e n t of r e n t a l s , a l t h o u g h t h e i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of t h e
renewal clause of t h e lease contract was also involved
therein, t h e s a m e was within t h e jurisdiction of t h e inferior courts (Nueva Vizcaya Chamber of Commerce vs.
CA, et al., L-49059, May 29, 1980).

47

REMEDIAL LAW COMPENDIUM

I I I . Family Courts:
1. On October 28, 1997, Congress enacted R.A.
8369 ( F a m i l y C o u r t s Act of 1997; s e e Appendix P)
establishing a Family Court in every province and city
and, in case the city is t h e provincial capital, t h e Family
Court shall be established in t h e municipality w i t h the
highest population. Pending t h e e s t a b l i s h m e n t of such
Family Courts, t h e S u p r e m e Court shall d e s i g n a t e t h e
s a m e from a m o n g t h e b r a n c h e s of t h e R e g i o n a l T r i a l
Courts e n u m e r a t e d in the Act; and in a r e a s w h e r e t h e r e
a r e n o F a m i l y C o u r t s , t h e c a s e s w h i c h a r e w i t h i n its
exclusive original jurisdiction shall be adjudicated by t h e
Regional Trial Court.
2. F u r t h e r a m e n d a t o r y of t h e provisions of B.P.
Big. 129, a s a m e n d e d , t h e F a m i l y C o u r t s s h a l l h a v e
exclusive original jurisdiction in t h e following civil cases
or proceedings:
a. P e t i t i o n s for g u a r d i a n s h i p , custody of children,
habeas corpus in relation to t h e latter;
b . P e t i t i o n s for a d o p t i o n o f c h i l d r e n a n d t h e
revocation thereof;
c. Complaints for a n n u l m e n t of marriage, declaration
of nullity of m a r r i a g e and those relating to m a r i t a l s t a t u s
and property relations of h u s b a n d and wife or those living
t o g e t h e r u n d e r different s t a t u s a n d a g r e e m e n t s , a n d
petitions for dissolution of conjugal p a r t n e r s h i p of gains;
d. Petitions for s u p p o r t and/or acknowledgment;
e. S u m m a r y judicial proceedings b r o u g h t u n d e r t h e
provisions of Executive O r d e r No. 209 (Family Code of
the Philippines);
f. Petitions for declaration of s t a t u s of children as
a b a n d o n e d , d e p e n d e n t or neglected children, p e t i t i o n s
for voluntary or involuntary commitment of children; t h e
suspension, termination, or restoration of p a r e n t a l
a u t h o r i t y u n d e r P.D. 603, Executive Order No. 56 (Series
48

JUDICIARY REORGANIZATION ACT OF 1980

of 1986), a n d o t h e r related laws;

g. Petitions for t h e constitution of t h e family home;
and
h. C a s e s of domestic violence a g a i n s t w o m e n a n d
children, as defined t h e r e i n , b u t which do not constitute
c r i m i n a l offenses subject to c r i m i n a l p r o c e e d i n g s a n d
penalties.
3. I m p l e m e n t i n g the foregoing provisions, the
S u p r e m e Court approved on M a r c h 4, 2003 t h e Rule on
D e c l a r a t i o n o f A b s o l u t e N u l l i t y o f Void M a r r i a g e s
and A n n u l m e n t of Voidable M a r r i a g e s in A.M.
No. 02-11-10-SC (see Appendix AA) a n d t h e Rule on
Legal S e p a r a t i o n in A.M. No. 02-11-11-SC (see
Appendix
BB).
IV. M e t r o p o l i t a n T r i a l C o u r t s , Municipal Trial C o u r t s
a n d Municipal Circuit Trial Courts:
"SEC. 33. Jurisdiction of Metropolitan Trial Courts,
Municipal
Trial Courts and Municipal
Circuit
Trial
Courts in Civil Cases. M e t r o p o l i t a n T r i a l C o u r t s ,
Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial
Courts shall exercise:
(1) E x c l u s i v e o r i g i n a l j u r i s d i c t i o n over civil
actions a n d p r o b a t e proceedings, t e s t a t e a n d intes t a t e , including t h e g r a n t of provisional remedies in
proper cases, where the value of the personal
property, e s t a t e , or a m o u n t of t h e d e m a n d does not
exceed One h u n d r e d t h o u s a n d pesos (P 100,000.00)
or, in M e t r o Manila w h e r e such personal property,
e s t a t e or a m o u n t of t h e d e m a n d does not exceed Two
h u n d r e d t h o u s a n d pesos (P200.000.00), exclusive of
interest, d a m a g e s of w h a t e v e r kind, attorney's fees,
litigation expenses, and costs, the a m o u n t of which
m u s t be specifically alleged: Provided, T h a t interest,
d a m a g e s of w h a t e v e r kind, attorney's fees, litigation
49

REMEDIAL LAW COMPENDIUM

expenses, and costs shall be included in the

d e t e r m i n a t i o n of t h e filing fees: Provided further,
T h a t w h e r e t h e r e are s e v e r a l claims or c a u s e s of
action b e t w e e n t h e s a m e or different p a r t i e s embodied in t h e s a m e complaint, t h e a m o u n t of t h e
demand shall be the totality of t h e claims in all t h e
causes of action, irrespective of w h e t h e r t h e causes
of action arose out of the s a m e or different
transactions;
(2) Exclusive original jurisdiction over cases of
forcible entry and unlawful detainer: Provided, T h a t
when, in such cases, the defendant raises t h e question
of o w n e r s h i p in his pleadings and t h e q u e s t i o n of
possession cannot be resolved without deciding t h e
issue of ownership, t h e issue of ownership shall be
resolved only to determine the issue of possession; and
(3) Exclusive o r i g i n a l j u r i s d i c t i o n in all civil
actions which involve title to or possession of, real
property, or any i n t e r e s t t h e r e i n w h e r e t h e assessed
value of t h e p r o p e r t y or i n t e r e s t t h e r e i n does not
exceed Twenty thousand pesos (P20.000.00) or, in civil
actions in Metro Manila, w h e r e such assessed value
does not exceed Fifty t h o u s a n d pesos (P50.000.00)
exclusive of i n t e r e s t , d a m a g e s of w h a t e v e r k i n d ,
a t t o r n e y ' s fees, l i t i g a t i o n e x p e n s e s a n d costs:
Provided, T h a t in c a s e s of l a n d n o t d e c l a r e d for
t a x a t i o n purposes t h e value of such property shall be
d e t e r m i n e d by t h e a s s e s s e d value of t h e adjacent
lots." (As amended by R.A. 7691)
"SEC. 34. Delegated jurisdiction in cadastral and
land registration cases. M e t r o p o l i t a n T r i a l C o u r t s ,
Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial
Courts may be assigned by t h e S u p r e m e Court to h e a r
and determine cadastral or land registration cases
covering lots w h e r e t h e r e is no controversy or opposition,
or contested lots where t h e value of which does not exceed

50

JUDICIARY REORGANIZATION ACT OF 1980

One h u n d r e d t h o u s a n d pesos (PIOO.OOO.OO), such value

to be a s c e r t a i n e d by t h e affidavit of t h e c l a i m a n t or by
a g r e e m e n t of t h e respective c l a i m a n t s if t h e r e a r e more
t h a n one, or from t h e corresponding tax declaration of
the r e a l p r o p e r t y . T h e i r decisions in t h e s e cases shall be
appealable in t h e s a m e m a n n e r as decisions of t h e Regional Trial Courts." (As amended by R.A. 7691)
"Sec. 35. Special jurisdiction in certain cases. In
the absence of all t h e Regional Trial J u d g e s in a province
or city, a n y M e t r o p o l i t a n T r i a l J u d g e , Municipal Trial
Judge, Municipal Circuit Trial J u d g e may h e a r and decide
petitions for a w r i t of habeas corpus or applications for
bail in c r i m i n a l cases in t h e province or city w h e r e t h e
absent Regional T r i a l J u d g e s sit."
NOTES
1. The jurisdictional a m o u n t within t h e exclusive
original jurisdiction of the inferior courts has been
i n c r e a s e d to PIOO.OOO, or in M e t r o M a n i l a , P 2 0 0 . 0 0 0
exclusive of i n t e r e s t s , d a m a g e s , a t t o r n e y ' s fees, litigation
expenses a n d costs, b u t w i t h t h e proviso t h a t t h e a m o u n t
thereof m u s t be specifically alleged.
2. Unlike t h e jurisdictional t e s t in joinder of claims
or causes of action in the same complaint under the
J u d i c i a r y Act (Sec. 88), t h e t o t a l i t y of all t h e c l a i m s
a l l e g e d i n all t h e c a u s e s o f a c t i o n s h a l l f u r n i s h t h e
jurisdictional test whether the same pertains to the
same or different p a r t i e s a n d irrespective of w h e t h e r t h e
causes of action arose out of the same or different
t r a n s a c t i o n s , b u t subject to the rule in Sec. 6, Rule 3 if
permissive joinder of p a r t i e s is involved.
3. U n d e r t h e Judiciary Act (Sec. 88), an inferior court
could i s s u e t h e w r i t s o f p r e l i m i n a r y a t t a c h m e n t a n d
replevin w h e r e t h e principal action was within its jurisdiction, and the w r i t of p r e l i m i n a r y prohibitory or
51

REMEDIAL LAW COMPENDIUM

m a n d a t o r y injunction b u t only in forcible e n t r y cases

(cf. Sec. 3, Rule 70; Art. 539, Civil Code). U n d e r B.P.
Big. 129, provided t h a t t h e m a i n action is w i t h i n its
j u r i s d i c t i o n , in a d d i t i o n to t h e foregoing p r o v i s i o n a l
remedies an inferior court can appoint a receiver and it
has jurisdiction to issue a writ of preliminary injunction
in either forcible e n t r y or unlawful d e t a i n e r cases.
4. The inferior courts now have probate jurisdiction where t h e gross value of t h e e s t a t e , w h e t h e r t e s t a t e
or i n t e s t a t e , does not exceed P 100,000, or if in M e t r o
Manila, P200.000. However, it has been held u n d e r the
former provision w h e r e t h e j u r i s d i c t i o n a l a m o u n t w a s
only up to P20.000, t h a t w h e r e the property was t h e only
one wherein the decedent had any p r o p r i e t a r y rights, is
conjugal in n a t u r e , it is t h e total value of such conjugal
p r o p e r t y , a n d not only t h e v a l u e of t h e s h a r e of t h e
decedent therein, which should furnish t h e jurisdictional
t e s t . This is because t h e s e t t l e m e n t proceedings will
necessarily entail t h e dissolution and s e t t l e m e n t of t h e
conjugal p a r t n e r s h i p and the property thereof (Fernandez,
etc., et al. vs. Maravilla, L-18799, Mar. 31, 1964). T h u s ,
u n d e r the p r e s e n t jurisdictional rule, if t h e only property
of the conjugal p a r t n e r s h i p located outside Metro Manila
has a gross value of P 150,000, while said decedent's s h a r e
t h e r e i n which constitutes his e s t a t e is normally P75.000
in value, t h e proceedings will have to be i n s t i t u t e d in t h e
Regional Trial Court since t h e total value of said property
exceeds t h e probate jurisdiction of t h e inferior court.
5 . T h e r e g l e m e n t a r y p e r i o d s for a p p e a l s from
j u d g m e n t s or final o r d e r s of t h e different t r i a l c o u r t s
have been made uniform at 15 days from receipt thereof,
except in special p r o c e e d i n g s , cases w h e r e i n m u l t i p l e
appeals are permitted, and habeas corpus cases. For a
detailed discussion on t h e bases, modes and periods for
a p p e a l from a n d to different c o u r t s , see Lacsamana,
et al. vs. The Hon. Second Special Cases Division of the
52

JUDICIARY REORGANIZATION ACT OF 1980

Intermediate Appellate Court, et al. (G.R. Nos. 73146-53,

Aug. 26, 1986), set out after Sec. 8, Rule 40 in t h i s volume.
Note also t h e c h a n g e s t h a t have s u p e r v e n e d since t h e n
by r e a s o n of t h e 1997 r e v i s i o n of t h e R u l e s of Civil
Procedure a n d r e l e v a n t decisions of t h e S u p r e m e Court,
as they a r e discussed in t h e corresponding p a r t s of t h i s
work.
An a m e n d e d outline of t h e p r e s e n t jurisdiction of our
courts in civil cases is p r e s e n t e d in t h e succeeding pages.
6. A notable initiative is t h e s u p e r v e n i n g adoption
by t h e S u p r e m e Court of t h e "Rule of Procedure for small
claims" on S e p t e m b e r 9, 2008 to t a k e effect on October 1,
2008 after t h e r e q u i s i t e p u b l i c a t i o n . This Rule is
reproduced in full, t o g e t h e r w i t h t h e forms a n d p a p e r s
involved in its operation a n d processes (see Appendix EE)
and a r e spelled out in simple details as to abviate t h e need
for clarifying c o m m e n t s for now. However, should t h e
a p p l i c a t i o n a n d f u t u r e w o r k i n g s o f t h e Rule P r o d u c e
situations which would require a m e n d m e n t s or
explanation, t h e m a t t e r will be duly brought to t h e reader's
attention, w i t h a r e p o r t of t h e court's action t h e r e o n .

53

REMEDIAL LAW COMPENDIUM

J U R I S D I C T I O N I N CIVIL C A S E S
I.

S U P R E M E COURT
A. Original
1. Exclusive
a. P e t i t i o n s for c e r t i o r a r i , p r o h i b i t i o n or
m a n d a m u s against:
(1) Court of Appeals;
(2) Court of Tax Appeals;
(3) S a n d i g a n b a y a n ;
(4) Commission on Elections; and
(5) Commission on Audit.
2. Concurrent
a. With t h e Court of Appeals
(1) Petitions for certiorari, prohibition or
m a n d a m u s against:
(a) Regional Trial Courts;
(b) Civil Service Commission;
(c) C e n t r a l B o a r d o f A s s e s s m e n t
Appeals;
(d) N a t i o n a l Labor R e l a t i o n s Commission; a n d
(e) O t h e r quasi-judicial agencies.
b. With t h e Court of Appeals a n d Regional
Trial Courts
(1) Petitions for certiorari, prohibition or
m a n d a m u s a g a i n s t courts of t h e first
level a n d o t h e r bodies; a n d
(2) Petitions for habeas corpus a n d quo
warranto.
c.

With Regional Trial Courts

(1) Actions a g a i n s t a m b a s s a d o r s , o t h e r
public ministers a n d consuls.
54

JURISDICTION IN CIVIL CASES

B. Appellate
1.

II.

Petitions for review on certiorari against:

a. Court of Appeals;
b. Court of Tax Appeals;
c. S a n d i g a n b a y a n ; a n d
d. Regional Trial Courts in cases involving
(1) C o n s t i t u t i o n a l i t y or v a l i d i t y of a
treaty, international or executive
a g r e e m e n t , law, p r e s i d e n t i a l decree,
proclamation, order, instruction,
ordinance, or regulation;
(2) Legality of a tax, impost, a s s e s s m e n t ,
toll or a p e n a l t y in relation t h e r e t o ;
(3) J u r i s d i c t i o n of a lower court; a n d
(4) Only e r r o r s or questions of law.

COURT OF APPEALS
A. Original
1.

Exclusive
a.

2.

Actions for a n n u l m e n t
Regional Trial Courts.

of j u d g m e n t s

of

Concurrent
a. W i t h t h e S u p r e m e Court (see P a r . 2, subp a r , a. on t h e original jurisdiction of t h e
S u p r e m e Court); a n d
b. With t h e S u p r e m e Court and t h e Regional
Trial C o u r t s (see P a r . 2, sub-par, b., loc.
cit.).

B. Appellate
1.

O r d i n a r y a p p e a l s from:
a. Regional Trial Courts, except in cases
exclusively a p p e a l a b l e t o t h e S u p r e m e
Court, supra; and
55

REMEDIAL LAW COMPENDIUM

b. Family Courts.
2. Appeal by petition for review from:
a. Civil Service Commission;
b. Central Board of Assessment Appeals;
c. Securities and Exchange Commission;
d. Land Registration Authority;
e. Social Security Commission;
f. Office of the President;
g. Civil Aeronautics Board;
h. B u r e a u s u n d e r the Intellectual Property
Office;
i. National Electrification Administration;
j . Energy Regulatory Board;
k. National Telecommunications Commission;
1. D e p a r t m e n t of A g r a r i a n Reform u n d e r
R.A. 6657;
m. Government Service I n s u r a n c e System;
n. Employees Compensation Commission;
o. Agricultural Inventions Board;
p. I n s u r a n c e Commission;
q. Philippine Atomic Energy Commission;
r. Board of I n v e s t m e n t s ;
s. Construction Industry Arbitration Commission;
t. Office of t h e O m b u d s m a n , in a d m i n i s t r a tive disciplinary cases; and
u. Any o t h e r quasi-judicial agency, i n s t r u mentality, board or commission in the
e x e r c i s e of i t s q u a s i - j u d i c i a l f u n c t i o n s ,
such as voluntary a r b i t r a t o r s .
3. Petitions for review from t h e Regional Trial
C o u r t s i n cases a p p e a l e d t h e r e t o from t h e
lower courts.
56

JURISDICTION IN CIVIL CASES

I I I . R E G I O N A L TRIAL C O U R T S
A. Original
1. Exclusive
a. Actions t h e subject m a t t e r s whereof are not
capable of pecuniary estimation;
b. Actions involving title to or possession of
r e a l p r o p e r t y or an i n t e r e s t t h e r e i n , w h e r e
the assessed value of such property exceeds
P 2 0 . 0 0 0 or, i n M e t r o M a n i l a , P 5 0 . 0 0 0 ,
except forcible e n t r y and u n l a w f u l
detainer;
c.

Actions in a d m i r a l t y and m a r i t i m e jurisdiction w h e r e t h e d e m a n d or claim exceeds

PIOO.OOO or, in M e t r o Manila, P200.000;
d. M a t t e r s of p r o b a t e , t e s t a t e or i n t e s t a t e ,
w h e r e t h e gross value of t h e e s t a t e exceeds
P100,000 or, in M e t r o Manila, P200.000;
e. Cases not within t h e exclusive jurisdiction
of any court, t r i b u n a l , person or body exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions;
f. Actions a n d special proceedings within t h e
exclusive original jurisdiction of t h e Court
of A g r a r i a n Relations as now provided by
law; a n d
g. O t h e r cases w h e r e t h e demand, exclusive
o f i n t e r e s t , d a m a g e s , a t t o r n e y ' s fees,
litigation expenses and costs, or t h e value
of t h e p r o p e r t y exceeds P 100,000 or, in
Metro Manila, P200,000.
2.

Concurrent
a. With t h e S u p r e m e Court:
(1) Actions affecting a m b a s s a d o r s , other
public ministers and consuls.
b. With t h e S u p r e m e Court and the Court of
Appeals:
57

REMEDIAL LAW COMPENDIUM

(1) Petitions for certiorari, prohibition and

mandamus as stated in par. 2, sub-par.
b on t h e original jurisdiction of t h e
Supreme Court.
(2) Petitions for habeas corpus and quo
warranto.
B. Appellate
All c a s e s decided by lower c o u r t s in t h e i r
respective territorial jurisdictions.
IV. FAMILY C O U R T S
A. Original
1. Exclusive
a. P e t i t i o n s for g u a r d i a n s h i p , c u s t o d y of
children, habeas corpus in relation to t h e
latter;
b. Petitions for adoption of children a n d t h e
revocation thereof;
c. C o m p l a i n t s for a n n u l m e n t of m a r r i a g e ,
declaration of nullity of m a r r i a g e a n d those
relating to marital status and property
r e l a t i o n s of h u s b a n d a n d wife or t h o s e
living t o g e t h e r u n d e r different s t a t u s a n d
a g r e e m e n t s , a n d petitions for dissolution
of conjugal p a r t n e r s h i p of gains;
d . P e t i t i o n s for s u p p o r t a n d / o r a c k n o w l edgment;
e. Summary judicial proceedings brought
u n d e r t h e provisions of Executive O r d e r
No. 209 (Family Code of t h e Philippines);
f. P e t i t i o n s for d e c l a r a t i o n of s t a t u s of
children as abandoned, dependent or
neglected children, for t h e v o l u n t a r y or
involuntary c o m m i t m e n t of children, a n d
for t h e s u s p e n s i o n , t e r m i n a t i o n , o r
58

JURISDICTION IN CIVIL CASES

restoration of parental authority under

P.D. 603, Executive O r d e r No. 56, s. 1986,
a n d o t h e r r e l a t e d laws;
g. Petitions for t h e constitution of t h e family
home; a n d
h. Cases of domestic violence a g a i n s t women
a n d children, as defined t h e r e i n , b u t which
do not c o n s t i t u t e criminal offenses subject
to criminal prosecution a n d p e n a l t i e s .
V.

METROPOLITAN, MUNICIPAL, AND MUNICIPAL CIRCUIT TRIAL COURTS

A. Original
1.

Exclusive
a. Actions involving personal property valued
at not more t h a n P 100,000 or, in M e t r o
Manila, =P200,000;
b . A c t i o n s d e m a n d i n g s u m s o f m o n e y not
exceeding P 100,000 or, in Metro Manila,
P200.000, exclusive of interest, d a m a g e s ,
a t t o r n e y ' s fees, litigation e x p e n s e s , a n d
costs;
c. Actions in a d m i r a l t y a n d m a r i t i m e jurisdiction w h e r e t h e d e m a n d or claim does not
e x c e e d P 1 0 0 . 0 0 0 or, i n M e t r o M a n i l a ,
P200,000, exclusive of interest, d a m a g e s ,
a t t o r n e y ' s fees, litigation e x p e n s e s , a n d
costs;
d. P r o b a t e proceedings, t e s t a t e or i n t e s t a t e ,
w h e r e t h e gross value of t h e e s t a t e does
not exceed P 100,000 or, in Metro Manila,
P200.000 ;
e. Forcible entry and unlawful detainer
cases;

59

REMEDIAL LAW COMPENDIUM

RULE 1

SEC. 1

f.

Actions involving title to or possession of

real property, or any interest therein,
where t h e assessed value does not exceed
P20.000 or, in Metro Manila, P50.000, exclusive of i n t e r e s t , d a m a g e s , a t t o r n e y ' s
fees, litigation expenses, and costs; and
g. Provisional remedies where the principal
action is within t h e i r jurisdiction.
2.

Delegated
a. C a d a s t r a l or land registration cases
covering lots where t h e r e is no controversy
or opposition, or contested lots t h e value
of which does not exceed P 100,000, as may
be assigned by t h e S u p r e m e Court.

3.

Special
a. Petitions for habeas corpus in t h e absence
of all t h e R e g i o n a l T r i a l J u d g e s in t h e
province or city.

4. S u m m a r y Procedure
a. Forcible entry and unlawful d e t a i n e r cases
irrespective of t h e a m o u n t of d a m a g e s or
unpaid r e n t a l s sought to be recovered; and
b. All other court cases, except p r o b a t e proceedings, w h e r e t h e total claim does not
exceed P 10,000, exclusive of i n t e r e s t a n d
costs.

60

RULE 1

GENERAL PROVISIONS

SEC. 1

D. T H E R E V I S E D R U L E S OF COURT*
P u r s u a n t t o t h e p r o v i s i o n s o f s e c t i o n 5(5) o f
Article VIII o f t h e C o n s t i t u t i o n , t h e S u p r e m e C o u r t
h e r e b y a d o p t s a n d p r o m u l g a t e s t h e following r u l e s
concerning the protection and enforcement of
constitutional r i g h t s , pleading, practice and procedure in
all c o u r t s , t h e a d m i s s i o n t o t h e p r a c t i c e o f law, t h e
Integrated Bar, and legal assistance to the underprivileged:
RULE 1
GENERAL PROVISIONS
S e c t i o n 1. Title of the Rules. T h e s e R u l e s s h a l l
b e k n o w n a n d c i t e d a s t h e R u l e s o f C o u r t . (1)
NOTES
1. The Rules of Court have t h e force and effect of
law (Shioji vs. Harvey, etc., et al., 43 Phil. 333; Alvero
vs. De la Rosa, etc., et al., 76 Phil. 428; Conlu vs. CA,
et al., 106 Phil. 940). They a r e not p e n a l s t a t u t e s and
cannot be given retroactive effect (Rilloraza vs. Arciaga,
L 23848, Oct. 31, 1967; Bermejo vs. Barrios, L-23614,
Feb. 27, 1970). However, s t a t u t e s r e g u l a t i n g the procedure of courts may be made applicable to cases pending
at the time of t h e i r passage and are retroactive in t h a t
sense (see Alday vs. Camilon, G.R. No. 60316, Jan. 31,
1983).
2. " W h e n by l a w j u r i s d i c t i o n is c o n f e r r e d on a
court or judicial officer, all auxiliary writs, processes and
*Theae revised Rules of Civil Procedure were approved by the
Supreme Court in its Resolution in Bar Matter No. 803, dated April 8,
1997, to take effect on July 1, 1997.

61

RULE 1

REMEDIAL LAW COMPENDIUM

SEC. 2

o t h e r m e a n s n e c e s s a r y to c a r r y it into effect may be

employed by such court or officer; and if the procedure to
be followed in t h e exercise of such j u r i s d i c t i o n is not
specifically pointed out by law or by t h e s e r u l e s , any
suitable process or mode of proceeding may be adopted
which a p p e a r s conformable to t h e spirit of said law or
rules" (Sec. 6, Rule 135).
It will be observed t h a t t h i s r e l e v a n t provision of
Rule 135 refers only to auxiliary w r i t s , processes a n d
other necessary means to carry out the jurisdiction
specifically conferred by law on the court over t h e main
suit or proceeding. See t h e related discussion over t h i s
ancillary jurisdiction of courts u n d e r Sec. 1, Rule 57.
3. The Code of Civil Procedure (Act No. 190) is one
of the majn sources of the old Rules of Court which took
effect o r / J u l y 1, 1940 and, in t u r n , of t h e p r e s e n t revised
Rules. However, certain provisions of t h e Code of Civil
Procedure which were not incorporated in or repealed
by the Rules are still considered in force. These provisions
are:
"7^
"Sec. 4 2 . Exceptions in Favor of Persons under
Disability. If a person entitled to bring t h e action
mentioned in t h e preceding sections of t h i s c h a p t e r
(Sec. 40. Action for recovery of title to or possession
of real property or an interest therein) is, at t h e time
t h e cause of action accrues, within t h e age of minority, of u n s o u n d mind or in prison, such person may,
after t h e expiration of t e n y e a r s from t h e time the
c a u s e of action a c c r u e s , b r i n g s u c h a c t i o n w i t h i n
t h r e e years after such disability is removed."
"Sec. 4 5 . Rights Saved to Certain Persons. If a
p e r s o n e n t i t l e d t o b r i n g a n y action m e n t i o n e d i n
e i t h e r of t h e two last p r e c e d i n g sections (Sec. 43.
Actions other than for recovery of real property;
Sec. 44. Any other action for relief) is, at t h e time t h e
cause of action accrues, within the age of minority,
62

RULE 1

GENERAL PROVISIONS

SEC. 3

of u n s o u n d mind, or in prison, such person may bring

such action within two y e a r s after t h e disability is
removed u n l e s s t h e r i g h t of action is one of those
n a m e d in subdivision four of section forty-three, in
which case it may be brought within one y e a r after
such disability is removed."
:

"Sec. 4 7 . As to Absent Persons. If, w h e n a

cause of action accrues a g a i n s t a person, he is out
of the Philippine Islands, or has absconded or
c o n c e a l e d himself, a n d h a s n o k n o w n o r visible
p r o p e r t y w i t h i n t h e I s l a n d s t h e period limited for
t h e commencement of t h e action shall not begin to
r u n u n t i l he comes into t h e Islands or while he is so
absconded or concealed, or u n t i l he h a s k n o w n or
visible p r o p e r t y w i t h i n t h e Islands; a n d if, after t h e
cause of action accrues, he d e p a r t s from t h e Philippine I s l a n d s , or absconds or conceals himself, t h e
t i m e of h i s a b s e n c e or c o n c e a l m e n t s h a l l not be
c o m p u t e d as a n y p a r t of t h e period w i t h i n which
time t h e cause of action should be brought."
It should be noted t h a t Art. 2270(3) of t h e Civil Code
repeals only t h e provisions of t h e Code of Civil Procedure
on prescription as far as t h e l a t t e r may be inconsistent
with t h e former, a n d A r t s . 1106 to 1155 of the Civil Code
do not provide for t h e above s i t u a t i o n s . Art. 1108 of said
Code provides t h a t extinctive prescription r u n s against
minors or incapacitated persons only if they have p a r e n t s ,
g u a r d i a n s or legal r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s .
4* F u r t h e r m o r e , it h a s been held t h a t not all t h e provisions in t h e Code of Civil P r o c e d u r e a r e r e m e d i a l in
n a t u r e , such as those p e r t a i n i n g to prescription, t h e requisites for m a k i n g a will, a n d t h e succession to t h e e s t a t e
of t h e adopted child (Primicias vs. Ocampo, etc., et al., 93
Phil. 446). Specifically w i t h respect to t h e above-quoted
provisions on prescription, not being procedural in n a t u r e ,
they cannot be deemed to have been impliedly repealed

63

RULE 1

REMEDIAL LAW COMPENDIUM

SEC. 4

j u s t because they were not incorporated in t h e Rules of

C o u r t . Being s u b s t a n t i v e i n n a t u r e , a n d not h a v i n g
been eliminated by substantive law as above explained,
these provisions are consequently still in force.
4. In t h e i n t e r e s t of j u s t and expeditious proceedings, t h e S u p r e m e Court may suspend t h e application of
t h e Rules of Court and except a case from their operation
because the Rules were precisely adopted with t h e prim a r y objective of e n h a n c i n g fair t r i a l a n d expeditious
justice (Republic vs. CA, et al, L-3130304, May 31, 1978).
S e c . 2. In what courts applicable. T h e s e R u l e s
s h a l l a p p l y i n all t h e c o u r t s , e x c e p t a s o t h e r w i s e
p r o v i d e d b y t h e S u p r e m e Court, (n)
NOTES
1.

The 1987 Constitution provides in Art. VIII thereof

that:
"Sec. 5. The S u p r e m e Court s h a l l have the
following powers:
(5) P r o m u l g a t e r u l e s concerning t h e protection
and enforcement of constitutional r i g h t s , pleading,
practice, and procedure in all courts, t h e admission
to t h e practice of law, t h e I n t e g r a t e d Bar, a n d legal
assistance to t h e underprivileged. Such rules shall
provide a simplified a n d inexpensive procedure for
t h e speedy disposition of cases, shall be uniform for
all courts of t h e same grade, and shall not diminish,
i n c r e a s e , or modify s u b s t a n t i v e r i g h t s . R u l e s of
procedure of special courts and quasi-judicial bodies
s h a l l r e m a i n effective u n l e s s d i s a p p r o v e d b y t h e
S u p r e m e Court."

64

RULE 1

GENERAL PROVISIONS

SEC. 6

2. P.D. 946 provided that t h e "Rules of Court shall

not be applicable to a g r a r i a n cases, even in a suppletory
c h a r a c t e r " and e a c h C o u r t of A g r a r i a n R e l a t i o n s t h e n
had t h e a u t h o r i t y to adopt any a p p r o p r i a t e procedure,
except t h a t i n c r i m i n a l a n d e x p r o p r i a t i o n c a s e s , t h e
Rules of Court shall apply (Sec. 16). U n d e r B.P. Big. 129,
said a g r a r i a n c o u r t s were i n t e g r a t e d into t h e Regional
Trial C o u r t s as b r a n c h e s thereof, and "the l a t t e r shall
have exclusive original jurisdiction over said cases and
proceedings b u t they shall continue to apply t h e special
rules of procedures u n d e r t h e p r e s e n t laws" (Sec. 24).
R.A. 6657 subsequently provided for t h e designation
of at least one b r a n c h of t h e Regional Trial Court within
each province to act as a Special A g r a r i a n Court. The
Special A g r a r i a n Courts shall have original and exclusive
jurisdiction over all p e t i t i o n s for t h e d e t e r m i n a t i o n of
just compensation to l a n d o w n e r s and t h e prosecution of
all c r i m i n a l offenses u n d e r said Act (Sees. 56 and 57).
On t h e o t h e r h a n d , t h e D e p a r t m e n t of A g r a r i a n Reform
is v e s t e d w i t h p r i m a r y j u r i s d i c t i o n a n d quasi-judicial
powers to d e t e r m i n e a n d adjudicate all o t h e r a g r a r i a n
reform m a t t e r s . It shall not be bound by t h e technical
r u l e s o f p r o c e d u r e a n d e v i d e n c e b u t m a y employ all
reasonable m e a n s to a s c e r t a i n t h e facts in accordance
with justice, equity a n d t h e m e r i t s of t h e case (Sec. 50).
S e c . 3. Cases governed. T h e s e R u l e s s h a l l
govern the procedure to be observed in actions,
civil o r c r i m i n a l , a n d s p e c i a l p r o c e e d i n g s .
(a) A c i v i l a c t i o n is o n e by w h i c h a p a r t y s u e s
a n o t h e r for t h e e n f o r c e m e n t o r p r o t e c t i o n o f a
right, or the p r e v e n t i o n or redress of a wrong,
( l a , R2)
A civil action may either be ordinary or special.
B o t h a r e g o v e r n e d b y t h e r u l e s for o r d i n a r y c i v i l
a c t i o n s , s u b j e c t t o t h e s p e c i f i c r u l e s p r e s c r i b e d for
a s p e c i a l c i v i l a c t i o n , (n)
65

RULE 1

REMEDIAL LAW COMPENDIUM

SEC. S

(b) A c r i m i n a l a c t i o n is o n e by w h i c h t h e S t a t e
p r o s e c u t e s a p e r s o n for an a c t or o m i s s i o n
p u n i s h a b l e by l a w . (n)
(c) A s p e c i a l p r o c e e d i n g is a r e m e d y by w h i c h a
p a r t y s e e k s to e s t a b l i s h a s t a t u s , a r i g h t , or a
p a r t i c u l a r fact. (2a, R2)
NOTES
1. In t h e Philippines, t h e r e is no difference between
a "suit" and an "action" as our courts are courts of law and
equity (see Lopez vs. Filipinos Cia. de Seguros, L-19613,
April 30, 1966). Likewise, in A m e r i c a n law, t h e t e r m s
" a c t i o n " a n d " s u i t " a r e now n e a r l y , i f n o t e n t i r e l y ,
synonymous (Elmos vs. James, Tex. Civ. App., 282 S.W.
835; Coleman vs. Los Angeles County, 180 Cal. 714, 182
P. 440), or if t h e r e be a distinction, it is t h a t t h e t e r m
"action" is generally confined to proceedings in a court
of law, while "suit" is equally applied to prosecutions at
law or in equity (Black's Law Dictionary, 6th Ed., p. 1434).
2. The S u p r e m e Court h a s i n h e r e n t jurisdiction t h a t
it can always exercise in s e t t i n g s a t t e n d e d by u n u s u a l
c i r c u m s t a n c e s to p r e v e n t manifest injustice t h a t could
result to b a r e technical adherence to t h e law a n d imprecise j u r i s p r u d e n c e (Co vs. PNB, G.R. No. 51767, June 29,
1982).
3. In an ordinary action, t h e r e m u s t be r e a l p a r t i e s
in i n t e r e s t a s s e r t i n g adverse claims and p r e s e n t i n g a ripe
issue (Tolentino vs. Board of Accountancy, 90 Phil. 88).
S e c . 4. In what cases not applicable. T h e s e R u l e s
shall not apply to election cases, land registration,
cadastral, naturalization and insolvency proc e e d i n g s , a n d o t h e r c a s e s n o t h e r e i n p r o v i d e d for,
except by analogy or in a suppletory character and
w h e n e v e r p r a c t i c a b l e a n d c o n v e n i e n t . (R143a)
66

RULE 1

GENERAL PROVISIONS

SEC. 5

NOTE
1.

See Note 3 u n d e r Sec. 5, Rule 2.

C' r'\

S e c . 5. Commencement of action. A c i v i l a c t i o n
is commenced by the filing of the original complaint
in court. If an additional defendant is impleaded in
a later pleading, the action is c o m m e n c e d with
regard to h i m on the date of the filing of such later
p l e a d i n g , i r r e s p e c t i v e o f w h e t h e r t h e m o t i o n for i t s
a d m i s s i o n ^ i f n e c e s s a r y , i s d e n i e d b y t h e c o u r t . (6a)
NOTES
1. This provision a s s u m e s significance especially
w h e r e p r e s c r i p t i o n is r a i s e d as a defense a g a i n s t t h e
claim of t h e plaintiff in t h e complaint. T h u s , as long as
the complaint which commences t h e action is filed within
the prescriptive period, t h e claim alleged t h e r e i n is not
barred even if s u m m o n s was served on t h e defendant after
the prescriptive period (Sotelo vs. Dizon, et al., 57 Phil.
573; Cabrera, et al. vs. Tiano, L-17299, July 31, 1963).
2. S u c h action may be commenced by filing t h e
complaint by registered mail. Hence, if t h e complaint was
duly s e n t to t h e proper court by registered mail within
the prescriptive period and in accordance with the
r e q u i r e m e n t s of Sec. 3, Rule 13, t h e fact t h a t said complaint, as mailed, was actually received by the clerk of
said court after t h e lapse of t h e prescriptive period is
i m m a t e r i a l as t h e d a t e of mailing is considered t h e date
of the filing of said complaint. However, if t h e requisite
docket fee was actually paid, e i t h e r personally or also by
mail, s u b s e q u e n t to t h e mailing of said complaint, t h e
d a t e of s u c h p a y m e n t or the m a i l i n g of s a i d a m o u n t
therefor shall be considered as the d a t e of t h e filing of
the complaint (Ago Timber Corp. vs. Ruiz, et al., L-23887,
Dec. 26, 1967). Where t h e r e was an u n d e r a s s e s s m e n t of

RULE 1

REMEDIAL LAW COMPENDIUM

SEC. 5

t h e d o c k e t fee to be paid due to an i n i t i a l l y h o n e s t

difference of opinion as to the n a t u r e of t h e action, the
plaintiff w a s p e r m i t t e d to s u b s e q u e n t l y complete t h e
p a y m e n t by paying the difference (Magaspi vs. Ramolete,
L-34840, July 20, 1982).
3. Ordinarily, t h e rule was t h a t a case is deemed
filed only upon t h e p a y m e n t of t h e docket fee. The Court
acquires jurisdiction over the case only upon full p a y m e n t
of such prescribed docket fee. All complaints, petitions,
a n s w e r s and similar pleadings m u s t specify the a m o u n t
of d a m a g e s being p r a y e d for b o t h in t h e body of t h e
pleading and in t h e p r a y e r t h e r e i n , and said d a m a g e s
shall be considered in the a s s e s s m e n t of the filing fees;
otherwise, such pleading shall not be accepted for filing
or shall be expunged from t h e record. Any defect in t h e
original pleading resulting in u n d e r p a y m e n t of t h e docket
fee cannot be cured by a m e n d m e n t , such as by t h e reduction of t h e claim as, for all legal purposes, t h e r e is no
original c o m p l a i n t over which t h e c o u r t h a s a c q u i r e d
jurisdiction (Manchester Development Corporation, et al.
vs. CA, et al., G.R. No. 75919, May 1, 1987).
H o w e v e r , t h e a f o r e s t a t e d r u l i n g i n Manchester
Development Corporation, et al. vs. CA, et al. h a s been
modified as follows: (1) when t h e filing of t h e initiatory
pleading is not accompanied by p a y m e n t of t h e docket
fee, t h e c o u r t may allow p a y m e n t of t h e fee w i t h i n a
reasonable time but not beyond the applicable prescriptive
or r e g l e m e n t a r y period; (2) t h e s a m e r u l e a p p l i e s to
permissive counterclaims, t h i r d - p a r t y claims a n d similar
pleadings; and (3) when t h e t r i a l court acquires jurisdiction over a claim by t h e filing of t h e a p p r o p r i a t e
pleading a n d p a y m e n t of t h e prescribed filing fee but,
subsequently, the j u d g m e n t a w a r d s a claim not specified
in t h e pleadings, or if specified t h e s a m e has been left
for d e t e r m i n a t i o n by the court, the additional filing fee
therefor shall constitute a lien on the judgment which shall
be enforced and t h e additional fee assessed a n d collected
68

RULE 1

GENERAL PROVISIONS

SEC. 5

by t h e clerk of court (Sun Insurance Office, Ltd., et al.

vs. Asuncion, et al., G.R. Nos. 79937-38, Feb. 13, 1989).
4. It is t r u e t h a t Manchester laid down the rule t h a t
all complaints should specify t h e a m o u n t of t h e d a m a g e s
prayed for not only in t h e body of t h e complaint b u t also
i n t h e p r a y e r . T h a t r u l e , however, h a s been relaxed.
Thus, while t h e body of t h e complaint in t h i s case is silent
as to t h e exact a m o u n t of d a m a g e s , t h e p r a y e r did specify
the a m o u n t . These a m o u n t s were definite enough and
enabled t h e clerk of c o u r t to c o m p u t e t h e docket fees
payable. F u r t h e r m o r e , t h e a m o u n t s claimed need not be
initially s t a t e d w i t h m a t h e m a t i c a l precision. Section 5(a),
Rule 141 allows an a p p r a i s a l "more or less," t h a t is, a final
d e t e r m i n a t i o n is still to be made and t h e fees ultimately
found to be payable will e i t h e r be additionally paid by or
refunded to t h e p a r t y concerned, as t h e case may be. The
party is, therefore, allowed to make an initial p a y m e n t of
the filing fees c o r r e s p o n d i n g to t h e e s t i m a t e d a m o u n t
of the claim subject to a d j u s t m e n t as to w h a t may later
be proved (Ng Soon vs. Alday, et al., G.R. No. 85879,
Sept. 29, 1989).
5. W h e r e t h e action involves r e a l property (such as
an accion publiciana) a n d r e l a t e d claims for d a m a g e s , t h e
legal fees s h a l l be a s s e s s e d on b o t h t h e v a l u e of t h e
property a n d t h e t o t a l a m o u n t o f t h e d a m a g e s sought.
Where t h e fees prescribed for an action involving r e a l
property have been paid but t h e a m o u n t s for t h e related
d a m a g e s being d e m a n d e d t h e r e i n a r e unspecified, t h e
action may not be dismissed. The court acquired
jurisdiction over t h e action involving real property upon
t h e filing o f t h e c o m p l a i n t a n d t h e p a y m e n t o f t h e
prescribed fee therefor. It is not divested of t h a t authority
by the fact t h a t it may not have acquired jurisdiction over
the accompanying claims for d a m a g e s because of lack of
specification thereof. Said claims for damages as to which
no a m o u n t s a r e s t a t e d may simply be expunged or t h e
69

RULE 1

REMEDIAL LAW COMPENDIUM

SEC. 6

court, on motion, may allow a reasonable t i m e for t h e

a m e n d m e n t of the complaint so as to allege t h e precise
a m o u n t of the damages and accept p a y m e n t of t h e fees
t h e r e f o r , p r o v i d e d said claims for d a m a g e s h a v e not
become time-barred (Tacay, et al. vs. Regional Trial Court
ofTagum, etc., et al, G.R. Nos. 88075-77, Dec. 20, 1989).
6. The a m o u n t of docket fees to be paid should be
c o m p u t e d on t h e b a s i s of t h e a m o u n t of t h e d a m a g e s
stated in t h e complaint. Where, subsequently, t h e judgm e n t a w a r d s a claim not specified in t h e p l e a d i n g or,
if specified, t h e same has been left for t h e d e t e r m i n a t i o n
of t h e c o u r t , t h e a d d i t i o n a l filing fee t h e r e f o r s h a l l
c o n s t i t u t e a l i e n on t h e j u d g m e n t . S u c h " a w a r d s of
claims not specified in t h e p l e a d i n g " refer only to
damages arising after the filing of t h e complaint or similar
p l e a d i n g . A c c o r d i n g l y , t h e a m o u n t o f a n y c l a i m for
d a m a g e s arising on or before t h e filing of t h e complaint
or any pleading should be specified. The exception
contemplated as to claims not specified or to claims which
a l t h o u g h specified a r e left to t h e d e t e r m i n a t i o n of t h e
court is limited only to d a m a g e s t h a t m a y a r i s e after
t h e filing of t h e complaint or similar p l e a d i n g since it
will not be possible for t h e claimant to specify or speculate
on t h e a m o u n t t h e r e o f (Ayala Corporation, et al vs.
Madayag, et al, G.R. No. 88421, Jan. 30, 1990).
7. It is well settled in our jurisdiction t h a t , unless
o t h e r w i s e provided by law or r e q u i r e d by public
i n t e r e s t , as in quo w a r r a n t o actions (see Note 3 u n d e r
Sec. 11, Rule 66), before bringing an action in or r e s o r t i n g
to t h e c o u r t s of justice, all r e m e d i e s of a d m i n i s t r a t i v e
c h a r a c t e r affecting or d e t e r m i n a t i v e of t h e controversy
at t h a t level should first be e x h a u s t e d by t h e aggrieved
p a r t y (Pestanas vs. Dyogi, L-25786, Feb. 27, 1978; Miguel
vs. Vda. de Reyes, 93 Phil. 542; Coloso vs. Board, L-5750,
April 30, 1950). It is likewise t r u e , however, t h a t t h e
doctrine of e x h a u s t i o n of a d m i n i s t r a t i v e remedies is not a
h a r d and fast rule.
70

