NATURAL RESOURCES

G.R No. 187167

August 16, 2011

PROF. MERLIN M. MAGALLONA, AKBAYAN PARTY-LIST REP. RISA

HONTIVEROS, PROF. HARRY C. ROQUE, JR., AND UNIVERSITY OF
THE PHILIPPINES COLLEGE OF LAW STUDENTS, ALITHEA BARBARA
ACAS, VOLTAIRE ALFERES, CZARINA MAY ALTEZ, FRANCIS ALVIN
ASILO, SHERYL BALOT, RUBY AMOR BARRACA, JOSE JAVIER
BAUTISTA, ROMINA BERNARDO, VALERIE PAGASA BUENAVENTURA,
EDAN MARRI CAETE, VANN ALLEN DELA CRUZ, RENE DELORINO,
PAULYN MAY DUMAN, SHARON ESCOTO, RODRIGO FAJARDO III,
GIRLIE FERRER, RAOULLE OSEN FERRER, CARLA REGINA GREPO,
ANNA MARIE CECILIA GO, IRISH KAY KALAW, MARY ANN JOY LEE,
MARIA LUISA MANALAYSAY, MIGUEL RAFAEL MUSNGI, MICHAEL
OCAMPO, JAKLYN HANNA PINEDA, WILLIAM RAGAMAT, MARICAR
RAMOS, ENRIK FORT REVILLAS, JAMES MARK TERRY RIDON,
JOHANN FRANTZ RIVERA IV, CHRISTIAN RIVERO, DIANNE MARIE
ROA, NICHOLAS SANTIZO, MELISSA CHRISTINA SANTOS, CRISTINE
MAE TABING, VANESSA ANNE TORNO, MARIA ESTER VANGUARDIA,
and MARCELINO VELOSO III, Petitioners,
vs.
HON. EDUARDO ERMITA, IN HIS CAPACITY AS EXECUTIVE
SECRETARY, HON. ALBERTO ROMULO, IN HIS CAPACITY AS
SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS, HON.
ROLANDO ANDAYA, IN HIS CAPACITY AS SECRETARY OF THE
DEPARTMENT OF BUDGET AND MANAGEMENT, HON. DIONY
VENTURA, IN HIS CAPACITY AS ADMINISTRATOR OF THE NATIONAL
MAPPING & RESOURCE INFORMATION AUTHORITY, and HON.
HILARIO DAVIDE, JR., IN HIS CAPACITY AS REPRESENTATIVE OF THE
PERMANENT MISSION OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES TO
THE UNITED NATIONS, Respondents.
DECISION
CARPIO, J.:
The Case
This original action for the writs of certiorari and prohibition assails the
constitutionality of Republic Act No. 95221 (RA 9522) adjusting the
countrys archipelagic baselines and classifying the baseline regime of
nearby territories.
The Antecedents

In 1961, Congress passed Republic Act No. 3046 (RA 3046)2 demarcating
the maritime baselines of the Philippines as an archipelagic State.3 This
law followed the framing of the Convention on the Territorial Sea and the
Contiguous Zone in 1958 (UNCLOS I),4 codifying, among others, the
sovereign right of States parties over their "territorial sea," the breadth of
which, however, was left undetermined. Attempts to fill this void during the
second round of negotiations in Geneva in 1960 (UNCLOS II) proved futile.
Thus, domestically, RA 3046 remained unchanged for nearly five decades,
save for legislation passed in 1968 (Republic Act No. 5446 [RA 5446])
correcting typographical errors and reserving the drawing of baselines
around Sabah in North Borneo.
In March 2009, Congress amended RA 3046 by enacting RA 9522, the
statute now under scrutiny. The change was prompted by the need to
make RA 3046 compliant with the terms of the United Nations Convention
on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS III),5 which the Philippines ratified on 27
February 1984.6 Among others, UNCLOS III prescribes the water-land ratio,
length, and contour of baselines of archipelagic States like the Philippines7
and sets the deadline for the filing of application for the extended
continental shelf.8 Complying with these requirements, RA 9522 shortened
one baseline, optimized the location of some basepoints around the
Philippine archipelago and classified adjacent territories, namely, the
Kalayaan Island Group (KIG) and the Scarborough Shoal, as "regimes of
islands" whose islands generate their own applicable maritime zones.
Petitioners, professors of law, law students and a legislator, in their
respective capacities as "citizens, taxpayers or x x x legislators,"9 as the
case may be, assail the constitutionality of RA 9522 on two principal
grounds, namely: (1) RA 9522 reduces Philippine maritime territory, and
logically, the reach of the Philippine states sovereign power, in violation of
Article 1 of the 1987 Constitution,10 embodying the terms of the Treaty of
Paris11 and ancillary treaties,12 and (2) RA 9522 opens the countrys
waters landward of the baselines to maritime passage by all vessels and
aircrafts, undermining Philippine sovereignty and national security,
contravening the countrys nuclear-free policy, and damaging marine
resources, in violation of relevant constitutional provisions.13
In addition, petitioners contend that RA 9522s treatment of the KIG as
"regime of islands" not only results in the loss of a large maritime area but
also prejudices the livelihood of subsistence fishermen.14 To buttress their
argument of territorial diminution, petitioners facially attack RA 9522 for
what it excluded and included its failure to reference either the Treaty of
Paris or Sabah and its use of UNCLOS IIIs framework of regime of islands to
determine the maritime zones of the KIG and the Scarborough Shoal.
Commenting on the petition, respondent officials raised threshold issues
questioning (1) the petitions compliance with the case or controversy
requirement for judicial review grounded on petitioners alleged lack of

locus standi and (2) the propriety of the writs of certiorari and prohibition
to assail the constitutionality of RA 9522. On the merits, respondents
defended RA 9522 as the countrys compliance with the terms of UNCLOS
III, preserving Philippine territory over the KIG or Scarborough Shoal.
Respondents add that RA 9522 does not undermine the countrys security,
environment and economic interests or relinquish the Philippines claim
over Sabah.

the peculiar nature of RA 9522, it is understandably difficult to find other

litigants possessing "a more direct and specific interest" to bring the suit,
thus satisfying one of the requirements for granting citizenship standing.17

Respondents also question the normative force, under international law, of

petitioners assertion that what Spain ceded to the United States under the
Treaty of Paris were the islands and all the waters found within the
boundaries of the rectangular area drawn under the Treaty of Paris.

In praying for the dismissal of the petition on preliminary grounds,

respondents seek a strict observance of the offices of the writs of certiorari
and prohibition, noting that the writs cannot issue absent any showing of
grave abuse of discretion in the exercise of judicial, quasi-judicial or
ministerial powers on the part of respondents and resulting prejudice on
the part of petitioners.18

We left unacted petitioners prayer for an injunctive writ.

The Issues
The petition raises the following issues:
1. Preliminarily
1. Whether petitioners possess locus standi to bring this
suit; and
2. Whether the writs of certiorari and prohibition are the
proper remedies to assail the constitutionality of RA 9522.
2. On the merits, whether RA 9522 is unconstitutional.
The Ruling of the Court
On the threshold issues, we hold that (1) petitioners possess locus standi
to bring this suit as citizens and (2) the writs of certiorari and prohibition
are proper remedies to test the constitutionality of RA 9522. On the merits,
we find no basis to declare RA 9522 unconstitutional.
On the Threshold Issues
Petitioners Possess Locus
Standi as Citizens
Petitioners themselves undermine their assertion of locus standi as
legislators and taxpayers because the petition alleges neither infringement
of legislative prerogative15 nor misuse of public funds,16 occasioned by
the passage and implementation of RA 9522. Nonetheless, we recognize
petitioners locus standi as citizens with constitutionally sufficient interest
in the resolution of the merits of the case which undoubtedly raises issues
of national significance necessitating urgent resolution. Indeed, owing to

The Writs of Certiorari and Prohibition

Are Proper Remedies to Test
the Constitutionality of Statutes

Respondents submission holds true in ordinary civil proceedings. When

this Court exercises its constitutional power of judicial review, however, we
have, by tradition, viewed the writs of certiorari and prohibition as proper
remedial vehicles to test the constitutionality of statutes,19 and indeed, of
acts of other branches of government.20 Issues of constitutional import are
sometimes crafted out of statutes which, while having no bearing on the
personal interests of the petitioners, carry such relevance in the life of this
nation that the Court inevitably finds itself constrained to take cognizance
of the case and pass upon the issues raised, non-compliance with the letter
of procedural rules notwithstanding. The statute sought to be reviewed
here is one such law.
RA 9522 is Not Unconstitutional
RA 9522 is a Statutory Tool
to Demarcate the Countrys
Maritime Zones and Continental
Shelf Under UNCLOS III, not to
Delineate Philippine Territory
Petitioners submit that RA 9522 "dismembers a large portion of the
national territory"21 because it discards the pre-UNCLOS III demarcation of
Philippine territory under the Treaty of Paris and related treaties,
successively encoded in the definition of national territory under the 1935,
1973 and 1987 Constitutions. Petitioners theorize that this constitutional
definition trumps any treaty or statutory provision denying the Philippines
sovereign control over waters, beyond the territorial sea recognized at the
time of the Treaty of Paris, that Spain supposedly ceded to the United
States. Petitioners argue that from the Treaty of Paris technical
description, Philippine sovereignty over territorial waters extends hundreds
of nautical miles around the Philippine archipelago, embracing the
rectangular area delineated in the Treaty of Paris.22
Petitioners theory fails to persuade us.

UNCLOS III has nothing to do with the acquisition (or loss) of territory. It is a
multilateral treaty regulating, among others, sea-use rights over maritime
zones (i.e., the territorial waters [12 nautical miles from the baselines],
contiguous zone [24 nautical miles from the baselines], exclusive economic
zone [200 nautical miles from the baselines]), and continental shelves that
UNCLOS III delimits.23 UNCLOS III was the culmination of decades-long
negotiations among United Nations members to codify norms regulating
the conduct of States in the worlds oceans and submarine areas,
recognizing coastal and archipelagic States graduated authority over a
limited span of waters and submarine lands along their coasts.
On the other hand, baselines laws such as RA 9522 are enacted by
UNCLOS III States parties to mark-out specific basepoints along their coasts
from which baselines are drawn, either straight or contoured, to serve as
geographic starting points to measure the breadth of the maritime zones
and continental shelf. Article 48 of UNCLOS III on archipelagic States like
ours could not be any clearer:

executing multilateral treaties on the regulations of sea-use rights or

enacting statutes to comply with the treatys terms to delimit maritime
zones and continental shelves. Territorial claims to land features are
outside UNCLOS III, and are instead governed by the rules on general
international law.26
RA 9522s Use of the Framework
of Regime of Islands to Determine the
Maritime Zones of the KIG and the
Scarborough Shoal, not Inconsistent
with the Philippines Claim of Sovereignty
Over these Areas

Article 48. Measurement of the breadth of the territorial sea, the

contiguous zone, the exclusive economic zone and the continental shelf.
The breadth of the territorial sea, the contiguous zone, the exclusive
economic zone and the continental shelf shall be measured from
archipelagic baselines drawn in accordance with article 47. (Emphasis
supplied)

Petitioners next submit that RA 9522s use of UNCLOS IIIs regime of

islands framework to draw the baselines, and to measure the breadth of
the applicable maritime zones of the KIG, "weakens our territorial claim"
over that area.27 Petitioners add that the KIGs (and Scarborough Shoals)
exclusion from the Philippine archipelagic baselines results in the loss of
"about 15,000 square nautical miles of territorial waters," prejudicing the
livelihood of subsistence fishermen.28 A comparison of the configuration of
the baselines drawn under RA 3046 and RA 9522 and the extent of
maritime space encompassed by each law, coupled with a reading of the
text of RA 9522 and its congressional deliberations, vis--vis the
Philippines obligations under UNCLOS III, belie this view.1avvphi1

Thus, baselines laws are nothing but statutory mechanisms for UNCLOS III
States parties to delimit with precision the extent of their maritime zones
and continental shelves. In turn, this gives notice to the rest of the
international community of the scope of the maritime space and submarine
areas within which States parties exercise treaty-based rights, namely, the
exercise of sovereignty over territorial waters (Article 2), the jurisdiction to
enforce customs, fiscal, immigration, and sanitation laws in the contiguous
zone (Article 33), and the right to exploit the living and non-living
resources in the exclusive economic zone (Article 56) and continental shelf
(Article 77).

The configuration of the baselines drawn under RA 3046 and RA 9522

shows that RA 9522 merely followed the basepoints mapped by RA 3046,
save for at least nine basepoints that RA 9522 skipped to optimize the
location of basepoints and adjust the length of one baseline (and thus
comply with UNCLOS IIIs limitation on the maximum length of baselines).
Under RA 3046, as under RA 9522, the KIG and the Scarborough Shoal lie
outside of the baselines drawn around the Philippine archipelago. This
undeniable cartographic fact takes the wind out of petitioners argument
branding RA 9522 as a statutory renunciation of the Philippines claim over
the KIG, assuming that baselines are relevant for this purpose.

Even under petitioners theory that the Philippine territory embraces the
islands and all the waters within the rectangular area delimited in the
Treaty of Paris, the baselines of the Philippines would still have to be drawn
in accordance with RA 9522 because this is the only way to draw the
baselines in conformity with UNCLOS III. The baselines cannot be drawn
from the boundaries or other portions of the rectangular area delineated in
the Treaty of Paris, but from the "outermost islands and drying reefs of the
archipelago."24

Petitioners assertion of loss of "about 15,000 square nautical miles of

territorial waters" under RA 9522 is similarly unfounded both in fact and
law. On the contrary, RA 9522, by optimizing the location of basepoints,
increased the Philippines total maritime space (covering its internal
waters, territorial sea and exclusive economic zone) by 145,216 square
nautical miles, as shown in the table below:29

UNCLOS III and its ancillary baselines laws play no role in the acquisition,
enlargement or, as petitioners claim, diminution of territory. Under
traditional international law typology, States acquire (or conversely, lose)
territory through occupation, accretion, cession and prescription,25 not by

Extent of maritime
area using RA 3046,
as amended, taking
into account the

Extent of maritime
area using RA 9522,
taking into account
UNCLOS III (in square

Treaty of Paris
delimitation (in
square nautical
miles)

nautical miles)

Internal or
archipelagic
waters

166,858

171,435

Territorial Sea

274,136

32,106

Exclusive
Economic Zone
TOTAL

382,669
440,994

586,210

Thus, as the map below shows, the reach of the exclusive economic zone
drawn under RA 9522 even extends way beyond the waters covered by the
rectangular demarcation under the Treaty of Paris. Of course, where there
are overlapping exclusive economic zones of opposite or adjacent States,
there will have to be a delineation of maritime boundaries in accordance
with UNCLOS III.30

Further, petitioners argument that the KIG now lies outside Philippine
territory because the baselines that RA 9522 draws do not enclose the KIG
is negated by RA 9522 itself. Section 2 of the law commits to text the
Philippines continued claim of sovereignty and jurisdiction over the KIG
and the Scarborough Shoal:
SEC. 2. The baselines in the following areas over which the Philippines
likewise exercises sovereignty and jurisdiction shall be determined
as "Regime of Islands" under the Republic of the Philippines consistent with
Article 121 of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea
(UNCLOS):
a) The Kalayaan Island Group as constituted under Presidential
Decree No. 1596 and

b) Bajo de Masinloc, also known as Scarborough Shoal. (Emphasis

supplied)
Had Congress in RA 9522 enclosed the KIG and the Scarborough Shoal as
part of the Philippine archipelago, adverse legal effects would have
ensued. The Philippines would have committed a breach of two provisions
of UNCLOS III. First, Article 47 (3) of UNCLOS III requires that "[t]he drawing
of such baselines shall not depart to any appreciable extent from the
general configuration of the archipelago." Second, Article 47 (2) of UNCLOS
III requires that "the length of the baselines shall not exceed 100 nautical
miles," save for three per cent (3%) of the total number of baselines which
can reach up to 125 nautical miles.31
Although the Philippines has consistently claimed sovereignty over the
KIG32 and the Scarborough Shoal for several decades, these outlying areas
are located at an appreciable distance from the nearest shoreline of the
Philippine archipelago,33 such that any straight baseline loped around
them from the nearest basepoint will inevitably "depart to an appreciable
extent from the general configuration of the archipelago."
The principal sponsor of RA 9522 in the Senate, Senator Miriam DefensorSantiago, took pains to emphasize the foregoing during the Senate
deliberations:
What we call the Kalayaan Island Group or what the rest of the world call[]
the Spratlys and the Scarborough Shoal are outside our archipelagic
baseline because if we put them inside our baselines we might be accused
of violating the provision of international law which states: "The drawing of
such baseline shall not depart to any appreciable extent from the general
configuration of the archipelago." So sa loob ng ating baseline, dapat
magkalapit ang mga islands. Dahil malayo ang Scarborough Shoal, hindi
natin masasabing malapit sila sa atin although we are still allowed by
international law to claim them as our own.
This is called contested islands outside our configuration. We see that our
archipelago is defined by the orange line which [we] call[] archipelagic
baseline. Ngayon, tingnan ninyo ang maliit na circle doon sa itaas, that is
Scarborough Shoal, itong malaking circle sa ibaba, that is Kalayaan Group
or the Spratlys. Malayo na sila sa ating archipelago kaya kung ilihis pa
natin ang dating archipelagic baselines para lamang masama itong
dalawang circles, hindi na sila magkalapit at baka hindi na tatanggapin ng
United Nations because of the rule that it should follow the natural
configuration of the archipelago.34 (Emphasis supplied)
Similarly, the length of one baseline that RA 3046 drew exceeded UNCLOS
IIIs limits.1avvphi1 The need to shorten this baseline, and in addition, to
optimize the location of basepoints using current maps, became imperative
as discussed by respondents:

[T]he amendment of the baselines law was necessary to enable the

Philippines to draw the outer limits of its maritime zones including the
extended continental shelf in the manner provided by Article 47 of
[UNCLOS III]. As defined by R.A. 3046, as amended by R.A. 5446, the
baselines suffer from some technical deficiencies, to wit:
1. The length of the baseline across Moro Gulf (from Middle of 3
Rock Awash to Tongquil Point) is 140.06 nautical miles x x x. This
exceeds the maximum length allowed under Article 47(2) of the
[UNCLOS III], which states that "The length of such baselines shall
not exceed 100 nautical miles, except that up to 3 per cent of the
total number of baselines enclosing any archipelago may exceed
that length, up to a maximum length of 125 nautical miles."
2. The selection of basepoints is not optimal. At least 9 basepoints
can be skipped or deleted from the baselines system. This will
enclose an additional 2,195 nautical miles of water.
3. Finally, the basepoints were drawn from maps existing in 1968,
and not established by geodetic survey methods. Accordingly,
some of the points, particularly along the west coasts of Luzon
down to Palawan were later found to be located either inland or on
water, not on low-water line and drying reefs as prescribed by
Article 47.35
Hence, far from surrendering the Philippines claim over the KIG and the
Scarborough Shoal, Congress decision to classify the KIG and the
Scarborough Shoal as "Regime[s] of Islands under the Republic of the
Philippines consistent with Article 121"36 of UNCLOS III manifests the
Philippine States responsible observance of its pacta sunt servanda
obligation under UNCLOS III. Under Article 121 of UNCLOS III, any "naturally
formed area of land, surrounded by water, which is above water at high
tide," such as portions of the KIG, qualifies under the category of "regime
of islands," whose islands generate their own applicable maritime zones.37
Statutory Claim Over Sabah under
RA 5446 Retained
Petitioners argument for the invalidity of RA 9522 for its failure to
textualize the Philippines claim over Sabah in North Borneo is also
untenable. Section 2 of RA 5446, which RA 9522 did not repeal, keeps open
the door for drawing the baselines of Sabah:
Section 2. The definition of the baselines of the territorial sea of the
Philippine Archipelago as provided in this Act is without prejudice to the
delineation of the baselines of the territorial sea around the
territory of Sabah, situated in North Borneo, over which the
Republic of the Philippines has acquired dominion and
sovereignty. (Emphasis supplied)

UNCLOS III and RA 9522 not

Incompatible with the Constitutions
Delineation of Internal Waters
As their final argument against the validity of RA 9522, petitioners contend
that the law unconstitutionally "converts" internal waters into archipelagic
waters, hence subjecting these waters to the right of innocent and sea
lanes passage under UNCLOS III, including overflight. Petitioners
extrapolate that these passage rights indubitably expose Philippine
internal waters to nuclear and maritime pollution hazards, in violation of
the Constitution.38
Whether referred to as Philippine "internal waters" under Article I of the
Constitution39 or as "archipelagic waters" under UNCLOS III (Article 49 [1]),
the Philippines exercises sovereignty over the body of water lying landward
of the baselines, including the air space over it and the submarine areas
underneath. UNCLOS III affirms this:
Article 49. Legal status of archipelagic waters, of the air space over
archipelagic waters and of their bed and subsoil.
1. The sovereignty of an archipelagic State extends to the
waters enclosed by the archipelagic baselines drawn in
accordance with article 47, described as archipelagic waters,
regardless of their depth or distance from the coast.
2. This sovereignty extends to the air space over the
archipelagic waters, as well as to their bed and subsoil, and
the resources contained therein.
xxxx
4. The regime of archipelagic sea lanes passage established in this
Part shall not in other respects affect the status of the
archipelagic waters, including the sea lanes, or the exercise
by the archipelagic State of its sovereignty over such
waters and their air space, bed and subsoil, and the
resources contained therein. (Emphasis supplied)
The fact of sovereignty, however, does not preclude the operation of
municipal and international law norms subjecting the territorial sea or
archipelagic waters to necessary, if not marginal, burdens in the interest of
maintaining unimpeded, expeditious international navigation, consistent
with the international law principle of freedom of navigation. Thus,
domestically, the political branches of the Philippine government, in the
competent discharge of their constitutional powers, may pass legislation
designating routes within the archipelagic waters to regulate innocent and

sea lanes passage.40 Indeed, bills drawing nautical highways for sea lanes
passage are now pending in Congress.41
In the absence of municipal legislation, international law norms, now
codified in UNCLOS III, operate to grant innocent passage rights over the
territorial sea or archipelagic waters, subject to the treatys limitations and
conditions for their exercise.42 Significantly, the right of innocent passage
is a customary international law,43 thus automatically incorporated in the
corpus of Philippine law.44 No modern State can validly invoke its
sovereignty to absolutely forbid innocent passage that is exercised in
accordance with customary international law without risking retaliatory
measures from the international community.
The fact that for archipelagic States, their archipelagic waters are subject
to both the right of innocent passage and sea lanes passage45 does not
place them in lesser footing vis--vis continental coastal States which are
subject, in their territorial sea, to the right of innocent passage and the
right of transit passage through international straits. The imposition of
these passage rights through archipelagic waters under UNCLOS III was a
concession by archipelagic States, in exchange for their right to claim all
the waters landward of their baselines, regardless of their depth or
distance from the coast, as archipelagic waters subject to their territorial
sovereignty. More importantly, the recognition of archipelagic States
archipelago and the waters enclosed by their baselines as one cohesive
entity prevents the treatment of their islands as separate islands under
UNCLOS III.46 Separate islands generate their own maritime zones, placing
the waters between islands separated by more than 24 nautical miles
beyond the States territorial sovereignty, subjecting these waters to the
rights of other States under UNCLOS III.47
Petitioners invocation of non-executory constitutional provisions in Article
II (Declaration of Principles and State Policies)48 must also fail. Our present
state of jurisprudence considers the provisions in Article II as mere
legislative guides, which, absent enabling legislation, "do not embody
judicially enforceable constitutional rights x x x."49 Article II provisions
serve as guides in formulating and interpreting implementing legislation,
as well as in interpreting executory provisions of the Constitution. Although
Oposa v. Factoran50 treated the right to a healthful and balanced ecology
under Section 16 of Article II as an exception, the present petition lacks
factual basis to substantiate the claimed constitutional violation. The other
provisions petitioners cite, relating to the protection of marine wealth
(Article XII, Section 2, paragraph 251 ) and subsistence fishermen (Article
XIII, Section 752 ), are not violated by RA 9522.
In fact, the demarcation of the baselines enables the Philippines to delimit
its exclusive economic zone, reserving solely to the Philippines the
exploitation of all living and non-living resources within such zone. Such a
maritime delineation binds the international community since the
delineation is in strict observance of UNCLOS III. If the maritime delineation

is contrary to UNCLOS III, the international community will of course reject

it and will refuse to be bound by it.
UNCLOS III favors States with a long coastline like the Philippines. UNCLOS
III creates a sui generis maritime space the exclusive economic zone in
waters previously part of the high seas. UNCLOS III grants new rights to
coastal States to exclusively exploit the resources found within this zone
up to 200 nautical miles.53 UNCLOS III, however, preserves the traditional
freedom of navigation of other States that attached to this zone beyond
the territorial sea before UNCLOS III.
RA 9522 and the Philippines Maritime Zones
Petitioners hold the view that, based on the permissive text of UNCLOS III,
Congress was not bound to pass RA 9522.54 We have looked at the
relevant provision of UNCLOS III55 and we find petitioners reading
plausible. Nevertheless, the prerogative of choosing this option belongs to
Congress, not to this Court. Moreover, the luxury of choosing this option
comes at a very steep price. Absent an UNCLOS III compliant baselines law,
an archipelagic State like the Philippines will find itself devoid of
internationally acceptable baselines from where the breadth of its maritime
zones and continental shelf is measured. This is recipe for a two-fronted
disaster: first, it sends an open invitation to the seafaring powers to freely
enter and exploit the resources in the waters and submarine areas around
our archipelago; and second, it weakens the countrys case in any
international dispute over Philippine maritime space. These are
consequences Congress wisely avoided.
The enactment of UNCLOS III compliant baselines law for the Philippine
archipelago and adjacent areas, as embodied in RA 9522, allows an
internationally-recognized delimitation of the breadth of the Philippines
maritime zones and continental shelf. RA 9522 is therefore a most vital
step on the part of the Philippines in safeguarding its maritime zones,
consistent with the Constitution and our national interest.
WHEREFORE, we DISMISS the petition.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 158290

October 23, 2006

HILARION M. HENARES, JR., VICTOR C. AGUSTIN, ALFREDO L.

HENARES, DANIEL L. HENARES, ENRIQUE BELO HENARES, and
CRISTINA BELO HENARES, petitioners,

vs.
LAND TRANSPORTATION FRANCHISING AND REGULATORY BOARD
and DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION AND COMMUNICATIONS,
respondents.

RESOLUTION

QUISUMBING, J.:
Petitioners challenge this Court to issue a writ of mandamus commanding
respondents Land Transportation Franchising and Regulatory Board (LTFRB)
and the Department of Transportation and Communications (DOTC) to
require public utility vehicles (PUVs) to use compressed natural gas (CNG)
as alternative fuel.
Citing statistics from the Metro Manila Transportation and Traffic Situation
Study of 1996,1 the Environmental Management Bureau (EMB) of the
National Capital Region,2 a study of the Asian Development Bank,3 the
Manila Observatory4 and the Department of Environment and Natural
Resources5 (DENR) on the high growth and low turnover in vehicle
ownership in the Philippines, including diesel-powered vehicles, two-stroke
engine powered motorcycles and their concomitant emission of air
pollutants, petitioners attempt to present a compelling case for judicial
action against the bane of air pollution and related environmental hazards.
Petitioners allege that the particulate matters (PM) complex mixtures of
dust, dirt, smoke, and liquid droplets, varying in sizes and compositions
emitted into the air from various engine combustions have caused
detrimental effects on health, productivity, infrastructure and the overall
quality of life. Petitioners particularly cite the effects of certain fuel
emissions from engine combustion when these react to other pollutants.
For instance, petitioners aver, with hydrocarbons, oxide of nitrogen (NOx)
creates smog; with sulfur dioxide, it creates acid rain; and with ammonia,
moisture and other compounds, it reacts to form nitric acid and harmful
nitrates. Fuel emissions also cause retardation and leaf bleaching in plants.
According to petitioner, another emission, carbon monoxide (CO), when not
completely burned but emitted into the atmosphere and then inhaled can
disrupt the necessary oxygen in blood. With prolonged exposure, CO
affects the nervous system and can be lethal to people with weak hearts.6
Petitioners add that although much of the new power generated in the
country will use natural gas while a number of oil and coal-fired fuel
stations are being phased-out, still with the projected doubling of power
generation over the next 10 years, and with the continuing high demand

for motor vehicles, the energy and transport sectors are likely to remain
the major sources of harmful emissions. Petitioners refer us to the study of
the Philippine Environment Monitor 20027, stating that in four of the
country's major cities, Metro Manila, Davao, Cebu and Baguio, the
exposure to PM10, a finer PM which can penetrate deep into the lungs
causing serious health problems, is estimated at over US$430 million.8 The
study also reports that the emissions of PMs have caused the following:
Over 2,000 people die prematurely. This loss is valued at about
US$140 million.
Over 9,000 people suffer from chronic bronchitis, which is valued
at about US$120 million.
Nearly 51 million cases of respiratory symptom days in Metro
Manila (averaging twice a year in Davao and Cebu, and five to six
times in Metro Manila and Baguio), costs about US$170 million.
This is a 70 percent increase, over a decade, when compared with
the findings of a similar study done in 1992 for Metro Manila, which
reported 33 million cases.9
Petitioners likewise cite the University of the Philippines' studies in 1990-91
and 1994 showing that vehicular emissions in Metro Manila have resulted
to the prevalence of chronic obstructive pulmonary diseases (COPD); that
pulmonary tuberculosis is highest among jeepney drivers; and there is a
4.8 to 27.5 percent prevalence of respiratory symptoms among school
children and 15.8 to 40.6 percent among child vendors. The studies also
revealed that the children in Metro Manila showed more compromised
pulmonary function than their rural counterparts. Petitioners infer that
these are mostly due to the emissions of PUVs.
To counter the aforementioned detrimental effects of emissions from PUVs,
petitioners propose the use of CNG. According to petitioners, CNG is a
natural gas comprised mostly of methane which although containing small
amounts of propane and butane,10 is colorless and odorless and
considered the cleanest fossil fuel because it produces much less
pollutants than coal and petroleum; produces up to 90 percent less CO
compared to gasoline and diesel fuel; reduces NOx emissions by 50
percent and cuts hydrocarbon emissions by half; emits 60 percent less
PMs; and releases virtually no sulfur dioxide. Although, according to
petitioners, the only drawback of CNG is that it produces more methane,
one of the gases blamed for global warming.11
Asserting their right to clean air, petitioners contend that the bases for
their petition for a writ of mandamus to order the LTFRB to require PUVs to
use CNG as an alternative fuel, lie in Section 16,12 Article II of the 1987
Constitution, our ruling in Oposa v. Factoran, Jr.,13 and Section 414 of
Republic Act No. 8749 otherwise known as the "Philippine Clean Air Act of
1999."

Meantime, following a subsequent motion, the Court granted petitioners'

motion to implead the Department of Transportation and Communications
(DOTC) as additional respondent.
In his Comment for respondents LTFRB and DOTC, the Solicitor General,
cites Section 3, Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court and explains that the
writ of mandamus is not the correct remedy since the writ may be issued
only to command a tribunal, corporation, board or person to do an act that
is required to be done, when he or it unlawfully neglects the performance
of an act which the law specifically enjoins as a duty resulting from an
office, trust or station, or unlawfully excludes another from the use and
enjoyment of a right or office to which such other is entitled, there being
no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of
law.15 Further citing existing jurisprudence, the Solicitor General explains
that in contrast to a discretionary act, a ministerial act, which a mandamus
is, is one in which an officer or tribunal performs in a given state of facts, in
a prescribed manner, in obedience to a mandate of legal authority, without
regard to or the exercise of his own judgment upon the propriety or
impropriety of an act done.
The Solicitor General also notes that nothing in Rep. Act No. 8749 that
petitioners invoke, prohibits the use of gasoline and diesel by owners of
motor vehicles. Sadly too, according to the Solicitor General, Rep. Act No.
8749 does not even mention the existence of CNG as alternative fuel and
avers that unless this law is amended to provide CNG as alternative fuel for
PUVs, the respondents cannot propose that PUVs use CNG as alternative
fuel.
The Solicitor General also adds that it is the DENR that is tasked to
implement Rep. Act No. 8749 and not the LTFRB nor the DOTC. Moreover,
he says, it is the Department of Energy (DOE), under Section 2616 of Rep.
Act No. 8749, that is required to set the specifications for all types of fuel
and fuel-related products to improve fuel compositions for improved
efficiency and reduced emissions. He adds that under Section 2117 of the
cited Republic Act, the DOTC is limited to implementing the emission
standards for motor vehicles, and the herein respondents cannot alter,
change or modify the emission standards. The Solicitor General opines that
the Court should declare the instant petition for mandamus without merit.
Petitioners, in their Reply, insist that the respondents possess the
administrative and regulatory powers to implement measures in
accordance with the policies and principles mandated by Rep. Act No.
8749, specifically Section 218 and Section 21.19 Petitioners state that
under these laws and with all the available information provided by the
DOE on the benefits of CNG, respondents cannot ignore the existence of
CNG, and their failure to recognize CNG and compel its use by PUVs as
alternative fuel while air pollution brought about by the emissions of
gasoline and diesel endanger the environment and the people, is
tantamount to neglect in the performance of a duty which the law enjoins.

Lastly, petitioners aver that other than the writ applied for, they have no
other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.
Petitioners insist that the writ in fact should be issued pursuant to the very
same Section 3, Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court that the Solicitor
General invokes.

the emission standards set forth in Rep. Act No. 8749 and the said law only
goes as far as setting the maximum limit for the emission of vehicles, but it
does not recognize CNG as alternative engine fuel. The Solicitor General
avers that the petition should be addressed to Congress for it to come up
with a policy that would compel the use of CNG as alternative fuel.

In their Memorandum, petitioners phrase the issues before us as follows:

Patently, this Court is being asked to resolve issues that are not only
procedural. Petitioners challenge this Court to decide if what petitioners
propose could be done through a less circuitous, speedy and unchartered
course in an issue that Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr. in his ponencia in
the Oposa case,24 describes as "inter-generational responsibility" and
"inter-generational justice."

I. WHETHER OR NOT THE PETITIONERS HAVE THE PERSONALITY TO

BRING THE PRESENT ACTION
II. WHETHER OR NOT THE PRESENT ACTION IS SUPPORTED BY LAW
III. WHETHER OR NOT THE RESPONDENT IS THE AGENCY
RESPONSIBLE TO IMPLEMENT THE SUGGESTED ALTERNATIVE OF
REQUIRING PUBLIC UTILITY VEHICLES TO USE COMPRESSED
NATURAL GAS (CNG)
IV. WHETHER OR NOT THE RESPONDENT CAN BE COMPELLED TO
REQUIRE PUBLIC UTILITY VEHICLES TO USE COMPRESSED NATURAL
GAS THROUGH A WRIT OF MANDAMUS20
Briefly put, the issues are two-fold. First, Do petitioners have legal
personality to bring this petition before us? Second, Should mandamus
issue against respondents to compel PUVs to use CNG as alternative fuel?
According to petitioners, Section 16,21 Article II of the 1987 Constitution is
the policy statement that bestows on the people the right to breathe clean
air in a healthy environment. This policy is enunciated in Oposa.22 The
implementation of this policy is articulated in Rep. Act No. 8749. These,
according to petitioners, are the bases for their standing to file the instant
petition. They aver that when there is an omission by the government to
safeguard a right, in this case their right to clean air, then, the citizens can
resort to and exhaust all remedies to challenge this omission by the
government. This, they say, is embodied in Section 423 of Rep. Act No.
8749.
Petitioners insist that since it is the LTFRB and the DOTC that are the
government agencies clothed with power to regulate and control motor
vehicles, particularly PUVs, and with the same agencies' awareness and
knowledge that the PUVs emit dangerous levels of air pollutants, then, the
responsibility to see that these are curbed falls under respondents'
functions and a writ of mandamus should issue against them.

Now, as to petitioners' standing. There is no dispute that petitioners have

standing to bring their case before this Court. Even respondents do not
question their standing. This petition focuses on one fundamental legal
right of petitioners, their right to clean air. Moreover, as held previously, a
party's standing before this Court is a procedural technicality which may, in
the exercise of the Court's discretion, be set aside in view of the
importance of the issue raised. We brush aside this issue of technicality
under the principle of the transcendental importance to the public,
especially so if these cases demand that they be settled promptly.
Undeniably, the right to clean air not only is an issue of paramount
importance to petitioners for it concerns the air they breathe, but it is also
impressed with public interest. The consequences of the counterproductive and retrogressive effects of a neglected environment due to
emissions of motor vehicles immeasurably affect the well-being of
petitioners. On these considerations, the legal standing of the petitioners
deserves recognition.
Our next concern is whether the writ of mandamus is the proper remedy,
and if the writ could issue against respondents.
Under Section 3, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, mandamus lies under any of
the following cases: (1) against any tribunal which unlawfully neglects the
performance of an act which the law specifically enjoins as a duty; (2) in
case any corporation, board or person unlawfully neglects the performance
of an act which the law enjoins as a duty resulting from an office, trust, or
station; and (3) in case any tribunal, corporation, board or person
unlawfully excludes another from the use and enjoyment of a right or office
to which such other is legally entitled; and there is no other plain, speedy,
and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.
In University of San Agustin, Inc. v. Court of Appeals,25 we said,

The Solicitor General, for his part, reiterates his position that the
respondent government agencies, the DOTC and the LTFRB, are not in a
position to compel the PUVs to use CNG as alternative fuel. The Solicitor
General explains that the function of the DOTC is limited to implementing

It is settled that mandamus is employed to compel the

performance, when refused, of a ministerial duty, this
being its main objective. It does not lie to require anyone

to fulfill contractual obligations or to compel a course of

conduct, nor to control or review the exercise of discretion.
On the part of the petitioner, it is essential to the issuance
of a writ of mandamus that he should have a clear legal
right to the thing demanded and it must be the imperative
duty of the respondent to perform the act required. It never
issues in doubtful cases. While it may not be necessary
that the duty be absolutely expressed, it must however, be
clear. The writ will not issue to compel an official to do
anything which is not his duty to do or which is his duty not
to do, or give to the applicant anything to which he is not
entitled by law. The writ neither confers powers nor
imposes duties. It is simply a command to exercise a power
already possessed and to perform a duty already imposed.
(Emphasis supplied.)
In this petition the legal right which is sought to be recognized and
enforced hinges on a constitutional and a statutory policy already
articulated in operational terms, e.g. in Rep. Act No. 8749, the Philippine
Clean Air Act of 1999. Paragraph (a), Section 21 of the Act specifically
provides that when PUVs are concerned, the responsibility of implementing
the policy falls on respondent DOTC. It provides as follows:
SEC 21. Pollution from Motor Vehicles. - a) The DOTC shall
implement the emission standards for motor vehicles set pursuant
to and as provided in this Act. To further improve the emission
standards, the Department [DENR] shall review, revise and publish
the standards every two (2) years, or as the need arises. It shall
consider the maximum limits for all major pollutants to ensure
substantial improvement in air quality for the health, safety and
welfare of the general public.
Paragraph (b) states:
b) The Department [DENR] in collaboration with the DOTC, DTI and
LGUs, shall develop an action plan for the control and
management of air pollution from motor vehicles consistent
with the Integrated Air Quality Framework . . . . (Emphasis
supplied.)
There is no dispute that under the Clean Air Act it is the DENR that is
tasked to set the emission standards for fuel use and the task of
developing an action plan. As far as motor vehicles are concerned, it
devolves upon the DOTC and the line agency whose mandate is to oversee
that motor vehicles prepare an action plan and implement the emission
standards for motor vehicles, namely the LTFRB.
In Oposa26 we said, the right to a balanced and healthful ecology carries
with it the correlative duty to refrain from impairing the environment. We

also said, it is clearly the duty of the responsible government agencies to

advance the said right.
Petitioners invoke the provisions of the Constitution and the Clean Air Act
in their prayer for issuance of a writ of mandamus commanding the
respondents to require PUVs to use CNG as an alternative fuel. Although
both are general mandates that do not specifically enjoin the use of any
kind of fuel, particularly the use of CNG, there is an executive order
implementing a program on the use of CNG by public vehicles. Executive
Order No. 290, entitled Implementing the Natural Gas Vehicle Program for
Public Transport (NGVPPT), took effect on February 24, 2004. The program
recognized, among others, natural gas as a clean burning alternative fuel
for vehicle which has the potential to produce substantially lower
pollutants; and the Malampaya Gas-to-Power Project as representing the
beginning of the natural gas industry of the Philippines. Paragraph 1.2,
Section 1 of E.O. No. 290 cites as one of its objectives, the use of CNG as a
clean alternative fuel for transport. Furthermore, one of the components of
the program is the development of CNG refueling stations and all related
facilities in strategic locations in the country to serve the needs of CNGpowered PUVs. Section 3 of E.O. No. 290, consistent with E.O. No. 66,
series of 2002, designated the DOE as the lead agency (a) in developing
the natural gas industry of the country with the DENR, through the EMB
and (b) in formulating emission standards for CNG. Most significantly, par.
4.5, Section 4 tasks the DOTC, working with the DOE, to develop an
implementation plan for "a gradual shift to CNG fuel utilization in PUVs and
promote NGVs [natural gas vehicles] in Metro Manila and Luzon through
the issuance of directives/orders providing preferential franchises in
present day major routes and exclusive franchises to NGVs in newly
opened routes" A thorough reading of the executive order assures us that
implementation for a cleaner environment is being addressed. To a certain
extent, the instant petition had been mooted by the issuance of E.O. No.
290.
Regrettably, however, the plain, speedy and adequate remedy herein
sought by petitioners, i.e., a writ of mandamus commanding the
respondents to require PUVs to use CNG, is unavailing. Mandamus is
available only to compel the doing of an act specifically enjoined by law as
a duty. Here, there is no law that mandates the respondents LTFRB and the
DOTC to order owners of motor vehicles to use CNG. At most the LTFRB has
been tasked by E.O. No. 290 in par. 4.5 (ii), Section 4 "to grant preferential
and exclusive Certificates of Public Convenience (CPC) or franchises to
operators of NGVs based on the results of the DOTC surveys."
Further, mandamus will not generally lie from one branch of government to
a coordinate branch, for the obvious reason that neither is inferior to the
other.27 The need for future changes in both legislation and its
implementation cannot be preempted by orders from this Court, especially
when what is prayed for is procedurally infirm. Besides, comity with and
courtesy to a coequal branch dictate that we give sufficient time and

leeway for the coequal branches to address by themselves the

environmental problems raised in this petition.
In the same manner that we have associated the fundamental right to a
balanced and healthful ecology with the twin concepts of "intergenerational responsibility" and "inter-generational justice" in Oposa,28
where we upheld the right of future Filipinos to prevent the destruction of
the rainforests, so do we recognize, in this petition, the right of petitioners
and the future generation to clean air. In Oposa we said that if the right to
a balanced and healthful ecology is now explicitly found in the Constitution
even if the right is "assumed to exist from the inception of humankind, it
is because of the well-founded fear of its framers [of the Constitution] that
unless the rights to a balanced and healthful ecology and to health are
mandated as state policies by the Constitution itself, thereby highlighting
their continuing importance and imposing upon the state a solemn
obligation to preserve the first and protect and advance the second, the
day would not be too far when all else would be lost not only for the
present generation, but also for those to come. . ."29
It is the firm belief of this Court that in this case, it is timely to reaffirm the
premium we have placed on the protection of the environment in the
landmark case of Oposa. Yet, as serious as the statistics are on air
pollution, with the present fuels deemed toxic as they are to the
environment, as fatal as these pollutants are to the health of the citizens,
and urgently requiring resort to drastic measures to reduce air pollutants
emitted by motor vehicles, we must admit in particular that petitioners are
unable to pinpoint the law that imposes an indubitable legal duty on
respondents that will justify a grant of the writ of mandamus compelling
the use of CNG for public utility vehicles. It appears to us that more
properly, the legislature should provide first the specific statutory remedy
to the complex environmental problems bared by herein petitioners before
any judicial recourse by mandamus is taken.
WHEREFORE, the petition for the issuance of a writ of mandamus is
DISMISSED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.

minor, represented by her parents SIGRID and DOLORES FORTUN,

GEORGE II and MA. CONCEPCION, all surnamed MISA, minors and
represented by their parents GEORGE and MYRA MISA, BENJAMIN
ALAN V. PESIGAN, minor, represented by his parents ANTONIO and
ALICE PESIGAN, JOVIE MARIE ALFARO, minor, represented by her
parents JOSE and MARIA VIOLETA ALFARO, MARIA CONCEPCION T.
CASTRO, minor, represented by her parents FREDENIL and JANE
CASTRO, JOHANNA DESAMPARADO,
minor, represented by her parents JOSE and ANGELA
DESAMPRADO, CARLO JOAQUIN T. NARVASA, minor, represented by
his parents GREGORIO II and CRISTINE CHARITY NARVASA, MA.
MARGARITA, JESUS IGNACIO, MA. ANGELA and MARIE GABRIELLE,
all surnamed SAENZ, minors, represented by their parents
ROBERTO and AURORA SAENZ, KRISTINE, MARY ELLEN, MAY,
GOLDA MARTHE and DAVID IAN, all surnamed KING, minors,
represented by their parents MARIO and HAYDEE KING, DAVID,
FRANCISCO and THERESE VICTORIA, all surnamed ENDRIGA,
minors, represented by their parents BALTAZAR and TERESITA
ENDRIGA, JOSE MA. and REGINA MA., all surnamed ABAYA, minors,
represented by their parents ANTONIO and MARICA ABAYA,
MARILIN, MARIO, JR. and MARIETTE, all surnamed CARDAMA,
minors, represented by their parents MARIO and LINA CARDAMA,
CLARISSA, ANN MARIE, NAGEL, and IMEE LYN, all surnamed
OPOSA, minors and represented by their parents RICARDO and
MARISSA OPOSA, PHILIP JOSEPH, STEPHEN JOHN and ISAIAH
JAMES, all surnamed QUIPIT, minors, represented by their parents
JOSE MAX and VILMI QUIPIT, BUGHAW CIELO, CRISANTO, ANNA,
DANIEL and FRANCISCO, all surnamed BIBAL, minors, represented
by their parents FRANCISCO, JR. and MILAGROS BIBAL, and THE
PHILIPPINE ECOLOGICAL NETWORK, INC., petitioners,
vs.
THE HONORABLE FULGENCIO S. FACTORAN, JR., in his capacity as
the Secretary of the Department of Environment and Natural
Resources, and THE HONORABLE ERIBERTO U. ROSARIO, Presiding
Judge of the RTC, Makati, Branch 66, respondents.
Oposa Law Office for petitioners.

G.R. No. 101083 July 30, 1993

JUAN ANTONIO, ANNA ROSARIO and JOSE ALFONSO, all surnamed
OPOSA, minors, and represented by their parents ANTONIO and
RIZALINA OPOSA, ROBERTA NICOLE SADIUA, minor, represented by
her parents CALVIN and ROBERTA SADIUA, CARLO, AMANDA SALUD
and PATRISHA, all surnamed FLORES, minors and represented by
their parents ENRICO and NIDA FLORES, GIANINA DITA R. FORTUN,

The Solicitor General for respondents.

DAVIDE, JR., J.:

In a broader sense, this petition bears upon the right of Filipinos to a
balanced and healthful ecology which the petitioners dramatically

associate with the twin concepts of "inter-generational responsibility" and

"inter-generational justice." Specifically, it touches on the issue of whether
the said petitioners have a cause of action to "prevent the
misappropriation or impairment" of Philippine rainforests and "arrest the
unabated hemorrhage of the country's vital life support systems and
continued rape of Mother Earth."
The controversy has its genesis in Civil Case No. 90-77 which was filed
before Branch 66 (Makati, Metro Manila) of the Regional Trial Court (RTC),
National Capital Judicial Region. The principal plaintiffs therein, now the
principal petitioners, are all minors duly represented and joined by their
respective parents. Impleaded as an additional plaintiff is the Philippine
Ecological Network, Inc. (PENI), a domestic, non-stock and non-profit
corporation organized for the purpose of, inter alia, engaging in concerted
action geared for the protection of our environment and natural resources.
The original defendant was the Honorable Fulgencio S. Factoran, Jr., then
Secretary of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources
(DENR). His substitution in this petition by the new Secretary, the
Honorable Angel C. Alcala, was subsequently ordered upon proper motion
by the petitioners. 1 The complaint 2 was instituted as a taxpayers' class
suit 3 and alleges that the plaintiffs "are all citizens of the Republic of the
Philippines, taxpayers, and entitled to the full benefit, use and enjoyment
of the natural resource treasure that is the country's virgin tropical forests."
The same was filed for themselves and others who are equally concerned
about the preservation of said resource but are "so numerous that it is
impracticable to bring them all before the Court." The minors further
asseverate that they "represent their generation as well as generations yet
unborn." 4 Consequently, it is prayed for that judgment be rendered:
. . . ordering defendant, his agents, representatives and
other persons acting in his behalf to
(1) Cancel all existing timber license agreements in the
country;
(2) Cease and desist from receiving, accepting, processing,
renewing or approving new timber license agreements.
and granting the plaintiffs ". . . such other reliefs just and equitable under
the premises." 5
The complaint starts off with the general averments that the Philippine
archipelago of 7,100 islands has a land area of thirty million (30,000,000)
hectares and is endowed with rich, lush and verdant rainforests in which
varied, rare and unique species of flora and fauna may be found; these
rainforests contain a genetic, biological and chemical pool which is

irreplaceable; they are also the habitat of indigenous Philippine cultures

which have existed, endured and flourished since time immemorial;
scientific evidence reveals that in order to maintain a balanced and
healthful ecology, the country's land area should be utilized on the basis of
a ratio of fifty-four per cent (54%) for forest cover and forty-six per cent
(46%) for agricultural, residential, industrial, commercial and other uses;
the distortion and disturbance of this balance as a consequence of
deforestation have resulted in a host of environmental tragedies, such as
(a) water shortages resulting from drying up of the water table, otherwise
known as the "aquifer," as well as of rivers, brooks and streams, (b)
salinization of the water table as a result of the intrusion therein of salt
water, incontrovertible examples of which may be found in the island of
Cebu and the Municipality of Bacoor, Cavite, (c) massive erosion and the
consequential loss of soil fertility and agricultural productivity, with the
volume of soil eroded estimated at one billion (1,000,000,000) cubic
meters per annum approximately the size of the entire island of
Catanduanes, (d) the endangering and extinction of the country's unique,
rare and varied flora and fauna, (e) the disturbance and dislocation of
cultural communities, including the disappearance of the Filipino's
indigenous cultures, (f) the siltation of rivers and seabeds and
consequential destruction of corals and other aquatic life leading to a
critical reduction in marine resource productivity, (g) recurrent spells of
drought as is presently experienced by the entire country, (h) increasing
velocity of typhoon winds which result from the absence of windbreakers,
(i) the floodings of lowlands and agricultural plains arising from the
absence of the absorbent mechanism of forests, (j) the siltation and
shortening of the lifespan of multi-billion peso dams constructed and
operated for the purpose of supplying water for domestic uses, irrigation
and the generation of electric power, and (k) the reduction of the earth's
capacity to process carbon dioxide gases which has led to perplexing and
catastrophic climatic changes such as the phenomenon of global warming,
otherwise known as the "greenhouse effect."
Plaintiffs further assert that the adverse and detrimental consequences of
continued and deforestation are so capable of unquestionable
demonstration that the same may be submitted as a matter of judicial
notice. This notwithstanding, they expressed their intention to present
expert witnesses as well as documentary, photographic and film evidence
in the course of the trial.
As their cause of action, they specifically allege that:
CAUSE OF ACTION
7. Plaintiffs replead by reference the foregoing allegations.

8. Twenty-five (25) years ago, the Philippines had some

sixteen (16) million hectares of rainforests constituting
roughly 53% of the country's land mass.
9. Satellite images taken in 1987 reveal that there
remained no more than 1.2 million hectares of said
rainforests or four per cent (4.0%) of the country's land
area.
10. More recent surveys reveal that a mere 850,000
hectares of virgin old-growth rainforests are left, barely
2.8% of the entire land mass of the Philippine archipelago
and about 3.0 million hectares of immature and
uneconomical secondary growth forests.
11. Public records reveal that the defendant's,
predecessors have granted timber license agreements
('TLA's') to various corporations to cut the aggregate area
of 3.89 million hectares for commercial logging purposes.
A copy of the TLA holders and the corresponding areas
covered is hereto attached as Annex "A".
12. At the present rate of deforestation, i.e. about 200,000
hectares per annum or 25 hectares per hour nighttime,
Saturdays, Sundays and holidays included the
Philippines will be bereft of forest resources after the end of
this ensuing decade, if not earlier.

This act of defendant constitutes a misappropriation and/or

impairment of the natural resource property he holds in
trust for the benefit of plaintiff minors and succeeding
generations.
15. Plaintiffs have a clear and constitutional right to a
balanced and healthful ecology and are entitled to
protection by the State in its capacity as the parens
patriae.
16. Plaintiff have exhausted all administrative remedies
with the defendant's office. On March 2, 1990, plaintiffs
served upon defendant a final demand to cancel all logging
permits in the country.
A copy of the plaintiffs' letter dated March 1, 1990 is hereto
attached as Annex "B".
17. Defendant, however, fails and refuses to cancel the
existing TLA's to the continuing serious damage and
extreme prejudice of plaintiffs.
18. The continued failure and refusal by defendant to
cancel the TLA's is an act violative of the rights of plaintiffs,
especially plaintiff minors who may be left with a country
that is desertified (sic), bare, barren and devoid of the
wonderful flora, fauna and indigenous cultures which the
Philippines had been abundantly blessed with.

13. The adverse effects, disastrous consequences, serious

injury and irreparable damage of this continued trend of
deforestation to the plaintiff minor's generation and to
generations yet unborn are evident and incontrovertible.
As a matter of fact, the environmental damages
enumerated in paragraph 6 hereof are already being felt,
experienced and suffered by the generation of plaintiff
adults.

19. Defendant's refusal to cancel the aforementioned TLA's

is manifestly contrary to the public policy enunciated in the
Philippine Environmental Policy which, in pertinent part,
states that it is the policy of the State

14. The continued allowance by defendant of TLA holders

to cut and deforest the remaining forest stands will work
great damage and irreparable injury to plaintiffs
especially plaintiff minors and their successors who may
never see, use, benefit from and enjoy this rare and unique
natural resource treasure.

(b) to fulfill the social, economic and other requirements of

present and future generations of Filipinos and;

(a) to create, develop, maintain and improve conditions

under which man and nature can thrive in productive and
enjoyable harmony with each other;

(c) to ensure the attainment of an environmental quality

that is conductive to a life of dignity and well-being. (P.D.
1151, 6 June 1977)

20. Furthermore, defendant's continued refusal to cancel

the aforementioned TLA's is contradictory to the
Constitutional policy of the State to
a. effect "a more equitable distribution of opportunities,
income and wealth" and "make full and efficient use of
natural resources (sic)." (Section 1, Article XII of the
Constitution);
b. "protect the nation's marine wealth." (Section 2, ibid);
c. "conserve and promote the nation's cultural heritage and
resources (sic)" (Section 14, Article XIV, id.);
d. "protect and advance the right of the people to a
balanced and healthful ecology in accord with the rhythm
and harmony of nature." (Section 16, Article II, id.)
21. Finally, defendant's act is contrary to the highest law of
humankind the natural law and violative of plaintiffs'
right to self-preservation and perpetuation.
22. There is no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy
in law other than the instant action to arrest the unabated
hemorrhage of the country's vital life support systems and
continued rape of Mother Earth. 6
On 22 June 1990, the original defendant, Secretary Factoran, Jr., filed a
Motion to Dismiss the complaint based on two (2) grounds, namely: (1) the
plaintiffs have no cause of action against him and (2) the issue raised by
the plaintiffs is a political question which properly pertains to the
legislative or executive branches of Government. In their 12 July 1990
Opposition to the Motion, the petitioners maintain that (1) the complaint
shows a clear and unmistakable cause of action, (2) the motion is dilatory
and (3) the action presents a justiciable question as it involves the
defendant's abuse of discretion.
On 18 July 1991, respondent Judge issued an order granting the
aforementioned motion to dismiss. 7 In the said order, not only was the
defendant's claim that the complaint states no cause of action against
him and that it raises a political question sustained, the respondent
Judge further ruled that the granting of the relief prayed for would result in
the impairment of contracts which is prohibited by the fundamental law of
the land.

Plaintiffs thus filed the instant special civil action for certiorari under Rule
65 of the Revised Rules of Court and ask this Court to rescind and set aside
the dismissal order on the ground that the respondent Judge gravely
abused his discretion in dismissing the action. Again, the parents of the
plaintiffs-minors not only represent their children, but have also joined the
latter in this case. 8
On 14 May 1992, We resolved to give due course to the petition and
required the parties to submit their respective Memoranda after the Office
of the Solicitor General (OSG) filed a Comment in behalf of the respondents
and the petitioners filed a reply thereto.
Petitioners contend that the complaint clearly and unmistakably states a
cause of action as it contains sufficient allegations concerning their right to
a sound environment based on Articles 19, 20 and 21 of the Civil Code
(Human Relations), Section 4 of Executive Order (E.O.) No. 192 creating the
DENR, Section 3 of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1151 (Philippine
Environmental Policy), Section 16, Article II of the 1987 Constitution
recognizing the right of the people to a balanced and healthful ecology, the
concept of generational genocide in Criminal Law and the concept of man's
inalienable right to self-preservation and self-perpetuation embodied in
natural law. Petitioners likewise rely on the respondent's correlative
obligation per Section 4 of E.O. No. 192, to safeguard the people's right to
a healthful environment.
It is further claimed that the issue of the respondent Secretary's alleged
grave abuse of discretion in granting Timber License Agreements (TLAs) to
cover more areas for logging than what is available involves a judicial
question.
Anent the invocation by the respondent Judge of the Constitution's nonimpairment clause, petitioners maintain that the same does not apply in
this case because TLAs are not contracts. They likewise submit that even if
TLAs may be considered protected by the said clause, it is well settled that
they may still be revoked by the State when the public interest so requires.
On the other hand, the respondents aver that the petitioners failed to
allege in their complaint a specific legal right violated by the respondent
Secretary for which any relief is provided by law. They see nothing in the
complaint but vague and nebulous allegations concerning an
"environmental right" which supposedly entitles the petitioners to the
"protection by the state in its capacity as parens patriae." Such allegations,
according to them, do not reveal a valid cause of action. They then
reiterate the theory that the question of whether logging should be
permitted in the country is a political question which should be properly
addressed to the executive or legislative branches of Government. They

therefore assert that the petitioners' resources is not to file an action to

court, but to lobby before Congress for the passage of a bill that would ban
logging totally.
As to the matter of the cancellation of the TLAs, respondents submit that
the same cannot be done by the State without due process of law. Once
issued, a TLA remains effective for a certain period of time usually for
twenty-five (25) years. During its effectivity, the same can neither be
revised nor cancelled unless the holder has been found, after due notice
and hearing, to have violated the terms of the agreement or other forestry
laws and regulations. Petitioners' proposition to have all the TLAs
indiscriminately cancelled without the requisite hearing would be violative
of the requirements of due process.
Before going any further, We must first focus on some procedural matters.
Petitioners instituted Civil Case No. 90-777 as a class suit. The original
defendant and the present respondents did not take issue with this matter.
Nevertheless, We hereby rule that the said civil case is indeed a class suit.
The subject matter of the complaint is of common and general interest not
just to several, but to all citizens of the Philippines. Consequently, since the
parties are so numerous, it, becomes impracticable, if not totally
impossible, to bring all of them before the court. We likewise declare that
the plaintiffs therein are numerous and representative enough to ensure
the full protection of all concerned interests. Hence, all the requisites for
the filing of a valid class suit under Section 12, Rule 3 of the Revised Rules
of Court are present both in the said civil case and in the instant petition,
the latter being but an incident to the former.
This case, however, has a special and novel element. Petitioners minors
assert that they represent their generation as well as generations yet
unborn. We find no difficulty in ruling that they can, for themselves, for
others of their generation and for the succeeding generations, file a class
suit. Their personality to sue in behalf of the succeeding generations can
only be based on the concept of intergenerational responsibility insofar as
the right to a balanced and healthful ecology is concerned. Such a right, as
hereinafter expounded, considers
the "rhythm and harmony of nature." Nature means the created world in its
entirety. 9 Such rhythm and harmony indispensably include, inter alia, the
judicious disposition, utilization, management, renewal and conservation of
the country's forest, mineral, land, waters, fisheries, wildlife, off-shore
areas and other natural resources to the end that their exploration,
development and utilization be equitably accessible to the present as well
as future generations. 10 Needless to say, every generation has a
responsibility to the next to preserve that rhythm and harmony for the full
enjoyment of a balanced and healthful ecology. Put a little differently, the
minors' assertion of their right to a sound environment constitutes, at the

same time, the performance of their obligation to ensure the protection of

that right for the generations to come.
The locus standi of the petitioners having thus been addressed, We shall
now proceed to the merits of the petition.
After a careful perusal of the complaint in question and a meticulous
consideration and evaluation of the issues raised and arguments adduced
by the parties, We do not hesitate to find for the petitioners and rule
against the respondent Judge's challenged order for having been issued
with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction. The
pertinent portions of the said order reads as follows:
xxx xxx xxx
After a careful and circumspect evaluation of the
Complaint, the Court cannot help but agree with the
defendant. For although we believe that plaintiffs have but
the noblest of all intentions, it (sic) fell short of alleging,
with sufficient definiteness, a specific legal right they are
seeking to enforce and protect, or a specific legal wrong
they are seeking to prevent and redress (Sec. 1, Rule 2,
RRC). Furthermore, the Court notes that the Complaint is
replete with vague assumptions and vague conclusions
based on unverified data. In fine, plaintiffs fail to state a
cause of action in its Complaint against the herein
defendant.
Furthermore, the Court firmly believes that the matter
before it, being impressed with political color and involving
a matter of public policy, may not be taken cognizance of
by this Court without doing violence to the sacred principle
of "Separation of Powers" of the three (3) co-equal
branches of the Government.
The Court is likewise of the impression that it cannot, no
matter how we stretch our jurisdiction, grant the reliefs
prayed for by the plaintiffs, i.e., to cancel all existing
timber license agreements in the country and to cease and
desist from receiving, accepting, processing, renewing or
approving new timber license agreements. For to do
otherwise would amount to "impairment of contracts"
abhored (sic) by the fundamental law. 11
We do not agree with the trial court's conclusions that the plaintiffs failed
to allege with sufficient definiteness a specific legal right involved or a

specific legal wrong committed, and that the complaint is replete with
vague assumptions and conclusions based on unverified data. A reading of
the complaint itself belies these conclusions.
The complaint focuses on one specific fundamental legal right the right
to a balanced and healthful ecology which, for the first time in our nation's
constitutional history, is solemnly incorporated in the fundamental law.
Section 16, Article II of the 1987 Constitution explicitly provides:
Sec. 16. The State shall protect and advance the right of
the people to a balanced and healthful ecology in accord
with the rhythm and harmony of nature.
This right unites with the right to health which is provided
for in the preceding section of the same article:
Sec. 15. The State shall protect and promote the right to
health of the people and instill health consciousness
among them.
While the right to a balanced and healthful ecology is to be found under
the Declaration of Principles and State Policies and not under the Bill of
Rights, it does not follow that it is less important than any of the civil and
political rights enumerated in the latter. Such a right belongs to a different
category of rights altogether for it concerns nothing less than selfpreservation and self-perpetuation aptly and fittingly stressed by the
petitioners the advancement of which may even be said to predate all
governments and constitutions. As a matter of fact, these basic rights need
not even be written in the Constitution for they are assumed to exist from
the inception of humankind. If they are now explicitly mentioned in the
fundamental charter, it is because of the well-founded fear of its framers
that unless the rights to a balanced and healthful ecology and to health are
mandated as state policies by the Constitution itself, thereby highlighting
their continuing importance and imposing upon the state a solemn
obligation to preserve the first and protect and advance the second, the
day would not be too far when all else would be lost not only for the
present generation, but also for those to come generations which stand
to inherit nothing but parched earth incapable of sustaining life.
The right to a balanced and healthful ecology carries with it the correlative
duty to refrain from impairing the environment. During the debates on this
right in one of the plenary sessions of the 1986 Constitutional Commission,
the following exchange transpired between Commissioner Wilfrido
Villacorta and Commissioner Adolfo Azcuna who sponsored the section in
question:

MR. VILLACORTA:
Does this section mandate the State to
provide sanctions against all forms of
pollution air, water and noise pollution?
MR. AZCUNA:
Yes, Madam President. The right to
healthful (sic) environment necessarily
carries with it the correlative duty of not
impairing the same and, therefore,
sanctions may be provided for impairment
of environmental balance. 12
The said right implies, among many other things, the judicious
management and conservation of the country's forests.
Without such forests, the ecological or environmental balance
would be irreversiby disrupted.
Conformably with the enunciated right to a balanced and healthful ecology
and the right to health, as well as the other related provisions of the
Constitution concerning the conservation, development and utilization of
the country's natural resources, 13 then President Corazon C. Aquino
promulgated on 10 June 1987 E.O. No. 192, 14 Section 4 of which
expressly mandates that the Department of Environment and Natural
Resources "shall be the primary government agency responsible for the
conservation, management, development and proper use of the country's
environment and natural resources, specifically forest and grazing lands,
mineral, resources, including those in reservation and watershed areas,
and lands of the public domain, as well as the licensing and regulation of
all natural resources as may be provided for by law in order to ensure
equitable sharing of the benefits derived therefrom for the welfare of the
present and future generations of Filipinos." Section 3 thereof makes the
following statement of policy:
Sec. 3. Declaration of Policy. It is hereby declared the
policy of the State to ensure the sustainable use,
development, management, renewal, and conservation of
the country's forest, mineral, land, off-shore areas and
other natural resources, including the protection and
enhancement of the quality of the environment, and
equitable access of the different segments of the
population to the development and the use of the country's
natural resources, not only for the present generation but

for future generations as well. It is also the policy of the

state to recognize and apply a true value system including
social and environmental cost implications relative to their
utilization, development and conservation of our natural
resources.
This policy declaration is substantially re-stated it Title XIV, Book IV of the
Administrative Code of 1987, 15 specifically in Section 1 thereof which
reads:
Sec. 1. Declaration of Policy. (1) The State shall ensure,
for the benefit of the Filipino people, the full exploration
and development as well as the judicious disposition,
utilization, management, renewal and conservation of the
country's forest, mineral, land, waters, fisheries, wildlife,
off-shore areas and other natural resources, consistent with
the necessity of maintaining a sound ecological balance
and protecting and enhancing the quality of the
environment and the objective of making the exploration,
development and utilization of such natural resources
equitably accessible to the different segments of the
present as well as future generations.
(2) The State shall likewise recognize and apply a true
value system that takes into account social and
environmental cost implications relative to the utilization,
development and conservation of our natural resources.
The above provision stresses "the necessity of maintaining a sound
ecological balance and protecting and enhancing the quality of the
environment." Section 2 of the same Title, on the other hand, specifically
speaks of the mandate of the DENR; however, it makes particular reference
to the fact of the agency's being subject to law and higher authority. Said
section provides:
Sec. 2. Mandate. (1) The Department of Environment
and Natural Resources shall be primarily responsible for
the implementation of the foregoing policy.
(2) It shall, subject to law and higher authority, be in
charge of carrying out the State's constitutional mandate
to control and supervise the exploration, development,
utilization, and conservation of the country's natural
resources.

