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TEMPORARY DISABILITY:
ESTRADA VS DESIERTO; ARROYO
Estrada vs Desierto G.R. No. 146710-15; Estrada vs Arroyo G.R. No. 146738, March
2 2001
[Immunity from Suit; Resignation of the President; Justiciable controversy]
FACTS:
It began in October 2000 when allegations of wrong doings involving bribe-taking,
illegal gambling, and other forms of corruption were made against Estrada before
the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee. On November 13, 2000, Estrada was
impeached by the Hor and, on December 7, impeachment proceedings were begun
in the Senate during which more serious allegations of graft and corruption against
Estrada were made and were only stopped on January 16, 2001 when 11 senators,
sympathetic to the President, succeeded in suppressing damaging evidence against
Estrada. As a result, the impeachment trial was thrown into an uproar as the entire
prosecution panel walked out and Senate President Pimentel resigned after casting
his vote against Estrada.
On January 19, PNP and the AFP also withdrew their support for Estrada and joined
the crowd at EDSA Shrine. Estrada called for a snap presidential election to be held
concurrently with congressional and local elections on May 14, 2001. He added that
he will not run in this election. On January 20, SC declared that the seat of
presidency was vacant, saying that Estrada constructively resigned his post. At
noon, Arroyo took her oath of office in the presence of the crowd at EDSA as the
14th President. Estrada and his family later left Malacaang Palace. Erap, after his
fall, filed petition for prohibition with prayer for WPI. It sought to enjoin the
respondent Ombudsman from conducting any further proceedings in cases filed
against him not until his term as president ends. He also prayed for judgment
confirming Estrada to be the lawful and incumbent President of the Republic of the
Philippines temporarily unable to discharge the duties of his office.
ISSUE(S):
1. WoN the petition presents a justiciable controversy.
2. WoN Estrada resigned as President.
3. WoN Arroyo is only an acting President.
4. WoN the President enjoys immunity from suit.
5. WoN the prosecution of Estrada should be enjoined due to prejudicial publicity.
RULING:
1. Political questions- "to those questions which, under the Constitution, are to be
decided by the people in their sovereign capacity, or in regard to which full
discretionary authority has been delegated to the legislative or executive branch of
the government. It is concerned with issues dependent upon the wisdom, not
legality of a particular measure."
Legal distinction between EDSA People Power I EDSA People Power II:
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EDSA I
exercise of the people power of
revolution which overthrew the
whole government.
extra constitutional and the
legitimacy of the new
government that resulted from
it cannot be the subject of
judicial review
presented a political question;
EDSA II
exercise of people power of
freedom of speech and
freedom of assemblyto petition
the government for redress of
grievances which only affected
the office of the President.
intra constitutional and the
resignation of the sitting
President that it caused and
the succession of the Vice
President as President are
subject to judicial review.
involves legal questions.
The cases at bar pose legal and not political questions. The principal issues for
resolution require the proper interpretation of certain provisions in the 1987
Constitution: Sec 1 of Art II, and Sec 8 of Art VII, and the allocation of governmental
powers under Sec 11 of Art VII. The issues likewise call for a ruling on the scope of
presidential immunity from suit. They also involve the correct calibration of the right
of petitioner against prejudicial publicity.
2. Elements of valid resignation: (a)an intent to resign and (b) acts of
relinquishment. Both were present when President Estrada left the Palace.
Totality of prior contemporaneous posterior facts and circumstantial evidence
bearing material relevant issuesPresident Estrada is deemed to have resigned
constructive resignation.
SC declared that the resignation of President Estrada could not be doubted as
confirmed by his leaving Malacaan Palace. In the press release containing his final
statement:
1. He acknowledged the oath-taking of the respondent as President;
2. He emphasized he was leaving the Palace for the sake of peace and in order to
begin the healing process (he did not say that he was leaving due to any kind of
disability and that he was going to reassume the Presidency as soon as the
disability disappears);
3. He expressed his gratitude to the people for the opportunity to serve them as
President (without doubt referring to the past opportunity);
4. He assured that he will not shirk from any future challenge that may come in the
same service of the country;
5. He called on his supporters to join him in promotion of a constructive national
spirit of reconciliation and solidarity.
Intent to resignmust be accompanied by act of relinquishmentact or omission
before, during and after January 20, 2001.
