Corporate Managers' Risky Behavior: Risk Taking or Avoiding?
Corporate Managers' Risky Behavior: Risk Taking or Avoiding?
Volume 10 Number 3
Fall 1997
INTRODUCTION
This paper investigates the risk behavior of professional corporate managers. Of specific interest is the extent to
which managers exhibit risk taking or risk avoiding behavior when making decisions with a variety of financial
data, and whether the form of the data used in the decision process affects managers risky behavior. The study
utilizes Prospect Theory and the concept of mental accounts to facilitate the analysis.
One of the most widely accepted descriptive models of risky choice is Prospect Theory, proposed by Kahneman
and Tversky [6]. A central feature of Prospect Theory is the notion of a reference point. The theory states that
decision makers utilize a reference point, such as ones current status or some other psychologically significant
point, and code decision alternatives as either gains or losses relative to that point. Decision alternatives with
outcomes above the reference point are viewed as gains, while outcomes below that point are viewed as losses.
Prospect Theory predicts that decision makers will generally be risk avoiding when choosing between alternatives
that fall above the reference point, and risk taking for alternatives below that point. Considerable empirical support
exists for this reflection effect [3] [6] [7] [17] [18] [19].
As Kahneman and Tversky [6] note, a critical factor in predicting risk behavior is understanding the manner in
which choice problems are coded (i.e., gains versus losses). This is especially relevant in a specialized professional
context such as corporate financial decision making since managers are exposed to many different types of
financial data in a variety of decision contexts. For example, managers may consider the costs associated with a
venture, the gross revenues generated, the cash expenditures required, and so on. When investment alternatives are
evaluated using such data, a managers decision to take or avoid risk may be affected if the form of the data results
in the manager coding the alternatives as either above or below a reference point. For example, costs may be
viewed as a reduction in ones current wealth position. If viewed in this light, Prospect Theory predicts that the
manager will exhibit greater risk taking when choosing between competing investments described in terms of
relevant costs.
However, Kahneman and Tversky [7] and Thaler [15] [16] also suggest that mental accounts can impact
decision framing. That is, a decision maker may combine different types of information considered relevant to a
given decision in one mental account, and assign other information considered irrelevant to the task to other
mental accounts. A decision makers frame of reference may be affected by the type of information included in an
*Westfield State College
I would like to thank Thomas Kida, Nelson Lacey, Jim Smith, Arnie Well, Bill Diamond, Sue Machuga, Pam Trafford, Chris Agoglia, and Sudip
Bhattacharjee for their helpful comments.
63
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account. For example, when evaluating the cost of an investment project, a manager may also infer the revenues
the investment may generate. If the revenues are included in the same mental account as the costs, an inferred
positive net return could place the manager in a gain frame, resulting in risk avoiding behavior.
In effect, Prospect Theory and the concept of mental accounts suggest that the manner in which financial data
are coded can affect managers risky behavior. However, managers coding and resulting tendencies to take or
avoid risk when making decisions with various forms of financial data is an empirical issue that must be
investigated. As a consequence, this study examines managers risky behavior across a number of decision contexts
in which various forms of financial data are considered. In doing so, the study provides evidence on the risk taking
and avoiding behavior of managers and suggests the manner in which managers code various forms of financial
data.
Five experiments are conducted that examine managers risky decisions when using data in the form of profits,
losses, revenues, costs, and expenditures. Profits and losses are net amounts which should clearly put managers in
a decision frame that is above and below their current status, respectively. That is, profits clearly increase a
managers current wealth, while losses clearly decrease their wealth position. Given this to be the case, we expect
risk avoiding behavior when managers evaluate the profits that result from competing decision alternatives, and
risk taking behavior when they must choose between alternatives that result in losses. However, when managers
evaluate the costs or cash expenditures associated with a project, their decision frame and resulting risky behavior
is less clear. If they use a separate mental account for such items, risk taking would be evident since costs and
expenditures decrease a managers current wealth. However, if they utilize a more inclusive mental account,
combining not only the costs or expenditures relating to a project but also any inferred revenues the project may
generated, a gain frame would likely occur resulting in risk avoiding behavior. As Lipe [11] indicates, many
discussions of mental accounts suggest that expenditures may be considered to be losses if the perceived benefits
derived from those expenditures are not included in the same mental account, and would not be considered as such
if the benefits are included in the same account. She notes, however, that little or no empirical work has been
conducted on this issue.
