PUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 12-4374

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff Appellee,
v.
LECONIE WILLIAMS, IV,
Defendant Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of
Maryland, at Greenbelt.
Peter J. Messitte, Senior District
Judge. (8:09-cr-00443-PJM-1)

Argued:

October 31, 2013

Decided:

January 23, 2014

Before NIEMEYER and WYNN, Circuit Judges, and Louise W.

FLANAGAN, United States District Judge for the Eastern District
of North Carolina, sitting by designation.

Affirmed by published opinion. Judge Wynn wrote the opinion, in

which Judge Niemeyer and Judge Flanagan joined.

ARGUED: Mary Elizabeth Davis, DAVIS & DAVIS,

for Appellant. Jonathan Allen Ophardt, UNITED
OF JUSTICE, Washington, D.C., for Appellee.
Rosenstein, United States Attorney, OFFICE OF
ATTORNEY, Baltimore, Maryland, for Appellee.

Washington, D.C.,
STATES DEPARTMENT
ON BRIEF: Rod J.
THE UNITED STATES

WYNN, Circuit Judge:

Late one night in June 2009, a police officer saw a car
stopped in the middle of the road in a residential district.
The officer activated his vehicle lights and the car pulled over
to the side of the road.
approaching

the

car

and

Thereafter, another officer joined in

saw

the

driver,

Defendant

Leconie

Williams, IV, remove something from his waistband and drop it

inside of the vehicle.
led

to

Defendants

That object turned out to be a gun which

conviction

at

jury

trial

of

firearm

offense.
On appeal, Defendant contends that the evidence discovered
during the stop should have been suppressed at trial because the
traffic offense for which he was cited did not apply to the road
on

which

he

had

stopped

his

car.

Because

another

closely

related traffic law barred the conduct for which Defendant was
cited,

we

Defendants

reject

evidence.

argument

Defendants
challenging

argument.
the

We

exclusion

also

reject

of

404(b)

Accordingly, we affirm.

I.
On June 12, 2009, at around 1:00 a.m., Major Joseph McCann,
a Prince Georges County police officer, was driving through a
residential area when he saw a vehicle stopped in the middle of
the road.

J.A. 34, 41, 47.

As McCann approached the vehicle,

2

he saw a person who had been bent over into the drivers side
window of the car stand up and walk away from the vehicle.
McCann observed the vehicle sitting still in the road for thirty
seconds to a minute.
drive past him.
pull away.

Defendant, the driver, waved for McCann to

McCann remained behind Defendant, who began to

McCann

then

activated

his

lights,

and

Defendant

pulled over to the side of the road.

Sergeant Edward Finn arrived and pulled up behind McCann.
As the officers approached Defendants vehicle, Finn observed
Defendant remove an object from his pants and drop it with a
thud onto the floorboard.

The officers removed the cars three

occupants, conducted a search, and found a gun on the floorboard

by the drivers seat.
During the process of handcuffing the three occupants of
the

vehicle,

J.A. 106.

Defendant

stated

thats

mine,

thats

my

gun.

Finn cited Defendant for violating Section 21-1001(b)

of the Maryland Codes Transportation Article, which prohibits

leaving a vehicle standing such that it obstructs traffic.1

That section provides:

Except as otherwise provided in this section, on any
highway
outside
of
a
business
district
or
a
residential district, a person may not leave any
vehicle standing, without providing an unobstructed
width of the roadway opposite the standing vehicle for
the free passage of other vehicles.
Md. Code Ann., Transp. 21-1001(b).
3

Ultimately,

the

government

indicted

Defendant

on

two

firearm charges: felon in possession of a firearm (Count One),

in

violation

of

18

U.S.C.

922(g)(1),

and

possession

of

firearm with an altered serial number (Count Two), in violation

of

18

U.S.C.

922(k).

Before

trial,

Defendant

moved

to

suppress the gun, arguing that McCann lacked probable cause to

initiate the traffic stop.

The district court denied the motion

because it found that McCann had a reasonable suspicion that

Defendant violated a different provision of the Maryland Code
Section 21-1001(a) of the Transportation Article.2

The district

court also granted the governments motion to exclude evidence

of alleged police misconduct by McCann and Finn.3
The case proceeded to a trial, at which the jury could not
reach a verdict on Count One and acquitted Defendant on Count
Two.
on

A mistrial was granted on Count One.