Both E.O. NO. 192 and the Administrative Code of 1987 have set the
objectives which will serve as the bases for policy formulation, and have
defined the powers and functions of the DENR.
It may, however, be recalled that even before the ratification of the 1987
Constitution, specific statutes already paid special attention to the
"environmental right" of the present and future generations. On 6 June
1977, P.D. No. 1151 (Philippine Environmental Policy) and P.D. No. 1152
(Philippine Environment Code) were issued. The former "declared a
continuing policy of the State (a) to create, develop, maintain and improve
conditions under which man and nature can thrive in productive and
enjoyable harmony with each other, (b) to fulfill the social, economic and
other requirements of present and future generations of Filipinos, and (c) to
insure the attainment of an environmental quality that is conducive to a
life of dignity and well-being." 16 As its goal, it speaks of the
"responsibilities of each generation as trustee and guardian of the
environment for succeeding generations." 17 The latter statute, on the
other hand, gave flesh to the said policy.
Thus, the right of the petitioners (and all those they represent) to a
balanced and healthful ecology is as clear as the DENR's duty under its
mandate and by virtue of its powers and functions under E.O. No. 192 and
the Administrative Code of 1987 to protect and advance the said right.
A denial or violation of that right by the other who has the corelative duty
or obligation to respect or protect the same gives rise to a cause of action.
Petitioners maintain that the granting of the TLAs, which they claim was
done with grave abuse of discretion, violated their right to a balanced and
healthful ecology; hence, the full protection thereof requires that no further
TLAs should be renewed or granted.
A cause of action is defined as:
. . . an act or omission of one party in violation of the legal
right or rights of the other; and its essential elements are
legal right of the plaintiff, correlative obligation of the
defendant, and act or omission of the defendant in
violation of said legal right. 18
It is settled in this jurisdiction that in a motion to dismiss based on the
ground that the complaint fails to state a cause of action, 19 the question
submitted to the court for resolution involves the sufficiency of the facts
alleged in the complaint itself. No other matter should be considered;
furthermore, the truth of falsity of the said allegations is beside the point
for the truth thereof is deemed hypothetically admitted. The only issue to
be resolved in such a case is: admitting such alleged facts to be true, may

the court render a valid judgment in accordance with the prayer in the
complaint? 20 In Militante vs. Edrosolano, 21 this Court laid down the rule
that the judiciary should "exercise the utmost care and circumspection in
passing upon a motion to dismiss on the ground of the absence thereof
[cause of action] lest, by its failure to manifest a correct appreciation of the
facts alleged and deemed hypothetically admitted, what the law grants or
recognizes is effectively nullified. If that happens, there is a blot on the
legal order. The law itself stands in disrepute."
After careful examination of the petitioners' complaint, We find the
statements under the introductory affirmative allegations, as well as the
specific averments under the sub-heading CAUSE OF ACTION, to be
adequate enough to show, prima facie, the claimed violation of their rights.
On the basis thereof, they may thus be granted, wholly or partly, the reliefs
prayed for. It bears stressing, however, that insofar as the cancellation of
the TLAs is concerned, there is the need to implead, as party defendants,
the grantees thereof for they are indispensable parties.
The foregoing considered, Civil Case No. 90-777 be said to raise a political
question. Policy formulation or determination by the executive or
legislative branches of Government is not squarely put in issue. What is
principally involved is the enforcement of a right vis-a-vis policies already
formulated and expressed in legislation. It must, nonetheless, be
emphasized that the political question doctrine is no longer, the
insurmountable obstacle to the exercise of judicial power or the
impenetrable shield that protects executive and legislative actions from
judicial inquiry or review. The second paragraph of section 1, Article VIII of
the Constitution states that:
Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to
settle actual controversies involving rights which are
legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine
whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of
any branch or instrumentality of the Government.
Commenting on this provision in his book, Philippine Political Law, 22 Mr.
Justice Isagani A. Cruz, a distinguished member of this Court, says:
The first part of the authority represents the traditional
concept of judicial power, involving the settlement of
conflicting rights as conferred as law. The second part of
the authority represents a broadening of judicial power to
enable the courts of justice to review what was before
forbidden territory, to wit, the discretion of the political
departments of the government.

As worded, the new provision vests in the judiciary, and

particularly the Supreme Court, the power to rule upon
even the wisdom of the decisions of the executive and the
legislature and to declare their acts invalid for lack or
excess of jurisdiction because tainted with grave abuse of
discretion. The catch, of course, is the meaning of "grave
abuse of discretion," which is a very elastic phrase that can
expand or contract according to the disposition of the
judiciary.
In Daza vs. Singson, 23 Mr. Justice Cruz, now speaking for this Court,
noted:
In the case now before us, the jurisdictional objection
becomes even less tenable and decisive. The reason is
that, even if we were to assume that the issue presented
before us was political in nature, we would still not be
precluded from revolving it under the expanded jurisdiction
conferred upon us that now covers, in proper cases, even
the political question. Article VII, Section 1, of the
Constitution clearly provides: . . .
The last ground invoked by the trial court in dismissing the complaint is the
non-impairment of contracts clause found in the Constitution. The court a
quo declared that:
The Court is likewise of the impression that it cannot, no
matter how we stretch our jurisdiction, grant the reliefs
prayed for by the plaintiffs, i.e., to cancel all existing
timber license agreements in the country and to cease and
desist from receiving, accepting, processing, renewing or
approving new timber license agreements. For to do
otherwise would amount to "impairment of contracts"
abhored (sic) by the fundamental law. 24
We are not persuaded at all; on the contrary, We are amazed, if not
shocked, by such a sweeping pronouncement. In the first place, the
respondent Secretary did not, for obvious reasons, even invoke in his
motion to dismiss the non-impairment clause. If he had done so, he would
have acted with utmost infidelity to the Government by providing undue
and unwarranted benefits and advantages to the timber license holders
because he would have forever bound the Government to strictly respect
the said licenses according to their terms and conditions regardless of
changes in policy and the demands of public interest and welfare. He was
aware that as correctly pointed out by the petitioners, into every timber

license must be read Section 20 of the Forestry Reform Code (P.D. No. 705)
which provides:
. . . Provided, That when the national interest so requires,
the President may amend, modify, replace or rescind any
contract, concession, permit, licenses or any other form of
privilege granted herein . . .
Needless to say, all licenses may thus be revoked or rescinded by
executive action. It is not a contract, property or a property right
protested by the due process clause of the Constitution. In Tan vs.
Director of Forestry, 25 this Court held:
. . . A timber license is an instrument by which the State
regulates the utilization and disposition of forest resources
to the end that public welfare is promoted. A timber license
is not a contract within the purview of the due process
clause; it is only a license or privilege, which can be validly
withdrawn whenever dictated by public interest or public
welfare as in this case.
A license is merely a permit or privilege to do what
otherwise would be unlawful, and is not a contract between
the authority, federal, state, or municipal, granting it and
the person to whom it is granted; neither is it property or a
property right, nor does it create a vested right; nor is it
taxation (37 C.J. 168). Thus, this Court held that the
granting of license does not create irrevocable rights,
neither is it property or property rights (People vs. Ong Tin,
54 O.G. 7576).
We reiterated this pronouncement in Felipe Ysmael, Jr. & Co., Inc. vs.
Deputy Executive Secretary: 26
. . . Timber licenses, permits and license agreements are
the principal instruments by which the State regulates the
utilization and disposition of forest resources to the end
that public welfare is promoted. And it can hardly be
gainsaid that they merely evidence a privilege granted by
the State to qualified entities, and do not vest in the latter
a permanent or irrevocable right to the particular
concession area and the forest products therein. They may
be validly amended, modified, replaced or rescinded by the
Chief Executive when national interests so require. Thus,
they are not deemed contracts within the purview of the
due process of law clause [See Sections 3(ee) and 20 of

Pres. Decree No. 705, as amended. Also, Tan v. Director of

Forestry, G.R. No. L-24548, October 27, 1983, 125 SCRA
302].
Since timber licenses are not contracts, the non-impairment clause, which
reads:
Sec. 10. No law impairing, the obligation of contracts shall
be passed. 27
cannot be invoked.
In the second place, even if it is to be assumed that the same are
contracts, the instant case does not involve a law or even an executive
issuance declaring the cancellation or modification of existing timber
licenses. Hence, the non-impairment clause cannot as yet be invoked.
Nevertheless, granting further that a law has actually been passed
mandating cancellations or modifications, the same cannot still be
stigmatized as a violation of the non-impairment clause. This is because by
its very nature and purpose, such as law could have only been passed in
the exercise of the police power of the state for the purpose of advancing
the right of the people to a balanced and healthful ecology, promoting their
health and enhancing the general welfare. In Abe vs. Foster Wheeler
Corp. 28 this Court stated:
The freedom of contract, under our system of government,
is not meant to be absolute. The same is understood to be
subject to reasonable legislative regulation aimed at the
promotion of public health, moral, safety and welfare. In
other words, the constitutional guaranty of non-impairment
of obligations of contract is limited by the exercise of the
police power of the State, in the interest of public health,
safety, moral and general welfare.
The reason for this is emphatically set forth in Nebia vs. New York, 29
quoted in Philippine American Life Insurance Co. vs. Auditor General, 30 to
wit:
Under our form of government the use of property and the
making of contracts are normally matters of private and
not of public concern. The general rule is that both shall be
free of governmental interference. But neither property
rights nor contract rights are absolute; for government
cannot exist if the citizen may at will use his property to
the detriment of his fellows, or exercise his freedom of
contract to work them harm. Equally fundamental with the

private right is that of the public to regulate it in the

common interest.
In short, the non-impairment clause must yield to the police power of the
state. 31
Finally, it is difficult to imagine, as the trial court did, how the nonimpairment clause could apply with respect to the prayer to enjoin the
respondent Secretary from receiving, accepting, processing, renewing or
approving new timber licenses for, save in cases of renewal, no contract
would have as of yet existed in the other instances. Moreover, with respect
to renewal, the holder is not entitled to it as a matter of right.
WHEREFORE, being impressed with merit, the instant Petition is hereby
GRANTED, and the challenged Order of respondent Judge of 18 July 1991
dismissing Civil Case No. 90-777 is hereby set aside. The petitioners may
therefore amend their complaint to implead as defendants the holders or
grantees of the questioned timber license agreements.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 79538 October 18, 1990

FELIPE YSMAEL, JR. & CO., INC., petitioner,
vs.
THE DEPUTY EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, THE SECRETARY OF
ENVIRONMENT AND NATURAL RESOURCES, THE DIRECTOR OF THE
BUREAU OF FOREST DEVELOPMENT and TWIN PEAKS
DEVELOPMENT AND REALTY CORPORATION, respondents.
Taada, Vivo & Tan for petitioner.
Antonio E. Escober and Jurado Law Office for respondent Twin Peaks
Development Corporation.

COURTS, J.:
Soon after the change of government in February 1986, petitioner sent a
letter dated March 17, 1986 to the Office of the President, and another

letter dated April 2, 1986 to Minister Ernesto Maceda of the Ministry of

Natural Resources [MNR], seeking: (1) the reinstatement of its timber
license agreement which was cancelled in August 1983 during the Marcos
administration; (2) the revocation of TLA No. 356 which was issued to Twin
Peaks Development and Realty Corporation without public bidding and in
violation of forestry laws, rules and regulations; and, (3) the issuance of an
order allowing petitioner to take possession of all logs found in the
concession area [Annexes "6" and "7" of the Petition; Rollo, pp. 54-63].
Petitioner made the following allegations:
(a) That on October 12, 1965, it entered into a timber license agreement
designated as TLA No. 87 with the Department of Agriculture and Natural
Resources, represented by then Secretary Jose Feliciano, wherein it was
issued an exclusive license to cut, collect and remove timber except
prohibited species within a specified portion of public forest land with an
area of 54,920 hectares located in the municipality of Maddela, province of
Nueva Vizcaya * from October 12, 1965 until June 30, 1990;
(b) That on August 18, 1983, the Director of the Bureau of Forest
Development [hereinafter referred to as "Bureau"], Director Edmundo
Cortes, issued a memorandum order stopping all logging operations in
Nueva Vizcaya and Quirino provinces, and cancelling the logging
concession of petitioner and nine other forest concessionaires, pursuant to
presidential instructions and a memorandum order of the Minister of
Natural Resources Teodoro Pena [Annex "5" of the Petition; Rollo, p. 49];
(c) that on August 25, 1983, petitioner received a telegram from the
Bureau, the contents of which were as follows:
PURSUANT TO THE INSTRUCTIONS OF THE PRESIDENT YOU
ARE REQUESTED TO STOP ALL LOGGING OPERATIONS TO
CONSERVE REMAINING FORESTS PLEASE CONDUCT THE
ORDERLY PULL-OUT OF LOGGING MACHINERIES AND
EQUIPMENT AND COORDINATE WITH THE RESPECTIVE
DISTRICT FORESTERS FOR THE INVENTORY OF LOGS CUT
PRIOR TO THIS ORDER THE SUBMISSION OF A COMPLIANCE
REPORT WITHIN THIRTY DAYS SHALL BE APPRECIATED
[Annex "4" of the Petition; Rollo, p. 48];
(d) That after the cancellation of its timber license agreement, it
immediately sent a letter addressed to then President Ferdinand Marcos
which sought reconsideration of the Bureau's directive, citing in support
thereof its contributions to alleging that it was not given the forest
conservation and opportunity to be heard prior to the cancellation of its

logging 531, but no operations (Annex "6" of the Petition; Rollo, pp. 50
favorable action was taken on this letter;
(e) That barely one year thereafter, approximately one-half or 26,000
hectares of the area formerly covered by TLA No. 87 was re-awarded to
Twin Peaks Development and Reality Corporation under TLA No. 356 which
was set to expire on July 31, 2009, while the other half was allowed to be
logged by Filipinas Loggers, Inc. without the benefit of a formal award or
license; and,
(f) That the latter entities were controlled or owned by relatives or cronies
of deposed President Ferdinand Marcos. Acting on petitioner's letter, the
MNR through then Minister Ernesto Maceda issued an order dated July 22,
1986 denying petitioner's request. The Ministry ruled that a timber license
was not a contract within the due process clause of the Constitution, but
only a privilege which could be withdrawn whenever public interest or
welfare so demands, and that petitioner was not discriminated against in
view of the fact that it was among ten concessionaires whose licenses were
revoked in 1983. Moreover, emphasis was made of the total ban of logging
operations in the provinces of Nueva Ecija, Nueva Vizcaya, Quirino and
Ifugao imposed on April 2, 1986, thus:
xxx xxx xxx
It should be recalled that [petitioner's] earlier request for
reinstatement has been denied in view of the total ban of
all logging operations in the provinces of Nueva Ecija,
Nueva Vizcaya, Quirino and Ifugao which was imposed for
reasons of conservation and national security.
The Ministry imposed the ban because it realizes the great
responsibility it bear [sic] in respect to forest t considers
itself the trustee thereof. This being the case, it has to
ensure the availability of forest resources not only for the
present, but also for the future generations of Filipinos.
On the other hand, the activities of the insurgents in these
parts of the country are well documented. Their financial
demands on logging concessionaires are well known. The
government, therefore, is well within its right to deprive its
enemy of sources of funds in order to preserve itself, its
established institutions and the liberty and democratic way
of life of its people.
xxx xxx xxx

[Annex "9" of the Petition, pp. 2-4; Rollo, pp. 65-67.]

Petitioner moved for reconsideration of the aforestated order reiterating,
among others. its request that TLA No. 356 issued to private respondent be
declared null and void. The MNR however denied this motion in an order
dated September 15, 1986. stating in part:
xxx xxx xxx
Regarding [petitioner's] request that the award of a 26,000
hectare portion of TLA No. 87 to Twin Peaks Realty
Development Corporation under TLA No. 356 be declared
null and void, suffice it to say that the Ministry is now in
the process of reviewing all contracts, permits or other
form of privileges for the exploration, development,
exploitation, or utilization of natural resources entered into,
granted, issued or acquired before the issuance of
Proclamation No. 3, otherwise known as the Freedom
Constitution for the purpose of amending, modifying or
revoking them when the national interest so requires.
xxx xxx xxx
The Ministry, through the Bureau of Forest Development,
has jurisdiction and authority over all forest lands. On the
basis of this authority, the Ministry issued the order
banning all logging operations/activities in Quirino
province, among others, where movant's former
concession area is located. Therefore, the issuance of an
order disallowing any person or entity from removing cut or
uncut logs from the portion of TLA No. 87, now under TLA
No. 356, would constitute an unnecessary or superfluous
act on the part of the Ministry.
xxx xxx xxx
[Annex "11" of the Petition, pp. 3-4; Rollo, pp. 77-78.]
On November 26, 1986, petitioner's supplemental motion for
reconsideration was likewise denied. Meanwhile, per MNR Administrative
Order No. 54, series of 1986, issued on November 26, 1986, the logging
ban in the province of Quirino was lifted.
Petitioner subsequently appealed from the orders of the MNR to the Office
of the President. In a resolution dated July 6, 1987, the Office of the

President, acting through then Deputy Executive Secretary Catalino

Macaraig, denied petitioner's appeal for lack of merit. The Office of the
President ruled that the appeal of petitioner was prematurely filed, the
matter not having been terminated in the MNR. Petitioner's motion for
reconsideration was denied on August 14, 1987.

appointed Minister of the MNR requesting reconsideration of the above

Bureau actions, these were already settled matters as far as petitioner was
concerned [See Rueda v. Court of Agrarian Relations, 106 Phil. 300 (1959);
Danan v. Aspillera G.R. No. L-17305, November 28, 1962, 6 SCRA 609;
Ocampo v. Arboleda G.R. No. L-48190, August 31, 1987, 153 SCRA 374].

Hence, petitioner filed directly with this Court a petition for certiorari, with
prayer for the issuance of a restraining order or writ of preliminary
injunction, on August 27, 1987. On October 13, 1987, it filed a supplement
to its petition for certiorari. Thereafter, public and private respondents
submitted their respective comments, and petitioner filed its consolidated
reply thereto. In a resolution dated May 22, 1989, the Court resolved to
give due course to the petition.

No particular significance can be attached to petitioner's letter dated

September 19, 1983 which petitioner claimed to have sent to then
President Marcos [Annex "6" of Petition, Rollo, pp. 50-53], seeking the
reconsideration of the 1983 order issued by Director Cortes of the Bureau.
It must be pointed out that the averments in this letter are entirely
different from the charges of fraud against officials under the previous
regime made by petitioner in its letters to public respondents herein. In the
letter to then President Marcos, petitioner simply contested its inclusion in
the list of concessionaires, whose licenses were cancelled, by defending its
record of selective logging and reforestation practices in the subject
concession area. Yet, no other administrative steps appear to have been
taken by petitioner until 1986, despite the fact that the alleged fraudulent
scheme became apparent in 1984 as evidenced by the awarding of the
subject timber concession area to other entities in that year.

After a careful study of the circumstances in the case at bar, the Court
finds several factors which militate against the issuance of a writ of
certiorari in favor of petitioner.
1. Firstly, the refusal of public respondents herein to reverse final and
executory administrative orders does not constitute grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
It is an established doctrine in this jurisdiction that the decisions and
orders of administrative agencies have upon their finality, the force and
binding effect of a final judgment within the purview of the doctrine of res
judicata. These decisions and orders are as conclusive upon the rights of
the affected parties as though the same had been rendered by a court of
general jurisdiction. The rule of res judicata thus forbids the reopening of a
matter once determined by competent authority acting within their
exclusive jurisdiction [See Brillantes v. Castro, 99 Phil. 497 (1956);
Ipekdjian Merchandising Co., Inc. v. Court of Tax Appeals, G.R. No. L-15430,
September 30, 1963, 9 SCRA 72; San Luis v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No.
80160, June 26, 1989].
In the case at bar, petitioner's letters to the Office of the President and the
MNR [now the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR)
dated March 17, 1986 and April 2, 1986, respectively, sought the
reconsideration of a memorandum order issued by the Bureau of Forest
Development which cancelled its timber license agreement in 1983, as well
as the revocation of TLA No. 356 subsequently issued by the Bureau to
private respondents in 1984.
But as gleaned from the record, petitioner did not avail of its remedies
under the law, i.e. Section 8 of Pres. Dec. No. 705 as amended, for
attacking the validity of these administrative actions until after 1986. By
the time petitioner sent its letter dated April 2, 1986 to the newly

2. Moreover, petitioner is precluded from availing of the benefits of a writ

of certiorari in the present case because he failed to file his petition within
a reasonable period.
The principal issue ostensibly presented for resolution in the instant
petition is whether or not public respondents herein acted with grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in refusing to
overturn administrative orders issued by their predecessors in the past
regime. Yet, what the petition ultimately seeks is the nullification of the
Bureau orders cancelling TLA No. 87 and granting TLA No. 356 to private
respondent, which were issued way back in 1983 and 1984, respectively.
Once again, the fact that petitioner failed to seasonably take judicial
recourse to have the earlier administrative actions reviewed by the courts
through a petition for certiorari is prejudicial to its cause. For although no
specific time frame is fixed for the institution of a special civil action for
certiorari under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court, the same must
nevertheless be done within a "reasonable time". The yardstick to measure
the timeliness of a petition for certiorari is the "reasonableness of the
length of time that had expired from the commission of the acts
complained of up to the institution of the proceeding to annul the same"
[Toledo v. Pardo, G.R. No. 56761, November 19, 1982, 118 SCRA 566, 571].
And failure to file the petition for certiorari within a reasonable period of
time renders the petitioner susceptible to the adverse legal consequences

of laches [Municipality of Carcar v. Court of First Instance of Cebu, G.R. No.

L-31628, December 27, 1982, 119 SCRA 392).
Laches is defined as the failure or neglect for an unreasonable and
unexplained length of time to do that which by exercising due diligence,
could or should have been done earlier, or to assert a right within a
reasonable time, warranting a presumption that the party entitled thereto
has either abandoned it or declined to assert it [Tijam v. Sibonghanoy, G.R.
No. L-21450, April 15, 1968, 23 SCRA 29; Seno v. Mangubat, G.R. No. L44339, December 2, 1987, 156 SCRA 113]. The rule is that unreasonable
delay on the part of a plaintiff in seeking to enforce an alleged right may,
depending upon the circumstances, be destructive of the right itself. Verily,
the laws aid those who are vigilant, not those who sleep upon their rights
(Vigilantibus et non dormientibus jura subveniunt) [See Buenaventura v.
David, 37 Phil. 435 (1918)].
In the case at bar, petitioner waited for at least three years before it finally
filed a petition for certiorari with the Court attacking the validity of the
assailed Bureau actions in 1983 and 1984. Considering that petitioner,
throughout the period of its inaction, was not deprived of the opportunity
to seek relief from the courts which were normally operating at the time,
its delay constitutes unreasonable and inexcusable neglect, tantamount to
laches. Accordingly, the writ of certiorari requiring the reversal of these
orders will not lie.
3. Finally, there is a more significant factor which bars the issuance of a
writ of certiorari in favor of petitioner and against public respondents
herein. It is precisely this for which prevents the Court from departing from
the general application of the rules enunciated above.
A cursory reading of the assailed orders issued by public respondent
Minister Maceda of the MNR which were ed by the Office of the President,
will disclose public policy consideration which effectively forestall judicial
interference in the case at bar,
Public respondents herein, upon whose shoulders rests the task of
implementing the policy to develop and conserve the country's natural
resources, have indicated an ongoing department evaluation of all timber
license agreements entered into, and permits or licenses issued, under the
previous dispensation. In fact, both the executive and legislative
departments of the incumbent administration are presently taking stock of
its environmental policies with regard to the utilization of timber lands and
developing an agenda for future programs for their conservation and
rehabilitation.

The ongoing administrative reassessment is apparently in response to the

renewed and growing global concern over the despoliation of forest lands
and the utter disregard of their crucial role in sustaining a balanced
ecological system. The legitimacy of such concern can hardly be disputed,
most especially in this country. The Court takes judicial notice of the
profligate waste of the country's forest resources which has not only
resulted in the irreversible loss of flora and fauna peculiar to the region,
but has produced even more disastrous and lasting economic and social
effects. The delicate balance of nature having been upset, a vicious cycle
of floods and droughts has been triggered and the supply of food and
energy resources required by the people seriously depleted.
While there is a desire to harness natural resources to amass profit and to
meet the country's immediate financial requirements, the more essential
need to ensure future generations of Filipinos of their survival in a viable
environment demands effective and circumspect action from the
government to check further denudation of whatever remains of the forest
lands. Nothing less is expected of the government, in view of the clear
constitutional command to maintain a balanced and healthful ecology.
Section 16 of Article II of the 1987 Constitution provides:
SEC. 16. The State shall protect and promote the right of
the people to a balanced and healthful ecology in accord
with the rhythm and harmony of nature.
Thus, while the administration grapples with the complex and multifarious
problems caused by unbridled exploitation of these resources, the judiciary
will stand clear. A long line of cases establish the basic rule that the courts
will not interfere in matters which are addressed to the sound discretion of
government agencies entrusted with the regulation of activities coming
under the special technical knowledge and training of such agencies [See
Espinosa v. Makalintal, 79 Phil. 134 (1947); Coloso v. Board of Accountancy,
92 Phil. 938 (1953); Pajo v. Ago, 108 Phil. 905 (1960); Suarez v. Reyes, G.R.
No. L-19828, February 28, 1963, 7 SCRA 461; Ganitano v. Secretary of
Agriculture and Natural Resources, G. R. No. L-21167, March 31, 1966, 16
SCRA 543; Villegas v. Auditor General, G.R. No. L-21352, November 29,
1966, 18 SCRA 877; Manuel v. Villena, G.R. No. L-28218, February 27,
1971, 37 SCRA 745; Lacuesta v. Herrera, G.R. No. L-33646, January 28,
1975, 62 SCRA 115; Lianga Bay Logging Co., Inc. v. Enage, G.R. No. L30637, July 16, 1987, 152 SCRA 80]. More so where, as in the present case,
the interests of a private logging company are pitted against that of the
public at large on the pressing public policy issue of forest conservation.
For this Court recognizes the wide latitude of discretion possessed by the
government in determining the appropriate actions to be taken to preserve
and manage natural resources, and the proper parties who should enjoy
the privilege of utilizing these resources [Director of Forestry v. Munoz, G.R.
No. L-24796, June 28, 1968, 23 SCRA 1183; Lim, Sr. v. The Secretary of

Agriculture and Natural Resources, G.R. No. L-26990, August 31, 1970, 34
SCRA 751]. Timber licenses, permits and license agreements are the
principal instruments by which the State regulates the utilization and
disposition of forest resources to the end that public welfare is promoted.
And it can hardly be gainsaid that they merely evidence a privilege granted
by the State to qualified entities, and do not vest in the latter a permanent
or irrevocable right to the particular concession area and the forest
products therein. They may be validly amended, modified, replaced or
rescinded by the Chief Executive when national interests so require. Thus,
they are not deemed contracts within the purview of the due process of
law clause [See Sections 3 (ee) and 20 of Pres. Decree No. 705, as
amended. Also, Tan v. Director of Forestry, G.R. No. L-24548, October 27,
1983, 125 SCRA 302].
In fine, the legal precepts highlighted in the foregoing discussion more
than suffice to justify the Court's refusal to interfere in the DENR evaluation
of timber licenses and permits issued under the previous regime, or to preempt the adoption of appropriate corrective measures by the department.
Nevertheless, the Court cannot help but express its concern regarding
alleged irregularities in the issuance of timber license agreements to a
number of logging concessionaires.
The grant of licenses or permits to exploit the country's timber resources, if
done in contravention of the procedure outlined in the law, or as a result of
fraud and undue influence exerted on department officials, is indicative of
an arbitrary and whimsical exercise of the State's power to regulate the
use and exploitation of forest resources. The alleged practice of bestowing
"special favors" to preferred individuals, regardless of merit, would be an
abuse of this power. And this Court will not be a party to a flagrant
mockery of the avowed public policy of conservation enshrined in the 1987
Constitution. Therefore, should the appropriate case be brought showing a
clear grave abuse of discretion on the part of officials in the DENR and
related bureaus with respect to the implementation of this public policy,
the Court win not hesitate to step in and wield its authority, when invoked,
in the exercise of judicial powers under the Constitution [Section 1, Article
VIII].
However, petitioner having failed to make out a case showing grave abuse
of discretion on the part of public respondents herein, the Court finds no
basis to issue a writ of certiorari and to grant any of the affirmative reliefs
sought.
WHEREFORE, the present petition is DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED

G.R. No. 2869

March 25, 1907

MATEO CARIO, petitioner-appellant,

vs.
THE INSULAR GOVERNMENT, respondent-appellee.
Coudert Brothers for appellant.
Office of the Solicitor-General Araneta for appellee.
ARELLANO, C.J.:
Mateo Cario, the appellant herein, on the 23d of February, 1904, filed his
petition in the Court of Land Registration praying that there be granted to
him title to a parcel of land consisting of 40 hectares, 1 are, and 13
centares, and situated in the town of Baguio, Province of Benguet, together
with a house erected thereon and constructed of wood and roofed with
rimo, and bounded as follows: On the north, in lines running 1,048 metes
and 20 decimeters with the lands of Sepa Cario, H. Phelps Whitmarsh,
and Calsi; on the east, in lines running 991 meters and 50 decimeters with
the land of Kuidno, Esteban Gonzales, and of the Civil Government; on the
south, in lines of 115 meters and 60 decimeters, with the lands of Talaca;
and on the west, in lines running 982 meters and 20 decimeters, with the
lands of Sisco Cario and Mayengmeng.
By order of the court the hearing of this petition, No. 561, and that of
Antonio Rebollo and Vicente Valpiedad filed under No. 834, were heard
together for the reason that the latter petition claimed a small portion of
land included in the parcel set out in the former petition.
The Insular Government opposed the granting of these petitions, alleging
that the whole parcel of land is public property of the Government and that
the same was never acquired in any manner or through any title of
egresion from the State.
After trial, and the hearing of documentary and oral proof, the court of
Land Registration rendered its judgment in these terms:
Therefore the court finds that Cario and his predecessors have not
possessed exclusively and adversely any part of the said property
prior to the date on which Cario constructed the house now there
that is to say, for the years 1897 and 1898, and Cario held
possession for some years afterwards of but a part of the property
to which he claims title. Both petitions are dismissed and the
property in question is adjudged to be public land. (Bill of
exceptions, p. 15.)

The conclusions arrived at the set forth in definite terms in the decision of
the court below are the following:
From the testimony given by Cario as well as from that of several
of the witnesses for the Government it is deduced, that in or about
the year 1884 Cario erected and utilized as a domicile a house on
the property situated to the north of that property now in question,
property which, according to the plan attached to expediente No.
561, appears to be property belonging to Donaldson Sim; that
during the year 1893 Cario sold said house to one Cristobal
Ramos, who in turn sold the same to Donaldson Sim, moving to
and living on the adjoining property, which appears on the plan
aforesaid to be the property of H. Phelps Whitmarsh, a place where
the father and the grandfather of his wife, that is to say, Ortega
and Minse, had lived . . ..
In or about the years 1898 Cario abandoned the property of
Whitmarsh and located on the property described in the plan
attached to expediente No. 561, having constructed a house
thereon in which he now lives, and which house is situated in the
center of the property, as is indicated on the plan; and since which
time he has undoubtedly occupied some portion of the property
now claimed by him. (Bill of exceptions, pp. 11 and 12.)
1. Therefore it is evident that this court can not decree the registration of
all of the superficial extension of the land described in the petition and as
appears on the plan filed herein, such extension containing 40 hectares, 1
are, and 13 centares, inasmuch as the documentary evidence
accompanying the petition is conclusive proof against the petitioners; this
documentary proof consists of a possessory information under date of
March 7, 1901, and registered on the 11th day of the same month and
year; and, according to such possessory information, the land therein
described contains an extension of only 28 hectares limited by "the
country road to the barrio of Pias," a road appearing on the plan now
presented and cutting the land, as might be said, in half, or running
through its center from north to south, a considerable extension of land
remaining on the other side of the said road, the west side, and which
could not have been included in the possessory information mentioned.
2. As has been shown during the trial of this case, this land, of which
mention is made in said possessory information, and upon which is
situated the house now actually occupied by the petitioner, all of which is
set forth as argument as to the possession in the judgment, is "used for
pasture and sowing," and belongs to the class called public lands.

3. Under the express provisions of law, a parcel of land, being of common

origin, presumptively belonged to the State during its sovereignty, and, in
order to perfect the legitimate acquisition of such land by private persons,
it was necessary that the possession of the same pass from the State. And
there is no evidence or proof of title of egresion of this land from the
domain of the Spanish Government, nor is there any possessory
information equivalent to title by composicion or under agreement. 4, The
possessory information filed herein is not the title to property authorized in
substitution for that of adjustment by the royal decree of February 13,
1894, this being the last law or legal disposition of the former sovereignty
applicable to the present subject-matter of common lands: First, for the
reason that the land referred to herein is not covered nor does it come
within any one of the three conditions required by article 19 of the said
royal decree, to wit, that the land has been in an uninterrupted state of
cultivation during a period of six years last past; or that the same has been
possessed without interruption during a period of twelve years and has
been in a state of cultivation up to the date of the information and during
the three years immediately preceding such information; or that such land
had been possessed openly without interruption during a period of thirty or
more years, notwithstanding the land had not been cultivated; nor is it
necessary to refer to the testimony given by the two witnesses to the
possessory information for the following reason: Second, because the
possessory information authorized by said royal decree or last legal
disposition of the Spanish Government, as title or for the purpose of
acquiring actual proprietary right, equivalent to that of adjustment with the
Spanish Government and required and necessary at all times until the
publication of said royal decree was limited in time to one year, in
accordance with article 21, which is as follows: " A period of one year, not
to be extended, is allowed to verify the possessory informations which are
referred to in articles 19 and 20. After the expiration of this period of the
right of the cultivators and persons in possession to obtain gratuitous title
thereto lapses and the land together with full possession reverts to the
state, or, as the case may be, to the community, and the said possessors
and cultivators or their assigns would simply have rights under universal or
general title of average in the event that the land is sold within a period of
five years immediately following the cancellation. The possessors not
included under this chapter can only acquire by time the ownership and
title to unappropriated or royal lands in accordance with common law."
5. In accordance with the preceding provisions, the right that remained to
Cario, if it be certain that he was the true possessor of the land in
question, was the right of average in case the Government or State could
have sold the same within the period of five years immediately following
for example, if the denouncement of purchase had been carried out by
Felipe Zafra or any other person, as appears from the record of the trial of
the case. Aside from this right, in such event, his possession as attested in
the possessory information herein could not, in accordance with common

law, go to show any right of ownership until after the expiration of twenty
years from the expiration of twenty years from the verification and registry
of the same in conformity with the provisions of article 393 of the Mortgage
Law and other conditions prescribe by this law.
6. The right of possession in accordance with common law that is to say,
civil law remains at all times subordinate to the Spanish administrative
law, inasmuch as it could only be of force when pertaining to royal
transferable or alienable lands, which condition and the determination
thereof is reversed to the government, which classified and designated the
royal alienable lands for the purpose of distinguishing them from those
lands strictly public, and from forestry lands which could at no time pass to
private ownership nor be acquired through time even after the said royal
decree of February 13, 1894.
7. The advent of the new sovereignty necessarily brought a new method of
dealing with lands and particularly as to the classification and manner of
transfer and acquisition of royal or common lands then appropriated, which
were thenceforth merely called public lands, the alienation of which was
reserved to the Government, in accordance with section 12 and 13 of the
act of Congress of July 1, 1902,1 and in conformity with other laws enacted
under this act of Congress by the Philippine Commission prescribing rules
for the execution thereof, one of which is Act No. 648,2 herein mentioned
by the petitioner, in connection with Act No. 627,3 which appears to be the
law upon which the petition herein is founded.
8. Section 6 of Act No. 627 admits prescription, in accordance with the
provisions contained in Act No. 190, as a basis for obtaining the right of
ownership. "The petitioners claims title under the period of prescription of
ten years established by that act, as well as by reason of his occupancy
and use thereof from time immemorial." (Allegation 1.) But said act admits
such prescription for the purpose of obtaining title and ownership to lands
"not exceeding more that sixteen hectares in extent." (Sec. 6 of said act.)
The land claimed by Cario is 40 hectares in extent, if we take into
consideration his petition, or an extension of 28 hectares, according to the
possessory information, the only thing that can be considered. Therefore, it
follows that the judgment denying the petition herein and now appealed
from was strictly in accordance with the law invoked herein.
9. And of the 28 hectares of land as set out in the possessory information,
one part of same, according to the testimony of Cario, belongs to Vicente
Valpiedad, the extent of which is not determined. From all of which it
follows that the precise extent has not been determined in the trial of this
case on which judgment might be based in the event that the judgment
and title be declared in favor of the petitioner, Mateo Cario. And we
should not lose sight of the fact that, considering the intention of Congress

in granting ownership and title to 16 hectares, that Mateo Cario and his
children have already exceeded such amount in various acquirements of
lands, all of which is shown in different cases decided by the said Court of
Land Registration, donations or gifts of land that could only have been
made efficacious as to the conveyance thereof with the assistance of these
new laws.
By reason of the findings set forth it is clearly seen that the court below did
not err:
1. In finding that Mateo Cario and those from whom he claims his
right had not possessed and claimed as owners the lands in
question since time immemorial;
2. In finding that the land in question did not belong to the
petitioner, but that, on the contrary, it was the property of the
Government. (Allegation 21.)
Wherefore, the judgment appealed from is affirmed with the costs of this
instance against the appellant. After the expiration of twenty days from the
notification of this decision let judgment be entered in accordance
herewith, and ten days thereafter let the case be remanded to the court
from whence it came for proper action. So ordered.
G.R. No. 135385

December 6, 2000

ISAGANI CRUZ and CESAR EUROPA, petitioners,

vs.
SECRETARY OF ENVIRONMENT AND NATURAL RESOURCES,
SECRETARY OF BUDGET AND MANAGEMENT and CHAIRMAN and
COMMISSIONERS OF THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON INDIGENOUS
PEOPLES, respondents.
HON. JUAN M .FLAVIER, HON. PONCIANO BENNAGEN, BAYANI
ASCARRAGA, EDTAMI MANSAYANGAN, BASILIO WANDAG, EVELYN
DUNUAN, YAOM TUGAS, ALFREMO CARPIANO, LIBERATO A. GABIN,
MATERNIDAD M. COLAS, NARCISA M. DALUPINES, BAI KIRAMCONNIE SATURNO, BAE MLOMO-BEATRIZ T. ABASALA, DATU
BALITUNGTUNG-ANTONIO D. LUMANDONG, DATU MANTUMUKAW
TEOFISTO SABASALES, DATU EDUAARDO BANDA, DATU JOEL UNAD,
DATU RAMON BAYAAN, TIMUAY JOSE ANOY, TIMUAY MACARIO D.
SALACAO, TIMUAY EDWIN B. ENDING, DATU SAHAMPONG
MALANAW VI, DATU BEN PENDAO CABIGON, BAI NANAPNAY-LIZA
SAWAY, BAY INAY DAYA-MELINDA S. REYMUNDO, BAI TINANGHAGA
HELINITA T. PANGAN, DATU MAKAPUKAW ADOLINO L. SAWAY, DATU
MAUDAYAW-CRISPEN SAWAY, VICKY MAKAY, LOURDES D. AMOS,
GILBERT P. HOGGANG, TERESA GASPAR, MANUEL S. ONALAN, MIA

GRACE L. GIRON, ROSEMARIE G. PE, BENITO CARINO, JOSEPH JUDE

CARANTES, LYNETTE CARANTES-VIVAL, LANGLEY SEGUNDO, SATUR
S. BUGNAY, CARLING DOMULOT, ANDRES MENDIOGRIN, LEOPOLDO
ABUGAN, VIRGILIO CAYETANO, CONCHITA G. DESCAGA, LEVY
ESTEVES, ODETTE G. ESTEVEZ, RODOLFO C. AGUILAR, MAURO
VALONES, PEPE H. ATONG, OFELIA T. DAVI, PERFECTO B.
GUINOSAO, WALTER N. TIMOL, MANUEL T. SELEN, OSCAR
DALUNHAY, RICO O. SULATAN, RAFFY MALINDA, ALFREDO
ABILLANOS, JESSIE ANDILAB, MIRLANDO H. MANGKULINTAS, SAMIE
SATURNO, ROMEO A. LINDAHAY, ROEL S. MANSANG-CAGAN,
PAQUITO S. LIESES, FILIPE G. SAWAY, HERMINIA S. SAWAY, JULIUS
S. SAWAY, LEONARDA SAWAY, JIMMY UGYUB, SALVADOR TIONGSON,
VENANCIO APANG, MADION MALID, SUKIM MALID, NENENG MALID,
MANGKATADONG AUGUSTO DIANO, JOSEPHINE M. ALBESO,
MORENO MALID, MARIO MANGCAL, FELAY DIAMILING, SALOME P.
SARZA, FELIPE P. BAGON, SAMMY SALNUNGAN, ANTONIO D. EMBA,
NORMA MAPANSAGONOS, ROMEO SALIGA, SR., JERSON P. GERADA,
RENATO T. BAGON, JR., SARING MASALONG, SOLEDAD M.
GERARDA, ELIZABETH L. MENDI, MORANTE S. TIWAN, DANILO M.
MALUDAO, MINORS MARICEL MALID, represented by her father
CORNELIO MALID, MARCELINO M. LADRA, represented by her
father MONICO D. LADRA, JENNYLYN MALID, represented by her
father TONY MALID, ARIEL M. EVANGELISTA, represented by her
mother LINAY BALBUENA, EDWARD M. EMUY, SR., SUSAN BOLANIO,
OND, PULA BATO B'LAAN TRIBAL FARMER'S ASSOCIATION, INTERPEOPLE'S EXCHANGE, INC. and GREEN FORUM-WESTERN VISAYAS,
intervenors.
COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS, intervenor.
IKALAHAN INDIGENOUS PEOPLE and HARIBON FOUNDATION FOR
THE CONSERVATION OF NATURAL RESOURCES, INC., intervenor.
RESOLUTION

constitutionality of the IPRA and pray that the petition be dismissed for lack
of merit.
On October 19, 1998, respondents Secretary of the Department of
Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) and Secretary of the
Department of Budget and Management (DBM) filed through the Solicitor
General a consolidated Comment. The Solicitor General is of the view that
the IPRA is partly unconstitutional on the ground that it grants ownership
over natural resources to indigenous peoples and prays that the petition be
granted in part.
On November 10, 1998, a group of intervenors, composed of Sen. Juan
Flavier, one of the authors of the IPRA, Mr. Ponciano Bennagen, a member
of the 1986 Constitutional Commission, and the leaders and members of
112 groups of indigenous peoples (Flavier, et. al), filed their Motion for
Leave to Intervene. They join the NCIP in defending the constitutionality of
IPRA and praying for the dismissal of the petition.
On March 22, 1999, the Commission on Human Rights (CHR) likewise filed
a Motion to Intervene and/or to Appear as Amicus Curiae. The CHR asserts
that IPRA is an expression of the principle of parens patriae and that the
State has the responsibility to protect and guarantee the rights of those
who are at a serious disadvantage like indigenous peoples. For this reason
it prays that the petition be dismissed.
On March 23, 1999, another group, composed of the Ikalahan Indigenous
People and the Haribon Foundation for the Conservation of Natural
Resources, Inc. (Haribon, et al.), filed a motion to Intervene with attached
Comment-in-Intervention. They agree with the NCIP and Flavier, et al. that
IPRA is consistent with the Constitution and pray that the petition for
prohibition and mandamus be dismissed.

PER CURIAM:

The motions for intervention of the aforesaid groups and organizations

were granted.

Petitioners Isagani Cruz and Cesar Europa brought this suit for prohibition
and mandamus as citizens and taxpayers, assailing the constitutionality of
certain provisions of Republic Act No. 8371 (R.A. 8371), otherwise known
as the Indigenous Peoples Rights Act of 1997 (IPRA), and its Implementing
Rules and Regulations (Implementing Rules).

Oral arguments were heard on April 13, 1999. Thereafter, the parties and
intervenors filed their respective memoranda in which they reiterate the
arguments adduced in their earlier pleadings and during the hearing.

In its resolution of September 29, 1998, the Court required respondents to

comment.1 In compliance, respondents Chairperson and Commissioners of
the National Commission on Indigenous Peoples (NCIP), the government
agency created under the IPRA to implement its provisions, filed on
October 13, 1998 their Comment to the Petition, in which they defend the

Petitioners assail the constitutionality of the following provisions of the

IPRA and its Implementing Rules on the ground that they amount to an
unlawful deprivation of the States ownership over lands of the public
domain as well as minerals and other natural resources therein, in violation
of the regalian doctrine embodied in Section 2, Article XII of the
Constitution:

"(1) Section 3(a) which defines the extent and coverage of ancestral
domains, and Section 3(b) which, in turn, defines ancestral lands;
"(2) Section 5, in relation to section 3(a), which provides that ancestral
domains including inalienable public lands, bodies of water, mineral and
other resources found within ancestral domains are private but community
property of the indigenous peoples;
"(3) Section 6 in relation to section 3(a) and 3(b) which defines the
composition of ancestral domains and ancestral lands;
"(4) Section 7 which recognizes and enumerates the rights of the
indigenous peoples over the ancestral domains;
(5) Section 8 which recognizes and enumerates the rights of the
indigenous peoples over the ancestral lands;
"(6) Section 57 which provides for priority rights of the indigenous peoples
in the harvesting, extraction, development or exploration of minerals and
other natural resources within the areas claimed to be their ancestral
domains, and the right to enter into agreements with nonindigenous
peoples for the development and utilization of natural resources therein for
a period not exceeding 25 years, renewable for not more than 25 years;
and
"(7) Section 58 which gives the indigenous peoples the responsibility to
maintain, develop, protect and conserve the ancestral domains and
portions thereof which are found to be necessary for critical watersheds,
mangroves, wildlife sanctuaries, wilderness, protected areas, forest cover
or reforestation."2
Petitioners also content that, by providing for an all-encompassing
definition of "ancestral domains" and "ancestral lands" which might even
include private lands found within said areas, Sections 3(a) and 3(b) violate
the rights of private landowners.3
In addition, petitioners question the provisions of the IPRA defining the
powers and jurisdiction of the NCIP and making customary law applicable
to the settlement of disputes involving ancestral domains and ancestral
lands on the ground that these provisions violate the due process clause of
the Constitution.4
These provisions are:

"(1) sections 51 to 53 and 59 which detail the process of

delineation and recognition of ancestral domains and which vest on
the NCIP the sole authority to delineate ancestral domains and
ancestral lands;
"(2) Section 52[i] which provides that upon certification by the
NCIP that a particular area is an ancestral domain and upon
notification to the following officials, namely, the Secretary of
Environment and Natural Resources, Secretary of Interior and Local
Governments, Secretary of Justice and Commissioner of the
National Development Corporation, the jurisdiction of said officials
over said area terminates;
"(3) Section 63 which provides the customary law, traditions and
practices of indigenous peoples shall be applied first with respect
to property rights, claims of ownership, hereditary succession and
settlement of land disputes, and that any doubt or ambiguity in the
interpretation thereof shall be resolved in favor of the indigenous
peoples;
"(4) Section 65 which states that customary laws and practices
shall be used to resolve disputes involving indigenous peoples; and
"(5) Section 66 which vests on the NCIP the jurisdiction over all
claims and disputes involving rights of the indigenous peoples."5
Finally, petitioners assail the validity of Rule VII, Part II, Section 1 of the
NCIP Administrative Order No. 1, series of 1998, which provides that "the
administrative relationship of the NCIP to the Office of the President is
characterized as a lateral but autonomous relationship for purposes of
policy and program coordination." They contend that said Rule infringes
upon the Presidents power of control over executive departments under
Section 17, Article VII of the Constitution.6
Petitioners pray for the following:
"(1) A declaration that Sections 3, 5, 6, 7, 8, 52[I], 57, 58, 59, 63,
65 and 66 and other related provisions of R.A. 8371 are
unconstitutional and invalid;
"(2) The issuance of a writ of prohibition directing the Chairperson
and Commissioners of the NCIP to cease and desist from
implementing the assailed provisions of R.A. 8371 and its
Implementing Rules;

"(3) The issuance of a writ of prohibition directing the Secretary of

the Department of Environment and Natural Resources to cease
and desist from implementing Department of Environment and
Natural Resources Circular No. 2, series of 1998;

redeliberation, the voting remained the same. Accordingly, pursuant to

Rule 56, Section 7 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, the petition is
DISMISSED. SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 183591

"(4) The issuance of a writ of prohibition directing the Secretary of

Budget and Management to cease and desist from disbursing
public funds for the implementation of the assailed provisions of
R.A. 8371; and
"(5) The issuance of a writ of mandamus commanding the
Secretary of Environment and Natural Resources to comply with his
duty of carrying out the States constitutional mandate to control
and supervise the exploration, development, utilization and
conservation of Philippine natural resources."7
After due deliberation on the petition, the members of the Court voted as
follows:
Seven (7) voted to dismiss the petition. Justice Kapunan filed an opinion,
which the Chief Justice and Justices Bellosillo, Quisumbing, and Santiago
join, sustaining the validity of the challenged provisions of R.A. 8371.
Justice Puno also filed a separate opinion sustaining all challenged
provisions of the law with the exception of Section 1, Part II, Rule III of NCIP
Administrative Order No. 1, series of 1998, the Rules and Regulations
Implementing the IPRA, and Section 57 of the IPRA which he contends
should be interpreted as dealing with the large-scale exploitation of natural
resources and should be read in conjunction with Section 2, Article XII of
the 1987 Constitution. On the other hand, Justice Mendoza voted to dismiss
the petition solely on the ground that it does not raise a justiciable
controversy and petitioners do not have standing to question the
constitutionality of R.A. 8371.
Seven (7) other members of the Court voted to grant the petition. Justice
Panganiban filed a separate opinion expressing the view that Sections 3 (a)
(b), 5, 6, 7 (a)(b), 8, and related provisions of R.A. 8371 are
unconstitutional. He reserves judgment on the constitutionality of Sections
58, 59, 65, and 66 of the law, which he believes must await the filing of
specific cases by those whose rights may have been violated by the IPRA.
Justice Vitug also filed a separate opinion expressing the view that Sections
3(a), 7, and 57 of R.A. 8371 are unconstitutional. Justices Melo, Pardo,
Buena, Gonzaga-Reyes, and De Leon join in the separate opinions of
Justices Panganiban and Vitug.
As the votes were equally divided (7 to 7) and the necessary majority was
not obtained, the case was redeliberated upon. However, after

October 14, 2008

THE PROVINCE OF NORTH COTABATO, duly represented by

GOVERNOR JESUS SACDALAN and/or VICE-GOVERNOR EMMANUEL
PIOL, for and in his own behalf, petitioners,
vs.
THE GOVERNMENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES PEACE
PANEL ON ANCESTRAL DOMAIN (GRP), represented by SEC.
RODOLFO GARCIA, ATTY. LEAH ARMAMENTO, ATTY. SEDFREY
CANDELARIA, MARK RYAN SULLIVAN and/or GEN. HERMOGENES
ESPERON, JR., the latter in his capacity as the present and dulyappointed Presidential Adviser on the Peace Process (OPAPP) or
the so-called Office of the Presidential Adviser on the Peace
Process, respondents.
x--------------------------------------------x
G.R. No. 183752

October 14, 2008

CITY GOVERNMENT OF ZAMBOANGA, as represented by HON.

CELSO L. LOBREGAT, City Mayor of Zamboanga, and in his personal
capacity as resident of the City of Zamboanga, Rep. MA. ISABELLE
G. CLIMACO, District 1, and Rep. ERICO BASILIO A. FABIAN, District
2, City of Zamboanga, petitioners,
vs.
THE GOVERNMENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES PEACE
NEGOTIATING PANEL (GRP), as represented by RODOLFO C.
GARCIA, LEAH ARMAMENTO, SEDFREY CANDELARIA, MARK RYAN
SULLIVAN and HERMOGENES ESPERON, in his capacity as the
Presidential Adviser on Peace Process, respondents.
x--------------------------------------------x
G.R. No. 183893

October 14, 2008

THE CITY OF ILIGAN, duly represented by CITY MAYOR LAWRENCE

LLUCH CRUZ, petitioner,
vs.
THE GOVERNMENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES PEACE
PANEL ON ANCESTRAL DOMAIN (GRP), represented by SEC.
RODOLFO GARCIA, ATTY. LEAH ARMAMENTO, ATTY. SEDFREY

CANDELARIA, MARK RYAN SULLIVAN; GEN. HERMOGENES

ESPERON, JR., in his capacity as the present and duly appointed
Presidential Adviser on the Peace Process; and/or SEC. EDUARDO
ERMITA, in his capacity as Executive Secretary. respondents.

FRANKLIN M. DRILON and ADEL ABBAS TAMANO, petitioners-inintervention.

x--------------------------------------------x

SEN. MANUEL A. ROXAS, petitioners-in-intervention.

G.R. No. 183951

x--------------------------------------------x

October 14, 2008

THE PROVINCIAL GOVERNMENT OF ZAMBOANGA DEL NORTE, as

represented by HON. ROLANDO E. YEBES, in his capacity as
Provincial Governor, HON. FRANCIS H. OLVIS, in his capacity as
Vice-Governor and Presiding Officer of the Sangguniang
Panlalawigan, HON. CECILIA JALOSJOS CARREON, Congresswoman,
1st Congressional District, HON. CESAR G. JALOSJOS, Congressman,
3rd Congressional District, and Members of the Sangguniang
Panlalawigan of the Province of Zamboanga del Norte, namely,
HON. SETH FREDERICK P. JALOSJOS, HON. FERNANDO R. CABIGON,
JR., HON. ULDARICO M. MEJORADA II, HON. EDIONAR M. ZAMORAS,
HON. EDGAR J. BAGUIO, HON. CEDRIC L. ADRIATICO, HON.
FELIXBERTO C. BOLANDO, HON. JOSEPH BRENDO C. AJERO, HON.
NORBIDEIRI B. EDDING, HON. ANECITO S. DARUNDAY, HON.
ANGELICA J. CARREON and HON. LUZVIMINDA E. TORRINO,
petitioners,
vs.
THE GOVERNMENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES PEACE
NEGOTIATING PANEL [GRP], as represented by HON. RODOLFO C.
GARCIA and HON. HERMOGENES ESPERON, in his capacity as the
Presidential Adviser of Peace Process, respondents.
x--------------------------------------------x
G.R. No. 183962

October 14, 2008

ERNESTO M. MACEDA, JEJOMAR C. BINAY, and AQUILINO L.

PIMENTEL III, petitioners,
vs.
THE GOVERNMENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES PEACE
NEGOTIATING PANEL, represented by its Chairman RODOLFO C.
GARCIA, and the MORO ISLAMIC LIBERATION FRONT PEACE
NEGOTIATING PANEL, represented by its Chairman MOHAGHER
IQBAL, respondents.
x--------------------------------------------x

x--------------------------------------------x

MUNICIPALITY OF LINAMON duly represented by its Municipal

Mayor NOEL N. DEANO, petitioners-in-intervention,
x--------------------------------------------x
THE CITY OF ISABELA, BASILAN PROVINCE, represented by MAYOR
CHERRYLYN P. SANTOS-AKBAR, petitioners-in-intervention.
x--------------------------------------------x
THE PROVINCE OF SULTAN KUDARAT, rep. by HON. SUHARTO T.
MANGUDADATU, in his capacity as Provincial Governor and a
resident of the Province of Sultan Kudarat, petitioner-in-intervention.
x-------------------------------------------x
RUY ELIAS LOPEZ, for and in his own behalf and on behalf of
Indigenous Peoples in Mindanao Not Belonging to the MILF,
petitioner-in-intervention.
x--------------------------------------------x
CARLO B. GOMEZ, GERARDO S. DILIG, NESARIO G. AWAT, JOSELITO
C. ALISUAG and RICHALEX G. JAGMIS, as citizens and residents of
Palawan, petitioners-in-intervention.
x--------------------------------------------x
MARINO RIDAO and KISIN BUXANI, petitioners-in-intervention.
x--------------------------------------------x
MUSLIM LEGAL ASSISTANCE FOUNDATION, INC (MUSLAF),
respondent-in-intervention.

x--------------------------------------------x
MUSLIM MULTI-SECTORAL MOVEMENT FOR PEACE & DEVELOPMENT
(MMMPD), respondent-in-intervention.
x--------------------------------------------x
DECISION
CARPIO MORALES, J.:
Subject of these consolidated cases is the extent of the powers of the
President in pursuing the peace process. While the facts surrounding this
controversy center on the armed conflict in Mindanao between the
government and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF), the legal issue
involved has a bearing on all areas in the country where there has been a
long-standing armed conflict. Yet again, the Court is tasked to perform a
delicate balancing act. It must uncompromisingly delineate the bounds
within which the President may lawfully exercise her discretion, but it must
do so in strict adherence to the Constitution, lest its ruling unduly restricts
the freedom of action vested by that same Constitution in the Chief
Executive precisely to enable her to pursue the peace process effectively.
I. FACTUAL ANTECEDENTS OF THE PETITIONS
On August 5, 2008, the Government of the Republic of the Philippines
(GRP) and the MILF, through the Chairpersons of their respective peace
negotiating panels, were scheduled to sign a Memorandum of Agreement
on the Ancestral Domain (MOA-AD) Aspect of the GRP-MILF Tripoli
Agreement on Peace of 2001 in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia.
The MILF is a rebel group which was established in March 1984 when,
under the leadership of the late Salamat Hashim, it splintered from the
Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) then headed by Nur Misuari, on the
ground, among others, of what Salamat perceived to be the manipulation
of the MNLF away from an Islamic basis towards Marxist-Maoist
orientations.1
The signing of the MOA-AD between the GRP and the MILF was not to
materialize, however, for upon motion of petitioners, specifically those who
filed their cases before the scheduled signing of the MOA-AD, this Court
issued a Temporary Restraining Order enjoining the GRP from signing the
same.

The MOA-AD was preceded by a long process of negotiation and the

concluding of several prior agreements between the two parties beginning
in 1996, when the GRP-MILF peace negotiations began. On July 18, 1997,
the GRP and MILF Peace Panels signed the Agreement on General
Cessation of Hostilities. The following year, they signed the General
Framework of Agreement of Intent on August 27, 1998.
The Solicitor General, who represents respondents, summarizes the MOAAD by stating that the same contained, among others, the commitment of
the parties to pursue peace negotiations, protect and respect human
rights, negotiate with sincerity in the resolution and pacific settlement of
the conflict, and refrain from the use of threat or force to attain undue
advantage while the peace negotiations on the substantive agenda are ongoing.2
Early on, however, it was evident that there was not going to be any
smooth sailing in the GRP-MILF peace process. Towards the end of 1999 up
to early 2000, the MILF attacked a number of municipalities in Central
Mindanao and, in March 2000, it took control of the town hall of
Kauswagan, Lanao del Norte.3 In response, then President Joseph Estrada
declared and carried out an "all-out-war" against the MILF.
When President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo assumed office, the military
offensive against the MILF was suspended and the government sought a
resumption of the peace talks. The MILF, according to a leading MILF
member, initially responded with deep reservation, but when President
Arroyo asked the Government of Malaysia through Prime Minister Mahathir
Mohammad to help convince the MILF to return to the negotiating table,
the MILF convened its Central Committee to seriously discuss the matter
and, eventually, decided to meet with the GRP.4
The parties met in Kuala Lumpur on March 24, 2001, with the talks being
facilitated by the Malaysian government, the parties signing on the same
date the Agreement on the General Framework for the Resumption of
Peace Talks Between the GRP and the MILF. The MILF thereafter suspended
all its military actions.5
Formal peace talks between the parties were held in Tripoli, Libya from
June 20-22, 2001, the outcome of which was the GRP-MILF Tripoli
Agreement on Peace (Tripoli Agreement 2001) containing the basic
principles and agenda on the following aspects of the negotiation:
Security Aspect, Rehabilitation Aspect, and Ancestral Domain Aspect.
With regard to the Ancestral Domain Aspect, the parties in Tripoli
Agreement 2001 simply agreed "that the same be discussed further by the
Parties in their next meeting."

A second round of peace talks was held in Cyberjaya, Malaysia on August

5-7, 2001 which ended with the signing of the Implementing Guidelines on
the Security Aspect of the Tripoli Agreement 2001 leading to a ceasefire
status between the parties. This was followed by the Implementing
Guidelines on the Humanitarian Rehabilitation and Development Aspects of
the Tripoli Agreement 2001, which was signed on May 7, 2002 at Putrajaya,
Malaysia. Nonetheless, there were many incidence of violence between
government forces and the MILF from 2002 to 2003.

from the Bangsamoro Homeland and/or Bangsamoro Juridical Entity and, in

the alternative, that the MOA-AD be declared null and void.

Meanwhile, then MILF Chairman Salamat Hashim passed away on July 13,
2003 and he was replaced by Al Haj Murad, who was then the chief peace
negotiator of the MILF. Murad's position as chief peace negotiator was
taken over by Mohagher Iqbal.6

Meanwhile, the City of Iligan16 filed a petition for Injunction and/or

Declaratory Relief, docketed as G.R. No. 183893, praying that
respondents be enjoined from signing the MOA-AD or, if the same had
already been signed, from implementing the same, and that the MOA-AD
be declared unconstitutional. Petitioners herein additionally implead
Executive Secretary Eduardo Ermita as respondent.

