People v Aruta

Dec. 13, 1988: P/Lt. Abello was tipped off by his informant, known only as Benjie,
that a certain Aling Rosa would be arriving from Baguio City the following day,
December 14, 1988, with a large volume of marijuana.
o Acting on said tip, P/Lt. Abello assembled a team composed of P/Lt. Jose
Domingo, Sgt. Angel Sudiacal, Sgt. Oscar Imperial, Sgt. Danilo Santiago
and Sgt. Efren Quirubin.
The team proceeded to West Bajac-Bajac, Olongapo City at around 4:00 in the
afternoon of December 14, 1988 and deployed themselves near the Philippine
National Bank (PNB) building along Rizal Avenue and the Caltex gasoline station.
Dividing themselves into two groups, one group, made up of P/Lt. Abello, P/Lt.
Domingo and the informant posted themselves near the PNB building while the
other group waited near the Caltex gasoline station.
They saw the bus arrive and 2 females and a male got off it - the informant
pointed out to the team Aling Rosa who was then carrying a travelling bag.
Having ascertained that accused-appellant was Aling Rosa, the team approached
her and introduced themselves as NARCOM agents. When P/Lt. Abello asked
Aling Rosa about the contents of her bag, the latter handed it to the former.
Upon inspection, the bag was found to contain dried marijuana leaves packed in
a plastic bag marked Cash Katutak. The team confiscated the bag together with
the Victory Liner bus ticket to which Lt. Domingo affixed his signature. Accusedappellant was then brought to the NARCOM office for investigation where a
Receipt of Property Seized was prepared for the confiscated marijuana leaves.
After the presentation of the testimonies of the arresting officers and of the
above technical report, the prosecution rested its case.
Instead of presenting its evidence, the defense filed a Demurrer to Evidence
alleging the illegality of the search and seizure of the items thereby violating
accused-appellants constitutional right against unreasonable search and seizure
as well as their inadmissibility in evidence.
The demurrer was denied without the TC ruling on the alleged illegality of the
search and seizure and the inadmissibility in evidence of the items seized to
avoid pre-judgment
o The TC continued to hear the case
Because of the denial, Aling Rosa testified on her behalf
o She claimed that immediately prior to her arrest, she had just come from
Choice Theater where she watched the movie Balweg. While about to
cross the road, an old woman asked her help in carrying a shoulder bag.
o In the middle of the road, Lt. Abello and Lt. Domingo arrested her and
asked her to go with them to the NARCOM Office.
o During investigation at said office, she disclaimed any knowledge as to
the identity of the woman and averred that the old woman was nowhere
to be found after she was arrested. Moreover, she added that no search
warrant was shown to her by the arresting officers.
After the prosecution made a formal offer of evidence, the defense filed a
Comment and/or Objection to Prosecutions Formal Offer of Evidence contesting
the admissibility of the items seized as they were allegedly a product of an
unreasonable search and seizure.

The TC convicted Aling Rosa for violating the Dangerous Drugs Act
o Aling Rosa appealed and assigned the following errors:
1. The trial court erred in holding that the NARCOM agents could not apply
for a warrant for the search of a bus or a passenger who boarded a bus
because one of the requirements for applying a search warrant is that the
place to be searched must be specifically designated and described.
2. The trial court erred in holding or assuming that if a search warrant was
applied for by the NARCOM agents, still no court would issue a search
warrant for the reason that the same would be considered a general
search warrant which may be quashed.
3. The trial court erred in not finding that the warrantless search resulting
to the arrest of accused-appellant violated the latters constitutional rights.
4. The trial court erred in not holding that although the defense of denial
is weak yet the evidence of the prosecution is even weaker.

W/N the TC erred in holding that the NARCOM agents could not apply for a
warrant YES
-

The fundamental protection accorded by the search and seizure clause is that
between person and police must stand the protective authority of a magistrate
clothed with power to issue or refuse to issue search warrants or warrants of
arrest
o A3, S2 is not a blanket prohibition against all searches and seizures, only
those that are unreasonable
Therewithal, the right of a person to be secured against any unreasonable
seizure of his body and any deprivation of his liberty is a most basic and
fundamental one.
A statute, rule or situation which allows exceptions to the requirement of a
warrant of arrest or search warrant must perforce be strictly construed and their
application limited only to cases specifically provided or allowed by law.
o To do otherwise is an infringement upon personal liberty and would set
back a right so basic and deserving of full protection and vindication yet
often violated
Allowed by law:
1. Warrantless search incidental to a lawful arrest recognized under Section 12,
Rule 126 of the Rules of Court and by prevailing jurisprudence;
2. Seizure of evidence in plain view, the elements of which are:
(a) a prior valid intrusion based on the valid warrantless arrest in which the police
are legally present in the pursuit of their official duties;
(b) the evidence was inadvertently discovered by the police who had the right to
be where they are;
(c) the evidence must be immediately apparent, and
(d) plain view justified mere seizure of evidence without further search;