RULE 1

GENERAL PROVISIONS

SEC. 6

This Title does not apply and has been disregarded

when: (1) t h e issue is purely a legal one, and nothing of
an a d m i n i s t r a t i v e n a t u r e is to be a n d can be done (Dauan
vs. Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources, et al.,
L-19547, Jan. 31, 1967; Aguilar vs. Valencia, L-30396,
July 30, 1971; Commissioner of Immigration vs. Vamenta,
L-34030, May 31, 1972; Del Mar vs. Phil. Veterans Adm.,
L-27299, June 27, 1973; Bagatsing vs. Ramirez, L-41631,
Dec. 17, 1976); (2) insistence on its observance would
result in nullification of the claim being asserted
(Gravador vs. Mamigo, L-24989, July 21, 1967); (3) t h e
c o n t r o v e r t e d a c t is p a t e n t l y illegal or w a s p e r f o r m e d
without jurisdiction or in excess of jurisdiction (Industrial
Power Sales, Inc. vs. Sinsuat, L-29171, April 15, 1988);
(4) t h e r e s p o n d e n t is a d e p a r t m e n t secretary, whose acts
a s a n a l t e r ego o f t h e P r e s i d e n t b e a r t h e i m p l i e d o r
assumed approval of the latter, unless actually disapproved
by him (Demaisip vs. CA, et al, 106 Phil. 237); (5) t h e r e
are circumstances indicating the urgency of judicial
intervention (Gonzales vs. Hechanova, L-21897, Oct. 22,
1963; Abaya vs. Villegas, L-25641, Dec. 17, 1966; Mitra
vs. Subido, L-21691, Sept. 15, 1967); (6) t h e rule does not
provide a plain, speedy and a d e q u a t e remedy (Cipriano
vs. Marcelino, L-27793, Feb. 28, 1972); (7) t h e r e is a
violation of due process (Quisumbing vs. Gumban, G.R.
No. 85156, Feb. 5, 1991; Salinas vs. NLRC, et al,
G.R. No. 114671, Nov. 24, 1999); (8) t h e r e is estoppel on
the p a r t of t h e a d m i n i s t r a t i v e agency concerned (Vda. de
Tan vs. Veterans Backpay Commission, 105 Phil 377);
(9) t h e r e is i r r e p a r a b l e injury (De Lara vs. Cloribel, 121
Phil. 1062); (10) to require exhaustion of a d m i n i s t r a t i v e
remedies would be u n r e a s o n a b l e (Cipriano vs. Marcelino,
et al, 150 Phil. 336); (11) t h e subject m a t t e r is a private
land in land case proceedings (Soto vs. Jareno, L-38962,
Sept. 15, 1986); a n d (12) t h e i s s u e of e x h a u s t i o n
of administrative proceedings has been rendered
moot (Carale, etc., et al. vs. Abarintos, etc., et al.,
G.R. No. 120704, Mar. 3, 1997).
71

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REMEDIAL LAW COMPENDIUM

SEC. 6

S e c . 6. Construction. T h e s e R u l e s s h a l l be
liberally construed in order to promote their
objective of securing a just, speedy and i n e x p e n s i v e
d i s p o s i t i o n o f e v e r y a c t i o n a n d p r o c e e d i n g . (2a)
NOTES
1. This section is a recognition of the fact t h a t the
rules of procedure are mere tools designed to facilitate the
a t t a i n m e n t of justice. Thus, the liberal construction of
t h e s e Rules h a s b e e n allowed in t h e following c a s e s :
(1) w h e r e a rigid a p p l i c a t i o n will r e s u l t in m a n i f e s t
failure or miscarriage of justice; (2) where t h e i n t e r e s t of
s u b s t a n t i a l justice will be served; (3) where t h e resolution
of the motion is addressed solely to the sound and judicious
discretion of the court; and (4) where t h e injustice to t h e
adverse p a r t y is not c o m m e n s u r a t e with t h e degree of his
t h o u g h t l e s s n e s s in not complying w i t h t h e p r e s c r i b e d
procedure (Tan us. CA, et al., G.R. No. 130314, Sept. 22,
1998).
2. In fact, in line with the spirit and purpose of this
section, even t h e suspension of t h e rules may be justified
in t h e i n t e r e s t of fair play. As- early as t h e case of Vda.
de Ordonez us. Raymundo (63 Phil. 275), it was held t h a t
the court has the power to suspend the rules, or to
except a p a r t i c u l a r case from t h e i r operation, w h e n e v e r
the ends of justice so require.
J u r i s p r u d e n c e h a s laid down t h e r a n g e of r e a s o n s
which m a y provide justification for a c o u r t to r e s t r i c t
adherence to procedure, e n u m e r a t i n g grounds for giving
d u e course to an o t h e r w i s e objectionable a p p e a l by a
suspension of t h e enforcement of procedural rules, viz.:
(1) i n m a t t e r s o f life, l i b e r t y , h o n o r o r p r o p e r t y ;
(2) c o u n s e l ' s n e g l i g e n c e w i t h o u t a n y p a r t i c i p a t o r y
negligence on the p a r t of t h e client; (3) t h e existence of
special or compelling circumstances; (4) the evident merits
of t h e case; (5) a cause not entirely a t t r i b u t a b l e to the
72

RULE 1

GENERAL PROVISIONS

SEC. 6

fault or negligence of the p a r t y favored by t h e suspension

of the rules; () the lack of any showing t h a t t h e review
s o u g h t is merely frivolous a n d d i l a t o r y ; a n d (7) t h e
o t h e r p a r t y will n o t b e u n j u s t l y p r e j u d i c e d t h e r e b y
(Baylon vs. Fact-finding Intelligence Bureau, etc., et al.,
G.R. No. No. 150870, Dec. 11, 2002).
3. While the Rules are liberally construed, the
provisions on reglementary periods are strictly applied as
they are "deemed indispensable to the prevention of
needless delays and necessary to the orderly and speedy
discharge of judicial business" (Alvero vs. De la Rosa, et
al., 76 Phil. 428; Valdez vs. Ocumen, et al, 106 Phil 929;
Mangali, et al. vs. CA, et al, L-47296, Aug. 21, 1980; cf.
Legaspi-Santos vs. CA, et al, G.R. No. 60577, Oct. 11,
1983) a n d strict compliance t h e r e w i t h is m a n d a t o r y and
i m p e r a t i v e (FJR Garments Industries vs. CA, et al,
L-49320, June 29, 1984). The same is t r u e with respect
to t h e r u l e s on t h e m a n n e r a n d periods for perfecting
appeals (Gutierrez vs. CA, et al, L-25972, Nov. 26, 1968),
and the r e q u i r e m e n t s as to w h a t should a p p e a r on the
face of a record on a p p e a l (Workmen's Insurance Co.,
Inc. vs. Augusto, et al, L-31060, July 29, 1971), although
these r u l e s have s o m e t i m e s been relaxed on equitable
considerations (see Pimentel, et al. vs. CA, et al, L-39684,
June 27, 1975; Bagalamon, et al. vs. CA, et al, L-43043,
Mar. 31, 1977).
All t h i n g s c o n s i d e r e d , t h e S u p r e m e C o u r t called
attention to t h e fact t h a t "(v)ules of procedure exist for a
purpose, and to disregard such rules in the guise of liberal
construction would be to defeat such purpose. Procedural
rules are not to be disclaimed as mere technicalities. They
may not be ignored to suit the convenience of a p a r t y .
Adjective l a w e n s u r e s t h e effective e n f o r c e m e n t o f
s u b s t a n t i v e rights t h r o u g h the orderly and speedy
a d m i n i s t r a t i o n of j u s t i c e . R u l e s a r e not i n t e n d e d to
hamper litigants or complicate litigation. But they help
provide for a vital system of justice where suitors may be
73

RULE 1

REMEDIAL LAW COMPENDIUM

SEC. 6

heard in the correct form and manner, at t h e prescribed

time in a peaceful though adversarial confrontation before
a judge whose authority litigants acknowledge. Public
o r d e r a n d o u r s y s t e m of j u s t i c e a r e well s e r v e d by a
c o n s c i e n t i o u s o b s e r v a n c e of t h e r u l e s of p r o c e d u r e ,
p a r t i c u l a r l y b y g o v e r n m e n t officials a n d a g e n c i e s "
(Kowloon House/Willy Ng vs. CA, et al., G.R. No. 140024,
June 18, 2003, quoted in United Pulp and Paper Co.,
Inc. vs. United Pulp and Paper Chapter, etc., G.R.
No. 141117, Mar. 24, 2004).

74

CIVIL A C T I O N S
ORDINARY CIVIL ACTIONS
RULE 2
C A U S E OF ACTION
S e c t i o n 1. Ordinary civil actions, basis of.
Every ordinary civil action must be based on a
c a u s e o f a c t i o n , (n)
S e c . 2. Cause of action, defined. A c a u s e of
action is the act or omission by w h i c h a party
v i o l a t e s a r i g h t of a n o t h e r , (n)
NOTES
1. See Note 2 of t h e Preliminary Considerations and
Notes 2 a n d 5 u n d e r Sec. 47, Rule 39.
2. A cause of action is the delict or wrongful act or
omission committed by t h e defendant in violation of the
primary right of t h e plaintiff. A single act or omission
can be violative of various rights at the same time but
where there is only one delict or wrong, there is b u t a
single cause of action regardless of the n u m b e r of rights
violated belonging to one person. Nevertheless, if only
one injury resulted from several wrongful acts, only one
cause of action arises. The singleness of a cause of action
lies in the singleness of the delict or wrong violating the
rights of one person (Joseph vs. Bautista, et al., L-41423,
Feb. 23, 1989).
S e c . 3. One suit for a single cause of action. A
p a r t y m a y n o t i n s t i t u t e m o r e t h a n o n e s u i t for a
s i n g l e c a u s e o f a c t i o n . (3a)
76

RULE 2

REMEDIAL LAW COMPENDIUM

SEC. 4

S e c . 4. Splitting a single cause of action; effect of.

If two or more suits are instituted on t h e basis of
t h e same cause of action, t h e filing of one or a
judgment upon the merits in any one is available
a s a g r o u n d for t h e d i s m i s s a l o f t h e o t h e r s . (4a)
NOTES
1. Splitting a cause of action is t h e act of dividing a
single cause of action, claim or d e m a n d into two or more
p a r t s , a n d b r i n g i n g s u i t for o n e o f s u c h p a r t s only,
intending to reserve t h e r e s t for a n o t h e r s e p a r a t e action.
The p u r p o s e s of t h e rule a r e to avoid h a r a s s m e n t a n d
vexation to t h e defendant a n d to obviate multiplicity of
suits.
'. 2. W h e r e a single c a u s e of action h a s been split,
the remedy of t h e defendant is to move to dismiss u n d e r
Rule 1 6 o n t h e g r o u n d t h a t t h e r e i s a n o t h e r a c t i o n
p e n d i n g between t h e s a m e p a r t i e s for t h e s a m e cause,
or litis pendentia (Sec. lfej); or, if t h e first action h a s
a l r e a d y been finally t e r m i n a t e d , on t h e g r o u n d of res
judicata
(Sec. IffJ).
3. T h u s , w h e r e t h e first,action was for recovery of
land, a n o t h e r action for the value of plaintiff s s h a r e in
the produce of said land is barred, as a single cause of
action was split into two suits (Jalandoni, et al. vs. MartirGuanzon, et al., 102 Phil. 859; cf. Pascua vs. Sideco, 24
Phil. 26). The s a m e doctrine applies w h e r e , in the action
to recover t h e land, t h e plaintiff sought to recover t h e
fruits a l r e a d y a p p r o p r i a t e d b y t h e d e f e n d a n t b u t not
the future fruits which may be realized thereon until the
possession of the land, was restored to him.
He could
have done so by s u p p l e m e n t a l complaint in said action,
failing which he cannot i n s t i t u t e a n o t h e r action for t h a t
purpose in violation of t h e rule of res judicata (Bayang
vs. CA, et al., G.R. No. 53564, Feb. 27, 1987).

76

RULE 2

CAUSE OF ACTION

SEC. 4

4. Where a contract is to be performed periodically,

as by i n s t a l l m e n t s , each failure to pay an i n s t a l l m e n t
constitutes a cause of action a n d can be t h e subject of a
s e p a r a t e suit as t h e i n s t a l l m e n t falls due, or it can be
included in the p e n d i n g s u i t by s u p p l e m e n t a l pleading.
However, if at the time of the bringing of suit, several
installments are already due, all must be included as
integrating a single cause of action, otherwise those not
included will be barred (Larena vs. Villanueva, 53 Phil.
923).
5. W i t h a l , e v e n if t h e c o n t r a c t is divisible in its
performance a n d t h e future periodic deliveries a r e not
yet due, b u t t h e obligor h a s already manifested his refusal
to comply w i t h his future periodic obligations, "the contract is entire and the breach total," hence t h e r e can only
be one action for damages (Blossom & Co. vs. Manila Gas
Corporation, 55 Phil. 226).
6. N o n - p a y m e n t of a mortgage loan cannot be split
into two actions, one for p a y m e n t of t h e debt a n d t h e
other for foreclosure of t h e m o r t g a g e , as t h e r e is only
one cause of action (Quiogue, et al. vs. Bautista, et al.,
L-13159, Feb. 28, 1962); b u t an action for collection of a
mortgage loan does not b a r a n o t h e r for rescission of the
mortgage if such rescission is based on the non-compliance
by t h e m o r t g a g o r w i t h c e r t a i n o t h e r conditions of t h e
m o r t g a g e c o n t r a c t (Enriquez, et al. vs. Ramos, et al.,
L-16797, Feb. 27, 1963).
7. Where the plaintiff filed the first action for forcible
entry in t h e belief and on t h e allegation t h a t the fence
c o n s t r u c t e d by t h e d e f e n d a n t i n t r u d e d upon only one
lot, but, after t h e relocation survey, he discovered t h a t
the other portion of t h e same fence extended to a n o t h e r
lot and as a consequence of which he filed a n o t h e r action
for forcible entry upon t h a t l a t t e r lot, the S u p r e m e Court,
while holding that technically t h e r e was a splitting of a

77

RULE 2

REMEDIAL LAW COMPENDIUM

SEC. 5

single cause of action since t h e alleged forcible e n t r y

c o n s t i t u t e d only one act, n e v e r t h e l e s s s u s t a i n e d t h e
order of t h e lower court denying defendant's motion to
dismiss t h e complaint on t h e ground of litis pendentia, it
a p p e a r i n g t h a t t h e first action had not yet been tried at
the time the second action was filed in t h e same court,
hence t h e two cases could be tried together as one, or the
second complaint could be t r e a t e d as an a m e n d m e n t of
t h e first (Tarnate us. Garcia, et al., L-26266, Dec. 29,
1972).
S e c . 5. Joinder of causes
in one pleading assert,
otherwise, as many causes
against an opposing party,
conditions:

of action. A p a r t y m a y
in the alternative or
of action as he may have
subject to the following

(a) T h e p a r t y j o i n i n g t h e c a u s e s o f a c t i o n s h a l l
comply with the rules on joinder of parties;
(b) T h e j o i n d e r s h a l l n o t i n c l u d e s p e c i a l c i v i l
actions governed by special rules;
(c) W h e r e t h e c a u s e s o f a c t i o n a r e b e t w e e n t h e
same parties but pertain to different venues or
jurisdictions, the joinder may be allowed in the
Regional Trial Court provided one of the causes of
a c t i o n falls w i t h i n t h e j u r i s d i c t i o n o f s a i d c o u r t
a n d t h e v e n u e lies t h e r e i n ; a n d - 1
(d) W h e r e t h e c l a i m s i n a l l t h e c a u s e s o f
a c t i o n a r e p r i n c i p a l l y for r e c o v e r y o f m o n e y t h e
aggregate^amount claimed shall be the test of
j u r i s d i c t i o n . (5a)
NOTES
1. The joinder of causes of action in one complaint
p r o m o t e s t h e policy on avoiding m u l t i p l i c i t y of s u i t s .
The rule in Sec. 5, however, is purely permissive a n d the

78

RULE 2

CAUSE OF ACTION

SEC. 5

plaintiff can always file s e p a r a t e actions for each cause

of action (Baldovir vs. Sarte, 36 Phil. 550).
2. P a r . (a) of t h i s section requires t h a t t h e joinder
of causes of action shall comply with t h e rule on joinder
of p a r t i e s . T h u s , in r e l a t i o n to Sec. 6 of Rule 3, it is
n e c e s s a r y t h a t t h e r i g h t of relief from said c a u s e s of
action should arise out of t h e same t r a n s a c t i o n or series
of t r a n s a c t i o n s , and a question of law and fact common
to all t h e plaintiffs or defendants may arise in the action.
3. U n d e r P a r . (b), only causes of action in ordinary
civil actions may be joined, obviously because they a r e
subject to t h e s a m e rules. Necessarily, therefore, special
civil actions or actions governed by special rules should
not be joined w i t h o r d i n a r y civil actions to avoid confusion in t h e conduct of t h e proceedings as well as in the
d e t e r m i n a t i o n of t h e presence of t h e requisite elements
of each p a r t i c u l a r cause of action. In fact, in the special
civil action of declaratory relief (Rule 63), the concept of
a cause of action in ordinary civil actions does not apply.
Note should be t a k e n , however, of Sec. 4 of Rule 1
which provides t h a t t h e s e Rules shall not apply, inter
alia, to election cases in t h e r e g u l a r courts (see Sec. 2[2],
Art. IXC, 1987 Constitution). T h u s , unless the rules of
t h e e l e c t o r a l t r i b u n a l o r body provide o t h e r w i s e , t h e
prohibition a g a i n s t joining in one action t h e r e i n a cause
of action for quo w a r r a n t o by reason of the ineligibility
of t h e d e f e n d a n t c a n d i d a t e ( w h i c h is a s p e c i a l civil
action) a n d one for an election protest due to electoral
irregularities, should not apply and both causes of action
may be adjudicated in a single case, especially in view of
the need for speedy d e t e r m i n a t i o n of the title to a public
office.
4. P a r s , (c) and (d) determine which court will have
jurisdiction over t h e action w h e r e i n s e v e r a l causes of
action have been joined. Unlike t h e former Rule, t h e
79

RULE 2

REMEDIAL LAW COMPENDIUM

SEC. 5

aggregate or totality rule applies only where t h e claims

are principally for s u m s of money, and not w h e r e they
are also of the same n a t u r e and character; and said claims
for money m u s t a r i s e out of t h e s a m e t r a n s a c t i o n or
series of t r a n s a c t i o n s wherein a question of law or fact
common to the p a r t i e s may arise in the action. Also, the
condition in the former Rule t h a t permissive joinder of
causes of action shall be "(s)ubject to t h e rules regarding
jurisdiction (and) venue" has been modified and clarified
in the p r e s e n t formulation of par. (c).
5 . I n a c o m p l a i n t filed i n t h e S e c u r i t i e s a n d
Exchange Commission by a stockholder of a corporation,
one of t h e causes of action t h e r e i n sought t h e a n n u l m e n t
of a dacion en pago a g r e e m e n t , whereby said corporation
ceded all its a s s e t s to the mortgagee b a n k in s e t t l e m e n t
of its account, and to recover said property from t h e thirdparty purchaser to whom the mortgagee bank had
subsequently sold t h e property and who was impleaded
as a co-defendant. It was held t h a t such cause of action
could not be joined in said complaint since jurisdiction
thereover lies in t h e r e g u l a r courts. While, ordinarily,
the p u r c h a s e r corporation should be included as a p a r t y
defendant since it h a s an i n t e r e s t in t h e subject m a t t e r ,
in this case said p u r c h a s e r has no intra-corporate
relationship with t h e complainant, hence, t h e Commission
has no jurisdiction over it u n d e r P.D. 902-A. The rule on
permissive joinder of causes of action is subject to t h e
rules r e g a r d i n g jurisdiction, venue and joinder of p a r t i e s
(Union Glass & Container Corp., et al. vs. SEC, et al.,
G.R. No. 64013, Nov. 28, 1983), as clarified in this revised
Rule.
6. This section presupposes t h a t t h e different causes
of action which a r e joined accrue in favor of t h e s a m e
plaintiff/s and against t h e same defendant/s and t h a t no
misjoinder of p a r t i e s is involved. The jurisdictional issue,
i.e., w h e t h e r t h e action shall be filed in t h e inferior court
80

RULE 2

CAUSE OF ACTION

SEC. 5

or in the Regional Trial Court, is determined by p a r a g r a p h s

(c) and (d).
7. Formerly, t h e rule was t h a t although t h e causes
of a c t i o n a r e for s u m s of m o n e y o w i n g to d i f f e r e n t
persons who a r e m e m b e r s of a labor union, but t h e same
are joined in a single complaint filed by said union as
a r e p r e s e n t a t i v e p a r t y p u r s u a n t to Sec. 3 of Rule 3,
jurisdiction shall be d e t e r m i n e d by t h e aggregate a m o u n t
of the d e m a n d s (Liberty Mfg. Workers Union vs. CFI of
Bulacan, et al., L-35252, Nov. 29, 1972).
Cases of t h i s
n a t u r e a r e now governed by t h e Labor Code.
8. Before t h e i m p l e m e n t a t i o n of B.P. Big. 129, it
was held t h a t w h e r e t h e plaintiff is u n c e r t a i n as a g a i n s t
whom to proceed for recovery on t h e loss of goods shipped
to him a n d sues on a joinder of causes of action a g a i n s t
the shipper or a r r a s t r e operator as alternative defendants,
the former on an a d m i r a l t y action and t h e l a t t e r on an
ordinary claim for a s u m of money, t h e joinder of causes
o f a c t i o n i s p r o p e r s i n c e t h e y a r o s e from t h e s a m e
transaction.
However, since one cause of action
(admiralty) was within t h e jurisdiction of the Court of First
Instance, even if t h e a m o u n t involved in t h e claim for a
sum of money was within t h e jurisdiction of the inferior
court, t h e action m u s t be filed and tried in t h e Court of
F i r s t I n s t a n c e , p u r s u a n t t o R u l e 2 , S e c . 5, s e c o n d
paragraph
(Insurance Company of North America vs.
Warner, Barnes & Co., Ltd., et al., L-24108, Oct. 31, 1967;
Insurance Company of North America vs. U.S. Lines Co.,
L-21839, April 30, 1968). The s u b s e q u e n t dismissal of
the a d m i r a l t y case a g a i n s t one of t h e a l t e r n a t i v e
defendants did not oust said court of jurisdiction over the
d a m a g e s u i t even if t h e claim w a s less t h a n t h e t h e n
jurisdictional amount
(Insurance Company of North
America vs. U.S. Lines Co., supra).
However, since u n d e r Sec. 19 of B.P. Big. 129 t h e
inferior courts were g r a n t e d jurisdiction over admiralty
81

RULE 2

REMEDIAL LAW COMPENDIUM

SEC. 6

actions, as well as ordinary civil actions, where t h e claim

does not exceed P20,000, the situations in t h e foregoing
cases were eliminated because the jurisdictional
a m o u n t in both c a u s e s of action being t h e s a m e , said
a m o u n t is determinative of w h e t h e r t h a t action should be
filed in t h e inferior courts or in the Regional Trial Court.
The a m e n d m e n t of Sec. 19, B.P. Big. 129 by Sec. 1
of R.A. 7691, as e a r l i e r indicated, does not affect t h i s
rule on admiralty and maritime cases since t h a t
a m e n d m e n t merely consisted of increasing the
jurisdictional a m o u n t for said cases, and also for ordinary
civil actions for a s u m of money, to claims exceeding
PIOO.OOO, or in M e t r o M a n i l a , e x c e e d i n g P 2 0 0 . 0 0 0 ,
exclusive of interest, damages of whatever kind, attorney's
fees, litigation expenses, and costs.
S e c . 6. Misjoinder of causes of action. M i s j o i n d e r
o f c a u s e s o f a c t i o n i s n o t a g r o u n d for d i s m i s s a l o f
an action. A misjoined cause of action may, on
motion of a party or on the initiative of the court,
b e s e v e r e d a n d p r o c e e d e d w i t h s e p a r a t e l y , (n)
NOTES
1. In case of misjoinder of causes of action, t h e cause
of action erroneously joined need only be s e p a r a t e d a n d
dismissed, w i t h o u t affecting t h e action w i t h r e g a r d to t h e
other cause or c a u s e s o action. Misjoinder of causes of
action, like misjoinder of p a r t i e s , is not a g r o u n d for
dismissal of an action. The p a r t y misjoined shall only be
dropped by order of t h e court sua sponte or on motion,
and any claim against a p a r t y may be severed and
proceeded with s e p a r a t e l y (Sec. 11, Rule 3).
2. Unlike t h e case of non-joinder of p a r t i e s which
is specifically provided for a n d r e g u l a t e d by t h e Rules
(Sees. 9 to 11, Rule 3), t h e r e is no provision on or sanction
against non-joinder of s e p a r a t e causes of action since a
82

RULE 2

PARTIES TO CIVIL ACTIONS

SEC. 6

plaintiff n e e d s only a single cause of action to m a i n t a i n

an action (Sec. 1, Rule 2). J o i n d e r of causes of action
which accrued in favor of a p a r t y is only a permissive
procedure, hence the p a r t y may institute as many
actions as he h a s causes of action, w i t h o u t prejudice to
t h e p r o v i s i o n s of S e c . 1 of R u l e 31 on j o i n t t r i a l or
consolidation of actions.

83

RULE 3
P A R T I E S TO CIVIL A C T I O N S
S e c t i o n 1.
Who may be parties; plaintiff and defendant. O n l y n a t u r a l o r j u r i d i c a l p e r s o n s , o r
e n t i t i e s a u t h o r i z e d b y law m a y b e p a r t i e s i n a c i v i l
action. The term "plaintiff may refer to the
claiming party, the counter-claimant, the crossc l a i m a n t , o r t h e t h i r d ( f o u r t h , e t c . ) - p a r t y plaintiff.
The term "defendant" may refer to the original
d e f e n d i n g party, the defendant in a counterclaim,
the cross-defendant, or the third (fourth, etc.)p a r t y d e f e n d a n t , (a)
NOTES
1. As to who a r e juridical persons w i t h capacity to
sue, see Art. 44, Civil Code. The entities authorized by
law to be parties to a suit include the estate of a deceased
person (Limjoco vs. Intestate Estate of Fragante, 8 Phil.
776; Estate of Mota vs. Concepcion, 56 Phil.
712),
a p o l i t i c a l p a r t y i n c o r p o r a t e d u n d e r Act 1459 (now,
B.P. Big. 68, Corporation Code) and a r e g i s t e r e d labor
u n i o n , u n d e r S e c . 2 4 ( d ) , R.A. 8 7 5 ( n o w , Sec. 243,
P.D. 442, Labor Code), with respect to its property. The
Roman Catholic Church h a s a juridical p e r s o n a l i t y
(Barlin vs. Ramirez, 7 Phil. 47).
2. Although t h e action was b r o u g h t a g a i n s t t h e
"Broadway T h e a t r e " which is not a juridical person, b u t
the lessee thereof filed an a n s w e r a n d l a t e r e n t e r e d into
a compromise a g r e e m e n t a d m i t t i n g liability and p u r s u a n t
to which j u d g m e n t was rendered, t h e procedural defect
w a s c u r e d . The w r i t of execution c a n n o t be enforced
a g a i n s t t h e t h e a t r e b u t a g a i n s t t h e l e s s e e (Oscar
Ventanilla Enterprises Corp. vs. Lazaro, G.R. No. 53856,
Aug. 21, 1980).

RULE 3

PARTIES TO CIVIL ACTIONS

SEC. 2

3. Sec. 1 of t h i s Rule provides t h a t only n a t u r a l or

juridical persons may be p a r t i e s in a civil action and, in
this case, t h e e d u c a t i o n a l i n s t i t u t i o n failed to comply
with its obligation to incorporate u n d e r t h e Corporation
Law after its recognition by t h e Government. However,
having contracted with its t e a c h e r for 32 years u n d e r t h e
r e p r e s e n t a t i o n t h a t it was possessed of juridical personality to do so, it is now e s t o p p e d from d e n y i n g s u c h
p e r s o n a l i t y to defeat h e r claim a g a i n s t it (Chiang Kai
Shek School us. CA, et al., G.R. No. 58028, April 18, 1989).
4. U n d e r Sec. 15 of t h i s Rule, an entity, which is not
registered as a juridical person and, therefore, without
the requisite personality required of p a r t i e s to a suit, may
at least be sued as a defendant in t h e first instance so
t h a t t h e m e m b e r s t h e r e o f s h a l l be disclosed by being
required to be individually n a m e d in t h e a n s w e r . This
exception is dictated by t h e need to identify its m e m b e r s
since it is from t h e m t h a t t h e plaintiff may seek relief on
his claim.
5. N o n - r e s i d e n t aliens living abroad may m a i n t a i n
personal actions a g a i n s t Philippine residents in Philippine
courts, e v e n if a c o u n t e r c l a i m is b r o u g h t a g a i n s t said
plaintiffs (Dilweg us. Philip, L-19596, Oct. 30, 1964).
S e c . 2. Parties in interest. A**e*L p a r t y in
interest i * t k e party w h o stands to be benefited or
injured by-the j u d g m e n t in the suit, or the party
entitled t o t h e avails of t h e suit. Unless o t h e r w i s e
a u t h o r i z e d by law or t h e s e Rules, every action m u s t
be prosecuted or defended in the name of the real
p a r t y i n i n t e r e s t . (2a)
NOTES
1. A real p a r t y in i n t e r e s t is the p a r t y who s t a n d s to
be benefited or injured by t h e j u d g m e n t in t h e suit, or
the p a r t y entitled to t h e avails of the suit (Salonga vs.
c

-ire*

<

(85

* '

RULE 3

REMEDIAL LAW COMPENDIUM

SEC. 3

Warner, Barnes & Co., Ltd., 88 Phil. 125). The term

"party" includes a surety who, although not initially a
party to the case, is sought to be h e l d liable on i t s
performance bond, hence, as such party, it can a p p e a l
from the order rendered thereon (PHHC vs. Jeremias,
et al., L-43252, Sept. 30, 1976).
2. If the suit is not brought in t h e name of or against
t h e real p a r t y in interest, a motion to dismiss may-be
filed on t h e ground t h a t the complaint s t a t e s no cause of
action (Sec. IfgJ, Rule 16).
3. Where t h e action was brought by t h e attorneyin-fact of the landowner in his own n a m e , and not in t h e
name of his principal, the action was properly dismissed
(Ferrer vs. Villamor, L-33293, Sept. 30, 1974; Marcelo vs.
De Leon, 105 Phil. 1175).
S e c . 3. Representatives as parties. W h e r e t h e
a c t i o n is a l l o w e d to be p r o s e c u t e d or d e f e n d e d by a
representative or s o m e o n e a c t i n g in a fiduciary
capacity, the beneficiary shall be included in the
title of the case and shall be d e e m e d to be the real
p a r t y in i n t e r e s t . A r e p r e s e n t a t i v e m a y be a t r u s t e e
of an express trust, a guardian, an e x e c u t o r or
a d m i n i s t r a t o r , or a p a r t y a u t h o r i z e d by l a w or t h e s e
R u l e s . A n a g e n t a c t i n g i n h i s o w n n a m e a n d for
the benefit of an undisclosed principal may sue or
be sued without joining the principal except w h e n
the contract involves things belonging to the
p r i n c i p a l . (3a)
NOTES
1. The impleading of t h e beneficiary as a p a r t y in
t h e suit is now a m a n d a t o r y r e q u i r e m e n t , a n d not a discretionary procedure as it was in t h e former section of
this Rule. This a m e n d e d section e n u m e r a t e s t h e s a m e
exceptions to t h e rule t h a t t h e action shall be brought in
86

RULE 3

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SEC. 3

the n a m e of t h e r e a l p a r t y in i n t e r e s t . The p h r a s e "party

authorized by law or t h e s e Rules," includes the
r e p r e s e n t a t i v e of t h e o w n e r in e j e c t m e n t p r o c e e d i n g s
(Sec. 1, Rule 70), a receiver (Sec. 6, Rule 59) a n d t h e
a s s i g n e e of a d e b t o r in i n s o l v e n c y p r o c e e d i n g s . T h e
judgment creditor may sue t h e debtor of a j u d g m e n t debtor
if t h e former denies t h e i n d e b t e d n e s s (Sec. 43, Rule 39).
Other instances u n d e r t h e s u b s t a n t i v e law a r e found in
Arts. 487, 1311, 1497, 1664, 2103 and 2118 of t h e Civil
Code.
2. A labor union, as t h e duly recognized b a r g a i n i n g
unit of its m e m b e r s , can file a r e p r e s e n t a t i v e suit in t h e i r
behalf u n d e r t h i s section which a u t h o r i z e s a p a r t y with
whom or in whose n a m e a c o n t r a c t h a s been m a d e for
the benefit of a n o t h e r , to sue or be sued without joining
the p a r t y for whose benefit t h e action is p r e s e n t e d or
defended (Liberty Mfg. Workers Union vs. CFI of Bulacan,
et al., supra; cf. National Brewery, etc. Labor Union of
the Phil. vs. San Miguel Brewery, Inc., L-19017, Dec. 7,
1963). This r e p r e s e n t a t i v e capacity of labor unions is
recognized u n d e r t h e Labor Code (Sec. 243) but, generally,
labor cases a r e not originally cognizable by t h e r e g u l a r
courts.
3. A*corporation c a n n o t m a i n t a i n an a c t i o n to
recover property belonging to its stockholders as it has
no interest therein, it having a separate personality and
the properties not having been transferred to it (Sulo
ng Bayan, Inc. vs. Gregorio Araneta, Inc., et al., L-31061,
Aug. 17, 1976).
4. U n d e r t h e p r e s e n t Rules, p a r t i e s in i n t e r e s t may
be classified a n d defined as follows:
a. Indispensable parties:
Those without whom no
final d e t e r m i n a t i o n can be had of an action (Sec. 7).
b. Necessary parties: Those who a r e not indispensable but ought to be parties if complete relief is to be
87

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REMEDIAL LAW COMPENDIUM

SEC. 3

accorded as to those already parties, or for a complete

determination or settlement of t h e claim subject of t h e
action (Sec. 8).
c. Representative parties:
3 of t h i s Rule.

Those referred to in Sec.

d. Pro forma parties: Those who are required to be

joined as co-parties in suits by or against a n o t h e r p a r t y
as may be provided by t h e applicable s u b s t a n t i v e law
or procedural rule (Sec. 4).
e. Quasi parties: Those in whose behalf a class or
r e p r e s e n t a t i v e suit is brought (Sec. 17).
5. The 1940 Rules of Court provided for t h e t e r m
" n e c e s s a r y p a r t i e s " b u t t h i s w a s c h a n g e d t o "proper"
p a r t i e s in t h e 1964 Rules of Court.
The p r e s e n t Rules
r e v e r t e d t o t h e o r i g i n a l n o m e n c l a t u r e a s b e i n g more
terminologically accurate.
In American law on the classification of p a r t i e s , from
which we derived and patterned our concepts with
a p p r o p r i a t e modifications, formal or proper p a r t i e s a r e
those who have no i n t e r e s t in t h e controversy between
the immediate litigants b u t have an i n t e r e s t in t h e subj e c t - m a t t e r which m a y b e c o n v e n i e n t l y s e t t l e d i n t h e
suit, a n d thereby p r e v e n t f u r t h e r litigation; they may be
made p a r t i e s or not, at t h e option of t h e c o m p l a i n a n t .
Necessary p a r t i e s a r e those p a r t i e s who have such an
i n t e r e s t in t h e s u b j e c t - m a t t e r of a s u i t in e q u i t y , or
whose rights a r e so involved in the controversy, t h a t no
complete and effective decree can be made, disposing of
t h e m a t t e r in issue and dispensing complete justice, unless they a r e before t h e court in such a m a n n e r as to
entitle t h e m to be h e a r d in vindication or protection of
their interests
(see Black's Law Dictionary, 4th ed.,
pp. 1275-1276; citations omitted).
The classification t h e r e i n also s p e a k s of n o m i n a l
p a r t i e s as those who a r e joined as plaintiffs or defendants,
88

RULE 3

PARTIES TO CIVIL ACTIONS

SEC. 4

not because they have any r e a l i n t e r e s t in t h e subject

m a t t e r o r b e c a u s e a n y relief i s d e m a n d e d a s a g a i n s t
them, but merely because t h e technical rules of pleadings
require t h e i r presence on t h e record. This would roughly
c o r r e s p o n d to o u r c o n c e p t of a n d r u l e on pro forma
p a r t i e s w h e r e i n t h e joinder of spouses is required, or in
c e r t i o r a r i a c t i o n s w h e r e i n t h e c o u r t o r agency whose
adjudication is c h a l l e n g e d is i m p l e a d e d as t h e public
respondent, with the prevailing party as the private
respondent.
6. In t h e p r e s e n t definition of a necessary p a r t y , t h e
a d d i t i o n of t h e a l t e r n a t i v e c l a u s e "or for a c o m p l e t e
d e t e r m i n a t i o n or s e t t l e m e n t of t h e claim subject of the
action" is i n t e n d e d to m a k e t h e definition of necessary
p a r t i e s more comprehensive a n d complete. T h u s , if the
plaintiff creditor s u e s only one of t h e two joint debtors,
the j u d g m e n t t h e r e i n would accord complete relief as
between him a n d said defendant. However, t h e co-debtor
who was not impleaded is definitely a necessary p a r t y
since a j u d g m e n t in t h a t action with respect to his own
joint liability is necessary for a complete s e t t l e m e n t of
the debt in favor of t h e plaintiff. Without such alternative clause, the u n i m p l e a d e d debtor would not be
considered as a necessary p a r t y and t h e procedure and
sanctions in Sec. 9 of t h i s Rule could not be applied to
him.
7. P a r t i e s who were not initially and formally
impleaded as original p a r t i e s to t h e case, but l a t e r bound
themselves to comply w i t h t h e t e r m s of a j u d g m e n t on
compromise r e n d e r e d t h e r e i n may also be considered as
quasi p a r t i e s in said case (Rodriguez, et al. vs. Alikpala,
L-38314, June 25, 1974).
S e c . 4. Spouses as parties. H u s b a n d a n d w i f e
shall s u e o* b e s u e d jointly, e x c e p t as provided by
law. (4a)
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SEC. 5

NOTE
1. The provision hereon in t h e 1964 Rules of Court
was merely a reproduction of Art. 113 of t h e Civil Code.
This is an i l l u s t r a t i o n of joinder of pro forma p a r t i e s
required by the Rules. The propriety of suits by or against
the spouses should now t a k e into account t h e p e r t i n e n t
provisions of t h e Family Code.
S e c . 5. Minors or incompetent persons. A m i n o r
or a person alleged to be incompetent, m a y sue or
be sued with the assistance of his father, mother,
g u a r d i a n , or if he h a s n o n e , a g u a r d i a n ad litem.
(5a)
r
NOTES
-

r -

1. U n d e r t h e 1964 Rules, a distinction w a s made

between unemancipated and emancipated minors. An
u n e m a n c i p a t e d minor could sue or to be sued "through"
h i s p a r e n t o r g u a r d i a n , t h a t is, t h e a c t i o n h a d t o b e
brought in the name of or against such p a r e n t or
guardian with the designation that he was bringing
the action or being sued in t h a t capacity. In t h e case of
e m a n c i p a t e d minors, they could sue or be sued "with t h e
assistance" of t h e p a r e n t or g u a r d i a n . The action was in
the n a m e of or a g a i n s t t h e minor, w i t h an indication t h a t
he was being assisted t h e r e i n by his p a r e n t or g u a r d i a n .
Note t h a t 18 y e a r s is now t h e age of majority (R.A. 6809)
and for contracting m a r r i a g e (Art. 5, Family Code).
2. Also, u n d e r t h e former Rules, it w a s necessary
t h a t to sue or be sued in t h e cases provided by law, t h e
incompetent m u s t have been judicially declared as such,
and he could t h u s sue or be sued only t h r o u g h his p a r e n t
or g u a r d i a n . U n d e r t h e p r e s e n t revision, t h e suit can be
brought by or a g a i n s t him personally b u t w i t h t h e assistance of his p a r e n t s or his g u a r d i a n . It is sufficient t h a t
90

RULE 3

PARTIES TO CIVIL ACTIONS

SEC. 6

his i n c o m p e t e n c y be alleged in t h e c o r r e s p o n d i n g
pleadings a n d t h e t r i a l court may p a s s upon t h e t r u t h a n d
effects thereof.
S e c . 6. Permissive joinder of parties.All p e r s o n s
in whom or against w h o m any right to relief in
respect to or arising out of the same transaction
or series of transactions is alleged to exist whether
jointly, severally, or in the alternative, may, except as
otherwise provided in t h e s e Rules, join as plaintiffs
or be joined as defendants in one complaint, where
any q u e s t i o n of law or fact c o m m o n to all s u c h
p l a i n t i f f s o r t o all s u c h d e f e n d a n t s m a y a r i s e i n t h e
action; but the court may make such orders as may
be j u s t to p r e v e n t any plaintiff or d e f e n d a n t from
b e i n g e m b a r r a s s e d or put to expense in connection
with any proceedings in which he may have no
i n t e r e s t . (6)
NOTES
1. In t h e case of indispensable p a r t i e s and necessary
parties, t h e i r joinder in t h e action is compulsory (Sees. 7
and 8). This section e n u n c i a t e s t h e rule on permissive
joinder of p a r t i e s , t h a t is, t h e y can e i t h e r he joined in
one single complaint or may themselves m a i n t a i n or be
sued in s e p a r a t e s u i t s . T h i s rule is also applicable to
counterclaims (Go, et al. vs. Go, et al., 95 Phil. 378).
2. Permissive joinder of p a r t i e s requires t h a t :
a. The r i g h t to relief arises out of t h e same t r a n s action or series of t r a n s a c t i o n s ;
b. T h e r e is a question of law or fact common to all
the plaintiffs or defendants; and
c. Such joinder is not otherwise proscribed by the
provisions of t h e Rules on jurisdiction and venue.