Defendants

motion,

the

district

At the second trial,

court

re-affirmed

its

earlier decisions on the gun-suppression and police-misconduct

That provision states:

Except as otherwise provided in this section, on any
highway
outside
of
a
business
district
or
a
residential district, a person may not stop, park, or
leave standing on the roadway any vehicle, whether
attended or unattended, if it is practicable to stop,
park, or leave the vehicle standing off the roadway.
Md. Code Ann., Transp. 21-1001(a).
3
Williams
also
moved
to
suppress
his
statements
acknowledging ownership of the gun.
The district court denied
the motion, and Defendant has not challenged that ruling.
4

evidence issues.
and

the

The jury found Defendant guilty on Count One,

district

court

sentenced

Defendant

to

120

months

imprisonment.
Defendant raises two issues on appeal.

First, he argues

that the district court erred by denying his motion to suppress

the gun recovered from the traffic stop.

Second, he contends

that the district court erred by excluding evidence of earlier

alleged incidents

of

police

misconduct.

We

address

each

in

turn.

II.
Defendants main argument on appeal is that the evidence
seized from the car as a result of the stop should have been
suppressed because McCann lacked probable cause or reasonable
suspicion to stop his car.

We review factual findings regarding

the motion to suppress for clear error and legal conclusions de

novo.

United States v. McBride, 676 F.3d 385, 391 (4th Cir.

2012).
The Fourth Amendment guarantees [t]he right of the people
to

be

against
amend.
person,

secure

in

their

unreasonable
IV.
the

requirement

persons,

searches

Because

an

stop

must

that

it

houses,

and

not

be
5

and

seizures[.]

automobile
comply

papers,

with

stop
the

is

U.S.

Const.

seizure

Fourth

unreasonable

effects,

of

Amendments
under

the

circumstances.

United States v. Wilson, 205 F.3d 720, 72223

(4th Cir. 2000) (en banc) (quoting Whren v. United States, 517
U.S. 806, 810 (1996)).

As a result, such a stop must be

justified by probable cause or a reasonable suspicion, based on

specific and articulable facts, of unlawful conduct.

Id. at

723 (quoting United States v. Hassan El, 5 F.3d 726, 729 (4th
Cir. 1993)).
Probable cause exists where the officer had reasonably
trustworthy information . . . sufficient to warrant a prudent
[person] in believing that the petitioner had committed or was
committing an offense.

United States v. Sowards, 690 F.3d

583, 588 (4th Cir. 2012) (alteration in original) (quoting Beck

v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89, 91 (1964)).

Crucially, this principle

holds true even for the most basic traffic offense:

When an

officer observes a traffic offensehowever minorhe has probable

cause to stop the driver of the vehicle.

Hassan El, 5 F.3d at

730 (quoting United States v. Cummins, 920 F.2d 498, 500 (8th
Cir.

1990)).

Moreover,

an

officer

who

observes

traffic

offense may have probable cause even where he has additional

motives for the stop.

[I]f an officer has probable cause or a

reasonable suspicion to stop a vehicle, there is no intrusion

upon the Fourth Amendment.

That is so regardless of the fact

that the officer would not have made the stop but for some hunch
or inarticulable suspicion of other criminal activity . . . .
6

Id.; see also United States v. Branch, 537 F.3d 328, 335 (4th
Cir. 2008) (Observing a traffic violation provides sufficient
justification
vehicle

for

for
as

long

police

officer

as

takes

it

to

to

detain

perform

the
the

offending

traditional

incidents of a routine traffic stop.).

Finally,

police

officers

inability

to

identify

the

correct code section at the time of a stop does not undermine

valid

probable

cause

or

violated a traffic law.

reasonable

suspicion

that

driver

In that regard, we agree with the Sixth

Circuit that
in order for traffic stop to be permissible under the
Fourth Amendment, a police officer must know or
reasonably believe that the driver of the car is doing
something that represents a violation of the law.
This is not to say that officers must be able to, at
the time of a stop, cite chapter and verseor title
and sectionof a particular statute or municipal code
in order to render the stop permissible.
United States v. Hughes, 606 F.3d 311, 316 (6th Cir. 2010).
This

does

not,

however,

give

the

government

license

look for after-the-fact justifications for stops . . . .

to
Id.

Nor do we suggest that a police officers mistake of law can

support probable cause to conduct a stop when the underlying
conduct

was

not,

in

fact,

illegal.

See

United

States

v.

McDonald, 453 F.3d 958, 961 (7th Cir. 2006) (collecting cases
and stating that [w]e agree with the majority of circuits to
have considered the issue that a police officers mistake of law

cannot support probable cause to conduct a stop.