3. The Congress passed House Resolution No. 176 expressly stating its support to
Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo as President of the Republic of the Philippines and
subsequently passed H.R. 178 confirms the nomination of Teofisto T. Guingona Jr. As
Vice President. Senate passed HR No. 83 declaring the Impeachment Courts as
Functius Officio and has been terminated. It is clear is that both houses of Congress
recognized Arroyo as the President. Implicitly clear in that recognition is the premise
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that the inability of Estrada is no longer temporary as the Congress has clearly
rejected his claim of inability.
The Court therefore cannot exercise its judicial power for this is political in nature
and addressed solely to Congress by constitutional fiat. In fine, even if Estrada can
prove that he did not resign, still, he cannot successfully claim that he is a President
on leave on the ground that he is merely unable to govern temporarily. That claim
has been laid to rest by Congress and the decision that Arroyo is the de jure,
president made by a co-equal branch of government cannot be reviewed by this
Court.
4. The cases filed against Estrada are criminal in character. They involve plunder,
bribery and graft and corruption. By no stretch of the imagination can these crimes,
especially plunder which carries the death penalty, be covered by the alleged
mantle of immunity of a non-sitting president. He cannot cite any decision of this
Court licensing the President to commit criminal acts and wrapping him with posttenure immunity from liability. The rule is that unlawful acts of public officials are
not acts of the State and the officer who acts illegally is not acting as such but
stands in the same footing as any trespasser.
5. No. Case law will tell us that a right to a fair trial and the free press are
incompatible. Also, since our justice system does not use the jury system, the judge,
who is a learned and legally enlightened individual, cannot be easily manipulated by
mere publicity. The Court also said that Estrada did not present enough evidence to
show that the publicity given the trial has influenced the judge so as to render the
judge unable to perform. Finally, the Court said that the cases against Estrada were
still undergoing preliminary investigation, so the publicity of the case would really
have no permanent effect on the judge and that the prosecutor should be more
concerned with justice and less with prosecution.
ESTRADA VS DESIERTO; ARROYO
353 SCRA 452 Political Law Constitutional Law De Jure vs De Facto
President Arroyo a de jure president
Joseph Erap Estrada alleges that he is the President on leave while Gloria
Macapagal-Arroyo claims she is the President. From the beginning of Eraps
term, he was plagued by problems that slowly but surely eroded his popularity.
His sharp descent from power started on October 4, 2000. Singson, a longtime
friend of Estrada, went on air and accused the Estrada, his family and friends of
receiving millions of pesos from jueteng lords. The expos immediately ignited
reactions of rage. On January 19, Estrada fell from power. At 1:20 p.m. of said
day, the Erap informed then Executive Secretary Edgardo Angara that General
Angelo Reyes, Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, had
defected. January 20 turned to be the day of Eraps surrender. On January 22,
the Monday after taking her oath, Arroyo immediately discharged the powers
and duties of the Presidency. After his fall from the pedestal of power, Eraps
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legal problems appeared in clusters. Several cases previously filed against him
in the Office of the Ombudsman were set in motion.
ISSUE: Whether or not Arroyo is a legitimate (de jure) president.
HELD: The SC holds that the resignation of Estrada cannot be doubted. It was
confirmed by his leaving Malacaang. In the press release containing his final
statement, (1) he acknowledged the oath-taking of the respondent as President
of the Republic albeit with the reservation about its legality; (2) he emphasized
he was leaving the Palace, the seat of the presidency, for the sake of peace and
in order to begin the healing process of our nation. He did not say he was
leaving the Palace due to any kind of inability and that he was going to reassume the presidency as soon as the disability disappears; (3) he expressed his
gratitude to the people for the opportunity to serve them. Without doubt, he
was referring to the past opportunity given him to serve the people as President;
(4) he assured that he will not shirk from any future challenge that may come
ahead in the same service of our country. Estradas reference is to a future
challenge after occupying the office of the president which he has given up; and
(5) he called on his supporters to join him in the promotion of a constructive
national spirit of reconciliation and solidarity. Certainly, the national spirit of
reconciliation and solidarity could not be attained if he did not give up the
presidency. The press release was petitioners valedictory, his final act of
farewell. His presidency is now in the past tense. Even if Erap can prove that he
did not resign, still, he cannot successfully claim that he is a President on leave
on the ground that he is merely unable to govern temporarily. That claim has
been laid to rest by Congress and the decision that respondent Arroyo is the de
jure President made by a co-equal branch of government cannot be reviewed by
this Court.