3. Search of a moving vehicle. Highly regulated by the government, the vehicles

inherent mobility reduces expectation of privacy especially when its transit in
public thoroughfares furnishes a highly reasonable suspicion amounting to
probable cause that the occupant committed a criminal activity;

4. Consented warrantless search;

5. Customs Search
6. Stop and frisk
7. Exigent and Emergency circumstances
The exceptions should not become unbridled licenses for police offers to trample
upon the constitutionally guaranteed and more fundamental right of persons
against unreasonable search and seizures.
The essential requisite of probable cause must still be satisfied before a
warrantless search and seizure can be lawfully conducted.
o Probable cause: signifies a reasonable ground of suspicion supported by
circumstances sufficiently strong in themselves to warrant a cautious man
to believe that the person accused is guilty of the offense with which he is
charged; existence of such facts and circumstances which could lead a
reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe that an offense has been
committed and that the item(s), article(s) or object(s) sought in
connection with said offense or subject to seizure and destruction by law
is in the place to be searched
An average man must weigh facts and circumstances relying on his common
sense to determine if there is probable cause
o Before a search warrant can be issued, it must be shown by substantial
evidence that the items sought are in fact seizable by virtue of being
connected with criminal activity, and that the items will be found in the
place to be searched
In searches and seizures effected without a warrant, it is necessary for probable
cause to be present. Absent any probable cause, the article(s) seized could not
be admitted and used as evidence against the person arrested. Probable cause,
in these cases, must only be based on reasonable ground of suspicion or belief
that a crime has been committed or is about to be committed.
In People v Tangliben, acting on information supplied by informers, police officers
conducted a surveillance at the Victory Liner Terminal compound in San
Fernando, Pampanga against persons who may commit misdemeanors and also
on those who may be engaging in the traffic of dangerous drugs. At 9:30 in the
evening, the policemen noticed a person carrying a red travelling bag who was
acting suspiciously. They confronted him and requested him to open his bag but
he refused. He acceded later on when the policemen identified themselves.
Inside the bag were marijuana leaves wrapped in a plastic wrapper. The police
officers only knew of the activities of Tangliben on the night of his arrest.
o In this case, the officers already had prior knowledge from their informant
regarding Arutas alleged activities and they had no indication that Aruta
was acting suspiciously

In Tangliben, they were confronted with an on-the-spot tip, they knew that
the Victory Liner compound was being used by drug traffickers, and
Tangliben was acting suspiciously
His actuations and the surrounding circumstances led the police to
reasonably suspect that Tangliben is committing a crime
In People v Malmstedt, the Narcom agents received reports that vehicles coming
from Sagada were transporting marijuana. They likewise received information
that a Caucasian coming from Sagada had prohibited drugs on his person. There
was no reasonable time to obtain a search warrant, especially since the identity
of the suspect could not be readily ascertained. His actuations also aroused the
suspicion of the officers conducting the operation. The Court held that in light of
such circumstances, to deprive the agents of the ability and facility to act
promptly, including a search without a warrant, would be to sanction impotence
and ineffectiveness in law enforcement, to the detriment of society.
o In this case, the police officers had reasonable time within which to secure
a search warrant. Second, Arutas identity was priorly ascertained. Third,
Aruta was not acting suspiciously. Fourth, Malmstedt was searched aboard
a moving vehicle, a legally accepted exception to the warrant
requirement. Aruta, on the other hand, was searched while about to cross
a street.
This case is similar to People v. Aminnudin where the police received information
two days before the arrival of Aminnudin that the latter would be arriving from
Iloilo on board the M/V Wilcon 9. His name was known, the vehicle was identified
and the date of arrival was certain. From the information they had received, the
police could have persuaded a judge that there was probable cause, indeed, to
justify the issuance of a warrant. Instead of securing a warrant first, they
proceeded to apprehend Aminnudin. When the case was brought before this
Court, the arrest was held to be illegal; hence any item seized from Aminnudin
could not be used against him.
In this case, the NARCOM agents were admittedly not armed with a warrant of
arrest.
To legitimize the warrantless search and seizure of accused-appellants bag,
accused-appellant must have been validly arrested under Section 5 of Rule 113
which provides inter alia:
o

Sec. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. - A peace officer or a private person
may, without a warrant, arrest a person: (a) When in his presence, the person to be
arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an
offense;
-

However, Aruta wasnt about to commit a crime, is committing a crime, nor had
she just committed a crime
o She was merely crossing the street and was not acting in any manner that
would engender a reasonable ground for the NARCOM agents to suspect
and conclude that she was committing a crime
It was only when the informant pointed to accused-appellant and identified her
to the agents as the carrier of the marijuana that she was singled out as the
suspect.

