PLANE IN THE MIDDLE: A HISTORY OF

THE U.S. AIR FORCE'S DEDICATED CLOSE

AIR SUPPORT PLANE
by

DOUGLAS NORMAN CAMPBELL, B.A., M.A.

A DISSERTATION
IN
HISTORY
Submitted to the Graduate Faculty
of Texas Tech University in
Partial Fulfillment of
the Requirements for
the Degree of
DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY
Approved

f ^ h f l i r p p p g ^ " ^ ^ **^^ nr^mmit.t<A

Aorpntpd

Dean of l\^e Graduate School

May, 1999

Copyright, 1999, Douglas Norman Campbell

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

There are a great many people who are responsible for this dissertation besides
myself First, my wife Ten and daughter Patty put up with a lot during this effort, and
their patience and support cannot be repaid. My mother also supported my accomplishing
this task.
At Texas Tech University, my committee chairman. Dr. James Reckner, helped by
being the finest graduate chairman a student could hope for. Dr. Reckner and his wife
Middy's patience with my numerous calls to their home about details great and small was a
big help. Especially appreciated were the graduate student "hand holding" sessions that he
endured with me, and his confidence in my success eased the times when the chapters and
tasks seemed never-ending. My other committee members, Drs. James Harper, Robert
Hayes, Otto Nelson, and Ron Rainger, helped inspire this work, both in discussions I had
with them and in the suggestions they made on the proposal. When 1 started writing this
work, Barbi Dickensheet spent time wnth me one afternoon making sure that I did not go
too far wrong with the format~I hope! Finally, I appreciate the efforts of the Texas Tech
University Library Inter-Library Loan office; these people supplied the first documentary
materials that enabled me to commence research on this work.
Other library and research staffs were also critical to my finishing this effort. The
harried front desk folks at the Air Force Historical Research Center at Maxwell Air Force
Base, Alabama, worked through a Tuskegee Airmen reunion and a Society for Military
History symposium to help me gather a wealth of information at their center. Material not
available there was made available by the Air University Library people. Dan Keogh and
Pamela Cheney at the Army Military History Institute at Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania,
were the very models of professionalism. Jean August and others at the Air Force Material
Command's History Office rendered critical support by declassifying and releasing
documents that gave me some of the proverbial "original sources." Jeff Thurman at the
Defense Visual Information Center responded with alacrity to some last minute

II

photo requests. Finally, Lois Knowles and the staff at the local New Mexico State
University at Alamogordo Library did what they could to help me.
There are also key individuals and business people. Air Force Major John Moring,
his wdfe Nan, and his wonderful family made their house my house during my research
work in the Washington, DC. area. Air Force officer, and fellow Texas Tech history
graduate school pilgrim. Matt Rodman provided moral support and was able to glean some
materials out of the Office of Air Force History for my work. Retired Air Force colonel
and current workplace boss Klaus Klause gave me time off to make the final push. The
folks at Falcon Copiers in Alamogordo helped me reproduce a lot of papers.
The other key individuals are the intervieweesseveral dozen of them. This topic is
current enough that one can choose between waiting decades for source documents which
may not even exist, or hunting down key participants who are willing to talk. I lack the
space to thank each one individually, and I do not want to offend others by praising a
particular few. Let me say that they gave their time and knowledge, and often pointed out
others who could also help. Some of them devoted hours patiently recounting and
explaining what they knew; and if one hears on tape my verbose interview style, one will
respect their patience!
All of the supporters, interviewees, and research library and archives people helped
create an abundance of research material-much more than I expected for this work. I had
so much that I finally cut off research work except for pressing cases in order to keep
things under conttol. How else can one tell that these people succeeded? Look at the
footnotes.

Ill

TABLE OF CONTENTS

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

ii

ABSTRACT

LIST OF FIGURES

vi

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS

ix

CHAPTER
I.

INTRODUCTION

n.

FOUNDATIONS, THROUGH WORLD WAR n

. 1 7

in.

FOUNDATIONS, THROUGH 1960

. 4 8

IV.

THE STAGE IS SET, 1961-1965

V.

THE A-10'S IMPROBABLE CONCEPTION, 1966-1970

VL

TRIALS, 1971-1974

VII.

THE A-10'S FURTHER TRIALS, AND ENTRY INTO THE

OPERATIONAL AIR FORCE, 1974-1983 .

.237

Vin.

FIRE IN THE MINDS OF MEN, 1979-1990

.296

IX.

THE BUREAUCRATIC WAR, THE POLITICAL WAR, AND

X.

83
.

126
180

THE REAL WAR, 1986-1991

366

CONCLUSION

435

BIBLIOGRAPHY

476

APPENDIX: ILLUSTRATIONS

553

IV

ABSTRACT

Close air support for ground forces can decisively affect battles, but it is difficult to
accomplish due to differences in air and ground force perspectives and warfighting
priorities. However, the American military accomplishes this mission more than any other
national military arm because it relies upon technology in the form of amplefirepowerto
win battles and savettoops'lives. Ironically, the best close air support plane is not the
latest and fastest fighter. It is instead a slower and more durable tactical plane. Air combat
history confirms this conclusion, but the mission and its plane's existence rely upon the
historical, technological, and procurement outlooks of the two servicesthe Army and the
Air Force-involved in this tmly joint mission.
Their relationship through the 1960s featured the airmen's stmggle to separate from
the Army, air power's decisive role in World War II, and interservice friction after that war.
During those years, the Air Force neglected close air support because it emphasized
strategic bombing and because it thought fighter planes could accomplish the mission
without much practice. The Army's development of attack helicopters and the Air Force's
own embarrassing unreadiness for close air support in Vietnam sparked the airmen's fears
that they might lose the mission. Thus, for thefirsttime, the Air Force in 1966
commenced purchase of a dedicated close air support plane.
After ten years of political maneuvering, budget decisions, technological
developments, and doctrinal changes, a more enthusiastic Air Force leadership fielded the
A-10. For the rest of the 1970s, the leaders sttove to prove the plane's worth. However,
in the early 1980s, the Army's own doctrinal evolution and a new tactical fighter, the F-16,
changed their attitude. Air Force leaders then claimed that modem air defenses, the
Army's new warfighting style, and the F-I6's multimission capabilities made CAS and the
A-10 obsolete. Their action ignited a bureaucratic, political, and defense media fight
against those who valued the mission and its plane. Political action, budgetary exigencies,
and the A-lO's success in Desert Storm reaffirmed the dedicated close air support plane's
worth. Post-Cold War demands revealed the mission's importance as well.

LIST OF FIGURES*

1.

B-17

553

2.

A-17

554

3.

B-25

555

4.

Ju-87Sttika

556

5.

P-40

557

6.

Flight of 11-2 Shturmoviks

558

7.

SBD Dauntless dive bombers in formation

8.

Flight of.two P-47s

9.

Another look at the mgged P-47

10.

P-51

562

11.

F-80

563

12.

F-84

.564

13.

F4U Corsair

14.

A-1, with French markings

15.

F-86

567

16.

F-lOO

568

17.

F-104

569

18.

F-105 . '

.570

19.

A.37

. 571

20.

OV-1

559
560

.561

.
.

.
.

.
.

*Appendix A Illustrations of Aircraft and other Equipment

vi

.
.

.
.

565
.

566

572

21.

UH-Is information

573

22.

F-111

574

23.

F-4

575

24.

A-4

25.

A-7

577

26.

F-5

578

27.

T-28

28.

A-1 two-seat version in Vietnam

29.

AC-47gunship

581

30.

AC-130gunship

582

31.

AH-56 Cheyenne

583

32.

AH-1 Cobra

584

33.

OV-10

585

34.

AV-8Han-ier

586

35.

A-9

587

36.

Flight of two A-10s

588

37.

Flight of four A-10s

589

38.

Single A-10

590

39.

SA-7

591

40.

SA-6

.592

41.

ZSU-23-4

. 593

42.

The Enforcer .

.576

579
.580

vii

594

43.

SA-8 .

44.

AH-64 Apache

596

45.

F-16

597

46.

Flight of three F-16s

598

47.

Su-25 Frogfoot

599

48.

Su-25 Frogfoot on the ground

49.

Mi-24Hind

VllI

.595

600

601

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS

A

Attack.

AAA

Anti-Aircraft Artillery.

AAD

Air Assault Division.

AAF

Army Air Force.

AAFSS

Advanced Aerial Fire Support System.

AAH

Advanced Attack Helicopter.

AASAC

Army Aviation School and Center.

AATC

Air National Guard and Air Force Reserve Test Center.

AC

Attack/Cargo.

ACC

Air Combat Command.

ADM

Admiral.

AFA

Air Force Association.

AFB

Air Force Base.

AFHRC

Air Force Historical Research Center.

Ml

Armed Forces Journal.

AFJI

Armed Forces Journal International.

AFM

Air Force Magazine.

AFMC

Air Force Material Command.

AFOTEC

Air Force Test and Evaluation Center.

AFRDQ

Directorate of Research and Development, Operational Requirements, and

Development Plans Office.

IX

AFT

Air Force Times

AGL

Above Ground Level.

AGM

Air-to-Ground Missile.

AH

Attack Helicopter.

AJAAT

Advanced Joint Air Attack Tactics (or Team, depending on context).

AL

Alabama.

ALFA

Air-Land Forces Application.

AMHI

Army Military History Institute.

ANG

Air National Guard.

ASCIET

All Services Combat Identification Evaluation Team.

ASD

Armaments System Division.

ATHS

Automatic Target Hand-off System.

ATP

Allied Tactical Publication.

AUR

Air University Review.

AV

VSTOL Attack.

AVM

Air Vice Marshal.

AWACS

Airborne Warning and Control System

AW&ST

Aviation Week & Space Technology

A-X

Designation for dedicated CAS plane project.

AZ

Arizona.

Bomber.

BAI

Battlefield Air Interdiction.

BDA

Bomb Damage Assessment.

BDM

Braddock, Dunn, and McDonough

BGEN

Brigadier General.

BRL

Ballistic Research Laboratory.

Cargo.

CA

California.

CAPT

Captain.

CAS

Close Air Support.

CASADA

Close Air Support Aircraft Design Altematives study.

CASMARG

Close Air Support Mission Area Review Group.

CCTS

Combat Crew Training Squadron.

CDC

Combat Developments Command.

CFP

Concept Formulation Package.

CHECO

Contemporary Historical Evaluation of Combat Operations.

CO

Colorado.

COEA

Cost and Operational Effectiveness Analysis.

COIN

Counter-intelligence

COL

Colonel.

CONARC

Continental Army Command.

CPGW

Conduct of the Persian Gulf War.

CT

Connecticut.

CT ANG

Connecticut Air National Guard.

XI

Democrat.

DC.

District of Columbia.

DCP

Development Concept Paper.

DDR&E

Director of Defense Research & Engineering.

DoD

Department of Defense.

DOL

Dispersed Operating Location.

DOT

Directorate of Training.

DSARC

Defense System Acquisition Review Council.

DTG

Date-time-group.

DVIC

Defense Visual Information Center.

ECM

Electronic Countermeasures.

ed.

editor; edited by; or edition, depending on context.

Fighter.

FAC

Forward Air Conttoller.

F-Kill

Firepower Kill.

FL

Florida.

FLIR

Forward-looking Infrared.

FM

Field Manual.

FOL

Forward Operating Location.

FOLTA

Forward Operating Location Training Area.

FWIC

Fighter Weapons Instmctor Course.

FWR

l-ighter Weapons Review.

XII

FWS

Fighter Weapons School.

FWW

Fighter Weapons Wing.

F-X

Designation for F-15 project.

FY

Fiscal Year.

GA

Georgia.

GAO

Government Accounting Office.

GAU

Gun, Automatic.

GE

General Electric.

GEN

General.

GPO

Government Printing Office.

GPS

Global Positioning System.

GWAPS

Gulf War Air Power Survey.

HASC

House Armed Services Committee.

HQ

Headquarters.

lAF

Israeli Air Force.

IDA

Institute for Defense Analysis.

IDR

International Defense Review.

IIR

Imaging Infrared.

IL

Illinois.

INS

Inertial Navigation System.

IOC

Initial Operational Capability.

JAAT

Joint Air Attack Team (or Tactics, depending on context).

XIII

JAWS

Joint Attack Weapons Systems

JSTARS

Joint Surveillance Target Attack System.

Ju

Junkers.

KKMC

King Khalid Military City.

K-Kill

Catastrophic Kill.

LACAS

Low Altitude Close Air Support.

LARA

Light Armed Reconnaissance Aircraft.

LASTE

Low-altitude Safety and Targeting Enhancement.

LAVP

Lot Acceptance Verification Program.

LTCOL

Lieutenant Colonel.

LTGEN

Lieutenant General.

LTV

Ling-Temco-Vought.

MACV

Military Assistance Command, Vietnam.

MAFB

Maxwell Air Force Base.

MAJ

Major.

Maj Gen

Major General.

MCPL

Members of Congress for Peace through Law.

MD

Maryland

Me

Messerschmitt.

MGEN

Major General.

Mi

Mil (Russian Aircraft Builder).

MiG

Mikoyan Gurevich.

xiv

MIT

Massachusetts Institute of Technology.

M-Kill

Mobility Kill.

MLRS

Multiple Launched Rocket System.

MNS

Mission Needs Statement.

MO

Missouri.

MOB

Main Operating Base.

MR

Military Review.

MRP

Mission Requirements Package.

MS

Mississippi.

NATO

North Atlantic Treaty Organization.

N/AW

Night/All-weather.

NC

North Carolina.

NH

New Hampshire.

NTC

National Training Center.

NV

Nevada.

NVG

Night Vision Goggles.

NY

New York.

OA

Observation/Attack.

OH

Ohio

OSD

Office of the Secretary of Defense.

OT&E

Operaional Test & Evaluation.

OV

Fixed-wing Observation.

\v

PA

Pennsylvania.

PACAF

Pacific Air Forces.

PA&E

Program Analysis & Evaluation.

Ph.D.

Doctor of Philosophy.

PL.

Public Uw.

PSAC

President's Science Advisory Committee.

Republican.

RAD

Requirements Action Directive.

RAF

Royal Air Force.

RAN

Royal Australian Navy.

ret.

retired.

RFP

Request for Proposal.

Surveillance.

SA

Soviet SAM designation (see below).

SAB

Scientific Advisory Board.

SAC

Strategic Air Command.

SAF-OII

Secretary of the Air Force, Office of Internal Information.

SAM

Surface-to-Air Missile.

SAR

Search and Rescue.

SASC

Senate Armed Services Committee.

SC

South Carolina.

SECDEF

Secretary of Defense.

XVI

SLUF

Short Little Ugly Fellow-A-7 nickname

SPO

System Program Office.

SQN LDR

Squadron Leader.

STOL

Short-Field-Takeoff-and-Land.

STOVL

Short-Field-Takeoff-and-Vertical-Land.

Su

Sukhoi.

Soviet Tank, or Aircraft Trainer, depending on context.

TAC

Tactical Air Command.

TASVAL

Joint Test of Tactical Aircraft Effectiveness in Close Air Support

Anti-Armor Operations.

TD&E

Tactics Development & Evaluation.

TF

Turbofan.

TFS

Tactical Fighter Squadron.

TFTW

Tactical Fighter Training Wing.

TFW

Tactical Fighter Wing.

TFWC

Tactical Fighter Weapons Center.

TFX

Designation for F-111 project.

TOW

Tube-launched, Optically-aimed, Wire-guided missile.

TRADOC

Training and Doctrine Command.

TTW

Tactical Training Wing.

TX

Texas.

Utility.

UCAV

Uninhabited Combat Aerial Vehicle

XVII

UH

Utility Helicopter.

U.N.

United Nations.

U.S.

United States.

USA

United States Army.

USAAD

United States Array Aviation Digest

USAAF

United States Army Air Force.

USAF

United States Air Force.

USAFR

United States Air Force Reserve.

USDR&E

United States Directorate of Research & Engineering (part of OSD).

USMC

United States Marine Corps.

USMCR

United States Marine Corps Reserve.

USN

United States Navy.

USSR

Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.

VA

Virginia.

VADM

Vice Admiral.

VAL

Designator for Navy light attack plane project.

VTOL

Vertical-Takeoff-and-Land

V/STOL

Vertical-and-Short-Takeoflf-and-Land.

WC

Wing Commander.

WI

Wisconsin.

WPAFB

Wright-Patterson Air Force Base.

WSEG

Weapons System Evaluation Group.

XVlll

ZSU

Soviet radar AAA designation.

XIX

CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION

A joke appeared in The Reader's Digest in July 1967, as America's involvement in

the Vietnam War deepened, and Americans became more aware of the tactics that their
military used. It seems that a boy returned from Sunday school and his mother asked him
what he had learned. He said that he learned about how Moses and his people escaped
from Pharaoh's Egypt. He told her that as Pharaoh's tanks approached the Israelites,
Moses got on the radio and called in an air strike, which knocked them out of action. The
puzzled mother asked, "Is that really the way the teacher told the story?" The boy replied,
"If I told it her way, you'd never believe it!"'
Thus it is with close air support, known also by its acronym, CAS. CAS is a
technological dream for war. One expects that ground troops should be able to use
airplanes to assist their battlefield efforts with extra firepower. The pilots and their planes
possess the ability to range over the battlefield in a manner that the soldiers lack. With
their high speed and their ability to carry very lethal weapons, they can surprise the enemy
with a hard knock. They not only can destroy the enemy currently vexing the ground
commander, but they also can spot and hit forces the soldiers cannot seefromthe ground.
It seems so easy and so logical. And as the joke implied, the American military developed
and used it so well in Vietnam that people took it for granted.
But CAS is anything but easy to accomplish. Indeed, the very term defies easy
definition. How close is close? The U.S. Air Force definition for much of that service's
existence went something like this: support of troops engaged or nearly engaged in combat
so that close coordination is required with the ground units. However, details within the
definition changed throughout the Air Force's history, even before it became a separate
service. Indeed, even after the Vietnam War-a conflict where the Air Force accomplished
CAS so well-a survey of Army and Air Force officers revealed no agreement about either
its definition or other terms associated with its accomplishment
'Excerpt from "Laughter, the Best Medicine," The Reader's Digest July 1967, 4.

Further, even if one accepts the above definition, there are other problems. TTie
perspective difference between the airman and the soldier is wide. Things do not appear
the same on the ground as they do in the air. To the infantryman, an enemy tank
one-hundred yards away is conspicuous, not only because of its size but also due to the
severe danger it represents. To a pilot preparing to attack the tankfroma mile and a half
away, it is a large dot; and if its camouflage matches the surroundings, it may not even be
visible. On the other hand, the pilot sees features that the soldier cannot see; thus, if the
soldier says to attack the troops in the red-roofed bam, the pilot may see many such bams.
Further, the battle area itself is often a confusing, dusty, and smoky chaos involving forces
on both sides frantically maneuvering for advantage. The opposing lines are rarely well
defined. One cannot say that one will merely attack everyone facing in a certain direction,
for in the heat of battle, both forces often face in all directions. In fact, the battle can be so
confusing that those directing the planes-whether ground controllers or dedicated airbome
controllers who know the battle area-are confused about who is friend or foe.
However, confirming the foe's location and effectively merging the air and ground
perspectives is of life and death importance, for the pilot cannot expend ordnance until the
target is properly identified. Otherwise, onerisksshooting the wrong target, or tragically,
the friendly troops who expect support. Therefore, good communication is necessary, and
though one assumes that airmen and soldiers easily communicate with one another, this is
not always so. Two different military organizations can procure different radios with
different frequencies and a lack of capability for air-ground communication This is a
pitfall that requires active effort to resolve. Beyond that, there are visual signals, but these
must be agreed upon by all concerned; and woe betide the ground force whose signals
become known to its enemy! In more recent times, laser designators and data link devices
which instantly transfer target information to airplanes'firecontrol computers offer the
promise of quick, reliable target designation But this is piling more technology upon an
already complex technological undertaking. One asks what happens if the equipment
breaks down, or if there is operator error, or if either the soldiers or the airplane have the
wrong equipment or none at all'^

Communications also involves providing a means for the ground party to call for air
strikes in thefirstplace. The U.S. Marines Corps' air task stmcture is relatively
streamlined, given that it is a self-contained operation in a service which emphasizes air
power as a substitute for artillery during amphibious operations. But the Air Force-Army
air task system crosses a boundary between two services with a long, turbulent past
between them. Beyond that, one must determine what ground unit level asks for the
support; one cannot send planes hither and yon in response to every nervous platoon
leader's pleas. Normally, the U.S. Army battalion is the lowest level that makes a CAS
request, but even this far up, it makes a long trip up the operational Army chain of
command to determine its priority and whether Armyfirepowercan support it instead. If
an air support request gets this far, it goes to the Air Force command chain which
determines whether there are any planes that can answer it. If so, it becomes an air task for
some flight of planes who hopefully can get to the battle quickly enough to make a
difference. The process is an eye poppingly complex one, and requires proper manning
and constant active use to work.
The air task setup brings up another perspective-related problem with this mission.
The soldiers and airmen see war itself differently. There are many soldiers and relatively
few airmen, and the soldier's months ofttainingpales next to the years required to produce
a competent tactical pilot. Though Army equipment-tanks, for example-inch up the cost
ladder, they still do not even closely match the cost of the average Air Force fighter.
Unless air units are at a base near the front, the Army's fortunes may be important to the
airmen (especially when they are flying near the battle area), but they are not as compelling
as they are to a tank commander or infantryman in constant direct contact with enemy
guns. Indeed, to the ground troops, the immediate objective and the enemy directly in
front of them are the most important things in the world, and the soldiers move only in
coordination with other friendly ground units. The pilots see themselves as able to move
independently, and relatively freely over terrain. They can move very quickly, too. 1 hcir
restrictions are likewise things that are seemingly irrelevant to the ground troops. They do
not like flying in a machine that is helpless against enemy fighters Dense anti-aircraft fire

can appear in areas that are out of the soldier's ken. Fuel considerations and pilot fatigue
bring back to earth even those planes with the best endurance. Therefore, they cannot
remain around the battle area indefinitely while the ground folks sort themselves out.
Weather that is a nuisance to the soldiers can ground the airmen or prevent them from
executing CAS. Finally, the airmen's sttategic and tactical objectives and priorities vary
from that of the soldiers. They tell the soldiers that air support is not possible if they do
notfirstsucceed in denying the enemy air force the air. They will also point out that
interdiction against enemy forces in the rear often yields better results both for the air effort
and the ground campaign's longer term. They may even say that strategic targets deep in
the enemy's homeland rate a higher priority effort than the enemy army.
The return for effort introduces one other factor germane to CAS. Of all the
airmen's missions, many consider it the most dangerous. Afighterpattol may yield no
contact if the enemy's planes do not appear or cannot be engaged. An interdiction mission
can be very dangerous //there isfighteropposition and dense belts of antiaircraft fire.
However, it often features flight routes over unarmed people, even if they are enemy. But
CAS is always a mission against an armed group of people. Along with the dedicated
antiaircraft batteries, nearly all of the enemy-perhaps thousands of troops in a
small areaare armed. Their weapons may be only rifles and light machine guns and they
may not know how to shoot at an airplane; but if the CAS pilot has to venture near the
target to hit it, then the metallic maelstrom from all of the aimed and barrage fire can down
his plane, no matter how fast or sophisticated it is And quite often, CAS pilots have to get
near the target in orderfirstto correctly identify it and then to hit it. Last, though their
perspectives vary, CAS pilot compassion for tmly beleaguered soldiers often leads to taking
tactically lethal risks to save them.
The two units, or services, involved in the CAS equation can also present a
difficulty factor. Both ground and air sides must be interested in the mission to make it
work. As such, personalities can be important. The history of relations between the units,
as well as past air support successes and failures, may affect the mission. Ihe airmen may
feel strongly that they have only enough assets to guarantee success for air superiority and

interdiction, and not the more costly and complex CAS mission. The soldiers may feel that
they have the weapons and wherewithal to handle their opponents at the front. The above
reasons may combine as both sides agree that the mission is unnecessary. And during
peacetime, one or the other side may see the mission as a detractor or threat to its
procurement program.
This last consideration can be important, because the mission as described seems to
demand a certain kind of plane. It must be able to maneuver close enough to the target and
slow enough for the pilot to see what is supposed to be hit, and in turn hit it. Since this
may take time, and the soldiers may want more than one attack, it needs good fuel
endurance (known in the parlance as loiter capability) and the ability to carry an abundance
of weapons. It needs durability-the ability to withstand the hitsfromsmall-caliber
antiaircraft cannon and small armsfirethat inevitably accompany this mission. It need not
be a high performance plane carrying the most advanced radar and avionics gear. In other
words, it is best that the plane remain simple and easy to maintain. Technological
complexity for its own sake increases cost and maintenance demands, and also creates
more machinery to break if there is combat damage. It is also possible that the plane may
operate from less developed air bases near thefront,where extensive maintenance facilities
might not be available. And though one does not want to accept losing many planes, one
does not need expensive planes in this dangerous arena. As will be seen, wars throughout
the Air Force's existence called for such a plane.

Thg Story
The wars called for such a plane because the Air Force often did not have one
when they started. This was because its leaders shunned the mission for a variety of
reasons, some of which have already been identified in the previous description's details.
They thought CAS was too difficult, too costly, too passe, or too low a priority in the
combat or budget strategy. To some of these officers, accomplishing the mission also
risked subservience to the Army, of which the Air Force was once an obstreperous part.

In fact, when the airmen were part of the Army, they dabbled with CAS and even
had dedicated ground attack planesbut not for long. More attractive were sttategic
bombing and interdiction with multi-engine bombers. The airmen believed these missions
were more productive and less dangerous than air support with single-engine attack planes,
which performed poorly anyway. Further, their budget and doctrinal stmggles with the
Army left them with a strong desire to prove the independent importance of their own
warfighting discipline. They also never forgot how the ever-fickle defense budget directly
affected how well they could achieve their aims, and thus developed an eye toward the
fiscal main chance for their favored missions and planes. This included a disciplined
presentation of aims via a well-orchesttated public relations campaign. Anything, like
CAS, which detractedfromthe most important tasks, was shunned.
One might say that the Air Force's reluctance to concenttate upon CAS was
justified, given the previous section's enumeration of its difficulties. But as the joke
introducing the section implied, the mission was attractive to Americans. It suited the
American desire to sacrifice firepower instead of citizen-soldiers' lives in foreign wars.
This the airmen learned during World War II They had to develop CAS procedures and
mostly used either obsoletefightersor reassigned frontlinefightersfor the mission. The
star plane for the role was the P-47, a mggedfighterwith heavy firepower.
The lesson did not go very far. The independent Air Force that formed after
Worid War II was dominated by bomber leaders who thought the war proved the military
preeminence of strategic bombing. They shunned air support, but that did not matter in
the sense that many tactical aviation leaders did not care much for the mission either.
Their lesson from the war was thatfront-linefighterscould perform CAS as an
afterthought when there were not more important things to do. They forgot the training
and preparation required to do the jobright,as well as the fact that World War II fighters
were still pretty slow and had good fuel endurance compared to the jetfighterscoming on
the scene.
Korea again brought the new service back to CAS. Its jets' performance generated
complaints by Army generals who remembered better air support in World War II, and

expected it. One of the Air Force planes that pleased the soldiers with its CAS capabilities
was the Worid War Il-vintagefighter,the P-51 --though its air support performance in that
previous war was not as good as the P-47 (which by the Korean War had already been
retired from service). The Navy and Marines' A-1 propeller-driven attack plane also did
well, and combined with the Marines' more dedicated CAS effort, provided a stark conttast
to the Air Force's efforts.
Again, the service came away from a war shunning the CAS lessons the war
provided. The 1950s New Look defense policy continued to emphasize strategic bombing,
and the organization assigned to develop tactical aviation. Tactical Air Command (TAC),
mostly aped the bombers in emphasizing nuclear strike missions. The supersonic jets in
TAC were calledfighter-bombersin the World War II tradition, but their pilots seldom
practiced CAS and other tactical missions. Disgusted with the Air Force's neglect of a
mission that it agreed to fly when it became an independent service. Army officers tumed
to a new aviation technology, the helicopter. It did not take long for the Army to see that
helicopters could be used in the close support role.
President John F. Kennedy's election in 1960 introduced Department of Defense
staffers who not only supported the Army's helicopter development ambitions, but also
disapproved of the Air Force's strategic bomber emphasis. Defense Secretary Robert
McNamara and his staff wanted the Air Force to build up its tactical forces and purchase
less expensive attack planes. Until America's involvement in the Vietnam War escalated,
the air leaders fought a two-front bureaucratic war against the Army's push for its own
helicopter air force and McNamara's attempts to change their aircraft procurement policies
Once again, the service found itself unprepared to render close air support when
needed. And though it developed a very responsive system using a variety of planes, one
of its star CAS planes was the A-1 that the Air Force had to procurefromthe Navy At
the same time, the Army more actively pursued purchase of specially built attack
helicopters to support its troops in Viettiam. It even started development of an advanced
model which, if successful, would match many characteristics of fixed-wmg planes This
development, and the added embarrassment of a congressional heanng cnticizing the Air

Force's lack of preparation for air support, led the service's top leadership to see that it
might actually lose its charter and associated funds for the CAS mission.
After directing purchase of a Navy jet attack plane, the A-7, Air Force Chief of
Staff General John McConnell in 1966 ordered procurement planning for a dedicated CAS
plane project, called the A-X. This was thefirstand only dedicated CAS plane that the Air
Force bought in its existence as a separate service. However, the plane's decade-long
gestation was not an easy process. Only a fortuitous combination of influences enabled it
to proceed from concept stage to its operational debut as the A-10 in 1976. During that
period. Army interest varied according to the fortunes of its own advanced helicopter
project, as well as to changing defense priorities as the Vietnam War ended. Congressional
support likewise depended upon changing attitudes about defense spending, aircraft
manufacturer constituents, and war-driven attitudes about the promise of this type of plane.
Facing opposition from various sides, the Air Force's top leadership now found new
enthusiasm for the mission and the plane. Enthusiastic staffers from both the Office of the
Secretary of Defense (OSD) and the Air Force Pentagon Headquarters also helped. They
ensured that the design specifications for the plane incorporated lessons leamed from CAS
in previous wars. Additionally, outside pressure to terminate the project and the Air
Force's own decision to keep it on a budgetary back burner meant that it met both cost and
performance goals. The result was a mgged plane with a huge intemal gun, good external
weapons carriage capability, and excellent loiter ability. It also was a simple, relatively
inexpensive plane that was easily maintained and able to fly from short mnways.
Challenges to the plane's viability continued after it became operational in 1976, but
a new spirit of air support cooperation between the Army and the Air Force meant that the
plane met these as well. Later developments in the 1980s were more serious. Ihe Army
embraced a new warfighting docttine in which the soldiers wanted interdiction more than
CAS from the Air Force. Further, the soldiers were more confident of their own ability to
handle enemy forces on thefrontlines in future wars This included faith in better
weapons, such as the Army's advanced attack helicopter, the Apache Air Force leaders
not only agreed with the Army's change of doctrinal course, but they also used it to claim

that the A-10 was obsolete, and that a new high performancefighter,the F-16, was its
replacement.
The petite F-16 did not appear to embody any of the optimum performance
characteristics for CAS, but the service claimed that a new CAS definition-an oxymoronic
one since it emphasized interdiction-meant that sleekfighterslike the F-16 were best
suited for CAS. This sparked a hot debate in the defense press and a bitter stmggle within
the Department of Defense between CAS F-16 supporters and those favoring an A-10
replacement that improved upon that plane while retaining its CAS attributes. As the
1980s ended. Congress once again became involved, forcing the service via various
punitive measures to reconsider its tack. However, what compelled the Air Force to heed
the critics was the budgetary drawdown accompanying the Cold War's end. Between the
outside pressure and the realization that it could not have all of its desired F-16s, the
service agreed to keep a certain number of A-10s. The 1990 Desert Shield mobilization
which demonstrated the need for CAS planes, and the ensuing Desert Storm conflict which
established their effectiveness, confirmed this action's wisdom

Aims
This is not only a story about an airplane. It is about technology in general: its
promise and its realities. It is about the way Americans tend tofighttheir wars, and how
this makes a very difficult mission compelling to this nation and its military services.
Concerning military services, it addresses the history of the U.S. Air Force-an
organization which, one would think, should embrace this mission as part of its very
charter, and for which there were several interservice agreements pledging that it would do
so And as for interservice agreements, it tells of an often recriminatory relationship with
the supported service, the U.S. Army. There was the background of the airmen's stmggle
for both status within and independence from the soldiers, the ensuingrivalrybetween two
separate services, the Air Force's often haughty proclamations of its warfighting superiority,
and then periods of close collaboration. All of these affected the CAS mission and the
plane dedicated to it. They also brought in a set of actors-the members of the US

Congress. Any history of service force structure and weapons procurement must include
this diverse and seemingly fickle body, for through its power of the purse, it conttols the
acquisition and development of, as well as training with, any military technology. And this
returns to the technology theme. The introduction of new aircraft, or readaptation of other
planes for air support, changed how the various actors viewed the mission.
As such, the work follows some previously trod academic paths and takes some
new ones. Several technology history works detail the complexities involved in developing
technological devices or processes, and this work will add to those. Further, many books
about military technology history also point out the complexities that vexed weapons
inventors and military services alike. These especially apply to accounts of military jet
procurement, and Charies Bright's The Jet Makers is a good example. In describing the
foundations for the CAS plane's creation, as well as its later fortunes, this work also
contributes to the picture of aircraft technology development as a difficult process.
However, one sometimes sees accounts that describe the difficulties well enough,
but then attribute simplistic motives to the military leaders. Fine accounts of Air Force
bomber procurement such as Michael Brown's Flving Blind and Nick Kotz' Wild Blue
Yonder detail the complexity of the process; but they tend to depict the Air Force leaders
as irrationally wedded to the bomber concept. Air Force leaders are guilty of following
certain technologies too closely, and this work will also criticize them for it. However, it
also will explain the intricate foundations for their actions and attitudes, so that even if one
does not accept them, one can at least better understand them.
Political scientists sometimes study how organizations become wedded to certain
technologies and associated processes. This study examines from where, as well as how
and why, certain planes and missions acquired influential supporters. Some writers focus
only upon constituencies within a particular service, but most show that military
technologies have supporters from various walks of life-this work emphasizes the latter.
For example, the Air Force had outside support from congressmen and elsewhere for some
of its sweeping airpower claims. Also, the CAS plane's constituency was an eclectic
hodgepodge of people and institutions

10

The author is on more undeveloped ground when discussing the ironies of

technological development. One aspect of "irony" in this case is the unintended
consequences or uses of technology; the author is fascinated with how the uses and effects
envisioned for a device or process by its creators often differ from its eventual use. This
particular feature has received academic attention; and two examples are Ruth Schwartz
Cowan's More Work for Mother and Edward Tenner's Why Things Bite Back However,
the author not only describes this kind of irony in the CAS plane case but also recounts
situations where certain actors literally wanted one result and instead got the opposite.
Even further afield is what could be called performance niches in technological progress.
If most inventions are intended to facilitate, accelerate, or ease some human action, devices
considered old or behind the leading wave of technological advance can still be quite useful
in their own way. An everyday example is the facility of using the telephone, an "older"
technology, to talk to someone instead of using the "new" e-mail technology. In air combat
technology, the A-10 was a step backward performance wise, considering the capabilities
of modem jets; but the nature of CAS dictated this setup Finally, irony involves what
some call myth debunking. In this case, several common assumptions about the A-lO's
past did not survive scmtiny. One might say that this is not technological irony so much as
it is the result of historical research; but the author believes that technological developments
often create situations that defy assumptions.
This work wanders into more sparselyttacked,and perhapsrisky,technology
history terrain in assessing the intentions and results of official studies-many of them
considered scientific and unbiased. The author's point is that Mark Twain's "lies, damned
lies, and statistics" quip applies to many of these, and the historian must be careful when
citing them. John Tetsoro Sumida's In Defense of Naval Superiority covers something
similar when describing the gunsight designrivalriesaccompanying British battleship
development at the turn of the twentieth century. However, to a greater extent than
Britain's battleships, modem military aviation technology is so complex that even honest
premises for analyzing an aircraft's performance must themselves be analyzed. Further,
these cases feature a heady mix of concerns for money, job security, professional

11

reputations, and national security, so everyone involved has an opinion which usually
appears in the plans or results. The author will point out that many of the studies and tests
that accompanied CAS plane creation, development, and later conttoversy often were
intended to prove a point, not necessarily to get at the "tmth " This involves not only the
military's studies, but also a host of others.
Of course, this is mostly a study of American military history; and as such, it will
follow many other observersRussell Weigley most prominent among them-in describing
an "American Way of War." This thesis states that, when American forces face combat
obstacles, they strongly prefer firepower solutions to sacrificing soldiers. Their concern for
citizen-soldiers, ample access to resources, and faith in technology make them want, in the
words of some Army observers, to "send the bullet before sending the man." The author
notes that this "American Way of War" observation does not mean that American generals
never conducted brilliant, economy-of-force, campaigns; or that American troops never
made serious sacrifices. The main research trip for this work led back east, and the author
hadtimeavailable to look at some Civil War battlefields. The Shenandoah Valley is a
monument to Stonewall Jackson's dazzling campaigns. One cannot fail to wonder at the
sacrifices made in the Antietam Cornfield on 17 September 1862. When the stakes are
high enough and certain conditions or people converge, Americans do these things.
However, they tend-especially in foreign wars where national survival is not seriously
threatened-to use their access to abundantfirepowerrather than their soldiers' lives.
This work will demonstrate that CAS is an example of the American way of war
because it is afirepowersolution to the soldiers' battlefield problems. Americans use CAS
more than any other national air arm in spite of difficulties encountered in practicing and
accomplishing it. Indeed, other nations' air arms see American CAS as a demonstration of
the nation's wealth and extravagant use of resources
The author also believes that the US Air Force should embrace CAS better than it
has historically done. Its leaders often agreed with their foreign counterparts in shunning
the mission CAS and any plane dedicated to it seemed a distraction of resources from
more important and desirable missions. Further, they dismissed CAS because of their

12

memory of the stmggle for independence and fiinds, as well as their belief that World War
II proved their ability to discern aviation technology trends. They saw the mission as a
wasteful diversion of their procurement budget to obsolete airplanes, and theirttainingand
combat resources to an unproductive mission. Ironically, they also followed the American
firepower solution philosophy, just on a grander scale. Missions like strategic bombing and
interdiction seemed more lucrative and ultimately less costly in American lives.
However, the American approach to its wars always drew Americans back to the
mission and its planes. It was not just this warfighting orientation; it was also the nature of
modem American foreign policy. The nation faced different warfighting arenas and
scenarios; many of these required airbomefirepowerto assist ground war efforts. This
situation continues, and it is high time the nation's premiere air arm realized it.
For that matter, the Air Force also needs a dedicated CAS plane. Just as wartime
demands forced the service to fly CAS, so they also forced the service to purchase planes
suited to the mission. As will be seen. Air Force leaders continue to insist that high
performancefightersand pilots can successfully perform CAS in their spare time, and cite
the air support use of P-47s and P-5 Is in World War 11 as the example. This work points
out the problems with that assertion via the ensuing American wars that drove the service
repeatedly to use planes that were better suited to CAS. Its continued use of A-10s in the
world's hot spots is further proof It also guarantees that there are Air Force pilots available
to practice this difficult mission on a routine basis.
These last points about CAS are where the work moves along the least
academically travelled ground. During the eariy-1970s CAS plane controversy, a RAND
study by Alfred Goldberg and Air Force Lieutenant Colonel Donald Smith recounted Air
Force-Army relations conceming CAS. Obviously, the study's account ended long before
the A-10 became operational. There is a fine anthology from the Office of Air Force
History, edited by Benjamin Franklin Cooling, called Case Studies in the Development of
Close Air Support. It features essays about CAS in various wars, and though the author
does not agree with some of the essays'findings,they are sufficiently well written to rate
frequent citation in this work. However, they cover only selected wars, and do not address

13

the post-Vietnam U.S. Air Force CAS plane program at all. Air Force and Air and Space
Museum historian Richard Hal lion's Strike from the Sky addresses air support up through
Worid War II. This effort, written at the height of the hot 1980s debate over CAS planes,
advocates the Air Force leadership's opinion about high-performance fighter CAS. Indeed,
Hallion exfrapolates the World War U experience into a set of maxims that he applies to
CAS experiences after that war. The author will discuss this book, for it is almost a
stand-alone example of the service's thinking during the debate. These efforts represent the
best or the most comprehensive of serious works focusing upon U.S. Air Force CAS; and
in order to better portray the Air Force's thinking on the mission, this work takes a more
sweeping view, chronologically.
As for the Air Force CAS plane itself, there are some good works, but none that
tackles the issue in its entirety. Two Air Force Systems Command histories. The A-X
Specialized Close Air Support Aircraft: Origins and Concept Phase. 1961-1970. and
George Watson's The A-10 Close Air Support Aircraft: From Development to Production.
1970-1976. mostly address the technical details of the A-lO's creation, and do not deal
with larger issues. Aviation writer Bill Sweetman's Modem Fighting Aircraft: A-10 (part
of a series of "coffee table" books on warplanes) does well in describing design details and
addresses some larger influences. However, some of his observations on the latter are
incorrect, and the book ends with the early 1980s. Finally, William Small wood's Warthog
uses extensive interviews with Desert Storm pilots to render an excellent account of the
A-lO's Gulf War performance, but Smallwood primarily focuses upon that war.
Therefore, this work addresses the fiill background of the Air Force CAS plane,
using as introductory chapters the CAS mission's birth during World War I and the
fortunes of the U.S. Army's airmen before and during Worid War II. It then recounts the
newly created Air Force's experience with the mission and the factors that led the service to
procure a plane specifically buih for CAS. Then it traces this plane's rather turbulent
fortunes, including the late-1980s debate about CAS planes that in turn requires some prior
review of Air Force CAS history. Indeed, other than defense journal articles, there is no
previous academic study of the period when the plane became operational and then

encountered further opposition. In all, this is a much more sweeping study of the U.S. Air
Force, CAS, and the CAS plane than ever before presented. In so doing, the author hopes
to demonstrate that military technology has complex developmental underpinnings. It will
also show that the Air Force needs a dedicated CAS plane in order to accomplish a mission
that Americans historically believe is necessary.

Caveats
There is the tricky effort of defining CAS for this work. As one will later note, the
actors involved sometimes changed the definition for some reason, and even many experts
never agreed exactly upon what it was. The author uses the following definition: It is an
air attack against enemy forces in and around the battlefield, and that it requires close
coordination between air and ground parties before the aircrew can expend ordnance.
Even this definition can invite carping. What does "in and around the battlefield" mean? If
one wants a specific, unvarying distance behind the front line, then one waits in vain. An
estimate is a maximum of fifty miles behind the front, but this changes due to the
battlefield's shape and size, the enemy force's ground speed, the fire support coordination
distance set up between ground and air commanders, and otherfluctuatingconditions.
Another perspective is that CAS is not interdiction against troops and supply lines so far
away that they do not require close coordination-or are at least a day's travel from the
battle area. Again, one might ask what a "day's travel" is. At this, the author ventures one
last attempt at an explanation, knowing that even this will not satisfy the more exacting
reader. CAS is flown against enemy ground forces who are in direct contact with friendly
ground forces or are near enough to be an imminent factor in a battle's outcome. In all
cases, it requires close coordination between air and ground forces to ensure that the
airmen accomplish the mission and do not shoot friendly troops who are nearby.
Though the author wants to present the various factors that affect military
operations and weapons procurement, his effort stops short of assessing the specific
motives and fortunes of all of the military aircraft companies mentioned in this work. The
one exception will be the A-lO's builder, the FairchiId-Republic Corporation. I he others
1.^

will be mentioned insofar as they influence, or are part of, the narrative. Discussing them
further risks denying the account what form that it does have. Besides, corporate interest
and influence usually manifested itself in the actions of sponsoring politicians, and this
work will certainly discuss those people
The desire for narrative length and coherence also dictates that this work will
address the command, control, and communication (C3) procedures for CAS only where
they are germane to the narrative. This is because the CAS C3 process and technology is a
very complex topic that rates further lengthy treatment. Critics may say that this ignores
the essential part of CASthe expeditious direction of planes to the proper target requires
good C3 above all. However, this work will contend that if there are no dedicated planes
to practice this all-important but difficult process, then it will not be practiced enough to be
effective, if it is practiced at all. The Air Force proved this repeatedly to its own chagrin,
and though it would be nice to cover the C3 side of CAS in depth, its even greater
complexity is for another work. In the meantime, the history of the relationship between
the U.S. Air Force and the dedicated CAS plane is story enough

16

CHAPTER 11
FOUNDATIONS, THROUGH WORLD WAR II

Long-term developments in, and interaction between, technology and military

affairs underlay the A-lO's creation. These factors in turn interacted with American
foreign policy trends, as well as the influence of the American democratic process. The
result of these intertwined currents was the A-lO's specific mission, close air support
(CAS), which stood in the middle of shifting and conflicting warfighting visions.
From just before World War I to the end of World War II, military men embraced
close air support as a promisingfirepoweraugmentation. But a split occurred between
ground and air officers when difficulties arose in making this mission succeed. Also,
American airmen shunned the mission not only because of the difficulties encountered in
World War I, but also due to their doctrinal and budget stmggles with ground officers and
Congress. World War II brought these men back to combat's very real exigencies, and
through a slow process, they leamed about air support But they also took away several
misinterpretations which would later affect Air Force CAS affairs. Finally, the atomic
bomb prepared them to ignore the war's CAS lessons.

Close Air Support in World War 1

Military officers recognized the airplane's potential for directly supporting ground
troops early on. The first instance involving air attacks on enemy ttoops occurred in the
1911 Italo-Turkish War, when Italian planes dropped small explosives on their opponents.
There were sporadic cases involving primitive air support in other world clashes, but World
War 1 offered greater opportunities to support troops, especially after the stalemate on the
Western Front created parallel and relatively static trench systems. To varying degrees, the
American, British, and German air arms all attacked enemy combat troops. British trench
strafing attacks revealed one close air support dividend, in that they hurt German morale
Troops even panicked at times. British planes also supported their own tank attacks by

17

knocking out German antitank gun positions. Finally, air attacks against an opponent's
reserves could sometimes undo his planned offensive.'
But air support encountered problems, some of which had to do with military
leaders and some pilots' enthusiasm for this type of air combat. Army generals often did
not understand the limitations of their new tools of war, and applied them incorrectly.
Assigning the wrong type of plane to attack enemy ttoops, for example, yielded
disappointing results and high losses. Communications between ground and air forces
were mdimentary, to say the least, and included such things as revving engines, dropping
messages, or deploying ground smokes and flares. The infantry did not like using the latter
because these sometimes revealed their position and intentions to the enemy. Wireless
radio was too primitive at this time to be reliable. These problems were not significant
when the opposing lines were static, but the appearance of movement warfare at the war's
end seriously hindered attempts to provide close air support to ttoops in contact.^
Indeed, even World War I pilots who flew slow biplanes at low altitudes had
trouble specifically identifying ground ttoops and vehicles. As one air support expert later
described, one discems no distinguishing features of men standing in an open field beyond

'Richard Hallion, in Strikefromthe Sky: The History of Battlefield Air Support.

1911-1945 (Washington, D C : Smithsonian Instittition Press, 1989), 11-12, recounts the
first use of airplanes for air support (besides the Italo-Turkish War, there were missions
flown in the 1912 Balkan War, French colonial fighting in Morocco, and the Mexican
Revolution). References to air support success can be found in Hallion, Sttike. 19-20, 24;
Lee Kennett, "Developments to 1939," chap. Case Studies in the Development of Close
Air Support, ed. Benjamin Franklin Cooling, (Washington, D C : Office of Air Force
History, 1990), 18, 20, 21 (morale effects); and Kennett's own book. The First Air War.
1914-1918 (New York: The Free Press, 1991), 210 (successful attacks on reserves). Air
support historian Brereton Greenhous praised British airmen's support of their tank attacks
in "Close Air Support Aircraft in Worid War 1: The Counter Anti-Tank Role," in
Aerospace Historian 21 (Summer 1974): 90-91
^Ground commanders' misuse of airplanes is from Kennett, The First Air War,
90-91. Signals usage is from Kennett, "Developments," in Cooling, ed.. Case Studi^<;,
16-17; and Greenhous, "Counter Anti-Tank Role," 89-90 And target recognition in fluid
combat is from Greenhous, "Counter Anti-Tank Role," 89; and Kennett, First Air W^f,
210-212.
18

two-thousand feet slant range, and large vehicles such as tanks can be hard to recognize
beyondfive-thousandfeetmuch closer if any camouflage or obscuring factor such as dust
or bad lighting is present.^ Throw in the speed and stress of combat flying, as well as the
time and distance required to achieve afiringsolution, and the problem becomes greater.
And in the stress of combat, what people on the ground believed was a grossly obvious
visual feature was not so obvious to a pilot stmggling to line up and hit the correct target.
Thus, a ground commander might want air support; but if histtoops'positions fluctuated
or intermixed with those of the enemyand then they could not tell the airmen these
detailsthe pilots sometimes mistakenly shot their own people or did not fire at all."
As the war continued, other problems surfaced. Veteran ttoops lost their fear of
the new weapon as commanders trained them to remain firm andfireback at attacking
planes. Pilots specializing in ground attack became committed to the soldiers they
supported and took seriousrisksto help them. With one exception, extant records indicate
that ground support units on all sides experienced above-average losses. During the Battle
of Cambrai, British trench strafing squadrons suffered 30 percent casualties daily. The
belligerents' air arms did not abandon air support; instead they looked for an airplane type
that could do the mission and survive. The best solution seemed to be single-engine,
two-seat biplane with reasonably high speed and good armor protection.'

^Harry Davis, Terrell Greene, and Seymour J. Deitchman, "Tactical Air Warfare:
Part I: Don't Take the Low Road," Aerospace America (August 1986): 20 (details
difficulties involved in CAS); Hallion, Sttike. 23; COL J. Hunter Reinburg, USMCR,
"Close Air Support: The Mission and the Weapons System," Army 12 (April 1962): 60
(the "expert"); and U.S. General Accounting Office, Close Air Support: Principal Issues
and Aircraft Choices. Report to the Chairman, Appropriations and Armed Services
Committees, Congress of the United States, (Washington, D C : Government Printing
Office [GPO], 1971), Attachment III, 62-63.
"LTCOL John Collins, Connecticut Air National Guard (ANG), "Close Air
Support: Another Look" (Military Studies program paper, U.S. Army War College,
1989), 22-23; and Davis, Greene, and Deitchman, "Don't Take the Low Road," 20.
'Hallion, Strike. 21: Kennett, "Developments," in Cooling, cd.. Case Studies. 23
Ihe one exception to the heavy losses in Worid War One CAS comes via Air Power
Showdown. Part 111: The Best Attack Aircraft, produced by Aviation Week & Space
19

Whatever the type of plane, air leaders came to believe the most productive ground
support occurred when airplanes attacked rear-echelon forces. In such a case, troops and
vehicles were obviously the enemy, and they were often not as well defended as those on
the front lines. The Americans particularly embraced this idea.

The Fortunes of the U.S. Army's Airmen and

Close Air Support from 1918 to 1941
The U.S. Army Air Service (the name for the "air force" in the early days)
commander in World War One was Brigadier General William "Billy" Mitchell, who strove
during the war to meet army needs. Most notable was his pilots' support of the American
offensive at St. Mihiel, though most of their missions stmck German positions behind the
front lines.^ Soon after the war, Mitchell and other air leaders such as Major William
Sherman developed air support guidelines that reflected the prevailing perceptions of
wartime air support results, as well as the capabilities they envisioned in future aircraft.
Though there was some previous disagreement over whether the best ground support
occurred at the point of contact or behind the lines, by 1923 a Chief of the Air Service
attack doctrine study preferred the latter. As for direct support of troops in contact, its
authors believed this should occur only in "extreme" circumstances. Reports on air-ground
maneuvers in 1926 stated that fiiture attack aircraft required speed and agility to evade the
pursuitfighterslurking behind the lines. This was a change from the idea of the armored
attack plane some services used in World War 1.'

Technology. 60rain.Aviation Week Group, 1997, videocassette. In this production.

World War One aviation historian Peter Grosz states that his review of German records
reveals that the German Halberstadt CL series ground attack planes experienced relatively
fewer losses than other German aircraft types flying other missions.
'Ibid, 42-43.
^Office of the Chief of Air Service, staff study, 1923, page 2, cited in MAJ Gary
Cox, USAF, "Beyond the Battle Line: US Air Attack Theory and Docttine, 1919-1941,"
(Master's thesis. Maxwell Air Force Base, Ala. [henceforth, this location shall be referred
to as MAFB]: School of Advanced Airpower Studies, 1996), 10. Aircraft requirements
are in Report of the Office of the Chief of Army Air Service, "Maneuvers of the Army Air
20

From the mid 1920s through the 1930s, the Army Air Corps (the new "air force"
name after 1926) faced changes that affected airmen's thinking in general and ground
support doctrine in particular. Congress' postwar defense budget cutbacks particularly hurt
the Army Air Corps. Much more than the rest of the Army of that time, the airmen relied
heavily upon the budget to support pilot training and proficiency, as well as aircraft
improvements. Army generals did not believe that the aviation technology of the time
justified high budget priority, leading Mitchell and others to actively advertise the airplane's
potential to an aviation-mad press and public.^ There were well-publicized bombing tests
on mothballed battleships, an around-the-world flight by Army planes, and Billy Mitchell's
frequent public pronouncements. As the budget noose tightened, Mitchell's comments
became more insubordinate, earning him a conviction in a General Court-Martial during
which he further tmmpeted air power's cause. Mitchell's successors likewise refused no
opportunity to sell their force's capabilities: tactical exercises, more ship bombings,
humanitarian efforts, flights to South America, a well-publicized bomber intercept of an

Service," 17 May 1926, 3-4, also in Cox, "Beyond the Battle Line," 12-13.
^World War I American Expeditionary Force commander. General John Pershing,
said as much shortly after the war; and Mitchell's antics further fixed Pershing's successors
in their intransigence. See Robert Futtell, Ideas. Concepts. Doctrine: Basic Thinking in the
United States Air Force. 1907-1960. vol. I, (MAFB: Air University Press, 1989), 35-52;
and Maurer Maurer. Aviation in the U.S. Army. 1919-1939. (Washington, D C : Office
of Air Force History, 1987), 119-129,440 (These segments cover the army's budget
priority, as well as the anti-ship bombing test. The Navy and Mitchell suspected each other
of breaking test mles in order to score publicity points. Mitchell certainly won in that
category. Also, the airmen's aims and actions, as well as the budget issue, are nicely
summarized in Peter Maslowski's and Allan Millett's survey. For the Common Defense: A
Military History of the United States of America, revised ed., (New York: The Free Press,
1994), 386-390, and 401-404.
The following is an observation from many years later, but it still points up the
disparity between Army and Air Force budget requirements: "If you spend $10 billion on
an army, you modernize a whole corps. Ten billion dollars on an aircraft progamme [sic]
is nothing. You could fix every problem in the Army for 10 percent of the F-22 [Air Force
advancedfighter]programme." See quote of U.S. Army MGEN Gamer (no first name
given), in Air Vice Marshal (AVM) Tony Mason, Air Power: A Centennial Appraisal
(London: Brassey's, 1994), 237.
21

ocean liner far at sea, and an abortive attempt to fly the nation's mail.^ Additionally, from
Mitchell's time onward, they worked with Congress to maintain political and bureaucratic
momentum. The result was a series of hearings and review boards in which the airmen
slowly gained status within the Army.' In all, air leaders developed a keen, ingrained,
consciousness of political and publicity issues-not to mention a serious antipathy toward
subservience to the Army-from this era's budget and status battles.
As such, the interwar stmggle helped cement an overall doctrinal shift among most
Air Corps officers. Revolted by the war's carnage and impressed by Germany's intemal
breakdowrn, Mitchell believed that a more humane and effective way to end future wars
was to use various types of planes to bomb key civilian and military targets within an
opponent's territory, thus inducing a collapse. The Army's actions before, during, and after
the court-martial reinforced Mitchell's conviction that only an independent air force could
achieve his strategic vision." And as they endured a sparse budget. Army resistance to
their plans, and the scandal of Mitchell's court-martial, the remaining air leaders remained
no less committed to their fallen leader's aims. Along with proving airpower's

^DeWitt S. Copp, A Few Great Captains: The Men and Events that Shaped the
Development of U.S. Air Power (McLean. Va.: EPM Publications. Inc., 1980), 47, 66,
92, 113, 126-127, 214, 393, 419; and Maurer, 131-148,299-317,400-412. Also, the
future leader of the World War H Army Air Force, General Henry "Hap" Arnold,
reminisced about Billy Mitchell's growing impatience in his "Everybody Knows How It
Happened," The Airpower Historian 6 (July 1959): 159-172.
'"Copp, A Few Great Captains. 44, 111-112, 137, 142, 243, 376; and Futtell,
Ideas, vol. I, 44-48, 70-75.
"The Italian air power enthusiast Giulio Douhet's ideas about winning wars through
bombing also influenced Mitchell and other Air Corps leaders, though how much is still
debated. See Copp, Captains. 106, 319 (some influence): Futrell, Ideas, vol. I, 38-39
(unsure, but skeptical); COL D. G. McLennan, USA, "Close Air Support History," (Ft
Meade, Md.: U.S. Army Continental Army Command [CONARC] Close Air Support
Requirements Board, 29 August 1963), 5-7 (heavy influence), photocopied, in author's
possession; and Russell Weigley, The American Way of War: A History of United States
Military Strategy and Policy. 2d ed., (New York: MacMillan Publishing, 1973; reprint,
Bloomington, Ind.: Indiana University Press, 1977), 225-228 (unsure of influence).
22

effectiveness, an independent service was prominent among the goals of the continued
publicity stunts and political maneuvering. '^
In the 1930s, aviation companies such as Boeing produced large, four-engine
bombers that met the air leaders' aims for airpower-driven strategic success. Further, the
new Norden bombsight promised to improve the normally inaccurate high-altitude level
bombing delivery that they wanted the big bombers to accomplish. In the hothouse
atmosphere of the Air Corps Tactical School (ACTS) at Maxwell Air Base, Alabama,
future Air Force generals such as Ira Eaker and Haywood S. Hansell, Jr. crafted a service
docttine which envisioned invincible bombers-new models like the B-17 (for photo, see
Appendix Fig. 1) were faster than mostfightersof the day-striking a country's industrial
vitals and bringing it to its knees. '^
It was not that they completely ignored other forms of aerial attack, as is popularly
assumed; they also modified how attacks on enemy troops would be conducted. The
passing years and scraps with Army ground generals cemented the airmen's attitudes about
World War One's air support lessons. They became increasingly skeptical about the

'^The airmen's separate service motivations and actions are from Copp, 47,
102-106; Cox, 21; Futtell, Ideas, vol. I, 52, 65; and Weigley, American Wav of War. 224.
ThefirstU.S. Air Force Chief of Staff, General Carl Spaatz, later recalled, "I guess we
considered ourselves a different breed of cat,rightin [sic] the beginning"; see MAJ
Richard Head, USAF, "Decision-Making on the A-7 Attack Aircraft Program" (Ph D.
diss., Syracuse University, 1970), 101. Head was one of the eariy Air Force Academy
graduates, and observed that underclassmen had to memorize this quote.
'^For summaries of this doctrine's evolution, see Futrell, Ideas, vol I, 62-66,
68-70, 78-83; and Donald Mrozek, Air Power andtiieGround War in Vietnam: Ideas and
Actions (MAFB: Air University Press, 1988), 7-10. A good assessment of the bomber
men's dismissal offightersis in MGEN Perry McCoy Smith, USAF (ret), The Air Force
Plans for Peace. 1943-1945 (Baltimore, Md.. The Johns Hopkins Press, 1970),
29-33. Smith discusses how the pre-war airmen's doctrinal bias led them to believe the
temporaryfighterdevelopmental lag was permanent, and quotes an ACTS slogan,
"Fighters are obsolete."
23

morale impact thatfrontlineattacks had upon troops-especially considering the aircraft

loss rates these attacks incurred.'^
Aircraft technology and beliefs conceming various design functions also changed
airmen's attitudes about not only where air support should occur, but also what types of
airplanes should accomplish it. The single-engine armored ground attack planes of the
interwar years, such as the A-17 (for photo, see Appendix Fig. 2), were all slow and
unmaneuverable. Air Corps doctrine stated, and exercises seemed to reveal, they would
not survivefighterdefenses during attacks behind the lines. And since the Army Air Corps
did not share the Navy's enthusiasm for dive bombers-the Army airmen thought these
planes were too vulnerable tofighterattacks-its attack planes were not as accurate in their
low-altitude, shallow-dive weapons deliveries. (A steeper dive angle reduces the magnitude
of bomb ranging error if errors in other release parameters such as airspeed, release
altitude, or aiming occur. This is why the Germans favored dive bombers. Lacking a
sophisticated bombsight such as the one produced by America's Carl Norden, they reduced
the problem of dropping bombs either grossly long or short of the target by using steep
dive technique.) To answer this problem, some officers believed that pursuit fighters
should provide air support only when absolutely neededor at least to clear out frontline
antiaircraft positions for heavy bombers on strategic missions. But as bomber doctrine
assumed preeminence after the mid 1930s, the Army Air Corps envisioned twin-engine,
multicrewed bombers fulfilling the Army support mission. Armed with the accurate
Norden bombsight, such planes would deliver heavier payloads against rear-echelon enemy
concentrations in level attacks above the range of small-arms fire. Just as the big bombers
would hit the vitals of the enemy's heartland, these smaller bombers would do the same to
the enemy's armies. Small bomber designs became the A-20, B-25, and B-26 of Worid
War II fame (for B-25 photo, see Appendix Fig. 3 ) "

'"Cox, 116-117; and Kennett, "Developments," in Cooling, Case Studies. 58-59.

"Single-engine aircraft performance and the turn to bombers is from Hallion,
Sttike, 48-49; Kennett, "Developments," in Cooling, ed . Case Studies. 48. 51-52, Cox,
12, 20-22, 30-32, 58-59; LTCOL Daniel Fake, USA, "The Evolution of Close Air Support
24

The overall doctrinal approach affected attack aviation in other ways. Just as the
air leaders endured a lower than desired funding priority in the Army's overall budget
scheme, so they also snubbed certain of their own missions in budgeting decisions. The
single-engine attack planes could have been improved, but most of the money went for
better bombers. And in keeping with the airmen's faith that accurate heavy bombing would
win wars, attacks on ttoops in contact were to be avoided because they would distract from
the well-planned effort to prevent enemy forces from reaching the battlefield. To Army
Air Corps planners, attacks upon engaged troops were simply not a cost-effective means of
waging air war. '^ There was some early discussion about placing attack units under a
high-ranking ground commander's-army corp commander, at least-conttol so they would
be used to best effect. But by the late 1930s, Army Air Corps leaders felt that the theater
air commander should have operational control, since only such an officer could
competently use the air assets to achieve victory.'^
Army Air Corps doctrinal beliefs in the interwar years presaged similar beliefs and
actions many years later. Since the leaders believed in an air force which independently
solved warfare problems by striking at targets behind the lines, they came to prefer airplane
types that could defeat, or at least withstand,fighterattacks while dropping lots of bombs
on army troop and logistic concentrations. Doctrine and technology interacted in this case;

Doctrine and Implications for the 21st Century," (Research paper, U.S. Air Force Air War
College [henceforth called Air War College], 1995), 4; Head, "A-7," 107-113; and
Matthew K. Rodman, "Flexible Air Power: The Fifth Air Force in World War 11"
(Master's thesis, Texas Tech University, 1998), 8-18. A source discussion of steep dive
angle advantages is from Air Force A-1 attack plane pilot, CAPT Alan Rennick, testimony
in Congress, House, Special Subcommittee on Tactical Air Support of the Committee on
Armed Services, Close Air Support. 89th Cong., 1st sess., 22 September 1965,4698; and
U.S. Air Force Tactical Air Command, "Instmctional Text: Manual Weapons Delivery,"
Course AlOOOIDOPN, Part One, (Nellis AFB, NV: Fighter Weapons School, October
1981), 2-3.
'^The Air Corps Tactical School's March 1930 air support text. Attack Aviation,
pages 40-50, said as much, cited in Cox, 17-18.
'^The sources for this paragraph are Cox, 20-38, Kennett, "Developments," 46-51,
58-59 (the last pages given discuss attack plane corrective research apathy)
25

Army Air Corps leaders promoted the bomber designs that suited their preconceptions,
while the pooriy funded and poorer performing small attack planes reinforced the
impression that such designs were not worthwhile. As Worid War II commenced in
Europe and America started war preparations. Army air and ground leaders searched to
replicate the air-land coordination of the German blitzkrieg tactics then stunning Europe.
The efforts were ineffectual. During exercises, both air and ground commanders shared
the blame for not collocating their headquarters and for making little effort to set up proper
ground-air radio communications. Ground commanders wanted to use air units in limited
roles wdthin their area of responsibility. Air commanders used their planes in accordance
with their doctrine, and thus took little account of ground campaign problems. '*
Army errors were due to ignorance, but the Army Air Corps pursued erroneous
paths in an effort to achieve self-perceived worthy aims. Future air leaders who were
either students or faculty at the 1930s Air Corps Tactical School took little account of
attack aviation's fortunes in that decade's wars, and when they did, they concluded that
battle results proved the bomber's worth. In his graduate school history of Army Air Corps
attack aviation, fiiture Air Force Chief of Staff Ronald Fogleman summarized the airmen's
attitude when he wrote that they paid "a certain amount of lip service .

to the attack

mission in order to escape the wrath of the General Staff"" Indeed, as America prepared
for European operations in World War II, that war's Army Air Force (the "air force" name
by then) commander, Henry "Hap" Arnold, primly replied to an exasperated ground
general's complaint about lack of cooperation: "There is just so much aviation available for

'^Abortive exercises are from Kennett, "Developments," 52-55; and Cox, 22-24.
'^MAJ Ronald Fogleman, USAF, "The Development of Ground Attack Aviation in
the United States Army Air Arm: Evolution of a Doctnne, 1908-1926," (Master's thesis,
Duke University, 1971), 90. Sources for previous sentences about 1930s wars' lessons are
Cox, 30-31; and Kennett, "Developments," 45-46, 59-60 Kennett writes that the Army
Air Corps ignored the Marines' air support setup in Nicaragua, apparently because the
Army airmen thought that the type offightingseen in Nicaragua was an anomaly in
modem war.
26

cooperative training . . . with the Army Ground Forces."^" The result was an air arm
which was ready to conduct the interdiction mission during World War II, but as one
student of this era's air support put it, was "inadequately prepared when called upon to
provide direct support to the ground forces."^'

The Army Air Force's World War fl CAS

Lessons and Perceived Lessons
The Army Air Force got itsfirstchance to support a serious ground campaign
during the North Africa campaign in 1943. After several months of combat, the airmen
gained a significant victory in that they established equality for themselves in the command
stmcture, and thus managed to wage a theater campaign which secured air superiority.
This change in status occurred because Army subordinate commanders misused the
airpower assigned to support their particular units.
One observer of America's North African campaign wrote that its problematical
outset was due, as it often is in close air support, to the differing perceptions between
airmen and soldiers. The soldiers did not think they received good air support unless they
actually saw their planes attacking targets, and they were much more disappointed if enemy
planes attacked them. For example, German Junkers Ju-87 Stuka dive bombers caused
only one-twentieth of the American combat casualties suffered in the European theater, but
American troops ranked the Stuka (for photo, see Appendix, Fig. 4) fifth among nine
German main battle weapons they considered most threatening.^^ However, this was why

2GEN Henry "Hap" Arnold, USA, letter to MGEN Jacob Devers, USA, 5
September 1942, quoted in Kennett, "Developments," 56. COL Paul Robinette, serving
on the U.S. Army General Staff early in the war, thought Hap Arnold was too wedded to
strategic bombing doctrine to be aware of other air combat needs (cited in Kennett,
"Developments," 60).
"Cox, 40.
^^"Observer" is David Syrett, "The Tunisian Campaign," in Benjamin Franklin
Cooling, ed.. Case Studies. 155. Stuka statistic is from Roger Beaumont, Joint Military
Operations. A Short History (Westtx)rt. Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1993), 106
27

the airmen resented Army ground commander interference. To them, the most important
objective was to gain air superiority which prevented enemy air attacks and then allowed
one's own air force to perform air support. Air operations conducted under some ground
general's control risked diverting the air effort away from this essential task to tasks
involving his own unit. Given this attitude, many American soldiers doubted the Army Air
Force's capacity and willpower to conduct close air support."
The problem with perception, use, and operational stmcture climaxed in Tunisia
when Major General Lloyd Fredendall mishandled his II Corps and the air units assigned to
it. The Army instmction regarding air support. Field Manual (FM) 31-35, still apportioned
tactical air units-light bombers,fighters,and such-to a theater commander's subordinates,
the corps and division commanders. The airmen did not like this arrangement from the
start of the African campaign, for they felt that it left airpower to be "frittered away in
penny packets." All of the American ground commanders were guilty of this practice, as
they heldfighterplanes under their command and thus denied the airmen the ability to
mass against German air attacks. But under Fredendall, air leader protests reached fever
pitch when the II Corps commander denied air support to Free French forces in another
sector in order to support one of his own, unopposed, operations. Fredendall continued
this practice, and greeted air leaders' entreaties with loud, often erroneous, complaints
about how German planes repeatedly mauled his forces.^"
The airmen won the day with an appeal to Allied Forces Commander, General
Dwight Eisenhower, at the January 1943 Casablanca Conference, as well as through
Fredendall's Febmary defeat at the Battle of Kasserine Pass. The mid-1943 creation of
Field Manual 100-20, Command and Employment of Air Power, codified their victory by
declaring that air units would be assigned to an air commander who served equally with a
ground commander underneath the theater commander's conttol. It also spelled out the

"Hallion, Smkfi, 175-176; and Syrett, 157.

^"Syrett, "Tunisian Campaign," 162-170. The quote is from Air Vice Marshal
Arthur Tedder, RAF (Syrett, 167). Though Tedder was British, Amencan air leaders
made similar observations.
28

Army Air Force's mission priorities: first came air superiority, then interdiction, and last,
close air support. Many people then and later considered FM 100-20 to be the airmen's
declaration ofrightsor independence, and so indeed it was. Close air support was not a
prominent mission for the rest of the North African campaign; and it was neariy
non-existent in the ensuing Sicilian campaign because, as one historian put it, the air
leaders were intent on exercising their new prerogatives.^^
This period is important because of the way in which future air and the ground
leaders remembered it. The 1993 U.S. Air Force Air War College text lessons addressing
the North African campaign claim that the airmen kept a bad situationfromgetting worse
by their actions, and to a good extent they are right. When ground commander selfishness
would not let the airmen meet their enemy on equal terms, the airmen suffered high losses,
and the Germans strafed and bombed American troops anyway. The reorganization
permitted a concerted campaign against the Germans' air bases and supply lines which
greatly reduced their air activity and isolated their ground units. Once the American
soldiers gained more experience and achieved better organization, they mastered the
German units they faced at the front. ^^
"Hallion, Strike. 167-179; McLennan, "Close Air Support History," 20-25, Tab A
to Annex A-pages 1-2 (details commanders' complaints about lack of CAS in Sicily;
Futrell, Ideas, vol. I, 137-138; Syrett, 170-175, and 184-185; and Alfred Goldberg and
LTCOL Donald Smith, USAF, "Army-Air Force Relations: The Close Air Support
Issue," RAND Project Air Force Study #R-906-PR (Santa Monica, Calif. RAND,
October 1971), 3-4, for FM 100-20's development. Alan Wilt, in his "Allied Cooperation
in Sicily and Italy, 1943-1945," in Cooling, ed.. Case Studies. 199-201, discusses the
reasons for lack of air support in Sicily.
^^Three assigned readings in the U.S. Air Force Air War College Associate
Programs Military Studies Course (MS 610AP), Volume 1,4th edition (MAFB: Air
University, 1993; henceforth known as Air War College Text) hammer home these lessons
and results. They are MAJ Michael Wolfert, USAF, "Misapplication of Air Power in
North Afiica," 287-294, reprintedfromMAJ Wolfert's Air Command and Staff College
Student Report #88-2800, April 1988; GEN Laurence Kuter, USAF (ret), "Goddammit,
Georgie!", 295-299, reprintedfromAir Force Magazine. Febmary 1973, 51-56 (Kuter
was one of the North Africa Army Air Force commanders, and he angrily refutes
conceptions of airpower's North African failures as portrayed in the award-winning movie,
Patton): and LTGEN Elwood "Pete" Quesada, USAF (ret.), "Tactical Air Power,"
29

But one conception that became the stuff of dogma in later years involved an
extrapolation from doctrinal preferences to aircraft procurement. During the times when
Allied planes could not properly muster against Germanfighterformations, getting caught
airbome in a poorly performing machine by enemyfighterscould be fatal. The mission
commander of the infamous October 1943 Schweinfurt raid, in which one-third of the
attacking B-17 force was shot down, later remembered his feelings about being
outnumbered and outperformed by enemyfightersover hostile country. And though his
experience involved bombers on raids deep into Germany, it still revealed the unforgettable
sensation of helplessness when facing a superior enemy airbome:
I suppose this feeling of being caught in a hopeless situation is far from
n e w . . . . I think of the Middle Ages. I see myself sttolling across an
open plain with a group of friends. Suddenly we are beset by many
scoundrels on horseback . . . . We cannot mn, we cannot dodge, we cannot
hide-the plain has no growth, no rocks, no holes. And it seems endless.
There is no way out, then or now.
And such cases did occur during air support missions; in one, the RAF lost an entire
squadron of slow attack planes in North Africa when a ground general sent them
unescorted gains heavyfighterdefenses. Future U.S. Air Force tactical airjwwer leaders
such as William Momyer werefighterleaders in North Africa, and not only did they want
the mission priorities set forth in FM 100-20, but they much preferred planes that won

311-314, reprinted from Air University Ouarteriv Review. Spring 1948, 37-45 (Quesada
was the acclaimed proponent of air support of army operations, but his article asserts that a
balanced air campaign is vital).
Besides tiie Air War College readings are other accounts and personal examples.
Syrett's North Africa history in Cooling's Case Sttidies uses air leaders' documents in
endorsing their position. Tactical Air Command chief GEN William Momyer described
North Africa in the same way in his article, "Centralized Control of Airpower," in
Supplement to the Air Force Policy Letter for Commanders. #4-1973 (Washington, DC:
OfficeoftheSecretaryofthe Air Force, April 1973): 30. And an Air University research
publication during the late-1980s CAS plane debate presented North Africa in a similar
vein; see LTCOL Harold Gonzales, USAF, Tactical Air Support of Ground Forces in the
Future. Research Report #AU-ARI-89-7 (MAFB: Air University Press), 26-33
30

fights against enemy air while also supporting the troops.^' Other commanders would also
embrace this concept as conventional wisdom, but the tmth was somewhere in between.
P-40 Warhawkfighterplanes flew air support missions in North Africa (and in Italy, and
some even later in France; for photo, see Appendix, Fig. 5), though the Army Air Force
regarded them as obsolete air combat machines. They continued in service because other
fighters seized air superiority and protected them. The situation was not that fighters
defeated enemy interference while simultaneously performing air support missions.^*
An historical corollary to this belief concerned the fortunes of the Germans' Stuka
dive bomber. A slow, ungainly plane capable of good bombing accuracy, it achieved great
notoriety supporting the German ground advance through Poland, the Low Countries, and
France; but it suffered heavy losses flying interdiction missions against tough fighter

"Momyer's views are courtesy of GEN William Momyer, USAF (ret), personal
interview by author, 29 April 1997, Washington, D C , notes in author's possession; and
Mrozek, Air Power and the Ground War in Vietnam. 22-24. Quesada also alludes to air
warfare pitfalls and aircraft preferences in the Air War College reprint. Richard Hallion
presents five decades-but mostly relies on the World War II experience-to present
accumulated Air Force "wisdom" asserting that the multirolefighteris the only viable air
support option. See his Strike. 50-51, 263-271, and his "Battlefield Air Support: A
Retrospective Assessment," Airpower Journal 4 (Spring 1990): 20-21, 25. Aviation
author Bill Sweetman discusses the multirole school in the opening pages of his A-10
study. Modem Fighting Aircraft: A-10 Thunderbolt II (London: Salamander Books,
1984), 4-5. In reviewing the debate over single- versus multirolefightersin his 1972 Air
Command and Staff College Research Study, MAJ Thomas Barnes, USAF, observes that
military analysts considered the P-51 "as supporting the case for developing multipurpose
fighters"; see Barnes, "A Concept for Tactical Fighter Design: The Case for Single
Purpose Aircraft," (1972), 16. B-17 bomber commander quote is from COL Budd
Peaslee, USAF (ret), quoted in Martin Caidin, Black Thursday (New York: Ballantine
Books, 1960), 159 (book is about tiie Schweinftirt raid).
'*COL Walter Boyne, USAF (ret), Clash of Wings: Air Power in Worid War II
(New York: Simon & Schuster, 1994), 170, and 178 (m this acclaimed survey of the air
war, the equally acclaimed Boyne asserts the P-40 was obsolete before the Americans
arrived); and Syrett, 168, 176-177, and 212-213. Author's telephonic interview with
former North Africa P-40 pilot and later Air Force Pentagon CAS plane project staff
officer, COL Ray Lancaster, USAF (ret), 18 Apnl 1997, recording and notes in author's
possession, reveals that the P-40 could defend itself if pilots used good tactics Lancaster
shot down three Messerschmitt ME-109 fighters.
31

defenses during the 1940 Battle of Britain, and had to be removed from that fight.
Nonetheless, it still provided good air support in various campaigns where the Allies could
not or would not venture into the battle area to contest air superiority: the German
invasions of Mediterranean countries and islands, the early North Africa campaigns, and
especially the Eastern Front for most of the war. But what American airmen remembered
was the Stuka's Battle of Britain fiasco, and they spent the rest of their careers fighting the
purchase of any plane that could not hold its own against enemy fighters. To them, the
Stuka's weaknesses were magnified by the fact that it was limited to one mission and one
situation: battlefield air support with limited to no fighter opposition. Never mind that
such a situation prevailed on the Eastern Front because Sovietfightersrefrained from
venturing into the rough-and-tumble battlefield arena, thus allowing Stukas to continue
operating to war's end. Nor did they recall, or apparently want to recall, that other World
War II air forces successfully used aerial combat "clunkers" such as the P-40, Illyushin
IL-2 Shturmovik, and Douglas SBD Dauntless for ground support (for photos of IL-2 and
SBD, see Appendix, Figs. 6 and 7). And though the Stuka did not attack American
soldiers after the Normandy invasion, neither did German fighters-such was the Allies'
aerial preeminence at that time. The Army airmen only saw that the plane was a limited
capability asset, and preferredfightersthat they believed would always excel in a variety of
roles.''