Current behavioral decision theory suggests that decision makers are flexible and adaptable problem solvers
that implement decision strategies considered appropriate for the task encountered [1] [8] [12] [9] [14]. We argue
that professional corporate managers, through their training and experience, consider costs and expenditures to be
a necessary ingredient in the generation of revenue for their job related decisions. As a consequence, even though
expenditures and costs represent reductions in a current asset position, it is likely that managers will typically
utilize a more inclusive mental account and infer revenues to exist along with costs and expenditures in the same
mental account. Therefore, while the effects are not likely to be as strong as when decision alternatives are clearly
above a reference point, managers should also exhibit a tendency towards risk avoidance when evaluating decision
alternatives on the basis of costs or expenditures, as long as they may realistically infer revenues generated from
the project.
Results across the five experiments indicate that corporate managers clearly exhibit risk avoiding behavior
when data are in the form of profits and revenues, and risk taking behavior when data clearly refer to financial
losses. In addition, there appears to be a greater tendency towards risk avoidance when managers make decisions
on the basis of costs and expenditures. This suggests that managers use more inclusive mental accounts when
making investment decisions, inferring potential revenues along with the costs or expenditures related to a project.
As such, the data provide evidence on both managerial risky behavior and on the potential use of more
comprehensive mental accounts by decision makers. Note that a tendency towards risk avoidance with costs and
expenditures, as well as with profits and revenues, points to a greater underlying tendency towards risk avoidance
on the part of financial managers across a broad range of financial decision contexts. This is especially true since
managers are typically not faced with a situation in which they must choose between decision alternatives that
result in losses. These data, therefore, provide support for an often cited assumption of risk avoidance in financial
decision contexts [2] [5].
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To obtain the subject group, a listing of potential subjects was first generated from Dun and Bradstreets
Million Dollar Directory. Small to medium sized manufacturing companies with annual sales of $1 to $200 million
were randomly selected from six New England states, and the name of the most senior executive responsible for
financial matters was noted. To assure an adequate response rate, each of the executives was personally contacted
by phone to solicit their cooperation. During this conversation, the study was explained in general terms. Of the
119 executives contacted, 96 agreed to participate. A version of the instrument was mailed to these 96 managers,
along with a cover letter, a stamped envelope, and a return postcard indicating that they would like to receive a
copy of the final results. Completed instruments were received from 72 subjects.
Five different experiments were conducted to investigate the managers risk taking behavior when using
different forms of financial data. The general form of the experiments involved a choice between two competing
capital investment alternatives. One alternative reflected a risky option, while the other was certain or less risky.
The managers chose one of the two alternatives and rated their strength of preference for that alternative on a five
point preference scale. The preference scale could therefore be combined with the alternative selected to create a
ten point transformed preference rating, with 1 (10) indicating a strong preference for the certain (risky)
alternative. Examples of the format used to gather the managers decisions are presented in Appendix B.
Each manager provided responses for the various experiments, and the decision scenarios were alternated so
that they responded to a gain scenario in experiment one, a loss scenario in experiment two, and so on. The general
instructions for each booklet specifically directed the managers to consider each choice scenario independently. It
was emphasized that there were no correct or incorrect responses, rather, that they should use their professional
judgment. The subjects were instructed to put themselves in the position of the corporate executive responsible for
making the decision under consideration. Twenty corporate executives, faculty, and business students participated
in pretesting the experimental instrument. The pretests indicated that the amounts used for the financial data
presented were realistic for the management group investigated (i.e., managers in small to medium sized firms). In
addition, the pretest indicated that the scenarios were perceived by the subjects in the way intended, and that the
instructions were clear and unambiguous.
