G.R. No.
99031
Rodolfo D. Llamas,
petitioner
Llamas v. Orbos
October 15, 1991
Executive Secretary Oscar Orbos and Mariano Un
Ocampo III,
respondents
Paras, J.
FACTS:
Ocampo III was the governor of Tarlac Province. Llamas together with some other complainants filed an
administrative case against Ocampo III for alleged acts constituting graft and corruption. Ocampo III was
found guilty. He was suspended for office for 90 days hence his vice governor, Llamas, assumed office. In
not less than 30 days however, Ocampo III returned with an AO showing that he was pardoned hence he
can resume office without completing the 90 day suspension imposed upon him.
The petitioner argues that President may grant executive clemency only in criminal cases. They say that the
qualifying phrase after conviction by final judgment applies solely to criminal cases, and no other law
allows the grant of executive clemency or pardon to anyone who has been convicted in an administrative
case, allegedly because the word conviction refers only to criminal cases.
ISSUE:
Whether or the President of the Philippines has the power to grant executive clemency in administrative cases.
HELD:
YES.
It is not specified in the constitution whether it may be considered under criminal or administrative cases.
Ubi lex non distinguit, nec nos distinguere debemus, if the law does not distinguish, so we must not
distinguish. The Constitution does not distinguish between which cases executive clemency may be
exercised by the President, with the sole exclusion of impeachment cases. By the same token, if executive
clemency may be exercised only in criminal cases, it would indeed be unnecessary to provide for the
exclusion of impeachment cases from the coverage of Article VII, Section 19 of the Constitution. Cases of
impeachment are automatically excluded inasmuch as the same do not necessarily involve criminal offenses.
The do not clearly see any valid and convincing reason why the President cannot grant executive clemency
in administrative cases. It is the courts considered view that if the President can grant reprieves,
commutations and pardons, and remit fines and forfeitures in criminal cases, with much more reason can
she grant executive clemency in administrative cases, which are clearly less serious than criminal offenses.
The court stressed, however, that when we say the President can grant executive clemency in administrative
cases, we refer only to all administrative cases in the Executive branch, not in the Judicial or Legislative
branches of the government.
In criminal cases, the quantum of evidence required to convict an individual is proof beyond reasonable
doubt. On the other hand, in administrative cases, the quantum of evidence required is mere substantial
evidence to support a decision.