In 2005, several exploratory talks were held between the parties in Kuala
Lumpur, eventually leading to the crafting of the draft MOA-AD in its final
form, which, as mentioned, was set to be signed last August 5, 2008.
II. STATEMENT OF THE PROCEEDINGS
Before the Court is what is perhaps the most contentious "consensus" ever
embodied in an instrument - the MOA-AD which is assailed principally by
the present petitions bearing docket numbers 183591, 183752, 183893,
183951 and 183962.
Commonly impleaded as respondents are the GRP Peace Panel on
Ancestral Domain7 and the Presidential Adviser on the Peace Process
(PAPP) Hermogenes Esperon, Jr.
On July 23, 2008, the Province of North Cotabato 8 and Vice-Governor
Emmanuel Piol filed a petition, docketed as G.R. No. 183591, for
Mandamus and Prohibition with Prayer for the Issuance of Writ of
Preliminary Injunction and Temporary Restraining Order.9 Invoking the right
to information on matters of public concern, petitioners seek to compel
respondents to disclose and furnish them the complete and official copies
of the MOA-AD including its attachments, and to prohibit the slated signing
of the MOA-AD, pending the disclosure of the contents of the MOA-AD and
the holding of a public consultation thereon. Supplementarily, petitioners
pray that the MOA-AD be declared unconstitutional.10
This initial petition was followed by another one, docketed as G.R. No.
183752, also for Mandamus and Prohibition11 filed by the City of
Zamboanga,12 Mayor Celso Lobregat, Rep. Ma. Isabelle Climaco and Rep.
Erico Basilio Fabian who likewise pray for similar injunctive reliefs.
Petitioners herein moreover pray that the City of Zamboanga be excluded

By Resolution of August 4, 2008, the Court issued a Temporary Restraining

Order commanding and directing public respondents and their agents to
cease and desist from formally signing the MOA-AD.13 The Court also
required the Solicitor General to submit to the Court and petitioners the
official copy of the final draft of the MOA-AD,14 to which she complied.15

The Province of Zamboanga del Norte,17 Governor Rolando Yebes, ViceGovernor Francis Olvis, Rep. Cecilia Jalosjos-Carreon, Rep. Cesar Jalosjos,
and the members18 of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Zamboanga del
Norte filed on August 15, 2008 a petition for Certiorari, Mandamus and
Prohibition,19 docketed as G.R. No. 183951. They pray, inter alia, that the
MOA-AD be declared null and void and without operative effect, and that
respondents be enjoined from executing the MOA-AD.
On August 19, 2008, Ernesto Maceda, Jejomar Binay, and Aquilino Pimentel
III filed a petition for Prohibition,20 docketed as G.R. No. 183962, praying
for a judgment prohibiting and permanently enjoining respondents from
formally signing and executing the MOA-AD and or any other agreement
derived therefrom or similar thereto, and nullifying the MOA-AD for being
unconstitutional and illegal. Petitioners herein additionally implead as
respondent the MILF Peace Negotiating Panel represented by its Chairman
Mohagher Iqbal.
Various parties moved to intervene and were granted leave of court to file
their petitions-/comments-in-intervention. Petitioners-in-Intervention
include Senator Manuel A. Roxas, former Senate President Franklin Drilon
and Atty. Adel Tamano, the City of Isabela21 and Mayor Cherrylyn SantosAkbar, the Province of Sultan Kudarat22 and Gov. Suharto Mangudadatu, the
Municipality of Linamon in Lanao del Norte,23 Ruy Elias Lopez of Davao City
and of the Bagobo tribe, Sangguniang Panlungsod member Marino Ridao
and businessman Kisin Buxani, both of Cotabato City; and lawyers Carlo
Gomez, Gerardo Dilig, Nesario Awat, Joselito Alisuag, Richalex Jagmis, all of
Palawan City. The Muslim Legal Assistance Foundation, Inc. (Muslaf) and
the Muslim Multi-Sectoral Movement for Peace and Development (MMMPD)
filed their respective Comments-in-Intervention.

By subsequent Resolutions, the Court ordered the consolidation of the

petitions. Respondents filed Comments on the petitions, while some of
petitioners submitted their respective Replies.

a) to create and recognize the Bangsamoro Juridical Entity

(BJE) as a separate state, or a juridical, territorial or
political subdivision not recognized by law;

Respondents, by Manifestation and Motion of August 19, 2008, stated that

the Executive Department shall thoroughly review the MOA-AD and pursue
further negotiations to address the issues hurled against it, and thus
moved to dismiss the cases. In the succeeding exchange of pleadings,
respondents' motion was met with vigorous opposition from petitioners.

b) to revise or amend the Constitution and existing laws to

conform to the MOA;

The cases were heard on oral argument on August 15, 22 and 29, 2008
that tackled the following principal issues:
1. Whether the petitions have become moot and academic
(i) insofar as the mandamus aspect is concerned, in view of
the disclosure of official copies of the final draft of the
Memorandum of Agreement (MOA); and
(ii) insofar as the prohibition aspect involving the Local
Government Units is concerned, if it is considered that
consultation has become fait accompli with the finalization
of the draft;
2. Whether the constitutionality and the legality of the MOA is ripe
for adjudication;

c) to concede to or recognize the claim of the Moro Islamic

Liberation Front for ancestral domain in violation of
Republic Act No. 8371 (THE INDIGENOUS PEOPLES RIGHTS
ACT OF 1997), particularly Section 3(g) & Chapter VII
(DELINEATION, RECOGNITION OF ANCESTRAL DOMAINS)[;]
If in the affirmative, whether the Executive Branch has the
authority to so bind the Government of the Republic of the
Philippines;
6. Whether the inclusion/exclusion of the Province of North
Cotabato, Cities of Zamboanga, Iligan and Isabela, and the
Municipality of Linamon, Lanao del Norte in/from the areas covered
by the projected Bangsamoro Homeland is a justiciable question;
and
7. Whether desistance from signing the MOA derogates any prior
valid commitments of the Government of the Republic of the
Philippines.24

3. Whether respondent Government of the Republic of the

Philippines Peace Panel committed grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when it negotiated and
initiated the MOA vis--vis ISSUES Nos. 4 and 5;

The Court, thereafter, ordered the parties to submit their respective

Memoranda. Most of the parties submitted their memoranda on time.

4. Whether there is a violation of the people's right to information

on matters of public concern (1987 Constitution, Article III, Sec. 7)
under a state policy of full disclosure of all its transactions
involving public interest (1987 Constitution, Article II, Sec. 28)
including public consultation under Republic Act No. 7160 (LOCAL
GOVERNMENT CODE OF 1991)[;]

As a necessary backdrop to the consideration of the objections raised in

the subject five petitions and six petitions-in-intervention against the MOAAD, as well as the two comments-in-intervention in favor of the MOA-AD,
the Court takes an overview of the MOA.

If it is in the affirmative, whether prohibition under Rule 65 of the

1997 Rules of Civil Procedure is an appropriate remedy;

Under the heading "Terms of Reference" (TOR), the MOA-AD includes not
only four earlier agreements between the GRP and MILF, but also two
agreements between the GRP and the MNLF: the 1976 Tripoli Agreement,
and the Final Peace Agreement on the Implementation of the 1976 Tripoli
Agreement, signed on September 2, 1996 during the administration of
President Fidel Ramos.

5. Whether by signing the MOA, the Government of the Republic of

the Philippines would be BINDING itself

III. OVERVIEW OF THE MOA-AD

The MOA-AD identifies the Parties to it as the GRP and the MILF.

The MOA-AD also identifies as TOR two local statutes - the organic act for
the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM)25 and the Indigenous
Peoples Rights Act (IPRA),26 and several international law instruments - the
ILO Convention No. 169 Concerning Indigenous and Tribal Peoples in
Independent Countries in relation to the UN Declaration on the Rights of
the Indigenous Peoples, and the UN Charter, among others.

The main body of the MOA-AD is divided into four strands, namely,
Concepts and Principles, Territory, Resources, and Governance.
A. CONCEPTS AND PRINCIPLES

The MOA-AD includes as a final TOR the generic category of "compact

rights entrenchment emanating from the regime of dar-ul-mua'hada (or
territory under compact) and dar-ul-sulh (or territory under peace
agreement) that partakes the nature of a treaty device."

This strand begins with the statement that it is "the birthright of all Moros
and all Indigenous peoples of Mindanao to identify themselves and be
accepted as Bangsamoros.'" It defines "Bangsamoro people" as the
natives or original inhabitants of Mindanao and its adjacent islands
including Palawan and the Sulu archipelago at the time of conquest or
colonization, and their descendants whether mixed or of full blood,
including their spouses.30

During the height of the Muslim Empire, early Muslim jurists tended to see
the world through a simple dichotomy: there was the dar-ul-Islam (the
Abode of Islam) and dar-ul-harb (the Abode of War). The first referred to
those lands where Islamic laws held sway, while the second denoted those
lands where Muslims were persecuted or where Muslim laws were outlawed
or ineffective.27 This way of viewing the world, however, became more
complex through the centuries as the Islamic world became part of the
international community of nations.

Thus, the concept of "Bangsamoro," as defined in this strand of the MOAAD, includes not only "Moros" as traditionally understood even by
Muslims,31 but all indigenous peoples of Mindanao and its adjacent islands.
The MOA-AD adds that the freedom of choice of indigenous peoples shall
be respected. What this freedom of choice consists in has not been
specifically defined.

As Muslim States entered into treaties with their neighbors, even with
distant States and inter-governmental organizations, the classical division
of the world into dar-ul-Islam and dar-ul-harb eventually lost its meaning.
New terms were drawn up to describe novel ways of perceiving non-Muslim
territories. For instance, areas like dar-ul-mua'hada (land of compact) and
dar-ul-sulh (land of treaty) referred to countries which, though under a
secular regime, maintained peaceful and cooperative relations with Muslim
States, having been bound to each other by treaty or agreement. Dar-ulaman (land of order), on the other hand, referred to countries which,
though not bound by treaty with Muslim States, maintained freedom of
religion for Muslims.28

The MOA-AD proceeds to refer to the "Bangsamoro homeland," the

ownership of which is vested exclusively in the Bangsamoro people by
virtue of their prior rights of occupation.32 Both parties to the MOA-AD
acknowledge that ancestral domain does not form part of the public
domain.33
The Bangsamoro people are acknowledged as having the right to selfgovernance, which right is said to be rooted on ancestral territoriality
exercised originally under the suzerain authority of their sultanates and the
Pat a Pangampong ku Ranaw. The sultanates were described as states or
"karajaan/kadatuan" resembling a body politic endowed with all the
elements of a nation-state in the modern sense.34

It thus appears that the "compact rights entrenchment" emanating from

the regime of dar-ul-mua'hada and dar-ul-sulh simply refers to all other
agreements between the MILF and the Philippine government - the
Philippines being the land of compact and peace agreement - that partake
of the nature of a treaty device, "treaty" being broadly defined as "any
solemn agreement in writing that sets out understandings, obligations, and
benefits for both parties which provides for a framework that elaborates
the principles declared in the [MOA-AD]."29

The MOA-AD thus grounds the right to self-governance of the Bangsamoro

people on the past suzerain authority of the sultanates. As gathered, the
territory defined as the Bangsamoro homeland was ruled by several
sultanates and, specifically in the case of the Maranao, by the Pat a
Pangampong ku Ranaw, a confederation of independent principalities
(pangampong) each ruled by datus and sultans, none of whom was
supreme over the others.35

The MOA-AD states that the Parties "HAVE AGREED AND ACKNOWLEDGED
AS FOLLOWS," and starts with its main body.

The MOA-AD goes on to describe the Bangsamoro people as "the First

Nation' with defined territory and with a system of government having
entered into treaties of amity and commerce with foreign nations."

The term "First Nation" is of Canadian origin referring to the indigenous

peoples of that territory, particularly those known as Indians. In Canada,
each of these indigenous peoples is equally entitled to be called "First
Nation," hence, all of them are usually described collectively by the plural
"First Nations."36 To that extent, the MOA-AD, by identifying the
Bangsamoro people as "the First Nation" - suggesting its exclusive
entitlement to that designation - departs from the Canadian usage of the
term.
The MOA-AD then mentions for the first time the "Bangsamoro Juridical
Entity" (BJE) to which it grants the authority and jurisdiction over the
Ancestral Domain and Ancestral Lands of the Bangsamoro.37
B. TERRITORY
The territory of the Bangsamoro homeland is described as the land mass
as well as the maritime, terrestrial, fluvial and alluvial domains, including
the aerial domain and the atmospheric space above it, embracing the
Mindanao-Sulu-Palawan geographic region.38
More specifically, the core of the BJE is defined as the present geographic
area of the ARMM - thus constituting the following areas: Lanao del Sur,
Maguindanao, Sulu, Tawi-Tawi, Basilan, and Marawi City. Significantly, this
core also includes certain municipalities of Lanao del Norte that voted for
inclusion in the ARMM in the 2001 plebiscite.39
Outside of this core, the BJE is to cover other provinces, cities,
municipalities and barangays, which are grouped into two categories,
Category A and Category B. Each of these areas is to be subjected to a
plebiscite to be held on different dates, years apart from each other. Thus,
Category A areas are to be subjected to a plebiscite not later than twelve
(12) months following the signing of the MOA-AD.40 Category B areas, also
called "Special Intervention Areas," on the other hand, are to be subjected
to a plebiscite twenty-five (25) years from the signing of a separate
agreement - the Comprehensive Compact.41
The Parties to the MOA-AD stipulate that the BJE shall have jurisdiction over
all natural resources within its "internal waters," defined as extending
fifteen (15) kilometers from the coastline of the BJE area; 42 that the BJE
shall also have "territorial waters," which shall stretch beyond the BJE
internal waters up to the baselines of the Republic of the Philippines (RP)
south east and south west of mainland Mindanao; and that within these
territorial waters, the BJE and the "Central Government" (used
interchangeably with RP) shall exercise joint jurisdiction, authority and
management over all natural resources.43 Notably, the jurisdiction over the
internal waters is not similarly described as "joint."

The MOA-AD further provides for the sharing of minerals on the territorial
waters between the Central Government and the BJE, in favor of the latter,
through production sharing and economic cooperation agreement. 44 The
activities which the Parties are allowed to conduct on the territorial waters
are enumerated, among which are the exploration and utilization of natural
resources, regulation of shipping and fishing activities, and the
enforcement of police and safety measures.45 There is no similar provision
on the sharing of minerals and allowed activities with respect to the
internal waters of the BJE.
C. RESOURCES
The MOA-AD states that the BJE is free to enter into any economic
cooperation and trade relations with foreign countries and shall have the
option to establish trade missions in those countries. Such relationships
and understandings, however, are not to include aggression against the
GRP. The BJE may also enter into environmental cooperation agreements. 46
The external defense of the BJE is to remain the duty and obligation of the
Central Government. The Central Government is also bound to "take
necessary steps to ensure the BJE's participation in international meetings
and events" like those of the ASEAN and the specialized agencies of the
UN. The BJE is to be entitled to participate in Philippine official missions
and delegations for the negotiation of border agreements or protocols for
environmental protection and equitable sharing of incomes and revenues
involving the bodies of water adjacent to or between the islands forming
part of the ancestral domain.47
With regard to the right of exploring for, producing, and obtaining all
potential sources of energy, petroleum, fossil fuel, mineral oil and natural
gas, the jurisdiction and control thereon is to be vested in the BJE "as the
party having control within its territorial jurisdiction." This right carries the
proviso that, "in times of national emergency, when public interest so
requires," the Central Government may, for a fixed period and under
reasonable terms as may be agreed upon by both Parties, assume or direct
the operation of such resources.48
The sharing between the Central Government and the BJE of total
production pertaining to natural resources is to be 75:25 in favor of the
BJE.49
The MOA-AD provides that legitimate grievances of the Bangsamoro people
arising from any unjust dispossession of their territorial and proprietary
rights, customary land tenures, or their marginalization shall be
acknowledged. Whenever restoration is no longer possible, reparation is to
be in such form as mutually determined by the Parties. 50

The BJE may modify or cancel the forest concessions, timber licenses,
contracts or agreements, mining concessions, Mineral Production and
Sharing Agreements (MPSA), Industrial Forest Management Agreements
(IFMA), and other land tenure instruments granted by the Philippine
Government, including those issued by the present ARMM.51
D. GOVERNANCE
The MOA-AD binds the Parties to invite a multinational third-party to
observe and monitor the implementation of the Comprehensive
Compact. This compact is to embody the "details for the effective
enforcement" and "the mechanisms and modalities for the actual
implementation" of the MOA-AD. The MOA-AD explicitly provides that the
participation of the third party shall not in any way affect the status of the
relationship between the Central Government and the BJE.52
The "associative" relationship
between the Central Government
and the BJE

states that it is "WITNESSED BY" Datuk Othman Bin Abd Razak, Special
Adviser to the Prime Minister of Malaysia, "ENDORSED BY" Ambassador
Sayed Elmasry, Adviser to Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC)
Secretary General and Special Envoy for Peace Process in Southern
Philippines, and SIGNED "IN THE PRESENCE OF" Dr. Albert G. Romulo,
Secretary of Foreign Affairs of RP and Dato' Seri Utama Dr. Rais Bin Yatim,
Minister of Foreign Affairs, Malaysia, all of whom were scheduled to sign
the Agreement last August 5, 2008.
Annexed to the MOA-AD are two documents containing the respective lists
cum maps of the provinces, municipalities, and barangays under
Categories A and B earlier mentioned in the discussion on the strand on
TERRITORY.
IV. PROCEDURAL ISSUES
A. RIPENESS

The MOA-AD describes the relationship of the Central Government and the
BJE as "associative," characterized by shared authority and responsibility.
And it states that the structure of governance is to be based on executive,
legislative, judicial, and administrative institutions with defined powers and
functions in the Comprehensive Compact.

The power of judicial review is limited to actual cases or controversies. 54

Courts decline to issue advisory opinions or to resolve hypothetical or
feigned problems, or mere academic questions.55 The limitation of the
power of judicial review to actual cases and controversies defines the role
assigned to the judiciary in a tripartite allocation of power, to assure that
the courts will not intrude into areas committed to the other branches of
government.56

The MOA-AD provides that its provisions requiring "amendments to the

existing legal framework" shall take effect upon signing of the
Comprehensive Compact and upon effecting the aforesaid amendments,
with due regard to the non-derogation of prior agreements and within
the stipulated timeframe to be contained in the Comprehensive Compact.
As will be discussed later, much of the present controversy hangs
on the legality of this provision.

An actual case or controversy involves a conflict of legal rights, an

assertion of opposite legal claims, susceptible of judicial resolution as
distinguished from a hypothetical or abstract difference or dispute. There
must be a contrariety of legal rights that can be interpreted and enforced
on the basis of existing law and jurisprudence. 57 The Court can decide the
constitutionality of an act or treaty only when a proper case between
opposing parties is submitted for judicial determination. 58

The BJE is granted the power to build, develop and maintain its own
institutions inclusive of civil service, electoral, financial and banking,
education, legislation, legal, economic, police and internal security force,
judicial system and correctional institutions, the details of which shall be
discussed in the negotiation of the comprehensive compact.

Related to the requirement of an actual case or controversy is the

requirement of ripeness. A question is ripe for adjudication when the act
being challenged has had a direct adverse effect on the individual
challenging it.59 For a case to be considered ripe for adjudication, it is a
prerequisite that something had then been accomplished or performed by
either branch before a court may come into the picture,60 and the
petitioner must allege the existence of an immediate or threatened injury
to itself as a result of the challenged action.61 He must show that he has
sustained or is immediately in danger of sustaining some direct injury as a
result of the act complained of.62

As stated early on, the MOA-AD was set to be signed on August 5, 2008 by
Rodolfo Garcia and Mohagher Iqbal, Chairpersons of the Peace Negotiating
Panels of the GRP and the MILF, respectively. Notably, the penultimate
paragraph of the MOA-AD identifies the signatories as "the representatives
of the Parties," meaning the GRP and MILF themselves, and not merely of
the negotiating panels.53 In addition, the signature page of the MOA-AD

The Solicitor General argues that there is no justiciable controversy that is

ripe for judicial review in the present petitions, reasoning that

xxxx
GOVERNANCE

The unsigned MOA-AD is simply a list of consensus points subject

to further negotiations and legislative enactments as well as
constitutional processes aimed at attaining a final peaceful
agreement. Simply put, the MOA-AD remains to be a proposal that
does not automatically create legally demandable rights and
obligations until the list of operative acts required have been duly
complied with. x x x
xxxx
In the cases at bar, it is respectfully submitted that this Honorable
Court has no authority to pass upon issues based on hypothetical
or feigned constitutional problems or interests with no concrete
bases. Considering the preliminary character of the MOA-AD, there
are no concrete acts that could possibly violate petitioners' and
intervenors' rights since the acts complained of are mere
contemplated steps toward the formulation of a final peace
agreement. Plainly, petitioners and intervenors' perceived injury, if
at all, is merely imaginary and illusory apart from being unfounded
and based on mere conjectures. (Underscoring supplied)
The Solicitor General cites63 the following provisions of the MOA-AD:

xxxx
7. The Parties agree that mechanisms and modalities for the actual
implementation of this MOA-AD shall be spelt out in the
Comprehensive Compact to mutually take such steps to enable it
to occur effectively.
Any provisions of the MOA-AD requiring amendments to the
existing legal framework shall come into force upon the signing of
a Comprehensive Compact and upon effecting the necessary
changes to the legal framework with due regard to non-derogation
of prior agreements and within the stipulated timeframe to be
contained in the Comprehensive Compact.64 (Underscoring
supplied)
The Solicitor General's arguments fail to persuade.
Concrete acts under the MOA-AD are not necessary to render the present
controversy ripe. In Pimentel, Jr. v. Aguirre,65 this Court held:

xxxx

x x x [B]y the mere enactment of the questioned law or the

approval of the challenged action, the dispute is said to have
ripened into a judicial controversy even without any other overt
act. Indeed, even a singular violation of the Constitution and/or the
law is enough to awaken judicial duty.

2. Toward this end, the Parties enter into the following stipulations:

xxxx

xxxx

By the same token, when an act of the President, who in our

constitutional scheme is a coequal of Congress, is seriously alleged
to have infringed the Constitution and the laws x x x settling the
dispute becomes the duty and the responsibility of the courts. 66

TERRITORY

d. Without derogating from the requirements of prior agreements,

the Government stipulates to conduct and deliver, using all
possible legal measures, within twelve (12) months following the
signing of the MOA-AD, a plebiscite covering the areas as
enumerated in the list and depicted in the map as Category A
attached herein (the "Annex"). The Annex constitutes an integral
part of this framework agreement. Toward this end, the Parties
shall endeavor to complete the negotiations and resolve all
outstanding issues on the Comprehensive Compact within fifteen
(15) months from the signing of the MOA-AD.

In Santa Fe Independent School District v. Doe,67 the United States

Supreme Court held that the challenge to the constitutionality of the
school's policy allowing student-led prayers and speeches before games
was ripe for adjudication, even if no public prayer had yet been led under
the policy, because the policy was being challenged as unconstitutional on
its face.68

That the law or act in question is not yet effective does not negate
ripeness. For example, in New York v. United States,69 decided in 1992, the
United States Supreme Court held that the action by the State of New York
challenging the provisions of the Low-Level Radioactive Waste Policy Act
was ripe for adjudication even if the questioned provision was not to take
effect until January 1, 1996, because the parties agreed that New York had
to take immediate action to avoid the provision's consequences. 70

facie case for Certiorari, Prohibition, and Mandamus, and an actual case or
controversy ripe for adjudication exists. When an act of a branch of
government is seriously alleged to have infringed the
Constitution, it becomes not only the right but in fact the duty of
the judiciary to settle the dispute.77

The present petitions pray for Certiorari,71 Prohibition, and Mandamus.

Certiorari and Prohibition are remedies granted by law when any tribunal,
board or officer has acted, in the case of certiorari, or is proceeding, in the
case of prohibition, without or in excess of its jurisdiction or with grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. 72 Mandamus
is a remedy granted by law when any tribunal, corporation, board, officer
or person unlawfully neglects the performance of an act which the law
specifically enjoins as a duty resulting from an office, trust, or station, or
unlawfully excludes another from the use or enjoyment of a right or office
to which such other is entitled.73 Certiorari, Mandamus and Prohibition are
appropriate remedies to raise constitutional issues and to review and/or
prohibit/nullify, when proper, acts of legislative and executive officials. 74

For a party to have locus standi, one must allege "such a personal stake in
the outcome of the controversy as to assure that concrete adverseness
which sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the court so largely
depends for illumination of difficult constitutional questions." 78

The authority of the GRP Negotiating Panel is defined by Executive Order

No. 3 (E.O. No. 3), issued on February 28, 2001. 75 The said executive order
requires that "[t]he government's policy framework for peace, including the
systematic approach and the administrative structure for carrying out the
comprehensive peace process x x x be governed by this Executive Order." 76
The present petitions allege that respondents GRP Panel and PAPP Esperon
drafted the terms of the MOA-AD without consulting the local government
units or communities affected, nor informing them of the proceedings. As
will be discussed in greater detail later, such omission, by itself, constitutes
a departure by respondents from their mandate under E.O. No. 3.
Furthermore, the petitions allege that the provisions of the MOA-AD violate
the Constitution. The MOA-AD provides that "any provisions of the MOA-AD
requiring amendments to the existing legal framework shall come into
force upon the signing of a Comprehensive Compact and upon effecting
the necessary changes to the legal framework," implying an amendment of
the Constitution to accommodate the MOA-AD. This stipulation, in effect,
guaranteed to the MILF the amendment of the Constitution. Such act
constitutes another violation of its authority. Again, these points will be
discussed in more detail later.
As the petitions allege acts or omissions on the part of respondent that
exceed their authority, by violating their duties under E.O. No. 3 and the
provisions of the Constitution and statutes, the petitions make a prima

B. LOCUS STANDI

Because constitutional cases are often public actions in which the relief
sought is likely to affect other persons, a preliminary question frequently
arises as to this interest in the constitutional question raised. 79
When suing as a citizen, the person complaining must allege that he has
been or is about to be denied some right or privilege to which he is lawfully
entitled or that he is about to be subjected to some burdens or penalties
by reason of the statute or act complained of.80 When the issue concerns a
public right, it is sufficient that the petitioner is a citizen and has an
interest in the execution of the laws.81
For a taxpayer, one is allowed to sue where there is an assertion that
public funds are illegally disbursed or deflected to an illegal purpose, or
that there is a wastage of public funds through the enforcement of an
invalid or unconstitutional law.82 The Court retains discretion whether or not
to allow a taxpayer's suit.83
In the case of a legislator or member of Congress, an act of the Executive
that injures the institution of Congress causes a derivative but nonetheless
substantial injury that can be questioned by legislators. A member of the
House of Representatives has standing to maintain inviolate the
prerogatives, powers and privileges vested by the Constitution in his
office.84
An organization may be granted standing to assert the rights of its
members,85 but the mere invocation by the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines or any member of the legal profession of the duty to preserve
the rule of law does not suffice to clothe it with standing. 86
As regards a local government unit (LGU), it can seek relief in order to
protect or vindicate an interest of its own, and of the other LGUs. 87

Intervenors, meanwhile, may be given legal standing upon showing of facts

that satisfy the requirements of the law authorizing intervention, 88 such as
a legal interest in the matter in litigation, or in the success of either of the
parties.
In any case, the Court has discretion to relax the procedural technicality on
locus standi, given the liberal attitude it has exercised, highlighted in the
case of David v. Macapagal-Arroyo,89 where technicalities of procedure
were brushed aside, the constitutional issues raised being of paramount
public interest or of transcendental importance deserving the attention of
the Court in view of their seriousness, novelty and weight as precedents. 90
The Court's forbearing stance on locus standi on issues involving
constitutional issues has for its purpose the protection of fundamental
rights.
In not a few cases, the Court, in keeping with its duty under the
Constitution to determine whether the other branches of government have
kept themselves within the limits of the Constitution and the laws and have
not abused the discretion given them, has brushed aside technical rules of
procedure.91
In the petitions at bar, petitioners Province of North Cotabato (G.R. No.
183591) Province of Zamboanga del Norte (G.R. No. 183951), City of
Iligan (G.R. No. 183893) and City of Zamboanga (G.R. No. 183752) and
petitioners-in-intervention Province of Sultan Kudarat, City of Isabela
and Municipality of Linamon have locus standi in view of the direct and
substantial injury that they, as LGUs, would suffer as their territories,
whether in whole or in part, are to be included in the intended domain of
the BJE. These petitioners allege that they did not vote for their inclusion in
the ARMM which would be expanded to form the BJE territory. Petitioners'
legal standing is thus beyond doubt.
In G.R. No. 183962, petitioners Ernesto Maceda, Jejomar Binay and
Aquilino Pimentel III would have no standing as citizens and taxpayers
for their failure to specify that they would be denied some right or privilege
or there would be wastage of public funds. The fact that they are a former
Senator, an incumbent mayor of Makati City, and a resident of Cagayan de
Oro, respectively, is of no consequence. Considering their invocation of the
transcendental importance of the issues at hand, however, the Court
grants them standing.
Intervenors Franklin Drilon and Adel Tamano, in alleging their standing
as taxpayers, assert that government funds would be expended for the
conduct of an illegal and unconstitutional plebiscite to delineate the BJE
territory. On that score alone, they can be given legal standing. Their
allegation that the issues involved in these petitions are of "undeniable

transcendental importance" clothes them with added basis for their

personality to intervene in these petitions.
With regard to Senator Manuel Roxas, his standing is premised on his
being a member of the Senate and a citizen to enforce compliance by
respondents of the public's constitutional right to be informed of the MOAAD, as well as on a genuine legal interest in the matter in litigation, or in
the success or failure of either of the parties. He thus possesses the
requisite standing as an intervenor.
With respect to Intervenors Ruy Elias Lopez, as a former congressman of
the 3rd district of Davao City, a taxpayer and a member of the Bagobo
tribe; Carlo B. Gomez, et al., as members of the IBP Palawan chapter,
citizens and taxpayers; Marino Ridao, as taxpayer, resident and member
of the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Cotabato City; and Kisin Buxani, as
taxpayer, they failed to allege any proper legal interest in the present
petitions. Just the same, the Court exercises its discretion to relax the
procedural technicality on locus standi given the paramount public interest
in the issues at hand.
Intervening respondents Muslim Multi-Sectoral Movement for Peace
and Development, an advocacy group for justice and the attainment of
peace and prosperity in Muslim Mindanao; and Muslim Legal Assistance
Foundation Inc., a non-government organization of Muslim lawyers,
allege that they stand to be benefited or prejudiced, as the case may be, in
the resolution of the petitions concerning the MOA-AD, and prays for the
denial of the petitions on the grounds therein stated. Such legal interest
suffices to clothe them with standing.
B. MOOTNESS
Respondents insist that the present petitions have been rendered moot
with the satisfaction of all the reliefs prayed for by petitioners and the
subsequent pronouncement of the Executive Secretary that "[n]o matter
what the Supreme Court ultimately decides[,] the government will not sign
the MOA."92
In lending credence to this policy decision, the Solicitor General points out
that the President had already disbanded the GRP Peace Panel. 93
In David v. Macapagal-Arroyo,94 this Court held that the "moot and
academic" principle not being a magical formula that automatically
dissuades courts in resolving a case, it will decide cases, otherwise moot
and academic, if it finds that (a) there is a grave violation of the
Constitution;95 (b) the situation is of exceptional character and paramount
public interest is involved;96 (c) the constitutional issue raised requires

formulation of controlling principles to guide the bench, the bar, and the
public;97 and (d) the case is capable of repetition yet evading review. 98
Another exclusionary circumstance that may be considered is where there
is a voluntary cessation of the activity complained of by the defendant or
doer. Thus, once a suit is filed and the doer voluntarily ceases the
challenged conduct, it does not automatically deprive the tribunal of power
to hear and determine the case and does not render the case moot
especially when the plaintiff seeks damages or prays for injunctive relief
against the possible recurrence of the violation.99
The present petitions fall squarely into these exceptions to thus thrust
them into the domain of judicial review. The grounds cited above in David
are just as applicable in the present cases as they were, not only in David,
but also in Province of Batangas v. Romulo100 and Manalo v. Calderon101
where the Court similarly decided them on the merits, supervening events
that would ordinarily have rendered the same moot notwithstanding.
Petitions not mooted
Contrary then to the asseverations of respondents, the non-signing of the
MOA-AD and the eventual dissolution of the GRP Peace Panel did not moot
the present petitions. It bears emphasis that the signing of the MOA-AD did
not push through due to the Court's issuance of a Temporary Restraining
Order.
Contrary too to respondents' position, the MOA-AD cannot be considered a
mere "list of consensus points," especially given its nomenclature, the
need to have it signed or initialed by all the parties concerned on
August 5, 2008, and the far-reaching Constitutional implications of
these "consensus points," foremost of which is the creation of the BJE.
In fact, as what will, in the main, be discussed, there is a commitment
on the part of respondents to amend and effect necessary changes
to the existing legal framework for certain provisions of the MOAAD to take effect. Consequently, the present petitions are not confined to
the terms and provisions of the MOA-AD, but to other on-going and
future negotiations and agreements necessary for its realization. The
petitions have not, therefore, been rendered moot and academic simply by
the public disclosure of the MOA-AD,102 the manifestation that it will not be
signed as well as the disbanding of the GRP Panel not withstanding.
Petitions are imbued with paramount public interest

There is no gainsaying that the petitions are imbued with paramount public
interest, involving a significant part of the country's territory and the wideranging political modifications of affected LGUs. The assertion that the
MOA-AD is subject to further legal enactments including possible
Constitutional amendments more than ever provides impetus for
the Court to formulate controlling principles to guide the bench,
the bar, the public and, in this case, the government and its
negotiating entity.
Respondents cite Suplico v. NEDA, et al.103 where the Court did not
"pontificat[e] on issues which no longer legitimately constitute an actual
case or controversy [as this] will do more harm than good to the nation as
a whole."
The present petitions must be differentiated from Suplico. Primarily, in
Suplico, what was assailed and eventually cancelled was a stand-alone
government procurement contract for a national broadband network
involving a one-time contractual relation between two parties-the
government and a private foreign corporation. As the issues therein
involved specific government procurement policies and standard principles
on contracts, the majority opinion in Suplico found nothing exceptional
therein, the factual circumstances being peculiar only to the transactions
and parties involved in the controversy.
The MOA-AD is part of a series of agreements
In the present controversy, the MOA-AD is a significant part of a series
of agreements necessary to carry out the Tripoli Agreement 2001. The
MOA-AD which dwells on the Ancestral Domain Aspect of said Tripoli
Agreement is the third such component to be undertaken following the
implementation of the Security Aspect in August 2001 and the
Humanitarian, Rehabilitation and Development Aspect in May 2002.
Accordingly, even if the Executive Secretary, in his Memorandum of August
28, 2008 to the Solicitor General, has stated that "no matter what the
Supreme Court ultimately decides[,] the government will not sign the
MOA[-AD]," mootness will not set in in light of the terms of the Tripoli
Agreement 2001.
Need to formulate principles-guidelines
Surely, the present MOA-AD can be renegotiated or another one will be
drawn up to carry out the Ancestral Domain Aspect of the Tripoli
Agreement 2001, in another or in any form, which could contain similar
or significantly drastic provisions. While the Court notes the word of the
Executive Secretary that the government "is committed to securing an

agreement that is both constitutional and equitable because that is the

only way that long-lasting peace can be assured," it is minded to render a
decision on the merits in the present petitions to formulate controlling
principles to guide the bench, the bar, the public and, most
especially, the government in negotiating with the MILF regarding
Ancestral Domain.
Respondents invite the Court's attention to the separate opinion of then
Chief Justice Artemio Panganiban in Sanlakas v. Reyes104 in which he stated
that the doctrine of "capable of repetition yet evading review" can override
mootness, "provided the party raising it in a proper case has been and/or
continue to be prejudiced or damaged as a direct result of their issuance."
They contend that the Court must have jurisdiction over the subject matter
for the doctrine to be invoked.
The present petitions all contain prayers for Prohibition over which this
Court exercises original jurisdiction. While G.R. No. 183893 (City of Iligan v.
GRP) is a petition for Injunction and Declaratory Relief, the Court will treat
it as one for Prohibition as it has far reaching implications and raises
questions that need to be resolved.105 At all events, the Court has
jurisdiction over most if not the rest of the petitions.
Indeed, the present petitions afford a proper venue for the Court to again
apply the doctrine immediately referred to as what it had done in a number
of landmark cases.106 There is a reasonable expectation that petitioners,
particularly the Provinces of North Cotabato, Zamboanga del Norte and
Sultan Kudarat, the Cities of Zamboanga, Iligan and Isabela, and the
Municipality of Linamon, will again be subjected to the same problem in
the future as respondents' actions are capable of repetition, in another or
any form.
It is with respect to the prayers for Mandamus that the petitions have
become moot, respondents having, by Compliance of August 7, 2008,
provided this Court and petitioners with official copies of the final draft of
the MOA-AD and its annexes. Too, intervenors have been furnished, or have
procured for themselves, copies of the MOA-AD.
V. SUBSTANTIVE ISSUES
As culled from the Petitions and Petitions-in-Intervention, there are
basically two SUBSTANTIVE issues to be resolved, one relating to the
manner in which the MOA-AD was negotiated and finalized, the other
relating to its provisions, viz:

1. Did respondents violate constitutional and statutory provisions on public

consultation and the right to information when they negotiated and later
initialed the MOA-AD?
2. Do the contents of the MOA-AD violate the Constitution and the laws?
ON THE FIRST SUBSTANTIVE ISSUE
Petitioners invoke their constitutional right to information on matters
of public concern, as provided in Section 7, Article III on the Bill of Rights:
Sec. 7. The right of the people to information on matters of public
concern shall be recognized. Access to official records, and to
documents, and papers pertaining to official acts, transactions, or
decisions, as well as to government research data used as basis for
policy development, shall be afforded the citizen, subject to such
limitations as may be provided by law.107
As early as 1948, in Subido v. Ozaeta,108 the Court has recognized the
statutory right to examine and inspect public records, a right which was
eventually accorded constitutional status.
The right of access to public documents, as enshrined in both the 1973
Constitution and the 1987 Constitution, has been recognized as a selfexecutory constitutional right.109
In the 1976 case of Baldoza v. Hon. Judge Dimaano,110 the Court ruled that
access to public records is predicated on the right of the people to acquire
information on matters of public concern since, undoubtedly, in a
democracy, the pubic has a legitimate interest in matters of social and
political significance.
x x x The incorporation of this right in the Constitution is a recognition of
the fundamental role of free exchange of information in a democracy.
There can be no realistic perception by the public of the nation's problems,
nor a meaningful democratic decision-making if they are denied access to
information of general interest. Information is needed to enable the
members of society to cope with the exigencies of the times. As has been
aptly observed: "Maintaining the flow of such information depends on
protection for both its acquisition and its dissemination since, if either
process is interrupted, the flow inevitably ceases." x x x 111
In the same way that free discussion enables members of society to cope
with the exigencies of their time, access to information of general interest
aids the people in democratic decision-making by giving them a better

perspective of the vital issues confronting the nation112 so that they may
be able to criticize and participate in the affairs of the government in a
responsible, reasonable and effective manner. It is by ensuring an
unfettered and uninhibited exchange of ideas among a well-informed
public that a government remains responsive to the changes desired by
the people.113
The MOA-AD is a matter of public concern
That the subject of the information sought in the present cases is a matter
of public concern114 faces no serious challenge. In fact, respondents admit
that the MOA-AD is indeed of public concern.115 In previous cases, the Court
found that the regularity of real estate transactions entered in the Register
of Deeds,116 the need for adequate notice to the public of the various
laws,117 the civil service eligibility of a public employee, 118 the proper
management of GSIS funds allegedly used to grant loans to public
officials,119 the recovery of the Marcoses' alleged ill-gotten wealth, 120 and
the identity of party-list nominees,121 among others, are matters of public
concern. Undoubtedly, the MOA-AD subject of the present cases is of
public concern, involving as it does the sovereignty and territorial
integrity of the State, which directly affects the lives of the public at
large.
Matters of public concern covered by the right to information include steps
and negotiations leading to the consummation of the contract. In not
distinguishing as to the executory nature or commercial character of
agreements, the Court has categorically ruled:
x x x [T]he right to information "contemplates inclusion of
negotiations leading to the consummation of the
transaction." Certainly, a consummated contract is not a
requirement for the exercise of the right to information. Otherwise,
the people can never exercise the right if no contract is
consummated, and if one is consummated, it may be too late for
the public to expose its defects.
Requiring a consummated contract will keep the public in the dark
until the contract, which may be grossly disadvantageous to the
government or even illegal, becomes fait accompli. This negates
the State policy of full transparency on matters of public concern, a
situation which the framers of the Constitution could not have
intended. Such a requirement will prevent the citizenry from
participating in the public discussion of any proposed contract,
effectively truncating a basic right enshrined in the Bill of Rights.
We can allow neither an emasculation of a constitutional right, nor
a retreat by the State of its avowed "policy of full disclosure of all

its transactions involving public interest."122 (Emphasis and italics

in the original)
Intended as a "splendid symmetry"123 to the right to information under the
Bill of Rights is the policy of public disclosure under Section 28, Article II of
the Constitution reading:
Sec. 28. Subject to reasonable conditions prescribed by law, the
State adopts and implements a policy of full public disclosure of all
its transactions involving public interest.124
The policy of full public disclosure enunciated in above-quoted Section 28
complements the right of access to information on matters of public
concern found in the Bill of Rights. The right to information guarantees the
right of the people to demand information, while Section 28 recognizes the
duty of officialdom to give information even if nobody demands.125
The policy of public disclosure establishes a concrete ethical principle for
the conduct of public affairs in a genuinely open democracy, with the
people's right to know as the centerpiece. It is a mandate of the State to
be accountable by following such policy.126 These provisions are vital to the
exercise of the freedom of expression and essential to hold public officials
at all times accountable to the people. 127
Whether Section 28 is self-executory, the records of the deliberations of
the Constitutional Commission so disclose:
MR. SUAREZ. And since this is not self-executory, this policy will not
be enunciated or will not be in force and effect until after Congress
shall have provided it.
MR. OPLE. I expect it to influence the climate of public ethics
immediately but, of course, the implementing law will have to be
enacted by Congress, Mr. Presiding Officer. 128
The following discourse, after Commissioner Hilario Davide, Jr., sought
clarification on the issue, is enlightening.
MR. DAVIDE. I would like to get some clarifications on this. Mr.
Presiding Officer, did I get the Gentleman correctly as having said
that this is not a self-executing provision? It would require a
legislation by Congress to implement?
MR. OPLE. Yes. Originally, it was going to be self-executing, but I
accepted an amendment from Commissioner Regalado, so that the

safeguards on national interest are modified by the clause "as may

be provided by law"
MR. DAVIDE. But as worded, does it not mean that this will
immediately take effect and Congress may provide for
reasonable safeguards on the sole ground national interest?
MR. OPLE. Yes. I think so, Mr. Presiding Officer, I said earlier
that it should immediately influence the climate of the
conduct of public affairs but, of course, Congress here may no
longer pass a law revoking it, or if this is approved, revoking this
principle, which is inconsistent with this policy. 129 (Emphasis
supplied)
Indubitably, the effectivity of the policy of public disclosure need
not await the passing of a statute. As Congress cannot revoke this
principle, it is merely directed to provide for "reasonable safeguards." The
complete and effective exercise of the right to information necessitates
that its complementary provision on public disclosure derive the same selfexecutory nature. Since both provisions go hand-in-hand, it is absurd to say
that the broader130 right to information on matters of public concern is
already enforceable while the correlative duty of the State to disclose its
transactions involving public interest is not enforceable until there is an
enabling law. Respondents cannot thus point to the absence of an
implementing legislation as an excuse in not effecting such policy.
An essential element of these freedoms is to keep open a continuing
dialogue or process of communication between the government and the
people. It is in the interest of the State that the channels for free political
discussion be maintained to the end that the government may perceive
and be responsive to the people's will.131 Envisioned to be corollary to the
twin rights to information and disclosure is the design for feedback
mechanisms.
MS. ROSARIO BRAID. Yes. And lastly, Mr. Presiding Officer, will the
people be able to participate? Will the government provide
feedback mechanisms so that the people can participate
and can react where the existing media facilities are not
able to provide full feedback mechanisms to the
government? I suppose this will be part of the government
implementing operational mechanisms.
MR. OPLE. Yes. I think through their elected representatives and
that is how these courses take place. There is a message and a
feedback, both ways.

xxxx
MS. ROSARIO BRAID. Mr. Presiding Officer, may I just make one last
sentence?
I think when we talk about the feedback network, we are
not talking about public officials but also network of private
business o[r] community-based organizations that will be
reacting. As a matter of fact, we will put more credence or
credibility on the private network of volunteers and voluntary
community-based organizations. So I do not think we are afraid
that there will be another OMA in the making.132 (Emphasis
supplied)
The imperative of a public consultation, as a species of the right to
information, is evident in the "marching orders" to respondents. The
mechanics for the duty to disclose information and to conduct public
consultation regarding the peace agenda and process is manifestly
provided by E.O. No. 3.133 The preambulatory clause of E.O. No. 3 declares
that there is a need to further enhance the contribution of civil society to
the comprehensive peace process by institutionalizing the people's
participation.
One of the three underlying principles of the comprehensive peace process
is that it "should be community-based, reflecting the sentiments, values
and principles important to all Filipinos" and "shall be defined not by the
government alone, nor by the different contending groups only, but by all
Filipinos as one community."134 Included as a component of the
comprehensive peace process is consensus-building and empowerment for
peace, which includes "continuing consultations on both national and local
levels to build consensus for a peace agenda and process, and the
mobilization and facilitation of people's participation in the peace
process."135
Clearly, E.O. No. 3 contemplates not just the conduct of a
plebiscite to effectuate "continuing" consultations, contrary to
respondents' position that plebiscite is "more than sufficient
consultation."136
Further, E.O. No. 3 enumerates the functions and responsibilities of the
PAPP, one of which is to "[c]onduct regular dialogues with the National
Peace Forum (NPF) and other peace partners to seek relevant information,
comments, recommendations as well as to render appropriate and timely
reports on the progress of the comprehensive peace process." 137 E.O. No. 3
mandates the establishment of the NPF to be "the principal forum for the
PAPP to consult with and seek advi[c]e from the peace advocates, peace

partners and concerned sectors of society on both national and local levels,
on the implementation of the comprehensive peace process, as well as for
government[-]civil society dialogue and consensus-building on peace
agenda and initiatives."138
In fine, E.O. No. 3 establishes petitioners' right to be consulted on
the peace agenda, as a corollary to the constitutional right to
information and disclosure.
PAPP Esperon committed grave abuse of discretion
The PAPP committed grave abuse of discretion when he failed to
carry out the pertinent consultation. The furtive process by which the MOAAD was designed and crafted runs contrary to and in excess of the
legal authority, and amounts to a whimsical, capricious, oppressive,
arbitrary and despotic exercise thereof.
The Court may not, of course, require the PAPP to conduct the consultation
in a particular way or manner. It may, however, require him to comply with
the law and discharge the functions within the authority granted by the
President.139
Petitioners are not claiming a seat at the negotiating table, contrary to
respondents' retort in justifying the denial of petitioners' right to be
consulted. Respondents' stance manifests the manner by which they treat
the salient provisions of E.O. No. 3 on people's participation. Such
disregard of the express mandate of the President is not much different
from superficial conduct toward token provisos that border on classic lip
service.140 It illustrates a gross evasion of positive duty and a virtual refusal
to perform the duty enjoined.
As for respondents' invocation of the doctrine of executive privilege, it is
not tenable under the premises. The argument defies sound reason when
contrasted with E.O. No. 3's explicit provisions on continuing consultation
and dialogue on both national and local levels. The executive order even
recognizes the exercise of the public's right even before the GRP
makes its official recommendations or before the government proffers its
definite propositions.141 It bear emphasis that E.O. No. 3 seeks to elicit
relevant advice, information, comments and recommendations from the
people through dialogue.
AT ALL EVENTS, respondents effectively waived the defense of executive
privilege in view of their unqualified disclosure of the official copies of the
final draft of the MOA-AD. By unconditionally complying with the Court's
August 4, 2008 Resolution, without a prayer for the document's disclosure

in camera, or without a manifestation that it was complying therewith ex

abundante ad cautelam.
Petitioners' assertion that the Local Government Code (LGC) of 1991
declares it a State policy to "require all national agencies and offices to
conduct periodic consultations with appropriate local government units,
non-governmental and people's organizations, and other concerned sectors
of the community before any project or program is implemented in their
respective jurisdictions"142 is well-taken. The LGC chapter on
intergovernmental relations puts flesh into this avowed policy:
Prior Consultations Required. - No project or program shall be
implemented by government authorities unless the consultations
mentioned in Sections 2 (c) and 26 hereof are complied with, and
prior approval of the sanggunian concerned is obtained: Provided,
That occupants in areas where such projects are to be
implemented shall not be evicted unless appropriate relocation
sites have been provided, in accordance with the provisions of the
Constitution.143 (Italics and underscoring supplied)
In Lina, Jr. v. Hon. Pao,144 the Court held that the above-stated policy and
above-quoted provision of the LGU apply only to national programs or
projects which are to be implemented in a particular local community.
Among the programs and projects covered are those that are critical to the
environment and human ecology including those that may call for the
eviction of a particular group of people residing in the locality where these
will be implemented.145 The MOA-AD is one peculiar program that
unequivocally and unilaterally vests ownership of a vast territory
to the Bangsamoro people,146 which could pervasively and
drastically result to the diaspora or displacement of a great
number of inhabitants from their total environment.
With respect to the indigenous cultural communities/indigenous peoples
(ICCs/IPs), whose interests are represented herein by petitioner Lopez and
are adversely affected by the MOA-AD, the ICCs/IPs have, under the IPRA,
the right to participate fully at all levels of decision-making in matters
which may affect their rights, lives and destinies. 147 The MOA-AD, an
instrument recognizing ancestral domain, failed to justify its noncompliance with the clear-cut mechanisms ordained in said Act, 148 which
entails, among other things, the observance of the free and prior informed
consent of the ICCs/IPs.
Notably, the IPRA does not grant the Executive Department or any
government agency the power to delineate and recognize an ancestral
domain claim by mere agreement or compromise. The recognition of the
ancestral domain is the raison d'etre of the MOA-AD, without which all

other stipulations or "consensus points" necessarily must fail. In

proceeding to make a sweeping declaration on ancestral domain, without
complying with the IPRA, which is cited as one of the TOR of the MOA-AD,
respondents clearly transcended the boundaries of their authority.
As it seems, even the heart of the MOA-AD is still subject to necessary
changes to the legal framework. While paragraph 7 on Governance
suspends the effectivity of all provisions requiring changes to the legal
framework, such clause is itself invalid, as will be discussed in the following
section.
Indeed, ours is an open society, with all the acts of the government subject
to public scrutiny and available always to public cognizance. This has to be
so if the country is to remain democratic, with sovereignty residing in the
people and all government authority emanating from them.149
ON THE SECOND SUBSTANTIVE ISSUE
With regard to the provisions of the MOA-AD, there can be no question that
they cannot all be accommodated under the present Constitution and laws.
Respondents have admitted as much in the oral arguments before this
Court, and the MOA-AD itself recognizes the need to amend the existing
legal framework to render effective at least some of its provisions.
Respondents, nonetheless, counter that the MOA-AD is free of any legal
infirmity because any provisions therein which are inconsistent with the
present legal framework will not be effective until the necessary changes
to that framework are made. The validity of this argument will be
considered later. For now, the Court shall pass upon how
The MOA-AD is inconsistent with the Constitution and laws as
presently worded.
In general, the objections against the MOA-AD center on the extent of the
powers conceded therein to the BJE. Petitioners assert that the powers
granted to the BJE exceed those granted to any local government under
present laws, and even go beyond those of the present ARMM. Before
assessing some of the specific powers that would have been vested in the
BJE, however, it would be useful to turn first to a general idea that serves
as a unifying link to the different provisions of the MOA-AD, namely, the
international law concept of association. Significantly, the MOA-AD
explicitly alludes to this concept, indicating that the Parties actually framed
its provisions with it in mind.
Association is referred to in paragraph 3 on TERRITORY, paragraph 11 on
RESOURCES, and paragraph 4 on GOVERNANCE. It is in the last mentioned
provision, however, that the MOA-AD most clearly uses it to describe the
envisioned relationship between the BJE and the Central Government.

4. The relationship between the Central Government and

the Bangsamoro juridical entity shall be associative
characterized by shared authority and responsibility with a
structure of governance based on executive, legislative, judicial
and administrative institutions with defined powers and functions
in the comprehensive compact. A period of transition shall be
established in a comprehensive peace compact specifying the
relationship between the Central Government and the BJE.
(Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
The nature of the "associative" relationship may have been intended to
be defined more precisely in the still to be forged Comprehensive Compact.
Nonetheless, given that there is a concept of "association" in international
law, and the MOA-AD - by its inclusion of international law instruments in
its TOR- placed itself in an international legal context, that concept of
association may be brought to bear in understanding the use of the term
"associative" in the MOA-AD.
Keitner and Reisman state that
[a]n association is formed when two states of unequal power
voluntarily establish durable links. In the basic model, one state,
the associate, delegates certain responsibilities to the
other, the principal, while maintaining its international
status as a state. Free associations represent a middle
ground between integration and independence. x x x150
(Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
For purposes of illustration, the Republic of the Marshall Islands and the
Federated States of Micronesia (FSM), formerly part of the U.S.administered Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands,151 are associated states
of the U.S. pursuant to a Compact of Free Association. The currency in
these countries is the U.S. dollar, indicating their very close ties with the
U.S., yet they issue their own travel documents, which is a mark of their
statehood. Their international legal status as states was confirmed by the
UN Security Council and by their admission to UN membership.
According to their compacts of free association, the Marshall Islands and
the FSM generally have the capacity to conduct foreign affairs in their own
name and right, such capacity extending to matters such as the law of the
sea, marine resources, trade, banking, postal, civil aviation, and cultural
relations. The U.S. government, when conducting its foreign affairs, is
obligated to consult with the governments of the Marshall Islands or the
FSM on matters which it (U.S. government) regards as relating to or
affecting either government.

In the event of attacks or threats against the Marshall Islands or the FSM,
the U.S. government has the authority and obligation to defend them as if
they were part of U.S. territory. The U.S. government, moreover, has the
option of establishing and using military areas and facilities within these
associated states and has the right to bar the military personnel of any
third country from having access to these territories for military purposes.
It bears noting that in U.S. constitutional and international practice, free
association is understood as an international association between
sovereigns. The Compact of Free Association is a treaty which is
subordinate to the associated nation's national constitution, and each
party may terminate the association consistent with the right of
independence. It has been said that, with the admission of the U.S.associated states to the UN in 1990, the UN recognized that the American
model of free association is actually based on an underlying status of
independence.152
In international practice, the "associated state" arrangement has usually
been used as a transitional device of former colonies on their way to full
independence. Examples of states that have passed through the status of
associated states as a transitional phase are Antigua, St. Kitts-NevisAnguilla, Dominica, St. Lucia, St. Vincent and Grenada. All have since
become independent states.153
Back to the MOA-AD, it contains many provisions which are consistent with
the international legal concept of association, specifically the following: the
BJE's capacity to enter into economic and trade relations with foreign
countries, the commitment of the Central Government to ensure the BJE's
participation in meetings and events in the ASEAN and the specialized UN
agencies, and the continuing responsibility of the Central Government over
external defense. Moreover, the BJE's right to participate in Philippine
official missions bearing on negotiation of border agreements,
environmental protection, and sharing of revenues pertaining to the bodies
of water adjacent to or between the islands forming part of the ancestral
domain, resembles the right of the governments of FSM and the Marshall
Islands to be consulted by the U.S. government on any foreign affairs
matter affecting them.
These provisions of the MOA indicate, among other things, that the Parties
aimed to vest in the BJE the status of an associated state or, at
any rate, a status closely approximating it.
The concept of association is not recognized under the present
Constitution

No province, city, or municipality, not even the ARMM, is recognized under

our laws as having an "associative" relationship with the national
government. Indeed, the concept implies powers that go beyond anything
ever granted by the Constitution to any local or regional government. It
also implies the recognition of the associated entity as a state. The
Constitution, however, does not contemplate any state in this jurisdiction
other than the Philippine State, much less does it provide for a transitory
status that aims to prepare any part of Philippine territory for
independence.
Even the mere concept animating many of the MOA-AD's provisions,
therefore, already requires for its validity the amendment of constitutional
provisions, specifically the following provisions of Article X:
SECTION 1. The territorial and political subdivisions of the Republic
of the Philippines are the provinces, cities, municipalities, and
barangays. There shall be autonomous regions in Muslim
Mindanao and the Cordilleras as hereinafter provided.
SECTION 15. There shall be created autonomous regions in Muslim
Mindanao and in the Cordilleras consisting of provinces, cities,
municipalities, and geographical areas sharing common and
distinctive historical and cultural heritage, economic and social
structures, and other relevant characteristics within the
framework of this Constitution and the national
sovereignty as well as territorial integrity of the Republic
of the Philippines.
The BJE is a far more powerful
entity than the autonomous region
recognized in the Constitution
It is not merely an expanded version of the ARMM, the status of its
relationship with the national government being fundamentally different
from that of the ARMM. Indeed, BJE is a state in all but name as it
meets the criteria of a state laid down in the Montevideo
Convention,154 namely, a permanent population, a defined territory, a
government, and a capacity to enter into relations with other states.
Even assuming arguendo that the MOA-AD would not necessarily sever any
portion of Philippine territory, the spirit animating it - which has
betrayed itself by its use of the concept of association - runs counter to
the national sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Republic.
The defining concept underlying the relationship between the
national government and the BJE being itself contrary to the

present Constitution, it is not surprising that many of the specific

provisions of the MOA-AD on the formation and powers of the BJE
are in conflict with the Constitution and the laws.

(6) Economic, social, and tourism development;

Article X, Section 18 of the Constitution provides that "[t]he creation of the

autonomous region shall be effective when approved by a majority of the
votes cast by the constituent units in a plebiscite called for the purpose,
provided that only provinces, cities, and geographic areas voting
favorably in such plebiscite shall be included in the autonomous
region." (Emphasis supplied)

(8) Preservation and development of the cultural heritage; and

As reflected above, the BJE is more of a state than an autonomous region.

But even assuming that it is covered by the term "autonomous region" in
the constitutional provision just quoted, the MOA-AD would still be in
conflict with it. Under paragraph 2(c) on TERRITORY in relation to 2(d) and
2(e), the present geographic area of the ARMM and, in addition, the
municipalities of Lanao del Norte which voted for inclusion in the ARMM
during the 2001 plebiscite - Baloi, Munai, Nunungan, Pantar, Tagoloan and
Tangkal - are automatically part of the BJE without need of another
plebiscite, in contrast to the areas under Categories A and B mentioned
earlier in the overview. That the present components of the ARMM and the
above-mentioned municipalities voted for inclusion therein in 2001,
however, does not render another plebiscite unnecessary under the
Constitution, precisely because what these areas voted for then was their
inclusion in the ARMM, not the BJE.
The MOA-AD, moreover, would not
comply with Article X, Section 20 of
the Constitution
since that provision defines the powers of autonomous regions as follows:
SECTION 20. Within its territorial jurisdiction and subject to the
provisions of this Constitution and national laws, the organic act of
autonomous regions shall provide for legislative powers over:
(1) Administrative organization;
(2) Creation of sources of revenues;
(3) Ancestral domain and natural resources;
(4) Personal, family, and property relations;
(5) Regional urban and rural planning development;

(7) Educational policies;

(9) Such other matters as may be authorized by law for the

promotion of the general welfare of the people of the region.
(Underscoring supplied)
Again on the premise that the BJE may be regarded as an autonomous
region, the MOA-AD would require an amendment that would expand the
above-quoted provision. The mere passage of new legislation pursuant to
sub-paragraph No. 9 of said constitutional provision would not suffice,
since any new law that might vest in the BJE the powers found in the MOAAD must, itself, comply with other provisions of the Constitution. It would
not do, for instance, to merely pass legislation vesting the BJE with treatymaking power in order to accommodate paragraph 4 of the strand on
RESOURCES which states: "The BJE is free to enter into any economic
cooperation and trade relations with foreign countries: provided, however,
that such relationships and understandings do not include aggression
against the Government of the Republic of the Philippines x x x." Under our
constitutional system, it is only the President who has that power. Pimentel
v. Executive Secretary155 instructs:
In our system of government, the President, being the head of
state, is regarded as the sole organ and authority in external
relations and is the country's sole representative with
foreign nations. As the chief architect of foreign policy, the
President acts as the country's mouthpiece with respect to
international affairs. Hence, the President is vested with the
authority to deal with foreign states and governments, extend or
withhold recognition, maintain diplomatic relations, enter into
treaties, and otherwise transact the business of foreign
relations. In the realm of treaty-making, the President has
the sole authority to negotiate with other states. (Emphasis
and underscoring supplied)
Article II, Section 22 of the Constitution must also be amended if
the scheme envisioned in the MOA-AD is to be effected. That
constitutional provision states: "The State recognizes and promotes the
rights of indigenous cultural communities within the framework of national
unity and development." (Underscoring supplied) An associative
arrangement does not uphold national unity. While there may be a
semblance of unity because of the associative ties between the BJE and
the national government, the act of placing a portion of Philippine territory

in a status which, in international practice, has generally been a

preparation for independence, is certainly not conducive to national unity.
Besides being irreconcilable with the Constitution, the MOA-AD is also
inconsistent with prevailing statutory law, among which are R.A.
No. 9054156 or the Organic Act of the ARMM, and the IPRA.157
Article X, Section 3 of the Organic Act of the ARMM is a bar to the
adoption of the definition of "Bangsamoro people" used in the MOAAD. Paragraph 1 on Concepts and Principles states:
1. It is the birthright of all Moros and all Indigenous peoples of
Mindanao to identify themselves and be accepted as
"Bangsamoros". The Bangsamoro people refers to those who are
natives or original inhabitants of Mindanao and its adjacent
islands including Palawan and the Sulu archipelago at the time of
conquest or colonization of its descendants whether mixed or of
full blood. Spouses and their descendants are classified as
Bangsamoro. The freedom of choice of the Indigenous people shall
be respected. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
This use of the term Bangsamoro sharply contrasts with that found in the
Article X, Section 3 of the Organic Act, which, rather than lumping together
the identities of the Bangsamoro and other indigenous peoples living in
Mindanao, clearly distinguishes between Bangsamoro people and
Tribal peoples, as follows:
"As used in this Organic Act, the phrase "indigenous cultural
community" refers to Filipino citizens residing in the
autonomous region who are:
(a) Tribal peoples. These are citizens whose social, cultural and
economic conditions distinguish them from other sectors of the
national community; and
(b) Bangsa Moro people. These are citizens who are believers
in Islam and who have retained some or all of their own
social, economic, cultural, and political institutions."
Respecting the IPRA, it lays down the prevailing procedure for the
delineation and recognition of ancestral domains. The MOA-AD's manner of
delineating the ancestral domain of the Bangsamoro people is a clear
departure from that procedure. By paragraph 1 of Territory, the Parties
simply agree that, subject to the delimitations in the agreed Schedules,
"[t]he Bangsamoro homeland and historic territory refer to the land mass

as well as the maritime, terrestrial, fluvial and alluvial domains, and the
aerial domain, the atmospheric space above it, embracing the MindanaoSulu-Palawan geographic region."
Chapter VIII of the IPRA, on the other hand, lays down a detailed
procedure, as illustrated in the following provisions thereof:
SECTION 52. Delineation Process. - The identification and
delineation of ancestral domains shall be done in accordance with
the following procedures:
xxxx
b) Petition for Delineation. - The process of delineating a specific
perimeter may be initiated by the NCIP with the consent of the
ICC/IP concerned, or through a Petition for Delineation filed with
the NCIP, by a majority of the members of the ICCs/IPs;
c) Delineation Proper. - The official delineation of ancestral domain
boundaries including census of all community members therein,
shall be immediately undertaken by the Ancestral Domains Office
upon filing of the application by the ICCs/IPs concerned.
Delineation will be done in coordination with the community
concerned and shall at all times include genuine involvement and
participation by the members of the communities concerned;
d) Proof Required. - Proof of Ancestral Domain Claims shall include
the testimony of elders or community under oath, and other
documents directly or indirectly attesting to the possession or
occupation of the area since time immemorial by such ICCs/IPs in
the concept of owners which shall be any one (1) of the following
authentic documents:
1) Written accounts of the ICCs/IPs customs and traditions;
2) Written accounts of the ICCs/IPs political structure and
institution;
3) Pictures showing long term occupation such as those of
old improvements, burial grounds, sacred places and old
villages;
4) Historical accounts, including pacts and agreements
concerning boundaries entered into by the ICCs/IPs
concerned with other ICCs/IPs;

5) Survey plans and sketch maps;

6) Anthropological data;
7) Genealogical surveys;
8) Pictures and descriptive histories of traditional
communal forests and hunting grounds;
9) Pictures and descriptive histories of traditional
landmarks such as mountains, rivers, creeks, ridges, hills,
terraces and the like; and
10) Write-ups of names and places derived from the native
dialect of the community.
e) Preparation of Maps. - On the basis of such investigation and the
findings of fact based thereon, the Ancestral Domains Office of the
NCIP shall prepare a perimeter map, complete with technical
descriptions, and a description of the natural features and
landmarks embraced therein;
f) Report of Investigation and Other Documents. - A complete copy
of the preliminary census and a report of investigation, shall be
prepared by the Ancestral Domains Office of the NCIP;
g) Notice and Publication. - A copy of each document, including a
translation in the native language of the ICCs/IPs concerned shall
be posted in a prominent place therein for at least fifteen (15)
days. A copy of the document shall also be posted at the local,
provincial and regional offices of the NCIP, and shall be published
in a newspaper of general circulation once a week for two (2)
consecutive weeks to allow other claimants to file opposition
thereto within fifteen (15) days from date of such publication:
Provided, That in areas where no such newspaper exists,
broadcasting in a radio station will be a valid substitute: Provided,
further, That mere posting shall be deemed sufficient if both
newspaper and radio station are not available;
h) Endorsement to NCIP. - Within fifteen (15) days from publication,
and of the inspection process, the Ancestral Domains Office shall
prepare a report to the NCIP endorsing a favorable action upon a
claim that is deemed to have sufficient proof. However, if the proof
is deemed insufficient, the Ancestral Domains Office shall require
the submission of additional evidence: Provided, That the Ancestral

Domains Office shall reject any claim that is deemed patently false
or fraudulent after inspection and verification: Provided, further,
That in case of rejection, the Ancestral Domains Office shall give
the applicant due notice, copy furnished all concerned, containing
the grounds for denial. The denial shall be appealable to the NCIP:
Provided, furthermore, That in cases where there are conflicting
claims among ICCs/IPs on the boundaries of ancestral domain
claims, the Ancestral Domains Office shall cause the contending
parties to meet and assist them in coming up with a preliminary
resolution of the conflict, without prejudice to its full adjudication
according to the section below.
xxxx
To remove all doubts about the irreconcilability of the MOA-AD with the
present legal system, a discussion of not only the Constitution and
domestic statutes, but also of international law is in order, for
Article II, Section 2 of the Constitution states that the Philippines
"adopts the generally accepted principles of international law as
part of the law of the land."
Applying this provision of the Constitution, the Court, in Mejoff v. Director
of Prisons,158 held that the Universal Declaration of Human Rights is part of
the law of the land on account of which it ordered the release on bail of a
detained alien of Russian descent whose deportation order had not been
executed even after two years. Similarly, the Court in Agustin v. Edu159
applied the aforesaid constitutional provision to the 1968 Vienna
Convention on Road Signs and Signals.
International law has long recognized the right to self-determination of
"peoples," understood not merely as the entire population of a State but
also a portion thereof. In considering the question of whether the people of
Quebec had a right to unilaterally secede from Canada, the Canadian
Supreme Court in REFERENCE RE SECESSION OF QUEBEC 160 had occasion
to acknowledge that "the right of a people to self-determination is now so
widely recognized in international conventions that the principle has
acquired a status beyond convention' and is considered a general principle
of international law."
Among the conventions referred to are the International Covenant on Civil
and Political Rights161 and the International Covenant on Economic, Social
and Cultural Rights162 which state, in Article 1 of both covenants, that all
peoples, by virtue of the right of self-determination, "freely determine their
political status and freely pursue their economic, social, and cultural
development."