Estrada V. Arroyo G.R. No. 146738
FACTS: Petitioner sought to enjoin the respondent Ombudsman from conducting any
further proceedings in any criminal complaint that may be filed in his office, until
after the term of petitioner as President is over and only if legally warranted. Erap
also filed a Quo Warranto case, praying for
judgment confirming petitioner to be the lawful and incumbent President of the
Republic of the Philippines temporarily unable to discharge the duties of his office,
and declaring respondent to have taken her oath as and to be holding the Office of
the President, only in an acting capacity pursuant to the provisions of the
Constitution.
HELD:
FIRST: The cases at bar pose legal and not political questions.
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The principal issues for resolution require the proper interpretation of certain
provisions in the 1987 Constitution, notably section 1 of Article II, and section 8 of
Article VII, and the allocation of governmental powers under section II of Article VII.
The issues likewise call for a ruling on the scope of presidential immunity from suit.
They also involve the correct calibration of the right of petitioner against prejudicial
publicity. As early as the 1803 case of Marbury v. Madison, the doctrine has been
laid down that it is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department
to say what the law is . . .
The Court also distinguished between EDSA People Power I and EDSA People Power
II. EDSA I involves the exercise of the people power of revolution which overthrew
the whole government. EDSA II is an exercise of people power of freedom of speech
and freedom of assembly to petition the government for redress of grievances
which only affected the office of the President. EDSA I is extra constitutional and the
legitimacy of the new government that resulted from it cannot be the subject of
judicial review, but EDSA II is intra constitutional and the resignation of the sitting
President that it caused and the succession of the Vice President as President are
subject to judicial review. EDSA I presented political question; EDSA II involves legal
questions.
SECOND: Using the totality test, the SC held that petitioner resigned as President.
1. The proposal for a snap election for president in May where he would not be a
candidate is an indicium that petitioner had intended to give up the
presidency even at that time.
2. The Angara diary shows that the President wanted only five-day period
promised by Reyes, as well as to open the second envelop to clear his name.
"If the envelope is opened, on Monday, he says, he will leave by Monday.
"The President says. Pagod na pagod na ako. Ayoko na masyado nang masakit.
Pagod na ako sa red tape, bureaucracy, intriga. (I am very tired. I dont want any
more of this its too painful. Im tired of the red tape, the bureaucracy, the
intrigue.)
"I just want to clear my name, then I will go.
The SC held that this is high grade evidence that the petitioner has resigned. The
intent to resign is clear when he said x x x Ayoko na masyado nang masakit.
Ayoko na are words of resignation.
3. During the negotiations, the resignation of the petitioner was treated as a
given fact. The only unsettled points at that time were the measures to be
undertaken by the parties during and after transition period.
4. His resignation was also confirmed by his leaving Malacaang. In the press
release containing his final statement, (1) he acknowledged the oath-taking
of the respondent as President of the Republic albeit with the reservation
about its legality; (2) he emphasized he was leaving the Palace, the seat of
the presidency, for the sake of peace and in order to begin the healing
process of our nation. He did not say he was leaving the Palace due to any
kind of inability and he was going to re-assume the presidency as soon as the
disability disappears; (3) he expressed his gratitude to the people for the
opportunity to serve them. Without doubt, he was referring to the past
opportunity given him to serve the people as President; (4) he assured that
he will not shirk from any future challenge that may come ahead in the same
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service of our country. Petitioners reference is to a future challenge after
occupying the office of the president which he has given up; and (5) he
called on his supporters to join him in the promotion of a constructive
national spirit of reconciliation and solidarity. Certainly, the national spirit of
reconciliation and solidarity could not be attained if he did not give up the
presidency. The press release was petitioners valedictory, his final act of
farewell. His presidency is now in the past tense.
THIRD: The petitioner is permanently unable to act as President.
Section 11 of Article VII provides that Congress has the ultimate authority under
the Constitution to determine whether the President is incapable of performing his
functions. Both houses of Congress have recognized respondent Arroyo as the
President.