''The many sources for the Stuka's performance provide somewhat diverse
assessments. See Edward Bavaro, Threat Branch, Directorate of Combat Development,
U.S. Army Aviation Center, "Tank Busters," U.S. Armv Aviation Digest (henceforth
known as USAAD) 31 (June 1985): 3-4 (likes its antitank capability but dwells upon its
aerial vulnerabilities); Boyne, Clash of Wings. 34-35, 59, 75, 80, 146, 174, 178-179, 385
(calls the plane "infamous," but praises Rudel); William Green, "The Junkers Ju-87," chap,
in Famous Bombers of the Second Worid War. Volume One (New York: Doubleday and
Company, 1959), 37-46 (writes that it still could provide support in many situations after
its Battle of Britain failure); Hallion, Strike. 49, 146, 239 (sees proving the folly of
dedicated attack planes); Robin Higham, Air Power: A Concise History (New York: St
Martin's Press, 1972), 101, 106, 138, and 143 (similar observations as Green); Ian Hogg,
Tank Killing: Anti-Tank Warfare bv Men and Machines (New York: Sarpedon, 1996),
208, 211-212; Williamson Murray, "The Lufhvaffe Expenence," in Cooling, ed , Cflse
Studies. 71-113 (emphasizes Stuka's increasing weakness throughout the war as the
^2

As for the Army, one official Army study after the war claimed that some of its
ground unit leaders viewed FM 100-20 with "dismay." They wondered if the airmen

Germans failed to improve upon the design); CAPT Lonnie Ratley, USAF, "A
Comparison of the USAF Projected A-10 Employment in Europe and the Luftwaffe
Schlachtgeschwader Experience on the Eastern Front in World War Two" (Master's thesis,
U.S. Naval Postgraduate School, 1977); Pierre Sprey, "Countering a Warsaw Pact Blitz,"
in Proceedings of Seminar on Anti-Tank Warfare. 25-26 May 1978. by Battelle
Laboratories (Columbus, Ohio: Battelle Laboratories, 1 May 1979), 119-126; Hans-Ulrich
Rudel, Stuka Pilot (Dublin, Ireland: Washbum and Sons, 1952); Rudel, "Colonel Rudel
Question and Answer Session," also in Proceedings of Seminar on Anti-Tank Warfare.
25-26 May 1978. by Battelle Uboratories, 139-169; and "Wings of the Luftwaffe,"
produced by Phil Osbom, 50 minutes. Network Projects, 1992, videocassette (the Stuka
had to continue operational flying because the Germans never updated the design). Ratley
praised the Stuka's Eastern Front performance. Sprey influenced the A-lO's design and
discusses Rudel's influence upon his own CAS plane design ideas in the above speech.
Rudel's Eastern Front experience brings up the Russians' successful ground attack
plane, the Ilyushin 11-2 Shturmovik. It was heavily armored, carried a respectable weapons
load, and was the Soviets' weapon of choice for targets just beyond artillery range. See
Bavaro, "Tank Busters," (high praise); Boyne, 142-143, 153-157, 162-164,384,391;
Hallion, Strike. 234, 244-245 (after condemning the Stuka, ironically praises the
Shturmovik and blames its losses on Sovietfighters'inability to protect it); Higham, 95
(Shturmovik "was in something of a class by itself); Hogg, 204-207; and Kenneth
Whiting, "Soviet Air-Ground Coordination," in Cooling, ed.. Case Studies. 115-147 Only
Hogg and Whiting mention that Shturmovik was no airfightereither, and thus suffered
heavy losses (though Boyne writes that Germanfighterpilots tallied phenomenal aerial
victory scores in the East).
The Stuka's negative image in American airmen's minds isfromRobert Futrell,
Ideas. Concepts. Docttine: Basic Thinking in tiie United States Air Force. 1961-1984. vol.
II, (MAFB: Air University Press, 1989), 174,492; Head, "A-7," 253. 284; COL Walter
Kross, USAF, Military Reform: The High-Tech Debate in the Tactical Air Forces (Fort
McNair, Washington, D C : National Defense University Press, 1985), 89, 157; and COL
William Scott, USAF, "The Rise and Fall of the Stuka Dive Bomber: A Warning for
Today," Air University Review 17 (May-June 1966): 47-63. World War 11 bomber
veteran Scott reveals his aversion to building planes to suit the army or limited wars while
neglecting the ability to defeat top-line enemy fighters. His take on the Stuka's Eastern
Front fortunes was that it made no contribution to the battle for air supremacy COL
Kross gives a fairly balanced account of the 1980s debate between defense reformers who
wanted low-cost, efficient airplanes versus "TACAIR planners," as he calls Air Force
procurement staffers. He mentions that both sides used the Stuka example cither to praise
or denigrate the simple, dedicated CAS plane concept. Finally, see Boyne, 342-347, for
overall Luftwaffe impotence on the post-Normandy Western Front.
33

would abandon them since close air support was a third priority and the air commander
now had the authority to keep it that way.^^ Also, some considered the airmen too rash in
making such a sweeping statement based upon the American forces' fumbling start.
Perhaps with more planes and better air-ground coordination-after all, the ground
commanders initially misused their ow^ tanks-air units could be assigned to key
subordinate ground commanders.^' As mentioned earlier, there were not many close air
support missions flown in either North Africa or the ensuing operation in Sicily.
Commenting upon this situation, John McCloy, the American Assistant Secretary of War,
investigated air support issues in spring 1943, and offered an assessment that rated
attention in America's citizen-soldier army:
It is my firm belief that the air forces are not interested in this type work
[close air support]. . . . What I cannot see is why we do not develop this
auxilliary [sic] to the infantry attack even if it is less important than strategic
bombing. It may be the wrong use of planes if you have to choose between
the two but to say that airpower is so impractical that it cannot be used for
immediate help of the infantry is nonsense and displays a failure to realize
the air's full potential.^'
Many of the decisions had been made in the heat of America's first inttoduction to
mechanized warfare, and in a quick flowing combat environment besides. When forward
movement stalled during the Italian campaign, airmen and soldiers had time to sort out how
to conduct air support. Ground and air leaders collocated their headquarters and set up a
coordinated request system which handled air support requests. And for thefirsttime, air
leaders assigned radio-equipped, pilot-led liaison teams to tactical ground units (no lower
than battalion level) so they could direct aircraft onto targets. There were still occasional

^^ent Roberts Greenfield, "Army Ground Forces and the Air-Ground Battle
Team, Including Organic Light Aviation, Study No. 35," (Fort Monroe, Va.: Army
Ground Forces Historical Section, 1948), 47, photocopied; and Futrell, Ideas, vol. I, 141.
^'McLennan, 21-24; and Greenfield, "Study No. 35," 45-50.
^'John McCloy, cited in McLennan, 19; and Gonzales, Tactical Air Support of
Ground Forces. 29. Gonzales sees FM 100-20 as a response to McCloy's remarks, and in
a way it was. McCloy made his comments in April 1943 and FM 100-20 was published in
July 1943.
34

problems. American troops did not always adhere to the procedures for identifying their
positions to their own planes, while pilots and liaison parties stmggled with target briefing
procedures. The Army Air Forcefriedto use bombers for close air support, but the
ponderous planes and theirrigidplanning procedures were ill-suited to the changing
conditions in even this relatively static front. The results of the above difficulties could be
tragic at times, with airplanes hitting their own troops, or not responding quickly enough to
urgent requests. But the efforts in Italy represented an important first step toward better
close air support. This was also significant because, without appreciable ground movement
to provide additional pressure upon the German Army, the Army Air Force's 1944 air
interdiction campaign in Italy, code-named Strangle, failed to cause a German military
collapse. Meanwhile, close air support contributed to several tactical successes, and earned
the appreciation of the American commander in Italy, General Mark Clark. ^^
Thanks to a fortuitous convergence of factors. Army Air Force support of the
soldiers achieved its greatest effect during the American sweep across France in 1944.
Due to dissension at the highest levels of command. Army Air Force control over all
aspects of air action was not possible; otherwise, the airmen might have adhered strictly to
their dogmatic concept of strategic bombing and interdiction while ignoring ground
objectives. Instead, the diverse air command setup and an abundance of American planes

"Boyne, in Clash of Wings. 187, ignores the P-40 and praises the introduction of
the P-47 and P-51. Hallion, in Strike. 179-187, discusses Italian campaign air support
innovations, notes aircrew dedication tofroopsupport, and also hails the fighters'
appearance. Wilt, "Allied Cooperation in Sicily and Italy, 1943-1945," 204-220, and
Greenfield, "Study No. 35," 76-85, discuss changes in air support procedures and
effectiveness. Mark Clark's compliments arefromMcClennan, 25 (though his study does
include numerous complaints about problems in its Appendix TAB 'A'). Strangle's failure
is from R. Ernest Dupuy and COL Trevor N. Dupuy, USA (ret). The Encyclopedia of
Military History, from 3500 B.C. to the Present. 2d revised ed. (New York: Harper &
Row, 1986), 1104; Hallion, "Battlefield Air Support," 14; and Eduard Mark, "Operation
Strangle, March 19-May 10 1944," chap, in his Aerial Interdiction in Three Wars
(Washington, D C : Center for Air Force History, 1994). Mark believes that Strangle was
a success, in that it weakened German defenses for later Allied ground attacks. His case is
convincing, but he too smoothly glosses over its utter failure to dislodge the Germans
during its own attacks.
35

and pilots in 1944 Europe meant that an entire air force-the Ninth Air Force-could be
dedicated to army support. Even this might not have worked, given the Ninth Air Force
commanders' doctrinally-induced lukewarm attitude toward this mission, combined with
FM 100-20's dictum that the air force commander still had final say on mission
apportionment. But commanding the Tactical Air Commands (TACs) under the Ninth Air
Force commander were two pragmatic and energetic officers. Brigadier Generals Otto Paul
"OP." Weyland and Elwood "Pete" Quesada. The TACs worked with a specific
American army-Quesada's Ninth TAC supported General Omar Bradley's Fifth Army and
Weyland's Nineteenth TAC supported General George Patton's Third Army-and both air
leaders got on famously with their soldier counterparts. Bradley's assessment of Quesada
was that he was "unlike most airmen who viewed ground support as a bothersome
diversion to war in the sky." And during his spearhead drive across France, Patton
sometimes entmsted to Weyland and his pilots the unprecedented responsibility for
covering his flanks.^"*
Most accounts describe Pete Quesada as the real driver in fomenting better
air and ground force relations. Quesada's brash, sometimes abrasive, personality ensured
that coordination between the various levels of air and ground commands within Ninth
TAC and Fifth Army actually occurred. He went so far as to put a radio and a liaison pilot
in at least one tank in the leading armored units. This quelled the sources of "simmering
complaints" by ground ttoops about friendly fire and "laborious" communications
procedures. He also pushed his fighter pilots, who were atfirstreluctant to forsake the

^"GEN Omar N. Bradley, USA (ret.) A Soldier's Storv (New York: Henry Holt &
Company, 1951), 249, (air leaders' coolness toward air support), 250 (Quesada assessment
quote); McLennan, "Close Air Support History," Tab C to Annex A, 1-2; Thomas
Alexander Hughes, Over Lord: General Pete Ouesada and the Triumph of Tactical Air
Power in Worid War II (New York: The Free Press, 1995), 119, 156, 240-242; and W A
Jacobs, "The Battle for France, 1944," in Cooling, ed.. Case Studies. 237-246, 267-268
36

glories of aerial combat, to learn and appreciate air-to-ground weapons delivery in support
of the Army. ^^
Fighter plane use and effectiveness in this particular campaign, as well as the
effectiveness of the campaign's close air support overall, would be one of its enduring
legacies, as well as a major source for the decades-later CAS debates. The twin-engine
bombers upon which the prewar air force based its doctrinal hopes were a disappointment
in this fast-moving campaign. They still performed the interdiction mission well
enough-though they were vulnerable to fighters and heavyflakbutthey required at least
forty-eight hours advance notification of a targeting request, which they weighed against
other air campaign priorities. Thus they mattered little, for example, to a tank unit
commander facing a sudden counterattack of unexpected force. Heavy bomber CAS
performance was spectacularly uneven. The heavy bombardment which helped spur the
American breakout at St. Lo crippled the warfighting capacity of the German soldiers who
received it, but the bombers* inflexible and cumbersome attack procedures directly
contributed to one of the war's most infamous fratricide incidents. ^^

^^Hughes, Over Lord. 119 (quotes), 182-187; Jacobs, "The Battle for France,"
254-255, 259-260, 271-273; and John Schlight, "Elwood R. Quesada: Tac Air Comes of
Age," in Makers of the United States Air Force, ed. John Frisbee (Washington, DC: Air
Force History and Museums Program, 1996), 196-197. Fratricidethe term for the
accidental killing of one's own ttoops-involved ground force errors as much as aircrew
errors. In order to stop American ttoops from shooting at their own planes. Army
commanders restricted firings to an officer's express permission. They also had to suppress
mmors that Germans were flying American planes (no doubt created by air-to-ground
fratricide incidents). See Hughes, 288; and Arthur Hadley, The Straw Giant: Triumph
and Failure: America's Armed Forces (New York: Random House, 1986), 60 (Hadley
served in France as an army officer during Worid War II); and Kenneth Werrell, Archie.
Flak. AAA, and SAM: A Short Operational History of Ground-Based Air Defense
(MAFB: Air University Press, 1988), 46-51.
^""Head, 110-113; Hughes, 205-216; and Jacobs, 281-282. For specific heavy
bomber CAS critique, see Ian Gooderson, "Heavy and Medium Bombers: How
Successful Were They in the Tactical Close Air Support Role During Worid War IP" The
Journal of Strategic Studies 15 (September 1992): 367-399; Hallion, "Close Air Support:
A Retrospective Assessment," 13-14; Hallion, Slrike, 206-214, 224; and Adrian R. Lewis,
"The Failure of Allied Planning and Doctrine for Operation Overlord: The Case of
37

By summer 1944, the American forces in France enjoyed air superiority, which
meant that the TACs' fighter planes were neither diverted from their CAS missions nor
required to fight enemy fighters on their way into or out of the target area. Because of
their maneuverability, speed, and relatively small-compared to the bombers-logistics
requirements, fighters were much more adept at CAS and made a serious contribution to
the ground war. Forced by the American breakout from Normandy into a war of
maneuver requiring open vehicular travel, German soldiers later revealed their wonder that
the swarming fighters attacked everything that moved. This especially happened within the
twenty miles of the front lines that comprised the battlefield air support arena. While the
fighters induced no mass panic among the Germans, they caused many Germans to desert
vehicles that were not destroyed outright. American ground officers observed that German
resistance was less fierce after air attacks, while American ttoop morale soared accordingly.
Perhaps the most prominent example of CAS effectiveness came when one German Army
commander insisted upon surrendering his unit to O.P. Weyland.^^
The fighter CAS success reinforced the North Africa-bom impression that fighters
could easily excel in most any task, including the CAS mission. The star plane for the role
was Republic Aviation's P-47 Thunderbolt (for photos, see Appendix Figs. 8 and 9), a
mgged radial-engine bmte of a plane which also enjoyed success against German fighters.
Its durability was probably one reason why CAS aircraft losses were not as high as
expected-and even less than those experienced by heavy bombers on strategic missions.

Minefield and Obstacle Clearance," The Journal of Military History 62 (October 1998):
800, 806-807. In both works, Hallion praises the bombers' contribution to the Normandy
breakout, but denigrates overall heavy bomber air support effectiveness. He notes the
cumbersome procedures as well as the fratricide incidents. In Strike, he criticizes medium
bomber performance as well. Both Hallion (in "Assessment") and Lewis criticize the
Normandy pre-invasion bombing as less relevant to the landing troops' needs than pure
CAS (Lewis believes that CAS and more direct naval firepower support could have helped
the mine and obstacle clearance operation at Omaha Beach). Gooderson not only writes
about the mixed results but recounts the bomber men's irritation at being diverted from
their other missions to do air support.
''Hallion, Strike. 203-206, 214-23; Hughes 24; Jacobs, 246-251, 277-279,
282-284; and Greenfield, "Sttidy No. 35," 90.
38

Otherfighterssuch as the legendary P-51 (for photo, see Appendix Fig, 10) and Spitfire
also did CAS, but each had certain stmctural vulnerabilities and neither could carry as
much ordnance as a Thunderbolt.'*
The concept of thefighter-bomberwas bom out of this time; and along with it
there arose the idea that the averagefighterpilot could handle the mission without much
practice. With only one exception-the years following the Vietnam War-the Air Force
pursued the multirolefighterdream sparked by the P-47 and P-51's Worid War II
accomplishments. Looking back from the early 1970s, one observer intimately familiar
with Air Force design philosophy asserted: "Every [fighter plane]... has been a
multipurpose plane and afighter-bombervery much of the old P-47 tradition . . . . in the
Air Force, all [fighter] pilots are multipurpose." Indeed, as the years passed. Air Force
generals waxed nostalgic about these planes' success in diverse missions, and at least one
Air Force historian in later decades cited their performance as proof thatfighterplanes and
pilots were a more worthwhile air support investment than dedicated CAS planes.''

'^The adaptation of air superiority pilots and their fighters to the ground attack role
can be found in Barnes, "Concept," 16-22; Boyne, 344-345; Futtell, Ideas, vol. I, 174;
Hallion, "Battlefield Air Support," 19-20; Hallion, Strike. 225, 264, 267; and James
Hasdorff, Interview of Maj Gen James R. Hildreth. (Spring Hope, N.C.: USAF Oral
History Program, 27-28 October 1987), 65, transcript, AFHRC Holding K239.0512-1772;
Head, "A-7," 110-113, 157-158, 252; Jane's Fighting Aircraft of Worid War II (New
York: Crescent Books, 1996), 248-249, 254-255 (performance details); and Wilt,
212-213.
Barnes discusses how tactical exigencies sometimes require that air forces use
planes for missions for which they were not designed. Hildreth was involved in Air Force
aircraft procurement and testing and asserted: "you don't know how you are going to use .
.. [an] airplane in combat until you get into combat" (65). The P-51 design was a
response to a British need for a high-speed, light dive-bomber (Boyne claims that it was
built for reconnaissance, 334) and was designated the A-36. The A-36 was underpowered
and the British re-engine it, thus creating one of the war's finest air-to-air fighters. The
Army Air Force wanted the P-47 to be its top air-to-air machine, and while it did well in
that capacity, it worked better as a ground attack plane. Boyne praises both the P-47 and
P-5rs operational performance (387).
"Observer quote is from Jack Neufeld, Mr. Pierre Sprey. (MAFB: USAF Oral
History Interview, 12 June 1973), 26-27,ttanscript,AFHRC Holding K239.0512-969
(cited with permission of Mr. Sprey, per document's instmctions). Other sources are
39

The question was whether these planes and their pilots could do all of the tasks
well. A later Government Accounting Office (GAO) report addressing air support
observed that CAS, like any other air combat mission, required special aircraft
performance characteristics and pilot training requirements. Trying to make planes and
pilots perform more than one mission required trade-offs and sacrifices that degraded the
ability to excel at either. As the service examined purchasing single-mission tactical planes
decades later, one Air Force pilot's Air Command and Staff College paper cited World
War II as an example of the pitfalls in pursuing the multirolefighterdream. The P-47 and
P-51 were intended as single-mission planes until wartime demands directed them to other
missions-in which they just happened to prevail. He further observed that different
warfighting environments in that global conflict allowed certain planes to succeed in certain

Barnes, 16; LTCOL John Dick, USAF, Corona Ace Interview of General William
Momver. USAF (ret.) (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Air Force [USAF] Oral History Program
, 31 January 1977), 38-40, 52-53, transcript. Air Force Historical Research Center
[AFHRC] Holding K239.0512-1068; Hallion, Sttike. 196, 264, 267 (cites this war as
proof of thefighter'sair support worth); Head, "A-7," 112-113, 157-158; GEN William
Momyer, USAF, testimony in Congress, Senate, Hearings before the Special
Subcommittee on Close Air Support of the Preparedness Investigating Subcommittee of
the Committee on Armed Services, Close Air Support. 92d Cong., 1st sess., 29 October
1971, 197; MAJ Raymond Reeves, US/NE, "Close Air Support, AH-56 vs. A-X: Docttine
Conflict Between the Services," (Research Study, Air Command and Staff College, May
1972), 24; GEN Bernard Schriever, USAF, testimony in Congress, House, Close Air
Support. 30 September 1965,4838,4950; and Mike Worden, COL, USAF, The Rise of
the Fighter Generals: The Problem of Air Force Leadership. 1945-1982 (MAFB: Air
University Press, 1998), 12-13.
GEN Momyer praised the P-47s CAS prowess in his Senate testimony. Air Force
Systems Command chief, GEN Bernard Schriever, briefly described the evolution of the
service'sfighter-bomberpreference during his House appearance. MAJ Head's dissertation
on the A-7 describes the evolution of the Air Force's desire forfighter-bombers.Reeves
and Hallion cite thefighterCAS performance in World War Two Europe as a prime
example of the multirolefighter'scontinued worth
Of course multi-mission planes require capable pilots. Worden cited World War
Two observations about fighter pilots' aggressiveness and superior flying ability. GE.N
Momyer spoke of thefighterpilot's ability to adapt, which given the diverse nature of his
normal in-flight tasks, was tme. The Air Force leader's deduction, however, was that
adapting to other missions was fairly easy
40

situations. Indeed, this is how slowerfightersand other planes successftilly flew ground
support missions until late in the war. And if the multirole tactical plane ideal was elusive,
achieving proficiency in all of that plane's missions was even tougher. The same engineer
who commented upon the service's multirole bent sharply appraised the pilots who flew
such machines: "a multipurpose pilot is probably worse than a multipurpose plane."
Speaking of his own experience in jetfighter-bomberunits, the staff college author
observed that he and his fellow aviators simply could not always maintain top proficiency
in all of the various missions and tactics assigned to them. His was an observation of later
conditions, of course, but had it been any easier flying air support infightersduring Worid
War II? One of the scholars of Quesada's air support setup, Thomas Alexander Hughes,
made clear that the fighter pilots flew air support well because Quesada made them do
well. Hughes and another air support scholar, Brereton Greenhous, pointed out that at
first, Americanfighterpilots were neither interested in the mission nor competent to fly it.
Hughes and yet another scholar, Ian Gooderson, wrote that techniques for attacking
German vehicles required much practice to be effective, and that the Americans had to set
up a special school to teachfighterpilots how to fly ground attack. The pilots did better
after this, but the mission remained tough. They may have been flying the fastest and most
advanced machines of their day, but their losses were still high. As one air leader said, a
mission against enemyfightersmight yield no combat if the enemy failed to appear; but in
a CAS mission, the enemy was always present and armed.'*"

''"Quote isfromNeufeld, Sprey. 27. The staff college pilot is Barnes, 16-22,
36-46. The Quesada scholar is Hughes, Over Lord. 127-131. Other scholars' observations
are Ian Gooderson, in "Allied Fighter-Bombers Versus German Armour in North-West
Europe, 1944-1945: Myths and Realities," The Journal of Sttategic Studies 14 (June
1991): 211-213; and Brereton Greenhous, in "Aircraft versus Armor: Cambrai to Yom
Kippur," chap, in Men at War: Politics. Technology, and Innovation in tiie Twentieth
Century, eds., Christon Archer and Timothy Travers (Chicago, 111.: Precedent, 1982),
106. The GAO report is Close Air Support: Principal Issues and Aircraft Choices. 72-74.
Forfighterlosses; see Jacobs, 279-280; and Wen-ell, Archie. Flak. AAA, and SAM 57.
The air leader is GEN Momyer, in Dick, Momyer. 28-29.
Another observer, Denis Warner, notes thatfighterpilots often dismiss the CAS
mission as less attractive than others; see Warner, "Army Needs Its Own Close Air
Support," Pacific Defense Reporter 11 (October 1984): 35-36. In this piece, he
41

Thefighterpilots' claims for attack mission prowess were such that some close air
support historians later claimed that their effectiveness against tanks with bombs and
rockets was overrated. Tme, rockets could be difficult to shoot accurately, and a bomb
had to hit very near a tank to destroy it. But Quesada's pilots worked to improve their
accuracy with these weapons, and they also studied captured German tanks' vulnerable
areas sotiiateven their planes'fifty-calibermachine gun bullets could set a tank's engine on
fire-or ricochet up into the tank's vulnerable underside. And whatever the effectiveness
against tanks, they still wreaked havoc against the unarmored and lightly armored vehicles
that comprised the bulk of any army's maneuver units."'

complains about the Royal Australian Air Force's (RAAF) infatuation with fastfightersfor
CAS and the ensuing lack of commitment to that mission. Citing historical precedent,
Warner recalls World War II air commanders' distaste for the mission, even in the
successful Normandy air operations.
"'An airplane's ability to destroy tanks was and is controversial, due to the weapons
procurement implications thereof (Mr. James O'Bryon, Deputy Director, Operational Test
& Evaluation, Live Fire Testing, Office of the Secretary of Defense, and former Deputy
Director, Ballistics Research Laboratory, personal interview by author, 7 May 1997,
Washington, D.C., notes and tape recording in author's possession).
Two critics of thefighters'effectiveness against German tanks in France are
Brereton Greenhous and Ian Gooderson. Greenhous, in "Aircraft versus Armor, 104-107
(praises British air support while criticizing initial Americanfighterpilot apathy toward
learning weapons delivery procedures). Gooderson, in "Allied Fighter-Bombers Versus
German Armour in North-West Europe," 210-229 cites military assessment teams'
findings. He concedes aircraft knocked out tanks by strafing their weak spots, and
especially by using rockets. However, he points out that rockets' inaccuracy and pilot
claims based on a lot of flashes and smoke meant they were not as effective as thought.
Though Gooderson is a harsh critic of fighter success against tanks, he still cites
their effectiveness against lightly-armored vehicles (214-221, 226-228). Greenfield's
"Study No. 35" citesfightereffectiveness (90), but also notes that target acquisition could
be difficult for even propeller-driven fighter planes (54-55, and 69-70). Hallion, in Strike.
225-227, concedes inflated pilot claims, but still believes that they were more effective than
some critics claim. Hogg, in Tank Killing (203-223), gives a measured appraisal of all of
the combatants' planes, concluding that they required accurate and powerful
weapons-heavy rockets and gunsto do the job. Hughes believes that they did succeed in
destroying tanks and especially other, less armored, vehicles; Over Lord. 145-151,
190-191, 220-224, 236-242. Frank Jordan's U.S. Air Force Oral History Program
interview with former P-47 pilot William Jarvis, (Langley AFB, Va.: 7 October 1977,
42

One Army Air Force leader complained that artillery should be doing what the
fighters were doing, but his arguments fell on deaf ears. The Army came to expect the
service the airmen provided. Especially in a war of movement, ground units might not
have all of their heavyfirepoweravailable, and CAS could be the remedy. And as many
military observers assert about American fighting style, iffirepowerwas available, the
American citizen-soldier army relied upon it more than sacrifice to achieve battlefield
success. Some point out that the Army has often followed the dictum to send a bullet into
the enemy's position before sending a man. And one of the acclaimed historians of the
American Army's exploits in World War II France, Stephen Ambrose, cited Wehrmacht
soldiers' observation that "the GIs let the high explosives do the hard work." Later Army
complaints about the independent Air Force were based upon this expectation of firepower
upon demand-as John McCloy's comments about Army Air Force CAS in North Africa
hinted. CAS was afirepowersolution at the tactical level just as sending heavy bombers
deep into Germany was one at the strategic level; and indeed, a scholar of the mission
pointed out that CAS "brings the greatest force to bear on the battle with the least risk of
lives." At least in the latter stages of the European war, the Army Air Force amply
answered the groundttoops'call for sending bullets instead of men, because as the war in
Europe ended. Army leaders warmly praised the airmen."^

transcript, AFHRC Holding K239.0512-1124), reveals that bombing tanks was indeed
difficult. Jacobs, in his "The Battle for France" (274, 282-284), asserts that the fighter
pilots were effective overall, citing such feats as their thwarting a (jerman armored attack at
Mortain on 7 August 1944.
"^The complainer was a future commander of the Ninth Air Force, MGEN Hoyt
Vandenberg; see Hughes, 224. General Omar Bradley dismissed Vandenberg's and other
air leaders' objections; see Greenfield, 30. Examples of Army praise and expectation of
CAS can also be found in Congress, Senate, Close Air Support. 186; Greenfield, 29-31,
35-36, Tab C of Annex A, 2-7; Jacobs, 281-284; Hallion, Slliks, 227; and Russell
Weigley, Eisenhower's Lieutenants: The Campaign of France and Germany. 1944-1945
(Bloomington, Ind.: Indiana University Press, 1981), 166.
Quotes are from Stephen Ambrose, Citizen Soldiers: The U.S. Armv from the
Normandy Beaches to the Bulge to tiie Surrender of (jennanv (New York: Simon &
Schuster, 1997), 489; and MAJ Charles Westenhoff, USAF, "Close Air Support:
Battiefield Challenges, Sttategic Opportunites," in Air Suooort of tiie Close-in Battle: P<^t
43

The final Worid War II CAS item concerns the Pacific theater. During eariy battles
such as Guadalcanal, air superiority was in question, as evenfightershad trouble
performing CAS while fending off enemyfighterattacks during a mission (meanwhile,
non-air superiorityfightertypes such as the Douglas SBD Dauntless dive bomber still flew
CAS and sea war missions against stiff Japanesefighteropposition). In the later island
fights, the Americans enjoyed air superiority and an abundance of aircraft to support the
troops. As in Europe, the air superiority requirement for CAS meant that, regardless of the

Lessons. Present Docttine. Futtire Directions: Proceedings of tiie United States Air Force
Aerospace Power Symposium. 9-10 March 1987 (MAFB: Air War College; henceforth
cited as Proceedings. Symposium: Air Support). 57.
Observations about the American penchant forfirepowersolutions in wars of
annihilation, as well as several comments about how these applied to World War II
strategy, are in Ambrose, Citizen Soldiers. 488-489; BGEN John "Doc" Bahnsen, USA
(ret), telephonic interview by author, 1 July 1997, notes and tape recording in author's
possession (Army helicopter aviation leader; cites the "bullet" dictum); Beaumont, Joint
Military Operations: A Short History. 114-115; Harold Brown, Thinking About National
Security: Defense and Foreign Policy in a Dangerous World (Boulder, Colo.: Westview
Press, 1983), 226; John Dick, LTCOL, USAF, Gen Gabriel P. Disoswav. (USAF Oral
History Interview, 4-6 October 1977), 196,ttanscript,AFHRC Holding K239.0512-974
(observes of the Army, "They want. . . somebody to come and shoot that guy out of a
tree. They don't want to have to bother with him"); James Fallows, National Defense
(New York: Random House, 1981), 26-27, 32-34; Colin Gray, The Geopolitics of
Superpower (Lexington, Ky.: The University Press of Kentucky, 1988), 197; Arthur
Hadley, Sfraw Giant. 194-196; Andrew Krepinevich, The Army and Vietnam (Baltimore,
Md.: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986), 6-8, 170-171 (also recalls "bullet"
dictum); Kross, Military Reform. 100; BGEN EM. Lynch, USA (ret), "Close Air
Support: Its Failed Form and Its Failing Function," 124 Armed Forces Journal
International (August 1986; henceforth cited as MR) 72-78 (writing about a later CAS
controversy; emphasizes that ground ttoops want CAS upon demand); Donald Mrozek,
Air Power and the Ground War in Vietnam: Ideas and Actions (MAFB: Air University
Press, 1988), 5; Geoffrey Ferret, A Counttv Made bv War: From the Revolution to
Vietnam-The Storv of America's Rise to Power (New York: Random House, 1989), 412415, 436-437, 556-557; Russell Weigley, The American Wav of War: A HLStorv of Ilmterj
States Military Strategy and Policy (Bloomington, Ind.: Indiana University Press, 1977),
xvii-xxiii, 223-241, and 358-359; and Westenhoff, USAF, "Battlefield Challenges,
Strategic Opportunites," 57.
44

type of plane performing it, an air force had to dominate the skies either by sheer numbers,
or by the quality of thefighterpilots andfighteraircraft dedicated Xo clearing the skies.''
General George Kenney, an innovative, pragmatic, hard-charger of the Pete
Quesada mold, led the army air force supporting General Douglas MacArthur's South
Pacific offensive. As such, Kenney made sure that his pilots responded to CAS requests.
Even so, the long distances between ground bases and thefrontlines, as well as the humid
jungle conditions, restticted high-quality air support. Radio communications suffered due
to atmospheric conditions and breakdowns. The jungle terrain often lacked distinct visual
references and the jungle itself inhibited ground-to-air signalling. These conditions and the
long distances often combined to create CAS response times of as late as an entire day.
Such a condition was unsatisfactory in Europe, but the island battles often featured glacial
advances against well-protected Japanese defensive positions. As a result, CAS firepower
was welcome even if it was late. CAS was critical to success in many Pacific battles, of
which the 1943 Australian attack on New Guinea's "Shaggy Ridge" and the 1944 Marine
assault on Bougainville's "Hellzapoppin' Ridge," were prime examples."'

"Greenfield, 32, 93-94 (at times the Air Force could afford to task up to five
squadrons to desfroy a dug-in Japanese infantry/?/a/oow, which says something both about
aerial abundance and the American preference forfirepowerover troop sacrifice); Hallion,
Strike. 38, 166 (specifically points out air superiority requirement for CAS); and Joe Gray
Taylor, "American Experience in the Southwest Pacific," in Case Studies, ed. Cooling,
298-306, 329. Taylor opines that, if more of the available planes were good at air-to-air
combat during those desperate early days, air commanders might have assigned them
exclusively to that mission at the expense of CAS (301). For the Dauntless' undaunted
performance in the teeth of Japanesefighterresistance, see Barrett Tillman, The Dauntless
Dive Bomber of World War Two (Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press, 1977).
Unfortunately, Tillman mostly focuses upon the plane's success in various sea battles while
neglecting its equally valuable service in island battle CAS. Hallion was less impressed
with the plane, citing instances where unescorted Army Air Force Dauntlesses on long
range missions suffered heavy losses.
"'Boyne, 269; Greenfield, 4, 7-8; Hallion, Sttike. 165-167; LTCOL Edward
Littlejohn, USA, "Close Air Support: Battle in the Fourth Dimension," (Military Studies
project, U.S. Army War College, 1990), 14, and Taylor, "Southwest Pacific," 301-323
(describes many examples where CAS was used) Littlejohn cites a greater percentage of
CAS was flown in the Pacific than in Europe.
45

As the Pacific island advance created a variety of battle areas, Kenney's airmen
used a variety of planes to accomplish CAS-from fighters to heavy bombers. But in spite
of Kenney's attitude, the most practical and dedicated air support came to be that of the
Marines. Though they considered troop support a primary mission. Marine airmen
neglected CAS before the war. But as battle experience increased, they became
increasingly enthusiastic and developed a reliable CAS setup. Devoted to their fellow
Marines, many actually came to thefrontto survey the terrain and interact with the ttoops.
This attitude could be critical, because in certain conditions Marine air was the only heavy,
accuratefirepowerthe landing forces could get. Meanwhile, even as late as the Luzon,
Philippines, groundfightingin 1945, Army Air Force officers occasionally bickered with
their soldier counterparts."^
The Pacific Ocean war ended after B-29 strategic bombers dropped atomic
weapons on Japan. The bombers' effectiveness was already the subject of some debate, as
the U.S. Strategic Bombing Survey for Europe was underway at that time. But the fact
that the bombs induced the surrender of the Japanese, who fanatically defended various
small Pacific islands throughout the war, spurred the Army Air Force bomber men's belief
that they possessed the ultimate strategic, doctrinal, and procurement tmmp card. Also, the

"^Hallion, Strike. 53, 165-167; Littlejohn, "Battle in the Fourth Dimension," 14;
and Taylor, 298, 319-321, 325, 327-329. As a small elite fighting force. Marine units did
not carry many heavy weapons, and the Guadalcanal campaign was one example of when
the naval gunfire support was often not available. For this latter item, see Richard Frank's
Guadalcanal: The Definitive Account of tiie Landmark Battle (New York: Penguin
Books, 1990), 138-140, and 206-211. The New Guinea mountain jungle fighting was an
situation where ground forcesthough on this occasion the ttoops were not Marinescould
not use heavy organicfirepowersuch as tanks. The Marines were not perfect, however.
Their increasing success led to increased, sometimes poorly executed requests, and even
they mistakenly attacked friendly ttoops in such battles as Iwo Jima.
Both Hallion and Taylor note some Marines' pre-World War II preference for air
support when otherfirepowermeans are hard to obtain. However, as Taylor points out,
they had not had much chance to solidly develop their CAS procedures until Worid War II
For a book that discusses air support up through Worid War 11, Hal lion's Strike
covers Pacific theater CAS for only three pages, saying little about Marine CAS On the
other hand, he spends sixty-one pages on Army Air Force air support in Africa, Italy, and
France, of which the France portion comprises one 39-page chapter.
46

early atomic weapons could be only carried by large planes such as their bombers. In the
years that followed, they would play the atomic card repeatedly to get their way, and
without regard to actual foreign and military affairs developments. This included close air
support, which became a neglected mission for many years.

47

CHAPTER III
FOUNDATIONS, THROUGH 1960

The close air support mission was hostage to postwar developments in American
foreign policy, technology. Air Force doctrine, and interservice friction. The Air Force
and its nuclear capable bombers seemed to answer American leaders' concerns about how
to wage the Cold War and not maintain an oversized military force. However, Americans'
foreign policy assumptions did not match realities, as the Korean War revealedtiiatthere
were indeed war conditions that the Air Force's bombers could not master. The Air Force
chose to ignore this lesson, and abetted by Eisenhower administration policy, continued to
focus upon strategic nuclear warfare at the expense of meeting its written agreements to
support the Army. The Army became increasingly exasperated with this state of affairs,
and aided by helicopter technological advances, started to answer the Air Force's neglect.

Postwar America and Its World

The victorious Americans did not quite know what to make of their new situation.
The American citizen-soldiers wanted to drop the "soldier" part of that term as soon as
possible, and their government obliged. Amid the backdrop of occasional demobilization
riots among impatient troops, the defense establishment declined from thirteen million
uniformed citizens to just over one million in three years.' Given their active involvement
in foreign affairs during even so-called isolationist periods, Americans should have known
better. As early as the 1870s, U.S. Marines stormed forts in a far-off place called Korea
And excluding the two world wars and the Spanish-American War, which stuck in most
people's memory, American ttoops had since shed blood in China, the Dominican

'Hadley, Straw Giant. 61, 74-75; and Walter Millis, Anns and Men: A Studv of
American Military History (New York: G.P. Putnam Sons, 1956), 317; and James
Patterson, Grand Expectations: The United States. 1945-1974 (New York: Oxford
University Press, 1996), 13-14.
48

Republic, Haiti, Mexico, Nicaragua, and the Philippines.^ The many reasons varied from
enforcing the Monroe Doctrine, to protecting the United Fmit Company, to serving
humanitarian concerns, to teaching foreigners to elect good men.
It is not within this work's scope to relate the details of the Cold War's start; suffice
it to say that after Worid War II, America found itself the most powerful nation in the
worid. Not only that, but the European powers who previously maintained periodic order
in their own region and colonies were no longer able to do so. Americans came to believe
that the next most powerful nation, Soviet Russia, was a menace to all of these lands, and
they gradually resolved to face it with the appropriate means.'
But what would be the means? The country was torn, as it still is, over how to
reduce military size and cost while achieving its foreign policy aims. Uninterested in
maintaining a large military force at war's end. Congress rejected President Harry S.
Tmman's bid for universal military training. It was here that air force bomber technology
provided an Americanfirepowersolution if ever there was one

The Air Force and Its Bomber Men Take

Center Stage
President Tmman and all of the military services except the Navy welcomed a
postwar opportunity to consolidate the service stmcture somehow. A major force
reduction, coupled with the increasing costs and development pitfalls of modem weapons,
meant the government could ill afford waste and poor planning by uncoordinated services.
But though later accounts normally depict the Navy resisting this proposal because of its
parochial interests, it also lacked faith in the other services' warfighting philosophies.

^Dupuy and Dupuy, Encyclopedia of Military History. 867, 1008-1009,

1012-1013.
'Three summary discussions of America's foreign policy style and Cold
War-induced assumption of a woridwide commitment are Stephen Ambrose,
"Introduction," in Rise to Globalism: American Foreign Policy since 1938 (Baltimore,
Md.: Penguin Books, 1971), 11-22; Maslowski and Millett, For the Common Defen.se
494-498; and Steven Hook and John Spanier. American Foreign Policy since World War
II, 13th ed. (Washington, D.C.: Congressional Quarteriy Press, 1996), 1-70
49

particulariy those of the soon-to-be independent Air Force.^ The bomber generals who ran
the new service when it formed in 1947 believed that Worid War II vindicated their earlier
claims about sttategic bombing's ability to win wars almost single-handedly. Some paid lip
service to the other services' combat efforts; but most others, including the new Air Force
Chief of Staff Carl Spaatz, asserted airpower's strategic dominance regardless of the mixed
results identified in the Strategic Bombing Survey. Lurking above all discussions of the
topic was the atomic bomb; for as one historian of the Air Force's early days put it:
No matter how ill-conceived the Combined Bomber Offensive
against Germany or the sttategic offensive in the Pacific had been,
it all became irrelevant to the American public. Congress, and the
Air Force. Ovemight, sttategic bombardment had gone from
thousand-plane missions . . . to a single bomber with a single bomb.
Ever conscious of their earlier fight for survival, the Air Force bomber men now believed
their planes rendered obsolete, or at least secondary, much of the senior services'
operations. And the Navy, with its long history offightingwars in widely varying
conditions, scoffed at the idea. Arthur Hadley, a World War II Army officer tumed
Pentagon reporter, recalled naval aviators' dismay at the Air Force's quasi-religious fervor
as they asked him incredulously, "Have you ever tried to talk to these guys?"^ Hadley

"The motives for, and resistance to, the restmcturing move which, among other
things, created a separate air force are covered in various sources: Futtell, Ideas, vol. I,
191-196; Hadley, "The Chaotic Creation," chap, in Sttaw Giant. 74-99; and Maslowski
and Millett, 501-507.
^The bomber men's self-confidence and attitudes toward other services is in Futrell,
Ideas, vol.1, 168-172 (initial praise for balanced force), and 238-239 (growing faith in own
abilities and "gloves off' boasting); Hadley, 76-83; Hughes, Over Lord. 307-308, GEN
Carl Spaatz, USAAF, "Strategic Air Power: A Concept," Foreign Affairs 24 (April 1946):
385-396; and Worden, Rise of tiie Fighter Generals. 27-35. Block quote and similar
observations are from Smith, The Air Force Plans for Peace. 15-17 (quote is on 17),
113-114. Smith adds that the successful development of the large bomber and atomic
bomb made Mitchell and the bomber men appear "quite prophetic." The Navy's friction
with the Air Force is in this note's Hadley citation, Maslowski and Millett, 501-507; and
Michael Isenberg's survey. Shield of tiie Republic: The United States Naw in an Era of
Cold War and Violent Peace. 1945-1962 vol. I. (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1993).
106-113, 118-119, and 148-149. Final quote is from Hadley, 83.
50

wrote that Navy pilots viewed Air Force pilots as mere technicians "who chewed bubble
gum and scratched themselves while they chased girls and drank whiskey." And though
only 50 percent of Air Force officers at the service's inception were college graduates, most
were either formally or practically trained engineers who shared a faith in a technology that
they believed had unlimited promise. And their technology appealed not only to national
policy makers but also to academic types witii a lot more education.^
As Worid War II ended, the Army Air Force leadership sanctioned a scientific
study of German combat aerospace technology led by scientist Theodor von Karman. Von
Karman's report recommended that the airmen move quickly to exploit the Germans'
advances because they were not only quite feasible, but would also render current aviation
technology obsolete. One observer later wrote that at this point, the Air Force erroneously
chased purely technological objectives at the expense of military ones. And indeed, the
airmen and scientists shared a mutual enthusiasm; Hap Arnold asserted that "For twenty
years the Air Force was built around pilots . . . The next twenty years is going to be built

^Quote and education statistic are from Hadley, 82. Smith, 109, 113, thinks the
anti-intellectual tendency concerns all military officers, but adds that the Air Force leaders
were indeed relatively young, lacked graduate as well as senior service school education,
and were not used to working joint service issues. Commentary on the Air Force
technology faith and postwar desire for independence and dominance arefromCarl
Builder, The Masks of War: American Military Styles in Sttategv and Analysis (Baltimore,
Md.: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1989), 18-20, 22-27, 32-33,67-73,104-105,
136-138; and Worden, 36-37. The airmen's technological orientation also forms the theme
of Michael Sherry's negative portrayal of the Army Air Force's World War II strategic
bombing campaign. The Rise of American Air Power: The Creation of Armageddon
(New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1987). The American belief in the promise of
flight is a theme in Joseph Corn's The Winged Gospel: America's Romance with Aviation,
1900-1950 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1983). Scientist enthusiasm for flight
technology is from Futrell, Ideas, vol. I, 205-206, 227; and is one theme in Michael Gom,
Harnessing tiie Genie: Science and Technology Forecasting for tiie Air Force. 1944-1986
U.S. Air Force Air Staff Historical Study (Washington, D C : Office of Air Force History,
1988). Alexander de Seversky was not an intellectual per s^, but he was a noted aircraft
designer and author who pushed the strategic airpower concept; see Mrozek, Air Power
and tiie Ground War in Viettiam. 10.
51

around scientists." Von Karman's recommendations spurred onward a chase for an

invincible jet bomber already underway since 1943.^
The Tmman administration did its own study in 1947. The President's Air Policy
Commission, normally named after its chairman Thomas Finletter, heard testimony from
leaders within the various services, as well as prominent scientists. Other than the Navy
men's objections, the witnesses and the Commission's findings stressed the importance of
air power as a deterrent to any future aggression. Hanging over the Commission's
deliberation was not only the atomic bomb, but also Pearl Harbor. It warned in ominous
tones that America could no longer afford to lose thefirstbattle in a war. A congressional
inquiry drew similar conclusions.^
These developments found their best expression in the service's first Secretary,
Stuart Symington. A successftil businessman noted for saving various companies by
introducing operational efficiency, Symington strongly encouraged the service to develop
cost assessment and management programs. He also had an eye for public relations, and
ordered Air Force leaders to perfect sophisticated briefing and staffing procedures that
would present a professional, unifiedfrontto congressional committees, the press, and

^Charles Bright, The Jet Makers: The Aerospace Industry from 1945-1972
(Lawrence, Kans.: The Regents Press of Kansas, 1978), 31-37; Futrell, Ideas, vol. I, 205206; Michael Gom, Harnessing the Genie, xiii, 17-18 (Arnold quote), 28-47 (von
Karman's work); Michael Gom, ed.. Prophecy Fulfilled: "Toward New Horizons" and Its
Legacy (Washington, D C : Air Force History and Museums Program, 1994); and
Worden, 36. In Harnessing the Genie. Gom ttaces the Air Force-science marriage and
laments the retteat of the Air Force Scientific Advisory Board (SAB)-a 1944 von Karman
brainchild-from purely scientific forecasting. Goon believes this was due to the increase in
uniformed scientists within the service (19, 183-186). The SAB plays a role in the A-lO's
life. Prophecy Fulfilled contains von Karman's various essays, including "Where We
Stand," the report on German advances. The "later observer," is Richard Hallion, in his
"A Troubling Past," 6-7. Hallion considers von Karman's work a "scientific and
technological think piece regretfully detached from realistic doctrinal underpinnings "
''Bright, 13; Thomas Finletter, "Survival in the Air Age," United States President's
Air Policy Commission, (Washington, D C : Government Printing Office, 1 January
1948), 3-10; and Futrell, Ideas, vol. 1, 224-230.
52

other potential critics. Finally, Symington was an airpower convert, and helped the Air
Force generals pursue their jets, their bombers, and their force size aims.'
The 1947 military reorganization and ensuing American defense policy did not go
as far as some people, particulariy Air Force leaders, wanted. The airmen did not gain
control over various functions of the other services; but the national interest, their past
experience at bureaucratic infighting, and perhaps some of Symington's techniques ensured
that they got the majority of the defense budget to service their planes-especially the

^^

bombers that formed the backbone of the new service. In the late 1940s, they bested their
naval aviator rivals in a nasty public squabble over strategic bomber versus aircraft carrier
funding. Indeed, they did so well that they provoked a failed counter-public relations
campaign by the Navy, dubbed the "Admirals' Revolt," which left a residue of fear and
distmst among the other services for the newest one Even so, the airmen's tack matched
Americans' desire to deter communist aggression without a large army.'"
However, a jet bomber Air Force was very expensive. Jet engines were much
more complex, costly, and difficult to develop and build than reciprocating engines. They
also spawned expensive aerodynamic and stmctural design features to handle the sharply
increased speeds. These were a factor in any jet aircraft design, but the bombers' size and
complexity magnified the problems. Operational considerations secured more special

'George Watson, Jr., The Office of the Secretary of the Air Force. 1947-1965
(Washington, D C : Center for Air Force History, 1993), 38-39, 54-58, and 61-67; and
Worden, 31-32.
'"LTCOL Thomas Gartett, USA, "Close Air Support: Why All the Fuss?"
(Military Studies program paper, U.S. Army War College, 1990), 7 (commenting upon the
birth of Air Force-Navy rancor, cites Air Force general's opinion of the Marines as a "small
bitched-up army [sic] talking Navy lingo"); Maslowski and Millett, 500-505; and Smith,
15-20, 113-114 (cites doctrinalrigidityand desire for autonomy as major factors in Air
Force planning efforts). A good overall account of the nasty fight between bomber
generals and carrier admirals is Jeffrey Barlow's, The Revolt of the Admirals (Washington,
D.C : Department of the Navy, 1994). Isenberg accuses such Air Force generals as
George Kenney and Jimmy Doolittle of provoking the "revolt" by their public boasts about
bombers' superiority over the Navy's carriers; see "Rebellion in Gold Braid," chap in
Shield of the Republic. 142-162.
53

attention for these planes. The Air Force had to develop tanker planes to refuel bombers
for the projected raids against the Soviets' homeland Even without actually dropping an
atomic bomb, the intercontinental nuclear mission and associated air refueling procedure
required a constant, intensive ttaining. Air Force bomber leaders wanted maximum
mission proficiency, for the country relied upon them to counterbalance Soviet threats in
such Cold War face offs as the 1948 Beriin Blockade. The Finletter Commission and later
Tmman administtation policy supported other types of planes, but the bombers consumed
by far the largest portion of the new service's manpower and budget."

The New Air Force and the Army

The Air Force did not eliminate the ground support mission, but Cold War and
budget battle exigencies led the service to neglect it. '^ As for the Army, it acquiesced in
this trend with only occasional mmblings. This was a shabby conclusion to a development
which promised so much during World War II's last years.
After World War II ended, both airmen and soldiers looked with satisfaction upon
the air support apparatus they created. The Army accepted not only this but such other
airpower contributions as achieving air superiority and crippling war efforts in the German
heartland. After all, even the U.S. Strategic Bombing Survey praised aerial bombing's
"Bright, 13-18, 31-39, 103-117 (the latter page entry comprises the appropriately
named chapter, "Design or Die"; Cold War exigencies put the aviation companies on a
treadmill of everrisingperformance expectations); Futtell, Ideas, vol. I, 229-231; Richard
Rhodes, Dark Sun: The Making of the Hydrogen Bomb (New York: Simon & Schuster,
1995), 340-351.
Two good sources for the bomber men's influence and the difficulties of bomber
building are Michael Brown, Flving Blind: The Politics of the U.S. Strategic Bomber
Program (Ithaca, NY.: Cornell University Press, 1992); and Nick Kotz, Wild Blue
Yonder: Money. Politics, and the B-1 Bomber (New York: Pantheon Books, 1988).
'^Joseph Harahan and Richard Kohn, eds.. Air Superiority in World War II and
Korea: An Interview with Gen. James Ferguson. Gen. Robert M. Lee. Gen. William
Momver. and Lt. Gen. Elwood R. Quesada, U.S. Air Force Warrior Studies (Washington,
D C : Office of Air Force History, 1983), 63-64 (GEN Momyer recalled that other Air
Force missions remained doctrinally alive during this time, but funding covered only the
strategic mission).
54

impact upon the German Air Force, oil production, andfransportation.Wartime lessons
also made the Army leaders appreciate the airmen's desire to control air assets in a theater
campaign. In 1947, Army Chief of Staff Dwight Eisenhower told both Congress and the
Secretary of the Army that a supreme commander wanted one expert point-of-contact for
air issues, and not several selfish subordinate Army commanders who were neither as
qualified nor as available to concentrate on the air war. Finally, the atomic bomb's
implications overwhelmed some Army leaders' modem warfighting view. Thus they were
willing to let the airmen to form a separate service, though General Eisenhower made the
creation of a tactical air arm one of the conditions of the split."
The 1947 National Security Act and accompanying Executive Order 9877 that
created the Department of Defense (DoD), Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), National
Security Council (NSC), various science research agencies, and of course, the Air Force,
did not sharply specify service duties. Defense Secretary James Forrestal wanted the
ensuing 1948 Key West Agreement to resolve major areas of growing interservice
dissension. It did not completely accomplish this regarding Air Force-Navy disputes, buK.
the Air Force agreed to provide close air support to the Army. The Agreement document
even defined close air support: "The attack by aircraft of hostile ground or naval targets
which are so close to friendly forces as to require detailed integration of each air mission
"Frederic Bergerson, The Army Gets an Air Force: Tactics of Insurgent
Bureaucratic Politics (Baltimore, Md.: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1980), 37-38,
43-46; Futrell, 171-178, Hadley, 82-87 (believes the Army's lack of overriding mission
agendas made it more amenable to Air Force independence); Hughes, 306-308 (Army
leader response to nuclear war); Richard Davis, The 31 Initiatives: A Study in Air
Force-Army Cooperation. U.S. Air Force Air Staff Historical Study, (Washington, D C :
Office of Air Force History, 1987), 9 (Eisenhower stipulation); Harahan and Kohn, Air
Superiority. 65-66 (Momyer and Quesada recall the conditions for separation and the air
force's strong desire to be separate); United States Strategic Bombing Survey, Summary
Report (Washington, D C : Government Printing Office, 30 September 1945; reprint,
MAFB: Air University Press, October 1987), 18-25, 30-31 (page references are to reprint
edition). Eisenhower opinion is from his testimony in Congress, House, Committee on
Expenditure in the Executive Department, Hearings on H.R. 2319. 219. 687. 80th cong.,
I St sess., 299, cited in MAJ Head, "A-7," 104; and his Memorandum to the Secretary of
Defense, entitled Tactical Air Support 3 November 1947, cited in Futrell, Idfias, vol. 1,
176-177.
55

with the fire and movement of those forces." With some modifications, the definition
would remain the same, but its implications for operations and procurement would shift.
The 1949 Bradley-Vandenberg Agreement further cemented the Air Force and Army
relationship by letting the Army have airplanes, but it restricted their maximum weight so
that the Army possessed only small liaison aircraft."
The two services also worked on, or appeared to work on, detailed close air support
procedures. Shortly after war's end, the Army hoped to create an air support apparatus
similar to the one set up in France. The 1946 revision to their FM 31-35, Air-Ground
Operations, featured co-equal air and ground commanders serving under a theater
commander, along with Army and Air Force liaison officers assigned to a Joint Operations
Center (JOC) and subordinate air and ground command headquarters. Air requests went
up the Army chain-of-command ladder, reviewed along the way by the liaison officers. If
they decided that organic Armyfirepowercould not better handle the request, they passed
it to the next higher level or to the JOC, as appropriate. The JOC determined the request's
validity relative to other air tasks, and if it passed review, the JOC tasked the appropriate air
unit. The procedure was cumbersome, but the two services explicitly rejected the Marines'
more streamlined method. Marine liaison teams at intermediate levels could task air units
in pressing circumstances, and Marines used smaller units with less heavyfirepowerin
smaller-scale, shorter-duration operations. On the other hand. Air Force and Army leaders
remembered the massive campaigns they had fought in World War II Europe. Even so,
with the Air Force committing so much of its resources to sttategic bombing, and Army

"Public Law 253, 61 Stat, Chap., 343, 80th Cong., 1st Sess., The National
Security Act of 1947. 26 July 1947, reprinted in Richard Wolf, The United States Air
Force: Basic Documents on Roles and Missions. U.S. Air Force, Air Sttiff Historical
Study, (Washington, D C : Office of Air Force History, 1987), 63-80 (page references are
from reprint); Executive Order 9877, 26 July 1947, reprinted in Basic Documents. 87-89
(page references from reprint); Basic Documents. 151-165, 237 (CAS definition, 165).
One oft-quoted essay on the Key West Agreement is Morton and David Halperin's "The
Key West Key," Foreign Policy (Winter 1983/1984): 114-130. However, the authors enin ascribing to the agreement so much of the later difficulty between the Air Force and
Army when there were other factorsnot to mention several later agreements-which also
played a role.
56

leaders facing severe manpower reductions, neither service ever gave the complex system
the attention it deserved.'^
The results were obvious. The Air Force eliminated the "A" for "attack"
designation of even its World War Il-vintage medium bombers. Liaison positions went
unfilled, or often contained unskilled or apathetic people. The two services did not
establish reliable radio links between pilots and ground parties. Joint maneuvers between
the years 1947 and 1950 featured air response delays and embarrassing instances where
lack of communications prevented any CAS. This bred some complaints from within the
Army leadership, but mostly that service seemed resigned to let the Air Force go its
separate way. The misuse of the "bomb line" best exemplified the actual dearth of
cooperation. This was a set distance infrontof one's own forward lines which ground
commanders used in World War Two to designate to the airmen where they required prior
coordination for air strikes. The intent was to prevent air-to-ground fratricide as well as to
avoid duplication of effort by planes and the Army's own heavy firepower. In the postwar
exercises the bomb line became more a strict demarcation line between ground fires and air
sttikes; the two services effectively gave up on the CAS mission as set forth in the Key
West Agreement. '^
The before-mentioned exercises also revealed that the Air Force's new jet planes
created problems for CAS accomplishment. Now wedded to what one aviation historian
called the "fighter-bomber" concept, the airmen viewed the F-80 and F-84 (for photos, see
Appendix Figs. 11 and 12) asfightersthat could also fly ground support missions, just as

'^Robert Asprey, CAPT, USA, "Close Air Support," Armv 12 (November 1961):
36-37 (explains Army-Marine warfighting differences); McLennan, "Close Air Support
History," 43; Futtell, Ideas. Vol. L 176-177, 705 (explains fundamental warfighting
concept differences between the Army and Marines); Isenberg, 266-267; Alan Millett,
"Korea, 1950-1953," in Cooling, ed.. Case Studies. 347-348; Goldberg and Smith,
"Army-Air Force Relations," 46 (also explains Marine differences).
'^Hadley, 112-113 (Hadley describes a European exercise during the Korean War
years where American planes and ttoops could not communicate; though it is after the time
discussed in this passage, it is interesting to note the problem still persisted); Head, 113
(designation changes); Millett, 349.
57

P-47s did in World War II. Even though the helter-skelter push for ever faster jets would
soon rendered these planes obsolete, they were a magnitude performance increase over
their prop-driven predecessors. Their operating speeds were almost double, and their turn
radius almost three times, that of the World War II fighters. If ground target recognition
and the ability to maneuver quickly to attack a suddenly recognized ground target was
difficult before, it was even more so now. Compounding the problem was the jet planes'
high fuel consumption, which restricted their time over target. The Air Force stuck to the
fighter-bomber concept, but it became increasingly obvious thatfightertechnology
advances created hard choices about optimum mission performance. One could not have it
both ways with the best air superiority designs and close air support designs. '^
Finally, the major tactical air warfare command-the establishment of which was a
precondition for Air Force independencefound itself in the budgetary and bureaucratic
wilderness. The Tactical Air Command's (TAC)firstchief was none other than Pete
Quesada of France air support fame. Interestingly, Quesada at this time echoed other
airpower enthusiasts by asserting that, if tactical air was properly managed, interdiction
missions would prevent enemy ground forces from defeating one's own ttoops. But even
this idea did not sway the bomber generals who ran the service. They believed that
Quesada and his command were too close to the Army; thus, they subordinated TAC to
another major command and reduced its staff to a skeleton force. Quesada told the rest of
the leadership that providing support to the Army was the best insurance against the Army
reentering tactical aviation with its own aircraft, but his pleas fell on deaf ears, and he
resigned in disgust. This caused some minor outcry, but little else given American and Air
'^Walter Boyne, "The Evolution of Jet Fighters," Air University Review 35
(January Febmary 1984): 36-37, 42; Bright, Jet Makers. 10-17; Futrell, Ideas, vol I, 307;
Hadley, 113; Hallion, "A Troubling Past," 4-7; Head, 110-114; Klaus Huenecke, Modem
(^ombat Aircraft Design, trans. Dermot McElholm (n.p.: Motorbuch Verlag, 1984;
reprint, Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press, Airiife Publishing, 1994), 27-28 (page
references are to reprint); Ed Mischler, "The A-X Specialized Close Air Support Aircraft:
Origins and Concept Phase, 1961-1970," (Wright-Patterson AFB, Ohio Air Force
Systems Command Office of History, 1977), photocopied, 4, Millett, "Korea," 349, and
Mike Spick, The Ace Factor: Air Combat and the Role of Situational Awareness
(Annapolis, Md.: The Naval Institute Press, 1988), 14
58

Force warfighting preferences. As for the Army's reaction, a later generation of Air Force
leaders would see Quesada's observation vindicated. In the meantime, the belief in
strategic bombing's invincibility and the insignificance of CAS was about to be shaken in
another conflict in that far-off place called Korea. 18

CAS and Korea

As Air Force Chief of Staff Hoyt Vandenberg later complained to a senate
committee, the Korean War just did not conform to Air Force doctrine. As a matter of
fact, it did not fit anything Americans wanted to do regarding their world role. Nuclear
deterrence did not prevent aggression. Korea was a hot war in which American
citizen-soldiers fought and died. Humanitarian, military, and foreign policy considerations
prevented use of the nuclear sttategic bombers. At times, the Army had to fight
undermanned and out-gunned in a fluid combat situation. And the rascally enemy would
not do what American military leaders expected it to do."

'^CAPT Scott Fedorchak, "Close Air Support: Repeating the Past... Again?" Air
Power Journal 8 (Spring 1994): 24; Futrell, Ideas, vol. I, 177-178; Hadley, 92-93;
Hallion, "A Troubling Past," 6; Hughes, 310-314; Schlight, "Quesada," in Makers, ed.,
Frisbee, 198-203; Smith, 23-24 (cites outright neglect offightersin headlong msh for
strategic development); and Worden, 38-40. Atomic bombing doctrine temporarily swayed
even the great tactical aviation advocate, GEN (then COL) William Momyer. In a 1948
study, he opined that tactical aviation would probably be unnecessary in the next war, and
thatfighterescort of bombers was obsolete (U.S. Air Force, Tactical Air Command, An
Evaluation of the Exchange of the 31st Fighter Group for the 82d Fighter Group, by COL
William Momyer, USAF (10 August 1948), cited in Futtell, Ideas, vol. I, 239. Momyer
later admitted tactical air was in retteat during this time; see Harahan and Kohn, Air
Superiority. 62-63.
"Vandenberg citation is from his testimony in Congress, Senate, Hearings before
the Committee on Armed Services and the Committee on Foreign Relations, Military
Situation in the Far East. 82dCong., 1st sess., 28 May 1951, 1378-1379, 1492-1493,
1500-150. Hadley, 100-102, 120; Isenberg, 268-280; D. Clayton James and Anne Sharp
Wells, Refighting tiie Last War: Command and Crisis in Korea. 1950-1953 (New York:
The Free Press, 1993), 1-8, 232-245; Maslowski and Millett, 520-526, and Mrozek, 14,
22, all mention that Korea was something the Americans did not expect. Isenberg writes of
air leaders' dismay over the communists' ability to adapt to air interdiction James and
Wells, Refitihting the La.st War 2-4, 7; and Millett, in "Korea," 358, 386-388, 396, wnte
59

Airpower made a big difference in this war, however. Both American and
communist military leaders cited its importance in stopping two major ground offensives.
Americanfightersmaintained air superiority, restricting communistfighterjets to only
occasional successes (against unescorted heavy bombers, for example, as in World War II).
But the services bickered over the CAS mission.^"
Most of the early air support missions were interdiction strikes not far behind the
vanguard of the North Korean advance. The communists indiscreetly massed their ttoops
and vehicles in their conventional-style offensive, creating lucrative targets for attack
planes. Interestingly, given the airmen's pre-World War II dismissal of air attacks' morale
effect upon troops, such strikes unnerved even hard-core communist soldiers known for
their massed suicidal charges. However, Army dissatisfaction with Air Force CAS
surfaced early on, for a variety of reasons. The jet pilots of the Air Force commands flying
in Korea had practiced air-to-air tactics and knew little about CAS. Given the long takeoff
and landing distances required by their higher flying speeds, F-80s and F-84s could not
operate from the rough fields within the ever-constricting U.N. held Korean territory.
Flying the increased distances from Japanese bases further limited the jets' time to work a
battlefield problem, especially considering their already poor loiter time. And since they
were air-to-air planes, their bomb-carrying capacity-aggravated by their poor fuel
consumptionwas very poor. Their radios were often incompatible with the ground
parties' radios. And though their attack speeds were not thettansonicand supersonic

of the Americans' reliance on airpower to make up for their lack of ground-based heavy
firepower. Futtell describes the army's early lack of heavyfirepowerin his massive survey.
The United States Air Force in Korea. 1950-1953 (n.p.: Duell, Sloan, and Pierce, 1961,
reprint, Washington: Office of Air Force History, 1996), 707 (page reference is from 1996
reprint).
^"Congress, Senate. Close Air Support. 176, 186; Futrell. Air Force in Korea.
371-372,411-418; Ideas, vol. I, 303, 350-351; MAJ Roger Kropf, USAF, "The U.S. Air
Force in Korea: Problems that Hindered the Effectiveness of Air Power," Airpower
Journal 4 (Spring 1990): 39-40; Maslowski and Millett, 522-524; and Dana Johnson and
James Winnefield, Joint Air Operations: Pursuit of Unity in Command and Control.
1942-1991. RAND Research Sttidy (Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press, 1993), 44-45.
60

velocities of later jets, they were fast enough that even discerning troops in the open was
nearly imix)ssible.^'
One prominent army complainer was the current U.N. Chief-of-Staff, Major
General Edward Almond. Almond saw service in Italy, remembered the quality CAS
developed there, and expected the same in Korea. The jets' poor CAS performance was
one aggravation, but the lack of coordination effort was another. In this case, both services
shared the blame, given the lack of persormel assigned to man the cumbersome air task
system. The one Air Force CAS item Almond and others liked was the performance of the
World War Il-vintage P-51 (now designated F-51) Mustang, relegated in Korea to a
ground support role. It operated from shorter strips close to the battlelines, its loiter time
over the battlefield was longer, and its speed and maneuverability guaranteed better target
acquisition. Finally, since the Air Force committed the plane and its pilots to ground
support, those pilots worked to perform that mission well.^^

^'GAO, Close Air Support: Principal Issues and Aircraft Choices. Appendix I, 55;
McLennan, "Close Air Support History," 44-50 (Army leaders' praise for airmen's role in
stopping the North Korean summer offensive, as well as their later condemnation of Air
Force CAS); Futrell, Korea. 84-98; Richard Hallion, The Naval Air War in Korea (New
York: Zebra Books, 1986), 75-76 (interservice incompatibility over maps and radios);
Lynch, "Close Air Support: Its Failed Form and Its Failing Function," 76 (Army Korean
War veteran recalls failures of jet CAS); Kropf, "Air Force in Korea: Problems," 41-43;
and Millett, "Korea," 353-361. Target acquisition problems of jets is from MAJ Charles
Goforth, USAF, "Do We Need a New Aircraft for Close Air Support?" (Master's thesis.
Air Command and Staff College, 1967), 18-19; and COL J. Hunter "J.H." Reinburg.
USMCR, "Close Air Support," Ami3i 53 (April 1962): 60-61. Goforth wrote that troop
acquisition probability decreased to nil above four hundred knots and fifteen hundred feet
altitude, which was roughly the weapons release parameters the jets used. Reinburg, who
flew Marine CAS in Korea, made similar observations based upon his experiences there.
For morale effects, see Stephen Hosmer, "Psychological Effects of U.S. Air Operations in
Four Wars, 1941-1991: Lessons for U.S. Commanders," RAND Project AIR FORCE
Study #MR-576-AF (Santa Monica, Calif: RAND, 1996), 88-89, 104-119. Hosmer
observes that the communists' inexperience with air attacks, their exhaustion and hunger,
and the open movement nature of the early war magnified the effect Once the lines
solidified and the forces constmcted shelters, the morale effect was less.
"M J. Armitage and R.A. Mason, Air Power in the Nuclear Age (Urbana, 111 .
University of Illinois Press, 1983), 24; James Bradin, From Hot Air to Hell fire: History of
61

Almond took command of the U.N. forces' X Corps, and the real aggravation for
him and other Army leaders came when Marine airmen gave outstanding support to their
particular units. The Marines remained dedicated to the CAS mission after World War
Two, and many of the Marine pilots in Korea flew CAS in that war. Also, their airplanes
were World War Il-vintage, radial-engine F4U Corsairs and A-1 Skyraiders (see photos
Appendix Figs. 13 and 14). Both planes were superior to the F-51 for CAS work, but the
Skyraider was in a class all by itself The big mgged plane could loiter, absorb punishment,
and carry a lot of ordnance. Thus, the actual combat comparison between these planes
and the CAS-deficient F-80s could be glaring. Retired Navy Admiral John Thach
remembered what one Air Force forward air controller (FAC) told aflightof F-80s
arriving on target low on fuel, carrying only two 100-pound bombs per plane, and
demanding priority over Navy prop planes already in the area: "Well, take your two little
firecrackers and drop them up the road somewhere because I've got something . . . that has
a load." The soldiers saw this performance disparity, and Almond and other Army leaders
began a public protest about unsatisfactory Air Force CAS performance. Their efforts led
Army Chief of Staff J. Lawton Collins to formally request greater Army control of CAS as
well as development of a dedicated CAS plane either for the Army or the Air Force."