The people's right to self-determination should not, however, be

understood as extending to a unilateral right of secession. A distinction
should be made between the right of internal and external selfdetermination. REFERENCE RE SECESSION OF QUEBEC is again instructive:
"(ii) Scope of the Right to Self-determination
126. The recognized sources of international law establish that the
right to self-determination of a people is normally fulfilled
through internal self-determination - a people's pursuit of
its political, economic, social and cultural development
within the framework of an existing state. A right to
external self-determination (which in this case potentially
takes the form of the assertion of a right to unilateral
secession) arises in only the most extreme of cases and,
even then, under carefully defined circumstances. x x x
External self-determination can be defined as in the
following statement from the Declaration on Friendly
Relations, supra, as
The establishment of a sovereign and independent State,
the free association or integration with an independent
State or the emergence into any other political status
freely determined by a people constitute modes of
implementing the right of self-determination by that people.
(Emphasis added)
127. The international law principle of self-determination
has evolved within a framework of respect for the
territorial integrity of existing states. The various
international documents that support the existence of a people's
right to self-determination also contain parallel statements
supportive of the conclusion that the exercise of such a right must
be sufficiently limited to prevent threats to an existing state's
territorial integrity or the stability of relations between sovereign
states.
x x x x (Emphasis, italics and underscoring supplied)
The Canadian Court went on to discuss the exceptional cases in which the
right to external self-determination can arise, namely, where a people is
under colonial rule, is subject to foreign domination or exploitation outside
a colonial context, and - less definitely but asserted by a number of
commentators - is blocked from the meaningful exercise of its right to
internal self-determination. The Court ultimately held that the population of

Quebec had no right to secession, as the same is not under colonial rule or
foreign domination, nor is it being deprived of the freedom to make
political choices and pursue economic, social and cultural development,
citing that Quebec is equitably represented in legislative, executive and
judicial institutions within Canada, even occupying prominent positions
therein.
The exceptional nature of the right of secession is further exemplified in
the REPORT OF THE INTERNATIONAL COMMITTEE OF JURISTS ON THE
LEGAL ASPECTS OF THE AALAND ISLANDS QUESTION. 163 There, Sweden
presented to the Council of the League of Nations the question of whether
the inhabitants of the Aaland Islands should be authorized to determine by
plebiscite if the archipelago should remain under Finnish sovereignty or be
incorporated in the kingdom of Sweden. The Council, before resolving the
question, appointed an International Committee composed of three jurists
to submit an opinion on the preliminary issue of whether the dispute
should, based on international law, be entirely left to the domestic
jurisdiction of Finland. The Committee stated the rule as follows:
x x x [I]n the absence of express provisions in international
treaties, the right of disposing of national territory is
essentially an attribute of the sovereignty of every State.
Positive International Law does not recognize the right of
national groups, as such, to separate themselves from the
State of which they form part by the simple expression of a
wish, any more than it recognizes the right of other States to claim
such a separation. Generally speaking, the grant or refusal of
the right to a portion of its population of determining its
own political fate by plebiscite or by some other method,
is, exclusively, an attribute of the sovereignty of every
State which is definitively constituted. A dispute between two
States concerning such a question, under normal conditions
therefore, bears upon a question which International Law leaves
entirely to the domestic jurisdiction of one of the States concerned.
Any other solution would amount to an infringement of sovereign
rights of a State and would involve the risk of creating difficulties
and a lack of stability which would not only be contrary to the very
idea embodied in term "State," but would also endanger the
interests of the international community. If this right is not
possessed by a large or small section of a nation, neither can it be
held by the State to which the national group wishes to be
attached, nor by any other State. (Emphasis and underscoring
supplied)
The Committee held that the dispute concerning the Aaland Islands did not
refer to a question which is left by international law to the domestic
jurisdiction of Finland, thereby applying the exception rather than the rule

elucidated above. Its ground for departing from the general rule, however,
was a very narrow one, namely, the Aaland Islands agitation originated at
a time when Finland was undergoing drastic political transformation. The
internal situation of Finland was, according to the Committee, so abnormal
that, for a considerable time, the conditions required for the formation of a
sovereign State did not exist. In the midst of revolution, anarchy, and civil
war, the legitimacy of the Finnish national government was disputed by a
large section of the people, and it had, in fact, been chased from the
capital and forcibly prevented from carrying out its duties. The armed
camps and the police were divided into two opposing forces. In light of
these circumstances, Finland was not, during the relevant time period, a
"definitively constituted" sovereign state. The Committee, therefore, found
that Finland did not possess the right to withhold from a portion of its
population the option to separate itself - a right which sovereign nations
generally have with respect to their own populations.
Turning now to the more specific category of indigenous peoples, this term
has been used, in scholarship as well as international, regional, and state
practices, to refer to groups with distinct cultures, histories, and
connections to land (spiritual and otherwise) that have been forcibly
incorporated into a larger governing society. These groups are regarded as
"indigenous" since they are the living descendants of pre-invasion
inhabitants of lands now dominated by others. Otherwise stated,
indigenous peoples, nations, or communities are culturally distinctive
groups that find themselves engulfed by settler societies born of the forces
of empire and conquest.164 Examples of groups who have been regarded as
indigenous peoples are the Maori of New Zealand and the aboriginal
peoples of Canada.
As with the broader category of "peoples," indigenous peoples situated
within states do not have a general right to independence or secession
from those states under international law,165 but they do have rights
amounting to what was discussed above as the right to internal selfdetermination.
In a historic development last September 13, 2007, the UN General
Assembly adopted the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of
Indigenous Peoples (UN DRIP) through General Assembly Resolution
61/295. The vote was 143 to 4, the Philippines being included among
those in favor, and the four voting against being Australia, Canada, New
Zealand, and the U.S. The Declaration clearly recognized the right of
indigenous peoples to self-determination, encompassing the right
to autonomy or self-government, to wit:
Article 3

Indigenous peoples have the right to self-determination. By

virtue of that right they freely determine their political status and
freely pursue their economic, social and cultural development.
Article 4
Indigenous peoples, in exercising their right to self-determination,
have the right to autonomy or self-government in matters
relating to their internal and local affairs, as well as ways and
means for financing their autonomous functions.
Article 5
Indigenous peoples have the right to maintain and strengthen their
distinct political, legal, economic, social and cultural institutions,
while retaining their right to participate fully, if they so choose, in
the political, economic, social and cultural life of the State.
Self-government, as used in international legal discourse pertaining to
indigenous peoples, has been understood as equivalent to "internal selfdetermination."166 The extent of self-determination provided for in the UN
DRIP is more particularly defined in its subsequent articles, some of which
are quoted hereunder:
Article 8
1. Indigenous peoples and individuals have the right not to be
subjected to forced assimilation or destruction of their culture.
2. States shall provide effective mechanisms for prevention
of, and redress for:
(a) Any action which has the aim or effect of depriving them
of their integrity as distinct peoples, or of their cultural
values or ethnic identities;
(b) Any action which has the aim or effect of dispossessing
them of their lands, territories or resources;
(c) Any form of forced population transfer which has the
aim or effect of violating or undermining any of their rights;
(d) Any form of forced assimilation or integration;

(e) Any form of propaganda designed to promote or incite

racial or ethnic discrimination directed against them.
Article 21
1. Indigenous peoples have the right, without discrimination, to the
improvement of their economic and social conditions, including,
inter alia, in the areas of education, employment, vocational
training and retraining, housing, sanitation, health and social
security.
2. States shall take effective measures and, where appropriate,
special measures to ensure continuing improvement of their
economic and social conditions. Particular attention shall be paid to
the rights and special needs of indigenous elders, women, youth,
children and persons with disabilities.
Article 26
1. Indigenous peoples have the right to the lands,
territories and resources which they have traditionally
owned, occupied or otherwise used or acquired.
2. Indigenous peoples have the right to own, use, develop and
control the lands, territories and resources that they possess by
reason of traditional ownership or other traditional occupation or
use, as well as those which they have otherwise acquired.
3. States shall give legal recognition and protection to these lands,
territories and resources. Such recognition shall be conducted with
due respect to the customs, traditions and land tenure systems of
the indigenous peoples concerned.
Article 30
1. Military activities shall not take place in the lands or territories of
indigenous peoples, unless justified by a relevant public interest or
otherwise freely agreed with or requested by the indigenous
peoples concerned.
2. States shall undertake effective consultations with the
indigenous peoples concerned, through appropriate procedures
and in particular through their representative institutions, prior to
using their lands or territories for military activities.

Article 32
1. Indigenous peoples have the right to determine and develop
priorities and strategies for the development or use of their lands
or territories and other resources.
2. States shall consult and cooperate in good faith with the
indigenous peoples concerned through their own representative
institutions in order to obtain their free and informed consent prior
to the approval of any project affecting their lands or territories
and other resources, particularly in connection with the
development, utilization or exploitation of mineral, water or other
resources.
3. States shall provide effective mechanisms for just and fair
redress for any such activities, and appropriate measures shall be
taken to mitigate adverse environmental, economic, social, cultural
or spiritual impact.
Article 37
1. Indigenous peoples have the right to the recognition,
observance and enforcement of treaties, agreements and other
constructive arrangements concluded with States or their
successors and to have States honour and respect such treaties,
agreements and other constructive arrangements.
2. Nothing in this Declaration may be interpreted as diminishing or
eliminating the rights of indigenous peoples contained in treaties,
agreements and other constructive arrangements.
Article 38
States in consultation and cooperation with indigenous peoples,
shall take the appropriate measures, including legislative
measures, to achieve the ends of this Declaration.
Assuming that the UN DRIP, like the Universal Declaration on Human
Rights, must now be regarded as embodying customary international law a question which the Court need not definitively resolve here - the
obligations enumerated therein do not strictly require the Republic to grant
the Bangsamoro people, through the instrumentality of the BJE, the
particular rights and powers provided for in the MOA-AD. Even the more
specific provisions of the UN DRIP are general in scope, allowing for
flexibility in its application by the different States.

There is, for instance, no requirement in the UN DRIP that States now
guarantee indigenous peoples their own police and internal security force.
Indeed, Article 8 presupposes that it is the State which will provide
protection for indigenous peoples against acts like the forced dispossession
of their lands - a function that is normally performed by police officers. If
the protection of a right so essential to indigenous people's identity is
acknowledged to be the responsibility of the State, then surely the
protection of rights less significant to them as such peoples would also be
the duty of States. Nor is there in the UN DRIP an acknowledgement of the
right of indigenous peoples to the aerial domain and atmospheric space.
What it upholds, in Article 26 thereof, is the right of indigenous peoples to
the lands, territories and resources which they have traditionally owned,
occupied or otherwise used or acquired.
Moreover, the UN DRIP, while upholding the right of indigenous peoples to
autonomy, does not obligate States to grant indigenous peoples the nearindependent status of an associated state. All the rights recognized in that
document are qualified in Article 46 as follows:
1. Nothing in this Declaration may be interpreted as implying
for any State, people, group or person any right to engage in any
activity or to perform any act contrary to the Charter of the United
Nations or construed as authorizing or encouraging any
action which would dismember or impair, totally or in part,
the territorial integrity or political unity of sovereign and
independent States.
Even if the UN DRIP were considered as part of the law of the land
pursuant to Article II, Section 2 of the Constitution, it would not suffice to
uphold the validity of the MOA-AD so as to render its compliance with other
laws unnecessary.
It is, therefore, clear that the MOA-AD contains numerous
provisions that cannot be reconciled with the Constitution and the
laws as presently worded. Respondents proffer, however, that the
signing of the MOA-AD alone would not have entailed any violation of law
or grave abuse of discretion on their part, precisely because it stipulates
that the provisions thereof inconsistent with the laws shall not take effect
until these laws are amended. They cite paragraph 7 of the MOA-AD strand
on GOVERNANCE quoted earlier, but which is reproduced below for
convenience:
7. The Parties agree that the mechanisms and modalities for the
actual implementation of this MOA-AD shall be spelt out in the
Comprehensive Compact to mutually take such steps to enable it
to occur effectively.

Any provisions of the MOA-AD requiring amendments to the

existing legal framework shall come into force upon signing of a
Comprehensive Compact and upon effecting the necessary
changes to the legal framework with due regard to non derogation
of prior agreements and within the stipulated timeframe to be
contained in the Comprehensive Compact.
Indeed, the foregoing stipulation keeps many controversial provisions of
the MOA-AD from coming into force until the necessary changes to the
legal framework are effected. While the word "Constitution" is not
mentioned in the provision now under consideration or anywhere
else in the MOA-AD, the term "legal framework" is certainly broad
enough to include the Constitution.
Notwithstanding the suspensive clause, however, respondents, by their
mere act of incorporating in the MOA-AD the provisions thereof regarding
the associative relationship between the BJE and the Central Government,
have already violated the Memorandum of Instructions From The President
dated March 1, 2001, which states that the "negotiations shall be
conducted in accordance with x x x the principles of the sovereignty and
territorial integrity of the Republic of the Philippines." (Emphasis
supplied) Establishing an associative relationship between the BJE and the
Central Government is, for the reasons already discussed, a preparation for
independence, or worse, an implicit acknowledgment of an independent
status already prevailing.
Even apart from the above-mentioned Memorandum, however, the MOAAD is defective because the suspensive clause is invalid, as discussed
below.
The authority of the GRP Peace Negotiating Panel to negotiate with the
MILF is founded on E.O. No. 3, Section 5(c), which states that there shall be
established Government Peace Negotiating Panels for negotiations with
different rebel groups to be "appointed by the President as her official
emissaries to conduct negotiations, dialogues, and face-to-face discussions
with rebel groups." These negotiating panels are to report to the President,
through the PAPP on the conduct and progress of the negotiations.
It bears noting that the GRP Peace Panel, in exploring lasting solutions to
the Moro Problem through its negotiations with the MILF, was not restricted
by E.O. No. 3 only to those options available under the laws as they
presently stand. One of the components of a comprehensive peace
process, which E.O. No. 3 collectively refers to as the "Paths to Peace," is
the pursuit of social, economic, and political reforms which may require
new legislation or even constitutional amendments. Sec. 4(a) of E.O. No. 3,
which reiterates Section 3(a), of E.O. No. 125,167 states:

SECTION 4. The Six Paths to Peace. - The components of the

comprehensive peace process comprise the processes known as
the "Paths to Peace". These component processes are interrelated
and not mutually exclusive, and must therefore be pursued
simultaneously in a coordinated and integrated fashion. They shall
include, but may not be limited to, the following:
a. PURSUIT OF SOCIAL, ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL REFORMS. This
component involves the vigorous implementation of various
policies, reforms, programs and projects aimed at
addressing the root causes of internal armed conflicts and
social unrest. This may require administrative action, new
legislation or even constitutional amendments.
x x x x (Emphasis supplied)
The MOA-AD, therefore, may reasonably be perceived as an attempt of
respondents to address, pursuant to this provision of E.O. No. 3, the root
causes of the armed conflict in Mindanao. The E.O. authorized them to
"think outside the box," so to speak. Hence, they negotiated and were set
on signing the MOA-AD that included various social, economic, and political
reforms which cannot, however, all be accommodated within the present
legal framework, and which thus would require new legislation and
constitutional amendments.

upheld the President's power to forbid the return of her exiled

predecessor. The rationale for the majority's ruling rested on the
President's
. . . unstated residual powers which are implied from
the grant of executive power and which are
necessary for her to comply with her duties under
the Constitution. The powers of the President are
not limited to what are expressly enumerated in the
article on the Executive Department and in
scattered provisions of the Constitution. This is so,
notwithstanding the avowed intent of the members of the
Constitutional Commission of 1986 to limit the powers of
the President as a reaction to the abuses under the regime
of Mr. Marcos, for the result was a limitation of specific
powers of the President, particularly those relating to the
commander-in-chief clause, but not a diminution of the
general grant of executive power.
Thus, the President's authority to declare a state of
rebellion springs in the main from her powers as chief
executive and, at the same time, draws strength from her
Commander-in-Chief powers. x x x (Emphasis and underscoring
supplied)

The inquiry on the legality of the "suspensive clause," however, cannot

stop here, because it must be asked whether the President herself
may exercise the power delegated to the GRP Peace Panel under
E.O. No. 3, Sec. 4(a).

Similarly, the President's power to conduct peace negotiations is implicitly

included in her powers as Chief Executive and Commander-in-Chief. As
Chief Executive, the President has the general responsibility to promote
public peace, and as Commander-in-Chief, she has the more specific duty
to prevent and suppress rebellion and lawless violence. 169

The President cannot delegate a power that she herself does not possess.
May the President, in the course of peace negotiations, agree to pursue
reforms that would require new legislation and constitutional amendments,
or should the reforms be restricted only to those solutions which the
present laws allow? The answer to this question requires a discussion of
the extent of the President's power to conduct peace negotiations.

As the experience of nations which have similarly gone through internal

armed conflict will show, however, peace is rarely attained by simply
pursuing a military solution. Oftentimes, changes as far-reaching as a
fundamental reconfiguration of the nation's constitutional structure is
required. The observations of Dr. Kirsti Samuels are enlightening, to wit:

That the authority of the President to conduct peace negotiations with

rebel groups is not explicitly mentioned in the Constitution does not mean
that she has no such authority. In Sanlakas v. Executive Secretary,168 in
issue was the authority of the President to declare a state of rebellion - an
authority which is not expressly provided for in the Constitution. The Court
held thus:
"In her ponencia in Marcos v. Manglapus, Justice Cortes put her
thesis into jurisprudence. There, the Court, by a slim 8-7 margin,

x x x [T]he fact remains that a successful political and governance

transition must form the core of any post-conflict peace-building
mission. As we have observed in Liberia and Haiti over the last ten
years, conflict cessation without modification of the political
environment, even where state-building is undertaken through
technical electoral assistance and institution- or capacity-building,
is unlikely to succeed. On average, more than 50 percent of states
emerging from conflict return to conflict. Moreover, a substantial

proportion of transitions have resulted in weak or limited

democracies.
The design of a constitution and its constitution-making process
can play an important role in the political and governance
transition. Constitution-making after conflict is an opportunity to
create a common vision of the future of a state and a road map on
how to get there. The constitution can be partly a peace
agreement and partly a framework setting up the rules by which
the new democracy will operate.170
In the same vein, Professor Christine Bell, in her article on the nature and
legal status of peace agreements, observed that the typical way that
peace agreements establish or confirm mechanisms for demilitarization
and demobilization is by linking them to new constitutional structures
addressing governance, elections, and legal and human rights
institutions.171
In the Philippine experience, the link between peace agreements and
constitution-making has been recognized by no less than the framers of
the Constitution. Behind the provisions of the Constitution on autonomous
regions172 is the framers' intention to implement a particular peace
agreement, namely, the Tripoli Agreement of 1976 between the GRP and
the MNLF, signed by then Undersecretary of National Defense Carmelo Z.
Barbero and then MNLF Chairman Nur Misuari.
MR. ROMULO. There are other speakers; so, although I have some
more questions, I will reserve my right to ask them if they are not
covered by the other speakers. I have only two questions.
I heard one of the Commissioners say that local autonomy
already exists in the Muslim region; it is working very well; it
has, in fact, diminished a great deal of the problems. So, my
question is: since that already exists, why do we have to go
into something new?
MR. OPLE. May I answer that on behalf of Chairman Nolledo.
Commissioner Yusup Abubakar is right that certain definite steps
have been taken to implement the provisions of the Tripoli
Agreement with respect to an autonomous region in
Mindanao. This is a good first step, but there is no question
that this is merely a partial response to the Tripoli
Agreement itself and to the fuller standard of regional
autonomy contemplated in that agreement, and now by
state policy.173(Emphasis supplied)

The constitutional provisions on autonomy and the statutes enacted

pursuant to them have, to the credit of their drafters, been partly
successful. Nonetheless, the Filipino people are still faced with the reality
of an on-going conflict between the Government and the MILF. If the
President is to be expected to find means for bringing this conflict to an
end and to achieve lasting peace in Mindanao, then she must be given the
leeway to explore, in the course of peace negotiations, solutions that may
require changes to the Constitution for their implementation. Being
uniquely vested with the power to conduct peace negotiations with rebel
groups, the President is in a singular position to know the precise nature of
their grievances which, if resolved, may bring an end to hostilities.
The President may not, of course, unilaterally implement the solutions that
she considers viable, but she may not be prevented from submitting them
as recommendations to Congress, which could then, if it is minded, act
upon them pursuant to the legal procedures for constitutional amendment
and revision. In particular, Congress would have the option, pursuant to
Article XVII, Sections 1 and 3 of the Constitution, to propose the
recommended amendments or revision to the people, call a constitutional
convention, or submit to the electorate the question of calling such a
convention.
While the President does not possess constituent powers - as those powers
may be exercised only by Congress, a Constitutional Convention, or the
people through initiative and referendum - she may submit proposals for
constitutional change to Congress in a manner that does not involve the
arrogation of constituent powers.
In Sanidad v. COMELEC,174 in issue was the legality of then President
Marcos' act of directly submitting proposals for constitutional amendments
to a referendum, bypassing the interim National Assembly which was the
body vested by the 1973 Constitution with the power to propose such
amendments. President Marcos, it will be recalled, never convened the
interim National Assembly. The majority upheld the President's act, holding
that "the urges of absolute necessity" compelled the President as the
agent of the people to act as he did, there being no interim National
Assembly to propose constitutional amendments. Against this ruling,
Justices Teehankee and Muoz Palma vigorously dissented. The Court's
concern at present, however, is not with regard to the point on which it was
then divided in that controversial case, but on that which was not disputed
by either side.
Justice Teehankee's dissent,175 in particular, bears noting. While he
disagreed that the President may directly submit proposed constitutional
amendments to a referendum, implicit in his opinion is a recognition that
he would have upheld the President's action along with the majority had

the President convened the interim National Assembly and coursed his
proposals through it. Thus Justice Teehankee opined:
"Since the Constitution provides for the organization of the
essential departments of government, defines and delimits the
powers of each and prescribes the manner of the exercise of such
powers, and the constituent power has not been granted to but has
been withheld from the President or Prime Minister, it follows that
the President's questioned decrees proposing and submitting
constitutional amendments directly to the people (without the
intervention of the interim National Assembly in whom the
power is expressly vested) are devoid of constitutional and
legal basis."176 (Emphasis supplied)
From the foregoing discussion, the principle may be inferred that the
President - in the course of conducting peace negotiations - may validly
consider implementing even those policies that require changes to the
Constitution, but she may not unilaterally implement them without the
intervention of Congress, or act in any way as if the assent of that
body were assumed as a certainty.

It will be observed that the President has authority, as stated in her oath of
office,178 only to preserve and defend the Constitution. Such presidential
power does not, however, extend to allowing her to change the
Constitution, but simply to recommend proposed amendments or revision.
As long as she limits herself to recommending these changes and submits
to the proper procedure for constitutional amendments and revision, her
mere recommendation need not be construed as an unconstitutional act.
The foregoing discussion focused on the President's authority to propose
constitutional amendments, since her authority to propose new
legislation is not in controversy. It has been an accepted practice for
Presidents in this jurisdiction to propose new legislation. One of the more
prominent instances the practice is usually done is in the yearly State of
the Nation Address of the President to Congress. Moreover, the annual
general appropriations bill has always been based on the budget prepared
by the President, which - for all intents and purposes - is a proposal for new
legislation coming from the President. 179
The "suspensive clause" in the MOA-AD viewed in light of the
above-discussed standards

Since, under the present Constitution, the people also have the power to
directly propose amendments through initiative and referendum, the
President may also submit her recommendations to the people, not as a
formal proposal to be voted on in a plebiscite similar to what President
Marcos did in Sanidad, but for their independent consideration of whether
these recommendations merit being formally proposed through initiative.

Given the limited nature of the President's authority to propose

constitutional amendments, she cannot guarantee to any third party that
the required amendments will eventually be put in place, nor even be
submitted to a plebiscite. The most she could do is submit these proposals
as recommendations either to Congress or the people, in whom constituent
powers are vested.

These recommendations, however, may amount to nothing more than the

President's suggestions to the people, for any further involvement in the
process of initiative by the Chief Executive may vitiate its character as a
genuine "people's initiative." The only initiative recognized by the
Constitution is that which truly proceeds from the people. As the Court
stated in Lambino v. COMELEC:177

Paragraph 7 on Governance of the MOA-AD states, however, that all

provisions thereof which cannot be reconciled with the present Constitution
and laws "shall come into force upon signing of a Comprehensive Compact
and upon effecting the necessary changes to the legal framework." This
stipulation does not bear the marks of a suspensive condition - defined in
civil law as a future and uncertain event - but of a term. It is not a question
of whether the necessary changes to the legal framework will be effected,
but when. That there is no uncertainty being contemplated is plain from
what follows, for the paragraph goes on to state that the contemplated
changes shall be "with due regard to non derogation of prior agreements
and within the stipulated timeframe to be contained in the Comprehensive
Compact."

"The Lambino Group claims that their initiative is the people's

voice.' However, the Lambino Group unabashedly states in ULAP
Resolution No. 2006-02, in the verification of their petition with the
COMELEC, that ULAP maintains its unqualified support to the
agenda of Her Excellency President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo for
constitutional reforms.' The Lambino Group thus admits that their
people's' initiative is an unqualified support to the agenda' of
the incumbent President to change the Constitution. This forewarns
the Court to be wary of incantations of people's voice' or
sovereign will' in the present initiative."

Pursuant to this stipulation, therefore, it is mandatory for the GRP to

effect the changes to the legal framework contemplated in the MOA-AD which changes would include constitutional amendments, as discussed
earlier. It bears noting that,

By the time these changes are put in place, the MOA-AD itself
would be counted among the "prior agreements" from which there
could be no derogation.
What remains for discussion in the Comprehensive Compact would merely
be the implementing details for these "consensus points" and, notably, the
deadline for effecting the contemplated changes to the legal framework.
Plainly, stipulation-paragraph 7 on GOVERNANCE is inconsistent with
the limits of the President's authority to propose constitutional
amendments, it being a virtual guarantee that the Constitution and the
laws of the Republic of the Philippines will certainly be adjusted to conform
to all the "consensus points" found in the MOA-AD. Hence, it must be
struck down as unconstitutional.
A comparison between the "suspensive clause" of the MOA-AD with a
similar provision appearing in the 1996 final peace agreement between the
MNLF and the GRP is most instructive.
As a backdrop, the parties to the 1996 Agreement stipulated that it would
be implemented in two phases. Phase I covered a three-year transitional
period involving the putting up of new administrative structures through
Executive Order, such as the Special Zone of Peace and Development
(SZOPAD) and the Southern Philippines Council for Peace and Development
(SPCPD), while Phase II covered the establishment of the new regional
autonomous government through amendment or repeal of R.A. No. 6734,
which was then the Organic Act of the ARMM.
The stipulations on Phase II consisted of specific agreements on the
structure of the expanded autonomous region envisioned by the parties. To
that extent, they are similar to the provisions of the MOA-AD. There is,
however, a crucial difference between the two agreements. While the MOAAD virtually guarantees that the "necessary changes to the legal
framework" will be put in place, the GRP-MNLF final peace agreement
states thus: "Accordingly, these provisions [on Phase II] shall be
recommended by the GRP to Congress for incorporation in the
amendatory or repealing law."
Concerns have been raised that the MOA-AD would have given rise to a
binding international law obligation on the part of the Philippines to change
its Constitution in conformity thereto, on the ground that it may be
considered either as a binding agreement under international law, or a
unilateral declaration of the Philippine government to the international
community that it would grant to the Bangsamoro people all the
concessions therein stated. Neither ground finds sufficient support in
international law, however.

The MOA-AD, as earlier mentioned in the overview thereof, would have

included foreign dignitaries as signatories. In addition, representatives of
other nations were invited to witness its signing in Kuala Lumpur. These
circumstances readily lead one to surmise that the MOA-AD would have
had the status of a binding international agreement had it been signed. An
examination of the prevailing principles in international law, however,
leads to the contrary conclusion.
The Decision on Challenge to Jurisdiction: Lom Accord Amnesty 180 (the
Lom Accord case) of the Special Court of Sierra Leone is enlightening. The
Lom Accord was a peace agreement signed on July 7, 1999 between the
Government of Sierra Leone and the Revolutionary United Front (RUF), a
rebel group with which the Sierra Leone Government had been in armed
conflict for around eight years at the time of signing. There were noncontracting signatories to the agreement, among which were the
Government of the Togolese Republic, the Economic Community of West
African States, and the UN.
On January 16, 2002, after a successful negotiation between the UN
Secretary-General and the Sierra Leone Government, another agreement
was entered into by the UN and that Government whereby the Special
Court of Sierra Leone was established. The sole purpose of the Special
Court, an international court, was to try persons who bore the greatest
responsibility for serious violations of international humanitarian law and
Sierra Leonean law committed in the territory of Sierra Leone since
November 30, 1996.
Among the stipulations of the Lom Accord was a provision for the full
pardon of the members of the RUF with respect to anything done by them
in pursuit of their objectives as members of that organization since the
conflict began.
In the Lom Accord case, the Defence argued that the Accord created an
internationally binding obligation not to prosecute the beneficiaries of
the amnesty provided therein, citing, among other things, the participation
of foreign dignitaries and international organizations in the finalization of
that agreement. The Special Court, however, rejected this argument, ruling
that the Lome Accord is not a treaty and that it can only create binding
obligations and rights between the parties in municipal law, not in
international law. Hence, the Special Court held, it is ineffective in
depriving an international court like it of jurisdiction.
"37. In regard to the nature of a negotiated settlement of an
internal armed conflict it is easy to assume and to argue with
some degree of plausibility, as Defence counsel for the
defendants seem to have done, that the mere fact that in

addition to the parties to the conflict, the document

formalizing the settlement is signed by foreign heads of
state or their representatives and representatives of
international organizations, means the agreement of the
parties is internationalized so as to create obligations in
international law.
xxxx
40. Almost every conflict resolution will involve the parties to the
conflict and the mediator or facilitator of the settlement, or persons
or bodies under whose auspices the settlement took place but who
are not at all parties to the conflict, are not contracting parties and
who do not claim any obligation from the contracting parties or
incur any obligation from the settlement.
41. In this case, the parties to the conflict are the lawful
authority of the State and the RUF which has no status of
statehood and is to all intents and purposes a faction
within the state. The non-contracting signatories of the
Lom Agreement were moral guarantors of the principle
that, in the terms of Article XXXIV of the Agreement, "this
peace agreement is implemented with integrity and in good
faith by both parties". The moral guarantors assumed no
legal obligation. It is recalled that the UN by its representative
appended, presumably for avoidance of doubt, an understanding of
the extent of the agreement to be implemented as not including
certain international crimes.
42. An international agreement in the nature of a treaty must
create rights and obligations regulated by international law so that
a breach of its terms will be a breach determined under
international law which will also provide principle means of
enforcement. The Lom Agreement created neither rights
nor obligations capable of being regulated by international
law. An agreement such as the Lom Agreement which
brings to an end an internal armed conflict no doubt
creates a factual situation of restoration of peace that the
international community acting through the Security
Council may take note of. That, however, will not convert it
to an international agreement which creates an obligation
enforceable in international, as distinguished from
municipal, law. A breach of the terms of such a peace agreement
resulting in resumption of internal armed conflict or creating a
threat to peace in the determination of the Security Council may
indicate a reversal of the factual situation of peace to be visited

with possible legal consequences arising from the new situation of

conflict created. Such consequences such as action by the Security
Council pursuant to Chapter VII arise from the situation and not
from the agreement, nor from the obligation imposed by it. Such
action cannot be regarded as a remedy for the breach. A peace
agreement which settles an internal armed conflict cannot
be ascribed the same status as one which settles an
international armed conflict which, essentially, must be
between two or more warring States. The Lom Agreement
cannot be characterised as an international instrument. x x
x" (Emphasis, italics and underscoring supplied)
Similarly, that the MOA-AD would have been signed by representatives of
States and international organizations not parties to the Agreement would
not have sufficed to vest in it a binding character under international law.
In another vein, concern has been raised that the MOA-AD would amount
to a unilateral declaration of the Philippine State, binding under
international law, that it would comply with all the stipulations stated
therein, with the result that it would have to amend its Constitution
accordingly regardless of the true will of the people. Cited as authority for
this view is Australia v. France,181 also known as the Nuclear Tests Case,
decided by the International Court of Justice (ICJ).
In the Nuclear Tests Case, Australia challenged before the ICJ the legality of
France's nuclear tests in the South Pacific. France refused to appear in the
case, but public statements from its President, and similar statements from
other French officials including its Minister of Defence, that its 1974 series
of atmospheric tests would be its last, persuaded the ICJ to dismiss the
case.182 Those statements, the ICJ held, amounted to a legal undertaking
addressed to the international community, which required no acceptance
from other States for it to become effective.
Essential to the ICJ ruling is its finding that the French government
intended to be bound to the international community in issuing its public
statements, viz:
43. It is well recognized that declarations made by way of
unilateral acts, concerning legal or factual situations, may have the
effect of creating legal obligations. Declarations of this kind may
be, and often are, very specific. When it is the intention of the
State making the declaration that it should become bound
according to its terms, that intention confers on the
declaration the character of a legal undertaking, the State
being thenceforth legally required to follow a course of
conduct consistent with the declaration. An undertaking of

this kind, if given publicly, and with an intent to be bound, even

though not made within the context of international negotiations, is
binding. In these circumstances, nothing in the nature of a quid pro
quo nor any subsequent acceptance of the declaration, nor even
any reply or reaction from other States, is required for the
declaration to take effect, since such a requirement would be
inconsistent with the strictly unilateral nature of the juridical act by
which the pronouncement by the State was made.
44. Of course, not all unilateral acts imply obligation; but a
State may choose to take up a certain position in relation
to a particular matter with the intention of being bound-the
intention is to be ascertained by interpretation of the act.
When States make statements by which their freedom of action is
to be limited, a restrictive interpretation is called for.
xxxx
51. In announcing that the 1974 series of atmospheric tests
would be the last, the French Government conveyed to the
world at large, including the Applicant, its intention
effectively to terminate these tests. It was bound to
assume that other States might take note of these
statements and rely on their being effective. The validity of
these statements and their legal consequences must be
considered within the general framework of the security of
international intercourse, and the confidence and trust which
are so essential in the relations among States. It is from the
actual substance of these statements, and from the
circumstances attending their making, that the legal
implications of the unilateral act must be deduced. The
objects of these statements are clear and they were
addressed to the international community as a whole, and
the Court holds that they constitute an undertaking
possessing legal effect. The Court considers *270 that the
President of the Republic, in deciding upon the effective cessation
of atmospheric tests, gave an undertaking to the international
community to which his words were addressed. x x x (Emphasis
and underscoring supplied)
As gathered from the above-quoted ruling of the ICJ, public statements of a
state representative may be construed as a unilateral declaration only
when the following conditions are present: the statements were clearly
addressed to the international community, the state intended to be bound
to that community by its statements, and that not to give legal effect to
those statements would be detrimental to the security of international

intercourse. Plainly, unilateral declarations arise only in peculiar

circumstances.
The limited applicability of the Nuclear Tests Case ruling was recognized in
a later case decided by the ICJ entitled Burkina Faso v. Mali,183 also known
as the Case Concerning the Frontier Dispute. The public declaration subject
of that case was a statement made by the President of Mali, in an interview
by a foreign press agency, that Mali would abide by the decision to be
issued by a commission of the Organization of African Unity on a frontier
dispute then pending between Mali and Burkina Faso.
Unlike in the Nuclear Tests Case, the ICJ held that the statement of Mali's
President was not a unilateral act with legal implications. It clarified that its
ruling in the Nuclear Tests case rested on the peculiar circumstances
surrounding the French declaration subject thereof, to wit:
40. In order to assess the intentions of the author of a unilateral
act, account must be taken of all the factual circumstances in
which the act occurred. For example, in the Nuclear Tests cases,
the Court took the view that since the applicant States
were not the only ones concerned at the possible
continuance of atmospheric testing by the French
Government, that Government's unilateral declarations had
conveyed to the world at large, including the Applicant, its
intention effectively to terminate these tests (I.C.J. Reports
1974, p. 269, para. 51; p. 474, para. 53). In the particular
circumstances of those cases, the French Government
could not express an intention to be bound otherwise than
by unilateral declarations. It is difficult to see how it could
have accepted the terms of a negotiated solution with each
of the applicants without thereby jeopardizing its
contention that its conduct was lawful. The circumstances
of the present case are radically different. Here, there was
nothing to hinder the Parties from manifesting an intention
to accept the binding character of the conclusions of the
Organization of African Unity Mediation Commission by the
normal method: a formal agreement on the basis of
reciprocity. Since no agreement of this kind was concluded
between the Parties, the Chamber finds that there are no grounds
to interpret the declaration made by Mali's head of State on 11
April 1975 as a unilateral act with legal implications in regard to
the present case. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Assessing the MOA-AD in light of the above criteria, it would not have
amounted to a unilateral declaration on the part of the Philippine State to
the international community. The Philippine panel did not draft the same

with the clear intention of being bound thereby to the international

community as a whole or to any State, but only to the MILF. While there
were States and international organizations involved, one way or another,
in the negotiation and projected signing of the MOA-AD, they participated
merely as witnesses or, in the case of Malaysia, as facilitator. As held in the
Lom Accord case, the mere fact that in addition to the parties to the
conflict, the peace settlement is signed by representatives of states and
international organizations does not mean that the agreement is
internationalized so as to create obligations in international law.
Since the commitments in the MOA-AD were not addressed to States, not
to give legal effect to such commitments would not be detrimental to the
security of international intercourse - to the trust and confidence essential
in the relations among States.
In one important respect, the circumstances surrounding the MOA-AD are
closer to that of Burkina Faso wherein, as already discussed, the Mali
President's statement was not held to be a binding unilateral declaration
by the ICJ. As in that case, there was also nothing to hinder the Philippine
panel, had it really been its intention to be bound to other States, to
manifest that intention by formal agreement. Here, that formal agreement
would have come about by the inclusion in the MOA-AD of a clear
commitment to be legally bound to the international community, not just
the MILF, and by an equally clear indication that the signatures of the
participating states-representatives would constitute an acceptance of that
commitment. Entering into such a formal agreement would not have
resulted in a loss of face for the Philippine government before the
international community, which was one of the difficulties that prevented
the French Government from entering into a formal agreement with other
countries. That the Philippine panel did not enter into such a formal
agreement suggests that it had no intention to be bound to the
international community. On that ground, the MOA-AD may not be
considered a unilateral declaration under international law.
The MOA-AD not being a document that can bind the Philippines under
international law notwithstanding, respondents' almost consummated act
of guaranteeing amendments to the legal framework is, by itself,
sufficient to constitute grave abuse of discretion. The grave abuse
lies not in the fact that they considered, as a solution to the Moro Problem,
the creation of a state within a state, but in their brazen willingness to
guarantee that Congress and the sovereign Filipino people would
give their imprimatur to their solution. Upholding such an act would
amount to authorizing a usurpation of the constituent powers vested only
in Congress, a Constitutional Convention, or the people themselves
through the process of initiative, for the only way that the Executive can
ensure the outcome of the amendment process is through an undue
influence or interference with that process.

The sovereign people may, if it so desired, go to the extent of giving up a

portion of its own territory to the Moros for the sake of peace, for it can
change the Constitution in any it wants, so long as the change is not
inconsistent with what, in international law, is known as Jus Cogens.184
Respondents, however, may not preempt it in that decision.
SUMMARY
The petitions are ripe for adjudication. The failure of respondents to consult
the local government units or communities affected constitutes a
departure by respondents from their mandate under E.O. No. 3. Moreover,
respondents exceeded their authority by the mere act of guaranteeing
amendments to the Constitution. Any alleged violation of the Constitution
by any branch of government is a proper matter for judicial review.
As the petitions involve constitutional issues which are of paramount public
interest or of transcendental importance, the Court grants the petitioners,
petitioners-in-intervention and intervening respondents the requisite locus
standi in keeping with the liberal stance adopted in David v. MacapagalArroyo.
Contrary to the assertion of respondents that the non-signing of the MOAAD and the eventual dissolution of the GRP Peace Panel mooted the
present petitions, the Court finds that the present petitions provide an
exception to the "moot and academic" principle in view of (a) the grave
violation of the Constitution involved; (b) the exceptional character of the
situation and paramount public interest; (c) the need to formulate
controlling principles to guide the bench, the bar, and the public; and (d)
the fact that the case is capable of repetition yet evading review.
The MOA-AD is a significant part of a series of agreements necessary to
carry out the GRP-MILF Tripoli Agreement on Peace signed by the
government and the MILF back in June 2001. Hence, the present MOA-AD
can be renegotiated or another one drawn up that could contain similar or
significantly dissimilar provisions compared to the original.
The Court, however, finds that the prayers for mandamus have been
rendered moot in view of the respondents' action in providing the Court
and the petitioners with the official copy of the final draft of the MOA-AD
and its annexes.
The people's right to information on matters of public concern under Sec.
7, Article III of the Constitution is in splendid symmetry with the state
policy of full public disclosure of all its transactions involving public interest
under Sec. 28, Article II of the Constitution. The right to information
guarantees the right of the people to demand information, while Section 28

recognizes the duty of officialdom to give information even if nobody

demands. The complete and effective exercise of the right to information
necessitates that its complementary provision on public disclosure derive
the same self-executory nature, subject only to reasonable safeguards or
limitations as may be provided by law.
The contents of the MOA-AD is a matter of paramount public concern
involving public interest in the highest order. In declaring that the right to
information contemplates steps and negotiations leading to the
consummation of the contract, jurisprudence finds no distinction as to the
executory nature or commercial character of the agreement.
An essential element of these twin freedoms is to keep a continuing
dialogue or process of communication between the government and the
people. Corollary to these twin rights is the design for feedback
mechanisms. The right to public consultation was envisioned to be a
species of these public rights.
At least three pertinent laws animate these constitutional imperatives and
justify the exercise of the people's right to be consulted on relevant
matters relating to the peace agenda.
One, E.O. No. 3 itself is replete with mechanics for continuing consultations
on both national and local levels and for a principal forum for consensusbuilding. In fact, it is the duty of the Presidential Adviser on the Peace
Process to conduct regular dialogues to seek relevant information,
comments, advice, and recommendations from peace partners and
concerned sectors of society.
Two, Republic Act No. 7160 or the Local Government Code of 1991 requires
all national offices to conduct consultations before any project or program
critical to the environment and human ecology including those that may
call for the eviction of a particular group of people residing in such locality,
is implemented therein. The MOA-AD is one peculiar program that
unequivocally and unilaterally vests ownership of a vast territory to the
Bangsamoro people, which could pervasively and drastically result to the
diaspora or displacement of a great number of inhabitants from their total
environment.
Three, Republic Act No. 8371 or the Indigenous Peoples Rights Act of 1997
provides for clear-cut procedure for the recognition and delineation of
ancestral domain, which entails, among other things, the observance of
the free and prior informed consent of the Indigenous Cultural
Communities/Indigenous Peoples. Notably, the statute does not grant the
Executive Department or any government agency the power to delineate

and recognize an ancestral domain claim by mere agreement or

compromise.
The invocation of the doctrine of executive privilege as a defense to the
general right to information or the specific right to consultation is
untenable. The various explicit legal provisions fly in the face of executive
secrecy. In any event, respondents effectively waived such defense after it
unconditionally disclosed the official copies of the final draft of the MOAAD, for judicial compliance and public scrutiny.
In sum, the Presidential Adviser on the Peace Process committed grave
abuse of discretion when he failed to carry out the pertinent consultation
process, as mandated by E.O. No. 3, Republic Act No. 7160, and Republic
Act No. 8371. The furtive process by which the MOA-AD was designed and
crafted runs contrary to and in excess of the legal authority, and amounts
to a whimsical, capricious, oppressive, arbitrary and despotic exercise
thereof. It illustrates a gross evasion of positive duty and a virtual refusal to
perform the duty enjoined.
The MOA-AD cannot be reconciled with the present Constitution and laws.
Not only its specific provisions but the very concept underlying them,
namely, the associative relationship envisioned between the GRP and the
BJE, are unconstitutional, for the concept presupposes that the
associated entity is a state and implies that the same is on its way to
independence.
While there is a clause in the MOA-AD stating that the provisions thereof
inconsistent with the present legal framework will not be effective until
that framework is amended, the same does not cure its defect. The
inclusion of provisions in the MOA-AD establishing an associative
relationship between the BJE and the Central Government is, itself, a
violation of the Memorandum of Instructions From The President dated
March 1, 2001, addressed to the government peace panel. Moreover, as
the clause is worded, it virtually guarantees that the necessary
amendments to the Constitution and the laws will eventually be put in
place. Neither the GRP Peace Panel nor the President herself is authorized
to make such a guarantee. Upholding such an act would amount to
authorizing a usurpation of the constituent powers vested only in
Congress, a Constitutional Convention, or the people themselves through
the process of initiative, for the only way that the Executive can ensure the
outcome of the amendment process is through an undue influence or
interference with that process.
While the MOA-AD would not amount to an international agreement or
unilateral declaration binding on the Philippines under international law,

respondents' act of guaranteeing amendments is, by itself, already a

constitutional violation that renders the MOA-AD fatally defective.
WHEREFORE, respondents' motion to dismiss is DENIED. The main and
intervening petitions are GIVEN DUE COURSE and hereby GRANTED.

In this original petition for mandamus,1 petitioners Social Justice Society

(SJS), Vladimir Alarique T. Cabigao and Bonifacio S. Tumbokon seek to
compel respondent Hon. Jose L. Atienza, Jr., mayor of the City of Manila, to
enforce Ordinance No. 8027.
The antecedents are as follows.

The Memorandum of Agreement on the Ancestral Domain Aspect of the

GRP-MILF Tripoli Agreement on Peace of 2001 is declared contrary to law
and the Constitution.
SO ORDERED.

On November 20, 2001, the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Manila enacted

Ordinance No. 8027.2 Respondent mayor approved the ordinance on
November 28, 2001.3 It became effective on December 28, 2001, after its
publication.4
Ordinance No. 8027 was enacted pursuant to the police power delegated
to local government units, a principle described as the power inherent in a
government to enact laws, within constitutional limits, to promote the
order, safety, health, morals and general welfare of the society.5 This is
evident from Sections 1 and 3 thereof which state:
SECTION 1. For the purpose of promoting sound urban planning and
ensuring health, public safety, and general welfare of the residents of
Pandacan and Sta. Ana as well as its adjoining areas, the land use of
[those] portions of land bounded by the Pasig River in the north, PNR
Railroad Track in the east, Beata St. in the south, Palumpong St. in the
southwest, and Estero de Pancacan in the west[,] PNR Railroad in the
northwest area, Estero de Pandacan in the [n]ortheast, Pasig River in the
southeast and Dr. M.L. Carreon in the southwest. The area of Punta, Sta.
Ana bounded by the Pasig River, Marcelino Obrero St., Mayo 28 St., and F.
Manalo Street, are hereby reclassified from Industrial II to Commercial I.
xxx xxx xxx

G.R. No. 156052

March 7, 2007

SOCIAL JUSTICE SOCIETY (SJS), VLADIMIR ALARIQUE T. CABIGAO,

and BONIFACIO S. TUMBOKON, Petitioners,
vs.
HON. JOSE L. ATIENZA, JR., in his capacity as Mayor of the City of
Manila, Respondent.
DECISION
CORONA, J.:

SEC. 3. Owners or operators of industries and other businesses, the

operation of which are no longer permitted under Section 1 hereof, are
hereby given a period of six (6) months from the date of effectivity of this
Ordinance within which to cease and desist from the operation of
businesses which are hereby in consequence, disallowed.
Ordinance No. 8027 reclassified the area described therein from industrial
to commercial and directed the owners and operators of businesses
disallowed under Section 1 to cease and desist from operating their
businesses within six months from the date of effectivity of the ordinance.
Among the businesses situated in the area are the so-called "Pandacan
Terminals" of the oil companies Caltex (Philippines), Inc., Petron
Corporation and Pilipinas Shell Petroleum Corporation.

However, on June 26, 2002, the City of Manila and the Department of
Energy (DOE) entered into a memorandum of understanding (MOU)6 with
the oil companies in which they agreed that "the scaling down of the
Pandacan Terminals [was] the most viable and practicable option." Under
the MOU, the oil companies agreed to perform the following:
Section 1. - Consistent with the objectives stated above, the OIL
COMPANIES shall, upon signing of this MOU, undertake a program to scale
down the Pandacan Terminals which shall include, among others, the
immediate removal/decommissioning process of TWENTY EIGHT (28) tanks
starting with the LPG spheres and the commencing of works for the
creation of safety buffer and green zones surrounding the Pandacan
Terminals. xxx
Section 2. Consistent with the scale-down program mentioned above,
the OIL COMPANIES shall establish joint operations and management,
including the operation of common, integrated and/or shared facilities,
consistent with international and domestic technical, safety, environmental
and economic considerations and standards. Consequently, the joint
operations of the OIL COMPANIES in the Pandacan Terminals shall be
limited to the common and integrated areas/facilities. A separate
agreement covering the commercial and operational terms and conditions
of the joint operations, shall be entered into by the OIL COMPANIES.
Section 3. - The development and maintenance of the safety and green
buffer zones mentioned therein, which shall be taken from the properties of
the OIL COMPANIES and not from the surrounding communities, shall be
the sole responsibility of the OIL COMPANIES.
The City of Manila and the DOE, on the other hand, committed to do the
following:
Section 1. - The City Mayor shall endorse to the City Council this MOU for
its appropriate action with the view of implementing the spirit and intent
thereof.
Section 2. - The City Mayor and the DOE shall, consistent with the spirit
and intent of this MOU, enable the OIL COMPANIES to continuously operate
in compliance with legal requirements, within the limited area resulting
from the joint operations and the scale down program.
Section 3. - The DOE and the City Mayor shall monitor the OIL
COMPANIES compliance with the provisions of this MOU.

Section 4. - The CITY OF MANILA and the national government shall

protect the safety buffer and green zones and shall exert all efforts at
preventing future occupation or encroachment into these areas by illegal
settlers and other unauthorized parties.
The Sangguniang Panlungsod ratified the MOU in Resolution No. 97.7 In the
same resolution, the Sanggunian declared that the MOU was effective only
for a period of six months starting July 25, 2002.8 Thereafter, on January
30, 2003, the Sanggunian adopted Resolution No. 139 extending the
validity of Resolution No. 97 to April 30, 2003 and authorizing Mayor
Atienza to issue special business permits to the oil companies. Resolution
No. 13, s. 2003 also called for a reassessment of the ordinance.10
Meanwhile, petitioners filed this original action for mandamus on
December 4, 2002 praying that Mayor Atienza be compelled to enforce
Ordinance No. 8027 and order the immediate removal of the terminals of
the oil companies.11
The issues raised by petitioners are as follows:
1. whether respondent has the mandatory legal duty to enforce
Ordinance No. 8027 and order the removal of the Pandacan
Terminals, and
2. whether the June 26, 2002 MOU and the resolutions ratifying it
can amend or repeal Ordinance No. 8027.12
Petitioners contend that respondent has the mandatory legal duty, under
Section 455 (b) (2) of the Local Government Code (RA 7160),13 to enforce
Ordinance No. 8027 and order the removal of the Pandacan Terminals of
the oil companies. Instead, he has allowed them to stay.
Respondents defense is that Ordinance No. 8027 has been superseded by
the MOU and the resolutions.14 However, he also confusingly argues that
the ordinance and MOU are not inconsistent with each other and that the
latter has not amended the former. He insists that the ordinance remains
valid and in full force and effect and that the MOU did not in any way
prevent him from enforcing and implementing it. He maintains that the
MOU should be considered as a mere guideline for its full
implementation.15
Under Rule 65, Section 316 of the Rules of Court, a petition for mandamus
may be filed when any tribunal, corporation, board, officer or person
unlawfully neglects the performance of an act which the law specifically
enjoins as a duty resulting from an office, trust or station. Mandamus is an

extraordinary writ that is employed to compel the performance, when

refused, of a ministerial duty that is already imposed on the respondent
and there is no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary
course of law. The petitioner should have a well-defined, clear and certain
legal right to the performance of the act and it must be the clear and
imperative duty of respondent to do the act required to be done.17

The question now is whether the MOU entered into by respondent with the
oil companies and the subsequent resolutions passed by the Sanggunian
have made the respondents duty to enforce Ordinance No. 8027 doubtful,
unclear or uncertain. This is also connected to the second issue raised by
petitioners, that is, whether the MOU and Resolution Nos. 97, s. 2002 and
13, s. 2003 of the Sanggunian can amend or repeal Ordinance No. 8027.

Mandamus will not issue to enforce a right, or to compel compliance with a

duty, which is questionable or over which a substantial doubt exists. The
principal function of the writ of mandamus is to command and to expedite,
not to inquire and to adjudicate; thus, it is neither the office nor the aim of
the writ to secure a legal right but to implement that which is already
established. Unless the right to the relief sought is unclouded, mandamus
will not issue.18

We need not resolve this issue. Assuming that the terms of the MOU were
inconsistent with Ordinance No. 8027, the resolutions which ratified it and
made it binding on the City of Manila expressly gave it full force and effect
only until April 30, 2003. Thus, at present, there is nothing that legally
hinders respondent from enforcing Ordinance No. 8027.24

To support the assertion that petitioners have a clear legal right to the
enforcement of the ordinance, petitioner SJS states that it is a political
party registered with the Commission on Elections and has its offices in
Manila. It claims to have many members who are residents of Manila. The
other petitioners, Cabigao and Tumbokon, are allegedly residents of Manila.
We need not belabor this point. We have ruled in previous cases that when
a mandamus proceeding concerns a public right and its object is to compel
a public duty, the people who are interested in the execution of the laws
are regarded as the real parties in interest and they need not show any
specific interest.19 Besides, as residents of Manila, petitioners have a
direct interest in the enforcement of the citys ordinances. Respondent
never questioned the right of petitioners to institute this proceeding.

Ordinance No. 8027 was enacted right after the Philippines, along with the
rest of the world, witnessed the horror of the September 11, 2001 attack
on the Twin Towers of the World Trade Center in New York City. The
objective of the ordinance is to protect the residents of Manila from the
catastrophic devastation that will surely occur in case of a terrorist
attack25 on the Pandacan Terminals. No reason exists why such a
protective measure should be delayed.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. Respondent Hon. Jose L.
Atienza, Jr., as mayor of the City of Manila, is directed to immediately
enforce Ordinance No. 8027.
SO ORDERED.

On the other hand, the Local Government Code imposes upon respondent
the duty, as city mayor, to "enforce all laws and ordinances relative to the
governance of the city.">20 One of these is Ordinance No. 8027. As the
chief executive of the city, he has the duty to enforce Ordinance No. 8027
as long as it has not been repealed by the Sanggunian or annulled by the
courts.21 He has no other choice. It is his ministerial duty to do so. In
Dimaporo v. Mitra, Jr.,22 we stated the reason for this:
These officers cannot refuse to perform their duty on the ground of an
alleged invalidity of the statute imposing the duty. The reason for this is
obvious. It might seriously hinder the transaction of public business if these
officers were to be permitted in all cases to question the constitutionality
of statutes and ordinances imposing duties upon them and which have not
judicially been declared unconstitutional. Officers of the government from
the highest to the lowest are creatures of the law and are bound to obey
it.23

PROPERTY
G.R. No. 114299 September 24, 1999
TRADERS
ROYAL
BANK, petitioner,
vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS, PATRIA, RUBY ANN, MARGARITA, ROSARIO, CYNTHIA,
LINDA JOY, all surnamed CAPAY and RAMON A. GONZALES, respondents.
G.R. No. 118862 September 24, 1999

PATRIA, RUBY ANN, MARGARITA, ROSARIO, CYNTHIA, LINDA JOY, all surnamed CAPAY,
and
RAMON
A.
GONZALES, petitioners,
vs.
SPS. HONORATO D. SANTOS and MARIA CRISTINA S. SANTOS, SPS. CECILIO L. PE and
JOSEFINA L. PE, FLORA LARON WESCOMBE, SPS. TELESFORO P. ALFELOR II and LIZA
R. ALFELOR, SPS. DEAN RODERICK FERNANDO and LAARNI MAGDAMO FERNANDO,
REMEDIOS OCA, DEVELOPMENT BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES and TRADERS ROYAL
BANK, respondents.

KAPUNAN, J.:
The present controversy has its roots in a mortgage executed by the spouses Maximo and
Patria Capay in favor of Traders Royal Bank (TRB) pursuant to a loan extended by the latter to
the former. The mortgage covered several properties, including a parcel of land, the subject of
the
present
dispute. 1 The loan became due on January 8, 1964 and the same having remained unpaid, TRB
instituted extra-judicial foreclosure proceedings upon the mortgaged property.
To prevent the property's sale by public auction, the Capays, on September 22, 1966, filed a
petition for prohibition with preliminary injunction (Civil Case No. Q-10453) before the Court of
First Instance (CFI) of Rizal, alleging that the mortgage was void since they did not receive the
proceeds of the loan. The trial court initially granted the Capays' prayer for preliminary injunction.
On March 17, 1967, the Capays caused to be filed in the Register of Deeds of Baguio City a
notice of lis pendens over the disputed property. Said notice was entered in the Day Book, as
well as in the Capays' certificate of title.
Subsequently, the injunction issued by the trial court was lifted thus allowing the foreclosure sale
to proceed. Foreclosure proceedings were initiated and on October 17, 1968, the property was
sold to TRB which was the highest bidder at the auction sale. A sheriff certificate of sale was
issued in its name on the same day. On February 25, 1970, the property was consolidated in the
name of TRB, the sole bidder in the sale. TCT No. T-6595 in the name of the Capay spouses
was then cancelled and a new one, TCT No. T-16272, 2 was entered in the bank's name. The
notice of lis pendens, however, was not carried over in the certificate of title issued in the name
TRB.
Thereafter, the Capays filed with the CFI a supplemental complaint praying for the recovery of
the property with damages and attorney's fees. Trial in Civil Case No. Q-10453 proceeded and,
on October 3, 1977, the CFI rendered its decision declaring the mortgage void for want of
consideration. The CFI ordered, among other things, the cancellation of TCT No. T-16272 in the
name of TRB and the issuance of new certificates of title in the name of the Capay spouses.
TRB appealed to the Court of Appeals. While the case was pending in the Court of Appeals,
TRB on March 17, 1982 sold the land to Emelita Santiago in whose name a new certificate of
title, TCT No. 33774, 3 was issued, also, without any notice of lis pendens annotated thereon.
Santiago in turn divided the land into six (6) lots and sold these to Marcial Alcantara, Armando
Cruz and Artemio Sanchez, who became co-owners thereof. 4 Alcantara and his co-owners
developed the property and thereafter sold the six (6) lots to seperate buyers who issued
seperate titles, again, bearing no notice of lis pendens. 5
On July 30, 1982, the Court of Appeals rendered its decision modifying the decision of the trial
court as to the award of damages but affirming the same in all other respects.
For having been filed out of time and for lack of merit, the petition for certiorari filed by TRB
before this Court 6 was denied in a Resolution dated September 12, 1983. TRB's motion for
reconsideration was similarly denied in a Resolution dated October 12, 1983. The Court's
September 12, 1983 Resolution having become final and executory on November 9, 1983, the

trial court issued a writ of execution directing the Register of Deeds of Baguio City to cancel TCT
No. 16272 in the name of TRB, and to issue a new one in the name of the Capay spouses.
Said writ, however, could not be implemented because of the successive subsequent transfers
of the subdivided property to buyers who obtained separate titles thereto. Thus, a complaint for
recovery of possession ownership dated 8 June 1985 was filed before the Quezon City Regional
Trial Court against TRB and the subsequent transferees of the property, the respondents in G.R.
No. 118862 (hereinafter, "the non-bank respondents"). Plaintiffs in said case were Patria Capay,
her children by Maximo 7 who succeeded him upon his death on August 25, 1976, and Ramon
Gonzales, counsel of the spouses in Civil Case No. Q-10453 who become co-owner of the
property to the extent of 35% thereof as his attorney's fees (collectively, "the Capays"). On
March 27, 1991, the trial court rendered its decision, the dispositive portion of which states:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiffs against the defendants and
ordering the Register of Deeds for Baguio to cancel TCT No. T-36177, Books 198, Page 177 in
the names of defendants Spouses Honorato D. Santos and Maria Cristina Santos; to cancel
TCT No. 36707, Book 201, Page 107 in the names of defendant Spouses Cecilio Pe and
Josefina L. Pe; to cancel TCT No. T-36051, Book 198, Page 51 in the name of Flora Laron
Wescombe, married to Kevin Lind Wescombe (now deceased); to cancel TCT No. 36147, Book
198, page 147 in the names of Spouses Telesforo P. Alfelor II and Liza R. Alfelor; to cancel TCT
No. T-36730, Book 201, Page 130 in the names of Spouses Dean Roderick Fernando and
Laarni Magdamo Fernando; to cancel TCT No. 37437, Book 205, Page 37 in the name of
Remedios Oca, and issue new ones free from all liens and encumbrances, together with all the
improvements therein in the names of plaintiffs sharing pro indiviso as follows: 35% to Ramon A.
Gonzales, married to Lilia Y. Gonzales, of legal age, with postal address at 23 Sunrise Hill, New
Manila, Quezon City 37.92% to Patria B. Capay, of legal age, widow, Filipino; 5.41% each to
Ruby Ann Capay, of legal age, Filipino married to Pokka Vainio, Finnish citizen; Chona Margarita
Capay, of legal age, Filipino, married to Waldo Flores; Rosario Capay of legal age, Filipino,
married to Jose Cuaycong, Jr.; Cynthia Capay, of legal age, Filipino, married to Raul Flores;
Linda Joy Capay, of legal age, Filipino, married to Pedro Duran, all with postal address at 37
Sampaguita St., Capitolville Subd., Bacolod City, ordering said defendants to vacate the
premises in question and restoring plaintiffs thereto and for defendant Traders Royal Bank to
pay each of the plaintiffs moral damages in the amount of P100,000.00, P40,000.00 in
exemplary damages and P40,000.00 as attorney's fees, all with legal interest from the filing of
the complaint, with costs against defendants.
SO ORDERED. 8
TRB and the non-bank respondents appealed to the Court of Appeals. In a Decision
promulgated on February 24, 1994 in CA-G.R. CV No. 33920, the appellate court affirmed the
decision of the trial court in toto. 9 It ruled that the non-bank respondents cannot be considered
as purchasers for value and in good faith, having purchased the property subsequent to the
action in Civil Case No. Q-10453 and that while the notice of lis pendens was not carried over to
TRB's certificate of title, as well as to the subsequent transferees' titles, it was entered in the Day
Book which is sufficient to constitute registration and notice to all persons of such adverse claim,
citing the cases of Villasor vs. Camon,10 Levin vs. Bass 11 and Director of Lands vs. Reyes. 12
As regard TRB, the Court of Appeals said that the bank was in bad faith when it sold the
property knowing that it was under the litigation and without informing the buyer of that fact.
On April 26, 1994, TRB filed with this Court a petition for review to set aside the CA decision,
docketed herein as G.R. No. 114299, invoking the following grounds:
I.
THE RESPONDENT HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED GRAVE AND
SERIOUS ERROR OF LAW IN PROMULGATING THE DISPUTED DECISION AND THEREBY
DECIDED A QUESTION OF SUBSTANCE WHOLLY CONTRARY TO SETTLED

JURISPRUDENCE AND TOTALLY NOT IN ACCORD WITH APPLICABLE DECISION OF THIS

HONORABLE SUPREME COURT.

