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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 10-4648
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff Appellee,
v.
LAWRENCE A. JORDAN,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of Virginia, at Alexandria.
Claude M. Hilton, Senior
District Judge. (1:09-cr-00409-CMH-1)
Submitted:
April 29, 2011
Decided:
May 3, 2011
Before KING, GREGORY, and DUNCAN, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Michael S. Nachmanoff, Federal Public Defender, Aamra S. Ahmad,
Assistant Federal Public Defender, Patrick L. Bryant, Research
and Writing Attorney, Alexandria, Virginia, for Appellant.
Neil H. MacBride, United States Attorney, Thomas J. Krepp,
Special Assistant United States Attorney, Alexandria, Virginia,
for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Lawrence A. Jordan appeals his conviction for being a
felon in possession of a firearm and ammunition, in violation of
18
U.S.C.
district
922(g)(1)
courts
(2006).
denial
of
On
his
appeal,
motion
he
to
challenges
suppress
the
evidence
seized from his person and, pursuant to an inventory search, the
vehicle he was driving.
He also challenges the district courts
denial of his motion to substitute counsel.
Finding no error,
we affirm.
On
Automobile
December
dealership
18,
in
2007,
Jordan
Manassas
visited
Park,
the
Farrish
Virginia.
Jordan
completed a credit application for the purchase of a vehicle.
Jordan
presented
District
of
Columbia
displaying his photo, name, and address.
noted
various
inconsistencies
between
identification
card
The dealership manager
the
credit
report
credit application and the photo identification provided.
and
Based
on the inconsistent information, the manager called the Manassas
Park
police
information.
a
test
drive
because
believed
Jordan
was
providing
false
At the time the police arrived, Jordan was out on
in
one
dealership employees.
Officer
he
Sproule
of
the
dealerships
cars
with
one
the
When Jordan returned from the test drive,
ordered
him
to
exit
the
vehicle.
However,
Jordan avoided contact with the officer, and instead manipulated
the CD player, rearview mirror, and gear shifter.
2
Jordan exited
the vehicle after being requested to do so four times and being
threatened with a taser.
Officer Sproule conducted a pat down
search and found a firearm in Jordans jacket pocket.
Pursuant
to an inventory search, the police searched the car Jordan drove
to the dealership and found ammunition.
The district court denied Jordans motion to suppress
the
that
evidence,
a
finding
crime
had
that
been
[t]here
was
committed.
reasonable
It
was
detention and the pat-down search . . . .
the
district
court
erred
in
denying
the
suspicion
justified,
the
Jordan argues that
motion
to
suppress
because the officer lacked probable cause to arrest him, and
even
if
he
had
reasonable
suspicion
to
conduct
an
investigatory stop, there was no indication that he was armed
and dangerous; therefore, a pat down search was illegal.
Government
responds
that
the
officer
had
probable
cause
The
to
arrest Jordan and merely conducted the search immediately before
arrest; that the officer had reasonable suspicion that criminal
activity was afoot; and that there was reason to believe that
Jordan was armed and dangerous.
We
review
factual
findings
underlying
the
district
courts denial of a motion to suppress for clear error and legal
conclusions de novo.
(4th
Cir.
factual
2009),
finding
United States v. Blake, 571 F.3d 331, 338
cert.
is
denied,
clearly
130
erroneous
3
S.
if
Ct.
1104
this
(2010).
court
on
A
the
entire evidence is left with the definite and firm conviction
that a mistake has been committed.
532
F.3d
326,
omitted).
337
(4th
Cir.
United States v. Harvey,
2008)
(internal
quotation
marks
When a motion to suppress has been denied by the
district court, this court construes the evidence in the light
United States v. Farrior, 535
most favorable to the government.
F.3d 210, 217 (4th Cir. 2008).
An officer may stop and briefly detain a person for
investigative purposes when there is reasonable suspicion based
on
articulable
Illinois v.
facts
Wardlow,
that
528
criminal
U.S.
activity
119,
123-24
is
afoot.
(2000);
United
States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 7 (1989); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S.
1, 30 (1968).
Moreover, in connection with such a seizure or
stop, if presented with a reasonable belief that the person may
be
armed
and
presently
dangerous,
an
officer
may
conduct
protective frisk.
Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143, 146 (1972);
United
Black,
States
v.
525
F.3d
359,
364
(4th
Cir.
2008);
United States v. Mayo, 361 F.3d 802, 806-07 (4th Cir. 2004).
Whether there is reasonable suspicion to justify the
stop depends on the totality of the circumstances, including the
information known to the officer and any reasonable inferences
to be drawn at the time of the stop.
Black, 525 F.3d at 364-65.
Sokolow, 490 U.S. at 8;
Reasonable suspicion may exist even
if each individual factor alone is susceptible of innocent
4
explanation.