Arniv Attack Aviation (Novato, Calif: Presidio Press, 1994), 83-84; Futrell, Korea. 9497; Michael Lewis, "Lt. Gen. Ned Almond, USA: A Ground Commander's Conflicting
View with Airmen over CAS Doctrine and Employment," (School of Advanced Airpower
Studies tiiesis. Air University, 1996), 71; Littlejohn, "Battle m the Fourth Dimension," 1718 (citations arguing over the Air Force's air support in Korea); Lynch, "Close Air
Support: Its Failed Form and Its Failing Function," 75 (F-51 praise): Millett, "Korea,"
362-363; "Mistakes in Air Support Methods in Korea," U.S. News & Worid Report 34 (6
March 1953): 58-61; and Worden, 41. One reason the F-5 Is were in Korea was because
the Air Force wanted to keep some of its advanced jets to cover the Soviet threat in
Europe, and by this time there were no longer enough spare parts to maintain the more
mgged P-47s; see Futrell, Korea. 391, Hallion, Naval Air War in Korea. 68 (observes that
pilots preferred a P-47, given the P-Sl's proven vulnerabilities); and Werrell, Archie. 76.
"MAJ Russell Bennett, USAF, "Can the A-X Adequately Replace the A-1 in the
COIN and SAR Roles?" (Research sttidy. Air Command and Staff College, 1973), 11-12
(praises A-1 performance, and mentions that its durability); Robert Dorr, Skvraider (New
York: Bantam Books, 1988), 86-91; Hallion, Naval Air War in Korea. 72-73
62

This occurred early in the war, and for its duration Air Force leaders fought the
other services as much as they did the communists.^" They tried to gain control of Marine
air units, complaining that the system would work if all U.N. air units were under one
command. From general officer level to pilot level, they worked to eliminate the air
support system's problems. Perhaps due to Symington's influence-and perhaps due to
their memory of bureaucratic battles long past-the airmen closed ranks against the soldiers,
who in turn could not muster enough unity and time to get their way. Indeed, a 1951
interservice CAS study revealed that Army leaders relied too much upon air support while
not fulfilling their manning obligations within the air task system. Finally, the two services
resolved divisive issues such as the Army's desire for CAS planes, as well as its increasing
use of a new aviation technology, the helicopter. Two interservice agreements between Air

(fundamental differences in Air Force and Marine CAS development); Michael Lewis,
"Ned Almond," 84-88; and Millett, "Korea," 365-37. Admiral Thach quote is from
interview of ADM John S. Thach, USN (ret.) by CDR Etta-Belle Kitchen, USN, (U.S.
Naval Institute Oral History Program), 533, cited in Hallion, Naval Air War in Korea. 78.
Hallion discusses the comparative ground attack advantages and disadvantages of jets and
props (81 -84, 151-154), but seems to favor jets (151, 291, 296). The propeller planes
carried heavier loads, were more maneuverable, and could loiter longer. The jets could
strike quickly and with little warning. The propeller planes had greater lossratesbut had
better accuracy than the jets. The Skyraider was much better than the Corsair in loadcarrying capacity and survivability (89, 151-152). Ironically, Hallion favors the CAS
mission much more in this book than he does in his other works. He also cites the
soldiers' favorable impression of Marine CAS (87).
The other services had a congressional ally in Congressman Carl Vinson (D-GA),
who unfavorably compared Air Force CAS to Marine CAS both before and during the war
(Millett, "Korea," 351, 371). However, Vinson was a Navy partisan in the pre-Korea roles
and missions battles (Hadley, 87-88, Isenberg, 66-70). One reason Army leaders preferred
a dedicated CAS plane was that they believed the Air Force divertedfighter-bombersto
other missions at the expense of CAS (Futrell, Ideas, vol. I, 308).
^"This work will not address most of these fights, but suffice it to say the Army,
Navy, and Marines launched bureaucratic campaigns against the Air Force CAS system
due to its real and perceived failures. Marine air's star turn during X Corps' Chosin
retrograde conclusively settled matters for many soldiers For these later incidents, see
Isenberg, 266-267; and Millett, "Korea," 373, 377-383, 387-392, 396-398.
63

Force Secretary Thomas Finletter and Army Secretary Frank Pace allowed the Army to
use these new aircraft, but stipulated that the Army could not duplicate Air Force
fixed-wing missions; its aircraft would perform their roles only close to thefrontlines; and
its fixed-wing planes still retained a weight restriction. Casting an eye at the Soviet
presence in Europe, and fearing that they would fight outnumbered in any future war
there, the Air Force stood firm in its desire to have multirole fighters. And taking
advantage of the Army's lack of a coherent plan for handling air assets. Air Force leaders
convincingly quashed the budding Army desire for its own attack planes.^^
The Air Force later continued to bend results to its liking. Its Korean War accounts
emphasized Army leader praise for the airmen instead of the earlier controversy or the
continued simmering discontent. Likewise, the airmen and their chroniclers insisted that jet
CAS performance improved with increased mission exposure, which meant the service's
choice of fighter jets was correct all along. (Korean jet-compatible bases increased with
rising U.N. fortunes, improving jet loiter time.) Further, they asserted that jets carried
bigger weapons loads, suffered fewer losses, and could fly other missions if needed. ^^

"Air Force counterefforts arefromMillett, "Korea," 368-369, 371-373, 375-377,

383, 388-390, 397; and the Pace-Finletter Agreements arefromGoldberg and Smith,
"Army-Air Force Relations," 9-12. Army leaders' CAS quality opinions featured mixed
opinions instead of unified dissatisfaction; see McLennan, "Close Air Support History,"
47-50; and Goldberg and Smith, "Army-Air Force Relations," 10. Air Force multirole
fighter stand in these proceedings is from Davis, 31 Initiatives, by 11-12. Friction over
Army helicopter use is from Bradin, 83-85; and Goldberg and Smith, "Anny-Air Force
Relations," 10. Marine Reserve CAS plane advocate, COL J.H. Reinburg, noted the Air
Force's predilection for jet CAS, the Korean War consequences, and the Army's
subsequent discontent in his "Trials of Close Air Support Aircraft," Army 16 (March .,
1966): 66-67. Interestingly, Worden claims that friction existed between Air Force
bomber leaders andfighterleaders over how the war should best be fought; see Worden,
Fighter Generals. 42-43. This may be so, but it certainly did not stop both factions from
uniting against the Army.
^^For Army praise citations, as well as continued Army leader ambivalence, see
McLennan, 48-50 (Army criticism, and includes future TAC commander GEN Gabriel
Disosway's assertions in a 9 May 1963 speech to the American Ordnance Association that
tactical airp)ower stood the test of Korea); General William Momyer's testimony in Senate,
r^o.se Air Support. 29 October 1971, 186 (cites army leader praise); and Futrell, Korea.
64

But some of these claims failed to stand scmtiny. Fighter jet pilots required
diversion from their other missions to master CAS, something hard to do given their planes'
characteristics. Also, one could not count on having just therightkind of bases for the
jets. The airmen downplayed the F-51's accomplishments by emphasizing its loss rate
performing CAS. The F-51 still had the same vulnerability problem that hurt it in World
War II. Its in-line cylinder engine relied upon a coolant system that was too vulnerable to
small-arms fire. Had the P-47 with its mgged constmction and air-cooled radial engine
been used, the loss rate might have been lower. The Air Force leaders still preferred
fighter-bombers because they wanted planes that "could function better in contested air
space." But they committed their F-86 (see Appendix Fig. 15) interceptor jets to clear
Korean skies, while the F-80s and F-84s could not out-perform the MiG-15s they
occasionally encountered on interdiction missions. Indeed, the propeller-driven AD-1
Skyraider used by the Navy and Marines could not defeat MiGs either, but it could
outturn them and thus had a chance to defend itself ^^
And speaking of vulnerabilities. Air Force historians included Korea CAS losses as
yet another example of the mission's relatively high battle cost. However, a recent Korea
CAS historical study stated that no conclusion about CAS losses in that war was possible

704-708 (these pages are Futrell's summary of Korea air support). The "Tactical air
support" index entry in Futrell's Korea contains four times as many "praise" references as
"criticism" references (Korea. 816). For the rest of the paragraph items, see Millett,
"Korea," 375-377, 394-395.
The service continued to porfray Korea as a vindication of fast jet CAS. In a later
CAS plane controversy. Air Force Pentagon staffer, LTCOL Bmce Carlson, did so in his
"Close Air Support," Military Review 69 (June 1989): 52-53. This earned a letters editor
rebuttal from Air Force MAJ Roger Kropf, in "MR Letters," Military Review 69 (October
1989): 90 (Kropf had written on Korean War air power issues).
"MAJ Raoul Archambault, USA, and LCDR Thomas Dean, USN, "Ending the
Close Air Support Controversy" (Research paper, U.S. Naval War College, 1991),
19-20 (also rebuts Carison); Larry Davis, MiG Allev: Air to Air Combat Over Korea
(Can-ollton, Tex.: Squadron/Signal Publications, 1978), 11, 15, 23; Don-. Skyraider. 88,
Millett, "Korea," 362-363, 394 (quote); Kropf, "MR Letters," 90, and Wen-ell, Archie.
75-81. Prop planes occasionally bagged MiGs whose pilots got overconfident or careless
(Davis, MiOAiky, 23).
65

because flight records did not differentiate between air support close to the battlefield, and
the interdiction missions against army reserves the Air Force favored. Another observer
intimated that part of the loss-rate problem-if there was one compared to sttategic
bombing and interdictionwas due to tactics. To reduce casualties, air leaders ordered
their pilots to release their weapons at higher altitudes to avoid the heavy small arms fire.
This hindered weapons accuracy somewhat, but also reduced losses. It also applied to both
propeller and jet planes, thus belying the Air Force claim that the faster jets somehow
outran concentrated antiaircraft fire in their weapons mns. And since Navy leaders were
not as concerned with the hypothetical airfighting prowess of their tactical planes, they
weighed down their Skyraiders with protective armor to reduce small arms damage.^^
The lessons the Air Force wanted to take from this war were not conducive to
maintaining what CAS capability they established during its duration. The man who
eventually commanded the air forces in Korea, O.P. Weyland of France fame, seemed
fixated upon interdiction as a war winner. When that did not happen, he and other Air
Force leaders complained about the war's idiosyncrasies compared to what they
encountered in World War II. Though he once commented that it seemed his service
forgot all its World War II lessons in Korea, he in turn chose to forget that interdiction did
not work in all of the earlier war's situations either. It failed in Italy when the lines

^^Futtell, Ideas, vol. I, 350 (cites Korean War Air Force leader, BGEN James
Ferguson's, preference for interdiction, given a straightforward profit-and-loss assessment);
Hallion "A Retrospective Assessment," 18 (similar conclusion as Ferguson, but see his
Naval Air War in Korea. 307, for a more CAS-favorable opinion); Millett, 395-396
("recent" study); and Werrell, 75-76.
Werrell cites an interesting Air Force use of statistics. The difference between F-51
and F-80 losses was 1.9 percent and 0.74 percent, respectively; and though any loss
increase should be avoided, the Air Force used this one percent difference to say the prop
plane losses were three times the losses of the jets. Furthermore, the issue of vulnerability
versus survivability arose here. Werrell mentions that the Navy's F4U prop planes took
more hits than its F9F jets, but fails to say if these hits produced a correspondingly higher
loss rate (Hallion did not discuss loss statistic methodology in Naval Air War in Korea,
though Navy/Marine Corsairs and Skyraiders did experience much higher losses than their
Navy/Marine jet counterparts; see p. 287). The "other observer" is Werrell, 76-81. The
Navy's actions with its Skyraider planes are from Dorr, 88; and Isenberg, 265
66

solidified, and it failed in the latter stages of the Korean War when, for both political and
military reasons, the lines also stabilized. In both cases the enemy had reduced need for
supplies at the front, and the communists also performed feats of primitive repair and
transportation skill which undid air efforts designed for a more industrially developed
enemy. But rather than recognize that shifting circumstances in war required different
mission emphases, Weyland and the U.N. commander. Army General Mark Clark, praised
the failed interdiction campaign for preventing further communist offensives as well as
applying pressure for an armistice. It may have done these things, but other Army
commanders still called for more CAS to cover the "routine" assaults and counterassaults
that their citizen-soldiers experienced in the late war jockeying for Korean real estate.^'
Instead, the Air Force report on Korea stated that the "lavish" CAS seen in this
war was "unlikely to exist in future wars." As for the war being a model of future tricky
conventional conflicts facing the world's Defender of Democracy, the Air Force simply
dismissed its relevance. Air Force Secretary Thomas Finletter declared it was "a special
case, and airpower can learn little from there about its future role in United States foreign
policy." And still looking from Korea to the large Soviet presence in Eastern Europe, the
report asserted that in the future, the Air Force would require an all-out effort to gain and
maintain air superiority. If the Air Force faced an enemy of superior numbers and equal
quality, its future vision could well be tme. But there were so many other contingencies,
and the service ignored them all throughout the rest of the fifties.^"

^'Weyland's attitudes and interdiction's Korean War ttiumphs and failures are from
Fedorchak, "Repeating the Past," 24; Futrell, Ideas, vol. I, 341 (U.N. commander. General
Mark Clark, wanted interdiction as a means of applying pressure without sacnficing
American troops); Futtell, Korea. 700-704. Further commentary on Korean War air
interdiction is in Armitage and Mason, Air Power in the Nuclear Age. 26-27; Hallion,
"Retrospective Assessment," 14-15; Isenberg, 269-272; Kropf, 40-41; Mark, "Korean
Interdiction Campaigns of 1951," chap, in Aerial Interdiction. 287-319 (mentions that
many Air Force interdiction missions could also be costly, and that F-51 s flew these
missions as well as CAS); and Maslowski and Millett, 523-527.
30i

^Finletter quote is from Earl Til ford. Setup: What the Air Force Did in Vietnam
^nd Why (Maxwell AFB, Ala.: Air University Press, 1991), 21. Tilford quotes Air Force
officers of that time who stated that they wanted no future part of such wars because these
67

The "New Look" and the Air Force's

Separate Path
However, most Americans thought Korea was abnormal. As one Army historian
put it, that service seemed to be in a "fit of pique" as it discounted "victory" as a limited
war objective in the 1954 version of its operations doctrine manual. Even General
Matthew Ridgway, a later critic of the nuclear-centric American defense policy, asserted in
1953 that "War, if it comes again, will be total in character."" Americans preferred the
general war and total victory of the World War Two variety, and scorned the
uncomfortable limited fights that were the price of globalism. The new Eisenhower
administration satisfied their desire with a defense policy called the "New Look."'^
Featuring fiscal cutbacks and reduced forces in most services while pinning its
budget dollars and defense hopes on U.S Air Force Strategic Air Command's (SAC) big
bombers, the New Look was supposed to deter aggression at any level via the threat of
nuclear annihilation. As such, the policy bolstered the Air Force bomber-background
leadership's single-minded, technologically distorted, warfighting view. Indeed, in spite of
the claim that this defense posture could thwart enemy efforts at any level of warfare. Air
Force doctrine at the time assumed total wars against fully industrialized nations like the
Soviet Union. Arthur Hadley witnessed an Air Force bomber general advance this policy

wars did not fit the service's warfighting preferences. Air Force report quote and
observations are from U.S. Air Force, Far East Air Force, "Far East Air Force Report on
the Korean War," vol. 1,126, cited in Futtell, Ideas, vol. 1, 346-349, 351. For what this
meant for Air Force doctrine, see COL Dennis Drew, USAF, "Two Decades in the Air
Power Wilderness: Do We Know Where We Are?" Air University Review 37
(September-October 1986): 4.
"COL Harry Summers, USA, On Sttategv: 1 he Vietnam War in Context.
(Cariisle Barracks, Pa.: U.S. Army War College Strategic Studies Institute, 1981), 41.
Another observer who describes Air Force and national dismissal of the war is Mrozek, 1417,22.
'^CAPT Budd Jones, USAF, "Flashblind: The Tactical Air Commands Capability
for Close Air Support between the Korean and Vietnam Wars," in Proceedings.
Symposium: Air Support. Jones considers dissatisfaction with Korea as one of the driving
factors in New Look policy and the Air Force's reliance on SAC's bombers).
68

in a speech at the very conservative and pro-military Texas A&M University. He

wondered at the audience response until a fire broke out in an ashtray and a wag blurted,
"For God's sake, getridof that ashttay . .. before the general drops an H-bomb on it."
The SAC commander. General Curtis LeMay, was singulariy unapologetic about his
nuclear bomber beliefs. At times he asserted that the Air Force should give its tactical
planes to the Army."
Obviously, such overall leadership attitudes wreaked havoc upon conventional
tactical aviation within the Air Force. The director of Air Force intelligence made an
observation reminiscent of previous, and premonitory of future, "budget must match the
doctrine" attitudes: "In this fast-moving age we no longer can build non-nuclear forces at
the expense of our atomic strike and defense units."'" The Korean War's results at least
returned to TAC some of its independent status; but faced with bureaucratic extinction due
to the pro-SAC national defense policy, the new TAC leader, OP. Weyland, worked hard
to secure nuclear capability for his planes. All accounts of the 1950s TAC mention its
attempt to be a "junior SAC," as one historian put it. General T.R. Milton was then

"The "New Look" and SAC's bombers are from several sources, such as Robert
Buhrow, "Close Air Support Requirements: A Study of Interservice Rivalry" (Carlisle
Barracks, Pa.: U.S. Army War College, 1971), 22-23; Drew, "Two Decades in the Air
Power Wilderness," 6 (notes that Air Force doctrine actually assumed total wars against
indusfrialized nations); Futtell, Ideas, vol. 1,419-423; Hadley, 103 (quote), 132-133;
Jones, "Flashblind," 352; Maslowski and Millett, 544-551; Pen-et, 471-475; Tilford, 24-28;
and Weigley, 399-410. LeMay's attitudes are from Hugh Ahmann, LT GEN Marvin L.
McNickle (Ariington, Va.: USAF Oral History Program, 21 October 1985), 56, 60,
69-70, transcript, AFHRC, Holding K239.0512-1679 (McNickle was a TAC wing
commander and staff officer during the 1950s, and was familiar with LeMay's opinion);
Tilford, 39 (LeMay wanted TAC subsumed into Air Force-wide bomber command); and
Worden, 81.
'"MGEN James Walsh, USAF, "The Influence of Nuclear Weapons on the
Determination of Military Objectives," lecture. Air War College, MAFB, 18 December
1957, partially reprinted in Futtell, Ideas, vol. 1,464. Air University International Politics
Professor Dr. Eugene Emme also observed that "the diversion to missions of limited war in
support of. .. ground forces .. . inevitably weakens the sttength of strategic striking
forces." See Eugene Emme, "Some Fallacies Conceming Air Power," The Air Power
Historian 4 (July 1957): 137.
69

commander of TACs Thirteenth Air Force, and recalled that TAC units were "all trying to
be little SACs with the primary mission being the nuclear one." And one leader who later
figured prominently in the A-lO's birth. General John McConnell, observed that "We did
not even start doing anything about tactical aviation until about 1961 or 1962." Although it
seems incredible now. Air Force leaders seriously believed that nuclear weapon-armed
tactical jets would deter limited conflicts, and were ready to use nuclear weapons in limited
conflicts if they occurred.'^
This attitude duly affected tactical jet design. The Air Force's nuclear strike trend
combined with its leaders' belief in greater high-speed performance to produce the
"Century Series" fighters. Nicknamed thus because their designations ran in sequence
from "F-lOO" to "F-106" (there was no operational F-103 model, however), the planes
achieved the Air Force's dream of extremely high speed, but at the cost of maneuverability,
fuel efficiency, and weapons-carrying capacity. The F-lOl, F-102, F-104, and F-106 were
all primarily designed to intercept the anticipated incoming Soviet bomber fleets, and were
not supposed to have air-to-ground capability. But the Air Force later asserted that the

'^Ahmann, McNickle 70-71; Fake, "Evolution of Close Air Support Doctrine," 9

(observes that the Air Force abjured all joint doctrine committees during this time); Futrell,
Ideas, vol. 1,450-452, 468 (LeMay wanted bombers, not fighters, and loaded the Air
Force Pentagon staff with SAC disciples); GAO, Close Air Support: Principal Issues and
Aircraft Choices. Appendix I, 55-56; Head, 122-123 (Air Force tactical units reduced in
the late 1950s); Hasdorff, Hildretii. 42-43, 56, 60-63; Jones, 346-347, 351-353 (some air
leaders believed that nuclear weapons made armies practically obsolete, and reduction in
the nuclear bomb's size also spurred TACs nuclear orientation); David Maclsaac, "Voices
from the Central Blue: The Air Power Theorists," in Peter Paret, ed.. Makers of Modem
Strategy, from Macchiavelli to the Nuclear Age (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University
Press, 1986), 644-645; John Sbrega, "Southeast Asia," in Cooling, Case Studies. 411;
Tilford, 20-34 ("Junior SAC" quote, 32); Worden, 75-85; and Caroline Ziemke, "In the
Shadow of the Giant: USAF Tactical Air Command in the Era of Strategic Bombing,
1945-1955" (Ph.D. diss., Ohio State University, 1989), passim.
Milton quote is from his article, "USAF and the Vietnam Experience," Air Force
Magazine 58 (June 1975): 56. McConnell quote is from Sbrega, "Southeast Asia," 411
Nuclear-armed tactical air power's capabilities in limited war is from Futrell, Ideas, vol. I,
447-452, and 461-464 (LeMay believed that nuclear weapons applied not only to strategic
situations but to all lesser cases). Air Force tactical attitude is also in Dick, Disosway. 197,
246.
70

F-lOO and F-105 werefighter-bombersin the tradition of the P-47 and P-51 (for photos of
the F-lOO, F-104, and F-105, see Appendix Figs. 16-18)."
These two planes' CAS suitability, as well as thefighter-bomberconcept that
implied their competence in that mission, were both debatable. The F-lOO began its
operational life as an air-to-airfighter,and its initial claim to fame was its ability to break
the sound barrier in level flight. The Air Force, in its quest for speed as the determinant of
air superiority, sacrificed maneuverability in the plane's design requirements. Only later
would the service modify the F-lOO to carry bombs, and even then thefighterlacked the
fuel efficiency and payload capacity of such allegedly passe prop-driven attack planes as
the A-1. In fact, the F-lOO's initial bomb load was a nuclear one since the size of such
weapons had shmnk; the Air Force planned for the plane to use its speed to conduct a
one-pass nuclear attack. The F-105 represented a more concerted TAC effort to enter the
nuclear strike business. The service designed ii to perform a supersonic low-level dash to
the target, deliver its atomic payload, and streak away. As such, it excelled neither as an
air-to-air dogfighter nor as a tactical air support plane.'^

'^One harsh assessment of the "Century Series" comes from Hallion, "A Troubling
Past," 9-10. Ironically, Hallion embraces the multirole fighter concept in his Strike from
the Sky. 267, and his "A Retrospective Assessment," 20-25 (he apparently believes that the
Air Force could build tmly multirole planes). Other aviation historians who examined
these planes are Bright, Jet Makers. 16-17, 68, 112; Futrell, Ideas, vol. 11, 288; Bill
Gunston, "North American F-lOO Super Sabre," "Convair F-102 Delta Dagger," and
"Lockheed F-104 Starfighter," chaps, in his Early Supersonic Fighters of the West (New
York: Charies Scribner's Sons, 1976), 138-165, 166-183, 184-214; Neufeld, Sprev. 26;
and Tilford, 31-34.
F-lOO pilot and Air Command and Staff College student MAJ Thomas Barnes, in
his "A Concept for Tactical Fighter Design," 16-19, 22, 36-37, cites three reasons why the
air leaders assigned multiple roles to these jets: the "fighter-bomber" legacy of Worid War
II; rising complexity and associated costs meant fewer planes to handle the various
missions; and the nuclear mission that thefightergenerals believed they had to accomplish
to remain relevant.
"Asprey, "Close Air Support," 35-36; Barnes, "Concept," 37-38; Buhrow, "Study
in Interservice Rivalry," 22; Gunston, Supersonic Fighters. 146-147; Head, "A-7,"
114-116, 157-158; Jones. 353-355; Benjamin Lambeth, "Pitfalls in Fighter Force
Planning," RAND Report #P-7064 (Santa Monica, Calif: RAND, 1985), 11-14 (does not
71

Yet the F-lOO and F-105 could be made to do most anything, as their later Vietnam
performance attested. The main factor which could ensure their competence in diverse
missions was their pilots' adaptability. The task would be difficult, because the planes'
cockpit visibility was poor and their very high delivery speeds and lack of maneuverability
led to long slant-range weapons release parameters regardless of ordnance. For example,
in order to provide safe escape from both the ground and the blast fragmentation effects of
his own ordnance during dive pullout, an F-lOO pilot had to release bombs five thousand
feet above ground level (AGL) in a forty-five degree dive bomb delivery. This practical
consideration of the laws of physics and aerodynamic design had several implications for
the pilot. It limited his ability to gain and maintain sight of a ground target, and it raised the
minimums of the weather required to visually maneuver to virtually clear days only. High
attack speeds and longer slant ranges placed a high premium on precise aiming and correct
release parameters, a task made more daunting by the primitivefixed-gunsightaiming
apparatus these planes carried. And finally, a Century Series jet's pitifully poor fuel
efficiency at low altitudes meant the pilot would have to find his target very quickly;
something not likely since enemy ttoops might be camouflaged or moving, and he would
be too fast or far away to see them at any rate.'*
Thefifties-eraemphasis on the nuclear mission meant that the fliers themselves
were not adaptable. Tactical units only sporadically practiced conventional air-to-ground
weapons delivery and CAS, and the lack of proficiency appeared in poor weapons scores
and exercise results. One Air Force officer observed after the 1958 Lebanon Crisis, a
distinctly conventional military operation, that "There is considerable doubt

. as to the

want overiy simplefighters,but criticizes the speed for speed's sake attitude in many Air
Force designs); Brooke Nihart, "Sixty Years of Unresolved Problems," Armed Forces
Journal 107 (25 April 1970): 20; Tilford, 33; and Buhrow, "Close Air Support
Requirements," 19-20.
'"Goforth, "Do We Need a New Aircraft for Close Air Support?" 18-20, 23,
33-34. Century series aiming problems are from COL Eugene Deatrick, USAF (ret),
personal interview by author, 8 May 1997, Alexandria, Va., tape recording and notes in
author's possession (Deatrick was one of thefirstgraduates from the Air Force's test pilot
school, and later was a squadron commander in Vietnam).
72

conventional combat capability of the F-lOO units. Only a few of the F-lOO pilots had
strafed; none had shot rockets or delivered conventional bombs." One critic of Air Force
fighter design philosophy who helped modify it in the 1960s and 1970s was Pierre Sprey.
He later pointed out that just as stretching a plane's mission requirements hurt its overall
effectiveness, increasing aircrew mission proficiency requirements hurt a pilot's
effectiveness as well."
Nonetheless, tactical air leaders clung hard to their desire for fast jetfightersthat
performed multiple roles, and several officers and observers later commented upon or were
living examples of this almost dogmatic insistence. Air Force Major Richard Head's 1970
dissertation on that service's early-1960s purchase of the A-7 attack plane highlighted the
increasing infatuation with multirole concepts throughout the 1950s and eariy 1960s, as
well as the procurement attitude difference between the Air Force and the Navy (Head
flew CAS in Vietnam and later served on the Pentagon staff). Besides Head, other experts
pointed out that the Navy's widely varying combat situations bred specialization in aircraft
mission design, which led to different career paths and combat philosophies for pilots. The
Air Force's tactical men were nearly allfighterpilots with World War 11 backgrounds who
focused mostly on the anticipated European smash-up with the Soviets. Available oral
histories of Air Force generals who either were TAC leaders or were somehow involved in
the 1950s and early-1960sfighterselection process confirm this observation. Most flew
fighters in World War II and asserted that no tactical plane should be designed without airto-air combat prowess in mind, given intelligence assessments of Soviet air defenses.

"Asprey, "Close Air Support," 33-34 (poor exercise results); Buhrow, "Close Air
Support Requirements," 24-25 (minimal weapons delivery training and almost non-existent
CAS training; made all the more compelling by the fact that author Buhrow was a research
project officer for an air force study of its CAS procedures both before and during
Vietnam); Dick, Disosway. 246-247 (poor weapons training); Jones, 354-356; Mason, Air
Power: A Centennial Appraisal. 92; Neufeld, Sprey. 20-27; and Tilford, 36 (specifies
TACs poor conventional weapons training procedures and adds that "Dependence on
nuclear weapons was the warp and woof of Air Force doctrine") Quote is from COL
Albert Sights, USAF, "Lessons of Lebanon: A Study in Air War Sttategy," Air University
Review 16 (July-August 1965): 42. MAJ Barnes observed that F-lOO outfits neglected
conventional weapons practice (45-46).
73

Remembering the successful fighter CAS of Worid War II, they likewise averred that any
fighter could perform the air-to-ground attack mission ""
In the 1950s, the service was not shy about expressing its narrow-minded
warfighting view to the Army, either. An Air Force general told Army magazine
correspondent Robert Asprey that in future wars with communist nations, "we are going to
need all the fast aircraft we have." Another officer told him: "The Air Force admits a
tactical relationship and responsibility to the ground forces, b u t . . . . Ourfirstpriority is air
defense. . . . [and] the Air Force can best serve the army by hitting the enemy in the rear
area . . . . close air support is a maximum waste offirepowerfor the results gained." Still
other Air Force leaders told the Army reporter that the F-lOO was either perfect for CAS
or that it had CAS mission weaknesses due to the need for aerial combat viability. Asprey's
Army article appeared in 1961, and in it he expressed arisingArmy exasperation with Air
Force attitudes up to that date."'

""Head, "A-7," 126-133, 156-160. For further discussion of Air Force-Navy

tactical jet procurement differences, see CAPT CO. Holmquist, USN, "Developments and
Problems in Carrier-Based Attack Aircraft," in 1969 Naval Review. Frank Uhlig, ed.,
(Annapolis, Md.: United States Naval Instittite, 1969), 195-196, 200, 211-212, and
Neufeld, Sprey. 27. Air Force and Army Eurocenttic planning orientation are from
Builder, The Masks of War. 118-123, 136-142. The oral histories are as follows: Dick,
Disosway. 181, 195-196 (Disosway served in various tactical air positions in the 1950s and
was TAC commander in the early 1960s); Jack Neufeld, Interview of Brig Gen William F.
Georgi. (Washington, D.C: USAF Oral History Program, 5 June 1973), 3, 18-22,
transcript, AFHRC Holding K239.0512-964 ((jeorgi worked in various procurement
staffs); Lt Gen Robert G. Ruegg. (Washington, D C : USAF Oral History Interview,
13-14 Febmary 1984), 139-140,ttanscript,AFHRC Holding K239.0512-1571 (extensive
experience in Air Force aircraft procurement and research during this time; believed in
tactical jet air-to-air superiority requirement); and Lt Gen Dale S. Sweat (Washington,
D.C: USAF Oral History Interview, 15 Febmary 1984), 118, transcript, AFHRC Holding
K239.0512-1572 (Sweat commanded various tactical air units in the 1950s and was later
head of Air Force Plans Directorate).
"'Quotes are from Asprey, "Close Air Support," 35 and 36
74

Army Discontent
It was not that the Army disagreed with many of the Air Force's warfighting
concepts. One reason for Army leaders' incoherent attempts at revising the air support
relationship in Korea was that they knew that some of the airmen's ideas were good ones.
After all, one expected one's air force to gain and maintain air superiority, and if a state
was engaged in an atomic superpowerrivalry,it expected the means for executing atomic
war, bombers, to be in top flight condition. Even Robert Asprey wrote in his Army article:
"1 think the free worid owes SAC enormous gratitude." Some Army leaders felt that the
airmen's stmtting assertions of independence and superiority were justified given their
pre-World War II travails and wartime vindication. Finally, their own Eurocentric
warfighting orientation led some of them to accept the Air Force's rationale."^
However, they also increasingly believed that their Air Force brethren had strayed
too far, especially regarding close air support and the planes the airmen claimed would
perform it. Indeed, the service had not produced one dedicated CAS plane since its
independence. Though not an Air Force pilot. Army Captain Asprey did common sense
figuring to determine the F-lOO and F-105's CAS suitability. He noted that these planes'
lengthy takeoff and landing rolls reduced their mnway suitability, which revived memories
of the F-80 and F-84's Korean War problems. He also noted that their inability to
maneuver at slow speeds increased their target acquisition difficulties. Above all, he saw
these deficiencies amply demonstrated during exercises. Army leaders also saw the results.

"^Asprey, 35 (quote). Frederic Bergerson, The Army Gets an Air Force: Tactics
of Bureaucratic Politics (Baltimore, Md.: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1980), 44;
Hadley, 84-87; LTCOL James Agnew, USA, The Harold K. Johnson Papers, vol. Ill,
U.S. Army Senior Officers Debriefing Program, (Carlisle Barracks, Pa.: US. Army
Military History Institute [henceforth cited as AMHI], 5 November 1973), 35-36,
transcript of interview #14, Tape #2, AMHI; LTCOL Ronald Andreson, USA, LTGEN
George Seneff USA (ret.). U.S. Army Senior Officer's Debriefing Program, (Carlisle
Barracks, Pa.: AMHI, 1978), 71, transcript. History of Army Aviation Collection, AMHI;
MAJ Charies Kirkpattick, USA, "The Army and the A-10: The Anny's Role in
Developing Close Air Support Aircraft, 1961-1971," (Washington, DC; U.S. Army
Center for Military History Analysis Branch, 1971), 4-5 (Army concern for Europe and
acceptance of Air Force's priorities).
75

Though they had not clearly articulated their discontent during the heat of war in Korea, a
later survey of that war's Army officer veterans sent an unambiguous signal. Two-thirds to
three-fourths condemned the Air Force CAS effort for lack of responsiveness and aircraft
incompatibility. One Army leader who became one of the foremost helicopter aviation
proponents. Major General Hamilton Howze, related how one 1950s Air Force live fire
demonsttation left him cold. A two thousand foot AGL broken cloud ceiling (relatively
low clouds, but not overcast) with unlimited visibility underneath stopped one performance
cold. Other attack mns were "dry" (no ordnance expenditure) because the pilots could not
see the well-marked demonsttation targets, and "hot" mns often missed the target because
of the complexities involved in fast jet weapons delivery. Howze and others resented the
way the airmen almost literally flew away from their CAS duties. They looked within their
own service for a solution."'

The Army Acts

Control of air assets was the primary Army motivation for obtaining its own air
service. The Air Force did not care to be at an Army commander's beck and call and,
using one Army leader's later analogy, had set up an uncaring monopoly holding company
for tactical air support. The Army used a budding aviation technology, the helicopter, to

"'Asprey, 35-36; James Coates and Michael Killian, Heavy Losses: The Dangerous
Decline of American Defense (New York: Viking Press, 1985), 138-139 (observations
about Air Force's policy and Army reaction); COL Jack Ridgway and LTCOL Paul
Walter, USA, GEN Barksdale Hamlett. USA (ret.). U.S. Arniy Senior Officers Debnefing
Program, (Cariisle Ban-acks, Pa.: AMHI, 23 January 1976), 56-57,ttanscript,AMHI,
(Hamlett was, along with Howze, another Army helicopter advocate); Goldberg and Smith,
"Anny-Air Force Relations," 45-46; McClennan, "Close Air Support Study," 68-70;
MGEN Hamilton Howze, USA (ret), "The Howze Board," Howze-Hawkins Family
Papers, Draft Writings Articles Box, (Carlisle Barracks, Pa.: AMHI, n.d), 10, 24, 25;
and, from the same Draft Writings Articles Box, MGEN Hamilton Howze, "The Growing
Vacuum," 3-4; Andreson, Seneff. 71 (Seneff, who was Director of Army Aviation in the
mid 1960s, admits he initially favored Air Force independence, but became critical of its
later ways).
GEN O. P. Weyland criticized his own service for its warfighting approach shortly
after his 1959 retirement; see Worden, 85.
76

encroach upon that holding company's turf. And at times, Army leaders launched sporadic
forays into the fixed-wing air support business ""
Helicopters proved their worth as flexible logistics aircraft in Korea. In one case
they provided important resupply to help thwart an attack upon an exposed American
flank. In 1954, the charismatic Army General James Gavin wrote an article entitled
"Cavalry, and I Don't Mean Horses." Gavin had in mind rapid movement of ttoops via
helicopters, something he and others considered necessary in modem war where weapons
of mass destmction could annihilate massed, stationary army forces. He also believed that
a sky cavalry could provide rapid strike and reconnaissance capability as horse cavalry did
for armies of old. Referring to the late-autumn 1950 debacle in Korea, he wrote: "While
some historians are lamenting the absence of Stuart at Gettysburg, no one has asked,
'Where was Walker's cavalry in Korea?'and it is high time they did." But the sky cavalry,
as its proponents called it, needed some form of armed escort to suppress enemy gunners.
It was obvious the Air Force would not do this, so the Army explored its own air support
options early after the Korean War."^

"'Analogy is courtesy of GEN Robert Williams, USA (ret), telephonic interview by

author, 19 June 1997, tape recording and notes in author's possession. Williams was
another pioneer of Army helicopter aviation, and emphasized that this dissertation must
address the 1940s' and 1950s' interservice actionsthe issue was always one of control. An
Air Force officer partially involved in the A-lO's design concept process who later became
TAC commander, GEN Robert Dixon, USAF (ret), stressed the same thing (telephonic
interview by author, 13 April 1997, tape recording and notes in author's possession).
Indeed, many of the cited Army-oriented sources carry this theme: Bergerson, Bradin,
Kirkpatrick, and McLennan. The U.S. Air Force RAND study by Goldberg and Smith
regarded control of air assets (47) as a central issue in the Army's development of organic
aviation, given the Army's displeasure with Air Force intent and performance (45).
"^BGEN John Bahnsen, USA (ret), "A New Anny Air Corps or a Full Combat
Arms Team Member?" 123 AFJI (October 1986): 64; Bergerson, The Army Gets an Air
Force. 72-75, 101-102; GEN James Gavin, USA, "Cavalry, and I Don't Mean Horses,"
Harper's 208 (April 1954): 54-60 (quote p. 54); Ferret, 474 (asserts that the soldiers
believed helicopters could have been decisive in warning of the late-1950 Chinese
offensive); John R. Galvin, Air Assault: The Development of Ainnobile Warfare (New
York: Hawthorne Books, 1969). 254-257 (short discussion of early helicopter
developments; though he did not use his rank on the book's title page, Galvin was an Army
77

As early as 1954, the Army tentatively explored procuring Cessna T-37 jet frainers
(for photo, see Appendix Fig. 19), ostensibly for testing them in the observation and
reconnaissance role. Further T-37 studies later helped raise Air Force suspicions about
Army intentions, but other Army actions irritated Air Force leaders before then.
Concerned not only about armed escort for their helibome troop units but also about
Russian tanks encountered in a Eurof)ean war, both Army aviation leaders and senior
leaders explored helicopter antitank weapons usage. The initial tests. Able Buster and
Baker Buster, were conducted in 1955 and yielded the not surprising result that more work
was in order. The commander of the Army Aviation School at Fort Rucker, Brigadier
General Carl Hutton and his Combat Developments Office chief. Colonel Jay Vanderpool,
set to with gusto. Vanderpool urged aviation contractors to submit bids or improved
helicopter models and conducted tests at Fort Rucker. Knowing that their work could be
viewed as an infringement of the Pace-Finletter Agreements, they did their work informally
in what Army aviation observer Frederic Bergerson called a bureaucratic insurgency. This
testing method was almost literally hit and miss; such as when they leamed in-flight that
machine-gun firing shattered a certain type of plastic canopy. But the Army aviators got
results, and by the time that service commenced thefirstof its large scale sky cavalry
experiments in 1956, machine-guns in transport helicopter doors were commonplace.
Furthermore, Vanderpool and his enthusiast subordinates-known as "Vanderpool's
Fools"-began conducting helicopter firepower demonstrations for various Army units "^
Air Force officers witnessed many of these events and passed on their observations
to the senior leadership, who in turn complained to Defense Secretary Charies Wilson.

LTCOL heavily involved in Vietnam airmobile operations); Richard Weinert, A History of

Armv Aviation. 1950-1962. U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC),
Historical Monograph Series, (Fort Monroe, Va.: US. Army TRADOC Office of the
Command Historian, 1991), 181-187.
""Bergerson, 70-81, 86-91. 99-110 (discussion of tests and insurgency); Bradin,
Hot Air to Hellfire. 92-99 (armed helicopter efforts); Weinert, History of Armv Aviation.
185-190 (various tests), 192 (door guns), 195 (more tests), 210-214 (T-37 studies); and
Davis, 31 Initiatives. 31 (Buster tests).
78

The Secretary already did not like the Army's attitude. During this time, that service's
Chief of Staff, General Matthew Ridgway, resigned his post early due to differences over
defense policy. There was also a "Colonels' Revolt" involving senior officers who publicly
declared that the New Look sacrificed the Army's readiness. In an autobiography written
shortly after his retirement, Ridgway issued the Air Force a waming about not producing
dedicated CAS planes: "If they continue to ignore our needs in this respect, we will
eventually have to develop them ourselves." In a November 1956 memorandum, Wilson
sharply clarified-some Army men believed curtailed-Army flying activities. He extended
the five thousand pound restriction on Army airplanes to include any special short-field
capable plane, and he limited Army helicopter size to less than twenty thousand pounds.
He warned the Army to honor agreements to limit its own aviation research and to rely
upon the Air Force. Wilson did leave important loopholes that the Army men would later
liberally use: he stipulated that the Defense Department could waive the weight resttiction
for certain aircraft models, and his memorandum left open to interpretation some
restrictions on in-house aircraft development. Furthermore, Army carping about the terms
led to Wilson's March 1957 Directive 5160.22, which warned the Air Force to meet its
various agreed-upon obligations to the Army."^
Of course, the Air Force had no intention of honoring Wilson's policies, and so,
neither did the Army. Their warfighting styles, based somewhat upon technology, did not
at that time allow it. Colonel Vanderpool himself astutely observed: "Each advancement
our air force made, separated it further in speed and distance from the army. The
necessary differences in [the] mission of the air force and the army left a partial vacuum
between [the] ground and the fringes of space." Indeed, joint talks between the services to

"^Dupuy and Dupuy, Encyclopedia of Military History. 1331 (Colonels' Revolt);

Pertet, 472-475 (Wilson's attitude); and GEN Matthew Ridgway, USA (ret.) Soldier (New
York: Harper Brothers, 1956), 315 (Ridgway's specifications required all-weather and
night capability [read costly complexity seen in other night/all-weather planesl and had to
be able to prevail against air defenses. This sounds like something that the Air I'orce
wanted to produce all along). The directives are addressed in Bergerson, 55, 70; Davis, 31
Initiatives. 13-14 Directive 5160.22, repnnted in Wolf Basic Documents. 317-323
Goldberg and Smith,, "Anny-Air Force Relations," 12-14, and Head, "A-7," 120.
79

update CAS procedures developed during the Korean War broke down in 1957 over the
Army's insistence upon, and the Air Force's rejection of, greater Army control of the CAS
process. Proceeding onward, the Army successfully obtained Defense Secretary waivers
for the AC-1 Caribou and the OV-1 Mohawk (for photo, see Appendix Fig. 20). The
Caribou was a medium-sized transport which the Army used instead of the Air Force's
tactical airiift. However, the Air Force would successfully stop the Army effort to use the
Mohawk-a twin-turboprop plane ostensibly designed for observation-as a CAS plane."*
Meanwhile, the Army also spared no effort toward cementing its hold upon
helicopter development. Aviation enthusiast leaders such as the late-1950s Director of
Army Aviation, Major General Hamilton Howze, qualified many other Army leaders as
pilots and thus created an influential clientele within the service. The Army aviators also
ensured that their service established no separate aviation branch. This prevented a repeat
of the old Army Air Corps sense of separateness and gave other service branches such as
Armor a stake in helicopter development. The aviators continued to stage firepower
demonstrations for their fellow ttoops, as well as various corporate, govemment, and
political leaders. They also cultivated a political following among the congressmen in Fort
Rucker's home state, Alabama."
One development that had serious implications for the Army helicopter's fortunes
was Bell Helicopter company's late-1950s creation of the jet-powered UH-1 (for photo,
see Appendix Fig. 21). The "Huey," or "Slick," as its pilots later called it, enjoyed a major
'^Vanderpool quote is from Bradin, 95-96 Buhrow, 26-29, chronicles the docttinal
divorce over air support, while contemporary observations of it arefromAsprey, 36-37;
Buhrow, "Case Study of Interservice Rivalry," 23 (notes that in 1959, Defense Secretary
Neil McElroy announced reduction of Air Force air support units due to Army's artillery
missiles); COL Jules Gonseth, USA, "Tactical Air Support for Army Forces," Military
Review 35 (July 1955): 3-16; and COL Gordon Moon II, USA, "Needed: Joint Doctrine
on Close Air Support," Military Review 36 (July 1956): 8-13. Breakdown in negotiations
is from McLennan, "Close Air Support Study," 54-55. Purchase of the Caribou and
Mohawk is from Bergerson, 90-91; and Weinert, History of Armv Aviation. 214-217
"Bahnsen, "A New Army Air Corps," 64 (recounts institutional efforts; with the
creation of a separate Army Aviation branch in 1986, Bahnsen wonders if the aviators will
act like their Air Corps predecessors); Bergerson, 79-80, 102-110.
80

performance advantage over piston-engine craft: it could go faster and carry heavier loads
than they could. This also meant these aircraft could carry an appreciable ordnance load,
for which other companies such as General Electric already agreed to build specially
adapted weapons. Army leaders moved carefully in this regard, lest they excite another
challenge from the Air Force. But they did develop and train with various weapons, even
if it meant sneaking in Navy weapons experts to demonstrate how to properiy set up
weapons launchers and such.^"
The Army's attitude and larger events started to put the Air Force on the defensive
as the decade ended. A growing choms of critics took aim at New Look policy problems.
There were the defense intellectuals, a group of academics who during the fifties stepped in
to provide some strategic guidance to the nuclear weapons-bedazzled 1950s military.
Bernard Brodie, Henry Kissinger, and Robert Osgood all pointed out the strategic
bankruptcy of a policy that chose massive nuclear assault as the answer to every world
crisis. Army generals who retired in fmstration over the Eisenhower administration's
policies formed another group. Generals John Gavin, Matthew Ridgway, and Maxwell
Taylor questioned the nation's ability to act if an aggressor did something that did not
justify Worid War III. All of these criticisms either directly or indirectly attacked the Air
Force which was so associated with the nuclear war outlook. Real world events such as the
1958 Lebanon Crisis lent credence to the critics' observations, as the United States
discovered a limited capacity to undertake non-nuclear options. More ominous for the Air
Force bomber men was the Soviets' radar-guided missile shootdown of a high-flying

^"Bergerson, 73 (weapons adaptation), 78, 89, 185; Bradin, 104; Galvin, Air
Assault. 264, 315 (cites the turbine-powered UH-1 as a major catalyst in the development
of helibome airmobile operations); Stephen Peter Rosen, Winning the Next War:
Innovation and the Modem Military (Ithaca, NY.: Cornell University Press, 1991), 90-91
(Rosen covers the Army's pursuit of helicopters on pp. 85-95), and Weinert, History of
Armv Aviation. 203-205.
81

American U-2 spy plane in 1960. This implied that the service's high-altitude, supersonic
B-70 prototype was itself already obsolete.^'
Thus the Air Force, which initially ridiculed Army helicopters while it focused upon
an anticipated supersonic, stratospheric Trafalgar with the Russians, found its position
under attack as the 1960s decade began. The Army developed armed helicopters and
purchased planes which, in spite of a Defense Secretary waiver, violated the spirit of
previous agreements. It continued to explore the capabilities of some T-37s it managed to
purchase. As the year 1960 ended, the Army's Aircraft Requirements Board, chaired by
Lieutenant General Gordon Rogers and known by his name, approved purchase of the
UH-1, which would laterfigureso prominently in Army aviation. Indeed, by decade's end
the Army possessed over five thousand aircraft."
And if the Air Force thought that it would receive respite with the new presidential
administration, it was mistaken. President John F. Kennedy and his advisors-one of
whom was Maxwell Taylor-promoted a policy of flexible response. Unlike the New
Look, this new policy envisioned fighting conventional wars that might require less than
state-of-the-art technology. The new administration was also not afraid to stick America's
nose into the kind of conflicts for which the Air Force was eminently unprepared.

^'Maslowski and Millett, 548-552; and Weigley, "Sttategies of Deterrence and of

Action: The Strategy Intellecttials," chap, in The American Wav of War. 399-440. Good
accounts of the B-70's difficulties come rom Brown, Flying Blind. 219-229; and Kotz,
Wild Blue Yonder. 59-61.
"Bergerson, 63, and Hadley, 136, discuss the Air Force's initial contempt for
helicopters. Bradin, 97, 102-105, discusses continued Army helicopter weapons tests and
the Rogers Board. Futrell notes that in 1960, at least one Army general publicly told the
Air Force that his service needed a specialized plane, since the Air Force's planes no longer
met standards; see Robert Futtell, Idsas, vol. 11, 174. Sbrega, 413, and Davis, I I
Initiatives. 23, gives Army aircraft inventory (by comparison, the Army possessed
three thousand aircraft at Korean War's end, and in 1960 the Air Force owned over twenty
thousand planes).
82

CHAPTER IV
THE STAGE IS SET, 1961-1965

In the first half of the 1960s decade, activist Democrat presidential administtations
challenged the Air Force's straitened warfighting view. Their confrontations with
communists around the world convinced them that the American military needed the
capability to wage war on higher intensity levels than the nuclear one for which it planned
in the 1950s. Their various appointees within the Defense Department pressured the Air
Force to procure planes and develop capabilities to meet tactical needs. The service
resisted, but a variety of factors undermined its position.
Keimedy Administration officials let the Army provoke the Air Force by delivering
ultimatums about CAS, investigating procurement of its ownfighterplanes, and above all,
developing its helicopter fleet. The services embarked upon competing exercises, studies,
and tests, but the harshest trial was the Democrats' most ambitious foreign policy project:
the escalating war in Vietnam. The Army needed armed helicopters for various Vietnam
combat roles, to include suppressing ground fire against troop helicopters. By 1965, it
sanctioned contract study of an advanced attack helicopter while entertaining purchase of
an interim attack helicopter from Bell Aircraft Company.
The Army's efforts shook an Air Force already embarrassed by the fact that the old
propeller-driven A-Is it had obtained from the Navy to perform CAS in South Vietnam
were outperforming supersonic jetfighter-bomberslike the F-100. This and other Air
Force CAS problems led Congressman Otis Pike (D-NY)-a former Marine dive-bomber
pilot upset about the Air Force's unwillingness to support the Army and the nation's
guerrilla war stmgglesto convene hearings in which he exposed the service's lack of
attention to air support. Air Force leaders tried to assuage the pressure from the Army,
administration officials, and Pike by acquiring a subsonic Navy attack plane, the A-7. This
move, unique for a service so wedded to buying supersonic tactical jets, was a precursor to
its dedicated CAS plane purchase.

83

Kennedy. McNamara. and Their Whiz Kids Take Charge

"Let every nation know, whether it wishes us well or ill, that we shall pay any pnce,
bear any burden, meet any hardship, support any friend, oppose any foe to assure the
survival and the success of liberty." President John F. Kennedy spoke these words in his
inaugural speech, and he soon backed them with deeds. Three months later, he failed in
his attempt to overthrow Cuban leader Fidel Castro via surrogate invasion at the Bay of
Pigs. Later that year, he stood firm against Soviet bullying in Beriin. Kennedy's foreign
adventures stemmed from his "streak of romantic liberalism" and "missionary impulse,"
which combined with a desire not to be seen as soft on communism. The Bay of Pigs
fiasco and the lack of an outright public success against communist regimes made Kennedy
strive harder to prove his mettle. The 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis was one example, and his
increasing involvement with Laos and Vietnam was another.'
These foreign policy actions also confirmed the Kennedy administration's growing
conviction that America's military posture required reorientation toward more conventional
means of warfare. The quickly evolving policy became known as "Flexible Response," and
reflected the influence of one of the angry Army generals of the 1950s, Maxwell Taylor.
Additionally, the Kennedy administration wanted more "civilianization" of top-level
military affairs, particularly involving weapons procurement. Kennedy and his lieutenants
were not alone in this opinion, increased weapons costs, interservice squabbles, "revolts,"
and other signs of military inefficiency irritated both Democratic and Republican leaders.^

'Kennedy inauguration quote is from David Whitney and Robin Vaughn Whitney,
The American Presidents. 8th ed. (Pleasantville, N.Y.: Reader's Digest Association, Inc.,
1996), 309. Observation about Kennedy's foreign policy predilections is from Maslowski
and Millett, For the Common Defense. 553. Other observers note Kennedy's increased
desire for success after early stumbles; see Stanley Kamow, Vietnam: A History (New
York: The Viking Press, 1983), 247-248; John Schlight, The War in Soutii Vietnam: The
Years of the Offensive. 1965-1968. The United States Air Force in Southeast Asia Series
(Washington, D C : Office of Air Force History, 1988), 3; Tilford, Setup. 53-55: and
Weigley, American Way of War. 450.
^Kamow, Vietnam. 249-250; Maslowski and Millett, 554-555: and H.R
McMaster, Dereliction of Dutv: Lvndon Johnson. Robert McNamara. tiie Joint Chiefs of
Staff, and the Lies That Led to Vietnam (New York HarperCollins, 1997), 2, 8-14.
84

The proud leader of the Kennedy assault on old-style military policy was his
Secretary of Defense, Robert Strange McNamara. McNamara was a brilliant but arrogant
man whose strong academic reputation led to World War II service as an Army Air Force
operations analyst, and then to a meteoric rise to the presidency of Ford Motor Company.
His background led him to believe that highly planned statistical analysis could determine
any problem's most efficient solution. He and his Office of the Secretary of Defense
(OSD) assistants-equally brilliant and sometimes arrogant academics whom he brought
with him to help effect change-called the approach "systems analysis." Dubbed the "Whiz
Kids," these assistants included Alain Enthoven, who headed McNamara's Office of
Systems Analysis; and Harold Brown, John Foster, and John McNaughton, all of whom
occupied various positions during their OSD tenure (Brown and Foster first served in the
Directorate for Defense Research and Engineering [DDR&E]).'
McNamara and the Whiz Kids experienced decidedly mixed fortunes as they
applied systems analysis to a wide range of military endeavors. Statistical validity depended
upon good methodology, which in turn required understanding statistical formulae, the
subject under study, and onds own biases. These people sometimes failed in the latter two
tasks-shortcomings made especially glaring by their confident assertions that they would
solve military problems better than the military leaders could. As one of the junior
members of this group said of their efforts: "They could make a case for anything . ..
[but] they made a case for a lot of bad things." Thus, McNamara and his Whiz Kids
effectively streamlined the military budgeting process, but the Vietnam War was the more
publicly remembered result of their quantification-over-sttategy outlook. The same applied
to military aviation; for though McNamara and his Whiz Kids seemingly favored a more

'Maslowski and Millett, 554; McMaster, Dereliction of Duty. 18-21 (especially

condemns Whiz Kid arrogance); Weigley, The American Wav of War. 445-448; and
Watson, Secretaries of the Air Force. 206-224. Deborah Shapley's Promise and Power:
The Life and Times of Robert McNamara (Boston, Mass.: Little, Brown, 1993),
summarizes the man's life and attitudes. For some of its details on McNamara's aims and
the Whiz Kids, see 99-104, 112-113, and 192-196. McNamara speaks of his continuing
faith in numerical analysis in his In Retrospect: The Tragedy and Lessons of Vietnam
(New York: Random House, 1995), 4, 24
85

conventional tactical air force, they often based their decisions on economic and statistical
grounds instead of any real knowledge of tactical air warfare. He revealed his ignorance
when he wanted the F-111 (for photo, see Appendix Fig. 22) to excel at most tactical
missions for both the Air Force and the Navy-an aerodynamical ly impossible task. After
the Air Force purchased the Navy's F-4 fighter (for photo, see Appendix Fig. 23) and
temporarily redesignated it the F-110, he thought they were two different planes and
publicly discussed their relative merits'
In later interviews. Air Force leaders noted how McNamara and his Whiz Kids
dismissed their expertise. But then military leaders often gave these people reason for
contempt. General Curtis LeMay and most of the rest of the Air Force leaders clung
tenaciously to their strategic bombers in spite of serious need for emphasis elsewhere.
They answered Kennedy's interest in unconventional warfare by asserting that their forces
must prepare for a worst-case, high-technology war and not squander effort on lesser

'Quote is from Pierre Sprey, personal interview by author, 4 May 1997, Upper
Marlboro, Md., recording and notes in author's possession. In his military reformist
manifesto. Straw Giant. Arthur Hadley conceded some McNamaraAVhiz Kid managerial
successes while damning them for deflecting blame to the military when the analysis
approach went awry in Vietnam (pp. 142-145, 155). COL Harry Summers, USA, made
similar points in "Friction: The Bureaucracy," chap, in his On Strategy: The Vietnam War
in Context (Cariisle Ban-acks, Pa.: U.S. Arniy War College, 1981), 27-32.
Descriptions of McNamara's high-handedness in the F-111 case, as well as the
F-111's stmggles, are in Bergerson, The Armv Gets an Air Force. 191 (McNamara's
confusion over the F-4/F-110); Robert Coulam, Illusions of Choice: The F-111 and the
Problem of Weapons Acquisition Reform (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press,
1977), 35-82, 98-100; Dick, Disosway. 297 (said it was supposed to "do everything . . .
but cook breakfast"); Bill Gunston, "General Dynamics F-111," chap, in Attack Aircraft of
the West. 170-208; Hadley, 147-156; Neufeld, Georgi. 18, 21 (McNamara's belief in the
F-111's multiple capabilities); Shapley, "Conttoller of Technology," chap, in Promise and
Power. 202-223; and Watson, Secretaries. 228-234.
GEN John McConnell was Air Force Chief of Staff from 1965 to 1969, and
disliked the overwhelming influence of systems analysis: "Systems analysis gradually grew
into an outfit that was dictating policy and sttategy." See Gen John P McConnell
(Washington, D C : USAF Oral History Program, 28 August 1969), 32-33 (quote, 32),
transcript, AFHRC Holding K239.0512-1190.
86

endeavors And some leaders in both the Air Force and Army were only too willing to
abandon military science for the systems analysis approach.^

McNamara. the Air Force, and Tactical Aviation

during the Kennedy Years
From the outset, McNamara pushed the Air Force toward a more conventional war
orientation. His first budget plan for the service reduced funding for its beloved strategic
bombers-and later, on his advice. President Kennedy let the troubled B-70 program die.
Since CAS was a quintessential conventional war mission, McNamara likewise showed
interest in it early on; in March 1961, he tasked the services to study development of a
dedicated CAS plane. The Air Force gave a guarded response to this memorandum, with
the leadership insisting upon the traditional multirole (especially air combat role) emphasis
for any tactical plane design. In June, McNamara reviewed the services' response, and set
forth his overall tactical aircraft philosophy. Characteristically, he wanted the Air Force
and Navy to buy the same fighter and attack plane when they replaced their existing
models. He wanted the fighter, initially called TFX and later the F-111, to be supersonic

^Numerous Air Force interviews revealed serious Air Force leader resentment of
McNamara. They are: Dick, Disosway. 205-207 (McNamara's arrogance led to errors,
but many officers went along with him); Jack Neufeld, Interview K239.0512-857 of
Lieutenant General C Agan. USAF (Ret). (Annapolis, Md.: USAF Oral History Program,
2 October 1973), 18-20, ttanscript, AFHRC Holding on titie (Agan worked Air Force
fighter procurement issues and recalls Whiz Kid arrogance), and LT GEN Carlos M.
Talbott (Washington, D.C: USAF Oral History Interview, 10-11 June 1985), 108-109,
111, transcript, AFHRC Holding K239.0512-1652 (Talbott served with the Pentagon Joint
Staff, and appreciated some of the McNamara reforms but hated the condescension).
Drew, "Air Power Wilderness," 5-7; Robert Futtell, Idsas, vol. II, 48, McMaster,
42-45; Tilford, Setup. 48-50; and Worden, Rise of the Fighter Generals. 107-155, all
recount LeMay and his Air Force's devotion to bombers in spite of the Kennedy
administration's irritation. Air Force response to unconventional war emphasis is in Futrell,
Ideas, vol. II, 56-57 (this section extensively quotes Air Force Deputy Director for Plans,
BGEN Jeny Page's 24 April 1962 Position Paper, "The USAF Concept of Limited War."
In Footnote 4, Hadley, McMaster, and Summers cited McNamara's contempt for the
military profession, but added that many military officers went along with his management
approach. Builder, Masks of War. 19, 104-109, 119, asserts the Air Force's technological
orientation leads it to strongly embrace systems analysis.
87

and multimission capable. This pleased Air Force leaders, since they felt it was time to
replace their beloved F-105, and they insisted upon multirole tactical planes anyway.
Indeed, TAC commander. General Walter Sweeney, said that "Infighteraircraft, we need
greater versatility," and stated his hope that the F-111 would answer his needs. But Navy
air admirals wanted an aircraft which excelled at one mission instead of being merely
acceptable at several. (Also, they wanted a plane which was not too large, too heavy, and
too fast in takeoff and landing to be aircraft carrier-suitable, which the F-111 was.) The
Navy eventually rejected it but the Air Force later used as an all-weather bomber.^
^The Air Force, Navy, and McNamara preferences regarding the F-111 are from
Barnes, "Concept," 46-47 (Sweeney quote, 46); Coulam, Illusions. 45-56, 90-96; Gunston,
Attack Aircraft. 170-180; Lambeth, "Pitfalls," 13 (cites TACs specification of supersonic
attack speed for F-111 in order to make it better than the F-105); Shapley, "Conttoller of
Technology," 202-223; and Tilford, Setup. 51 -52.
Most of the first half of Shapley's McNamara biography recounts his impact upon
the Department of Defense. Futrell summarizes the Kennedy administtation's impact upon
the Air Force in two chapters in his Ideas, vol., II, see "New Frontier: Redirection," and
"AF in a Changing Environment," pp. 1-252. In his 4 May 1997 interview with the author,
Pierre Sprey tersely assessed McNamara's approach to the service: "He just wanted a
non-nuclear Air Force. That's about as deep as he got." Funding reduction and B-70 fate
is in Michael Brown, Flying Blind: The Politics of the U.S. Sttategic Bomber Program
(Ithaca, NY.: Cornell University Press, 1992), 213-226; Futtell, Ideas, vol. II, 26-35; and
Tilford, 47-50.
McNamara referenced his March 1961 tactical aircraft study directive in his June
1961 response; see Robert S. McNamara, Secretary of Defense Memorandum for the
Secretaries of the Navy, Army, and Air Force, SecDef Cont. No. C-595, 7 June 1961,
(from A-10 monograph supporting document copies that author purchased from
Headquarters Air Force Material Command Historical Office, Wright-Patterson AFB,
Ohio, henceforth called "supporting documents"). Initial Air Force response by Air Force
Secretary Eugene Zuckert is quoted in McLennan, "Close Air Support Study," 63. The
McNamara 7 June response memo speaks of an attack plane to replace the F-105 and A-7.
The A-7 did not exist at the time of the memo. Edward Mishler, "The A-X Specialized
Close Air Support Aircraft: Origins and Concept Phase, 1961-1970," (Wright-Patterson
AFB, Ohio: Air Force Systems Command Office of History, 1977), 5, writes that it
specified the F-105 and A-4, which makes more sense given the Air Force and Navy
aircraft inventory of the time. The clarification is important because of the procurement
infighting details recounted in this chapter. This author believes that "A-7" is a
typographical error in this case.
Boston Globe writer Fred Kaplan makes a good point about the Air Force's
infatuation with aircraft multi-role capability when he writes that Army generals and Navy
88

The TFX program revealed the services' differing concepts of tactical airplane
design, and the differences were especially distinct conceming attack planes. In his June
response, McNamara specifically told the services that he wanted a dedicated CAS plane,
since "aircraft which are optimized for 'air superiority' missions are not fully effective in an
air support role." Though McNamara specified that the prospective CAS plane would
replace the Air Force F-105 and the Navy A-4 (for photo, see Appendix Fig. 24), his Whiz
Kids explored making the A-4 an interim replacement for the F-105, since they considered
the F-105 eminentiy unsuited for conventional attack missions. But given their affinity for
supersonic, multirole tactical planes. Air Force leaders emphatically rejected the
inexpensive, more agile, but subsonic A-4 when they felt they could do better keeping the
fast F-105. One of the Air Force's Pentagon tactical issues staffers of the time. Colonel
Gordon Graham, gave his service's fiilly evolved twenty-year attitude when he later said:
"We hadn't bought an attack plane since Worid War 11. The general doctrine . . . is that
those aircraft are not the kinds of machines that would survive in a sophisticated
environment." On the other hand, the Navy encountered no problems with the little attack
plane. They wanted it for a specific tactical role, it carried a surprisingly large underwing
bomb load for a small plane, and such an external ordnance load aerodynamically
prohibited supersonic flight anyway.^
Tofiirtherguide the reluctant Air Force generals toward ditching the F-105, OSD
Whiz Kids conducted a cost effectiveness study to determine the best attack plane from a

admirals never try to cram every tactical capability into all of their tanks and ships, but this
approach is a "matter of course" for Air Force leaders; see Kaplan, "The Little Plane that
Could Fly, If the Air Force Would Let It," Boston Globe. 14 March 1982, reprinted in
More Bucks. Less Bang: How the Pentagon Buys Ineffective Weapons, ed., Dina Rasor
(Washington, D C : Fund forConstittitional Govemment, 1983), 188-189.
^Head, 157-158 (Graham quote is on page 158; Head interview with
then-LTGEN Graham, 11 Febmary 1970); McNamara Memorandum, 7 June 1961
(quote). The Navy's satisfaction with the A-4, and its specifications, are from Gunston,
234-236, 257 (explains that external ordnance carriage prohibits supersonic flight and a lot
of external ordnance requires an equally high amount of thmst-read also fuel-to maintain
even high subsonic speeds); and Holmquist, "Carrier Based Aircraft," 205-207
89

list of candidate jets-some of which did not even remotely fit McNamara's preference for
attack planes. On the simplistic basis of its ability to carry more ordnance longer distances,
their study concluded that the supersonic Navy F-4 interceptor was the best attack plane.
The Air Force liked this choice, since the plane was yet another ultra-fast fighter-and the
service demonstrated its own mastery of the convenient uses of systems analysis when
TAC staff produced a study condemning the A-4 and confirming OSD's choice of the F-4.
McNamara revealed that his economic preferences could at times override his CAS plane
design policy when he approved the Air Force F-4 as an interim CAS plane in late 1961.
He liked the fact that the plane carried more weapons further than the F-105, that it would
serve as a commonfighterfor two services, and that it possessed mission flexibility (the last
item repudiated his June memorandum). He also praised it as a better CAS plane than the
F-105, but that was not saying much. One pilot claimed that tactically maneuvering an F-4
was "akin to driving a dump tmck in an obstacle course."*
Meanwhile, the Navy told OSD in March 1961 that it would proceed with plans to
replace the A-4. Though the A-4 was a good plane, its fuel endurance and load carrying
capacity were not what that service ultimately desired. Some Navy air leaders even

^Head, 159-165, discusses McNamara's decision somewhat via block quotes of

interviews he conducted with OSD staffers Alain Enthoven and Victor Heyman, and leans
toward judging the decision as mostly economic. See also Glenn Bugos, Engineering the
F-4 Phantom II: Parts into Systems (Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press, 1996),
115-121, for more details of the service's F-4 buy. Tilford, 50-53, more forthrightly
declares the F-4 decision efficiency-oriented.
F-4 maneuverability observation is from an unidentified Marine pilot in MiGs
Versus America, produced and directed by Adam Friedman and Monte Markham, 45
min., U.S. News Productions in association with Perpetual Motion Films, 1993,
videocassette. McNamara's opinion of the F-4 as a CAS plane is from Head, 216.
As another example of the Air Force's mastery of the systems analysis game, in
spring 1962, its Systems Commands commander. Lieutenant General James Ferguson
proudly told Congress that "exhaustive cost effectiveness studies" revealed that the F-4 was
better at CAS than any dedicated plane; see Congress, House, Committee on
Appropriations, Department of Defen.se Appropriations for 1963. Part IV. Procurement.
87th Cong., 2d sess., 9 March 1962, 321. Author's note: the A-4 remained in active
Argentine Navy, Israeli Air Force, Singapore Air Force, and U.S. Navy service through the
1980s, serving both in attack roles and as a MiG-17 surrogate forfighterpilot training.
90

wondered if a supersonic plane would be better for the attack role-though they certainly
did not think that the heavy F-111 fit the description In one of those occasional cases
where systems analysis and good military sense coincided, McNamara and his staffers
ordered the Navy to do intensive analytical research to determine the plane's best possible
design, which confirmed the Navy men'sttaditionalattitude about speed versus fuel
endurance and ordnance carriage. A supersonic plane cost too much and used too much
fuel, especially when it flew low-level attack missions to evade enemy defenses. If it flew
higher to conserve fuel and reduce the pilot workload involved in high-speed, low-level
flight, its exposure to enemy defenses was just as great as that of the subsonic plane. The
result was the subsonic VAL design, later called the A-7 (for photo, see Appendix Fig. 25),
which offered exceptional range and ordnance carriage ability. McNamara's interim
acceptance of the F-4 as an Air Forcefighter-bombermeant that he and the Whiz Kids
wanted that service to further study buying a CAS plane. The A-7 seemed to be that
plane; but only after McNamara and company spent a few years attempting to reconcile
the airmen and soldiers' view of CAS.'

McNamara. the Air Force, and the Army. 1961-1965

The Army, especially its aviators, viewed Kennedy's inauguration with optimism.
Thanks to Kennedy's increased conventional force funding in accordance with his "Flexible
Response" defense policy, "Life in the army took on new meaning as soldiers once again
felt appreciated." The policy change found the Army's aviators already redoubling their
aviation expansion efforts into fixed-wing planes. Indeed, the Army General who served

'Further Navy attack plane intentions, McNamara's directive for design research,
and results, are from Gunston, Attack Planes. 234-237. McNamara's continued pressure
on the Air Force about attack planes is from Defense Secretary Memorandum to the Air
Force and Army Secretaries, 9 October 1961, "A Revised Program for Land Based
Tactical Air," cited in Head, 216. Another source for the Navy's attack plane intentions, as
they pertained to the A-7, is Holmquist, 208-210. Navy's opinion of TFX as an attack
plane and ultimatum to OSD is from Assistant Navy Secretary for Research and
Development Memorandum to Department of Defense Director of Defense Research and
Engineering (DDR&E), 9 March 1961, quoted in Head, "A-7," 171
91

as Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Lyman Lemnitzer, recommended that a dedicated
CAS plane be built. Two fixed-wing tactical jets emerged from Army studies as likely
CAS plane candidates. The Fiat G.91 exemplified the problem with the Air Force's
philosophy, in that Italy built an inexpensive, small, attack jet which some NATO air forces
preferred to the Americans' high-speed, high-cost monstrosities. The F-5 (for photo, see
Appendix Fig. 26) was an Air Force response of sorts to Army actions, as the service
modified its sleek T-38 supersonic trainer to provide its impression of an inexpensive attack
plane: a little hot rodfighterthat possessed credible air-to-air performance at the cost of
ordnance capacity and loiter time. The Army did not limit attack aircraft acquisition to
fixed-wing jets; the Rogers Board which met in 1960 already sanctioned future study of
armed helicopters.'"
Air Force leaders did not ignore the change. Facing both McNamara's attacks on
their bomber force size and a looming Army incursion into their CAS mission, they tried to
maintain control through a ploy called Operation Menu. In eariy 1961, outgoing Air Force
Chief of Staff Thomas White offered to dedicate to Army use eleven tactical squadrons
equipped with planes chosen by the Army from a menu of candidate planes created by the
Air Force. The Army refused the deal for a number of reasons; one was that the Air Force
pushed the Army to choose the F-105. Another was that the Air Force wanted the Army
to fund the operation, and the Army balked at the resources required. The Kennedy

'"Army optimism over Kennedy's accession to power is in Davis, The 31 Initiatives.

15; and Bradin, From Hot Air to Hellfire. 105 (quote). Army study of different jet types is
from Weinert, History of Army Aviation. 214. Asprey, "Close Air Support," 37; Futtell,
Ideas. Vol. II. 174-175; Morton and David Halperin, "The Key West Key," 119; and
Schlight, Years of the Offensive. 88-90, all discuss the G.91 and F-5 (the Halpenns claim
that the Air Force blocked the Army's G.91 efforts throughout the 1950s). Rogers Board
details are in Bradin, Hot Air. 103-105 (Rogers did not go so far as to embrace the
ambitious sky cavalry proposals of one of his board members, aviation activist Hamilton
Howze). Chuck Myers, personal interview by author, 1 May 1997, Alexandria Va.,
recording and notes in author's possession, also recalls Army work with armed helicopters
at this time. (Myers was a civilian test pilot with ties to the Army)
92

people also removed some of the Air Force's initial apprehension when foreign policy
events led them to expand the service's tactical force stmcture."
If anything, Kennedy's increase of the Air Force's tactical force stmcture only
increased pressure upon that service to meet its CAS commitment. Army leaders and
aviation activists seized upon the administration's emphasis to demand air support-whether
the Air Force or their own service accomplished it. An example came in spring 1961 when
Army Chief of Staff General George Decker, in a final response to the Air Force's Project
Menu ploy, issued a ringing declaration that became a quote in some Army histories: "The
Army's requirement is to have close air support where we need it, when we need it, and
under a system of operational control which makes it responsive to Army needs." These
were strong words, but apparently because of Project Menu's results. General Decker
demurred on asserting the Army's CAS plane choices. '^

"The Air Force's sales effort is in Bergerson, The Army Gets an Air Force.
108-109; Buhrow, "Case Study of Interservice Rivalry," 33; Goldberg and Smith,
"Army-Air Force Relations," 17-19; and LTCOL Millhouse, USA (first name not given on
document), "Briefing of President's Scientific Advisory Committee (PSAC) on Army's
Requirements for Close Air Support," Final Draft, 21 November 1962, in McClennan,
Tab F to Annex A. One account asserts that the Army's G.91 procurement study
frightened Air Force leaders; see Gregg Easterbrook, "All Aboard Air Oblivion,"
Washington Monthly (September 1981); reprinted in More Bucks. Less Bang, ed. Dina
Rasor, 56. Tactical force stmcture changes are in Futrell, Ideas, vol. II, 468-469; and
Maslowski and Millett, 558-560.
In the John Tolson Papers, "Vietnam Diary, 1960-1968" Folder, at AMHI, Carlisle
Barracks, Pa, is a 16 January 1961 briefing by then-Army COL Tolson to Air Force Chief
of Staff Thomas White, and transcript of ensuing discussion. The list of attendees is
unavailable, but the transcript indicates that Army and Air Force senior officers attended,
to include Army Chief of Staff George Decker and Army aviation advocate Gen Barksdale
Hamlett. Tolson presents the Army's plans for arming helicopters and in the ensuing
discussion. Army officers mention their jet CAS plane study. White is suspicious of Army
intentions, and there is a brief exchange about the Air Force's neglect and the possibility of
an interservice fight if the Army pursues its plans.
'^The Army-perspective histories that contain this quote are Kirkpatrick, "The
Army and the A-10," 11; and McLennan, "Close Air Support History," 62 Both also
mention that General Decker failed to demand a voice in CAS plane selection. Futrell
implies that Decker backed away because of the Project Menu, see Ideas, vol. II, 175.
93

McNamarafiirtherprodded the Air Force to study CAS plane procurement in an

October 1961 memorandum. Air Force Secretary Zuckert replied in November by
asserting that the Army was satisfied with the Air Force's aircraft choices, which obviously
were multirole planes. Perhaps spurred by Zuckert's reply. Army Secretary Starr departed
from General Decker's previous position and specified characteristics for an ideal air
support plane. In short, he declared that the plane must possess short-takeoff-and-land
(STOL) capabilities so as to closely follow the Army, good loiter and maneuverability for
target area work, navigation equipment for bad weather, and radios for ground-air
communications. Starr also disagreed with the Air Force Secretary's proposed CAS force
size, and both issues produced an ongoing, formalized exchange of differing views called
Project Cross Feed. The dialogue's one positive result was that it led McNamara in autumn
1961 to form Strike Command, a joint Air Force-Army organization intended to develop
better procedures for such coop)erative ventures as CAS."
Army aviation activists in the Pentagon pushed beyond this debate when they
drafted a memorandum that a sympathetic McNamara agreed to sign as his own.
Published in April 1962, it was a virtual ultimatum to the Army leadership to take a "bold
new look" at their mobility concepts and use of aviation Army leaders readily assembled a
pro-aviation study board under the redoubtable Major General Howze's chairmanship. It
started work the next month and produced a report in August."