THE COURT OF APPEALS PALPABLY ERRED IN REVERSING ITSELF BY NOW HOLDING

THAT PETITIONERS ARE GUILTY OF LACHES.

II.

THE RESPONDENT HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS HAS COMMITTED SO GRAVE AND

SERIOUS ERRORS OF LAW IN SANCTIONING A DEPARTURE FROM THE USUAL AND
ACCEPTED COURSE OF JUDICIAL PROCEEDING AS TO CALL FOR THE EXERCISE OF
THE POWER OF BY THIS HONORABLE SUPREME COURT.

THE COURT OF APPEALS PALPABLY ERRED IN REVERSING ITSELF BY NOW HOLDING

THAT THERE IS NO DISTINCTION IN THE REGISTRATION OF VOLUNTARY
INSTRUMENTS VIS-A-VIS INVOLUNTARY INSTRUMENTS.

a) The public respondent has plainly and manifestly acted whimsically, arbitrarily, capriciously,
with grave abuse of discretion, in excess of jurisdiction tantamount to lack of jurisdiction.
xxx xxx xxx
b) The public respondent erred in not finding that it was not the fault of petitioner when the notice
of lis pendens was not carried over to its new title.
xxx xxx xxx
c) The public respondent erred in not finding that PD No. 1271 had legally caused the
invalidation of the Capay's property and the subsequent validation of TRB's title over the same
property was effective even as against the Capays. 13
Meanwhile, the non-bank respondents moved for a reconsideration of the Court of Appeals'
decision. Convinced of the movants' arguments, the Court of Appeals in a Resolution
promulgated on August 10, 1994 granted the motion for reconsideration and dismissed the
complaint as against them. The dispositive portion of the resolution states:
ACCORDINGLY, in view of the foregoing disquisitions and finding merit in the motion for
reconsideration, the same is hereby GRANTED. Consequently, the decision of this Court,
promulgated on February 24, 1994, is hereby RECONSIDERED. The complaint filed against
defendants-appellants with the court a quo is hereby ordered DISMISSED, and the certificate of
titles originally issued to them in their individual names are hereby ordered restored and duly
respected. We make no pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED. 14
The Capays thus filed with this Court a petition for review, docketed as G.R. No. 118862 to set
aside the resolution of the Court of Appeals raising the following errors:
I
THE COURT OF APPEALS PALPABLY ERRED IN REVERSING ITSELF BY NOW HOLDING
THAT TUAZON VS. REYES, 48 PHIL. 814 AND RIVERA VS. MORAN, 48 PHIL. 836 ARE NOT
APPLICABLE HEREOF, WHILE PINO VS. COURT OF APPEALS, 198 SCRA 436, IS
APPLICABLE.
II
THE COURT OF APPEALS PALPABLY ERRED IN REVERSING ITSELF BY NOW HOLDING
THAT ATUN VS. MUNOZ, 97 PHIL. 762 AND LAROZA VS. GUIA, 134 SCRA 34, ARE NOT
APPLICABLE.
III
THE COURT OF APPEALS PALPABLY ERRED IN REVERSING ITSELF BY NOW HOLDING
THAT LEVIN VS. BASS, 91 PHIL. 419 VILLASOR VS. CAMON, 89 PHIL. 404 AND DIRECTOR
OF LANDS VS. REYES, 68 SCRA 73, ARE NOT APPLICABLE HEREOF.
IV

VI
THE COURT OF APPEALS PALPABLY ERRED IN REVERSING ITSELF BY NOW HOLDING
THAT RESPONDENTS WHO ARE LAWYERS, RESPONSIBLE CITIZENS AND WELLRESPECTED RESIDENTS IN THE COMMUNITY, ARE EXEMPTED FROM THE EFFECTS OF
THE CONSTRUCTIVE NOTICE ARISING FROM REGISTRATION.
VII
THE COURT OF APPEALS PALPABLY ERRED IN REVERSING ITSELF WITH REGARDS TO
TRADERS ROYAL BANK, AFTER THE LATTER HAS PERFECTED ITS APPEAL TO THE
SUPREME COURT.
VIII
THE COURT OF APPEALS PALPABLY ERRED IN NOT RULING ON THE COUNTERASSIGNMENT OF ERROR THAT:
B) THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT HOLDING THAT DEFENDANTS ARE BOUND BY
THE DECISION IN CIVIL CASE NO. Q-10453.
Subsequently, G.R. No. 118862 was consolidated with G.R No. 114299, pursuant to this Court's
Resolution dated July 3, 1996. 15
The consolidated cases primarily involve two issues: (1) who, as between the Capays and the
non-bank respondents, has a better right to the disputed property, and (2) whether or not TRB is
liable to the Capays for damages.
On the first issue, we rule for the non-bank respondents.
I
First, when TRB purchased the property at the foreclosure sale, the notice of lis pendens that
the Capays caused to be annotated on their certificate of title was not carried to the new one
issued to TRB. Neither did the certificate of title of Emelita Santiago, who purchased the property
from TRB, contain any such notice. When Santiago caused the property to be divided, six (6)
new certificates of title were issued, none of which contained any notice of lis pendens. Santiago
then sold the lots to Marcial Alcantara and his co-owners who next sold each of these to the
non-bank respondents. The non-bank respondents, therefore, could not have been aware that
the property in question was the subject of litigation when they acquired their respective portions
of said property. There was nothing in the certificates of title or respective predecessors-ininterest that could have aroused their suspicion. The non-bank respondents had a right to rely
on what appeared on the face of the title of their respective predecessors-in-interest, and were
not bound to go beyond the same. To hold otherwise would defeat one of the principal objects of
the Torrens system of land registration, that is, to facilitate transactions involving lands.
The main purpose of the Torrens system is to avoid possible conflicts of title to real estate and to
facilitate transactions relative thereto by giving the public the right to rely upon the face of a
Torrens certificate of title and to dispense with the need of inquiring further, except when the
party concerned has actual knowledge of facts and circumstances that should impel a
reasonably cautious man to make such further inquiry. Where innocent third persons, relying on

the correctness of the certificate of title thus issued, acquire rights over the property, the court
cannot disregard such rights and order the total cancellation of the certificate. The effect of such
an outright cancellation would be to impair public confidence in the certificate of title, for
everyone dealing with property registered under the Torrens system would have to inquire in
every instance as to whether the title has been regularly or irregularly issued by the court. Every
person dealing with registered land may safely rely on the correctness of the certificate of title
issued therefor and the law will in no way oblige him to go beyond the certificate to determine
the condition of the property.
The Torrens system was adopted in this country because it was believed to be the most effective
measure to guarantee the integrity of land titles and to protect their indefeasibility once the claim
of ownership is established and recognized. If a person purchases a piece of land on the
assurance that the seller's title thereto is valid, he should not run the risk of being told later that
his acquisition was ineffectual after all. This would not only be unfair to him. What is worse is
that if this were permitted, public confidence in the system would be eroded and land
transactions would have to be attended by complicated and not necessarily conclusive
investigations and proof of ownership. The further consequence would be that land conflicts
could be even more numerous and complex than they are now and possibly also more abrasive,
if not even violent. The Government, recognizing the worthy purposes of the Torrens system,
should be the first to accept the validity of titles issued thereunder once the conditions laid down
by the law are satisfied. 16
Second, the foregoing rule notwithstanding, the non-bank respondents nevertheless physically
inspected the properties and inquired from the register of Deeds to ascertain the absence of any
defect in the title of the property they were purchasing an exercise of diligence above that
required by law.

A We did because at the time we went there, Mr. Alcantara was there supervising the workers.
Q And who?
A Amado Cruz sir.
Q After you saw this property, what else did you do?
A My first concern then was am I buying a property with a clean title.
Q In regards to this concern of yours, did you find an answer to this concern of yours?
A At first; I asked Mr. Alcantara and I was answered by him.
Q What was his answer?
A That it was a property with a clean title, that he has shown me the mother title and it is a clean
title.
Q Aside from being informed that it is a property with a clean title, did you do anything to answer
your question?
A Yes, sit.
Q What did you do?
A Well, the first step I did was to go to the Land Registration Office.

Thus, respondent Aida Fernando Meeks, who bought Lot 5 for her son Dean, testified:

Q Are you referring to the City Hall of Baguio?

Q How did you come to live in Baguio City, particulary in Kim. 2.5 San Luis, Baguio City?

A Yes, the City Hall of Baguio.

A In one of my visits to my sister who has been residing here for twelve (12) years now, I got
interested in buying a property here.

Q And what did you do in the Registry of Deeds?

Q How did you come to know of this property at Asin Road where you now reside?
A My sister, Ruth Ann Valdez, sir.
Q When this particular property was bought by you, when was that?
A I do not remember the exact date, but it was in 1984, sir.
Q At the time when you went to see the place where you now reside, how did it look?

A We looked for the title, the original title, sir.

Q When you say we, who was your companion?
A Mr. Alcantara and my present husband, sir.
Q The three (3) of you?
A Yes, sir.
Q What title did you see there?

A This particular property that I bought was then a small one (1) room structure, it is a two (2)storey one (1) bedroom structure.

A We saw the title that was made up in favor of Amado Cruz, sir.

Q What kind of structure with regards to material?

Q And what was the result of your looking up for this title in the name of Amado Cruz?

A It is a semi-concrete structure, sir.

A We had to be reassured that it was a genuine one, so we asked Atty. Diomampo who heads
the office. We showed him a copy of that title and we were also reassured by him that anything
that was signed by him was as good as it is.

Q And aside from this two (2)-storey one (1)-room structure, how did the surrounding area look
like at the time you visited?
A There were stone walls from the road and there were stone walls in front of the property and
beside the property.
Q At the time you went to see the property with your agent, rather your sister Ruth Ann Valdez
did you come to know the owner?

Q Did this Atty. Diomampo reassure you that the title was good?
A He did.
Q After your conversation with the Register of Deeds, what did you do?
A The second step we did was to confer with our lawyer, a friend from RCBC Binondo, Manila
this is Atty. Nelson Waje.

Q What is your purpose in going to this lawyer?

A We wanted an assurance that we were getting a valid title just in case we think of buying the
property.

season and it was muddy, we fell on our way going to the property and walked to have an ocular
inspection and physical check on the area, sir.
xxx xxx xxx

Q What was the result of your conference with this lawyer?

Q What was the improvement, if any, that was in that parcel which you are going to purchase?

A He was absolutely certain that was a valid title.

A During that time, the riprap of the property is already there, the one-half of the riprap sir.

Q Mrs. Meeks, after looking at the place, going to the Register of Deeds, looking at the title and
seeing your lawyer friend, what decision did you finally make regarding the property?

Q Do you know who was making this improvement at the time that you went there?
A I would understand that it was Marcial Alcantara, sir.

A We wanted more reassurances, so we proceeded to Banaue, as advised by that same lawyer,

there is another office of the Bureau of Lands. I cannot recall the office but it has something to
do with registration of the old.

Q After you saw the place riprap and you were in the course of deciding to purchase this
property, what else did you do?

Q What is your purpose in going to this Office in Banaue?

A First, I have to consider that the property is clean.

A I wanted more reassuances that I was getting a valid title.

Q How did you go about determining whether the title of the property is clean?

Q What was the result of your visit to the Banaue Office?

A Considering that Marcial Alcantara is a real estate broker, I went to his office and checked the
documents he has regarding the property.

A We found the title of this property and there was reassurance that it was a clean title and we
saw the mother title under the Hilario family.

Q And what was the result of your checking as to whether the title of the property is clean?

Q Mrs. Meeks, when you say Banaue, what particular place is this Banaue?

A He showed me the copy of the title and it was clean, sir.

A It is in Banaue Street in Quezon City, sir.

Q Aside from going to Mr. Alcantara to check up the title of the property, what else did you do?

Q And when you saw the title to this property and the mother title, what was the result of your
investigation, the investigation that you made?

A Well, the next thing is I requested his wife to accompany me to the Bureau of Lands or rather
the Registry of Deeds, sir.

A We were reassured that we were purchasing a valid title, we had a genuine title.

Q What registry of Deeds are you referring to?

Q When you were able to determine that you had a valid, authentic or genuine title, what did you
do?

A The Registry of Deeds of Baguio City, sir.

A That is when I finally thought of purchasing the property. 17

Telesforo Alfelor II, the purchaser of Lot 4, narrated going through a similar routine:
Q How did you come to know of this place as Asin Road where you are presently residing?

Q And were you able to see the Register of Deeds regarding what you would like to know?
A Yes, and we were given a certification regarding this particular area that it was clean, sir.
Q What Certification are you referring to?
A It is a Certification duly signed by the employee of the Registry of Deeds Adelina Tabangin, sir.

A It was actually through Mrs. Flory Recto who is presently the Branch Manager of CocoBank.
She informed my wife that there is a property for sale at Asin Road, and she was the one who
introduced to us Mr. Alcantara, sir.

Q Do you have a copy of that Certification?

Q When you were informed by Mrs. Recto and when you met with Mr. Alcantara, did you see the
property that was being offered for sale?

The testimonies of Honorato Santos 19 and Josefina Pe 20 were to the same effect.

A Yes, sir.

The non-bank respondent predecessor-in-interest, Marcial Alcantara, was less thorough:

Q When did you specifically see the property, if you can recall?

Q And will you give a brief description of what you do?

A I would say it is around the third quarter of 1983, sir.

A I normally acquire land, quite big tract of land and subdivide it into smaller lots and sold it to
some interested parties.

Q When you went to see the place, could you please describe what you saw at that time?
A When we went there the area is still being developed by Mr. Alcantara. As a matter of fact the
road leading to the property is still not passable considering that during that time it was rainy

A Yes, I have, sir. 18

Q Specifically, Mr. Alcantara will you please inform the Court in what place in Baguio have you
acquired and subdivided and sold lots?
A Dominican Hill, Leonila Hill, Cristal Cave and Asin Road, sir.

Q You mentioned Asin Road, what particular place in Asin Road are you referring?

Q What is your purpose in investigating it with the Register of Deeds?

A That property I bought from Emelita Santiago, sir.

A To see if the paper in clean and there are no encumbrances, sir.

Q When you say you bought it from Emelita Santiago, how did you come to know that Emelita
Santiago is disposing of the property?

Q To whom did you talk?

A Because of the father, he is the one who offered me the property, sir, Armando Gabriel.

A To Atty. Ernesto Diomampo, sir.

Q Is he also a resident of Baguio?

Q And when you went to the Registry of Deeds to investigate and check, did you have occasion
to talk with Atty. Diomampo?

A He is from Buyagan, La Trinidad sir,

A Yes, sir.

Q How did you come to know of this Armando Gabriel wanting to sell a property in Asin?

Q And what was the result of your talk with Atty. Diomampo?

A He approached me in the house, sir. He has acquired a title from the Traders Royal Bank.

A The papers are clean except to the annotation at the back with the road right of way, sir.

Q Can you inform the Honorable Court when you had this conversation with Armando Gabriel on
the sale of the property at Asin Road?

Q After making this investigation with the Register of Deeds and talking with Atty. Diomampo,
what else transpired?

A Later part of March, 1983, sir.

A We bought the property, sir.

Q Now, when this Armando Gabriel informed you that he wants his property to be sold, what did
you do?

Q After purchasing the property from Emelita Santiago, could you please tell the Honorable
Court what you did with that deed of sale?

A I went to the place with the agent, sir.

A We registered it with the Register of Deeds for the Certificate of Title because at that time
when we bought the property, Emelita Santiago had it subdivided into six (6) lots, sir.

Q When you say you went to the place with the agent, what place?
A Kilometer 2, Asin Road sir.

Q Is it our understanding that prior to your purchase the property was subdivided into six (6)
parcels?

Q And when you went there to see the place, did you actually go there to see the place?

A Yes, sir.

A By walking, I parked my car a kilometer away, sir.

Q Could you please inform the Honorable Court if you have any buyers in the subdivision of this
property prior to your purchase?

Q Is it my understanding that when you went to see the property there were no roads?
A None, sir.
xxx xxx xxx
Q Mr. Alcantara, when you went to see this place at Asin Road last week of March, 1983, will
you please briefly describe how this place looked like at that time?
A The place was mountainous, grassy, there were cogon trees, some of the roads were eroding
already, so we cannot possibly enter the property, sir.
Q At the time you entered the place, was there any visible sign of claim by anyone?
A None, sir.
Q In terms of fence in the area?
A There is no such, sir.
xxx xxx xxx
Q Aside from looking or going to the property, what else did you do to this property prior to your
purchase?
A I investigated it with the Register of Deeds, sir.

A Yes, I have.
Q This subdivision of this property, to what office was it brought for action?
A Bureau of Lands, San Fernando, La Union, sir.
Q Now, Mr. Alcantara, at the time that you had this property subdivided by the owner, could you
please inform the Court if there was any claim by any other party opposing the subdivision or
claiming the property?
A None, sir.
Q When the Deed of Sale was executed and you said that you presented it to the Register of
Deeds and after the subdivision already, what action did the Register of Deeds have regarding
the matter?
A They approved it and registered it already in six (6) titles, sir.
Q In whose names?
A One (1) title under my name, Amado Cruz and Dr. Sanchez, sir.
Q Initially, Mr. Alcantara, you said that you are the sole purchaser of this entire area of One
Thousand Five Hundred Ninety One (1,591) Square Meters. Now, you are informing this

Honorable Court that one Amado Cruz and one Dr. Sanchez were also issued two (2) titles.
Could you explain how these titles came into their possession?
A Actually, two (2) are our co-owners, sir.
Q So, is it our understanding that the Deed of Sale from Emelita Santiago is in favor of these two
(2) Atty. Cruz and Dr. Sanchez?
A Yes, sir. 21
Third, between two innocent persons, the one who made it possible for the wrong to be done
should be the one to bear the resulting loss. 22 The Capays filed the notice of lis pendens way
back on March 17, 1967 but the same was not TRB's title. The Capays and their counsel Atty.
Ramon A. Gonzales knew in 1968 of the extra-judicial foreclosure sale of the property to TRB
and the consolidation of title in the bank's name following the lapse of the one-year period of
redemption. But in the next fifteen (15) years or so, they did not bother to find out the status of
their title or whether the liens noted on the original certificate of title were still existing
considering that the property had already been foreclosed. In the meantime, the subject property
had undergone a series of transfers to buyers in good and for value. It was not until after the
land was subdivided and developed with the buyers building their houses on the other lots when
the Capays suddenly appeared and questioned the occupants' titles. At the very least, the
Capays are guilty of laches. Laches has been defined as the failure or neglect, for an
unreasonable and unexplained length of time, to do that which by exercising due diligence could
nor should have been done earlier; it is negligence or omission to assert a right within a
reasonable time, warranting presumption that the party entitled to it either has abandoned it or
declined to assert it. 23
Verily, the principle on prescription of actions is designed to cover situations such as the case at
bar, where there have been a series of transfers to innocent purchasers for value. To set aside
these transactions only to accommodate a party who has slept on his rights is anathema to good
order.
Independently of the principle of prescription of actions working against petitioners, the doctrine
of laches may further be counted against them, which latter tenet finds application even to
imprescriptible
actions. . . . 24
In De La Calzada-Cierras vs. Court of Appeals, 25 we held:
While it is true that under the law it is the act of registration of the deed of conveyance that
serves as the operative act to convey the land registered under the Torrens System (Davao
Grains, Inc. vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, 171 SCRA 612), the petitioners cannot invoke said
dictum because their action to recover Lot 4362 is barred by the equitable doctrine of laches.
The act of registering the conveyance to Rosendo was constructive notice to the whole world of
the fact of such conveyance (Heirs of Maria Marasigan vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, 152
SCRA 253).
But the petitioners' complaint to recover the title and possession of Lot 4362 was filed only on
July 21, 1981, twelve (12) years after the registration of the sale to Rosendo. The petitioners
failed and neglected for an unreasonably long time to assert their right, if any, to the property in
Rosendo's possession.
Being guilty of laches, the Capays cannot invoke the ruling in Villasor vs. Camon Levin
Bass and Director of Lands vs. Reyes 26 to the effect that entry of the notice of lis pendens in the
day book (primary entry book) is sufficient to constitute registration and such entry is notice to all
persons of such adverse claim. Certainly, it is most iniquitous for the Capays who, after sleeping
on their rights for fifteen years to assert ownership over the property that has undergone several
transfers made in good faith and for value and already subdivided into several lots with
improvements introduced thereon by their owners.

In the same vein, the cases cited by the Capays in their first two (2) assignment of errors, do not
help them any, as the transferees in said cases were not innocent purchasers for value and in
good
faith.
In Tuazon
vs.
Reyes
and
Siochi, 27 where the land involved therein was sold by Petronilo David to Vicente Tuazon, it was
with a deed containing the recital that the land was in dispute between the vendor and Roberto
Siochi. Tuazon, who was merely subrogated to the rights of the vendor was aware of the dispute
and, furthermore, David did not warrant the title to the same. In Rivera vs. Moran, 28 Rivera
acquired interest in the land before the final decree was entered in the cadastral proceedings.
Rivera, the transferee, was aware of the pending litigation and, consequently, could not have
been considered a purchaser in good faith. Similarly, in Atun, et al. vs. Nuez, et
al. 29 and Laroza vs. Guia, 30the buyers of the property at the time of their acquisition knew of the
existence of the notice of lis pendens. In contrast to the cited cases, the non-bank respondents
in the case at bar acquired their respective portions of the land with clean title from their
predecessors-in-interest.
II
We come now to TRB's liability towards the Capays.
The Bank unconvincingly tries to wash its hands off the present controversy, and attempts to
shift the blame on the Capays, thus:
xxx xxx xxx
23. The petitioner Bank, during all the time that it was holding the title for over fourteen (14)
years that there was no legal impediment for it to sell said property, Central Bank regulations
require that real properties of banks should not he held for more than five (5) years:
24. The fault of the Register of Deeds in not carrying over the Notice of Lis Pendens to the new
title of the petitioner Bank should not be absorbed by the latter considering that in all good faith,
it was not aware of the existence of said annotation during all the time that said title was in its
possession for almost fourteen (14) years before the property was sold to Emelita G.
Santiago. . . . 31
TRB concludes that "(t)he inaction and negligence of private respondents allowing ownership to
pass for almost 15 years constitute prescription of action and/or laches." 32
Sec. 25 of the General Banking Act, 33 provides that no bank "shall hold the possession of any
real estate under mortgage or trust, deed, or the title and possession of any real estate
purchased to secure any debt due to it, for a longer period than five years." TRB, however,
admits hoding on to the foreclosed property for twelve (12) years after consolidating title in its
name. The bank is, therefore, estopped from involving banking laws and regulations to justify its
belated disposition of the property. It cannot be allowed to hide behind the law which it itself
violated.
TRB cannot feign ignorance of the existence of the lis pendens because when the property was
foreclosed by it, the notice of lis pendens was annotated on the title. But when TCT No. T-6595
in the name of the Capay spouses was cancelled after the foreclosure, TCT No. T-16272 which
was issued in place thereof in the name of TRB did not carry over the notice of lis pendens.
We do not find the Capays guilty of "inaction and negligence" as against TRB. It may be recalled
that upon the commencement of foreclosure proceedings by TRB, the Capays filed an action for
prohibition on September 22, 1966 against the TRB before the CFI to stop the foreclosure sale.
Failing in that attempt, the Capays filed a supplemental complaint for the recovery of the
property. The case reached this Court. Prescription or laches could not have worked against the
Capays because they had persistently pursued their suit against TRB to recover their property.
On the other hand, it is difficult to believe TRB's assertion that after holding on to the property for
more than ten (10) years, it suddenly realized that it was acting in violation of the General Bank
Act. What is apparent is that TRB took advantage of the absence of the notice of lis pendens at

the back of their certificate of title and sold the property to an unwary purchaser. This
notwithstanding the adverse decision of the trial court and the pendency of its appeal. TRB,
whose timing indeed smacks of bad faith, thus transferred caused the property without the lis
pendens annotated on its title to put it beyond the Capays' reach. Clearly, the bank acted in a
manner contrary to morals, good customs and public policy and should be held liable for
damages. 34

Issues having been joined, the parties later entered into a stipulation of facts before the trial
court, reading in full as follows:

Considering however, that the mortgage in favor of TRB had been declared null and void for
want of consideration and, consequently, the foreclosure proceedings did not have a valid effect,
the Capays would ordinarily be entitled to the recovery of their property. Nevertheless, this
remedy is not now available to the Capays inasmuch as title to said property has passed into the
hands of third parties who acquired the same in good faith and for value. Such being the case,
TRB is duty bound to pay the Capays the fair market value of the property at the time it was sold
to Emelita Santiago, the transferee of TRB.

2. That plaintiffs Fortunato Bollozos and Andrea Bollozos are the only surviving children of the
late Paulino Bollozos while the rest of the above-named plaintiffs are the grandchildren of said
Paulino Bollozos,

WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Court of Appeals dated Frebruary 24, 1994 in CA-G.R. CV
No. 33920, as modified by its Resolution dated August 10, 1994 is hereby AFFIRMED. In
addition, Traders Royal Bank is ordered to pay the Capays the fair market value of the property
at the time it was sold to Emelita Santiago.
This Decision is without prejudice to whatever criminal, civil or administrative action against the
Register of Deeds and or his assistants that may be taken by the party or parties prejudiced by
the failure of the former to carry over the notice of lis pendens to the certificate of title in the
name of TRB.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. L-29442 November 11, 1987

FORTUNATO BOLLOZOS, ANDREA BOLLOZOS VDA. DE RAPANOT PABLO B. CALAM,
EPIFANIA B. BEVERA, SERGIO B. CALAM, GUALBERTO B. CALAM, IGNACIO B. CALAM,
JOSE
B.
CALAM,
JR.
and
CAROLINA
B.
CALAM, plaintiffs-appellees,
vs.
YU TIENG SU, alias SISO YU, defendant-appellant.

CRUZ, J.:
The original protagonists in this controversy have long since passed away into "the tongueless
silence of the dreamless dust" and are now but mute witnesses to this litigation. We can now go
only by the musty records that will take us back to more than half a century ago, before the
period of the Commonwealth.
This case was formally commenced on January 20, 1968, with the filing of a complaint for the
recovery of a 1.2 hectare parcel of land and accounting for its use from defendant Yu, the herein
appellant. The plaintiffs claimed that the said land had been delivered to him only for
administration so he could apply the produce thereof to the indebtedness of Paulino Bollozos,
their predecessor-in-interest. It was alleged that Yu had refused to return the land despite
demand and to make the required accounting although the debt had long been paid. 1
In his answer, the defendant averred that he had acquired ownership of the land in question by
virtue of two documents executed in his favor by Paulino Bollozos, to wit, a deed of sale with
right of repurchase dated September 1, 1934, and a deed of absolute sale dated September 21,
1936. He therefore had no obligation to return it. Additionally, Yu claimed that the suit was barred
by prescription, the complaint having been filed only after all of 26 years. 2

1. That both parties hereby agree on the Identity of the parcel of land in litigation as described in
paragraph II of the amended complaint, which parcel of land is covered by OCT No. 5033 in the
name of Paulino Bollozos;

3. That sometime on September 1, 1934, the late Paulino Bollozos executed a document entitled
"Escritura de Compra y Venta Con Pacto de Retro," the original of which is hereto attached as
Annex A to form part hereof and another document was executed by the late Paulino Bollozos
entitled "A Definite and Absolute Purchase and Sale" dated September 21, 1936, the original
copy of which is hereto attached to form an integral part of this complete stipulation of facts
4. That the parties agree to submit the entitled case for decision on the basis of the following
issue or issues:
(a) Whether a valid conveyance of ownership was made of the parcel of land in litigation on
September 1, 1934 as appearing in Annex A, entitled "Escritura de Compra y Venta Con Pacto
de Retro," or on September 21, 1936 as appearing in Annex B, entitled "A Definite and Absolute
Purchase and Sale" of the parcel of land in litigation, and for the Honorable Court to determine
the legality or nullity of the above-mentioned documents. 3
On the basis of this agreement and of the memoranda filed subsequently by the parties, the
lower court, * without receiving further evidence, rendered judgment in favor of the plaintiffs. 4 It
held, first, that the deed of sale with pacto de retro executed on September 1, 1934, was in
reality an equitable mortgage and did not transfer ownership of the land to the defendant; and
second, that the subsequent sale executed in 1936 was null and void ab initio because by that
time the transfer of agricultural lands to aliens was already prohibited by the Commonwealth
Constitution, which became effective on November 15, 1935. Yu was a Chinese national.
The above rulings are the subject of this appeal, ** which we find meritorious. We shall reverse.
It is important to note at the outset that there is nothing in the record to show that the disputed
property had merely been entrusted to Yu for administration in connection with Paulino Bollozos'
indebtedness to him, as claimed by the plaintiff. Neither is there any evidence of such
indebtedness. This allegation, which was the very basis of the complaint, was not among those
admitted in the stipulation of facts and indeed had been categorically denied in the answer. It
thus remained a bare averment without any actual or presumptive support.
It should also be noted that, by contrast, the defendant, to substantiate his answer, produced the
two above-cited documents Annexes "A" and "B", which clearly indicate the intention of the
parties regarding the ownership and disposition of the land in question. These documents are
the best and, as it happens, the only evidence adduced of such intention.
Annex "A" reads as follows:
ESCRITURA
CON PACTO DE RETRO

DE

COMPRA

VENTA

Nosotros, PAULINO BOLLOZOS, de 71 aos de edad y FAUSTINA LILOC, de 58 aos de edad,

marido y mujer respectivamente, filipinos y vecinos y residentes del barrio de Bonbon, Municipio
de Catarman Provincia de Misamis Oriental, Islas Filipinas, por la presente hacemos constar
que consideracion a la suma de SEISCIENTOS TREINTA Y SEIS PESOS (P636.00) en moneda
filipina que nos ha pagado y hemos recibido a nuestra entera satisfaccion del SR. YU TIENG
SU, de 34 aos de edad, chino, casado de la SRA SIA PUTE, de 29 aos de edad, china y
residente de este Municipio de Catarman Provincia de Misamis Oriental, Islas Filipinas,

VENDEMOS, CEDEMOS ENTREGAMOS y TRASPASAMOS al referido SR. YU TIENG SU sus

herederos y causahabientes una parcela de terreno con todas sus mejoras existentes situada
en el distrito de Quilambon, barrio de Bonbon, Municipio de Catarman Provincia de Misamis
Oriental, Islas Filipinas bajo el numero del Lote Cadastral de este Municipio Catarman Misamis
Oriental, Caso No. 9m y cuya descripcion tecnica es como sigue:
(Technical Description)
Hacemos constar tambien que queda pacto y convenido con el referrido SR. YU TIENG SU, que
si nosotros devolvieramos o mandamos devolver dentro del termino de SIETE (7) ANOS
contados desde esta fecha la suma de SEISCIENTOS TREINTA Y SEIS PESOS (P636.00) en
moneda filipina, y le abonaremos ademas los gastos que ocasione el presente contrato, nos
otorgaran el comprador o sus representantes escritura de retroventa pero si transcurre dicho
plazo sin haberse utilizado el derecho de redencion, adquirira la presente el character de
absolutamente consumada, y entretanto solo podra el comprador disponer la finca con las
limitaciones prescritas en la Ley Hipotecaria
En testimiento de rado lo cual firmamos la presente en este Municipio de Catarman Provincia de
Misamis Oriental hoy 1, o-de Septiembre, 1934, A.D.
(Sgd.) PAULINO BOLLOZOS Y
(Sgd.) FAUSTINA LILOC,
Firmadas en presencia de
(Sgd.) JOSE LIM PATUNGAN y
(Sgd.) EUFROSINO LIMBACO
The second instrument, Annex "B", declared the following:
DEFINITE AND ABSOLUTE PURCHASE AND SALE
That I, PAULINO BOLLOZOS, 72 years of age, Filipino married to Faustina Liloc, 60 years of
age, and resident of the barrio of Bonbon, Municipality of Catarman, Province of Oriental
Misamis, P.I. do hereby declare and say:
1st. That I am the lawful owner of one parcel of land together with all existing improvements
thereon, located in the sitio of Kilambon, barrio of Bonbon, Municipality of Catarman, Province of
Oriental Misamis, P.I., particularly described as follows:
(Technical Description)
2nd. That the said parcel of land together with all existing improvements thereon is registered in
my name in the Office of the Register of Deeds of the Province of Oriental Misamis, as
evidenced by the ORIGINAL CERTIFICATE OF TITLE number FIVE THOUSAND THIRTY
THREE (5033).
3rd. That the said parcel of land, together with all existing improvements thereon was sold by me
to Mr. YU TIENG SU, married to Sia Pute on September 1, 1934 for the sum of SIX HUNDRED
THIRTY SIX (P636.00) under the instrument of purchase with right or repurchase (Compra venta
con pacto de retro) and said document is ratified before Notary Public Mr. Eufrosino Limbaco, of
Mambajao, Misamis Oriental, on the 1st day of September 1934, Not. Reg. No. 149-Page No.
97-Book No. 8-Series of 1934.
4th. That by these presents I do hereby declare and say that I will forever renounce and
repudiate my rights and privileges to repurchase the said parcel of land together with all its
existing improvements thereon and for and in consideration of an additional sum TWO
HUNDRED NINETY-FIVE PESOS (P295.00), Philippine Currency to me in hand paid and the

receipt whereof is hereby acknowledged by Mr. YU TIENG SU, 36 years of age, Chinese,
married to Sia Pute, 31 years of age, Chinese and resident of this Municipality of Catarman
Misamis Oriental, P.I., by these presents I do hereby sell, transfer and forever convey a deliver
unto said Mr. YU TIENG SU, his heirs, executors, administrators and assigns that parcel of land
together with all its existing improvements thereon, particularly described above (Lot No. 473).
Original Certificate of Title number Five Thousand Thirty-three.
5th. Lastly, I do hereby declare and say that I will forever warrant and defend unto said Mr. YU
TIENG SU, his heirs, executors, administrator and assigns all lawful claims of all persons
whomsoever of his right of ownership of the said parcel of land together with its existing
improvements thereon described above.
IN WITNESSETH WHEREOF, I have hereunto signed my name in this Municipality of Catarman
Province of Misamis Oriental, P. I., on this 21 st day of September 1936.
(Sgd.) PAULINO BOLLOZOS
Signed in the presence of:
(Sgd.) JOSE LIM PATUNGAN and
(Sgd.) JOSE L. RIVERA
It is clear from the first document that Paulino Bollozos actually sold the land in question to Yu
for the sum of P636.00, subject only to the former's right to repurchase it within a period of
seven years. There is nothing in this instrument suggesting a different arrangement such as that
alleged by the plaintiffs-appellees in their complaint, nor have they submitted any evidence in
proof of such arrangement.
The intention clearly embodied in Annex "A" was affirmed in the second transaction between the
same parties as reduced to writing in Annex "B", denominated as "A" Definite and Absolute
Purchase and Sale." Concluded two years later, it specifically referred to the first sale made in
1934 by virtue of which, as Paulino Bollozos declared, the land in question and its improvements
were "sold by me to Mr. Yu Tieng Su" for the agreed consideration of P636.00. He further stated
in Annex "B" that "by these presents I do hereby declare and say that I will forever renounce and
repudiate my right and privilege to repurchase" the said property as reserved by him in the first
instrument. For such renunciation, Bollozos acknowledged receipt of an additional sum of
P295.00, thus increasing the total purchase price of the land to P931.00.
The Court holds that the first transaction was a valid sale with right of repurchase and effectively
transferred ownership of the land in dispute to the defendant-appellant. All the elements of a
valid contract were present, and in any case the plaintiffs-appellees themselves have stipulated
on its authenticity. As it was concluded in 1934, the prohibition against the acquisition of
agricultural lands by aliens was not yet applicable, having become effective only from November
15, 1935, under the Commonwealth Constitution. Moreover, the title acquired by Yu was
recognized in the said Constitution as a vested right that could no longer be disturbed under the
new provisions of that charter reserving ownership of such lands to Filipino citizens. 5
The plaintiffs-appellees err in suggesting that the first transaction, being conditional, did not
effectively transfer the ownership of the land to the vendee. It did, certainly, subject only to the
right of the vendor to redeem it within the period specified. As we said in an earlier case:
In the deed of pacto de retro sale executed by Ignacio Reyes in favor of Lim Kiam on May 30,
1932, covering Lot 9203, the period of repurchase was not fixed. The Court of Appeals correctly
held that in accordance with Article 1508 of the old Civil Code the right could be exercised within
four years from the date of execution of the conveyance - in this case up to May 30, 1936. The
fact, however, that on this date the Constitution was already in force did not affect the right
acquired by Lim Kiam. We have held in a number of cases decided under the provisions of the
old Civil Code that the nature of a sale with the right of repurchase is such that the ownership
over the thing sold is transferred to the vendee upon execution of the contract, subject only to

the resolutory condition that the vendor exercise his right, of repurchase within the period agreed
upon. Manalansan v. Manalang, L-13646, July 26, 1960; Almiranez v. Devera,
L-19496 February 27, 1965; Rosario v. Rosario, L-13018, December 29, 1960. 6
A sale with pacto de retro transfers the legal title to the vendee and this, in the absence of an
agreement to the contrary, carries with it the right of possession. In the case of Santos v. heirs of
Crisostomo and Tiongson (41 Phil. 342), this court, in discussing the nature of sale with pacto de
retro said: ... It is our opinion, however, that the insertion of a stipulation for repurchase by the
vendor in a contract of sale does not necessarily create any right inconsistent with the right of
ownership in the purchaser. Such a stipulation is in the nature of an option, and the possible
exercise of it rests upon contingency. ... 7
To be sure, Paulino Bollozos could have repurchased the property within seven years pursuant
to the first contract. However, he did not choose to do so and in fact "renounced and repudiated"
this right two years later in the second contract. It is noted that this contract also purported to
convey the same property to Yu but this was merely an affirmation or reiteration of the parties'
intention in the first transaction. It was not really necessary to repeat the sale because the first
contract had already been perfected and consummated. Indeed, the sale could not have been
made for the first time then for it would have been illegal under the provisions of the new
Constitution that had come into force in 1935. Actually, the real purpose of the second contract
was to manifest Paulino Bollozo's waiver of his right to repurchase, for which he received the
additional sum of P295.00.
The plaintiffs-appellees make much of the admitted fact that the disputed property is still in the
name of Paulino Bollozos as so too are the tax declarations. This circumstance, it is argued,
proves that ownership of the land was retained by Bollozos and later transferred to his heirs,
besides being an indication as well that the first contract was really only an equitable mortgage
and not a deed of sale. The contention is that as long as the land had not yet been registered in
the name of the defendant-appellant, title hereto remained with Bollozos.
This is not correct. The first deed of sale took effect on September 1, 1934, and legally
transferred ownership of the land subject thereof from the vendor to Yu on the said date. Failure
to register the sale did not vitiate it or render it unenforceable. As we have held in several cases,
an unrecorded deed of sale is binding between the parties and their privies because actual
notice is equivalent to registration. The real purpose of registration being to give notice to third
persons, deed of sale that has not been registered does not lose its efficacy insofar as the
parties thereto and their heirs are concerned. 8
It is settled that registration is not a mode of acquiring ownership. Thus:
Registration does not confer ownership. It is not a mode of acquiring dominion, but only a means
of confirming the fact of its existence with notice to the world at large. 9
And with particular reference to problems such as the one at bar, we have ruled that:
Title and ownership over lands within the meaning and for the purposes of the constitutional
prohibition, dates back to the time of their purchase, not later. Any other ruling would be illegal
and unjust, and would operate to dispossess alien owners who had acquired their lands in good
faith before the prohibition was established, but either failed wholly to register them or registered
them only after the Constitution was adopted. 10
As for the finding of the trial court that the deed of sale with the right of repurchase was an
equitable mortgage, we hold it has no basis in fact and law. All that is invoked in its support is
that the land continued to be registered, and all the tax declarations thereon were made, in the
name of Paulino Bollozos. That may well be, but that circumstance would not change the nature
of the contract concluded in 1934. At best, it may demonstrate neglect on the part of the vendee,
who had a right to transfer the registration in his name, but that would not signify that Paulino
Bollozos retained or recovered ownership of the land he had already sold.

The defendant-appellant cites Article 1602 of the Civil Code and argues that none of the
indications mentioned therein of an equitable mortgage are present in this case. While we are
inclined to agree, it should be noted that the said article is not applicable because it was not
embodied in the old Civil Code which was in force in 1934. This is an innvocation in the present
Code. In any event, it is worth stressing that one of the indicia mentioned in the said article is
that the vendor not remains in possession of the property in question, which is riot the situation
here. The complaint, in fact, asks for recovery of possession of the land from defendant Yu.
In sum, we hold that the trial court erred in disregarding the sale with right of repurchase
concluded on September 1, 1934, and in considering it an equitable mortgage. The second
contract executed on September 21, 1936, could not have validly conveyed the land in question
to defendant Yu, who was an alien, as this was already prohibited by the Commonwealth
Constitution. Nevertheless, it was effective in affirming the earlier contract of September 1, 1934,
and, more importantly, in making it absolute with the renunciation by the vendor of his right to
repurchase the property. Accordingly, Yu should be recognized as the lawful owner of the land in
dispute, acquired by him by virtue of a legitimate contract of sale with pacto de retro which
became absolute when the vendor waived his right of repurchase.
The fact that the defendant in this case was an alien cannot be taken against him for he was not
disqualified from acquiring the land in question when the sale was concluded in 1934. It should
not deter us from ruling in his favor now.
This Court dispenses equal justice to the citizen and the alien and judges them on the merits of
their cause and not the color of their skin. Having admitted him into our territory, the State is
committed to the recognition of all the rights of the stranger in our midst save only where they
unduly clash with the higher interests of our own nation. There is no such collision here. On the
contrary, we see here an opportunity to prove, as we do now, that respect for the foreign guest is
ingrained in the law of the land and in the nature of our people.
WHEREFORE, the appealed decision is REVERSED. The complaint and the counterclaim in
Civil Case No. 66-C are DISMISSED, with costs against the plaintiffs-appellees. It is so ordered.
G.R. No. 130174

July 14, 2000

REPUBLIC
OF
THE
PHILIPPINES, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS AND TABANGAO REALTY, INC., represented by Rodolfo
Perez, respondents.
DECISION
PARDO, J.:
The case is an appeal 1 via certiorari from a decision of the Court of Appeals 2 affirming that of the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 07, Batangas City decreeing the registration under the Property
Registration Decree, P. D. No. 1529, of three (3) parcels of land situated in Tabangao, Batangas
City in favor of respondent corporation.3
The facts, as found by the Court of Appeals, are as follows:
"On January 8, 1991, Tabangao Realty, Inc. filed an application for Original Registration of Title
over three parcels of land, more particularly described as follows:
"Lot 9895 Plan Ap-4A-001136, containing an area of 4,596 square meters, situated in the
Barrio of Tabangao, City of Batangas;
"Lot 10155 Plan Ap-4A-001221, containing an area of 4, 031 square meters, situated in the
Barrio of Libjo, City of Batangas;

"Lot 10171 Plan Ap-4A-001157, containing an area of 8,224 square meters, situated in the
Barrio of Tabangao, City of Batangas.
"Applicant Tabangao Realty, Inc. alleged in its application that it acquired the above-mentioned
lots by purchase from its previous owners as evidenced by the corresponding Deeds of Sale;
that it is the owner of all adjoining lots; that it had been in actual possession of the lots since the
time it acquired the same from the previous owners up to the present; and that its possession
and occupation as owners including that of its predecessor-in-interest has been open, peaceful,
continuous, adverse to the whole world and in the concept of an owner.
"The applicant further alleged that the plant of the Liquefied Petroleum Gas (LPG) Company is
partly erected on the subject lots which improvements are owned by it (applicant). It also claims
that the subject lots are not subject of any lien or encumbrance; that no adverse interests exist
with respect to the subject lots; and that there are no military or forest reservation or any
pending litigation affecting said subject lots.
"Should the property registration decree invoked not be allowed, the applicant in the alternative
applied for the benefits under CA No. 141 as amended and thus alleged that together with its
predecessors-in-interest it had been in open, continuous, public, peaceful and adverse
possession of the subject lots for more than 30 years. It also declared that the lots are not
tenanted nor subject of an agricultural leasehold relationship.
"Applicant Tabangao Realty, Inc. attached to its application its Articles of Incorporation, the
tracing cloth plan of the lots, blue print copies of said plan, technical descriptions of the lots,
Deeds of Sale, Assessment Certificate, Tax Declarations for the three lots and Tax Clearances.
"On August 12, 1991, the application was ordered archived by the Regional Trial Court for the
applicants failure to comply with the requirements called for in the Report dated February 22,
1994 by the Office of the Land Registration Authority. On June 2, 1994, the applicant filed a
motion to revive the application and to set the case for initial hearing. The motion was granted by
the Regional Trial Court on June 7, 1994 and initial hearing was set on September 1994.
"At the hearing, only the Assistant City Prosecutor appeared to oppose the application on behalf
of the Republic of the Philippines. Counsel for the applicant thereupon presented all the
necessary evidence to satisfy the jurisdictional requirements. Thereafter, upon motion of the
application, the Regional Trial Court issued an order of special default against the whole world
with the exception of the government. The court also issued an order designating and
authorizing Mr. Rodolfo G. Serrano, Legal Researcher of Regional Trial Court, Branch 7, to
receive evidence.
"At the reception of evidence, the applicant presented Romeo Geron, the Consultant and Project
Controller of applicant Tabangao Realty, Inc. Geron testified that he is a resident of Tabangao
and was a member of the Task Force responsible for negotiating with the numerous landowners
and the subsequent acquisition by sale of the properties of Tabangao Realty, Inc. in Tabangao
and Libjo, Batangas. He testified that the applicant-corporation was duly organized and
registered with the Securities and Exchange Commission and is authorized to acquire land by
purchase and develop, subdivide, sell, mortgage, exchange, lease and hold for investment or
otherwise, real estate of all kinds.
"He also testified that Lot 9895 was acquired by the applicant-corporation on March 31, 1980 by
virtue of a Deed of Absolute Sale executed in its favor by the previous owners; the spouses
Santiago and Cristina Dimaano (Exh. "L"); that Lot 10155 was acquired by applicant-corporation
by virtue of a Deed of Sale executed on April 25, 1980 in its favor by the former owner Mr.
Perpetuo Almario married to Felisa Magpantay who owned the lot since 1945 (Exh. "L-1"); and
that Lot 10171 was purchased by applicant-corporation on March 31, 1980 from Anita Clear de
Jesus who had been the owner of said lot since 1945 (Exh. "L-2").
"The witness presented the tax declarations for the three parcels of land and tax receipts
showing full payment of all taxes due. (Exh. "P, P-1, P-2" and "Q") He testified that there is no

pending litigation involving the subject properties or any adverse claims filed against the
applicants; that they are free from any liens or encumbrances; that there are no tenants or
agricultural leasehold contracts involving the subject properties; and that there are no mineral
deposits in said lots.
"Geron also testified that the properties are presently under Lease Contract with Shell Gas
Philippines for 25 years from 1981 up to 2006 as evidenced by a Lease Contract executed on
May 18, 1991 (Exh. "M").
"The applicants also presented Crecencio Marasigan. He is an employee at the Office of the
Register of Deeds of Batangas since June 1971. He testified that he has been a resident of
Barangay Malitan, Batangas City even before 1937 up to the present and that he knew the
applicant Tabangao Realty, Inc. and the areas surrounding the lots subject of the application. He
mentioned that he was the Chairman of the Task Force that was responsible for the negotiations
that were done with the previous owners of the subject lots, and was therefore personally aware
of the specific dealing regarding the lots subject of the application. He said that he knew the
previous owners since he started residing in Batangas; and that their possessions had been
open, public, peaceful, continuous, adverse and in the concept of owners.
"Marasigan corroborated the testimony of Romeo Geron with regard to the ownership,
possession and the status of the lots subject of the application.
"In opposition, the City Prosecutor of Batangas offered the testimonies of Rodolfo Fernandez of
the Bureau of Lands and Loida Maglinao of the Bureau of Forest Development.
"Rodolfo Fernandez testified that the three parcels of land subject of the application are not
covered by any kind of public land application or patent; that they are not within the reservation
area nor within the forest zone; that they are not reserved for any government purposes; and
that the entire areas are within the Alienable and Disposable Zone as Classified under Project
No. 13, Map No. 718 and certified on March 26, 1928. Fernandez presented the Investigation
Report made by the Bureau of Lands dated April 24, 1991 (Exh. "1" to "1-b").
"Loida Maglinao testified that the subject properties are within the alienable and disposable area
of the public domain and no forestry interest is adversely interposed by the Bureau of Forest
Development.
"On the basis of all the evidence presented, the Regional Trial Court rendered a decision on
March 31, 1995 granting the application for registration. It held:
"From the credible testimony and documentary evidence adduced establishing applicantcorporation that the latter and its predecessors-in-interest have been in open, public,
continuous, peaceful, uninterrupted and adverse possessions of the parcels of land applied for
up to the present, for the requisite period of time, under bona fide claim of ownership, and
considering, that no evidence has been presented by the government in support of its
Opposition, and even presented the favorable testimonies of Mr. Rodolfo Fernandez, of the
Bureau of Lands and Miss Loida Y. Maglinao, of the Bureau of Forest Development, both
CENRO, Batangas City Branch, Batangas City, supported by their respective official Reports,
the Court is convinced that the applicant-corporation Tabangao Realty Incorporated had
sufficiently established its rights to the grant of title over the three (3) parcels of land subject of
this case."
In due time, petitioner appealed the decision of the trial court to the Court of Appeals.4
On July 30, 1997, the Court of Appeals promulgated its decision affirming the appealed
decision.5
Hence, this appeal.6
The issue raised is whether respondent Tabangao Realty, Inc. has registerable title over three
(3) parcels of land situated in Tabangao, Batangas City applied for.

The Court of Appeals ruled that the applicant Tabangao Realty, Inc. is entitled to registration of
title over the three (3) parcels of land applied for. The ruling is erroneous.
An applicant seeking to establish ownership over land must conclusively show that he is the
owner thereof in fee simple,7 for the standing presumption is that all lands belong to the public
domain of the State, unless acquired from the Government either by purchase or by grant,
except lands possessed by an occupant and his predecessors since time immemorial, for such
possession would justify the presumption that the land had never been part of the public domain
or that it had been private property even before the Spanish conquest. 8
The land in question is admittedly public. The applicant has no title at all.1wphi1 Its claim of
acquisition of ownership is solely based on possession. In fact, the parcels of land applied for
were declared public land by decision of the Cadastral Court. 9 Such being the case, the
application for voluntary registration under P. D. No. 1529 10 is barred by the prior judgment of the
Cadastral Court. The land having been subjected to compulsory registration under the Cadastral
Act and declared public land can no longer be the subject of registration by voluntary application
under Presidential Decree No. 1529. The second application is barred by res-judicata.11 As
previously held, "[W]here the applicant possesses no title or ownership over the parcel of land,
he cannot acquire one under the Torrens System of registration."12
Nonetheless, applicant anchors its application for registration of title on the provisions of P. D.
No. 1529 or in the alternative Com. Act No. 141, Section 48 (b), as amended by Rep. Act No.
1942, which allows "those who by themselves or through their predecessors in interest have
been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of agricultural
lands of the public domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership, for at least thirty
years immediately preceding the filing of the application" to apply for judicial confirmation and
registration of title.13
However, the evidence is inconclusive that applicant and its predecessors in interest had been in
open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession of the land in question, en concepto de
dueo, or a bona fideclaim of acquisition of ownership for at least thirty (30) years immediately
preceding the filing of the application,14or since June 12, 1945,15 or earlier,16 or since time
immemorial.17
Analyzing the evidence submitted, we note that the applicant failed to prove the fact of
possession by itself and its predecessors in interest for at least thirty (30) years before the filing
of the application.
Witness Romeo Geron, a consultant of applicant Tabangao Realty, Inc. testified that in the year
1945, he knew that the land designated as Lot 9895, with an area of 4,596 square meters was
owned by Santiago Dimaano, who sold the lot to applicant corporation on March 31, 1980 and
that the parcel of land designated as Lot 10155 with an area of 4,031 square meters was owned
by Perpetuo Almario way back in 1945, and that he possessed the lot up to the time he sold the
same to applicant corporation on April 25, 1980 because he was in charge of negotiation with
the numerous landowners for acquisition of their property by Tabangao Realty, Inc. 18 However, in
1945, witness Geron was only seven (7) years old, and obviously could not competently testify
on the ownership and possession of the subject land.
Applicant failed to prove specific acts showing the nature of its possession and that of its
predecessors in interest.19 "The applicant must present specific acts of ownership to substantiate
the claim and cannot just offer general statements which are mere conclusions of law than
factual evidence of possession."20 "Actual possession of land consists in the manifestation of
acts of dominion over it of such a nature as a party would naturally exercise over his own
property."21
The bare assertion of witnesses that the applicant of land had been in the open, adverse and
continuous possession of the property for over thirty (30) years is hardly "the well-nigh
incontrovertible" evidence required in cases of this nature. 22 In other words, facts constituting
possession must be duly established by competent evidence.

Consequently, the lower court gravely erred in granting the application.

WHEREFORE, the Court REVERSES the decision of the Court of Appeals, DENIES the
application for registration of title filed by applicant Tabangao Realty, Inc. and declares the
subject parcels of land to be public land belonging to the public domain.
No costs. SO ORDERED.
FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. 100995 September 14, 1994

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and DELFINA S. DOLOR, respondents.
The Solicitor General for petitioner.
Leopoldo C. Nagera, Jr. for private respondent.

BELLOSILLO, J.:
On 10 August 1988, private respondent Delfina S. Dolor filed an application before the Regional
Trial Court of Daet, Camarines Norte, for the confirmation and registration of her title to a 908square meter residential lot located at the interior of Dencio Cabanela Street, Poblacion, Daet,
Camarines Norte, described on Plan Ccn-05-000025 and covered by Tax Declaration
No. 005-0823.
On 25 November 1988, when the case was called for initial hearing, the Fiscal entered his
appearance on behalf of petitioner Republic of the Philippines. Respondent Delfina S. Dolor
moved that an order of general default be issued against the whole world except petitioner which
had filed an opposition. On the same date, the trial court issued an order, stating:
When this case was called for initial hearing today, only the Fiscal in behalf
of the Republic of the Philippines interposed an opposition to the
application.
Applicant, thru counsel, prayed for the issuance of an order of general
default against the whole world with the exception of the Republic of the
Philippines represented by the Fiscal.
It appearing from the record that the jurisdictional requirements have been
complied with and there being no private oppositor to the application, the
reception of evidence is hereby delegated to the Branch Clerk of Court who
is required to render a report within twenty (20) days from the date of

hearing which is hereby set on Dec. 20, 1988 at 9:00 o'clock in the
morning. 1
At the hearing on 20 December 1988, respondent Dolor's counsel marked as Exhibits "A" to "D,"
respectively, the Notice of Initial Hearing, the Certificate of Publication of the Notice of Initial
Hearing in the Official Gazette, the Affidavit of Publication of the Editor of the "Weekly Informer,"
and the Certification or Return of Posting by the Deputy Sheriff.
Satisfied that respondent Dolor had a registerable title over subject property the trial court in its
decision of 17 August 1989 confirmed her title thereto and ordered its registration as her
exclusive property. 2
Petitioner assailed the trial court's decision before the Court of Appeals on a purely jurisdictional
ground. Petitioner argued that it was incumbent upon respondent Dolor to show proof that on or
before the date of initial hearing on 25 November 1988, there had been compliance with the
requirements specified by Sec. 23 of P.D. 1529, otherwise known as The Property Registration
Decree, to wit:
Sec. 23. Notice of initial hearing, publication, etc. The court shall, within
five days from filing of the application, issue an order setting the date and
hour of the initial hearing which shall not be earlier than forty-five days nor
later than ninety days from the date of the order.
The public shall be given notice of the initial hearing of the application for
land registration by means of (1) publication; (2) mailing; and (3) posting.
1. By publication. Upon receipt of the order of the
court setting the time for initial hearing, the
Commissioner of Land Registration shall cause a
notice of initial hearing to be published once in the
Official Gazette and once in a newspaper of general
circulation in the Philippines; Provided, however, that
the publication in the Official Gazette shall be sufficient
to confer jurisdiction upon the court. Said notice shall
be addressed to all persons appearing to have an
interest in the land involved including the adjoining
owners so far as known, and "to all whom it may
concern." Said notice shall also require all persons
concerned to appear in court at a certain date and time
to show cause why the prayer of said application shall
not be granted . . . .
The records show that while the trial court stated that the jurisdictional requirements
were complied with on 25 November 1988, they were yet to be presented on 20
December 1988 before its Branch Clerk, the designated Commissioner.
In its decision dated 16 July 1991, the appellate court affirmed the decision of the trial court. 3 It
found petitioner's submission not only too formalistic but also contrary to the facts and the law
and in derogation of substantial justice, rationalizing thus

We find that the requirements of Sec. 23 of Presidential Decree

No. 1529 have been complied with in the instant case. The record shows
that the Notice of Initial Hearing set on November 25, 1988, issued by the
Administrator, National Land Titles and Deeds Registration Administration
(Exh. "A") had been published in the September 10, 1988 issue of the
"Weekly Informer" (Exh. "C") and in Volume 84, No. 42 of the Official
Gazette issue of October 17, 1988 (Exh. "B"), and posted in the prescribed
conspicuous places in the subject parcel of land the municipal building of
Daet, Camarines Norte by the Sheriff (Exh. "D"). The documents attesting to
the compliance with Sec. 23 of PD 1529 were attached to the record even
before the date of the initial hearing of the instant Land Registration Case
No. N-678 . . . .
The appellant claims that while the presiding judge of the trial court stated
that "the jurisdictional requirements have been complied with" on November
25, 1988, the jurisdictional requirements have yet to be presented on
December 20, 1988 before the Branch Clerk of Court, the designated
Commissioner. Hence, appellant argues, the Order of November 25, 1988
had no basis in fact and in law; there was no notice to interested persons
adjoining owners, and the whole world; and jurisdiction to hear and decide
the case has not yet been conferred with the court on November 25, 1988.
We cannot agree. The jurisdiction is not conferred by the marking of the
relevant documents as exhibits, but by the fact that all the requirements of
Sec. 23, PD 1529 had been complied with as shown by those documents
proving compliance therewith, identified later as Exhibits "A" to "D," which
were all attached to the records of the case even before November 25,
1988. The trial court is not precluded from taking cognizance of its own
record. Although in actual practice, it is incumbent upon the applicant's
counsel to mark those documents as exhibits at the initial hearing to prove
the jurisdictional facts, the omission of such markings by applicant's counsel
who might have been as yet unfamiliar with such practice would not deprive
the trial court of its jurisdiction to hear and proceed with the trial of the case,
for the simple reason that the jurisdictional requirements have been
complied with as shown by the documents that were already attached to the
record of the case and of which the trial court can take judicial notice. The
failure of the Fiscal as well as the Presiding Judge to have called the
attention of the counsel for the applicant to proceed with the marking of the
documents to prove the jurisdictional facts would not have deprived the trial
court of its jurisdiction to hear and decide the case. Neither would the
marking of those documents later after the initial hearing deprive the trial
court of its jurisdiction. 4
In this petition, while petitioner concedes that the jurisdiction to take cognizance of the case is
not conferred by the marking of the relevant documents as exhibits but, rather, by the fact that all
the jurisdictional requirements of law had been carried out, yet, it takes exception to the factual
finding that there was compliance with the jurisdictional requirements. As borne out by the
records, at the scheduled date of initial hearing on 25 November 1988 and even during the
actual hearing on 20 December 1988, the publication requirement in the Official Gazette was yet
to be complied with. Although the Notice of Initial Hearing was included for publication in the 17
October 1988 issue of the Official Gazette, specifically Vol. 84, No. 42, thereof, the same was
however released for publication only on 31 January 1989, as shown by the Certification of
Publication issued by the Director of the National Printing Office. 5 In other words, the actual

publication of the notice came out sixty-seven (67) days after the scheduled initial hearing and/or
forty-two (42) days after private respondent had rested her case. Petitioner concludes that the
late publication did not vest jurisdiction in the trial court.
In petitioner's brief filed before respondent Court of Appeals, we note that the issue of late
publication of the Notice of Initial Hearing in the Official Gazette was raised squarely. But for no
apparent reason, the issue was ignored in the questioned decision. Indeed, respondent court
could have easily resolved the issue in favor of petitioner supported as it was not only by
competent evidence but also by ample jurisprudence.
The primary legal principle against which the legality of all the proceedings conducted by the trial
court should be tested is jurisdiction. In order to ascertain whether a court has jurisdiction, the
provision of the law in point should be inquired into. 6 Section 23 of P.D. 1529 explicitly provides
that before the court can act on the application for land registration, the public shall be given
notice of the initial hearing thereof by means of publication, mailing, and posting. InDirector of
Lands v. Court of Appeals, 7 citing Caltex v. CIR, 8, this Court ruled that in all cases where the
authority of the courts to proceed
is conferred by a statute and when the manner of obtaining jurisdiction is mandatory it must be
strictly complied with, or the proceedings will be utterly void. So that where there is a defect of
publication of petition, such defect deprives the court of jurisdiction. 9 And when the court lacks
jurisdiction to take cognizance of a case, the same lacks authority over the whole case and all its
aspects. 10

initial hearing. While there is no dispute that the notice was included in Vol. 84, No. 42, 17
October 1988 issue of the Official Gazette, this particular issue was released for publication only
on 31 January 1989 when the initial hearing was already a fait accompli. The point of reference
in establishing lack of jurisdiction of the trial court was 31 January 1989 because it was only on
that date when the notice was made known to the people in general. 14 Verily, the late publication
of the notice defeated the purpose for its existence thereby reducing it to a mere pro
forma notice.
By reason of the defective notice of initial hearing, all the proceedings conducted by the trial
court which culminated in its decision granting the prayer of respondent Dolor are declared
VOID and it was error for respondent Court of Appeals to have sustained the same.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The questioned decision of respondent Court of
Appeals which affirmed the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Daet, Camarines Norte, is
VACATED and SET ASIDE, and the application of private respondent for the confirmation and
registration of her title over the property described therein is DENIED.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., Quiason and Kapunan, JJ., concur.
Cruz, J., is on leave.