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SEC. 7

"Series of transactions" means separate dealings with

the parties but all of which dealings are directly connected
with the same type of subject-matter of the suit. The
third r e q u i r e m e n t is contemplated by the proviso "except
as otherwise provided in these Rules" stated in this section.
Formerly, it was held t h a t several employees, hired
u n d e r s e p a r a t e contracts, could join in a suit for m i n i m u m
wages and non-payment thereof against t h e i r employer,
their contracts being a "series of t r a n s a c t i o n s " and t h e r e
is a common question of fact and law applicable to all of
t h e m (Abrasaldo, et al. vs. Cia. Maritima, 104 Phil. 1051
fUnrep.J). The same rule applied where several employees
were jointly dismissed and not paid by t h e i r employer
(International Colleges, Inc. vs. Argonza, 90 Phil.
470).
The foregoing situations are now governed by t h e Labor
Code, but t h e doctrines in said cases a r e still applicable to
ordinary claims not involving labor cases or employere m p l o y e e r e l a t i o n s h i p s a s long a s t h e r e q u i s i t e s for
permissive joinder of p a r t i e s are p r e s e n t .
3. Where a complaint contained two causes of action,
each for a s u m of money less t h a n P20,000 (which was
t h e n t h e m a x i m u m o f t h e j u r i s d i c t i o n a l a m o u n t for
cases cognizable by t h e municipal t r i a l courts) owed by
t h e plaintiff to a different d e f e n d a n t a n d a r i s i n g from
different a n d independent transactions, a l t h o u g h t h e
total of both claims exceeded P20,000, t h e Regional Trial
C o u r t h a d n o j u r i s d i c t i o n t h e n since t h e t o t a l i t y r u l e
involving different p a r t i e s , in Sec. 33(1) of B.P. Big. 129
and Sec. 11 of the I n t e r i m Rules, is subject to t h e
r e q u i r e m e n t s in t h i s section, one of which is t h a t t h e
right to relief arises out of t h e s a m e t r a n s a c t i o n or series
of t r a n s a c t i o n s (Flores vs. Mallare-Philipps, et al.,
G.R. No. 66620, Sept. 24, 1986).
y

S e c . 7. Compulsory joinder of indispensable parties.

Parties in interest w i t h o u t w h o m no final

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RULE 3

PARTIES TO CIVIL ACTIONS

SECS. 7-8

determination can be had of an action shall be joined

e i t h e r a s p l a i n t i f f s o r d e f e n d a n t s . (7)
S e c . 8. Necessary party. A n e c e s s a r y p a r t y is
one w h o is not indispensable but who ought to be
joined as a party if c o m p l e t e relief is to be accorded
as to t h o s e a l r e a d y p a r t i e s , or for a c o m p l e t e
determination or settlement of the claim subject of
the action. (8a)
NOTES
1. In t h e case of indispensable p a r t i e s , t h e action
c a n n o t p r o c e e d u n l e s s t h e y a r e j o i n e d (Borlasa vs.
Polistico, 47 Phil. 345; Cortez vs. Avila, 101 Phil. 705),
w h e r e a s t h e action can proceed even in t h e absence of
some necessary p a r t i e s . If an indispensable p a r t y is not
impleaded, any j u d g m e n t would have no effectiveness;
w h e r e a s , e v e n if a n e c e s s a r y p a r t y is not included in
the suit, t h e case may be finally d e t e r m i n e d in court, but
the j u d g m e n t t h e r e i n will not resolve the whole
controversy.
2. Indispensable parties are those with such an
i n t e r e s t in t h e c o n t r o v e r s y t h a t a final decree would
necessarily affect t h e i r r i g h t s , so t h a t t h e court cannot
proceed w i t h o u t t h e i r presence. Necessary p a r t i e s a r e
those whose presence is necessary to adjudicate the whole
controversy b u t whose i n t e r e s t s are so far separable t h a t
a final decree c a n be m a d e in t h e i r a b s e n c e w i t h o u t
affecting them
(Wyoga Gas & Oil Corp. vs. Schrack,
1 Fed. Rules Service, 292, cited in 1 Moran 191, 1979 Ed.).
3. Where, in an action to a n n u l the sale of land made
by the defendant b a n k to its co-defendant spouses, the
action w a s d i s m i s s e d w i t h r e s p e c t t o s a i d d e f e n d a n t
spouses, t h e case m u s t also be dismissed as against the
defendant bank. The defendant spouses are indispensable

93

RULE 3

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SEC. 9

parties, hence having been discharged by t h e t r i a l court,

said court is no longer in a position to g r a n t t h e relief
sought by the plaintiff (Pillado us. Francisco, 105 Phil.
1254 fUnrep.J). On the other hand, where t h e action was
dismissed against t h e defendants who, before t h e filing
of said action, had sold t h e i r interests in t h e land subject
of the suit to their co-defendant, the said dismissal
against t h e former, who are only necessary p a r t i e s to t h e
suit, will not b a r the action from proceeding a g a i n s t t h e
latter as the remaining defendant. Said remaining
d e f e n d a n t h a v i n g been vested w i t h absolute title over
t h e subject property, t h e t r i a l court is in a position to
g r a n t t h e relief sought if proved by t h e plaintiffs (Seno,
et al. us. Mangubat, et al., L-44339, Dec. 2, 1987).
S e c . 9. Non-joinder of necessary parties to be pleaded.
W h e n e v e r in a n y p l e a d i n g in w h i c h a c l a i m is
asserted a necessary party is not joined, the pleader
shall set forth his name, if known, a n d shall state
w h y h e i s o m i t t e d . S h o u l d t h e c o u r t find t h e r e a s o n
for t h e o m i s s i o n u n m e r i t o r i o u s , i t m a y o r d e r t h e
inclusion of the omitted necessary party if
jurisdiction over his person may be obtained.
T h e f a i l u r e t o c o m p l y w i t h t h e o r d e r for h i s
inclusion, without justifiable cause, shall be deemed
a waiver of the claim against such party.
The non-inclusion of a necessary p a r t y does not
p r e v e n t t h e c o u r t from p r o c e e d i n g in t h e action,
and the judgment rendered therein shall be without prejudice to the rights of such necessary party.
(8a, 9 a )
NOTES
1. T h i s r e v i s e d provision r e i t e r a t e s t h e need for
impleading all necessary p a r t i e s in order t h a t t h e claims
involved in t h e action m a y be completely d e t e r m i n e d
94

RULE 3

PARTIES TO CIVIL ACTIONS

SEC. 9

t h e r e i n a n d t h e r e b y avoid multiplicity of s u i t s . The noninclusion of t h e necessary p a r t y may be excused only on

meritorious grounds, a b s e n t which t h e court shall order
him to be impleaded if jurisdiction over his person can
be obtained, subject to t h e sanction in t h e second p a r a graph of t h i s section. If his inclusion cannot, however,
be effected for valid reasons, u n d e r t h e t h i r d p a r a g r a p h
of t h i s section t h e action may proceed b u t t h e j u d g m e n t
t h e r e i n shall not prejudice t h e r i g h t s of t h a t necessary
party. Logically considered, therefore, n e i t h e r shall his
rights be prejudiced if his non-inclusion in t h e action in
the first place w a s due to a valid cause.
2. U n d e r t h e circumstances contemplated in the first
paragraph, the court shall order the inclusion of the
necessary p a r t y , t h a t is, t h e plaintiff shall be ordered to
file a n a m e n d e d c o m p l a i n t i m p l e a d i n g t h e n e c e s s a r y
party t h e r e i n as a co-defendant. Where t h e plaintiff unjustifiedly fails or refuses to do so, t h e sanction in t h e
second p a r a g r a p h comes into play a n d t h e plaintiff shall
be deemed to have waived his claim a g a i n s t said p a r t y .
The s a m e rule applies to any pleading a s s e r t i n g a claim
against a necessary p a r t y .
3. It is t r u e t h a t u n d e r Sec. 3 of Rule 17, w h e r e the
plaintiff fails w i t h o u t justifiable cause to comply with an
o r d e r of t h e c o u r t , h i s c o m p l a i n t m a y be d i s m i s s e d .
However, such dismissal shall not be ordered w h e r e t h e
plaintiff fails to comply w i t h t h e order of t h e court for
the joinder of t h e necessary p a r t y u n d e r this Rule, in line
with Sec. 11 thereof which provides t h a t non-joinder of
parties should not be a ground for dismissal of an action.
Thus, t h e rule merely declaring the waiver of plaintiffs
claim a g a i n s t t h e necessary p a r t y whose non-inclusion
was unjustified, as provided in t h e second p a r a g r a p h of
this section, is in effect an exception to t h e provision on
penalties imposed on a disobedient p a r t y u n d e r Sec. 3
of Rule 17 which would have entailed t h e dismissal of the
complaint itself.
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RULE 3

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SECS. 10-11

S e c . 10. Unwilling co-plaintiff. If t h e c o n s e n t

of any party w h o should be joined as plaintiff can
not be obtained, he may be made a defendant and
the reason therefor shall be stated in the complaint.
(10)
S e c . 1 1 . Misjoinder and non-joinder of parties.
Neither misjoinder nor non-joinder of partiee is
g r o u n d for d i s m i s s a l o f a n a c t i o n . P a r t i e s m a y b e
dropped or added by order of the court on motion of
a n y p a r t y o r o n its o w n i n i t i a t i v e a t a n y s t a g e o f
the action and on such terms as are just. Any claim
against a misjoined party may be severed and
p r o c e e d e d w i t h s e p a r a t e l y . (11a)
NOTES
1. Objections to defects in t h e p a r t i e s impleaded
should be made at t h e earliest opportunity, t h e moment
such defects become a p p a r e n t , by a motion to s t r i k e t h e
n a m e s of t h e p a r t i e s impleaded. If t h e r e is misjoinder, a
s e p a r a t e action should be brought against the party
misjoined. Objection to misjoinder cannot be raised for
the first time on appeal (Garcia vs. Chua, [CA], 50 O.G.
No. 2, 653).
2. Non-joinder does not warrant dismissal b u t the
court should order the inclusion of the necessary p a r t y
(see Sanchez vs. CFI, 40 Phil. 155). But if t h e case is
erroneously dismissed on this ground without stating that
it is without prejudice, and plaintiff did not appeal, such
dismissal bars the filing of another action on the same
cause (Rivera vs. Luciano, L-20844, Aug. 14, 1965).
3. Although both misjoinder of p a r t i e s a n d causes
of action a r e not g r o u n d s for dismissal, they s t a n d on
different p r e m i s e s as t h e r e can be misjoinder of p a r t i e s
even if t h e r e is only one cause of action common to them,

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SEC. 12

and t h e r e can be misjoinder of causes of action even if

there is only one plaintiff.
4. In case of misjoinder of causes of action, the one
which h a s been misjoined need merely be severed and
proceeded with separately, as provided in Sec. 6, Rule 2.
Along t h e s a m e r a t i o n a l e , Sec. 2 of Rule 31 allows t h e
court, in furtherance of convenience or to avoid prejudice,
to o r d e r a s e v e r a n c e a n d s e p a r a t e t r i a l of any claim,
cross-claim, counterclaim, or t h i r d - p a r t y complaint, or of
any s e p a r a t e i s s u e or of a n y n u m b e r of claims, crossclaims, counterclaims, t h i r d - p a r t y complaints or issues.
5. See Note 2 u n d e r Sec. 2, Rule 17.
S e c . 12. Class suit. W h e n t h e s u b j e c t m a t t e r
of the controversy is one of common or general
interest to many persons so numerous that it is
i m p r a c t i c a b l e to join all as p a r t i e s , a n u m b e r of
them which the court finds to be sufficiently
n u m e r o u s a n d r e p r e s e n t a t i v e a s t o fully p r o t e c t t h e
i n t e r e s t s o f a l l c o n c e r n e d m a y s u e o r d e f e n d for
the benefit of all. Any p a r t y in i n t e r e s t shall h a v e
the right to intervene to protect his individual
i n t e r e s t . (12a)
NOTES
1. The requisites of a class suit (or r e p r e s e n t a t i v e
suit) are:
--a. The subject-matter of t h e controversy is one of
common or general i n t e r e s t to many persons;
--b. The p a r t i e s affected a r e so n u m e r o u s t h a t it is
impracticable to bring t h e m all before the court; and
y c. The p a r t i e s bringing the class suit are sufficiently
n u m e r o u s or r e p r e s e n t a t i v e of t h e class and can fully
protect t h e i n t e r e s t s of all concerned.
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SEC. 12

2. The complaint must specially s t a t e t h a t t h e same

is b e i n g b r o u g h t in b e h a l f of o t h e r s w i t h w h o m t h e
p a r t i e s s h a r e a common interest (Borlasa vs. Polistico,
47 Phil. 345; Claudio vs. Zandueta, 64 Phil. 819).
If
t h e r e is a conflict of i n t e r e s t between those sought to be
r e p r e s e n t e d a n d t h o s e who filed t h e action, t h e class
suit will not prosper (Ibahez vs. Roman Catholic Church,
12 Phil. 227). The p a r t y bringing t h e class suit m u s t
have t h e legal capacity to do so (Chinese Flour Importers
Association vs. Price Stabilization Board, 9 Phil. 461;
Anti-Chinese League vs. Felix, 77 Phil. 1012; Recreation
& Amusement Association vs. City of Manila, 100 Phil.
950). However, wrongs suffered by some stockholders do
not necessarily constitute the same wrongs to other
s t o c k h o l d e r s a s would c r e a t e t h a t c o m m o n o r g e n e r a l
i n t e r e s t in t h e s u b j e c t - m a t t e r (Mathay, et al. vs. Consolidated Bank & Trust Co., et al., L-23136, Aug. 26,
1974). See also Newsweek, Inc. vs. IAC, et al. (G.R. No.
63559, May 30, 1986) r e g a r d i n g a supposed class suit for
libel a g a i n s t s u g a r p l a n t e r s in Negros which w a s denied
since each plaintiff h a s a s e p a r a t e a n d distinct r e p u t a t i o n
in t h e community.
3. Formerly, when the courts had jurisdiction in labor
cases, it w a s held t h a t a class suit to recover wages due to
23 l a b o r e r s is not p r o p e r as t h e p a r t i e s s o u g h t to be
represented are not so numerous as to make it
impracticable to include t h e m individually in t h e compla int (Diaz vs. De la Rama, 73 Phil. 104). The principle
would apply t o o t h e r s i m i l a r s i t u a t i o n s n ot involving
labor relations.
4. One plaintiff w a s held qualified to bring a class
suit in behalf of t h e m e m b e r s of t h e Methodist Episcopal
religious association, it appearing t h a t he had been
chosen by said association to look after t h e i r i n t e r e s t s
(De la Cruz vs. Seminary of Manila, 18 Phil. 334).

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SEC. 12

5. The p a r t i e s who brought the class suit have

control over t h e case w i t h t h e right to compromise or even
discontinue t h e s a m e . B u t a class suit cannot be compromised or dismissed w i t h o u t t h e approval of t h e court
(Sec. 2, Rule 17). A m e m b e r of t h e class is bound by t h e
j u d g m e n t in t h e class suit, hence t h i s section gives him
t h e r i g h t to i n t e r v e n e if he d e s i r e s to p r o t e c t his own
individual i n t e r e s t s . In t h e i n t e r e s t of justice, t h e a b s e n t
members should be notified of t h e filing of t h e class suit
whenever practicable.
6. As amended, t h i s section now regulates not only
the right and r e q u i r e m e n t s for a group to sue b u t also
to defend in a class suit.
7. A t a x p a y e r ' s s u i t (see Gonzales vs. Hechanova,
L-21897, Oct. 22, 1963; Phil. Constitution Association,
Inc. vs. Gimenez, L-23326, Dec. 18, 1965) or a stockholder's
derivative s u i t a r e in t h e n a t u r e of a class suit, although
subject to the o t h e r requisites of the corresponding
governing law (cf. Financing Corp. of the Phil. vs. Teodoro,
93 Phil. 679), especially on t h e issue of locus standi.
8. C l a i m a n t s of different portions embraced in a big
t r a c t of land cannot be impleaded altogether in a class
suit by or a g a i n s t t h e m as each one of t h e m has a
p a r t i c u l a r i n t e r e s t i n h i s own p o r t i o n , s e p a r a t e a n d
different from t h e o t h e r s
(see Rallonza vs. Villanueva,
15 Phil. 531; Berses vs. Villanueva, 25 Phil. 473; Sulo ng
Bayan, Inc. vs. Gregorio Araneta, Inc., et al., supra).
However, if t h e r i g h t to relief a r o s e out of t h e s a m e
t r a n s a c t i o n or s e r i e s of t r a n s a c t i o n s a n d t h e r e is a
common question of law or fact, they may be joined in
one suit as plaintiffs or defendants in accordance with
Sec. 6 of this Rule on permissive joinder of p a r t i e s .
9. An action does not become a class suit merely
because it is designated as such in the pleadings.
Whether t h e suit is or is not a class suit depends upon
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the a t t e n d i n g facts, and the complaint or other pleading

initiating the class action should allege t h e existence of a
subject-matter of common interest, as well as t h e existence
of a class and t h e n u m b e r of persons in the alleged class,
in order t h a t the court may be able to d e t e r m i n e w h e t h e r
t h e m e m b e r s of t h e class are so n u m e r o u s as to m a k e it
impracticable to bring t h e m all before the court, to contrast
t h e n u m b e r a p p e a r i n g on the record with t h e n u m b e r in
t h e class, to ascertain w h e t h e r t h e c l a i m a n t s on record
a d e q u a t e l y r e p r e s e n t t h e class, a n d t o verify t h a t t h e
subject-matter is of general or common i n t e r e s t (Mathay,
et al. vs. Consolidated Bank & Trust Co., et al., supra; cf.
Ortigas & Co. vs. Ruiz, et al, L-33952, Mar. 9, 1987).
10. U n d e r t h e former Rule, w h e n a supposed class
suit was filed, it was t h e duty of t h e court to m a k e sure
t h a t t h e p a r t i e s a c t u a l l y before i t w e r e s u f f i c i e n t l y
n u m e r o u s a n d r e p r e s e n t a t i v e o f t h e class. U n d e r t h e
p r e s e n t formulation, such fact is one of t h e requisites for
i n s t i t u t i n g and m a i n t a i n i n g a class suit. The significance
of such change is t h a t the p a r t i e s bringing t h e suit have
the b u r d e n of proving t h e sufficiency of t h e r e p r e s e n t a t i v e
c h a r a c t e r which they claim. Corollarily, t h e defendant
can assail t h a t fact t h r o u g h a motion to dismiss on t h e
ground t h a t the plaintiffs have no capacity to sue
(Sec. lfdj, Rule 16), t h a t is, t h a t they do not have t h e
r e p r e s e n t a t i o n t h a t they claim (see Lunsod vs. Ortega,
46 Phil 664).
S e c . 13. Alternative defendants. W h e r e t h e
plaintiff is uncertain against w h o of several persons
h e i s e n t i t l e d t o relief, h e m a y j o i n a n y o r all o f t h e m
as defendants in the alternative, although a right
to relief against one may be inconsistent with a
r i g h t o f r e l i e f a g a i n s t t h e o t h e r . (13a)

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PARTIES TO CIVIL ACTIONS

SECS. 14-15

NOTE
1. T h u s , w h e r e t h e owner of t h e goods is not sure
w h e t h e r t h e s a m e w a s lost in t r a n s i t or while it was on
deposit in t h e w a r e h o u s e of t h e a r r a s t r e o p e r a t o r , he
may sue t h e s h i p p e r or t h e operator in t h e a l t e r n a t i v e ,
although t h e r i g h t a g a i n s t t h e former is on a d m i r a l t y
while t h a t a g a i n s t t h e o p e r a t o r i s o n c o n t r a c t (see
Insurance Company of North America vs. United States
Lines Co., L-21839, April 30, 1968).
S e c . 14.
Unknown identity or name of defendant.
Whenever t h e identity or n a m e of a defendant is
unknown, he may be sued as the unknown owner,
heir, devisee, or by s u c h o t h e r designation as t h e
case m a y r e q u i r e ; w h e n his identity o r t r u e n a m e
is discovered, the pleading must be amended
a c c o r d i n g l y . (14)
NOTES
1. A r e l a t e d provision in Rule 14 reads as follows:
"Sec. 14. Service upon defendant whose identity
or whereabouts are unknown. In a n y a c t i o n ,
w h e n e v e r t h e defendant is designated as an unknown
owner, or t h e like or whenever his w h e r e a b o u t s are
unknown and cannot be ascertained by diligent
inquiry, service may, by leave of court, be effected
upon h i m by publication in a newspaper of general
circulation a n d in such places and for such time as
t h e court may order."
2. This presupposes t h a t t h e plaintiff really does not
know t h e identity and/or address of t h e defendant or is
not in a position to ascertain such identity or whereabouts.
Sec.
defendant.

15.
Entity without
W h e n t w o or
101

juridical personality as
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RULE 3

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SEC. 15

organized as an entity with juridical personality

enter into a transaction, they may be sued under
the name by which they are generally or commonly
known.
In the answer of such defendant, the names
and addresses of the persons composing said
e n t i t y m u s t all b e r e v e a l e d . (15a)
NOTES
1. Rule 14 p e r t i n e n t l y provides as follows:
"Sec. 8. Service upon entity without juridical
personality. When persons associated in an entity
without juridical personality are sued u n d e r t h e name
by which t h e y a r e g e n e r a l l y or commonly k n o w n ,
service may be effected upon all t h e d e f e n d a n t s by
serving upon any one of t h e m , or upon t h e p e r s o n in
charge of t h e office or place of business m a i n t a i n e d
in such n a m e . But such service shall not bind
individually any person whose connection w i t h the
e n t i t y has, upon due notice, been severed before t h e
action was brought."
2. With respect to j u d g m e n t s to be r e n d e r e d in this
situation, Sec. 6 of Rule 36 provides t h a t w h e n j u d g m e n t
is r e n d e r e d a g a i n s t two or more p e r s o n s associated in an
entity w i t h o u t juridical personality, t h e j u d g m e n t shall
set out t h e i r individual or proper n a m e s , if known.
3. The predecessor of t h i s section referred only to
suits against two or more persons associated in any
business a n d who t r a n s a c t such b u s i n e s s u n d e r a common n a m e . Accordingly, it w a s understood t h a t t h e suit
c o n t e m p l a t e d t h e r e i n could b e b r o u g h t only a g a i n s t
associations which do not have an i n d e p e n d e n t juridical
personality b u t a r e engaged in business, t h u s excluding
non-profit or c h a r i t a b l e associations. T h a t d i s t i n c t i o n
h a s been eliminated in t h i s revision since non-profit or
102

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SEC. 16

charitable associations can also commit and be liable for

actionable wrongs.
S e c . 16. Death of party; duty of counsel. W h e n ever a party to a p e n d i n g action dies, and the claim
is not thereby extinguished, it shall be the duty of
h i s c o u n s e l t o i n f o r m t h e c o u r t w i t h i n t h i r t y (30)
d a y s a f t e r s u c h d e a t h o f t h e fact thereof, a n d t o g i v e
the name and address of his legal representative or
representatives. Failure of counsel to comply with
t h i s d u t y s h a l l be a g r o u n d for d i s c i p l i n a r y a c t i o n .
The heirs of the deceased may be allowed to be
s u b s t i t u t e d for t h e d e c e a s e d , w i t h o u t r e q u i r i n g t h e
appointment of an executor or administrator and
the c o u r t m a y a p p o i n t a g u a r d i a n ad litem for t h e
minor heirs.
The court shall forthwith order said legal
representative or representatives to appear and
be s u b s t i t u t e d w i t h i n a p e r i o d of t h i r t y (30) d a y s
from n o t i c e .
If no legal representative is named by the
c o u n s e l for t h e d e c e a s e d p a r t y , o r i f t h e o n e s o
n a m e d s h a l l fail to a p p e a r w i t h i n the specified
period, t h e court may order the opposing party,
within a specified time, to procure the appointment
o f a n e x e c u t o r o r a d m i n i s t r a t o r for t h e e s t a t e o f t h e
deceased, and the latter shall immediately appear
for a n d o n b e h a l f o f t h e d e c e a s e d . T h e c o u r t c h a r g e s
in procuring such appointment, if defrayed by the
o p p o s i n g p a r t y , m a y b e r e c o v e r e d a s c o s t s . (16a, 17a)
NOTES
1. This section is a consolidation of Sees. 16 and 17
of the former Rule, with t h e following a m e n d m e n t s :

103

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a. The duties of t h e counsel, as specified u n d e r t h e

first p a r a g r a p h , are now limited to the m a t t e r of the death
of his client and not in case of the latter's incapacity or
incompetency. The reason for the change is t h a t the death
of t h e client will r e q u i r e his s u b s t i t u t i o n by his legal
r e p r e s e n t a t i v e to be ordered by t h e court w h e r e i n t h e
case is pending, or even t h e a p p o i n t m e n t of an executor
or a d m i n i s t r a t o r but, t h i s time, by a court of p r o b a t e
jurisdiction. In the case of incapacity or incompetency of
the p a r t y , this fact will merely entail t h e a p p o i n t m e n t of
a g u a r d i a n ad litem by t h e court t r y i n g t h e case upon
being informed t h e r e o f by counsel of t h e p a r t i e s , t h e
p a r t i e s themselves, or other reliable sources.
b. T h e failure of t h e counsel to comply w i t h his
duties u n d e r t h i s section is now a ground for disciplinary
action, as his inaction will result in u n d u e delay in t h e
proceedings or may prejudice t h e i n t e r e s t s of his client's
successors in interest.
c. In t h e absence of a legal r e p r e s e n t a t i v e of t h e
deceased p a r t y , t h e opposing p a r t y s h a l l b e r e q u i r e d ,
w i t h i n a specified time, to procure t h e a p p o i n t m e n t of
an executor or a d m i n i s t r a t o r for t h e e s t a t e of t h e deceased
in an a p p r o p r i a t e special proceeding. U n d e r t h e former
p r o c e d u r e , in s u c h a c o n t i n g e n c y t h e o p p o s i n g p a r t y
was authorized to directly procure t h e a p p o i n t m e n t of a
legal r e p r e s e n t a t i v e for t h e d e c e a s e d by h i m s e l f a n d
apparently without participation by the heirs of the
deceased and, consequently, with limited judicial intervention in t h e choice and a p p o i n t m e n t of such r e p r e s e n t a t i v e .
2. These provisions apply w h e r e t h e claim survives
a n d r e g a r d l e s s o f w h e t h e r e i t h e r t h e plaintiff o r t h e
d e f e n d a n t dies or w h e t h e r t h e case is in t h e t r i a l or
appellate courts. No summonses are required to be
served on t h e s u b s t i t u t e defendants. I n s t e a d , t h e order
of substitution shall be served upon the p a r t i e s substituted
in t h e action; otherwise, t h e court does not acquire juris104

RULE 3

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SEC. 16

diction over the s u b s t i t u t e p a r t y (Ferreria, et al. vs. Vda.

de Gonzales, et al., 104 Phil. 143). Proceedings conducted
by the t r i a l court after t h e d e a t h of t h e defendant, and
without such substitution, a r e null and void (Lawas vs.
CA, et al., L-45809, Dec. 12, 1986).
3. Upon l e a r n i n g of the d e a t h of a p a r t y , t h e t r i a l
court should not order the a m e n d m e n t of t h e complaint
but t h e appearance of the decedent's legal r e p r e s e n t a t i v e .
An o r d e r for the- a m e n d m e n t of the c o m p l a i n t before
s u b s t i t u t i o n of the deceased p a r t y is void (Casenas vs.
Rosales, L-18707, Feb. 28, 1967). Upon t h e d e a t h of t h e
party, t h e a t t o r n e y h a s no further a u t h o r i t y to appear,
save to inform t h e court of his client's d e a t h and to t a k e
steps t o s a f e g u a r d t h e d e c e d e n t ' s i n t e r e s t , u n l e s s his
services a r e f u r t h e r r e t a i n e d by t h e s u b s t i t u t e p a r t i e s
(Vda. de Haberer vs. CA, et al., L-42709, May 26, 1981;
Lavina, et al. vs. CA, et al., G.R. Nos. 78295 and 79917,
April 10, 1989; Heirs of Maxima Regoso vs. CA, et al.,
G.R. No. 91879, July 6, 1992). The d e f e n d a n t ' s legal
heirs are his legal r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s if t h e r e is no pending
proceeding for t h e s e t t l e m e n t of his e s t a t e (Magdalera vs.
Benedicto, 103 Phil. 1102 [Unrep.J). The rule is t h a t in
the s u b s t i t u t i o n of t h e deceased, priority is given to his
legal r e p r e s e n t a t i v e , i.e., t h e executor or a d m i n i s t r a t o r of
his e s t a t e . The court may allow t h e substitution by the
heirs instead if t h e r e is unreasonable delay in the
a p p o i n t m e n t of an executor or a d m i n i s t r a t o r or when the
estate was extrajudicially settled (Lawas vs. CA, et al.,
supra).
4. The question as to w h e t h e r an action survives or
not depends on t h e n a t u r e of the action and the damage
sued for. In the causes of action which survive, t h e wrong
complained of affects p r i m a r i l y and principally property
and property rights, the injuries to the person being merely
incidental; w h i l e in the causes of action which do not
survive, the injury complained of is to the person, the
105

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property and property rights affected being incidental.

Thus, for instance, the claim of t h e deceased plaintiff in
t h e p r e s e n t action to quiet title over t h e land in litigation
affects primarily and principally property and property
rights and, therefore, is one t h a t survives even after h e r
d e a t h (Bonilla, et al., etc. vs. Barcena, et al., L-41715,
June 18, 1976).
5. The actions t h a t survive a g a i n s t t h e decedent's
r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s a r e : (a) a c t i o n s t o r e c o v e r r e a l a n d
personal property against t h e e s t a t e ; (b) actions to enforce
liens thereon; and (c> actions to recover for an injury to
person or property by reason of tort or delict committed
by t h e deceased (Board of Liquidators, etc. vs. Heirs of
Maxima M. Kalaw, et al, L-18805, Aug. 14, 1967).
See
Rule 87 a n d notes t h e r e u n d e r . See also Sec. 20 of t h i s
Rule which h a s been a m e n d e d and provides a new
procedure for c o n t r a c t u a l money claims.
6. W h e r e d u r i n g t h e p e n d e n c y of actions filed by
t h e g u a r d i a n in behalf of his ward, t h e l a t t e r died and
t h e former w a s t h e r e a f t e r a p p o i n t e d a d m i n i s t r a t o r of
t h e e s t a t e of t h e decedent, he may be s u b s t i t u t e d as a
representative p a r t y in t h e pending actions (Ypil vs. Solas,
et al., L-49311, May 27, 1979).
7. It h a s been held t h a t w h e n a p a r t y dies a n d t h e
action s u r v i v e s his d e a t h , b u t no o r d e r of s u b s t i t u t i o n
was issued or effected by t h e court, t h e t r i a l held by said
court was null a n d void since it did not acquire jurisdiction over t h e legal r e p r e s e n t a t i v e or heirs of t h e decedent,
hence t h e j u d g m e n t was not binding on t h e m (Ferreria,
et al. vs. Vda. de Gonzales, et al., supra). In a l a t e r case,
however, it w a s also held t h a t w h e r e counsel failed to
comply w i t h his d u t y u n d e r t h e n Sec. 16 to inform the
court of t h e d e a t h of his client, t h e defendant, a n d no
s u b s t i t u t i o n of such p a r t y w a s effected, t h e proceedings
a n d j u d g m e n t t h e r e i n a r e valid i f t h e a c t i o n (in t h i s
case, e j e c t m e n t ) s u r v i v e s t h e d e a t h of said p a r t y a n d
106

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SEC. 16

said decision is b i n d i n g upon his successor in i n t e r e s t

(Sec. 47lb]. Rule 39; Florendo, et al. vs. Coloma, et al
G.R. No. 60544, May 19, 1984).
In t h e Florendo case, however, t h e defendant died
while t h e case w a s p e n d i n g on a p p e a l in t h e C o u r t of
Appeals and, consequently, involved only a review of t h e
evidence p r e s e n t e d with t h e participation of t h e original
party litigants. Also, since t h e binding effect of a judgment in an ejectment case upon t h e successors in i n t e r e s t
of a d e c e a s e d l i t i g a n t a r e specifically provided for in
Rule 39, t h e p r o c e d u r a l l a p s e a p p e a r s t o h a v e b e e n
disregarded in t h e i n t e r e s t of s u b s t a n t i a l justice.
8. Where the plaintiff father brought an action
against a common c a r r i e r for t h e d e a t h of his son, b u t
because of his failing h e a l t h he assigned all his r i g h t s
t h e r e i n to a t h i r d p a r t y , t h e s u b s e q u e n t d e a t h of said
original plaintiff does not t e r m i n a t e the action. The rights
assigned a r e t r a n s f e r a b l e in c h a r a c t e r a n d this situation
is not covered by Sec. 17 (now included in Sec. 16, as
amended) of t h i s Rule since t h e plaintiff died after he
had already assigned his r i g h t s in t h e action. Where a
right is t r a n s f e r r e d before t h e institution of t h e action,
the suit should be b r o u g h t in t h e n a m e of the assignee;
where t h e t r a n s f e r is m a d e pendente lite, t h e assignee
should be s u b s t i t u t e d for t h e o r i g i n a l plaintiff. T h e
failure to effect such formal substitution, however, will
not p r e v e n t t h e court from r e n d e r i n g j u d g m e n t in favor
of the assignee. If j u d g m e n t w a s r e n d e r e d in favor of
t h e a s s i g n o r b e c a u s e t h e s u b s t i t u t i o n w a s not d u l y
effected, t h e a s s i g n o r s h a l l hold t h e p r o c e e d s of t h e
j u d g m e n t in t r u s t for t h e a s s i g n e e (Del Castillo vs.
Jaymalin, et al., L 28256, Mar. 11, 1982).
9. Sec. 16 of t h i s Rule requires t h a t prompt notice
of the d e a t h of t h e plaintiff should be made so t h a t substitution by a legal r e p r e s e n t a t i v e of the p a r t y may be
effected. Where t h e counsel of plaintiff filed such motion
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SECS. 17-18

for substitution 5 days after a decision in t h e case had

been rendered by the court, although plaintiff had died
more t h a n a y e a r p r i o r t h e r e t o , said j u d g m e n t is not
binding. No valid s u b s t i t u t i o n having been m a d e , t h e
court never acquired jurisdiction over t h e legal r e p r e sentative for t h e purpose of making him a p a r t y in t h e
case. F u r t h e r m o r e , the motion for substitution filed by
counsel for t h e deceased is null a n d void as counsel's
a u t h o r i t y t o r e p r e s e n t t h e client h a d ceased w i t h t h e
latter's d e a t h (Chittick vs. CA, et al., L-25350, Oct. 4, 1988;
cf. Saligumba, et al. vs. Palanog, G.R. No. 143365,
Dec. 4, 2008).
S e c . 17. Death or separation of a party who is a
public officer. W h e n a p u b l i c o f f i c e r is a p a r t y in
an action in his official capacity and d u r i n g its
pendency dies, resigns, or otherwise ceases to hold
office, t h e a c t i o n m a y b e c o n t i n u e d a n d m a i n t a i n e d
b y o r a g a i n s t h i s s u c c e s s o r if, w i t h i n t h i r t y (30) d a y s
a f t e r t h e s u c c e s s o r t a k e s office o r s u c h t i m e a s m a y
be granted by the court, it is satisfactorily shown
to the court by any party that there is a substantial
n e e d for c o n t i n u i n g o r m a i n t a i n i n g i t a n d t h a t t h e
successor adopts or continues or threatens to adopt
or c o n t i n u e the action of his predecessor. Before a
substitution is made, the party or officer to be
affected, unless expressly a s s e n t i n g thereto, shall
be given reasonable notice of the application
therefor and accorded an opportunity to be heard.
(18a)
S e c . 18. Incompetency or incapacity. If a p a r t y
becomes incompetent or incapacitated, the court,
upon motion with notice, may allow the action to
be continued by or against the incompetent or
incapacitated person assisted by his legal guardian
or g u a r d i a n ad litem. (19a)
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SECS. 17-19

S e c . 19. Transfer of interest. In c a s e of a n y

transfer of interest, the action may be continued
by or against the original party, unless the court
upon motion directs the person to whom the interest
is transferred to be substituted in the action or
j o i n e d w i t h t h e o r i g i n a l p a r t y . (20)
NOTES
1. These sections provide for t h e other instances
wherein s u b s t i t u t i o n of p a r t i e s is proper, subject to the
conditions t h e r e i n and w h e n e v e r the court, upon motion
and notice, finds justifiable reason therefor.
2. The "officer of t h e Philippines" contemplated in
Sec. 17 does not include a judge who is sued in connection w i t h t h e exercise of his judicial functions as any
action i m p u g n i n g it is not a b a t e d by his cessation from
office (Republic vs. CFI of Lanao del Norte, L 33949,
Oct. 23, 1973, jointly deciding t h e r e i n L-33986 and
L-34188).
3. Sec. 17 h a s been a m e n d e d to make it clear t h a t
the action contemplated t h e r e i n is one brought against
the public officer in his official capacity. Also, this section
is no longer limited to actions involving "an officer of
the Philippines," as it was u n d e r the former Rule, since
t h e r e a r e p e r m i s s i b l e i n s t a n c e s for m a i n t a i n i n g civil
s u i t s a g a i n s t public officers of a foreign g o v e r n m e n t ,
subject to t h e n a t u r e of t h e action and considerations of
i n t e r n a t i o n a l law and a g r e e m e n t s .
F u r t h e r m o r e , it is
not required, as clarified u n d e r this revision, t h a t w h a t
the successor in office is continuing or t h r e a t e n s to adopt
and continue is an action of his predecessor "in enforcing
a law alleged to be in violation of the Constitution of the
Philippines." The challenged action of a public officer
need not necessarily involve a constitutional issue. It is
believed t h a t no such delimitation was intended under the
old Rule which authorized such substitution as long as
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it was satisfactorily shown to t h e court t h a t t h e r e was a

s u b s t a n t i a l need for continuing t h e action (see Moore's
Federal Practice, Vol. II, p. 243).
4. U n d e r Sec. 18, as amended, in case of supervening
incapacity or incompetency of a p a r t y , t h e action shall
continue to be prosecuted by or against him personally
a n d n o t t h r o u g h h i s r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s , i n line w i t h t h e
a m e n d m e n t s in Sees. 3 and 5 of this Rule, since he cont i n u e s to be t h e real p a r t y in i n t e r e s t although assisted
by t h e corresponding g u a r d i a n .
5. Sec. 19 of t h i s Rule does not provide t h a t t h e
s u b s t i t u t i o n of p a r t i e s contemplated t h e r e i n is m a n d a tory, it being p e r m i s s i b l e to c o n t i n u e t h e action by or
a g a i n s t t h e original p a r t y in case of t r a n s f e r of i n t e r e s t
pendente lite. As t h e original p a r t y is bound by t h e final
outcome of t h e case, his s u b s t i t u t i o n by t h e t r a n s f e r e e is
not necessary u n l e s s t h e s u b s t i t u t i o n by or t h e joinder of
t h e l a t t e r is r e q u i r e d by t h e court; otherwise, failure to
do so does n o t w a r r a n t t h e d i s m i s s a l of t h e c a s e . A
t r a n s f e r e e pendente lite is a p r o p e r , a n d n o t an
i n d i s p e n s a b l e , p a r t y in t h e case
(Heirs of Francisco
Guballa, Sr., et al. vs. CA, et al, G.R. No. 78223, Dec. 19,
1988). However, w h e r e t h e t r a n s f e r w a s effected before
the commencement of the suit, the transferee must
necessarily be t h e defendant or t h e plaintiff, b u t he m a y
file a t h i r d - p a r t y c o m p l a i n t a g a i n s t a n d i m p l e a d t h e
t r a n s f e r o r in t h e action w h e n e v e r t h e s a m e is necessary
and p r o p e r for a complete d e t e r m i n a t i o n of all t h e rights
of t h e p a r t i e s .
S e c . 2 0 . Action on contractual money claims.
W h e n t h e a c t i o n i s for r e c o v e r y o f m o n e y a r i s i n g
from c o n t r a c t , e x p r e s s or implied, a n d t h e
d e f e n d a n t dies before e n t r y o f final j u d g m e n t i n t h e
court in which the action was pending at the time
of such death, it shall not be dismissed but shall
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SEC. 20

i n s t e a d be a l l o w e d to c o n t i n u e u n t i l e n t r y of final
j u d g m e n t . A favorable j u d g m e n t obtained by the
plaintiff therein shall be enforced in the manner
e s p e c i a l l y p r o v i d e d i n t h e s e R u l e s for p r o s e c u t i n g
claims against the e s t a t e of a deceased person. (21a)
NOTES
1. This w a s t h e former Sec. 21 of t h e old Rule which
has been a m e n d e d to provide a new procedure specially
for t h e disposition of c o n t r a c t u a l money claims w h e r e
the defendant dies before t h e t e r m i n a t i o n of t h e action
thereon. Two i m p o r t a n t aspects thereof m u s t inceptively
be t a k e n note of: (1) t h e action m u s t p r i m a r i l y be for
recovery of m o n e y , d e b t or i n t e r e s t t h e r e o n , a n d not
w h e r e t h e subject m a t t e r is p r i m a r i l y for some o t h e r
relief a n d t h e collection of an a m o u n t of money sought
therein is merely incidental t h e r e t o , such as by way of
d a m a g e s ; a n d (2) t h e claim subject of t h e action arose
from a contract, express or implied, e n t e r e d into by t h e
decedent in h i s lifetime or t h e liability for which h a d
been a s s u m e d by or is i m p u t a b l e to him.
2. U n d e r t h e former procedure, t h e d a t e of t h e d e a t h
of t h e defendant, in relation to t h e stage of t h e action at
t h a t time, was d e t e r m i n a t i v e of t h e procedure t h a t should
be followed thereafter. If he died "before final j u d g m e n t
in t h e C o u r t of F i r s t I n s t a n c e , " t h e action should be
dismissed w i t h o u t prejudice to t h e plaintiff p r e s e n t i n g
his claim t h e r e i n as a money claim in t h e s e t t l e m e n t of
the e s t a t e of t h e deceased defendant in accordance with
and as required by Sec. 5, Rule 86. The reason given for
the adoption of such procedure was t h a t if t h e defendant
dies a n d despite such fact t h e case against him proceeds
t o j u d g m e n t , h i s e s t a t e will n o n e t h e l e s s h a v e t o b e
settled in a Regional Trial Court (then, t h e Court of First
I n s t a n c e ) wherein s u c h j u d g m e n t for money s h a l l be
presented as a claim. Consequently, unless t h e action is
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SEC. 20

dismissed upon his death, the subsequent proceedings may

result in a Regional Trial Court reviewing t h e decision of
a n o t h e r or even the same Regional Trial Court involving
t h e s a m e money claim.
On t h e o t h e r hand, if t h e defendant died while t h e
case was on a p p e a l from t h e j u d g m e n t of t h e Regional
Trial Court, t h e appeal will continue with t h e deceased
b e i n g s u b s t i t u t e d t h e r e i n b y h i s h e i r s o r o t h e r legal
r e p r e s e n t a t i v e . When the j u d g m e n t of the appellate court
t h e r e o n i s t h e r e a f t e r r e n d e r e d a n d s h a l l h a v e become
final and executory, t h a t j u d g m e n t shall be t h e basis of
t h e m o n e y c l a i m to be filed in t h e p r o b a t e c o u r t , as
likewise authorized by Sec. 5, Rule 86.
3. The p r e s e n t revised procedure is believed to be
s i m p l e r a n d more p r a c t i c a l since, after all, t h e c o u r t
w h e r e i n t h e c o n t r a c t u a l money claim w a s p e n d i n g a t
t h e t i m e of t h e decedent's d e a t h m u s t have been fully
a c q u a i n t e d with t h e facts and issues t h e r e i n , or may even
have been in t h e process of r e n d e r i n g j u d g m e n t t h e r e o n .
Accordingly, to require t h e dismissal of said case a n d t h e
t r a n s f e r thereof to t h e p r o b a t e court will cause an unnecessary a n d otherwise avoidable b u r d e n on said court
which will t h e n be obliged to try a n d adjudicate t h e case
as a claim a g a i n s t t h e e s t a t e of t h e deceased defendant,
with t h e possibility t h a t it may even e n t a i l a duplication
of efforts and proceedings in whole or in p a r t .
4. U n d e r t h e p r e s e n t procedure, if t h e defendant dies
before e n t r y of final j u d g m e n t in t h e court w h e r e it was
pending at t h a t time, t h e action shall not be dismissed but
shall be allowed to continue until e n t r y of final j u d g m e n t
t h e r e o n . Such e n t r y of final j u d g m e n t may t a k e place in
the Regional Trial Court itself, w h e r e no appeal was t a k e n
from its j u d g m e n t , or it may be t h e e n t r y of j u d g m e n t of
t h e appellate court. In e i t h e r case, t h e former objection
a g a i n s t t h e probate court having to review t h e j u d g m e n t
of a n o t h e r court, which may possibly be of t h e s a m e r a n k ,
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SEC. 20

is eliminated. Since t h e money claim t h a t shall thereafter

be filed in t h e p r o b a t e court is based upon a final a n d
executory j u d g m e n t of a court of competent jurisdiction,
the former does not have to, because it cannot, review
t h a t j u d g m e n t which, for t h a t m a t t e r , is even conclusive
upon t h e p a r t i e s t h e r e t o and t h e i r privies.
5. T h i s section p r o v i d e s t h a t t h e action s h a l l be
allowed to continue until e n t r y of final judgment, hence
it will be necessary to have a legal r e p r e s e n t a t i v e a p p e a r
and be s u b s t i t u t e d for t h e deceased defendant. For this
purpose, t h e provisions of Sec. 17 of this Rule shall also
apply since t h e s a m e governs regardless of which of the
p a r t i e s to t h e action dies or w h e t h e r t h e case is in the
trial or appellate court.
6. T h i s s e c t i o n s p e a k s of c o n t r a c t s , " e x p r e s s or
implied," which is t h e s a m e terminology used in Sec. 5,
Rule 86 w i t h r e g a r d to one of t h e bases for t h e money
claims to be filed t h e r e u n d e r , and, formerly, in Sec. 1(a),
Rule 57 on p r e l i m i n a r y a t t a c h m e n t with respect to the
bases of causes of action contemplated therein. In Leung
Ben vs. O'Brien, et al. (38 Phil. 182), it was held t h a t
the contracts, express or implied, referred to in Rule 57,
include all p u r e l y p e r s o n a l obligations which a r e not
based on a delict or a tort, t h a t is, a quasi-delict. Accordingly, o n t h e s a m e c o n c e p t u a l r a t i o n a l e , t h e " i m p l i e d "
contracts mentioned in this section and in Sec. 5, Rule 86
may properly include w h a t are referred to in civil law as
quasi-contracts, a n d t h i s is t h e t e r m now used in Sec. 1(a)
of Rule 57, as a m e n d e d .
7. Where t h e action is for the revival of a j u d g m e n t
for a s u m of money which h a s become s t a l e for nonexecution after t h e lapse of 5 years, and the defendant
dies during t h e pendency of said action, Sec. 20 of this
Rule is not involved since t h e action is merely to keep
alive t h e j u d g m e n t s o t h a t t h e s u m s a w a r d e d i n t h e
action for revival thereof may be p r e s e n t e d as claims
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SEC. 21

against t h e e s t a t e of t h e decedent (Romualdez, et al. va.