"McNamara's 9 October 1961 Memorandum is cited and discussed in Head, 216;

Goldberg and Smith, 20; Kirkpatrick, 11-12; McLennan, 62. The exchange of service
secretary views is from Goldberg and Smith, 19; Kirkpatrick, 11-15 (also mentions Cross
Feed); McLennan, 64-66; and Millhouse, "PSAC", 3-4. Strike Command formation is
from Air Force Secretary Harold Brown, "Secretary Brown Speaks About the Importance
of Tactical Aviation," Supplement to Air Force Policy Letter for Commanders 12
(Washington, D C : Office of the Secretary of the Air Force [SAF] Intemal Information
Division [Oil], December 1965): 1, Goldberg and Smith, 19.
'^Some accounts describe McNamara directing this study on his own initiative, see
Bradin, 108 ("McNamara popped a lethargic army"); and Kirkpatrick, 15. Later research,
and an oral history reveal something else: see Bergerson, 110-111 (at the time, Bergerson
could not reveal his activist sources' names); Davis, 15 (the effort included sympathetic
OSD staffers); Krepinevich, The Army and Vietnam. 119 (identifies Army GEN Robert
94

One "key" Howze Board officer's admonition to another member summed up its
attitude: "Don't fart around. Go big. Don't ask for battalions, ask for divisions." Howze
later wrote that resentment of Air Force neglect was one motivator for an around-the-clock
effort that produced a sweeping final report filling over one hundred footlockers. It
primarily contained annexes addressing coordinating agencies, but it reflected the aviators'
air cavalry concept of large Army units travelling mostly by helicopter. Of course, these
units would require protection as they advanced toward defended areas. Howze claimed
that he still wanted the Air Force to provide heavyfirepowersupport to such operations via
traditional CAS. But his board spent a lot of time testing helicopter weapons employment,
especially in the antitank role. Not only that, his report recommended that the Army use its
OV-1 Mohawk twin turboprop battlefield reconaissance plane for CAS. '^
The report's aggressive, ambitious tack shook even McNamara, who generally
praised it while specifically criticizing its downplaying the logistic and fire support he
expected the Air Force to provide. The Air Force's reaction was more hostile, for the
Howze Board threatened its smug, nuclear bomber-oriented complacence. Howze
permitted the Air Force to observe his board's actions, which helped that service more
rapidly respond by convening arivalboard named for its chairman. Lieutenant General
Gabriel Disosway. The Disosway Board's report appeared barely a month after the Howze

Williams and COL Edwin Powell as memo instigators); Mishler, The A-X. 2 (McNamara
"allowed" the Army to expand its role); COL Bryce Kramer, USA, and COL Ralph
Powell, USA, GEN Edwin Powell. USA (ret.). Senior Officers Debriefing Program,
(Cariisle Ban-acks, Pa.: AMHI, 18 March 1978), 47-48, transcript, tape 1, side 1, History
of Army Aviation Box, AMHI; and Rosen, Winning the Next War: Innovation and the
Modern Military. 91-92 (provides a detailed account of Powell's and Williams's activities)
The board's aviator-studded composition is noted in Bergerson, 111; and Davis, 16-17; as
well as a journal article of the time, Larry Booda's "DOD Orders Army Shift to Air
Mobility," Aviation Week and Space Technology 76 (25 June 1962): 26-27.
''The Howze Board and itsfindingscome from many sources. The most important
is MGEN Hamilton Howze, "The Howze Board" (page sources for Air Force neglect.
Board intentions, and report composition are 10, 22, 24-25, 37, 39, 46). Other good
sources are Bergerson, 11 l-l 14 (quote and tempo); Bradin, 108-111 (weapons tests);
Davis, 16; Galvin, "The Howze Board: The Search for More Air Mobility," chap in his
Air Assault. 274-279; Goldberg and Smith, 20-21; and Head, 219-221
95

Board report, and it attacked Howze's effort as an Army attempt to usurp Air Force
missions. Conceming CAS, Disosway and other Air Force leaders believed that neither
helicopters nor propeller planes like the Mohawk would survive in a high-threat
environment. Disosway and his officers also used some of McNamara's systems analysis
when they claimed that the F-4 could carry more ordnance faster than the Army planes.
They had come to like the F-4's multirole capability, especially conceming air combat. '^
The Cuban Missile Crisis occurred just as the two boards completed their work,
and the event reemphasized to Kennedy and McNamara the need tofine-tuneAmerica's
conventional capabilities. They did not have to worry about a lethargic effort from the Air
Force and Army, for the open rivalry between the two services combined with OSD's
efforts to generate an intense and somewhat disorganized attempt to resolve the
roles-and-missions dispute. The next three years witnessed various memoranda, studies,
exercises, and organizational shifts.'^

'^Howze, "The Howze Board," 39, 56-57, mentions his including the Air Force in
Board progress briefings, and his belief that the Disosway Board was a rebuttal. In his Air
Force interview. General Disosway thought the Howze Board was an Army attempt to
"Take it [tactical aviation] all back." He believed that his board's response was reasonable,
since Army helicopter aviators "were going to lose their shirts . . . in the tac roles because
they would easily be shot down" (Dick, Disosway. 176-178). Disosway Board member
Marvin McNickle mentioned that Howze let Air Force officers observe the tests and
examine the findings. He also said that the Disosway Board formed to rebut Howze's
findings, and asserted that the Army "wanted their own tactical air force"; see Ahmann,
McNickle. 91-92. Lany Booda, "USAF, Army Air Roles Evolving Slowly," Aviation
Week and Space Technology 78 (27 May 1963): 30-31; and Futrell, Ideas, vol II, 188,
discuss McNamara's cautious response to both boards and their respective service's claims
and counterclaims. Davis, 17-18; Goldberg and Smith, 21; and Head, 221-223, all either
summarize McNamara's response or the Disosway Board's findings. Some Air Force
leaders believed that the Howze Board exposed the bomber-dominated Air Force's lack of
military intellectual development, but most stuck to the dogma; see Futrell, Ideas, vol II,
182; and Mrozek, 16-20.
''In his dissertation, MAJ Head believed the Cuban Missile Crisis and the
competing service boards spurred Kennedy and McNamara to improve their conventional
forces. Given theflurryof activity surrounding Air Force-Army battlefield cooperation,
his observation seems quite valid; see Head, 223-224 Mrozek writes that Air Force
leaders actually saw the Cuban Missile Crisis outcome as vindication of their strategic
96

In November 1962, the President's Scientific Advisory Committee (PSAC)

convened to determine, among other things, the Anny's CAS plane desires. But in spite of
the Howze Board, the top Army leadership continued to move cautiously conceming CAS
aircraft procurement, and gave an irresolute response. Helicopter technology was
promising but unproven. And there were other CAS factors to consider besides the
specific aircraft, such as command and control arrangements, which could possibly
alleviate interservice CAS friction. Thus they stated that they agreed with the Air Force's
determination of priorities while expressing performance preferences similar to those
previously made by Secretary Starr. In the meantime, they created the 11th Air Assault
Division (AAD) to further develop the Howze Board's helicopter concepts. The Air Force
Chief of Staff, old bomber man General Curtis LeMay, continued to attack the Howze
Board and helicopters' combat viability while asserting the Air Force's ability to meet Army
needs. But LeMay also increased the size of the counterinsurgency unit that he had
formed in 1961 both to satisfy Kennedy's interest in this type of warfare and to supply
assistance to the South Vietnamese. LeMay also apparently hoped to keep the Army's
helicopters from dominating future American counterinsurgency operations. '*
McNamara continued his pressure for more interservice air support cooperation
with a 16 February 1963 memorandum to the Air Force and Army Secretaries. He wanted
a nonredundant meshing of the Army's growing airmobile capabilities with the Air Force's
considerable logistic andfirepowercapacity, and thus directed further studies and
exercises. From this, each service set up its respective Close Air Support Board, both of
which issued reports in August 1963. Each wanted a plane fitting its view of CAS: the Air
Force wanted a multipurposefighterand the Army wanted a dedicated plane under its

warfare orientation (p. 18-19).

'See Kirkpatrick, 14-15; and Millhouse, "(PSAC)," 1-12; for PSAC details.
Davis, 18; Bradin, 111; Galvin, "The Ainnobile Division: Tests of the Concept," chap in
his Air Assault. 280-288; and Head, 223, discuss 11th Air Assault Division purpose and
actions. Futrell, Ideas, vol. II, 182, and Head, 220-221, recount LeMay's actions
18<

97

control. However, theirfindingsand those of later tests would lead to other cooperative
efforts."
The top Army leadership remained cautious and continued to send contradictory
signals about CAS in general and a CAS plane in particular. In March 1963, the Army
Chief of Staff, General Earle Wheeler, requested that the new Army Secretary, Cyms
Vance, approve procurement of a dedicated attack helicopter. This was a departure even
from the Howze Board's work, since that group mostly focused upon arming transport
helicopters. Vance denied the request while, in the spirit of McNamara's edict that incited
the Howze Board, telling the Army:
At the same time I want to emphasize that this disapproval is . . . a signal
to lift the Army's sights in its efforts to provide aircraft for the helicopter
escort role. We must now press forward with speed and imagination to
develop a more advanced weapons system that will more nearly
approximately [sic] the optimum.
But given the Air Force's angry denunciations and plans forrivaltests. Army generals did
not at that time aggressively pursue Vance's guidance. Instead, they remained circumspect,
making sure that their every move was justified and would not provoke the Air Force to
commence interservice battle. As the Close Air Support Boards adjourned. Army Deputy
Chief of Staff for Operations, Lieutenant General Harold Johnson (soon to be the Army
Chief of Staff), even ordered an historical study to determine if CAS was really worth the
effort. The study concluded that American ground commanders loved it in spite of any
direct profit-and-loss analysis. And after the Army Close Air Support Board made its
report. General Wheeler rejected its proposal for a CAS plane, and sent a policy letter to
his commanders. In it, he asserted that the Army did not plan to create arivalair arm, and

"See Robert McNamara, "Close Air Support," Memorandum for Air Force and
Army Secretaries, 16 Febmary 1963. For the Close Air Support Boards, see Futrell,
Ideas, vol. II, 183; Goldberg and Smith, 23-24; Kirkpatnck, 16-20, and McLennan, 72.
(His work dates from the time the boards were about to convene, and expresses a hope
they will resolve CAS issues.)
98

in a semantic effort to sidestep previous agreements and thus avoid an ugly roles-andmissions fight over CAS, retermed helicopter fire support as "direct support."^"
Wheeler's tendered olive branch and fig leaf renaming of helicopter CAS did not
mean that he kept his service from competing with the Air Force. Under the Strike
Command's overall direction, each service conducted separate preliminary exercises before
starting a heavily monitored joint exercise in autumn 1964 called Gold Fire I. The results
did not give either side a decisive advantage. The Air Force demonsttated prowess in
combat area logistics and reconnaissance, which led to McNamara's cancellation of further
Army purchase of the Caribouttansportplane and OV-1 Mohawk surveillance plane. But

^"Vance quote is from Memorandum from Secretary of the Army for the Chief of
Staff, U.S. Army, "High Speed Helicopter Weapons System," 27 March 1963, reproduced
in James Hessman, et al, "The Army Gets a New Weapons System," Armed Forces
Journal 106 (14 December 1968): 7.
Bergerson believes that the Army top leadership sttove to avoid open conflict with
the Air Force since 1958 (p. 118). The attack helicopter request isfromHead, 224. LT
GEN Johnson's study is from Kirkpatrick, 20-21. LeMay sustained a verbal attack upon
the Army's actions; see Futtell, Ideas, vol. 11, 186-187.
COL James Agnew, USA and ETC Rupert Glover, USA, GEN Harold Johnson.
USA (ret.). Senior Officers' Debriefing Program (Carlisle Barracks, Pa.: AMHI, 23 April
1973 and 5 November 1973), 36-40,ttanscriptof interview 12, tape 12 (23 April), 28-36,
transcript of interview 14, tape 2 (5 November), The Harold K. Johnson Papers, Vol. Ill,
AMHI, reveal Johnson's skepticism of CAS' affordability as well as his discomfort with the
Army aviators' zeal. However, Johnson welcomed some agitation in order to enforce
better Air Force and Army cooperation.
GEN Wheeler's reaction is quoted at length in MAJ Raymond Reeves, USAF,
"Close Air Support, AH-56 VS. A-X: Doctrine Conflict between the Services," (Research
Study, Air Command and Staff College, 1972), 10-11; see also Head, 225-226.
There is also a 16 January 1964 briefing in the Fort Rucker Papers (AMHI, Cariisle
Barracks, Pa), entitled "Army Views on the Use of Aerial Vehicles," source apparently the
Army Aviation School and Center (AASAC), which repeats Wheeler's views. It defines
CAS as large volumes of aerialfirepoweravailable to a commander courtesy of another
service, and direct fire support as firepower delivered in close proximity to engaged ground
units by organic Army aircraft. Furthermore, direct support aircraft would be simple,
rugged, and integral to Army ground units, while other support aircraft would be
multipurpose, not part of the Army, and available only part time Apparently, the bnefing
was the end result of the leadership's attempt to control its aviators and fine tune its public
stance And it again reveals the Army leadership's ambivalence over the best way to
conduct CAS, given therapidadvance of both jet airplane and helicopter technology
99

the Air Force failed to sell the Arniy on fast jet support; Air Force F-4s could not
successfully escort slow-moving transport aircraft. The tests spun-ed some cooperation,
however, as the Air Force releamed operations not seen since Elwood Quesada's days in
France. The exercise and CAS Boards led the service to promise a more streamlined CAS
operation and more forward air conttollers.^'
Therivalrywas not over by any means. In May 1964, Chairman of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff, General Maxwell Taylor, attempted to make peace by creating another
interservice agreement which would divide aircraft between the services by design and
function rather than weight. His effort spurred Secretary Zuckert and Air Force Chief of
Staff LeMay to demand that the Air Force assume responsibility for all Air Force-Army
aircraft operations. The Army and OSD rejected this move, but the Army was itself guilty
of a similar attitude: Strike Command's commander. Army General Paul Adams, criticized
his own service for a too-zealous and parochial view of airmobile operations. According to
one source, there was some talk of disbanding the 11th AAD, though this might have been
premature since a second Gold Fire test was planned. Neither action occurred, and one of
the prime reasons was that in summer 1965, OSD sent the new unitnow designated the
1st Cavalry Division (Airmobile)~into a situation where one could determine its worth
better than any test: the escalating war in Vietnam.^^
"Sorting out the mix of studies, tests, and agencies is a challenge, and this
footnote's paragraph is a quick summary only. One finds daunting accounts in Bergerson,
114; Davis, 18-19; Futrell, Ideas, vol. II, 182-189; Goldberg and Smith, 21-23. Bergerson
writes an account of Army aviation's "heroic"rise,and makes the exercises seem as if the
Air Force desperately aped the Army. Davis's short description portrays the tests as
virtually free-style competition. But the other two accounts make clear that although the
tests were competitive, they-especially the joint Gold Fire test-were controlled by the
joint-service Strike Command. The F-4s' problem with helicopter escort is from the above
Futrell citation; and MGEN Benjamin Harrison, USA (ret), telephonic interview by
author, 27 June 1997, tape recording and notes in author's possession.
^Goldberg and Smith, 22-27 feature the following items: Taylor's proposal and
LeMay and Zuckert's brazen grab for total conttol; extensive quote of General Adams'
opinion; exercise termination and orders to Vietnam; and Air Force opposition to airmobile
division creation. Bergerson, 115; and Futrell, jjkas, vol II, 189, are the 11th AAD
disbandment sources. Other sources for exercise termination, unit redes i gnat ion, and
100

Vietnam. 1961-1965
The growing American involvement in Vietnam highlighted the give-and-take
occurring between the services conceming CAS. Long before the 1st Cavalry Division and
mainstream Air Force units arrived in Vietnam, Air Force planes and Army helicopters
delivered air support to ground units. The friction that characterized the services' stateside
relationship transferred to their low intensity combat operations in Vietnam.
In 1961, the Air Force sent pilots, planes, and maintenance crews from LeMay's
special air unit, the 4400th Combat Crew Training Squadron (CCTS, unit code name
r

Jungle Jim). Under the operational code-name of Farm Gate, they mostly ran their own
operation using South Vietnamese passengers as window dressing for what officially was
declared an advisory mission. They used a Worid War Il-vintage medium bomber, the
B-26, and an almost equally old single-engined trainer-cum-attack plane, the T-28 (for
photo, see Appendix Fig. 27) for fire support missions They also had to borrow little
spotter planes from the Army. Air Force leaders revealed their infatuation with World War
ll-style air superiority stmggles when they delayed the T-28s' arrival so as to arm them with
Sidewinder air-to-air missiles. (The upper levels of the American chain of command in
Vietnam cancelled the effort since there was utterly no air threat in South Vietnam.) It was
just as well, for both the T-28 and the B-26's old airframes suffered an increasing number
of catastrophic inflight stmctural failures from the tactical maneuvering that did occur. The
attack plane the Air Force increasingly had to use was plane with solid CAS credentials
from the Korean War that they purchased from the Navy, the A-1."

orders to Vietnam are Bergerson, 116; Bradin 111-112; Futrell, Ideas, vol. II, 189; and
Reeves, 12. One of the other reasons for exercise cancellation was that the Joint Chiefs of
Staff believed they had enough information
"Tilford, 63-67, 76-77; Sbrega, "Southeast Asia," in Cooling, ed.. Case Studies
420-425, 441; Schlight, 3-5; Neil Sheehan, A Bnght Shining Lie: John Paul Vann and
America in Vietnam (New York: Vintage Books, 1988), 64-65; and Congress, House,
Report of the Special Subcommittee on Tactical Air Support of the Committee on Armed
Services, Close Air Support. 89th Cong., 2d sess., 1 Febmary 1966, 4863
101

The Army sent a small helicopter detachment to Vietnam in 1961, but in spite of
some of its aviators' belief that Vietnam would vindicate the Howze Board, the top
leadership actually saw helicopters as better suited to high-technology conventional wars
than to the counterinsurgency role. However, the aircraft proved their worth in battlefield
logistics, supporting the unexpected fights that broke out in normally inaccessible locations.
And in a development disturbing to the Air Force, they sometimes provided-or had to
provide-fire support as they inserted troops into a landing zone Unfortunately, they were
vulnerable against defenses. Their main and rear stabilizer rotors needed to operate
without serious dents or bends, and their engine-rotor gearboxes also could not work with
any serious damage. The helicopter pilots' cocky attitude did not help their lack of tme
combat experience when flying these vulnerable machines in a defended areaa situation
made increasingly unfortunate as communist gunners acquired proficiency and better
weapons. Aviation units modified their logistics craft to provide armed escort for logistics
missions, but even the jet-powered UH-1 could neither maneuver nor keep up with its
charges when carrying heavy weapons. Helicopter unit commanders faced a dilemma of
either lightly arming their escorts, which meant weakfirepower,or carrying heavier
armament and the attendant performance penalties. Thus, by 1964, Army aviators
increasingly wanted a dedicated attack helicopter. Meanwhile, they experienced
embarrassing losses in such fights as the 1963 Battle of Ap Bac and the 1965 Battle of
Binh Gia. The Army'sfirstserious fight with North Vietnamese regulars revealed its
helicopters' inability to deliver heavyfirepowersupport At the Battle of la Drang in
October 1965, an element of the 1st Air Cav met the North Vietnamese and, by the
commander's later admission. Air Force airplanes and not his own modified helicopter
gunships were primarily responsible for saving his men."
^"The Army's conventional war onentation as it pertains to Vietnam and helicopters
is from Buhrow, "Study of Interservice Rivalry," 40-42 (neither service was ready for a
Vietnam-style conventional war); Krepinevich, The Armv and Viettiam. 121-126 (asserts
that aviator leaders envisioned using helicopters against a conventional communist
Vietnamese ground force); and Donald Mrozek, Air Power and the Ground War in
Vietnam. 76 (quotes Army leader reminiscences about their initial skepticism).
Army helicopter aviator confidence and negative results arc from Dick, Disosway,
102

Early on, the airmen and the soldiers wanted to fight the war in their own way,
which created tension within the American command. From 1963 through 1965, Air
Force people in Vietnam complained that the soldiers who dominated the Military
Assistance Command, Vietnam (MACV) staff ignored their concerns, which included an
already snaried air traffic control system and unresponsive air support tasking network.
Indeed, before retiring as Air Force Chief of Staff, General LeMay visited Vietnam and
criticized the operation for not granting the Air Force complete control of all air assets in
accordance with its doctrine. The situation changed as the exigencies of an escalating war
demonstrated to both sides the value of cooperation.^^
The war's escalation in 1964 and 1965 meant that Air Force leaders had a reason to
send their supersonic jets and show that their service could win the war. "A squadron of
F-100s over here could puncture the balloon of the skeptics," boasted one staff officer.

179, 192; Easterbrook, "All Aboard Air Oblivion," 52-60; Futrell, Ideas, vol. II, 299 (cites
belief that Vietnam would vindicate Howze); Sbrega, 423, 454-455; Schlight, 16; and
Sheehan, Lie. 214-238 (pilot mindset and Ap Bac account).
The helicopters' problems carrying weapons, vulnerabilities, and the attendant
desire for an attack helicopter, is from Bradin, 111-115 (Vietnam deployment date is on
12); Cecil Brownlow, "Burgeoning U.S. Use of Air Power Aims at Forestalling Ground
War with Chinese," Aviation Week & Space Technology (henceforth known as AW&ST)
(26 April 1965): 28-29; Rosen, Winning. 94 (notes communist gunners' increasing
proficiency); Andreson, Seneff. 43-48 (Seneff was Director of Army Aviation in 1965 and
noted the UH-l's lack offirepowerand resulting need for something with more punch)
The Battle of la Drang was desperate at times, and the U.S. Army commander
there, then-COL Harold Moore, later said that an important advantage for his forces was
that they hadfirepowerand the North Vietnamese did not-and that fixed wing tactical
planes "helped provide that edge." See Joseph Galloway and LTGEN Harold Moore, USA
(ret.) We Were Soldiers Once
and Young. la Drang: The Battle that Changed the War
in Vietnam (New York: Harper Perennial, 1992), 121 (quote in this footnote), 305-307
"Relations between Air Force and Army commanders in Vietnam during the early
years were bad, and featured stmggles over air tasking and control even more complex
than the interservice tussle occurring stateside. See Tilford, 68-70; and Sbrega, 418-431
Tilford believes the friction dissipated for three reasons: the desire to support the war
effort and prevent needless loss of life; the Rolling Thunder campaign distracted the Air
Force with an air war more to its liking; and new personalities in the air and MACV
commander positions smoothed personal relations within MACV staff. (Air I orce MGEN
Joseph Moore was a boyhood chum of Army GEN William Westmoreland )
103

But the preferred interdiction/air-superiority campaign over North Vietnam (called Rolling
Thunder) and the ground support effort in South Vietnam created fmstrations because, as
with the Korean War, the Vietnam War did not fit the airmen's preconceived warfighting
notions. The interdiction campaign failed to stanch the communists' logistic flow because
there were not enough planes to prevent a too-numerous and too-determined enemy from
using the vast, mountainous jungle to its advantage. As with Korea's latter years when the
battle lines froze, the Vietnam War's early escalation years featured an opponent who did
not manufacture or transport the mass quantities of industrial war material for which
interdiction is well suited. The Vietnam War also featured political limitations upon the air
campaign against North Vietnam that President Lyndon Johnson's administration
aggravated with its tactical stupidity (such as forbidding the airmen to attack the
surface-to-air missile [SAM] sites and interceptor units set up to shoot them down).
Indeed, though the North Vietnamese Air Force never remotely challenged American air
superiority, its MiG interceptors-cheap planes that Air Force leaders would have
considered unacceptable for their own service-used the Americans' self-imposed
restrictions to conduct an aerial guerrilla campaign which occasionally brought down the
big, expensive, supersonic jet fighter-bombers.^^

^^Tilford, Setup. 79 (staff officer quote), 93-98 and 114 (recounts the airmen's
eagerness to use jets). Tilford observes that the Air Force leadership was convinced that it
could conduct a classic strategic bombing campaign against the North to break its will.
Fmstrated with the outcome of a 1964 Vietnam scenario wargame which later became
reality, GEN LeMay insisted that the solution against the North Viettiamese was to "bomb
them into the Stone Age" (LeMay quote in Setup. 98). Momyer believed that jets could
accomplish any of the missions in Vietnam better than slower planes (Setup. 114). Dick,
Disosway. 203; at least reveals that general's desire to get jets into the war. Schlight, 21,
61, 114, describes how LeMay's successor, GEN John McConnell, also wanted a strong
airpower-based strategy, though he was not as vehement as LeMay.
However, things did not turn out that well. Works that reveal or discuss the Air
Force's fmstrations in Rolling Thunder are COL Jack Broughton, USAF (ret), "In Spite of
Command and Control," "And There Were MiGs," and "And There Were SAMs," chaps
in Going Downtown: The War Against Hanoi and Washington (New York: Orion Books,
1988), 83-108, 149-190; MAJ Mark Clodfelter, USAF, "An Extended Application of
Force," and "Restraints and Results, 1965-1968," chaps in The Limits of Air Power: The
American Bombing of North Vietnam (New York: The Free Press, 1989), 73-146, COL
104

The Air Force supersonic jets that flew CAS in South Vietnam, predominantly the
F-4 , F-100, and F-105, earned their share of praise. In fact, over the years the Air Force's
South Vietnam CAS operation became so efficient that observers both inside and outside
the military commented that the Army relied too much upon it.^' However, the fast jets

Dennis Drew, USAF, "Rolling Thunder: Anatomy of a Failure," CADRE Paper, Report
#AU-ARI-CP 86-3 (MAFB: Airpower Research Institute, 1986; reprint MAFB: Air War
College Associate Programs Course-MS 61 OAF, Lessons 8-13, 1993), 84-98 (page
reference is to reprint); Futrell, Ideas, vol. II, 288-294; COL AL. Gropman, USAF (ret),
"The Air War in Vietnam, 1961-1973," in War in the Third Dimension: Essays in
Contemporary Air Power, ed. AVM R.A. Mason, RAF (London: Brassey's, 1986),
70-76; Hosmer, "Psychological Effects," 129-139; Eduard Mark, Aerial Interdiction: Air
Power and the Land Battle in Three Wars (Washington, D.C: Center for Air Force
History, 1994), 324-326, and 406-409 (also mentions that the Air Force lacked suitable
fighter-bombers even for its favored interdiction work); Mrozek, 17-20 (Air Force's
narrow war view created problems); Neufeld, Sprey. 28 (discusses irony of MiG-17
victories over faster American jets); Sheehan, A Bright Shining Lie. 676-679 (explains how
the mathematics of too few airplanes attacking too many targets spelled the interdiction
campaign's failure); Spick, The Ace Factor. 144-151 (recounts the problems encountered
byfightersin the North); Tilford, "Rolling Thunder and the Diffusion of Heat," chap, in
Setup. 89-163; and Worden, "Absolutists and the Fmstration of Airpower in Vietnam
(1964-69)," chap, in his Rise of the Fighter Generals. 157-183.
"John Sbrega's "Southeast Asia" chapter in Cooling's CAS anthology features
praise for supersonic jets; saying of the F-100 and F-4 that they "carried the close
air-support load" (p. 441). After he retired, GEN William Momyer wrote a history of
tactical airpower as he had seen it. Air Power in Three Wars (MAFB: Air University
Press, 1978). He believed that jets were better support machines (p. 270).
The soldiers' gratitude and some belief that they came to rely upon CAS too much
are from Beaumont, Joint Militttfv Operations. 152-153 (CAS success created a
psychological dependence); MAJ Steve Bell, USAF, "Close Air Support for the Future,""
(Master's thesis. Army Command and General Staff College, 1992), 31-33; Dick,
Disosway. 195; GAO, Close Air Support: Principal Issues and Aircraft Choices. Appendix
11, 57-60; Hadley, Sfraw Giant. 182; Krepinevich, 170-171; Sbrega, 469 (quotes GEN
Momyer's belief that abundant CAS availability was unrealistic); and Schlight, 216-217.
Galloway and Moore, We Were Soldiers Once. 305-307, is one of the most dramatic
examples. Indeed, beleaguered Army soldiers did not really care who delivered life-saving
attacks, and the Air Force Project Contemporary Historical Evaluation of Combat
Operations Report (henceforth known as CHECO) program features a number of CHECO
battle accounts with Army praise of the fast jets' support, for example, see Warren Trest
and CAPT James Bmce, USAF, "Operation El Paso" (Hickam AFB, Hawaii
I leadquaters [HQ], Pacific Air Forces [PACAFl, 30 November 1966), and CAPT Mel vin
105

had their problems. With their great speed, they could respond to an air task quickly
enough, but the same problems seen in Korea surfaced in Vietnam, especially given the
region's tropical climate. Their ability to maneuver closely and slowly enough to see the
target, to work safely when the weather was poor, to carry sufficient ordnance, and to
remain over the battle area, were all limited.^* Colonel Jack Broughton, a legendary F-105
pilot, summed up the handicaps when he described a four-plane formation of F-105s flying
a road reconnaissance ("road recce") mission in bad weather with a heavy load of bombs
and missiles:
Sitting there with a heavy load like that, trying to road recce, and looking
for a native village was a disaster. The machines were just not built for it
. . . . They had no maneuverability and the fuel on all four airplaoes. was.^
going like crazy asthey snaked down the road, giving it the old college try
to find that village . . . . Dave [one of the pilots] was hurting. He was
running out of fuel and he couldn't get high enough to put the bombs
anyplace worthwhile, even if he had found someplace worthwhile.^'

Porter, USAF, "The Siege at Plei Me" (Hickam AFB, Hawaii; HQ PACAF, 24 February
1966).
Conceming the CHECO Program, however, Bergerson, 120; and Futrell, Ideas.
Vol. II. 316-323, question its charter and results. Bergerson implies that one of its
purposes was to compare Air Force and Army aviation performance, apparently to provide
documentary ammunition for possible interservice fights back home. Futrell commends its
attempt to provide contemporary historical documentation of the service's Vietnam War
performance, but he believes that its Air Force-centered attitude led it to overlook what
effect the air campaign had upon the enemy.
^''Jet problems are from Barnes, 63-65 (Vietnam presented weather difficulties that
hurt fast jet CAS; and in spite of the generals' beliefs, the war witnessed specialization of
airplanes for missions); Gunston, 249-250, 256-257 (good explanation of difficulties);
Momyer, 271 (inadvertently reveals one disadvantage when praising the jets' artival-long
paved mnways built to handle their heavy weight and lengthy takeoff and landing rolls),
Craig Powell, "The A-10," Army (March 1976): 45; Sbrega, 444 (in spite of praising the
jets' effort, concedes their difficulties with high speeds and lack of sufficient fuel). Spick,
146 (F-4's lack of maneuverability even for dogfighting); and Tilford, 113 (details
performance penalties as they pertained to Vietnam)
^'Broughton, Going Downtown. 67.
106

Broughton's observations were not unique. The supersonic jet pilots had other
missions to think about. Their high speed and/or high altitude weapons deliveries gave
them little opportunity to fully understand what was happening dovvn below and sometimes
gave them the feeling that air support missions were useless. One observed that CAS
results were good if one could find the target, and added "What's the target? A piece of
jungle out here. . . . you don't know what you're hitting; [you're] making toothpicks."'"
Given these problems, even officers and later observers who favored the supersonic
jets conceded that the propeller-driven A-1 (for photo, see Appendix Fig.28) was the CAS
star. Major Richard Griffin was a forward air controller (FAC) who flew a spotter plane in
Vietnam during the mid 1960s. He acknowledged the greater abundance of fast jets,
particularly the F-100, but he still preferred the A-l:
I think that anybody in Vietnam that flew as a FAC probably has
somewhat the same thought. If it wasn't the best, it was probably the
most versatile . . . . Number one is that the A-1 would carry an awful
lot of crap . . . it had all kinds of bombs and everything hanging on it
. . . . Another thing . . . that you always ask for early when you've got
fighters on to the target, say: "Well. . . how long can you stay here?"
And invariably the guys in the A-1's would always come up with
something smart . . . "about an hour longer than you can." Well, you
know, most of the time in the F-lOO's or F-4's . . . they talked in minutes."
Major Griffin also submitted the common sense observation about jet versus A-1
attack speeds that "If you're coming out on a target at 450 knots you, obviously, have to
release higher than you do if you're coming in at 250." When he directed a jet pilot's eyes
unto a target, he "had to talk in terms ofriversand mountains." But with A-l pilots.

'"Strain on multi-purpose pilots is from Neufeld, Sprev. 27; and Tilford, 217.
Dick, Disosway. 192, recalls a staff research visit in 1962: "Of course, you couldn't see
anything in the damn jungles out there." Quote is from Talbott. 137. Talbott was an F-4
wing commander in 1966. The wing also flew fighter escort missions in North Viettiam.
"Hugh Ahmann and LTCOL Vaughn Gallagher, USAF, Interview of Major
Richard L. Griffin (MAFB: USAF Oral History Program, 24 March 1972), 62-63,
transcript, AFHRC Holding K239.0512-542. LTGEN Talbott liked his F-4's CAS
performance, but conceded the A-l was superb because of its load carriage,
maneuverability, and loiter time; see Talbott. 144.
107

"Instead of having to talk in large geographic features, you can talk in very much detail.. .
[so] he can comerightin."'^
Colonel Eugene Deatrick, who served in Vietnam as an A-l squadron commander,
made similar comments in later interviews while pointing out further implications of the
A-l's performance and mission. Since his was a dedicated air support outfit, Deatrick
insisted that men from Army units and his pilots conduct exchange visits, and he often took
the soldiers on flights over their own camps. This yielded very positive results, as soldiers
and pilotsfine-tunedprocedures involving communications, optimum weapons, visual
signalling, and unit escape routes from an overmn camp. Deatrick later described the
soldiers' reaction to their orientation flight as "those air force people aren't as blind as we
think they are. They've got some problems and what we've got to do is find a better way to
identify ourselves from the ground." For their part, the pilots gained increased empathy for
the soldiers that they supported. Deatrick observed that this was not the case with the
F-100 units in Vietnam at the time. They not only did not have Army-compatible radios
like the A-l, but their units did not pursue exchange visits as assiduously as Deatrick's
outfit. "I doubt if they had ever seen each other," he quipped. That and the jets' higher
altitudes for setting up their weapons deliveries and higher speeds made it such that a jet
pilot was often "sitting up there completely in the dark just circling. All he could see was
the FAC [in a spotter plane] flying around. Had no idea of what was going on. He might
see some .. . smoke go up .. . and still had no idea what it meant.""

"Ahmann and Gallagher, Griffin. 64

"COL Ray Bowers, USAF, and MAJ Ralph Rowley, USAF, Interview with Col
Eugene Deatrick (USAF). CO. 1st Air Commando Sodn. Pleiku. SVN. Feb 66-Feb 67
and Col. Eleazar Pamilv (USA). Spec. Forces Advisor to Laos. Mav 60-Mav 61. USSF
Pet CO. 1 and III Corps. Aug 66-Jul 67. (Washington, D C : USAF Oral History, 9
March 1972), 55-62, transcript, AFHRC Holding K239.0512-705 (first quote, 58, second
quote, 62, and third quote, 51-52). Parmly confirmed the advantages Deatrick mentioned
(48-50). Years later, Deatrick re-emphasized the importance of interaction between air
support units and the ground units, the fast jets' CAS deficiencies, and TACs low regard
for the CAS mission in the war's eariy days; interview by author, Alexandria, Va , 8 May
1997, author's notes. It is understood that Deatrick's tour occurted in 1966, but his
assessment is included here as an example of the A-l's-and A-l units'- special CAS
108

The A-l also scored on accuracy and its ability to handle Vietnam's often cloudy
weather conditions. Whether delivering ordnance from steep dives (the more accurate
delivery) or from level-flight, its low speed and maneuverability allowed the pilot to
execute his attack relatively close to the ground, which further improved accuracy. The
plane routinely delivered weapons within fifty meters of hard-pressed friendly forces per
their desperate request. One type of air support was combat search-and-rescue (SAR) of
downed pilots, a mission in which the A-l excelled as an armed escort for rescue
helicopters. An A-l pilot who supervised SAR operations. Major James Costin, stated that
one reason for choosing the A-l over fast jetfighterswas its accuracy hitting potential
captors pursuing the downed aviator. "On at least two occasions," he said of the jets, "I
saw them drop on the survivor . . . . They're too high . . and they just weren't that
accurate." A-Is earned respect for working targets in marginal weather unsuited to jets,
and both Army units and helicopter pilots praised the plane for sticking around in fair
weather or foul to provide life-saving heavy fire support. Colonel Deatrick's men made
sure this happened by devising procedures for working beneath the weather to support
each camp. The A-l's success in poor weather raises the question of its night capability.
Though it did not have the radar or infrared equipment carried by so-called
night/all-weather planes, it flew many night missions. The pilots improvised tactics to
prevent mid-air collisions, identify the target viaflares,and above all, not get shot down.
Interestingly, A-10 pilots would use many of the same tactics in Desert Storm."

proficiency. GAO, Close Air Support: Principal Issues and Aircraft Choices. 63, also
points out the difficulty of seeing ttoops in the jungle tertain.
"LTCOL Vaughn Gallagher, USAF, and MAJ Lyn Officer, USAF, Interview
#653 of Major James Costin. (Eglin AFB, Fla.: USAF Oral History Program, 6 Febmary
1973), 10-12 (SAR quote p. 10), 24-25 (marginal weather procedures), transcnpt,
AFHRC Holding K239.0512-653.
Conceming, the A-l's ability to deliver weapons near troops in contact, LTGEN
Moore and Galloway again provide another good CAS example in We Were Soldiers
Once. They cite the Army's appreciation for the A-l and its accuracy (and loiter time) in
the October 1965 la Drang battle: "Overhead, some of the best air-support work was
being done by the A-IE Skyraider
it delivered very accurate fire and, best of all,
could hang around for up to eight hours" (p 96). Praise for the plane is scattered
109

A final characteristic that impressed people about the A-l was its ability to survive
in a hostile environment. Survivability involves two characteristics: ability to avoid being
hit and ability to survive hits. Critics and some A-l pilots pointed out that the plane was
too slow to evade antiaircraft fire, especially the new SAMs that North Vietnam obtained
from Russia. Even so. A-Is flew into certain parts of North Vietnam until the 1970s, and
Navy A-Is even scored two kills against MiG-17 jetfightersin 1965 (defensive fights
against cocky or inept MiG pilots). ;The plane's most important combat survival attribute
was its mggedness, because A-Is took many antiaircraft artillery (AAA) hits in their low
and slow attacks. A-l pilot Costin said it was "the type of aircraft which could take a good

elsewhere in the book; see pp. 96-97, 227, 303-307. On pages 189-190, F-100s are called
off after they accidently roll in on American soldiers. In his Air Force Oral History
interview, MAJ Griffin said that the A-l's accuracy was another reason FACs and the
Army preferred it; Gallagher and Ahmann, Griffin. 64-65. Helicopter pilots praised the
A-l's support in the landing zones; see Cecil Brownlow, "Burgeoning U.S. Use of Air
Power," AW&ST. 29-30 (Brownlow reflected the Air Force view, however, in that he kept
mentioning that the A-l would not survive if the Red Chinese Air Force got involved in the
war[?]).
Costin was not the only A-l pilot happy with his plane. A-l pilots themselves fairiy
boasted of their plane's weapons delivery and marginal weather capabilities; see Bowers
and Rowley, Deattick. 49-50 (accuracy), 56 (weather descent procedures); COL Deatrick,
interview by author; and LTCOL Lyn Officer, USAF, Interview of M^jor Upton D.
Officer. (MAFB: USAF Oral History Program, 11-13 July 1973), 26-28, 31-32,
transcript, AFHRC Holding K239.0512-680.
CAPT Melvin Porter, USAF, "Second Defense of Lima Site 36," Project CHECO
Report (Hickam AFB, Hawaii: HQ PACAF, 28 April 1967), iv, 5, 6, praises the A-ls for
preventing a massacre when jets could not operate for weather (the action occurred in
1966, but is included here to demonstrate the A-l's abilities). MGEN James Hildreth also
served as an A-l squadron commander, and recounts an incident where headquarters
refused his request to help a surrounded Army patrol, and instead sent F-100s. The jets
could not get under the weather and the patrol was lost; see Hasdorff, Hildreth. 31
Schlight, 99-100, provides an example of A-l night CAS operations that occurred dunng
1965. Night tactics are from Gallagher and Officer, Costin. 31-40.
Besides Costin, other comments on the A-l's SAR role are in MAJ Russell
Bennett, USAF, "Can the A-X Adequately Replace the A-l in the COIN and SAR Role?"
(Research study, USAF Air Command and Staff College [henceforth cited as ACSC),
1973), 14; and Eari Tilford, Search and Rescue in Southeast Asia. USAF in Southeast
Asia Series, (Washington, D C : Office of Air Force History, 1980; repnnt, Washington,
D.C: Center for Air Force History, 1992), 66 (page reference to repnnt).
110

hard hit and a lot of them and not get hurt too bad." Colonel Deatrick recalled returning to
base with his engine shot up and one landing gear shot away. His unit lost only one plane
to ground fire, and even that one managed to belly land back at base. Another squadron
commander later asserted that jet aircraft could not take the punishment he saw A-ls
endure, which included a man-sized hole in one plane's wing and another so badly shot it
looked like a "sieve." Indeed, the available A-l pilot oral histories reveal that losses often
came when pilots became too aggressive or used bad tactics.'^
The previous discussion about weather capability and survivability is important
considering the A-l's-and later, the A-10's-Air Force dedicated CAS counterpart, the
gunship. The modification of transports such as the C-47 and C-130 (for photos, see
Appendix Figs. 29 and 30) into bristling gun platforms was another Vietnam-related story
of how tactical common sense prevailed in a doctrine-slaved Air Force. These lumbering
planes had much better loiter capability than even the A-l, and theirfirepower,which
included Galling guns, cannon, and lots of ammunition, was tmly striking. They thus made
many impressive saves of beleaguered Army units. But they were slower, much less
maneuverable, and less mgged than the A-l, and any sort of antiaircraft opposition
restticted their operation. In spite of one observer's praise of their all-weather capability
and quick air-request response times, the actual evidence tends toward another conclusion.
Their night-vision gear could not see through clouds, and their weapons delivery pattern
altitudes and lack of maneuverability precluded any work beneath low clouds. The quick
'^Outside critic of A-l's speed is Sbrega, 441; and Air Force critics are Momyer,
Airpower in Three Wars. 263, 270; and MAJ Costin interview by Gallagher and Officer,
33 (A-l pilot). Account of A-l success against MiGs is in Dorr, 57-60. Information on
A-l flights into Laos and north of the DMZ is also from Dorr, "Loitering with Intent," and
"Secret War in Laos," chaps, in his Skyraider. 93-128; and Gallagher and Officer, Costin.
14. A number of sources speak of the A-l's ability to sustain damage and fly; they are
Don-, 60; Gallagher and Officer, Costin. 6 (quote), 13, 27-29 (observations about bad
tactics and losses); Gunston, 250-251; Officer, Officer. 68-69 (makes the same point as
Costin). The "other squadron commander" is MGEN Hildreth, in Hasdorff, Hildreth.
68-78. Hildreth pointed out that the plane was not invincible, and many losses occurred
due to over-aggressiveness and carelessness. Air Force LTGEN Marvin McNickle was no
fan of the A-10, but remembered the A-l's mggedness and load carrying capacity with
affection; see Ahmann, McNickle. 114.
Ill

response-time claim is curious, for in spite of being slower than the A-l, they escaped the
same observer's censure of the A-l for being too slow to respond to air requests. The Air
Force mostly used gunships in a logistic interdiction capacity in Laos. They flew night
missions in the dry season in areas prepared by other planes-the A-l being one of them.
These criticisms are not to say that the gunships were unnecessary. Like the A-l, and later
the A-10, they had their place in the American airpower and foreign policy spectrum.'^

The Pike Committee Examines Vietnam CAS. Autumn 1965

The A-l's performance was one part of the Air Force CAS effort getting attention
in the U.S. Congress in mid 1965. The teething process as the services worked out CAS
procedures in Vietnam was still underway, and legislators heard plenty of complaints. But
most of the blame lay with the Air Force and its failure to meet agreed-upon commitments.
"^The best source for the gunships' stmggle for existence and respect is Jack
Ballard, Development and Employment of Fixed-Wing Gunships (Washington, D C :
Office of Air Force History, 1982). The favorable gunship CAS source is Sbrega; see pp.
444-445 (p. 441 has his criticism of slow A-l response). Other sources for gunship design
and action are: Dorr, 110-111 (A-l support required for gunship interdiction); Futrell,
Ideas, vol. II, 306-307 (aircraft support for gunship interdiction); Gallagher and Officer,
Costin. 14 (A-l support missions); Mark, 335-338 (gunship interdiction action); LTCOL
Thomas McGrath, USAF (ret.), personal interview by author, 7 November 1997,
Holloman AFB, N.Mex., notes in author's possession (former Laos airbome FAC points
out AC-130 poor weather limitations with its infrared sensors, as well as need for armed
escorts to suppress anti-aircraft fire); Mrozek, 125-132 (cites irony of lumbering planes
flying interdiction, as well as capabilities); Schlight, 199 (example of gunship problems
with weather), 238-240; Tilford, 175-177 (interdiction, survivability problems, and
required aircraft support). AC-130 crew member LTCOL Henry Zeybel, USAF (ret)
describes the gunships' strengths and weaknesses in his Laotian interdiction campaign
nan-ative, "Tmck Count," Air University Review 34 (January Febmary, 1983): 36-45.
Even B-52s performed air support in Vietnam. Their huge bomb loads guaranteed
maximum shock effect and especially helped during the siege of Khe Sanh. However, the
same problem that heavy bombers encountered during World War II often hindered the
B-52s' effectiveness in Vietnam. They required much more mission preparation time, and
their high altitude, mass bomb deliveries were more suited to area targets free of friendly
troops. See Hallion, "A Rettospective Assessment," 13-14; Mrozek, 139-145; and Sbrega,
445-446, 456-458; and Jeffrey West, "On the Decisive Role of Air Power in the Outcome
of Two Indochina Battles: Dien Bien Phu-1954, and Khe Sanh-1968," in ProcggdingS.
Symposium: Air Support. 307-341
112

and some congressmen agreed. Starting a trend whereby ex-Marine congressmen and
staffers willingly served as CAS advocates versus the Air Force, Daniel Flood (D-PA) was
a conduit for Army complaints about Air Force Vietnam CAS snafus. Congressman Otis
Pike (D-NY), who flew Marine dive bomber CAS in World War II and who wanted more
focus upon unconventional warfare, later said that he also received discreet complaints
from lower ranking Army officers about Air Force failings (the senior leadership
apparently did not want another interservice fight and told him everything was fine). He
gladly chaired a subcommittee convened for seven days in early autumn 1965 by House
Armed Services Committee Chairman Mendel Rivers (D-SC) to investigate Vietnam CAS
deficiencies.'^
The committee members focused upon slow air task response times and
incompatible radios, and also made unfavorable comparisons to the Marines' CAS style.
But they spent most of the hearings criticizing the Air Force's failure to produce an airplane
dedicated to meeting its agreed-upon commitment to the Army. They asked all of the
witnesses, which consisted of Vietnam veterans and senior officers of various services,
their opinions about suitable CAS planes. The three Army Vietnam veterans who
appeared were primarily concerned that Air Force planes show up when needed, though all
regarded the A-l as one of the best, if not the best, CAS planes. They also liked all of the
fixed-wing planes' capacity to deliver heavy firepower. The junior-ranking Air Force pilots
tried to avoid directly answering the congressmen's pointed questions-perhaps because
they felt the gaze of their superiors. Thefirst,A-l pilot Captain Alan Rennick, gave

'^MGEN Hildreth noted that Army commanders relayed their enthusiasm for the
A-l to visiting govemment functionaries; Hasdorff, Hildreth. 32. For Flood's role and the
Army's complaints to congressmen, see Bergerson, 116. Pike's background, his assessment
of Army dissatisfaction, and his position on warfare are from Buhrow, "Close Air Support
Requirements," 1-2, 39; Congress, House, Close Air Support. 22 September 1965,
4639-4641; Goldberg and Smith, 27; and authors telephonic interview of Otis Pike, 10
March 1997, author's notes. Mendel Rivers' concerns are from Congress, House, Report
of Special Subcommittee on Tactical Air Support of the Committee on Armed Services,
Close Air Support. 89th Cong., 1st sess., 1 February 1966, 4859
113

conditional answers that were actually quite sensible. He praised the A-l's accuracy,
mggedness, loiter time, and short mnway capability. But when pressed to compare the
A-l and F-100, he wanted the F-lOO's speed to evade defenses when needed. He also
believed that the two planes complemented each other. Under Pike's badgering, F-lOO
pilot Captain David Sands, still preferred speed and multi-role capability, while another
F-100 pilot. Lieutenant Colonel Emmett Hays, admitted that the F-100 was not primarily a
CAS plane and lacked Army-compatible radios. Before the committee brought in the
higher ranking officers, it questioned Marines about their well-developed procedures to
provide comparison to the Air Force and Army.'^
Pike revealed the Air Force's deficiencies better when he and his colleagues
interviewed the generals. The former Director of Army Aviation and aviation activist.
Major General Delk Oden, perhaps felt his own service's pressure not to upset interservice
relations as he resisted the committee's leading questions about CAS. "It's a great morale
booster, if nothing else," insisted Subcommittee Chief Counsel John Blandford as he
pressed the general. Oden said he agreed with the Air Force's mission priorities as they
pertained to aircraft selection until Pike asked him bluntiy if he knew of any Air Force
planes that were really designed to do CAS-to which he had to reply that he did not. .^9

"^Army Vietnam veteran witness preferences are from Congress, House Hearing,
Close Air Support. 4653, 4663, and 4674. Pertinent Hearing testimony from CAPT
Rennick, CAPT Sands, and LTCOL Hays is on 4688-4689, 4691,4693-4698, 4710,
4715, 4722, and 4729. (On p. 4691, Rennick questions the committee's apparent
preference for STOL aircraft that operate on rough strips near the troops by asking how
these planes will be resupplied. On p. 4722, Hays retorts that the Army should prepare its
requests better in order to get quicker response.) Marine testimony is on 4732-4752
(The Marines said their jets' accuracy was okay, and Pike-apparently feeling that this was
due to their superior system-left it at that; see p. 4748).
"Pertinent parts of Oden's testimony are in House Hearings, Closg Air SUPPQH,
4765, 4771 (Blandford quote), 4778, 4779-4780 (Pike asks blunt questions). Another
possible reason why Oden was willing to accept Air Force CAS decisions was that, as will
be seen, the Army had pressed forward with its attack helicopter plans. Being an Army
aviation advocate, perhaps he wanted the attack helicopter to do CAS and let the Air Force
handle the air superiority and interdiction missions
114

With that. Pike dismissed Oden and tumed his attention to the Air Force Assistant Chief of
Staff for Plans and Operations, Major General Arthur Agan.
One Air Force general later described Arthur Agan as thefighterpilot in the Air
Force Plans Directorate at that time, and as such, he represented the Air Force philosophy
that Pike wanted to challenge. As with Major General Oden, Pike forced the general to
admit that the F-100 and F-105 were not designed for CAS-and that the A-ls in the
service inventory were originally Navy planes. Pike finally asked, "Can you give me any
aircraft that the Air Force has developed since World War II for which the primary mission
was close air support?" Agan replied, "Not that way; no, sir." Agan and Pike agreed that
the nation's 1950s New Look strategy drove the current jet conventional war design
deficiencies, but Agan had no answer to Pike's question about what the Air Force currently
planned for CAS. As his time before the subcommittee ended, Agan insisted that
procuring a dedicated CAS plane would be fine as long as it possessed the capability to
defeat enemy fighters.'"
The last two Air Force generals appeared together; they were the Systems
Command chief. General Bernard Schriever, and the Deputy Chief of Staff for Research
and Development, Lieutenant General James Ferguson. Schriever answered most of the
questions and tried somewhat to defend and explain the Air Force position. He produced a
letter from a grateful Vietnam ground commander for air support at the Battle of An Khe,
and he admitted that the service's historical development and budget concems led it to
desire air combat capability for its tactical planes. He himself preferred the F-5 for
conflicts like Vietnam. But Congressman Charles Gubser (R-CA) attacked Schriever's
budget excuse (Agan had used it as well) by asking him if "the lessons we have leamed in
Vietnam have pointed up the fact that you cannot apply the cost-effectiveness technique in
a situation like Vietnam, where the possibilities are so infinite?" Pike skewered Schriever's
F-5 CAS plane choice by forcing him to admit that it was not primarily a CAS plane. But
""Hasdorf, Hildreth. 62, features the opinion of Major General Agan (Hildreth
was on the Air Force Pentagon staff at the time.) For Pike's hard questioning and Agan's
response, see House Hearing, Close Air Support. 4789-4790. Agan's parting preference
forfighter-typeplanes is on pp. 4796-4797.
115

Schriever was unlike the other Air Force men in that he at least opined that the Air Force
had ignored an entire combat spectmm He claimed that he "would have started a
development for a close air support plane, for the nature of warfare that we have been
encountering since the end of World War II, sooner." This comment revealed an attitude
change affecting some Air Force leaders."

Aircraft Choices, and the A-7 Choice. 1963-1965

Air Force leader attitudes changed because pressures beset the service from many
directions. In mid 1964, as the Vietnam War escalated and the A-l started eaming
favorable attention, McNamara and OSD studied re-opening A-l production. They
decided not do this because, in an example of aircraft cost inflation and McNamara's
mindset, he felt that the five-fold increase over its original price eliminated its cost
effectiveness. For his part. Air Force Secretary Zuckert had his service explore limited war
aircraft options through the end of the year. In a memorandum response to one of

"'Pertinent Schriever testimony is from House Hearings, Close Air Support.

4836-4839 (Schriever produced the Army letter and an unsigned staff study for the record
which discussed Air Force tactical plane selection and its CAS predicament in Vietnam),
4844-4846 (discussion of F-5), 4850-4851 (Schriever's own observations about traditional
Air Force tactical plane selections, and quote of his opinion), and 4852 (Gubser quote).
Schriever revealed his more common sense approach to the CAS plane question in
later discussions. In a personal interview by the author (1 May 1997, Washington, D C ,
notes in author's possesion), he spoke of his 1963 clash with LeMay over the attack plane
issue because he believed that such a plane was possible given the Air Force's air
superiority. In an earlier interview for the Air Force, he sharply rebuked the Air Force
interviewers' dogmatic contempt for gunships in the following exchange. Interviewer: "Do
you feel that the gunship violated Air Force doctrine by putting guns on transport aircraft
and using it in that fashion?" Schriever: "Air Force doctrine. I don't know what the hell
you're talking about. What I want is a weapon system that can do the job at hand in the
most effective way." Interviewer: "You need air superiority to maintain a gunship
program though, and we were awful shortsighted in that area." Schriever: "Sure we need
air superiority . . . . we have had . . . air superiority . . . since Worid War Two
No, 1
think that the gunship is one of the great inventions of the Vietnam War ' See James
Hasdorff and MAJ Lyn Officer, USAF, General Bernard A. Schriever. (Washington,
D C : USAF Oral History Program, 20 June 1973), 71-72, transcript, AFHRC, Holding
K239.0512-1566.
116

Zuckert's letters requesting money for the study, McNamara told the Air Force Secretary
that the service needed to accept that it would encounter limited wars where air superiority
would not be an issue. As such, he wanted it to reexamine purchasing such planes as the
A-7 or F-5, and he raised this effort's budget to demonstrate his seriousness.'^
McNamara's early-1965 memorandum actually reinforced the ongoing efforts of
his Whiz Kids. The previous June, the Director of Defense Research and Engineering
(DDR&E), Harold Brown, pointed out to McNamara that although the two services could
not agree on the ideal CAS plane, a mixed force stmcture of low and high cost planes
might satisfy both the Air Force's and the Anny's needs. He noted that using only
expensive planes like the F-111 would satisfy neither these nor overall force needs. Other
OSD staff had also pressed the Air Force to examine the Navy's A-7, then under
development. LeMay's response to this OSD effort was public and blunt: "I am very
unenthusiastic about the A-7 . . . it is not much good." Meanwhile, his Research and

'^Bright, Jet Makers. 21 and 149 (the A-l originally cost approximately $150,000
each, but to build one in 1965 would cost approximately $800,000); Robert McNamara,
Secretary of Defense, "Close Support and SAW Aircraft," Memorandum for the Secretary
of the Air Force, 7 January 1965, Supporting Documents ("SAW" means "special air
warfare," such as the Farm Gate/Jungle Jim operations); and Mischler, A-X. 6-8; and MAJ
Pat "Doc" Pentland, USAF, "Evolution of A-10 Mission Requirements," Headquarters
(HQ) Air Force Staff (Fighter Plans) Research Paper, 10 June 1988, from Air Force
History Office via 2/LT Matthew Rodman, USAF, copy in author's possession (Pentland
called Zuckert's study the Air Force Light Ground Attack Aircraft [EGA] Study).
A sidelight OSD activity during the 1963-1965 period was the choice of one
service to oversee the Counter-Insurgency/Light Armed Aircraft (COIN/LARA) program.
OSD wanted to buy an armed light propeller plane with STOL capability to support jungle
antiguerrilla operations. It dismissed the Air Force for obvious bias against even
nonsupersonic jets. However, given the A-l's Vietnam success. Air Force leaders wanted
that mgged well-armed plane for such missions-they were less impressed with the combat
performance of the less durable and less lethal T-28 armed trainer that they considered a
COIN/LARA equivalent. OSD rejected the Army due to the roles-and-missions fight
already underway. Finally, OSD assigned development to the Marine Corps, which bought
the North American OV-10 Bronco. The OV-10 was a light twin turboprop plane that
the Air Force purchased only for airbome FAC duties. See Futrell, Ideas, vol II, 207-208;
Mischler, 6; and Sweetman, Modem Fighting Aircraft: A-10. 4-5
117

Development Deputy, Lieutenant General Ferguson, supplied the usual explanation that the
A-7 had no air-to-air capability."
But the McNamara OSD staff believed, in the words of one of the most prominent
Whiz Kids, Alain Enthoven, "that for the kind of wars the tactical air forces were likely to
fight... the A-7 would simply be substantially better." As such, LeMay's resistance did
not deter OSD staffers from ordering the Air Force in the summer of 1964 to study
Brown's proposal. Formally titled, "Force Options for Tactical Air," and more popularly
known by the last name of its project officer, Lieutenant Colonel John Bohn, the study
generally agreed with Brown's overall force-mix but offered another air-to-air fighter, the
F-5, as the low-cost end of the force-mix spectmm. (Its release in early 1965 made it a
ready response to McNamara's memorandum of that time.)"
The Bohn Study revealed the Air Force's prowess at using systems analysis for its
own ends. The study board took OSD's simplistic analysis model that compared several
tactical aircraft by total payload carried for total miles against nonexistent ground defenses;
and then added another model which included heavy air defenses. The board members
failed OSD's favored A-7, which had exceptional payload and range abilities but was no
fighter, and favored the F-5, which was supersonic and a reasonably good air-to-air
machine. The Air Force Pentagon staff briefed the results to Brown and another OSD
staff member in March, 1965. Brown was happy that the service accepted the force-mix
concept but bluntly told the briefers that action would be required soon-and that the A-7

"Head, 230-231, for Brown's actions. MAJ I lead believes Brown's memorandum
was significant because Brown would soon be Secretary of the Air Force. LeMay and
Ferguson details are from Futrell, Ideas, vol. II, 470.
"Enthoven quote is from his 8 April 1970 interview with MAJ Head, cited in
Head, 246. Bohn Study setup is from Head, 243-246, and Jacob Neufeld, "The F-15
Eagle: Origins and Development, 1964-1972," (Washington, D.C: Office of Air Force
History, 1974), 9-10. Secretary Zuckert intimated to McNamara that the Air Force wanted
a CAS plane too, but the plane had to survive in all theaters (read Europe); see Eugene
Zuckert. Secretary of the Air Force, "Close Support and SAW Aircraft," Memorandum for
the Secretary of Defense, 2 Febmary 1965, Supporting Documents
118

and F-5 would be the candidates (he regarded the Air Force's other favored option-a
stripped-dovyn F-4-as too much modification effort and cost for the return).'^
The Air Force Tactical Air Command (TAC) was the command that would have to
integrate the A-7 into the force stmcture if the service procured it. Thus, OSD staffers
realized that TAC support was cmcial to service acceptance of the plane, but TAC rejected
it. Indeed, TAC headquaters officers introduced the air defense methodology to the Bohn
Study. In December 1964, OSD sent one of its A-7 proponents, Vic Heyman, to
determine the depth and nature of TAC resistance.'^ "I laughed at him," recalled the
former TAC Deputy Commander for Operations, Major General Gordon Graham, of
Heyman's personal visit. Heyman later said, "They really considered the A-7 a dog." He
could not understand the attitude, but fellow staffer Alain Enthoven rated it as symptomatic
of the Air Force's world view, which involved "doing their own thing like winning the air
battle while somebody else was winning the ground battle."'^
Enthoven's opinion leaned toward organizational dynamics, which given the service
history presented so far, has some validity. However, thefightermen felt that historical
common sense combined with force stmcture considerations to support their position.
General Agan remembered telling Enthoven about the large number offightersrequired to
escort bombers in World War II, and then reminding the OSD staffer that such an escort
force size would not be available to protect A-7s in the projected desperate fight with
Soviet interceptors in Europe. But to Agan, Enthoven's reaction seemed oriented toward

'^Results are from Jack Neufeld, Interview of M^ Gen John J. Bums.

(Washington, D C : USAF Oral History Program, 22 March 1973), 20-25, ttanscript,
AFHRC Holding K239.0512-961 (Bums participated in the study, and recounted the
methodology change); Head, 247; and Air Force GEN John McConnell, Chief of Staff,
Air Force (CSAF), "Hq USAF Study on 'Force Options for Tactical Air,'" letter to
Secretary of the Air Force, 15 March 1965, Supporting Documents.
46

Head, 251-253.

'^Graham quote is from interview with MAJ Head, 11 February 1970, and
Enthoven quote is from interview with same source, 8 April 1970; both cited in Ibid., 251,
and 253.
119

cost effectiveness instead of any valid tactical reason "The 'crime of the time' was that we
had to talk to a guy like that," Agan snorted"*
To thefightergenerals, the issue summoned memories of life-and-death aerial
stmggles in World War II, and what stmck them most about that conflict was the penalty
for technological inferiority. To the incoming TAC commander. General Gabriel
Disosway, dedicated ground attack planes like the German Stuka were meat for Allied
fighter predators, and he did not want to waste force stmcture assets repeating the
Germans' mistake. He correctly remembered that the Stuka encountered problems flying
unescorted interdiction missions in the Battle of Britain, but he forgot that it flew Eastern
Front air support missions until the end of the war because Sovietfightersrarely ventured
into the hostile battlefield environment." But no matter, TAC staff members bitterly
opposed buying an attack plane with the attendant risk that "someone's going to send it up
to shoot MiGs and they're going to get themselves killed," as one put it. One TAC general
even told thefighterpilot assigned to research the A-7 issue at Air Force Pentagon
headquarters, "Major, you'd better remember, you're going to want to come back to TAC
one of these days. You had better remember that when you're working this thing." But the
opposition did not deter Heyman. Apparently believing that systems analysis could
overcome all biases, and perhaps emboldened by McNamara's recent memorandum, he
tasked TAC in April 1965 to conduct a cost effectiveness study of CAS plane candidates.

'^Neufeld, Agan. 18-20 (quote on p. 20). Hildreth also was disturbed by the Whiz
Kids' simple-minded infatuation with economic efficiency. But he agreed that, for CAS, a
cheap mgged plane was better for the high threat battle arena than an expensive plane; see
Hasdorff, Hildreth. 30, 59.
"Futrell, Ideas, vol. II, 174, 492; and Head, 253 and 284 (his 3 Apnl 1970
interview with GEN Disosway). Both authors mention that thefighterleaders fixated upon
the Stuka as an historical example of the folly of dedicated attack planes. Even in his 1984
Air Force Oral History Interview, LTGEN Sweat likened the A-10 to the Stuka-after
calling the A-10 a "stupid plane to buy"; Sweat. 119. MGEN Hildreth observed that GEN
William Momyer fought the A-7 buyfromafar, but no less intensely than his colleagues.
(He commanded Air Force Training Command and then was Seventh Air Force
commander in Vietnam.) Momyer stuck to his World War 11-bred principle that tactical
planes had to be able to defeat enemy fighters. See Neufeld, Hildreth. 29, 60-61.
120

Equally undaunted, TAC published the resulting report, entitled "Cost Effectiveness in
Close Air Support," in May 1965, and condemned the A-7 while praising the F-4."^
But 1965 was a time when such obstinate resistance faced more than persistent
OSD bureaucrats, as the Vietnam War provided two sources of pressure. It created an
arena to showcase the A-l's talents while revealing the deficiencies of the Air Force's fast
tactical jet dogma. And the Army now more urgently acted upon Vance's 1963 attack
helicopter call in order to provide protection for its helicopters. Throughout late 1964 and
into 1965, that service requested and reviewed contracts for development of an Advanced
Aerial Fire Support System (AAFSS), or AH-56 Cheyenne (for photo, see Appendix Fig.
31). This was respectively the program name and official designation of a super attack
helicopter that hopefully would solve thefirepowerproblem. In the meantime. Bell
Aircraft Company pressed the Army to accept an interim attack model.^'
The new Air Force Chief of Staff, General John McConnell, was more pragmatic
than his predecessor. Unlike LeMay, he had some tactical air background, having
commanded such units in the Far East during World War II and in Europe afterwards. He
and Secretary Zuckert moved toward some possible compromise measure conceming CAS
planes, and proposed to McNamara in Febmary 1965 that the Air Force purchase two
wings of F-5s. Additionally, in summer that year they quickly deployed twelve F-5s to
Vietnam for an operational evaluation. OSD delayed its response to the procurement
request, perhaps because it wanted to see how the F-5 fared. The results by autumn 1965
were obvious, given the F-5's design. Most of the pilots liked its sportscar qualities and, at
first, its maintainability also was good. But others still preferred the A-l, especially since
the F-5 had only afractionof that plane's loiter, load carrying, and slow speed

^"First quote is from Neufeld, Georgi. 20. Second quote is from Hasdorff,
Hildreth. 60. Hildreth said that his superiors assigned him to the A-7 because he was the
junior staff officer, and "no one wanted to touch that A-7" (59). Heyman's ensuing study is
from Head, 257.
*'Helicopter developments are from Walter Andrews, "Rugged Tests and a Rugged
Machine," Armed Forces Journal 106 (14 December 1968): 17 (AAFSS development
milestone chart); Bradin, 111-121; and Futrell, Ideas, vol. II, 189.
121

characteristics. And probably because the Air Force mshed the plane into active service, it
developed various mechanical problems due to the combat operations tempo "
As the F-5 encountered its problems, the Pike Committee blistered the Air Force in
its hearings. The Air Force Pentagon staff had at the same time sanctioned yet another
study to determine whether the F-5, the A-7, or a stripped-down F-4 were most suitable
for CAS. The study, presided over by Air Force Colonel Howard Fish and subsequently
known by his name, was a monstrosity based upon a computerized massive air war
featuring several different combat scenario models. The setup was so complicated that, by
November, no one could really make anything of the information it produced-much of
which depended upon what biases one entered into the computer. Not surpnsingly, a split
over the best procurement action developed. OSD staff was on one side pressing hard for
the A-7 as a cost-effective attack plane solution for two services; TAC staffers formed
another side which wanted a supersonic air superiority plane; and some Air Force
Pentagon staff wanted a small number of A-7s simply to get outsiders off their backs. So
intense were opinions that in his results briefing to General McConnell, Colonel Fish only
presented the options and their basis instead of the traditional recommendation for a single
course of action."
General McConnell saw the military and political realities, and on 5 November
1965 opted for A-7 procurement. In later discussions, he said that he "didn't pay too much
attention to the computer study." More pressing was:

"McConnell background is from his Biographical Sketch, provided in Congress,

Senate, Hearings before the Preparedness Investigating Subcommittee of the Committee on
Armed Services, U.S. Air Force Tactical Operations and Readiness. 89th Cong., 2d sess ,
9-10 May 1966. 2-3. Davis, 31 Initiatives. 19, believes his background had some effect
upon his subsequent decisions. F-5 deployment and difficulties are from Head, 273;
McConnell testimony in Senate, Hearings, Air Force Tactical Operations. 9 May 1966, 37,
and Schlight, 88-90.
^'A good account of the Fish Study and divided opinion is in Head, 258-271,
276-279. I lildreth told his interviewer that "Right at the end the decision was made to buy
the A-7, and they were still fighting the program Everybody. TAC and everybody " See
Hadorff, Hildreth. 60.
122

considerable pressure by certain elements in the military and by certain

elements in the Congress because they said we had never provided a
capability or a specialized airplane for close air support of the Army. At
the same time, the Army was coming in with a strong close air support
proposal which was the AH-56, the advanced helicopter. In order to
demonstrate that we did want to give the Army every possible means of
close support-and I know that we can do it better than they can, particularly
with the AH-56we opted for the A-7 in sufficient quantities to provide
close support for the Army in an environment that did not have intensive air
defenses.
The above statement reflected McConnell's acute awareness of what the AH-56
represented, and in congressional testimony he expressed his assessment of the threat
involved in this issue and the consequences of ignoring it: "The thing that was pushing was
that we had to get something to give the Army close air support. First, it was our job.
Second, if we didn't do it, somebody else was going to do it for us." That "somebody"
was the Army itself, with the attendant threat of lost tactical aircraft funding.^
The former DDR&E and incoming Air Force Secretary, Harold Brown, later spoke
of the warfighting implications involved:
It was perfectiy clear by late 1965 and early 1966 that the Air Force was
going to be put to the test both by the existence of the Vietnam War and
its nature-however representative or unrepresentative they would be of a
war somewhere elseand by Congressional interest and by OSD interest
. . . . therefore it [the Air Force] had to look at the question of close air
support specifically, and not just say as had been part of doctrine . . . within
the Air Force for many years, that whatever can fight the air battle can then
go ahead and do the Close Air Support role. I think there was coming to
be an awareness in the Air Force that, as a result of constraints inherent in
limited war, you might not be able tofightthe air war.
In other words, some Air Force leaders began to realize that their former procurement
policiesriskedloss of control to outside agencies, and that there were other wars besides

"First McConnell quote is from his 6 May 1970 interview by MAJ Head, cited in
Head, 281-282. The second McConnell quote isfromhis testimony in Congress, Senate,
Hearings before the Subcommittee of the Committee on Appropriations, Department of
Defense Appropriations for Fiscal Year 1970. Part 4. Department of the Air Force 91st
Cong., 1st sess., 29 July 1969, 122. His third quote is from the interview with Head, 280.
123

the projected European one with the Soviets. Thus, neither the F-4 nor the F-5 was
acceptable."
The Air Force had taken a momentous step in acquiring a subsonic tactical jet
dedicated to air-to-ground weapons delivery. A number of factors converged to produce
this decision, and one would think that the A-7 buy settled things. This was not to be,
because the forces that brought about and opposed this move were not spent yet. The new
Air Force Secretary, and former McNamara Whiz Kid, Harold Brown, saw the
A-7 buy as an interim measure in the process of getting a more CAS-capable plane. The
Vietnam War continued, which guaranteed that the Army still wanted attack helicopters to
helpfightthe Vietnamese communists. Several Air Force generals fervently believed that
the A-7 was an unwanted, inferior plane that Congress and OSD forced upon them, but so
far, that pressure consisted only of public embarrassment in congressional hearings and
continual prodding by OSD staffers.^^ With the Army proceeding with all deliberate speed
toward buying attack helicopters, at least Chief of Staff McCormell realized that Congress
and OSD could eventually grant CAS responsibility and funding to the Air Force's parent
service. This would be a costly and humiliating loss for the Air Force, given its fight for

"Brown quote is from 8 April 1970 interview with MAJ Head, cited in Head, 281
In a 30 July 1997 letter to the author, Brown wrote that the Air Force needed to provide
CAS to the Army across the combat spectmm from Vietnam to Europe.
^'^In his letter to the author. Brown wrote that the A-7 was "an intenm step in the
way of a low cost ground attack aircraft." A number of Air Force leaders remained
convinced that either Congress or the Whiz Kids forced their service to buy the A-7; see
Neufeld, Bums. 25-26 (Bums did not think so-but he acknowledged interviewer Neufeld's
claim that many other generals thought otherwise); Neufeld, Georgi. 19 ("We were . . .
overridden by the dollars crowd."); Ruegg. 139.
The belief persists, too. Robert Coulam's 1977 history of F-111 procurement.
Illusions of Choice, contains a footnote asserting that the A-7 was an OSD-imposed
purchase and even states that the A-10 was a "possible" supporting case; see Coulam,
165. Doc Pentiand makes the same assertion in his 1988 "Evolution of A-10 Mission
Requirements" study. And in his 1990 report for the Air University's Airpower Research
Institute, Air Force LTCOL Harold Gonzales writes that McNamara "ordered"' the service
to buy A-7s; see Gonzales, Tactical Air Support of Ground Forces. 55.
124

independence and its leaders" desire to control all means of air combat. The service was
not by any means done with the CAS plane issue

125

CHAPTER V
THE A-l 0'S IMPROBABLE CONCEPTION, 1966-1970

The Air Force's decision to buy the A-7 in November 1965 represented a major
departure from that service's supersonic, air-to-air capable, tactical plane policy. However,
the factors that converged to spur this development remained and intensified throughout
1966. The Pike Committee's published its hearings report that Febmary, and its findings
castigated the Air Force for not producing specialized air support planes. As the Vietnam
War escalated during the year, the A-l continued its impressive performance and received
more favorable attention. The war's exigencies also led the Air Force and Army Chiefs of
Staff to attempt in April a resolution of air support disputes. But as Army helicopters
encountered tougher defenses and more fire support requests in Vietnam, Army leaders
continued work on the AH-56 Cheyennne advanced attack helicopter project while buying
an interim attack model, the AH-1 Cobra.
Thus, the Air Force perceived a serious threat to its CAS mandate from the very
service it was supposed to support, and it acted quickly to present its bona fides to that
customer-cum-rival service. Initial A-7 flight tests revealed that the plane had certain
deficiencies regarding CAS. That summer, urgent conferences and studies addressing the
CAS plane issue led the pragmatic Air Force Chief of Staff John McConnell to order a
design concept study of a dedicated CAS plane, designated the A-X, in September 1966.
Nonetheless, the A-X program had tenuous support. The Air Force still wanted to
see how well the Cheyenne project fared, and there were those within the service who still
opposed the CAS plane idea. In the meantime, the relatively small group of Air Force and
OSD staff who were interested in the design worked to create a plane that would eliminate
the need for a Cheyenne. They also wanted an improvement on the A-l that could
accomplish CAS in any theater-not just in a war such as that in Vietnam, which after 1968
witnessed decreasing American involvement. They formulated a design concept featunng
four characteristics which must govern actual construction: lethality, maneuverability,
simplicity, and survivability.

26

The project encountered problems and delays Haggling over design details
delayed the date when a real CAS plane would be operational. Further, OSD's Director of
Defense Research and Engineering asked for further clarification of some of the design's
details. Finally, the Cheyenne encountered serious problems, which cooled the Air Force's
initial msh to build a CAS plane.
However, Congress entered the scene in 1968 with questions about why it should
fund either of the two aircraft. A sick national economy, skyrocketing warplane costs, and
the Vietnam War irritated many congressmen and made them skeptical about military
aviation projects. In 1969, the House temporarily withheld funds for the A-X, stirring a
lethargic Air Force to greater efforts on behalf of it. Congressional pressure also helped
force a critical agreement between the Army and Air Force secretaries to declare the A-X
and Cheyenne complementary instead of competitive weapons systems.
The delays, pressure, and a presidential administration change also changed the
A-X's development and design. President Richard Nixon's defense staff favored cost goals
and competition between prototypes to reduce some of the scandalous costs of recently
procured military aircraft, such as the C-5 and F-111. The Air Force favored this
approach for the low-cost, simple A-X, given that it planned big outlays for its higher
priority projects, such as the F-X and B-1. Thus, the A-X project became thefirstAir
Force plane in many years to feature aflightcompetition between the leading candidate
planes and thefirst-everAmerican military plane held to a design cost goal. The delays
created time for further development of the gun that would so define the plane They also
allowed for technological progress, in the form of turbofan jet engines, to change the
design from a turboprop plane to a jet.
As 1970 ended. Congress still expressed skepticism about the A-X, and many trials
remained. But circumstances had yielded a well-conceived design developed via an
innovative, efficient development process. Twelve contractors submitted bids to produce
designs, and the best two would later compete in an actual flying competition to determine
which the Air Force would choose.