Probable cause

only exists when an officer has a reasonable belief that a law

has

been

broken. . . .

An

officer

cannot

have

reasonable

belief that a violation of the law occurred when the acts to

which an officer points as supporting probable cause are not
prohibited by law. (internal citation omitted)).
The facts in this matter show that McCann pulled Defendant
over because Defendant had stopped his car in the middle of the
road.

Specifically, McCann saw Defendants vehicle positioned

in the middle of the road, observed that the car was stopped in
the

road

for

at

least

thirty

seconds,

and

saw

Defendants

attempt to wave him past when he pulled up behind Defendant.

Defendant argues that McCann incorrectly identified that conduct
as illegal under Md. Code Ann., Transp. 21-1001(b).

It is

true that Md. Code Ann., Transp. 21-1001(b) does not apply to
roadways

in

residential

areas

and

the

stop

undisputedly occurred in a residential area.

1001(b)

could

not

Defendants vehicle.

be

the

basis

for

at

issue

here

Therefore 21-

conducting

stop

of

Nonetheless, we uphold the trial courts

determination in this matter because the conduct that McCann set

forth as a basis for the stop was plainly illegal under Maryland
law, albeit in a different section than the one in the traffic
citation.

Specifically,

the

transportation

section

of

the

Maryland code requires that a vehicle that is stopped or parked

8

on a two-way roadway shall be stopped or parked parallel to the

right hand curb or edge of the roadway, with its right hand
wheels within 12 inches of that curb or edge of the roadway.
Md. Code Ann., Transp. 21-1004(a).

Under that section, stop

means to halt even momentarily a vehicle, whether or not it is

occupied, except when necessary to avoid conflict with other
traffic or in compliance with the directions of a police officer
or a traffic control device.

Md. Code Ann., Transp. 11-162.

Thus, the conduct relied upon by McCann supported the reasonable

suspicion to believe that Defendant had violated Section 211004(a) by stopping his car in the middle of the road for at
least thirty seconds.4
It was precisely this conductconduct plainly illegal under
Maryland lawfor which Defendant was cited.

The traffic law

identified by Finn in the citation, Md. Code Ann., Transp. 211001(b), was inapplicable because that section does not apply to
roadways in residential areas.

But because a closely related

provision of the Maryland Code, Md. Code Ann., Transp. 211004, barred the exact conduct that McCann observed: stopping a
vehicle in the middle of the road rather than next to the curb,

The government also made this Section 21-1004(a) argument

below, though the district courts ruling focused on Section 211001(a).
9

we

conclude

that

the

district

court

did

not

err

in

denying

Defendants motion to suppress on that basis.

Defendant

counters

that

even

if

the

citation

to

the

incorrect code section did not render the stop unlawful, the
government failed to show that Defendant violated the applicable
traffic law.

Specifically, Defendant contends that there was

insufficient evidence to show that he had stopped his car more

than twelve inches from the curb.

But this argument does not

square

testified

with

the

record.

McCann

that

vehicle was stopped in the middle of the road.

47.

And

when

McCann

pulled

up

behind

Defendants
J.A. 34, 41,

Defendant,

Defendant

signaled to McCann to pass around him, further indicating that

Defendant was stopped in the travel lane rather than on the side
of the road by the curb.
The district court credited McCanns testimony and found
that McCann had reasonable suspicion based on Defendants car
being in the middle of the road.
found

that

[t]here

was

plenty

Further, the district court

of

room,

according

to

the

testimony even of the defendants investigator, that there would

have been room to stop on the side of the road for the defendant
at that night.

J.A. 182.

In sum, Defendant was cited for a traffic violation that

McCann witnessed and immediately identified as illegal.
the

traffic

citation

listed

an
10

incorrect,

albeit

That

closely

related, provision of Marylands traffic laws does not alter the

fact

that,

at

Amendments

the

time

McCann

requirement

that

stopped

the

stop

Defendant,
must

be

the

Fourth

justified

by

probable cause or a reasonable suspicion, based on specific and

articulable facts, of unlawful conduct had been met.
El, 5 F.3d at 729.

Hassan

Further, Defendant has failed to show that

the district court clearly erred in finding that Defendant had

stopped

his

constituted

vehicle
a

in

the

violation

middle

of

the

of

the

roadconduct

applicable

traffic

that
law.

Therefore, we affirm the district courts denial of Defendants

motion to suppress.

III.
Defendant next argues that the district court improperly
excluded

evidence

of

prior

police

misconduct.

Specifically,

Defendant sought to have admitted evidence of alleged police

misconduct by McCann and Finn.