The House of Representative passed on January 24, 2001 House Resolution No. l75
which states: RESOLUTION EXPRESSING THE SUPPORT OF THE HOUSE OF
REPRESENTATIVES TO THE ASSUMPTION INTO OFFICE BY VICE PRESIDENT GLORIA
MACAPAGAL-ARROYO AS PRESIDENT OFTHE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES,
EXTENDING ITS CONGRATULATIONS AND EXPRESSING ITS SUPPORT FOR HER
ADMINISTRATION AS A PARTNER IN THE ATTAINMENT OF THE NATIONS GOALS
UNDER THE CONSTITUTION. The Senate also passed Senate Resolution No. 82
which states: RESOLUTION CONFIRMING PRESIDENT GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYOS
NOMINATION OF SEN. TEOFISTO T. GUINGONA, JR. AS VICE PRESIDENT OF THE
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES
Implicitly clear in that recognition is the premise that the inability of petitioner
Estrada is no longer temporary. Congress has clearly rejected petitioners claim of
inability. Even if petitioner can prove that he did not resign, still, he cannot
successfully claim that he is a President on leave on the ground that he is merely
unable to govern temporarily. That claim has been laid to rest by Congress and the
decision that respondent Arroyo is the de jure President made by a co-equal branch
of government cannot be reviewed by the Supreme Court.
FOURTH: The petitioner does not enjoy immunity from suit.
The Supreme Court rejected petitioners argument that he cannot be prosecuted for
the reason that he must first be convicted in the impeachment proceedings. The
impeachment trial of petitioner Estrada was aborted by the walkout of the
prosecutors and by the events that led to his loss of the presidency. On February 7,
2001, the Senate passed Senate Resolution No. 83 Recognizing that the
Impeachment Court is Functus Officio. Since the Impeachment Court is now functus
officio, it is untenable for petitioner to demand that he should first be impeached
and then convicted before he can be prosecuted. The plea, if granted, would put a
perpetual bar against his prosecution. The debates in the Constitutional Commission
make it clear that when impeachment proceedings have become moot due to the
resignation of the President, the proper criminal and civil cases may already be filed
against him.
The SC also ruled in In re: Saturnino Bermudez that incumbent Presidents are
immune from suit or from being brought to court during the period of their
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incumbency and tenure but not beyond. Considering the peculiar circumstance
that the impeachment process against the petitioner has been aborted and
thereafter he lost the presidency, petitioner cannot demand as a condition sine qua
non to his criminal prosecution before the Ombudsman that he be convicted in the
impeachment proceedings.
Also, petitioner cannot cite any decision of the SC licensing the President to commit
criminal acts and wrapping him with post-tenure immunity from liability. The rule is
that unlawful acts of public officials are not acts of the State and the officer who
acts illegally is not acting as such but stands in the same footing as any other
trespasser.
FIFTH: Petitioner was not denied the right to impartial trial.
Pervasive publicity is not per se prejudicial to the right of an accused to fair trial.
The mere fact that the trial of appellant was given a day-to-day, gavel-to-gavel
coverage does not by itself prove that the publicity so permeated the mind of the
trial judge and impaired his impartiality. In the case at bar, the records do not show
that the trial judge developed actual bias against appellant as a consequence of the
extensive media coverage of the pre-trial and trial of his case. The totality of
circumstances of the case does not prove that the trial judge acquired a fixed
opinion as a result of prejudicial publicity which is incapable if change even by
evidence presented during the trial. Appellant has the burden to prove this actual
bias and he has not discharged the burden.
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SECRETARY OF JUSTICE AS MEMBER OF JBC:
Civil Liberties Union vs Executive Secretary
194 SCRA 317 Political Law Ex Officio Officials Members of the Cabinet
Singularity of Office EO 284
In July 1987, then President Corazon Aquino issued Executive Order No. 284 which
allowed members of the Cabinet, their undersecretaries and assistant secretaries to
hold other government offices or positions in addition to their primary positions
subject to limitations set therein. The Civil Liberties Union (CLU) assailed this EO
averring that such law is unconstitutional. The constitutionality of EO 284 is being
challenged by CLU on the principal submission that it adds exceptions to Sec 13,
Article 7 of the Constitution which provides:
Sec. 13. The President, Vice-President, the Members of the
Cabinet, and their deputies or assistants shall not, unless
otherwise provided in this Constitution, hold any other office
or employment during their tenure. They shall not, during said
tenure, directly or indirectly practice any other profession,
participate in any business, or be financially interested in any
contract with, or in any franchise, or special privilege granted by
the Government or any subdivision, agency, or instrumentality
thereof, including government-owned or controlled corporations or
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their subsidiaries. They shall strictly avoid conflict of interest in the
conduct of their office.