127

The Pressure Continues and Increases

If the Air Force thought that the congressional heat would subside following its
selection of the A-7 two months after Otis Pike's committee adjoumed, it was wrong. In
Febmary 1966, the committee released a report that spent half of its fourteen pages scoring
the Air Force for its tactical plane selection. Conceming CAS, the report stated of the
service: "It has never developed one plane for this particular purpose. It is not developing
one today. In fact, it insists upon multipurpose aircraft." The committee believed the
reason was that in the service's "magnificent accomplishments in the wild blue yonder it has
tended to ignore the foot soldiers in the dirty brown under." In the report's final sentences,
the committee hoped that it would serve as a "useful prod."'
It was also during 1966 that Colonel Eugene Deatrick served his tour as A-l
squadron commander. The plane showed its qualities in 1966 battles as it had in 1965.
Given this, and the Pike Committeefindingsabout the plane, service leaders asked Deatrick
to brief them on the plane. He praised the A-l and its CAS strengths.^
The Air Force's selection of the A-7 did not slow Army efforts to procure an attack
helicopter. Vietnam saw to that. In the same month that the Air Force announced its
intention to buy the plane, the Army capped a two-year review of AAFSS contract
proposals by selecting Lockheed Aircraft Company to build the new helicopter.
Lockheed's design for the AH-56 Cheyenne "exceeded the Army's wildest expectations," as
one Army aviation historian put it. It sported an innovative combination of propulsion and
lift features: stubby wings, a main rotor, and a pusher propeller. The rotor assembly itself

'Congress, House, Report of the Special Subcommittee on Tactical Air Support of

the Committee on Armed Services, Close Air Support. 89th Cong., 2d sess., 1 Febmary,
1966, 4872 (first and second quotes), 4873 (third quote). The report also documented the
Air Force's resisting development of a COIN/LARA (Counter-Insurgency/Light Attack and
Reconnaissance) aircraft (4865).
^Deatrick, interview by author. Porter, "Second Defense of Lima Site 36," iv, 5, 6;
The Honorable Harold Brown, "The Air Force Role in Southeast Asia," in Supplement to
the Air Force Policy Letter for Commanders. #3-1968 (Washington, D C : SAF-OII,
March 1968), 32. MGEN Hildreth also accomplished his squadron commander's tour in
1966.
128

was revolutionary for helicopter technology, in that it was morerigidlyconstmcted than

conventional rotors. The result was that the Cheyenne could fly at 210 knots, which was
not only an unheard-of speed for a helicopter but also nearly as fast as the A-l. The
unique aerodynamic design also allegedly permitted it to drop bombs from a dive delivery
like the A-l and other fixed-wing planes. But the Lockheed designers went further. They
gave the Cheyenne an impressive weapons package, including a turret-mounted 30 mm
(millimeter) gun, a 40 mm grenade launcher, rocket and bomb pylons, and a laser range
finder-all told, an alleged capability to haul eight-thousand pounds of ordnance. The
Cheyenne's capacity for carrying weapons did not equal that of the A-l, but it was
outstanding for a helicopter. Finally, Lockheed incorporated a most advanced
all-weather avionics package-"more complicated than a B-52," as one observer put
itthat included terrain-following radar, inertial navigation systems, and an autopilot.'
Lockheed's daring ambition for the Cheyenne was one factor which would
eventually kill the program. One omen of later difficulties was that the company could not
deliver the aircraft soon enough to meet the Army's urgent need for attack helicopters to
defeat tougher air defenses in Vietnam. In the meantime. Army leaders bought an interim
attack helicopter that Bell Aircraft Company built on its own initiative, the AH-1 Cobra
(for photo, see Appendix Fig. 32). Though not nearly as impressive a design as the
Cheyenne, the sleek Cobra could nonetheless travel fast enough and carry enough weapons
to escort transport helicopters and provide some direct fire support for troops in battle.^
The Cheyenne and Cobra were unmistakably CAS machines, but could the Air
Force's A-7 match them? By spring 1966, the service saw that the answer was no. The

'Walter Andrews, "There Are No Red Flags," Armed Forces Journal (henceforth
known as AEl) 106 (14 December 1968): 20-23; Bradin, Hot Air to Hellfire. 115 (quote),
116-117 (design discussion); GAO, Close Air Support: Principal Issues and Aircraft
Choices. 12-14; and Hessman, and others, "The Army Gets a New Weapons System,"
7-10. The last quote is from unnamed source in Bill Gunston, AH-64 Apache (London:
Osprey Publishing, 1986), 3.
'Bradin, 118-122. Bradin writes that the North Vietnamese and Viet Cong
specifically introduced 12.7mm heavy machine guns and 30 mm light antiaircraft cannon
to counter the American helicopter threat.
129

plane made its first flight in September 1965, and subsequent test flights confirmed that its
takeoff and landing rolls were very long, and that it lacked maneuverability. The Air Force
also wanted to substantially upgrade the A-7's weapons delivery avionics from the
antiquated system that the Navy installed, and this sharply increased the plane's cost. As
such, the A-7 could not meet CAS mission requirements as well as the Army's own
Cheyenne. Not even a year after buying the A-7, the Air Force found itself in another air
support roles-and-missions crisis.^

An Agreement and a CAS Plane Decision

In the early spring of 1966, Air Force Chief of Staff John McConnell and Army
Chief of Staff General Harold Johnson met secretly to iron out simmering air support
differences that the Vietnam War had aggravated. Both leaders apparently feared a
war-driven, inter-service clash which OSD or Congress might settle in a manner not to
their liking. Experience in various Vietnam battles demonstrated that the Air Force
provided airlift support as well or better than the fixed-wing transport units the Army had
created in the previous ten years. Vietnam combat also cemented the Army's attachment to
its helicopters, and this included the ready fire support they provided when battle

^Dr. John Foster, Department of Defense Director of Defense Research and

Engineering (DDR&E), "Development Concept Paper, AX Close Air Support Aircraft,"
(DCP No. 23), December 1968, 2, 11, supporting documents; Goldberg and Smith, 33;
Head, "A-7," 337, 415 (sees the A-7's deficiencies as a driving factor in McConnell's
decision for the A-X); LTCOL Richard Head, USAF, "The Air Force A-7 Decision: fhe
Politics of Close Air Support," Aerospace Historian 21 (Winter, December 1974): 224
(article based upon dissertation; observes that by 1969, the A-7 cost as much as the F-4),
COL Avery Kay, USAF (ret.), 16 March 1997, telephonic interview by author, recording
and notes in author's possession (served as an action officer in the A-X program and
recalled that the Army dismissed the A-7 as a band-aid fix and not a ttue solution to its
CAS needs); GEN John McConnell testimony in Congress, Senate, Department of
Defense Appropriations for Fiscal Year 1970. Part 4. 29 July 1969, 122; GEN William
Momyer testimony in Congress, Senate, Hearings, Close Air Support. 29 October 1971,
194; and Pierte Sprey, interview by author, 4 May 1997.
Head's dissertation research on the A-7's procurement was helped not onl\ bv his
air combat experience, which included flying A-ls in Vietnam, but also by his tour as the
Military Assistant to the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy
130

conditions demanded it. Likewise, Army aviators pressured their leaders to arm that
service's OV-1 reconnaissance planes, something one OV-1 unit did in the war's early days
until angry Air Force leaders successfully demanded that it disarm. Indeed, this latter item
was one example of why McConnell and Johnson kept their discussions secret. As
evidenced by the behavior of McConnell's predecessor LeMay, many Air Force leaders
wanted no mission ceded to the Army. For his part, Johnson dealt with Army aviation
activists who wanted to assert that service's domain not only over helicopters, but any
fixed-wing aviation directly supporting Army activities. These officers had fought hard to
getfixed-wingtransports and reconnaissance planes for their service, and did not want to
relinquish that hold now.^
The April Agreement basically shifted the criterion for aviation responsibility from
aircraft weight to aircraft type. The Air Force would still provide CAS, but recognized the
Army's use of helicopters for various missions to include fire support. The Army ceded its
largefixed-wingtransports to the Air Force. Additionally, the Air Force kept some
helicopters for SAR work, and the Army kept some fixed-wing planes for observation and

'^GEN Robert Williams, telephonic interview by author (Williams became Director

of Army Aviation the day after the agreement and recalled that subordinates in both
services opposed it. He believed that GEN Johnson's rationale was to give up the
fixed-wing transports in order to secure the Anny'srightto use and develop helicopters);
Bergerson, 117-119; Davis, 31 Initiatives. 19-20; Futrell, Ideas, vol. II, 312-313; Goldberg
and Smith, 29-31; Head, "A-7," 335-337 (sees the agreement as a defensive move by the
Air Force against the Cheyenne and Army encroachment intofixed-wingairiift; also sees it
as an overall Army victory); "Look but Don't Shoot," Command: Military History.
Strategy & Analysis (December 1997): 10-14; and Schlight, 122-124.
That the Air Force seriously monitored violations of its mission prerogatives
appears in the fact that it successfully forbade Navy special operations OV-lOs to drop
bombs in combat, though the planes had that capability. See prepared statement of Mr
David Isby (Analyst and Historian for Washington think-tank BDM Corporation) in
Congress, House, Hearing before the Investigations Subcommittee of the Committee on
Armed Services, Roles and Missions of Close Air Support. 101st Cong., 2d sess , 27
September 1990, 15.
131

liaison-but not fire support. Subordinate officers in both services chafed at the agreement,
but it represented an encouraging pragmatism on the part of both service leaders.^
The Johnson-McConnell Agreement, 2is it became known, solved overall aircraft
type-versus-mission problems between the two services, but like previous interservice
accords, it did not sort out all specifics. The technology represented by the Cheyerme still
threatened to duplicate the Air Force CAS mission as A-ls flew it in Vietnam. In June
1966, the Army capped its initial development work with Lockheed by presenting a
Cheyerme mock-up. Also, by this time Bell Aircraft neared production of its first Cobra
for the Army, whose expenditures on helicopters had risen accordingly.^
General McCormell did not sit idle. Also in June 1966, he ordered Major General
Richard Yudkin, his Director of Doctrine, Concepts, and Objectives, to conduct a
roles-and-missions study. This was the directorate's charter, but as some former Pentagon
staffers observed, its job was more specifically to study defense of Air Force roles and
missions. As early as 1964, the Directorate had an officer. Colonel Ray Lancaster,
assigned to monitor Army development of an armed helicopter and assess its implications
for the Air Force. To Lancaster, the Cheyenne was an expensive "monstrosity"
representing nothing less than "the Army wanting to take over the close air support
mission." The mock-up unveiling spurred him to support any effort to build a successful
rival. Another Doctrine, Concepts, and Objectives staffer of the time. Colonel Avery Kay,
recalled that the Army probably had a legitimate complaint against the Air Force
conceming its ttaditional CAS neglect, but its expensive Cheyenne program threatened the

^"Agreement between Chief of Staff, U.S. Army, and Chief of Staff, U.S. Air
Force," 6 April 1966, reproduced in Wolf, Basic Documents on Roles and Missions.
382-383. Wolf provides a short section describing the agreement, and provides the Chiefs'
preamble, on pages 379-381. Most of the citations in the previous footnote also describe
the agreement's terms.
''Bradin, 122 (Cobra time line); Davis, 23 (by 1966, the Army possessed 5632
helicopters; by comparison, the Air Force owned 18,000 aircraft of all types); and
Andrews, "Rugged Tests and a Rugged Machine," 17 (Chevenne time line).
132

Air Force's authority to conduct that mission and thus drove the service to answer it. A
possible secondary reason for McConnell's choice of Yudkin was that Yudkin was a
non-aviator who might provide a disinterested view of the Army's helicopters and the
potential need for a CAS plane to counteract it. Indeed, TAC commander General
Disosway did not hide his contempt for any such plane: "I was very much opposed to it. I
argued with McConnell about i t . . . . He said, "No, we have to do that for the Army.'"'
Yudkin and company were undaunted. By this time, there were not only favorable
reports from Vietnam about the A-l, but there were also A-l pilots retuming to the

'COL Kay, interview by author; COL Ray Lancaster, USAF (ret), 18 April 1997,
telephonic interview by author, tape recording and notes in author's possession; Sprey,
interview by author ("monstrosity" and "take over" quotes); and MGEN Richard Yudkin,
USAF (ret.), 15 March 1997 telephonic interview by author, tape recording and notes in
author's possession. (Yudkin said that the office was formerly named "Long Range Plans"
until a political flap over an officer's alleged release of documents to Senator Barry
Goldwater's 1964 presidential campaign made the name too controversial.) Disosway
quote is from Dick, Disosway. 180. Other accounts of McConnell's action are from
Goldberg and Smith, 31-33; and Mischler, 15-16.
Ironically (or perhaps deliberately), the service's professional joumal. Air University
Review, published two competing views of slow-moving versus ever-faster tactical planes
in its May-June 1966 (Vol. 17) issue. Air Force COL William Scott's "The Rise and Fall
of the Stuka Dive Bomber" cites the Stuka's inability to help maintain air superiority as a
waming against buying a dedicated attack plane lacking air-to-air prowess. COL Scott's
other Stuka experience lesson was that the service should not get too preoccupied with
meeting Army needs in conventional wars like Vietnam and Korea, lest it end up with
Stuka-like planes in the big war with the Russians. Hans Multhopp, in his "The Challenge
of the Performance Spectrum for Military Aircraft" (30-41), questions the Air Force's
slavish pursuit of fasterfighterswhen the current ones paid deariy for speed via increased
takeoff/landing rolls, fuel inefficiency, poor agility, and negligible ability to attack and
reattack ground targets. Multhopp was an aerodynamic engineer who designed jets for
Nazi Germany and later for the Western powers. While working for the Martin Company
in 1966, Multhopp proposed a design for an inexpensive, maneuverable ground attack
plane built around a gun, which Martin had to dismiss because of unspecified problems
involved with getting a contract to build the plane. (The information in the last sentence is
courtesy of author's interviews with Chuck Myers. Myers attended Multhopp's briefing on
the design, and passed some of the details on to Pierre Sprey, who influenced the A-lO's
design. Sprey told this author that Multhopp's ideas had some effect upon his thinking.)

133

Pentagon to serve their staff tours. They helped influence Yudkin and his office staff, who
worked through the summer to present findings to General McConnell (One of the
Yudkin's subordinates. Captain Robert Winger, was one of those A-l pilots.) Yudkin
briefed the Chief of Staff in August, telling him that though the Army was satisfied with
Air Force CAS in Vietnam, current Air Force jetfighterspossessed a poor to
unsatisfactory helicopter escort and direct fire support capability. The Army filled the gap
with its armed helicopters, and Yudkin recommended that besides paying more official
attention to CAS operations, the Air Force "should take immediate and positive steps to
obtain a specialized close air support aircraft, simpler and cheaper than the A-7, with equal
or greater characteristics than the A-l." Yudkin recalled that McConnell took an unusually
long time to officially decide upon the report's recommendations, but on 8 September
1966, he issued a decision paper directing his service to develop and procure a dedicated
close air support plane, which for the time being would be called the A-X-and after years
of development and stmggle, the A-10.'"
'"Fred Kaplan, "Beast of Battle, The Tale of the Warthog: How the Military
Bureaucracy Almost Grounded a Gulf War Hero," Boston Globe. 21 July 1991, 12; Kay,
Lancaster, Sprey, and Yudkin, interviews by author; Goldberg and Smith, 33 (quote and
report findings).
Kaplan portrayed Yudkin as taking the initiative and confronting other Air Force
leaders. But in the author interview, Yudkin specifically rebutted Kaplan's account. Quite
modest about his role in this decision, and professing ignorance of specific study
motivations and details, he declared: "I didn't volunteer to take this up . . Someone else
threw the ball to me and I don't know what caused them to throw i t . . . . I not only got my
feet wet [handling this issue] but I damn near drowmed!" He also kindly reminded the
author that he was in his eighties and that these events occurred thirty years before.
Others, such as Sprey, have praised his courage in presenting a conclusion unpopular with
many Air Force leaders, and thus consider his role pivotal In this regard, see Jack
Neufeld, Interview #859 of Colonel John Bovd (Washington, D C : USAF Oral History
Program, 23 May 1973), 25, AFHRC Holding K239.0512-859. (Boyd was a legendary
fighter pilot, warfighting theorist, and aircraft designer who served in the Pentagon around
this time.) Yudkin also mentioned that RAND (the Air Force's renowned private research
agency) experts also considered a CAS plane necessary, something confirmed by former
Defense Secretary James Schlesinger, who served at RAND during that time, telephonic
interview by author, 22 April 1997, tape recording and notes in author's possession
Yudkin told the author that the Chief of Staff and other senior staffers attended briefings
like this, and he could remember no unusual response to this particular one. Finally,
134

Thus, for thefirsttime in its existence as a separate service, the Air Force moved to
build an airplane dedicated to the CAS mission, something many of its leaders then and
later believed that it could not, and would not, do. In a 1989 interview with the service
weekly newspaper Air Force Times, former Air Force Vice Chief of Staff Robert Mathis
dismissed the A-10 as an "aircraft designed for the last war and pushed through by a
coalition of lawmakers from the Northeast and influential staff members." The statement
reveals that Mathis held an impression of the plane's birth similar to what earlier leaders
believed about the A-7that ignorant or malignant civilian policy makers forced it upon a
properly unwilling service. The same article, written during a later service effort to divest
itself of the A-10, openly mentioned that Air Force leaders resisted the plane, so it is
important here to ponder what sparked its creation and development. The central
motivation was to counteract the Army's Cheyenne project and the threat it posed. As
Pierre Sprey, one man intimately familiar with the A-X project, put it: "The A-10 was
invented strictly to defeat the Cheyenne." Indeed, a cartoon in a 1968 Armed Forces
Joumal issue poked fun at the Air Force effort by showing a winged tank sitting behind a
"Tactical Air Command" sign. An Air Force general glares at the craft while a subordinate
says to him: "No sir General it won't fly, but it will sure scare hell out of the Army!!"
However, other factors helped create both the Cheyenne and the Air Force dedicated CAS
plane, the A-10. The man whom Sprey praised as a key player in the plane's conception,
Richard Yudkin, said of the Cheyerme-only theory of the A-lO's birth: "You make a
mistake if you oversimplify it that way.""

Yudkin said that in private meetings with McConnell, the Chief of Staff did not confide to
him the reasons for his decision.
"Mathis comment is in David Fulghum, "A-7F Makes Comeback as Temporary
Solution," Defense Trends Special Section, Air Force Times (25 September 1989): 4.
(The author notes the article's ironic title, given the story of both the A-7's and the A-lO's
birth. But it indicates the level of some Air Force leaders' contempt for the A-10 that in
the late 1980s, they considered modifying the A-7, an attack plane that eariier Air Force
leaders despised, to replace it.) Sprey quote is from Neufeld, Sprey. 37, 38 (quote);
cartoon quote is from Walter Andrews, "A Weapons Ship for All Environments," AFJ 106
(14 December 1968): 13; and Yudkin quote is from author's interview
135

The Vietnam War revealed Air Force weaknesses in waging both conventional and
guerrilla war. General McConnell revealed in a 1968 speech that the service needed to
prepare for other types of war besides the nuclear one. McConnell added that this meant
the service was developing "new equipment, new applications, and new tactics which will
greatly enhance our ability to deal with similar conflicts in the future." McConnell's words
reflected a significant departure by the Air Force leadership from the nuclear-oriented
warfighting doctrine it had followed from its 1947 birth (though, as shall be seen, only a
temporary departure from emphasizing readiness for a high-technology conventional war
with the Soviets in Europe).'^

Of course. Army helicopter histories see the A-X as a direct answer to Cheyenne;
see Bergerson, 126, 131; and Bradin, 123. Three senior officersone from the Air Force
and two from the Armyassociated with Cheyenne and A-X matters at the time also
believed that Cheyenne was the sole reason for the A-X's birth: GEN Williams, interview
by author; MGEN Benjamin Hamson, USA (ret), "The A-10: A Gift the Arniy Can't
Afford," Army 41 (July 1991): 36-39 (memorable line: "Indeed, the A-10 was illegitimate
in conception." p. 39); and Dick, Disosway. 180. William Smallwood"s excellent account
of the A-10 in Desert Storm leaves the question of the A-lO's birth unanswered. He does,
however, present a version which says that the Army's pursuit of afixed-wingplane scared
the Air Force into building a CAS plane; see Smallwood, Warthog: Flving the A-10 in the
GuifWar (Washington, D.C: Brassey's [U.S.], 1993), 10-11. There is nothing-other
than the Cheyennethat supports thefixed-wingthreat version; and Smallwood does not
give it much weight either. In his telephonic interview with the author on 5 March 1997
(notes in author's possession), he said that he wanted to focus upon the pilots' wartime
experiences more than previous history anyway.
"GEN John McConnell, USAF, "The Quest for New Orders of Military
Capability," speech made to the Air Force Association (AFA) Convention at Atlanta, GA,
4 April 1968, reprinted in Air Force & Space Digest 51 (June 1968): 121-123 (quote,
122). There is also his testimony in Congress, Senate, Preparedness Investigating
Subcommittee of the Committee on Armed Services, U.S. Tactical Air Power Program.
90th Cong., 2d sess., 28 May 1968, 80-82, 102 (explains that aviation technology progress
and different warfighting environments require specialization; GEN Disosway claims that
he believes the same thing on p. 113). See also LTGEN Lucius Clay, Jr., Headquarters
Air Force Deputy Chief of Staff, Plans and Operations, "Shaping the Air Force
Contribution to National Sttategy," Air University Review 21 (March-April 1970): 3-9.
(also calls for more balance in Air Force combat orientation); and Worden, Rise of the
Fighter Generals. 169-170 (discusses McConnell's frustrations with the Air Force's
Vietnam performance). Air Force Secretary Harold Brown made similar points in public
136

General McConnell did not specifically or publicly explain the reasons for
procuring the A-X as he did for the A-7, and one possible reason why was because they
were quite similar. Indeed, the A-7 was the precedent for (not predecessor of) the A-X, as
the service broke with its supersonic tactical plane procurement policy. The Air Force
needed to buy a plane which might answer congressional and OSD critics as well as the
bureaucratic threat posed by the Army's attack helicopters. In congressional testimony,
McConnell confirmed the A-7 shortcomings which helped drive the campaign for a
dedicated CAS plane. And in a later interview. Air Force Secretary Harold Browm
confirmed that he and General McConnell agreed about sincerely redressing Air Force
CAS deficiencies, and that they both saw the A-7 as an interim gesture on the way toward
a more capable CAS plane design."
In summary, the Air Force neglected its air support commitments to the Army, as it
had since the 1920s when it was an Army subordinate command. In the 1950s, atomic
weapons developments and aviation technology advances further propelled it away from
Army support and toward an all-supersonic bomber force. Its path created a doctrinal and
performance void that in turn spurred Army efforts to create its own air force with
helicopters and any other aircraft that it could obtain. The Vietnam War in the 1960s
headlined glaring Air Force CAS deficiencies (as well as other conventional war
shortcomings beyond the scope of this work) and quickened Army efforts to produce
attack helicopters that could escort other helicopters and provide direct fire support in the
landing zone. Additionally, OSD staffers and congressmen pressured Air Force leaders to
adapt to different warfighting scenarios, as well as meet their Army support commitments.

""Air Force Secretary Brown: "Tactical Air Power . . . a Vital Element in the
Application of Military Forces," Armed Forces Management 13 (October 1966): 66-68
(interview with both Brown and McConnell reveals their commitment to strengthening
tactical air forces, to include CAS capability); Department of Defense Appropriations for
Fiscal Year 1970. Part 4. 122; and Harold Brown letter response to author's written
interview questions, 30 July 1997. Air Force BGEN William Georgi, who worked fighter
requirements issues in TAC Headquarters during this time, also mentioned that the Air
Force went for the A-X because its leaders believed the plane could do CAS more
effectively than the Army's helicopters; Neufeld, Georgi. 24-25
138

Vietnam also accelerated the Anny's development of armed helicopters, something

it started in the 1950s partially out of fmstration with Air Force neglect of CAS. One Air
Force leader involved with Air Force-Army issues throughout his career asserted that the
Army's helicopter efforts and the ensuing Air Force CAS plane decision boiled down to
one question-who controlled air assets in the CAS mission. General Robert Dixon worked
joint-service issues in the Pentagon staff in 1966, helped General Yudkin with the CAS
roles-and-missions study, and later led TAC toward greater cooperation with the Army. In
an interview years after his retirement, he said that one should not merely focus upon
Army helicopter development, for this was merely the symptom of the deeper issue of who
owned the CAS aircraft. To him, it was natural for organizations to want control over
activities related to their function, and one could add that this urge increased when the heat
of battle demanded a military unit's rapid response to save a situation Dixon said that the
Air Force created a CAS plane in order to prove it would respond to Army needs and thus
prevent an Army seizure of the CAS mission."

speeches, and COL Kay told the author that design staffers cited Brown's words when they
encountered resistance during A-X concept development. Two Secretary Brown speeches
on the need for different types of planes for different air war environments are "The Air
Force Role in Southeast Asia," made to the Michigan Aeronautics and Space
Administration, Detroit MI, 2 Febmary 1968, reproduced in Supplement to the Air Force
Policy Letter for Commanders No. 3-1968 (Washington, D C : SAF-OII, March 1968):
25-34; and "The Next Twenty Years in the Life of the Air Force," made to Air Force
Association Luncheon, Dallas, TX, 25 March 1966, reproduced in Supplement to tiie Air
Force Policy Letter for Commanders. No. 4-1966 (Washington, D C : SAF-Oll, April
1966): 2-7.
"GEN Robert Dixon, USAF (ret), telephonic interview by author, 13 April 1997,
recording and notes in author's possession. In their interviews with the author, neither
Dixon nor Sprey believed that McConnell's more diverse background made him more
receptive to buying a CAS plane. To them, he was still primarily a bomber general who
faced a threat to one of the service's missions and responded accordingly. The author
disagrees because he cannot see LeMay making the same decision. LeMay sharply resisted
outside pressures for a more conventional war orientation until his 1964 retirement
McConnell showed courage in his decision because many of his high-ranking subordinates,
such as TACs Disosway, vehemently opposed it.
137

All of these pressures led the service to procure a subsonic attack plane, the A-7, which still
did not specifically answer the Army's needs. That service's continuing advanced attack
helicopter development represented a tme threat to Air Force CAS prerogatives and
funding. Thus the Air Force commenced development of a dedicated CAS plane,
something it had not done since the inter-war years and certainly not since its formal birth
in 1947. The questions that remained were how long would this confluence of issues
continue so the project could survive? And perhaps more importantly, given differing
impressions of CAS, what would be the plane's design?

Design Concept Work

Air Force generals who served in subordinate senior leadership and staff positions
during the time of the CAS plane's development used such terms as "stupid plane" and
"ridiculous" to describe it. Thus, it was not only the Air Force's fear of Cheyenne, but also
McConnell's fear of his own subordinates scuttling the project, that Yudkin's Doctrine,
Concepts, and Objectives shop retained some oversight of A-X development in the ensuing
couple of years. (The project would normally have been the sole responsibility of the
Directorate of Research and Development, Operational Requirements and Developments
Plans [office symbol AFRDQ], the Air Force Pentagon department associated with aircraft
design.) In order to determine what deficiencies the A-X had to redeem, Yudkin's staffers
had a chart showing the performance capabilities of the Air Force'sfightersas they stacked
up against the Cheyenne. The F-4 and F-105 failed utterly, while the A-7 (still in testing)
lacked maneuverability.'^ But the officers needed further expertise, and Yudkin invited

'^Kay, Lancaster, Sprey, and Yudkin, interviews by author. Lancaster spoke of

keeping the chart, which he asserted had one function: to better aid design concept staffers
construct a plane that would eliminate the need for Cheyenne. An Army officer familiar
with the A-X and Cheyenne projects during this period confirms these activities; see
Hamson, "A Gift the Army Can't Afford," 37-38. Yudkin said that McConnell had to
forcefully tell his subordinates to support the project. Thus, Yudkin expected
foot-dragging by AFRDQ staffers, and stayed with the program to keep it alive. Sprey was
more emphatic about the opposition. He asserted that these staffers tried to kill the
program, and General McConnell assigned Yudkin's office to participate in concept
development, which is what led Yudkin to bring in others. Kay recalled that General
139

more A-l Vietnam veterans and a young OSD staffer who expressed interest in the A-X
project from the start, Pierre Sprey, to participate in the concept formulation. Sprey was
an aerodynamic engineer from Yale, whose short stint working at the large Gmmman
Aircraft Corporation revealed that "it would be twenty years before they let me design an
aileron." After meeting one of McNamara's Whiz Kids at a symposium, Sprey became
one himself, working tactical air combat matters on the staff of the Assistant Secretary of
Defense for Systems Analysis. After finishing a controversial analysis study criticizing
World War II air interdiction, Sprey became a close air support advocate, and offered his
services to the Doctrine, Concepts, and Objectives staff. He would now influence more
than the design of an aircraft aileron. Sprey was another person who stood outfromthe
many people who helped make the A-10 a reality; in his case, he ensured that its design
remained practical.'^

Momyer, then commanding Seventh Air Force in Vietnam, sent Yudkin "nastygrams"
about the A-X (though Yudkin reminded the author that Momyer's opposition was a
doctrinal one based upon his combat experience and warfighting views). And in his Air
Force Oral History interview. General Disosway recalled his vehement resistance to the
plane; see Dick, Disosway. 180. Kay and Yudkin both said that Disosway and his staff
coolly received their A-X briefing in 1967, and Sprey said that Air Force Headquarters
concept designers invited TAC to participate in their A-X work, but TAC refused.
Oral histories provide further examples of Air Force subordinate leader opposition
during the A-lO's developmental years. The former TAC staffer forfighterrequirements,
MGEN William Georgi, described the A-X as a force stmcture "problem" that could not
serve effectively in many air war environments; Neufeld, Georgi. 17-19, 22 (quote), 23-25.
LTGEN Marvin McNickle, who served as Deputy Chief of Staff for Research and
Development from 1969 to 1970, called the plane "ridiculous"; Ahmann, McNickle. 114.
LTGEN Dale Sweat, who was Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations at Headquarters U.S.
Air Forces in Europe (USAFE) in 1968 and 1969, and was Vice Commander of TAC in
1972, said "1 think the A-10 is a stupid plane to buy . . . 1 am not a fan of the A-10";
Sweat. 119. MGEN James Hildreth, who was Chief of the Tactical Support Division in
the Headquarters Air Force Studies and Analysis Office in 1969, was concerned about the
A-lO's slow speed and declared that when it "spends a little time in the target area . you
say, well, my god, [sic] you can shoot it down"; Hasdorff, Hildreth. 65
'^Quote is from Sprey, interview by author. Observers who credit Sprey with
influence upon the A-10 project are James Burton, The Pentagon Wars: Reformers
Challenge the Old Guard (Annapolis. Md.: Naval Institute Press, 1993), 24, 241 (Burton
was an Air Force Colonel); Kaplan, "Beast of Battle," 12; James Stevenson, The Pentagon
140

The initial result of this early work, which AFRDQ published in December 1966 as
a Requirements Action Directive (RAD) to Air Force Systems Command, specified the
same design details as Yudkin's August briefing to General McConnell: an improvement
upon the A-l without the complexity and cost of an A-7. They wanted it to be:
Paradox: The Development of the F-18 Hornet (Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press,
1993), 100 (Stevenson also discusses the design thinking that went into the A-10, F-15 and
F-16). Kay and Yudkin praised Sprey's work; and author personal interviews with Thomas
Christie, 29 April 1997, Washington, D.C, tape recording and notes in author's possession;
and Donald Fredericksen, 28 April 1997, Vienna, Va., tape recording and notes in author's
possession, also reveal high regard (both men served in various high-ranking OSD
positions during this time and later, and would have some impact upon the A-lO's future).
Burton, Christie and Stevenson observe that Sprey was exfremely intelligent. Sprey never
directly ran the program, but Christie adds that Sprey could marshall staffers to express his
position. A forceful man, Sprey also fought with various recalcitrants throughout the
procurement system to preserve his vision, and thus his "take" on Air Force leaders'
opposition to the A-10 was uncompromising. In a 1973 interview with the Office of Air
Force History, he averred, "The Air Force doesn't want it and they'll try anything to get rid
of i t . . . . It's perfectly clear that if there is no further threatfromthe Army, that airplane
won't get bought"; Neufeld, Sprey. 37-38. Burton and Stevenson credit Sprey as a major
influence in creating both the A-10 and the highly successful F-16fighter,but Sprey told
this author he was most proud of his A-10 work. "In the larger scheme of things, it's [the
F-16] like an irrelevance compared to the A-10," he said. This was because CAS was
"something that actually makes a difference in warfare,"" and "It was a real landmark trying
to get the Air Force to do what it was supposed to do."
An important note here is that COL Boyd, COL Burton, Christie, Fredericksen,
Myers, Spinney, and Sprey were all to some extent members of the 1980s "Military
Reform" movement. Burton's and Stevenson's works both chronicle this group's
experiences, and Burton calls the A-10 a "symbol of the 'Reform Movement'" (Pentagon
Wars. 242). The reform group had its origins in the late 1960s/early 1970s "Gunfighter
Mafia" which spurred creation of the A-10, F-15, and F-16, and that group included Boyd,
Christie, Myers, Sprey, and Air Force COL Everest Riccioni, among others. One could
dismiss the Sprey praise as group admiration, but these men had their differences in the
various aircraft procurement cmsades through the years. And author Stevenson, who
started his F-18 history as a disinterested observer, endorsed their assessments of Sprey.
Some other sources besides the above works for the Fighter Mafia are: Ingemar DCrfer,
Arms Deal: The Selling of the F-16 (New York: Praeger, 1983), 4-1 l(like Stevenson,
recounts the Mafia's responsibility for the F-16); James Fallows, National Defense (New
York: Random House, 1981), 95-106 (Fallows was a newsman sympathetic to the
Reformers; gives Sprey credit, along with Boyd and Riccioni, for the F-16), and Franklin
C "Chuck" Spinney, "Genghis John," Naval Institute Proceedings 123 (July 1997) 42-47
(praise for Boyd)
141

simple, lightweight, reliable, highly survivable and capable of operating

from medium-length semi-prepared airstrips with a high utilization rate.
It must be able to carry a large payload of mixed ordnance and deliver it
accurately. It must have sufficient low-altitude range and loiter capability,
airspeed range, and aerial agility to perform the entire spectmm of close
air support missions.
The spectmm of CAS that the above statement envisioned was support of troops in close
combat with enemy ttoops, helicopter escort, and armed reconnaissance of enemy troop
positions. In later paragraphs, the RAD re-emphasized loiter and maneuverability
characteristics, and in a new twist for tactical planes, directed that the design incorporate
the ability to survive hits. It further specified that the aircraft carry not only pylons for
bombs and rockets but also guns, that it be easily maintainable and cheap, and that its
avionics be simple (though allowing potential modifications to conduct night/all-weather
operations). Finally, the RAD asked that designers create a judicious balance between all
of the requirements. '^
The December 1966 RAD was only thefirstof many development directives in the
A-lO's life, but it set the tone for the ones that followed. It also showed the influence of
the design team. The specific desired performance features reflected their attempt to make
thefixed-wingplane compete as much as possible with Cheyenne while improving upon
the A-l: short field capability (4000 feet), 8000 pound ordnance capacity (matched the
A-l), an improved cmise speed over the A-1 (300 knots), a slow minimum maneuvering
speed and corresponding tight turn radius like the A-l (120 knots and 1000 feet), and a
maximum gross weight which fell neatly between that of the A-1 and A-7 (22,500
pounds). Sprey recalled that the A-l pilots were one of three influences upon his thinking
in conceiving the A-X design (the other two being the legendary Stuka pilot Hans Rudel

'^MGEN Kenneth Dempster, USAF, Director of Operational Requirements &

Development Plans, Headquarters Air Force, "Requirement for a Specialized Close Air
Support Aircraft (A-X)," Requirements Action Directive RAD 7-69-(I), 22 December
1966, 1-6 (quote, 1), supporting documents (henceforth referred to as "Dempster,
"RAD"). Mischler, "A-X," 20-24, discusses the RAD, and points out that it specified a
tactical aircraft design which, for thefirsttime in the Air Force's existence, lacked
multi-mission capability.
142

and historical CAS performance). The A-l pilots stressed that, like the A-l. the A-X must
be mgged, maneuverable, and above all, they wanted to have loiter capability. This led to
the RAD's desire that the A-X have two hours of loiter time. The staff wanted guns for the
plane in order to counteract the Air Force trend to dispense with guns as obsolete
weapons-Vietnam certainly proved their worth both in air support missions in the South as
well as dogfights over the North (the proposed design also contained ample weapons
stations for bombs and rockets). For survivability, the RAD stated that the A-X must be
able to successfully sustain hits from 14.5 mm shells due to the historically proven high risk
of ground fire damage in the CAS mission. (It also wanted the plane to survive hits from
the shoulder-launched, heat-seeking SAMs just appearing on the scene.) Above all, they
wanted a plane that exceeded the A-l's mggedness, loiter time, ordnance capacity,
simplicity, and maneuverability. This was so much the case that one AFRDQ staffer who
later became Air Force Chief of Staff, Larry Welch, described the A-10 as a "'jet-age A-l."
It would also lead later critics to claim that the plane was too much a design for the
Vietnam War. Yet, though the plane incorpx)rated many lessons derived from Vietnam,
the concept designers believed that they were producing a plane that could handle, as the
Army intended for Cheyenne, a wider warfare spectrum of CAS.'*

'^Dempster, "RAD," 1-6; GEN Lany Welch, USAF (ret), personal interview by
author, 2 May 1997, Alexandria, Va., tape recording and notes in author's possession; and
the following interviews by author: Christie, Kay, Lancaster, Sprey. Mischler, 21-22,
discusses survivability and how it related to the CAS mission. Pentland, "Evolution of
A-10 Mission Requirements"; and Pentland, telephonic interviews by author, 19 and 22
Febmary 1997, and 3 June 1997, notes in author's possession, reveal some of the belief
that the plane's design concept favored limited wars like Korea. (Pentland was an A-10
pilot who worked CAS issues on the Air Force Headquarters staff in the late 1980sduring
yet another battle between the service and its CAS plane.) Through the years, the plane
would face many assertions that it was "designed for the last war." Christie knew Sprey at
this time and called Sprey's A-l contacts the "A-l Mafia." Sprey said that the A-l pilots'
tactics manual was just a collection of mimeographed sheets, which to Sprey showed "how
much hind tit these guys were getting, they couldn't even get a hard cover [from the Air
Force] to put on a manual!"
Sprey answered the author's query about Marine Reserve COL J.H. Reinburg's
possible influence upon A-X design by saying that he was aware of Reinburg's writings,
but felt that Reinburg's proposed CAS plane was too heavily armored for its size and
143

Working together. Systems Command and Headquarters Air Force in April 1967
created two preliminary A-X designs: one powered by twin turboprops and one powered
by twin turbofans. At that time, the Air Force preferred the turpoprop design because it
provided good thmst for subsonic flight while at the same time maintaining fuel efficiency
for good loiter. Turbofan technology was not sufficiently developed at this time, and the
representative turbofan engine had both poor thmst and poor fuel efficiency.^"
Both designs featured a large gun with one thousand rounds of ammunition, and
the creative source for this weapon which would later so define the A-10 is an issue worth
discussing. At least one govemment document and a number of book and joumal sources
claim the Israeli Air Force's success against Arab tanks in the June 1967 Six Day War

A simplified description follows of the major steps and documents of the Air Force
airplane development process as they existed during the A-lO's creation. The RAD was
thefirstformal step and tasked the major Air Force command involved in A-X
development, usually Systems Command, to further work the design concept embodied in
the RAD. After study. Systems Command replied with a Concept Formulation Package
(CFP), which Headquarters Air Force and OSD reviewed, and if they liked it, re-worked it
into a Development Concept Paper (DCP) which they sent to the Secretary of Defense for
approval (the DCP summarized the reasons for and details of the plane's creation). If the
Secretary approved the DCP, OSD and the Air Force then wrote a Request for Proposal
(RFP) which they sent to prospective contractors for bids. The A-10 was unprecedented
in this particular phase, because the contract bid involved not only competing designs but
an actual flyoff between the leading candidate planes. After approval, the winning design
faced a series of milestone meetings conducted by a DSARC (named after the group set up
to conduct them, the Defense Systems Acquisition Review Council), which determined
progress and future action. Milestone I validated the concept, II approved full-scale
engineering development, and III ordered full-scale production and employment. Each
Milestone produced another DCP. As in the A-lO's case, there can be sub-milestones to
answer intervening questions. Good summaries of this process are in MAJ Roger
Carieton, USAF, "The A-10 and Design-to-Cost: How Well Did It Work?" (Research
study, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, 1979), 12-14; and an address by
BGEN FM. Rogers, USAF, before the National Security Industnal Association, Dayton,
OH, Chapter, 27 Febmary 1969, supporting documents.
^"Mischler, 25-31, 39, and Sweetman, 27-30 (good introductory discussion of
turbofan evolution and its relation to the A-10). Additionally, dunng this time Systems
Command solicited informal design ideas from four aerospace contractors:
McDonnell-Douglas, Northrop Corporation, Gmmman, and General Dynamics
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In eariy 1967, Headquarters Air Force assigned the RAD to Systems Command,
which commenced work upon the next big step in the development process, the Concept
Formulation Package (CFP). Systems Command assigned supervision of A-X design work
to its F-X project office. The F-X project, which would produce the F-15, commenced
just before the A-X. It represented the service's response to the F-111's failure to meet air
combat performance expectations, as well as American fighters' less than overwhelming
success against North Vietnamese MiGs. Additionally, the Air Force's decision to procure
the A-7, and then the A-X, gave impetus tofightertypes who wanted a dedicated air
superiority plane instead of a machine afflicted with serious design compromises in the
name of multi-mission capability. The reasoning was that, if the service committed to
buying dedicated attack planes lacking aerial combat prowess, then it would require the
best air-to-airfighteravailable. Thefightermen's desire mirrored that of attack plane
advocates in that they were both tired of ineffective multimission planes; but the Air
Force's priority for the two projects could be seen in Systems Command making the A-X a
subset of F-X."

power. COL Reinburg was a World War IIfighterace, flew many CAS missions in
Korea, and later wrote many articles advocating purchase of a simple, slow, maneuverable,
and well-armored CAS plane. In these articles, he also gave brief primers on past
American CAS performance as he saw it, and described the tactics that his ideal plane
would use. See his "Close Air Support," Army 12 (April 1962): 59-63; "For Maximum
Effort: LACAS [Low Altitude Close Air Support]," Infantty 53 (September-October
1963): 24-26; "The Flying Tank," Infantt-y 55 (May-June 1965): 66-67; and "Tnals of
Close Air Support Aircraft," Army 16 (March 1966): 67-68. The articles' timing and
publication source are noteworthy, for they coincide with the Army's interest in procuring a
CAS plane with capabilities similar to what he described. Interestingly, Sprey was the only
source-written or oral-who specifically acknowledged Reinburg, though Reinburg's
concept of an armored "tub" to protect the pilot was what appeared in the A-10.
"The creation of F-X and its relation to the F-111, A-7, and A-X can be found in
Christie, interview by author (F-X was the priority project); Dorfer, Arms Deal: The
Selling of the F-16. 4; Futtell, Ideas, vol. II, 470-474; Hasdorff. Hildretii. 61, Richard
Head, "Fhe Air Force A-7 Decision; The Politics of Close Air Support," 223-224;
Mischler, "A-X," 24; Neufeld, BfiXi 27-29; Neufeld, "The F-15 Eagle," 11-27; Neufeld,
Sprey. 20 (compares popularity of the two projects); Stevenson, Pentagon Paradox. 27-28
(F-111's failure as an air-to-airfighter);and Sweetman, Modem Fighting Aircraft. A-10 7.
144

motivated the U.S. Air Force to fit a large gun on the A-X However, other sources
indicate the motivation lay elsewhere. The Doctrine, Concepts, and Objectives staffers and
Pierre Sprey recall that the idea for a large, rapid-firing gun appeared early on.
Specifically, Pierre Sprey approached Colonel Kay with intelligence information about
increasing Soviet tank strength in Europe. As Kay and Sprey both later recalled, they
needed to demonstrate the design's applicability to other CAS environments besides the
guerrilla war in Vietnam, and incorporating a large caliber gun which could kill tanks was
appropriate (they already envisioned including gun armament anyway). Influences upon
Sprey included not only intelligence reports, but also the ideas of German aircraft engineer
Hans Multhopp. The experiences of Stuka pilot Hans Rudel, who used a single-shot 37
mm cannon to destroy Soviet tanks in World War II, also inspired the designer. Sprey was
impressed enough that he later said, "If you didn't have something that could effectively
generate a probability of kill against a tank, it wasn't worth having an A-10." Perhaps most
importantly, the staffers also needed an antiarmor weapon to match the Cheyenne's
planned antiarmor capability, and Sprey directly stated that the "airplane stands or falls on
this . . . [or] we don't have a way offending off Cheyenne." Finally, the Systems
Command proposal appeared before the Six Day War, and postwar analysis of destroyed
Arab armor revealed that the Israeli aviator claims were inflated.^'

"Sprey quote is from interview by author. The sources citing Israeli gun success is
an influence are: "AF Concerned Over AX Opposition," AFI107 (11 October 1969): 14;
Gunston, 259; OSD Director of Defense Research & Engineering's (DDR&E)
Development Concept Paper (DCP) 23, "A-X Close Air Support Aircraft,'" 11 December
1968, 12; Smallwood, Warthog. 11-12 (says the Israeli success was "on the minds " of the
A-X planners, and that the Israeli airmen killed tanks by hitting the weaker parts);
Sweetman, 8; Joseph Volz, "A-X vs, AH-56: Competitive or Complementary?" AFJ 108
(25 April 1970): 26; and Wan-en Wetmore, "Israelis' Air Punch Major Factor in War,"
AW&ST 87 (3 July 1967): 21-23. In a later work, Brereton Greenhous also describes
Israeli air success against tanks, but admits that some claims were inflated and that tank kills
came via a variety of weapons, mostiy rockets; see his "The Israeli Experience," in Cooling,
ed.. Case Studies. 503-509.
The above DDR&E source especially seems to validate the Israeli gun success
claim, but the author believes A-X advocates included it in order to better sell the A-X
concept. This was certainly the case with the above AFJ articles, which both discuss Air
Force reaction to A-X criticismand feature service spokesmen citing Israeli gun success as
146

the Cheyenne), the risk was justified. However, as Systems Command historian Robert
Mischler observed in his monograph about A-X development, a delay that affected how
the plane was created occurred at this time. In a process which Pierre Sprey called
"bloodshed," Air Force Pentagon staffers modified the CFP to ensure certain aircraft
characteristics. As a result, the final version did not appear until a critical two months later.
The finalized CFP described A-X CAS the same as the RAD, but for thefirsttime, the
document specified four design guidelines that would shape A-10 constmction: lethality,
simplicity, survivability, and responsiveness."
Lethality above all meant the service accepted its staff designers' argument that the
A-X possess a large-caliber, rapid-firing gun to kill tanks. ThefinalizedCFP specified a 30
mm gun with a six thousand rounds-per-minute rate-of-fire and a twelve hundred round
magazine. Lest one think that the designers short-changed future CAS pilots with a fire
rate six times what the magazine held, staffers at both Systems Command and the
Pentagon conceived a reasonably accurate picture of employment parameters. The longest
planned burst length per pass was approximately two secondsenough to hurl about one
hundred rounds at a target and ensure at least ten total passes. They wanted the round's
constitution, velocity, and weight to amply guarantee that this burst length would kill a
tank. As such, the tungsten-carbide constitution of traditional antitank rounds would not
do; Rudel's experience against Soviet tanks demonsttated that. Rudel had to fire very close

"Andrews, "Rugged Tests and a Rugged Machine," 16-17 (Army Cheyenne

project details); Robert McNamara, Secretary of Defense, "Statement before the Senate
Armed Services Committee on the Fiscal Year (FY) 1969-1973 Defense Program and
1969 Budget," 22 January 1968, reprinted in "Selected Statements by DoD and Other
Administration Officials, January 1-June 30, 1968," (Washington, D C : Office of the
Secretary of the Air Force Analysis Division, n.d), 5 AFHRC Holding K 168.04-48 (given
his arrogance and faith in paper analysis studies, he said that this complex and innovative
aircraft entailed "relatively small risk and ... favorable price"); Mischler, 37, 43-57; and
Michael Wilson, "Fairchild A-10," Flight International 109 (20 March 1976): 708.
Gunston substitutes maneuverability for responsiveness in his work (Attack Aircraft. 254),
but the A-X project document, "A-X Close Air Support Aircraft," DCP 23, 4-5, uses
responsiveness. Concurrency's pitfalls as they pertain to various Air Force aircraft are in
Brown, Flving Blind. 20-26, 190-192, 334-337, 344-347; Coulam, Illusions of Choice
203-215; and Gunston, Early Supersonic Fighters of the West. 172-174.
148

By March 1968, a working group had taken the vanous design inputs and
fashioned a Concept Formulation Package (CFP), which was to be sent to OSD for review
and approval to commence the constmction contract phase. Perhaps reflecting a
Cheyenne-induced sense of urgency-the helicopter made itsfirstflightin September 1967
and McNamara approved production of 375 more Cheyennes in January 1968-the
working group's CFP directed an A-X initial operational capability (IOC, the staff term for
the first plane built and delivered to an operational squadron) date of December 1970.
This required "concurrency," a service term signifying the accomplishment of normally
sequential steps in the aircraft creation process at the same time, thusriskingmajor snaris if
something went wrong. Concurrency had occurred before with various planes that the Air
Force wanted badly, and their ensuing development proceeded badly too. But the service
was confident that, since the A-X was a cheap and simple aircraft (and again, because of

a precedent for buying the A-X and its big gun. Also, Dr. Russel Stolfi, in a telephonic
interview by author, 6-7 March 1997, notes in author's possession, further clarifies Israeli
gun results. Dr. Stolfi was a Naval Postgraduate School history professor and tank warfare
expert who personally inspected wrecked Arab armor at war's end as part of an American
study. (Since the Arabs were routed, their damaged and desttoyed tanks remained behind,
in place, for examination.) The Aden 30 mm gun rounds that Israelifightersused lacked
the mass and velocity to lethally hit tanks, and Stolfi's inspection revealed that ground fire
destroyed 97 percent of Arab tanks. (Stolfi will laterfigurein tests of the A-lO's gun.)
Smallwood, Warthog 11 (cites other factors besides Israeli success), and author interviews
of Christie, Kay, Lancaster, and Sprey are sources for the other motivations for a large
gun. (Christie worked A-X gun issues, and said the Israeli Aden gun experience actually
motivated him and others to seek a more powerful gun for the A-X. The latter three also
specifically dismissed the Israeli experience as an influence.) Neither Mischler's "A-X"
monograph nor Malcolm Wall's Systems Command monograph history of the A-10 gun's
development, "The Development and Acquisition of the GAU-8/A: The A-lO's 'Tank
Buster', 1966-1976," vol. I, (Wright-Patterson AFB, Ohio: Office of History, Air Force
Systems Command, 1989), mention the specific motivation.
For the Army's anti-tank intentions for its Cheyenne, see COL Ronald Andreson,
USA, and COL Ralph Powell, USA, Conversation with Colonel Delbert Bnstol. Senior
Officers Debriefing Program, (Cariisle Bartacks, Pa.. AMHI, 1978), 64-76, ttanscript.
History of Army Aviation Collection. Colonel Bristol was Director of Army Aviation on
the Army's Pentagon staff, and also commanded the Army's Aviation Systems Command
during this time, and told his interviewers that the Army wanted the Cheyenne to be able to
destroy Soviet tanks in both day and night conditions.
147

to a tank (six hundred feet) and only at a weak spot at the rear of its turret to destroy it.
The staffers wanted a shortfiringrange as well, but preferred four thousand feet to allow
steep dive recovery, given the A-X's higher speeds (as compared to a Stuka or an A-l).
Through research they discovered depleted uranium, which had the appropriate heavy
density combined with the ability to ignite like magnesium upon high velocity impact.
Finally, the CFP expanded the number of pylons for bomb/rocket carriage to ten-and the
ordnance capacity to over sixteen thousand pounds-though Sprey later said that he should
have insisted that the plane use only the gun. The McNamara Whiz Kid emphasis upon
maximizing tons of ordnance carried per mile travelled drove the decision, but he felt that
hanging pylons on the plane to carry extra ordnance meant a wing redesign and
corresponding reduction in performance.^'
Depleted uranium ensured penetration of armor, but Sprey remembered that there
was, and would be, "bloodletting" over this and other gun specifications. Designers looked
at a 25 mm gun, but its shells lacked the appropriate mass. They considered a 35 mm gun.

"Mischler, 51-54 (mentions that contractor studyfindingsalso supported the idea

of a large intemal gun); Pentland, "Evolution," (Cited the gun dive delivery requirement as
an example of the designers' limited war orientation-dive deliveries meant that ground
defenses were weak enough to allow higher attack altitudes) Reeves, "AH-56 vs. the A-X,"
27 (puts the A-X load carrying capacity in perspective by describing possible weapons load
combinations, such as eighteen 500-pound bombs or eighteen launcher pods carrying
nineteen 2.75-inch rockets each, which is a lot of ordnance; but which still does not exceed
the 18,000-pound total carriage capacity); and Christie Sprey, and Welch, interviews by
author, who all discussed the reasoning involved in the gun concept. Wall, "GAU8/A,"
iv-v., 1-6, also mentions that originally the Air Force intended for the gun to fit onto the
A-7, A-37, F-4, and F-105, among others. Wall describes the various gun options and
reasons for rejecting them in favor of the 30 mm Galling gun, and also mentions that
requirements specified that the gun be effective against Soviet JS-Ill heavy tanks, T-54
medium tanks, and PT-76 light tanks with a Pk of 50 percent. (Pk signifies percentage
chance of catastrophic kill; that is, complete destmction of item and its ability to move and
shoot.) Wall's account describes the decision-making as occumng under the auspices of a
Study Group set up with Systems Command's Armament Laboratory (ATL) and Eglin
Armaments Laboratory people. Christie, who had already met and worked with Pierre
Sprey in the Pentagon, also worked in OSD's Joint Technical Coordinating Group (JTCG),
and as such, had some oversight authority over the project. It is in this way that Christie
and Sprey were involved in early gun design.
149

but its size induced too many performance penalties. And they studied using a recoilless
rifle, but its accuracy and muzzle velocity were poor. Systems Command's Gun and
Rocket Division at its Eglin Air Force Base, Florida, Armaments Laboratory objected to
the staff designers' 30 mm proposal and suggested modifying the standard 20 mm gun used
in Air Force fighters. This weapon utterly lacked the ability to pierce tank armor. Eglin
did not like using depleted uranium, though studies proved that as depleted uranium, it had
no unsafe radioactive properties. The Army's Ballistics Research Laboratory at Aberdeen
Proving Ground, Maryland, revealed the growing friction between the A-X and Cheyenne
projects by challenging the proposed 30 mm gun's effectiveness. Though one of the Air
Force Armament Laboratory directors remembered some of these details differently, this
was the first of several clashes between aggressive CAS plane advocates and the respective
Air Force and Army gun laboratories."
"Robert Buchta, telephonic interview by author, 12 August 1997, notes in author's
possession; COL Robert Dilger, USAF (ret), 26 February 1997, notes in author's
possession; COL Sam Kishline, USAF (ret), 13 April 1997, tape recording and notes in
author's possession; Richard Oates, 9 July 1997, notes in author's possession; and author
personal interviews with LTGEN Thomas McMullen, USAF (ret), 5 May 1997,
Alexandria, Va., recording and notes in author's possession; and the following previously
cited interviews by author: Christie and Sprey.
These men and the other interview sources commented upon the strained
relationship between the Aberdeen BRL and Eglin Armaments Lab on the one hand and,
apparently, any outsiders on the other. Some sources were vehement about the lab's
incompetence based upon serious fmsttations in dealing with it. COL Dilger, who later
figures in the A-lO's gun history, believed that the Armaments Lab lived in a research ivory
tower, and that the BRL sometimes placed Army interests above research tmth. Sprey
asserted that both labs were simply incompetent, and that the Armaments Lab consisted of
BRL castoffs from the time when the Air Force separatedfromthe Army. Burton's
Pentagon Wars backs these two men, in that it is partially an account of the author's
stmggles with the BRL as its research chose Army image and budget priorities over
operational efficiency and survivability. Christie was more measured, but observed that the
Armaments Lab had mixed-up priorities and that its members were indeed former BRL
types who were too hidebound. COL Kishline, who supervised Dilger and worked with
Christie on A-10 gun issues, reminded the author that Eglin's charter was to explore
technology, and thus there would be differences between it and operationally oriented
agencies (though Kishline fought the lab as well). LTGEN McMullen, who was Director
of the A-10 Project Office in the early 1970s and later commanded the Tactical Air
Warfare Center (TAWC) at Eglin, observed that Eglin was a bit too casual and had a
150

In keeping with the A-l's relatively simple constmction, as well as the desire to
undercut the Cheyenne's cost, the Air Force made sure that the A-X did not carry an
abundance of avionics goodies that escalated costs on other planes. It would not have an
all-weather radar like the F-111, or sophisticated inertial fire conttol system like the
A-7. Nor did it carry even a fraction of the gear the Cheyerme was supposed to have.
Instead, it carried sufficient radios to talk to ground troops, a basic optical sight for
weapons delivery, and a laser spot tracker (for laser designation of CAS targets by ground
troops or FAC). The staff did allow for inclusion of cockpit instruments to accommodate
either the television-guided Maverick missile then under development or Forward Looking
InFrared (FLIR) night vision apparatus. In all, the CFP projected a per-aircraft cost of just
over one million dollars, which was well short of the Cheyenne's looming estimate of six
million dollars per copy.^^

history of weapons development problems. Oates and Buchta, both of whom were project
managers within the A-10 gun program, conceded that problems existed between the lab
and even other Systems Command agencies, and this was due to the personalities involved
as well as Eglin's separate charter and ample research budget. One individual cited by
Christie and Sprey as a "personality" was the Director of the Gun and Rockets Division of
the Armaments Laboratory, Dale Davis. Davis' recollection of why his division made the
modified 20 mm counter-offer differs from Sprey's; it was an answer to an Air Force
Pentagon query about what his lab could quickly develop to meet a six months' deadline
supporting the early IOC When given more time, his shop developed something better;
see Jack Neufeld and Ralph Rowley, Interview of Mr. Dale Davis. (Washington, D C :
USAF Oral History Program, 22 May 1973), 4-6, transcript, AFHRC Holding
K239.0512-963.
^^Mischler, 49-5, 55-57; and the following interviews by author: Christie, Sprey,
and Welch.
The design's de-emphasis of advanced technology pleased Sprey, who told the
author that "The only thing that counts is effectiveness. To have the latest technology is
irrelevant. . . we're not in this to field technology. We're in this to make weapons that
keep our people alive and help them to win." In an earlier interview, he sarcastically
observed that the Air Force's low budget priority ensured a practical A-X design: "So the
A-X came out close to being as austere as it was simply by fluke because it was an
unpopular program. If TAC headquarters had wanted an A-X, 1 guarantee you that the
damn thing would haverivaledthe B-58 for complexity today", see Neufeld, Sprey. 19.
Sprey's comparison to the B-58 is apt, for it represented an ambitious Air Force attempt to
field a supersonic jet bomber in the 1950s, and it encountered many problems due to
151

The survivability features were extensive and unprecedented. The CFP reflected
the service's recently commencedand effective-use of systems analysis in studying
aircraft battle damage, as well as a genuine concern about the lethality of the CAS
environment. Analysis revealed that 80 percent of aircraft combat losses occurred due to
fire and loss of control. Accordingly, the CFP demanded that the A-X have
flame-retardant foam in its self-sealing fuel tanks, that its armor-protected engines be well
separated from the fuel tanks and each other, and that the gun magazine have blow-out
doors. Also, studies of aircraft losses in Vietnam unearthed problems peculiar to modem
jets. Tactical jet designers in the 1950s erred in setting up the hydraulic systems required
to power a jet's flight conttols by placing their lines in vulnerable spots, or next to engine
hot sections (where a leak could cause theflammablehydraulic fluid to ignite), or
providing no back-up system in case of total failure. A major source of F-105 losses, for
example, was small arms fire hitting its vulnerable components. Thus the A-X would have
protected hydraulic lines, dual flight controls, control jamming protection features, and a
manual flight conttol system. There would even be a "bathtub" of heavy armor that would
protect the cockpit from small arms fire. The designers also preferred maneuverability to
overall speed because maneuvering helped defeat antiaircraft tracking solutions, whereas
flying fast on a straight, predictable course did not (and because the staff designers insisted
upon maneuverability over speed, TAC refused to participate in the concept formulation
phase), /^alysis did not drive every survivability feature, however. Designers wanted a
unforeseen consequences in its revolutionary, complex design; see Brown, Flving Blind.
172-192; and Bill Gunston, "General Dynamics B-58 Hustler," chap, in his Bombers of
the West (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1973), 185-199.
Author Bradin writes that by 1967, the Cheyenne'srisingcost and complexity
presented problems; see his Hot Air to Hellfire. 117. See also Reeves, "Close Air Support,
AH-56 vs. A-X," 45-48. This 1972 Air Command and Staff College work is a good
general summary of interservice relations as they pertained to the Cheyenne and A-X,
marred by Reeves' insistence that the Cheyenne was a successor to the Cobra (13); this
simply does not square with other. Army-oriented, sources. However, Reeves dwells upon
the Cheyenne's cost compared to other Army helicopters, concludes that it violates the
Army's original bent for mass producing inexpensive aircraft such as the UH-1 and AH-1,
and recommends that this complex and expensive advanced helicopter he tramferred to
the Air Force where it can work as a team with the A-X.
152

twin-engine plane even though studies did not conclusively prove that they made a plane
more survivable. In all, Sprey made a very important point about the intentions behind
these features: "Bar none, this is the most survivable plane ever built for the close air
support mission. [But we] didn't make it survivable over Moscow or attacking air bases."
Later Air Force leaders denigrated the A-10 for not being able to operate in a high-threat
interdiction environment-but the designers never intended that it fly that type of mission. 26
^^Quote is from Sprey, interview by author. Armament Systems Division (ASD),
Headquarters U.S. Air Force, Information Office, "News Release," 18 May 1970, 1,
supporting documents; Congress, Senate, Hearings Before the Committee on
Appropriations, Department of Defense Appropriations. Part 4. 91st Cong., 2d sess., 4
May 1970,41 (Seamans claims that the A-X is thefirstplane built with survivability
features in mind); Gunston, Attack Aircraft. 256-257; LTCOL Robert McDermott,
"Engineering for Survivability." USAF Fighter Weapons Review (Fall 1978): 13-14
(McDermott put the statistics, derived from both Vietnam and the Six Day War, at 62
percent due to fire/explosions, 18 percent due to pilot incapacitation, and 20 percent due to
loss of control, which fits the survivability emphasis placed in the A-X design); Mischler,
54-55; Sweetman, A-10. 7 (preference for two engines), 16 (the A-10 "set standards" for
survivability), 24-25 ; Franklin C "Chuck" Spinney, personal interview by author, 7 May
1997, Washington, D.C, tape recording and notes in author's possession; and the
following interviews by author: Christie, Fredericksen, and Sprey.
Sprey said that in spite of the conventional wisdom justification for two engines,
analysis revealed that this setup often meant greater size, extra weight, performance
degradation, greater complexity (read tougher maintainability), and greater cost. The
DDR&E chief at the time of the A-X's development. Dr. John Foster, made similar points;
Dr. John Foster, telephonic interview by author, 19 December 1997, notes in author's
possession. This author believes that two engines are compelling to American air leaders
because an engine loss in peacetime flying does not automatically mean aircraft loss, and
American leaders in general do a lot to prevent unnecessary losses in war. An assigned
reading in the U.S. Air Force Air War College Associate Programs, Military Studies
Course (MS 612AP), Volume II, 4th edition. Lessons 17-18, (MAFB: Air University,
1993) confirms these views, at least as they pertain tofighterslike the twin-engine
F-4, F-14, and F-15; see William Gregory, "Uncertainty: Technical and Financial," 46-54,
reprinted chap, in his The Defense Procurement Mess (New York: MacMillan, 1989),
129-153 (page numbers are from the Air University text). Further, in a later discussion of
the relative merits of the A-10 versus the A-7, Congressman Otis Pike and Air Force
Deputy Chief of Staff for Research and Development, LTGEN Otto Glasser, cite the
A-lO's two engines as an advantage over the A-7's single engine setup; see Congress,
House, Committee on Armed Services, Hearings on Cost Escalation in Defense
Procurement Contracts and Military Posture and H.R. 6722. 93d Cong., 1st sess., 21 May
1973, 1336.
153

Pierre Sprey recalled that the A-l Vietnam veteran pilots wanted loiter capability,
and one reason was that it determined responsiveness more than aircraft speed:
The other thing these guys taught me, just banged it home, because
it didn't make sense to me atfirst,was the overwhelming importance
of loiter time . . . . that if you want very fast time response . . . . you
can't get it with speed, because you're always too far away. If you're
on the ground it's too late . . . you can have an airplane go Mach 3 and
it's still too late. The only way to get super quick response time is to be
in the air, loitering, and checked in with a FAC . . . you need three to
five minutes response time . . . come any later and you might as well
not have come.
The staff designers believed that responsiveness depended not only upon loiter capability
but also upon maneuverability and the ability to fly from short, austere fields. A
maneuverable plane could quickly tum to reattack a target, and short field capability helped
the plane compete with the Cheyenne. The latter item was because the A-X would have
more basing flexibility than other Air Force tactical planes, and thus allow the Air Force
better to demonstrate its CAS commitment by placing A-X units close to the troops they
supported. These requirements would create a future problem in that such a plane needed
a thicker wing to carry all of its planned ordnance ami allow both STOL performance as
well as fuel efficiency for slow-speed loiter. This type of wing produced a lot of drag that
prevented faster speeds regardless of the powerplant's strength. Finally, in reaction to a
problem that had kept airmen from precisely meeting ground units' needs in at least two

Spinney achieved some fame as a Pentagon defense reformer openly challenging

his bosses' management of President Ronald Reagan's military buildup; see Walter
Isaacson, "The Winds of Reform," Time. 7 March 1983, 12-30 (Spinney is on the
cover.) He began his Air Force and Pentagon career doing aircraft battle damage analysis.
Both Spinney and Sprey told the author that the A-7 had poor survivability features. Its
engine and fuel tanks fit snug together, hydraulic lines ran through vulnerable spots, one
specific hydraulic systems failure combination rendered it unflyable, and no manual backup control system existed if all hydraulics failed Sprey called it a "hopeless candidate for
close air support," and both Spinney and Sprey said that combat damage analysis statistics
supported this claim.
154

wars, the designers specified that the plane would carry the appropriate Army-compatible
communications gear."
The later CFP completion date-as well as some of its details, such as having to
invent a new gun and fit it into the plane-led the service to slip the A-X IOC to 1972.
Another reason possibly was that stories of the Cheyennne's developmental problems
started to become public, which relaxed the pressure to build a plane to compete with it.
Thus, the initial msh to produce the plane subsided, which allowed more deliberate
consideration of its design. It was just as well, for the modified CFP that the service sent to
OSD for review and approval snagged upon some of these extra considerations.^*
Dr. John Foster's DDR&E office was responsible for crafting the ensuing
Development Concept Paper (DCP) that would be sent to the Defense Secretary for
review and approval for further action. As Foster later told the author, DDR&E's
questions about the new design were mostly routine, analysis-type questions that ensured
that OSD addressed all pertinent issues. These were: would a current aircraft meet the
requirements; and should concurrent development occur on a more complex A-X that
could do night and all-weather CAS? One other question reflected a procurement
philosophy change overtaking OSD and the Air Force with Robert McNamara's March
1968 departure: should competitive prototypes be developed and flown before selecting a
particular design? Due to his faith in the power of systems analysis to answer any problem,
McNamara favored using paper and computer studies to choose from among competing
designs. However, the controversy and problems surrounding his headlong push to build
the F-111 left many people cold. Both Foster and the Systems Command commander.

"Gunston, Attack Aircraft. 254-256; Mischler, 44; and Sprey, interview by author.
Sprey's quote conttadicts the thmst of John Sbrega's comparison of A-l and jet fighter
performance in his "Southeast Asia," essay in Cooling's Case Studies. 441,444. Sbrega
favored speed as the determinant of responsiveness.
^^Mischler, 43; and two 1968 Walter Andrews articles on the Cheyenne project
reveal increasing suspicions about its health; see "The 'Known Unknowns' and the
'Unknown Unknowns,'" and "There Are No Red Flags Flying," AFJ 106 (14 December
1968): 14-15, and 20-24.
155

General James Ferguson, were interested in competitive prototyping. Foster made it an

actual procurement issue by incorporating it as a design question.^'
The questions produced varying alternative answers. The Air Force insisted that no
other aircraft could match A-X's programmed CAS strengths, and that it should proceed
with due haste to field this plane no later than 1973. However, Foster had a number of
concems about the design concept, and in DCP 23, submitted to OSD in December 1968,
recommended deferment of approval for contract proposals. Foster felt that the design's
specified survivability against small arms fire (14.5 mm) was insufficient given the heavier
automatic weapons, such as 23 mm, available to most Warsaw Pact ground units.
Additionally, he wanted to see if anything from the development of the A-7, OV-10, and
A-37 could bettansferredto the A-X (the A-37 was a counterinsurgency attack version of
the Air Force's small T-37 trainer; for photos of the A-37 and OV-10, see Appendix Figs.
19 and 33). Finally, Foster was suspicious of the CFP's expanding the A-X's size and
weight. He did not want a repeat of the F-111 experience, when the service wanted to
add too much capability to the plane and nearly produced a monsttous failure. Also, it
seemed to Foster that the plarmed size, range and payload specifications probably would
produce a plane no different than the A-7. Foster wanted an A-X, but truly wanted to
keep it simple and survivable.'"
"DDR&E, "A-X Close Air Support Aircraft," DCP 23; Mischler, 57-59
'"DDR&E, DCP 23; Mischler, 57-61, 64; Wilson, "Fairchild A-10," 707; and the
following interviews by author: Foster and Sprey. DCP 23 reiterated the RAD's and
CFP's definitions of the type of CAS the A-X would fly. It specified the A-7, OV-10, and
A-37 deficiencies that necessitated A-X development: A-7, excessive mnway
requirements, marginal survivability, poor maneuverability, OV-10, a FAC/observation
plane and not an attack plane; A-37, limited loiter, poor combat radius, reduced weapons
carriage, and little protective armor. DCP 23 also discussed the Air Force's preference-to
date-for a turboprop plane. It addressed A-X use of smart weapons such as the Maverick
missile, as well as the plane's possible operation in night and all-weather scenarios. 1 he
document emphasized the design's cost-effectiveness, proposed further studies on how the
A-X compared to the Cheyenne, and recommended prototype testing as a means of
reducing developmental risk. A later defense joumal article also enumerated the other
attack planes' deficiencies; see Wilson, "Fairchild A-10," 707.
Pierre Sprey believed that Foster delayed the A-X program because he was
156

OSD reviewed DCP 23 and approved money in the Fiscal Year 1970 budget for
contract definition, contingent on the Air Force reviewing Foster's concems. Through
early 1969, the service examined them and made some small reduction in size and gross
weight. The Air Force seemed anxious to press on with a Request for Proposal (RFP) to
aviation conttactors. Indeed, in September 1969, it requested a Defense System
Acquisition Review Council (DSARC) to review its new CFP and start contract definition.
One possible reason was that outside factors-the Cheyenne's fate, an irritated Congress,
and a new presidential administrationincreasingly dominated A-X development."

Other Factors and A-X Development

However, before moving forward, OSD wanted more opinions of A-X. Most
important was the Army's attitude, since that service would be the prime beneficiary of this
plane's creation. But the undercurrent of friction between the services made one wonder
how the Army would answer, and how the Air Force would in tum react. The two
services' actions throughout this period of CAS plane gestation were not encouraging. A
1967 Army study revealed that its commanders in Vietnam liked the Air Force CAS that
they received, but they preferred aircraft that could guarantee quick response andfindthe
target. The latterfindingimplied that the ground commanders wanted armed helicopters.
Thus, through 1968, the Air Force conducted comparative studies that described the
A-X as a more cost-effective aircraft than the Cheyenne. Wanting a hopefully unbiased
source of information, OSD, in conjunction with Foster's DCP 23, directed its Weapons
System Evaluation Group (WSEG) to conduct a comparative evaluation to explore
WSEG's ability to resolve uncertainty between competing aircraft (afirstfor WSEG, which
was established in 1948 as part of the Key West Agreement). WSEG's February 1969

enamored of high-technology weapons and thus did not like the A-X. Foster insisted to
this author that the reason was quite the contrary. Foster wanted the Air Force to produce
a CAS plane, but he wastiredof overambitious airplane projects and feared too much
ambition for the A-X. A later DDR&E DCP, DCP 23a, 16 March 1970, seems to bear
this out; see excerpt in Mischler, 71.
"Mischler, 61-62, 66, 82-83.
157

findings featured a caution that they should not be used to pick one aircraft. In this, the
study previewed the inconclusive nature of early-1970s CAS study conclusions.'^
Indeed, any conclusion would be based upon the shifting sands of varying
definitions and impressions of CAS, as well as the various players' immediate and
perceived future needs. A later analysis of Vietnam CAS, for example, found that only 10
percent of the many missions flown in South Vietnam that either the tasking authority or
pilots called "CAS" actually involved troops in contact with enemy forces. Furthermore,
just after the Vietnam War ended, an Army Command and General Staff College study
conducted a survey that revealed confusion over air support procedures and definitions
between and among both services' veteran officers ."
Though the Army definitely wanted air support, it not only subtly redefined it to
secure the Cheyenne's continued existence, but also backed awayfromdemanding an
input in Air Force tactical airplane development. Hoping to avoid a head-on turf clash with
the Air Force, Army leaders continued to brandish the term "direct fire support" to
describe helicopter CAS. And when Defense Secretary Clark Clifford asked the Army its
opinion of the A-X concept, that service's Combat Developments Command (CDC)
responded by openly acknowledging that the A-X and the Cheyenne competed for the
same mission's defense funds. CDCs commander. Army helicopter proponent Lieutenant
General Harry Kirmard, wondered if the A-X was a plane designed too much for Vietnam
instead of other war environments. As such, he believed that the A-X's design and

'^J. N. Bradshaw, "Close Air Support (CAS)," CFP Supplement (Chronology and
Summary Sheets), 25 April 1969, 1.2-2.5, supporting documents; and DDR&E, DCP 23,
13; Reeves, "AH-56 vs. A-X," 13; and Wolf, Basic Documents on Roles and Missions.
180. According to Wolf, the Key West Agreement created WSEG in order to prevent
bitter inter-service turf fights such as the one then (1948) brewing between the Air Force
and Navy over strategic bombers, aircraft carriers, and nuclear weapons
"BDM Corporation, A Study of Statistical Lessons Leamed in Viettiam. vol VI,
RnM/W-78-128-TR-VOL-6-l. Conduct of tiie War. 9 May 1980, 18-19, AMFII Library;
and MAJ H. G. Nophsker, USAF, "Perceptions of Fighter Strikes: An Investigation into
Army and Air Force Officers' Concepts of Close Air Support, Air Interdiction, and
Tactical Air Control" (Master's thesis, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College,
1976), 14-40,80-89.
158

single-mission intent added little additional air capability for thefinancialand force
stmcture sacrifice to accommodate it. He preferred that the Air Force be allowed to
choose tactical aircraft based upon itsttaditionaldoctrinal preference for air superiority.
To Kinnard, this tack represented more effective Air Force air support of the Army. Thus,
his Cheyenne-driven attitude fulfilled General Ridgway's 1956 waming about the Army's
intention to go its own way if the Air Force did not build a CAS plane."
Kinnard's attitude also reflected the fact that the Army was nervous about a rival
aircraft, because the Cheyenne project was in trouble. Cost overruns beset the project to
the point where one aircraft cost twice as much as the Air Force's F-5 jetfighter(and as
Army aviation historian Frederic Bergerson pointed out, it would have cost the same as the
sophisticated F-16fighterthat the Air Force bought in the 1970s). Additionally, the design
encountered problems with its innovative rotor technology; so much so, that one
Cheyerme's main rotor smashed into its canopy during a 1968 test flight. In Febmary
1969, a Cheyenne crashed and killed its pilot during flight tests, and in April, the Army
sent Lockheed an ultimatum to write a plan for curing the program's ills. When Lockheed
failed to meet the Army's demands, that service cancelled the Cheyenne conttact. But
since the Army very much wanted an advanced attack helicopter, it later renegotiated a
research and development contract with Lockheed for a Cheyenne with an improved rotor
system. And given that the rotor was important to the whole design, this meant that the
Army and Lockheed resumed the program almost from scratch. Later Army leader and
"COL James T. Avery, U.S. Army Combat Developments Command, "AH-56
Outiine Plan of Test," letter ofttansmittal.Fort Rucker Papers, 27 June 1968 File, (Cariisle
Barracks, Pa.: U.S. Army Military History Institute, 24 October 1968), para. 2b. (COL
Avery specifies that the Army will not mn comparison tests between Cheyenne and Air
Force planes because it does not see the aircraft and their missions as comparable.) Davis,
The 31 Initiatives. 21; Kirkpatrick, "The Army and the A-10," 27-30 (extensive discussion
of and quotes from CDC study and Kinnard); and Sbrega, "Southeast Asia," in Cooling,
ed.. Case Studies. 454-455. Kinnard reiterated his position in an article of the time; see
Walter Andrews, "A Weapons Ship for All Environments," 12-13. This article, Kinnard's
CDC study, and another article in the same AFJ issue, Hessman's "New Weapon System,"
7-10 (and even Reeves in "AH-56 vs. A-X," 18), confirm that one of the Cheyenne's
planned strong suits was its anti-armor capability, which reinforces Sprey's point to the
author that the A-X needed an anti-armor gun as a way offending off' the Cheyenne
159

Army aviation historian recollections of the aircraft described an overiy ambitious program
that failed due to misunderstandings between, and errors by, the Army and Lockheed.
Army aviation historian Bergerson and aviation leader Hamilton Howze both criticized that
service for departing from its simple, inexpensive aircraft preference in favor of an aircraft
which represented more the Air Force's penchant for expensive and complex machinery.
The Army leadership further contributed to the problem by insisting that Lockheed help
recoup the Army Material Command's research investment on an unworkable gun by
installing it on the Cheyenne. For its part, Lockheed had never built a military helicopter
before, and the Cheyerme was far too ambitious for afirstattempt. Finally, the company
found itself receiving congressional criticism about its C-5ttansportplane, and channeled
most of its attention to that program.'^

'^Bergerson, 122 (source of cost comparisons); and Bradin, 117, 123-124, 142-143
(writes that when the Army revisited advanced attack helicopter development in the 1970s,
the Cheyerme legacy was so bitter that it hindered acceptance of any contract engineer
formerly associated with Lockheed); and the following interviews by author: Bahnsen and
Williams. See also the following Carlisle Barracks, Pa., U.S. Army Military History
Institute, Senior Officers' Debriefing Program, History of Army Aviation Box items:
LTCOL Ronald Andreson, USA, and COL Bryce Kramer, USA, BGEN O. Glen
Goodland. USA (ret). 9 May 1978, 1-2, 7, transcript, tape 2, side; LTCOL Philip Court,
USA, and COL Ralph Powell, USA, GEN Robert Williams. USA (ret). 1978, 21-22,
transcript, side 1, tape 3; COL Bryce Kramer, USA, and COL Ralph Powell, USA, GEN
Edwin Powell. USA (ret.). 18 March 1978, 26-27,ttanscript,tape 2, side 1; and LTCOL
Robert Reed, USA, GEN Hamilton Howze. USA (ret.). 14 October 1972, 58-59,
transcript.
The 14 December 1968 edition of Armed Forces Joumal focused upon the
Cheyenne and revealed some of its problems. Previously cited articles from this edition are
Walter Andrews, "No Red Flags Flying," '"Known Unknowns,'" "Rugged Tests," and
"Weapons Ship for All Environments"; and James Hessman, "The Army Gets a New
Weapons System." Also, there is Hessman's "Into the Inventory," 11. A later Ml article,
Volz' "AX vs AH-56," 25, states that the problems cited in the Army's cure notice to
Lockheed were rotor instability, inadequate directional control in hovering flight, and
excessive coupling during maneuvering flight (coupling means that when the pilot
commands a roll about the longitudinal axis, the aircraft tries to roll about the lateral axis as
well, producing tumbling flight if the coupling becomes bad enough).
GEN Williams told the author that the Cheyenne was an "engineer's dream" He
said that a harmonics problem in the main rotor caused the fatal crash, and that the ensuing
need for extensive rework caused the initial contract cancellation. He told both the author
160

The C-5's problems were but one of the military aircraft issues that upset Congress
at this time. America's disillusionment with the Vietnam War and the military was one
reason for a chilly reversal from earlier acceptance of the Pentagon's aviation needs.
Another was that aircraft costs skyrocketed due not only to the inflation gripping the
country's economy, but also to ever more high-performance and complex machiner> A
congressional report written about military aircraft costs complained that: "It is striking
. . . thatfighteraircraft now being developed for procurement in the mid 1970s will cost
more than five or six times more than comparable aircraft at the beginning of the 1960s."
Though the report appeared in the early 1970s, it described aircraft such as the A-X which
were conceived in the late 1960swhen all of the services wanted new aircraft in order to
remain superior to Russian planes. Thus the CAS aircraft argument appeared at a bad
time, and the Senate Armed Services Committee in 1968 questioned the A-X requirement
when the military already had A-4, A-6, and A-7 attack planes. An ominous sign of
Congress' temper came in summer 1969, after Senate hearings where the Air Force
inadequately demonsttated the A-7's specific purpose versus other planes-and also failed
to show how it would prevent further A-7 development cost overmns. For this, the
lawmakers cancelled A-7 funding. (It restored funds after the Air Force submitted a
reclama showing corrective action.) Congress then trained its angry eyes on the A-X. In
September 1969, the House Armed Services Committee held up funding for A-X because
some members did not feel that a turboprop design represented enough of a technological
advance to warrant support. After all, the Air Force seemed to have plenty of
low-technology planes such as the A-37, OV-10, and gunships to provide air support.
Others, such as antiwar liberals in the Democratic Study Group, thought the plane

and Army interviewers that the C-5's problems diverted Lockheed's attention and engineers
away from the Cheyenne, especially when the Cheyenne was in danger of cancellation.
Goodland was an Army aviation advocate who felt that the Army not only erred in
choosing Lockheed, a company with no helicopter experience, but also in choosing the
treacherous path of high-technology weapons procurement. Howze's comments agreed
with Goodland, in that he felt that the Army needed helicopter quantity more than
advanced technology. Powell thought the design was poor and that the program skipped
cntical steps, such as wind tunnel testing, which might have prevented the fatal crash
161

represented a Defense Department promotion of limited wars like the increasingly

unpopular one in Vietnam.'^
'^An excellent summary of why aircraft costs escalated is in Assistant Air Force
Secretary for Research and Development, Grant Hansen's testimony in Congress, Senate,
Hearings before the Committee on Appropriations, Department of Defense
Appropriations. Fiscal Year 1973. Part 4. 92d Cong., 2d sess, 21 February 1972,
691-695. Other sources for this paragraph are: "AF Concerned Over AX Opposition,"
AFJ. 14 (source of House opposition for technological reasons; also points out that Otis
Pike tried to get fellow members to support the A-X project, but to no avail); Bright,
"Costs: Into the Sttatosphere," chap, in his The Jet Makers. 149-167; MAJ Bames,
"Concept," 21-22, 36 (good description of jet complexity as it pertains to costs, and also
details costs); DCP 23,14 (source of 1968 congressional A-X opposition); Fallows,
National Defense. 36-37 (discusses the rapid rise of fighter costs); Head, "A-7," 416,463,
476-520; Eric Ludvigsen, "Up From the Ground or Down From the Sky," Army (July
1971): 49; and "Stopping the Incredible Rise in Weapons Costs," Business Week (19
Febmary 1972): 60-61 (source of congressional quote and report about rising defense
costs); Volz, "AX vs. AH-56," 25-26 (source of liberal Democrat opposition). When
outlining the A-7s later developmental ttavails. Head cites and includes excerpts from
Congress, Senate, Committee on Armed Services, Authorization for Military Procurement.
Research and Development. Fiscal Year 1970.91st Cong., 1st sess.; and Congress, Senate,
Report #91-290. 3 July 1969. See also Bright, Jet Makers. 70-73, for discussion of how
McNamara's bent for paper studies contributed to cost inflation Though McNamara
thought such studies saved money, they did not account for the many uncertainties and
modifications that a design faced during development; hence, cost fiascoes in the C-5,
F-14, and F-111 programs.
As early as 1968, former Air Force Secretary and current Senator Stuart
Symington (D-MO) warned Air Force leaders about how they handled selling
low-technology aircraft purchases to Congress. Symington favored the ttaditional Air
Force bent toward fast, complex planes, and apparently did not like the service's ttend
toward obtaining the subsonic attack planes. After sarcastically remarking to GEN
McConnell that "The way things are going, pretty soon we may have a recommendation
for a plane that flies backward," he told GEN Disosway that a simple plane "just does not
interest the civilians currently making the decisions." See Congress, Senate, Hearings
before the Preparedness Investigating Subcommittee of the Committee on Armed Services,
U.S. Tactical Air Power Program. 90th Cong., 2d sess., 28 May 1968, 92-96 (first quote,
95), 112-116 (second quote, 114).
The author notes the irony of lawmakers who lambast high weapons costs but want
the best weapons. Even with many congressmen drawing the line on military spending in
the eariy 1970s, others still wanted the best for American ttoops. In 1972, F. Edward
Hebert (D-LA), chairman of the House Armed Services Committee, stated, "In war they
don't pay off for second place . . . . I intend to build the sttongest military we can get
Money's no question" (See Bright, The Jet Makers. 153). Hebert's later ouster from the
162

Congressional pressure galvanized all of the OSD and military players involved
with A-X and Cheyenne development. It spurred the Air Force to take a stand for the
A-X when the Cheyerme's threatened demise might have led the service to abandon it.
Articles touting Air Force support for the plane appeared in various defense-related
journals. In an Armed Forces Joumal article that discussed the House cut. Air Force
officials downplayed favorable reports about the OV-lO's CAS potential by saying
(correctly) that it lacked the mggedness and lethality of the A-X. Some months later, in
another Armed Forces Joumal article. Air Force leaders reminded congressional skeptics
that the A-X was the successor of the popular A-l. Both articles also appealed to the
alleged Israeli Six Day Warfightersuccess against Arab tanks to prove that the A-X's big
gun made it a valuable CAS asset in war environments where tanks were a factor. The Air
Force Association (AFA) was the service's civilian advocacy and lobbying group, and in
January 1970, its Air Force/Space Digest presented all of the salient A-X characteristics yet
given in the CFP and DCP 23-and pointedly told readers that A-X was "persuasively
cost-effective" in many ways. The service also elevated the A-X project's stature. The
A-X project office had remained stuck within the F-X Systems Project Office (SPO), and
as the Cheyenne encountered problems through 1969, Systems Command removed people
from the A-X office to work other programs. Normally, an officer of at least colonel's
rank supervised a new Air Force aircraft project, but at the time of the House's action, a
major ran A-X affairs. By April 1970, Colonel James Hildebrandt was the chief of the
newly created, and independent, A-X SPO.'^

chairmanship apparentiy had more to do with the end of the seniority system than his
defense views, as several chairmen lost their committees during the mid 1970s. Defense
procurement observer Nick Kotz believes the ensuing diffusion of power within Congress
ironically led to less defense fiscal self-discipline, as more members scrambled for defense
contracts for their constituents; see Kotz, Wild Blue Yonder. 126-127.
37i.