Tiglao, et al, G.R. No. 51151, July 24, 1981). In fact, to
be more accurate, t h e subject of t h e action is t h e d o r m a n t
j u d g m e n t s o u g h t to be revived, a n d not a claim for a
s u m of m o n e y of c o n t r a c t u a l o r i g i n , s i n c e t h e s a m e
may also be said even if t h e claim arises from a crime or a
tort.
S e c . 2 1 . Indigent party. A p a r t y m a y be
authorized to litigate his action, claim or defense
a s a n i n d i g e n t i f t h e c o u r t , u p o n a n e x parte
application and hearing, is satisfied that the party
is one w h o has no money or property sufficient and
a v a i l a b l e for f o o d , s h e l t e r a n d b a s i c n e c e s s i t i e s for
himself and his family.
Such authority shall include an exemption
from p a y m e n t of docket and other lawful fees, and
of transcripts of stenographic notes which the
court may order to be furnished him. The amount
of the docket and other lawful fees which the
indigent w a s e x e m p t e d from p a y i n g shall be a lien
on any judgment rendered in the case favorable to
the indigent, unless the court otherwise provides.
Any adverse party may contest the grant of
such authority at any time before judgment is
rendered by the trial court. If the court should
d e t e r m i n e after h e a r i n g that the party d e c l a r e d as
an i n d i g e n t is in fact a p e r s o n w i t h sufficient
income or property, the proper docket and other
lawful fees shall be assessed and collected by
the clerk of court. If payment is not made within
the time fixed by the court, e x e c u t i o n shall issue
for t h e p a y m e n t t h e r e o f , w i t h o u t p r e j u d i c e t o s u c h
other s a n c t i o n s as the court may impose. (22a)

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NOTES
1. The t e r m "indigent p a r t y " h a s been s u b s t i t u t e d
for w h a t used to be called a "pauper litigant." For purposes
of a suit in forma pauperis,-* pauper litigant is not really
a pauper but a person who is indigent although not a
public charge, i.e., t h a t he has no property or income
sufficient for his support aside from his labor, even if he
is self-supporting when able to work and in employment
(see Black's Law Dictionary, 4th Ed., pp. 913, 1284, citing
People vs. Schoharie County, 121 N.Y., 345, 24N.E. 830).
This s a m e concept w a s adopted for p u r p o s e s of criminal
cases in applying t h e provisions of R.A. 6033, R.A. 6034
and R.A. 6035.
2. T h e p r e s e n t c o n c e p t of an i n d i g e n t l i t i g a n t is
believed to be more realistic in light of t h e contemporary
s i t u a t i o n . T h e proof of p a u p e r i s m r e q u i r e d u n d e r t h e
former Rule consisted merely of affidavits or certificates
of t h e c o r r e s p o n d i n g t r e a s u r e r s t h a t t h e p a r t y had no
r e g i s t e r e d p r o p e r t y . I t w a s considered i n a c c u r a t e and
misleading since a p a r t y may be financially sound although
h e h a s n o t a c q u i r e d o r r e g i s t e r e d a n y p r o p e r t y for
reasons of his own, hence t h e p r e s e n t revision opted for
judicial i n t e r v e n t i o n w i t h s a n c t i o n s a s set out i n t h i s
section.
3. Section 2 1 , Rule 3 of t h e p r e s e n t Rules h a s not
been affected by t h e incorporation of Rule 141 on Legal
Fees a n d t h e two a m e n d m e n t s t h e r e t o , now constituting
Section 19 thereof. It is to be noted t h a t said Section 21 of
Rule 3 could have been repealed w h e n t h e p r e s e n t Rule
141 was adopted, or also a m e n d e d when t h e l a t t e r was
then a m e n d e d . The fact is t h a t t h e two provisions can be
harmonized a n d can s t a n d together.
T h u s , when an application to litigate as an indigent
litigant is filed and t h e court finds t h a t it complies with
Section 19 of Rule 141, t h e a u t h o r i t y to litigate as such is
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SEC. 22

automatically g r a n t e d . However, if both r e q u i r e m e n t s

t h e r e i n have not been complied with, a h e a r i n g shall be
conducted and t h e application resolved on t h e evidence
of t h e p a r t i e s . Also, t h e adverse p a r t y m a y l a t e r still
c o n t e s t t h e g r a n t before j u d g m e n t a n d proceed in
accordance with t h e p r e s e n t provisions of said Section 21
(Algura, et al. vs. City of Naga, et al., G.R. No. 150135,
Oct. 30, 2006).
S e c . 22. Notice to the Solicitor General. In a n y
action involving the validity of any treaty, law,
ordinance, executive order, presidential decree,
r u l e s o r r e g u l a t i o n s , t h e c o u r t , i n its d i s c r e t i o n , m a y
require the appearance of the Solicitor General who
may be heard in person or through a representative
d u l y d e s i g n a t e d b y h i m . (23a)

116

RULE 4
VENUE OF ACTIONS
S e c t i o n 1. Venue of real actions. A c t i o n s
affecting title to or possession of real property, or
interest therein, shall be commenced and tried in
the proper court which has jurisdiction over the
area wherein the real property involved, or a
portion thereof, is situated.
Forcrbre^ntry and detainer actions shall be
c o m m e n c e d and tried in the municipal trial court
of the municipality or city wherein the real
property involved, or a portion thereof, is situated.
(l[a],2[a]a)
S e c . 2. Venue of personal actions. A l l o t h e r
actions may be commenced and tried where the
plaintiff or any of the principal plaintiffs resides,
or where the defendant or any of the principal
defendants resides, or in the case of a nonresident
defendant where he may be found, at the election
of t h e plaintiff. (2[b]a)
NOTES
1. Rule 4 formerly provided different rules of venue
in t h e so-called inferior c o u r t s a n d t h e Regional Trial
Courts, both in r e a l and personal actions, although the
lower courts have long a s s u m e d t h e s t a t u s of courts of
record. Such v a r i a n t rules of venue sometimes resulted
in conflicting views r e q u i r i n g clarification. F u r t h e r m o r e ,
Par. 9 of t h e I n t e r i m or T r a n s i t i o n a l Rules and Guidelines
provided, as early as 1981, t h a t "(t)he procedure to be
observed in metropolitan trial courts, municipal trial courts
and municipal circuit t r i a l courts, in all cases and
proceedings, w h e t h e r civil or criminal, shall be t h e same
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SECS 1-2

as t h a t to be observed in t h e regional t r i a l courts." The

p r e s e n t revised Rule has adopted uniform rules of venue
for all t r i a l c o u r t s , t h e v e n u e for r e a l a c t i o n s b e i n g
determined by the place where the real property is situated
and, for personal actions, by t h e residence of t h e p a r t i e s ,
with special provisions for nonresident defendants.
2. The v e n u e of t h e r e a l actions c o n t e m p l a t e d in
t h e first p a r a g r a p h of Sec. 1 of t h i s Rule shall be "in t h e
proper court which h a s jurisdiction over t h e a r e a w h e r e i n
the r e a l p r o p e r t y involved, or a portion thereof, is
situated." This is so because under the a m e n d m e n t s
i n t r o d u c e d by R.A. 7 6 9 1 to S e e s . 19 a n d 33 of B . P .
Big. 129, both t h e Regional Trial C o u r t s a n d t h e lower
courts now have jurisdiction over real actions, d e p e n d i n g
on the value of the property in controversy. This
p r e s u p p o s e s , h o w e v e r , t h a t s u c h r e a l a c t i o n involves
the title to or t h e possession of t h e r e a l p r o p e r t y or any
interest therein.
3. Where t h e subject-matter of t h e action involves
various parcels of land s i t u a t e d in different provinces,
t h e venue is d e t e r m i n e d by t h e singularity or p l u r a l i t y
of t h e t r a n s a c t i o n s involving said parcels of land. T h u s ,
w h e r e said parcels a r e t h e objects of one a n d t h e s a m e
t r a n s a c t i o n , t h e v e n u e w a s in t h e t h e n C o u r t of F i r s t
I n s t a n c e of any of t h e provinces w h e r e i n a parcel of land
is s i t u a t e d (El Hogar Filipino vs. Seua, 57 Phil. 873). If
t h e parcels of land a r e subject of s e p a r a t e a n d distinct
t r a n s a c t i o n s , t h e r e i s n o common v e n u e a n d s e p a r a t e
actions should be laid in t h e Court of F i r s t I n s t a n c e of
the province wherein each parcel of land is situated
(Mijares, et al. us. Piccio, etc., et al., 101 Phil. 142).
4. A c t i o n s for t h e a n n u l m e n t or r e s c i s s i o n of a
sale a n d t h e r e t u r n of realty (Muhoz us. Llamas, et al.,
87 Phil. 737; Gauieres vs. Sanchez, et al., 94 Phil. 760;
Punsalan vs. Vda. de Lacsamana, et al., G.R. No. 55729,
Mar. 28, 1983), to compel t h e vendor to accept p a y m e n t
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SECS.

1-2

of t h e p u r c h a s e p r i c e of t h e l a n d (Lizares vs. Caluag,

et al., L-17699, Mar. 30, 1962), or to compel t h e v e n d o r to
deliver t h e certificate of title to t h e land (Espineli, et al.
vs. Santiago, et al., 107 Phil. 830) a r e r e a l actions a n d
the location of t h e land d e t e r m i n e s t h e venue of t h e action.
But actions only to recover t h e p u r c h a s e price of t h e land
(Garcia vs. Velasco, 72 Phil. 248) or for recovery a g a i n s t
t h e A s s u r a n c e F u n d (Hodges vs. Treasurer of the Phil.,
50 Phil. 16) a r e p e r s o n a l actions.
5. An action for t h e a n n u l m e n t of t h e cancellation
of t h e a w a r d of a lot in favor of t h e plaintiff, which he
was p r e p a r e d to p a y for p u r s u a n t to said a w a r d , does
not involve t h e issue of possession or title to t h e property,
hence it is a p e r s o n a l action (Hernandez vs. DBP, et al.,
L-31095, June 15, 1976).
6. An a c t i o n for t h e r e v i e w of an a d m i n i s t r a t i v e
decision involving r e a l p r o p e r t y should he brought in t h e
Regional T r i a l Court of t h e place w h e r e t h e officer who
r e n d e r e d t h e decision holds office, a n d not w h e r e t h e
land is s i t u a t e d (Salud vs. Executive Secretary, L-25446,
May 22, 1969), such as w h e r e t h e m a t t e r in dispute is a
fishpond p e r m i t (Digon vs. Bayona, 98 Phil. 442; Sarabia
vs. Secretary, 104 Phil. 115) or t h e r i g h t to a t i m b e r
concession
(Suarez vs. Reyes, L-19828, Feb. 28, 1963),
the location of t h e p r o p e r t y being i m m a t e r i a l .
7. An action to compel the mortgagee to accept
p a y m e n t a n d for t h e c o n s e q u e n t cancellation of a real
e s t a t e m o r t g a g e is a p e r s o n a l action, if t h e m o r t g a g e e
has not foreclosed t h e mortgage and t h e mortgagor is in
possession of t h e p r e m i s e s , since n e i t h e r t h e plaintiff
mortgagor's title to nor possession of t h e property is in
q u e s t i o n (Hernandez vs. Rural Bank of Lucena, Inc.,
L-29791, Jan. 10, 1978; cf. Chua vs. Total Office Products,
etc. Inc., G.R. No. 152808, Sept. 30, 2005), otherwise, it
is a real action.

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8. An^ action by the landowner against t h e subdivision developer for the rescission and t e r m i n a t i o n of their
contract and the r e t u r n to the plaintiff of all documents
a n d titles, w i t h d a m a g e s by r e a s o n of t h e d e f e n d a n t ' s
contractual breach, is a real action as t h e relief sought
will necessarily e n t a i l t h e recovery by t h e plaintiff of
possession of t h e land or such unsold portions thereof,
hence t h e venue of the action is determined by t h e location
of t h e real p r o p e r t y (Tenorio vs. Paho, et al, L-48117,
Nov. 27, 1986).
9. An action filed by the h u s b a n d for damages, based
on t h e wife's a d u l t e r o u s acts, and for his s h a r e in t h e
fruits of t h e conjugal p a r t n e r s h i p , with a p r a y e r for prel i m i n a r y i n j u n c t i o n t o r e s t r a i n h e r from s e l l i n g r e a l
p r o p e r t y b e l o n g i n g to t h e conjugal p a r t n e r s h i p , is a
personal action as he does not thereby a s k to be declared
t h e owner thereof, nor for possession or p a r t i t i o n of the
same, b u t merely seeks to exercise his right as administ r a t o r of t h e conjugal p a r t n e r s h i p (De Guzman, et al. vs.
Genato, et al., L-42260, April 10, 1979).
10. The v e n u e in ejectment cases u n d e r Sec. 1 of this
Rule may be changed by a g r e e m e n t of the p a r t i e s
p u r s u a n t to Sec. 4 t h e r e o f (Villanueva vs. Mosqueda,
et al., G.R. No. 58287, Aug. 19, 1982), b u t it m u s t now be
made in w r i t i n g a n d before t h e filing of t h e action.
1 1 . The r u l e s of v e n u e for p e r s o n a l actions in t h e
inferior courts and in the Regional Trial Courts are
generally made to depend on t h e residence of t h e p a r t i e s .
The residence referred to is t h e place w h e r e t h e p a r t y
actually resides at t h e time t h e action is i n s t i t u t e d (De la
Rosa vs. De Borja, 53 Phil. 998), not his p e r m a n e n t home
or domicile (Koh vs. CA, et al, L-40428, Dec. 17, 1975; cf.
Arevalo vs. Quilatan, G.R. No. 57892, Sept. 21, 1982,
r e g a r d i n g service of s u m m o n s at defendant's residence).

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12. The residence of t h e person is his personal, a c t u a l

or physical h a b i t a t i o n or his a c t u a l residence or place of
abode (Fule, et al. vs. CA, et al., L-40502, Nov. 29, 1976),
w h e t h e r p e r m a n e n t or t e m p o r a r y as long as he resides
with continuity a n d consistency t h e r e i n (Dangwa Trans.
Co., Inc. vs. Sarmiento, et al., L-22795, Jan. 31, 1977;
Ang Kek Chen vs. Spouses Calasan, G.R. No. 161685,
July 24, 2007).
S e c . 3. Venue of actions against nonresidents. If
any of the defendants does not reside and is not
found i n t h e P h i l i p p i n e s , a n d t h e a c t i o n affects t h e
p e r s o n a l s t a t u s o f t h e plaintiff, o r a n y p r o p e r t y o f
said d e f e n d a n t located in t h e P h i l i p p i n e s , t h e action
may be commenced and tried in the court of the
place w h e r e the plaintiff resides, or where the
property or any portion thereof is situated or found.
(2[c]a)
NOTES
1. W h e r e a p e r s o n a l action is a g a i n s t a r e s i d e n t
defendant a n d a n o n r e s i d e n t defendant b u t who is in t h e
Philippines, both of whom a r e principal defendants, t h e
venue may be laid e i t h e r w h e r e t h e r e s i d e n t defendant
resides or where the nonresident defendant may be
found, as a u t h o r i z e d by Sec. 2 of this Rule, but with an
additional a l t e r n a t i v e v e n u e , i.e., t h e residence of any of
the principal plaintiffs, p u r s u a n t to Sees. 2 and 3.
It will be observed t h a t w h e n t h e r e is more t h a n one
defendant or plaintiff in t h e case, t h e residences of t h e
p r i n c i p a l p a r t i e s s h o u l d b e t h e b a s i s for d e t e r m i n i n g
the p r o p e r v e n u e . O t h e r w i s e , t h e purpose of t h e Rule
would be defeated w h e r e a n o m i n a l or formal p a r t y is
impleaded in t h e action since t h e l a t t e r would not have
the degree of i n t e r e s t in t h e subject of the action which
would w a r r a n t and entail the desirably active participation
expected of litigants in a case.
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2. Sec. 4 of t h e former Rule provided t h a t "(w)hen

improper, venue is not objected to in a motion it is deemed
waived." Correlatively, Sec. 5 of Rule 16 provided t h a t
"(a)ny of t h e grounds for dismissal provided for in t h i s
rule, except improper venue, may be pleaded as an
affirmative defense, and a preliminary h e a r i n g may be
had t h e r e o n as if a motion to dismiss had been filed."
The aforesaid Sec. 4 of t h e former Rule h a s been
deleted, and Sec. 5 of Rule 16 correspondingly modified,
in these revised Rules. There does not a p p e a r to be any
cogent r e a s o n t o single o u t i m p r o p e r v e n u e from t h e
various preliminary objections t h a t may be raised a g a i n s t
a complaint, and require t h a t it may be raised only in a
motion to d i s m i s s u n d e r p a i n of i t s b e i n g c o n s i d e r e d
waived for failure to do so. It is entirely possible t h a t
such objection was not immediately discernible b u t
became a p p a r e n t only at t h e time t h e defendant p r e p a r e d
his a n s w e r or t h a t , for any other reason, he w a s not t h e n
in a position to file a motion to dismiss.
U n d e r t h e s e revised Rules, therefore, t h e ground of
improper venue is placed on t h e s a m e footing as t h e other
grounds for a motion to dismiss e n u m e r a t e d in Sec. 1 of
Rule 16 a n d is entitled to t h e s a m e considerations in t h a t ,
if it is not raised in a motion to dismiss, it may likewise be
alleged as an affirmative defense in t h e a n s w e r for a
p r e l i m i n a r y h e a r i n g t h e r e o n . At all e v e n t s , it is likewise
subject to t h e s a m e sanction provided in Sec. 1, Rule 9
t h a t if it is not pleaded as an objection e i t h e r in a motion
to dismiss or in t h e answer, it is deemed waived.
3. W h e r e t h e plaintiff is a n o n r e s i d e n t of t h e
Philippines b u t is p e r m i t t e d to sue h e r e (as in t h e case
of a foreign corporation with t h e requisite license u n d e r
Sec. 123 of t h e Corporation Code), t h e n t h e v e n u e is t h e
place w h e r e t h e d e f e n d a n t r e s i d e s , or, in r e a l actions,
w h e r e t h e real p r o p e r t y or p a r t thereof is s i t u a t e d . This
is proper since t h e a l t e r n a t i v e venue g r a n t e d to plaintiffs
122

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SEC. 4

is not available to said c o r p o r a t i o n (see Time, Inc. vs.

Reyes, L-28882, May 31, 1971, involving a s u i t a g a i n s t
a foreign corporation).
4. Where, on the other hand, it is the defendant
who is a n o n r e s i d e n t a n d is not found in t h e Philippines,
civil actions a r e p r o p e r only w h e n t h e action affects t h e
personal s t a t u s of the plaintiff or property of the
defendant, in which case Sec. 2 d e t e r m i n e s t h e v e n u e .
See Sec. 15, Rule 14 r e g a r d i n g service of s u m m o n s in
these cases.
5. An e x c e p t i o n to t h e g e n e r a l r u l e s on v e n u e is
found in civil actions for d a m a g e s in case of libel, w h e t h e r
a criminal action therefor h a s been filed or not, as special
rules of v e n u e a r e provided in A r t . 360 of t h e Revised
Penal Code, as l a s t a m e n d e d by R.A. 4363. Said venue
provisions apply to both residents and nonresidents,
assuming t h a t jurisdiction over the l a t t e r has been
acquired (Time, Inc. vs. Reyes, et al., supra).
S e c . 4. When Rule not applicable.
shall not apply

This

Rule

(a) I n t h o s e c a s e s w h e r e a s p e c i f i c r u l e o r l a w
provides otherwise; or
(b) W h e r e t h e p a r t i e s h a v e v a l i d l y a g r e e d i n
writing before the filing of the action on the
exclusive v e n u e thereof. (3a, 5a)
NOTES
1. Sec. 4(b) e n u n c i a t e s a clarification of t h e rule
regarding stipulations of t h e p a r t i e s on venue. It requires
a valid w r i t t e n a g r e e m e n t executed by t h e p a r t i e s before
the filing of t h e action. Accordingly, t h e provision in t h e
former Sec. 3 of this Rule to t h e effect t h a t "(b)y w r i t t e n
a g r e e m e n t of the parties t h e venue of an action may be
changed or transferred from one province to a n o t h e r "
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has been eliminated.

To be binding, t h e p a r t i e s m u s t have agreed on t h e
exclusive n a t u r e of t h e venue of any prospective action
between t h e m . This adopts t h e doctrines laid down by
t h e S u p r e m e Court requiring t h a t , to avoid t h e general
rules on venue, the a g r e e m e n t of the p a r t i e s thereon m u s t
be restrictive a n d not permissive. Those decisions are set
out h e r e u n d e r by way of illustrations, aside from other
decisional rules on venue.
2. It is f u n d a m e n t a l in t h e law governing venue of
a c t i o n s t h a t t h e s i t u s i s fixed t o a t t a i n t h e g r e a t e s t
convenience possible to the litigants by t a k i n g into
consideration t h e m a x i m u m accessibility to t h e m of t h e
courts of justice (Koh vs. CA, et al, L-40428, Dec. 17,
1975). V e n u e i n p e r s o n a l a c t i o n s i s fixed for t h e
convenience of t h e plaintiff a n d his w i t n e s s e s a n d to
promote t h e ends of justice. Where t h e contract, subject
of t h e suit, w a s executed at t h e time w h e n both plaintiff
and d e f e n d a n t had t h e i r business a d d r e s s e s in t h e City of
Manila and contained a proviso t h a t all actions on said
contract "may be brought in and submitted to the
jurisdiction of t h e proper courts in t h e City of Manila,"
b u t at t h e time of suit t h e r e o n all t h e p a r t i e s h a d t h e i r
respective offices or residences within t h e jurisdiction of
t h e Province of Rizal, t h e action t h u s i n s t i t u t e d in t h e
Court of F i r s t I n s t a n c e of Rizal should not be dismissed
on the ground of improper venue as, under such
c i r c u m s t a n c e s , t h e ends of justice can not be served or
promoted by confining t h e situs of t h e action in Manila
(Nicolas vs. Reparations Commission, L-28649, May 21,
1975; see also Capati vs. Ocampo, L-22742, April 30,
1982).
3. The court may declare a g r e e m e n t s on venue as
c o n t r a r y to p u b l i c policy if s u c h s t i p u l a t i o n u n j u s t l y
denies a p a r t y a fair opportunity to file suit in t h e place
designated by the Rules. The court shall take into
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SEC. 4

consideration t h e economic conditions of t h e p a r t i e s , t h e

practical need to avoid n u m e r o u s suits filed a g a i n s t t h e
defendant in v a r i o u s p a r t s of t h e country a n d t h e peculiar
circumstances of t h e case (Hoechst Philippines, Inc. vs.
Torres, et al, L-44351, May
18, 1978).
4 . In- c o n t r a c t s o f a d h e s i o n , t h e r u l e i s t h a t
ambiguities t h e r e i n a r e t o b e c o n s t r u e d a g a i n s t t h e p a r t y
who c a u s e d it. If t h e s t i p u l a t i o n s a r e not obscure a n d
leave no d o u b t on t h e i n t e n t i o n of t h e p a r t i e s , t h e literal
meaning of t h e stipulations m u s t be held controlling
(Lufthansa German Airlines, et al.
vs. CA, et al.,
G.R. No. 91544, May 8, 1992; RCBC vs. CA, et al.,
G.R. 133107, Mar. 25, 1999).
C o n t r a c t s of a d h e s i o n
are n o t p r o h i b i t e d , b u t t h e f a c t u a l c i r c u m s t a n c e s o f
each c a s e m u s t b e carefully s c r u t i n i z e d t o d e t e r m i n e
the respective claims of t h e p a r t i e s as to their efficacy
(see National Dev. Co. vs. Madrigal Wan Hai Lines Corp.,
G.R. No. 148332, Sept. 30, 2003).
T h u s , in c o n t r a c t s involving passage tickets, a
condition p r i n t e d a t t h e b a c k t h e r e o f t h a t all a c t i o n s
arising out of t h a t c o n t r a c t of c a r r i a g e can be filed only in
a p a r t i c u l a r province or city, to t h e exclusion of all others,
was declared void a n d unenforceable due to t h e s t a t e of
the shipping i n d u s t r y . The Court noted t h a t t h e acute
shortage of i n t e r - i s l a n d vessels could not provide enough
a c c o m m o d a t i o n s for p l a i n t i f f s to t r a v e l to t h e v e n u e
indicated, a s i d e from t h e fact t h a t t h e p a s s e n g e r s did
not h a v e t h e o p p o r t u n i t y t o e x a m i n e t h e fine p r i n t
providing for s u c h v e n u e (Sweet Lines, Inc. vs. Teves,
etc., et al., L-37750, May 19, 1978).
In a s u b s e q u e n t c a s e i n v o l v i n g 6 s u b s c r i p t i o n
c o n t r a c t s for c e l l u l a r t e l e p h o n e s e a c h c o v e r e d by a
mobiline service a g r e e m e n t , t h e subscriber challenged
the provisions in said agreements providing t h a t the
v e n u e for all s u i t s a r i s i n g t h e r e f r o m s h a l l be in t h e
proper court of M a k a t i , with t h e subscriber waiving any
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SEC. 4

other venue. The Supreme Court s u s t a i n e d t h e validity

of t h a t venue stipulation, considering t h a t t h e subscriber
h a s sufficient o p p o r t u n i t y to go over s u c h s t i p u l a t i o n
during each time he signed those a g r e e m e n t s , as well as
in the subsequent subscriptions he acquired while
r e m a i n i n g as a s u b s c r i b e r for s o m e t i m e (Pilipino
Telephone Corp. vs. Tecson, G.R. No. 156966, May 7,
2004; cf. DBP vs. National Merchandising Corp., L-22957
& L-23737, Aug. 31, 1971).
5. A stipulation as to t h e venue of a prospective action
does not preclude t h e filing of t h e suit in t h e residence of
t h e plaintiff or t h a t of t h e defendant u n d e r Sec. 2 of t h i s
Rule, in t h e absence of qualifying or restrictive words in
t h e a g r e e m e n t t h a t would indicate t h a t t h e venue can not
be any place o t h e r t h a n t h a t agreed upon by t h e p a r t i e s
(Polytrade Corp. vs. Blanco, L 27033, Oct. 31, 1969),
especially w h e r e t h e venue stipulation w a s imposed by
t h e plaintiff for its own benefit and convenience (Eastern
Assurance & Surety Corp. vs. Cui, et al., infra).
6. The former C o u r t of F i r s t I n s t a n c e of Quezon
City h a d jurisdiction w h e r e t h e d e f e n d a n t electric corporation h a s its principal office in Quezon City, a l t h o u g h
t h e a c t s c o m p l a i n e d of werer c o m m i t t e d by its electric
p l a n t i n D a g u p a n City, since c o r p o r a t e d e c i s i o n s a r e
made in Quezon City a n d t h e employees in D a g u p a n City
merely c a r r y out said o r d e r s , hence t h e acts s o u g h t to
be r e s t r a i n e d are being committed in Quezon City
(Dagupan Electric Corp.
vs. Paho, et al., L-49520,
Jan. 28, 1980; cf. Limjap vs. Animas, et al., G.R.
No. 53334, Jan. 17, 1985; Olongapo Electric Light &
Power Corp. vs. National Power Corp., et al., L-24912,
April 9, 1987).
7. In actions involving domestic c o r p o r a t i o n s ,
for p u r p o s e s o f v e n u e , w h a t i s c o n t r o l l i n g i s t h e
location of its p r i n c i p a l place of b u s i n e s s s t a t e d in its
articles of incorporation, not t h e b r a n c h office or place of
126

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SEC. 4

business thereof (Hyatt Elevators and Escalators Corp.

vs. Goldstar Elevators Phils., Inc., G.R. No. 161026
Oct. 24, 2005).
8. W h e r e t h e c h a t t e l mortgage h a d been fully paid,
but t h e m o r t g a g e e still s e n t a telegram d e m a n d i n g payment from t h e mortgagor, t h e venue for t h e l a t t e r ' s action
for d a m a g e s is not governed by t h e venue stipulation in
the c h a t t e l m o r t g a g e since t h e suit is not based on said
contract b u t on d e f e n d a n t ' s act of s e n d i n g the telegram
(Zoleta vs. Romillo, G.R. No. 58080, Feb. 15, 1982).
9. Since a t h i r d - p a r t y complaint is b u t ancillary to a
main action, t h e r u l e s on jurisdiction and venue do not
apply to it. T h u s , a t h i r d - p a r t y complaint yields to t h e
jurisdiction a n d v e n u e of t h e m a i n action even if said
t h i r d - p a r t y complaint is based on a s e p a r a t e a g r e e m e n t
which specifies a different venue for s u i t s arising from
said a g r e e m e n t (Eastern Assurance & Surety Corp. vs.
Cui, et al., G.R. No. 54452, July 20, 1981).
10. Where only one of t h e two defendants, both being
indispensable p a r t i e s , filed a motion to dismiss for improper v e n u e , while t h e o t h e r filed his a n s w e r without
raising s u c h objection, t h e h e a r i n g should not proceed
against t h e l a t t e r u n t i l t h e objection raised by the
former s h a l l have been resolved (Punzalan vs. Vda. de
Lacsamana, G.R. No. 55729, Mar. 28, 1983).
1 1 . The stipulation in a contract of affreightment to
the effect t h a t said a g r e e m e n t "shall be governed by and
c o n s t r u e d in a c c o r d a n c e w i t h S i n g a p o r e Law, a n d all
d i s p u t e s a r i s i n g ( t ) h e r e u n d e r s h a l l b e subject t o t h e
exclusive j u r i s d i c t i o n of t h e High Court of Singapore"
refers to t h e forum of t h e actions contemplated therein.
It may not be declared invalid on t h e theory t h a t such
a g r e e m e n t would divest Philippine courts of jurisdiction
by a g r e e m e n t of t h e p a r t i e s , since w h a t has been agreed
upon was merely t h e venue of the action which may legally
127

RULE 4

REMEDIAL LAW COMPENDIUM

SEC. 4

be done. However, since t h e defendant did not timely

raise t h a t issue b u t filed two motions to lift t h e writ of
preliminary a t t a c h m e n t and a counterbond therefor,
before it eventually filed a motion to dismiss on the ground
of improper venue, such objection h a s been waived and
the trial court erred in granting the motion and dismissing
t h e case (Phil. International Trading Corp. vs. M.V.
Zileena, et al, G.R. No. 102904, Oct. 30, 1992).
12. The foregoing considerations n o t w i t h s t a n d i n g ,
the S u p r e m e Court, to avoid a miscarriage of justice, h a s
the power to order a change of venue or place of t r i a l in
civil or criminal cases or o t h e r judicial proceeding (see
Sec. 5[4J, Art. VIII, 1987 Constitution; Magsaysay vs.
Magsaysay, et al, L-49847, July 17, 1980).
13. Because of t h e s u p e r v e n t i o n of R.A. No. 7691
(Appendix N) which, inter alia, a m e n d e d t h e jurisdiction
of t h e r e g u l a r t r i a l courts in real actions, p e n d i n g final
action on t h e p r e s e n t revised Rules, t h e S u p r e m e Court
approved in advance and p r o m u l g a t e d t h e p r e s e n t Rule 4
to t a k e effect on A u g u s t 1, 1995, i s s u i n g t h e r e f o r its
A d m i n i s t r a t i v e Circular No. 13-95 on J u n e 20, 1995.

128

RULE 5
U N I F O R M P R O C E D U R E I N TRIAL C O U R T S
S e c t i o n 1. Uniform procedure. T h e p r o c e d u r e
in the Municipal Trial Courts shall be the same as
i n t h e R e g i o n a l T r i a l C o u r t , e x c e p t (a) w h e r e a
particular provieion expressly or impliedly applies
o n l y t o e i t h e r o f s a i d c o u r t s , o r (b) i n c i v i l c a s e s
g o v e r n e d b y t h e R u l e o n S u m m a r y P r o c e d u r e , (n)
S e c . 2. Meaning of terms. T h e t e r m " M u n i c i p a l
Trial C o u r t s " a s u s e d i n t h e s e R u l e s s h a l l i n c l u d e
M e t r o p o l i t a n T r i a l C o u r t s , M u n i c i p a l Trial C o u r t s
in Cities, Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal
Circuit Trial Courts, ( l a )
NOTES
1. The former Rule 6 of t h e s e Rules was expressly
repealed by t h e I n t e r i m or T r a n s i t i o n a l Rules and Guidelines p r o m u l g a t e d by t h e S u p r e m e Court effective upon
the implementation of B.P. Big. 129. Par. 9 of said interim
rules further provided t h a t "(t)he procedure to be observed
in m e t r o p o l i t a n t r i a l courts, municipal t r i a l courts and
municipal circuit t r i a l courts, in all cases and proceedings,
w h e t h e r civil or criminal, shall be t h e same as t h a t to be
observed in t h e regional trial courts." This is now provided
in Sec. 1, with exceptions.
2. It h a s b e e n held t h a t i n t e r p l e a d e r (Rule 62) is
available in inferior courts although they are not bound
to follow strictly t h e procedure therefor as set out for t h e
t h e n C o u r t s of F i r s t I n s t a n c e (Makati Dev. Co. vs.
Tanjuatco, L-26443, Mar. 25, 1969). It is submitted t h a t
since t h e procedure in t h e p r e s e n t Regional Trial Courts
is now applicable to t h e inferior courts, while t h e l a t t e r

129

RULE 5

REMEDIAL LAW COMPENDIUM

SEC. 2

can t r y i n t e r p l e a d e r a c t i o n s , t h e y m u s t perforce now

observe t h e procedure as provided for t h e Regional Trial
Courts.
3. U n d e r Sec. 22 of B.P. Big. 129 and P a r . 21(a) of
t h e I n t e r i m Rules and Guidelines, all cases decided by
t h e inferior courts may be appealed to t h e Regional Trial
Courts. It h a s been held t h a t such provisions a r e broad
enough to cover j u d g m e n t s by default, s u m m a r y
judgments and judgments on the pleadings rendered
by inferior c o u r t s . T h e c o n t r a r y d o c t r i n e s in Luzon
Rubber & Manufacturing Co. vs. Estaris, et al. [L-31439,
Aug. 31, 1973] a n d r e i t e r a t e d in Stratchan, et al. vs. CA,
et al. [L-23455, J a n . 27, 1985] a r e t h e r e b y d e e m e d overruled (Guanson vs. Montesclaros, et al., G.R. No. 59330,
June 28, 1983). T h e c o n t r o v e r s y in t h e p a s t on t h i s
point (see Vda. de Hoyo-a, et al. vs. Virata, et al., G.R.
No. 71171, July 23, 1985), which h a s now b e e n s e t at
r e s t , w a s d u e t o t h e fact t h a t , formerly, only d e f a u l t
j u d g m e n t s of t h e Courts of F i r s t I n s t a n c e were appealable
u n d e r t h e t h e n Sec. 2 of Rule 4 1 .
4. W h e r e t h e lower court h a d no jurisdiction over
the case, the Regional Trial Court does not acquire
appellate jurisdiction. However, while the appellant
may assail such jurisdiction on appeal, t h e p a r t i e s may
s u b m i t to t h e original jurisdiction of t h e Regional Trial
Court a n d said court can proceed to try t h e case (Alvir
vs. Vera, L-39338, July 16, 1984).
For the present
p r o c e d u r a l rule, see Sec. 8, Rule 40.
5. Formerly, t h e decisions of t h e t h e n C o u r t s of F i r s t
I n s t a n c e , in cases appealed to t h e m from t h e decisions of
t h e inferior courts in t h e exercise of t h e l a t t e r ' s original
jurisdiction, were a p p e a l a b l e to t h e S u p r e m e C o u r t by
c e r t i o r a r i u n d e r Rule 45 if t h e only issue w a s w h e t h e r
t h e conclusion of t h e t h e n C o u r t of F i r s t I n s t a n c e w a s
i n c o n s o n a n c e w i t h law a n d j u r i s p r u d e n c e , h e n c e t h e
issue is consequently a p u r e l y legal q u e s t i o n . W h e r e ,
130

RULE 5

UNIFORM PROCEDURE IN TRIAL COURTS

SEC. 2

however, t h e issue w a s w h e t h e r t h e findings of fact of

said C o u r t o f F i r s t I n s t a n c e w e r e s u p p o r t e d b y s u b s t a n t i a l evidence, or such question w a s raised t o g e t h e r
with a purely legal issue, a petition for review should be
brought to t h e Court of Appeals in t h e form prescribed in
its Resolution of A u g u s t 12, 1971. It w a s opined t h e r e i n
t h a t a l t h o u g h Sec. 22 of B.P. Big. 129 a b a n d o n e d t h e
"substantial evidence" rule formerly provided u n d e r
R.A. 6031 in d e t e r m i n i n g w h e t h e r to give due course to
the petition, t h e question of w h e r e to file said petition,
as above s t a t e d , h a s not been affected by B.P. Big. 129
(Torres, et al. vs. Yu, et al, L-42626, Dec. 18, 1982; cf.
Mania vs. Vda. de Segarra, et al, L-48257, Aug. 24, 1984).
U n d e r t h e s e revised Rules, a p p e a l s from a decision
of t h e Regional T r i a l Court r e n d e r e d in t h e exercise of its
a p p e l l a t e j u r i s d i c t i o n s h a l l be b r o u g h t to t h e C o u r t of
Appeals r e g a r d l e s s of t h e issues involved. T h u s , Sec. 2
of Rule 42 r e q u i r e s t h a t in such a p p e a l t h e petition for
review to t h e C o u r t of Appeals m u s t set forth, inter alia,
"the specification of t h e e r r o r s of fact or law, or both,
allegedly committed by t h e Regional Trial Court."
6. W i t h respect to t h e system of amicably settling
disputes at t h e barangay level and which, in proper cases,
is a p r e r e q u i s i t e for t h e i n s t i t u t i o n of an action in court
u n d e r P.D. 1508, g e n e r a l l y referred to as t h e Katarungang Pambarangay d e c r e e , see n o t e s u n d e r Sec. 1,
Rule 123. Sec. 2 of said P.D. 1508 provided for t h e cases
within t h e jurisdiction of t h e lupon, while Sec. 3 thereof
d e t e r m i n e d t h e v e n u e o f t h e p r o c e e d i n g s , i.e., t h e
barangay w h e r e t h e p r o c e e d i n g s s h a l l be c o n d u c t e d
(Agbayani vs. Belen, et al, G.R. No. 65629, Nov. 24, 1986).
See, however, t h e corresponding provisions of the Local
G o v e r n m e n t C o d e of 1 9 9 1 (R.A. 7160) r e p r o d u c e d
thereunder.
7. Excepted from t h e uniform procedure as s t a t e d
in this Rule a r e t h e cases covered by t h e Rule on Sum131

RULE 5

REMEDIAL LAW COMPENDIUM

SEC. 2

m a r y Procedure promulgated by t h e S u p r e m e Court for

inferior courts effective August 1, 1983, a n d last revised
with effectivity on November 15, 1991, which w i t h respect
to civil cases provides as follows:
" P u r s u a n t to Section 36 of t h e J u d i c i a r y Reorganization Act of 1980 (B.P. Big. 129) and to achieve
an expeditious and inexpensive d e t e r m i n a t i o n of t h e
cases referred to herein, t h e Court Resolved to prom u l g a t e t h e following Revised Rule o n S u m m a r y
Procedure:
I.
Applicability
S E C T I O N 1. Scope. This rule shall govern t h e
s u m m a r y procedure in the Metropolitan Trial Courts,
t h e Municipal Trial Courts in Cities, t h e Municipal
Trial Courts, a n d t h e Municipal Circuit Trial C o u r t s
in t h e following cases falling w i t h i n t h e i r jurisdiction:
A. Civil Cases:
(1) All c a s e s o f f o r c i b l e e n t r y a n d u n l a w f u l
d e t a i n e r irrespective of t h e a m o u n t of d a m a g e s or
u n p a i d r e n t a l s sought to be recovered. W h e r e attorney's fees a r e a w a r d e d , t h e s a m e s h a l l not exceed
t w e n t y t h o u s a n d pesos (P20,000.00).
(2) All o t h e r civil cases, except p r o b a t e proceedings, w h e r e t h e total a m o u n t of t h e p l a i n t i f f s claim
does not exceed t e n t h o u s a n d p e s o s (P10.000.00),
exclusive of i n t e r e s t a n d costs.
X

II.
Civil Cases
SEC. 3. Pleadings.
A. Pleadings allowed. T h e only p l e a d i n g s
allowed to be filed a r e t h e complaints, compulsory
132

RULE 5

UNIFORM PROCEDURE IN TRIAL COURTS

SEC. 2

counterclaims and cross-claims pleaded in t h e answer,

and the answers thereto.
B.

Verification. All pleadings shall be verified.

S E C . 4. Duty of court. After t h e court determ i n e s t h a t t h e case falls u n d e r s u m m a r y procedure,

i t m a y , from a n e x a m i n a t i o n o f t h e a l l e g a t i o n s
t h e r e i n a n d such evidence as may be attached thereto,
dismiss the case o u t r i g h t on any of the grounds
a p p a r e n t therefrom for t h e dismissal of a civil action.
If no ground for dismissal is found, it shall forthwith issue summons which shall state t h a t the
s u m m a r y procedure u n d e r this Rule shall apply.
S E C . 5. Answer. W i t h i n t e n (10) d a y s from
s e r v i c e of s u m m o n s , t h e d e f e n d a n t s h a l l file his
a n s w e r to t h e complaint a n d serve a copy thereof on
t h e plaintiff. Affirmative a n d negative defenses not
pleaded t h e r e i n shall be deemed waived, except for
lack of jurisdiction over t h e subject m a t t e r . Crossclaims a n d compulsory counterclaims not a s s e r t e d in
t h e a n s w e r shall be considered barred. The a n s w e r
to c o u n t e r c l a i m s or cross-claims shall be filed and
served within t e n (10) days from service of the answer
in which they a r e pleaded.
S E C . 6. Effect of failure to answer. Should t h e
d e f e n d a n t fail to a n s w e r t h e complaint w i t h i n t h e
period above provided, t h e court, motu proprio, or on
motion of t h e plaintiff, shall r e n d e r j u d g m e n t as may
be w a r r a n t e d by t h e facts alleged in the complaint
a n d limited to w h a t is prayed for therein: Provided,
however, t h a t t h e court may in its discretion reduce
t h e a m o u n t of d a m a g e s and attorney's fees claimed
for being excessive or otherwise unconscionable. This
is w i t h o u t prejudice to the applicability of Section 4,
Rule 18 of t h e Rules of Court, if t h e r e are two or more
defendants.