In Register of Deeds of Malabon v. RTC, Malabon, 11 an issue similar to the one presented in the
present petition was posed, that is, whether the actual publication of the notice of the petition in
the Official Gazette forty-seven (47) days afterthe hearing, instead of at least thirty (30) days
prior to the date of hearing, 12 was sufficient to vest jurisdiction in the court to hear and determine
the petition. We answered in the negative since the purpose of the publication of the notice of
the petition for reconstitution in the Official Gazette is to apprise the whole world that such a
petition has been filed and that whoever is minded to oppose it for good cause may do so within
thirty (30) days before the date set by the court for hearing the petition. It is the publication of
such notice that brings in the whole world as a party in the case.
Regarding applications for land registration, the purpose of publication of the notice of initial
hearing is the same: to require all persons concerned who may have any rights or interests in
the property applied for to appear in court at a certain date and time to show cause why the
application should not be granted. In particular, the notice in this case commanded all persons
concerned:
. . . to appear before this Court at its session to be held at Branch XXXVIII,
Municipality of Daet, Province of Camarines Norte, Philippines, on the 25th
day of November, 1988, at 8:30 o'clock in the forenoon, then and there to
present such claims as you may have to said land or any portion thereof,
and to submit evidence in support of such claims, and unless you appear at
said Court at the time and place aforesaid, your default will be recorded and
the title to the land will be adjudicated and determined in accordance with
law and the evidence before the Court, and thereafter you will forever be
barred from contesting said application (or petition) or any decree entered
thereon 13 (Emphasis supplied).
Section 23 of P.D. 1529 does not provide a period within which the notice should be published in
the Official Gazette but for reasons already obvious, the publication should precede the date of

[G.R. No. 132963. September 10, 1998]

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, (represented by Opol National Secondary Technical
School), petitioner, vs. NICANOR DOLDOL, respondent.
DECISION
ROMERO, J.:
Before us is a petition for review of the decision of the Court of Appeals dated October 27, 1997,
reversing the decision of the Regional Trial Court and dismissing herein petitioners complaint, as
well as its resolution of March 5, 1998, denying petitioners motion for reconsideration.
The facts are as follows:
Sometime in 1959, respondent Nicanor Doldol occupied a portion of land in Barrio Pontacan,
Municipality of Opol, Misamis Oriental. On October 23, 1963, he filed an application for saltwork
purposes for the said area with the Bureau of Forest Development. The Director of Forestry,
however, rejected the same on April 1, 1968. Meanwhile, the Provincial Board of Misamis
Oriental passed a resolution in 1965 reserving Lot 4932, Cad-237, Opol Cadastre as a school
site. This reserved lot unfortunately included the area occupied by Doldol.
In accordance with said resolution, the Opol High School transferred to the site in
1970. Seventeen years later, on November 2, 1987, then President Corazon Aquino issued
Proclamation No. 180 reserving the area, including the portion in dispute, for the Opol High
School, now renamed the Opol National Secondary Technical School (hereafter Opol National
School). Needing the area occupied by Doldol for its intended projects, the school made several
demands for him to vacate said portion, but he refused to move.

In view of Doldols refusal to vacate, Opol National School filed in 1991 a complaint for accion
possessoria with the Regional Trial Court of Cagayan de Oro. The trial court ruled in the schools
favor and ordered Doldol to vacate the land. On appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed the
decision of the court a quo, ruling that Doldol was entitled to the portion he occupied, he having
possessed the same for thirty-two years, from 1959 up to the time of the filing of the complaint in
1991.
Opol National Schools motion for reconsideration of said decision having been denied by the
Court of Appeals in its resolution of March 5, 1998, Opol National School elevated its case to
this Court, claiming that the Court of Appeals erred on a question of law when it held, contrary to
the evidence on record, that respondent had been in open, continuous, notorious and exclusive
possession of the land in dispute for thirty-two years.
The petition is meritorious.
In ruling in Doldols favor, the Court of Appeals grounded its decision on Section 48 of
Commonwealth Act No. 141 (otherwise known as the Public Land Act). Said provision, as
amended by Republic Act No. 1942, provides as follows:
Section 48. The following described citizens of the Philippines, occupying lands of the public
domain or claiming interest therein, but whose titles have not been perfected or completed, may
apply to the Court of First Instance (now Regional Trial Court) of the province where the land is
located for confirmation of their claims and the issuance of a certification of title therefor under
the Land Registration Act, to wit:
xxxxxxxxx
(b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have been in open,
continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of agricultural lands of the
public domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition or ownership for at least thirty years
immediately preceding the filing of the application for confirmation of title, except when
prevented by wars or force majeure. Those shall be conclusively presumed to have performed
all the conditions essential to a Government grant and shall be entitled to a certificate of title
under the provisions of this chapter.(Italics ours)
In accordance with the above provision, the appellate court averred that a citizen of the
Philippines may acquire alienable land of the public domain if he has possessed the same for
thirty years. Finding Doldol to have occupied the disputed lot for thirty-two years, it ruled that the
former had acquired ownership of the same, thereby negating Opol National S chools claim over
the questioned area.
To further bolster its argument, the appellate court cited Republic vs. CA[1] where this Court, citing Director of
Lands vs. Iglesia ni Cristo, 200 SCRA 606 (1991) declared that:
The weight of authority is that open, exclusive and undisputed possession of alienable public land for the
period prescribed by law creates the legal fiction whereby the land, upon completion of the requisite
period ipso jure and without the need of judicial or other sanction, ceases to be public land and becomes
private property.
xxxxxxxxx
with the latters proven occupation and cultivation for more than 30 years since 1914, by himself and by his
predecessors-in-interest, title over the land has vested on petitioner so as to segregate the land from the mass
of public land.
xxxxxxxxx
As interpreted in several cases, when the conditions as specified in the foregoing provision are complied with,
the possessor is deemed to have acquired, by operation of law, a right to a grant, a government grant, without
the necessity of a certificate of title being issued. The land, therefore, ceases to be of the public domain and
beyond the authority of the Director of Lands to dispose of. The application for confirmation is mere formality,

the lack of which does not affect the legal sufficiency of the title as would be evidenced by the patent and the
Torrens title to be issued upon the strength of said patent.
The appellate court has resolved the question as to who between the parties had a better right to possess the
lot through the erroneous application of an outdated version of Section 48 of the Public Land Act. Likewise,
Solicitor Renan E. Ramos of the Office of the Solicitor General erred in assuming that the thirty-year proviso in
the aforementioned section was still good law. The original Section 48(b) of C.A. No. 141 provided for
possession and occupation of lands of the public domain since July 26, 1894. This was superseded by R.A.
No. 1942,[2] which provided for a simple thirty year prescriptive period of occupation by an applicant for judicial
confirmation of imperfect title. The same, however, has already been amended by Presidential Decree No.
1073, approved on January 25, 1977. As amended, Section 48(b) now reads:
(b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous,
exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of agricultural lands of the public domain, under a bona
fide claim of acquisition or ownership, since June 12, 1945, or earlier, immediately preceding the filing of the
application for confirmation of title, except when prevented by wars orforce majeure. Those shall be
conclusively presumed to have performed all the conditions essential to a Government grant and shall be
entitled to a certificate of title under the provisions of this chapter. (Italics ours)
Thus, in the aforecited Republic vs. CA case, we stated that the Public Land Act requires that the applicant
must prove (a) that the land is alienable public land and (b) that his open, continuous, exclusive and notorious
possession and occupation of the same must either be since time immemorial or for the period prescribed in
the Public Land Act. When the conditions set by law are complied with, the possessor of the land, by operation
of law, acquires a right to a grant, a government grant, without the necessity of a certificate of title being
issued.
The evidence presented shows that the land in dispute is alienable and disposable, in accordance with the
District Foresters Certification dated September 20, 1978, that the subject area is within Project 8, an alienable
and disposable tract of public land, as appearing in Bureau of Forest Land Classification Map No. 585. Doldol,
thus, meets the first requirement.
The parties, however, stipulated during the pre-trial hearing that Doldol had been occupying the portion
reserved for the school site only since 1959. The law, as presently phrased, requires that possession of lands
of the public domain must be from June 12, 1945 or earlier, for the same to be acquired through judicial
confirmation of imperfect title.
Consequently, Doldol could not have acquired an imperfect title to the disputed lot since his occupation of the
same started only in 1959, much later than June 12, 1945. Not having complied with the conditions set by law,
Doldol cannot be said to have acquired a right to the land in question as to segregate the same from the public
domain. Doldol cannot, therefore, assert a right superior to the school, given that then President Corazon
Aquino had reserved the lot for Opol National School. As correctly pointed out by the Solicitor General:
(T)he privilege of occupying public lands with a view of preemption confers no contractual or vested right in the
lands occupied and the authority of the President to withdraw such lands for sale or acquisition by the public,
or to reserve them for public use, prior to the divesting by the government of title thereof stands, even though
this may defeat the imperfect right of a settler. Lands covered by reservation are not subject to entry, and no
lawful settlement on them can be acquired. [3]
In sum, Opol National School has the better right of possession over the land in dispute.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the decision of the Court of Appeals dated October 27, 1997, and
Resolution dated March 27, 1998, are hereby ANNULLED and SET ASIDE and the Decision of the Regional
Trial Court dated August 25, 1992, is hereby REINSTATED.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. L-69002 June 30, 1988

REPUBLIC
OF
THE
PHILIPPINES, petitioner,
vs.
AMANDA LAT VDA. DE CASTILLO, FLORENCIO T. CASTILLO, SOLEDAD LOTA
CASTILLO, CARLOS L. CASTILLO, NIEVES KATIGBAK CASTILLO, MARIANO L.
CASTILLO, HIPOLITA DYTIAPCO CASTILLO, AIDA CASTILLO HERRERA, HERMITO
HERRERA, JOSE L. CASTILLO, LILIA MACEDA CASTILLO, TERESITA L. CASTILLO,
REGISTER OF DEEDS OF BATANGAS and THE INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE
COURT,respondents.
Castro, Nardo, Quintanilla, Gonzales & Macatangay Law Office for respondents.

PARAS, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari of the April 26, 1984 Decision of the then Intermediate
Appellate Court *reversing the February 6, 1976 Decision of the then Court of First Instance of
Batangas, Branch VI, in Civil Case No. 2044.
The antecedental facts of this case, as found by the then Intermediate Appellate Court, are as
follows:
Sometime in 1951, the late Modesto Castillo applied for the registration of two parcels of land,
Lots 1 and 2, located in Banadero, Tanauan, Batangas, described in Plan Psu-119166, with a
total area of 39,755 square meters. In a decision dated August 31, 1951, the said Modesto
Castillo, married to Amanda Lat, was declared the true and absolute owner of the land with the
improvements thereon, for which Original Certificate of Title No. 0-665 was, issued to him by the
Register of Deeds at Batangas, Batangas, on February 7, 1952. By virtue of an instrument dated
March 18, 1960, the said Lots 1 and 2 covered by Original Certificate of Title No. 0-665, together
with Lot No. 12374 covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 3254-A and Lot No. 12377
covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 3251-A, were consolidated and sub-divided into Lots
1 to 9 under Pcs-1046. After the death of Modesto Castillo, or on August 31, 1960, Amanda Lat
Vda. de Castillo, et al., executed a deed of partition and assumption of mortgage in favor of
Florencio L. Castillo, et al., as a result of which Original Certificate of Title No. D-665 was
cancelled, and in lieu thereof, new transfer cerfificates of title were issued to Florencio Castillo,
et al., to wit: Transfer Certificate of Title No. 21703 (Lot 4) (and) Transfer Certificate of Title No.
21704 to Florencio Castillo (Lot 5); Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-21708 to Carlos L. Castillo
(Lot 7); Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-21712 to Mariano L. Castillo (Lot 6); Transfer Certificate
of Title No. T-21713 to Jose L. Castillo (Lot 9); Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-21718 to Aida C.
Herrera (Lot 2); and Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-21727 to Teresita L. Castillo (Lot 8).
The Republic of the Philippines filed Civil Case No. 2044 with the lower court for the annulment
of the certificates of title issued to defendants Amanda Lat Vda. de Castillo, et al., as
heirs/successors of Modesto Castillo, and for the reversion of the lands covered thereby (Lots 1
and 2, Psu-119166) to the State. It was alleged that said lands had always formed part of the
Taal Lake, washed and inundated by the waters thereof, and being of public ownership, it could
not be the subject of registration as private property. Appellants herein, defendants below,
alleged in their answer that the Government's action was already barred by the decision of the
registration court; that the action has prescribed; and that the government was estopped from
questioning the ownership and possession of appellants.

Certificates of Title issued over the property in the names of the defendants. Lots Nos. 1 and 2
of Plan Psu-19166 are hereby declared public lands belonging to the state. Without
pronouncement as to costs.
The Court of Appeals, on appeal, in a Decision promulgated on April 26,1984, reversed and set
aside the appealed decision, and dismissed the complaint (Record, pp. 31-41). Herein petitioner
filed a Motion for Reconsideration (Record, pp. 42-51), but the same was denied in a Resolution
promulgated on October 12,1984 (Record, p. 52). Hence, the instant petition.
The sole issue raised in this case is whether or not the decision of the Land Registration Court
involving shore lands constitutes res adjudicata.
There is no question that one of the requisites of res judicata is that the court rendering the final
judgment must have jurisdiction over the subject matter (Ramos v. Pablo, 146 SCRA 24 [1986];
that shores are properties of the public domain intended for public use (Article 420, Civil Code)
and, therefore, not registrable. Thus, it has long been settled that portions of the foreshore or of
the territorial waters and beaches cannot be registered. Their inclusion in a certificate of title
does not convert the same into properties of private ownership or confer title upon the registrant
(Republic v. Ayala y Cia, 14 SCRA, 259 [1965], citing the cases of Dizon, et al. v. Bayona, et al.,
98 Phil. 943; and Dizon, et al. v. Rodriguez, et al., 13 SCRA 704).
But an important bone of contention is the nature of the lands involved in this case.
Petitioner contends "that "Lots 1 and 2, PSU-119166 had always formed part of the Taal Lake,
washed and inundated by the waters thereof. Consequently, the same were not subject to
registration, being outside the commerce of men; and that since the lots in litigation are of public
domain (Art. 502), par. 4 Civil Code) the registration court (of 1951) did not have jurisdiction to
adjudicate said lands as private property, hence, res judicata does not apply. (Rollo, pp. 37-38).
The Government presented both oral and documentary evidence.
As summarized by the Intermediate Appelate Court (now Court of Appeals), the testimonies of
the witnesses for the petitioner are as follows:
1. Rosendo Arcenas, a Geodetic Engineer connected with the Bureau of Lands since 1961,
testified to the effect that Lots 1 and 2, Psu-119166, which are the lots in question, adjoin the
cadastral survey of Tanauan, Batangas (Cad. 168); that the original boundary of the original
cadastral survey was foreshore land as indicated on the plan; that the cadastral survey of
Tanauan was executed sometime in 1923; that the first survey executed of the land after 1923
was the one executed in 1948 under Plan Psu-119166 that in the relocation survey of the
disputed lots in 1962 under SWO-40601, said lots were annotated on the plan as claimed by the
Republic of the Philippines in the same manner that it was so annotated in Plan Psu-119166;
thus showing that the Government was the only claimant of the land during the survey in 1948;
that during the relocation survey made in 1962, old points cannot be Identified or located
because they were under water by about forty centimeters; that during the ocular inspection of
the premises on November 23, 1970, he found that 2 monuments of the lots in question were
washed out by the waters of the Baloyboy Creek; that he also found duck pens along the lots in
question; that there are houses in the premises as well as some camotes and bananas; and that
he found also some shells ('suso') along the banks of the Taal lake (Tsn, Nov. 16, 1970, pp. 1321; Feb. 16, 1971, pp. 4-36).

After trial, the then Court of First Instance of Batangas, Branch VI, presided over by Honorable
Benjamin Relova, in a Decision dated February 6, 1976 (Record on Appeal, pp. 62-69), ruled in
favor of herein petitioner Republic of the Philippines. The decretal portion of the said decision,
reads:

2. Braulio Almendral testified to the effect that he is a resident of Tanauan, Batangas, near the
Taal lake; that like himself there are other occupants of the land among whom are Atanacio
Tironas, Gavino Mendoza, Juliano Tirones, Agapito Llarena, etc.; that it was they who filled up
the area to make it habitable; that they filled up the area with shells and sand; that their
occupation is duck raising; and that the Castillos never stayed in or occupied the premises (Tsn,
Nov. 16, 1970, pp. 32-50).

WHEREFORE, the Register of Deeds of Batangas is hereby ordered to cancel Original

Certificate of Title No. 0-665 in the name of Modesto Castillo and the subsequent Transfer of

3. Arsenio Ibay, a Geodetic Engineer connected with the Bureau of Lands since 1968, also
testified to the effect that in accordance with the cadastral plan of Tanauan, the only private

claim of Sixto Castillo referred to Lots 1006 to 1008; that the Castillos never asserted any private
claim to the lots in question during the cadastral survey;' that in the preparation of plan Psu119166, Lots 12374 and 12377 were made as reference to conform to previously approved
plans; that lot 12374 is a portion of cadastral lot 10107, SWO-86738 while Lot 22377 is a portion
of Lot 10108 of the same plan (Tsn, Nov. 25, 1970, pp. 115-137).
4. Jose Isidro, a Land Investigator of the Bureau of Lands, testified to the effect that pursuant to
the order of the Director of Lands, he, together with Engineer Rufino Santiago and the barrio
captain of Tanauan, Batangas, conducted an investigation of the land in question; that he
submitted a report of investigation, dated October 19, 1970 (Exh. H-1); that portions of the lot in
question were covered by public land applications filed by the occupants thereof; that Engineer
Santiago also submitted a report (Exh. H-8); that he had notified Dr. Mariano Castillo before
conducting the investigation (Tsn, Nov. 25,1970, pp. 137-162).
5. Rufino Santiago, another Geodetic Engineer connected with the Bureau of Lands, testified to
the effect that on October 19,1970, he submitted a report of investigation regarding the land in
question; that he noted on the plan Exhibit H-9 the areas on which the houses of Severo
Alcantara and others were built; that he found that the land was planted to coconuts which are
about 15 years old; that the land is likewise improved with rice paddies; that the occupants
thereof are duck raisers; that the area had been elevated because of the waste matters and
duck feeds that have accumulated on the ground through the years (Tsn, Nov. 26,1970, pp. 163196).
6. Pablo Tapia, Barrio Captain of Tanauan, Batangas, since 1957, testified to the effect that the
actual occupants of Lots I and 2 are Atanacio Tirones,tc.; that during the war the water line
reached up to a point marked Exhibit A-9 and at present the water has receded to a point up to
Exhibit A-12; that the reasons why the waters of Taal lake have receded to the present level is
because of the fillings made by the people living in Lots 1 and 2; that there are several duck
pens all over the place; that the composition of the soil is a mixture of mud and duck feeds; that
improvements consist of bananas, bamboos and palay; that the shoreline is not even in shape
because of the Baloyboy Creek; that the people in the area never came to know about the
registration case in which the lots in question were registered; that the people living in the area,
even without any government aid, helped one another in the construction of irrigated rice
paddies; that he helped them file their public land applications for the portions occupied by them;
that the Castillos have never been in possession of the premises; that the people depend upon
duck raising as their means of their livelihood; that Lots 1 and 2 were yet inexistent during the
Japanese occupation; and that the people started improving the area only during liberation and
began to build their houses thereon. (Tsn, Nov. 26,1970, pp. 197-234).
Among the exhibits formally offered by the Government are: the Original Plan of Tanauan,
Batangas, particularly the Banader Estate, the Original Plan of PSU-119166, Relocation
Verification Survey Plan, maps, and reports of Geodetic Engineers, all showing the original
shoreline of the disputed areas and the fact that the properties in question were under water at
the time and are still under water especially during the rainy season (Hearing, March 17,1971,
TSN, pp. 46-47).

1. Silvano Reano, testified to the effect that he was the overseer of the property of the late
Modesto Castillo located at Banadero,Tanauan, Batangas since 1944 to 1965; that he also
knows Lots 1 and 2, the parcels of land in question, since he was managing said property; that
the occupants of said Lots 1 and 2 were engaged in duck raising; that those occupants were
paying the Castillos certain amount of money because their animals used to get inside the lots in
question; that he was present during the survey of the land in 1948; and that aside from the duck
pens which are built in the premises, the land is planted to rice (Tsn, April 14, 1971, pp. 62-88).
2. Dr. Mariano Castillo, testified to the effect that the late Modesto Castillo was a government
official who held high positions in the Government; and that upon his death the land was
subdivided among his legal heirs. (Appellee's Brief, pp. 4-9).
As above-stated, the trial court decided the case in favor of the government but the decision was
reversed on appeal by the Court of Appeals.
A careful study of the merits of their varied contentions readily shows that the evidence for the
government has far outweighed the evidence for the private respondents. Otherwise stated, it
has been satisfactorily established as found by the trial court, that the properties in question
were the shorelands of Taal Lake during the cadastral survey of 1923.
Explaining the first survey of 1923, which showed that Lots 1 and 2 are parts of the Taal Lake,
Engineer Rosendo Arcenas testified as follows:
ATTY. AGCAOILI:
Q Now, you mentioned Engineer that a subject matter of that plan which appears to be Lots 1
and 2 are adjoining cadastral lots of the Tanauan Cadastre, now, will you please state to the
Court what is the basis of that statement of yours?
A The basis of that statement is the plan itself, because there is here an annotation that the
boundary on the northeastern side is Tanauan Cadastre 168 which indicates that the boundary
of the original cadastral survey of Tanauan Cadastre way back in the year 1923 adjoins a
foreshore land which is also indicated in this plan as foreshore lands of Taal lake, sir.
xxx xxx xxx
Q Now, on this plan Exhibit "A-2", there are two lots indicated namely, Lots 12374 and 12377,
what do these lots represent?
A This is the cadastral lot executed in favor of a certain Modesto Castillo that corresponds to
Lots 12374 and another Lot 12377, sir.
Q At the time this survey plan Psu-119166 and marked as Exhibit "A-2" was executed in 1948,
were these lots 1 and 2 already in existence as part of the cadastral survey?
A No, sir, because there is already a foreshore boundary.

On the other hand, private respondents maintain that Lots 1 and 2 have always been in the
possession of the Castillo family for more than 76 years and that their possession was public,
peaceful, continuous, and adverse against the whole world and that said lots were not titled
during the cadastral survey of Tanauan, because they were still under water as a result of the
eruption of Taal Volcano on May 5, 1911 and that the inundation of the land in question by the
waters of Taal Lake was merely accidental and does not affect private respondents' ownership
and possession thereof pursuant to Article 778 of the Law of Waters. They finally insisted that
this issue of facts had been squarely raised at the hearing of the land registration case and,
therefore, res judicata(Record on Appeal, pp. 63-64). They submitted oral and documentary
evidence in support of their claim.

Q Do I understand from you Mr. Witness at the time of the survey of this land these two lots form
part of this portion?

Also summarized by respondent Appellate Court, the testimonies of the witnesses of private
respondents are as follows:

That as per original plan Psu-119166, it appears that Lot 1 and Lot 2, Psu-119166 surveyed and
approved in the name of Modesto Castillo is a portion of Taal Lake and as such it appears to be

A Yes, sir.
Q When again was the cadastral survey of Tanauan, Batangas, executed if you know?
A In the year 1923, sir. (Hearing of Nov. 16, 1970, TSN pp. 15-17).
Such fact was further verified in the Verification-Relocation Survey of 1948 by Engineer Arcenas
who conducted said survey himself and reported the following:

under water during the survey of cadastral Lot No. 12374 and Lot No. 12377, which was
surveyed and approved in the name of Modesto Castillo under Cad. 168. To support this theory
is the annotation appearing and printed along lines 2-3-4-5 of Lot 1, Psu-119166 and along lines
4-5-6 of Lot 2, Psu-119166 which notations clearly indicates that such boundary of property was
a former shorelines of Taal Lake, in other words, it was the extent of cultivation being the
shorelines and the rest of the area going to the southwestern direction are already covered by
water level.
Another theory to bolster and support this Idea is the actual location now in the verificationrelocation survey of a known geographic point were Barrio Boundary Monument (BBM N. 22) is
under water level quite for sometimes as evidence by earthworks (collection of mud) that
amount over its surface by eighty (80) centimeters below the ground, see notation appearing on
verification-relocation plan previously submitted. (Re-Verification-Relocation Survey Exhibits, pp.
64-65).
Said surveys were further confirmed by the testimonies of witnesses to the effect that from 1950
to 1969, during rainy season, the water of Taal lake even went beyond the questioned lots; and
that the water, which was about one (1) foot, stayed up to more or less two (2) to three (3)
months (Testimonies of Braulio Almendral and Anastacio Tirones both residents of Banadero,
Tanauan, Batangas (Hearing of Nov. 16, 1970, TSN, pp. 41-42 and Hearing of Nov. 23, 1970,
TSN, pp. 93, 98-99, respectively). In the Relocation Survey of 1962, there were no definite
boundary or area of Lots 1 and 2 because a certain point is existing which was under water by
40 centimeters (Testimony of Engineer Arcena, Hearing of Nov. 16,1970, TSN, p. 20).
Lakeshore land or lands adjacent to the lake, like the lands in question must be differentiated
from foreshore land or that part of the land adjacent to the sea which is alternately covered and
left dry by the ordinary flow of the tides (Castillo, Law on Natural Resources, Fifth Edition, 1954,
p. 67).
Such distinction draws importance from the fact that accretions on the bank of a lake, like
Laguna de Bay, belong to the owners of the estate to which they have been added (Gov't. v.
Colegio de San Jose, 53 Phil. 423) while accretion on a sea bank still belongs to the public
domain, and is not available for private ownership until formally declared by the government to
be no longer needed for public use (Ignacio v. Director of Lands, 108 Phil. 335 [1960]).
But said distinction will not help private respondents because there is no accretion shown to
exist in the case at bar. On the contrary, it was established that the occupants of the lots who
were engaged in duck raising filled up the area with shells and sand to make it habitable.
The defense of long possession is likewise not available in this case because, as already ruled
by this Court, mere possession of land does not by itself automatically divest the land of its
public character (Cuevas v. Pineda, 143 SCRA 674 [1968]).
PREMISES CONSIDERED, the April 26,1984 Decision of the then Intermediate Appellate Court
is hereby SET ASIDE and REVERSED and the February 6,1976 Decision of the then Court of
First Instance of Batangas is hereby AFFIRMED and REINSTATED.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 97493 February 8, 1993

PATRICIO
B.
MANALASTAS
and
BELEN
MANALASTAS, petitioners,
vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS, APOLONIA DELA CRUZ and THE HEIRS OF MOISES
CAO, respondents.
Santiago P. Armamento III for petitioners.

Public Attorney's Office for respondents.

NOCON, J.:
The case at bar involves the question of which prevails: is it the disposition of public agricultural
land by a deed of sale over the same or its disposition by free patent? The answer, of course, is
obvious. But first the facts of the case have to be tackled as there is where the seeming
confusion lies.
As the petitioners dispute the findings of facts by both the respondent Court of Appeals and the
trial court, the respective statements of fact by the litigants will have to be considered for a
proper disposition of the case at bar.
According to petitioners:
By virtue of a Deed of Absolute Sale dated December 30, 1949 (Exhibit "A"), Patricio Manalastas
and Belen Manalastas obtained from spouses Albino Magat and Benigna Sangalang a parcel of
land situated in Vizal, San Pablo, Candaba, Pampanga, which contained an area of sixty four
thousand and sixty (64,060) square meters (tsn, Nov. 15, 1985, pp. 7, 10-12). Due to the
construction of road and irrigation canal, the land was separated or divided into Lots Nos. 747,
3801, 3802 and 4160, Pls-476 of the Candaba Public Land Subdivision (Exhibit "E" and Exhibit
"B", tsn, id., pp. 29-30). Pursuant to a survey of land conducted on March 7, 1956, the Bureau of
Lands approved on October, 9, 1972 Exhibit "E", or the survey plan of Lot Nos. 747, 3801 and
3802, as well as Exhibit "B", the survey plan of Lot No. 4160, both in the name of Patricio
Manalastas. Lot No. 4160 with an area of two thousand two hundred and two (2,202) square
meters (Exhibit "B") adjoined Lot No. 745 belonging to Moises Cao (tsn, id., pp. 10, 14-15). A
fence made of concrete hollow blocks was constructed by Moises Cao to separate Lot No. 745
from Lot 4160 (tsn, id., p. 16). On March 2, 1951, Patricio and Belen Manalastas declared the
property subject of Exhibit "A" for taxation purposes with the Office of the Provincial Assessor of
Pampanga under Tax Declaration No. 4723 (Exhibit "C"), and have since paid the taxes thereon
(tsn, id., pp. 17-18).
Specifically, Lot No. 4160 was used for both residential and agricultural purposes. The
residential portion is occupied by four householders, namely, spouses Daniel Manalastas and
Apolonia Caasa, Alfonso and Belen Buco, Aquilino and Marieta Buco, and lastly, Maxima
Caasa. They have been staying in Lot No. 4160 since the purchase of the land by Patricio and
Belen Manalastas, to whom they each pay a yearly rent of one (1) cavan of palay (tsn, id., pp.
18-20; Oct. 5, 1985, p. 5) Witnesses Aquilino Buco and Maximo Manalastas, both admitted that
the lot (Exhibit "B") situated in Vizal, San Pablo, Candaba, Pampanga on which their houses
stand is owned by Patricio Manalastas, to whom they pay a yearly rent of one cavan of palay
(tsn, Jan. 15, 1986, pp. 9-13). On the other hand, the agricultural portion is cultivated by one
Felicisimo Balmeo, tenant of Patricio and Belen Manalastas (tsn, Nov. 15, 1985, pp. 20-21).
Witness Balmeo testified that Patricio and Belen Manalastas gave him the authority to cultivate
the land, which he started in 1950 continuously up to the present and which portion of land he
identified as Exhibit "B-1" (tsn, Jan. 15, 1986, pp. 5-6). From the time that Patricio and Belen
Manalastas acquired Lot No. 4160, neither Moises Cao nor any of his heirs have occupied any
portion thereof, whether actual or constructive (tsn, Nov. 15, 1985, pp. 22-23).
Sometime in February 1985, Patricio Manalastas was informed by his tenant, Felicisimo Balmeo
that while he was cutting bamboo on a portion of Lot No. 4160, he was stopped by the Caos
(referring to the heirs of Moises Cao who died in 1982) who claimed that the property belong to
them (tsn, id., p. 23). Patricio Manalastas went to the proper government offices to verify the
basis of this claim. He discovered that when Moises Cao was still alive, he filed an application
for free patent title with the Bureau of Lands, of which he (Manalastas) did not receive any notice
(tsn, id., pp. 22-24). Patricio Manalastas was able to secure a certified true copy of the duplicate
original of the said application of Moises Cao dated June 9, 1958, which showed that the
application for free patent referred only to Lot No. 745, Pls-476 of Candaba, Pampanga,

described therein as containing an area of only one thousand fifty (1,050) square meters
(Exhibits
"D"
and
"D-l") (tsn, id., p. 25). On the basis of a free patent title obtained on Lot No. 745, Pls-476, the
Register of Deeds for the Province of Pampanga issued Original Certificate of Title No. 948 in
favor of Moises Cao on November 17, 1972, which showed however that Lot No. 745, Pls-476
now contains an area of three thousand one hundred and fourteen (3,114) square meters
(Exhibit "I"). Comparing Moises Cao's application for free patent with the certificate of title
subsequently issued to him (Moises Cao), Patricio Manalastas found that said title to the land
embraced and covered the whole of Lot No. 4160 belonging to him (tsn, id., p. 31). Thereafter,
Patricio Manalastas went to the farm and talked to the wife and children of the late Moises Cao
and told them about the mistake in the title of Moises because it encroached on his Lot No.
4160. He offered to settle the matter anicably with them in order to avoid litigation, but they told
him that they could no longer return his lot to him as it was already titled in the name of Moises
Cao (tsn, id., p. 32). 1
Moreover, according to private respondents:
1. The land in dispute (Lot 4160, AS-1547 having an area of 2,202 square meters) was a part of
the Candaba Public Land Subdivision located in Visal, San Pablo, Candaba, Pampanga and
thus, a public land. It is an agricultural public land and was originally designated as portion of Lot
745, PLS-476 which has a total area of 3,114 square meters. (Annex "1", Comment).
2. In 1930, the parents of Moises Cao were actually possessing and cultivating the said public
land. Moises Cao and family, subsequently, occupied the same in the concept of an owner and
in an open, public and adverse manner.
3. Moises Cao, on November 13, 1956 caused the survey of the said public land (Lot 745, PLS476) in his (Cao's) name.
4. Moises Cao, on June 9, 1958 applied for a free patent over said public land.
5. On October 2, 1972, Lot 745, PLS-476 was subdivided by the Bureau of Lands into two (2)
lots one of which is Lot 4160-AS-1547 which had an area of 2,202 square meters and the other
one, is Lot 245 with an area of 912 square meters.
6. The then Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources Arturo R. Tanco, Jr. thru the Bureau
of Lands as authorized by the President of the Philippines approved said application for free
patent of Moises Cao not only over the 912 square meters lot but on the original Lot 745, PLS476 which was said to contain an area of 3,114 square meters. Moises Cao, therefore, obtained
a free patent title on the said public land. (Annex "2", Comment) Original Certificate of Title
(OCT) No. 948 of the Office of the Register of Deeds of Pampanga, consequently, was issued in
Moises Cao's name. (Annex "3", Comment) Moises Cao, thus, become the lawful owner and
possessor of Lot 745, PLS-476 which includes Lot 4160, AS-1547 being caimed by the
petitioners.
7. Moises Cao, in 1982, died and was survived by his wife Apolonia de la Cruz and their
children. Private respondents Apolonia de la Cruz Vda. de Cao and children, consequently,
inherited the said property. 2
As a result of this controversy over Lot 4160, petitioners instituted an action for reconveyance
against private respondents which the trial court dismissed for lack of merit, reasoning out as
follows:
The present action was filed only on April 17, 1985, Original Certificate of Title No. 948 issued by
virtue of a free patent application, as already stated, on November 17, 1972. For an action for
reconveyance of land to prosper in this case, there must be evidence to show that the fraudulent
statements were made in the application for free patent, and moreover, the action must be
instituted four years from the discovery of such fraudulent statements. No evidence was
presented by the plaintiffs to show such fraudulent statements were made in the application to

warrant reconveyance. More than four years had already elapsed whenthis action was filed.
Prescription of action therefrom lies.
An action for reconveyance of land, for which a patent had been issued to the defendant by
reason of fraudulent statements, is one based on fraud, and must be instituted within four years
from the discovery of the fraudulent statements made in the application. (Rosario v. Auditor
General, L-11817, April 30, 1958; Jean v. Agregado, L-7921, Sept. 28, 1955).
Another thing that militates against the plaintiffs.
A holder of a land acquired under free patent is more favorably situated than that of an owner of
registered property. (Cabacug vs. Lao, L-27036, 36 SCRA 91).
The plaintiffs have no title for the portion sought to be reconveyed. They anchor their cause of
action merely on the deed of sale and the survey plan.
Mere claim cannot defeat a registered title. It is obvious that a mere claim cannot defeat a
registered title. Furthermore, the "claim" is only noted on the survey plan, and such notation
cannot prevail over the actual decree of registration as reproduced in the certificate. All claims of
third persons to the property must be asserted in the registration proceedings. If any claim to a
portion thereof is upheld, that portion is segregated from the property applied for, and is not
included in the decree of registration and certificate of title subsequently issued to the applicant.
If it is included, the claim is deemed adversely resolved with finality, subject only to a petition for
review of the decree within one year from its issuance on the ground of fraud, under Section 38
of
the Land Registration Act. (Fernandez vs. Aborantigue, 36 SCRA 476). 3 (Emphasis in the
original).
The respondent court found petitioners' appeal to be devoid of merit. 4 Their motion for
reconsideration, likewise, met the same fate, with the respondent Court ruling as follows:
In the present case, the title sought to be annulled, Original Certificate of Title No. 948, was
issued by the Register of Deeds of Pampanga on September 17, 1972. Appellants, however,
filed their action for reconveyance only on April 16, 1985, clearly beyond the ten (10) year
prescriptive period. 5
Petitioners now plead their case before Us complaining that the respondent Court of Appeals
erred in:
1. . . . IGNORING VITAL FACTS AND CIRCUMSTANCES WHICH SHOW THAT PRIVATE
RESPONDENTS AND THEIR PREDECESSOR-IN-INTEREST, MOISES CAO, HAVE NEVER
BEEN IN POSSESSION OF LOT 4160 AND THAT THE INCLUSION OF SAID LOT IN THE
CERTIFICATE OF TITLE ISSUED TO MOISES CAO WAS DUE TO FRAUD OR MISTAKE.
2. . . . DISREGARDING THE SETTLED JURISPRUDENCE THAT AN ACTION TO QUIET TITLE
TO PROPERTY IN ONE'S POSSESSION IS IMPRESCRIPTIBLE.
3. . . . HOLDING THAT THE CARAGAY-LAYNO DOCTRINE HAS BEEN ABANDONED. 6
From the narration of facts by petitioners essentially, what petitioners did was to:
1. buy a parcel of land from the Magat spouses on December 30, 1949;
2. have the land surveyed due to the construction of a road and irrigation canal;
3. declare the property for taxation purposes and pay the taxes;
4. put a tenant in the agricultural area; and
5. build four (4) houses for himself and relatives.

What private respondents did, essentially, was to:

1. cause the survey of the land in Moises Cao's name; and
2. apply for a free patent over the said land.
Since what is at stake here was public agricultural land, the procedure to obtain such land must
be followed. Said procedure is spelled out in Section 11, CA 141, as amended, which reads
asfollows:
Sec. 11. Public lands suitable for agricultural purposes can be disposed of only as follows, and
not otherwise:
1. For homestead settlement.
2. By sale.
3. By lease.

TAMAYO, THE COMMISIONER OF THE LAND REGISTRATION COMMISSION and the

REGISTER OF DEEDS OF NUEVA ECIJA, respondents.
G.R. No. L-28144 November 28, 1975
ALIPIO ALINSUNURIN, now substituted by PARAAQUE INVESTMENT and
DEVELOPMENT
CORPORATION, applicant-appellee,
vs.
THE DIRECTOR OF LANDS, THE DIRECTOR OF FORESTRY and the ARMED FORCES OF
THE PHILIPPINES,oppositors-appellants.
Acting Solicitor General Hugo E. Gutierrez, Jr. and Assistant Solicitor General Reynato S. Puno
for The Director of Lands, etc.
Jaime B. Lumasag Jr. and Jose J. Roy and Associates Law Office for Roman C. Tamayo.
Nemesio P. Diaz and Celso B. Fernandez, Jr. for Alipio Alinsunurin, etc.

4. By confirmation of imperfect or incomplete titles:

a) By judicial legislation.
b) By administrative legislation (free patent).
Obviously, petitioners did not follow the procedure mandated by law. Even if petitioners could
trace their deed of sale back to Adam and Eve, fill in every square inch of the land with
agricultural tenants, have residential houses built every few meters here and there, pay the
realty taxes religiously every year and have an approved Bureau of Lands Survey yearly, they
will NOT become the owners of said parcel of land IF THEY WILL NOT follow the procedures
above indicated.
Since private respondents' father, the deceased Moises Cao did follow the procedure outlined in
the law, Moises Cao became the owner of the disputed parcel of land, as in fact, he was
awarded title to all 3,134 square meters of it by no less than the then Secretary of Agriculture
and Natural Resources, Arturo R. Tanco, Jr. 7
There was no fraud on the part of the late Moises Cao in obtaining title to the land in dispute. On
the other hand, there was lack of proper legal advice on the part of petitioners. They probably
thought they knew what to do in this particular situation without consulting a lawyer. For
example, petitioners could have tacked on to their length of possession of the Magat spouses
and any predecessors-in-interest and then apply for judicial confirmation of their imperfect
title. 8 Sad to say, they did not.
The respondent court and the trial court, therefore, did not ignore those alleged vital facts and
circumstances upon which petitioners stake their claim.
There is no need, therefore, to discuss the other assigned errors.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED for lack of merit. The respondent court's
resolution is hereby AFFIRMED in toto.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-27594 November 28, 1975
THE DIRECTOR OF LANDS, THE DIRECTOR OF FORESTRY, and the ARMED FORCES OF
THE
PHILIPPINES, petitioners,
vs.
HON. SALVADOR C. REYES, as Judge of the Court of First Instance of Nueva Ecija,
Branch III, PARAAQUE INVESTMENT and DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, ROMAN C.

ANTONIO, J.:
These cases are interrelated, and so are decided jointly.
In his application originally filed on February 24, 1964 with the Court of First Instance of Nueva
Ecija, the applicant Alipio Alinsunurin, claiming ownership in fee simple by inheritance from the
late Maria Padilla, sought the registration of title under Act 496, as amended, of a vast tract of
land, containing an area of 16,800 hectares, more or less, situated at the municipality of Laur,
province of Nueva Ecija, admittedly inside the boundary of the military reservation of Fort
Magsaysay. 1
On May 5, 1966, the Director of Lands, Director of Forestry, and the Armed Forces of the
Philippines opposed the application, claiming that the applicant was without sufficient title and
was not in open, exclusive, continuous and notorious possession and occupation of the land in
question for at least thirty (30) years immediately preceding the filing of the application; that
approximately 13,957 hectares of said land consist of the military reservation of Fort Magsaysay
established under Proclamation No. 237, dated December 10, 1955 of the President. 2
On May 10, 1966, the applicant Alipio Alinsunurin filed a motion for substitution of parties,
requesting that the Paraaque Investment and Development Corporation be considered as the
applicant in his place, it having acquired all his rights, interests, ownership and dominion over
the property subject matter of the application. 3 The motion was granted by the lower court in its
order dated June 10, 1966. 4
It is beyond dispute that the land subject of the application is included within the area reserved
for military purposes under Proclamation No. 237, dated December 19, 1955, of the President.
The land is largely uncultivated, mountainous and thickly forested with a heavy growth of timber
of commercial quantities. 5 Except for a small area cultivated for vegetation by homesteaders
issued patents by the Director of Lands, there were no occupants on the land. 6
It is claimed by the applicant that Melecio Padilla acquired the land by virtue of a possessory
information title issued during the Spanish regime on March 5, 1895, and upon his death in
1900, he transmitted the ownership and possession thereof to his daughter and sole heir, Maria
Padilla. The latter in turn continued to cultivate the land thru tenants and utilized portions for
pasture, until her death sometime in 1944.
On November 19, 1966, the lower court rendered decision holding that the parcel of land applied
for, described in the technical description Plan II-6752, is adjudicated to and ordered to be
registered in favor of (a) Paraaque Investment and Development Corporation, a Philippine
corporation wholly owned by Filipino citizens, with address at Manila, Philippines, two-thirds

(2/3) portion, subject to the rights of Ariosto Santos per Joint Manifestation of Alipio Alinsunurin
and Encarnacion Caballero-Alinsunurin, Ariosto Santos and Paraaque Investment and
Development Corporation dated July 19, 1966 and marked as Exhibit "AA-4 " 7 and (b) Roman
C. Tamayo, Filipino citizen, married, resident of Cullit, Lallo, Cagayan, one-third (1/3) portion of
the said property.

are hereby restrained from accepting for registration documents referring to the subject land until
petitioners shall have filed a notice of lis pendens as to the title certificates of Roman Tamayo
and Paraaque Investment and Development Corporation, under Sec. 24, Rule 14, Rules of
Court, subject of the above-mentioned Land Registration Case No. N-675, LRC Rec. No. N25545.

On December 12, 1966, the oppositors Director of Lands, Director of Forestry and the Armed
Forces of the Philippines filed a Notice of Appeal from the said decision to the Supreme
Court, 8 copy of which notice was furnished counsel for the applicant Paraaque Investment and
Development Corporation; however, no copy was furnished to counsel for Roman C. Tamayo, to
whom one-third (1/3) portion of the land was adjudicated.

Accordingly, petitioners-appellants caused the entry of a notice of lis pendens to be duly

inscribed in the primary entry book of the Registry of Deeds of Nueva Ecija and annotated in the
memorandum of encumbrances in Original Certificate of Title No. 0-3151.

On January 18, 1967, within the extended period granted by the court, the oppositors-appellants
filed the corresponding Record on Appeal, copy of which was duly served upon appellees
Paraaque Investment and Development Corporation and Roman C. Tamayo.
By an order dated March 8, 1967, the lower court required the Provincial Fiscal to file an
Amended Record on Appeal, so as to include therein certain orders and pleadings, within ten
(10) days from receipt of the order. 9
On March 16, 1967, the Amended Record on Appeal was duly filed and copies served upon the
appellees.
Pending the approval of the Record on Appeal, the applicant Paraaque Investment and
Development Corporation filed a motion for the issuance of a decree of registration pending
appeal. Likewise, Roman C. Tamayo, thru counsel, filed a motion for the issuance of a decree of
registration. Both motions were opposed by the Government.
On March 11, 1967, the lower court, ruling that its decision of November 19, 1966 had become
final as to the share of Roman C. Tamayo, directed the issuance of a decree of registration of
the entire land, one-third (1/3)pro-indiviso in favor of Roman C. Tamayo, and two-thirds (2/3) pro
indiviso in favor of Paraaque Investment and Development Corporation, subject to the final
outcome of the appeal.
On March 14, 1967, the Commissioner of Land Registration forthwith issued Decree No. 113485
pursuant to the said order, and, on March 15, 1967, the Register of Deeds issued Original
Certificate of Title No. 0-3151 of the Register of Deeds of the Province of Nueva Ecija.
On April 12, 1967, the lower court approved the Amended Record on Appeal which, together
with the evidence and transcripts, was forwarded to this Court in due course of appeal.
As the lower court denied reconsideration of the order directing the issuance of a decree of
registration, on May 29, 1967, the Director of Lands, Director of Forestry and the Armed Forces
of the Philippines instituted before this Court a special civil action for certiorari and mandamus
with preliminary injunction (L-27594), seeking to nullify the order dated March 11, 1967, the
decree of registration issued pursuant thereto (Decree No. 113485 dated March 14, 1967) and
Original Certificate of Title No. 0-3151 of the Register of Deeds for the province of Nueva Ecija,
and to command the respondent court to certify the entire proceedings and to allow appeal to
the Supreme Court from its decision in toto in LRC Case No. N-675, LRC Rec. No. N-25545.
On June 5, 1967, We issued a writ of preliminary injunction as follows:
NOW, THEREFORE, until further orders from this Court, You (respondent Judge) are hereby
restrained from issuing a writ of possession in Land Registration Case No. N-675, LRC Rec. No.
25545 of the Court of First Instance of Nueva Ecija, entitled "Paraaque Investment and
Development Corporation versus Director of Lands, et al."; You (respondent Paraaque
Investment and Development Corporation and Roman C. Tamayo), your agents or
representatives are hereby restrained from taking possession and/or excercising acts of
ownership, occupancy or possession over the property in question subject matter of Land
Registration Case No. N-675, LRC Rec. No. N-25545; and You (respondent Register of Deeds)

In due time, the respondents filed their answers to the petition for certiorari. The parties having
filed their respective memoranda, the case is deemed submitted for decision.
At
the
(L-27594).

outset,

We

shall

resolve

the

petition

for certiorari and mandamus

I
Under the circumstances of this case, the failure of the appellants to serve a copy of their Notice
of Appeal to the counsel for adjudicatee Roman C. Tamayo is not fatal to the appeal because,
admittedly, he was served with a copy of the original, as well as the Amended Record on Appeal
in both of which the Notice of Appeal is embodied. 10 Hence, such failure cannot impair the right
of appeal. 11
What is more, the appeal taken by the Government was from the entire decision, which is not
severable. Thus, the appeal affects the whole decision. 12
In any event, We rule that execution pending appeal is not applicable in a land registration
proceeding. It is fraught with dangerous consequences. Innocent purchasers may be misled into
purchasing real properties upon reliance on a judgment which may be reversed on appeal.
A Torrens title issued on the basis of a judgment that is not final is a nullity, as it is violative of the
explicit provisions of the Land Registration Act which requires that a decree shall be issued only
after the decision adjudicating the title becomes final and executory, and it is on the basis of said
decree that the Register of Deeds concerned issues the corresponding certificate of title.
Consequently, the lower court acted without jurisdiction or exceeded its jurisdiction in ordering
the issuance of a decree of registration despite the appeal timely taken from the entire
decision a quo.
II
In the instant case, as a precaution, oppositors-appellants caused notice of lis pendens to be
duly inscribed in Original Certificate of Title No. 0-3151 of the Register of Deeds of Nueva Ecija,
thereby keeping the whole land subject matter of the appeal within the power of the court until
the litigation is terminated. 13
Such entry of notice of lis pendens cannot be cancelled until the final termination of the litigation.
The notice of lis pendens must be carried over in all titles subsequently issued, which will yield
to the ultimate result of the appeal.14
During the pendency of the appeal, it appears that Honofre A. Andrada, et al., filed with the
Court of First Instance of Nueva Ecija (Branch I, not the land registration court), a complaint
against the appellee Paraaque Investment and Development Corporation, Rodolfo A. Cenidoza
and Roman C. Tamayo, for reconveyance of a portion of the land in question (Civil Case No.
4696). The trial court assumed jurisdiction over the case despite the pendency of the appeal
involving the same land, and decided the case in favor of plaintiffs. In violation of Our injunction
adverted to above, Paraaque Investment and Development Corporation executed a subdivision
plan of the original single parcel of land subject of the land registration proceedings covered by
Original
Certificate
of
Title
No.

0-3151, and deeded over six (6) lots of the subdivision plan to plaintiffs Honofre A. Andrada and
Nemesio P. Diaz. By an order dated September 23, 1968, entered in Civil Case No. 4696, the
Register of Deeds of Nueva Ecija was directed to cancel Original Certificate of title No. 0-3151
and to issue new titles to the above-named transferees "free from all liens and encumbrances."
Immediately, transfer certificates of title were issued to them and other transferees in which the
Register of Deeds of Nueva Ecija did not carry over the notice of lis pendens originally inscribed
in Original Certificate of Title No. 0-3151. Subsequently, other transactions were entered into
involving portions of the land reconveyed in Civil Case No. 4696, including a transfer of about
4,000 hectares to the Land Bank of the Philippines in consideration of P8,940,000.00.

p. 3, Exhibits of Applicant) was submitted by the said applicant, but it lacks the approval of the
Director of Lands.

We find the order to cancel Original Certificate of Title No. 03151 and to issue subsequent titles
free from all liens and encumbrances to be void ab initio.

It is also asserted that a blue print copy of the plan (Exhibit "D", p. 5, Exhibits of Applicant) was
superimposed in the military plan of the reservation under Proclamation No. 237, which military
plan was presented in evidence by the oppositors-appellants (Exhibit "6"), and it was agreed by
the parties that the plan, Exhibit "D", superimposed in the plan of the area covered by the
proclamation, is the plan of the land applied for (p. 15, Brief for Applicant-Appellee).

Civil Case No. 4696 is an action in personam to which the appellants are not parties; its object
was to decree reconveyance to plaintiffs of a portion of the area adjudicated to the Paraaque
Investment and Development Corporation and Roman C. Tamayo in Land Registration Case No.
N-675, LRC Rec. No. N-25545, which is subject to the outcome of the appeal. Such action is
barred by the pendency of the appeal. In that case, the court is without jurisdiction to order the
Register of Deeds to cancel Original Certificate of title No. 0-3151 and to issue titles to
transferees "free from all liens and encumbrances ." 15 Nor can such order be construed to
authorize the Register of Deeds to cancel the notice of lis pendens, which was not entered by
virtue of the reconveyance case. Thus, the Register of Deeds was duty bound to carry over the
said notice of lis pendens on all titles subsequently issued. But, in plain violation of lis
pendens in said titles; such act constitutes misfeasance in the performance of his duties for
which he may be held civilly and even criminally liable for any prejudice caused to innocent third
parties, but cannot affect the petitioners-appellants who are protected by Our writ of injunction
and the notice of lis pendens inscribed in the original title. It must be remembered that Our
injunction restrained the Register of Deeds "from accepting for registration documents referring
to the subject land until the petitioners shall have filed a notice of lis pendens as to the title
certificates of Roman C. Tamayo and Paraaque Investment and Development Corporation
under section 24, Rule 14, Rules of Court, subject of the above-mentioned Land Registration
Case No. N-675, LRC Rec. No. 25545." Its plain meaning is to enjoin registration of documents
and transactions unless the notice of lis pendens is annotated and so subject the same to the
outcome of the litigation. In such case, subsequent transferees cannot be considered innocent
purchasers for value.
On the other hand, the lower court's order dated September 23, 1968, in Civil Case No. 4696,
cannot overrule an injunction of this Court (in L-27594). As a result, We consider the notice of lis
pendens entered in virtue of this litigation to remain in full force and effect, and affects all
subsequent transferees of the title of the land subject of this appeal.
At any rate, it is well-settled that entry of the notice of lis pendens in the day book (primary entry
book) is sufficient to constitute registration and such entry is notice to all persons of such
adverse claim. 16
III
We now consider the appeal on the merits.
1. To begin with, the original tracing cloth plan of the land applied for, which must be approved
by the Director of Lands, was not submitted in evidence. The submission of such plan is a
statutory requirement of mandatory character. 17 Unless a plan and its technical description are
duly approved by the Director of Lands, the same are not of much value. 18
It is true that blueprints of two survey plans were presented before the trial court (both marked
Exhibit "D"). The first blueprint copy of a plan of land as surveyed for Maria Padilla (Exhibit "D",
p. 4, Exhibits of Applicant), was not formally offered in evidence. The second plan of the land, as
surveyed for Paraaque Investment and Development Corporation (also marked as Exhibit "D",

Of course, the applicant attempts to justify the non-submission of the original tracing cloth plan
by claiming that the same must be with the Land Registration Commission which checked or
verified the survey plan and the technical descriptions thereof. It is not the function of the LRC to
check the original survey plan as it has no authority to approve original survey plans. If, for any
reason, the original tracing cloth plan was forwarded there, the applicant may easily retrieve the
same therefrom and submit the same in evidence. This was not done.

Obviously, the superimposition of the copy of the survey plan of land as surveyed for applicant in
the military map of the area under Proclamation No. 237 was for the sole purpose of showing
that the land applied for is situated within the area covered by the military reservation of Fort
Magsaysay appropriately indicated in the perimeter map of said reservation (Exhibit "6"). But the
applicant is not relieved from the original tracing cloth plan approved by the Director of Lands as
required by law. One of the distinguishing marks of the Torrens System is the absolute certainty
of the identity of a registered land. Consequently the primary purpose of the aforesaid
requirement is to fix the exact or definite identity of the land as shown in the plan and technical
descriptions. Hence, the applicant is not relieved of his duty of submitting the original tracing
cloth of the survey plan of the land duly approved by the Director of Lands.
It will be noticed that the plan (Exhibit "D", p. 5, Exhibits of Applicant) does not bear the approval
of any officer authorized by law.
In similar manner, the surveyor's certificate, also required in original land registration
proceedings, was not offered in evidence.
2. We next consider the question of whether the applicant has a registerable title to the land
applied for.
The applicant relies on a purported titulo de informacion posesoria issued in the name of
Melecio Padilla (Exhibit "T" pp. 64-68, Exhibits of Applicant). However, neither the original of the
said titulo de informacion posesoria, nor a duly authenticated copy thereof, was submitted in
evidence, and there are serious flaws on the faces of the alleged copies of the document, as in
the circumstances surrounding their execution. Thus, the two (2) purported photostat copies of
the said informacion posesoria title materially differ on the date when said informacion
posesoria was issued. One copy showed that the said document was issued on March 5, 1895
(Exhibit "T") while the other indicated that it was issued twelve (12) years earlier, or on March 5,
1883 (Exhibit "2").
Moreover, according to the official records of the Register of Deeds of Nueva Ecija, on the basis
of the "List of Possessory Information Titles (Spanish Titles) of Nueva Ecija", the corresponding
supporting documents of which are kept in the vault of said office, the name of Melecio Padilla
does not appear among those listed as holders ofinformacion posesoria titles as of the year
1898 covering lands situated in Santor (now Laur) Nueva Ecija. According to said document, the
name Melecio Padilla appears only in the list of holders of possessory information titles over
lands situated in Pearanda, Nueva Ecija, but of a substantially smaller acreage. 19 Thus, the
seven (7) parcels recorded in the name of Melecio Padilla covered only a total area of 49
hectares, 18 acres and 325 centares. 20 In addition, the list of property owners in Santor (now
Laur), Nueva Ecija existing in the Division of Archives does not include the name of Melecio
Padilla. 21 It is true that an alleged copy of an informacion posesoria in the name of Melecio
Padilla, was recorded in the office of the Register of Deeds on November 10, 1942 by one
Rodolfo Baltazar, Register of Deeds (Exhibit "H"), but the Register of Deeds of Nueva Ecija

could not certify to its veracity, as the supposed document does not exist in their
records. 22 There is another factor which weighs heavily against the claim of the applicant. The
alleged informacion posesoria covers an area of "seis mil quiiones, poco mas e menos" or an
equivalent of 16,800 hectares. Under the Royal Decrees in force at the time of the supposed
acquisition, no one could acquire public land in excess of 1,000 hectares. Thus, the Royal
Decrees of November 25, 1880 and October 26, 1881, prohibited any grant of public land in
excess of one thousand (1,000) hectares. 23
Besides, the document described in Exhibit "H" is not the titulo de informacion posesoria,
because it was merely a certification of possession of Melecio Padilla over the property, and was
issued
without
prejudice
to
a
third
party
or
parties
having
a
better
right. 24 Thus, it states: "En su virtud habiendo examinado el Registro nuevamente formado por
la perdida o destruccion del mismo y no hallando en ningun asiento contrario a lo relacionado
reinscribe la posesion de la finca de este numero a favor de Don Melecio Padilla sin perjuicio de
tercero que puede tener mejor derecho a la propiedad." Under Spanish law, in order that
an informacion posesoria may be considered as title of ownership, it must be proven that the
holder thereof has complied with the provisions of Article 393 of the Spanish Mortgage Law.
It cannot be claimed that the registration of possession has been legally converted into a
registration of ownership because Melecio Padilla had not complied with the requirements of
Article 393 of the Spanish Mortgage Law, to wit: "that the applicant has been in open possession
of the land; that an application to this effect be filed after the expiration of 20 years from the date
of such registration; that such conversion be announced by means of a proclamation in a proper
official bulletin; that the Court order the conversion of the registration of possession into a record
of ownership; and that the Registrar make the proper record thereof in the Registry." 25 Evidently,
Melecio Padilla, having died on February 9, 1900, barely five (5) years after the inscription of the
informacion posesoria, could not have converted the same into a record of ownership twenty
(20) years after such inscription, pursuant to Article 393 of the Spanish Mortgage Law.
One year after the promulgation of the Maura Law, or on April 17, 1895, the right to perfect
possessory information title under the law expired. After that date, full property right of the land
reverted to the government and the right of the cultivator and possessor to obtain gratuitous title
was extinguished. 26
Before the military reservation was established, the evidence is inconclusive as to possession,
for it is shown by the evidence that the land involved is largely mountainous and forested. As a
matter of fact, at the time of the hearing, it was conceded that approximately 13,957 hectares of
said land consist of public forest. During the lifetime of Melecio Padilla, only a small portion
thereof was cleared and cultivated under the "kaingin" system, while some portions were used
as grazing land. After his death, his daughter, Maria Padilla, caused the planting of vegetables
and had about forty (40) tenants for the purpose. 27 During the Japanese occupation, Maria
Padilla died. Alipio Alinsunurin and Encarnacion Caballero took possession of the land
approximately in 1950, but they had to abandon the place due to the unsettled peace and order
conditions in the area. In 1955, entry by them was prevented by the Army.
It seems obvious, on the basis of the facts in the record, that neither applicant Paraaque
Investment and Development Corporation nor Alipio Alinsunurin nor the latter's predecessors-ininterest have been "in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation" of
the property in question, "under a bona fideclaim of acquisition or ownership, for at least thirty
years immediately preceding the filing of the application for confirmation of title." 28
A mere casual cultivation of portions of the land by the claimant, and the raising thereon of
cattle, do not constitute possession under claim of ownership. In that sense, possession is not
exclusive and notorious so as to give rise to a presumptive grant from the State. 29 While grazing
livestock over land is of course to be considered with other acts of dominion to show
possession, the mere occupancy of land by grazing livestock upon it, without substantial
inclosures or other permanent improvements, is not sufficient to support a claim of title thru
acquisitive prescription. 30 The possession of public land, however long the period may have
extended, never confers title thereto upon the possessor because the statute of limitations with

regard to public land does not operate against the State, unless the occupant can prove
possession and occupation of the same under claim of ownership for the required number of
years to constitute a grant from the State. 31
Apart from the aforesaid inconclusive evidence of possession to support the applicant's claim of
title, it does not appear that the said property has ever been declared for taxation purposes by
either applicant or applicant's predecessors-in-interest. Thus, the only tax declarations submitted
were those of Mamerto Garcia and Honofre Andrada, et al. (Exhibit "G", Tax Declaration No.
5576, covering an area of 7,340 hectares) and Mamerto Garcia, et al. (Exhibit "H-1", Tax
Declaration No. 5577, over an area of 9,547 hectares) but both were filed only in 1958. The
latter declaration contains an annotation that the property described therein is an unidentified
property, as the declarant failed to identify the same, and it "was only through his insistence" that
it was assessed. Neither applicant Paraaque Investment and Development Corporation nor its
predecessor, Alipio Alinsunurin had submitted any tax declaration supporting its/his claim over
the property. It is true that tax receipts and declarations of ownership for taxation purposes are
not incontrovertible evidence of ownership, but they constitute at least proof that the holder had
a claim of title over the property.
It is obvious that the applicant has failed to submit convincing proof of actual, peaceful and
adverse possession in the concept of owner of the entire area in question during the period
required by law. This is especially true in view of the basic presumption that lands of whatever
classification belong to the State and evidence of a land grant must be "well-nigh
incontrovertible." 32
Even more important, Section 48[b] of CA No. 141, as amended, applies exclusively to public
agricultural land. Forest lands or areas covered with forest are excluded. 33 It is well-settled that
forest land is incapable of registration; and its inclusion in a title, whether such title be one
issued during the Spanish sovereignty or under the present Torrens system of registration,
nullifies the title. 34
Finally, the applicant urges that Proclamation No. 237 recognizes the existence of private
property within the military reservation. It is true that the proclamation states that the same is
subject "to private rights, if any there be", but applicant must prove its private rights over the
property, which said party failed to do. 35 For it is well-settled that, unless the applicant has
shown by clear and convincing evidence that the property in question was ever acquired by the
applicant or his ancestors either by composition title from the Spanish Government or by
possessory information title, or any other means for the acquisition of public lands, the property
must be held to be part of the public domain. 36
WHEREFORE, decision in the above case is hereby rendered:
(1) in G. R. No. L-27594, the petition for certiorari is granted; the order dated March 11, 1967 in
LRC Case No. N-675, LRC Rec. No. N-25545, the decree of registration issued pursuant thereto
(Decree No. 113485 dated March 14, 1967), and Original Certificate of Title No. 0-3151 of the
Registry of Deeds of Nueva Ecija are all declared void; the Registry of Deeds of Nueva Ecija is
ordered to recall and cancel all transfer certificates of title, including owners' duplicates and
mortgagees' copies, if any, arising out of Original Certificate of Title No. 0-3151; the preliminary
injunction issued on June 5, 1967 and the temporary restraining order issued on June 1, 1973
are made final and permanent, with costs against respondents (except respondent Judge); and
(2) in G. R. No. L-28144, the appealed decision is hereby reversed and set aside, and judgment
is rendered dismissing the application for registration. Costs against appellee.
G.R. No. 124292 December 10, 1996
GREGORIO C. JAVELOSA, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, SPOUSES CORAZON J. DE LEON & MELVIN DE LEON, SPOUSES

KRISTINE SOLINAP & ALFONSO SOLINAP, MARLINA J. BALLEZA, MYRNA J.