The district court excluded the

evidence under Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b), a decision we

review for abuse of discretion.
F.3d 305, 312 (4th Cir. 2004).
court

to

have

abused

its

United States v. Hodge, 354

We will not find a district

discretion

unless

its

decision

to

admit evidence under Rule 404(b) was arbitrary and irrational.

United

States

v.

Byers,

649

F.3d

11

197,

206

(4th

Cir.

2011)

(quoting United States v. Weaver, 282 F.3d 302, 313 (4th Cir.
2002)).
Rule 404(b) allows for the admission of evidence of other
crimes

or

opportunity,

wrongs
intent,

for

purposes

preparation,

such
plan,

absence of mistake, or lack of accident.

as

proving

knowledge,

motive,
identity,

Fed. R. Evid. 404(b).5

We apply a four-factor test for determining the admissibility of

evidence under this rule:
(1) The evidence must be relevant to an issue, such as
an element of an offense, and must not be offered to
establish the general character of the defendant.
In
this regard, the more similar the prior act is (in
terms of physical similarity or mental state) to the
act being proved, the more relevant it becomes.
(2)
The act must be necessary in the sense that it is
probative of an essential claim or an element of the
offense. (3) The evidence must be reliable. And (4)
the
evidences
probative
value
must
not
be
substantially
outweighed
by
confusion
or
unfair
prejudice in the sense that it tends to subordinate
reason to emotion in the factfinding process.
United States v. Queen, 132 F.3d 991, 997 (4th Cir. 1997).

The

fourth factor reflects that the proffered 404(b) evidence must

satisfy Rule 403.

Unfair prejudice exists when there is a

genuine risk that the emotions of a jury will be excited to

5

Rule 404(b) was amended in December 2011, but this does

not change the analysis in this case.
The district courts
August 2011 decision granting the governments motion in limine
to preclude evidence of police misconduct was properly made
under the old version of the rule. However, the district court
reaffirmed its own earlier decision in January 2012, before the
second jury trial. Thus, the appropriate rule for the appeal is
the current version of Rule 404(b).
12

irrational behavior, and this risk is disproportionate to the

probative value of the offered evidence.

Byers, 649 F.3d at

210 (quoting United States v. Siegel, 536 F.3d 306, 319 (4th
Cir.

2008)).

balancing

[W]e

using

defer

these

to

or

the

other

district
factors

courts

unless

arbitrary or irrational exercise of discretion.

Rule
it

403

is

an

United States

v. Kelly, 510 F.3d 433, 437 (4th Cir. 2007) (quoting United
States v. Heater, 63 F.3d 311, 321 (4th Cir. 1995)).
In this case, Williams sought to admit documents from three
civil suits that alleged police misconduct against McCann and
Finn.

The first suit involved allegations from 1999 that McCann

slapped a suspect in the back of the head, pushed his head into
a window multiple times, and threatened the suspect by telling
him that if he tried to run we all have guns.
221-22.

The

suspect

was

also

allegedly

J.A. 213-14,

choked

during

interactions with McCann and another officer.

J.A. 221.

second

suit

confession
third
dating

involved

from

suit
back

another

involved
to

McCanns
suspect,

excessive

2000.

The

his
The

alleged

role

in

coercing

Corey

Beale,

in

1998.

The

against

Finn

force

allegations

government

moved

evidence regarding the three civil lawsuits.

to

exclude

all

Relying on Rule

403, the district court granted the governments motion, holding

that the dated civil allegations of police misconduct were only
marginally relevant, would be confusing to the jury, and would
13

be

time-consuming

at

trial.

The

district

court

later

re-

affirmed this decision before the second trial for Count One.
Upon careful review, we cannot conclude that the district
courts decision to exclude the evidence was either arbitrary
or irrational.

Kelly, 510 F.3d at 437.

evidence,

which

included

incidents

dating

probative

value

settlement

materials

back
to

civil

well

complaints

over

Defendants
Defendant

First, the proffered

decade

criminal

sought

presented admissibility problems.

and

to

motions

ago,

had

case.
introduce

from

minimal
Further,
may

have

See, e.g., Fed. R. Evid. 408.

And the district court did not act irrationally in concluding

that these barely, if at all, probative materials likely would
have been confusing to the jury and time-consuming.

IV.
For the foregoing reasons, we hold that the district court
properly denied Defendants motion to suppress and also did not
err

in

excluding

the

evidence

of

previous

police

misconduct

allegations against McCann and Finn.

AFFIRMED

14