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REMEDIAL LAW COMPENDIUM

SEC. 2

SEC. 7. Preliminary conference; appearance of

parties. Not later t h a n t h i r t y (30) days after the
last a n s w e r is filed, a preliminary conference shall be
held. The rules on pre-trial in ordinary cases shall
be applicable to t h e preliminary conference unless
inconsistent with the provisions of t h i s Rule.
The failure of t h e plaintiff to a p p e a r in t h e preliminary conference shall be a cause for t h e dismissal
of his complaint. The defendant who a p p e a r s in t h e
absence of t h e plaintiff shall be entitled to j u d g m e n t
on his c o u n t e r c l a i m in accordance w i t h Section 6
hereof. All cross-claims shall be dismissed.
If a sole defendant shall fail to appear, t h e plaintiff shall be entitled to j u d g m e n t in accordance with
Section 6 hereof. This Rule shall not apply w h e r e
one of two or more defendants sued u n d e r a common
cause of action who had pleaded a common defense
shall a p p e a r at t h e p r e l i m i n a r y conference.
S E C . 8. Record of preliminary conference.
Within five (5) days after t h e t e r m i n a t i o n of t h e preliminary conference, t h e court shall issue an order
s t a t i n g t h e m a t t e r s t a k e n u p t h e r e i n , including b u t
not limited to:
(a) W h e t h e r t h e p a r t i e s have arrived a t a n amicable s e t t l e m e n t , a n d if so, t h e t e r m s thereof;
(b) The stipulations or admissions e n t e r e d into
by t h e p a r t i e s ;
(c) W h e t h e r , on t h e basis of t h e pleadings a n d
t h e s t i p u l a t i o n s a n d admissions m a d e by t h e p a r t i e s ,
j u d g m e n t may be rendered without the need of
f u r t h e r p r o c e e d i n g s , i n which e v e n t t h e j u d g m e n t
s h a l l b e r e n d e r e d w i t h i n t h i r t y (30) d a y s from
issuance of t h e order;
(d) A clear specification of m a t e r i a l facts which
r e m a i n controverted; a n d

134

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UNIFORM PROCEDURE IN TRIAL COURTS

(e) S u c h o t h e r m a t t e r s i n t e n d e d to expedite t h e
disposition of t h e case.
SEC.
9.
Submission of affidavits and position
papers. W i t h i n t e n (10) days from receipt of t h e
o r d e r m e n t i o n e d in t h e next preceding section, t h e
p a r t i e s shall s u b m i t t h e affidavits of t h e i r witnesses
a n d o t h e r evidence on t h e factual issues defined in
t h e order, t o g e t h e r w i t h t h e i r position p a p e r s s e t t i n g
forth t h e law a n d t h e facts relied upon by t h e m .
S E C . 10.
Rendition of judgment. W i t h i n
t h i r t y (30) days after receipt of t h e last affidavits and
position p a p e r s , or t h e expiration of t h e period for
filing t h e s a m e , t h e court shall r e n d e r j u d g m e n t .
However, should t h e court find it necessary to
clarify c e r t a i n m a t e r i a l facts, it may, d u r i n g t h e said
period, issue an order specifying t h e m a t t e r s to be
clarified, a n d r e q u i r e t h e p a r t i e s to s u b m i t affidavits
or o t h e r evidence on t h e said m a t t e r s within t e n (10)
days from receipt of said order. J u d g m e n t shall be
r e n d e r e d w i t h i n fifteen (15) days after t h e receipt of
t h e l a s t clarificatory affidavits, or t h e expiration of
t h e period for filing t h e s a m e .
T h e c o u r t s h a l l not r e s o r t to clarificatory procedure to gain time for t h e rendition of t h e j u d g m e n t .
X

IV.
Common Provisions
SEC. 18. Referral to Lupon. Cases requiring
referral to t h e Lupon for conciliation u n d e r t h e provisions of P r e s i d e n t i a l Decree No. 1508 w h e r e t h e r e
is no showing of compliance with such requirement,
s h a l l be d i s m i s s e d w i t h o u t prejudice, a n d may be
r e v i v e d only a f t e r s u c h r e q u i r e m e n t s h a l l h a v e
been complied with, x x x.

135

RULE 6

REMEDIAL LAW COMPENDIUM

SEC. 2

SEC. 19.
Prohibited pleadings and motions.
The following pleadings, motions, or petitions shall
not be allowed in t h e cases covered by this Rule:
(a) Motion to dismiss the complaint x x x except
on t h e ground of lack of jurisdiction over the subject
matter, or failure to comply with the preceding section;
(b) Motion for a bill of p a r t i c u l a r s ;
(c) Motion for new trial, or for reconsideration of
a j u d g m e n t , or for reopening of trial;
(d) Petition for relief from j u d g m e n t ;
(e) Motion for extension of time to file pleadings,
affidavits or any other paper;
(0 Memoranda;
(g) P e t i t i o n for c e r t i o r a r i , m a n d a m u s , or prohibition a g a i n s t any interlocutory o r d e r issued by
t h e court;
(h) Motion to declare t h e defendant in default;
(i) Dilatory motions for postponement;
0) Reply;
(k) T h i r d - p a r t y complaints;
(1) I n t e r v e n t i o n s .
S E C . 2 0 . Affidavits. The affidavits r e q u i r e d
to be s u b m i t t e d u n d e r t h i s R u l e shall s t a t e only facts
of direct p e r s o n a l knowledge of t h e affiants which a r e
admissible in evidence, and shall show their
competence to testify to t h e m a t t e r s s t a t e d t h e r e i n .
A violation of t h i s r e q u i r e m e n t may subject
p a r t y or t h e counsel who s u b m i t s t h e s a m e to
ciplinary action, a n d shall be cause to expunge
i n a d m i s s i b l e affidavit or p o r t i o n t h e r e o f from
record.

the
disthe
the

S E C . 2 1 . Appeal. The j u d g m e n t or final order

shall be appealable to t h e a p p r o p r i a t e regional t r i a l
court which shall decide t h e s a m e in accordance with
Section 22 of B a t a s P a m b a n s a Big. 129. The decision
of t h e regional t r i a l court in civil cases governed by
t h i s R u l e , i n c l u d i n g forcible e n t r y a n d u n l a w f u l
136

RULE 5

UNIFORM PROCEDURE IN TRIAL COURTS

SEC. 2

d e t a i n e r , s h a l l b e i m m e d i a t e l y executory, w i t h o u t
prejudice to a further appeal t h a t may be t a k e n
therefrom. Section 10 of Rule 70 shall be deemed
repealed.
SEC. 22.
Applicability of the regular rules.
T h e r e g u l a r p r o c e d u r e p r e s c r i b e d in t h e Rules of
C o u r t s h a l l apply to t h e special cases herein provided
for in a suppletory capacity insofar as they a r e not
inconsistent h e r e w i t h .
S E C . 2 3 . Effectivity. T h i s r e v i s e d Rule on
S u m m a r y P r o c e d u r e s h a l l be effective on November 15, 1991."
8. New court r u l e s apply to pending cases only
with reference to proceedings t h e r e i n which t a k e place
after t h e d a t e of t h e i r effectivity. They do not apply to
the e x t e n t t h a t in t h e opinion of t h e court t h e i r application would not be feasible or would work injustice, in
which e v e n t t h e former p r o c e d u r e s h a l l apply. T h u s ,
where t h e application of t h e Rule on S u m m a r y Procedure
will m e a n t h e dismissal of t h e appeal of t h e p a r t y , t h e
same should not apply since, after all, t h e procedure they
availed of w a s also allowed u n d e r t h e Rules of C o u r t
(Laguio, et al. vs. Garnet, et al, G.R. No. 74903, Mar. 21,
1989).
9. While Sec. 6 (now, Sec. 7) of t h e Rule on Summary Procedure makes a preliminary conference
m a n d a t o r y , it does not logically follow t h a t the absence
thereof would necessarily render nugatory the proceedings
had in t h e court below. A preliminary conference u n d e r
this Rule is akin a n d similar to a pre-trial u n d e r Rule 20,
both provisions being e s s e n t i a l l y designed to p r o m o t e
amicable s e t t l e m e n t or to simplify t h e trial. Proceedings
conducted w i t h o u t pre-trial or a legally defective pre-trial
have been voided because e i t h e r of t h e p a r t i e s t h e r e t o
suffered s u b s t a n t i a l prejudice thereby or were denied due
process. T h u s , unless t h e r e is a showing of s u b s t a n t i a l
137

RULE S

REMEDIAL LAW COMPENDIUM

prejudice caused to a p a r t y , t h e i n a d v e r t e n t failure to

c a l e n d a r for a n d c o n d u c t a p r e - t r i a l o r p r e l i m i n a r y
conference cannot r e n d e r t h e proceedings illegal or void
ab initio. A p a r t y ' s failure to object to t h e absence of a
p r e l i m i n a r y conference, despite opportunity to do so, is
deemed a waiver of t h e right t h e r e t o , especially w h e r e
t h e p a r t y h a d a l r e a d y s u b m i t t e d to t h e j u r i s d i c t i o n of
t h e t r i a l court (Martinez, et al. vs. De la Merced, et al.,
G.R. No. 82039, June 20, 1989).
10. E x c e p t i n c a s e s c o v e r e d b y t h e a g r i c u l t u r a l
t e n a n c y laws or w h e n the law o t h e r w i s e expressly
p r o v i d e s , all a c t i o n s for forcible e n t r y a n d u n l a w f u l
d e t a i n e r , irrespective of t h e a m o u n t of d a m a g e s or u n p a i d
r e n t a l s sought to be recovered, a r e now governed by t h e
s u m m a r y procedure provided in revised Rule 70.

138

P R O C E D U R E I N R E G I O N A L TRIAL C O U R T S
RULE 6
KINDS OF PLEADINGS
S e c t i o n 1. Pleadings defined. P l e a d i n g s a r e t h e
written statements of the respective claims and
d e f e n s e s o f t h e p a r t i e s s u b m i t t e d t o t h e c o u r t for
appropriate judgment, (la)
S e c . 2. Pleadings allowed. T h e c l a i m s of a p a r t y
are a s s e r t e d i n a c o m p l a i n t , c o u n t e r c l a i m , c r o s s claim, third (fourth, etc.)-party complaint or
complaint-in-intervention.
The d e f e n s e s of a party are alleged in the a n s w e r
to the pleading asserting a claim against him.
A n a n s w e r m a y b e r e s p o n d e d t o b y a r e p l y , (n)
NOTE
1. In a broad sense, the t e r m "pleadings" includes
all p a p e r s filed, excluding evidentiary m a t t e r s , from the
complaint down to the j u d g m e n t . Documents a t t a c h e d to
the p l e a d i n g s a n d m a d e a p a r t thereof a r e considered
evidence a n d also p a r t of t h e pleadings (Asia Banking
Corporation vs. Olsen & Co., 48 Phil. 529).
A bill of
particulars constitutes p a r t of the pleading that it
s u p p l e m e n t s (Sec. 6, Rule 12). A covering l e t t e r for a
pleading is not p a r t of t h e l a t t e r (Clorox Co. vs. Director
of Patents, L-19531, Aug. 10, 1967).
S e c . 3 . Complaint. T h e c o m p l a i n t i s t h e
pleading alleging the plaintiffs cause or causes of
action. The n a m e s and residences of the plaintiff
and d e f e n d a n t m u s t b e s t a t e d i n t h e c o m p l a i n t . (3a)

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NOTES
1. The provisions of t h i s section with r e g a r d to a
complaint are also t r u e with and are applicable to other
initiatory pleadings, as well as to petitions filed in the
t r i a l or appellate courts, except t h a t , in t h e l a t t e r case, it
is t h e act of t h e lower court which is complained of t h a t
has to be alleged, instead of a cause of action as technically
understood.
2. The jurisdiction of the court a n d t h e n a t u r e of t h e
action a r e d e t e r m i n e d by t h e a v e r m e n t s in t h e complaint.
The p r a y e r for relief is not controlling on t h e court and
is merely advisory as to t h e n a t u r e of t h e action, as it is
t h e a v e r m e n t s in t h e complaint which control. See notes
u n d e r Sec. 2, Rule 7.
S e c . 4. Answer. An a n s w e r is a p l e a d i n g in
w h i c h a defending party sets forth his defenses.
(4a)
S e c . 5 . Defenses. D e f e n s e s m a y e i t h e r b e
negative or affirmative.
(a) A n e g a t i v e d e f e n s e i s t h e s p e c i f i c d e n i a l o f
t h e material fact or facts alleged in t h e p l e a d i n g of
the claimant essential to his cause or causes of
action.
(b) An a f f i r m a t i v e d e f e n s e is an a l l e g a t i o n of a
new matter which, while hypothetically admitting
the material allegations in the pleading of the
c l a i m a n t , w o u l d n e v e r t h e l e s s p r e v e n t or bar
recovery by him. The affirmative defenses include
fraud, statute of limitations, release, payment,
illegality, statute of frauds, estoppel, former
recovery, discharge in bankruptcy, and any other
m a t t e r b y w a y o f c o n f e s s i o n a n d a v o i d a n c e . (5a)

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NOTES
1. Section 5(a) defines a "negative defense" as the
specific denial of t h e m a t e r i a l allegations in the complaint.
A d e n i a l is not specific j u s t b e c a u s e it is so qualified
(Agton vs. CA, et al., L-37309, Mar. 30, 1982), a n d t h i s is
especially t r u e w h e r e a b l a n k e t denial is made of all t h e
averments of t h e complaint i n s t e a d of dealing particularly
with e a c h . S u c h a g e n e r a l d e n i a l will be d e e m e d an
admission of t h e a v e r m e n t s in t h e complaint.
2. To be considered a specific denial, Rule 8 provides:
"Sec. 10. Specific denial. The defendant m u s t
specify e a c h m a t e r i a l allegation of fact t h e t r u t h of
which he does not a d m i t and, w h e n e v e r practicable,
s h a l l s e t forth t h e s u b s t a n c e o f t h e m a t t e r s upon
which he relies to s u p p o r t his denial. Where a
d e f e n d a n t d e s i r e s to deny only a p a r t of an a v e r m e n t ,
he shall specify so much of it as is t r u e and m a t e r i a l
and shall deny only the r e m a i n d e r . Where a
defendant is without knowledge or information
sufficient to form a belief as to t h e t r u t h of a m a t e r i a l
a v e r m e n t m a d e in t h e complaint, he shall so s t a t e ,
and t h i s s h a l l have t h e effect of a denial."
3. Sec. 5(b) defines a n d illustrates t h e so-called
affirmative defenses. The e n u m e r a t i o n is not exclusive.
Thus, res judicata (Fernandez vs. De Castro, 48 Phil. 123),
ultra Mrofl aoto of a oorporation, or lack of a u t h o r i t y of a
person assuming to a c t for the corporation (Ramirez vs.
Orientalist Co., 38 Phil. 634), laches (Gov't of the P.I. vs.
Wagner, et al., 49 Phil. 944), a n d u n c o n s t i t u t i o n a l i t y
(Santiago vs. Far Eastern Broadcasting Co., 73 Phil. 408)
are affirmative d e f e n s e s which should be specifically
pleaded. F u r t h e r m o r e , if no motion to dismiss had been
filed, a n y of t h e g r o u n d s t h e r e f o r m a y be r a i s e d as
affirmative defenses in t h e a n s w e r (Sec. 6, Rule 16).

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S e c . 6. Counterclaim. A c o u n t e r c l a i m is a n y
claim w h i c h a defending party may have against
a n o p p o s i n g p a r t y . (6a)
S e c . 7.
Compulsory counterclaim.A c o m p u l s o r y
counterclaim is one which, being cognizable by the
regular courts of justice, arises^ out ofjor is
connected with the transaction or occurrence
constituting the subject matter of the opposing
party's c l a i m and d o e s not r e q u i r e for its
adjudication the presence of third parties of w h o m
the court cannot acquire jurisdiction. Such a
counterclaim must be within the jurisdiction of the
court both as to the a m o u n t and the nature thereof,
except that in an original action before the
Regional Trial Court, the c o u n t e r c l a i m may be
c o n s i d e r e d c o m p u l s o r y r e g a r d l e s s o f t h e a m o u n t , (n)
NOTES
1. In American law from which we have derived t h e
concept of a counterclaim, it is considered as in effect a
new s u i t in which t h e p a r t y n a m e d as t h e d e f e n d a n t is
t h e p l a i n t i f f a n d t h e plaintiff b e c o m e s t h e d e f e n d a n t
(Roberts Min. & Mill Co. vs. Schroder, CCA. Nev., 95 F.
2d 522). It is b u t a n o t h e r n a m e for a cross-petition (Clark
vs. Duncanson, 79 Okl. 180, 192 P. 806, 16 A.L.R. 450) or
is a s u b s t i t u t e for a cross-bill in equity (Vidal vs. South
American Securities Co., CCA. N.Y., 276 F. 855).
The
t e r m is b r o a d e r in m e a n i n g t h a n set-off or r e c o u p m e n t ,
and includes t h e m both (Williams vs. Williams, 192 N.C.
405, 135 S.E. 39; Aetna Life Insurance Co. vs. Griffin,
200 N.C. 251, 156 S.E. 515).
2. A c l a r i f i c a t i o n h a s b e e n i n c o r p o r a t e d in t h e
d e f i n i t i o n of a c o m p u l s o r y c o u n t e r c l a i m by r e a s o n of
d i v e r g e n t views i n t h e p a s t a s t o w h e t h e r o r not t h e
a m o u n t involved in t h e counterclaim should be t a k e n into
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account w h e n such a counterclaim is pleaded in t h e Regional Trial Court, in t h e s a m e m a n n e r as t h e rule on

j u r i s d i c t i o n a l a m o u n t r e q u i r e d for a c o m p l a i n t filed
therein. The present formulation makes it clear t h a t
such a counterclaim may be e n t e r t a i n e d by t h e Regional
Trial Court r e g a r d l e s s of t h e a m o u n t involved provided
that, in addition to t h e other r e q u i r e m e n t s , it is cognizable
by t h e r e g u l a r c o u r t s of j u s t i c e . T h u s , for i n s t a n c e , a
claim a r i s i n g from a labor dispute, a l t h o u g h w i t h i n t h e
jurisdictional a m o u n t provided for Regional Trial Courts,
may not be raised as a counterclaim t h e r e i n as, u n d e r t h e
law presently in force, t h e same should be filed in t h e labor
t r i b u n a l s or agencies. The s a m e is t r u e with respect to
other claims jurisdiction over which is vested exclusively
in the quasi-judicial agencies.
3. As t h u s clarified, counterclaims a r e classified a n d
distinguished as follows:
A compulsory counterclaim- is one which arises out
of or is n e c e s s a r i l y c o n n e c t e d w i t h t h e t r a n s a c t i o n or
occurrence t h a t is t h e s u b j e c t - m a t t e r of t h e opposing
party's claim. If it is w i t h i n t h e jurisdiction of a r e g u l a r
court of j u s t i c e a n d it does not r e q u i r e for its adjudication t h e presence of t h i r d p a r t i e s over whom t h e court
cannot acquire jurisdiction, it is b a r r e d if not set up in
the action (see Sec. 2, Rule 9). This is also known as a
"recoupment" (Lopez vs. Glories 40 Phil, 26).
A permissive counterclaim does not arise out of nor
is it necessarily connected w i t h the subject-matter of t h e
opposing p a r t y ' s claim. It is not b a r r e d even if not set up
in the action. This is also known as a "set-off (Lopez vs.
Gloria, supra).
4. Accordingly, even if t h e counterclaim arises out
of t h e s u b j e c t - m a t t e r of t h e opposing p a r t y ' s claim but
it is not w i t h i n t h e jurisdiction of the regular courts of
justice, or it r e q u i r e s for its adjudication the presence of
third p a r t i e s over whom the court cannot acquire
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jurisdiction, it is considered as only a permissive counterclaim a n d is not b a r r e d even if not set up in t h e action
(see also Sec. 2, Rule 9).
5. A counterclaim is, therefore, compulsory if (a) it
arises out of, or is necessarily connected with, t h e t r a n s action or occurrence which is t h e s u b j e c t - m a t t e r of t h e
o p p o s i n g p a r t y ' s claim; (b) it does not r e q u i r e for its
adjudication t h e presence of t h i r d p a r t i e s of w h o m t h e
court c a n n o t acquire jurisdiction; a n d (c) subject to t h e
qualification on t h e jurisdictional a m o u n t w i t h r e g a r d to
c o u n t e r c l a i m s r a i s e d in t h e Regional T r i a l C o u r t s , t h e
court h a s j u r i s d i c t i o n to e n t e r t a i n t h e claim. While a
n u m b e r of criteria have been advanced for t h e d e t e r m i n a t i o n of w h e t h e r t h e c o u n t e r c l a i m is c o m p u l s o r y or
permissive, t h e "one compelling t e s t of compulsoriness"
is t h e logical relationship b e t w e e n t h e claim alleged in
t h e complaint a n d t h a t in t h e counterclaim, i.e., w h e r e
s e p a r a t e t r i a l s of e a c h of t h e r e s p e c t i v e c l a i m s would
involve a s u b s t a n t i a l d u p l i c a t i o n of effort or t i m e by
t h e p a r t i e s a n d t h e courts, a s w h e r e they involve m a n y
of t h e s a m e factual and/or legal issues (Quintanilla vs.
CA, et al., G.R. No. 101747, Sept. 24, 1997).
In Alday vs. FGU Insurance Corp. (G.R. No. 138822,
J a n . 23, 2001), t h e S u p r e m e Court r e i t e r a t e d t h e c r i t e r i a
in d e t e r m i n i n g w h e t h e r a counterclaim is compulsory or
permissive, t h a t is, w h e t h e r or not (I) t h e issues of fact
and law raised by the claim and c o u n t e r c l a i m are
essentially t h e s a m e , (2) res judicata would b a r a subs e q u e n t s u i t or defendant's claim a b s e n t t h e compulsory
c o u n t e r c l a i m r u l e , (3) s u b s t a n t i a l l y t h e s a m e evidence
s u p p o r t o r r e f u t e t h e claim a n d t h e c o u n t e r c l a i m , o r
(4) t h e r e is a logical relation b e t w e e n t h e claim a n d t h e
c o u n t e r c l a i m (citing Valencia vs. CA, et al. [263 SCRA
275J). See also Tan vs. Kaakbay Finance Corp., et al.,
G.R. No. 146595, June 20, 2003, a n d c a s e s d i s c u s s e d
therein.

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6. An after-acquired counterclaim is not barred, even

if t h e s a m e a r i s e s out of or is necessarily connected with
the claim alleged in t h e complaint in t h e previous case
but was not set up t h e r e i n , since Sec. 8 of Rule 11 provides
t h a t a compulsory counterclaim " t h a t a defending p a r t y
has at the time he files his answer s h a l l be c o n t a i n e d
therein" (Tiu Po vs. Bautista, G.R. No. 55514, Mar. 17,
1981).
7. W h e r e t h e c o u n t e r c l a i m , a n d t h e s a m e is t r u e
with a cross-claim, w a s already in existence at t h e time
the d e f e n d a n t filed his a n s w e r b u t was not set up t h e r e i n
t h r o u g h o v e r s i g h t , i n a d v e r t e n c e , or excusable neglect,
or w h e n justice so r e q u i r e s , t h e s a m e may be set up by
filing an a m e n d e d a n s w e r (Sec. 10, Rule 11). Where said
counterclaim or cross-claim m a t u r e d after t h e filing of t h e
a n s w e r , t h e d e f e n d i n g p a r t y c a n s e t it up by filing a
s u p p l e m e n t a l a n s w e r or p l e a d i n g (Sec. 9, Rule 11). In
either case, leave of court is required and such pleadings
must be filed before t h e rendition of the j u d g m e n t .
8. A c o u n t e r c l a i m or c r o s s - c l a i m n e e d n o t be
answered if it is based on a n d inseparable from t h e very
defense r a i s e d by t h e opposing p a r t y as it will merely
r e s u l t in said opposing p a r t y p l e a d i n g t h e s a m e facts
already raised in his former pleading (Navarro vs. Bello,
102 Phil. 1019) or w h e r e t h e counterclaim merely alleges
the opposite of t h e facts in t h e complaint (Ballecer vs.
Bernardo, L-21766, Sept. 30, 1966).
Thus, where the
counterclaims a r e only for d a m a g e s and attorney's fees
arising from t h e filing of t h e complaint, the same shall be
considered as special defenses and need not be answered
(see Worcester vs. Lorenzana, 104 Phil. 234).
9. A plaintiff who chooses not to a n s w e r a compulsory counterclaim cannot be declared in default on such
counterclaim. Where t h e complaint is for consolidation
because t h e period for redemption had expired and the

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counterclaim is for reformation on t h e ground t h a t the

document was really a mortgage, the inconsistent
allegations in t h e complaint s t a n d as an a n s w e r to t h e
counterclaim (Gojo vs. Goyola, L-26768, Oct. 30, 1970).
10. A counterclaim or cross-claim m u s t be a n s w e r e d
w i t h i n 10 days from service (Sec. 4, Rule 11). W h e r e t h e
p a r t y is in default on said counterclaim or cross-claim,
t h e court may r e n d e r j u d g m e n t g r a n t i n g such relief as
the pleading may w a r r a n t or require the claimant to
s u b m i t evidence (Sec. 3, Rule 9).
1 1 . Although t h e G o v e r n m e n t is
from suit, if it files an action a g a i n s t
s u r r e n d e r s its privileged position and
validly file a c o u n t e r c l a i m a g a i n s t
Oriental Shipping Co., 95 Phil. 905).

generally i m m u n e
a p r i v a t e p a r t y , it
t h e d e f e n d a n t may
it (Froilan vs. Pan

12. It is not proper to allow a counterclaim to be filed

a g a i n s t a lawyer who h a s filed a complaint for his client
and is merely his r e p r e s e n t a t i v e in court, not a plaintiff
or c o m p l a i n a n t in t h e case, since such a procedure would
r e s u l t in mischievous consequences. A lawyer owes his
client e n t i r e devotion to his genuine i n t e r e s t , w a r m zeal
in t h e m a i n t e n a n c e a n d defense of his r i g h t s , a n d t h e
exertion of his u t m o s t l e a r n i n g a n d ability. He cannot
properly a t t e n d to his d u t i e s if, in t h e s a m e case, he is
k e p t busy defending himself. Where t h e lawyer acts in
t h e n a m e of a client, t h e c o u r t s h o u l d not p e r m i t his
being impleaded as an additional p a r t y d e f e n d a n t in t h e
c o u n t e r c l a i m in t h e very s a m e case w h e r e he is acting
only as a counsel. Any claim for alleged d a m a g e s or o t h e r
causes of action a g a i n s t h i m should be filed in an entirely
s e p a r a t e a n d d i s t i n c t civil a c t i o n (Chavez, etc. vs.
Sandiganbayan,
et al., G.R. No. 91391, Jan. 24, 1991).
S e c . 8. Cross-claim. A c r o s s - c l a i m is a n y c l a i m
by one party against a co-party arising out of the

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SECS. 9-10

transaction or occurrence that is the subject matter

either of the original action or of a counterclaim
therein. Such cross-claim may include a claim that
the party against w h o m it is asserted is or may be
l i a b l e t o t h e c r o s s - c l a i m a n t for all o r p a r t o f a c l a i m
asserted in the action against the cross-claimant.
(7)
NOTES
1. A cross-claim differs from a counterclaim in t h a t
the former is filed a g a i n s t a co-party a n d a cross-claim
always a r i s e s out of t h e t r a n s a c t i o n or occurrence t h a t is
t h e s u b j e c t - m a t t e r e i t h e r of t h e original action or of a
counterclaim t h e r e i n . A cross-claim which is not set up
in t h e a c t i o n is b a r r e d , e x c e p t w h e n it is o u t s i d e t h e
jurisdiction of t h e court or if t h e court c a n n o t acquire
jurisdiction over t h i r d p a r t i e s whose presence is necessary
for t h e adjudication of said cross-claim (Sec. 8 of this Rule;
Sec. 2, Rule 9). The l a t t e r case is w h a t some w r i t e r s call
a permissive cross-claim.
2. The dismissal of t h e complaint carries with it the
dismissal of a cross-claim which is purely defensive, but
not a cross-claim seeking affirmative relief (Torres, et al.
vs. CA, et al., L-25889, Jan. 12, 1973).
S e c . 9.
Counter-counterclaims and counter-crossclaims. A c o u n t e r c l a i m m a y be a s s e r t e d a g a i n s t
an original counter-claimant.
A c r o s s - c l a i m m a y also be filed a g a i n s t an
o r i g i n a l c r o s s - c l a i m a n t , (n)
S e c . 10. Reply. A r e p l y is a p l e a d i n g , t h e office
or function of w h i c h is to deny, or allege facts in
denial or avoidance of new matters alleged by way
of defense in the answer and thereby join or make
issue as to s u c h n e w matters. If a party does not
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file s u c h r e p l y , all t h e n e w m a t t e r s a l l e g e d in t h e
a n s w e r a r e d e e m e d c o n t r o v e r t e d , '-h ^ p P
If the plaintiff wishes to interpose any claims
arising out of the new matters so alleged, such
claims shall be set forth in an a m e n d e d or
s u p p l e m e n t a l c o m p l a i n t . (11)
NOTES
1. The p r i m a r y purpose of t h e reply is to join issues
with new m a t t e r s raised in t h e a n s w e r and t h e r e b y authorize t h e p l e a d e r of t h e reply to introduce evidence on
said new issues.
2. T h e filing of t h e reply is o p t i o n a l as t h e new
matters raised in the answer are deemed controverted
even w i t h o u t a reply. Where t h e p a r t y desires to file a
reply, he m u s t n e v e r t h e l e s s do so w i t h i n 10 days from
service of t h e pleading responded to (Sec. 6, Rule 11).
3. As t h e n formulated, it was believed t h a t in t h e
following i n s t a n c e s , t h e filing of a reply w a s compulsory
a n d m u s t be filed w i t h i n t h e said 10-day period:
(a) W h e r e t h e a n s w e r alleges t h e defense of u s u r y
in which case a reply u n d e r o a t h is required, otherwise
t h e allegations of u s u r y a r e deemed a d m i t t e d (Sec. 11,
Rule 8); a n d
(b) W h e r e t h e a n s w e r i s b a s e d o n a n a c t i o n a b l e
d o c u m e n t in which case a verified reply is n e c e s s a r y ,
otherwise the genuineness and due execution of said
actionable document are generally deemed admitted
(Sec. 8, Rule 8).
With respect to p a r . (a) on usury, t h e view t h a t all
a l l e g a t i o n s of u s u r y h a d to be d e n i e d specifically a n d
u n d e r o a t h w a s e n g e n d e r e d by t h e fact t h a t t h e former
Sec. 1 of Rule 9, in m a k i n g t h e r e q u i r e m e n t for such
sworn denial u n d e r pain of admission of t h e allegations
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on usury, did not m a k e any distinction as to t h e pleadings

involved.
However, in Liam Law vs. Olympic Sawmill,
et al. (L-30771, May 26, 1984), it was held t h a t p u r s u a n t
to Sec. 9 of t h e U s u r y Law, t h e first abovecited instance
r e q u i r i n g denial of allegations of u s u r y u n d e r o a t h does
not apply to a case w h e r e it is t h e defendant, not t h e
plaintiff, who is alleging usury.
Accordingly, Sec. 11 of Rule 8 now e x p r e s s e s t h a t
specific r e q u i r e m e n t a n d provides t h a t "(a)llegations of
u s u r y in a c o m p l a i n t to recover u s u r i o u s i n t e r e s t a r e
deemed a d m i t t e d if not denied u n d e r oath." Hence, if t h e
allegation of u s u r y is contained in the defendant's
answer, for i n s t a n c e , by way of defense to a complaint
for a s u m of money, it is not necessary for plaintiff to file
a reply t h e r e t o in o r d e r to deny t h a t allegation u n d e r
oath.
It is believed, however, t h a t if such allegation was
made by t h e defendant in a counterclaim in t h a t action,
it would be necessary for plaintiff, in order to controvert
the s a m e , to m a k e a specific d e n i a l u n d e r o a t h in t h e
answer to such counterclaim since t h e latter, after all, is
in t h e n a t u r e of a counter-complaint of t h e defendant.
In fact, u n d e r Sec. 1, Rule 3, t h e t e r m "plaintiff may refer
to t h e claiming p a r t y , t h e counter-claimant, t h e crossclaimant, or t h e t h i r d (fourth, etc.) party-plaintiff.
The distinction here proposed is due to the fact t h a t
a c o u n t e r c l a i m i n v o l v e s a c a u s e of a c t i o n a n d s e e k s
affirmative relief, while a defense merely defeats t h e
p l a i n t i f f s cause of action by a denial or confession and
avoidance, and does not a d m i t of affirmative relief to t h e
d e f e n d a n t (Lovett vs. Lovett, 93 Fla. 611, 112 So. 768;
Secor vs. Silver, 165 Iowa 673, 146 N.W. 845).
4. Where t h e case is submitted on the pleadings, the
failure of the p a r t y to make a reply does not mean t h a t
he is deemed to have controverted t h e issues raised in
the answer, as this is an exception to the rule (Falcasantos
149

RULE 6

REMEDIAL LAW COMPENDIUM

SEC. 11

vs. How Suy Ching, 91 Phil. 456).

5. A p a r t y cannot, in his reply, a m e n d his cause of
action (Calvo vs. Roldan, 76 Phil. 445) nor i n t r o d u c e
t h e r e i n new or a d d i t i o n a l c a u s e s of action (Anaya vs.
Palaroan, L-27930, Nov. 26, 1970).
S e c . 1 1 . Third, (fourth, etc.) - p a r t y complaint.
A t h i r d ( f o u r t h , etc.) - p a r t y c o m p l a i n t is a c l a i m
t h a t a d e f e n d i n g p a r t y m a y , w i t h l e a v e o f c o u r t , file
a g a i n s t a p e r s o n n o t a p a r t y to t h e a c t i o n , c a l l e d
t h e t h i r d ( f o u r t h , etc.) - p a r t y d e f e n d a n t , for
contribution, indemnity, subrogation or any other
relief, i n r e s p e c t o f h i s o p p o n e n t ' s c l a i m . ( 1 2 a )
- ..

----

'

J.'.y

...

wj

NOTES
1. A t h i r d - p a r t y complaint is similar to a cross-claim
in t h a t t h e t h i r d - p a r t y plaintiff s e e k s to recover from
a n o t h e r p e r s o n some relief i n r e s p e c t t o t h e opposing
p a r t y ' s claim, b u t it differs therefrom in t h a t in a crossclaim, t h e t h i r d p a r t y is a l r e a d y impleaded in t h e action
while in a t h i r d - p a r t y complaint, said t h i r d p a r t y is not
y e t i m p l e a d e d . Consequently,- in t h e filing of a t h i r d p a r t y complaint, leave of court is r e q u i r e d as thereafter,
if g r a n t e d , s u m m o n s will have to be served on t h e thirdp a r t y defendant.
2. A t h i r d - p a r t y complaint need not arise out of or
be e n t i r e l y d e p e n d e n t on t h e m a i n action as it suffices
t h a t t h e former be only "in respect of t h e claim of t h e
t h i r d - p a r t y p l a i n t i f f s opponent. Consequently, t h e judgm e n t on a t h i r d - p a r t y complaint may become final a n d
executory w i t h o u t w a i t i n g for t h e final d e t e r m i n a t i o n of
t h e m a i n case (Pascual vs. Bautista, L 21644, May 29,
1970).
3. A t h i r d - p a r t y complaint is similar to a complaint
in i n t e r v e n t i o n (Rule 19) in t h a t both r e s u l t in b r i n g i n g
150

RULE 6

KINDS OF PLEADINGS

SEC. 11

into t h e action a t h i r d person who was not originally a

party; but they differ in t h a t t h e initiative in a t h i r d - p a r t y
complaint is w i t h t h e person already a p a r t y to t h e action,
while in intervention t h e initiative is with a non-party
who s e e k s t o j o i n t h e a c t i o n . T h e d e f e n d a n t i s n o t
compelled to bring t h i r d p a r t i e s into t h e litigation as t h e
rule simply p e r m i t s t h e inclusion of anyone who meets
the s t a n d a r d set forth therein, in order to avoid multiplicity
of s u i t s (see Balbastro, et al. vs. CA, et al., L-33255
Nov. 29, 1972).
4. The t e s t s to d e t e r m i n e w h e t h e r the t h i r d - p a r t y
complaint is in respect of plaintiff s claim a r e :
"a. W h e r e it a r i s e s out of t h e s a m e t r a n s a c t i o n on
which t h e p l a i n t i f f s claim is based; or w h e t h e r t h e thirdparty claim, a l t h o u g h arising out of a n o t h e r or different
contract or t r a n s a c t i o n , is connected with the p l a i n t i f f s
claim;
b. W h e t h e r t h e t h i r d - p a r t y defendant would be liable
to the plaintiff or to t h e defendant for all or p a r t of t h e
plaintiff's claim a g a i n s t t h e original defendant, although
the t h i r d - p a r t y defendant's liability arises out of a n o t h e r
transaction; a n d
c. W h e t h e r t h e t h i r d - p a r t y defendant may assert any
defenses which t h e t h i r d - p a r t y plaintiff h a s or may have
to t h e p l a i n t i f f s claim" (see Capayas vs. CFI of Albay,
et al. 77 Phil. 181).
C o n s e q u e n t l y , a d e f e n d a n t may file a t h i r d - p a r t y
complaint in t h e s a m e capacity in which he is being sued
in t h e original complaint. A plaintiff may also file a thirdparty complaint b u t also in t h e same capacity in which he
is sued u n d e r a counterclaim.
5. Where t h e t r i a l court has jurisdiction over the
main case, it also h a s jurisdiction over t h e t h i r d - p a r t y
complaint regardless of t h e a m o u n t involved as a thirdparty complaint is merely auxiliary to and is a continua151

RULE 6

REMEDIAL LAW COMPENDIUM

SEC. 11

tion of t h e main action (Republic vs. Central Surety &

Insurance Co., et al., L-27802, Oct. 26, 1968; Eastern
Assurance & Surety Corp. vs. Cui, et al., G.R. No. 54452,
July 20, 1981). For t h e s a m e r e a s o n , w h a t is d e t e r minative of venue a r e t h e operative facts in the main case,
and not those alleged in t h e t h i r d - p a r t y complaint.
6. An order disallowing a t h i r d - p a r t y complaint is
appealable (Dtr&ioo uai Malagat, L-2413, Aug. 10, 1967)
since it would finally dispose of d e f e n d a n t ' s r i g h t to
implead the t h i r d p a r t y .
7. Where a t h i r d - p a r t y defendant appealed to the
t h e n Court of F i r s t Instance but t h e t h i r d - p a r t y plaintiff
(defendant) did not a p p e a l from t h e j u d g m e n t a g a i n s t
him in favor of t h e plaintiff, such j u d g m e n t became executory, w i t h o u t prejudice to t h e t h i r d - p a r t y defendant's
appeal being given due course as it p e r t a i n s only to t h e
t h i r d - p a r t y complaint (Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. vs.
Tempongko, L-24399, Mar. 28, 1969) a n d such j u d g m e n t
on t h e t h i r d - p a r t y complaint is s e p a r a t e a n d severable
from t h a t in t h e m a i n case.
8. Where t h e t r i a l court dismissed t h e complaint
a n d t h e d e f e n d a n t s ' t h i r d - p a r t y complaint a n d only t h e
plaintiff appealed, t h e Court of Appeals, in r e v e r s i n g t h e
j u d g m e n t dismissing p l a i n t i f f s complaint, c a n n o t m a k e
a f i n d i n g of l i a b i l i t y on t h e p a r t of t h e t h i r d - p a r t y
defendants since t h e defendants, as t h i r d - p a r t y plaintiffs,
did not a p p e a l from t h e d i s m i s s a l of t h e i r t h i r d - p a r t y
complaint and the third-party defendants were not
p a r t i e s in t h e case on a p p e a l (Go, et al. vs. CA, et al,
L-25393, Oct. 30, 1980).
9. A t h i r d - p a r t y c o m p l a i n t c a n n o t be filed in a
special civil action for declaratory relief as no m a t e r i a l
relief is sought in t h i s action
(Comm. of Customs, et al.
vs. Cloribel, et al., L-21036, June 30, 1977).