SERVANDO, respondents.

PUNO, J.:p
The subject land, with an area of 2,061 square meters, situated in Jaro, Iloilo City, was originally
owned by petitioner Gregorio Javelosa. Sometime in the 70's, petitioner mortgaged said land to
Jesus Jalbuena to secure several loans. Petitioner failed to pay his loans and Jalbuena, as
mortgagee, foreclosed on the land and purchased it as highest bidder at the foreclosure sale.
During the one-year period of redemption, petitioner-mortgagor filed an action against the
mortgagee at the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Iloilo City to annul the mortgage contracts and
public auction sale (Civil Case No. 16460). 1 He claimed that the mortgage contracts were illegal
and the conduct of the foreclosure sale was irregular.
While the case was pending, the period of redemption prescribed. Consequently, the mortgagee
consolidated title over the land, caused the cancellation of the mortgagor's title and the issuance
of a new title in his name. Thereafter, petitioner obtained an Order 2 from the RTC in Civil Case
No. 16460 restraining the mortgagee from further effecting the foreclosure sale of the property.
In the early part of December 1986, the mortgagee divided the subject land among his married
daughters (private respondents herein). On December 27, 1986, the mortgagee died. He was
substituted by his heirs, private respondents, in the pending RTC case for annulment of
mortgage and foreclosure sale. On January 19, 1987, title to the subject was issued in the
names of private respondents.
In the meantime, the RTC case for annulment of mortgage and foreclosure sale continued to
drag on. On June 1, 1993, private respondents, as registered owners, sent a letter to petitionermortgagor demanding that the vacate the subject premises within ten (10) days from receipt
thereof. Despite receipt of the demand letter on June 4, 1993, petitioner-mortgagor refused to
vacate said lot. Thus, on August 6, 1993, private respondents filed a complaint for illegal
detainer before the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) in Cities, Iloilo City, and sought to eject petitioner
from the premises.
Petitioner, in his Answer, 3 asserted his ownership over the disputed land. He claimed that he
had a TCT in his name but that the mortgagee (father and predecessor-in-interest of private
respondents), in bad faith, was able to cause his title to be cancelled and a new title issued in
his name despite the pendency of the RTC case questioning the award of the subject land to the
mortgagee in the foreclosure proceedings. Thus, petitioner denied he was illegally occupying the
land. He claimed that he was legally entitled to the continued possession thereof by virtue of
pending legal incidents in his RTC case for annulment of mortgage and foreclosure sale, from
which transactions the mortgagee (predecessor-in-interest of private respondents) derived his
title.
The MTC decided the unlawful detainer case in favor of private respondents and ordered
petitioner to vacate the premises and pay reasonable rental. The MTC held that the pendency of
the case for annulment of mortgage in the RTC would not abate the proceedings in the unlawful
detainer case filed before it for the issues in these cases are distinct from each other. 4
Petitioner elevated the case to the RTC. He alleged that the ejectment case was improperly filed
with the MTC for private respondents (plaintiffs therein) should have prayed instead for the
issuance of a writ of possession with the RTC where the case for annulment of mortgage and
foreclosure sale was pending.
Without ruling on the propriety of the filing of the ejectment case before the MTC, the RTC
reversed the MTC decision on a different ground. It held that the complaint was filed out of time
for under Section 1, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court, an unlawful detainer case must be filed within
one year from the time title was issued in private respondents' name, i.e., from January 19,

1987, and not from the last demand to vacate made by private respondents (plaintiffs therein).
Thus, the ejectment case initiated on August 6, 1993 was filed beyond the one-year prescriptive
period. The RTC dismissed the ejectment case. 5
In their appeal to the Court of Appeals, private respondents alleged that the RTC erred in holding
that the complaint for unlawful detainer was filed out of time. The Court of Appeals reversed the
RTC decision and reinstated the decision of the MTC. It held that the complaint for unlawful
detainer was filed on time for the prescriptive period should be counted not from the issuance of
title in the name of plaintiffs (private respondents herein), but from the date of the last demand to
vacate made against the defendant. Moreover, the fact that private respondents were never in
prior physical possession of the subject land is of no moment for prior physical possession is
necessary only in forcible entry cases. The Court of Appeals thus ordered the petitioner
(defendant in the ejectment case) to vacate the premises and pay reasonable rentals. 6
Hence, this petition for review on certiorari.
In this Court, petitioner does not raise the issue regarding the timeliness of the filing of the
ejectment case against him. For the first time, he puts in the issue the nature of the suit filed
against him. He contends that the complaint filed before the MTC is not an unlawful detainer suit
but one for accion publiciana cognizable by the RTC. Petitioner argues that the reading of the
complaint reveals there was no allegation as to how entry on the land was made by petitionermortgagor or when the latter unlawfully took possession of said land. Citing the case ofSarona
v. Villegas, 7 petitioner contends that the omission of these jurisdictional facts stripped the MTC
of jurisdiction over the case.
The petition is devoid of merit.
It is settled that jurisdiction of courts over the subject matter of the litigation is determined by the
allegations in the complaint. It is equally settled that an error in jurisdiction can be raised at any
time and even for the first time on appeal. 8
The issue of jurisdiction in the case at bar depends on the nature of the case filed by private
respondents in the MTC. If it is an unlawful detainer case, the action was properly filed with the
MTC. However, if the suit is one foraccion publiciana, jurisdiction is with the RTC and the
complaint should be dismissed. To resolve the issue, we should examine the specific allegations
made by private respondents in their complaint. The complaint for unlawful detainer 9 contained
the following material allegations, viz:
xxx xxx xxx
2. Plaintiffs (private respondents) are the registered owners of a parcel of land . . . covered by
Transfer
Certificate
of
Title
No.
T-74417 . . .;
3. Defendant (petitioner-mortgagor) has been illegally occupying the above described property
without the consent of the herein plaintiffs, thus unlawfully withholding possession of the same
from them who are the owners and the ones entitled to the physical possession thereof;
4. On June 1, 1993, plaintiffs . . . sent a letter dated May 26, 1993 to the defendant demanding
that he vacate the premises within ten days from receipt of the said letter . . .;
xxx xxx xxx
6. The said letter was received by the defendant on June 4, 1993 . . .;
xxx xxx xxx
8. Having received the demand to vacate the property in question, defendant is now unlawfully
withholding possession of the . . . property from the plaintiffs who are entitled to the physical
possession thereof;

9. As a consequence of the refusal of the defendant to vacate the premises . . . the plaintiffs
were constrained to file this action for illegal detainer against him in order to take away the
physical possession thereof from them and to place them in de facto possession of the said
property;

registered owners. An action for unlawful detainer may be filed when possession by a landlord,
vendor, vendee or other person against whom the possession of any land or building is
unlawfully withheld after the expiration or termination of their right to hold possession, by virtue
of a contract, express or implied. 13

xxx xxx xxx

Under the Rules, if the mortgaged property is not redeemed within one year from the foreclosure
sale, the purchaser at public auction is entitled to possession of the property. 14 To obtain
possession, the vendee or purchaser may either ask for a writ of possession or bring an
appropriate independent action, such as a suit for ejectment, which private respondents did. The
RTC case assailing the public auction sale of the property and seeking annulment of mortgages
did not preclude the filing of an ejectment case against petitioner. 15 We have consistently ruled
that the pendency of an action for annulment of sale and reconveyance (which necessarily
involves the issue of ownership) may not be successfully pleaded in abatement of an action for
ejectment, the issue in the latter being merely physical possession. 16 To be sure, private
respondents' most effective remedy was to file a separate action for unlawful detainer against
petitioner. 17 They cannot ask for a writ of possession from the RTC where the case for
annulment of mortgage and foreclosure sale is pending because after the mortgagee was able
to consolidate his title on the land and a new title issued in his name, petitioner was able to
obtain an Order 18 from the RTC directing the mortgagee, (predecessor-in-interest of private
respondents) to desist from further enforcing the foreclosure proceedings.

Clearly, private respondents (as plaintiffs therein) alleged in their complaint that they are the
registered owners of the subject land and therefore, entitled to possession thereof; that
petitioners were illegally occupying the premises without their consent and thus unlawfully
withholding possession from them; and, despite receipt of their demand to vacate the premises,
petitioner refused to leave the property. On the face of the complaint, it also appears that private
respondents were seeking to recover merely the physical possession or possession de factoof
the subject land. Private respondents did not allege the incidents respecting the mortgage of the
land and the pending RTC case questioning the mortgage contract as the issue involved therein
is ownership which has no place in an ejectment case. In fine, the allagations in the complaint
make out a case for unlawful detainer. We have ruled in a long line of cases 10 that "in an action
for unlawful detainer, a simple allegation that defendant is unlawfully withholding possession
from plaintiff is . . . sufficient for the words "unlawfully withholding" imply possession on the part
of defendant, which was legal in the beginning, having no other source than a contract, express
or implied, possession which has later expired as a right and is being withheld by defendant."
Thus, in the case at bar, private respondents' allegation in their complaint that petitioner was
unlawfully withholding possession of the land from them is sufficient to make out a case for
unlawful detainer.
In Co Tiamco v. Diaz, 11 the Court emphasized that "the principle underlying the brevity and
simplicity of pleadings in forcible entry and unlawful detainer cases rests upon considerations of
public policy. Ejectment cases are summary in nature for they involve perturbation of social order
which must be restored as promptly as possible and, accordingly, technicalities or details of
procedure should be carefully avoided."
The ruling in the Sarona case 12 cited by petitioner i.e., that a complaint for unlawful detainer
should alleged when and how entry on the land was made by the defendant, finds no application
to the case at bar. In Sarona, the main issue was the timeliness of the filing of the complaint
before the MTC. In forcible entry cases, the prescriptive period is counted from the date of
defendant's actual entry on the land; in unlawful detainer, from the date of the last demand to
vacate. Hence, to determine whether the case was filed on time, there was a necessity to
ascertain whether the complaint was one for forcible entry or for unlawful detainer. In light of
these consideration, the Court ruled that since the main distinction between the two actions is
when and how defendant entered the land, the determinative facts should be alleged in the
complaint. Thus, in Sarona, the jurisdiction of the MTC over the complaint was never issue for
whether the complaint was one for forcible entry or unlawful detainer, the MTC had jurisdiction
over it. The case at bar is different for at issue is the jurisdiction of the MTC over the unlawful
detainer case for petitioner (defendant therein) asserts that the case is one for accion
publicianacognizable by the RTC.
Petitioner likewise insists that he is entitled to the physical possession of the property since he
has been in actual, continuous possession thereof as owner-mortgagor. He contends that
private respondents have never been in actual physical possession of the land since they have
not prayed for the issuance of a writ of possession with the RTC where the case assailing the
sale of the land was pending and where the parties' adverse claims of ownership are being
litigated.
We find petitioner's contentions untenable.
Again, it is settled that prior physical possession is indispensable only in actions for forcible entry
but not in unlawful detainer. Since we have ruled that the MTC case filed against petitioner is
one for unlawful detainer, petitioner's prior possession of the land is of no moment. Private
respondents are entitled to its passession from the time title was issued in their favor as

The case of Joven v. Court of Appeals 19 cited by petitioner is not on all fours with the case at
bar. In Joven, DBP as mortgagee was not able to consolidate its title over the foreclosed land
nor cause the cancellation of title in the mortgagor's name. Although the title was still in the
name of the mortgagor, DBP sold the land to private respondents and the latter, without first
securing a court order, took the law into their own hands and entered said land. Hence, it was
the mortgagor who filed and successfully maintained an action for forcible entry against private
respondents, the transferees of the mortgagee.
The factual mould of the case at bar is different. The mortgagee (predecessor-in-interest of
private respondents) was able to consolidate his ownership over the foreclosed land, cause the
cancellation of title in the name of petitioner-mortgagor and the issuance of a new title in his own
name. It was this title that he passed on to his daughters, private respondents herein. As
aforestated, a restraining order was issued by the RTC where the case for annulment of
foreclosure sale is pending after the mortgagee had consolidated his ownership over the land,
hence, private respondents were left with no choice but to file a separate and independent
action for unlawful detainer to recover physical possession of the property. Unlike in the Joven
case, private respondents did not take the law into their own hands and entered the property
without the benefit of a court order. They sought the aid of the court precisely to settle the issue
of physical possession or possession de facto of the land when they filed the ejectment case
with the MTC.
We find that private respondents have adequately proved that they are entitled to possess the
subject land as the registered owners thereof. The age-old rule is that the person who has a
torrens title over a land is entitled to possession thereof. 20 Except for the bare claim that the title
of private respondents was obtained in bad faith, petitioner has pointed to no right to justify his
continued possession of the subject property.
Be that as it may, we reiterate the rule that the award of possession de facto over the subject
land to private respondents would not constitute res judicata as to the issue of ownership
thereof, which issue is still being litigated before the RTC of Iloilo City where the case for
annulment of mortgages and foreclosure proceeding is pending.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petitioner is DENIED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals, dated
January 17, 1996, is AFFIRMED in toto. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-16995

October 28, 1968

JULIO
vs.
JAIME L. LOOT, ET AL., oppositors-appellants.

LUCERO, movant-appellee,

Ramon Gonzales for movant-appellee.

Jaime L. Loot for and in his own behalf as oppositor-appellant.
FERNANDO, J.:
The order of the Court of First Instance of Iloilo, the former Judge Wenceslao L. Fernan
presiding, dated September 21, 1959, now on appeal before this Court, speaks to this effect:
"Regarding the writ of possession, once the final decree has been issued the issuance of a writ
of possession is only a matter of course if nothing in the past has been issued in favor of the
registered owner. There is no period of prescription as to the issuance of a writ of possession,
and inasmuch as the final decree has already been entered, it follows that a writ of possession
should be issued in favor of the registered owner."1
Accordingly, it granted a writ of possession in favor of movant, now appellee, Julio Lucero. There
was an opposition on the part of oppositors, all surnamed Loot, now appellants. The lower court
failed to see merit in the opposition interposed. It explained why: "The opposition interposed by
the oppositors to the effect that there are defects in the reconstitution of the records and that the
motion is not under oath is trivial in its nature and consequently untenable." 2 Accordingly, the writ
of possession, as prayed for, was issued.
There was an urgent motion to quash the writ of possession filed by the oppositors on
September 25, 1959,3followed by a motion for reconsideration on October 10, 1959,4 which was
denied in an order of October 23, 1959. 5 As set forth in such order of denial: "After weighing the
arguments adduced by the movant represented by Atty. Gonzales and the oppositor represented
by Atty. Loot, this Court adheres to the previous ruling that inasmuch as no writ of possession
has been issued in this case, it is the ministerial duty of this Court to issue one in compliance of
the provisions of Act 496 as amended." There was a second motion for reconsideration filed by
oppositors on November 3, 1959,6 which was denied in an order of December 10, 1959.7 Not
satisfied, there was still another motion for reconsideration of the above order filed by oppositors
on December 28, 1959,8 which similarly met the same fate, an order of denial being issued on
February 20, 1960.9 The appeal was taken direct to us.
The sore issue, therefore, is whether on the above facts, the order granting the writ of
possession was in accordance with law. The answer must be in the affirmative. This appeal
cannot prosper.
No other view would be compatible with the pertinent provision of the Land Registration Act, 10 as
uniformly interpreted by this Court. As was noted in the order of September 21, 1959, there was
a final decree in a land registration case which arose from a decision promulgated in 1938, the
final decree being issued on October 29, 1941. It was not incorrect for the lower court to state,
therefore, that "the issuance of a writ of possession is only a matter of course if nothing in the
past has been issued in favor of the registered owner." 11 It is equally true, as likewise mentioned
therein, that there is "no period of prescription as to the issuance of a writ of
possession, ..."12In Pasay Estate Co. v. Del Rosario,13 it has been made clear that the purpose of
the statutory provision empowering the then Court of Land Registration, now the ordinary courts
of first instance, to enforce its orders, judgments or decrees in the same way that the judiciary
does is so that the winning party could be placed in possession of the property covered by such
decree. Thereby, there would be an avoidance of the inconvenience and the further delay to
which a successful litigant would be subjected if he were compelled "to commence other actions
in other courts for the purpose of securing the fruits of his victory."
There was a restatement of the above principle in Demorar v. Ibaez,14 the closest in period of
time to the challenged order of the lower court. Thus: "We have heretofore held that a writ of
possession may be issued not only against the person who has been defeated in a registration

case but also against anyone adversely occupying the land or any portion thereof during the
land registration proceedings ... The issuance of the decree of registration is part of the
registration proceedings. In fact, it is supposed to end the said proceedings. Consequently, any
person unlawfully and adversely occupying said lot at any time up to the issuance of the final
decree, may be subject to judicial ejectment by means of a writ of possession and it is the duty
of the registration court to issue said writ when asked for by the successful claimant." As a
matter of fact, in a 1948 decision,15 it was held by us that "the fact that the petitioners have
instituted, more than one year after the decree of registration had been issued, an ordinary
action with the Court of First Instance attacking the validity of the decree on the ground of fraud,
is not a bar to the issuance of the writ of possession applied for by the registered owners."
A few months after the issuance of such a challenged order of September 21, 1959, Marcelo v.
Mencias was decided,16 where this Court went so far as to hold that "if the writ of possession
issued in a land registration proceeding implies the delivery of possession of the land to the
successful litigant therein, ... a writ of demolition must, likewise, issue, especially considering
that the latter writ is but a complement of the former which, without said writ of demolition, would
be ineffective."
It is clear, therefore, to repeat, that on the facts as found, the validity of the challenged order
cannot be impugned. It is equally clear that this being a direct appeal to us, no questions of fact
may be raised. As was held recently in Perez v. Araneta:17 "Nothing is better settled than that
where the correctness of the findings of fact of the lower court are assailed, the Court of Appeals
is the proper forum. If resort be had directly to us, then appellant must be deemed to have
waived the opportunity otherwise his to inquire into such findings and to limit himself to disputing
the correctness of the law applied."
The problem thus confronting oppositors-appellants in bringing the matter direct to us was to
show that the above two-page order on the meager but sufficient facts as found, was vitiated by
error or errors in law. It was far from easy, therefore, considering as above shown that on the
authority of applicable decisions, the lower court was left with no choice but to issue the writ of
possession sought.
Resolute and undaunted, oppositors did their best to accomplish a task formidable in its
complexity. It seemed they overdid it. They assigned twenty-one errors a great many of them
factual, and, therefore, not for us to consider, and the remaining, except the last, far from
decisive in view of the rather settled state of the law concerning the issuance of a writ of
possession. Nor did the twenty-first error assigned suffice to call for a reversal, as will be more
fully explained. That is why, as earlier stated, the appeal was doomed to futility.
It would not be amiss, though, to discuss even briefly one of them, the fourteenth. Invoking three
of our previous decisions,18 they would impugn the issuance of the writ of possession on the
ground that they were not oppositors and defeated parties in the land registration proceeding.
They would ignore the fact, however, that in the above decisions relied upon, the basis for the
impropriety of issuing a writ of possession was that the parties adversely affected entered the
property in question after the issuance of the decree. There is nothing in the challenged order
that such is the case here. Thus, they would raise a factual issue a matter not properly
cognizable by us.
A reminder may not be out of place. The apparent ease with which oppositors-appellants could
conjure up so many alleged errors, while it may be a tribute to their ingenuity in making a twopage order yield so many instances of the rankest violation of legal precepts, hardly contributes
to the persuasiveness of their brief. As a matter of fact, the suspicion could be legitimately
entertained that in thus attempting to paint the highly unrealistic picture of a terse and brief order
being so sadly riddled with errors, oppositors- appellants were trying in vain to bolster what
inherently was a weak case.
That is all that needs be said about this appeal except for the disposition of the twenty-first error
assigned, referring to the existence of a pending case between the parties for
reconveyance.19 There was no denial in the brief for movant-appellee that such a case was then

pending at the time the respective briefs were filed. What is decided here cannot affect whatever
final decision might possibly have been rendered by this time in the aforesaid reconveyance
action. Nonetheless, the mere fact that such suit was then pending did not oust the lower court
of its jurisdiction to issue the writ of possession. As stated by our present Chief Justice in Agreda
v. Rodriguez:20 "Besides, it is clear that respondent Judge had jurisdiction to pass upon the
motion of Santiago Agreda for the issuance of a writ of possession. Whether or not the motion
should have been denied, in view of institution of said Civil Case No. 6267, is a matter that does
not affect said jurisdiction."
WHEREFORE, the order of September 21, 1959, granting the writ of possession in favor of
movant-appellee, and the orders of October 23, 1959, December 10, 1959 and February 20,
1960, denying the reconsideration thereof, are affirmed. With costs against oppositorsappellants.

G.R. No. L-28790

April 29, 1968

ANTONIO H. NOBLEJAS, as Commissioner of Land Registration, petitioner,

vs.
CLAUDIO TEEHANKEE, as Secretary of Justice, and RAFAEL M. SALAS, as Executive
Secretary,respondents.
Leandro
Sevilla,
Ramon
C.
Aquino
and
Lino
Claudio Teehankee for and in his own behalf as respondent.

M.

Patajo

for

petitioner.

REYES, J.B.L., Actg. C.J.:

Petition for a writ of prohibition with preliminary injunction to restrain the Secretary of Justice
from investigating the official actuations of the Commissioner of Land Registration, and to
declare inoperative his suspension by the Executive Secretary pending investigation.
The facts are not in dispute. Petitioner Antonio H. Noblejas is the duly appointed, confirmed and
qualified Commissioner of Land Registration, a position created by Republic Act No. 1151. By
the terms of section 2 of said Act, the said Commissioner is declared "entitled to the same
compensation, emoluments and privileges as those of a Judge of the Court of First Instance."
The appropriation laws (Rep. Acts 4642, 4856 and 5170) in the item setting forth the salary of
said officer, use the following expression:
1. One Land Registration Commissioner with the rank and privileges of district judge
P19,000.00.
On March 7, 1968, respondent Secretary of Justice coursed to the petitioner a letter requiring
him to explain in writing not later than March 9, 1968 why no disciplinary action should be taken
against petitioner for "approving or recommending approval of subdivision, consolidation and
consolidated-subdivision plans covering areas greatly in excess of the areas covered by the
original titles." Noblejas answered and apprised the Secretary of Justice that, as he enjoyed the
rank, privileges, emoluments and compensation of a Judge of the Court of First Instance, he
could only be suspended and investigated in the same manner as a Judge of the Courts of First
Instance, and, therefore, the papers relative to his case should be submitted to the Supreme
Court, for action thereon conformably to section 67 of the Judiciary Act (R. A. No. 296) and
Revised Rule 140 of the Rules of Court.
On March 17, 1968, petitioner Noblejas received a communication signed by the Executive
Secretary, "by authority of the President", whereby, based on "finding that a prima facie case
exists against you for gross negligence and conduct prejudicial to the public interest", petitioner
was "hereby suspended, upon receipt hereof, pending investigation of the above charges."
On March 18, 1968, petitioner applied to this Court, reiterating the contentions advanced in his
letter to the Secretary of Justice, claiming lack of jurisdiction and abuse of discretion, and

praying for restraining writs. In their answer respondents admit the facts but denied that
petitioner, as Land Registration Commissioner, exercises judicial functions, or that the petitioner
may be considered a Judge of First Instance within the purview of the Judiciary Act and Revised
Rules of Court 140; that the function of investigating charges against public officers is
administrative or executive in nature; that the Legislature may not charge the judiciary with nonjudicial functions or duties except when reasonably incidental to the fulfillment of judicial duties,
as it would be in violation of the principle of the separation of powers.
Thus, the stark issue before this Court is whether the Commissioner of Land Registration may
only be investigated by the Supreme Court, in view of the conferment upon him by the Statutes
heretofore mentioned (Rep. Act 1151 and Appropriation Laws) of the rank and privileges of a
Judge of the Court of First Instance.
First to militate against petitioner's stand is the fact that section 67 of the Judiciary Act providing
for investigation, suspension or removal of Judges, specifically recites that "No District
Judge shall be separated or removed from office by the President of the Philippines unless
sufficient cause shall exist in the judgment of the Supreme Court . . ." and it is nowhere claimed,
much less shown, that the Commissioner of Land Registration is a District Judge, or in fact a
member of the Judiciary at all.
In the second place, petitioner's theory that the grant of "privileges of a Judge of First Instance"
includes by implication the right to be investigated only by the Supreme Court and to be
suspended or removed upon its recommendation, would necessarily result in the same right
being possessed by a variety of executive officials upon whom the Legislature had
indiscriminately conferred the same privileges. These favoured officers include (a) the Judicial
Superintendent of the Department of Justice (Judiciary Act, sec. 42); (b) the Assistant Solicitors
General, seven in number (Rep. Act No. 4360); (c) the City Fiscal of Quezon City (R.A. No.
4495); (d) the City Fiscal of Manila (R. A. No. 4631) and (e) the Securities and Exchange
Commissioner (R. A. No. 5050, s. 2). To adopt petitioner's theory, therefore, would mean placing
upon the Supreme Court the duty of investigating and disciplining all these officials, whose
functions are plainly executive, and the consequent curtailment by mere implication from the
Legislative grant, of the President's power to discipline and remove administrative officials who
are presidential appointees, and which the Constitution expressly placed under the President's
supervision and control (Constitution, Art. VII, sec. 10[i]).
Incidentally, petitioner's stand would also lead to the conclusion that the Solicitor General,
another appointee of the President, could not be removed by the latter, since the Appropriation
Acts confer upon the Solicitor General the rank and privileges of a Justice of the Court of
Appeals, and these Justices are only removable by the Legislature, through the process of
impeachment (Judiciary Act, sec. 24, par. 2).
In our opinion, such unusual corollaries could not have been intended by the Legislature when it
granted these executive officials the rank and privileges of Judges of First Instance. This
conclusion gains strength when account is taken of the fact that in the case of the Judges of the
Court of Agrarian Relations and those of the Court of Tax Appeals, the organic statutes of said
bodies (Republic Act 1267, as amended by Act 1409; Rep. Act No. 1125) expressly provide that
they are to be removed from office for the same causes and in the same mannerprovided by law
for Judges of First Instance", or "members of the judiciary of appellate rank". The same is true of
Judges of the Court of Agrarian Relations (Comm. Act No. 103) and of the Commissioner of
Public Service (Public Service Act, Sec. 3). It is thereby shown that where the legislative design
is to make the suspension or removal procedure prescribed for Judges of First Instance
applicable to other officers, provision to that effect is made in plain and unequivocal language.
But the more fundamental objection to the stand of petitioner Noblejas is that, if the Legislature
had really intended to include in the general grant of "privileges" or "rank and privileges of
Judges of the Court of First Instance" the right to be investigated by the Supreme Court, and to
be suspended or removed only upon recommendation of that Court, then such grant of
privileges would be unconstitutional, since it would violate the fundamental doctrine of
separation of powers, by charging this court with the administrative function of supervisory

control over executive officials, and simultaneously reducing pro tanto the control of the Chief
Executive over such officials.
Justice Cardozo ruled in In re Richardson et al., Connolly vs. Scudder (247 N. Y. 401, 160 N. E.
655), saying:
There is no inherent power in the Executive or Legislature to charge the judiciary with
administrative functions except when reasonably incidental to the fulfillment of judicial duties.
The United States Supreme Court said in Federal Radio Commission vs. General Electric Co., et
al., 281 U.S. 469, 74 Law. Ed., 972,
But this court cannot be invested with jurisdiction of that character, whether for purposes of
review or otherwise. It was brought into being by the judiciary article of the Constitution, is
invested with judicial power only and can have no jurisdiction other than of cases and
controversies falling within the classes enumerated in that article. It cannot give decisions which
are merely advisory; nor can it exercise or participate in the exercise of functions which are
essentially legislative or administrative. Keller v. Potomac Electric Power Co., supra (261 U.S.
444, 67 L. ed. 736, 43 Sup. Ct. Rep. 445) and cases cited; Postum Cereal Co. vs. California Fig
Nut Co. supra (272 U.S. 700, 701, 71 L. ed. 481, 47 Sup. Ct. Rep. 284); Liberty Warehouse Co.
v. Grannis, 273 U.S. 70, 74, 71 L. ed. 541, 544, 47 Sup. Ct. Rep. 282; Willing v. Chicago
Auditorium Asso. 277 U.S. 274, 289, 72 L. ed. 880, 884, 48 Sup. Ct. Rep. 507; Ex parte Bakelite
Corp. 279 U.S. 438, 449, 73 L. ed. 789, 793, 49 Sup. Ct. Rep. 411. (Federal Radio Commission
v. General Electric Company, 281 U.S. 469, 74 L. ed. 972.) (Emphasis supplied.)

But even granting that the resolution of consultas by the Register of Deeds should constitute a
judicial (or more properly quasi judicial) function, analysis of the powers and duties of the Land
Registration Commissioner under Republic Act No. 1151, sections 3 and 4, will show that the
resolution of consultas are but a minimal portion of his administrative or executive functions and
merely incidental to the latter.
Conformably to the well-known principle of statutory construction that statutes should be given,
whenever possible, a meaning that will not bring them in conflict with the Constitution, 2 We are
constrained to rule that the grant by Republic Act 1151 to the Commissioner of Land Registration
of the "same privileges as those of a Judge of the Court of First Instance" did not include, and
was not intended to include, the right to demand investigation by the Supreme Court, and to be
suspended or removed only upon that Court's recommendation; for otherwise, the said grant of
privileges would be violative of the Constitution and be null and void. Consequently, the
investigation and suspension of the aforenamed Commissioner pursuant to sections 32 and 34
of the Civil Service Law (R. A. 2260) are neither abuses of discretion nor acts in excess of
jurisdiction.
WHEREFORE, the writs of prohibition and injunction applied for are denied, and the petition is
ordered dismissed. No costs.

G.R. No. L-30173 September 30, 1971

In this spirit, it has been held that the Supreme Court of the Philippines and its members should
not and cannotbe required to exercise any power or to perform any trust or to assume any duty
not pertaining to or connected with the administration of judicial functions; and a law requiring
the Supreme Court to arbitrate disputes between public utilities was pronounced void in Manila
Electric Co. vs. Pasay Transportation Co. (57 Phil. 600).1wph1.t

GAVINO
A.
TUMALAD
and
GENEROSA
R.
TUMALAD, plaintiffs-appellees,
vs.
ALBERTA VICENCIO and EMILIANO SIMEON, defendants-appellants.

Petitioner Noblejas seeks to differentiate his case from that of other executive officials by
claiming that under Section 4 of Republic Act No. 1151, he is endowed with judicial functions.
The section invoked runs as follows:

Jose Q. Calingo for defendants-appellants.

Sec. 4. Reference of doubtful matters to Commissioner of Land Registration. When the

Register of Deeds is in doubt with regard to the proper step to be taken or memorandum to be
made in pursuance of any deed, mortgage, or other instrument presented to him for registration,
or where any party in interest does not agree with the Register of Deeds with reference to any
such matter, the question shall be submitted to the Commissioner of Land Registration either
upon the certification of the Register of Deeds, stating the question upon which he is in doubt, or
upon the suggestion in writing by the party in interest; and thereupon the Commissioner, after
consideration of the matter shown by the records certified to him, and in case of registered
lands, after notice to the parties and hearing, shall enter an order prescribing the step to be
taken or memorandum to be made. His decision in such cases shall be conclusive and binding
upon all Registers of Deeds: Provided, further, That, when a party in interest disagrees with the
ruling or resolution of the Commissioner and the issue involves a question of law, said decision
may be appealed to the Supreme Court within thirty days from and after receipt of the notice
thereof.
Serious doubt may well be entertained as to whether the resolution of a consulta by a Register
of Deeds is a judicial function, as contrasted with administrative process. It will be noted that by
specific provision of the section, the decision of the Land Registration Commissioner "shall be
conclusive and binding upon all Registers of Deeds" alone, and not upon other parties. This
limitation1 in effect identifies the resolutions of the Land Registration Commissioner with those of
any other bureau director, whose resolutions or orders bind his subordinates alone. That the
Commissioner's resolutions are appealable does not prove that they are not administrative; any
bureau director's ruling is likewise appealable to the corresponding department head.

Castillo & Suck for plaintiffs-appellees.

REYES, J.B.L., J.:

Case certified to this Court by the Court of Appeals (CA-G.R. No. 27824-R) for the reason that
only questions of law are involved.
This case was originally commenced by defendants-appellants in the municipal court of Manila
in Civil Case No. 43073, for ejectment. Having lost therein, defendants-appellants appealed to
the court a quo (Civil Case No. 30993) which also rendered a decision against them, the
dispositive portion of which follows:
WHEREFORE, the court hereby renders judgment in favor of the plaintiffs and against the
defendants, ordering the latter to pay jointly and severally the former a monthly rent of P200.00
on the house, subject-matter of this action, from March 27, 1956, to January 14, 1967, with
interest at the legal rate from April 18, 1956, the filing of the complaint, until fully paid, plus
attorney's fees in the sum of P300.00 and to pay the costs.
It appears on the records that on 1 September 1955 defendants-appellants executed a chattel
mortgage in favor of plaintiffs-appellees over their house of strong materials located at No. 550
Int. 3, Quezon Boulevard, Quiapo, Manila, over Lot Nos. 6-B and 7-B, Block No. 2554, which
were being rented from Madrigal & Company, Inc. The mortgage was registered in the Registry
of Deeds of Manila on 2 September 1955. The herein mortgage was executed to guarantee a
loan of P4,800.00 received from plaintiffs-appellees, payable within one year at 12% per annum.
The mode of payment was P150.00 monthly, starting September, 1955, up to July 1956, and the
lump sum of P3,150 was payable on or before August, 1956. It was also agreed that default in

the payment of any of the amortizations, would cause the remaining unpaid balance to
becomeimmediately due and Payable and
the Chattel Mortgage will be enforceable in accordance with the provisions of Special Act No.
3135, and for this purpose, the Sheriff of the City of Manila or any of his deputies is hereby
empowered and authorized to sell all the Mortgagor's property after the necessary publication in
order to settle the financial debts of P4,800.00, plus 12% yearly interest, and attorney's fees... 2
When defendants-appellants defaulted in paying, the mortgage was extrajudicially foreclosed,
and on 27 March 1956, the house was sold at public auction pursuant to the said contract. As
highest bidder, plaintiffs-appellees were issued the corresponding certificate of sale. 3 Thereafter,
on 18 April 1956, plaintiffs-appellant commenced Civil Case No. 43073 in the municipal court of
Manila, praying, among other things, that the house be vacated and its possession surrendered
to them, and for defendants-appellants to pay rent of P200.00 monthly from 27 March 1956 up
to the time the possession is surrendered. 4 On 21 September 1956, the municipal court
rendered its decision
... ordering the defendants to vacate the premises described in the complaint; ordering further to
pay monthly the amount of P200.00 from March 27, 1956, until such (time that) the premises is
(sic) completely vacated; plus attorney's fees of P100.00 and the costs of the suit. 5
Defendants-appellants, in their answers in both the municipal court and court a quo impugned
the legality of the chattel mortgage, claiming that they are still the owners of the house; but they
waived the right to introduce evidence, oral or documentary. Instead, they relied on their
memoranda in support of their motion to dismiss, predicated mainly on the grounds that: (a) the
municipal court did not have jurisdiction to try and decide the case because (1) the issue
involved, is ownership, and (2) there was no allegation of prior possession; and (b) failure to
prove prior demand pursuant to Section 2, Rule 72, of the Rules of Court. 6
During the pendency of the appeal to the Court of First Instance, defendants-appellants failed to
deposit the rent for November, 1956 within the first 10 days of December, 1956 as ordered in the
decision of the municipal court. As a result, the court granted plaintiffs-appellees' motion for
execution, and it was actually issued on 24 January 1957. However, the judgment regarding the
surrender of possession to plaintiffs-appellees could not be executed because the subject house
had been already demolished on 14 January 1957 pursuant to the order of the court in a
separate civil case (No. 25816) for ejectment against the present defendants for non-payment of
rentals on the land on which the house was constructed.

(a) Defendants-appellants mortgagors question the jurisdiction of the municipal court from which
the case originated, and consequently, the appellate jurisdiction of the Court of First Instance a
quo, on the theory that the chattel mortgage is void ab initio; whence it would follow that the
extrajudicial foreclosure, and necessarily the consequent auction sale, are also void. Thus, the
ownership of the house still remained with defendants-appellants who are entitled to possession
and not plaintiffs-appellees. Therefore, it is argued by defendants-appellants, the issue of
ownership will have to be adjudicated first in order to determine possession. lt is contended
further that ownership being in issue, it is the Court of First Instance which has jurisdiction and
not the municipal court.
Defendants-appellants predicate their theory of nullity of the chattel mortgage on two grounds,
which are: (a) that, their signatures on the chattel mortgage were obtained through fraud, deceit,
or trickery; and (b) that the subject matter of the mortgage is a house of strong materials, and,
being an immovable, it can only be the subject of a real estate mortgage and not a chattel
mortgage.
On the charge of fraud, deceit or trickery, the Court of First Instance found defendantsappellants' contentions as not supported by evidence and accordingly dismissed the
charge, 8 confirming the earlier finding of the municipal court that "the defense of ownership as
well as the allegations of fraud and deceit ... are mere allegations." 9
It has been held in Supia and Batiaco vs. Quintero and Ayala 10 that "the answer is a mere
statement of the facts which the party filing it expects to prove, but it is not evidence; 11 and
further, that when the question to be determined is one of title, the Court is given the authority to
proceed with the hearing of the cause until this fact is clearly established. In the case of Sy vs.
Dalman, 12 wherein the defendant was also a successful bidder in an auction sale, it was likewise
held by this Court that in detainer cases the aim of ownership "is a matter of defense and raises
an issue of fact which should be determined from the evidence at the trial." What determines
jurisdiction are the allegations or averments in the complaint and the relief asked for. 13
Moreover, even granting that the charge is true, fraud or deceit does not render a contract
void ab initio, and can only be a ground for rendering the contract voidable or annullable
pursuant to Article 1390 of the New Civil Code, by a proper action in court. 14 There is nothing on
record to show that the mortgage has been annulled. Neither is it disclosed that steps were
taken to nullify the same. Hence, defendants-appellants' claim of ownership on the basis of a
voidable contract which has not been voided fails.

The motion of plaintiffs for dismissal of the appeal, execution of the supersedeas bond and
withdrawal of deposited rentals was denied for the reason that the liability therefor was
disclaimed and was still being litigated, and under Section 8, Rule 72, rentals deposited had to
be held until final disposition of the appeal. 7

It is claimed in the alternative by defendants-appellants that even if there was no fraud, deceit or
trickery, the chattel mortgage was still null and void ab initio because only personal properties
can be subject of a chattel mortgage. The rule about the status of buildings as immovable
property is stated in Lopez vs. Orosa, Jr. and Plaza Theatre Inc., 15 cited in Associated
Insurance Surety Co., Inc. vs. Iya, et al. 16 to the effect that

On 7 October 1957, the appellate court of First Instance rendered its decision, the dispositive
portion of which is quoted earlier. The said decision was appealed by defendants to the Court of
Appeals which, in turn, certified the appeal to this Court. Plaintiffs-appellees failed to file a brief
and this appeal was submitted for decision without it.

... it is obvious that the inclusion of the building, separate and distinct from the land, in the
enumeration of what may constitute real properties (art. 415, New Civil Code) could only mean
one thing that a building is by itself an immovable property irrespective of whether or not said
structure and the land on which it is adhered to belong to the same owner.

Defendants-appellants submitted numerous assignments of error which can be condensed into

two questions, namely: .

Certain deviations, however, have been allowed for various reasons. In the case of Manarang
and Manarang vs. Ofilada, 17 this Court stated that "it is undeniable that the parties to a contract
may by agreement treat as personal property that which by nature would be real property",
citing Standard Oil Company of New York vs. Jaramillo. 18 In the latter case, the mortgagor
conveyed and transferred to the mortgagee by way of mortgage "the following
described personal property."19 The "personal property" consisted of leasehold rights and a
building. Again, in the case of Luna vs. Encarnacion, 20 the subject of the contract designated as
Chattel Mortgage was a house of mixed materials, and this Court hold therein that it was a valid
Chattel mortgage because it was so expressly designated and specifically that the property
given as security "is a house of mixed materials, which by its very nature is considered personal
property." In the later case of Navarro vs. Pineda, 21 this Court stated that

(a) Whether the municipal court from which the case originated had jurisdiction to adjudicate the
same;
(b) Whether the defendants are, under the law, legally bound to pay rentals to the plaintiffs
during the period of one (1) year provided by law for the redemption of the extrajudicially
foreclosed house.
We will consider these questions seriatim.

The view that parties to a deed of chattel mortgage may agree to consider a house as personal
property for the purposes of said contract, "is good only insofar as the contracting parties are
concerned. It is based, partly, upon the principle of estoppel" (Evangelista vs. Alto Surety, No. L11139, 23 April 1958). In a case, a mortgaged house built on a rented land was held to be a
personal property, not only because the deed of mortgage considered it as such, but also
because it did not form part of the land (Evangelists vs. Abad, [CA]; 36 O.G. 2913), for it is now
settled that an object placed on land by one who had only a temporary right to the same, such
as the lessee or usufructuary, does not become immobilized by attachment (Valdez vs. Central
Altagracia, 222 U.S. 58, cited in Davao Sawmill Co., Inc. vs. Castillo, et al., 61 Phil. 709). Hence,
if a house belonging to a person stands on a rented land belonging to another person, it may be
mortgaged as a personal property as so stipulated in the document of mortgage. (Evangelista
vs. Abad, Supra.) It should be noted, however that the principle is predicated on statements by
the owner declaring his house to be a chattel, a conduct that may conceivably estop him from
subsequently claiming otherwise. (Ladera vs. C.N. Hodges, [CA] 48 O.G. 5374): 22
In the contract now before Us, the house on rented land is not only expressly designated as
Chattel Mortgage; it specifically provides that "the mortgagor ... voluntarily CEDES, SELLS and
TRANSFERS by way of Chattel Mortgage 23 the property together with its leasehold rights over
the lot on which it is constructed and participation ..." 24Although there is no specific statement
referring to the subject house as personal property, yet by ceding, selling or transferring a
property by way of chattel mortgage defendants-appellants could only have meant to convey the
house as chattel, or at least, intended to treat the same as such, so that they should not now be
allowed to make an inconsistent stand by claiming otherwise. Moreover, the subject house stood
on a rented lot to which defendats-appellants merely had a temporary right as lessee, and
although this can not in itself alone determine the status of the property, it does so when
combined with other factors to sustain the interpretation that the parties, particularly the
mortgagors, intended to treat the house as personalty. Finally unlike in the Iya cases, Lopez vs.
Orosa, Jr. and Plaza Theatre, Inc. 25 and Leung Yee vs. F. L. Strong Machinery and
Williamson, 26 wherein third persons assailed the validity of the chattel mortgage, 27 it is the
defendants-appellants themselves, as debtors-mortgagors, who are attacking the validity of the
chattel mortgage in this case. The doctrine of estoppel therefore applies to the herein
defendants-appellants, having treated the subject house as personalty.
(b) Turning to the question of possession and rentals of the premises in question. The Court of
First Instance noted in its decision that nearly a year after the foreclosure sale the mortgaged
house had been demolished on 14 and 15 January 1957 by virtue of a decision obtained by the
lessor of the land on which the house stood. For this reason, the said court limited itself to
sentencing the erstwhile mortgagors to pay plaintiffs a monthly rent of P200.00 from 27 March
1956 (when the chattel mortgage was foreclosed and the house sold) until 14 January 1957
(when it was torn down by the Sheriff), plus P300.00 attorney's fees.
Appellants mortgagors question this award, claiming that they were entitled to remain in
possession without any obligation to pay rent during the one year redemption period after the
foreclosure sale, i.e., until 27 March 1957. On this issue, We must rule for the appellants.
Chattel mortgages are covered and regulated by the Chattel Mortgage Law, Act No.
1508. 28 Section 14 of this Act allows the mortgagee to have the property mortgaged sold at
public auction through a public officer in almost the same manner as that allowed by Act No.
3135, as amended by Act No. 4118, provided that the requirements of the law relative to notice
and registration are complied with. 29 In the instant case, the parties specifically stipulated that
"the chattel mortgage will be enforceable in accordance with the provisions of Special Act No.
3135 ... ." 30 (Emphasis supplied).
Section 6 of the Act referred to 31 provides that the debtor-mortgagor (defendants-appellants
herein) may, at any time within one year from and after the date of the auction sale, redeem the
property sold at the extra judicial foreclosure sale. Section 7 of the same Act 32 allows the
purchaser of the property to obtain from the court the possession during the period of
redemption: but the same provision expressly requires the filing of a petition with the proper
Court of First Instance and the furnishing of a bond. It is only upon filing of the proper motion

and the approval of the corresponding bond that the order for a writ of possession issues as a
matter of course. No discretion is left to the court. 33 In the absence of such a compliance, as in
the instant case, the purchaser can not claim possession during the period of redemption as a
matter of right. In such a case, the governing provision is Section 34, Rule 39, of the Revised
Rules of Court 34 which also applies to properties purchased in extrajudicial foreclosure
proceedings. 35 Construing the said section, this Court stated in the aforestated case of Reyes
vs. Hamada.
In other words, before the expiration of the 1-year period within which the judgment-debtor or
mortgagor may redeem the property, the purchaser thereof is not entitled, as a matter of right, to
possession of the same. Thus, while it is true that the Rules of Court allow the purchaser to
receive the rentals if the purchased property is occupied by tenants, he is, nevertheless,
accountable to the judgment-debtor or mortgagor as the case may be, for the amount so
received and the same will be duly credited against the redemption price when the said debtor
or mortgagor effects the redemption.Differently stated, the rentals receivable from tenants,
although they may be collected by the purchaser during the redemption period, do not belong to
the latter but still pertain to the debtor of mortgagor. The rationale for the Rule, it seems, is to
secure for the benefit of the debtor or mortgagor, the payment of the redemption amount and the
consequent return to him of his properties sold at public auction. (Emphasis supplied)
The Hamada case reiterates the previous ruling in Chan vs. Espe. 36
Since the defendants-appellants were occupying the house at the time of the auction sale, they
are entitled to remain in possession during the period of redemption or within one year from and
after 27 March 1956, the date of the auction sale, and to collect the rents or profits during the
said period.
It will be noted further that in the case at bar the period of redemption had not yet expired when
action was instituted in the court of origin, and that plaintiffs-appellees did not choose to take
possession under Section 7, Act No. 3135, as amended, which is the law selected by the parties
to govern the extrajudicial foreclosure of the chattel mortgage. Neither was there an allegation to
that effect. Since plaintiffs-appellees' right to possess was not yet born at the filing of the
complaint, there could be no violation or breach thereof. Wherefore, the original complaint stated
no cause of action and was prematurely filed. For this reason, the same should be ordered
dismissed, even if there was no assignment of error to that effect. The Supreme Court is clothed
with ample authority to review palpable errors not assigned as such if it finds that their
consideration is necessary in arriving at a just decision of the cases. 37
It follows that the court below erred in requiring the mortgagors to pay rents for the year
following the foreclosure sale, as well as attorney's fees.
FOR THE FOREGOING REASONS, the decision appealed from is reversed and another one
entered, dismissing the complaint. With costs against plaintiffs-appellees.

[G.R. No. 135385. December 6, 2000]

ISAGANI CRUZ and CESAR EUROPA, petitioners, vs. SECRETARY OF ENVIRONMENT
AND NATURAL RESOURCES, SECRETARY OF BUDGET AND MANAGEMENT and
CHAIRMAN and COMMISSIONERS OF THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON INDIGENOUS
PEOPLES, respondents.
HON. JUAN M .FLAVIER, HON. PONCIANO BENNAGEN, BAYANI ASCARRAGA, EDTAMI
MANSAYANGAN, BASILIO WANDAG, EVELYN DUNUAN, YAOM TUGAS, ALFREMO
CARPIANO, LIBERATO A. GABIN, MATERNIDAD M. COLAS, NARCISA M. DALUPINES,
BAI KIRAM-CONNIE SATURNO, BAE MLOMO-BEATRIZ T. ABASALA, DATU
BALITUNGTUNG-ANTONIO D. LUMANDONG, DATU MANTUMUKAW TEOFISTO
SABASALES, DATU EDUAARDO BANDA, DATU JOEL UNAD, DATU RAMON BAYAAN,
TIMUAY JOSE ANOY, TIMUAY MACARIO D. SALACAO, TIMUAY EDWIN B. ENDING, DATU

SAHAMPONG MALANAW VI, DATU BEN PENDAO CABIGON, BAI NANAPNAY-LIZA

SAWAY, BAY INAY DAYA-MELINDA S. REYMUNDO, BAI TINANGHAGA HELINITA T.
PANGAN, DATU MAKAPUKAW ADOLINO L. SAWAY, DATU MAUDAYAW-CRISPEN SAWAY,
VICKY MAKAY, LOURDES D. AMOS, GILBERT P. HOGGANG, TERESA GASPAR, MANUEL
S. ONALAN, MIA GRACE L. GIRON, ROSEMARIE G. PE, BENITO CARINO, JOSEPH JUDE
CARANTES, LYNETTE CARANTES-VIVAL, LANGLEY SEGUNDO, SATUR S. BUGNAY,
CARLING DOMULOT, ANDRES MENDIOGRIN, LEOPOLDO ABUGAN, VIRGILIO
CAYETANO, CONCHITA G. DESCAGA, LEVY ESTEVES, ODETTE G. ESTEVEZ, RODOLFO
C. AGUILAR, MAURO VALONES, PEPE H. ATONG, OFELIA T. DAVI, PERFECTO B.
GUINOSAO, WALTER N. TIMOL, MANUEL T. SELEN, OSCAR DALUNHAY, RICO O.
SULATAN, RAFFY MALINDA, ALFREDO ABILLANOS, JESSIE ANDILAB, MIRLANDO H.
MANGKULINTAS, SAMIE SATURNO, ROMEO A. LINDAHAY, ROEL S. MANSANG-CAGAN,
PAQUITO S. LIESES, FILIPE G. SAWAY, HERMINIA S. SAWAY, JULIUS S. SAWAY,
LEONARDA SAWAY, JIMMY UGYUB, SALVADOR TIONGSON, VENANCIO APANG,
MADION MALID, SUKIM MALID, NENENG MALID, MANGKATADONG AUGUSTO DIANO,
JOSEPHINE M. ALBESO, MORENO MALID, MARIO MANGCAL, FELAY DIAMILING,
SALOME P. SARZA, FELIPE P. BAGON, SAMMY SALNUNGAN, ANTONIO D. EMBA,
NORMA MAPANSAGONOS, ROMEO SALIGA, SR., JERSON P. GERADA, RENATO T.
BAGON, JR., SARING MASALONG, SOLEDAD M. GERARDA, ELIZABETH L. MENDI,
MORANTE S. TIWAN, DANILO M. MALUDAO, MINORS MARICEL MALID, represented by
her father CORNELIO MALID, MARCELINO M. LADRA, represented by her father MONICO
D. LADRA, JENNYLYN MALID, represented by her father TONY MALID, ARIEL M.
EVANGELISTA, represented by her mother LINAY BALBUENA, EDWARD M. EMUY, SR.,
SUSAN BOLANIO, OND, PULA BATO BLAAN TRIBAL FARMERS ASSOCIATION, INTERPEOPLES EXCHANGE, INC. and GREEN FORUM-WESTERN VISAYAS, intervenors.
COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS, intervenor.
IKALAHAN INDIGENOUS PEOPLE and HARIBON FOUNDATION
CONSERVATION OF NATURAL RESOURCES, INC., intervenor.

FOR

THE

On March 22, 1999, the Commission on Human Rights (CHR) likewise filed a Motion to
Intervene and/or to Appear as Amicus Curiae. The CHR asserts that IPRA is an expression of
the principle of parens patriae and that the State has the responsibility to protect and guarantee
the rights of those who are at a serious disadvantage like indigenous peoples. For this reason it
prays that the petition be dismissed.
On March 23, 1999, another group, composed of the Ikalahan Indigenous People and the
Haribon Foundation for the Conservation of Natural Resources, Inc. (Haribon, et al.), filed a
motion to Intervene with attached Comment-in-Intervention. They agree with the NCIP and
Flavier, et al. that IPRA is consistent with the Constitution and pray that the petition for
prohibition and mandamus be dismissed.
The motions for intervention of the aforesaid groups and organizations were granted.
Oral arguments were heard on April 13, 1999. Thereafter, the parties and intervenors filed their
respective memoranda in which they reiterate the arguments adduced in their earlier pleadings
and during the hearing.
Petitioners assail the constitutionality of the following provisions of the IPRA and its
Implementing Rules on the ground that they amount to an unlawful deprivation of the States
ownership over lands of the public domain as well as minerals and other natural resources
therein, in violation of the regalian doctrine embodied in Section 2, Article XII of the Constitution:
(1) Section 3(a) which defines the extent and coverage of ancestral domains, and Section 3(b)
which, in turn, defines ancestral lands;
(2) Section 5, in relation to section 3(a), which provides that ancestral domains including
inalienable public lands, bodies of water, mineral and other resources found within ancestral
domains are private but community property of the indigenous peoples;
(3) Section 6 in relation to section 3(a) and 3(b) which defines the composition of ancestral
domains and ancestral lands;

RESOLUTION

(4) Section 7 which recognizes and enumerates the rights of the indigenous peoples over the
ancestral domains;

PER CURIAM:
Petitioners Isagani Cruz and Cesar Europa brought this suit for prohibition and mandamus as
citizens and taxpayers, assailing the constitutionality of certain provisions of Republic Act No.
8371 (R.A. 8371), otherwise known as the Indigenous Peoples Rights Act of 1997 (IPRA), and
its Implementing Rules and Regulations (Implementing Rules).
[1]

In its resolution of September 29, 1998, the Court required respondents to comment. In
compliance, respondents Chairperson and Commissioners of the National Commission on
Indigenous Peoples (NCIP), the government agency created under the IPRA to implement its
provisions, filed on October 13, 1998 their Comment to the Petition, in which they defend the
constitutionality of the IPRA and pray that the petition be dismissed for lack of merit.
On October 19, 1998, respondents Secretary of the Department of Environment and Natural
Resources (DENR) and Secretary of the Department of Budget and Management (DBM) filed
through the Solicitor General a consolidated Comment. The Solicitor General is of the view that
the IPRA is partly unconstitutional on the ground that it grants ownership over natural resources
to indigenous peoples and prays that the petition be granted in part.
On November 10, 1998, a group of intervenors, composed of Sen. Juan Flavier, one of the
authors of the IPRA, Mr. Ponciano Bennagen, a member of the 1986 Constitutional Commission,
and the leaders and members of 112 groups of indigenous peoples (Flavier, et. al), filed their
Motion for Leave to Intervene. They join the NCIP in defending the constitutionality of IPRA and
praying for the dismissal of the petition.

(5) Section 8 which recognizes and enumerates the rights of the indigenous peoples over the
ancestral lands;
(6) Section 57 which provides for priority rights of the indigenous peoples in the harvesting,
extraction, development or exploration of minerals and other natural resources within the areas
claimed to be their ancestral domains, and the right to enter into agreements with nonindigenous
peoples for the development and utilization of natural resources therein for a period not
exceeding 25 years, renewable for not more than 25 years; and
(7) Section 58 which gives the indigenous peoples the responsibility to maintain, develop,
protect and conserve the ancestral domains and portions thereof which are found to be
necessary for critical watersheds, mangroves, wildlife sanctuaries, wilderness, protected areas,
forest cover or reforestation.[2]
Petitioners also content that, by providing for an all-encompassing definition of ancestral
domains and ancestral lands which might even include private lands found within said areas,
Sections 3(a) and 3(b) violate the rights of private landowners.[3]
In addition, petitioners question the provisions of the IPRA defining the powers and jurisdiction of
the NCIP and making customary law applicable to the settlement of disputes involving ancestral
domains and ancestral lands on the ground that these provisions violate the due process clause
of the Constitution.[4]
These provisions are:

(1) sections 51 to 53 and 59 which detail the process of delineation and recognition of ancestral
domains and which vest on the NCIP the sole authority to delineate ancestral domains and
ancestral lands;
(2) Section 52[i] which provides that upon certification by the NCIP that a particular area is an
ancestral domain and upon notification to the following officials, namely, the Secretary of
Environment and Natural Resources, Secretary of Interior and Local Governments, Secretary of
Justice and Commissioner of the National Development Corporation, the jurisdiction of said
officials over said area terminates;
(3) Section 63 which provides the customary law, traditions and practices of indigenous peoples
shall be applied first with respect to property rights, claims of ownership, hereditary succession
and settlement of land disputes, and that any doubt or ambiguity in the interpretation thereof
shall be resolved in favor of the indigenous peoples;
(4) Section 65 which states that customary laws and practices shall be used to resolve disputes
involving indigenous peoples; and
(5) Section 66 which vests on the NCIP the jurisdiction over all claims and disputes involving
rights of the indigenous peoples.[5]
Finally, petitioners assail the validity of Rule VII, Part II, Section 1 of the NCIP Administrative
Order No. 1, series of 1998, which provides that the administrative relationship of the NCIP to
the Office of the President is characterized as a lateral but autonomous relationship for purposes
of policy and program coordination. They contend that said Rule infringes upon the Presidents
power of control over executive departments under Section 17, Article VII of the Constitution. [6]
Petitioners pray for the following:
(1) A declaration that Sections 3, 5, 6, 7, 8, 52[I], 57, 58, 59, 63, 65 and 66 and other related
provisions of R.A. 8371 are unconstitutional and invalid;
(2) The issuance of a writ of prohibition directing the Chairperson and Commissioners of the
NCIP to cease and desist from implementing the assailed provisions of R.A. 8371 and its
Implementing Rules;
(3) The issuance of a writ of prohibition directing the Secretary of the Department of
Environment and Natural Resources to cease and desist from implementing Department of
Environment and Natural Resources Circular No. 2, series of 1998;
(4) The issuance of a writ of prohibition directing the Secretary of Budget and Management to
cease and desist from disbursing public funds for the implementation of the assailed provisions
of R.A. 8371; and
(5) The issuance of a writ of mandamus commanding the Secretary of Environment and Natural
Resources to comply with his duty of carrying out the States constitutional mandate to control
and supervise the exploration, development, utilization and conservation of Philippine natural
resources.[7]
After due deliberation on the petition, the members of the Court voted as follows:
Seven (7) voted to dismiss the petition. Justice Kapunan filed an opinion, which the Chief Justice
and Justices Bellosillo, Quisumbing, and Santiago join, sustaining the validity of the challenged
provisions of R.A. 8371. Justice Puno also filed a separate opinion sustaining all challenged
provisions of the law with the exception of Section 1, Part II, Rule III of NCIP Administrative
Order No. 1, series of 1998, the Rules and Regulations Implementing the IPRA, and Section 57
of the IPRA which he contends should be interpreted as dealing with the large-scale exploitation
of natural resources and should be read in conjunction with Section 2, Article XII of the 1987
Constitution. On the other hand, Justice Mendoza voted to dismiss the petition solely on the

ground that it does not raise a justiciable controversy and petitioners do not have standing to
question the constitutionality of R.A. 8371.
Seven (7) other members of the Court voted to grant the petition. Justice Panganiban filed a
separate opinion expressing the view that Sections 3 (a)(b), 5, 6, 7 (a)(b), 8, and related
provisions of R.A. 8371 are unconstitutional. He reserves judgment on the constitutionality of
Sections 58, 59, 65, and 66 of the law, which he believes must await the filing of specific cases
by those whose rights may have been violated by the IPRA. Justice Vitug also filed a separate
opinion expressing the view that Sections 3(a), 7, and 57 of R.A. 8371 are
unconstitutional.Justices Melo, Pardo, Buena, Gonzaga-Reyes, and De Leon join in the
separate opinions of Justices Panganiban and Vitug.
As the votes were equally divided (7 to 7) and the necessary majority was not obtained, the case
was redeliberated upon. However, after redeliberation, the voting remained the
same.Accordingly, pursuant to Rule 56, Section 7 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, the petition is
DISMISSED.
Attached hereto and made integral parts thereof are the separate opinions of Justices Puno,
Vitug, Kapunan, Mendoza, and Panganiban.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-43938 April 15, 1988
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES (DIRECTOR OF FOREST DEVELOPMENT), petitioner,
vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS (THIRD DIVISION) and JOSE Y. DE LA ROSA, respondents.
G.R. No. L-44081 April 15, 1988
BENGUET
CONSOLIDATED,
INC., petitioner,
vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS, JOSE Y. DE LA ROSA, VICTORIA, BENJAMIN and EDUARDO,
all surnamed DE LA ROSA, represented by their father JOSE Y. DE LA ROSA, respondents.
G.R. No. L-44092 April 15, 1988
ATOK-BIG
WEDGE
MINING
COMPANY, petitioner,
vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS, JOSE Y. DE LA ROSA, VICTORlA, BENJAMIN and EDUARDO,
all surnamed DE LA ROSA, represented by their father, JOSE Y. DE LA
ROSA, respondents.

CRUZ, J.:
The Regalian doctrine reserves to the State all natural wealth that may be found in the bowels of
the earth even if the land where the discovery is made be private. 1 In the cases at bar, which
have been consolidated because they pose a common issue, this doctrine was not correctly
applied.
These cases arose from the application for registration of a parcel of land filed on February 11,
1965, by Jose de la Rosa on his own behalf and on behalf of his three children, Victoria,
Benjamin and Eduardo. The land, situated in Tuding, Itogon, Benguet Province, was divided into
9 lots and covered by plan Psu-225009. According to the application, Lots 1-5 were sold to Jose
de la Rosa and Lots 6-9 to his children by Mamaya Balbalio and Jaime Alberto, respectively, in
1964. 2

The application was separately opposed by Benguet Consolidated, Inc. as to Lots 1-5, Atok Big
Wedge Corporation, as to Portions of Lots 1-5 and all of Lots 6-9, and by the Republic of the
Philippines, through the Bureau of Forestry Development, as to lots 1-9. 3
In support of the application, both Balbalio and Alberto testified that they had acquired the
subject land by virtue of prescription Balbalio claimed to have received Lots 1-5 from her father
shortly after the Liberation. She testified she was born in the land, which was possessed by her
parents under claim of ownership. 4 Alberto said he received Lots 6-9 in 1961 from his mother,
Bella Alberto, who declared that the land was planted by Jaime and his predecessors-in-interest
to bananas, avocado, nangka and camote, and was enclosed with a barbed-wire fence. She
was corroborated by Felix Marcos, 67 years old at the time, who recalled the earlier possession
of the land by Alberto's father. 5 Balbalio presented her tax declaration in 1956 and the realty tax
receipts from that year to 1964, 6 Alberto his tax declaration in 1961 and the realty tax receipts
from that year to 1964. 7
Benguet opposed on the ground that the June Bug mineral claim covering Lots 1-5 was sold to it
on September 22, 1934, by the successors-in-interest of James Kelly, who located the claim in
September 1909 and recorded it on October 14, 1909. From the date of its purchase, Benguet
had been in actual, continuous and exclusive possession of the land in concept of owner, as
evidenced by its construction of adits, its affidavits of annual assessment, its geological
mappings, geological samplings and trench side cuts, and its payment of taxes on the land. 8
For its part, Atok alleged that a portion of Lots 1-5 and all of Lots 6-9 were covered by the Emma
and Fredia mineral claims located by Harrison and Reynolds on December 25, 1930, and
recorded on January 2, 1931, in the office of the mining recorder of Baguio. These claims were
purchased from these locators on November 2, 1931, by Atok, which has since then been in
open, continuous and exclusive possession of the said lots as evidenced by its annual
assessment work on the claims, such as the boring of tunnels, and its payment of annual taxes
thereon. 9
The location of the mineral claims was made in accordance with Section 21 of the Philippine Bill
of 1902 which provided that:
SEC. 21. All valuable mineral deposits in public lands in the philippine Islands both surveyed and
unsurveyed are hereby declared to be free and open to exploration, occupation and purchase
and the land in which they are found to occupation and purchase by the citizens of the United
States, or of said islands.