AF Concerned Over AX Opposition," Ml, 14-15 (A-X versus OV-10

comparisons; the OV-10, by the way, was only one-third the size and could carry only
one-fourth the load of the proposed A-X, and later, the A-10), Christie, interview by
author (asserts that A-Xs eariy progress varied directly with the Cheyennes progress);
BGEN James Frankosky, USAF, Deputy Director of Operational Requirements and
163

Colonel Hildebrandt's office remained small, but this was due to a combined OSD
and Air Force response to the congressional budget axe. Already in 1968, Dr. Foster and
Systems Command chief General Ferguson had expressed support for actual flight
competition between design prototypes, known as "fly before buy"-something not seen in
the Air Force since the 1950s. And the Deputy Secretary of Defense in President Richard
Nixon's newly formed administtation, David Packard, led the move toward some sort of
"fly before buy" competition as a means to reduce mnaway costs and developmental
fiascos. Packard's actions spurred the new Air Force Secretary, Robert Seamans, to
explore how to implement the philosophy, and on 10 October 1969, Seamans chose an
approach called parallel undocumented development. As later promulgated in DCP 23A,
the successor to DCP 23, this developmental style featured a minimally manned SPO that
monitored selected conttactors' efforts to produce a design that best met the Air Force's
specifications. DCP 23A expressed the hope that parallel undocumented development
would prevent concurrency, minimize development time, and above all, reduce cost. The
Systems Command history saw the progress toward competitive prototyping as something
intemal to OSD and the Air Force, but Seamans' choice of this austere version of
competitive prototyping occurred a few weeks after Congress' sharp fiscal rebuff.'"

Development Plans, Headquarters Air Force, "Systems Management Directive

#SMD-0-379-329A(l), 10 April 1970, supporting documents (establishes A-X SPO);
Gunston, Attack Aircraft. 250 (confirming commentary on OV-lO's CAS plane
weakness-it "lacked punch"); Mischler, 91-92 (Mischler focuses upon the project
development and few of the outside factors); Edgar Ulsamer, "AX: Lethal, Accurate, and
Cheap," Air Force/Space Digest 53 (January 1970): 33-39; and Volz, "AX vs. AH-56,"
25 (A-l comparisons). An unabashed account of the Air Force Association's fight for the
service is in a history written by one of Air Force/Space Digest's writers; see James
Straubel, Crusade for Airpower: The Storv of the Air Force Association (Washington.
D C : Aerospace Education Foundation, 1982). That it fights hard for the service's image
and interests can be seen in various historians' wounded yelps in Tom Englehardt and
Edward Linenthal, eds.. History Wars: The Battle for the Enola Gay and Other Battles for
the American Past (New York: Henry Holt and Company, 1996).
'*"AX Fighter Paved Way for Prototyping," AW&ST 94 (28 June 1972):
103-104; "Competitive Prototype Program Planned for USAF AX Aircraft," AW&ST 92
(4 May 1970): 25; Gunston, Attack Aircraft. 254-267, "Fly Two Before Deciding,"
164

Furthermore, it reflected the Air Force's doctrinally driven spending priorities, as

given by General Ryan in congressional testimony a few months later. He told the
legislators that the F-X air superiorityfighterwas the number one priority, followed by the
B-1 strategic bomber, then the Airbome Waming and Conttol System (AWACS) plane,
andfinally,the A-X. Neither the F-X, the B-l, nor the AWACS featured a prototype
flyoff in its development, even though the service procured each at the same time as the
A-X. As one observer pointed out, the contractor cost andriskinvolved in building
admittedly complex planes for a winner-take-all competition was simply too much. (There
were competitions for various components of these planes, however.) Another observer
involved with developing both the A-10 and F-15 averred that in its fervor to create the
ultimate air superiority machine, the service made the F-15 the best plane money could
buyliterally. From the start, the A-X represented something of a reaction against high
technology. It was supposed to be an updated A-l, the basic propeller plane that seemed
to disprove the need for high speed and complex fire control avionics in the CAS arena.
Given these considerations, and the Air Force's intention to preserve its CAS mandate at

Govemment Executive 2 (November 1970): 30; Mischler, 72-82; Morton Mintz, "The
Maverick Missile: If at First You Don't Succeed . . . A Case Study of Defense
Procurement Problems," The Washington Post, article series starting on 23 February 1982,
reprinted in More Bucks. Less Bang, ed. Rasor, 182; COL Peter Odgers, USAF,
"Design-to-Cost, The A-X/A-IO Experience," (Research report. Air War College, 1974),
I -5 (Odgers served on the A-X SPO during this time); David Packard, Deputy Secretary
of Defense (DEPSECDEF), "Improvement in Weapons Systems Acquisition,"
Memorandum to Secretaries of the Army, Navy, and Air Force, 31 July 1969, supporting
documents; Sprey, interview by author; Sweetman, 8; and Edgar Ulsamer, "The A-10
Approach to Close Air Support," Air Force Magazine 56 (May 1973): 41 (Ulsamer
mentions that the last prototype competition occurred between the F-105 and F-107)
Mintz gave Sprey credit for inttoducing the competitive protoype idea to Air Force
Secretary John McLucas and, apparently, the rest of the service. The sources available to
the author indicate that competitive prototyping was in the minds of other influential people
besides Mr. Sprey. Sprey himself gave Packard some credit during the author interview.
165

the same time, it is not surprising that Seamans, Ryan, and company seized upon the
low-priority, low-budget plane to reintroduce prototype competition."
At the same time that the House cancelled A-X funding, both houses of Congress
quickly seconded the Anny's move to suspend funds for the Cheyenne. But congressmen
still evinced interest in the Cheyenne, as shown by their insistence upon comparing the
A-X and the Cheyenne in order to determine the best CAS aircraft to buy. Thus, as OSD
reviewed the two programs in summer and fall 1969, it brought staffers from both services
to discuss their respective air support aircraft. Dr. Foster chaired the meetings, and in
them, the Army prioritized the types of air support it wanted from the Air Force. These
replicated the Air Force's own doctrinal priorities. In fact, the senior Army representative.
Force Development Chief of Staff (and former Army aviation advocate and leader)
General Robert Williams told Foster and company that if the Air Force really wanted to
provide CAS to the Army, it should upgrade its attack jets to accomplish night and

"Burton, Pentagon Wars. 13-19 (Air Force's headlong push for an ultra-high
technology F-X); Gunston, Attack Aircraft. 260 (source for prohibitive expense of F-X
and B-1 prototyping); Address by Grant Hansen, Assistant Secretary of the Air Force for
Research and Development, to the American Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics,
Washington, D.C, reprinted in Supplement to the Air Force Policy Letter for
Commanders #3-1973 (Washington, D C : SAFOIl, March 1973): 2-7 (source for
decision to create competitions for components of the more expensive planes); Mischler,
66-67; Neufeld, "The F-15 Eagle," 32-36, 66-68, Sprey, interview by Neufeld, 5-9, 18-19
(source for the Air Force's desire to pay dearly for the F-X); Stevenson, Pentagon Paradox.
1-50, 152-158; and Volz, "A-X vs. AH-56," 26 (report on Ryan 19 Febmary 1970
testimony to the House Appropriations Committee about priorities). Neufeld writes that
the Air Force and Packard believed that prototyping induced unacceptable costs and delays
to urgent Air Force programs, but they at least included project milestone review
procedures to prevent overmns. Neufeld and Stevenson both recount the wariness of
many govemment officials, including some congressmen, to conduct simulated air combat
between the Air Force's air superiority jet, the F-15 (what the F-X project created), and the
Navy's newfighter,the F-14. The costs and implications involved scared too many people,
and provide another example of why there was no F-X flyoff. Gregory, "Uncertainty,"
mentions that the Air Force and Navy wanted the highest performance for their fighters,
which meant serious cost inflation. He believes that competitive prototyping would have
been inelevant in cutting costs for these planes, given that money seemed to be no object
to their creators. Interestingly, Gregory only mentions the YF-16/YF-17 flyoff when
discussing "fly before buy" examples.
166

all-weather CAS. When queried about the Air Force's preferences given the demonstrated
lack of congressional fiscal support, the senior Air Force representative, Vice Chief of
Staff General John Meyer, said that he would choose air superiorityfighterprojects.'"
An Army representative at the meetings found Meyer's statement "rather
remarkable," given congressional scmtiny and the services' high-stakes competition over
this mission. But like his Chief of Staff did months later, Meyer simply voiced his service's
doctrinal priorities under the pressure of an either-or choice. Other top Air Force leaders
were only too happy to scmb the A-X, however. When the Army cancelled the Cheyenne
contract, TACs General Disosway approached the new Air Force Chief of Staff, General
John Ryan, and told him he "could get rid" of A-X. Of course, as Pierte Sprey observed,
Ryan had to protect his service'srightto the CAS mission and resisted such a precipitant
move. This was especially so with Congress threatening to enter the interservice debate
and make its own decisions. In fact, the Air Force and Army Secretaries intervened at this
time with an agreement which helped secure the A-X's future versus its rival-cum-reason
for existence, the Cheyenne."

""DDR&E, "Minutes of the Defense Acquisition Review Council (DSARC),"

(Washington, D.C: DDR&E, 31 December 1969), 1-2, supporting documents; "HASC
[House Armed Services Committee] Restores Most Senate Weapons Cuts," AFJ 107 (4
October 1969): 2; Harrison, "Gift," 38; Mischler, 66-67 (writes that the meeting between
service representatives occurred under the auspices of above-cited DSARC that the Air
Force wanted and got in fall 1969; besides asking about the A-X's night/all-weather
capabilities, the Army representatives questioned whether the Air Force could afford to
fund a dedicated CAS planes, given the service's other doctrinal commitments); and Volz,
"A-X versus AH-56," 25 (recounts congressional questioning about A-X versus
Cheyenne). Not all Army officers were ambivalent about or hostile to an Air Force CAS
plane, however. Retired Army BGEN John Bahnsen, who worked force development
issues for Army aviation in the Pentagon from 1966 through 1968, later said that he
thought one of the Army's intentions during this time was to scare the Air Force into
meeting its commitments (telephonic interview by author, 1 July 1997, recording and notes
in author's possession).
"'The Army representative was Hartison, and in "Gift," 38, he describes the details
of the meeting. Disosway quote is from Dick, Disosway. 181-182. Neufeld, Sprey.
19-20, provides insight into McConnell's and Ryan's duty to the Air Force in spite of their
subordinates.
167

"Two service secretaries entered this arena where angels should fear to tread."
Robert Seamans later wrote of his CAS aircraft agreement with Army Secretary Stanley
Resor. The agreement's primary motivation was that congressional heat about CAS aircraft
funding drove Deputy Defense Secretary David Packard in January 1970 to ask both
service secretaries to resolve their CAS aircraft differences. But the two secretaries also
independently realized that interservicerivalrythreatened to min what they believed were
two aircraft that actually complemented each other in the CAS arena. Seamans had visited
combat units in Vietnam and wanted the Air Force to build planes that could better fulfill
the service's CAS commitment to the Army. And though he believed that helicopters
provided valuable support, he felt that they were far too vulnerable to perform CAS alone.
Sources indicate that Resor needed an Air Force guarantee of support for the advanced
armed helicopter now that the Cheyenne was in trouble. Their March 1970 agreement
specified that the two aircraft's fundamental aerodynamic and design differences made
them suitable weapons for different types of air support. The Cheyenne possessed a
helicopter's flexibility in maneuver, take-off, and landing that made it better at such
operations as helicopter escort, urban CAS, and highly fluid, close-in ground combat
situations. The A-X was faster, flew further and for a longer time, and carried greater
firepower than the helicopter. (Seamans also believed it was far more mgged than a
helicopter, though this was a contentious issue and was left out of the agreement.) They
also envisioned situations where the two aircraft would work together to provide mutual
support infindingtargets, avoiding/suppressing air defenses, and providing combined fire
support. The two secretaries did not agree on everything, and one scholar criticized them
for not achieving agreements on fundamental doctrinal issues as well as aircraft suitability
for every air support task. Given the intense feelings at the time-not to mention external
pressure from Congressthis was a tall order. The secretaries may only have been able to
"agree to disagree" on some issues (such as helicopter vulnerability), but their proposal to

168

keep both programs alive was important to the CAS plane's and advanced attack
helicopter's future.'^
It also raised a firestorm of anger among uniformed subordinates in both services.
Seamans had the following recollection of his pact with Resor: "I later heard that Stan had
said, 'Bob and I must have done something right. Both of our staffs told us that we had
sold them down theriver.'"Indeed, Seamans recalled that General Ryan would not talk to
him for a few days out of fear that he "would be too emotional" if he personally spoke to
the secretary. The reason for the rancor was that advocates on both sides felt that their
respective secretaries reprieved a threat to their own service's aircraft. Intense feelings
remained, and one example was General Ryan's reply to Army Chief of Staff General
William Westmoreland's January 1970 assessment of Army CAS needs. Westmoreland
reiterated General Kinnard's assertion that the Army's air support priorities matched Air
'^Quote is from Robert Seamans, Aiming at Targets: The Autobiography of
Robert Seamans (Washington. D C : NASA History Office, 1996), 174 (quote), 175.
Other sources are Robert Seamans, telephonic interview by author, 4 June 1997, tape
recording and notes in author's possession; Davis, 22 (scholar and "agree" quote cited in
text); Futrell, Ideas, vol. II, 521-522; Goldberg and Smith, 34-35; Hanison, "Gift," 38
(certainly believes that this agreement was important for the CAS plane and advanced
armed helicopter); The Honorable Stanley Resor and the Honorable Robert Seamans,
"Systems for the Air Delivered Fire Support of Ground Forces," Memorandum for the
Secretary of Defense (Washington: Departments of the Army and the Air Force, 26
March 1970), supporting documents; and Joseph Volz, "A-X vs. AH-56," 25-26.
The above Memorandum for the Secretary of Defense is the Seamans-Resor
Agreement, and beyond the four-page letter, there are three lengthy attachments that
discuss the two aircraft and the various types of CAS as they were understood in 1970.
These attachments described the types of CAS in which each aircraft excelled, and which
types could benefit from coordinated use of both aircraft. Interestingly, Attachment 3,
"Weapons System Application-II" states that armed helicopters had a twenty- to
thirty-minute response time to ground requests (p. 8) and that many helicopter units in
Vietnam were not co-located with infantry units (Annex B, p. 2-3). This information
belied two of the Army helicopter advocates' assertions about helicopter advantages-super
quick response time because the helicopter units would live with the units they supported
Attachment 3's Annex A, pp. 1-3 also contains praise for the A-l's loiter time, which amply
enabled the planes to hold airbome and immediately respond to CAS tasking-as well as
provide sustained support-in the Vietnam Battles of Plei Me (1965), Bong Son (1966),
and Cu Phong Massif (1966). Volz' article also contains praise for the A-l and the hope
that the A-X will be a worthy successor
169

Force doctrinal preferences, and that perhaps the Air Force tactical plane designs "should
emphasize multi-mission capabilities" (italics are this author's). Ryan matched this ironic
twist by sharply reminding Westmoreland that:
We believe that only by optimizing an aircraft for close air support can
we provide the capabilities outlined in your memorandum. Our experience
has shown that a multi-mission design must sacrifice too many of the
characteristics desirable in a close air support aircraft in order to meet the
requirements of its other roles.
As the Air Force leadership expressed renewed enthusiasm for the CAS plane via joumal
articles, SPO reinforcements, inter-service agreements, andringingdeclarations on behalf
of single-mission tactical planes, the Air Force staff designers pressed forward."

Further Concept Issues

In March 1970, OSD released DCP 23A, which incorporated changes based upon
the previous DCP, outside factors, and the Army's concems expressed in the autumn
DSARC. The Air Force deferred somewhat to Dr. Foster's concems, and offered a design
specification for a slightly smaller plane than that envisioned in the CFP. The new DCP
ratified the previous document's preference for competition between prototypes, as well as
the parallel undocumented development that Secretary Seamans approved in 1969. And
though the service admitted that the A-X would needfighterescort in situations where
enemyfighterscontested air superiority, it asserted that the plane could provide CAS in all
theaters and not just Vietnam. The Air Force answered the Army's night/all-weather
capability concems by promising to study incorporating the necessary features into the
A-X. Finally, DCP 23A included provision for a jet-powered plane.44

"Futtell, Ideas, vol. II, 519-520 (quotes other officers' comments revealing the
irony of the Air Force's insistence upon a CAS plane and the Army's ambivalence about
same); Goldberg and Smith, 34-36 (Westmoreland quote, 35, and Ryan quote, 36);
Hartison, 38-39; and Seamans, Aiming. 174 (first and second quotes), 175; and Seamans,
interview by author.
"Mischler, 67-71, 79. 82-84; and Pentland, "Evolution "
170

The last two items rate further discussion. Especially in the situations where ttoops
are actively engaged, confirmation of the target is of utmost importance to the CAS pilot,
and visual identification is the surest means. The artificial means for determining the target
such as radar and infrared were not reliable-or at least required enough advance planning
and increased pilot workload to make the effort unsuitable for the fluid circumstances of
battlefield air support. Yet the Army always wanted and the Air Force searched, and
continues to search, for technology which would allow fixed-wing CAS at night and in
clouds. There was also the monetary cost involved with incorporating night/all-weather
attack technology-radar, inertial navigation systems, FLIR-into a plane which was number
four on the service's funding priority list. "An unconscionably high price," was the way
one Air Force leader put it, and if one required proof of the developmental and cost pitfalls
of incorporating night/all-weather technology, one only needed to look at the F-111 and
Cheyenne projects. The service promised to examine the possibilities, if only to mollify the
Army, butrightfullyinsisted that the A-X could at least operate in poor weather outside of
clouds, if it could not actually perform CAS in clouds. That is. Air Force leaders
emphasized that visual recognition was important to CAS. And the AX, like the A-l
before it, possessed the combination of maneuverability and slow speed to allow it to work
visually in weather poor enough to prohibit other planes from doing so."
'^Sources for night/all-weather CAS capability-difficulties in acomplishing it, the
search for it, and the A-lO's part in it, are from: MAJ Howard Barnard, USAF, "Is
Tactical Support of an Airbome Battalion Feasible in Adverse Weather?" (Master's thesis.
Arniy Command and General Staff College, 1979), 32-33, 57-59; Bell, "Close Air Support
for the Future," 34-36, 93-99 (details target acquisition difficulties that exist even in good
conditions and expresses hope-in 1992-that FLIR and night vision goggles [NVGs] will
help night CAS); Natalie Crawford, "Low Level Attacks of Armored Targets," RAND
Paper, (Santa Monica, Calif: The RAND Corporation, 1977), 11-16 (discusses high pilot
workload involved with flying against tough defenses in bad weather, especially with high
airspeeds and equipment operation tasks); GEN Wilbur Creech, USAF (ret), telephonic
interview by author, 30 March 1997, tape recording and notes in author's possession (a
former TAC commander, GEN Creech told the author that night CAS was tough to
accomplish, even with technological aids); Gunston, Attack Aircraft. 270; MGliN Fred
Haynes, USMC (ret), and COL Glenn Jones, USAF (ret), "Air Support of the 'Close-In
Battle,' Future Directions," in Air Support of the Close-in Battle: Past Lessons. Present
Doctrine. Future Directions: Proceedings of the U.S. Air Force Aerospace Power
171

The A-X would bejel powered, and this was because the technology had caught
up while the design encountered delays. Due to its excessive fuel consumption, a
traditional turbojet engine was incompatible with the designers' loiter intentions for the
A-X. This was the reason that, throughout the late 1960s, the Air Force publicized design
concepts that contained the much more fuel-efficient turboprop engines. In the meantime,
several aerospace engine companies worked on turbofans mostly as a means of breaking

Symposium, by the U.S. Air Force Air War College (MAFB, 9-10 March 1987), 110-111
(explains that none of the current night/all-weather fire conttol devices-radar or FLIR-can
differentiate enemy and friendly forces at normal weapons employment ranges); LTCOL
Robert Hinds, USAF, "Replacing the A-10," (defense analytical study. Air War College,
1989), 36-37 (observes that pilots flying the proposed A-10 replacement, the F-16, could
have problems with the plane's high speed and complex fire conttol avionics, even though
these gave pilots a potential night/all-weather CAS ability); COL Robert Ramussen, USAF,
"The A-10 in Cenfral Europe," Air University Review 30 (November-December 1978):
27-28 (states that the A-10 was designed to fly in one-thousand foot cloud ceiling and one
mile visibility weather-normal "visual flight mles" [VFR] weather is 1500 foot ceiling and
three miles visibility); V.H. Reis, "Close Air Support Systems: A First Order Analysis,"
Technical Note 1980-5, (Lexington, Mass.: Massachusetts Institute of Technology [MIT]
Lincoln Laboratory, 19 Febmary 1980), 29, 32, 35 (mentions that all aircraft must close
with the enemy to determine targets in CAS); MAJ L. Michael Ritchie, USAF,
"Technological Solutions to the Problem of Fixed-Wing Air-to-Ground Fratricide, [sic] Do
They Address the Fundamental Causes?" (Master's thesis. Army Command and General
Staff College, 1993), 102-110 (describes various technological devices for preventing CAS
friendly fire incidents in various conditions, and concludes that none of these provides a
sure-fire way of preventing target mis-identification); Richard Simpkin, Antitank: An
Airmechanized Response to Armored Threats in the 90s (Oxford: Brassey's, 1982), 209
(identifies current technology's inability to identify anything less than large vehicle
concentrations in night or bad weather; also notes that these conditions make low-level
flying tough); Pierre Sprey, interview by author (Sprey mentioned that the A-X concept
designers had European weather in mind); Sweetman, 8; and H.W. Wessely, "Limiting
Factors in Tactical Target Acquisition," RAND Paper #P-5942, (Santa Monica, Calif
The RAND Corporation, 1978), 18-21 (concludes that determining which tactical
targettank, tmck, etc.-to hit is tough even in good weather, but will be worse in bad
weather regardless of equipment used); MAJ Charles Westenhoff, USAF, "Close Air
Support: Battlefield Challenges, Strategic Opportunities," in Air Support of the Close-In
Battle: Proceedings. 59-63 (describes difficulty of visually acquiring camouflaged targets in
good weather and explains why inertial or global positioning satellite [GPS] navigation
systems do not guarantee hitting the target in bad weather; also describes heavy cockpit
task loading when attacking a well-defended CAS target).
172

into the airliner market, where fuel-efficient engines made goodfinancialsense. In a

turbofan engine, the first stage of compressor fan blades is extended beyond the engine's
diameter at the front. The outer ends of these particular blades are carefully crafted to
direct air along the external sides of the engine and produce not only extra thmst but also
air cooling of the jet's hot section. The result is greater thmst than a turboprop but less fuel
consumption than a turbojet. The Air Force A-X designers noticed two likely candidates
for their plane. In 1968, General Electric won a Navy contract to produce a turbofan, the
TF34, for an antisubmarine patrol plane, the S-3. Meanwhile, Lycoming Company rebuilt
its T55 turbojet into a turbofan engine to compete in the airline market. Both engines
seemed to have the requisite thmst and fuel specifications for the A-X, and so DCP 23A
included them as likely candidates for the A-X.'^

Initial Contract Work. Gun Development.

and More Congressional Pressure
The engine issue affected the efforts to define a contract that were underway in by
mid 1970. In May 1970, the Air Force released a Request for Proposal (RFP) to twelve
civilian contractors for aircraft constmction bids. Compared to RFPs for other aircraft, this

'^Hugh Ahmann, Interview of Lieutenant General Leroy J. Manor (Eglin AFB,

Fla.: USAF Oral History Program, 26-27 January & 9 May 1988), 93, transcript, AFHRC
Holding K239.0512-1799; Gunston, Attack Aircraft. 256; COL Edsel Field, USAF, "A-10
Test and Evaluation: A Case Sttidy," (MAFB: Air War College, 1976), 47; Mischler,
83-84; Sweetman, 28-32; and the following interviews by author: Christie, Sprey, and
Welch.
LTGEN Manor points out that the Air Force, particularly the oncoming TAC
commander GEN Momyer, wanted an all-jet tactical force because it represented
progress; Christie, COL Field, Sprey, and Welch made similar observations about the
service's predilection for jets. Sprey felt that props had certain qualities, such as fuel
efficiency and excellent power response, but conceded that turbofans won out due to
acceptable fuel efficiency and better thmst. Gunston and Welch thought the turbofan
choice was good because turboprops were more vulnerable to damage (the turbofan also
emitted a relatively low amount of heatwhat tactical aviators call a "low heat
signature"-which enables better evasion of heat-seking missiles). And though there is no
written proof of this, the decision for a turbofan may also have been due to the recent
congressional rebuff.
173

one was short and concise (just over one-hundred pages). In accordance with its parallel
undocumented development plan for the A-X, the service included DCP 23A's general
design specifications in the RFP and expected the contractors to come up with the best
design. By August 1970, the Air Force stated that it would fiirther review six of the
retumed proposals, and after a December meeting of the A-X DSARC, picked two
companies, Fairchild-Hiller Corporation and Northrop Corporation, to build prototypes
and compete in a government-run flyoff. The initial buy would be for six hundred aircraft
with a twenty-six month competitive development period and an IOC of 1975.'^
Although one might think that the conttact selection process described so far
revealed no problems with parallel undocumented development, two issues surfaced that
would later challenge the A-X's existence. First, an Air Force attempt to make this project
survivefinanciallywhile it pursued other big-ticket items, created yet one more first-time
weapons acquisition policy, design-to-cost. This policy meant that both the contractor and
the govemment would adhere to the initial staff estimates for aircraft cost-accounting for
later ciurency inflationin all developmental actions involving the plane. Failure to meet
the cost goals at various points would mean denial to proceed with the next phase. But the
decision for turbofan engines increased the cost already envisioned in the earlier design

'^Mischler, 83, 89-102, and Aeronautical Systems Division (ASD), Headquarters

U.S. Air Force, "A-X Specialized Close Air Support Aircraft, Request for Proposal,
F33657-70-R-0896, Competitive Prototype Development Program," (Wright-Patterson
AFB, Ohio: ASD, 7 May 1970), 1-2, supporting documents. The twelve companies were
Beech Aircraft Corporation, The Boeing Company, Cessna Aircraft Company, Fairchild
Hiller Corporation, General Dynamics Corporation, Grumman Aerospace Corporation,
Lockheed Aircraft Corporation, McDonnell Douglas Corporation, North American
Rockwell Corporation, Northrop Corporation, LTV Aerospce Corporation, and Textron,
Incorporated. Fairchild-Hiller, Boeing, Northrop, Cessna, General Dynamics, and
Lockheed were the six semi-finalists. Pierre Sprey, in interview by author, placed great
emphasis upon the RFP as the decisive document in the A-lO's development. He believes
that this is where most of the battles over the plane's design concept occurted. However,
though Mischler mentions that TAC made an apparently desperate attempt during RFP
formulation to replace the design with one resembling the F-5, evidence indicates that the
key conceptual decisions occurred in previous documents such as the CFP and DCP, and
that the RFP mostly ratified them Additionally, Mischler descnbes an RFP constmction
process that took weeks and occurted at the highest levels of Air Force leadership.
174

studies, and in the RFP the service had to revise the cost per plane from 1.2 million dollars
to 1.4 million dollars in Fiscal Year 1970 dollars. It was to the service's credit that it at
least picked engines already under development for other uses ("off the shelf," in
govemment parlance). However, it was still the kind of thing that irritated a skeptical
Congress only too willing to hold the service to itsfinancialpromise.'"
The second issue involved the A-X's gun. In June 1970, as the service worked
contractural issues for the plane, it also sent to DDR&E its DCP 103, which concerned
gun design. DCP 103 specifically directed that the proposed 30mm gun be built only for
the A-X, which meant that the service effectively abandoned its original intent to adapt it to
other attack planes as well. This wedded the plane and its gun in fortune as well as in fact,
something mutually guaranteed by the A-X RFP's demand that the plane meet not only
cost-effectiveness goals but also weapons-effectiveness goals. The marriage of economy
and effectiveness would be tricky, for DCP 103 demanded that the gun be effective against
Soviet T-55 tanks (at that time the most prevalent model), and asked that designers
determine and use the best shell. DCP 103 also confirmed a previous DDR&E
recommendation that gun selection be based upon competition between the best two

'"Brown, Flying Blind. 332 (cites C-5 and F-111 cost overmns as catalysts); MAJ
Roger Carieton, USAF, "The A-10 Design-to-Cost: How Well Did It Work?" (Fort
Leavenworth, Kans.: U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, 1979), 3 (cites
cost overmns with the C-5 and F-111 programs as another design-to-cost motivating
factor, but observes that the F-X project observed no such restriction); Mischler, 98; Field,
"A-10 Test," 49 (also cites C-5 and F-111 cost problems as an influence); COL Peter
Odgers, USAF, "Design-to-Cost: The A-X/A-10 Experience," (Research report. Air War
College, 1974), 1-5; and Wilson, "Fairchild A-10," Flight International. 708. In 1970,
COL Odgers was then a major serving as Chief of Test and Development in the A-X SPO;
see COL James Hildebrandt, USAF, "Program History, 1 January 1970 to 30 June 1970,
A-X Specialized Close Air Support Aircraft," (Wright-Patterson AFB, Ohio:
Headquarters, Aeronautical Systems Division, 27 October 1970), 3 (COL Hildebrandt's
report also notes that the General Accounting Office [GAO] was already investigating the
A-X project).
175

prototypes, a move that ultimately would help ensure that the economy and weapons
"martiage" worked."
The marriage had to work. Though Congress let the Air Force continue with A-X
competitive prototyping, it further questioned the need for the CAS plane, given budget
constraints and the existence of other aircraft that also flew CAS. Throughout early 1970,
the House Appropriations Committee pressed OSD and the Air Force to justify the push
for several planes to do the same mission. Febmary hearings featured questions about why
the OV-10 or Cheyenne could not be used instead. Secretary Seamans and General Ryan
repeated findings in the A-X's developmental documents that the A-X far surpassed the
OV-10 in loiter capability, weapons carriage capacity, and survivability. Conceming the
Cheyerme, the Air Force leaders stated that the A-X could cany more weapons, and was
faster, more survivable, and almost as maneuverable. Additionally, they asserted their
service's right to fly CAS per past interservice agreements. In April 1970, the House
Appropriations Committee Chairman, Representative George Mahon (D-TX), pointedly
asked Dr. Foster if it was "essential" to support both A-X and Cheyenne, "in view of the
fiscal problems which appear to be ahead." Foster replied that the choice was still
undetermined, since neither machine was fully developed enough to make comparisons.
Mahon also specifically asked Foster why the A-7 could not be used, and Foster replied
that modifying it to fly the CAS mission like the A-X was too difficult Additionally, the
A-7 lacked the A-X's ability to fly in marginal weather. Though favorable to defense
needs, Mahon was a fiscal conservative. He also was from Texas, the home state of

"McMullen, interview by author; Mischler, 98; Odgers, 6; and Wall, "GAU-8/A, "
3-9. Both McMullen and Wall note that competitive conttacting also pertained to the
ammunition. This idea'stimingassumes importance later when the issue of credit for it
arises. Wall also notes the other types of gun and ammunition rejected at this time: liquid
propellant rounds (too expensive and unproven), sabot rounds (such as those used by
tanks, but sabots pieces created an ingestion damage hazard for jet engines), and the Swiss
Oerlikon cannon (not as reliable, and low firing rate) The latter weapon figures in the
later history of gun development
176

Ling-Temco-Vought (LTV), the A-7's maker. His questions on the A-7's behalf
foreshadowed the partisan politics that would affect the A-X's later development. 50
As if there were not enough attack planes already, the Marines wanted to buy a jet
that they felt was optimum for their warfighting environment, the British Hawker-Siddely
AV-8A Harrier. Since 1969, the Marines had conducted their own bureaucratic
insurgency by procuring a small number of these first-ever vertical/short-takeoff-and-land
(V/STOL) tactical jets, ostensibly for evaluation. They had considered buying Cheyennes
for their CAS needs, but the Cheyenne's complexity and escalating cost scared them away.
Though the Harrier cost roughly the same as a Cheyenne, it was an already developed
design. It also possessed not only the Cheyenne's vertical-take-off-and-land (VTOL)
capability, albeit with serious weapons carriage and loiter penalties, but it was also a tactical
jet. As such, the plane fit their needs for a jet providingfirepowerand some aerial
protection during amphibious operations that often offered only carrier decks and very
short fields for flight operations. By 1970, they caught Congress' attention due to their

^"Congress, House, Hearings Before a Subcommittee of the Committee on

Appropriations, Department of Defense Appropriations. Part 1. 91st Cong., 2d sess., 19
Febmary 1970, 554,636-640 (questions for Ryan and Seamans); Congress, House,
Hearings before a Subcommittee of the Committee on Appropriations, Department of
Defense Appropriations for 1971. Part 6. 91st Cong.. 2d sess.. 27 April 1970, 101-103
(Mahon questions Foster); Congress, Senate, Department of Defense Appropriations. Part
4,4 May 1970,41 (Seamans' statement before the committee emphasizes A-X simplicity),
"Mahon Rites Friday," Midland Reporter Telegram. 20 November 1985, 1 A, 2A (headline
article from the Southwest Collections Archive at Texas Tech University claims that though
Mahon was a "champion of strong defense," he also had a "passion for pay-as-you-go
govemment" [2A]); Volz, "AX vs. AH-56," 25 (Volz is cited often in this chapter, but
spring 1970 congressional skepticism and the recent Seamans-Resor Agreement are his big
topics). The defense news media started to cover the CAS aircraft issue by this time, as
some of the articles cited so far indicate. AFJ writer Brooke Nihart's short account of CAS
doctrinal and interservice problems foimd the history to beratherintractable and sordid,
with the Air Force mostiy at fault; see Nihart, "Sixty Years of Unresolved Problems,"
Arnied Forces Joumal (25 Apnl 1970): 19-24
177

suddenly stated intent to buy many more Harriers, as well as the fact that the planes were
foreign built. ^'
The Marine move was the last straw for Congress. As one Marine staffer close to
the issue later commented, this was not a good time to bring a new plane into the Marine
Corps. Congress' own commentary on its Fiscal Year 1971 budget intoned, "There is a
serious question as to whether or not future Defense budgets can support the development
and/or procurement of three separate aircraft weapons systems . . . to perform essentially
the same mission." The Senate Armed Services Committee supported the House
committee in the same report, condemning the services for a history of "parochialism"
conceming the close air support mission. In spite of its own complaints. Congress allowed
Fairchild and Northrop to continue their work on CAS plane competitors; the legislators at
least liked the idea of a low-cost plane developed from head-to-head competition between
contractors. However, in October 1970, the House Appropriations Committee directed
OSD to "reevaluate the roles and missions and aircraft relative to close air support," and
determine which of these planes was most suitable. The Air Force CAS plane's fate now
lay with OSD and Congress."

"Bergerson, 125; LTCOL JR. Braddon, "What Every Marine Should Know
About Harrier," Marine Corps Gazette 55 (May 1971): 20-24; Gunston, Attack Aircraft.
96-99; GAO, Close Air Support: Principal Issues and Aircraft Choices. 19-21, 23, 26, 28
(cites Marine motivations for Harrier versus Cheyenne, and gives comparable costs for
both machines); Goldberg and Smith, "Army-Air Force Relations," 36-37; and Bill
Gunston, "Harrier," chap, in The Great Book of Modem Warplanes. Ray Bonds, and
others, eds. (New York: Salamander Books, 1987), 349-351.
"Congress, Senate, Report of the Special Subcommittee on Close Air Support of
the Preparedness Investigating Subcommittee of the Committee on Armed Services, Close
Air Support. 92d Cong., 1st sess., 1; and GAO, Close Air Support: Principal Issues and
Aircraft Choices, are the primary sources for Congress' concern and directives in this
matter (GAO, 6, contains the quotes in this paragraph). The Marine staffer was COL
Noah New, who worked Marine air issues in the Pentagon and later appeared at the 1971
Senate close air support hearings; see New, "Perspectives of Close Air Support," Marine
Corps Gazette 57 (May 1973): 14. Other sources provide curtent defense press
assessment as well as the concern expressed within the Air Force about keeping the A-X's
cost low so as to keep it alive; see "Close Air Support Cheyenne vs Harrier vs. A-X?"
AFJ 108 (19 October 1970): 41 (Mahon's committee expresses senous doubt about
178

Thus, the influences deciding the CAS plane's existence and development were
changing. It was bom from a convergence of factors; the most prominent of which was a
CAS machine that the Army built, the Cheyenne. The Air Force's ensuing effort to build
the plane moved haltingly due to intemal opposition, differing conceptions of the ideal
CAS plane, the Cheyerme's mixed fortunes, and higher Air Force procurement priorities.
New threats to the plane and to the Air Force's traditional claim on the CAS mission
renewed the service's interest and sense of urgency. The result was a design that
emphasized the qualities required for successfully conducting CAS. It would need these
features, for though the plane faced a variety of challenges throughout its development and
existence, the ones arising in the early 1970s took the form of direct trials.

supporting three aircraft for the same mission, and also scoffs at the 1.4 million dollar per
plane A-X estimate as too low. Furthermore, some Pentagon officials believe that the A-X
would never survive comparison with the A-7.); "Fly Two Before Deciding," 30 (describes
the A-X's competitive prototype plan, and that Congress voted to authorize the approach,
and still describes the A-X as a turboprop); Ludvigsen, "Up From the Ground or Down
From the Sky?" 50 (Mahon's committee wanted an OSD study group); E.J. Nucci,
Executive Secretary, DDR&E, "Minutes, DSARC Review, AX Aircraft Program,"
(Washington, D C : DDR&E, 17 December 1970), 2, supporting documents (COL
Hildebrandt tells the DSARC that unless the service meets the 1.4 million dollar per plane
figure, the plane might not survive); and Benjamin Schemmer, "Packard Personally Heads
New Group to Resolve Inter-Service Close Air Support," Ml 108(15 March 1971): 15
(cites September 1970 House Appropriations Committee memo to Defense Secretary
Melvin Laird, as well as FY 1971 budget report isued in October 1970, as sources for
congressional waming; also points out that the A-X program was the only one of the three
CAS aircraft programs that Congress did not enact budget cuts for FY 1971)
179

CHAPTER VI
TRIALS, 1971-1974

In early 1971, OSD faced a daunting task. Congress wanted it to study the three
different attack aircraft sponsored by the Air Force, Army, and Marines, and then pick one
to serve for all. This action threatened to escalate an already simmering interservice fight
over CAS. Aware of congressional budget scmtiny and the fact that action in Vietnam
could not provide only combat but also procurement success, the Army and Air Force
were already arguing over the nature and implications of Army helicopter losses in a recent
Vietnam War operation. Lam Son 719. Deputy Secretary of Defense David Packard led
the OSD study, and faced these problems as well as differing service warfighting views,
aircraft, and approaches to CAS. Overwhelmed by all of the details, requirements, and
ramifications, his report preserved interservice peace and recognized American military
realities by reporting that each service needed its respective plane. The Senate expressed
dissatisfaction with Packard's inconclusive report and conducted its own hearings to
determine the best machine. It fared no better than Packard and company, as parochial
political and military interests among the senators led them to advocate the various
candidates no less than the services they criticized. Also, they admitted that the services
had legitimate differences that pertained to the wide spectmm of war that the United
States, as a superpower, might encounter.
However, they did not completely let the services off the hook. In their final
report, they directed that the A-X flyoff winner then participate in a flyoff competition
against the A-7, which had done good CAS work in Vietnam. There might have been a
flyoff between the Air Force CAS candidate and the Anny's Cheyenne helicopter, but the
Cheyenne project finally died due to cost overmns and developmental difficulties.
In the meantime, Fairchild-Republic and Northrop built their CAS plane
candidates, and in late 1972, conducted their flyoff competition. The A-10 beat the A-9
because it handled better, and also was more maintainable and mgged The A-IO's victory
was not due to political influence, as some observers later claimed

180

Congress did not forget about its directive for an A-X versus A-7 flyoff, and in late
summer 1973, it cut A-10 funding until the Air Force set up the competition. Texas
congressmen were particularly interested in the flyoff because the A-7 was built in their
state. Further, the test gained special urgency after the 1973 Arab-Israeli War, known to
history as the "October War," or "Yom Kippur War " High Israeli Air Force (lAF) losses
on CAS missions led many observers to declare the demise of tactical air support,
particularly when flown by slow planes like the A-10. In spring 1974, the Air Force
conducted the flyoff, and the A-10 again emerged the winner.
Though the Air Force scmpulously ensured no bias among the pilots flying the two
planes-after all, the New York congressional delegation also scmtinized the competition
on behalf of its constituent, Fairchild-Republic-the premise for the flyoff favored the
A-10. With America's long involvement in Vietnam now over, the theater demanding the
most attention from the American military was Europe, where NATO faced overwhelming
Warsaw Pact forces. The U.S. Army had no advanced attack helicopter to help its ground
forces handle the Soviet tank hordes in a European war, and now looked more favorably
upon the A-10. Further, in 1974 Defense Secretary James Schlesinger secured further
official Air Force enthusiasm for the CAS plane. He supported the service's desire for
more tactical units to face the Soviet threat in return for the service's support for lower cost
planes such as the A-IO and the F-16. This situation, along with the attitudes of the
respective service leaders, contributed to a new era of cooperation between the Air Force
and the Army. As such, the Air Force designed the A-10 versus A-7 flyoff to highlight the
A-lO's ability to fly in Europe'sfrequentlymarginal weather, while emphasizing the A-7's
weakness in same.
Thus the Air Force CAS plane passed these trials. These confrontational affairs
featured competition against competing CAS aircraft and concepts. If nothing else, one
could say that the plane so far had stood up to the best its opponents could throw at it.

81

OSD Attempts to Answer Congress

Against a Backdrop of Bureaucratic and Real Combat
In late 1970, OSD responded to Congress' call for a study of the various services'
CAS aircraft proposals. Congress dismissed the answer as too "perfunctory," according to
one account. And so, on 26 February 1971, Deputy Defense Secretary David Packard
directed a full study of CAS roles-and-missions differences between the services as they
pertained to choosing a CAS plane. Besides Congress' rebuff, another reason for Packard's
directive may have been that events in Vietnam threatened to escalate the CAS plane issue
into another public interservice fight.'
In eariy Febmary, a South Vietnamese Army incursion into Laos, Operation Lam
Son 719, stalled and then tumed into a rout. The Americans wanted to interdict North
Vietnamese supply lines and bases existing just outside the Vietnamese border, just as they
did the previous year in the Cambodia invasion. Specifically, the targets for this excursion
would be the famous "Ho Chi Minh Trail" and supply depots around Tchepone, Laos.
But in this case, only the South Vietnamese Army entered Laos. President Nixon wished
to prove the success of his Vietnamization policy, and after the 1970 Cambodian
operation, an angry Congress forbade American ground forces to enter neighboring
countries. Thus, only American aircraft participated in Lam Son 719, and though the
South Vietnamese Army's poor showing stirted national media debate about
Vietnamization, the air combat results excited the lesser-known CAS debate.^
U.S. Army helicopters supporting the South Vietnamese encountered far tougher
anti-aircraft defensesradar-controlled AAA in some instances-than they had seen before,
and their normal tactic of flying low over the ground (two thousand feet or less) made

'Schemmer, "Packard Personally Heads New Group," 29.

^Glen Gendzel, "Lam Son 719," in Encyclopedia of the Vietnam War, ed. Stanley
Cutler, (New York: Charies Scribner's Sons, 1996), 276; and Keith Nolan, Into Laos:
The Story of Dewev Canvon II/Lam Son 719; Vietnam 1971 (Novato, Calif: Presidio
Press, 1986), 359-360. Vietnamization was Nixon's program allowing/making the South
Vietnamese assume a greater share of military responsibility as American troops departed,
see Stanley Kamow, Vietnam. A History (New York: Fhe Viking Press, 1983), 629.
182

them easy targets for communist gunners. Additionally, South Vietnamese soldiers at the
landing zones seemed more intent upon boarding the helicopters and leaving Laos than in
providing suppression fire for the helicopters as they approached. The actual helicopter
casualty counts were, and remain, in dispute. Army helicopter advocates mostly tried to
downplay or revise the implications of Lam Son conceming helicopter survivability against
antiaircraft defenses. They pointed out that, after some initial surprises, they changed
altitudes and flight routes to avoid further losses. That service also claimed that helicopters
enjoyed a key advantage over fixed-wing planes in that a stricken helicopter could
autorotate to the ground and be retrieved later (an autorotation occurs when a helicopter
pilot with a failed engine modulates the main rotor blades' pitch for a conttollable descent).
Thus, the Army people asserted that such an aircraft was not "lost" if it could be retrieved
and repaired.'
Air Force leaders and other critics countered that Army commanders often claimed
wreckage as a retrieved helicopter, and accused the Army of doctoring the loss figures
(there were some Army observers who then and later conceded serious losses, albeit
quietly). The service quickly seized upon the Lam Son results as proof of fixed-wing
mggedness versus rotary-winged weakness. One day before Lam Son officially ended, the

'An early pro-helicopter account is George Weiss, "CO [Commanding Officer]

2/17 AirCav: 'Gunships Took Tanks, Survived Flak'in Laos," AFI 109(19 April 1971):
22-23. It covers Army AH-1 Cobra squadron commander LTCOL Robert Molinelli as he
led his attack ships in Lam Son. Molinelli said that his machines initially took some losses,
but adjusted their tacticsspecifically, they raised their altitudes to avoid small arms fire
and chose routes that avoided more serious threats. Weiss writes that Molinelli was "the
foremost military advocate of the armed helicopter." Molinelli previously had commanded
the Army's Cheyenne test unit; see Hessman, "Into the Inventory," AFJ. 11. A later
pro-helicopter account is John Everett-Heath, Helicopters in Combat: The First Fifty
Years (Poole, Dorsett, U.K.: Arms and Armour, 1992), 100-102, which concedes the
official Army 15 percent loss rate (107 shot down and 600 damaged, some beyond repair);
but counters that most of these werettansportsand that the helicopter men adjusted tactics
as necessary. He concludes that "the helicopter proved itself in a particularly hostile
environment" (101). James Bradin does not even mention Lam Son in his Army aviation
history. From Hot Air to Hellfire. Frederic Bergerson, in The Armv Gets an Air Force.
123, writes that the lossfiguresare in dispute, but focuses upon the Air Force's immediate
charges of helicopter vulnerability.
183

Air Force completed a CHECO history of the battle, criticizing Army helicopter
vulnerability while praisingfixed-wingjets for destroying communist tanks (the North
Vietnamese were starting to introduce these into the war) and providing what anti-aircraft
suppression there was. The Air Force argument was that though helicopters might survive
against weak air defenses, they would not do so in the tough European environment upon
which the military increasingly lavished attention as the Vietnam War de-escalated.'
'Robert Seamans describes Air Force suspicions of Army loss rate counts, writing
that "the Army kept helicopters in their operational inventory if they could retrieve any
identifiable part of the aircraft"; see Seamans, Aiming at Targets. 174 (he reiterated this
point in his author interview). LTGEN Marvin McNickle, who commanded both
Thirteenth and Seventh Air Forces (the latter unofficially for a short period after its
commander, GEN John Lavelle, was relieved) in Southeast Asia, made a similar
observation; see Ahmarm, McNickle. 93-94 Keith Nolan, in Into Laos. 358, also
mentions the retrievability policy and thus accuses the Army of "gerrymandering" its Lam
Son helicopter loss figures. He also infers that the losses were higher than the official
estimate. Of course, COL J.F. Loye, USAF, and others, in the U.S. Air Force Project
CHECO "Lam Son 719, 30 January-24 March 1971: The South Vietnamese Incursion
Into Laos," (Hickam AFB, Hawaii: HQ PACAF, 24 March 1971), xii-xvii, 104-115,
criticizes Army helicopters while praising its ownfixed-wingtactical planes. Air Force
historians Earl Tilford, in Setup. 201; and Kenneth Werrell, in Archie. Flak. AAA, and
SAM. 112-114, both highlight the helicopters' Lam Son difficulties, and also assert that the
Army hid its tme Lam Son losses. A hyperbolic description of helicopter misfortunes is in
military reformist reporter Gregg Easterbrook's "All Aboard Air Oblivion," Washington
Monthly (September 1981), reprinted in More Bucks. Less Bang, ed. Rasor, 57-60 (page
reference to reprint).
Finally, some Army sources indicate that Lam Son was a tough time for their
helicopters. ETC Rick Johnson, USA, was a helicopter veteran of Lam Son 719 (as of
March 1997, he was Director of Plans, Training, Mobility and Security at the Army
Aviation Center, FT Rucker, AL), and said that his unit suffered 30 percent losses when
one accounted for outtight shootdowns and retrieved wrecks. However, he added that the
battle was a learning experience for the helicopter pilots, and they successfully adjusted
their altitudes and ingress routes to minimize further losses; Johnson, telephonic interview
by author, 14 March 1971, notes in author's possession. The papers of the 101st Airbome
Division Chief of Staff at the time, COL Donald Seibert, USA, at Cariisle Bartacks, AMHI
(the lOlst's helicopters flew at Lam Son) reveal Lam Son-driven doubt about a helicopter's
ability to survive heavy air defenses unaided (actually, he regards Lam Son as a medium
intensity air defense environment). He praises tactics adjustments that reduced further
losses, such as altitude changes, changed ingress routes, and faster landing zone
approaches; but states that the helicopters need better threat suppression, which includes
tactical plane support. He does not believe that helicopters can be thrown into any battle
184

Perhaps due to a combination of Lam Son and the upcoming OSD review, in
March 1971 the Army unilaterally, and thus rather impertinently, rescinded a Department
of Defense (DoD) policy statement. This was the 1956 DoD Directive 5160.22, which
had denied the Anny and reserved to the Air Force therightto conduct CAS. The stage
was set for another public brawl between the services over a mission as well as the funding
and resources that went with it. It was afightthat senior leaders in all of the services did
not want. There were distant memories of the 1949 Admiral's Revolt, and more recent
memories of a bureaucratic fight during the height of the 1968 Tet Offensive. During that
desperate battle. Generals Westmoreland and Momyer fought Marine commanders over
placing Marine tactical air units under control of a central air commander, who was the Air
Force General Momyer. The fight waxed so intense that Westmoreland considered
resigning over it, and not over the real battle which caused so much consternation among
Americans at home! This fear, and Packard's inclusion of senior officers from the affected
services-Army aviation leader General Robert Williams, TAC commander General
William Momyer, Marine air leader Major General Homer Hillled to greater cooperation
in the study.'

without prior tactical plarming, and praises the success of combinedfixed-wingand

helicopter operations in Lam Son. The specific papers are Memo for Record, "Ainnobile
Operations in Support of Operation Lam Son 719," 20 March 1971, and "The Regulars,"
(Seibert's unpublished autobiography, 1988 revision), 1056-1058.
'The Packard study group's composition is from Congress, Senate Hearings, Close
Air Support. Appendix A, 413. The formal name for Packard's study group was the Close
Air Support Review Group. The other members were Dr. John Foster, DDR&E,
Gardiner Tucker, Assistant Defense Secretary for Systems Analysis, and Navy VADM
John Heinel. The fight over a single manager of tactical air support during the Tet
Offensive is worthy of a Ph.D. dissertation, or at least a Master's thesis. A few summaries
of the incident are in Futrell, Ideas, vol, II, 283-284; Johnson and Winnefield, Joint Air
Operations. 70-73; Mrozek, 82; and Sbrega, 456-464. The Army's revocation of DoD
5160.22 is from Bergerson, 129-130, 137; David Packard testimony in Congress, Senate
Hearings, Close Air Support. 22 October 1971, 12-13; and Goldberg and Smith, 37.
Bergerson's account and Packard's testimony indicate that the Army was merely
shedding the old regulations and agreements due to the upcoming OSD study Also,
Bergerson writes that Army leaders at this time forbade their attack helicopter aviators to
use the term "close air support" and even the cosmetic term "direct support" to descnbe
185

Packard's study group was supposed to resolve service roles and missions as they
pertained to CAS and CAS aircraft choices. This was an exceedingly tall order. The Air
Force and Army Secretaries, as well as OSD's Weapons System Evaluation Group
(WSEG), had already dodged the issue. And the previously mentioned Army Command
and General Staff College research study completed during this period showed that officers
within the various services could not agree upon the precise nature of the mission.
Packard's group initially was game for the task, but even the study questions that they
allowed the defense publication Armed Forces Journal to publish proved how daunting it
really was. Covering nearly three pages, the questions cited in the article involved four
different warfighting environments: Lam Son 719 (which included questions about what
really happened to helicopters andfixed-wingplanes there), defense against a Soviet attack
in Europe, a Middle Eastern war, and a Korean war. From these premises, the questions
addressed the three aircraft's specific capabilities, how they would fare against various
threats in these warfighting environments, and the tactics and weapons they would use in
these environments. Additionally, the questions addressed more meaty issues, such as how
the various services conducted CAS in the different environments and how CAS was
supposed to support the overall campaign. Finally, the questions required from the various
services some indication of how they would use the other services' machine if their own
craft were not approved.^
The result was predictable, and the body of the ensuing report revealed the
problems Packard faced. In addition to the four theaters and dozens of specific questions,
the study group identified six different CAS submissions and eleven different types of CAS
targets, each of which invited creation of an aircraft optimally designed for one or a

what they did for ground ttoops. Bergerson thinks this was the Army's attempt to avoid
any appearance of interservice competition on the eve of the Senate Close Air Support
Hearings; however, the cancellation's timing is still curious.
^Congress, Senate Hearings, Close Air Support. Appendix A (the Packard study
group's report); and Bmce Nihart, "Packard Review Group: Roles and Missions to
Remain Untouched, Aircraft Systems to Be Scmtinized," Ml 109 (19 Apnl 1971): 20,
39-40.
186

combination of several. The group also established twelve characteristics and key
competitive factors, each of which presented its own interpretational problems.
"Payload," for example, could befree-fallingbombs, which all helicopters-including even
Cheyenne-had great difficulty delivering. Or it could be guided missiles such as the
Maverick or TOW (Tube-launched, Optically aimed. Wire-guided anti-tank missile), which
presented their own problems with target acquisition and guidance. "Responsiveness"
could mean aircraft speed, which enabled a quicker trip to the battlefield. It could mean
V/STOL characteristics, which allowed forward basing, and thus overlapped into the
"Basing Flexibility" factor. Or it could mean simplicity of operation, which allowed more
sorties over time, which in tum overlapped into the "Utilization Rate" factor. Packard
considered the simply constmcted A-X the most responsive plane, for though the
Cheyenne and Harrier possessed more basing flexibility with their V/STOL characteristics,
they also were complex machines requiring more maintenance attention. Finally,
Packard's group attempted a computer analysis of the machines' performance against a
defended CAS target. The variables were so complicated that the group accepted a
scenario featuring a lone aircraft attacking a single target with only one antiaircraft weapon
defending it-a situation that the report admitted allowed no realistic conclusions.^
Thus, Packard's report dispensed with the question of which service should provide
CAS because, not surprisingly, "Close air support is a complex mission" (italics in the
original document). Indeed, the report stated that analyzing the relative merits of the three
aircraft-not to mention those of other already operational attack aircraft-was task enough.
It concluded that the A-X, Cheyenne, and Harrier should all be developed because each
promised to deliver to its respective service unprecedented air support capability in ways
specific to each service's needs. TTie A-X could operate from short fields nearer to ground
forces than other Air Force jets; and its mggedness,firepower,and loiter ability ensured

^Congress, Senate Hearings, Close Air Support. Appendix A, 418-426, 431-36;

Fredericksen, interview by author; and Pierte Sprey, interview by author. Fredericksen
was responsible for land warfare and CAS issues in DDR&E at the time, and participated
in writing the report. Though he and other staffers leaned toward the A-X, he recalled that
the conclusion basically stated that the three aircraft "do different kinds of things"
187

that the Air Force provided heavy, sustainedfirepowersupport to the Army. Operating
day or night in most weather conditions, the Cheyenne would be the most mobile and
versatile direct fire support vehicle Army units had ever possessed. The Harrier well met
the Marines' requirement for a tactical jet that could closely follow their amphibious
operations. Likewise, each aircraft could not duplicate the other's sttengths, designed as it
was to maximize its own. The Cheyenne could operate in weather poor enough to ground
an A-X, but the Cheyerme lacked the A-X's firepower, mggedness, and loiter-and its
complexity was a serious liability. The Harrier's V/STOL capability commanded a stiff
price in weapons carriage capacity and loiter capability. Packard qualified his support for
the three aircraft by requiring them to meet their cost and effectiveness goals. He also
wanted flight tests of the fully developed A-X and Cheyenne to resolve any questions
about specific strengths and weaknesses."
Overall, the service representatives concurtcd with Packard, since he granted their
respective aircraft a reprieve and averted interservice war. But as if to punctuate how
strongly they believed that their particular machine fulfilled its service's specific air support
mission, they filed addenda disputing certain of even these benign conclusions. General
Momyer wanted only the A-X to be approved, since CAS was an Air Force mission and
the A-X was the optimum plane. General Williams discounted the report's skepticism
about the helicopter's ability to acquire targets versusfixed-wingplanes. And the Marine
Corps Commandant himself. General Leonard F. Chapman, Jr., insisted that the Marines
could support Harrier units in the field, no matter how austere the surtoundings.'

"Congress, Senate Hearings, Close Air Support. Appendix A, 409-411.

Apparently, determination of Lam Son helicopter lossrateswas too much for the group,
for the report does not even mention it. For the Harrier's performance penalties in
exchange for V/STOL capability, see also Futrell. Ideas, vol. II, 520-521; and Ahmann,
McNickle. 173.
'Congress, Senate Hearings, Close Air Support. Appendix A, 411-413.
188

The Senate Tries to Solve the CAS Riddle

One could say, and at least one observer has intimated, that Packard and the
generals intentionally created a report supporting thefindingsthey wanted. The study's
ultra-complex premises precluded a clear determination of which service would assume
primary responsibility for the CAS mission and its attendant resources. It thus avoided a
messy interservice fight with an unsatisfactory ending for all concerned, and instead
allowed the services to continue their programs.'"
The Packard group submitted its report in June 1971 as intended, but neither its
conclusions nor its timing allayed the legislators' suspicions. Besides George Mahon and
his House Appropriations Committee, the Senate Armed Services Committee also
questioned the military about the issue throughout 1970. In March 1971, that committee's
chairman. Senator John Steimis (D-MS), charged his Tactical Air Power Subcommittee to
conduct hearings on the matter. Subcommittee Chairman Howard Cannon (D-NV),
seemed confident that his committee members could resolve such matters, if the military
was unable: "I feel reasonably certain in my own mind that when it gets down to the wire
we are not going to be able to have a Cheyenne, an A-X, an A-7, a Harrier, and all of
these other weapons . . . simply from an economic standpoint.""

'"Bergerson, 125-126, is the observer, and believes that Packard's study signified
the Army helicopter men's transition from intraservice politics to big-time interservice
allocation politics. Goldberg and Smith, 36-39, directly state that Packard and the generals
were loath to start another interservice conflict.
"Congress, Senate Hearings, Close Air Support. 104 (Cannon quote. Senators
Barry Goldwater [R-AZ] and Stuart Symington [D-MO] made similar comments as
Cannon in the hearings; see 32-33, 58-59, and 276); and Congress, Senate, Report of the
Special Subcommittee on Close Air Support of the Preparedness Investigating
Subcommittee of the Committee on Armed Seryices, Close Air Support. 92d Cong., 1st
sess , 18 April 1972, I (states reasons for calling the hearings). The Senate Armed
Services Committee's previous interest in the issue isfromGAO, Close Air Support:
Principal Issues and Aircraft Choices. 5-6 (committee's commentary on the FY 1971
budget); letter from David Packard to John Stennis, 11 September 1970; and letter from
David Packard to Howard Cannon, 13 May 1970, AFHRC, MAFB; both letters AFHRC
Holding K 168.7094-38, 39. Packard's letters are his response to congressional queries and
actions conceming the CAS aircraft, and contain his assertion that they are complementary
189

They should have known better. As Packard called for his study. Congress tasked
the Govemment Accounting Office (GAO) to examine the mission and the aircraft that
flew it. The GAO did not formally publish its report until after the hearings, and though its
findings criticized the services' inability to create joint doctrine, it gave the impression that
the mission's complexity and demands intimidated it as much as it did Packard and the
generals. It even-handedly listed the sttengths and weaknesses of the various candidates,
and unintentionally made the military's point that the machines met certain needs. It also
detailed the issues which made the mission so hard to address, and asked for better
weapons testing to answer the tricky questions that they raised. '^

and not competitive.

'^GAO, Close Air Support: Principal Issues and Aircraft Choices, passim. The
report's Appendices I and II (53-60) contain a short history of CAS mostly detailing the Air
Force's neglect of it. Besides the GAO report, the early-1970s CAS plane conttoversy
spurted other official reports whose histories became valuable sources for this work. Some
of these are Air Force COL Robert Buhrow's Army War College study, "Close Air
Support Requirements: A Study of Interservice Rivalry"; Goldberg and Smith's RAND
study, "Army-Air Force Relations: The Close Air Support Issue"; and MAJ Charles
Kirkpatrick's Army Center for Military History Analysis, "The Army and the A-10: The
Anny's Role in Developing Close Air Support Aircraft, 1961-1971."
Buhrow wants better interservice coordination on missions like CAS (39-52).
Goldberg and Smith see the 1971 conttoversy as a confluence of technological advance
(helicopters), America's evolving world strategy (fighting conventional wars and not
nuclear ones), and simmering interservicerivalriesthat are normally resolved in nartow
terms instead ofriskieroverall terms (which allows avoidance of an "Admirals' Revolt"
repeat). They believe that the Air Force at least appeared dilatory about serving Army
needs; and that the Air Force in tum believed that the Army deliberately agreed to Air
Force doctrinal preferences in order to create an aircraft "void" for Army helicopters to fill.
Only by showing a keen interest in CAS can the Air Force retain itsrightto the mission,
and the authors conclude by saying that both services will probably share the mission
(39-50). Kirkpatrick argues that the Army understood and accepted the Air Force's
doctrinal priorities, but wanted greater control over CAS to guarantee its accomplishment
when needed. The single-mission A-10 at least could not be diverted to other more
doctrinally pressing missions (35-37).
Tom Christie, interview by author, tells of delays encountered with the GAO study
(he was on OSD's Joint Technical Coordinating Group and helped research these
questions). GAO questions about weapons effectiveness created arguments between
various military agencies about their favored weapons. The Army's Aberdeen BRL
190

The hearings opened on 22 October 1971 with Senator Carmon announcing that
his subcommittee would work to resolve not only procurement questions but also the
interservice roles-and-missions issue regarding CAS. His first witnesses were Packard and
the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Admiral Thomas H. Moorer. Packard explained
his report's conclusions and Moorer backed him, adding that the Navy did not buy only
one type of ship for all of its missions. The senators spent the rest of the day following a
winding path of questions revealing their ignorance of the various interservice agreements
conceming CAS, the capabilities of the various aircraft, and how to apply CAS to different
scenarios. Some senators on the subcommittee did know the details, but they backed their
favorite service's interests. Former Air Force Secretary and curtent Senator Stuart
Symington (D-MO) wanted the services to choose one of the CAS planes, but questioned
the Cheyenne's viability and implied that the Marines' requirements to support their
beach incursion warfighting style did not govern the Air Force and Army's needs. Senator
Strom Thurmond (R-SC) revealed his pro-Army stance when he made the witnesses
reiterate their support for the Army's attack helicopters."

refused to cooperate with Christie's requests for vulnerability and weapons effectiveness
questions conceming the Cheyenne.
Also in 1971, the Air Force conducted a study of future tactical air requirements
and problems, called "TAC 85" (apparentiy either still classified, or lost, as all of the
author's attempts to retrieve it failed). The study emphasized European war requirements
and revealed that there would be many airstrips, roads, etc., of around 4,000 feet length
available, even after Soviet airfield attacks. Thisfindingled to an upward revision of the
A-X STOL requirement to a range between 1,000 and 4,000 feet; see Gunston, Attack
Aircraft. 254-255.
"Congress, Senate Hearings, Close Air Support. 1-55; and Congress, Senate
Report, Close Air Support. 1-2 (gives Stennis' charter to Cannon). Symington's interests
and opinions are on pp. 17-18, 27. Besides Symington, there were two other pro-Air
Force members. Chairman Cannon and Senator Goldwater, who were both Air Force
reserve officers (though Bergerson commends Cannon for allovying all sides their say; The
Army Gets an Air Force. 126). ADM Moorer's Navy ships analogy is on p. 32, and is part
of an exchange with Symington about choosing only one aircraft. Thurmond's interests
can be seen on pp. 50-55. Thurmond had an Army background, and another
pro-Army-or at least anti-Air Force-view in the heanngs came via Senator Ihomas
Mclntyre (D-NH). Don Fredericksen, interview by author, doubts that any of the key
191

Following a day of briefings from witnesses about Soviet weapons in Europe, the
senators called Army witnesses, all senior officers led by the helicopter advocate and Army
Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, General Robert Williams. "Today,
gentlemen, we are going to get down to the nitty-gritty of these close air support hearings.
You in the Army are the primary users of close air support," Senator Cannon told them.
Perhaps the senator was disappointed, for General Williams and the others supported
Packard's findings. They praised Air Force air support in Vietnam, told the senators that
the A-X and Cheyenne were complementary and not competitive, and refused one
senator's suggestion that the /^rmy assume sole control of CAS and its associated aircraft.
They appreciated the heavierfirepowerand mggedness of fixed wing planes, and thus
wanted their helicopters to work with Air Force planes in the air support arena. General
Williams explained that fixed-wing tactical aviation was not the Army's forte, and therefore
the Air Force should fly fixed-wing CAS. But the witnesses adamantly supported their
attack helicopters. They pointed out that though helicopters could not perform CAS while
in the clouds, the craft could fly the mission in much poorer weather than even the A-X.
They Army men played down their Lam Son losses, though the subcommittee pressed
them on the issue. Also conceming tactical vulnerability, the senators wanted to know
about recent helicopter tactical trials the Army had staged in Europe. The officers replied
that they knew Europe was not Vietnam and had adjusted their attacks to handle the
expected tougher defenses. Helicopters would not engage in one-on-one duels with air
defenses, but instead would use the tertain to hide until they had a shot opportunity. This
last item produced more questions, since the wire-guided TOW missile that served as the
helicopters' prime antitank weapon required them to maintain line-of-sight with the target

players in the 1971 CAS hearings ever read the entire Packard report. To the author, this
means that everyone saw in it what he wanted to see, and serves as yet another example of
the complex nature of this mission.
192

until missile impact. Again, the witnesses emphasized that they would use good
tacticsdecoys, suppression fires, and the liketo minimize risk."
The Army's time before the senators openly exposed their differences conceming
this mission and their opinion of the various services. As Senator Thomas Mclntyre
(D-NH) pushed General Williams to admit to Air Force CAS unpreparedness in Vietnam
and to accept all CAS aircraft into the Army, both Senators Cannon and Barry Goldwater
(R-AZ) rebuked him in a somewhat heated exchange. "I hope you will stay and listen to all
the hearings, so you won't make your decisions from a preconceived idea rather than from
the testimony that is presented," Cannon chided Mclntyre. Meanwhile, Senator Thurmond

"Congress, Senate, Close Air Support. 71-172 (one two-hour session, and one
three-hour session, both on 28 October 1971). Cannon's quote is on p. 71. Page examples
of testimony are as follows: Air Force air support praise, 75, 80-82 (GEN Williams resists
Senator Mclntyre's suggestion that the Air Force was unready for Vietnam CAS by saying
that the service was as prepared as the Army; also praises A-l) 137; A-X and attack
helicopters are complementary weapons systems, 77, 85, 90, 101, 106, 123-125, 134;
Army rejection of control of CAS, 85-86, 136; faith in helos and European helicopter
tactics, 91, 114-119, 126, 128, 141-143, 156-157, 162, (cites Army sttidy that claims
A-X will be able to attack targets only at long ranges [greater than a mile away], which
means that it cannot operate in bad weather-about the only time the Army officers
"attacked" the other service with a spurious charge); helicopter's ability to operate in poor
weather-especially Europe's poor weather, 102, 119, 131, 152-153, 160; and Lam Son
losses explanation. 111, 121-122, 143-145. The Army men also stuck to their definition of
helicopter CAS as something different, and thus termed it differently (155). For another
account of the Army's work to adapt the attack helicopter to European anti-tank missions,
see Bradin, 125-131.
In his description of the hearings (The Armv Gets an Air Force. 126-135),
Bergerson claims that though the "Army appeared to bend over backward to accommodate
both the Air Force and the Department of Defense" (128), it may have been to please a
pro-Air Force subcommittee. He also believes that the Army may have agreed to Air
Force priorities in order to create the operational void for helicopters that Goldberg and
Smith describe. The author disagrees with Bergerson's pro-Air Force subcommittee
description, for that body had its share of Army partisans. Additionally, Williams
repeatedly stated in the hearings his desire that the Air Force continue to support the Army
and its helicopter operations, something he repeated to the author in his 19 June 1997
telephonic interview (notes in author's possession). Further, BGEN John Bahnsen, who
worked force development issues for aviation on the Army Pentagon staff in the
late 1960s, confirmed the view in his interview with the author: "No way we were going to
backwheel and let the Air Force get out of what they're supposed to do "
193

asked questions that allowed the Army men to sell their advanced attack helicopter. The
senator was serious enough about Army helicopters that his dialogue with the witnesses
produced twenty pages of hearings testimony.''
The next day the Air Force sent only its TAC commander. General William
Momyer, to deal with the senators. Momyer loved his service and was a dutiful soldier.
Though he opposed the dedicated CAS plane concept, he followed his service superiors'
desires and strongly presented its case to the panel. And if the Army officers accepted the
Air Force position, Momyer certainly did not reciprocate. Defending his service's CAS
performance, he dismissed the attack helicopter requirement by citing Army commander
praise for Air Force CAS in every war since World War II. He criticized design flaws in
both the Cheyenne and the Harrier. The Cheyenne was too expensive, carried a light
ordnance load, and would survive in only benign threat environments-Lam Son 719 was
proof of the latter claim. As for the Harrier, he believed that it paid too high a
performance penalty for V/STOL capability; it might be fine for the Marines but it was not
for the Air Force.'^

"Congress, Senate Hearings, Close Air Support. 80-84 (Cannon, Goldwater, and
Mclntyre exchange), 112-131 (Thurmond's questions).
'^One could accuse GEN Momyer of mendacity, or see his behavior as
symptomatic of Air Force institutionalrigidity,but he actually followed the officer's proper
action conceming lawrful orders. Officers may have honest differences about the best
course of action in a specific case, and can privately express their reservations-but they
obey and execute the ensuing decision. Both those who either agreed or disagreed with
GEN Momyer's airpower beliefs said that his sense of purpose and military duty impressed
them. These are GEN Jimmie V. Adams, USAF (ret), telephonic (20 February 1997) and
personal (29 April 1997, Arlington VA) interviews by author, recording and notes in
author's possession (Adams worked in TAC staff in the eariy 1970s); Broughton, Going
Downtown. 105-107, 265; Tom Christie, interview by author; Dick, Disosway. 162;
Hasdorff, Hildreth. 32-34; Sweat. Oral History, 118-120; and MGEN Yudkin, USAF
(ret), interview by author. Others, such as Mrozek, 22-24, Tilford, 114, and to some
extent, the author, believe that Momyer's consistent preference for high performance
planes for all missions sometimes bred doctrinal rigidity
Momyer's testimony isfromCongress, Senate Hearings, Close Air Support. 29
October 1971, 173-249; his citation of Army commander CAS praise history is on
174-176, 185-187; and his criticisms of the Cheyenne and Hamer arc on 183-184,
194

Conceming the Air Force's CAS machines, Momyer praised the A-X as the best
CAS plane design, especially for Europe. He answered questions about European weather
by saying that, if the pilot flew slowly enough, the plane could operate outside of clouds
neariy all of the time. The A-X's gun and Maverick guided-missile allowed the plane to
stand off from enemy defenses and hit the target-something that Momyer asserted the
Cheyenne could not do. When the senators asked him why he could not accept the A-7
instead of the A-X, he told them that the A-X was the remedy to various A-7 CAS
deficiencies. The A-X's high maneuverability allowed it to evade enemyfighters,whereas
the faster A-7 could neither outmn nor outturn them. Also, the A-X was a more efficient
CAS machine in every way. Its high-lift wing gave it better loiter capability, weapons
cartiage capacity, and field requirements. It cost less than an A-7. '^

195-196, 220-221, 231-232, 245.