152

RULE 6

KINDS OF PLEADINGS

SECS. 12, 13

S e c . 12. Bringing new parties. W h e n t h e

presence of parties other than those to the original
a c t i o n i s r e q u i r e d for t h e g r a n t i n g o f c o m p l e t e r e l i e f
in the d e t e r m i n a t i o n of a c o u n t e r c l a i m or crossclaim, the court shall order them to be brought in
as defendants, if jurisdiction over them can be
o b t a i n e d . (14)
NOTES
1. F o r p u r p o s e s of Sec. 12 of t h i s Rule, t h e court
m a y a u t h o r i z e t h e filing o f t h e p r o p e r t h i r d - p a r t y
complaint to implead t h e o t h e r p a r t i e s not included in
the original complaint (Rubio vs. Mariano, et al., L-30403,
Jan. 31, 1973).
2. E v e n w h e r e t h e i m p l e a d i n g of t h e t h i r d - p a r t y
defendants does not fall squarely within t h e requisites of
Sec. 12, Rule 6 on t h i r d - p a r t y complaints, their inclusion
in t h e action may be p e r m i t t e d where t h e r e is a question
of law or fact common to t h e r i g h t in which they a r e
i n t e r e s t e d a n d a n o t h e r right sought to be enforced in the
action, hence t h e i r inclusion as proper (now, necessary)
p a r t i e s is j u s t i f i e d u n d e r Sec. 6, Rule 3 of t h e Rules
(Balbastro, et al. vs. CA, et al., supra).
S e c . 13. Answer to third (fourth, etc.) - party
complaint. A t h i r d ( f o u r t h , etc.) - p a r t y d e f e n d a n t
may allege in his answer his defenses, counterclaims or cross-claims, including such defenses that
t h e t h i r d ( f o u r t h , etc.) - p a r t y p l a i n t i f f m a y h a v e
against the original p l a i n t i f f s claim. In proper
cases, he may also assert a counterclaim against
t h e o r i g i n a l p l a i n t i f f i n r e s p e c t o f t h e latter's c l a i m
a g a i n s t t h e t h i r d - p a r t y plaintiff, (n)

153

RULE 7
PARTS OF A P L E A D I N G
S e c t i o n 1. Caption. T h e c a p t i o n s e t s f o r t h t h e
name of the court, the title of the action, and the
docket number if assigned.
The title of the action indicates the names of
t h e p a r t i e s . T h e y s h a l l all b e n a m e d i n t h e o r i g i n a l
c o m p l a i n t or petition; but in all s u b s e q u e n t
pleadings, it shall be sufficient if the name of the
first party on each side be stated with an
appropriate indication when there are other
parties.
Their respective participation in the case shall
b e i n d i c a t e d , ( l a , 2a)
NOTES
1. As revised, t h e caption of a p l e a d i n g in civil cases
is no l o n g e r r e q u i r e d to s t a t e t h e d e s i g n a t i o n of t h e
pleading, since t h e designation of t h e p l e a d i n g is properly contained in t h e body thereof (Sec. 2) p r e c e d i n g t h e
allegations. In criminal cases, it is r e q u i r e d t h a t , whenever possible, t h e complaint or information should s t a t e
t h e d e s i g n a t i o n of t h e offense or t h e section or subsection
of t h e s t a t u t e p u n i s h i n g it (see Sec. 8, Rule 110 a n d notes
thereunder).
2. It is not the caption of the pleading but the
allegations t h e r e i n t h a t determine t h e n a t u r e of t h e action,
a n d t h e c o u r t s h a l l g r a n t t h e relief w a r r a n t e d b y t h e
allegations a n d t h e proof even if no such relief is p r a y e d
for (Ras vs. Sua, L-23302, Sept. 25, 1968).
3. The abbreviation "et al." for et alii ("and others")
or et alius ("and another") is often affixed to t h e n a m e of

154

RULE 7

PARTS OF A PLEADINGS

SEC. 2

the person first mentioned, where there are more than

one party to the action on either side (see In re Mc-Govern's
Estate, 77 Mont. 182, 250 P. 812; Lyman vs. Milton, 44
Cal. 630).
S e c . 2. The body.The b o d y of t h e p l e a d i n g s e t s
forth i t s d e s i g n a t i o n , t h e a l l e g a t i o n s o f t h e p a r t y ' s
c l a i m s o r d e f e n s e s , t h e r e l i e f p r a y e d for, a n d t h e d a t e
o f t h e p l e a d i n g , (n)
(a) Paragraphs. T h e a l l e g a t i o n s in t h e b o d y
of a p l e a d i n g shall be divided into paragraphs so
numbered as to be readily identified, each of which
shall c o n t a i n a s t a t e m e n t of a s i n g l e set of
c i r c u m s t a n c e s s o far a s t h a t c a n b e d o n e w i t h
c o n v e n i e n c e . A p a r a g r a p h m a y be r e f e r r e d to by a
n u m b e r i n a l l s u c c e e d i n g p l e a d i n g s . (3a)
(b) Headings. W h e n t w o or m o r e c a u s e s of
a c t i o n a r e j o i n e d , t h e s t a t e m e n t o f t h e first s h a l l b e
p r e f a c e d b y t h e w o r d s "first c a u s e o f a c t i o n , " o f t h e
s e c o n d b y " s e c o n d c a u s e o f a c t i o n , " a n d s o o n for
the others.
When one or more paragraphs in the answer
are a d d r e s s e d t o o n e o f s e v e r a l c a u s e s o f a c t i o n i n
the complaint, they shall be prefaced by the words
" a n s w e r t o t h e first c a u s e o f a c t i o n " o r " a n s w e r t o
the s e c o n d c a u s e of action" and so on; and w h e n
one or more paragraphs of the answer are addressed
to several causes of action, they shali be prefaced
by w o r d s to t h a t effect. (4)
(c) Relief. T h e p l e a d i n g s h a l l s p e c i f y t h e r e l i e f
s o u g h t , b u t i t m a y a d d a g e n e r a l p r a y e r for s u c h
further or other relief as may be d e e m e d just or
e q u i t a b l e . (3a, R6).
(d) Date. E v e r y p l e a d i n g s h a l l be d a t e d , (n)

155

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REMEDIAL LAW COMPENDIUM

SEC. 3

NOTES
1. The p r a y e r in a pleading does not constitute an
e s s e n t i a l p a r t of t h e a l l e g a t i o n s d e t e r m i n a t i v e of t h e
j u r i s d i c t i o n of a c o u r t . T h e q u e s t i o n of j u r i s d i c t i o n
depends largely upon the determination of the t r u e n a t u r e
of t h e action filed by a p a r t y which, in t u r n , involves t h e
consideration of t h e u l t i m a t e facts alleged as constitutive
of t h e cause of action t h e r e i n (Bautista vs. Fernandez,
L-24062, April 30, 1971). The p r a y e r for relief, a l t h o u g h
p a r t of t h e complaint, c a n n o t c r e a t e a cause of action;
hence, it c a n n o t be considered as a p a r t of the allegations
on t h e n a t u r e of the cause of action (Rosales vs. Reyes, 25
Phil. 495; Cabigao vs. Lim, 50 Phil. 844).
2. The s a m e rule obtains in a majority of t h e s t a t e s
in t h e American jurisdiction which hold t h a t t h e p r a y e r
or d e m a n d for relief is not p a r t of t h e s t a t e m e n t of t h e
cause of action (Salmons vs. Sun & Bradstreet, 162 S.W.
2d 245; Central Nebraska Public Power & Irrigation Dist.
vs. Watson, et al., 299 N.W. 609; Durham vs. Rasco, 227
P. 599). The p r a y e r for relief c a n n o t be considered as
a d d i n g to t h e a l l e g a t i o n s of t h e c o m p l a i n t or p e t i t i o n
(Speizman vs. Guill, 25 S.E. 2d 731; Coke, et al. vs. Sharks,
et al., 291 S.W. 862). The p r a y e r does not e n l a r g e t h e
cause of action s t a t e d nor does it change t h e legal effects
of w h a t is alleged (Sandgren vs. West et ux., 115 P. 2d,
724; State vs. Bonham, et al., 193 S.E. 340).
A good
p r a y e r does not aid a defective pleading (Somers vs. Bank
of America, et al., 187 P. 2d 433; Villani vs. National City
Bank of New York, 256 N.Y.S., 602).
S e c . 3. Signature and address. E v e r y p l e a d i n g
must be signed by the party or counsel representing
him, stating in either case his address which should
n o t be a p o s t o f f i c e box.

156

RULE 7

PARTS OF A PLEADING

SEC. 3

The s i g n a t u r e of counsel constitutes a

certificate by him that he has read the pleading, that
to the best of his knowledge, information, and belief
t h e r e i s g o o d g r o u n d t o s u p p o r t it, a n d t h a t i t i s n o t
i n t e r p o s e d for d e l a y .
A n u n s i g n e d p l e a d i n g p r o d u c e s n o l e g a l effect.
H o w e v e r , t h e c o u r t m a y , i n its d i s c r e t i o n , a l l o w s u c h
deficiency to be remedied if it shall appear that the
same w a s d u e t o m e r e i n a d v e r t e n c e a n d not i n t e n d e d
for d e l a y .
Counsel w h o deliberately files an
unsigned pleading, or signs a pleading in violation
of this Rule, or alleges scandalous or indecent
matter therein, or fails to promptly report to the
court a c h a n g e of his address, shall be subject to
a p p r o p r i a t e d i s c i p l i n a r y a c t i o n . (5a)
NOTES
1. The S u p r e m e Court has further resolved t h a t , in
addition to t h e r e q u i r e m e n t t h a t counsel should indicate
in all pleadings, motions a n d p a p e r s submitted by him to
judicial or quasi-judicial bodies his c u r r e n t Professional
Tax Receipt (PTR) a n d IBP official receipt or Lifetime
Member N u m b e r (Bar Matter No. 287, Sept. 26, 2000), he
should f u r t h e r indicate his Roll of Attorneys Number.
All p l e a d i n g s , m o t i o n s a n d p a p e r s filed in court,
w h e t h e r personally or by mail, which do not bear counsel's
Roll of A t t o r n e y s N u m b e r may not be acted upon by the
court, without prejudice to w h a t e v e r disciplinary action
the court may t a k e a g a i n s t t h e erring counsel who shall
likewise be required to comply with the requirement within
5 d a y s from notice. F a i l u r e to comply with such
r e q u i r e m e n t shall be a ground for further disciplinary
sanction and for contempt of court (Bar Matter No. 1132,
April 1, 2003).
2. It will be noted t h a t this amended section further
specifically r e q u i r e s , u n d e r p a i n o f a d m i n i s t r a t i v e
157

RULE 7

REMEDIAL LAW COMPENDIUM

SEC. 4

d i s c i p l i n a r y a c t i o n o r e v e n a c i t a t i o n for i n d i r e c t
c o n t e m p t , t h a t counsel should p r o m p t l y r e p o r t t o t h e
court w h e r e he is a p p e a r i n g in a case any change of his
a d d r e s s . It is e l e m e n t a r y t h a t the r e q u i r e m e n t to make
of record in the court his a d d r e s s or any change thereof is
to e n s u r e his prompt receipt of judicial orders or processes;
yet, a n u m b e r of lawyers fail to report such changes in
both the trial and appellate courts resulting in unnecessary
delay in judicial a d m i n i s t r a t i o n . This situation is further
a g g r a v a t e d w h e r e even t h e a d d r e s s of t h e p a r t y is not
stated in the pleadings or it is merely averred t h a t
processes to said p a r t y may be served on his counsel.
3. No s u b s t i t u t i o n of a t t o r n e y s will be a l l o w e d
unless (a) t h e r e is a w r i t t e n r e q u e s t for such s u b s t i t u t i o n ,
(b) filed w i t h t h e w r i t t e n c o n s e n t o f t h e c l i e n t , a n d
(c) with the written consent of the attorney to be substituted,
or with proof of service of notice of said motion to t h e
a t t o r n e y to be s u b s t i t u t e d . U n l e s s t h e s e a r e complied
with, no s u b s t i t u t i o n will be p e r m i t t e d a n d t h e a t t o r n e y
who last a p p e a r e d in t h e case before such application will
be responsible for t h e conduct of t h e case (Bacarro vs. CA,
et al, L-28203, Jan. 22, 1971, citing U.S. vs. Borromeo,
20 Phil. 189; see Magpayo, et al. vs. CA, et al., L-35966,
Nov. 19, 1974; Sumadchat vs. CA, et al, G.R. No. 52197,
Jan. 30, 1982; Aban vs. Enage, L-30666, Feb. 26, 1983;
Yu, et al. vs. CA, et al, G.R. No. 56766, Feb. 28, 1985).
S e c . 4.
Verification. E x c e p t w h e n o t h e r w i s e
specifically provided by law or rule, pleadings need
not be under oath, verified or accompanied by
affidavit.
A p l e a d i n g is verified by an affidavit that the
affiant has read the pleading and that the
allegations therein are true and correct of his
personal knowledge or based on authentic records.

158

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PARTS OF A PLEADING

SEC. 4

A p l e a d i n g required to be verified w h i c h
contains a verification based on "information and
belief," or u p o n " k n o w l e d g e , i n f o r m a t i o n a n d belief,"
or l a c k s proper verification, s h a l l be treated as
an u n s i g n e d - p l e a d i n g . ( 4 a ) (As amended in A.M.
No. 00-2-10SC, effective May 1, 2000)
NOTES
1. The second p a r a g r a p h of this section h a s been
further a m e n d e d so t h a t t h e pleader's affirmation of the
t r u t h a n d correctness of t h e allegations in his pleading
shall be based not only on his "knowledge and b e l i e f but
specifically o n h i s " p e r s o n a l k n o w l e d g e o r b a s e d o n
a u t h e n t i c records." In t h e 1964 Rules of Court, Sec. 6 of
Rule 7 required p e r s o n a l knowledge of t h e facts averred,
w h i c h w a s c o n s i d e r e d too s t r i c t s i n c e a p e r s o n c a n
reasonably affirm a fact based on his belief in its t r u t h
when t h e r e is or h a s been no other fact or reason contrary
thereto.
However, t h a t liberalized version is b e t t e r regulated
by t h e p r e s e n t a m e n d e d provisions t h a t facts should be
attested to on t h e basis of one's personal knowledge or,
especially with r e g a r d to old or vintage facts or events,
by the recitals thereof in a u t h e n t i c records. Verification
is intended to forestall allegations which are perjured or
h e a r s a y , a n d t h i s p u r p o s e is r e a s o n a b l y s u b s e r v e d by
the r e q u i r e m e n t for a u t h e n t i c documents such as official
records which a r e exceptions to t h e h e a r s a y evidence
rule. For t h e s a m e reason, a verification cannot be made
on facts obtained or arising in whole or in p a r t from mere
information and belief.
2. Verification may be made by the p a r t y , his
r e p r e s e n t a t i v e , l a w y e r o r any p e r s o n who p e r s o n a l l y
knows the t r u t h of the facts alleged in the pleading. Where
the verification is made by the attorney who also signed

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the pleadings, the courts a r e inclined to be liberal and

accept s u b s t a n t i a l compliance with t h e verification rule
(Arambulo vs. Perez, 78Phil. 387;Matel vs. Rosal, 96Phil.
984 fUnrep.J; Cajefe vs. Fernandez, etc., et al, 109 Phil
743). T h u s , w h e r e a petition for m a n d a m u s w a s verified
by the counsel to be t r u e "to t h e best of (his) knowledge,
information a n d belief," it w a s held to be sufficient in
view of t h e sanctions respecting a t t o r n e y s in Sec. 5 (now,
Sec. 3) of this Rule (Guerra Enterprises, Co., Inc. vs. CFI
of Lanao del Sur, et al, L-28310, April 17, 1970).
On t h e o t h e r h a n d , a c e r t i f i c a t i o n a g a i n s t forum
s h o p p i n g (Sec. 5) m u s t be m a d e by t h e p a r t y h i m s e l f
a n d not by his l a w y e r (Santos, et al. vs. CA, et al, G.R.
No. 141947, July 3, 2001).
3. As a rule, pleadings need not be verified u n l e s s
so r e q u i r e d by t h e R u l e s a n d j u r i s p r u d e n c e , as in t h e
following i n s t a n c e s :
a.
Rule

Petition for relief from j u d g m e n t or o r d e r (Sec. 3,

38);

b. Petition for review from t h e Regional Trial Courts

to t h e Court of Appeals (Sec. 1, Rule 42);
c. Petition for review from t h e quasi-judicial agencies
to t h e C o u r t of Appeals (Sec. 5, Rule 43);
d . A p p e a l b y c e r t i o r a r i from t h e C o u r t o f T a x
A p p e a l s to t h e S u p r e m e C o u r t (Sec. 12, R.A. 9 2 8 2 ,
a m e n d i n g Sec. 19, R.A. 1125);
e. Appeal by c e r t i o r a r i from t h e Court of Appeals to
t h e S u p r e m e Court (Sec. 1, Rule 45);
f. P e t i t i o n for a n n u l m e n t of j u d g m e n t s or final
o r d e r s a n d resolutions (Sec. 1, Rule 47);
g.

Complaint for injunction

(Sec. 4, Rule 58);

h. Application for a p p o i n t m e n t of receiver (Sec. 1,

Rule 59);

160

RULE 7

i.
Rule

PARTS OF A PLEADING

SEC. 4

A p p l i c a t i o n for s u p p o r t pendente lite (Sec.

69);

1,

j.
P e t i t i o n for c e r t i o r a r i a g a i n s t t h e j u d g m e n t s ,
final o r d e r s or resolutions of constitutional commissions
(Sec. 2, Rule 64);
k.

Petition for certiorari (Sec. 1, Rule 65);

1.

P e t i t i o n for prohibition (Sec. 2, Rule 65);

m. Petition for m a n d a m u s (Sec.

3, Rule 65);

n.

Petition for quo w a r r a n t o (Sec. 1, Rule 66);

o.

Complaint for expropriation (Sec. 1, Rule 67);

p. Complaint for forcible e n t r y or unlawful d e t a i n e r

(Sec. 4, Rule 70);
q.

Petition for indirect contempt (Sec. 4, Rule 71);

r. P e t i t i o n for a p p o i n t m e n t of a general g u a r d i a n
(Sec. 2, Rule 93);
s. Petition for leave to sell or e n c u m b e r property of
the w a r d by a g u a r d i a n (Sec. 1, Rule 95);
t. P e t i t i o n for t h e d e c l a r a t i o n of competency of a
ward (Sec. 1, Rule 97);
u.

Petition for habeas corpus (Sec. 3, Rule 102);

v.

Petition for change of n a m e (Sec. 2, Rule 103);

w. P e t i t i o n for v o l u n t a r y judicial dissolution of a

corporation (Sec. 1, Rule 104); and
x. Petition for cancellation or correction of e n t r i e s
in the civil registry (Sec. 1, Rule 108).
4. While not required to be verified in the m a n n e r
and form prescribed by Sec. 4 of this Rule, the following
must be under oath:
a. Denial of t h e genuineness and due execution of
an actionable document (Sec. 8, Rule 8);
b. Denial of allegations of usury (Sec. 11, Rule 8);

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c. Motion to s e t aside a default o r d e r (Sec. 3[bJ,

9).
d. Answer to w r i t t e n interrogatories (Sec. 2, Rule 25);

and
e. Answer to r e q u e s t for admission (Sec. 2, Rule 26).
5. Supporting affidavits
required in t h e following:

or

affidavits

of merits

are

a . M o t i o n t o p o s t p o n e for a b s e n c e o f e v i d e n c e
(Sec. 3, Rule 30);
b. Motion to postpone for illness of a p a r t y or counsel
(Sec. 4, Rule 30);
c. M o t i o n for s u m m a r y j u d g m e n t o r o p p o s i t i o n
t h e r e t o (Sees. 1, 2, 3 a n d 5, Rule 35);
d. M o t i o n for n e w t r i a l on t h e g r o u n d of f r a u d ,
accident, m i s t a k e or excusable negligence or opposition
t h e r e t o (Sec. 2, Rule 37);
e.
Rule
f.

Petition for relief from j u d g m e n t or o r d e r (Sec. 3,

38);
T h i r d - p a r t y claim (See. 16, Rule 39);

g. P r o o f r e q u i r e d of a r e d e m p t i o n e r (Sec.
Rule 39);
Rule

h. M o t i o n for p r e l i m i n a r y a t t a c h m e n t (Sec.
57);

30,
3,

i. Motion for dissolution of p r e l i m i n a r y injunction

(Sec. 6, Rule 58);
j.

Application for a w r i t of replevin (Sec. 2, Rule 60);

k. Claim a g a i n s t t h e e s t a t e of a d e c e d e n t (Sec. 9,
Rule 86); a n d
1. Motion for new t r i a l on t h e ground of newlydiscovered evidence in criminal cases (Sec. 4, Rule 121).
6. E v e n w h e r e verification is r e q u i r e d by t h e Rules,
t h e court m a y give due course to t h e p l e a d i n g even if
162

RULE 7

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SEC. 5

such verification is lacking or is insufficient or defective

if the circumstances warrant the relaxation or dispensing
of the rule in the interest of justice (Oshita vs. Republic,
L-21180, Mar. 31, 1967; cf. Quimpo vs. Dela Victoria,
L 31822, July 31, 1972; Valino vs. Munoz, et al., L-26151,
Oct. 22, 1970; Villasanta, et al. vs. Bautista, et al.,
L-30874, Nov. 26, 1970). Verification of a pleading is a
formal, not a jurisdictional, requisite (Buenaventura vs.
Uy, et al., L-28156, Mar. 31, 1987). It is simply intended
to secure an assurance that the allegations are true and
correct and that the pleading is filed in good faith (Bank
of the Phil. Islands vs. CA, et al., G.R. No. 146923,
April 30, 2003). Hence, in the interest of substantial
justice, the Court may simply order the correction of the
unverified pleading or act on it and waive strict compliance
with the rules (Vda. de Gabriel vs. CA, et al., G.R. No.
103883, Nov. 14, 1996; Panaguiton, Jr. vs. Dept. of
Justice, et al., G.R. No. 167571, Nov. 25, 2008).
7. Pleadings filed in the inferior courts in cases
covered by the Rule on Summary Procedure are all required to be verified (Sec. 2[BJ on Civil Cases).
S e c . 6.
Certification against forum shopping. T h e
plaintiff or principal party shall certify under oath
in the complaint or other initiatory pleading
a s s e r t i n g a c l a i m for relief, or in a s w o r n
certification annexed thereto and simultaneously
f i l e d t h e r e w i t h : (a) t h a t h e h a s n o t t h e r e t o f o r e
c o m m e n c e d a n y a c t i o n o r filed a n y c l a i m i n v o l v i n g
the same issues in any court, tribunal or quasijudicial agency and, to the best of his knowledge,
no such other action or claim is pending therein;
(b) if t h e r e is s u c h o t h e r p e n d i n g a c t i o n or c l a i m , a
c o m p l e t e s t a t e m e n t o f t h e p r e s e n t s t a t u s thereof;
a n d (c) i f h e s h o u l d t h e r e a f t e r l e a r n t h a t t h e s a m e
or similar action or claim has been filed or is
p e n d i n g , h e s h a l l r e p o r t t h a t fact w i t h i n five (5) d a y s
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RULE 5

REMEDIAL LAW COMPENDIUM

SEC. 2

therefrom to the court wherein his aforesaid

c o m p l a i n t o r i n i t i a t o r y p l e a d i n g h a s b e e n filed.
Failure to comply with the foregoing requirements shall not be curable by mere amendment of
the complaint or other initiatory pleading but shall
b e c a u s e for t h e d i s m i s s a l o f t h e c a s e w i t h o u t
prejudice, unless otherwise provided, upon motion
and after hearing. The s u b m i s s i o n of a false
certification or non-compliance with any of the
undertakings therein shall constitute indirect
contempt of court, without prejudice to the
corresponding administrative and criminal actions.
If the acts of the party or his counsel clearly
constitute willful and deliberate forum shopping,
t h e s a m e s h a l l b e g r o u n d for s u m m a r y d i s m i s s a l w i t h
prejudice and shall constitute direct contempt, as
w e l l a s a c a u s e for a d m i n i s t r a t i v e s a n c t i o n s , (n)
NOTES
1. The S u p r e m e Court h a s explained t h a t t h e r e is
forum shopping when, as a r e s u l t of an a d v e r s e decision
in one forum, or in anticipation thereof, a p a r t y s e e k s a
favorable opinion in a n o t h e r forum t h r o u g h m e a n s o t h e r
t h a n a p p e a l or c e r t i o r a r i by r a i s i n g identical c a u s e s of
action, s u b j e c t - m a t t e r a n d issues. ' T o r u m shopping exists
w h e n two or more actions involve t h e s a m e t r a n s a c t i o n s ,
e s s e n t i a l facts a n d c i r c u m s t a n c e s , a n d r a i s e i d e n t i c a l
c a u s e s o f action, s u b j e c t - m a t t e r a n d i s s u e s . A n o t h e r
i n d i c a t i o n is w h e n t h e e l e m e n t s of litis pendentia a r e
p r e s e n t o r w h e r e a f i n a l j u d g m e n t i n o n e c a s e will
a m o u n t to res judicata in t h e o t h e r case. T h e t e s t is
w h e t h e r in t h e two or more p e n d i n g cases t h e r e is identity
of p a r t i e s , r i g h t s or c a u s e s of action a n d reliefs s o u g h t
(Ligon vs. CA, et al, G.R. No. 127683, Aug. 7, 1998; cf.
Melo, et al. vs. CA, et al, G.R. No. 123686, Nov. 16, 1999).

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SEC. 5

Forum shopping is condemned because it duly

b u r d e n s courts w i t h heavy caseloads, unduly taxes t h e
m a n p o w e r a n d financial resources of t h e judiciary, and
trifles with and mocks judicial processes. The primary evil
sought to be prescribed by t h e prohibition against forum
shopping, however, is the possibility of conflicting decisions
being r e n d e r e d by t h e different c o u r t s upon t h e s a m e
issues (Guy vs. CA, et al., G.R. No. 165849, Dec. 10, 2007,
and companion cases).
2. This section, w i t h modifications, is t a k e n from
Administrative Circular No. 04-94 issued by the S u p r e m e
C o u r t on F e b r u a r y 8, 1994 for t h e p u r p o s e e x p l a i n e d
therein:
"Revised Circular No. 28-91, dated F e b r u a r y 8,
1994 applies to a n d governs t h e filing of petitions in
t h e S u p r e m e Court and t h e Court of Appeals and is
intended to p r e v e n t t h e multiple filing of petitions or
complaints involving the same issues in other
t r i b u n a l s or agencies as a form of forum shopping.
"Complementary t h e r e t o and for t h e same purpose, t h e following r e q u i r e m e n t s , in addition to those
in p e r t i n e n t provisions of t h e Rules of C o u r t a n d
existing circulars, shall be strictly complied with in
t h e filing of c o m p l a i n t s , p e t i t i o n s , applications or
o t h e r initiatory pleadings in all courts and agencies
other t h a n the Supreme Court and the Court of
Appeals and shall be subject to the sanctions provided
hereunder."
The provisions of Revised Circular No. 28-91 have
been adopted and incorporated in Rules 42, 43, 45, 46,
47, 64 and 65.
3. The S u p r e m e Court has advanced the rule t h a t
compulsory c o u n t e r c l a i m s a r e not c o n t e m p l a t e d in its
Administrative Circular No. 04-94 which refers to initiatory
and similar pleadings. A compulsory counterclaim set up
16B

RULE 7

REMEDIAL LAW COMPENDIUM

SEC. 5

in t h e a n s w e r s should not be considered as an initiatory

or s i m i l a r p l e a d i n g since t h e d e f e n d a n t h a s to raise a
compulsory counterclaim where proper, otherwise he
waives t h e s a m e . The rationale is t h a t t h e compulsory
counterclaim is only a reaction or response, m a n d a t o r y
u n d e r p a i n of waiver, to an initiatory pleading which is
the complaint (Cruz-Agana vs. Santiago-Logman, etc., et
al., G.R. No. 139018, April 11, 2005). There are American
doctrines, however, holding t h a t any counterclaim is in the
n a t u r e of a counter-complaint or cross-petition; hence, under
t h a t theory it is actually initiatory of a claim for relief discrete
from the adverse party's claim.
4 . Aside from some a m e n d m e n t s t o t h e o r i g i n a l
sanctions imposed in A d m i n i s t r a t i v e Circular No. 04-94,
this section r e i t e r a t e s as a r e g u l a r r e q u i r e m e n t u n d e r t h e
Rules t h a t t h e certification a g a i n s t forum shopping may
be incorporated in t h e complaint or contained in a sworn
certification a n n e x e d t h e r e t o a n d s i m u l t a n e o u s l y filed
t h e r e w i t h . T h i s e n u n c i a t e s t h e policy of t h e S u p r e m e
C o u r t e x p r e s s e d a s e a r l y a s C i r c u l a r N o . 1-88 t h a t
s u b s e q u e n t c o m p l i a n c e w i t h t h e r e q u i r e m e n t s for t h e
filing of p e t i t i o n s or motions is not a ground for reconsid e r a t i o n of t h e d i s m i s s a l of said p l e a d i n g s , except for
compelling r e a s o n s . In light hereof, t h e view t h a t belated
filing of t h e certification m a y be d e e m e d a s u b s t a n t i a l
compliance should no longer be s u s t a i n e d .
With respect to the contents of the certification
which t h e p l e a d e r may p r e p a r e , t h e rule of s u b s t a n t i a l
compliance m a y be availed of. While t h i s section r e q u i r e s
t h a t it be strictly complied with, it merely u n d e r s c o r e s
its m a n d a t o r y n a t u r e in t h a t it cannot be altogether
dispensed with or its r e q u i r e m e n t s completely disregarded
b u t it does not t h e r e b y p r e v e n t s u b s t a n t i a l compliance on
this aspect of its provisions u n d e r justifiable circumstances
(see Gabionza vs. CA, et al, G.R. No. 112547, July 18,
1994).
This certification on non-forum s h o p p i n g
was designed to promote and facilitate the orderly
166

RULE 7

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SEC. 5

a d m i n i s t r a t i o n of justice and, therefore, should not be

i n t e r p r e t e d with absolute literalness (Loyola us. CA, et
al., G.R. No. 117186, June 29, 1995; Maricalum Mining
Corp. us. NLRC, et al., G.R. No. 124711, Nou. 3, 1998;
RLC Construction and Deu. Corp., et al. us. Emily Homes,
etc., et al., G.R. No. 139360, Sept. 23, 2003).
More importantly, this section specifically s t a t e s t h a t
the "(f)ailure to comply with the foregoing r e q u i r e m e n t s
shall not be curable by mere a m e n d m e n t of the complaint
or o t h e r i n i t i a t o r y p l e a d i n g but shall be cause for t h e
dismissal of t h e case without prejudice, unless otherwise
provided, upon motion a n d after h e a r i n g . " T h i s will
obviate the former practice of some trial courts in allowing
a m e n d m e n t of the incomplete pleading for the incorporation t h e r e i n of the certificate a g a i n s t forum shopping.
That was erroneous since this u n d e r t a k i n g against
multiple filing of cases is not p a r t of the operative facts
required to be alleged in an initiatory pleading, such as
allegations on the cause of action. It is a special requirement for admission of the initiatory pleading for filing in
court, hence the absence thereof is not curable by mere
amendment.
Instead, the case shall be dismissed on motion but,
just like the practice u n d e r Revised Circular No. 28-91 in
t h e a p p e l l a t e c o u r t s , such d i s m i s s a l shall be w i t h o u t
prejudice. This more liberal rule is distinguishable from
the effects of dismissal of t h e case for non-compliance
with the Rules u n d e r the provisions of Sec. 3, Rule 17
which p r e s u p p o s e s t h e pendency of t h e case, w h e r e a s
what is contemplated in this section is the initiation of
the case. The case may consequently be refiled within
the balance of t h e r e g l e m e n t a r y period but subject to
the provisions on prescription of actions.
5. In applying t h e forerunner of this section, the
S u p r e m e C o u r t , in t h e c a s e of Fil-Estate Golf and
Development, Inc. us. CA, et al. (G.R. No. 1 2 0 9 5 8 ,
Dec. 16, 1996), ruled as follows:
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RULE 7

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SEC. 5

"As clearly demonstrated above, the willful a t t e m p t

by p r i v a t e r e s p o n d e n t s to o b t a i n a p r e l i m i n a r y
injunction in a n o t h e r court after it failed to acquire
the s a m e from the original court c o n s t i t u t e s grave
a b u s e of t h e j u d i c i a l p r o c e s s . S u c h d i s r e s p e c t is
penalized by the s u m m a r y dismissal of both actions
as m a n d a t e d by p a r a g r a p h 17 of the I n t e r i m Rules
and Guidelines issued by this Court on 11 J a n u a r y
1983 and S u p r e m e Court Circular No. 28-91. x x x.
X

The rule against forum-shopping is further

s t r e n g t h e n e d by the issuance of S u p r e m e Court
C i r c u l a r No. 04-94.
Said c i r c u l a r formally e s t a blished t h e rule t h a t t h e deliberate filing of multiple
c o m p l a i n t s t o o b t a i n favorable a c t i o n c o n s t i t u t e s
forum-shopping and shall be a ground for s u m m a r y
dismissal thereof."
6. As earlier stated, with respect to t h e c o n t e n t s of
t h e c e r t i f i c a t i o n of n o n - f o r u m s h o p p i n g , t h e r u l e of
s u b s t a n t i a l compliance may be invoked u n d e r justifiable
circumstances. However, it is mandatory that the
certification be executed by the petitioner himself, and
not by counsel. Obviously, it is the petitioner, and not
t h e counsel r e t a i n e d for a p a r t i c u l a r case, who is in the
best position to personally know w h e t h e r he or it had
actually filed or caused the filing of a n o t h e r or previous
petition involving the same case or s u b s t a n t i a l l y the s a m e
i s s u e s . H e n c e , a certification e x e c u t e d by c o u n s e l is
defective and c o n s t i t u t e s a valid cause for dismissal of
the petition (Far Eastern Shipping Co. us. CA, et a I., G.R.
No. 130068, and Manila Pilots Association vs. Phil. Ports
Authority, et al., G.R. No. 130150, j o i n t l y decided on
Oct. 1, 1998; cf. Commissioner of Internal Revenue vs.
S.C. Johnson & Son, Inc., et al., G.R. No. 127105,
June 25,
1999; Mendigorin vs. Cabantog, etc., G.R.
No. 136449, Aug. 22, 2002).

168

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SEC. 5

7. On the foregoing premises, where there are

several petitioners, it is not sufficient that only one of
them executes the certification, absent a showing that
he was so authorized by the others. That certification
requires personal knowledge and it cannot be presumed
that the signatory knew that his co-petitioners had the
same or similar actions filed or pending (Loquias, et al
vs. Office of the Ombudsman, et al., G.R. No. 139396,
Aug. 15, 2000). Where, however, the co-petitioners are
husband and wife with joint interest in the subject
matter of the case which is their conjugal property, the
husband alone as administrator of said property can
execute the certification (Docena, et al. vs. Lapesura, etc.,
et al., G.R. No. NO 153, Mar. 28, 2001). Also, where all
the petitioners, being relatives and co-owners of the
properties in dispute, share a common interest therein
and a common defense in the action, one of them alone can
execute the certificate of non-forum shopping (Cavile,
et al. vs. Cavile, et al., G.R. No. 148635, April 1, 2003).
8. This requirement is intended to apply to both
natural and juridical persons. Where the petitioner is a
corporation, the certification against forum shopping
should be signed by its duly authorized director or
representative. The same is true with respect to any
juridical entity since it has of necessity the proper
officer to represent it in its other transactions (Digital
Microwave Corp. vs. CA, et al, G.R. No. 128550, Mar. 16,
2000).
In National Steel Corp. vs. CA, et al. (G.R.
No. 134468, Aug. 29, 2002), the rule was liberally
applied pro hoc vice "in view of the peculiar circumstances
of the case and in the interest of substantial justice."
However, in BA Savings Bank vs. Sia, et al. (G.R.
No. 131214, July 27, 2000), it was held that the
certification of non-forum shopping may be signed, for and
on behalf of a corporation, by a specifically authorized
lawyer who has personal knowledge of the facts required
to be disclosed in such document. This does not mean,
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RULE 7

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SEC. 5

though, t h a t any lawyer representing the corporation may

routinely sign t h a t certification. T h a t lawyer m u s t be
specifically auOwrized in order to validly sign t h e s a m e .
F u r t h e r , while said counsel may be t h e counsel of record;
t h e r e m u s t be a resolution of the board of directors t h a t
specifically a u t h o r i z e s him to file the action and execute
the certification (BPI Leasing Corp. vs. CA, et al., G.R.
No. 127624, Nov. 18, 2003).
9. If a case is dismissed without prejudice because
of the filing by t h e plaintiff of a notice or dismissal before
the service of t h e a n s w e r or responsive pleading p u r s u a n t
to Sec. 1, Rule 17, the s u b s e q u e n t refiling of the case by
the same p a r t y will not require a certification of non-forum
shopping s e t t i n g forth such a n t e c e d e n t facts.
As already stated, forum shopping is resorted to by a
p a r t y with a case in one forum in order to possibly secure
a favorable j u d g m e n t in a n o t h e r forum, o t h e r t h a n by
a p p e a l or c e r t i o r a r i , or t h e i n s t i t u t i o n of two or more
actions or proceedings on the same cause, on the
s u p p o s i t i o n t h a t one or t h e o t h e r c o u r t would m a k e a
favorable d i s p o s i t i o n . Since a p a r t y r e s o r t s to forum
shopping to improve his chances of obtaining a favorable
decision, t h a t prohibition could not apply to a s i t u a t i o n
c o n t e m p l a t e d in Sec. 1, Rule 17. T h e r e is no a d v e r s e
decision a g a i n s t the plaintiff and t h e order of dismissal
merely confirms t h e dismissal of t h e complaint w i t h o u t
prejudice. The a p p r e h e n s i o n t h a t t h e case was dismissed
in o r d e r to be t r a n s f e r r e d to t h e sala of a n o t h e r j u d g e
supposedly more s y m p a t h e t i c to t h e plaintiff is baseless
and speculative (Roxas vs. CA, et al., G.R. No. 139337,
Aug. 15, 2001).
10. This section provides for
be contained in t h e certification
in the complaint or initiatory
R e g i o n a l T r i a l C o u r t . Sec. 3,

170

t h e m a t t e r s t h a t should
a g a i n s t forum shopping
p l e a d i n g s filed i n t h e
Rule 46 p r e s c r i b e s t h e

r e q u i r e m e n t s for a certification against forum shopping

in petitions filed in the Court of Appeals, which have also
been adopted for petitions filed in the S u p r e m e Court,
p u r s u a n t to Sec. 2, Rule 56.
11. As a goneraLjttle-, t h e violation of t h e rule-on
f o r u m H6hofHHig ohoulabe- r a i s e d a t t h e e a * l i e s t
opportunity^ eueh- *a-a-motion to dismiss or a similar
pleading. It should be noted t h a t Sec. 1, Rule 9 provides
t h a t defenses and objections not pleaded in a motion to
dismiss or in an a n s w e r are deemed waived. Also, Sec. 8,
Rule 15 s t a t e s t h a t , subject to t h e provisions of said
Sec. 1, Rule 9, a motion a t t a c k i n g a p l e a d i n g , order,
j u d g m e n t or proceeding shall include all objections t h e n
available, and all objections not so included are deemed
waived.
T h u s , -belatedly raising, an.objection due to forum
shopping at the-appellate stage will not cause t h e dismissal
of t h e appeal, except w h e r e t h e court h a s no jurisdiction
over t h e s u b j e c t m a t t e r , or w h e r e litis pendentia, res
judicata or b a r by s t a t u t e of limitations are present (Young
vs. Seng, etc., G.R. No. 143464, Mar. 5, 2003).
12. The doctrine of forum non conveniens literally
means "the forum is inconvenient," and emerged in private
i n t e r n a t i o n a l law to d e t e r the practice of global forum
shopping, t h a t is, to p r e v e n t nonresident litigants from
choosing the forum or place to bring their suit for malicious
reasons, to secure procedural advantages, or to select a
more friendly venue. The court, may, however, refuse
impositions on its jurisdiction where it is not the most
convenient forum and the p a r t i e s are not precluded from
seeking remedies elsewhere.
W h e t h e r a suit should be e n t e r t a i n e d or dismissed
under this doctrine depends largely on the facts of the
particular case and is addressed to the sound discretion of
the t r i a l c o u r t . T h e S u p r e m e C o u r t h a s held t h a t a

171

RULE 7

REMEDIAL LAW COMPENDIUM

SEC. 5

Philippine court may assume jurisdiction over a conflict

of laws case, if it chooses to do so, provided t h a t it is one to
which the p a r t i e s may conveniently resort, t h a t it is in a
position to make an intelligent decision on the law and
the facts, and t h a t it has or is likely to have t h e power to
enforce its decision. However, while it h a s t h e discretion
to a b s t a i n from a s s u m i n g jurisdiction u n d e r t h e doctrine,
it should do so only after vital facts a r e established to
d e t e r m i n e w h e t h e r special c i r c u m s t a n c e s r e q u i r e t h e
court's desistance.
Since this doctrine requires such a factual determination, it is more properly considered a m a t t e r of defense.
It should not be used as a ground for a motion to dismiss,
and, in fact, Rule 16 does not include said doctrine as a
g r o u n d . In any e v e n t , s u c h a claim of global forum
s h o p p i n g s h o u l d r e q u i r e t h a t a l l e l e m e n t s o f litis
pendentia a r e p r e s e n t and a final j u d g m e n t in one case
will a m o u n t to res judicata in the other (Bank of America
NT & SA, et. al. vs. CA, et al., G.R. No. 120435,
Mar. 31, 2003). Apropos t h e r e t o , this equitable doctrine
p r e s u p p o s e s at least two forums in which t h e d e f e n d a n t is
a m e n a b l e to p r o c e s s a n d f u r n i s h e s c r i t e r i a for choice
b e t w e e n s u c h f o r u m s (Wilson vs. Seas Shipping Co.,
D.C.Pa., 78 F. Supp. 464).