There is no question that the 9 lots applied for are within the June Bug mineral claims of
Benguet and the "Fredia and Emma" mineral claims of Atok. The June Bug mineral claim of
plaintiff Benguet was one of the 16 mining claims of James E. Kelly, American and mining
locator. He filed his declaration of the location of the June Bug mineral and the same was
recorded in the Mining Recorder's Office on October 14, 1909. All of the Kelly claims ha
subsequently been acquired by Benguet Consolidated, Inc. Benguet's evidence is that it had
made improvements on the June Bug mineral claim consisting of mine tunnels prior to 1935. It
had submitted the required affidavit of annual assessment. After World War II, Benguet
introduced improvements on mineral claim June Bug, and also conducted geological mappings,
geological sampling and trench side cuts. In 1948, Benguet redeclared the "June Bug" for
taxation and had religiously paid the taxes.
The Emma and Fredia claims were two of the several claims of Harrison registered in 1931, and
which Atok representatives acquired. Portions of Lots 1 to 5 and all of Lots 6 to 9 are within the
Emma and Fredia mineral claims of Atok Big Wedge Mining Company.
The June Bug mineral claim of Benguet and the Fredia and Emma mineral claims of Atok having
been perfected prior to the approval of the Constitution of the Philippines of 1935, they were
removed from the public domain and had become private properties of Benguet and Atok.
It is not disputed that the location of the mining claim under consideration was perfected prior to
November 15, 1935, when the Government of the Commonwealth was inaugurated; and
according to the laws existing at that time, as construed and applied by this court in McDaniel v.
Apacible and Cuisia (42 Phil. 749), a valid location of a mining claim segregated the area from
the public domain. Said the court in that case: The moment the locator discovered a valuable
mineral deposit on the lands located, and perfected his location in accordance with law, the
power of the United States Government to deprive him of the exclusive right to the possession
and enjoyment of the located claim was gone, the lands had become mineral lands and they
were exempted from lands that could be granted to any other person. The reservations of public
lands cannot be made so as to include prior mineral perfected locations; and, of course, if a valid
mining location is made upon public lands afterwards included in a reservation, such inclusion or
reservation does not affect the validity of the former location. By such location and perfection,
the land located is segregated from the public domain even as against the Government. (Union
Oil Co. v. Smith, 249 U.S. 337; Van Mess v. Roonet, 160 Cal. 131; 27 Cyc. 546).

The trial court * denied the application, holding that the applicants had failed to prove their claim
of possession and ownership of the land sought to be registered. 11 The applicants appealed to
the respondent court, * which reversed the trial court and recognized the claims of the applicant,
but subject to the rights of Benguet and Atok respecting their mining claims. 12 In other words,
the Court of Appeals affirmed the surface rights of the de la Rosas over the land while at the
same time reserving the sub-surface rights of Benguet and Atok by virtue of their mining claims.

"The legal effect of a valid location of a mining claim is not only to segregate the area from the
public domain, but to grant to the locator the beneficial ownership of the claim and the right to a
patent therefor upon compliance with the terms and conditions prescribed by law. Where there is
a valid location of a mining claim, the area becomes segregated from the public domain and the
property of the locator." (St. Louis Mining & Milling Co. v. Montana Mining Co., 171 U.S. 650;
655; 43 Law ed., 320, 322.) "When a location of a mining claim is perfected it has the effect of a
grant by the United States of the right of present and exclusive possession, with the right to the
exclusive enjoyment of all the surface ground as well as of all the minerals within the lines of the
claim, except as limited by the extralateral right of adjoining locators; and this is the locator's
right before as well as after the issuance of the patent. While a lode locator acquires a vested
property right by virtue of his location made in compliance with the mining laws, the fee remains
in the government until patent issues."(18 R.C.L. 1152) (Gold Creek Mining Corporation v. Hon.
Eulogio Rodriguez, Sec. of Agriculture and Commerce, and Quirico Abadilla, Director of the
Bureau of Mines, 66 Phil. 259, 265-266)

Both Benguet and Atok have appealed to this Court, invoking their superior right of ownership.
The Republic has filed its own petition for review and reiterates its argument that neither the
private respondents nor the two mining companies have any valid claim to the land because it is
not alienable and registerable.

It is of no importance whether Benguet and Atok had secured a patent for as held in the Gold
Creek Mining Corp. Case, for all physical purposes of ownership, the owner is not required to
secure a patent as long as he complies with the provisions of the mining laws; his possessory
right, for all practical purposes of ownership, is as good as though secured by patent.

It is true that the subject property was considered forest land and included in the Central
Cordillera Forest Reserve, but this did not impair the rights already vested in Benguet and Atok
at that time. The Court of Appeals correctly declared that:

We agree likewise with the oppositors that having complied with all the requirements of the
mining laws, the claims were removed from the public domain, and not even the government of
the Philippines can take away this right from them. The reason is obvious. Having become the

The Bureau of Forestry Development also interposed its objection, arguing that the land sought
to be registered was covered by the Central Cordillera Forest Reserve under Proclamation No.
217 dated February 16, 1929. Moreover, by reason of its nature, it was not subject to alienation
under the Constitutions of 1935 and 1973. 10

private properties of the oppositors, they cannot be deprived thereof without due process of
law. 13
Such rights were not affected either by the stricture in the Commonwealth Constitution against
the alienation of all lands of the public domain except those agricultural in nature for this was
made subject to existing rights. Thus, in its Article XIII, Section 1, it was categorically provided
that:
SEC. 1. All agricultural, timber and mineral lands of the public domain, waters, minerals, coal,
petroleum and other mineral oils, all forces of potential energy and other natural resources of the
Philipppines belong to the State, and their disposition, exploitation, development, or utilization
shall be limited to citizens of the Philippines or to corporations or associations at least 60% of
the capital of which is owned by such citizens, subject to any existing right, grant, lease or
concession at the time of the inauguration of the government established under this Constitution.
Natural resources with the exception of public agricultural lands, shall not be alienated, and no
license, concession, or lease for the exploitation, development or utilization of any of the natural
resources shall be granted for a period exceeding 25 years, except as to water rights for
irrigation, water supply, fisheries, or industrial uses other than the development of water power,
in which case beneficial use may be the measure and the limit of the grant.
Implementing this provision, Act No. 4268, approved on November 8, 1935, declared:
Any provision of existing laws, executive order, proclamation to the contrary notwithstanding, all
locations of mining claim made prior to February 8, 1935 within lands set apart as forest reserve
under Sec. 1826 of the Revised Administrative Code which would be valid and subsisting
location except to the existence of said reserve are hereby declared to be valid and subsisting
locations as of the date of their respective locations.
The perfection of the mining claim converted the property to mineral land and under the laws
then in force removed it from the public domain. 14 By such act, the locators acquired exclusive
rights over the land, against even the government, without need of any further act such as the
purchase of the land or the obtention of a patent over it. 15 As the land had become the private
property of the locators, they had the right to transfer the same, as they did, to Benguet and
Atok.
It is true, as the Court of Appeals observed, that such private property was subject to the
"vicissitudes of ownership," or even to forfeiture by non-user or abandonment or, as the private
respondents aver, by acquisitive prescription. However, the method invoked by the de la Rosas
is not available in the case at bar, for two reasons.
First, the trial court found that the evidence of open, continuous, adverse and exclusive
possession submitted by the applicants was insufficient to support their claim of ownership. They
themselves had acquired the land only in 1964 and applied for its registration in 1965, relying on
the earlier alleged possession of their predecessors-in-interest. 16 The trial judge, who had the
opportunity to consider the evidence first-hand and observe the demeanor of the witnesses and
test their credibility was not convinced. We defer to his judgment in the absence of a showing
that it was reached with grave abuse of discretion or without sufficient basis. 17
Second, even if it be assumed that the predecessors-in-interest of the de la Rosas had really
been in possession of the subject property, their possession was not in the concept of owner of
the mining claim but of the property asagricultural land, which it was not. The property was
mineral land, and they were claiming it as agricultural land. They were not disputing the lights of
the mining locators nor were they seeking to oust them as such and to replace them in the
mining of the land. In fact, Balbalio testified that she was aware of the diggings being undertaken
"down below" 18 but she did not mind, much less protest, the same although she claimed to be
the owner of the said land.
The Court of Appeals justified this by saying there is "no conflict of interest" between the owners
of the surface rights and the owners of the sub-surface rights. This is rather doctrine, for it is a

well-known principle that the owner of piece of land has rights not only to its surface but also to
everything underneath and the airspace above it up to a reasonable height. 19 Under the
aforesaid ruling, the land is classified as mineral underneath and agricultural on the surface,
subject to separate claims of title. This is also difficult to understand, especially in its practical
application.
Under the theory of the respondent court, the surface owner will be planting on the land while
the mining locator will be boring tunnels underneath. The farmer cannot dig a well because he
may interfere with the operations below and the miner cannot blast a tunnel lest he destroy the
crops above. How deep can the farmer, and how high can the miner, go without encroaching on
each other's rights? Where is the dividing line between the surface and the sub-surface rights?
The Court feels that the rights over the land are indivisible and that the land itself cannot be half
agricultural and half mineral. The classification must be categorical; the land must be either
completely mineral or completely agricultural. In the instant case, as already observed, the land
which was originally classified as forest land ceased to be so and became mineral and
completely mineral once the mining claims were perfected. 20 As long as mining operations
were being undertaken thereon, or underneath, it did not cease to be so and become
agricultural, even if only partly so, because it was enclosed with a fence and was cultivated by
those who were unlawfully occupying the surface.
What must have misled the respondent court is Commonwealth Act No. 137, providing as
follows:
Sec. 3. All mineral lands of the public domain and minerals belong to the State, and their
disposition, exploitation, development or utilization, shall be limited to citizens of the Philippines,
or to corporations, or associations, at least 60% of the capital of which is owned by such
citizens, subject to any existing right, grant, lease or concession at the time of the inauguration
of government established under the Constitution.
SEC. 4. The ownership of, and the right to the use of land for agricultural, industrial, commercial,
residential, or for any purpose other than mining does not include the ownership of, nor the right
to extract or utilize, the minerals which may be found on or under the surface.
SEC. 5. The ownership of, and the right to extract and utilize, the minerals included within all
areas for which public agricultural land patents are granted are excluded and excepted from all
such patents.
SEC. 6. The ownership of, and the right to extract and utilize, the minerals included within all
areas for which Torrens titles are granted are excluded and excepted from all such titles.
This is an application of the Regalian doctrine which, as its name implies, is intended for the
benefit of the State, not of private persons. The rule simply reserves to the State all minerals that
may be found in public and even private land devoted to "agricultural, industrial, commercial,
residential or (for) any purpose other than mining." Thus, if a person is the owner of agricultural
land in which minerals are discovered, his ownership of such land does not give him the right to
extract or utilize the said minerals without the permission of the State to which such minerals
belong.
The flaw in the reasoning of the respondent court is in supposing that the rights over the land
could be used for both mining and non-mining purposes simultaneously. The correct
interpretation is that once minerals are discovered in the land, whatever the use to which it is
being devoted at the time, such use may be discontinued by the State to enable it to extract the
minerals therein in the exercise of its sovereign prerogative. The land is thus converted to
mineral land and may not be used by any private party, including the registered owner thereof,
for any other purpose that will impede the mining operations to be undertaken therein, For the
loss sustained by such owner, he is of course entitled to just compensation under the Mining
Laws or in appropriate expropriation proceedings. 21

Our holding is that Benguet and Atok have exclusive rights to the property in question by virtue
of their respective mining claims which they validly acquired before the Constitution of 1935
prohibited the alienation of all lands of the public domain except agricultural lands, subject to
vested rights existing at the time of its adoption. The land was not and could not have been
transferred to the private respondents by virtue of acquisitive prescription, nor could its use be
shared simultaneously by them and the mining companies for agricultural and mineral purposes.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the respondent court dated April 30, 1976, is SET ASIDE and that
of the trial court dated March 11, 1969, is REINSTATED, without any pronouncement as to
costs.
SO ORDERED.

and not within any forest zone or public domain; and that tacking her predecessors-in-interests
possession to hers, applicant appears to be in continuous and public possession thereof for
more than thirty (30) years.[4]
The dispositive portion of the decision reads:
WHEREFORE, this Court hereby approves this application for registration and thus places under
the operation of Act 141, Act 496 and/or P.D. 1529, otherwise known as Property Registration
Law, the land described in Plan Ap-04-007770 and containing an area of nine thousand three
hundred forty-nine (9,349) square meters as supported by its technical description now forming
part of the record of this case, in addition to other proofs adduced in the name of ALEXANDRA
A. LAO, of legal age, married to NELSON O. LAO, Filipino citizen, with residence at 1648 Yakal
Street, Sta. Cruz, Manila.

[G.R. No. 150413. July 1, 2003]

Once this Decision becomes final and executory, the corresponding decree of registration shall
forthwith issue.

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. ALEXANDRA LAO, respondent.

SO ORDERED.[5]

DECISION

Petitioner Republic of the Philippines, represented by the Office of the Solicitor General,
appealed to the Court of Appeals which was docketed as CA-G.R. CV No. 56230. On October
15, 2001, the appellate court affirmed the judgment of the trial court. [6] Hence, this petition for
review raising the following errors:

YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
This petition for review assails the decision[1] of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 56230,
which affirmed the judgment [2] of the Regional Trial Court of Tagaytay City, Branch 18, in Land
Registration Case No. TG-719.
On September 4, 1995, respondent Alexandra Lao filed with the Regional Trial Court of Tagaytay
City, Branch 18, an application for the registration of title over a parcel of land designated as Lot
No. 3951, Cad. 452-D, Silang Cadastre, Plan Ap-04-007770, consisting of nine thousand three
hundred forty nine (9,349) square meters under Presidential Decree No. 1529, otherwise known
as the Property Registration Decree. Respondent alleged that she acquired the land by
purchase from the siblings Raymundo Noguera and Ma. Victoria A. Valenzuela, who inherited it
from Generosa Medina. The latter, in turn, inherited the land from her father, Jose Medina, who
acquired the same from Edilberto Perido by transfer.
In the alternative, respondent prayed that the land be awarded to her under the provisions of
Commonwealth Act No. 141, as amended, also known as the Public Land Act, based on her and
her predecessors open, public, actual, continuous, exclusive, notorious and adverse possession
and occupancy under bona fide claim of ownership for more than thirty (30) years.
At the hearing in the lower court, respondent presented the following witnesses: Candido
Amoroso, who testified on the ownership of the land by Edilberto Perido in 1932; Vicente
Laudato, who testified on respondents purchase of the property from Raymundo and Ma.
Victoria; and Fina Victoria So-Liwanag, who assisted respondent in her application for
registration.Respondent likewise presented in evidence the Deed of Absolute Sale [3] dated April
19, 1994 executed by Raymundo and Victoria in her favor, the survey plan and technical
description of the property, and the tax declarations in the name of respondent as well as her
predecessors-in-interest.
On June 28, 1996, the trial court made the following findings, to wit:
x x x the applicant acquired the subject parcel of land by purchase from Raymundo Noguera and
Ma. Victoria A. Valenzuela in 1994, and that applicant and her predecessors-in-interest have
been in continuous, uninterrupted, open, public, adverse and in the concept of an owner
possession of the subject parcel of land for more than thirty (30) years now; and that the same
parcel was declared for taxation purposes; that the realty taxes due thereon have been duly
paid; that the land involved in this case is not covered by any land patent. Likewise, this Court
could well-discern from the survey plan covering the same property, as well as technical
description and other documents presented, that the land sought to be registered is agricultural

THERE IS NO SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE TO WARRANT THE ORIGINAL REGISTRATION OF

TITLE OF SUBJECT PROPERTY IN THE NAME OF RESPONDENT.[7]
A. RESPONDENT FAILED TO COMPLY WITH THE LEGALLY REQUIRED PERIOD AND ACTS
OF POSSESSION.[8]
B. THE TAX DECLARATIONS PRESENTED BY RESPONDENT DO NOT CORROBORATE
HER CLAIM OF THE LEGALLY REQUIRED PERIOD OF POSSESSION.[9]
C. RESPONDENT FAILED TO PRESENT A CERTIFICATION FROM THE APPROPRIATE
GOVERNMENT AGENCY THAT THE LAND SUBJECT OF HER APPLICATION FOR
REGISTRATION IS ALIENABLE AND DISPOSABLE LAND OF THE PUBLIC DOMAIN. [10]
In sum, the issues presented before us are (a) whether or not respondent was able to prove, by
the quantum of evidence mandated by law, that she met the required period of open, exclusive,
continuous and notorious possession, in the concept of an owner, of the subject parcel of land;
and (b) whether or not respondent was able to show that the land subject of her application was
disposable and alienable land of the public domain.
Section 14 (1) of Presidential Decree No. 1529 states:
Who may apply. The following persons may file in the proper Court of First Instance an
application for registration of title to land, whether personally or through their duly authorized
representatives:
(1) Those who by themselves or through their predecessor-in-interest have been in open,
continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of alienable and disposable
lands of the public domain under a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945, or earlier.
On the other hand, Section 48 (b) of Commonwealth Act No. 141, as amended by Section 4 of
Presidential Decree No. 1073, provides:
The provisions of Section 48(b) and Section 48(c), Chapter VIII, of the Public Land Act are
hereby amended in the sense that these provisions shall apply only to alienable and disposable
lands of the public domain which have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious

possession and occupation by the applicant himself or thru his predecessor-in-interest, under a
bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership, since June 12, 1945.

respondent can not tack her possession with those of Generosa Medina and her predecessorsin-interest.

Thus, before one can register his title over a parcel of land, the applicant must show that (a) he,
by himself or through his predecessors-in-interest, has been in open, continuous, exclusive and
notorious possession and occupation of the subject land under a bona fide claim of ownership
since June 12, 1945 or earlier; and (b) the land subject of the application is alienable and
disposable land of the public domain.

There is merit in the petition.

Respondent submits that Section 48 (b) of CA 141 was amended by Republic Act No. 6940,
which reduced the required period of possession to thirty years immediately prior to the filing of
the application. Said law became effective on April 15, 1990. However, petitioner maintains that
the required period of possession remained the same. RA 6940 explicitly states that its
provisions amended sections 44, 45 and 47 of CA 141. Nothing in RA 6940 amends Section 48
(b). In other words, the requisites for judicial confirmation of imperfect or incomplete title set forth
therein remains the same, namely, (1) possession of the subject land from June 12, 1945, and
(2) the classification of the land as alienable and disposable land of the public domain. In Public
Estates Authority v. Court of Appeals,[11] we held that:
Under the public land act, judicial confirmation of imperfect title required possession en
concepto de dueo since time immemorial, or since July 26, 1894. Under C.A. No. 141, this
requirement was retained. However, on June 22, 1957, Republic Act No. 1942 was enacted
amending C.A. No. 141. This later enactment required adverse possession for a period of only
thirty (30) years. On January 25, 1977, the President enacted P.D. No. 1073, further amending
C.A. No. 141, extending the period for filing applications for judicial confirmation of imperfect or
incomplete titles to December 31, 1987. Under this decree, the provisions of Section 48 (b) and
Section 48 (c), Chapter VIII, of the Public Land Act are hereby amended in the sense that these
provisions shall apply only to alienable and disposable land of the public domain which have
been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation by the applicant
himself or thru his predecessors-in-interest under a bona fide claim of acquisition of
ownership, since June 12, 1945.
The aforequoted ruling was reiterated in Republic v. Court of Appeals,[12] thus:
This Court has held in Republic vs. Doldol [295 SCRA 359, (1998)] that, originally, Section 48(b)
of C.A. No. 141 provided for possession and occupation of lands of the public domain since July
26, 1894. This was superseded by R.A. No. 1942 which provided for a simple thirty-year
prescriptive period of occupation by an applicant for judicial confirmation of imperfect title. The
same, however, has already been amended by Presidential Decree No. 1073, approved on
January 25, 1977. As amended Section 48 (b) now reads:
(b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have been in open,
continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of agricultural lands of the
public domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition or ownership, since June 12, 1945, or
earlier, immediately preceding the filing of the application for confirmation of title, except when
prevented by wars or force majeure.Those shall be conclusively presumed to have performed all
the conditions essential to a Government grant and shall be entitled to a certificate of title under
the provisions of this chapter.
Petitioner argues that respondent failed to prove by incontrovertible evidence that she had been
in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of the subject land, in
the concept of an owner, since June 12, 1945 or earlier. According to petitioner, respondents
witnesses did not state the exact period when respondents predecessors-in-interest started
occupying the subject land. They only made sweeping statements to the effect that respondent
had been in possession of the property for more than thirty years. Hence, it can not be
conclusively determined whether respondent and her predecessors-in-interest have truly been in
possession of the property since June 12, 1945 or earlier. Furthermore, respondent failed to
show how the property was transferred from Generosa Medina to Raymundo Noguera and Ma.
Victoria A. Valenzuela. No extrajudicial settlement of property was established.Consequently,

Candido Amoroso, respondents first witness, testified that he first knew of the property in 1932
and that it was owned by a certain Edilberto Perido. However, no evidence was presented to
support his claim. Respondent submitted the tax declarations in the name of her predecessorsin-interest, including that of Edilberto. However, the earliest of these documents pertained to the
year 1948 only, three years short of the required period. Respondents other witness, Vicente
Laudato, claimed that he had known about the property since he was ten years old, which was
in 1945, and that Edilberto Perido owned the property. On cross-examination, however, he
testified that he based his information on Edilbertos ownership of the land on the fact that the
latter used to greet him and his family whenever he passed by their house. Vicente later on
admitted that he did not know with certainty whether Edilberto was indeed the owner and
possessor of the property.[13]
Finally, respondent failed to present the extrajudicial settlement or other document evidencing
the transfer of the land from Generosa Medina to Raymundo Noguera and Ma. Victoria A.
Valenzuela. She likewise did not show the relationship between these parties. She only
presented the deed of sale between her and the latter, where it was stated that Raymundo and
Ma. Victoria inherited the property from Generosa. Hence, respondent can not tack her
possession with those of Generosa and her predecessors-in-interest. At most, respondents
possession can only be reckoned from the time that Raymundo and Ma. Victoria claimed
possession of the property.
Respondent having thus failed to show by incontrovertible evidence that her possession of the
land commenced on June 12, 1945 or earlier, she failed to meet the first requisite under the
pertinent provisions of PD 1529 and CA 141.
Petitioner further submits that respondent failed to show that the land subject of her application
is classified as alienable and disposable land of the public domain. Under the Regalian doctrine
which is embodied in our Constitution,[14] all lands of the public domain belong to the State,
which is the source of any asserted right to ownership of land. [15] All lands not appearing to be
clearly within private ownership are presumed to belong to the State.[16] Unless public land is
shown to have been reclassified or alienated to a private person by the State, it remains part of
the inalienable public domain.[17] To overcome this presumption, incontrovertible evidence must
be established that the land subject of the application is alienable or disposable.[18]
In De Ocampo v. Arlos,[19] it was held that:
x x x a title may be judicially confirmed under Section 48 of the Public Land Act only if it pertains
to alienable lands of the public domain. Unless such assets are reclassified and considered
disposable and alienable, occupation thereof in the concept of owner, no matter how long,
cannot ripen into ownership and be registered as a title. Verily, Presidential Decree No. 1073
clarified Section 48 (b) of the Public Land Act by specifically declaring that the latter applied only
to alienable and disposable lands of the public domain.
In the case at bar, no certification from the appropriate government agency or official
proclamation reclassifying the land as alienable and disposable was presented by
respondent.Respondent merely submitted the survey map and technical descriptions of the land,
which contained no information regarding the classification of the property. These documents
are not sufficient to overcome the presumption that the land sought to be registered forms part of
the public domain.
Respondent argues that she was not required to present any certification stating that the land is
open for disposition because no opposition to her application was ever made by the appropriate
government agencies. She claims that in the absence of any proof to the contrary, lands of the
public domain are agricultural in nature and thus susceptible to private ownership.

As an applicant for registration of a parcel of land, respondent had the initial obligation to show
that the property involved is agricultural. Being the interested party, it was incumbent upon her to
prove that the land being registered is indeed alienable or disposable. She cannot rely on the
mere presumption that it was agricultural and, therefore, alienable part of the public domain.
[20]
Thus, in Director of Lands v. Funtilar,[21] we held:
It was rather sweeping for the appellate court to rule that after an applicant files his application
for registration, the burden shifts totally to the government to prove that the land forms part of
the unclassified forest zone. The ruling in Heirs of Amunategui v. Director of Forestry (126 SCRA
69) governs applications for confirmation of imperfect title. The applicant shoulders the burden of
overcoming the presumption that the land sought to be registered forms part of the public
domain.
Moreover, the absence of opposition from the government agencies is of no moment because
the State cannot be estopped by the omission, mistake or error of its officials or agents. [22]
It bears stressing at this point that declassification of forest land and its conversion into alienable
or disposable land for agricultural or other purposes requires an express and positive act from
the government.[23] It cannot be presumed; but must be established by convincing proof.[24]
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the petition is GRANTED. The decision of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 56230 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The application for original
registration of title over Lot No. 3951, Cad. 452-D, Silang Cadastre, Plan Ap-04-007770, which
was docketed as Land Registration Case No. TG-719 before the Regional Trial Court of
Tagaytay City, Branch 18, is DENIED.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 81163 September 26, 1988

EDUARDO
S.
BARANDA
and
ALFONSO
HITALIA, petitioners,
vs.
HONORABLE JUDGE TITO GUSTILO, ACTING REGISTER OF DEEDS AVITO SACLAUSO,
HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, and ATTY. HECTOR P. TEODOSIO, respondents.
Eduardo S. Baranda for petitioners.
Rico & Associates for private respondents.

GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:

Eduardo S. Baranda and Alfonso Hitalia were the petitioners in G.R. No. 64432 and the private
respondents in G.R. No. 62042. The subject matter of these two (2) cases and the instant case
is the same a parcel of land designated as Lot No. 4517 of the Cadastral Survey of Sta.
Barbara, Iloilo covered by Original Certificate of Title No. 6406.
The present petition arose from the same facts and events which triggered the filing of the
earlier petitions. These facts and events are cited in our resolution dated December 29, 1983 in
G.R. No. 64432, as follows:
. . . This case has its origins in a petition for reconstitution of title filed with the Court of First
Instance of Iloilo involving a parcel of land known as Lot No. 4517 of the Sta. Barbara Cadastre
covered by Original Certificate of Title No. 6406 in the name of Romana Hitalia. Eventually,
Original Certificate of Title No. 6406 was cancelled and Transfer Certificate of Title No. 106098
was issued in the names of Alfonso Hitalia and Eduardo S. Baranda The Court issued a writ of
possession which Gregorio Perez, Maria P. Gotera and Susana Silao refused to honor on the

ground that they also have TCT No. 25772 over the same Lot No. 4517. The Court, after
considering the private respondents' opposition and finding TCT No. 25772 fraudulently
acquired, ordered that the writ of possession be carried out. A motion for reconsideration having
been denied, a writ of demolition was issued on March 29, 1982. Perez and Gotera filed a
petition for certiorari and prohibition with the Court of Appeals. On August 6, 1982, the Court of
Appeals denied the petition. Perez and Gotera filed the petition for review on certiorari
denominated as G.R. No. 62042 before the Supreme Court. As earlier stated the petition was
denied in a resolution dated January 7,1983. The motion for reconsideration was denied in
another resolution dated March 25, 1983, which also stated that the denial is final. This decision
in G.R. No. 62042, in accordance with the entry of judgment, became final on March 25, 1983.
The petitioners in the instant case G.R. No. 64432--contend that the writs of possession and
demolition issued in the respondent court should now be implemented; that Civil Case No.
00827 before the Intermediate Appellate Court was filed only to delay the implementation of the
writ; that counsel for the respondent should be held in contempt of court for engaging in a
concerted but futile effort to delay the execution of the writs of possession and demolition and
that petitioners are entitled to damages because of prejudice caused by the filing of this petition
before the Intermediate Appellate Court. On September 26, 1983, this Court issued a Temporary
Restraining Order ' to maintain the status quo, both in the Intermediate Appellate Court and in
the Regional Trial Court of Iloilo. Considering that (l)there is merit in the instant petition for
indeed the issues discussed in G.R. No. 64432 as raised in Civil Case No. 00827 before the
respondent court have already been passed upon in G.R. No. 62042; and (2) the Temporary
Restraining Order issued by the Intermediate Appellate Court was only intended not to render
the petition moot and academic pending the Court's consideration of the issues, the Court
RESOLVED to DIRECT the respondent Intermediate Appellate Court not to take cognizance of
issues already resolved by this Court and accordingly DISMISS the petition in Civil Case No.
00827. Immediate implementation of the writs of possession and demolition is likewise ordered.
(pp. 107-108, Rollo G.R. No. 64432)
On May 9, 1984, the Court issued a resolution denying with finality a motion for reconsideration
of the December 29, 1983 resolution in G.R. No. 64432. On this same date, another resolution
was issued, this time in G.R. No. 62042, referring to the Regional Trial Court of Iloilo the exparte motion of the private respondents (Baranda and Hitalia) for execution of the judgment in
the resolutions dated January 7, 1983 and March 9, 1983. In the meantime, the then
Intermediate Appellate Court issued a resolution dated February 10, 1984, dismissing Civil Case
No. 00827 which covered the same subject matter as the Resolutions above cited pursuant to
our Resolution dated December 29, 1983. The resolution dated December 29, 1983 in G.R. No.
64432 became final on May 20, 1984.
Upon motions of the petitioners, the Regional Trial Court of Iloilo, Branch 23 presided by Judge
Tito G. Gustilo issued the following order:
Submitted are the following motions filed by movants Eduardo S. Baranda and Alfonso Hitalia
through counsel dated August 28, 1984:
(a) Reiterating Motion for Execution of Judgment of Resolutions dated January 7, 1983 and
March 9, 1983 Promulgated by Honorable Supreme Court (First Division) in G.R. No. 62042;
(b) Motion for Execution of Judgment of Resolution dated December 29, 1983 Promulgated by
Honorable Supreme Court (First Division) in G.R. No. 64432;
(c) The Duties of the Register of Deeds are purely ministerial under Act 496, therefore she must
register all orders, judgment, resolutions of this Court and that of Honorable Supreme Court.
Finding the said motions meritorious and there being no opposition thereto, the same is hereby
GRANTED.
WHEREFORE, Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-25772 is hereby declared null and void and
Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-106098 is hereby declared valid and subsisting title concerning
the ownership of Eduardo S. Baranda and Alfonso Hitalia, all of Sta. Barbara Cadastre.

The Acting Register of Deeds of Iloilo is further ordered to register the Subdivision Agreement of
Eduardo S. Baranda and Alfonso Hitalia as prayed for." (p. 466, Rollo--G.R. No. 64432)
The above order was set aside on October 8, 1984 upon a motion for reconsideration and
manifestation filed by the Acting Registrar of Deeds of Iloilo, Atty. Helen P. Sornito, on the ground
that there was a pending case before this Court, an Action for Mandamus, Prohibition, Injunction
under G.R. No. 67661 filed by Atty. Eduardo Baranda, against the former which remained
unresolved.
In view of this development, the petitioners filed in G.R. No. 62042 and G.R. No. 64432 ex-parte
motions for issuance of an order directing the Regional Trial Court and Acting Register of Deeds
to execute and implement the judgments of this Court. They prayed that an order be issued:
1. Ordering both the Regional Trial Court of Iloilo Branch XXIII, under Hon. Judge Tito G. Gustilo
and the acting Register of Deeds Helen P. Sornito to register the Order dated September 5,
1984 of the lower court;
2. To cancel No.T-25772. Likewise to cancel No.T-106098 and once cancelled to issue new
certificates of title to each of Eduardo S. Baranda and Alfonso Hitalia;
Plus other relief and remedies equitable under the premises. (p. 473, 64432 Rollo)
Acting on these motions, we issued on September 17,1986 a Resolution in G.R. No. 62042 and
G.R. No. 64432 granting the motions as prayed for. Acting on another motion of the same nature
filed by the petitioners, we issued another Resolution dated October 8, 1986 referring the same
to the Court Administrator for implementation by the judge below.

WHEREFORE, Maria Provido Gotera is hereby ordered to surrender Transfer Certificate of Title
No. T-25772 to this Court within ten (10) days from the date of this order, after which period,
Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-25772 is hereby declared annulled and the Register of Deeds
of Iloilo is ordered to issue a new Certificate of Title in lieu thereof in the name of petitioners Atty.
Eduardo S. Baranda and Alfonso Hitalia, which certificate shall contain a memorandum of the
annulment of the outstanding duplicate. (pp. 286-287, Rollo 64432)
On February 9, 1987, Atty. Hector Teodosio, the counsel of Gregorio Perez, private respondent
in G.R. No. 64432 and petitioner in G.R. No. 62042, filed a motion for explanation in relation to
the resolution dated September 17, 1986 and manifestation asking for clarification on the
following points:
a. As to the prayer of Atty. Eduardo Baranda for the cancellation of TCT T-25772, should the
same be referred to the Court of Appeals (as mentioned in the Resolution of November 27,
1985) or is it already deemed granted by implication (by virtue of the Resolution dated
September 17, 1986)?
b. Does the Resolution dated September 17, 1986 include not only the implementation of the
writ of possession but also the cancellation of TCT T-25772 and the subdivision of Lot 4517? (p.
536, Rollo 4432)
Acting on this motion and the other motions filed by the parties, we issued a resolution dated
May 25, 1987 noting all these motions and stating therein:
xxx xxx xxx

ORDER

Since entry of judgment in G.R. No. 62042 was made on January 7, 1983 and in G.R. No. 64432
on May 30, 1984, and all that remains is the implementation of our resolutions, this COURT
RESOLVED to refer the matters concerning the execution of the decisions to the Regional Trial
Court of Iloilo City for appropriate action and to apply disciplinary sanctions upon whoever
attempts to trifle with the implementation of the resolutions of this Court. No further motions in
these cases will be entertained by this Court. (p. 615, Rollo-64432)

This is an Ex-parte Motion and Manifestation submitted by the movants through counsel on
October 20, 1986; the Manifestation of Atty. Helen Sornito, Register of Deeds of the City of Iloilo,
and formerly acting register of deeds for the Province of Iloilo dated October 23, 1986 and the
Manifestation of Atty. Avito S. Saclauso, Acting Register of Deeds, Province of Iloilo dated
November 5, 1986.

In the meantime, in compliance with the Regional Trial Court's orders dated November 6, 1986
and January 6, 1987, Acting Register of Deeds AvitoSaclauso annotated the order declaring
Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-25772 as null and void, cancelled the same and issued new
certificates of titles numbers T-111560, T-111561 and T-111562 in the name of petitioners
Eduardo S. Baranda and Alfonso Hitalia in lieu of Transfer Certificate of TItle No. T-106098.

Considering that the motion of movants Atty. Eduardo S. Baranda and Alfonso Hitalia dated
August 12, 1986 seeking the full implementation of the writ of possession was granted by the
Honorable Supreme Court, Second Division per its Resolution dated September 17,1986, the
present motion is hereby GRANTED.

However, a notice of lis pendens "on account of or by reason of a separate case (Civil Case No.
15871) still pending in the Court of Appeals" was carried out and annotated in the new
certificates of titles issued to the petitioners. This was upheld by the trial court after setting aside
its earlier order dated February 12, 1987 ordering the cancellation of lis pendens.

WHEREFORE, the Acting Register of Deeds, Province of Iloilo, is hereby ordered to register the
Order of this Court dated September 5, 1984 as prayed for.

This prompted the petitioners to file another motion in G.R, No. 62042 and G.R. No. 64432 to
order the trial court to reinstate its order dated February 12, 1987 directing the Acting Register of
Deeds to cancel the notice of lis pendens in the new certificates of titles.

In compliance with our resolutions, the Regional Trial Court of Iloilo, Branch 23 presided by
Judge Tito G. Gustilo issued two (2) orders dated November 6,1986 and January 6,1987
respectively, to wit:

xxx xxx xxx

ORDER

In a resolution dated August 17, 1987, we resolved to refer the said motion to the Regional Trial
Court of Iloilo City, Branch 23 for appropriate action.

This is a Manifestation and Urgent Petition for the Surrender of Transfer Certificate of Title No. T25772 submitted by the petitioners Atty. Eduardo S. Baranda and Alfonso Hitalia on December 2,
1986, in compliance with the order of this Court dated November 25, 1 986, a Motion for
Extension of Time to File Opposition filed by Maria Provido Gotera through counsel on
December 4, 1986 which was granted by the Court pursuant to its order dated December 15,
1986. Considering that no Opposition was filed within the thirty (30) days period granted by the
Court finding the petition tenable, the same is hereby GRANTED.

Since respondent Judge Tito Gustilo of the Regional Trial Court of Iloilo, Branch 23 denied the
petitioners' motion to reinstate the February 12, 1987 order in another order dated September
17, 1987, the petitioners filed this petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus with
preliminary injunction to compel the respondent judge to reinstate his order dated February l2,
1987 directing the Acting Register of Deeds to cancel the notice of lis pendens annotated in the
new certificates of titles issued in the name of the petitioners.
The records show that after the Acting Register of Deeds annotated a notice of is pendens on
the new certificates of titles issued in the name of the petitioners, the petitioners filed in the

reconstitution case an urgent ex-parte motion to immediately cancel notice of lis pendens
annotated thereon.
In his order dated February 12, 1987, respondent Judge Gustilo granted the motion and directed
the Acting Register of Deeds of Iloilo to cancel the lis pendens found on Transfer Certificate of
Title Nos. T-106098; T-111560; T-111561 and T-111562.
Respondent Acting Register of Deeds Avito Saclauso filed a motion for reconsideration of the
February 12, 1987 order stating therein:
That the undersigned hereby asks for a reconsideration of the said order based on the second
paragraph of Section 77 of P.D. 1529, to wit:

This petition is impressed with merit.

Maria Provido Gotera was one of the petitioners in G.R. No. 62042. Although Calixta Provido,
Ricardo Provido, Maxima Provido and Perfecta Provido, the plaintiffs in Civil Case No. 15871
were not impleaded as parties, it is very clear in the petition that Maria Provido was acting on
behalf of the Providos who allegedly are her co-owners in Lot No. 4517, Sta. Barbara Cadastre
as shown by Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-25772 issued in her name and the names of the
plaintiffs in Civil Case No. 15871, among others. (Annex "E" G.R. No. 62042, p. 51, Rollo) In
fact, one of the issues raised by petitioners Maria Provido Gotera and Gregoria Perez in G.R.
No. 62042 was as follows:
xxx xxx xxx

"At any time after final judgment in favor of the defendant or other disposition of the action such
as to terminate finally all rights of the plaintiff in and to the land and/or buildings involved, in any
case in which a memorandum or notice of Lis Pendens has been registered as provided in the
preceding section, the notice of Lis Pendens shall be deemed cancelled upon the registration of
a certificate of the clerk of court in which the action or proceeding was pending stating the
manner of disposal thereof."

2. Whether or not, in the same reconstitution proceedings, respondent Judge Midpantao L. Adil
had the authority to declare as null and void the transfer certificate of title in the name of
petitioner Maria Provido Gotera and her other co-owners. (p. 3, Rollo; Emphasis supplied)

That the lis pendens under Entry No. 427183 was annotated on T-106098, T-111560, T-111561
and T-111562 by virtue of a case docketed as Civil Case No. 15871, now pending with the
Intermediate Court of Appeals, entitled, "Calixta Provido, Ricardo Provido, Sr., Maria Provido
and Perfecto Provido, Plaintiffs, versus Eduardo Baranda and Alfonso Hitalia, Respondents."

G.R. No. 62042 affirmed the order of the then Court of First Instance of Iloilo in the reconstitution
proceedings declaring TCT No. 25772 in the name of Providos over Lot No. 4517, Sta. Barbara
Cadastre null and void for being fraudulently obtained and declaring TCT No. 106098 over the
same parcel Lot No. 4517, Sta. Barbara Cadastre in the name of petitioners Eduardo Baranda
and Alfonso Hitalia valid and subsisting.

That under the above-quoted provisions of P.D. 152, the cancellation of subject Notice of Lis
Pendens can only be made or deemed cancelled upon the registration of the certificate of the
Clerk of Court in which the action or proceeding was pending, stating the manner of disposal
thereof.
Considering that Civil Case No. 1587, upon which the Notice of Lis Pendens was based is still
pending with the Intermediate Court of Appeals, only the Intermediate Court of Appeals and not
this Honorable Court in a mere cadastral proceedings can order the cancellation of the Notice of
Lis Pendens. (pp. 68-69, Rollo)
Adopting these arguments and on the ground that some if not all of the plaintiffs in Civil Case
No. 15871 were not privies to the case affected by the Supreme Court resolutions, respondent
Judge Tito Gustilo set aside his February 12, 1987 order and granted the Acting Register of
Deeds' motion for reconsideration.
The issue hinges on whether or not the pendency of the appeal in Civil Case No. 15871 with the
Court of Appeals prevents the court from cancelling the notice of lis pendens in the certificates of
titles of the petitioners which were earlier declared valid and subsisting by this Court in G.R. No.
62042 and G.R. No. 64432. A corollary issue is on the nature of the duty of a Register of Deeds
to annotate or annul a notice of lis pendens in a torrens certificate of title.
Civil Case No. 15871 was a complaint to seek recovery of Lot No. 4517 of Sta. Barbara
Cadastre Iloilo, (the same subject matter of G.R. No 62042 and G.R. No. 64432) from petitioners
Baranda and Hitalia filed by Calixta Provido, Ricardo Provido, Maxima Provido and Perfecta
Provido before the Regional Trial Court of Iloilo, Branch 23. At the instance of Atty. Hector P.
Teodosio, the Provides' counsel, a notice of is pendens was annotated on petitioners' Certificate
of Title No. T-106098 covering Lot No. 4517, Sta. Barbara Cadastre.
Acting on a motion to dismiss filed by the petitioners, the court issued an order dated October
24, 1984 dismissing Civil Case No. 15871.
The order was then appealed to the Court of Appeals. This appeal is the reason why respondent
Judge Gustilo recalled the February 12, 1987 order directing the Acting Register of Deeds to
cancel the notice of lis pendens annotated on the certificates of titles of the petitioners.

It thus appears that the plaintiffs in Civil Case No. 15871 were privies to G.R. No. 62042 contrary
to the trial court's findings that they were not.

The decision in G.R. No. 62042 became final and executory on March 25,1983 long before Civil
Case No. 15871 was filed.
Under these circumstances, it is crystal clear that the Providos, private respondents herein, in
filing Civil Case No. 15871 were trying to delay the full implementation of the final decisions in
G.R. No. 62042 as well as G.R. No. 64432 wherein this Court ordered immediate
implementation of the writs of possession and demolition in the reconstitution proceedings
involving Lot No. 4517, Sta. Barbara Cadastre.
The purpose of a notice of lis pendens is defined in the following manner:
Lis pendens has been conceived to protect the real rights of the party causing the registration
thereof With the lis pendens duly recorded, he could rest secure that he would not lose the
property or any part of it. For, notice of lis pendens serves as a warning to a prospective
purchaser or incumbrancer that the particular property is in litigation; and that he should keep his
hands off the same, unless of course he intends to gamble on the results of the litigation.
(Section 24, Rule 14, RuIes of Court; Jamora v. Duran, et al., 69 Phil. 3, 11; I Martin, Rules of
Court, p. 415, footnote 3, citing cases.) (Natanov. Esteban, 18 SCRA 481, 485-486)
The private respondents are not entitled to this protection. The facts obtaining in this case
necessitate the application of the rule enunciated in the cases of Victoriano v. Rovila (55 Phil.
1000), Municipal Council of Paranaque v. Court of First Instance of Rizal (70 Phil., 363) and
Sarmiento v. Ortiz (10 SCRA 158), to the effect that:
We have once held that while ordinarily a notice of pendency which has been filed in a proper
case, cannot be cancelled while the action is pending and undetermined, the proper court has
the discretionary power to cancel it under peculiar circumstances, as for instance, where the
evidence so far presented by the plaintiff does not bear out the main allegations of his complaint,
and where the continuances of the trial, for which the plaintiff is responsible, are unnecessarily
delaying the determination of the case to the prejudice of the defendant. (Victoriano v.
Rovira, supra; The Municipal Council of Paranaque v. Court of First Instance of Rizal, supra)

The facts of this case in relation to the earlier cases brought all the way to the Supreme Court
illustrate how the private respondents tried to block but unsuccessfuly the already final decisions
in G.R. No. 62042 and G.R. No. 64432.
Parenthetically, respondent Judge Tito Gustilo abused his discretion in sustaining the
respondent Acting Register of Deeds' stand that, the notice of lis pendens in the certificates of
titles of the petitioners over Lot No. 4571, Barbara Cadastre cannot be cancelled on the ground
of pendency of Civil Case No. 15871 with the Court of Appeals. In upholding the position of the
Acting Register of Deeds based on Section 77 of Presidential Decree No. 1529, he conveniently
forgot the first paragraph thereof which provides:
Cancellation of lis pendens. Before final judgment, a notice of lis pendens may be cancelled
upon Order of the Court after proper showing that the notice is for the purpose of molesting the
adverse party, or that it is not necessary to protect the rights of the party who caused it to be
registered. It may also be cancelled by the Register of Deeds upon verified petition of the party
who caused the registration thereof.
This Court cannot understand how respondent Judge Gustilo could have been misled by the
respondent Acting Register of Deeds on this matter when in fact he was the same Judge who
issued the order dismissing Civil Case No. 15871 prompting the private respondents to appeal
said order dated October 10, 1984 to the Court of Appeals. The records of the main case are still
with the court below but based on the order, it can be safely assumed that the various pleadings
filed by the parties subsequent to the motion to dismiss filed by the petitioners (the defendants
therein) touched on the issue of the validity of TCT No. 25772 in the name of the Providos over
Lot Number 4571, Sta. Barbara Cadastre in the light of the final decisions in G.R. No. 62042 and
G.R. No. 64432.
The next question to be determined is on the nature of the duty of the Register of Deeds to
annotate and/or cancel the notice of lis pendens in a torrens certificate of title.
Section 10, Presidential Decree No. 1529 states that "It shall be the duty of the Register of
Deeds to immediately register an instrument presented for registration dealing with real or
personal property which complies with all the requisites for registration. ... . If the instrument is
not registrable, he shall forthwith deny registration thereof and inform the presentor of such
denial in writing, stating the ground or reasons therefore, and advising him of his right to appeal
by consulta in accordance with Section 117 of this Decree."
Section 117 provides that "When the Register of Deeds is in doubt with regard to the proper step
to be taken or memoranda to be made in pursuance of any deed, mortgage or other instrument
presented to him for registration or where any party in interest does not agree with the action
taken by the Register of Deeds with reference to any such instrument, the question shall be
submitted to the Commission of Land Registration by the Register of Deeds, or by the party in
interest thru the Register of Deeds. ... ."
The elementary rule in statutory construction is that when the words and phrases of the statute
are clear and unequivocal, their meaning must be determined from the language employed and
the statute must be taken to mean exactly what it says. (Aparri v. Court of Appeals, 127 SCRA
231; Insular Bank of Asia and America Employees' Union [IBAAEU] v. Inciong, 132 SCRA 663)
The statute concerning the function of the Register of Deeds to register instruments in a torrens
certificate of title is clear and leaves no room for construction. According to Webster's Third
International Dictionary of the English Language the word shall means "ought to, must,
...obligation used to express a command or exhortation, used in laws, regulations or directives to
express what is mandatory." Hence, the function of a Register of Deeds with reference to the
registration of deeds encumbrances, instruments and the like is ministerial in nature. The
respondent Acting Register of Deeds did not have any legal standing to file a motion for
reconsideration of the respondent Judge's Order directing him to cancel the notice of lis
pendens annotated in the certificates of titles of the petitioners over the subject parcel of land. In
case of doubt as to the proper step to be taken in pursuance of any deed ... or other
instrumentpresented to him, he should have asked the opinion of the Commissioner of Land

Registration now, the Administrator of the National Land Title and Deeds Registration
Administration in accordance with Section 117 of Presidential Decree No. 1529.
In the ultimate analysis, however, the responsibility for the delays in the full implementation of
this Court's already final resolutions in G.R. No. 62042 and G.R. No. 64432 which includes the
cancellation of the notice of lis pendens annotated in the certificates of titles of the petitioners
over Lot No. 4517 of the Sta. Barbara Cadastre falls on the respondent Judge. He should never
have allowed himself to become part of dilatory tactics, giving as excuse the wrong impression
that Civil Case No. 15871 filed by the private respondents involves another set of parties
claiming Lot No. 4517 under their own Torrens Certificate of Title.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED. The February 12, 1987 order of the Regional
Trial Court of Iloilo, Branch 23 is REINSTATED. All subsequent orders issued by the trial court
which annulled the February 12, 1987 order are SET ASIDE. Costs against the private
respondents.
SO ORDERED.

21) RICARDO CHENG, petitioner, vs. RAMON B. GENATO and ERNESTO R. DA

JOSE & SOCORRO B. DA JOSE, respondents.
DECISION
MARTINEZ, J.:

On September 6, 1989, respondent Genato entered into an agreement with

respondent-spouses Ernesto R. Da Jose and Socorro B. Da Jose (Da Jose spouses)
over the above-mentioned two parcels of land. The agreement culminated in the
execution of a contract to sell for which the purchase price was P80.00 per square
meter. The contract was in a public instrument and was duly annotated at the back of
the two certificates of title on the same day. Clauses 1 and 3 thereof provide:

This petition for review on certiorari seeks to annul and set aside the Decision of the
Court of Appeals (CA)[1] dated July 7, 1997 in CA-G.R. No. CV No. 44706 entitled
Ricardo Cheng, plaintiff-appellee vs. Ramon B. Genato, defendant-appellant, Ernesto
R. Da Jose & Socorro B. Da Jose, Intervenors-Appellants which reversed the ruling of
the Regional Trial Court, Branch 96 of Quezon City dated January 18, 1994. The
dispositive portion of the CA Decision reads:

'1. That the purchase price shall be EIGHTY (P80.00) PESOS, Philippine Currency
per square meter, of which the amount of FIFTY THOUSAND (P50,000.00) Pesos
shall be paid by the VENDEE to the VENDOR as partial down payment at the time of
execution of this Contract to Sell.

WHEREFORE, based on the foregoing, appealed decision is hereby REVERSED and

SET ASIDE and judgment is rendered ordering;

'3. That the VENDEE, thirty (30) DAYS after the execution of this contract, and only
after having satisfactorily verified and confirmed the truth and authenticity of
documents, and that no restrictions, limitations, and developments imposed on and/or
affecting the property subject of this contract shall be detrimental to his interest, the
VENDEE shall pay to the VENDOR, NINE HUNDRED FIFTY THOUSAND
(P950,000.00) PESOS, Philippine Currency, representing the full payment of the
agreed Down Payment, after which complete possession of the property shall be
given to the VENDEE to enable him to prepare the premises and any development
therein.[5]

1. The dismissal of the complaint;

2. The cancellation of the annotations of the defendant-appellants Affidavit to Annul
Contract to Sell and plaintiff-appellees Notice of Adverse Claim in the subject TCTs,
namely, TCT No. T-76.196 (M) and TCT No. T-76.197 (M);
3. Payment by the intervenors-appellants of the remaining balance of the purchase
price pursuant to their agreement with the defendant-appellant to suspend
encashment of the three post-dated checks issued since 1989.
4. Ordering the execution by the defendant-appellant Genato of the Deed of Absolute
Sale over the subject two lots covered by TCT No. T-76.196 (M) and TCT No. T76.197 (M) in favor of intervenors-appellants Spouses Da Jose;
5. The return by defendant-appellant Genato of P50,000.00 paid to him by the
plaintiff-appellee Cheng, and
6. Payment by plaintiff-appellee Cheng of moral damages to herein intervenorsappellants Da Jose of P100,000.00, exemplary damages of P50,000.00, attorneys
fees of P50,000.00, and costs of suit; and to defendant-appellant, of P100,000.00 in
exemplary damages, P50,000.00 in attorneys fees. The amounts payable to the
defendant-appellant may be compensated by plaintiff-appellee with the amount
ordered under the immediately foregoing paragraph which defendant-appellant has to
pay the plaintiff-appellee.
SO ORDERED.[2]

xxx xxx xxx

On October 4, 1989, the Da Jose spouses, not having finished verifying the titles
mentioned in clause 3 as aforequoted, asked for and was granted by respondent
Genato an extension of another 30 days or until November 5, 1989. However,
according to Genato, the extension was granted on condition that a new set of
documents is made seven (7) days from October 4, 1989.[6] This was denied by the
Da Jose spouses.
Pending the effectivity of the aforesaid extension period, and without due notice to the
Da Jose spouses, Genato executed an Affidavit to Annul the Contract to Sell,[7] on
October 13, 1989. Moreover, no annotation of the said affidavit at the back of his titles
was made right away. The affidavit contained, inter alia, the following paragraphs;
xxx xxx xxx
That it was agreed between the parties that the agreed downpayment of P950,000.00
shall be paid thirty (30) days after the execution of the Contract, that is on or before
October 6, 1989;
The supposed VENDEES failed to pay the said full downpayment even up to this
writing, a breach of contract.

The antecedents of the case are as follows:

Respondent Ramon B. Genato(Genato) is the owner of two parcels of land located at
Paradise Farms, San Jose Del Monte, Bulacan covered by TCT No. T-76.196 (M)[3]
and TCT No. T-76.197 (M)[4] with an aggregate area of 35,821 square meters, more
or less.

That this affidavit is being executed to Annul the aforesaid Contract to Sell for the
vendee having committed a breach of contract for not having complied with the
obligation as provided in the Contract to Sell;[8]
On October 24, 1989, herein petitioner Ricardo Cheng (Cheng) went to Genatos
residence and expressed interest in buying the subject properties. On that occasion,
Genato showed to Ricardo Cheng copies of his transfer certificates of title and the

annotations at the back thereof of his contract to sell with the Da Jose spouses.
Genato also showed him the aforementioned Affidavit to Annul the Contract to Sell
which has not been annotated at the back of the titles.
Despite these, Cheng went ahead and issued a check for P50,000.00 upon the
assurance by Genato that the previous contract with the Da Jose spouses will be
annulled for which Genato issued a handwritten receipt (Exh. D), written in this wise.
10/24/89
Received from Ricardo Cheng
the Sum of Fifty Thousand Only (P50,000 -)
as partial for T-76196 (M)
T-76197 (M) area 35,821 Sq.m.
Paradise Farm, Gaya-Gaya, San Jose Del Monte
P70/m2 Bulacan
Plus C.G.T. etc
(SGD) Ramon B. Genato
Check # 470393
10/24/89[9]
On October 25, 1989, Genato deposited Chengs check. On the same day, Cheng
called up Genato reminding him to register the affidavit to annul the contract to sell.
[10]
The following day, or on October 26, 1989, acting on Chengs request, Genato caused
the registration of the Affidavit to Annul the Contract to Sell in the Registry of Deeds,
Meycauayan, Bulacan as primary entry No. 262702.[11]
While the Da Jose spouses were at the Office of the Registry of Deeds of
Meycauaya, Bulacan on October 27, 1989, they met Genato by coincidence. It was
only then that the Da Jose spouses discovered about the affidavit to annul their
contract. The latter were shocked at the disclosure and protested against the
rescission of their contract. After being reminded that he (Genato) had given them (Da
Jose spouses) an additional 30-day period to finish their verification of his titles, that
the period was still in effect, and that they were willing and able to pay the balance of
the agreed down payment, later on in the day, Genato decided to continue the
Contract he had with them. The agreement to continue with their contract was
formalized in a conforme letter dated October 27, 1989.
Thereafter, Ramon Genato advised Ricardo Cheng of his decision to continue his
contract with the Da Jose spouses and the return of Chengs P50,000.00 check.
Consequently, on October 30, 1989, Chengs lawyer sent a letter[12] to Genato
demanding compliance with their agreement to sell the property to him stating that the
contract to sell between him and Genato was already perfected and threatening legal
action.
On November 2, 1989, Genato sent a letter[13] to Cheng (Exh. 6) enclosing a BPI
Cashiers Check for P50,000.00 and expressed regret for his inability to consummate
his transaction with him. After having received the letter of Genato on November 4,
1989, Cheng, however, returned the said check to the former via RCPI telegram[14]

dated November 6, 1989, reiterating that our contract to sell your property had
already been perfected.
Meanwhile, also on November 2, 1989, Cheng executed an affidavit of adverse
claim[15] and had it annotated on the subject TCTs.
On the same day, consistent with the decision of Genato and the Da Jose spouses to
continue with their Contract to Sell of September 6, 1989, the Da Jose spouses paid
Genato the complete down payment of P950,000.00 and delivered to him three (3)
postdated checks (all dated May 6, 1990, the stipulated due date) in the total amount
of P1,865,680.00 to cover full payment of the balance of the agreed purchase price.
However, due to the filing of the pendency of this case, the three (3) postdated
checks have not been encashed.
On December 8, 1989, Cheng instituted a complaint[16] for specific performance to
compel Genato to execute a deed of sale to him of the subject properties plus
damages and prayer for preliminary attachment. In his complaint, Cheng averred that
the P50,000.00 check he gave was a partial payment to the total agreed purchase
price of the subject properties and considered as an earnest money for which Genato
acceded. Thus, their contract was already perfected.
In Answer[17] thereto, Genato alleged that the agreement was only a simple receipt
of an option-bid deposit, and never stated that it was a partial payment, nor is it an
earnest money and that it was subject to the condition that the prior contract with the
Da Jose spouses be first cancelled.
The Da Jose spouses, in their Answer in Intervention,[18] asserted that they have a
superior right to the property as first buyers. They alleged that the unilateral
cancellation of the Contract to Sell was without effect and void. They also cited
Chengs bad faith as a buyer being duly informed by Genato of the existing annotated
Contract to Sell on the titles.
After trial on the merits, the lower court ruled that the receipt issued by Genato to
Cheng unerringly meant a sale and not just a priority or an option to buy. It cannot be
true that the transaction was subjected to some condition or reservation, like the
priority in favor of the Da Jose spouses as first buyer because, if it were otherwise,
the receipt would have provided such material condition or reservation, especially as
it was Genato himself who had made the receipt in his own hand. It also opined that
there was a valid rescission of the Contract to Sell by virtue of the Affidavit to Annul
the Contract to Sell. Time was of the essence in the execution of the agreement
between Genato and Cheng, under this circumstance demand, extrajudicial or
judicial, is not necessary. It falls under the exception to the rule provided in Article
1169[19] of the Civil Code. The right of Genato to unilaterally rescind the contract is
said to be under Article 1191[20] of the Civil Code. Additionally, after reference was
made to the substance of the agreement between Genato and the Da Jose spouses,
the lower court also concluded that Cheng should be preferred over the intervenorsDa Jose spouses in the purchase of the subject properties. Thus, on January 18,
1994 the trial court rendered its decision the decretal portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered:

1. Declaring the contract to sell dated September 6, 1989 executed between

defendant Ramon Genato, as vendor, and intervenors Spouses Ernesto and Socorro
Da Jose, as vendees, resolved and rescinded in accordance with Art. 1191, Civil
Code, by virtue of defendants affidavit to annul contract to sell dated October 13,
1989 and as the consequence of intervenors failure to execute within seven (7) days
from October 4, 1989 another contract to sell pursuant to their mutual agreement with
the defendant;
2. Ordering defendant to return to the intervenors the sum of P1,000,000.00, plus
interest at the legal rate from November 2, 1989 until full payment;
3. Directing defendant to return to the intervenors the three (3) postdated checks
immediately upon finality of this judgment;
4. Commanding defendant to execute with and in favor of the plaintiff Ricardo Cheng,
as vendee, a deed of conveyance and sale of the real properties described and
covered in Transfer Certificates of Title No. T-76-196 (M) and T-76.197 (M) of the
Registry of Deeds of Bulacan, Meycauyan Branch, at the rate of P70.00/sqaure
meter, less the amount of P50,000.00 already paid to defendant, which is considered
as part of the purchase price, with the plaintiff being liable for payment of the capital
gains taxes and other expenses of the transfer pursuant to the agreement to sell
dated October 24, 1989; and
5. Ordering defendant to pay the plaintiff and the intervenors as follows:
a/ P50,000.00, as nominal damages, to plaintiff;
b/ P50,000.00, as nominal damages, to intervenors;
c/ P20,000.00, as and for attorneys fees, to plaintiff;
d/ P20,000.00, as and for attorneys fees, to intervenors; and
e/ Cost of the suit.
xxx xxx xxx
Not satisfied with the aforesaid decision, herein respondents Ramon Genato and Da
Jose spouses appealed to the court a quo which reversed such judgment and ruled
that the prior contract to sell in favor of the Da Jose spouses was not validly
rescinded, that the subsequent contract to sell between Genato and Cheng,
embodied in the handwritten receipt, was without force and effect due to the failure to
rescind the prior contract; and that Cheng should pay damages to the respondents
herein being found to be in bad faith.
Hence this petition.[21]
This petition for review, assails the Court of Appeals Decision on the following
grounds: (1) that the Da Jose spouses Contract to Sell has been validly rescinded or
resolved; (2) that Ricardo Chengs own contract with Genato was not just a contract to
sell but one of conditional contract of sale which gave him better rights, thus

precluding the application of the rule on double sales under Article 1544, Civil Code;
and (3) that, in any case, it was error to hold him liable for damages.
The petition must be denied for failure to show that the Court of Appeals committed a
reversible error which would warrant a contrary ruling.
No reversible error can be ascribed to the ruling of the Court of Appeals that there
was no valid and effective rescission of resolution of the Da Jose spouses Contract to
Sell, contrary to petitioners contentions and the trial courts erroneous ruling.
In a Contract to Sell, the payment of the purchase price is a positive suspensive
condition, the failure of which is not a breach, casual or serious, but a situation that
prevents the obligation of the vendor to convey title from acquiring an obligatory force.
[22] It is one where the happening of the event gives rise to an obligation. Thus, for its
non-fulfillment there will be no contract to speak of, the obligor having failed to
perform the suspensive condition which enforces a juridical relation. In fact with this
circumstance, there can be no rescission of an obligation that is still non-existent, the
suspensive condition not having occurred as yet.[23] Emphasis should be made that
the breach contemplated in Article 1191 of the New Civil Code is the obligors failure to
comply with an obligation already extant, not a failure of a condition to render binding
that obligation.[24]
Obviously, the foregoing jurisprudence cannot be made to apply to the situation in the
instant case because no default can be ascribed to the Da Jose spouses since the
30-day extension period has not yet expired. The Da Jose spouses contention that no
further condition was agreed when they were granted the 30-days extension period
from October 7, 1989 in connection with clause 3 of their contract to sell dated
September 6, 1989 should be upheld for the following reason, to wit; firstly, If this
were not true, Genato could not have been persuaded to continue his contract with
them and later on agree to accept the full settlement of the purchase price knowing
fully well that he himself imposed such sine qua non condition in order for the
extension to be valid; secondly, Genato could have immediately annotated his
affidavit to annul the contract to sell on his title when it was executed on October 13,
1989 and not only on October 26, 1989 after Cheng reminded him of the annotation;
thirdly, Genato could have sent at least a notice of such fact, there being no
stipulation authorizing him for automatic rescission, so as to finally clear the
encumbrance of his titles and make it available to other would be buyers. It likewise
settles the holding of the trial court that Genato needed money urgently.
Even assuming in gratia argumenti that the Da Jose spouses defaulted, as claimed
by Genato, in their Contract to Sell, the execution by Genato of the affidavit to annul
the contract is not even called for. For with or without the aforesaid affidavit their nonpayment to complete the full downpayment of the purchase price ipso facto avoids
their contract to sell, it being subjected to a suspensive condition. When a contract is
subject to a suspensive condition, its birth or effectivity can take place only if and
when the event which constitutes the condition happens or is fulfilled.[25] If the
suspensive condition does not take place, the parties would stand as if the conditional
obligation had never existed.[26]
Nevertheless, this being so Genato is not relieved from the giving of a notice, verbal
or written, to the Da Jose spouses for decision to rescind their contract. In many
cases,[27] even though we upheld the validity of a stipulation in a contract to sell

authorizing automatic rescission for a violation of its terms and conditions, at least a
written notice must be sent to the defaulter informing him of the same. The act of a
party in treating a contract as cancelled should be made known to the other.[28] For
such act is always provisional. It is always subject to scrutiny and review by the courts
in case the alleged defaulter brings the matter to the proper courts. In University of
the Philippines vs. De Los Angeles,[29] this Court stressed and we quote:
In other words, the party