For comparison purposes, the first experiment involves a situation similar to an often cited framing experiment
conducted by Tversky and Kahneman [17] [18]. The subsequent four experiments involve decision contexts with
alternative forms of financial data that are often utilized by corporate managers. In these experiments, managers
consider data in the form of profits, losses, revenues, costs, and expenditures. As such, these experiments
investigate managers risky behavior across a range of decision contexts. Note that while some prior research [10]
[13] provides evidence of managerial risk behavior in certain tasks, those studies generally investigated gambles
that were characterized in terms of profits or losses. Other forms of information commonly used in financial
contexts, such as costs and expenditures, were not typically considered. A summary of the decision scenarios
investigated here is presented in Table 1, while the results of all the experiments are summarized in Table 2.
EXPERIMENT 1: FRAMING
Overview
Experiment one is based on the classic lives saved, lives lost scenario of Tversky and Kahneman (see [17] and
[18] for a description of their specific manipulation). A between subjects design was employed, where one group of
managers was exposed to the save (gain) frame, while another group was given the loss frame. Managers in both
experimental groups were told that, Due to difficult economic conditions, your division is facing an expected loss
of $600,000 for the next quarter. You are considering two different alternatives to confront this situation.
Managers in the gain (save) experimental group were told that The first course of action would result in a sure
savings of $200,000. For the second option, you estimate that there is a 1/3 probability of saving the entire
$600,000 and a 2/3 probability of saving nothing. Managers in the loss experimental group were told that The
first course of action would result in a sure loss of $400,000. For the second option, you estimate that there is a 1/3
probability of losing nothing and a 2/3 probability of losing the entire $600,000. Of course, the first alternative in
both conditions is identical in terms of its final outcome, as is the second. According to Expected Utility Theory,
artificially framing the alternatives in terms of savings or losses should have no effect on judgments. However,
Prospect Theory predicts that the majority of managers will choose the sure outcome in the gain condition,
exhibiting risk avoiding behavior, and the probabilistic alternative in the loss condition, exhibiting risk taking
behavior.
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TABLE 1
Summary Of Decision Alternatives For Each Experiment
Panel A: Experiment One - Framing
Save
A: Save $200,000 for sure.
B: 1/3 probability of saving $600,000.
2/3 probability of saving nothing.
Loss
A: Sure loss of $400,000.
B: 1/3 probability of losing nothing.
2/3 probability of losing $600,000.
Expenditure
A: Certain expenditure of $420,000.
B: 75% chance of $570,000 in expenditures.
25% chance of no additional expenditures.
Cost
Cost
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TABLE 2
Summary Of Risky Behavior Of Corporate Managers Across Experimental Scenarios
Percentage Of Managers Selecting Risk Avoiding And Risk Taking Alternatives
Experimental
Condition
Risk
Taking
Risk
Avoiding
Comments
37.1%
75.0
62.9%
25.0
21.6%
78.4%
21.1
78.9
75.7
24.3
73.7
26.3
11.8%
37.8
88.2%
62.2
21.6%
38.2
78.4%
61.8
13.5%
51.4
86.5%
48.6
*Chi-square tests indicate difference between risk taking and risk avoiding proportions is significant at p < .01 level.
Results
The percentage of managers in each experimental condition exhibiting risk taking or risk avoiding tendencies is
presented in Table 2, panel A. The managers choice of risky or certain alternatives did, in fact, depend upon the
experimental condition. Managers were much more likely (75% vs. 25%) to select the risky alternative when the
choice was presented in terms of losses, as predicted by Prospect Theory (p=.003; all significance levels based on
chi-square tests unless otherwise indicated). In the gain condition, a greater number of managers chose the certain
outcome (62.9% vs 37.1%), indicating risk avoidance, although the results failed to reach statistical significance
(p=.128). However, those managers who selected the certain outcome were more likely to have been in the gain
condition (p=.020), while managers selecting the risky outcome were more likely to have been in the loss condition
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(p=.027). In addition, the more discriminating transformed preference ratings yielded significant differences
between the gain and loss conditions (4.49 versus 6.86, t=3.42, p=.001), indicating that managers in the gain
condition more strongly preferred the certain alternative, while managers in the loss condition preferred the risky
alternative.