172

RULE 8
M A N N E R OF MAKING ALLEGATIONS
IN PLEADINGS
S e c t i o n 1. In general. E v e r y p l e a d i n g s h a l l
c o n t a i n in a m e t h o d i c a l a n d l o g i c a l form, a p l a i n ,
c o n c i s e a n d d i r e o t ^ e t a t e m e n t o f t h e u l t i m a t e facts
o n w h i c h t h e p a r t y p l e a d i n g r e l i e s for h i s c l a i m o r
defense, as the case m a y be, o m i t t i n g t h e s t a t e m e n t
o f m e r e e v i d e n t i a r y f a c t s . (1)
hi a d e f e n s e r e l i e d o n i s b a s e d o n l a w , t h e
pertinent provisions thereof and their applicability
t o h i m s h a l l - b e c l e a r l y a n d c o n c i s e l y s t a t e d , (n)
NOTES
1. As already stated, an^nexes to--pleadings, -are
considered p a r t of t h e pleadings, but the said pleadings
m u s t c o n t a i n - a s u m m a r y s t a t e m e n t of t h e matters
contained in t h e a n n e x and c a n n o t j u s t refer to the same
(Rubios, et al. vs. Reolo, 96 Phil. 984fUnrep.J; La Mallorca
vs. CA, et al., 100 Phil. 1048; see Sec. 7 of this Rule).
2. "Ultimate facte" are the important and substantial facts which either directly form the basis of the
plaintiff's primary right and duty or directly make up
the wrongful acts or omissions of the defendant (Alsua
us. Johnson, 21 Phil. 308). A fact is essential if it cannot
be stricken out without leaving the statement of the
cause of action or defense insufficient (Toribio, et al. vs.
Bid in, etc., et al, G.R. No. 57821, Jan. 17, 1985). Hence,
conclusions, inferences, presumptions, and details of
probative matters should not be alleged.
. <t\-

3. "Evidentiary facts" are those which are necessary

to prove the ultimate fact or which furnish evidence of
the existence of some other facts. They are not proper as
173

RULE 8

REMEDIAL LAW COMPENDIUM

SECS. 2-3

allegations in the pleadings as they may only result in

confusing the statement of the cause of action or the
defense. They are not necessary therefor, and their
exposition is actually premature as such facts must be
found and drawn from testimonial and other evidence.
4. The second paragraph is a new provision and is
in line with the rule that a party must set out with
clarity right in his pleading the matters upon which he
intends to rely for his defense. It has been a matter of
judicial experience that often a defense is postulated
supposedly upon certain provisions of law and, with such
bare allegation, the pleader leaves it to the court and the
opposing party to divine for themselves how said legal
provisions or principles could possibly apply or relate to
the nature of the defense invoked, a strategy made more
irksome and undesirable where several defenses and legal
provisions are invoked. The rationale for this new
requirement where the defense is based on legal grounds
is the same as the requirement for stating the ultimate
facts where the defense is based on factual grounds.
S e c . 2.
Alternative causes of action or defenses.
A p a r t y m a y set forth t w o or m o r e s t a t e m e n t s of a
claim or defense alternatively or hypothetically,
either in one cause of action or defense or in
separate causes of action or defenses.
When two
or more statements are made in the alternative and
one of t h e m if made i n d e p e n d e n t l y would be
sufficient, t h e p l e a d i n g is not m a d e insufficient by
the insufficiency of one or m o r e of the alternative
s t a t e m e n t s . (2)
S e c . 3. Conditions precedent. In a n y p l e a d i n g
a general a v e r m e n t of the p e r f o r m a n c e or occurr e n c e of all c o n d i t i o n s p r e c e d e n t shall be sufficient.
(3)

174

RULE 8

MANNER OF MAKING ALLEGATIONS

IN PLEADINGS

SECS 4 5

S e c . 4. Capacity. F a c t s s h o w i n g t h e c a p a c i t y
of a p a r t y to s u e or be s u e d or t h e a u t h o r i t y of a
party to s u e or be s u e d in a r e p r e s e n t a t i v e c a p a c i t y
or the legal existence of an organized association
of p e r s o n s t h a t is m a d e a party, m u s t be a v e r r e d .
A party d e s i r i n g to raise an issue as to the legal
existence of any party or the capacity of any party
to s u e or be s u e d in a r e p r e s e n t a t i v e c a p a c i t y , s h a l l
do so by specific denial, which shall include such
s u p p o r t i n g p a r t i c u l a r s a s are p e c u l i a r l y w i t h i n t h e
p l e a d e r ' s k n o w l e d g e . (4)
NOTE
1. Where the plaintiffs are foreign corporations,
the specific circumstance t h a t they are duly licensed to do
business in the Philippines, or t h a t the transaction sued
upon is singular and isolated, is an essential p a r t of the
e l e m e n t of t h e plaintiff's capacity to sue and m u s t be
affirmatively pleaded as required by Sec. 4 of this Rule
(Atlantic Mutual Insurance Co.
us. Cebu Stevedoring
Co., Inc., L-18961, Aug. 31, 1966).
S e c . 5. Fraud, mistake, condition of the mind. In
all a v e r m e n t s of fraud-or m i s t a k e , the c i r c u m s t a n c e s
c o n s t i t u t i n g fraud o r m i s t a k e m u s t be staged w i t h
partieulanty. Malice, intent, knowledge or other
c o n d i t i o n of t h e m i n d of a p e r s o n m a y be a v e r r e d
g e n e r a l l y . (5a)
NOTE
1. F a c t s c o n s t i t u t i n g condition of t h e mind a r e
permitted to be averred generally as it would be difficult
to do so with particularity. However, fraud and mistake
are required to be averred with particularity in order to
enable the opposing party to controvert the p a r t i c u l a r
facta allegedly constituting the same. This requirement
175

RULE 8

REMEDIAL LAW COMPENDIUM

SECS. 6. 7-8

assumes significance in motions for new trial or

petitions for relief from judgment or order based on
fraud or mistake.
S e c . 6. Judgment. In p l e a d i n g a j u d g m e n t or
decision of a d o m e s t i c or foreign court, judicial or
q u a s i - j u d i c i a l t r i b u n a l , o r o f a b o a r d o r officer, i t i s
sufficient to aver the j u d g m e n t or decision w i t h o u t
setting forth m a t t e r showing jurisdiction to r e n d e r
it. (6)
NOTE
1. This provision is a necessary consequence of the
disputable presumption that a court, or judge acting as
such, whether in the Philippines or elsewhere, was
acting in the lawful exercise of his jurisdiction (Sec. 3(n],
Rule 131). Such judicial record may be impeached by
evidence of want of jurisdiction in the court or judicial
officer (Sec. 29, Rule 132).
S e c . 7. Action or defense based on document.
W h e n e v e r an action or defense is based upon a
written instrument or document, the substance of
such i n s t r u m e n t or d o c u m e n t shall be set forth in
the pleading, and the original or a copy thereof shall
be attached to the pleading as an exhibit, which
shall be d e e m e d to be a p a r t of the pleading, or said
c o p y m a y w i t h l i k e effect b e s e t f o r t h i n t h e p l e a d i n g .
(7)
S e c . 8. How to contest such documents. W h e r e
an action or defense is founded u p o n a w r i t t e n
instrument, copied in or attached to the
corresponding pleading as provided in the
preceding section, the genuineness and due
execution of the instrument shall be deemed

176

RULE 8

MANNER OF MAKING ALLEGATIONS

IN PLEADINGS

SECS. 7-8

a d m i t t e d nwleag. t h e a d ^ w u e p a i i y - w ^ d e r - ^ a t h ,
s p e c i f i c a l l y de-mea t k m , a n d uviv furfch w h a t h e
c l a i m s to Ja-the ~aets;^but t h e r e q u i r e m e n t of an
oath does not apply w h e n the adverse party does
not a p p e a r to be a p a r t y to t h e i n s t r u m e n t or w h e n
c o m p l i a n c e w i t h a n o r d e r for a n i n s p e c t i o n o f t h e
o r i g i n a l i n s t r u m e n t i s r e f u s e d . (8a)
4

NOTES
1. These two sections constitute the rule on actionable documents, as distinguished from evidentiary
documents. There are two permissible ways of pleading
an actionable document, i.e., (a) by setting forth the
substance of such document in the pleading and
attaching the document thereto as an annex, or (b) by
setting forth said document verbatim in the pleading.
Unless alleged in any of these modes, the rule on implied
admission in Sec. 8 will not apply.
2. A variance in the substance of the document set
forth in the pleading and the document annexed thereto
does not warrant the dismissal of the action (Convets,
Inc. us. National Deuelopment Co., 103 Phil 46). However,
the contents of the document annexed are controlling.
3. Where the actionable document is properly
alleged, the failure to deny the same results in the
admission of the "genuineness and due execution" of said
document, except (a) when the adverse party was not a
party to the instrument, and (b) when an order for the
inspection of the document (see Rule 27) was not complied
with.
4. By "geHuiwencoc" is meant that the document is
not spurious, counterfeit, or of different import on its
face from the one executed hy the party (Bough vs.
Cantiveros, 40 Phil. 208), or that the party whose signature it bears has signed it and that at the time it was
177

RULE 8

REMEDIAL LAW COMPENDIUM

SECS. 7-8

signed, it was in words and figures exactly as set out in

the pleadings (Hibberd vs. Rhode, 32 Phil. 476).
5. By "due-execution" is m e a n t t h a t the document
was signed voluntarily and knowingly by t h e p a r t y whose
s i g n a t u r e a p p e a r s t h e r e o n , t h a t if signed by somebody
else such r e p r e s e n t a t i v e had the a u t h o r i t y to do so, t h a t
i t w a s duly d e l i v e r e d , a n d t h a t t h e f o r m a l i t i e s w e r e
complied with (see Hibberd vs. Rhode, supra; Ramirez
vs. Orientalist Co., et al., 38 Phil. 634).
6. By t h e a d m i s s i o n of t h e g e n u i n e n e s s a n d due
execution of a document, such defenses as t h a t the sign a t u r e was a forgery; or t h a t it was u n a u t h o r i z e d in t h e
case of an a g e n t signing in behalf of a p a r t n e r s h i p or of
a c o r p o r a t i o n ; or t h a t , in t h e c a s e of t h e l a t t e r , t h e
corporation was not authorized u n d e r its c h a r t e r to sign
t h e i n s t r u m e n t ; o r t h a t t h e p a r t y c h a r g e d signed t h e
i n s t r u m e n t in some o t h e r capacity t h a n t h a t alleged in
the pleading s e t t i n g it out; or t h a t it was never delivered,
are deemed cut off. But t h e failure to deny the genuineness a n d due execution of t h e d o c u m e n t does not estop
a p a r t y from controverting it by evidence of fraud, mistake,
compromise, p a y m e n t , s t a t u t e of limitations, estoppel, and
w a n t of consideration (1 Martin 301, citing Hibberd vs.
Rhode, supra, and Bough vs. Cantiveros, supra).
7. E v e n w h e r e t h e opposing p a r t y failed to deny
under oath the authenticity and due execution of an
actionable d o c u m e n t properly alleged, he can still raise
t h e defense i n his a n s w e r a n d prove a t t h e t r i a l t h a t
t h e r e is a m i s t a k e or imperfection in t h e writing, or t h a t
it does not e x p r e s s the t r u e a g r e e m e n t of t h e p a r t i e s , or
t h a t t h e a g r e e m e n t is invalid or t h a t t h e r e is an intrinsic
ambiguity in t h e writing, as these exceptions to the parol
evidence rule (Sec. 9, Rule 130) a r e not cut off by, since
they a r e not inconsistent with, the implied admission of
t h e a u t h e n t i c i t y and due execution of the i n s t r u m e n t .

178

RULE 8

MANNER OF MAKING ALLEGATIONS

IN PLEADINGS

SEC 9

8. In an action for the recovery of a parcel of land

claimed b y plaintiffs a s t h e i r h e r e d i t a r y s h a r e s , defendants in t h e i r a n s w e r a t t a c h e d , by way of defense,
copies of t h e d e e d s of sale allegedly e x e c u t e d by
plaintiffs in favor of their brother over their s h a r e s in said
parcel of land, and a copy of the deed of sale thereafter
executed by said vendee in favor of the defendants. Said
original deeds of sale and the s u b s e q u e n t deed of sale in
favor of t h e defendants a r e actionable documents as they
constitute t h e i r defense to the action. P u r s u a n t to Sees. 7
and 8 of Rule 8, the-ewjthenticity and due execution of
said d e e d s of sale a r e impliedly a d m i t t e d by plaintiffs for
failure on t h e i r p a r t to file a reply u n d e r oath specifically
denying t h e s a m e . This implied admission, however, does
not apply to t h e o t h e r plaintiffs who are the heirs of one
of t h e (deceased) original v e n d o r s since they were not
p a r t i e s to the documents. F u r t h e r m o r e , it a p p e a r s t h a t
in their verified complaint, the plaintiffs alleged t h a t they
never sold t h e i r h e r e d i t a r y s h a r e s and, consequently, the
defendants were a w a r e t h a t they would be called upon to
establish the genuineness and due execution of said deeds
of sale. Accordingly, t h e S u p r e m e Court relieved the
plaintiffs of t h e effects of t h e i r implied a d m i s s i o n in
the i n t e r e s t of justice (Toribio, et al. us. Bidin, etc., et al.,
G.R. No. 57821, Jan. 17, 1985).
9. Where t h e case had been tried in disregard of the
rule on actionable documents and plaintiff presented oral
evidence to prove a u t h e n t i c i t y and due execution, and
failed to object to defendant's evidence in refutation, the
rule is deemed waived (Yu Chuck us. Kong Li Po, 46 Phil.
608), especially where both p a r t i e s acted in disregard of
or overlooked t h e rule at t h e t r i a l (Central Surety &
Insurance Co. us. Hodges, L-28633, Mar. 30, 1971).
S e c . 9. Official document or act. In p l e a d i n g an
official d o c u m e n t o r official a c t i t i s s u f f i c i e n t t o

179

RULE 8

REMEDIAL LAW COMPENDIUM

SEC. 10

aver that the document was issued or the act done

in c o m p l i a n c e w i t h law. (9)
S e c . 10. Specific denial. A d e f e n d a n t m u s t
s p e c i f y e a c h m a t e r i a l a l l e g a t i o n o f fact t h e t r u t h
of which he does not admit and, w h e n e v e r pract i c a b l e , s h a l l s e t forth t h e s u b s t a n c e o f t h e m a t t e r s
upon which he relies to support his denial. Where
a d e f e n d a n t d e s i r e s to d e n y o n l y a part of an
averment, he shall specify so m u c h of it as is true
and material and shall deny the remainder. Where
a d e f e n d a n t is w i t h o u t k n o w l e d g e or information
s u f f i c i e n t to form a b e l i e f as to t h e t r u t h of a m a t e r i a l
averment made in the complaint, he shall so state,
a n d t h i s s h a l l h a v e t h e e f f e c t of a d e n i a l . (10a)
NOTES
1. There are two ways of making a specific denial,
i.e., (a) by specifically denying the averment and,
whenever possible, setting forth the substance of the
matters relied upon for such denial; and (b) by an
allegation of lack of knowledge or information sufficient
to form a belief as to the truth of the averment in the
opposing party's pleading.
2. Where the averments in the opposing party's
pleading are based on documents which are in the possession of the defendant, or are presumed to be known by
him, or are readily ascertainable by him, a general
allegation of lack of knowledge or information thereof on
his part will not be considered a specific denial but an
admission (see Warner, Barnes and Co., Ltd. vs. Reyes,
et al., 103 Phil. 662; Capitol Motors Corp. vs. Yabut,
L-28140, Mar. 19, 1970; New Japan Motors, Inc. vs.
Perucho, L-44387, Nov. 5, 1976; Gutierrez, et al. vs. CA,
et al., L-31611, Nov. 29, 1976). The defendant must aver
or state positively how it is that he is ignorant of the facts
180

RULE 8

MANNER OF MAKING ALLEGATIONS

IN PLEADINGS

SEC 11

alleged (Phil. Advertising Counselors, Inc. vs. Revilla,

et al, L-31869, Aug. 8, 1973). Where the answer alleges
lack of knowledge of the "exact amount due" to the
plaintiff, the same will preclude a judgment on the
pleadings but not a motion for summary judgment
if supported by adequate proof (Phil. Bank of
Communications vs. Guitar Match Mfg. Co., Inc.
102
Phil. 1162 fUnrep.J).
3. Where the answer merely reproduces the recitals
in the complaint and denies such recitals without setting
forth the matters relied upon in support of such denials
although it is practicable to do so, such answer contains
only general denials and judgment on the pleadings is
proper (Sy-Quia, et al. vs. Marsman, ct al, L-23426,
Mar. 1, 1968).
4. A "aeg*tiv pregnant" is that form of denial
which at the same time involves an affirmative implication favorable to the opposing party. Such a "negative
pregnant" is in effect an admission of the averment
to which it is directed (1 Martin 306). It is said to be a
denial pregnant with an admission of the substantial
facts in the pleading responded to (Guevarra vs. Eala, A.C.
No. 7136, Aug. 6, 2007).
Where a fact is alleged with some qualifying or
modifying language, and the denial is conjunctive, a
negative pregnant exists and only the qualification or
modification is denied, while the fact itself is admitted
(Ison vs. Ison, 115 SW 2d. 330, 272 Ky, 836). Thus,
where the complaint alleges that the defendant deprived
plaintiff of possession on a claim of having purchased
the property from a third person, and the answer denies
merely the "material averments" and asserts that the
defendant never claimed possessory rights based on the
alleged purchase from such third person, there is a
negative pregnant as the defendant has in effect, denied
only the qualification but not the averment that he had
181

RULE 8

REMEDIAL LAW COMPENDIUM

SEC. 11

deprived the plaintiff of actual possession of the land

(Galofa vs. Nee Bon Sin, L-22018, Jan. 17, 1968).
5. The same rule applies in appellate proceedings
where the appellant's assignment of error is to the effect
that the conclusion of the Court of Appeals "is not supported by any direct testimonial evidence." This is a
negative pregnant as such contention does not deny
the existence of indirect testimonial evidence or of
documentary evidence
(Taniayo us. Callejo, et al., L25563, July 28, 1972).
6. Where the suit is brought upon the contractual
obligation under the contract of carriage contained in
bills of lading, such bills of lading can be categorized as
actionable documents which under this Rule must be
pleaded either as causes of action or defenses, and the
genuineness and execution of which are deemed admitted
unless specifically denied under oath by the adverse
party.
Even assuming that the party against whom said
provisions in the bills of lading are alleged made an
averment in its responsive pleading which amounts to a
denial, such denial is nonetheless pregnant with the
admission of the substantial facts in the pleading
responded to which are not squarely denied. Thus, while
the responding party objected to the validity of the
agreement contained in the bills of lading for being
contrary to public policy, the existence of the bills of lading
and the stipulations therein are impliedly admitted. The
denial made by the responding party is what is known in
the law on pleadings as a negative pregnant and is in
effect an admission of the averment it is directed to
(Philippine American General Insurance Co., et al. vs.
Sweet Lines, Inc., et al, G.R. No. 87434, Aug. 5, 1992).
Sec. 11.
Allegations not specifically denied deemed
admitted. M * t e x i a l ~ i v e r m e n t in t h e c o m p l a i n t ,
182

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MANNER OF MAKING ALLEGATIONS

IN PLEADINGS

SEC 11

o t h e r thon- t h o s e e t o t h e - a m o u n t o f u n l i q u i d a t e d
damages, shall be d e e m e d admitted w h e n not
specifically d e n i e d . Allegations of usury in a
c o m p l a i n t t o r e c o v e r u s u r i o u s i n t e r e s t are d e e m e d
a d m i t t e d i f n o t d e n i e d u n d e r o a t h , ( l a , R9)
NOTES
1. The following averments in the complaint are
not deemed admitted even if not specifically denied:
(sf) allegations as to the amount of damages, (b) allegations
which are immaterial to the cause of action (Worcester
vs. Lorenzana, 104 Phil. 134), which includes conclusions
of fact and law, inferences, etc., and (c)'all allegations in
the complaint where no answer has been filed by the
defendant (Lopez vs. Mendezona, 11 Phil. 209; Worcester
vs. Lorenzana, supra).
2. The following averments in the complaint are
deemed admitted even if specifically denied: (a) allegations
as to usury, and (b) the authenticity and due execution
of actionable documents properly pleaded where the
opposing party was a party thereto. Mere specific denial
is insufficient as the Rules require that such denial must
be under oath.
3. However, it has been held that the rule that
allegations of usury are deemed admitted if not denied
specifically and under oath is a procedural rule and the
lack of an oath in a pleading is a defect which is subject
to waiver just as a defective or imperfect verification may
be waived. Besides, the reglementary admission of the
allegation of usury arising from failure to make a denial
under oath may, like any other admission in court, be
withdrawn with leave of court under Sees. 2 and 3,
Rule 10 which permit substantial amendment of pleadings
once as a matter of right when the action has not been
placed on the trial calendar or, after the case is set for

183

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REMEDIAL LAW COMPENDIUM

SEC. 12

hearing, upon leave of court (Dionisio vs. Puerto, et al.,

L-39452, Oct. 31, 1974).
See, in t h i s connection, t h e case of Liam Law vs.
Olympic Sawmill, et al., supra, cited u n d e r Note 3 of
Sec. 10, Rule 6 and the discussion thereon.
4. Where the defendant relied solely on his defense
of res judicata and s u b m i t t e d t h e case for decision on
t h a t issue, he is deemed to have a d m i t t e d all t h e m a t e r i a l
allegations in the complaint and j u d g m e n t can be
r e n d e r e d accordingly (Dominguez vs. Filipinos Integrated
Services Corp., et al., G.R. No. 58820, Sept. 30, 1982).
S e c . 12. Striking
out
of pleading
or
matter
contained therein. U p o n m o t i o n m a d e by a p a r t y
b e f o r e r e s p o n d i n g t o a p l e a d i n g or, i f n o r e s p o n s i v e
pleading is permitted by these Rules, upon motion
m a d e b y a p a r t y w i t h i n t w e n t y (20) d a y s a f t e r t h e
service of the pleading upon him, or upon the court's
own initiative at any time, the court may order any
pleading to be stricken out or that any sham or
false, redundant, immaterial, impertinent, or
scandalous matter be stricken out therefrom.
(5, R9)

184

RULE 9
E F F E C T OF FAILURE TO PLEAD
S e c t i o n 1. Defenses and objections not pleaded.
D e f e n s e ^ - a ^ u l - o b j e c t i o n e - n o t - p l e a d e d e i t h e r in a
motion t o d i s m i s s - o r i n the a n s w e r are d e e m e d
waived. However, w h e n it appears from the
pleadings or the evidence on record that the court
has no jurisdiction over the subject matter, that
there is another action pending between the same
p a r t i e s for t h e s a m e c a u s e , o r t h a t t h e a c t i o n i s
barred by a prior j u d g m e n t or by s t a t u t e of
l i m i t a t i o n s , t h e c o u r t s h a l l d i s m i s s t h e c l a i m . (2a)
NOTES
1. Under this amended provision, the following
defenses are not waived even if not raised in a motion to
dismiss or in the answer: (a") lack of jurisdiction over the
subject matter; (p~) litis pendentia; (c) res judicata; and
(d) prescription of the action.
2. The omnibus motion rule in the former Sec. 2 of
this Rule also provided, as an exception thereto, "the
failure to state a cause of action which may be alleged in
a later pleading, if one is permitted, or by motion for
judgment on the pleadings, or at the trial on the merits;
but in the last instance, the motion shall be disposed of
as provided in Section 5, Rule 10 in the light of any
evidence which may have been received."
That ground and the alternative bases for considering it, in the event it was not alleged in either a motion
to dismiss or in the answer, has been deleted as an
exception to the omnibus motion rule. The alternative
ways for posing this ground for consideration of the
court in other pleadings, that is, in a later pleading if

185

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REMEDIAL LAW COMPENDIUM

SEC. 1

p e r m i t t e d or by motion for j u d g m e n t on t h e pleadings,

are contingent on future events and will only result in
delay. On t h e other h a n d , t h e failure to s t a t e a cause
of a c t i o n s h o u l d be c h a l l e n g e d in e i t h e r a m o t i o n to
dismiss or in the a n s w e r so t h a t t h e case will not proceed
for consideration, despite such omission, upon a defective
and insufficient complaint which could have been remedied
in the first instance by the plaintiff duly r e s p o n d i n g to
t h e objection on t h a t ground. If t h a t ground is correctly
r a i s e d in a motion to d i s m i s s , or in t h e a n s w e r as an
affirmative defense, the court can a l w a y s allow
a m e n d m e n t of t h e complaint a n d t h e case will proceed to
t r i a l sans t h a t defect. If t h e complaint is dismissed on
t h a t g r o u n d , t h e plaintiff c a n refile his c o m p l a i n t a s
such dismissal does not normally constitute an adjudication
on t h e m e r i t s .
T h e foregoing o b s e r v a t i o n s refer t o t h e s i t u a t i o n
w h e r e the complaint or o t h e r initiatory pleading fails to
allege facts c o n s t i t u t i v e of a c a u s e of action. W h a t is
c o n t e m p l a t e d , therefore, is a failure to state a e a u s e of
action which is provided in Sec. 1(g) of Rule 16. T-hie-is a
m a t t e r of insufficiency of t h e pleading. Sec. 5 of Rule 10,
w h i c h w a s also i n c l u d e d a s t h e l a s t m o d e for -raising
t h e issue to t h e court, refers to t h e s i t u a t i o n w h e r e t h e
evidence does not prove a cause of action. T h i s i s , therefore,
a m a t t e r of insufficiency of t h e evidence. F a i l u r e to s t a t e
a cause of action is different from failure to prove a cause
of action. The-remedy in t h e first is to move for dismissal
of t h e pleading, while t h e remedy in t h e second is t e d e m u r
to t h e evidence, hence reference to Sec. 5 of Rule-1-0 h a s
been e l i m i n a t e d in t h i s section. The p r o c e d u r e would
consequently be to r e q u i r e t h e pleading to s t a t e a cause
of action, by timely objection to its deficiency; or, at the
trial, to file a d e m u r r e r to t h e evidence, if such motion is
warranted.

186

RULE 9

EFFECT OF FAILURE TO PLEAD

SEC. 1

3. The objection on jurisdictional grounds which is

not waived even if not alleged in a motion to dismiss or
the answer is lack of jurisdiction over the subject-matter.
Lack of jurisdiction over the nature of the action has been
eliminated in Rule 16 of these revised Rules, although
that objection may possibly be raised in other pleadings
or proceedings. Lack of jurisdiction over the subjectmatter can always be raised anytime, even for the first
time on appeal, since jurisdictional issues cannot be
waived but subject, however, to the principle of estoppel
by laches.
4. The'defense of litis pendentia has been included
in the exceptions to the general rule on waiver in this
amended section by reason of the fact that, since the
other case is still pending, a resolution of the objection
raised on this ground should properly await the resolution
of and the developments in the other pending case. Upon
the occurrence of the relevant contingencies in that
other case, this objection may then be raised, unless
already submitted to the court, which by then would be
in a better position to appreciate the merits of this
objection.
5. Res judicata and prescription of the claim have
also been added as exceptions since they are grounds
for extinguishment of the claim. It would appear to be
unduly technical, if not contrary to the rule on unjust
enrichment, to have the defending party respond all
over again for the same claim which has already been
resolved or is no longer recoverable under the law. It is
worth mentioning in this connection that, in Sec. 5 of
Rule 16 as amended, an order granting a motion to
dismiss on the grounds, inter alia, of res judicata or
prescription shall bar the refiling of the same action or
claim.

187

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REMEDIAL LAW COMPENDIUM

SEC. 1

6 . T h e p r e s e n c e o f a n y o f t h e s e four g r o u n d s
authorizes the court to motu proprio dismiss the claim,
t h a t is, the claims a s s e r t e d in a complaint, counter claim,
cross-claim, third (fourth, etc.)-party complaint or
complaint-in-intervention (see Sec. 2, Rule 6). In order
t h a t it may do so, it is necessary t h a t t h e constitutive
facts of such grounds, if not in the a n s w e r with evidence
duly adduced therefor, should a p p e a r in the other
pleadings filed or in the evidence of record in t h e case.
7. Specifically with respect to t h e defense of pres c r i p t i o n , t h e p r e s e n t provision is s i m i l a r to t h e r u l e
a d o p t e d i n civil c a s e s , b u t d i s s i m i l a r t o t h e r u l e a n d
r a t i o n a l e in c r i m i n a l cases. In civil cases, it h a s been
held t h a t the defense of prescription may be considered
only if t h e s a m e is invoked in t h e a n s w e r , except w h e r e
t h e fact of prescription a p p e a r s in t h e allegations in the
c o m p l a i n t or t h e e v i d e n c e p r e s e n t e d by t h e plaintiff,
in which case such defense is not deemed waived
(Ferrer vs. Ericta, et al., L 41761, Aug. 23, 1978; Garcia
vs. Mathis, et al., L-48577, Sept. 30, 1980).
It would
thus appear t h a t the non-waiver is dependent on the
t i m e l i n e s s of invocation of t h e defense, or w h e r e such
defense is a m a t t e r of record or evidence.
8. In criminal cases, the s a m e general rule on waiver
of any ground for a motion to q u a s h also o b t a i n s w h e r e
t h e accused fails to a s s e r t t h e s a m e e i t h e r b e c a u s e he
did not file such motion before he p l e a d e d or failed to
allege s u c h g r o u n d t h e r e i n . E x c e p t e d from t h i s r u l e ,
h o w e v e r , is t h e g r o u n d of p r e s c r i p t i o n e i t h e r of t h e
offense or t h e penalty, t h a t is, t h a t t h e criminal action or
liability h a s been e x t i n g u i s h e d (Sec. 9, Rule 117). This
provision does not r e q u i r e the qualifications of seasonable i n v o c a t i o n or r e c o r d e d fact of t h e g r o u n d of
prescription as discussed above for civil actions. Instead,
said provision is evidently based on t h e r u l i n g s of t h e
S u p r e m e Court t h a t objection on the ground of

188

RULE 9

EFFECT OF FAILURE TO PLEAD

SEC. 2

p r e s c r i p t i o n of t h e c r i m e is not w a i v e d e v e n if not
raised before t h e plea, since prescription is a substantive
r i g h t w h i c h c a n n o t be d e f e a t e d by p r o v i s i o n s of a
procedural law (People vs. Moran, 44 Phil. 387; People
vs. Castro, 95 Phil. 462). For t h a t m a t t e r , such objection
may even be raised for the first time on appeal (People
vs. Balagtas, 105 Phil. 1362 fUnrep.J; Escano, et al. vs.
Geronimo, [CA], 60 O.G. 8497).
S e c . 2. Compulsory counterclaim, or cross-claim, not
set up barred. A c o m p u l s o r y c o u n t e r c l a i m , or a
c r o s s - c l a i m , n o t s e t u p s h a l l b e b a r r e d . (4a)
NOTES
1. See notes u n d e r Sees. 7 and 8, Rule 6.
2. W h e r e , in a first action a g a i n s t him, t h e compulsory c o u n t e r c l a i m of d e f e n d a n t w a s d i s m i s s e d for
non-payment of docket fee, such dismissal is not a bar
to his filing of t h e s a m e counterclaim in a s u b s e q u e n t
action i n s t i t u t e d b y t h e plaintiff involving t h e s a m e
subject-matter. The dismissal of said counterclaim
does not c o n s t i t u t e res judicata because it w a s not a
determination on the merits of the counterclaim. Also,
the dismissal of said counterclaim having been
u n q u a l i f i e d , h e n c e w i t h o u t p r e j u d i c e , i t d o e s not
constitute an adjudication on the merits since this rule
in Sec. 2, Rule 17 applies not only to a complaint but
also to a counterclaim which p a r t a k e s of the n a t u r e of a
complaint. This is aside from t h e consideration t h a t ,
since the dismissal of the counterclaim was premised on
the postulate t h a t for non-payment of the docket fee the
court did not acquire jurisdiction thereover, t h e n with
much more r e a s o n can t h e r e be no invocation of res
judicata, not to speak of the fact t h a t it was error for
the trial court to order such dismissal since the
payment of docket fees is required only for permissive,
189

RULE 9

REMEDIAL LAW COMPENDIUM

SEC. 3

not compulsory, counterclaims (Meliton vs. CA, et al.,

G.R. No. 101883, Dec. 11, 1992).
S e c . 3. Default; declaration of. If t h e d e f e n d i n g
party fails to a n s w e r within the time allowed
therefor, the court shall, upon motion of the
c l a i m i n g party with notice to the d e f e n d i n g party,
and proof of such failure, declare the defending
party in default. Thereupon, the court shall proceed
to render judgment granting the claimant such
relief as his pleading may warrant, unless the court
in its d i s c r e t i o n r e q u i r e s the c l a i m a n t to s u b m i t
evidence. Such reception of evidence may be
d e l e g a t e d t o t h e c l e r k o f c o u r t , ( l a , R18)
(a) Effect of order of default. A p a r t y in d e f a u l t
shall be entitled to notice of s u b s e q u e n t proceedings
b u t n o t t o t a k e p a r t i n t h e t r i a l . (2a, R18)
(b) Relief from order of default. A p a r t y d e c l a r e d
in default may at any time after notice t h e r e o f and
b e f o r e j u d g m e n t file a m o t i o n u n d e r o a t h t o s e t a s i d e
the order of default upon proper showing that his
failure to a n s w e r was due to fraud, accident,
mistake or excusable negligence and that he has a
meritorious defense. In such case, the order of
default may be set aside on such terms and
conditions as the judge may impose in the interest
o f j u s t i c e . (3a, R18)
(c) Effect of partial default. W h e n a p l e a d i n g
a s s e r t i n g a claim states a c o m m o n c a u s e of action
against several defending parties, some of whom
a n s w e r a n d t h e o t h e r s fail t o d o s o , t h e c o u r t s h a l l
t r y t h e c a s e a g a i n s t all u p o n t h e a n s w e r s t h u s filed
and render judgment upon the evidence presented.
(4a, R18)

190

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EFFECT OF FAILURE TO PLEAD

SEC. 3

(d) Extent of relief to be awarded. A j u d g m e n t

r e n d e r e d a g a i n s t a p a r t y in d e f a u l t s h a l l n o t e x c e e d
t h e a m o u n t o r b e d i f f e r e n t i n k i n d from t h a t p r a y e d
for n o r a w a r d u n l i q u i d a t e d d a m a g e s . (5a, R18)
(e) Where no defaults allowed. If t h e d e f e n d i n g
party i r f a n a c t i o n for a n n u l m e n t o r d e c l a r a t i o n o f
n u l l i t y of m a r r i a g e or for l e g a l s e p a r a t i o n fails to
answer, the court shall order the prosecuting
attorney to investigate w h e t h e r or not a collusion
between the parties exists, and if there is no
c o l l u s i o n , t o i n t e r v e n e for t h e S t a t e i n o r d e r t o s e e
to it that the e v i d e n c e submitted is not fabricated.
(6a, R18)
^ ^ O T E S ' ' " ' - "
1. An order of default should be distinguished from
a judgment by default. An order of default is issued by
the court, on plaintiffs motion and at the start of the
proceedings, for failure of the defendant to file his
responsive pleading seasonably. It is only thereafter,
when the evidence for the plaintiff has been received ex
parte, that the court renders a judgment by default on
the basis of such evidence.
2. This section provides for the extent of the relief
that may be awarded in the judgment by default, i.e.,
only so much as has been alleged and proved. The court
acts in excess of jurisdiction if it awards an amount
beyond the claim made in the complaint or beyond that
proved by the evidence. Furthermore, as amended, no
unliquidated damages can be awarded and said judgment
shall not exceed the amount or be different in kind from
that prayed for. If the claim is not proved, the case should
be dismissed (Pascua, et al. us. Florendo, et al., L-38047,
April 30, 1985).

191

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SEC. 3

3. F a i l u r e to file a responsive pleading within the

r e g l e m e n t a r y period, a n d not failure t o a p p e a r a t t h e
hearing, is the sole ground for an order of default (Rosario,
et al. vs. Alonzo, et al, L-17320, June 29, 1963), except
t h e failure to a p p e a r at a p r e - t r i a l conference w h e r e i n t h e
effects of a d e f a u l t on t h e p a r t of t h e d e f e n d a n t a r e
followed, t h a t is, t h e plaintiff shall be allowed to p r e s e n t
evidence ex parte and a j u d g m e n t based t h e r e o n may be
r e n d e r e d a g a i n s t t h e d e f e n d a n t (Sec. 5, Rule 18). Also,
a default j u d g m e n t may be rendered, even if t h e defendant
had filed his a n s w e r , u n d e r t h e c i r c u m s t a n c e in Sec. 3(c),
Rule 29.
4. The court c a n n o t motu proprio declare a defend a n t in default (Viacrusis vs. Estenzo, L-18457, June 30,
1962; Trajano, et al. vs. Cruz, et al, L-47070, Dec. 29,
1977). T h e r e m u s t be a m o t i o n to t h a t effect by t h e
plaintiff w i t h proof of failure by t h e d e f e n d a n t to file
his responsive p l e a d i n g despite due notice (Soberano vs.
MRR Co., L-19407, Nov. 23, 1966; Sarmiento vs. Juan,
G.R. No. 56605, Jan. 28, 1983). Formerly, t h e d e f e n d a n t
did not have to be served w i t h notice of t h e motion to
have h i m d e c l a r e d in default (Pielago vs. Generosa, 73
Phil. 634, based on Sec. 9, Rule 27 of t h e old Rules a n d
r e p r o d u c e d s u b s t a n t i a l l y in Sec. 9, Rule 13; De Guzman
vs. Santos, et al, L-22636, June 11, 1970, citing Duran
vs. Arboleda, 20 Phil. 253; Inchausti & Co. vs. De Leon,
24 Phil. 224; Monteverde vs. Jaranilla, 49 Phil. 297;
Manila Motor Co. vs. Endencia, 72 Phil. 130; The Phil.
British Co., Inc., et al vs. Delos Angeles, etc., et al,
L-33720-21, Mar. 10, 1975). An i m p o r t a n t c h a n g e h a s
been effected by t h e p r e s e n t a m e n d m e n t s in t h e sense
t h a t an order of default can be made only upon motion of
t h e claiming p a r t y and with t h e corresponding notice to
t h e defending p a r t y .
On the other hand, under the rule on summary
p r o c e d u r e , no default order is r e n d e r e d or required as a
motion to declare t h e d e f e n d a n t in default is prohibited;
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EFFECT OF FAILURE TO PLEAD

SEC. 3

and a default j u d g m e n t may be r e n d e r e d by the court

motu proprio or on motion of the party asserting the claim.
5. The defendant who files his a n s w e r in court in
time but failed to serve a copy thereof upon the adverse
p a r t y may validly be declared in default (Gonzales vs.
Francisco, 49 Phil. 747; Banares vs. Flordeliza, et al., 51
Phil. 786).
6. T h e fact t h a t t h e d e f e n d a n t w a s d e c l a r e d in
default is of no m o m e n t w h e n t h e plaintiff would not
have been entitled to relief since his complaint did not
state a cause of action, hence the same should be dismissed
(Reyes vs. Tolentino, et al., L-29142, Nov. 29, 1971).
7. It is within the discretion of the trial court to set
a s i d e a n o r d e r o f d e f a u l t a n d p e r m i t t h e filing o f
defendant's a n s w e r even beyond the r e g l e m e n t a r y
period, or to refuse to set aside the default order where it
finds no justification for t h e delay in the filing of the
a n s w e r (Malipod vs. Tan, L-27730, Jan. 21, 1974).
However, defendant's answer should be admitted where
it was filed before he had been declared in default and
no p r e j u d i c e could h a v e b e e n c a u s e d to plaintiff, as
default j u d g m e n t s a r e generally disfavored (Trajano,
et al. vs. Cruz, et al., supra). Where the answer is filed
beyond the r e g l e m e n t a r y period but before the defendant
was declared in default, and t h e r e is no showing t h a t
defendant intended to delay the case, the answer should
be a d m i t t e d (Cathay Pacific Airways, Ltd. vs. Romillo,
etc., et al, G.R. No. 64276, Mar. 4, 1986).
Also, where
the failure of d e f e n d a n t to seasonably file her a n s w e r
is excusable and the lifting of the default order will not
in any way prejudice plaintiff's s u b s t a n t i a l rights, the
court should apply the Rules liberally and set aside the
default order (Santos vs. De la Fuente Samson, et al,
L-46371, Dec. 14, 1981; cf. Akut vs. CA, et al, L-45472,
Aug. 30, 1982; Azul, et al. vs. Castro, et al, G.R.
No. 52241, Nov. 19, 1984).
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SEC. 3

8. A motion to lift an o r d e r of d e f a u l t should be

u n d e r oath or verified and accompanied by an affidavit of
m e r i t s . T h e r e q u i r e m e n t s of Sec. 3 of t h i s Rule a r e
practically identical to those of Sec. 3, Rule 38 (The Phil.
British Co., Inc. vs. De los Angeles, etc., et al., supra;
Claridad, et al. vs. Santos, et al., L-29594, Jan. 27, 1983).
H o w e v e r , if t h e motion to lift t h e o r d e r of d e f a u l t is
grounded on t h e very root of t h e proceedings, i.e., invalid
service of s u m m o n s on the defendant, affidavits of m e r i t s
a r e not necessary (Ponio vs. IAC, et al., G.R. No. 66782,
Dec. 20, 1984).
Also, if the motion to lift an order of default is u n d e r
oath a n d contains t h e r e a s o n s for the failure to a n s w e r ,
as well as t h e prospective defenses, a s e p a r a t e affidavit
of m e r i t s a n d a v e r i f i c a t i o n a r e not n e c e s s a r y (Lim
Tanhu, et al. vs. Ramolete, et al, L-40098, Aug. 29, 1975;
Azul, et al. vs. Castro, et al., supra).
9. Where a motion to lift an order of default is denied
and a motion for t h e reconsideration of said denial order
is filed based on s u b s t a n t i a l l y t h e s a m e g r o u n d s , said
motion for reconsideration is not pro forma as it is directed
a g a i n s t an interlocutory, a n d not a final, order a n d the
r e i t e r a t i o n of t h e s a m e g r o u n d s seeks a second look by the
court on t h e m e r i t s of said g r o u n d s (BA Finance Corp. vs.
Pineda, et al., G.R. No. 61628, Dec. 29, 1982).
10. The motion to lift t h e order of default, aside from
t h e r e q u i r e m e n t s in Sec. 3 of this Rule, m u s t f u r t h e r show
t h a t t h e d e f e n d a n t h a s a m e r i t o r i o u s defense o r t h a t
s o m e t h i n g would be gained by having the o r d e r of
d e f a u l t s e t a s i d e (Carandang vs. Cabatuando, et al.,
L-25384, Oct. 26, 1973). O t h e r w i s e , and if t h e motion is
not accompanied by affidavits of m e r i t s , it may properly
be denied (Ong Peng vs. Custodio, L-14911, Oct. 26, 1961;
The Phil. British Co., Inc., et al. vs. De los Angeles, etc.,
et al., supra).

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SEC. 3

11. T h e former r u l e w a s t h a t w h e r e a p a r t y had

moved to set aside the order of default, he was entitled to
copies o f all p l e a d i n g s a n d o r d e r s filed a n d i s s u e d
thereafter. If he had not done so, he was still entitled to
be served with copies of substantially amended or supp l e m e n t a l pleadings, as well as final orders or j u d g m e n t s .
The qualifications were rationalized as follows:
He must be served with amended pleadings and
s u p p l e m e n t a l pleadings as he may be entitled to plead
thereto. T h u s , if the defendant was declared in default
upon an original complaint, t h e filing of t h e a m e n d e d
c o m p l a i n t r e s u l t e d in t h e w i t h d r a w a l of t h e o r i g i n a l
complaint, hence t h e defendant was entitled to file an
answer to the amended complaint as to which he was not
in default. If t h e s u p p l e m e n t a l pleading introduced new
claims, he was entitled to plead thereto as jurisdiction had
not been acquired over him in respect thereof.
He had to be served with a copy of the j u d g m e n t by
default as he had t h e right to appeal therefrom and in
said appeal he may, aside from attacking the propriety
of the relief t h e r e i n awarded, assign as error the order of
t h e c o u r t d e c l a r i n g him in default, or refusing to set
aside such order, or denying a motion for new trial as
the case may be.
T h i s w a s b e c a u s e t h e n Sec. 2 of Rule 18 r e a d :
"Except as provided in Section 9 of Rule 13, a p a r t y
d e c l a r e d in d e f a u l t s h a l l not be e n t i t l e d to notice of
s u b s e q u e n t proceedings, nor to take p a r t in t h e trial."
T h i s r u l e w a s c o n s i d e r e d too h a r s h , h e n c e , a s now
amended, p a r . (a) of t h i s section simply provides t h a t
while a p a r t y in default cannot take p a r t in the trial, he is
nonetheless entitled to notice of subsequent proceedings
without the qualifications under the former practice.
12. If the court sets aside the order of default, the
defendant is restored to his standing and rights in the
action. However, proceedings already taken are not to
195

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SEC. 3

be disturbed (Jaime vs. Maniego, 101 Phil. 828), although

it is w i t h i n t h e discretion of t h e c o u r t to re-open t h e
evidence submitted by the plaintiff and enable the
defendant to challenge the s a m e , as by cross-examination
of p l a i n t i f f ' s w i t n e s s e s or i n t r o d u c i n g c o u n t e r v a i l i n g
e v i d e n c e (see Denso [Phil.], Inc. vs. IAC, et al., G.R.
No. 75000, Feb. 27, 1987). The lifting of an order of default
does not r e v e r t t h e case to its pre-trial stage, much less
r e n d e r a second p r e - t r i a l m a n d a t o r y (DBP vs. CA, et al.,
L-49410, Jan. 26, 1989).
13. U n d e r t h e former procedure, and t h e s a m e would
hold t r u e u n d e r t h e p r e s e n t a m e n d e d Rules, t h e alternative and successive r e m e d i e s of a p a r t y properly
declared in default in t h e former Court of F i r s t I n s t a n c e
were: (1) He may file a verified motion to set aside t h e
order of default at any time after discovery thereof and
before j u d g m e n t ; (2) If he did not file one or t h e s a m e
was denied, he could file a motion for new t r i a l at any
time after service of j u d g m e n t by default a n d w i t h i n 30
days therefrom; (3) If he failed to file said motion or t h e
s a m e w a s denied, he could perfect his a p p e a l from and on
t h e m e r i t s of said j u d g m e n t by default w i t h i n t h e balance
of said 30-day period; a n d (4) If he failed to t a k e any of
such s t e p s , he could file a petition for relief from j u d g m e n t
within 60 days from notice of t h e j u d g m e n t b u t w i t h i n 6
m o n t h s from e n t r y thereof (see Lina vs. CA, et al., G.R.
No. 62397, April 9, 1985).
It should be noted, however, t h a t u n d e r B.P. Big. 129
a n d t h e I n t e r i m Rules, t h e r e g l e m e n t a r y period to a p p e a l
h a s been uniformly set at 15 days, except in habeas corpus
cases for which t h e 48-hour period h a s been m a i n t a i n e d ,
and in special proceedings or cases wherein multiple
appeals are p e r m i t t e d and in which cases the r e g l e m e n t a r y
period is still 30 days. Considering the fact t h a t t h e period
for filing a motion for new t r i a l is c o t e r m i n o u s with the
r e g l e m e n t a r y period for appeal, the 30-day periods for the
s e c o n d a n d t h i r d r e m e d i e s a b o v e s t a t e d w o u l d now
196

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EFFECT OF FAILURE TO PLEAD

SEC. 3

apply only to special proceedings and cases susceptible of

multiple appeals, with the first and fourth remedies being
a v a i l a b l e as before. In all o t h e r civil a c t i o n s , all t h e
abovestated remedies from a default j u d g m e n t are still
available, it being understood, however, t h a t the remedy
of new t r i a l and appeal should now be availed of within
15 days from receipt of the j u d g m e n t by default.
14. Where however, the defendant was improperly
declared in default, as w h e r e the reglementary period to
a n s w e r had not yet expired, he can, if such default order
is not lifted, e l e v a t e t h e m a t t e r by c e r t i o r a r i w i t h o u t
waiting for t h e default j u d g m e n t (Viacrusis vs. Estenzo,
L-18457, June 30, 1962;
Pioneer Insurance & Surety
Corp. vs. Hontanosas, L-35951,
Aug. 31, 1977).
If a
default j u d g m e n t was already rendered, he can also resort
immediately to certiorari as his challenge is on the nullity
of both t h e order and the j u d g m e n t by default and not
on the m e r i t s or correctness of the j u d g m e n t (Matute vs.
CA, et al., L-26751, Jan. 3, 1969), especially where a writ
of execution was already issued, hence appeal would not
be a s p e e d y a n d a d e q u a t e r e m e d y (Omico Mining &
Industrial Corp. vs. Vallejos, et al., L-38974, Mar. 25,
1975; Zenith Insurance Corp. vs. Purisima, et al., G.R.
No. 57535, May 24, 1982).
15. It has also been held t h a t while, as a general
rule, certiorari may not be availed of where an appeal is
available a n d an appeal lies from a j u d g m e n t by default,
nevertheless if t h e r e was grave abuse of discretion on the
p a r t of t h e trial court, the special civil action of certiorari
may be availed of by the aggrieved party as this is an
exception to said general rule. Certiorari would provide a
more speedy and a d e q u a t e remedy since the aggrieved
party in a default j u d g m e n t had no opportunity to adduce
evidence in the trial court; hence, on appeal, only the selfserving evidence presented by the plaintiff in the ex parte
reception thereof would be considered (Continental Leaf
197

RULE 9

REMEDIAL LAW COMPENDIUM

Tobacco [Phil.], Inc.