In a 1974 article, he repeated his criticism of the attack helicopter and Harrier, see
GEN William Momyer, USAF, "Close Air Support in the USAF," International Defense
Review (henceforth known as IDR) 7 (February 1974): 79.
In his personal interview with the author, GEN Momyer said that he told Chief of
Staff Ryan before the hearings that he would support the A-X. But he also told Ryan that
if the senators ever asked him for a personal opinion, he would not support it.
'^Congress, Senate Hearings, Close Air Support. 213-214 (standoff capability),
214-217 (weather capability). Comparisons to A-7 due to frequent queries are from
179-182, 196, 201, 203, 207-208, 211 (A-7 not in Southeast Asia yet), 224, 227 (A-X
evadesfighters),234 (A-X high-lift wing), 235-236 (cost comparisons), 240 (A-X loiter),
242 (A-7 lacks loiter). Momyer went on record for the A-10 in early 1974, as the A-10
faced a flyoff with the A-7. In his "Close Air Support m the USAF," IDR, 77-79, he
wrote that the Soviet armored threat in Europe had overridden the Air Force's (and though
he did not mention it, his own) preference for air-superiority planes that flew CAS as a side
mission. The situation required a dedicated CAS plane, and the A-10 was optimally
designed for it.
Conceming loiter and aircraft availability, the senators asked all of the services
about the ability to support these aircraft in forward locations. Williams used these
questions to favorably compare forward location logistics requirements for the helicopter
with those of fixed-wing planes (129-130, 151, 159). Momyer admitted that forward base
logistic support would be tough, and this was one reason why he liked the A-X's airbome
loiter capability (211-213). Thus, his attitude matched that of the A-l staff planners and
Pierte Sprey. Momyer's claim that very slow speed (170 knots) helped in bad weather
situations was somewhat disingenuous. The pilot had more time to handle oncoming
195

Reflecting his service's jealous solicitude for its mission prerogatives, Momyer
stoutiy asserted the Air Force's position as the nation's dedicated air service. He told the
panel that the Army's attack helicopter development usurped the Air Force's CAS mission,
and that the A-X was an answer to it. He pithily observed that the Army attack helicopter
community probably would embark upon a path similar to that seen in the 1920s Air
Corps: "I am sure that after Cheyennean Army aviator is no different than any other
aviator; he is going to want to go faster; he is going to want to go farther; and he is going to
want to carry more bomb load." Referting back to his command of all fixed-wing air units
in Vietnam, he answered the panel's curiosity about the Marines' reputed CAS prowess by
saying that they were no better at CAS than the Air Force. And to him, the Marines' desire
to control their own air assets undermined a properly coordinated air campaign.'"
Three days later there was a long session with Marine Corps and Navy officers,
led by the Marines' Deputy Chief of Staff for Air, Major General Homer Hill. Cannon
announced, "Some say the Marines have the finest close air support in the worid. We will
be anxious to discuss all aspects of this mission with you" With this mandate, the Marines
wasted no time asserting that their amphibious mission required a plane like the Hartier.
They agreed that it lacked payload and range, but unlike the Air Force men, they believed
that airfield location determined responsiveness more than airbome loiter capability. This
was because specific operational requirements demanded that the Marines administratively
and geographically integrate their air units with the supported ground units. At this, the
witnesses cited their World War II success as an example. Indeed, they were so keen on
the Hartier that they deactivated some of their other air units to procure it. And in spite of
repeated questions, they were confident that they could logistical ly support their operation

terrain features, but his plane now lacked the speed energy to sustain hard maneuvering.
'"Congress, Senate Hearings, Close Air Support. 190 (quote), 208-210 (Momyer's
assessment of the Marines), 220-223, 226 (Momyer's assertion of Army doctrinal turf
invasion). In his interview with the author, GEN Robert Williams cited Momyer's
testimony as an example of the Air Force's intention to kill Cheyenne. And in his Senate
testimony, Momyer indicated that he understood that one underlying Army motive was that
ground commanders wanted control of all of their resources.
196

via ships and helicopters. The senators also probed an issue that laterfiguredin the
Hartier's history, vulnerability to antiaircraft hits, but the Marines dismissed it because they
believed the Hartier was fast enough to avoid ground fire. Conceming helicopters, they
agreed with the Air Force that helicopters were too slow to be survivable in a
high-threat environment, but like the Army witnesses, they wanted attack helicopters to
better meet the varying conditions of CAS."
Another part of the Marine/Navy session was a lengthy discussion of the A-7's
merits. Impressed with the Air Force A-7's advancedfire-conttolsystem, the Navy started
modifying its own A-7s to carry it, creating the A-7E. The Navy used the plane in
Vietnam, and the witnesses included veteran A-7E pilots who sttongly endorsed it. They
thrilled the senators with accounts of the A-7E's weapons accuracy and loiter capability,
citing FAC praise of its Lam Son 719 air support as proof Furthermore, their use of the
A-7E's ground mapping radar for medium-altitude (ten thousand to twenty thousand feet)
night-time navigation offered the possibility that this plane was indeed the night/all-weather
CAS plane that the Army wanted the Air Force to buy.^"

"Ibid., 251-330 (testimony was in two sessions totalling over five hours). Specific
sources from testimony are: 253-254, 283 (Marines mission creates aircraft requirements
that match the Hanier, and no other aircraft); 255-256, 260, 273, 280, 288-290, 296-298
(Hartier does not need range because close basing matches response and close cooperation
requirement better than airbome loiter prowess; World War II proof); 287 (Marines trade
other units for Harrier); 275, 286, 295, (asserts Harrier is supportable, and cites British
austere field operations as an example); 262, 303-306 (helicopterfirepowerand
survivability limits effectiveness, but can work well in some situations and in coordination
withfixed-wing;after all, CAS is very tactical/flexible mission; cites Vietnam proof); 258,
279, 299, 307-320 (vulnerability questions and answers). The panel asked what the
Marines thought of the A-X, and the Marines answered simply that it might suit the Air
Force but it was neither ship compatible nor VTOL capable (275). One of the Marine
witnesses, COL Noah New, wrote an article that May advocating a mixed helicopter and
fixed-wing air support force; see New, "Helicopter or Fixed-Wing? Both!" Marine Corps
Gazette 55 (May 1971): 25-30. In his 1973 "Perspectives of Close Air Support" article
for Marine Corps Gazette. New wrote, "The fundamental differences between helicopters
and fixed wing aircraft are a scientific fact" (16).
^"Congress, Senate, Hearings, Close Air Support. 307-322, 327-329. The Navy
witnesses also claimed that the A-7E's 20 mm gun proved its anti-tank capability in
197

The panel followed its aroused curiosity two days later when it questioned Air
Force A-7 SPO staffers and tactical unit pilots about the plane. These officers confirmed
the plane's weapons accuracy, loiter capability, and ensuing praise in Army CAS exercises
(the Air Force had not yet deployed its A-7s to Vietnam). They also described their work
with a FLIR apparatus that enabled them to navigate and deliver weapons from medium to
high altitudes at night. However, they did not think that theradar,which could be used for
dropping bombs in bad weather or night, was accurate enough for CAS. Significantly,
they told the panel that the need for attack capability at low altitudes underneath the
weather (and also in low visibility situations) still remained. Finally, they contradicted the
Navy pilots' claim that the plane could defeat afighterin air-to-air combat, and produced
the test results to prove it.^'
With the hearings nearly complete, the panel not only seemed undecided about the
fates of A-X, Cheyenne, and Harrier, but now had virtually inttoduced a fourth candidate,
the A-7. The plane's stellar fuel economy and weapons accuracy were two reasons, but
other factors also played a role. Its development process was complete, whereas the A-X
and Cheyenne required much more work. The senators also had more personal interests.
Senator Goldwater admitted in testimony that one of the Air Force A-7 pilot witnesses was
the son of a friend, and in a news article he said that he had changed his mind about the
Vietnam, and that it could defeat fighters like the F-4 in air-to-air combat. Their claims
failed the panel's scmtiny, however. The gun only stripped the treads off of tanks, and the
A-7E's ability to avoid defeat by fighters-not to mention in tum defeating them-depended
upon the relative skills of the combatant pilots.
"Congress, Senate, Hearings, Close Air Support. 3 November 1971, 331-364.
FLIR briefing is on 334-340. The A-7 witnesses also said that the FLIR was good only
clear of clouds (342, 348). Praise for the plane's characteristics is on 347-349, 352,
355-356, 358-360 (the latter pages feature praise in Army CAS exercises). Discussion of
radar is on 351, 359. Doubt about air-to-air prowess is on 354, 363-364 The A-7 men
admitted that the plane needed at least seven thousand feet of mnway (358). The need for
low altitude capability is on 348.
For other Air Force praise of the plane, see Harold Davis, "The A-7D Corsair 11:
Old Airplane in a New Package,"" Army 20 (July 1970): 20-21 (this was a sidebar piece by
a SAF-OII staffer in an article by MAJ Rudolph Wacker, USAF [later, the first A-10 wing
commander in Europe], explaining Vietnam CAS to Army readers)
198

plane after watching a performance demonstration. A closer connection involved Senator

John Tower, whose Texas constituency included the A-7s manufacturer, LTV. These
hearings marked constituent politics'firstsignificant public entry into the CAS plane story,
as legislators jockeyed to ensure the best outcome for their client aircraft companies, and
the associated voters'jobs. The Texas congressional delegation of the time was legendary
for securing lucrative military conttacts for its state. Tower was absent from the
proceedings held so far. The exact reason is unknown, but perhaps it was because he did
not want to be too closely associated with the increasingly pro-A-7 slant of the hearings."
Indeed, the issue of Texas political influence on military procurement, as well as the
political angles behind the CAS plane debate, came on the hearings' last day. Senator
William Proxmire (D-WI) appeared as a witness to influence the panel's decisions on
behalf of the Members of Congress for Peace through Law (MCPL). MCPL consisted of
"Congress, Senate, Hearings, Close Air Support. 1,71, 173, 251, 312, 320, 331,
474 (pages relate to hearing attendance and Goldwater's relationship with and opinion of
A-7). Goldwater liked the A-7 so much he inserted George Weiss' favorable article, "They
Call It 'SLUF'-Short Little Ugly Feller-or Something Like That," Armed Forces Joumal
(December 1971) as Appendix D of the hearings record (which contains the story of his
conversion to supporting the plane).
Texas' interest in, and organized political clout for, military conttacts has many
sources: Anthony Battista, personal interview by author, 30 April 1997, Fredericksburg,
VA, recording and notes in author's possession (Battista was a renowned House and
Senate staffer for military procurement affairs); Coulam, Illusions of Choice. 63 (cites Vice
President Lyndon Johnson's alleged influence in securing the TFX [F-111] conttact for
Texas-based General Dynamics); D6rfer, Arms Deal. 42; Robert Giaimo, telephonic
interview by author, 12 March 1997, notes in author's possession (Giaimo served in the
House P-CT]); Gunston, Attack Aircraft. 247, 269; Hadley, Stt^w Giant. 154-155;
George Mahon, interview by Kent Hance, c. 1980, interview 00048, transcript. Southwest
Collection, Texas Tech University, Lubbock, TX, 29-30 (Mahon recalls that when he first
came to Congress, senior Texas congressmen steered him to the most important
committees); LTGEN Thomas McMullen, USAF (ret), personal interview by author, 5
May 1997, Alexandria, Va., recording and notes in author's possession (McMullen ran the
A-10 SPO in the eariy 1970s); Morton Mintz, "The Maverick Missile: If At First You
Don't Succeed . . . A Case Sttidy of Defense Procurement Problems," The Washington
Post (23 February 1982, start of article series), reproduced in More Bucks. Less Bang, ed.
Rasor, 183; Otis Pike, interview by author; Robert Pnce, telephonic interview by author,
12 March 1997, recording and notes in author's possession (Price served in the House
during this time [R-TX]); and Robert Seamans, interview by author.
199

liberals from both parties who opposed defense spending and the US-Soviet arms race.
Proxmire represented them apparently due to his recent success in leading the effort to stop
funding the supersonic transport (SST); but if he thought his charisma would solve the
CAS plane question, he erted as much as the panel members The MCPL's report to the
panel praised the A-X as the most economical choice while condemning the other designs,
but its argument contained faults. For example, it dismissed the much closer physical and
organizational cormection between attack helicopters and the Army units they supported.
Proxmire's testimony also contained crtors and assertions that sparked more argument.
The Air Force wanted to increase its authorized tactical wings to accommodate the A-X,
but Proxmire wanted to reduce the service's force stmcture and buy the plane. The reason,
as revealed in arguments with Senators Cannon and Thurmond, was that CAS yielded
tangible results compared to other missions, and A-X was the most efficient CAS machine.
CAS was important, but it required both air superiority to reduce the enemy air threat and
interdiction (well planned) to constrict enemy reinforcements. His argument recalled the
McNamara Whiz Kids' economic infatuation and occasional lack of good tactical sense."
Proxmire's most volatile testimony came with his attacks upon the A-7 and the
Texas congressional delegation. He noted in his opening remarks that though the MCPL
report did not address the A-7, recent developments in the hearings required him to
criticize this plane's faults as well. Accordingly, he repeated many of General Momyer's
reasons for why the A-X was a better CAS plane. Conceming the Texans, Proxmire
detailed the political fortunes of the Texas-produced F-111 and how Texas-based LTV
needed more A-7 orders to keep its people employed. This inspired Senator Tower-who
certainly appeared at this session-to sharply demand that Proxmire elaborate upon his
charges. In response, Proxmire played coy, telling Tower that "I think you probably know
a great deal more about that than 1 do for a number of reasons. First, you are on this
committee, and second, you are from Texas." Tower reminded Proxmire that Texas
"Congress, Senate Hearings, Close Air Support. 365-377, 386, 388, and Appendix
B (the MCPL report and member roster). The MCPL's specific recommendation for the
three planes was that the A-X be procured, while the Cheyenne should only be retained as
a prototype, and the Harrier be accepted in smaller numbers than requested.
200

aviation companies had lost several recent contract competitions, and then directly asked,
"But what I want to establish is whether or not you are accusing certain of us here on the
committee of bringing political pressure to keep the production line open?" To this, the
acclaimed fearless cmsader against govemment fraud and waste replied, "Certainly not."
Tower crossed up Proxmire in his own logic by demonsttating that the Wisconsin senator
had his own favorite expensive weapons, such as submarines. As a parting shot at
Proxmire, the panel not only inserted the MCPL report but two Armed Forces Joumal
articles charging Proxmire and MCPL with hypocrisy."
"Ibid., 372-373 (Proxmire did not mind a flyoff between the A-X and A-7), 379
(Cannon questions Proxmire's charge that the panel recommended cancellation of the A-X
in favor of the A-7, and Proxmire answers that he "hypothesized" the charge), 399-400
(quotes and Tower-Proxmire fireworks). The critical AFJ pieces are Weiss' "They Call It
SLUF," which contains a subsection entitled "A-X's Strange Bedfellow: Senator William
Proxmire Debuts in New Role as Super Airplane Salesman"; and Benjamin Schemmer,
"Bum Dope and a Stacked Deck on Close Air Support," (October 1971), reprinted Senate
Hearings, Close Air Support. Appendix C, 465-468.
Weiss contrasts Proxmire's frequent demands for specifics from military people in
other hearings to his occasionally vague presentation before the panel. Weiss also charges
Proxmire with political grandstanding, as evidenced by some of his other senatorial
actions. But if Proxmire hoped to gamer more press attention, he failed at this as well.
Besides articles in the defense press, none of the major American news sourcesThe New
York Times. The Washington Post. Time. Nevysweek. etc.covered the story. Perhaps
this was because they knew that this issue would probably confuse the lay public, and that
it involved relatively low-cost weapons. According to Congress, Senate Report, Close Air
Support. 12, 21-24, the most expensive CAS aircraft contestant cost $3.8 million per copy.
This paled in comparison to such planes as the B-1 and C-5, which generated so much
media and public attention at the time; see William O'Neill, Coming Apart: An Informal
History of America in the 1960s (Chicago. 111.: Quadrangle Books, 1971), 410-412.
Schemmer does not like the MCPL report because of its anti-attack helicopter bent,
and argues with the report's helicopter casualty statistics. He also scouts the report for
using poor logic and research overall, and its asserted claim that amphibious operations
were obsolete is one example. And though Schemmer does not mention Pierre Sprey by
name, he cites the activities of a certain former OSD analyst, curtent consultant, and
acclaimed "father of the A-X" (p. 466). Sprey had apparently generated papers used by
MCPL to criticize helicopters and praise the A-X. Schemmer cites other Sprey papers
goading defense officials to ensure that the A-X's gun perform to standards as evidence
that A-X had its own problems. Sprey did not specifically mention MCPL to the author,
but did say that he wrote papers on roles-and-missions issues during 1971. Ihese asserted
that the A-X's competitors "weren't close air support planes" Proxmire and MCPL's
201

Thus the hearings that convened to resolve not only aircraft choices but also overall
CAS issues ended in indecision and acrimony. One interesting item about both the studies
and hearings was that no one questioned the need for CAS, regardless of the difficulties
involved in understanding and accomplishing it as a mission. Indeed, every military leader,
OSD official, and senator-including Proxmire-wanted the American soldier to receive the
best possible CAS. With that premise established, it should have surprised no one that the
services won their case to prevent cancellation of their respective machine, which each
believed best accomplished CAS as determined by its own history and ensuing war
doctrine. The senators seemed befuddled by the varying capabilities, mission definitions,
and service agreements. A couple of them qualified their initial bluster about choosing
only one machine and accepted that at least two might be fine. Others took sides, which
almost guaranteed the CAS machines' survival.^^
The ensuing April 1972 hearings report reflected the problems. It reaffirmed the
senators' support for the best CAS possible, cancelled none of the programs, and as with
Packard's report, wanted further development and testing of all of the aircraft. There were
some differences in how this should proceed, however The senators liked the A-X's
competitive prototype development process enough that they wanted to see what the
winner looked like. But reflecting their newfound interest in the A-7, they wanted the A-X
winner to then compete against it in another flyoff. Perhaps reflecting the senators'
awareness that the Army would soon completely cancel the Cheyenne contract-which it
did in Augustthe report's conclusions did not mention Cheyenne by name. Instead, it
only stated that there was a "valid requirement for a more capable attack helicopter,
provided the questions regarding helicopter vulnerability are resolved successfully." As for

assertions about CAS' importance agrees with Sprey's opinion.

"For a sampling of the hearings' advocacy of air support for ground ttoops, see
Congress, House, Close Air Support 11, 71-72, 83, 90-95, 105 (Air Force reserve officer
Goldwater supports Army, and admits the panel may choose more than one aircraft),
112-114 (Senator Thurmond-GEN Williams colloquy about Army's agreement with Air
Force on air mission priorities, and both men's admitted confusion on whether a plane
optimized for interdiction can do CAS as well), 134, 137, 174, 185-187,251,276.
202

the Hartier, the panel recommended no more purchases pending operational evaluation.
Finally, the report conceded that the mission and its planes were hard to analyze, and as if
to underscore this, it contained addenda by dissenting senators just as Packard's report
featured military dissent. Senator Symington objected to the A-7 provisions. Senator
Harold Hughes (D-IA), a subcommittee member who did not attend the hearings,
demanded that the "Army's right to provide close air support should be protected."
Senator Goldwater asserted that the Air Force held the sole right to perform CAS.
Senators Thurmond and Tower believed that a valid need existed for all of the planes, with
Thurmond objecting to claims that the machines duplicated each other and Tower pointing
out that the British had already proved Hartier's worth. (Tower did not push the A-7, but
then, he did not need to.) With this rancorous sendoff, the Air Force CAS plane
proceeded to the next trial.^^

^^Congress, Senate Report, Close Air Support. 2-3 and 25-26 (conclusions and
recommendations, quote about Army helicopter recommendation); 5-6 (summary of
Packard report); 7-9 (discussion of varying CAS philosophies and CAS' importance to
soldiers); and 21-24 (summary of aircraft); 27 (Hughes' quote); 28-29 (Goldwater dissent);
and 30-36 (Thurmond and Tower dissent) Actually, the report recommended a flyoff
between the A-7, A-10, and the A-4. It also identified factors that the senators believed
influenced the curtent controversy: interservice agreements that could not address all of
the contingencies, especially the appearance of the armed helicopter (15-16).
Symington's complaint appeared in one line at the bottom of text in the report (25),
but George Weiss, in his article "They Call It 'SLUF,'" quoted Symington's protest that the
A-7 was a plane the Navy foisted on the Air Force in order to reduce unit costs. Weiss
noted that Symington had no problems with another Navy plane that the Air Force
procured, the F-4, apparently because McDonnell-Douglas built it in Symington's state,
Missouri. The author believes that, as a former Air Force Secretary and curtent
congressional Air Force advocate, Symington followed his client service's wishes
The Cheyenne's demise is in Bergerson, 140; Bradin, 124; and Futrell, Ideas, vol.
11, 527. The reasons for its end have been discussed, though Bradin observes that once it
ran into serious problems, opponents "gathered to peck it to death." Futrell writes that the
cancellation occuned because Cheyenne could not compete with the Cobra cost wise, and
also lost a flyoff to its upgraded version, the King Cobra, in 1972. The Harrier passed its
evaluations and continued in service; see Gunston, Attack Aircraft. 99-100, 104-105; and
New, "Perspectives," 17-19.
203

The CAS Plane Candidates Compete

Meanwhile, the two companies continued building their candidate planes, and by
spring 1972, had actually flown their respective prototypes. The two aircraft were similar
in many ways, especially where they followed the government's requirements for
survivability features. Both featured redundant flight conttol hydraulic systems, blow-out
panels, interchangeable parts (between each side of the plane, an uncommon feature for
many aircraft at that time), protected fuel tanks, an armored cockpit "tub" protecting the
pilot, and a manual (non-hydraulic boosted) backupflightconttol system. Their cockpits
were roomy and had large, bubble canopies to allow the pilot unhindered visibility. Both
planes carried only basic radios and navigation systems, reflecting the desire for simplicity
and low cost. They were also built to accommodate the 30 mm gun then under initial
development, and they used as many "off-the-shelf items as possible. The companies
themselves were somewhat similar, in that both had experienced mixed fortunes working
with the Air Force. Fairchi Id-Republic's (henceforth referted to as Fairchild) last
successful effort was the F-105, while Northrop had more recently built the F-5."
There also were differences. Northrop's A-9 (for photo, see Appendix Fig. 35)
was the more conventional design, with two engines mounted within the fuselage like
nearly all tactical jets. The engines and intakes were low to the ground because Northrop's
designers wanted them placed at a height that allowed easy maintenance access. It weighed
slightiy less than itsrival,Fairchild's A-10, but its engines, Lycoming F102 turbofans,
produced nearly one-fourth less thmst per engine than the A-10's General Electric TF34s.
In order to meet the government's loiter, short field performance, and maneuverability
specifications, Northrop had to offset the lack of thmst by extending the span of its thinner
wings. It also had a selectable flight conttol subsystem that was supposed to allow the pilot
"Bright, The Jet Makers. 189-191; Woods Hansen, ""A-10 Prototype Ready for
Production," AW&ST 96 (26 June 1972): 114-118; "Northrop Stteamlines A-9A
Management," AW&ST 96 (26 June 1972): 107-113; George Watson, "The A-10 Close
Air Support Aircraft, 1970-1976" (Wright-Patterson AFB, Ohio [henceforth, this location
shall be refcrtcd to as WPAFB]): Office of History, Headquarters Air Force Systems
Command [HQ/AFSC], n.d), 13-19, 22. The A-9 and A-lO'sfirstflightwas 30 May
1972 and 10 May 1972, respectively
204

to smoothly fine tune his target run-in alignment with his rudders (normally, this technique
induced unwanted rolling motion on many jets).^"
The A-10 (for photos, see Appendix Figs. 36-38), on the other hand, had an
unconventional design. It had a twin tail and its two engines sat separately atop the
fuselage just aft of midway between the plane's nose and tail. The twin tail provided
obvious control redundancy, and Fairchild engineers asserted that the engine setup
prevented one engine's catastrophic failure from affecting either the other engine or other
fuselage components. Though the engines sat high above ground, they required none of
the extensive effort of access or extraction required for extensive repair or replacement of
engines placed within the ftiselage. They also had less chance of experiencing foreign
object damage (FOD)fromobjects sucked up by the intakes or thrown up from the
ground. In striving for maximum efficiency in weight and cost, Fairchi Id-Republic's
designers rejected fully recessed landing gear bays, which increased aircraft weight and
size, in favor of wing pods that only partially concealed the gear. The wing was thicker
than that of the A-9, in order to better meet the CAS performance guidelines set forth in
the RFP. It also sat low on theftiselagebut curved upward toward its tips to provide better
control response and stable handling. The A-lO's wing and engine design allowed more
weapons carriage pylons to be installed underneath its wing and ftiselage. Finally, the
plane had no sophisticated autopilot system for weapons delivery.^'

^"Gunston, Attack Aircraft. 263-264; "Northrop Streamlines A-9A Management,""

107-113; and Watson, "Close Air Support Aircraft," 13-16. The A-9's maximum weight
was 41,000 pounds while the A-lO's maximum was nearly 45,600 pounds. The F102 fan
developed 7,500 pounds of thrust and the TF34 generated 9,275 pounds of thrust. The
A-9's dimensions were 58 feet wingspan, 54 feet length, and 16 feet height The A-lO's
dimensions were 57 feet wingspan, 53 feet length, and nearly 15 feet height.
^'Gunston, Attack Aircraft. 264-265; Hansen, "A-10 Prototype," 114-118; Robert
Sanator, telephonic interview by author, 16 May 1997, notes (interviewee requested no
recording) in author's possession. (From 1969 through 1973, Sanator was the manager of
Fairchild-Republic's A-10 preliminary design team; the chief designer, Vincent Tizio, is
deceased) Sprey, interview by author; Sweetman, "Stmcture" and "Powerplant," chaps, in
his Modem Fighting Aircraft: A-10. 16-27, and 28-33; and Watson, "Close Air Support
Aircraft," 16-19. Sanator told the author that the designers' intention for the wing to
205

The flyoff occurted at the Air Force's famed high-desert test facility at Edwards Air
Force Base, California, between October and December 1972. When the competition
commenced, both aircraft had flown over 150 hours, which allowed both companies
adequate time to prepare. This also allowed the Edwards test pilots time to familiarize
themselves with both planes, for the test featured the same pilots flying both planes in order
to gain a better comparative assessment. Each plane flew approximately 140 hours in
profiles that not only tested weapons delivery suitability (though the planes had to use a 20
mm cannon because the 30 mm gun was not ready), but also handling characteristics and
cockpit features. Though one observer later criticized the test for lacking such tactically
realistic items as simulated air defenses, even he conceded that time and cost constraints
did not allow this. He also admitted that it was still a "very stringent" competitive test of
aircraft at this stage of their development. The test planners designed the flyoff to
accentuate the differences between the planes, and all observers noted that it did just that.
Even though the planes did not actually fly against air defenses, one of the flyoffs tests
involved taking sections of each plane, such as engines, fuel cells, and wings, to
Wright-Patterson Air Force Base, Ohio, and firing actual Soviet 23 mm rounds at them in
a wind tunnel. This "unprecedented" test action was the best simulation, short of actual
combat, of how durable each aircraft's components were when hit by AAA in flight.'"

deliver the RFP performance specificationsand the design-to-cost restrictionsdrove the

plane's performance.
A simplified explanation of wing positioning and shape versus aircraft handling
follows. The fuselage sits beneath a high wing and serves as a stabilizing counterweight to
the wing's aerodynamic forces; thus, a high-wing plane is normally quite stable but less
responsive to the pilot's roll inputs. The fuselage is less of a counterforce to a low wing,
creating the opposite effect. If the designers want compromise performance with the low
wing, they can curve it upward toward its tips. This allows the fuselage to sit at the bottom
of the wing's arc and provide a more stabilizing influence.
'"MAJ Roy Bridges, USAF, "Realism in Operational Test and Evaluation for Close
Air Support," Research Sttidy (MAFB: Air Command and Staff College, 1976): 28-35
("stringent" quote, 30); Clarence Robinson, "A-lOA Future Keyed to Gun Development,"
AW&ST (29 January 1973): 16-17; "History of Air Force Systems Command, FY 73,"
(WPAFB: HQ/AFSC, n.d), 195-202; Sweetman, Modem Fighting Aircraft, 11-12
("unprecedented" quote, 11); and Watson, "Clo.sc Air Support Aircraft," 22-23 Picrtc
206

The weapons results were nearly even, with the A-9 slightly more successful in
forty-five degree dive deliveries and the A-10 performing better infifteen-degreedive
deliveries. Test personnel cited the A-9's strong features, which included cockpit visibility,
maintainability, and weapons accuracy. However, the A-9's mdder input adjustment
feature encountered problems, and test pilots found that mdder forces were unacceptably
high during manual (hydraulic systems out) flight. The A-10 scored well for similar
reasons, but criticisms were different. These addressed items that later caused some
problem in the program, such as engine performance difficulties encountered due to the
engines' position on the plane."
The DSARC reviewed the results in January 1973 and chose the A-10. Secretary
Seamans said that the A-10 won due to its ease of maintenance, ordnance carrying
capacity, simplicity, and more complete development. These latter two items were
important to the A-X program meeting its design-to-cost goals. Dr. Foster added that the
test pilots generally chose the A-10 as the plane that they would most like to fly in combat.
Additionally, the A-10or at least its parts-fared better in the survivability testing.
Through Febmary and March, the DSARC's recommendation received approval by senior

Sprey told the author that Air Force Systems Command (AFSC), which oversees the
Edwards testing, initially balked at the idea of using the same pilots for flying both aircraft:
"As if they didn't ever have pilots that could fly two airplanes at once." The organizational
setup for this test was called the "Joint Test Force," since it included personnel from
outside AFSC. Of the seven test pilots who participated in theflyoff,two were from TAC.
The pilots encountered problems with both aircraft during the checkout and early
testing. One pilot ran his A-10 off the runway on landing rollout and collapsed its gear.
There was a gravity sfress ("G") limit on both planes, and the pilots routinely overstressed
the A-9 during dive-bomb puUouts until Northrop engineers modified its too-sensitive pitch
conttol authority. The A-lO's engine performance problems-the engines surged during
high angles of attack (the angle between the aircraft and the relative wind)-were rectified
shortly after the flyoff. For these details, see COL Edsel Field, USAF, "A-10 Test and
Evaluation: A Case Study," (MAFB: Air War College, 1976), 56-61.
Packard's Close Air Support Review Group actually made the recommendation for
the 23 mmfiringas part of its overall desire for more testing; see DCP 23B, 5,15.
"Sweetman, 11-12; Sprey, interview by author; and Watson, "Close Air Support
Aircraft," 23-24. Sprey said that Northrop's decision to incorporate the mdder sideslip
system hurt it in the test.
207

OSD officials with their stipulation that the plane must meet its cost and performance
goals. Specifically, they allowed further development but not full-scale production, and
paid Fairchild enough money to build ten prototypes which would be used for
developmental milestone tests. Deputy Secretary of Defense Packard revealed the
military's cost-consciousness when he ordered, "I expect the Air Force to thoroughly
review the design and eliminate any features not absolutely necessary for the
accomplishment of the close air support mission."'^
Both at the time and later, some observers either asserted or surmised that the
A-lO's flyoff victory was largely political. Two aviation history authors. Bill Gunston and
Bill Sweetman, built a case for this. To them, the flyoff was too even, and thus the
question became which aircraft company could best stand conttact rejection. Long Island,
New York-based Fairchild had not had a successful military contract in some time, and
was still smarting from the recent SST cancellation, for which it was the largest single
subcontractor. Another rejection could possibly mean unemployment for many New
Yorkers, while California-based Northrop was in betterfinancialshape. The Air Force
allegedly accepted the A-10 because it did not want heatfromthe politically powerful New
York delegation and because the govemment did not want to see an established military
aircraft maker go defunct."
'^"History of Air Force Systems Command, FY73," 202 (quote); Seamans, Aiming
at Targets. 175; Sweetman, 11-12; Sprey, interview by author; and Watson, "Close Air
Support Aircraft," 24-29. Seamans recalls that the A-lO's engine setup promoted
maintainability. Good descriptions of the A-lO's survivability features are Smallwood,
Warthog. 13-17 (Smallwood also mentions the turbofan engines, which had a lower heat
signature); Sweetman, "Stmcture," chap, in his A-10. 16-27; and Wilson, "Fairchild
A-10," Flight International. 710-715.
"Gunston, Attack Aircraft. 265; and Sweetman, 11 Sweetman cites Gunston's
work in his own, but adds other information, such as the failed SST bid. Gunston
mentions that Fairchild-Republic was one of the rejected companies in the F-15 contract
competition Sweetman also writes that another Long Island aircraft maker, Gmmman,
had troubles with its F-14 Navyfighterduring this time, which further spurted the New
York delegation's push for the A-10. James Stevenson, in his The Pentagon Paradox
(history which focuses upon 1970sfighterprocurement in general, and upon the F/A-18
buy in particular), 151-152, mentions a nasty contract squabble between the Navy and
208

However, people close to the issue assert that the result was based upon the planes'
relative merits. The Air Force Secretary at that time, Robert Seamans, later told this
author, "I can assure you it was not political.'" He added that Senator Lowell Weicker
(R-CT), in whose state the A-9's Lycoming engines were manufactured, accused the Air
Force of bowing to political pressure from New York and Maryland (another state with a
Fairchild facility). Seamans artanged a special briefing to show Weicker why the A-10 was
the better plane. Weicker remained unconvinced, and told Seamans and the other briefing
attendees that the A-10 won on the "sttength of Agnew and Rockefeller," or words to that
effect (Vice President Spiro Agnew was from Maryland and Nelson Rockefeller was
Govemor of New York). Seamans told the author that Weicker's behavior left him
"apoplectic with rage," and that he immediately left the room. One New York
congressman, Otis Pike of 1965 CAS hearings fame, believed that New York and
California were equally matched in political clout; perhaps, one could add, even more than
the respective planes. In such a case, the decision would then fall back to the planes'
relative merits."
Everyone admitted that the finish was close, but added that the A-10 had certain
unmistakable advantages. For one thing, it more closely matched the CFP's desire for
widely separated engines. In this vein. Air Force leaders claimed in later congressional
testimony that its high-placed engines better improved its chances of avoiding FOD when
operating on rough fields. Furthermore, the A-lO's TF34 engines were more powerful

Gmmman that lastedfromDecember 1972 to March 1973. Thistimeframeencompasses

the A-10 decision, but since Stevenson also asserts that the Navy and many non-New York
congressmen tmly wanted F-14s (60-61, 153-157), the author questions the seriousness of
Grumman's predicament.
"Fredericksen, interview by author (feels that the A-10 won on its mggedness and
maintainability, and not on politics; Fredericksen was still at DDR&E at the time); Pike,
interview by author; Craig Powell, "A-10 Source Selection," Govemment Executive 5
(November 1973): 17 (cites Senator Abraham Ribicoffs [DCT] questions about the
outcome; apparently Connecticut's representatives were more upset about Northrop's loss
than those from California, perhaps because Lycoming could ill-afford it); Seamans,
Aiming at Fargets. 175; and Seamans, interview by author (all quotes).
209

than those in the A-9, and were also a proven design. Service leaders also stated that the
A-10 was better designed to receive the 30 mm gun, and the plane's low wing setup
allowed comparatively ample space for weapons cartiage. As one of Fairchild's design
executives, Robert Sanator, put it: "We literally sat down and designed a plane around the
gun that we had to have." Its more advanced state of development, as well as its greater
simplicity and maintainability, were most important to govemment officials anxious about
the cost constraints they faced. They said the A-9's underwing engine placement restricted
the amount of ordnance it could carry; also, the engines were more closely placed to each
other, and their intakes were close to the ground. Additionally, its 30 mm gun bay did not
allow as easy access than that of the A-10. The A-9 was too complex, even in its simple
prototype state, and labored under too many questions about its future development and
associated costs. The test pilots also liked the A-10, and its survivability features stood out
in realistic testing. Conceming the latter item, TAC would later boast that the plane could
lose one engine, half of one tail, two-thirds of one wing, and assorted parts of the
fuselage-and still fly!"

'^The other sources are Air Force Deputy Chief of Staff for Research and
Development, LTGEN William Evans, testimony in Congress, House, Hearings before a
Subcommittee of the Committee on Appropriations, DoD Appropriations for 1974. Part 6.
93d Cong., 1st sess., 19 September 1973, 1351; John Brindley, "Fairchild's A-10 Is
Entering Service: The Return of the Flying Can-Opener," Interavia 31 (November 1976):
1089-1090 (A-10 design and survivability features); ""The Fairchild Can-Opener:
Shtunnovik of the Eighties," Air International 16 (June 1979): 267-272, 282 (nice
description of A-lO's background and features; features TAC boast on p. 271);
Fredericksen, interview by author; COL Sam Kishline, interview by author (served in A-X
SPO); Minutes, DSARC Review of A-X Aircraft-Milestone II, 17 January 1973, 5-6,
supporting documents; Clarence Robinson, "USAF Unveils War Game Study to Blunt
A-10 Contract Attacks," AW&ST 98 (5 March 1973): 14 (Connecticut senators call for
an investigation); Air Force Chief of Staff, GEN John Ryan, testimony in Congress,
Senate, Hearings before a Subcommittee of the Committee on Appropriations, Department
of Defense Appropriations for Fiscal Year 1974. Part 4. 93d Cong., 1st sess., 2 April
1973, 68-69; Clarence Robinson, Jr., "A-lOA Future Keyed to Gun Development,"
AW&ST 99 (29 January 1973): 17 (A-9's gunfittingdifficulties); Sprey, interview by
author (believes that the test was fairiy mn), Smallwood, Warthog. 12-19 (good basic
description of A-lO's gun and survivability features; Sanator quote, 12), Sweetman, 11-12;
Watson, "Close Air Support Aircraft," 24-26, and Michael Wilson, "Fairchild A-10,"
210

Congress and Combat Again Intervene

There was still the matter of a contest between the A-X flyoff winner and the A-7,
and Congress pointedly reminded Air Force leaders about it throughout 1973. Service
leaders told the congressmen that the A-10 was not yet fully developed enough to make the
flyoff meaningful, and instead offered up three studies, called SABER ARMOR ALPHA,
BRAVO, and CHARLFE, which it said showed that the A-10 was a better plane than the
A-7 in nearly all categories. Since the Air Force seemed reluctant to comply, the legislators
played rough. In late August, they cut the service's A-10 prototype buy from ten planes to
six and reduced development funding for the plane. Funds would be released pending the
results of the A-7 versus A-10 flight test. The service, fearing Congress' outright
cancellation of the A-10 program, was actively setting up test mles and creating a test plan
by October.'^

Flight International 109 (20 March 1976): 709, 707-717 (A-10 and TF34 features).
Kishline told the author that the A-9 was too complex to meet the rigid
design-to-cost goals. The Milestone II meeting was held to select the flyoff winner. Its
minutes noted that the attendees liked the A-lO's simplicity and maintainability; it also
noted that the test pilots preferted the A-l0 for combat. Even Sweetman concedes that the
A-lO's cost-efficiency and survivability features surpassed those of the A-9
""A-lO/A-7 Flyoff Rules Drafted, Await Defense Chiefs Approval,'" 99 AW&ST
(15 October 1973): 23; "A-7D, A-10 'Fly-Off Suggested," Air Force Times (15 August
1973): 29; Bridges, "Realism in Operational Test," 37-38 (believes that the Air Force
opposed the test due to the following: limited resources that prevented a tmly meaningful
comparison, and flying an undeveloped prototype against a combat-proven plane was
unfair); Cecil Brownlow, "Senate Unit Presses A-7/A-10 Flyoff," 99 AW&ST (20 August
1973): 18-19; Futrell, Ideas, vol. II, 527-529; J. Phillip Geddes, "The A-10-USAF
Choice for the Close Air Support Role," IDR 7 (January 1974): 76 (besides recounting
Air Force resistance to the flyoff, it is also an extensive description of the plane, and
focuses upon the four characteristics-responsiveness, lethality, simplicity, and
survivability-that guided its design); Clarence Gieger, and others, "History of the
Aeronautical Systems Division, July 1973-June 1974," vol. 1, (WPAFB: History Office,
Aeronautical Systems Division, n.d), 80-84; Minutes, DSARC Milestone 11, 7, supporting
documents (in this January 1973 meeting, the members discuss Congress' flyoff desires,
resolve to be responsive, but believe that they have the information Congress needs to
make a decision); Powell, "A-10 Source Selection," 15-17 (good summary history of CAS
issues, procurement issues, procurement politics, and the relative merits of the A-7 and AlO-cites Fairchild-Republic President' Ed Uhfs and the Air Force's assertion that the A-10
211

Beyond the fact that the Senate's CAS hearing report demanded it, other items
spurted Congress' bmsque action and sustained its interest. Budget concems still drove
skepticism, in spite of the Senate's post-CAS hearings go-ahead to develop the various
aircraft (and in a preview of future congressional hearings about CAS, the legislators asked
the same questions raised in the 1971 CAS hearings-such as why the Air Force did not
choose the Harrier). During this time. Congress sanctioned a GAO study of the A-10, and
that agency's March 1974 report stated that the plane was not developed enough to judge
cost issues. However, the GAO added that the design-to-cost philosophy governing its
is the plane for CAS); "Senate Unit Cuts A-lOA Funds; Recommends Flyoff with A-7D,"
AW&ST 99 (23 July 1973): 22; "USAF Agrees to Flyoff for A-10, A-7D," 99 AW&ST
(1 October 1973): 22-23; "Washington Roundup: Strike Delay," AW&SI 98 (19
Febmary 1973): 71 (George Mahon asks OSD to delay signing contract with Fairchild);
and Watson, "Close Air Support Aircraft," 38-40.
Sources for the SABER ARMOR studies are Congress, House, Committee on
Armed Services, Hearings on Cost Escalation in Defense Contracts and Military Posture
and H.R. 6722. 93d Cong., 1st sess., 21 May 1973, 1339-1340; Futrell, Ideas, vol. 1,
528-529; and Robinson, "USAF Unveils War Game Study to Blunt A-10 Contract
Attacks," AW&ST. 14. SABER ARMOR ALPHA occurted in support of David
Packard's 1971 close air support study group, and favorably compared the A-X with
various attack aircraft in the European theater antitank role. SABER ARMOR BRAVO
was completed in spring 1972, and dealt mostly with European CAS command and control
issues. However, it noted that air power could play a big role in blunting a Soviet armored
breakthrough. SABER ARMOR CFL\RLIE appeared as the DSARC chose the A-10 over
the A-9, and compared the A-10 with the A-4 and A-7 in various performance categories,
threat scenarios, and weather situations as they pertained to European CAS. It weighed
any questionable factor in favor of the other two planes. The A-10 won for its loiter,
maneuverability, lethality, basing, survivability, and cost effectiveness. In the Robinson
piece, the Air Force asserts that the studies were not intended to sway the legislators.
None of the sources consulted for this work specifically mentions why the A-4 was
not included per the Senate's wishes expressed in its CAS hearings report. However, one
can surmise some reasons why. The flyoff promised to be complex enough with only two
jets. LTV did not have the wide domestic and intemational market for its A-7 that
McDonnell-Douglas had for the A-4. Thus, LTV was more desperate and its
representatives fought harder for it. The A-7 appeared to be a more promising candidate,
given its excellent range and load carrying capacity, as well as rave reviews for its
navigation and weapons delivery avionics performance in Vietnam Indeed, a later
document scores the A-4 for its comparative weakness in these regards-as well as its
greater battle damage vulnerability compared to the A-IO. See DDR&E, Decision
Coordinating Paper (DCP) 23B, 19 February 1975, 10
212

creation probably would prevent cost overmns There was also the Texas congressional
delegation's interest in LTVs A-7. House Appropriations Committee Chairman George
Mahon criticized the A-10. "It seems to present a beautiful target," he acidly remarked in
one hearings session. Apparently, Texas' influence became overt enough that Fairchild
President Ed Uhl held a press conference in late August 1973 complaining about it. "It's
time for the New York delegation to get out and tell our story," he asserted (italics in the
original quotation). One could dismiss Uhl's action as so much political noise, but many
sources, at least one of them Texan, agreed. Brigadier General Thomas McMullen took
over the A-10 SPO just after the A-9 flyoff (which reflected some increase in project
status, since his predecessor, Hildebrandt, was a colonel), and he later said that politically
motivated pressure for a flyoff was evident. Congressman Robert Price (R-TX) served on
the House Armed Services Committee during this time, and his recollection was that the
Texas delegation believed the New York delegation was trying to push the A-10 upon the
rest of Congress without the A-7 getting its due. Also, to Price and others, there was a
more important itema growing opinion that the A-IO was no longer the best plane for the
modem CAS arena.'^
'^For Congress' concems about the A-lO's cost and survivability during the
1973-1974 timeframe, see Anthony Battista, interview by author; Congress, House,
Hearings, DoD Appropriations for 1974. Part 6. 1346-1348; Congress, House, Hearings,
DoD Appropriations for 1974. Part 7. 1008-1016; Congress, House, Hearings before a
Subcommittee of the Committee on Appropriations, DoD Appropriations for 1975. Part 7
93d Cong., 2d sess., 23 May 1974, 1052-1060; Congress, House, Hearings, H.R. 6722.
1330-1336 (includes Congressman George O'Brien's [R-IL] question about the Hartier and
Air Force Deputy Chief of Staff for Research and Development, LTGEN Otto Glasser's
patient reply that the Harrier lacked the range, payload, and durability desired by his
service); BGEN Raymond Furlong, USAF, Memorandum for Director of Defense
Research and Engineering, 17 September 1973, supporting documents; Otis Pike,
interview by author; Robert Price, interview by author; and James Schlesinger, interview
by author. Furlong notes that Senator Cannon "challenged the survivability of the A-10 in
the European environment." Pike said that survivability was an issue with some of his
congressional colleagues. Schlesinger was Defense Secretary at the time, and he recalled
concems about A-10 survivability in Europe.
For the Texas influence and Mahon's opinions, see Adams, interview by author;
Anthony Battista, interview by author; Congress, House, Hearings before a Subcommittee
of the Committee on Appropriations, DoD Appropriations for 1974. Part 7. 93d Cong , 1 st
213

The legislators reached this conclusion due to American tactical air power's-and
more specifically, the A-7's-fortunes in the last full year of American involvement in
Vietnam, 1972. In their Easter Offensive that year, the North Vietnamese launched a
massive conventional assault against South Vietnam and brought more sophisticated
antiaircraft weapons systems with them. Radar-controlled SA-2 missiles threatened
American aircraft in Laos and just south of the demilitarized zone (DMZ), and communist
troops used the shoulder-launched, heat-seeking SA-7 (for photo, see Appendix Fig. 39)
throughout South Vietnam. Their action caught American airmen off guard, and aircraft
losses mounted, especially among slower-moving or less maneuverable aircraft such as
helicopters, the A-l (now flown almost exclusively by South Vietnamese), the AC-130,
and the OV-10. Adjusting altitudes and attack routing helped somewhat, and using decoy
flares also helped, but the bottom line was that the Americans initially were not prepared
for this new threat. The invasion gave the Air Force a chance to use its A-7Ds in combat,
as the Americans mshed air units into Southeast Asian bases to stanch the communist
sess., 27 September 1973, 999-1004 (quote, 1000); Congress, House, Committee on
Armed Services, Hearings on Military Posture and H.R. 12564. Part 1. 93D Cong., 2d
sess., 4 March 1974, 614 (Texas Republican Congressman Robert Price compares the A-7
and A-10 to "flying a Cadillac, I suppose and a Model T Ford"); CAPT Mark Cleary,
USAF. General Robert Dixon (Oral History Interview, 18-19 July 1984), 301, ttanscript,
AFFIRC Holding K239.0512-1591; Robert Giamio, interview by author (in 1973, he was a
new Democrat congressman from Connecticut skeptical about funding more than one CAS
plane; says the Texas influence was not provable in fact, but there were sttong overtones;
recalls that questions about the A-lO's survivability was another congressional concern);
Gunston, 267-268; Morton Mintz, "The Maverick Missile: If at First You Don't Succeed .
. . A Case Study of Defense Procurement Problems," The Washington Post (article series
starting 23 February 1982), reprinted in More Bucks. Less Bang, ed., Rasor, 183 (page
reference from reprint); LTGEN McMullen, interview by author; Otis Pike, interview by
author; Robert Price, interview by author; Schlesinger, interview by author; Robert
Sanator, interview by author; and Watson, "Close Air Support Aircraft," 38 Adams was
the TAC Headquarters project officer for the flyoff, and observes that LTV pushed the
issue continually. Battista said the flyoff issue seemed like a battle between Mahon and
Pike.
GAO's report, U.S. General Accounting Office Staff Study, A-10 Close Air
Support Aircraft (March 1974), points up Congress' concems about the plane at this time;
cost, survivability, and effectiveness compared to the A-7. The report urged continued
vigilance by Congress regarding this plane. See "Summary," 1-9
214

onslaught. The A-7D did well, suffering minimal combat losses in missions over both
North and South Vietnam, and impressing everyone with its ability to carry bombs long
distances and accurately hit targets.'"
Combat in the Middle East further sparked congressional skepticism about the
A-lO's survivability against modem threats, and it would also affect CAS tactics and
developments for years to come. In October 1973, the Israeli Air Force (lAF) encountered
serious difficulties early in the Yom Kippur War (also known as the October War)

'"Dale Andrade, Trial by Fire: The 1972 Easter Offensive. America's Last Vietnam
Battle (New York: Hippocrene Books, 1995), 28-29,40, 87-88, 117, 156-157, 219, 349,
475, 510-511, 536-537; Brownlow, "Senate Unit Presses A-7/A-10 Flyoff," 18-19; COL
John Doglione, USAF, and others, "Airpower and the 1972 Spring Invasion," Part II of
Air War-Vietnam. COL Donaldson Frizzell, and others, eds. (New York: Amo Press,
1978), 97-206; James Dort, Skvraider. 150-151; Futrell, Ideas, vol. II, 482-483, 529 (A-7
Vietnam performance, and Congress' Easter Invasion-based skepticism about the A-10);
Geiger, et al, "History of the Aeronautical Systems Division, July 1973-June 1974," 80-81;
CAPT Patrick McAdoo, USAF "Letters to the Editor: A-7D/A-10A Debate," AW&ST 99
(17 September 1973): 126; LTCOL McGrath, interview by author; Price, interview by
author; Watson, "Close Air Support Aircraft," 38-40; and Wertell, Archie. Flak. AAA, and
SAM. 115-116.
McAdoo was an Air Force pilot who flew both A-37s and A-7s in Vietnam. He
praises the A-7's performance, but concedes the best solution is a mix of A-7s and A-lOs
because each contributes to ground attack in a specific way. McGrath flew as a FAC
during the Easter Offensive, and observes that the new antiaircraft weapons initially caught
airmen unawares. Geiger and company specifically recount congressional doubts about
A-10 survivability, as well as that body's admiration for the A-7's recent Vietnam
performance. Price cited his own background for his skepticism; he flew fighters in the
Korean War. Watson quotesfroma record of a September 1973 meeting between
Senator Cannon and Defense Secretary James Schlesinger, in which Cannon told the
Defense Secretary that he seriously doubted the A-lO's survivability in a European
environment, and wanted a flyoff with the A-7. Wertell cites testimony by Seventh Air
Force commander. General John Vogt, to claim that the SA-7 "put some aircraft, such as
the A-l, out of business" (116). Both Andrade and Dort conttadict this claim with several
specific examples of South Vietnamese and American A-l exploits during this campaign.
Andrade writes that the SA-7 forced all American fliers, especially helicopter pilots, to
change their tactics. Helicopters were very vulnerable to the missiles, and could not
underfly their employment envelope due to the even greater AAA threat down low Futrell
also cites Vogt's testimony, which was in connection with his strong praise for the A-7
Vogt did not like the A-10 either; see Talbott. 144

215

providing CAS to its beleaguered ground forces Though the lAF included CAS as one of
its missions, its commanders disparaged it and lAF units did not practice it much. Their
openly stated preferences followed the U.S. Air Force's doctrinal priorities, and upon
examination, one could easily see why. The lAF's battle doctrine fit Israel's particular
conditions as a small desert nation facing larger, hostile, but militarily second-rate
neighbors. Its leaders preferted the quick strike against their enemies' vitals to achieve early
victory and avoid a protracted, expensive conflict. When the Israelis concentrated upon
immediately gaining air superiority, as they had in the 1967 Six Day War, it allowed them
to freely attack Arab military targets that could not hide in the open desert as military units
could in other environments. Quick action also naturally favored interdiction over close
air support's more time-consuming, direct contact, nature. And since the Israeli Army
whipped its Arab opponents in every war since Israel's embattled 1948 birth, CAS was
almost irtelevant. Interdiction far better served to pummel or eliminate any rear-echelon
forces that the Israeli Army might later encounter in its inevitable advance. Even after the
October War ended, and mmors surfaced that the lAF did not perform CAS up to
expectations during the desperate early days, both the Israeli Army leadership and lAF
commander Major General Benyamin Peled dismissed CAS as too costly and difficult for
the expected tactical retum."
"Gerald Astor, "The World's Toughest Air Force: It Keeps Israel Alive," Look. 30
June 1970, 20-21; Anthony Cordesman and Abraham Wagner, The Lessons of Modem
War. Volume I: The Arab-Israeli Conflicts. 1973-1989 (Boulder. Colo.: Westview Press,
1990), 90, 95-97; Futrell, Ideas, vol. II. 484; Greenhous, "Israeli Experience," in Case
Studies, ed. Cooling, 493-511, 520-527; Chaim Herzog, The Arab-Israeli Wars: War and
Peace in the Middle East (New York: Random House, 1982), 230; COL Michael Herzog,
Israeli Defense Force (IDF), inttoduction to The War of Atonement, by Chaim Herzog
(London: Weidenfield and Nicolson, 1975; reprint, London: Greenhill Books, 1998), xixvii (page references to reprint; COL Herzog is Chaim Herzog's son), AVM Tony Mason,
Air Power: A Centennial Appraisal. 69-71, 74, 76-79; and Wetmore, "Israelis' Air Punch
Major Factor in War," 21-23; Lon Nordeen, Jr., Air Warfare in tiie Missile Age
(Washington, D C . Smithsonian Institution Press, 1985), 146. Astor quotes such
luminaries as Six Day War lAF commander Mordecai Hod to demonstrate the lAPs
disregard for Arab war technology capabilities.
Israeli military leaders' postwar opinions of CAS are courtesy of repnnted
interviews in Air War College Text, Lessons 8-13, 1*^1-155; .see David Eleazar (Chief of
216

The October War'sfirstfew days featured a reversal of priorities, however.

Diplomatic considerations and hubris created by past victories led the Israelis to forego a
preemptive strike against a looming Arab attack. Thus, the war commenced with massive
Arab ground assaults across the Suez Canal and toward the Golan Heights.'" The Israeli
Army barely repelled them, especially on the Golan Front, and CAS became the L\F's
most important mission as the soldiersfranticallycalled for air support. The lAF was not
only unready for CAS but also for the air defenses the Arab army units brought with them.
These included the latest Soviet-made mobile SAMs, such as the SA-6, and mobile,
radar-guided AAA, such as the ZSU-23 (for photos, see Appendix Figs. 40-41). The
Israelis had neglected upgrades to their electtonic countermeasures (ECM), apparently due
to faith in their own tactics as well as their contempt for the Arabs' competence with
modem air defense weapons. When Israeli jets flew CAS on the Golan Front, they faced
100,000 Arab soldiers with 1,500 tanks, over 400 anti-aircraft guns, and at least 100 SAM
batteries. This force crammed itself into a front 25 miles wide, which a jet going 450 knots
could traverse in about 3 minutes. Avoiding metal aimed at one's jet is difficult in such
close quarters against a densely packed defense, especially when one is not well prepared
for it. One Israeli observer said that when the first Israeli jets attacked the Arabs' Golan
juggemaut, "simultaneously we saw over fifty ground-to-air missiles in the air at one time.
Over fifty on a very, very narrow strip of land." In the first few days, the Israelis lost fifty

Staff of the Israeli Defense Force during the October War), "Israel's Eleazar Evaluates
Yom Kippur War," Aerospace Daily (5 November 1973): 22-23 (pp.fromjoumal); and
MGEN Benyamin Peled, Israeli Air Force (lAF), "Air Force Chief Discusses Experiences
of Yom Kippur War," interview reproduced in Translations on Near East #1238 (U.S.
Joint Publications Research Service, October 1974): 46-51 (page references are to
joumal).
'"The political decision not to preempt is from Futtell, Ideas, vol. II, 484; Chaim
Herzog, The War of Atonement (London: Weidenfield and Nicolson, 1975; reprint,
London: Greenhill Books, 1998). 52-54 (page references are to repnnt); and Howard
Sachar, A History of Israel: From the Rise of Zionism to Our Time (New York: Alfred
A.Knopf, 1976), 754-755.
217

planes-half of the estimated total Israeli air losses for the two-week war." Finally, rancor
occurted during and after the war about the lAF's CAS effectiveness. The command and
control setup for directing lAFfightersto CAS targets was not well rehearsed. Thus,
ground units sometimes complained of a lack of air support. Arab defenses made the lAF
pilots msh their attacks or release ordnance at longer distances, thus reducing accuracy.
Though the lAF played a key role in blunting Arab assaults on both fronts, some observers
asserted that its effectiveness owed more to its shock effect against Arabttoopsthan in
actual destmction of Arab tanks.'^

"Andrew Cockbum, The Threat: Inside the Soviet Military Machine (New York:
Random House, 1980), 132-133; Cordesman and Wagner, 92-97; James Crabttee, On Air
Defense. The Military Profession Series (Westport, Conn.: Praeger, 1994), 152-157;
Futrell, Ideas, vol. II, 485-487; Greenhous, 512-515 (quote, 515); Nordeen, 147-165; and
Wertell, ^hie, 139-146.
The SA-7 mostly was a nuisance in the war; when the small missile hit the jets it
usually damaged only their tailpipe. The SA-6 and ZSU-23, on the other hand, were quite
lethal. Israeli pilots diving low to avoid SAMs wound up in the clutches of the
radar-guided AAA. Helicopters apparently did not fare well, either. Both sides suffered
notably high helicopter casualties. The Arabs often salvofiredtheir missiles without
regard as to whose planes were in the air. As a result, they shot down as many of their
own planes as they did Israeli planes.
"^MAJ Donald Alberts, USAF, "Tactical Air Power in NATO: A Growing
Convergence of Views." Air University Review 31 (March-April 1980): 67 (pithy
assessment of lAF's normal doctrinal priorities versus its early-October War priorities);
Andrew Cockbum, The Threat. 132-133; Cordesman and Wagner, 92-97; James Crabtree,
On Air Defense. 152-157; Futtell, Ideas, vol. II, 484-487; Greenhous, 510-527 (quote is
from Mordecai Hod, who by the time of the war had retired as lAF commander and was
serving as an air advisor to the army on the Golan Front, 515); Chaim Herzog, The War of
Atonement. 251-261 (generally favorable to lAF, but notes priority reversal); Hogg, Tank
Killing. 166; Mason, 72-76; Nordeen, 147-165; MAJ Ross Smith, USAF, "Close Air
Support-Can It Survive the 80s?" (Master's thesis, U.S. Army Command and General
Staff College, 1979), 47-53; Russel Stolfi, interview by author.
Aircraft effectiveness against tanks was again an issue. Greenhous' verdict is
balanced. He recounts several instances where the lAF scored important successes against
Arab ground units, but gives only moderate credit to thefighters'antitank claims. He
quotes the lAF colonel assigned to the postwar battle damage assessment team, Yoash
Tsidon-Chatto, as saying that most Arab tank hulks had both air and ground fire hits scored
on them. Thus, assigning proper credit for a tank kill was neariy impossible (16) Russel
Stolfi also did tank battle damage assessment after this war. He told the author that aircraft
218

The Israelis recovered, of course, taking advantage of Arab mistakes and their own
successful combined air-ground efforts against Arab SAM sites. War's end witnessed
Israeli ground forces seizing more Arab territory with their trademark slashing attacks, and
the lAF cmshing Arab ground reinforcements with an effective interdiction campaign. As
mentioned, Israeli leaders dismissed any criticism of their CAS performance by saying that
it was too costiy and yielded little return.
For the next several years, this conflict affected military thinking, especially on
tactical air power. Commentators wondered if and how tactical jets could still influence
battlefield events as they had done in every war since World War II." This obviously

killed only a few tanks. Stolfi acknowledged that tank hulks often had both ground and air
hits, but that the ground hit was obviously lethal whereas the air hit was not. (Ground hits
were usually from Israeli 105 mm tank rounds, and air hits included 30 mm Aden cannon
rounds, rockets, and cluster bomblets.) Cordesman and Wagner also were skeptical of
claims made in the defense press and elsewhere of the lAFs prowess against tanks in this
war; for an example, see Herbert Coleman, "Israeli Air Force Decisive in War," AW&ST
99 (3 December 1973), 18-21. However, both they and Stolfi conclude that the lAF
affected the Arabs' ground effort by dismpting their advances and desttoying their morale,
if nothing else. One also could say that lAF hits upon tanks may have caused the crews to
abandon them; and then wary Israeli tank crews assumed that the Arab tanks that they
faced were still operational and shot them again. Hogg credits the Israelis' greatest October
War victories over Arab armored forces to well-prepared ground ambushes.
Israeli aircraft losses vary by source, since all are estimates due to the Israelis'
understandable reticence on the matter. But all sources indicate that CAS-related losses in
thefirstthree days of the war comprised approximately 50 percent of the lAFs losses.
4^1

For sources explaining or symbolizing the war's general or tactical air power
significance, both at the time and years later, see Vincent Caterina and Thomas
McDonnell, "Future Air Combat Environments: An Analysis of USAF Tactical Aircraft
Entering the Inventory," Student Paper (Santa Monica, Calif: California Seminar on
Arms Conttol and Foreign Policy, 1979), 3; Cockbum, Threat 132; Seymour J.
Deitchman, "The Implications of Modem Technological Developments for Tactical Air
Tactics and Doctrine," Air University Review 29 (November-December 1977): 36, 43
(opined about air defenses that the "worst case must be anticipated everywhere," 43); COL
Trevor N. Dupuy, USA (ret). The Evolution of Weapons and Warfare (Indianapolis, Ind.:
The Bobbs-Memll Company, 1980), 282-283; Michael Evans, "History of Anns Is the
Difference," Proceedings 124 (May 1998): 75; "Five Lessons of the War," Newsweek. 5
November 1973, 54, (discusses problems posed by densely packed, integrated radar
anti-aircraft defenses); Futtell, Ideas, vol. 11, 485,487-490 ("lessons" of the vyar and the
219

battiefield events as they had done in every war since Worid War 11.^' This obviously
impacted the A-lO's fortunes. Though Congress had already forced a flyoff against the

"For sources explaining or symbolizing the war's general or tactical air power
significance, both at the time and years later, see Vincent Caterina and Thomas
McDonnell, "Future Air Combat Environments: An Analysis of USAF Tactical Aircraft
Entering the Inventory," Student Paper (Santa Monica, Calif: California Seminar on
Arms Control and Foreign Policy, 1979), 3; Cockbum, Threat. 132; Seymour J.
Deitchman, "The Implications of Modem Technological Developments for Tactical Air
Tactics and Doctrine," Air University Review 29 (November-December 1977): 36, 43
(with air defenses, must now assume the "worst case . . everywhere," 43); COL Trevor
N. Dupuy, USA (ret.). The Evolution of Weapons and Warfare (Indianapolis, Ind.: The
Bobbs-Mertill Company, 1980), 282-283; Michael Evans, "History of Arms Is the
Difference," Proceedings 124 (May 1998): 75; "Five Lessons of the War," Newsweek. 5
November 1973, 54, (problems posed by densely packed, integratedradarantiaircraft
defenses); Futrell, Ideas, vol. II, 485, 487-490 ("lessons" of the war, the Air Force's
ensuing programs; COL Michael Herzog, introduction to War of Atonement, by Chaim
Herzog, xi-xvii; Robert Hotz, "The Mideast Surprise," AW&ST 99 (15 October 1973): 7;
Sam Kishline, interview by author; Kenneth Macksey, Technology in War (New York:
Prentice-Hall, 1986), 194-200; Mason, 76; Newsweek magazine's 22 October 1973 issue,
which contains "A War that Broke the Myths," 60, and "Waming: 'No Easy Victories,'"
63-64, 79; CAPT Gerald O'Rourke, USN (ret), "Is TacAir Dead?" United States Naval
Institute Proceedings (henceforth referted to as Proceedings) 102 (October 1976): 35-41;
COL Robert Rasmussen, USAF, "The Central Europe Battlefield: Doctrinal Implications
for Counter-Air Interdiction," Air University Review 29 (July-August 1978): 2-20 (tactical
air planner who worked A-10 employment issues); Ben Rich and Leo Janos, Skunk
Works: A Personal Memoir of My Years at Lockheed (Boston, Mass.: Little, Brown,
1994), 16-18; Gideon Rose, "Arab-Israeli Wars," in Robert Cowley and Geoffrey Parker,
eds. The Reader's Companion to Military History (Boston, Mass.: Houghton Mifflin,
1996), 27; Smith, "Close Air Support-Can It Survive the 80s?" 53-57,91-93; and David
Stein, "The Development of NATO Tactical Air Doctrine, 1970-1985," RAND Project
AIR FORCE Report #R-3385-AF (Santa Monica, Calif: RAND, December 1987), 46.
Futtell also observes that many congressmen asserted that the Soviets' air defense
weapons were cheap but effective, thus driving an American push for a "mix" of expensive
and cheaper weapons. Kishline observed that the war created immediate skepticism about
the A-lO's ability to defeat the SA-7, which in tum led to testing that proved the A-lO's
ability to defeat such missiles. O'Rourke sees the October War punctuating a trend toward
more lethal air defenses. Rasmussen bases his article about Soviet air defense on the
October War's results, and states that all planes will require defense suppression to operate.
Stealth aircraft designer Ben Rich recalls that the October War spurted work on stealth,
since the war's results genuinely scared Air Force tactical air planners. Smith believes that
the October War proved that CAS was too expensive, and prefers interdiction.
220

A-7, after October 1973 its members pressed Air Force leaders for answers about the war's
"lessons" as they pertained to the A-lO's survivability. After all, it was the Israeli Air
Force, the internationally acclaimed master of aerial battle, which encountered these
problems. In March 1974 hearings. Tactical Airpower Subcommittee Chairman Howard
Cannon asked Air Force witnesses what they thought of the Israelis' postwar opinion that
any plane that flew CAS required high speed, excess thmst to sustain hard maneuvering,
and the best anti-aircraft counter-measures equipment. The Air Force witnesses countered
that the American-built A-4s and F-4s that Israel chose for its interdiction-oriented
ground-attack mission did not possess the A-lO's survivability features. They repeated the
CAS adage that too much speed hindered the ability to acquire and attack targets. And
they reminded the senators that, although the Israelis did not like CAS, the requirement for
the mission certainly existed when their army was neariy overmn on the Golan Heights.
They could also have pointed out that the A-4s and F-4s were fast enough already, and that
their speed had not made much difference in the situations that they faced over the Golan
Heights and Suez Canal. Senator Thurmond directly asked Air Force witnesses if the A-10
could have survived in such an environment, and why the service needed such a plane
instead of the combat-proven A-7. They replied that the U.S. Air Force's more varied
arsenal and capabilities would have provided better airbome defense suppression-in other
words, the United States was not Israel. They also repeated the service's already-stated
preference for the A-10 due to its customized design for CAS."
"The source for the March 1974 hearing is Congress, Senate, Hearings before the
Tactical Air Power Subcommittee of the Committee on Armed Services, Fiscal Year 1975
Authorization for Military Procurement. Research and Development, and Active DutySelected Reserve and Civilian Persormel Sttengths. Part 8. 93d Cong., 2d sess., 14 March
1974,4310-4313,4316-4317, 4345-4347. Another source for where legislators raised the
October War as an item conceming the A-10 and CAS is Congress, Senate, Heanngs
before a Subcommittee of the Committee on Appropriations, DoD Appropriations for
Fiscal Year 1975. Part 4. 93d Cong., 2d sess., 7 March 1974, 603-604. The senators do
not specifically mention the war, but want to know how the A-10 would fare against the
threats, such as the SA-6, which did so well in it. See also Futrell, Ideas, vol. II, 529; and
GAO, A-10 Close Air Support Aircraft. 8. Futrell quotes exchanges between congressmen
and Air Force leaders that follow the same line as the Tactical Air Power Subcommittee
hearing cited herein. He notes that the legislators "were intensely interested" (529) in what
221

The Preparations for, and Context of the Competition

With such arisingcrescendo of doubt, the Air Force worked to create a situation
that suited all sides. At congressional hearings, its leaders de-emphasized the flyoffs
consequences. A flyoff implied that there would be a winner that would be procured, and
a loser that would not. The Air Force was confident that the A-10 would "win," and that
the A-7 would continue service in the Air National Guard (ANG). Perhaps to some, this
implied relegation to a nonactive status, but the A-7 would remain in the Air Force wartime
force stmcture and provide a nice air support complement to the A-10.'^
OSD made TAC the lead command for conducting the test, with two OSD
agencies, DDR&E and WSEG, providing guidance for planning and evaluation. Given
TACs opinion of slow-speed planes, one might think that the test featured conditions
supporting a conclusion that neither plane passed scmtiny-and that the CAS plane should

the air leaders thought of the A-10 and its survivability in an October War air defense
environment. The GAO report urges that the A-10 fly against some of the Soviet weapons
captured by the Israelis, which included vanous anti-aircraft weapons and the T-62 tank.
Many of the sources noted in this citation imply or directly state that the Israelis are
masters of war and that their precepts should be followed. Also, several observers express
shock that such misfortune befell the lAF in the October War's early days. One forgets
that the Israelis' military situation is quite specific compared to that of the United States,
and in this war at least, they were neither as well prepared nor capable of waging their
preferted type of campaign as in other conflicts. But they are greatfighters,and
Americans still cite their opinions to make their own points. The Air War College text
previously cited for the October War features four articles on that war; one is a general
account, one tells of the American resupply airlift, and two are interviews with Israeli
leaders who disparage CAS. For an example of the lAF's stature before the war, see
Astor, "The Worids Toughest Air Force," 17-22.
'^Cleary, Dixon. 301, 303; Congress, House, Hearings before a Subcommittee of
the Committee on Appropriations, Department of Defense Appropriations for 1975. Part
4, 93d Cong., 2d sess., 29 April 1974, 860; Congress, House Hearings, H.R. 6722. 1337;
and Congress, Senate Hearings, Fiscal Year 1975 Authorization for Military. 4183, 4319
In the above 29 April 1974 hearing. Air Force Deputy Chief of Staff for Research and
Development, LTGEN William Evans, tells the committee that if the A-10 lost, its future
would be in serious jeopardy, but he does not feel this will happen.
222

be the F-4. At the least, one might expect a conclusion favoring the faster, and more
avionics-laden A-7.'^
But opinions within TAC were changing, at least at the top leadership level. Ever
the good soldier. General Momyer told subordinates who opposed the A-10 that they
would support it. Not only this, but both the Air Force Chief of Staff, General George
Brown, and Momyer sttove to improve cooperation with the Army-something that the
Army leadership reciprocated. When General Momyer retired in October 1973, his
successor. General Robert Dixon-the same Dixon who served on the Air Force Pentagon
staff at the time of the A-X's conception-resolutely followed the same course. Both TAC
commanders, and the commander of the Army's Training and Doctrine Command
(TRADOC), General William DePuy, pursued a dialogue on training and operational
issues that led to the July 1975 formation of the Air-Land Forces Application Directorate
(ALFA) at Langley AFB, Virginia. This was appropriate, for TACS headquarters was
also at Langley, and Langley was in tum a " 15 minute drive" from TRADOCs
headquarters at Fort Story. Thus did placing TAC and the Army's training and docttine
headquarters close by each other-accomplished with TACs formation in 1948-finally
achieve results.'^

'^Malcolm Currie, DDR&E, Memorandum for the Secretaries of the Army, Air
Force, and the Director of WSEG, "Fly-Off between the A-7 and A-IO Aircraft," 23
October 1973; Malcolm Currie, DDR&E, Memorandum for the Secretary of Defense,
"Fly-Off between the A-10 and A-7," 2 October 1973, both memoranda are supporting
documents; Watson, "Close Air Support Aircraft," 40-43. The 23 October DDR&E
memo is OSD's "tasker" to the various departments involved in the flyoff. In the 2
October memo, Currie gives a short history of the 1973 scrap over the flyoff between OSD
and the Air Force on the one side, and Congress on the other. He notes concems about
using an undeveloped prototype against a combat proven plane-as well as Cannon's reply
that the flyoff address pilot assessments and not aircraft development. Citing Cannon's
concems about survivability, he adds that he will direct the testers to address this. Finally,
WSEG would provide an independent assessment of the results.
^^Adams, interview by author (worked A-10 issues at TAC staff at the time; Davis,
31 Initiatives. 24-26; Futrell, Ideas, vol. II, 539-546; Sweat. 120 (Sweat was Vice
Commnader of TAC from 1972 through 1974); LTCOL Harold Winton, USA (ret),
"Partnership and Tension: The Army and Air Force between Vietnam and Desert Shield,"
223

There were several reasons for the shift. Army. Air Force, TAC and TRADOC
commanders of the time either had joint-service staff backgrounds, such as Dixon, or
recalled the well-coordinated air support that developed in Vietnam, such as Army Chief of
Staff, General Creighton Abrams. In an interview, Dixon demonstrated his Army
commitment by tartly asserting that "we would crash airplanes into the opposing troops to
provide close air support, if those were the required circumstances. If you think that is a
joke, it ain't a joke to me at all. That may be one of the reasons why the Army and I
understand each other."'" They also did not want a repeat of the A-X/Cheyenne
competition, which had nearly expanded into a major political battle with Congress
dictating terms unsatisfactory to both services. Another reason was that with the end of
America's involvement in Vietnam, attention shifted back to Europe and the fact that the
Soviets enjoyed an increasingly lopsided numerical superiority over NATO forces,
especially in tanks. After Cheyenne's cancellation, the Army possessed only Cobra attack
helicopters that cartied the new TOW anti-tank missile, but lacked the performance and
weapons cartiage capability the Army wanted. That service was only just commencing its
search for another advanced attack helicopter design, a process which did not produce an
operational aircraft until 1985. In the meantime, the soldiers neededfirepower,something

Parameters (Spring 1996): 101-105 (quote, 105).