In summary, these results indicate framing effects that are generally in line with Prospect Theory and prior
empirical work [17]. Artificially changing the frame of the decision problem resulted in a change in the financial
managers decisions, even though the alternatives were essentially identical in both groups. Risk avoiding
tendencies were observed when alternatives were framed as gains, while risk taking occurred when managers were
required to choose between alternatives that involved financial losses.
Results
The results of experiment two are presented in Table 2, panel B. As can be seen, the percentage of managers
exhibiting risk avoiding behavior in the two profit conditions was 78.4% and 78.9%. These were significantly
greater than those exhibiting risk taking in the two groups. In addition, the two loss conditions revealed
significantly more risk taking behavior, with 75.7% and 73.7% of the managers selecting the risky alternative. The
reversal of risk behavior between the gain and loss scenarios is clear and unambiguous. Thus, we see risk taking
behavior exhibited by managers when they are presented with losses, and risk avoiding behavior by those same
managers when the alternatives are potential gains. (The transformed preference measure corroborates the results
reported in this and subsequent experiments, and is therefore not reported.) These results provide strong support
for risk avoiding and risk taking behavior in contexts that involve alternatives clearly above or below a reference
point of zero. Whether such risk taking effects occur across financial contexts, where data often used by managers
may make the coding of alternatives less clear, is considered in the next three experiments.
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This, and the subsequent two experiments, explore risky behavior when using these different constructs. It is
reasonable to expect that revenues, like profits, would be considered in the gain domain, resulting in risk avoiding
behavior. Risky behavior when evaluating costs and expenditures is less clear. As previously noted, if managers
consider expenditures in a separate mental account, Prospect Theory predicts risk taking since the expenditures
would likely be seen as a reduction in the status quo. However, managers may consider expenditures in a more
inclusive mental account, in which the benefits (i.e., revenues) derived from the expenditures may also be inferred
and included in the same mental account. An inferred profit would result in an overall gain frame, and a prediction
of risk avoidance. In essence, the risky behavior exhibited by managers when making decisions with these different
forms of financial data is an empirical issue that is open to question. However, given managers training and
experience with financial data, a more inclusive account is likely to be used, resulting in a tendency towards risk
avoidance in contexts in which potential revenues can be realistically inferred from the expenditures made.
A between subjects design was employed in experiment three, with one-half of the managers responding to a
profit scenario and one-half given an expenditure context. In the profit group, the managers were told that
Product A is an established product with stable demand. If this alternative is selected, it will result in a sure profit
of $420,000. Product B is also being considered. This a new product, with uncertain demand. Your staff has
determined that, based on market research, you have a 75% chance to earn $570,000 and a 25% chance that you
will earn nothing if product B is marketed. The managers should have a greater incentive to select the risky
option since the expected value of the risky outcome ($427,500) is above the riskless outcome. Any preference for
the sure profit will therefore provide strong evidence of risk avoidance.
Managers in the other experimental condition were asked to choose between two alternatives, where the data
were in the form of cash expenditures. In this experimental scenario, two alternative programs of research and
development were considered, each requiring different expenditures. The dollar amounts and probabilities were the
same as those utilized in the profit condition. The managers were told that either alternative would achieve their
objectives. It was indicated that the first alternative requires spending an additional $420,000 beyond what is
already being spent on R&D, while in the second alternative there is a 75% chance that they will be required to
spend an additional $570,000, and a 25% chance that the current expenditures will be adequate, requiring no
additional expenditures (see Table 1, panel C for a summary of the options presented). Note that to increase the
realism of the task, the experimental context differs in this and the subsequent experiments. While context
differences may affect risky choice, managers do not make risky decisions in a vacuum. Rather, their decisions
with this type of data are made in contexts similar to those investigated here.