CLU avers that by virtue of the phrase unless otherwise provided in this
Constitution, the only exceptions against holding any other office or employment in
Government are those provided in the Constitution, namely: (i) The Vice-President
may be appointed as a Member of the Cabinet under Sec 3, par. (2), Article 7; and
(ii) the Secretary of Justice is an ex-officio member of the Judicial and Bar Council by
virtue of Sec 8 (1), Article 8.
ISSUE: Whether or not EO 284 is constitutional.
HELD: No, it is unconstitutional. It is clear that the 1987 Constitution seeks to
prohibit the President, Vice-President, members of the Cabinet, their deputies or
assistants from holding during their tenure multiple offices or employment in the
government, except in those cases specified in the Constitution itself and as above
clarified with respect to posts held without additional compensation in an ex-officio
capacity as provided by law and as required by the primary functions of their office,
the citation of Cabinet members (then called Ministers) as examples during the
debate and deliberation on the general rule laid down for all appointive officials
should be considered as mere personal opinions which cannot override the
constitutions manifest intent and the peoples understanding thereof.
In the light of the construction given to Sec 13, Art 7 in relation to Sec 7, par. (2), Art
IX-B of the 1987 Constitution, EO 284 is unconstitutional. Ostensibly restricting the
number of positions that Cabinet members, undersecretaries or assistant
secretaries may hold in addition to their primary position to not more than 2
positions in the government and government corporations, EO 284 actually allows
them to hold multiple offices or employment in direct contravention of the express
mandate of Sec 13, Art 7 of the 1987 Constitution prohibiting them from doing so,
unless otherwise provided in the 1987 Constitution itself.
Civil Liberties Union VS. Executive Secretary
FACTS:
Petitioners: Ignacio P. Lacsina, Luis R. Mauricio, Antonio R. Quintos and Juan T. David
for petitioners in 83896 and Juan T. David for petitioners in 83815. Both petitions
were consolidated and are being resolved jointly as both seek a declaration of the
unconstitutionality of Executive Order No. 284 issued by President Corazon C.
Aquino on July 25, 1987.
Executive Order No. 284, according to the petitioners allows members of the
Cabinet, their undersecretaries and assistant secretaries to hold other than
government offices or positions in addition to their primary positions. The pertinent
provisions of EO 284 is as follows:
Section 1: A cabinet member, undersecretary or assistant secretary or other
appointive officials of the Executive Department may in addition to his primary
position, hold not more than two positions in the government and government
corporations and receive the corresponding compensation therefor.
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Section 2: If they hold more positions more than what is required in section 1, they
must relinquish the excess position in favor of the subordinate official who is next in
rank, but in no case shall any official hold more than two positions other than his
primary position.
Section 3: AT least 1/3 of the members of the boards of such corporation should
either be a secretary, or undersecretary, or assistant secretary.
The petitioners are challenging EO 284s constitutionality because it adds
exceptions to Section 13 of Article VII other than those provided in the constitution.
According to the petitioners, the only exceptions against holding any other office or
employment in government are those provided in the Constitution namely: 1. The
Vice President may be appointed as a Member of the Cabinet under Section 3 par.2
of Article VII. 2. The secretary of justice is an ex-officio member of the Judicial and
Bar Council by virtue of Sec. 8 of article VIII.
Issue: Whether or not Executive Order No. 284 is constitutional.
Decision: No. It is unconstitutional. Petition granted. Executive Order No. 284 was
declared null and void.
Ratio:
In the light of the construction given to Section 13 of Article VII, Executive Order No.
284 is unconstitutional. By restricting the number of positions that Cabinet
members, undersecretaries or assistant secretaries may hold in addition their
primary position to not more that two positions in the government and government
corporations, EO 284 actually allows them to hold multiple offices or employment in
direct contravention of the express mandate of Sec. 13 of Article VII of the 1987
Constitution prohibiting them from doing so, unless otherwise provided in the 1987
Constitution itself.
The phrase unless otherwise provided in this constitution must be given a literal
interpretation to refer only to those particular instances cited in the constitution
itself: Sec. 3 Art VII and Sec. 8 Art. VIII.
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