Nov. 22, 1985).

vs.

CA,

et

al.,

G.R.

SEC. 3

No.

69243,

16. A p e t i t i o n for relief from t h e o r d e r of default

m a y be filed at any t i m e after discovery of t h e default
order a n d before j u d g m e n t (Turqueza vs. Hernando, etc.,
et al., G.R. No. 51626, April 30, 1980). Said o r d e r of
default, however, is not a p p e a l a b l e as t h e s a m e is an
i n t e r l o c u t o r y o r d e r (Vda. de Hoyo-a, et al. vs. Virata,
et al., G.R. No. 71171, July 23, 1985) a n d t h e s a m e is t r u e
w i t h an order d e n y i n g a motion for t h e r e c o n s i d e r a t i o n
of t h e default order.
17. It h a s also b e e n h e l d , h o w e v e r , t h a t w h i l e a
default order, being interlocutory, is not a p p e a l a b l e , an
order d e n y i n g a p e t i t i o n for relief, s e e k i n g to set aside
an order of default, is not merely interlocutory but
final a n d , t h e r e f o r e , a p p e a l a b l e (Rodriguez, et al. vs.
IAC, et al, G.R. No. 74816, Mar. 17, 1987).
18. It should not be overlooked t h a t p a r . (c) of t h i s
section, which enunciates the rule on p a r t i a l default,
does not apply w h e r e t h e defending p a r t i e s a r e jointly
s u e d or i m p l e a d e d u n d e r s e p a r a t e c a u s e s of action. It
c o n t e m p l a t e s a claim or s u i t u p o n a c o m m o n c a u s e of
action a g a i n s t s e v e r a l defending p a r t i e s at l e a s t one of
w h o m files an a n s w e r while t h e o t h e r s a r e in default.
19. If t h e a n s w e r i n g d e f e n d a n t succeeds in defeating
t h e p l a i n t i f f s claim, such r e s u l t i n u r e s also to t h e benefit
of t h e d e f a u l t i n g d e f e n d a n t s (Velez vs. Ramos, 10 Phil.
788;
Bringas vs. Hernando, G.R. No. 51933, Sept. 24,
1986).
2 0 . W h e r e a c o - d e f e n d a n t w h o filed h i s a n s w e r
died a n d t h e case w a s dismissed a s t o him, t h e a n s w e r h e
filed does not i n u r e to t h e benefit of t h e d e f e n d a n t who
did not file his own a n s w e r . N e i t h e r will t h e rule apply
where the defenses alleged by the defendant who

198

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EFFECT OF FAILURE TO PLEAD

SEC. 3

answered are personal to him (Luzon Surety Co., Inc. us.

Magbonua, et al., L-43851, July 30, 1976).
2 1 . The d e f e n d a n t who failed to a n s w e r s h a l l be
declared in default and is deprived of the right to take
p a r t in the trial and, in effect, he submits to w h a t e v e r
decision may be rendered on the basis of the a n s w e r and
evidence adduced by t h e a n s w e r i n g co-defendant (Lim
Tanhu us. Ramolete, etc., et al., L-40098, Aug. 29, 1975;
cf. Co us. Acosta, et al, G.R. No. 64591, Jan. 17, 1985).
22. There is no provision of the Rules disqualifying
a p a r t y declared in default from taking the witness stand
for h i s c o - d e f e n d a n t s . T h e specific e n u m e r a t i o n of
d i s q u a l i f i e d w i t n e s s e s e x c l u d e s t h e o p e r a t i o n of t h e
causes of disability o t h e r t h a n to those m e n t i o n e d in
Sees. 19, 20 and 2 1 , Rule 130. The provision of t h e n
Sec. 2, Rule 18 to t h e effect t h a t "a p a r t y declared in
default s h a l l not be e n t i t l e d to notice of s u b s e q u e n t
proceedings nor to t a k e p a r t in the trial" (now, par. [a]
of this section, as amended) means only the forfeiture of
the defaulting party's rights as a party litigant and not
a disqualification from merely testifying as a witness.
The incidental benefit of giving the party in default the
opportunity to p r e s e n t evidence which may eventually
redound to his a d v a n t a g e , through his co-defendants, is
of minor consequence. There is no reason why the nondefaulting d e f e n d a n t s should be deprived of the
testimony of the party in default and thereby also suffer
the c o n s e q u e n c e s of t h e l a t t e r ' s p r o c e d u r a l omission
(Cavili, et al. us. Florendo, et al, G.R. No. 73039, Oct. 9,
1987, and cases jointly decided therein).
2 3 . U n d e r par. (c) of this section, when a common
cause of action is alleged against several defendants, two
of w h o m seasonably filed their answers while the others
were declared in default, the answers of the former inure
to t h e b e n e f i t of t h e l a t t e r a n d all t h e d e f e n d a n t s ,

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SEC. 3

defaulted and not defaulted, s h a r e a common fate in the

action. It is not within the authority of the trial court to
divide the case before it by first dismissing the same, on
m o t i o n of t h e plaintiff, as a g a i n s t t h e n o n - d e f a u l t e d
defendants and thereafter hearing it ex parte as a g a i n s t
the defaulted defendants and rendering a default
j u d g m e n t a g a i n s t t h e m . This is an unfair procedure and
deprives the defaulted defendants of due process as
they a r e thereby denied the benefit of t h e a n s w e r and the
evidence which could have been p r e s e n t e d by t h e i r nondefaulted co-defendants, and which could be considered
in favor of all. F u r t h e r , said order of dismissal divested
t h e t r i a l court of t h e jurisdiction to proceed with t h e case
since all t h e d e f e n d a n t s a r e obligors in solidum, hence
indispensable p a r t i e s (Lim Tanhu, et al. us. Ramolete, etc.,
et al., supra).
24. T h e p e r t i n e n t p r o v i s i o n s o f t h e Civil Code
provided as follows
"Art. 88. No j u d g m e n t a n n u l l i n g a m a r r i a g e shall
be p r o m u l g a t e d u p o n a s t i p u l a t i o n of facts or by
confession of j u d g m e n t .
In case of n o n - a p p e a r a n c e of t h e d e f e n d a n t t h e
provisions of article 101, p a r a g r a p h 2, shall be
observed."
"Art. 101. No decree of legal s e p a r a t i o n shall be
p r o m u l g a t e d u p o n a s t i p u l a t i o n of f a c t s or by
confession of j u d g m e n t .
In case of n o n - a p p e a r a n c e of t h e defendant, t h e
court shall o r d e r the p r o s e c u t i n g a t t o r n e y to inquire
w h e t h e r or not a collusion b e t w e e n t h e p a r t i e s exists.
If t h e r e is no collusion, the p r o s e c u t i n g a t t o r n e y shall
i n t e r v e n e for t h e S t a t e in order to t a k e care t h a t t h e
evidence for t h e plaintiff is not fabricated."
a n d , u n d e r t h e said Code, every collusion to o b t a i n a
decree of legal s e p a r a t i o n or of a n n u l m e n t of m a r r i a g e

200

RULE 9

EFFECT OF FAILURE TO PLEAD

SEC. 3

was void and of no effect (Art. 221).

The i n t e r v e n t i o n of t h e prosecuting a t t o r n e y was,
therefore, proper and required where the defendant does
not a n s w e r or, even if he has answered, he does not a p p e a r
personally or by counsel at the trial.
The equivalent provisions of the Family Code are to
this effect:
"Art. 48. In all cases of a n n u l m e n t or declaration
of absolute nullity of m a r r i a g e the court shall order
t h e prosecuting a t t o r n e y or fiscal assigned to it to
a p p e a r on behalf of the S t a t e to take steps to prevent
collusion between t h e p a r t i e s and to take care t h a t
evidence is not fabricated or suppressed.
In the cases referred to in the preceding
p a r a g r a p h , no j u d g m e n t s h a l l be b a s e d u p o n a
stipulation of facts or confession of judgment."
"Art. 60. No decree of legal separation shall be
based upon a stipulation of facts or a confession of
judgment.
In any case, the court shall order the prosecuting
attorney or fiscal assigned to it to take steps to prevent
collusion between t h e parties and to take care t h a t
the evidence is not fabricated or suppressed."
2 5 . A default j u d g m e n t rendered in an a n n u l m e n t
case, even if procedurally erroneous, is nevertheless a
valid j u d g m e n t (De la Cruz vs. Ejercito, L-40895, Nov. 6,
1975).

201

R U L E 10
AMENDED AND SUPPLEMENTAL PLEADINGS
S e c t i o n 1.
Amendments in general. P l e a d i n g s
may be amended by adding or striking out an
allegation or the name of any party, or by
c o r r e c t i n g a m i s t a k e in t h e n a m e of a p a r t y or a
mistaken or inadequate allegation or description
in any other respect, so that the actual merits of
the controversy may speedily be determined,
without regard to technicalities, and in the most
e x p e d i t i o u s a n d i n e x p e n s i v e m a n n e r . (1)
S e c . 7. Filing of amended pleadings. W h e n a n y
p l e a d i n g is a m e n d e d , a new copy of the entire
pleading, incorporating the amendments, which
shall be indicated by appropriate marks, shall be
filed. (7a)
NOTES
1. A m e n d m e n t s to a pleading should be indicated in
the a m e n d e d pleading, as by underscoring, enclosing t h e m
in q u o t a t i o n m a r k s , p u t t i n g t h e m in capital l e t t e r s , a n d
so forth, as would m a k e t h e m readily evident.
2. The a m e n d e d p l e a d i n g s u p e r s e d e s t h e original
pleading which is deemed w i t h d r a w n and no longer
c o n s t i t u t e s p a r t of t h e record. However, t h e filing of t h e
a m e n d e d p l e a d i n g does not r e t r o a c t to t h e d a t e of t h e
filing of t h e original, h e n c e , t h e s t a t u t e of l i m i t a t i o n s
r u n s u n t i l t h e filing of t h e a m e n d m e n t (Ruymann, et al.
vs. Director of Lands, 34 Phil. 429). But an a m e n d m e n t
which merely s u p p l e m e n t s and amplifies facts originally
alleged in t h e complaint r e l a t e s back to t h e d a t e of the
c o m m e n c e m e n t of t h e action a n d is not b a r r e d by t h e

202

RULE 10

AMENDED AND
SUPPLEMENTAL PLEADINGS

SECS. 1, 7

s t a t u t e of limitations which expired after the service of

the original complaint (Panay Electric Co. vs. CA, et al.,
G.R. No. 59647, Dec. 11, 1982). It is the actual filing in
c o u r t t h a t c o n t r o l s , a n d not t h e d a t e o f t h e f o r m a l
admission of the amended pleading (Republic vs. Marsman
Dev. Co., L-18956, April 27, 1972).
3. Where t h e original complaint s t a t e s a cause of
action but does it imperfectly, and a f t e r w a r d s an
a m e n d e d c o m p l a i n t is filed c o r r e c t i n g t h e defect, t h e
plea of prescription will relate to the time of the filing of
the original complaint (Pangasinan Trans. Co. vs. Phil.
Farming Co., Ltd., 81 Phil. 273).
However, such rule
would not apply to t h e p a r t y who was impleaded for the
first time in the amended complaint which was filed after
the period of prescription had already lapsed, hence t h e
amended complaint m u s t be dismissed as to such p a r t y
who w a s t h u s belatedly included in the action (Aetna
Insurance Co.
vs. Luzon Stevedoring Corp., L-25266,
Jan. 15, 1975; Seno, et al. vs. Mangubat, et al., L-44339,
Dec. 2, 1987).
4. The rule is t h a t a m e n d m e n t s should be liberally
allowed (Cese vs. GSIS, 109 Phil. 306). This liberality at
the outset of the action decreases as the case moves to its
termination (Salvador vs. Frio, L-25352, May 29, 1970).
However, a m e n d m e n t s to pleadings may be p e r m i t t e d
even for the first time on appeal if, without changing the
cause of action or causing unfair prejudice to the other
p a r t y , t h e p u r p o s e is to (a) correct a defect of p a r t y
plaintiff, as where it is merely to include the husband of
the plaintiff wife (Cuyugan vs. Dizon, 79 Phil. 81); or
(b) s u b s t i t u t e t h e n a m e of t h e r e a l p a r t y in i n t e r e s t
(Palacio vs. Fely Trans. Co., L-15121, Aug. 31, 1962; Chua
Kiong vs. Whitaker, 46 Phil. 578; Alonso vs.Villamor, 16
Phil. 320). T h u s , since a sole proprietorship is a business
organization without juridical personality to sue, an
a m e n d m e n t to s u b s t i t u t e the owner thereof as plaintiff
203

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REMEDIAL LAW COMPENDIUM

SEC. 2

is only a f o r m a l a m e n d m e n t (Juasing Hardware vs.

Mendoza, et al., G.R. No. 55687, July 30, 1982). These
a r e a u t h o r i z e d as formal a m e n d m e n t s u n d e r Sec. 4 of
this Rule.
S e c . 2. Amendments as a matter of right.A p a r t y
may amend his pleading once as a matter of
right at any time before a responsive p l e a d i n g
is s e r v e d or, in t h e c a s e of a reply, at a n y t i m e
w i t h i n t e n (10) d a y s a f t e r i t i s s e r v e d . (2a)
NOTES
1. A m e n d m e n t for t h e first time is a m a t t e r of r i g h t
before a responsive pleading is filed or, in t h e case of a
reply, within 10 days after it was served. However,
a m e n d m e n t for t h e second or subsequent t i m e m u s t
always be w i t h leave of court even before a responsive
p l e a d i n g is filed or before t h e case is s e t in t h e c a l e n d a r
of t h e court.
Where some but not all the defendants have filed t h e i r
a n s w e r s , t h e plaintiff may a m e n d his complaint, once as
a m a t t e r of right, in respect to t h e claims a s s e r t e d only
a g a i n s t t h e n o n - a n s w e r i n g d e f e n d a n t s , b u t not as to t h e
claims a s s e r t e d a g a i n s t t h e o t h e r d e f e n d a n t s who have
a n s w e r e d (Siasoco, et al., vs. CA, et al., 362 Phil. 525,
Republic vs. Africa, et al., G.R. No. 172315, Aug 28, 2007).
2. Even after a motion to dismiss h a s been filed by
d e f e n d a n t (Paeste vs. Jaurigue, 94 Phil. 179) or s u c h
motion h a s been s u b m i t t e d for decision (Republic vs. Ilao,
L-16667, Jan. 30, 1962), t h e plaintiff can still a m e n d h i s
c o m p l a i n t as a m a t t e r of right, since a motion to dismiss
is not a responsive p l e a d i n g within t h i s rule. An e r r o r
of t h e court in refusing such a m e n d m e n t is controllable
by m a n d a m u s (Breslin, et al. vs. Luzon Stevedoring Co.,
et al, 84 Phil. 618; Ong Peng vs. Custodio, L-14911,

204

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AMENDED AND
SUPPLEMENTAL PLEADINGS

SEC. 2

Mar. 25, 1961; cf. Dauden-Hernandez vs. De los Angeles

L-27010, April 30, 1969).
3. A m e n d m e n t of the complaint may be allowed even
if an order for its dismissal has been issued as long as the
motion to a m e n d is filed before the dismissal order became
final (Constantino vs. Reyes, L-16853, June 29, 1963).
An
amended a n s w e r may also be allowed even after the case
had been set for trial on the merits if the purpose of the
a m e n d m e n t is to submit the real m a t t e r in dispute without
intent to delay t h e action (Paman vs. Diaz et al., G.R.
No. 59582, Aug. 26, 1982; cf. Sec. 3 of this Rule).
4. It h a s also been held t h a t a complaint can still be
amended as a m a t t e r of right before an a n s w e r t h e r e t o
has been filed, even if t h e r e was a pending proceeding in
a higher court for t h e dismissal of t h a t complaint.
U n d e r Sec. 3 of Rule 10, s u b s t a n t i a l a m e n d m e n t s of
the complaint a r e not allowed without leave of court after
an answer has been served, and this is because any
material change in t h e allegations in the complaint could
p r e j u d i c e t h e d e f e n d a n t who h a s a l r e a d y s e t u p his
defenses in h i s a n s w e r . Conversely, no r i g h t s of t h e
d e f e n d a n t will b e v i o l a t e d b y c h a n g e s m a d e i n t h e
complaint if he has yet to file an answer thereto. The
d e f e n d a n t h a s not p r e s e n t e d any defense t h a t can be
altered or affected by an a m e n d m e n t made in accordance
with Sec. 2 of the Rule. In fact, he can thereafter address
the amended allegations by setting up the defenses thereto
in his p r o j e c t e d a n s w e r (Remington Industrial Sales
Corp. vs. CA, et al, G.R. No. 133657, May 29, 2002).
5. The defense of prescription, which was not raised
in a motion to dismiss nor as an affirmative defense in
the original answer, may be validly set up for the first
time in an amended answer. This situation would not be
violative of, because it does not fall under, the general
rule in t h e n Sec. 2 (now, Sec. 1), Rule 9. The effect of the
205

RULE 10

REMEDIAL LAW COMPENDIUM

SECS. 3-4

filing of the amended answer is t h e w i t h d r a w a l of the

original answer and its substitution by the former. Since
in t h i s case no responsive p l e a d i n g , such as a reply,
h a d been filed by t h e plaintiff a n d t h e case had not
b e e n c a l e n d a r e d for h e a r i n g , t h e d e f e n d a n t h a d t h e
right to amend his answer, p u r s u a n t to Sec. 2, Rule 10,
and in t h e process set up t h e defense of p r e s c r i p t i o n
(Aznar III, et al. vs. Bemad, etc., et al., G.R. No. 81190,
May 9, 1988).
S e c . 3. Amendments by leave of court. E x c e p t
as provided in the next preceding section,
substantial a m e n d m e n t s may be made only upon
leave of court. But such leave may be refused if
it appears to the court that the motion was made
with intent to delay. Orders of the court upon the
matters provided in this section shall be made upon
m o t i o n filed i n c o u r t , a n d after n o t i c e t o t h e a d v e r s e
p a r t y , a n d a n o p p o r t u n i t y t o b e h e a r d . (3a)
S e c . 4. Formal amendments. A d e f e c t in t h e
designation of the parties and other clearly clerical
or typographical errors may be summarily corrected
by the court at any stage of the action, at its
initiative or on motion, provided no prejudice is
c a u s e d t h e r e b y t o t h e a d v e r s e party. (4a)
NOTES
1. Sec. 3 of this Rule amended t h e former rule by
e l i m i n a t i n g t h e p h r a s e "or t h a t t h e cause of action or
defense is s u b s t a n t i a l l y altered." The clear import of
such a m e n d m e n t is t h a t u n d e r the new Rule "the
a m e n d m e n t may (now) s u b s t a n t i a l l y a l t e r t h e cause of
action or defense." This should only be t r u e , however,
when despite a s u b s t a n t i a l change or a l t e r a t i o n in the
cause of action or defense, the a m e n d m e n t s sought to be
made shall serve the higher interests of substantial justice,
206

RULE 10

AMENDED AND
SUPPLEMENTAL PLEADINGS

SECS. 3-4

p r e v e n t delay a n d t h u s equally promote t h e l a u d a b l e

objective of t h e Rules which is to secure a "just, speedy
and inexpensive disposition of every action and
p r o c e e d i n g " (see Valenzuela, et al. vs. CA, et al.,
G.R. No. 131175, Aug. 28, 2001). Philippine Ports
Authority vs. William Gothong, etc., Inc., G.R. No. 158401,
Jan. 28, 2008).
2.

A m e n d m e n t s are not proper and should be denied:

a. W h e r e t h e c o u r t h a s no j u r i s d i c t i o n over t h e
original complaint and the purpose of the a m e n d m e n t is
to confer j u r i s d i c t i o n on the court by e l i m i n a t i n g
the objectionable portion (Rosario, et al. vs. Carandang,
et al., 96 Phil. 845), or w h e r e t h e c a u s e of a c t i o n
originally pleaded in the complaint was outside the
jurisdiction of the court (Versoza vs. Versoza, L-25609,
Nov. 27, 1968; Campos Rueda Corporation vs. Bautista,
et al., L-18453, Sept. 29, 1982), since t h e court m u s t
first have jurisdiction over the case before it can order
such a m e n d m e n t (Caspar vs. Dorado, L-17884, Nov. 29,
1965);
b. If it would result in delay (Lerma vs. Reyes, etal.,
103 Phil. 1027; Sec. 3 of this Rule);
c. If it would result in a change of the cause of action
or defense or change t h e theory of the case (Torres vs.
Tomacruz, 49 Phil. 914; Sec. 3 of t h i s Rule), or a r e
inconsistent with the allegations in the original
complaint (Castillo, et al. vs. CA, et al., G.R. No. 52008,
Mar. 25, 1988), unless justice and equity w a r r a n t such
a m e n d m e n t which would n e g a t e d e f e n d a n t ' s liability
(R&B Insurance Co., et al. vs. Savellano, et al., L-45234,
May 8, 1985), or will not r e s u l t in s u b s t a n t i a l injury
to the adverse p a r t y (Marini-Gonzales vs. Lood, et al.,
L-35098, Mar. 16, 1987); and
d. If the plaintiff had no cause of action at the filing
of the original complaint and the purpose of the amend207

RULE 10

REMEDIAL LAW COMPENDIUM

SEC. 5

ment is to i n t r o d u c e a subsequently-accrued c a u s e of
action (Surigao Mine Exploration Co. vs. Harris, 68 Phil.
118).
3. To d e t e r m i n e w h e t h e r a different cause of action
is introduced by a m e n d m e n t s to the complaint, w h a t is
ascertained is w h e t h e r the defendant is being required to
a n s w e r for a liability or legal o b l i g a t i o n c o m p l e t e l y
different from t h a t s t a t e d i n t h e o r i g i n a l c o m p l a i n t
(Rubio vs. Mariano, et al, L-30404, Jan. 31, 1973). The
same t e s t may be applied with respect to s u p p l e m e n t a l
pleadings.
4. As earlier stated, a plaintiff may move to amend
his complaint even if the same was dismissed on motion of
the defendant provided the dismissal order is not yet final.
An order denying such motion to amend the complaint is
appealable a n d the r e g l e m e n t a r y period to perfect t h e
appeal r u n s from plaintiffs receipt of t h e order denying
his motion to amend the complaint (Constantino vs. Reyes,
supra).
S e c . 5.
Amendment to conform to or authorize
presentation of evidence. W h e n i s s u e s n o t r a i s e d by
the pleadings are tried with the express or implied
c o n s e n t o f t h e p a r t i e s , t h e y s h a l l b e t r e a t e d i n all
respects as if they had been raised in the pleadings.
Such a m e n d m e n t of the pleadings as may be
necessary to cause them to conform to the evidence
and to raise these issues may be made upon motion
o f a n y p a r t y a t a n y t i m e , e v e n after j u d g m e n t ; but
f a i l u r e t o a m e n d d o e s n o t affect t h e r e s u l t o f t h e
trial o f t h e s e i s s u e s . I f e v i d e n c e i s o b j e c t e d t o a t
the trial on the ground that it is not within the
issues made by the pleadings, the court may allow
the pleadings to be a m e n d e d and shall do so with
liberality if the presentation of the merits of the
action and the e n d s of substantial justice will be

208

RULE 10

AMENDED AND
SUPPLEMENTAL PLEADINGS

SEC. 5

subserved thereby. The court may grant a c o n t i n u a n c e

t o e n a b l e t h e a m e n d m e n t t o b e m a d e . (5a)
NOTES
1. This is an instance wherein t h e court acquires
j u r i s d i c t i o n over t h e i s s u e s even if t h e s a m e a r e not
alleged in the original pleadings of the parties, i.e., where
t h e t r i a l of said issues is w i t h t h e e x p r e s s or implied
consent of the p a r t i e s . Also, this rule is premised on the
fact t h a t evidence had been introduced on an issue not
r a i s e d by t h e p l e a d i n g s w i t h o u t any objection by t h e
adverse p a r t y . It, therefore, does not apply when t h e
case w a s d e c i d e d on a s t i p u l a t i o n of facts in w h i c h
case t h e pleadings are not deemed amended to conform to
t h e e v i d e n c e (MWSS us. CA, et al., G.R. No. 54526,
Aug. 25, 1986).
2. One line of cases holds t h a t where the evidence
s u s t a i n s an a w a r d in excess of t h a t claimed in the
complaint, but the plaintiff failed to amend the prayer
of its complaint as to the a m o u n t of damages to conform
to the evidence, the a m o u n t demanded in the complaint
should be the m e a s u r e of damages [Malayan Insurance
Co., I n c . v s . M a n i l a P o r t S e r v i c e , e t a l . , L - 2 3 1 2 8 ,
Sept. 30, 1978; J.M. Tuason & Co. vs. Santiago, 99 Phil.
615]. There have, however, also been cases where the
S u p r e m e Court has held t h a t even w i t h o u t such
a m e n d m e n t to conform to the evidence, the amount proved
at the trial may be validly awarded [Tuazon vs. Bolanos,
91 Phil. 106]. The rule on a m e n d m e n t need not be applied
rigidly, p a r t i c u l a r l y w h e r e no s u r p r i s e or prejudice is
caused the objecting party [Co Tiamco vs. Diaz, 75 Phil.
672] and w h e r e t h e r e is a variance in the defendant's
pleadings and the evidence adduced at the trial, the court
may t r e a t t h e pleading as amended to conform to the
evidence [National Power Corp. vs. CA, et al., L-43814,
April 16, 1982].
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RULE 10

REMEDIAL LAW COMPENDIUM

SEC. 6

Consequently, the trial court should not be precluded

from a w a r d i n g an a m o u n t higher t h a n t h a t claimed in
the pleadings notwithstanding the absence of the
required a m e n d m e n t , provided t h a t the evidence of such
h i g h e r a m o u n t has been p r e s e n t e d properly, with full
opportunity on the p a r t of the opposing p a r t i e s to support
t h e i r respective contentions and to refute each other's
evidence (Northern Cement Corp. us. IAC, et al., G.R.
No. 68636, Feb. 29, 1988).
3. Where the ejectment case was dismissed by the
inferior court and on appeal the plaintiff filed an amended
c o m p l a i n t to i n c l u d e , as a d d i t i o n a l c a u s e of a c t i o n ,
c o n t r a c t u a l b r e a c h b y t h e d e f e n d a n t w h i c h w a s not
alleged in the original complaint but on which issue the
parties had presented their respective evidence, an
amended complaint may be admitted since the a m e n d m e n t
is to make the pleadings conform to t h e evidence (Dayao
us. Shell Co. of the Phil., Ltd., et al., L-32475, April 30,
1980).
S e c . 6. Supplemental pleadings. U p o n m o t i o n
of a party the court may, upon reasonable notice
and upon such terms as are just, permit him to serve
a s u p p l e m e n t a l p l e a d i n g s e t t i n g forth t r a n s a c t i o n s ,
occurrences or events which have happened since
the date of the pleading sought to be supplemented.
T h e a d v e r s e p a r t y m a y p l e a d t h e r e t o w i t h i n t e n (10)
days from notice of the order a d m i t t i n g the
s u p p l e m e n t a l p l e a d i n g . (6a)
NOTES
1. Distinctions between amended and s u p p l e m e n t a l
pleadings:
a. Amended pleadings refer to facts existing at the
time of the commencement of t h e action; s u p p l e m e n t a l

210

RULE 10

AMENDED AND
SUPPLEMENTAL PLEADINGS

SEC. 8

p l e a d i n g s refer to facts a r i s i n g after t h e filing of t h e

original pleading.
b. An amended pleading results in the w i t h d r a w a l
of the original pleading; a supplemental pleading is merely
in addition to, but does not result in the withdrawal of,
the original pleading.
c. An amended pleading can be made as of right, as
when no responsive pleading has yet been filed; supplemental pleadings are always with leave of court.
2. Unlike t h e former provision wherein the court
could r e q u i r e t h e a d v e r s e p a r t y t o p l e a d t o t h e
s u p p l e m e n t a l pleading if it deemed the same advisable,
it is now up to said p a r t y to decide w h e t h e r or not to plead
thereto, provided t h a t if he desires to plead he must observe
the r e g l e m e n t a r y period of 10 days therefor.
3. F o r c o r r e l a t i o n , Sec. 7 of t h i s Rule h a s b e e n
transposed to follow Sec. 1 thereof.
S e c . 8. Effect, of amended pleading. An a m e n d e d
pleading supersedes the pleading that it amends.
However, admissions in superseded pleadings may
be received in evidence against the pleader; and
claims or defenses alleged therein not incorporated
in the a m e n d e d pleading shall be deemed waived,
(n)
NOTES
1. The first sentence of this section states, in general,
the effect on the original pleading by the subsequent filing
of a pleading amendatory thereof. See, however, Notes 2
and 3 under Sec. 1 of this Rule for the qualifications to
and ramifications of this general rule.
2. Although the supersedure of the original pleading, upon the admission of the amended pleading, amounts
211

RULE 10

REMEDIAL LAW COMPENDIUM

SEC. 8

to the w i t h d r a w a l of the former, it is nevertheless not

expunged from b u t r e m a i n s in t h e record of t h e case.
Reference can t h e r e b y be readily m a d e t h e r e t o w i t h
r e g a r d t o t h e e f f e c t s o f t h e a m e n d m e n t , t h a t is,
(a) admissions in t h e s u p e r s e d e d pleading can still be
received in evidence against the pleader, and (b) claims
o r d e f e n s e s a l l e g e d t h e r e i n b u t not i n c o r p o r a t e d o r
r e i t e r a t e d in the amended pleading are deemed waived.
The first effect, t h a t is, the admissibility in evidence
of w h a t e v e r admission had been made by t h e p l e a d e r
t h e r e i n is in line with the rulings on judicial admissions.
It will be noted t h a t the admission made in t h a t pleading
was, before it was superseded by amendment, in the n a t u r e
of a j u d i c i a l a d m i s s i o n which does not e v e n r e q u i r e
proof a n d o r d i n a r i l y c a n n o t b e c o n t r a d i c t e d b y t h e
pleader. Despite its being superseded a n d w i t h d r a w n ,
the admissions t h e r e i n are still considered extrajudicial
admissions and may be proved by the party relying
t h e r e o n by formal offer in e v i d e n c e of s u c h o r i g i n a l
pleading. See notes u n d e r Sec. 4 of Rule 129.

212

RULE 11
W H E N TO FILE R E S P O N S I V E P L E A D I N G S
S e c t i o n 1. Answer to the complaint. T h e
d e f e n d a n t s h a l l file h i s a n s w e r t o t h e c o m p l a i n t
w i t h i n fifteen (15) d a y s after s e r v i c e o f s u m m o n s
u n l e s s a d i f f e r e n t p e r i o d is fixed by t h e c o u r t , ( l a )
S e c . 2.
Answer of a defendant foreign private
juridical entity. W h e r e t h e d e f e n d a n t is a f o r e i g n
private juridical entity and service of summons is
m a d e o n t h e g o v e r n m e n t official d e s i g n a t e d b y law
t o r e c e i v e t h e s a m e , t h e a n s w e r s h a l l b e filed w i t h i n
t h i r t y (30) d a y s after r e c e i p t o f s u m m o n s b y s u c h
e n t i t y . (2a)
NOTES
1. In the case of a nonresident defendant on whom
e x t r a t e r r i t o r i a l service of summons is made, the period to
answer m u s t be at least 60 days (Sec. 15, Rule 14).
2. The g r a n t i n g of additional time to the defendant
w i t h i n w h i c h to file an a n s w e r is a m a t t e r l a r g e l y
addressed to t h e sound discretion of the trial court (Naga
Dev. Corp. vs. CA, et al., L-28173, Sept. 30, 1971). Foreign
authorities are to the effect t h a t while courts can extend
the time for filing of responsive pleadings, they can not
shorten the time to do so (1 Martin 344, citing Aaron vs.
Anderson, 18 Ark. 268, 49 C.J. 200). This seems to be the
i n t e n d m e n t of our rules, as the p r e s e n t Rule provides
for discretion on the p a r t of the court to extend the time
or allow pleadings filed after the reglementary period,
thus
"Sec. 11. Extension of time to plead. Upon
motion and on such terms as may be just, the court
213

RULE 11

REMEDIAL LAW COMPENDIUM

SEC. 3

may e x t e n d t h e t i m e t o p l e a d p r o v i d e d i n t h e s e
Rules.
The court may also, upon like t e r m s , allow an
a n s w e r or other pleading to be filed after the time
fixed by these Rules. (8a)"
It is believed, however, t h a t the discretion of the court
to admit pleadings filed after the reglementary period has
expired does not extend to the steps necessary to perfect
an appeal which must all be done within the reglementary
period, unless prior to its expiration an extension has been
sought and granted on justifiable grounds.
3. A motion for extension of time to file an a n s w e r
may be heard and granted ex parte (Amante us. Sunga,
L-40491, May 28, 1975).
4. An order allowing the filing of a late a n s w e r is
i n t e r l o c u t o r y a n d n o t a p p e a l a b l e (De Ocampo us.
Republic, L-19533, Oct. 31, 1963).
S e c . 3.
Answer to amended complaint. W h e r e
t h e p l a i n t i f f files a n a m e n d e d c o m p l a i n t a s a m a t t e r
of right, the defendant shall a n s w e r the same within
f i f t e e n (15) d a y s a f t e r b e i n g s e r v e d w i t h a c o p y
thereof.
Where its filing is not a matter of right, the
defendant shall answer the amended complaint
w i t h i n t e n (10) d a y s from n o t i c e o f t h e o r d e r
a d m i t t i n g t h e s a m e . A n a n s w e r e a r l i e r filed m a y
serve as the answer to the amended complaint if no
n e w a n s w e r i s filed.
This Rule shall apply to the answer to an
amended counterclaim, amended cross-claim,
a m e n d e d third (fourth, etc.)-party complaint, and
a m e n d e d c o m p l a i n t - i n - i n t e r v e n t i o n . (3a)

214

RULE 11

WHEN TO FILE
RESPONSIVE PLEADINGS

SEC. 3

NOTE
1. This amended section, while adopting the period
provided by the former Rule for the filing of an answer
to an amended complaint, now makes clear t h e date from
which such period shall be reckoned. Thus, if the filing
of an amended complaint is a m a t t e r of right, as where
no a n s w e r has yet been filed to the original complaint,
no motion for leave or court order granting such leave
to file an amended complaint being involved, the 15-day
period to answer is counted from service of the amended
complaint. If t h e filing of the amended complaint is not
a m a t t e r of right, t h e n leave of court is required, hence
the 10-day period to a n s w e r r u n s from notice of the court
order g r a n t i n g the same. This simplified procedure has
been made possible by the new provisions in Rule 15,
t h a t is, Sec. 9 thereof which provides t h a t a motion for
leave to file such pleading shall be accompanied by t h a t
pleading sought to be admitted, hence the defendant has
advance knowledge of t h a t proposed amended complaint.
See notes u n d e r said Sec. 9.
The alternative practice under the old Rule was for
the pleader to file a motion for leave to amend his complaint, a t t a c h i n g t h e r e t o the proposed amended pleading,
with copies of both furnished to the other party. In such
a case, t h e period to file an a n s w e r to t h a t a m e n d e d
complaint commences after receipt of the order of the
c o u r t a l l o w i n g t h e filing of such a m e n d e d p l e a d i n g .
Where, however, a motion for leave to amend was first
filed and t h e n , after t h e order g r a n t i n g the same, the
amended pleading was filed and served on the opposing
party, the reglementary period started to run from service
of such amended pleading. Thus, Sec. 3 was understood
to m e a n t h a t t h e period shall "run from notice of the
order admitting the amended complaint" or the service of
the latter, whichever is later. T h a t procedure has been

215

RULE 11

REMEDIAL LAW COMPENDIUM

SECS. 4-6, 6

simplified by the aforesaid a m e n d m e n t s , and h a s been

extended in application to the answer to other amended
initiatory pleadings. See Sec. 7 of this Rule with respect
to a supplemental complaint.
S e c . 4. Answer to counterclaim or cross-claim. A
counterclaim or cross-claim must be answered
w i t h i n t e n (10) d a y s from s e r v i c e . (4)
S e c . 6. Answer to third (fourth, etc.)-party complaint. T h e t i m e to a n s w e r a t h i r d ( f o u r t h , etc.)party complaint shall be governed by the same rule
a s t h e a n s w e r t o t h e c o m p l a i n t . (5a)
NOTES
1 . J u s t a s p r o v i d e d i n R u l e 6, t h e t h i r d - p a r t y
d e f e n d a n t s h a l l file his a n s w e r a l l e g i n g t h e r e i n h i s
defenses and his counterclaims and cross-claims against
the plaintiff, t h e third-party plaintiff or any other party;
and he may a s s e r t such defenses as the t h i r d - p a r t y
plaintiff may have a g a i n s t the p l a i n t i f f s claim.
2. The t h i r d - p a r t y defendant is served with
s u m m o n s j u s t like the original defendant, hence he also
h a s 15, 30 or 60 days from service of s u m m o n s , as the
case may be, to file his a n s w e r j u s t like t h e o r i g i n a l
defendant.
S e c . 6. Reply. A r e p l y m a y be filed w i t h i n t e n
(10) d a y s f r o m s e r v i c e o f t h e p l e a d i n g r e s p o n d e d
to. (6)
NOTES
1. This section uses the word "may" as it is ordinarily
optional for a p a r t y to file a reply since, by his failure to
do so, all t h e new m a t t e r s alleged in t h e a n t e c e d e n t
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WHEN TO FILE
RESPONSIVE PLEADINGS

SEC. 6

pleading a r e deemed controverted. However, if he elects

to file a reply, he m u s t observe the above period.
2. Where the last day of the reglementary period
falls on a Sunday or holiday, the pleading may be filed
or t h e r e q u i r e d a c t may be d o n e on t h e s u c c e e d i n g
business day. Although pleadings may also be served
and filed by mail (Sec. 3, Rule 13), it has been held t h a t
even if the B u r e a u of Posts and its branches are open
on a holiday which is the last day for filing a pleading,
such pleading may still be filed on the next day (Galang
us. WCC, et al., L-33928, Mar. 29, 1972).
3. In the computation of the reglementary period,
especially if it is i n t e r r u p t e d by the filing of a pleading,
t h e d a t e w h e n t h e p l e a d i n g is filed a n d t h e d a t e of
receipt of the j u d g m e n t or order thereon are to be
excluded. Thus, when the motion for reconsideration of
a j u d g m e n t is filed on the 15th or last day within which
to perfect the appeal, t h a t day should be excluded and
t h e p a r t y still h a s one day to perfect an a p p e a l . The
filing of said motion and the pendency thereof suspends
t h e r u n n i n g of t h e r e g l e m e n t a r y period, u n l e s s said
motion is pro forma. W h e r e , t h e r e a f t e r , an o r d e r is
received d e n y i n g said motion for reconsideration, the
date of such receipt is also not considered in the computation. Thus, excluding such date of receipt and there
being a balance of one day of the reglementary period,
the appeal can be perfected on the working day following
t h e day of r e c e i p t of t h e d e n i a l o r d e r . T h i s r u l i n g
clarifies and sets aside the doctrines in Federal Films,
Inc. us. Judge of First Instance of Manila [78 Phil. 472]
and Taroma us. Cruz, et al. [68 Phil. 281] (Lloren us. De
Veyra, L-13929, Mar. 28, 1962).
The aforesaid doctrine in Lloren was reiterated and
d e c l a r e d a p p l i c a b l e w h e t h e r t h e motion for reconsideration is filed days before or on the last day of the
reglementary period. Where such motion is filed, say,
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REMEDIAL LAW COMPENDIUM

SEC. 7

2 d a y s before t h e end of t h e r e g l e m e n t a r y period of

appeal, the date of filing shall be added to the remaining
days of the period. As already stated, the pendency of
s u c h m o t i o n shall be deducted from, since it suspends, the
r e g l e m e n t a r y p e r i o d u n l e s s i t fails t o s a t i s f y t h e
r e q u i r e m e n t s of Rule 37 (Sec. 2). If t h e m o t i o n is
thereafter denied, the 3 remaining days of the period shall
s t a r t to r u n again on the day after the receipt of the order
d e n y i n g t h e motion (De las Alas, et al. vs. CA, et al.,
L-38006, May 16, 1978; Mayor vs. IAC, et al., G.R.
No. 74410, May 4, 1988).
S e c . 7. Answer to supplemental complaint. A
supplemental complaint may be answered within
t e n (10) d a y s from n o t i c e o f t h e o r d e r a d m i t t i n g t h e
s a m e , u n l e s s a d i f f e r e n t p e r i o d is fixed by t h e c o u r t .
The answer to the complaint shall serve as the
answer to the supplemental complaint if no new or
s u p p l e m e n t a l a n s w e r i s filed, (n)
NOTE
1. This is a new provision which remedies the oversight in the old Rule which did not provide for an a n s w e r
to a s u p p l e m e n t a l c o m p l a i n t a l t h o u g h t h e a l l e g a t i o n s
t h e r e i n may very well n e c e s s i t a t e the a p p r o p r i a t e
r e s p o n s e , clarification or denial. Since t h e filing of a
s u p p l e m e n t a l complaint requires leave of court, the
procedure for filing an a n s w e r t h e r e t o is similar to the
case of an a m e n d e d complaint the filing of which is not
a m a t t e r of r i g h t , h e n c e l i k e w i s e r e q u i r i n g l e a v e of
court therefor (see 2nd par., Sec. 3 of the Rule). However,
unlike t h e l a t t e r , t h e court may fix a different period
for a n s w e r i n g the s u p p l e m e n t a l complaint in lieu of t h e
r e g l e m e n t a r y 10-day p e r i o d . T h e difference m a y be
ascribed to t h e fact t h a t in an amended complaint, the
facts s o u g h t to be i n c o r p o r a t e d t h e r e i n w e r e a l r e a d y

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WHEN TO FILE
RESPONSIVE PLEADINGS

SECS. 8-11

known to but were merely omitted by the pleader and, in

all probability, were likewise known to the defending
party. The supplemental complaint, on the other hand,
seeks the introduction of facts or events which occurred
or supervened after the filing of the original complaint,
h e n c e , for lack of k n o w l e d g e thereof, t h e d e f e n d i n g
party may need a longer period of time to ascertain and
respond to the allegations thereof.
S e c . 8. Existing counterclaim
c o m p u l s o r y c o u n t e r c l a i m or a
defending party has at the time
s h a l l be c o n t a i n e d t h e r e i n . (8a,

or cross-claim. A
cross-claim that a
h e files h i s a n s w e r
R6)

S e c . 9.
Counterclaim or cross-claim arising after
answer. A c o u n t e r c l a i m or a c r o s s - c l a i m w h i c h
either m a t u r e d or w a s acquired by a party after
serving his pleading may, with the permission of
t h e c o u r t , be p r e s e n t e d as a c o u n t e r c l a i m or a c r o s s c l a i m b y s u p p l e m e n t a l p l e a d i n g before j u d g m e n t .
(9, R6)
S e c . 10.
Omitted counterclaim or cross-claim.
When a p l e a d e r fails to s e t up a c o u n t e r c l a i m or a
cross-claim through oversight, inadvertence, or
e x c u s a b l e n e g l e c t , o r w h e n j u s t i c e r e q u i r e s , h e may,
by leave of court, set up the counterclaim or crossc l a i m by a m e n d m e n t before j u d g m e n t . (3a, R9)
S e c . 11. Extension of time to plead. U p o n
motion and on such terms as may be just, the court
may e x t e n d the time to plead provided in t h e s e
Rules.
The c o u r t m a y a l s o , u p o n like t e r m s , a l l o w a n
a n s w e r o r o t h e r p l e a d i n g t o b e filed after t h e t