Results
Table 2, panel C presents the percentage of managers selecting the risky versus the certain alternative in each
experimental condition. In this experiment a majority of subjects (74.6%) opted for the certain outcome across both
conditions, while 25.4% selected the risky outcome (p<.001). Thus, there appears to be a clear tendency for risk
avoidance. Behavior in the profit condition clearly indicates risk avoidance with about 88% of the managers
selecting the certain profit, while only about 12% chose the risky alternative (p<.001). An examination of behavior
in the expenditure condition also indicates a tendency towards risk avoiding behavior. Approximately 62% of the
managers selected the certain expenditure, versus 38% selecting the probabilistic expenditure. While not achieving
statistical significance (p=.14), this result is distinctly different from the results noted in the loss conditions of
previous experiments.
Expenditures directly reduce a managers current asset position. If only the expenditure data are considered in a
mental account, expenditures would be viewed as a reduction from such a position and therefore induce risk taking.
However, the results reported here suggest that managers use a more inclusive mental account in their decision
processes. Given their training and experience, managers likely view expenditures as essential to generating
revenues, resulting in a net profit. Therefore, they appear to not only consider the expenditure data provided in the
decision scenario, but to also infer generated revenues from those expenditures in their mental accounts, resulting
in an inferred overall profit reflecting a gain frame. Such a frame would lead to greater risk avoidance, as found
here. These results suggest that managers may exhibit risk taking only if choice alternatives are stated in terms of
clear financial losses.
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Results
The results are presented in Table 2, panel D. In the revenue condition, 78.4% of the managers selected the
certain outcome, while 21.6% selected the risky prospect, indicating clear risk avoidance (p=.001). Risk behavior
in the cost condition is also in the direction of risk avoidance. About 62% of the managers chose the certain
alternative, while 38% selected the risky alternative, although the difference is not statistically significant (p=.17).
Instead of observing a reflection of risk avoidance for revenues and risk taking for costs, it appears that risk
behavior in the cost condition is similar to that in the revenue condition. An examination of the proportion of
managers selecting the risk avoiding alternative across conditions also supports this claim, with no significant
difference between the revenue and cost conditions (78.4% vs. 61.8%, p=.258).
In summary, behavior was strongly risk avoiding when data were presented in terms of revenues, and risk
avoiding tendencies were also evident with data in the form of costs. Similar to expenditures in experiment three,
the cost data in this experiment do not appear to induce a below reference point frame that results in risk taking.
Rather, the tendency toward risk avoidance may be explained by managers use of a more inclusive mental
account. These results, taken in conjunction with the previous experiment, suggest an overall tendency toward risk
avoidance on the part of financial managers across a variety of decision contexts. It appears that alternatives must
strictly concern clear financial losses for strong risk taking to occur.
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$142,100 and $18,300 for products A and B, respectively. Selecting the alternative with the smaller (larger)
variance would indicate risk avoiding (taking) behavior.
Managers in the cost condition were told that in order to comply with government regulations, their company is
considering different procedures to remove waste materials from their production process. They could choose
between two different disposal methods. They were told that an outside consultant has determined that, given
[their] level of production, there is a 70% chance that alternative A will cost $465,000, and a 30% chance that
costs will be $155,000. Costs for alternative B have a 70% chance to be $384,000, and a 30% chance of being
$344,000. The amounts and probabilities are the same as those used in the profit condition.
Results
The proportion of managers choosing each alternative for the two experimental groups is presented in Table 2,
panel E. In the profit condition, behavior is clearly risk avoiding. Over 86% of the financial managers selected the
low risk alternative, while only about 14% opted for the high risk alternative (p<.001). Choices are evenly split in
the cost condition, with about 51% and 49% selecting the high and low risk alternatives, respectively (p=.866).
Consequently, there is no support for overall risk taking with cost data.