Black, 525 F.3d at 365 (quoting United States v.
Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266, 277 (2002)).
reaction
further
support
Evasive behavior and alarmed
reasonable
suspicion
of
criminal
United States v. Smith, 396 F.3d 579, 584 (4th Cir.
activity.
2005); United States v. Humphries, 372 F.3d 653, 657 (4th Cir.
2004); United States v. Lender, 985 F.2d 151, 154 (4th Cir.
1993).
The district court did not clearly err in determining
that the officer had reasonable suspicion that criminal activity
was
afoot.
suspicion.
It
specifically
Based
on
the
made
finding
inconsistencies
of
in
reasonable
the
credit
application and photo identification provided and examining the
totality of the circumstances, it was reasonable for Officer
Sproule
to
believe
that
Jordan
was
attempting
forgery or a stolen identification offense.
to
engage
in
There was testimony
and argument regarding whether Sproule and the other officers
had reason to believe that Jordan was armed and dangerous, thus
permitting a pat down incident to the Terry stop.
Although
Jordan was in the process of evaluating a vehicle that he was
unfamiliar with, this should not have impeded him from directing
his attention to the officer and responding to him.
The cars
radio was not audible, the passenger-side door was open, and the
employee had been escorted from the car.
Officer Sproule was
standing directly outside the drivers door and Jordan would not
5
acknowledge
the
officers
until
Officer
Johnson
stated
Jordan would be tased if he did not exit the vehicle.
affirmed
district
court
determinations
that
an
that
We have
officer
had
reason to believe that a defendant was armed and dangerous based
on the defendants evasive behavior.
584;
Humphries,
Reviewing
the
372
F.3d
evidence
at
in
657;
the
See Smith, 396 F.3d at
Lender,
light
most
985
F.2d
at
favorable
to
154.
the
Government, we conclude there was no error in denying the motion
to suppress.
Next, Jordan contends that the district court erred in
denying his request to substitute counsel.
On the day trial was
scheduled to begin, Jordan made remarks to the district court
that caused it to order that Jordan undergo psychiatric testing
to determine his mental competency to stand trial.
After the
evaluation was ordered, Jordan requested new counsel and stated
that he wished to file for ineffective assistance of counsel,
and stated that he and his counsel were not communicating.
The
district court told Jordan that his attorneys were competent and
experienced and that he would need to talk with his attorneys.
The
court
then
denied
the
motion.
There
were
no
further
challenges to counsel in the remainder of the proceedings.
While a criminal defendant has a right to counsel of
his own choosing, that right is not absolute but is limited so
as not to deprive courts of the exercise of their inherent
6
power
to
control
justice.
United
States v. Gallop, 838 F.2d 105, 108 (4th Cir. 1988).
Thus, a
defendants
courts
right
the
to
administration
substitute
of
counsel
after
the
initial appointment is restricted, and he must show good cause
as
to
why
general,
he
good
should
receive
cause
exists
substitute
when
counsel.
denying
the
Id.
In
request
for
substitute counsel would deny the defendant a constitutionally
adequate defense.
United States v. Johnson, 114 F.3d 435, 443
(4th Cir. 1997) (A total lack of communication [between counsel
and the defendant] is not required.
whether
the
extent
of
the
Rather[,] an examination of
breakdown
prevents
the
ability
to
conduct an adequate defense is the necessary inquiry.).
This
court
reviews
for
abuse
of
discretion
the
district courts ruling on a motion for substitution of counsel.
United States v. Reevey, 364 F.3d 151, 156 (4th Cir. 2004).
When considering the district courts decision on a motion for
substitution, we consider three factors: (1) the timeliness of
[the motion]; (2) the adequacy of the courts inquiry into [the
defendants]
defendant
and
complaint
defense
about
counsel;
counsel]
and
experienced
communication preventing an adequate defense.
(3)
a
whether
total
[the
lack
of
Id.
Here, Jordans motion was not timely, as it was made
the day trial was scheduled to begin.
With respect to the
second factor, the district courts inquiry could have been more
7
complete.
However, viewing the evidence in the record, there
was not an evident and significant breakdown in communication
between Jordan and his attorneys.
of
total
attorneys
Jordan
context
lack
such
was
of
communication
that
counsels
imperiled.
in
which
There simply was no evidence
This
Jordan
between
ability
conclusion
made
the
to
is
Jordan
and
adequately
bolstered
request.
He
his
defend
by
the
requested
substitute counsel after he made statements that led the court
to
order
mental
competency
examination.
On
balance,
therefore, we conclude that the three factors weighed against
granting the motion for substitute counsel and that the district
court did not abuse its discretion in denying Jordans motion.
We therefore affirm the judgment.
oral
argument
adequately
because
presented
in
the
the
facts
and
materials
We dispense with
legal
before
contentions
the
court
are
and
argument would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