The NARCOM agents would not have apprehended accused-appellant were

it not for the furtive finger of the informant because, as clearly illustrated
by the evidence on record, there was no reason whatsoever for them to
suspect that accused-appellant was committing a crime, except for the
pointing finger of the informant.
The court cannot tolerate this violation of the constitutional guarantee against
unreasonable searches and seizure because there is no semblance of any
compliance with the rigid requirements of probable cause and warrantless arrest
Consequently, there was no legal basis for the NARCOM agents to effect a
warrantless search of accused-appellants bag, there being no probable cause
and the accused-appellant not having been lawfully arrested. Stated otherwise,
the arrest being incipiently illegal, it logically follows that the subsequent search
was similarly illegal, it being not incidental to a lawful arrest
o As such, the articles seized could not be used as evidence against
accused-appellant for these are fruits of a poisoned tree and, therefore,
must be rejected, pursuant to Article III, Sec. 3(2) of the Constitution.
Emphasis is to be laid on the fact that the law requires that the search be
incidental to a lawful arrest, in order that the search itself may likewise be
considered legal. Therefore, a lawful arrest must precede the search of a person
and his belongings. Where a search is first undertaken, and an arrest effected
based on evidence produced by the search, both such search and arrest would
be unlawful, for being contrary to law.
In the absence of probable cause to effect a valid and legal warrantless arrest,
the search and seizure of accused-appellants bag would also not be justified as
seizure of evidence in plain view under the second exception. The marijuana was
obviously not immediately apparent as shown by the fact that the NARCOM
agents still had to request accused-appellant to open the bag to ascertain its
contents.
Neither would the search and seizure of accused-appellants bag be justified as a
search of a moving vehicle. There was no moving vehicle to speak of in the
instant case as accused-appellant was apprehended several minutes after
alighting from the Victory Liner bus. In fact, she was accosted in the middle of
the street and not while inside the vehicle.
This is also not a case of voluntary search and inspection
o When one voluntarily submits to a search or consents to have it made on
his person or premises, he is precluded from complaining later thereof.
o The act of giving the bag to the NARCOM agents cant be construed as
voluntary submission to the unreasonable search
o Silence should not be lightly taken as consent to such search. The implied
acquiescence to the search, if there was any, could not have been more
than mere passive conformity given under intimidating or coercive
circumstances and is thus considered no consent at all within the purview
of the constitutional guarantee
o To constitute a waiver, it must appear first that the right exists; secondly,
that the person involved had knowledge, actual or constructive, of the
existence of such right; and lastly, that said person had an actual
intention to relinquish the right. The fact that the accused failed to object
o

to the entry into his house does not amount to a permission to make a
search therein
The SolGens argument that it would be difficult to secure a search warrant
because it can only be done if the accused-appellants name is known, the
vehicle identified, and the date of arrival is certain is untenable
o Search warrants to be valid must particularly describe the place to be
searched and the persons or things to be seized. The purpose of this rule
is to limit the things to be seized to those and only those, particularly
described in the warrant so as to leave the officers of the law with no
discretion regarding what articles they shall seize to the end that
unreasonable searches and seizures may not be made
o Had the NARCOM agents only applied for a search warrant, they could
have secured one without too much difficulty, contrary to the assertions of
the Solicitor General. The person intended to be searched has been
particularized and the thing to be seized specified. The time was also
sufficiently ascertained to be in the afternoon of December 14, 1988. Aling
Rosa turned out to be accused-appellant and the thing to be seized was
marijuana. The vehicle was identified to be a Victory Liner bus. In fact, the
NARCOM agents purposely positioned themselves near the spot where
Victory Liner buses normally unload their passengers. Assuming that the
NARCOM agents failed to particularize the vehicle, this would not in any
way hinder them from securing a search warrant. The above particulars
would have already sufficed.
o In any case, this Court has held that the police should particularly describe
the place to be searched and the person or things to be seized, wherever
and whenever it is feasible.
Waiver of the non-admissibility of the fruits of an invalid warrantless arrest and
of a warrantless search and seizure is not casually to be presumed, if the
constitutional right against unlawful searches and seizures is to retain its vitality
for the protection of our people.
We consider that appellants objection to the admission of such evidence was
made clearly and seasonably and that, under the circumstances, no intent to
waive his rights under the premises can be reasonably inferred from his conduct
before or during the trial