Once again, profits are framed as gains, and induce significant risk avoiding behavior. While cost data resulted
in more managers exhibiting risky behavior than when they were presented with profit data, a clear majority of
managers were still not risk taking. It is interesting to note that the split in risk behavior found in this experiments
cost condition occurred in the context of disposing waste material in order to comply with government regulations.
It is likely that managers would be less inclined to infer potential benefits (i.e., revenues) from such costs. As a
consequence, there would be a greater likelihood that only the cost data would be considered in the managers
mental accounts, resulting in greater risk taking as compared to the cost and expenditure conditions in the prior
two experiments.
CONCLUDING REMARKS
The purpose of this study was to investigate the risky behavior of professional financial managers across a
range of decision contexts. Five experiments were performed which investigated managers behavior when
evaluating data in the form of profits, losses, revenues, costs, and expenditures. The results indicate a greater
underlying tendency towards risk avoidance on the part of financial managers. That is, while risk taking occurred
when managers dealt with clear financial losses, risk avoidance predominated across a range of contexts that
involve data commonly encountered by those managers. When alternatives are presented in the form of revenues or
profits, managers exhibit strong risk avoidance. In addition, when alternatives are presented in the context of costs
or expenditures, risk behavior also tends toward risk avoidance. The only context in which risk taking was
observed was when choice alternatives were presented in terms of clear financial losses, reflecting negative
numbers. Given that managers typically do not have to choose between different alternatives that would result in
losses, it appears that risk avoidance will predominate across a wide variety of financial contexts.
In addition to providing evidence on managers risky behavior, the results reported here also provide
information on the type of mental accounts expert decision makers use in their decision processes [15] [16]. As
previously indicated, a decision maker may form a mental account which includes only a specific type of data, or
he/she may utilize a more inclusive mental account in which various types of data are gathered and combined. The
type of mental accounts used can have a profound effect on risky decision making; however, the type of accounts
used by decision makers is an empirical issue that must be investigated. The experiments reported here, especially
those concerning costs and expenditures, suggest that financial managers use a more inclusive mental account in
their decision processes. That is, managers appear to not only consider expenditure or cost data in a mental
account, but they also appear to infer and include generated revenue in the account. An inferred positive profit in a
mental account would reflect a gain domain and risk avoidance, as found in the present study. In effect, managers
appear to generally frame choices in terms of the potential gains that may arise from their decisions. Consequently,
they generally tend toward risk avoidance, unless alternatives clearly reflect negative outcomes (e.g., clear financial
losses that reflect negative numbers).
As with most behavioral studies, generalizations of the results must be tempered by the fact that the
experiments conducted are, at best, an abstraction of the environment actually faced by the decision maker. More
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work needs to be performed in managerial contexts to determine the generalizability of the findings reported here.
In addition, the type of mental accounts used by decision makers in other task domains should be examined. While
considerable support exists for Prospect Theorys predictions that risk avoiding (taking) will occur when decision
alternatives are framed as gains (losses) [3] [6] [7] [17] [18] [19], the type of mental account used by the decision
maker can affect the manner in which decision alternatives are framed [15] [16]. Investigations into the type of
mental accounts used by decision makers across task domains, and their resulting effect on risky behavior, is a
fruitful area for future research.
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Appendix A
Demographic Data
Position Within Firm
Title
Number of Subjects
18
20
16
4
5
4
5
Mean
Standard Deviation
21.61
6.06
9.03
4.77
Appendix B
Examples Of The Format Used To Elicit The Managers Decisions
B: ________
Please place an X in the space that best indicates the degree to which you prefer the chosen alternative.
|
weakly prefer
the chosen alternative
|
strongly prefer
the chosen alternative
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Appendix B (CONTD)
Examples Of The Format Used To Elicit The Managers Decisions
B: ________
Please place an X in the space that best indicates the degree to which you prefer the chosen alternative.
|
weakly prefer
the chosen alternative
|
strongly prefer
the chosen alternative