'"Cleary, Dixon. 274-276, 299-300 (quote, 300); and Edgar F. Puryear, Jr., George
S. Brown. General. U.S. Air Force: Destined for Stars (San Francisco, Calif: Presidio
Press, 1983), 212. Brown was Air Force Chief of Staff from August 1973 to August
1974. Puryear relates that when Brown heard that a subordinate general berated the A-10,
he wanted "a good piece of him"; the A-10 and its promise of better air support relations
with the Army was too important to disparage.
Considering the impact of Vietnam War CAS upon senior Air Force and Army
officer thinking, Momyer's recollection was that the war created an artificially benign
environment that allowed CAS to be conducted with impunity. And though he conceded
that CAS would be necessary in future wars, he believed that the nature of these conflicts
would be much more inimical to the CAS mission See GEN William Momyer, USAF,
"Close Air Support," in Supplement to the Air Force Policy Letter for Commanders
(Washington, D C : SAF-OII, June 1973), 13-21; and GEN William Momyer, USAF
(ret), "Validation of Close Air Support (CAS) Phase II Results," Memorandum for
General Ralph, 9 January 1975, AFHRC Holding K 168.7041-131
224

that they felt the Yom Kippur War confirmed. New weapons and fire control systems
made the war as costly on the ground as it had been in the air, as tank losses for both sides
appalled observers. Indeed, as the A-7/A-10 controversy climaxed, TRAEXX commander
DePuy started work on a new, October War-inspired, Army conventional warfighting
doctrine. It emphasized that the Americans had to mass theirfirepowerto defeat a Soviet
attack in Europe, because "thefirstbattle of our next war could well be its last battle."
This in tum signified that the Army needed Air Force firepower. Indeed, since the Army's
Cheyenne project had failed, that service waxed more more enthusiastic about the A-10.
The plane not only provided heavy antitankfirepower,but also an Air Force guarantee of
dedicated air support against a Soviet tank assault. Thus, in the congressionally incited
controversy between the A-7 and A-10, the Army publicly stated its preference for the
custom-made, durable, and long-loitering tank killer."

"Quote is from Romjue, From Active Defense to AirLand Battle. 6. Other sources
are Adams, interview by author (cites Army support for the A-10 during the flyoff),
"A-lO/A-7 Flyoff Rules Drafted," AW&ST. 23; Bradin, "Birth of a Brave," chap, in From
Hot Air to Hellfire. 133-156; Davis, 31 Initiatives. 24-29; Dupuy, Evolution of Weapons
and Warfare. 310; GEN William DePuy, USA, to GEN Frederick Weyand, USA, 18
Febmary 1976, reprinted in John Romjue, From Active Defense to AirLand Battle: The
Development of Annv Doctrine. 1973-1982 (FT Monroe. Va.: TRADOC, 1984), 82-86;
Futrell, Ideas, vol. H. 490-510, 546-548; Geddes, "A-10-USAF Choice," IDE, 71;
Gunston, AH-64 Apache. 4-8, 41-44; Ort Kelly, King of the Killing Zone (New York:
WW. Norton, 1989), 230-231; LTGEN McMullen, interview by author (A-10 project
director at this time; Romjue, From Active Defense to AirLand Battle. 4-7; James
Schlesinger, interview by author; Winton, "Partnership and Tension," 100-106; and
Worden, Rise of the Fighter Generals. 222-223.
Bradin recounts the extensive modifications required to make the Cobra meet the
Army's increased antitank requirements after the Cheyenne project failed. Futrell identifies
the 1968 Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia as the spark for increased NATO awareness.
Geddes cites Army backing of the A-10 prior to the flyoff. Gunston's work contains dates
of developmental milestones for the AH-64, and notes that the Soviet armored threat in
Europe continued to drive the Army's desire for an advanced attack helicopter McMullen
noted that the Army had just lost Cheyenne and saw the A-10 as a positive Air Force step.
Schlesinger recalled that the Army hoped that the A-10 represented an Air Force bona
fide about CAS. Winton writes that, to the Army, "the A-10 ground attack aircraft was the
most tangible and, in many ways, the most significant indicator of the Air Force's
commitment to air-ground operations between Vietnam and Desert Shield" (104)
225

Further, President Nixon's Defense Secretary, James Schlesinger, sympathized with

those who wanted a strong tactical air force to fight the Soviets. He did not favor the Air
Force's high-technology air superiority bent, as evidenced by its desire for as many F-15s
as it could acquire. In March 1974, he "stmck a deal" with Air Force Chief of Staff
General George Brown about force stmcture. In retum for extra tactical air units, he
secured from Brown the promise to support the A-10 and the new low-cost, lightweight
fighter prototype, the F-16. When Brown left Chief of Staff to be Chairman of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff in July 1974, the new Air Force chief. General David Jones, supported the
artangement even more strongly than Brovyn.^"
The plarmers worked to ensure that the test setup addressed as much as possible the
concems and desires expressed by the Army, Congress, and within the service itself Test
objectives, simply put, were to: (a) determine the pilots' ability to acquire and attack targets
when flying each plane; (b) determine each plane's ability to evade modem battlefield air
defenses; and (c) gather each pilot's subjective assessment of the two planes. The latter
objective was OSD and the Air Force's answer to Senator Cannon. As Cannon forced the
service to hold the flyoff, he said that it need not be "too long or complex." He added that
its main objective was "to take experienced combat pilots and let them fly both airplanes,
the A-10 and the A-7D, and then make a judgment as to which airplane they would rather
^"Christie, interview by author; Dorfer, Arms Deal. 14-15 (the "Arms Deal" is not
the Schlesinger-Brown agreement, but the sale of F-16s to NATO countries-however,
Dorfer discusses the agreement on these pages); GEN David Jones, USAF (ret),
telephonic interview by author, 25 March 1997, recording and notes in author's possession;
Mintz, "The Maverick Missile," The Washington Post, reprinted in More Bucks. Less
Bang, ed. Rasor, 183 (quote; page reference to reprint); Schlesinger, interview by author;
Sprey, interview by author; and Stevenson, Pentagon Paradox. 161, 176.
Jones did not mention the Schlesinger-Brown agreement, but felt that the service
had made its decision for the A-10 and that it should follow through. Sprey recalled that
he helped influence Schlesinger's agreement with Brown, but Schlesinger did not cite
Sprey's influence in his interview. Schlesinger was sympathetic to tactical air power,
especially air support, from his time at RAND in the 1960s. Schlesinger said that, as
Defense Secretary, he sensed a continued lack of Air Force interest in the CAS plane, and
that he wanted something to support the Army in F^.urope. Puryear does not mention the
agreement in his biography of Brown. Stevenson writes that Sprey influenced Schlesinger
on behalf of the F-16.
226

fly in combat." The flyoff would occur at the Army's Fort Riley, Kansas, maneuver area
against armored vehicle artays that represented either a Soviet battalion-sized attack or a
breakthrough situation (Fort Riley's rolling, wooded tertain further matched European
conditions). Defenses featured Army air defense weaponry that simulated the most
lethal-or at least the most notorious-of those encountered in the Yom Kippur War. The
Hawk missile stood in for the SA-6 (though it was an even more effective weapon than the
Soviet missile), the mobile, radar-guided, antiaircraft Vulcan Catling gun simulated the
ZSU-23, and the Redeye shoulder-launched heat-seeker served as an SA-7 surtogate. As
the planes attacked the target artay. Army air defense troops would attempt to track them
and provide hit assessments. The attack profiles simulated European conditions by asking
the test pilots to adjust their maneuvers for four simulated weather situations of decreasing
quality: (a) clear skies, and unlimited visibility; (b) 5000 feet cloud ceiling and 5 miles
visibility; (c) 3000 feet ceiling and 3 miles visibility; and (d) 1000 feet ceiling and 2 miles
visibility. Four Air Force fighter pilots with Vietnam CAS experience in either F-4s or
F-lOOs would fly both competitor planes and make subjective judgments. To further
guarantee impartiality, none of them hadflowmeither plane before."
"Bridges, "Realism in Operational Test and Evaluation," 39 (Fort Riley suitability);
GEN George Brown, CSAF (Chief of Staff of the Air Force), to TAC/CC, AFSC/CC,
AFLC/CC ("CC" stands for commander), "A-lO/A-7 Fly-off Planning," 10 December
1973, supporting documents (delineates conditions for the test); Congress, Senate, Fiscal
Year 1975 Authorization. Part 8. 4321-4328 (Senators wanted the planes to face
sophisticated air defenses); Currie, Memorandum for the Secretary of Defense, 2 October
1973, supporting documents (Cannon quote; and Curtie's intention to answer Cannon's
survivability concems in spite of fears for the cost involved); P.G. Freck, and others,
"Comparison of Some Aspects of the Relative Operational Effectiveness of the A-7D and
A-10 Aircraft Engaged in Close Air Support," Weapons System Evaluation Group
(WSEG) Report 212, (Arlington, Va.: WSEG, June 1974), 1-7, 27-38 (Freck was
WSEG's project leader for this test). Air University Library; Headquarters USAF (office
symbol AF/RDPN [Research and Development]), ""Program Management Directive
[PMD] for the A-10/A7D Fly-Off," 11 Febmary 1974, supporting documents (spells out
test objectives and conditions, and delineates responsibilities); Geiger, and others, "History
of the Aeronautical Systems Division, July 1973-June 1974," 90-91; Harold Helfman,
Deputy Director, Office of Information, Headquarters, Air Force Systems Command,
Memorandum for Commander and Cortespondents, "A-10/A-7D Comparative Flight
Evaluation," 4 April 1974 (explains Fort Riley suitability), supporting documents;
227

The Ouestion of Comparative Weapons' Effectiveness

The above plans reflected the service's best effort to determine-or perhaps better
put, to demonstrate-which was the CAS best plane as the service envisioned it. One big
flight test issue to be addressed/demonstrated was which airplane employed weapons more
effectively. However, the test encountered problems in this regard, the most important of
which concerned the 30 mm antitank gun that so defined the A-10."
The gun project had experienced a few developmental adventures of its own by this
time. Following the same procurement process as the A-X, project leaders had by June
1971 announced two competitors for a gun evaluation; Philco-Ford Aeronautics and
General Electric (GE) Company. Both companies submitted Galling gun designs as
specified in DCP 103. Into the midst of this process came a proposal from
DDR&E-apparently driven by Pierte Sprey-to substitute Switzerland's Oerlikon 304RK
30 mm gun for the Galling gun designs. The Oerlikon had been rejected earlier as an
A-X candidate due to its low reliability and rate of fire. However, it delivered its full rate
of fire instantaneously while the Gatiings' rotating bartel clusters required a few seconds to
spin up to their maximum rate. Sprey's logic was that in a typical strafing pass, the most
accurate tracking occurted in thefirsttwo secondsa concept that some A-10 weapons
instmctors later taught. To Sprey, the Oeriikon gun allowed the pilot to concentrate the
maximum amount of shells on his target while his aim held. Those responsible for the gun

McMullen, interview by author; "USAF Agrees to Flyoff for A-10, A-7D," AW&ST. 23
(Cannon quote); and Watson, "Close Air Support Aircraft," 40-46. The "attack" situation
featured tanks artayed in a line advance with armored personnel cartiers (APCs) and air
defense vehicles following. The "breakthrough" consisted of tanks, APCs, and air defense
vehicles moving along a road.
"Adams, interview by author (says that the flyoff was fair, but its setup and
questions for the pilots to answer were important to the outcome); "A-7D, A-10
'Fly-Off Suggested," Air Force Times. 29 (Air Force concerns about flying undeveloped
A-10 prototypes against the combat veteran A-7); and Watson, "Close Air Support
Aircraft," 43-44.
228

project did not mind competition, obviously, but the inttoduction of a rejected candidate
after they had chosen two other competitors was both an embartassment and a hindrance.
Further, influential members of Eglin's Armaments Lab wanted the Philco-Ford
gun in spite of the fact that the January through April 1973 shooting competition
graphically demonstrated that the GE gun was the best. To some members of the
Armaments Lab, the Philco-Ford gun represented a more advanced lightweight design, in
contrast to GE's more conventional and much heavier weapon However, Philco-Ford's
gun failed miserably. Competition mles required the guns to fire 70,000 rounds, and GE's
gun fired its full allotment, while the Philco-Ford model jammed repeatedly and finally
fired only 15,000 rounds. A separate testfiringof the Oerlikon revealed similar problems
as the Philco-Ford model; it repeatedly jammed afterfiringan average of 842 rounds/^

"Wall, "Development and Acquisition of the GAU-8A," ix-xi, 12-23, 32; and the
following interviews by author: Christie (in addition to the previously cited interview, this
material is courtesy of author's telephonic interview, 26 March 1998, notes in author's
possession), Dilger, Fredericksen, Kishline, Oates, and Sprey.
Fredericksen, who was serving as CAS programs monitor in DDR&E at the time of
the gun competition, says he welcomed Sprey's influence on behalf of the Oeriikon gun,
since it guaranteed competition against what he believes was GE's almost unbeatable
weapon. Christie, who was in charge of the Systems Analysis Division of the Armaments
Lab, says that Sprey's efforts on behalf of the Oerlikon inttoduced undue delay. Wall's
account and sources indicate that Sprey was involved and that the Oerlikon candidacy
caused some discontent. Sprey proudly acknowledges his role, and his assertion about
aiming has some validity; see CAPT Sam Walker, USAF, "GAU-8A: High Versus Low
Rate," USAF Fighter Weapons Review (Spring 1982): 2-5. Fredericksen and Sprey also
liked the fact that it was cheaper, lighter, and an already developed design.
The GE Gatiing gun, for example could fire rounds at two selectable rates,
two thousand and four thousand per minute. The Oerlikon 304 RKfiredrounds at just
over thirteen hundred per minute.
"Edmund Suydam, "GAU the Giant Killer," National Defense 72
(September-October 1977): 132-133; Wall, 20-27, 30-31, and author interviews of
Christie, Fredericksen, McMullen, Oates, Sprey, and anonymous (by request) witness "A."
Oerlikon advocates Fredericksen and Sprey concede that the competition was fair.
Christie, Dilger, McMullen, Oates, and "A" mention the Eglin Armaments Lab's
preference for the Philco-Ford gun and give various reasons for it Philco-Ford had a
large operation at Eglin ("A"). The gun was an advanced design that was lighter than the
more conventional GE model, and was supposed to be simpler to maintain (Christie and
229

In June 1973, the gun project's DSARC formally announced that GE's candidate
won. But the gun, designated the GAU-8A, required substantial development work before
it would be a fully fimctional part of the A-10. For example, conttacting negotiations for,
and constmction of, low-cost but effective 30 mm rounds still remained. Further, the
GAU-8A required flight testing aboard its host aircraft. Initial trials in late 1973 revealed
no big problems, but more extensive firings in early 1974 featured a continuous secondary
ignition of gun gas in front of the plane's nose during firings. The phenomenon occurted
due to the propellant's chemical makeup and the fact that some of this material escaped as a
hot gas through imperfectly shaped shell rings as they exited the bartel. The problem
would be fixed, but both it and the competition deadline meant that the A-10s involved in
the flyoff would not carry the weapon."

The Flvoff
None of the A-lO's other weapons delivery gear would be available either. So, in
order to guarantee fairness, weapons effectiveness for both planes would be based upon
postulated hits derived from recorded flight parameters matched vyith the various weapons'
known employment envelopes. And since one could not actually shoot down the planes,
the air defense assessments would also be simulations derived fromttackingdata. Further,
the attacks on the target arrays would be flown by one aircraft, thus negating any tactical
advantages derivedfrommulti-plane attacks. The planes would not carry countermeasures
gear against the defenses, either. On the face of it, the test appeared to satisfy a neophyte's
view of a fair, head-to-head, competition. Certainly, it was a "test," as recommended by
the Senate and GAO, but the restrictions already in place reduced the obtained data's

Oates). Conceming the Philco-Ford gun's fate, Christie, Fredericksen, "A", and Oates
observe that it lacked parts and was not developed well enough "A" and Christie are
sources for the Armaments Lab's post-competition preference for the Philco-Ford gun
"Wall, 18-20, 28-30, 35-45. Wall notes that the test would evaluate effectiveness
against tanks, which excited interest by LTV in a 30 mm gun pod for its A-7 The Air
Force rejected the idea because the pod was too big and cost too much, especially since
including the Oeriikon gun in the test incurted unexpected costs and effort already
230

meaning. These results would still be useful, in their way, and Senator Cannon had told
the Air Force that he did not require either a long or complex test. But given that the
objective data would be based upon postulations, the four pilots' subjective assessments
assumed even greater importance. Then again, Carmon seemed most interested in these. ^^
TAC commander Dixon was quite aware of the significance of the pilots' opinions,
as well as the hard congressional scmtiny directed at the Air Force and its flyoff pilots.
Just before the test commenced, Dixon informed the pilots that he would not direct their
responses. As he later recalled, one of the pilots expressed concern that the Air Force
seemed to want the A-10, and that they had better choose it as well. General Dixon said
he answered:
'^Adams, interview by author (observes that Dixon was under great political
pressure during thistime);Bridges, "Realism," 41 -44, 76; GEN George Brown, CSAF
(Chief of Staff of the Air Force), to TAC/CC, AFSC/CC, AFLC/CC ("CC" stands for
commander), "A-lO/A-7 Fly-off Plarming," 10 December 1973, supporting documents
(contains attachment that delineates the conditions and restrictions of the test; there were a
lot of simulations); Headquarters USAF, AF/RDPN, PMD for the A-10/A7D
Fly-Off'; Currie Memorandum, 2 October 1973 (requirement to at least address the air
defense issue); Freck, "Comparison," 4-22, 36-53; Gieger, "History," 94; Sprey, interyiew
by author; "USAF Agrees to Flyoff for A-10, A-7D," AW&ST. 23; and Watson, 49.
The planes carried bombs during the attacks to determine how they handled in such
situations, but did not drop them. Using postulations can create suspicions that the
parameters are rigged to favor one plane over another. For example, Sprey is considered
the "Father of the A-10," but he dismisses this fly-off as biased toward his machine. MAJ
Bridges follows this line, somewhat. He writes that he was involved in the flyoff (though
he dos not specify his duties), and asserts that though he witnessed a professional and fair
effort, he believes that the air defense part of the test could have featured more interaction
between the defenses and the pilots flying the planes. For example, the evaluators should
have used Army gunners' actual ability tofrackthe planes instead of assuming perfect
tracking in all cases; and the pilots should have had radar waming devices and jammers.
However, this author believes that this would have inttoduced too many variables and an
ensuing unacceptable level of complexity. Further, it would have violated Senator
Cannon's dictum that the test results be based upon unbiased pilots' opinion of the planes
Bridges concedes that the test still yielded enough information to resolve the CAS plane
dispute, and even led to quicker resolution of A-10 gun sight andflightconttol
deficiencies. In spite of this, Fairchild's President Ed Uhl thought that the test's conditions
were unfair to the A-10! See Edward Uhl, letter to GEN George Brown, USAF, 4
Febmary 1974; and GEN George Brown, USAF, letter to Edward Uhl, 28 Febmary 1974,
both letters, supporting documents.
231

No, no. You didn't listen, and you don't believe me, but I am going to say it
again, and you had better believe me. You are going to do this, and you are
going to say what you have to say. That is an order.... 1 assure you if you
don't, you are going to suffer the consequences and so am I, because I have
assured the Chief of Staff you will, and 1 have assured Senator Cannon you
will. I'm not going to tell you what to say, and if you are waiting for me to
tell you, you are going to wait a long . . . time, boys.
To further ensure that their operational judgment would remain untainted, the pilots could
not talk to each other during the test, and their base location was isolated."
The test commenced in mid April and ended in mid May. In itsfirstphase, the
pilots flew the planes and rated their cockpit setup and handling characteristics. The
second phase was the most important: it featured the attacks flown by a single plane
against the defended target artays. This phase's results revealed that, in simulated free-fall
bomb deliveries, both planes did equally well; the A-lO's closer employment ranges offset
the A-7's advanced bomb delivery avionics. When making mock Maverick missile attacks,
both planes again did equally well, with the test confirming to the Air Force that the
Maverick would make a good standoff weapon (though the attacks obviously could not
address the difficulties pilots later had with getting the missile to lock on to target). The
decisive factor in these weapons effectiveness tests came with the postulated gun attack
results. Based upon its much greater hitting power than the A-7's 20 mm gun, the test
authorities judged the A-lO's GAU-8A a more effective weapon. Conceming battlefield
threats, the Air Force had managed to derive information from the Israelis' SA-6 war
prizes, and thus leamed that missile's radar and missile performance capabilities against the
competitors. The Hawk missile crews had no problem tracking the two planes, but

"Cleary, Dixon. 301, 302 (quote), 303-304. (On page 303, Dixon added that "I
also had to call in the contractor[s] and tell them that if they got down there [Fort Riley]
and f-ked around and interfered with the operation and did a few other little tricks that
contractors are capable of, I would have thrown them off thefield.");McMullen, interview
by author (emphasizes the unbiased nature of the flyoff and importance of pilots'
judgment; remembers that Dixon chided him for trying to give the pilots some A-10
information); and LTGEN Dale Tabor, USAF (ret), telephonic interview by author, 4
March 1997, notes in author's possession. Tabor was a Major at the time of theflyoff.and
was one of the four pilots.
232

SA-6 postulations revealed that both planes would defeat the missile if they maneuvered
and used countermeasures. Similar testing based upon exploitation revealed that the SA-7
was not a threat if the planes used countermeasures. As for the ZSU-23, the A-10 was
more likely to be hit due to its slower speed and lower attack altitudes. However, since it
was a far more mgged and easily reparable plane, the evaluators rated it an overall more
survivable machine against this weapon. Again, use of good tactics and countermeasures
probably would help both planes.^"
Though these results gave the edge to the A-10, the most important result would
still be the four pilots'judgment. Retired Lieutenant General Jimmie V. Adams, who as a
major served as TACs project officer for the flyoff, later said that the questionnaire was
one of the most important things about the competition-and thefirstquestion it asked was
whether the plane they flew could accomplish CAS in the often poor European weather.
In clear weather with unlimited visibility, the A-7 with its superb weapons delivery avionics
was the flyoff pilots' unanimous choice. But as the weather scenario reached the 3000 feet
cloud ceiling and 3 miles visibility, one pilot changed his mind and another rated both
planes equal. For the 1000 feet ceiling and 2 miles visibility scenario, the pilots' unanimous
choice became the A-10. This preference was in spite of the fact that in their assessment
of the planes' respective characteristics, they liked the A-7's smoother handling and
navigation/weapons delivery avionics (though most conceded that the A-10 was still an
undeveloped prototype that could improve). The agility built into the A-10, based upon
^"Freck, and otiiers, "Comparison," 6-22,40-66; Geiger, et al "History," 95-96; and
Watson, "Close Air Support Aircraft," 49-53. Ominously, Freck and company note that
the planes' estimated survivability against the Stinger, the U.S. Army's newest shoulderlaunched, heat-seeking missile, was not good if they lacked tmly effective countermeasures
gear. This missile could be launched against any aspect of an aircraft, not just at its
exhaust as for most heat-seekers. It was also much faster and had longer range than an
SA-7, and its postulated lethality against the A-7 and A-10 was twenty to thirty times
greater than that of the SA-7. It would become the scourge of Soviet attack aircraft dunng
the Russians' war against Afghan rebels during the 1980s, and the report concludes:
"Finally, if the enemy were to develop a tme Stinger capability, new IR [infrared]
countermeasures would have to be developed, because countermeasures effective for the
SA-7, such as rearward ejecting flares, would not be nearly as effective against Stinger"
(20).
233

the combat lessons of CAS, paid off at this point. The payoff also appeared in the aircraft
characteristics ratings; most of the pilots liked the plane's cockpit visibility and believed that
its maneuverability enabled them to acquire and attack targets quicker. As previous studies
and tests indicated, the A-7 simply could not maneuver well enough to operate comfortably
in a poor-weather CAS environment."
In June 1974, OSD reported that the A-10 was the winner, and Air Force leaders
brought the four pilots with them to brief the results to the House Armed Services
Committee that same month. The legislators seemed generally satisfied, though one Texas
representative wondered why the A-7's combat record did not count toward the selection.
Further, another congressman wanted to know what the Air Force thought of the Piper
Enforcer, a design based on the World War II P-51 fighter that Piper was then trying to sell
as a counter-insurgency and CAS plane (for photo, see Appendix Fig. 42). The legislator
alleged that it "could do everything these planes could do, only more cheaply," and thus
previewed Congress' use of the Enforcer to threaten the Air Force when the A-10
encountered future developmental problems. And as the House hearings ended. Chairman
F Edward Hebert (D-LA) still seemed interested in the comparative costs of the A-7 and
A-10. The lawmakers remained skeptical of the dedicated CAS plane's worth.^

"Freck, and others, "Comparison," Appendix A, A-l through A-22 (pilot

questionnaire and pilots' recorded responses; pilots are not cited by name); and Geiger, and
others, "History," 94. Thefirstasked the pilots' preference given decreasing weather
conditions-it specifically asked them to envision themselves in a European combat
environment. The second asked them toratethe planes' characteristics, with sub-questions
asking about handling qualities, ability to acquire targets, cockpit visibility, and ability to
take evasive maneuvers. Conceming the last sub-question, two pilots preferted the A-7
since it was the faster plane, and two observed that both planes were underpowered.
A January 1974 AW&ST article stated that the test would "be measured against a
standard based upon the A-lOA's capabilities." This offset tiie A-7s advantage of being a
fully developed, Vietnam combat-proven weapons system. See "A-lOA Capabilities Set
Basis for Flyoff," (7 January 1974): 53.
^"Congress, House, Committee on Artned Services, Full Committee Consideration
of H.R. 8591. HR 11144, H.R. 15406. 93d Cong., 2d sess., 20 June 1974, 16-50 (quote,
29); and author interviews with McMullen and Schlesinger (both remembered some, but
not many, complaints by the Texas delegation). The pilots' names and backgrounds arc
234

But in the meantime, the A-X had become the A-10, having experienced review by
Senate committee hearings, a flyoff between two A-X candidates, and a flyoff competition
against the A-7. The Senate CAS hearings were supposed to reduce the competing CAS
aircraft designs to one, but the issue's complexity defeated the senators, and the hearings
ended with one more candidate, the A-7. The A-X flyoff was a trial in its way; the Air
Force and OSD ran a fair competition to determine the best design, in spite of some
political pressure on behalf of the competitors. Congress then forced a flyoff between the
A-X flyoff winner and the A-7. Combat results charged the atmosphere for the A-7/A-10
included in this hearings document; beyond their combat backgrounds, three were
graduates of the Air Force's prestigious Fighter Weapons School and one vyas a graduate of
the service's equally prestigious Test Pilot School. GEN Dixon recalled that, as the pilots
testified before the Senate Armed Services Committee, "One of the questions he [Senator
Cannon] asked them was, 'Did General Dixon tell you what to tell me?' One of them told
me later-he almost died laughinghe was about to say, 'Yes, he did,' meaning 'He told us
to tell you the tmth,' when suddenly he realized if he said, 'Yes, he did,' that might be as far
as he got. So he said, 'No. He didn't tell us what to tell you.'" See Dixon Oral History,
304. Also, both LTGEN McMullen and LTGEN Tabor botii say that thefirsttime the
pilots leamed the results and the other pilots' opinions was when they were presented to
Congress; McMullen and Tabor, interviews by author.
The test did not address the competitor planes' ability to defeatfighterattacks, but
in the hearings. Air Force officials cited a study stating that the A-10 was better able to
outmaneuver and evade enemy fighters.
Through late spring and early summer, the Air Force and Congress sparted over
the implications of the test results. Initially, the service did not announce a clear winner,
reflecting its desire to retain a mix of planes. The other reason was that the service was
trapped between two factions in Congress: those who wanted it to pick one plane, and the
Texas delegation which threatened to block funds for the A-10 in favor of more A-7s. By
July, congressional and service compromises having been achieved, the Air Force declared
the A-10 the flyoff winner, retained some A-7s, and appeased the Texans. See the
following AW&ST articles which recount the minor scrap: "Decision on A-10 Production
May Sway Action in Congress," 100 (1 July 1974): 23 (Air Force has announced winner,
and apparent congressional compromise that removed wording that would allow Congress
to reject the flyoff results); "Flyoff Decision Favoring A-10 Expected," 100 (17 June
1974): 16; and "Lack of Clear Flyoff Decision Could Postpone Funds for A-10," 100 (3
June 1974): 22.
Indeed, the Texas delegation would press the A-7's case for a long time. In 1981,
The Washington Post noted that neither the Air Force nor the Navy had A-7s in their
budget, but the Texans appropriated money anyway. See "Opponents Find Vought
Corporation's A7 Impossible to Shoot Down," 13 March 1981, A3.
235

flyoff, as many in Congress doubted whether a plane like the A-10 could survive over the
modem battlefield. However, by this time, both the Air Force and the Army worried about
whether their combined forces were strong enough to stop the Soviets in Europe. As a
result, the flyoff was oriented toward operations in the often-poor European weather
against armored units, a condition for which the A-10 was designed. The flyoff ended the
overt, direct-competition, contests aimed to determine the Air Force CAS plane's fate, but
it would not end questions about whether the plane should be built. As the Air Force
briefed the flyoff results to Congress, some lawmakers still expressed skepticism about the
requirement for the plane as well as its cost. Upcoming and less overt trials would involve
the A-10 SPO demonsttating that the plane, its manufacturer, and the Air Force could
meet both cost and effectiveness goals. Successfully meeting these challenges would allow
the plane to enter the operational inventory as thefirstdedicated CAS plane in the history
of the independent Air Force.

236

CHAPTER VII
THE A-l 0'S FURTHER TRIALS, AND ENTRY INTO
THE OPERATONAL AIR FORCE, 1974-1983

The A-7 flyoff victory and the Schlesinger-Brown agreement did not end the
challenges to the A-lO's existence. Skeptics and opponents still existed. However, now the
primary threat was not a rival CAS concept or another CAS aircraft. Instead it was the
plane's own developmental progress.
The plane encountered problems in several areas: its cost, weight, and gun. All of
these invited carping from various quarters. Congressmen who either had dealings with
airplane designer David Lindsay, or wanted a cheaper CAS plane, or doubted the A-lO's
combat prowess, pushed Lindsay's Enforcer attack plane as an A-10 alternative. Though
there was no direct flyoff competition, the Enforcer did as its name implied, and helped
goad the Air Force to make the A-10 operate and cost as planned.
The A-10 did so. OSD and the Air Force mthlessly cut any item deemed
unnecessary to meet the design-to-cost goal set in 1970. This involved cutting equipment
items that later were added to ease the pilot's workloadindeed, some pilots asserted that
design-to-cost failed as a program because of the capability penalties that it incurred in the
A-10. Nor did Fairchild-Republic escape scmtiny; an Air Force report cnticizing its
management and constmction practices led to organizational changes both at the company
and within the Air Force's A-10 SPO. The plane remained slightly overweight, due in part
to General Electric's GAU-8A 30 mm gun. Some people did not believe that this weapon
would be as reliable, cheap, and effective as claimed. However, aggressive, innovative
work on the part of its developers ensured its success.
In March 1976, the A-10finallyjoined the operational Air Force Officially
nicknamed the Thunderbolt II in honor of the mgged Republic P-47 Thunderbolt, its pilots
acknowledged its ungainly, ugly, appearance by calling it the Warthog. The nickname was
one of honor and affection, as the pilots who flew the Warthog became its fiercest
defenders. Still, there were skeptics and operational questions to answer. Belying its

237

previous institutional skepticism about such planes, the service strove to prove the plane's
worth via equipment upgrades, exercises, and favorable media reports. In this regard, the
Army helped the Air Force. The growing climate of cooperation between the two services
had already manifested itself in an agreement which acknowledged each service'srightto
conduct air support with its respective types of aircraft. Further, the Army's new
warfighting doctrine, "Active Defense," emphasized heavyfirepowerdirected against a
Soviet armored onslaught in Europe. Both services needed the A-10.
In joint exercises, the pilots for both services created a new operating concept, the
Joint Air Attack Team (JAAT). JAAT involved coordinated A-10 and attack helicopter
attacks that sharply increased kills on enemy vehicles while reducing losses to enemy antiaircraft defenses. One of these late-1970s exercises was a congressionally influenced test
to compare attack plane and attack helicopter's fortunes against European-read Yom
Kippur Wardefenses, the Joint Test of Tactical Aircraft Effectiveness in Close Air
Support Anti-Armor Operations (called TASVAL). Though there was some tension
between the services during TASVAL, given its possible procurement implications, the test
proved that their respective air support machines and pilots worked better together. Also
during this time, energetic staffers successfully organized a system for procuring affordable
30 mm rounds, which guaranteed a much cheaper overall program. Further, they
conductedfiringtests against T-62s captured in the October War to demonstrate
conclusively the GAU-8A's value as an antiarmor weapon.
Finally, the A-10 proved itself via its operational deployment. Air Force staffers set
up A-10 bases near Army units in the U.S. and the two regions featuring the greatest
tension between U.S. and communist forces, Europe and Korea. Most impressive was the
European A-10 operation, in which six Warthog squadrons based at Royal Air Force base
(RAF) Bentwaters and RAF Woodbridge, England, formed the Air Force's largest tactical
fighter wing. From there. A-10 flights routinely deployed to forward bases in Germany to
work with their Army counterparts.
The Warthog's future seemed bright, but problems loomed close by. The Air Force
considered, and then rejected, a two-seat, night/all-weather A-10 due to its lack of

238

performance and the problems extant with performing CAS in such conditions with even
the most advanced bad-visibility equipment. The service showed no inclination to buy any
more than its planned number of A-lOs. This was in accordance with the service's normal
CAS force stmcture needs. It also indicated that there was a limit to the service's interest in
this mission.

The Enforcer Interlude

The A-7 flyoff should have been the final challenge for the A-10, but a variety of
extemal and intemal factors made the last two years before its operational debut exciting.
Several legislators continued attacking the plane from the time of the A-7 flyoff through
the end of the 1970s. Some, such as Robert Giaimo (D-CT) and Jim Lloyd
(D-CA), opposed the plane due to continuing doubts about its suitability for modem
combat. Others, like George Mahon (D-TX), seemed against the A-10 due to resentment
over its defeating a Texas-built plane, the A-7, in a flyoff competition. Many others,
including Les Aspin (D-WI), Mahon, and influential staffer Anthony Battista, wanted
further military procurement cuts and considered the A-10 program, with its escalating
costs, a good candidate.'
The result was that, by August, the legislators introduced the Piper Enforcer, an
even simpler and slower plane than the A-10, as yet another competitor. The Enforcer's
creator was politically influential newspaper publisher David Lindsay, and except for the
wingtip tanks, and a nose elongation due to its turboprop engine, the plane looked like a
P-51. In 1970, he submitted a prototype for consideration in the Air Force's

'Battista, interview by author; Congress, House, Hearings, H.R. 8591. 49-50;

Congress, House, Hearings before a Subcommittee of the Committee on Appropnations,
Department of Defense Appropriations for 1975. Part 7. 93rd Cong., 2d sess., 23 May
1974, 1050-1058; William Dickinson, telephonic interview by author, 25 March 1997,
notes in author's possession (Democratic Congressman from Alabama during the 1970s;
skeptical of the A-lO's modem combat suitability); Giaimo, interview by author; Jim Lloyd,
telephonic interview by author, 17 March 1997, notes and recording in author's possession;
Pike, interview by author; and Price, interview by author.
239

counterinsurgency/light-attack plane candidate search project, known as PA VE COIN.

The Air Force judged the Enforcer "a strong candidate for source selection," but finally
rejected it and other candidates in favor of the OV-10 and A-37. The winning planes'
capabilities, and the fact that they were already operational, made them the service's
choices for the counterinsurgency attack mission.^
In an August 1974 special briefing requested by the House Armed Services
Committee, Lindsay claimed that he did not want his plane to compete with the A-10.
This was not tme. Not only did hefrequentlyattack the A-10 then and later, but an
Aviation Week & Space Technology article appearing that same August cited his contempt
for the A-10 and desire for an A-10/Enforcer flyoff. The congressmen ably abetted him,
in that they were upset with the A-10 program's costs and lingering uncertainties. At the
start of the briefing, the chairman of the subcommittee convened to hear it, Melvin Price
(D-IL), submitted for the record letters from other congressmen-one was Armed Services
Committee Chairman F. Edward Hebert (D-LA)-criticizing the A-10 for cost overmns
and suggesting the Enforcer as a cheap altemative. The congressmen's leading questions,
as well as his own apparent strong desire to secure govemment purchase of his plane, led
Lindsay to shed his initial reluctance about publicly endorsing the Enforcer over the A-10.'

^J. Lynn Helms, telephonic interview by author, 23 April 1997, notes and recording
in author's possession (Helms was President of Piper Aircraft Corporation during the
1970s; believes that the Air Force also preferted the AC-130 for counter-insurgency
warfare); Jacquelyn Forth, "Enforcer Out of Mustang Came," Defense & Foreign Affairs
(October 1981): 6-14 (notes the Mustang connection); Clarence Robinson, "Flight Test
Program Sought for Enforcer," AW&ST 101(12 August 1974): 50-55 (recounts how
Lindsay modified P-51 s that he owned, and then derived the Enforcer design from the
Mustang); U.S. Air Force, Project PAVE COIN, "Forward Air Conttol (FAC) and Light
Strike Aircraft (LSA) Evaluation Report," Task No. 327, Project 1559, P.E.-647085,
September 1971, iii-xv, 153-204 (quote, 162), AFHRC Holding K143.054-2.
'Congress, House, Hearings before the Committee on Armed Services, Military
Posture and H.R. 3689 [H.R. 66741. Department of Defense Authorization for
Appropriations for Fi.scal Year 1976 and 197T. Part 4. 94th Cong., 1st sess., 9 April 1975,
5151 (Linday asserts no contest with A-10), 5154-5155 (Lindsay and congressmen
challenge A-10); Congress, House, Subcommittee No. 1 of the Committee on Armed
Services, Briefing on the Military Airiift Capability during the Middle East Conflict and
240

Indeed, the reluctance further decreased as the congressmen repeatedly invited

Lindsay and Piper Aircraft Corporation President J. Lynn Helms to present their plane's
case specifically against the A-10. They retumed in 1975, 1977, and 1978. The 1977
hearings alone spent 125 pages of testimony and featured a congressionally orchestrated
debate over the A-10 and Enforcer's relative merits between Lindsay and Helms on one
side, and Air Force general officer witnesses on the other. A key reason for their
continued popularity was Senator Strom Thurmond, who had political connections to
Lindsay. Other congressional support, such as that from Congressman Les Aspin and
Senator William Proxmire, was due to a simplistic desire for ever cheaper planes. These
lawmakers ignored performance deficiencies that would generate even more spending
either to make the planes fit for combat, or to procure more of them to do the same job as

Enforcer Aircraft. 93rd Cong., 2d sess., 8 August 1974, 2-40; Congress, Senate, Hearings
before the Committee on Armed Services, Fiscal Year [FY] 1978 Authorization for
Military Procurement. Research and Development, and Active Duty. Selected Reserve.
and Civilian Personnel Sttengths. Part 7. 95th Cong.. 1st sess., 16 March 1977,5141-5155
(Lindsay testimony attacking A-10 and praising Enforcer); Forth, "Enforcer Out of
Mustang," 8 (notes that Lindsay came to see Enforcer acceptance more as a matter of pride
than of financial gain; he was independently wealthy and not directly employed by Piper);
Robinson, "Flight Test Program Sought for Enforcer," AW&ST. 50-55.
Lindsay's shift to comparisons to the A-10 in the 1974 congressional briefing is on
8-9 (atfirstsees Enforcer as a complement to the A-10), 19-21, 32-35 (asserts Enforcer's
superiority to A-10 in projected European conflict). Lindsay also complained about the
Air Force's judgment against his plane in the PAVE COIN test, 22-23.
Even in later hearings, Lindsay and Piper President Helms commenced their
testimony with an assertion that they were not competing with the A-10. In the 1975
House hearings. Military Posture and H.R. 3689. Lindsay said, "At no time did we seek to
attack the A-10 aircraft. The decision to pit up against the A-10 . . . was that of the Air
Staff' (5151). In the 1977 Senate hearings, FY 78 Authorization. Part 7. Helms asserted
that "we have never, and do not now, suggest that the Enforcer can and should replace the
A-10" (5165). And in the 1978 House hearings. Enforcer Aircraft. Helms repeated, "I
wish to emphasize in the sttongest possible way that this is in no way meant to be a critique
of or comparison with the A-10" (11).
Lindsay also gave confusing statements about the Enforcer's P-51 lineage. In the
1977 Senate Heanngs, Lindsay asserted that "the Enforcer is not a P-51. 1 cannot stress
that enough gentlemen" (5143). Yet, news articles included in the hearings' report mention
how he derived the plane from that very design (5196-5200; not to mention Porth's
"Enforcer Out of Mustang," 6-8.
241

fewer A-10s. Some congressmen considered offering it to the Army if the Air Force
resisted, but the Army backed away, apparently fearing another roles-and-missions fight.'
'Jack Anderson, "Secrets Leak Out of Foggy Bottom," The Washington Post. 23
August 1980, E3 (notes Thurmond's support); MAJ Lloyd Bryant, USAF, and MAJ
Thomas Dapore, USAFR, A Man for the Time: An Oral History Interview with
Lieutenant General James T. Stewart (Fairbom, Ohio: Aeronautical Systems Division
[ASD] Historical Office, 16 October 1983), 95-96, transcript, AFHRC Holding
K239.0512-1927 (former ASD commander talks about Strom Thurmond and political
push for Enforcer); Congress, House, Hearings, Military Posture and H.R. 3689. Part 4.
5150-5169 (in this hearing, the lawmakers allowed Lindsay to present his case with no
opposition-except for Congressman William Dickinson [D-AL], who pressed Lindsay
hard on hisfinancialclaims); Congress, House, Hearing before the Research and
Development Subcommittee of the Committee on Armed Services, Enforcer Aircraft. 95th
Cong., 2d sess., 22 June 1978, 3-4 (Lloyd's discussion of A-10/Enforcer issue); GEN
Wilbur Creech, USAF (ret.), telephonic interview by author, 30 March 1997, notes and
recording in author's possession (Creech commanded TAC from 1978 to 1984); LTGEN
McMullen, interview by author; Crosby Noyes, '"Taxpayers Deserve Test of Less
Expensive Plane," Washington Star. 18 November 1975, reprinted in Congress, Senate,
Hearings, FY 78 Authorization. Part 7. 5199; and the following previously cited interviews
by the author: Battista, Christie, Fredericksen, Helms, Lloyd, Myers, Pike, and Sanator.
In the 1977 Senate Hearing, FY 78 Authorization. Part 7. 5204, Thurtnond gushed
over Helms' Enforcer briefing: "I wish to state that in my judgment, I have never heard a
more convincing or more effective presentation in the 22 years that I have been in the
Congress of any defense weapon, Mr. Helms, than you made this moming" (5204).
Anderson, Battista, Christie, Creech, and Myers all note that Senator Strom Thurmond
was afirmsource of Enforcer congressional support and/or note political connections
(Myers told the author that Lindsay had "clout"). Helms told the author that Thurmond
was upset with the Air Force because he thought that the service had lied to him
conceming comparative performance and costfiguresbetween the Enforcer and the A-10.
After Lloyd entered Congress in 1975, he supported the Enforcer because he believed the
A-10 was still too vulnerable a plane for the money spent on it. Pike supported it because
of his desire for the best counterinsurgency weaponry. The Noyes article mentions that, in
1974, Senators Goldwater and Cannon followed the Air Force's wishes and cancelled
Enforcer test funding.
Creech recalled the Enforcer's popularity with those who favored cheaper, simpler
fighters, but Lindsay's plane actually split some of the Fighter Mafia group. Chuck Myers,
who at the time served in DDR&E as Director of Air Warfare, thought the Enforcer was a
great plane (in fact, the Robinson AW&ST article noted OSD's conclusion that the
Enforcer's performance matched Lindsay's claims). However, Christie who was at the
Eglin Artnaments Lab, and Fredericksen, who was in OSD Systems Analysis, did not
support the plane.
Congressmen's intent to offer the Enforcer to the Army and the Army's reluctance
242

If Lindsay and Helms thought that congressional interest and attacking the A-10
would obtain an Enforcer govemment contract, they were wrong. Neither Congress nor
the Air Force ever seriously pursued buying it. The Enforcer might have been good for
small-scale, counter-insurgency wars, but it could not compete with the A-10 for CAS
prowess in all situations. Air Force witnesses testily pointed out that the Enforcer's
maximum ordnance load was only a fraction of what the A-10 carried. When Lindsay's
creation carried no ordnance, it was already slightly slower than the "slow" A-lO-and later
studies revealed that ordnance carriage indeed incurted serious maneuvering performance
penalties. The Air Force men also criticized its durability. To obtain an unbiased
assessment, they deliberately disregarded the P-51 's difficulties with CAS-related battle
damage in past wars, and still found the Enforcer highly vulnerable to any battle damage.
Among other things, it lacked redundant controls, and its ceramic armor did not match the
A-lO'stitaniumarmor. ^

is from Congress, Senate, Hearings, FY 78 Authorization. Part 7. 5216-5217; "House Unit

to Urge Enforcer Flight Test," AW&ST 101 (23 September 1974): 27; and Robinson,
"Flight Test Program Sought," AW&ST. 50-55.
^GEN Lew Allen, USAF (ret), telephonic interview by author, 3 April 1997, notes
in author's possession, Battista, interview by author; Congress, House, Briefing on Military
Airiift and the Enforcer. Attachment I, 12-15, 19 (disingenuous comparison on range);
Congress, House, Hearings before the Committee on Armed Services, Military Posture and
H.R. 3689. 5163 (Lindsay attacks PAVE COINfindings,butfiguresbear out Air Force);
Congress, Senate, Hearings before the Committee on Armed Services, FY 78
Authorization. Part 7. 5140 (Air Force Deputy Chief of Staff for Research and
Development, GEN Alton Slay, summarizes Air Force position, which agrees with
Enforcer advocates' performance claims; but says that A-10 is more survivable and lethal),
5205-5251 (Helms and Lindsay debate Slay and A-10 SPO chief, BGEN Jay Bnll; Air
Force rebuttal documents performance and vulnerability); 5220, 5244-5251 (Slay
testimony features competitive bidding, P-5rs CAS history discarded, and Enforcer
weapons cartiage maneuverability problems); Creech, interview by author (TAC
commander from 1978 through 1984, said that neither the Air Force nor Congress
senously wanted the plane); and U.S. Air Force, PAVE COIN, "Evaluation Report,"
157-171 (Enforcer had sttengths but required further development work to be acceptable)
Allen was Air Force Chief of Staff from July 1978 through July 1982, and said that
the Enforcer was never a serious contender. Perhaps as proof, he could not remember
much about it.
243

Lindsay and Helms tried to rebut these assertions by playing up the Enforcer's
strengths. First, it was cheaper than the A-10. The plane had exceptional loiter
performance and handled better on unpaved mnways. It carried a remarkable amount of
ordnance for its size, and Lindsay and Helms made all sorts of promises through the years
about what weapons it could be adapted to carry. They emphasized that its small size
made it less vulnerable to air defenses, especially against radar weapons. But their
testimony often became special pleading as they shifted the terms of their argument to
make the best point and perhaps swing the sale. As Air Force leaders made clear, the plane
was simply not the optimum design for CAS, especially European CAS. Conceming
vulnerability, they explained that the Enforcer's propeller was a natural radar reflector, and
that vulnerability to hits was not only a factor of size but more importantly, what there was
inside the plane to hit and how well internal components withstood hits. The Enforcer's
airframe did not have the A-lO's backup systems and mggedness. Lindsay and Helms
complained about the PAVE COIN evaluation during these hearings, but PAVE COIN
identified as many developmental problems as curtently vexed the A-10. The A-10 had
already achieved two flyoff successes, and yet its developmental glitches spurted hearings
on behalf of another potential competitor, the Enforcer. As such, the Air Force
representatives pithily observed that, if the Air Force wanted such a plane, it would have to
accept competitive bidding and the Enforcer might lose to some other aircraft.*

'Congress, House, Military Airiift and the Enforcer. 8-9, 17-21, 25-27, 34-35
(Lindsay and Helms assert, ertoneously, that tiie A-10 could not fly from unimproved
fields, but it could; see Congress, Senate, FY 78 Authorization. Part 7. 5220, 5225), 37-39
(sweeping claims for Enforcer's ordnance carriage potential); Congress, House, Military
Posture and H.R. 3689. Part 4. 5151-5169 (5162, Lindsay claims that the PAVE COIN
test limited the Enforcer's maximum maneuverability envelope in demonstration exercises,
but cites minuscule weapons loads cartied for these maneuvers; thus, he inadvertently
demonstrates the plane's limitations); Congress, House, Enforcer Aircraft. 5-21 (attacks
previous Air Force rebuttals, as well as the service leaders' assertion that competitive
bidding is required for an Enforcer-type aircraft), 140-153 (discussion of lack of foreign
sales possibilities~the State Department was an obstacle); Congress, Senate, Heanngs, EY
78 Authorization. Part 7. 5141-5155 (Lindsay testimony), 5155-5162 (testimony of
Andrew Baker, who helped create the Enforcer's ceramic armor), 5162-5204 (Helms
briefing, and inclusion of pro-Enforcer press articles), 5241-5243 (further argument by
244

Lindsay and Helms, with an able assist from Thurmond, at least secured an Air
Force flight test for their plane in 1984, but the service delivered the samefindingsas
before. The Enforcer was a good machine, but not as good as the A-10 for CAS-and the
service did not need another counter-insurgency aircraft.^ If nothing else, they made a
remarkable effort to secure a govemment contract-a stmggle made more desperate by the
fact that they found no foreign buyer. Their hearings testimony featured impressive
double-talk and a remarkable ability to tactically argue both sides of various issues in order
to sway the legislators. The congressmen's motives were fair neither to tme circumstances
nor to the active players involved. Senator Thurmond pushed a political favorite's plane as
far as he could, while other legislators shopped for weapons bargains by playing a
Lindsay and Helms); U.S. Air Force, PAVE COIN, "Evaluation Report," 163 (weak roll
response and no redundant controls), 164 (modifications to landing gear required), 165
(Enforcer has weapons carriage versatility, but gun sighting problems due to long nose),
168 (unknown tip tank performance), 186 (Enforcer "weaknesses" include insufficient cost
estimates by Piper).
In his bid to demonstrate that the Enforcer had the same lethality against tanks,
Lindsay claimed that recoilless rifles could be attached to his plane. What Lindsay failed to
mention or did not know was that, in 1970, the Air Force Close Air Support Gun System
Study Group that decided upon the A-X gun design rejected recoilless rifles due to their
poor accuracy and slow firing rate. See Congress, Senate, Hearings, FY 78 Authonzation.
Part 7. 5196, 5201, Fredericksen, interview by author; Sprey, interview by author; and
Wall, "Development and Acquisition of the GAU-8A," 3-4.
^The Enforcer's 1984 fate is from COL Marvin Bass, USAF (ret), telephonic
interview by author, 7 July 1998, notes in author's possession; The Honorable Verne Ort,
letter to The Honorable Strom Thurmond, 27 March 1981, Verne Ort Papers, AFHRC
Holding K168.7270-28; Verne Ort, telephonic interview by author, 12 June 1997,
recording and notes in author's possession; and the following previously cited author
interviews: Creech, Helms, and McMullen.
Ort was Air Force Secretary at the time of the test, and reported that political
pressure was ongoing even in the eariy 1980s. This fact is confirmed by Orr's reply letter
to Thurmond assuring the senator that Ort "is keeping on top of the Enforcer program."
The test report is still classified, but Ort said that it revealed nothing new Further, Bass
was a TAC staffer assigned to monitor and report on the test, which involved noting the
plane's performance and ability to carry and deliver certain types of ordnance. His general
observations matched earlier assessments. It could not carry much ordnance without
suffering serious performance penalties, and interestingly, pilots still could not see targets
over the plane's long nose.
245

simplistic unit cost comparison game. They liked the Enforcer's projected cheaper price
tag, but disregarded the required development work-with the associated cost escalation-to
yield a machine lacking the A-lO's performance, adaptability, weapons cartiage, lethality,
and durability. Even more remarkable in this regard was the fact that the A-lO's total cost,
with alleged small cost overmns, paled in comparison to other jets procured at this time,
such as the B-1, F-14, and F-15. One had to conclude, as two observers close to the scene
have, that the lawmakers did with the Enforcer as its name implied and pushed the Air
Force to guarantee the A-lO's planned performance and cost. In so doing, the
congressmen also created a lot more work than was perhaps necessary for those on both
sides of this debate."
"Sources for Piper's inability to secure foreign sales are Congress, House, Hearings,
Enforcer Aircraft. 142-147; and Forth, "Enforcer Out of Mustang," 9 (notes that many
nations would not buy American planes that the U.S. military would not buy). The two
observers' conclusion about the legislators' ultimate motives isfromauthor interviews with
Battista and Christie. Battista is a good source, because he was a staffer in the 1974 House
briefing and 1978 House hearings.
Examples of Lindsay and Helms' behavior from the hearings and other sources
follow, with parenthetical references. Already noted are their misleading statements
regarding the Enforcer's lineage, recoilless rifles, and their intentions regarding the A-10.
In his 1975 House Hearings testimony, Lindsay concluded by observing that the A-10
weighed as much as some World War II bombers but lacked those planes' gun turtets and
rearward lookout (5168). Apparently appealing to the lawmakers' simplistic attitudes about
cost and combat aircraft capabilities, his story ignored tactical planes' dramatic increase in
size and performance since that war. He also knew nothing of the A-lO's cockpit visibility,
for it was designed with good cockpit vision in mind. The most spectacular examples of
misleading testimony came in the 1977 Senate hearings. Helms over-simplified the
vulnerability issue to one of size, opening himself to sharp rebuttalsfromGEN Slay (51725183, 5206-5214, 5221-5223, 5248). Senator Thurtnond and Helms agreed that the
Enforcer could fire the Maverick missile, even though the plane was not then configured to
carry the weapon (5205-5206). Further, Lindsay and Helms ertoneously exttapolated
chart data and took Air Force performance statements out of context to make their plane
appear competitive with the A-10. However, they could not mask the fact that the
Enforcer carried only a fraction of the A-lO's ordnance load. Further, in arguments over
the two planes' combat range, they avoided saying that the Enforcer lacked air-to-air
refueling capability. Finally, Lindsay asserted that the 30 mm Aden (DEFA) gun was as
lethal as the GAU-8A, but in a previous chapter, this work points out the Aden gun's
known Six Day War shortfalls (5183, 5188-5189. 5225-5227, 5250-5251). When Senator
Goldwater pressed Lindsay about Fmforcer performance deficiencies versus the A-10,
246

A Challenge from Within the Project

Though the A-10 was indeed nowhere near as expensive as the B-1 or F-15, whose
per-unit costs were over $60 million and $15 million, respectively, questions about its cost
made it vulnerable to initiatives by such people as Lindsay, Thurmond, and Lloyd. As
Congressman Giaimo told DDR&E Director Malcolm Curtie in hearings one month before
the A-lO's operational debut: "I remember when this plane wasfirstsold to us . . one of
the real key things about it was the reasonableness of the plane. [Now] It is already up to
$3.6 million." This was the mb; depending upon how one did the accounting, A-10
per-unit expense either hovered around the design-to-cost $1.7 million goal or had done
like other curtent designs and encountered unwanted overmns. The design-to-cost
estimate accounted for inflation and other outside influences upon the original 1970 figure;
but some estimates, based upon later costs, put the A-lO's cost at Giaimo's $3.6 million and
even over $4 million. Lindsay and Helms used the inflated figures in their congressional
testimony. Determining and later defending the design-to-cost figure was tough, given
such factors as political and defense trends, inflation estimates, evolving demands, life
cycle estimates, and varying fuel, labor, and parts costs. Facing tough congressional
questioning about the A-lO's original cost estimate. Air Force General Alton Slay said that
"in 1970, we didn't know too much about how to do design-to-cost analysis.'i i 9

Lindsay replied that "the aircraft were not designed to the same specifications" (5242).
This comment came after nearly one-hundred pages of unfavorable comparisons of the
A-10 to the Enforcer in the European CAS mission. In his 1978 testimony. Helms
appealed to the Israelis' opinions and the Yom Kippur experience. He noted that the
Israelis did not believe that any aircraft could perform CAS against the defenses they faced
early in the war, but after the defenses were taken out, most any aircraft could. Therefore,
the Enforcer could fly CAS more cheaply in such a situation, and aflyingtank like the
A-10 was unnecessary (5-6,9).
'Congress, House, Hearings before a Subcommittee of the Committee on
Appropriations, Department of Defense [DoD] Appropriations for 1975. Part 7. 93rd
Cong., 2d sess., 23 May 1974, 1050-1058 (congressional concems about A-lO's
developmental costs, and Air Force Deputy Chief of Staff, GEN William Evans'
observation that costs will increase if interiudes such as flyoffs throw the developmental
schedule off track); Congress. House, Hearings before a Subcommittee of the Committee
on Appropriations, DoD Appropriations for 1977. Part 3. 94th Cong., 2d sess., 1 March
247

The Air Force stuck to its assertion that, if the plane was over its cost goal, it was
not by much. Nonetheless, congressional attention left the service quite aware of the peril
created by any sort of cost inflation. For example, in the Milestone IIIA review after the
A-7 flyoff, the DSARC members discussed the A-lO's developmental problems and
potential cost overmns. The Deputy Secretary of Defense, William Clements, approved
the DSARC'sfindings,which included a limited buy of fifty-two planes, but stipulated that
the A-10 project had to conduct various handling tests and demonsttate the functionality of
its GAU-8A gun. The aircraft handling issues resolved themselves well enough, but the
gun's performance became the most critical factor in the project's survival, and it took a
while to demonsttate its worth. And as the service continued work upon the gun, it

1976, 121-123 (questions about A-10 cost and performance, and Giaimo quote, 123);
Congess, House, Hearings before a Subcommittee of the Committee on Appropriations,
DoD Appropriations for 1977. Part 5. 94th Cong., 2d sess., 8 March 1976, 104-112 (hard
questions about A-10 cost hikes and performance shortfalls, and GEN Slay's answer
conceming developmental and design-to-cost pitfalls, 110); Congress, Senate, Hearings
before a Subcommittee of the Committee on Appropriations, DoD Appropriations for
Fiscal Year 1976. Part 4. 94th Cong, 1st sess., 26 Febmary 1975, 324-325 (aircraft cost
estimates); and Odgers, "Design-to-Cost, The A-X/A-10 Experience," 24 (Odgers was
formerly on the A-X SPO, and observes that, although the design-to-cost concept had to
account for many complex variables and still needed work, it instilled cost discipline upon
the project players); and "Some Fun Program Working Paper," Headquarters Air Force
staff paper spoof, supplied by LTCOL Thomas J. McGrath, USAF (ret., and former
staffer) to author (the piece lampoons funding complexity).
Congress' auditing body later admitted that design-to-cost was a complex goal to
meet. In a 1978 letter to the Secretary of Defense, the GAO reviewed various military
design-to-cost programs, including the A-10, and found that initial estimates were too
simplistic, and too short-sighted. The letter cited the A-10 as an example of the latter
pitfall, in that program managers actuallyfradedaway performance enhancements in order
to meet specific short-term financial limits. Of course, GAO did not mention that the
service set harsh design-to-cost limits because of hard congressional attention. See R.W.
Gutmann, Director, Procurement and Systems Acquisition Division, GAO, to The
Secretary of Defense, 20 March 1978, B-163058, copy in author's possession.
Lindsay and Helms references to A-10 costs are in Congress, House, Hearings,
Military Posture and H.R. 3689. 5154; Congress, House, Briefing, Military Airiift and The
Enforcer Aircraft 9; and Congress, Senate, Heanngs, FY 78 Autiiorization. Part 7. 80 (in
these proceedings. Helms asserted that the A-10 cost $6.3 million per plane).
248

attended to another concern that abmptly surfaced: the performance of the primary
contractor, Fairchild-Republic.'"
In summer 1974, with Congress upset over the A-lO's cost and David Lindsay
hawking the Enforcer, the service scmtinized difficulties with Fairchild conceming its
operational efficiency. As the Air Force Systems Command's historian of this phase of
A-10 development wrote, the biggest problem was that the company had not undertaken an
aircraft project of this size in some time. This created various problems, to which the
service demanded cortective action. One of these was the Air Force's desire to move at
least some A-10 constmction to the company's Hagerstown, Maryland, plant, where the
service believed that better production facilities existed. When Fairchild rejected Air Force
queries on this matter, the service sanctioned a study by ciurent TAC Vice Commander
and former chief of the A-7 project. Lieutenant General Robert Hails, which focused upon
the company's organizational setup.''

'"The following sources arefromSystems Command supporting documents:

William Clements, Deputy Secretary of Defense, "A-10 Production Decision,"
Memorandum for the Secretary of the Air Force, 31 July 1974; Chief of Staff, Air Force
(CSAF), "A-10 Production Approval," Message to Major Commands, date-time-group
(DTG) 312150Z JUL 74; Defense Systems Acquisition Review Council, "DSARC IIIA
Review of A-10 Aircraft Program," 9 July 1974, 1-7; Headquarters U.S. Air Force,
"Report of the Program Management Review of Aircraft Gas Turbine Engine Acquisition
and Logistics Support," February 1976; and Arthur Mendolia, Assistant Secretary of
Defense, Installations and Logistics, "A-10 Close Air Support Aircraft Program,"
Memorandum for the Secretary of Defense, 26 July 1974, (Mendolia chaired the
DSARC's Milestone IIIA meeting, and this is record of it). The other sources are from
Systems Command History Office: U.S Air Force Systems Command, "History, 1 July
1974-30 June 1975," n.d, 255-257; U.S. Air Force Systems Command, "History, 1 July
1975-31 December 1975," n.d., 79; and Watson, "A-10 Close Air Support Aircraft," 55,
57-59.
The other items to be tested were the plane's air loads and performance, stall
performance, spin avoidance capability, engine performance, in-flight refueling, and
extemal stores certification.
"LTGEN Robert Hails, USAF, "Report Relative to Production Readiness Posture
of the A-10 Program, 4-30 September 74," n.d., 3-4, Part I, 19-35 (tiiis report will
henceforth be called the Hails Report), supporting documents; and Watson, "Close Air
Support Aircraft," 65-66. Watson gives the impression that the service was mostly
249

Hails' group conducted its investigation throughout most of 1974. and its objective
findings were harsh for Fairchild. The ensuing Hails Report, as it was known, criticized
company managers for their inexperience in handling a project of this magnitude. The top
management did not oversee the operation well enough, and thus created confusion about
responsibility at the lower levels. As a result, Fairchild lost control of the pricing and
delivery of subcontractors' goods. Further, both the machinery and skilled work force were
getting old. This meant that the company faced problems with equipment reliability and, as
the workers retired, work force competence. Many people who comprised the skilled labor
force were aging as well, and their expected retirements threatened the company with even
more production problems in the future.'^
The Hails Report shook Fairchild throughout late 1974 and eariy 1975, as the
company changed top-level managers and streamlined its responsibility and
communications channels. More manufacturing went to Hagerstown, but not as much as

concerned with Fairchild's recent combat plane production experience. Though the author
agrees that this was the root cause of the Hails investigation, the study'stimingleads the
author to believe that the actual spark for it came due to outside pressures about the
budget. After all, the Air Force would have known about Fairchild-Republic from the
start, and could have conducted an investigation much earlier. It certainly could have been
an issue during one of the flyoffs. Indeed, the Hails report mentions that the company
induced delays and cost overmns due to its organizational shortcomings (35).
'^Hails Report, Parts I, II, and III, supporting documents; John McLucas, Secretary
of the Air Force, letter to Senator John McClellan, n.d., supporting documents; LTGEN
Thomas McMullen, interview by author; Dr. Robert Sanator, interview by author; MGEN
John Toomay, USAF (ret), telephonic interview by author, 5 March 1997, recording and
notes in author's possession; and Watson, "Close Air Support Aircraft," 67-89 (outstanding
sjmopsis of the Hails investigation and results, given the issues and actions involved)
McLucas' letter was a response to McClellan's questions about the Hails
investigation, and describes the issues and people involved. McMullen said that Fairchild's
Farmingdale facilities were poor and that those at Hagerstown were not much better.
Sanator was Fairchild's Director of Technical Development during this time, and later
moved through a variety of positions to company president in 1983. He recalled that lack
of major program experience caused many problems. Toomay worked technology
development issues on the Air Force Pentagon staff in the 1970s, and later chaired Air
Force Scientific Advisory Board studies He observed that Fairchild-Republic's
constmction practices and equipment were antiquated.
250

originally planned. Fearing the loss of constituents'jobs, the New York congressional
delegation pressed the Air Force to reexamine its findings, which led to its conclusion that
the move would not be as profitable, after all. The management changes and
improvements on the factory floor led to an operation which could compete with that of
any other aerospace company. Finally, there were shakeups on the Air Force side as well.
The service revamped the official relationship between the A-10 project office and the Air
Force corporate liaison office to ensure better responsiveness and understanding. And
though the action was considered non-punitive. Air Force Chief of Staff General David
Jones removed Brigadier General Thomas McMullen as head of the A-10 SPO and
replaced him with Brigadier General-select Jay Brill. There were other personnel additions
to the Air Force A-10 SPO, and one of them was a hard-chargingfighterpilot. Colonel
Robert Dilger, who oversaw A-10 armaments issues. Dilger was already a seasoned
veteran of A-10 gun debates due to his previous job handling gun development projects at
Headquarters Air Force staff. Others had important roles in ensuring the GAU-8A's
success. Colonel Samuel Kishline, the A-10 SPO Deputy Director, was such a one, and
Lieutenant Colonel Ronald Yates, the Director of A-10 Development Test, was
another-but Dilger would be the standout."
Interestingly, one Hails Reportfindingcriticized govemment efforts to meet
design-to-cost goals and ensure the best CAS plane through flyoffs. Both the report and
Air Force congressional testimony pointed out that dismptions in the form of

"Thomas Downey, telephonic interview by author, 20 March 1997, recording and

notes in author's possession (Democratic congressman from New York at the time); COL
Kishline, interview by author; LTGEN Thomas McMullen, interview by author; Dr.
Robert Sanator, interview by author; Watson, "Close Air Support Aircraft," 67-89; and
Warten Wetmore, "A-10 Program Approach Reshaped," AW&ST 102 (10 Febmary
1975): 44-47.
McMullen said that GEN Jones told him his relief was due more to a desire to
clear the air. His career continued and he was later Vice Commander of TAC. Sanator
believed that McMullen's relief was more due to unfortunate timing than any particular
failing. Watson notes that the Air Force initially cited comparative labor costs as another
reason for relocating production to Hagerstown, but the congressionally driven review of
itsfiguresindicated that savings would be minimal.
251

congressionally directed flyoffs cost Fairchild time and money for development. Further,
these sources and later studies criticized the headlong push to meet design-to-cost goals for
inducing performance penalties not only upon Fairchild management practices but also
upon the A-10 itself The A-10 that entered the operational inventory in 1976 lacked an
inertial navigation system and associated heads-up display, chaff andflareantiaircraft
countermeasures dispensers, and a proper flight control augmenter. The service
considered these worthwhile sacrifices until the plane achieved final acceptance; after all, it
was still not a high priority program such as the B-1 or F-15. As mentioned, the July
DSARC listed several items requiring demonstration, but the gun performance and cost
items were most important. As the service worked through 1974 and early 1975 to resolve
Fairchild's problems, it also had to work to prove the A-lO's gun."

The Gun Proves Itself

Clements and the DSARC specifically wanted the gun to demonsttate reliability,
effectiveness, and ability to meet cost goals. Their reasoning was good, because the
General Electric GAU-8A gun comprised not only the lion's share of the A-lO's attack

"Hails' observation matched that of the later R.W. Gutmann GAO letter. Other
sources for this paragraph are Bridges, "Realism in Operational Test,"" 44 (notes that A-7
flyoff hurt the A-lO's test schedule); Carieton, "The A-10 and Design-to-Cost," 6-11,
16-21; Congress, House, Hearings, DoD Appropriations for 1975. Part 7. 1050-1053,
1057-58 (GEN Slay responds to congressional questions about slight deficiencies in the
A-lO's takeoff/landing and loiter capabilities by saying that cost constraints do not allow
meeting the precise stipulations); Congress, House, Hearings, DoD Appropriations for
1977. Part 5. 109; Congress, Senate, Hearings, DoD Appropriations for FY 1976. Part 4.
72, 325; Hails Report, 12-13, 65, 68; and GEN Welch, interview by author.
In the Senate hearings. Air Force Secretary McLucas testified: "The A-10 is the
first aircraft to which we applied the design-to-cost concept. We set a limit. We said the
airplane will not be allowed to cost more than that. If people think of wonderful things to
do to improve it, we are not interested" (72). Welch said that removal of radar range
device for aiming the gun was another casualty of design-to-cost; but that since A-10 was a
low priority project with several enemies, design-to-cost stuck. The flight control
augmenter mentioned was in fact called a stability augmentation system. Its purpose was to
coordinate mdder movement with aileron movement so that turns and other maneuvers
were coordinated properly.
252

capability but also the A-10 itself From the eariiest developmental stages, the designers
intended for the gun to be the plane's primary tank killing weapon. Its complete bartel,
engine, and magazine apparatus was bigger than a Volkswagen Beetle car. It was one
reason for the weight increase and cortesponding flight performance decrease that caused
congressional carping.'^
From late 1974 through 1975, the Air Force and General Electric tackled the
reliability issue head-on. GE successfully conducted a fifty thousand round test of a
GAU-8A in various environmental conditions, including salt fog, dust, humidity, and
extremes of temperature. The service fired GAU-8As using various types of rounds. In all
cases, it did well.''
Verifying the GAU-8A's weapons effectiveness required overcoming various
difficulties. The ammunition initially used in aerial firings created a critical problem. The
secondary ignition of gun gas infrontof the plane's nose dismpted airflow to the engines,
threatened to blind the pilot during night firings, and even scorched the cockpit windscreen
on one test flight. Also, some people wondered about the safety, feasibility, and costs
surtounding the production, stowage, and use of depleted uranium armor piercing shells.
Friction came from the armaments laboratories. The Army's Ballistic Research Laboratory
(BRL) was involved with the GAU-8A project as part of the Defense Department's Joint
Technical Coordinating Group, and questioned whether a 30 mm gun really could desttoy
a tank. As Colonel Dilger later w^ote, people wondered that, if tanks used guns of over
100 mm bartel bore displacement to desttoy other tanks, what could a gun of one-fourth
that displacement do? Along with this sensible skepticism went more parochial motives,
such as fear of what a successful 30 mm aerial gun would do to Army tank procurement
efforts. Both BRL and Eglin Laboratory wanted controlledfiringsof single rounds against

'^COL Robert Dilger, USAF, "Tank Killer Team," National Defense 71

(November-December 1976): 190-191 (page 191 has a picture of the GAU-8A sitting
next to, and dwarfing, a Volkswagen Beetle); and Wall, 30, 37, 63-64
"Geiger, and others, "History of the Aeronautical Systems Division," 101, and
Wall, 64-66.
253

steel plates. They believed that they could determine weapons effectiveness against tanks
from this result; but their model did not account for the synergistic effect of dozens of
rounds hitting a combat-loaded tank. Finally, since it was more a research organization
used to big budgets and its own deadlines, Eglin seemed oblivious to how increasing
weapons costs or developmental difficulties affected the overall program. '^
The battle to address these problems began immediately. The June 1973 DDR&E
approval for fiill scale ammunition provided for dual-source contracting for ammunition to
lower costs, as well as analysis leading to the best armor piercing shell. GE had already
contracted with Aerojet for ammunition supply, and the govemment added Honeywell as a
second competitive source. But Aerojet wanted to remain sole source, and in early 1974
even contacted congressional allies to ensure this. In response, the A-10 SPO successfully
insisted upon the dual-source policy. The gun gas problem that surfaced in Febmary 1974
took more time to solve. The Eglin Lab wanted extensive studies to resolve the problem.
However, as Colonel Kishline and others later averted, the program had neither the time,
the money, and the powerful backing to do this. A-10 SPO staffers worked aroundand
in some accounts, ran overEglin to remix the propellant and create a shell that yielded no
combustible gases outside the bartel but retained the required high muzzle velocity. Fo
further ensure that secondary ignition did not happen, the A-10 SPO replaced copper shell
'^The gun gas problem sources are Wall, 42-45; and author interviews with Dilger,
Kishline and Oates (assistant to Dilger, also source for scorched windscreen). The sources
for the Army BRL's suspicions are previously cited author interviews with Buchta
(ammunition program manager at Eglin from 1972-1975), Dilger, O'Bryon; and GEN
Ronald Yates, USAF (ret.), telephonic interview by author, 21 April 1997, recording and
notes in author's possession (A-10 SPO Director of Development Test). Sources for
Eglin's position are author interviews with Buchta, Christie, Dilger, Kishline, Oates, and
Yates.
O'Bryon worked as a BRL ballistics engineer until June 1974, followed by a
research fellowship at MIT until August 1975, and then was Assistant to the Director,
BRL, from August 1975 through September 1976. Though he was not at BRL for the one
year when many of the GAU-8A gun issues climaxed, he vyas there both immediately
before and afterwards, and was familiar with the issues involved. His observation was that
the BRL takes the worst case scenario for weapons effectiveness, and uses only one-round
firings to base its assessment. It did not then have the technology to postulate the effect of
several rounds hitting a tank; nor did it do realistic testing until much later.
254

rings with plastic ones. This not only prevented propellant gas from escaping, but also
reduced bartel wear and provided a cheaper source of shell rings. Though there would be
occasional problems with bad lots of ammunition in later years, the gun gas fix was tested
and found sure enough that the Air Force Systems Command Headquarters declared the
problem closed in November 1974.'"
The SPO also strove to prove the ammunition's effectiveness against tanks.
Though the govemment determined that depleted uranium contained the desired mass and
ability to bum metal upon impact (called "pyrophoric effect") early during concept
development, outside players still interfered. Back in 1971, Packard's Close Air Support
Study Group insisted upon tungsten and steel rounds. The Air Force tested the various
candidate rounds, and in July 1973 repeated its assertion that depleted uranium was the
best for the armor piercing incendiary function. Still, the service had to show that depleted
uranium would not produce harmful radioactive side effects during production, handling,
and battlefield use-both Dilger and Kishline recalled several congressional inquiries on this
matter. Perhaps to ensure an unbiased judgment, DoD's Joint Technical Coordinating
Group handled the study, and in April 1974, reported that the material had "no significant
'"LTGEN Al Casey, USAF (ret), telephonic interview by autiior, 17 May 1998,
notes and recording in author's possession (Casey assisted Dilger with gun issues at the
A-10 SPO); Buchta, interview by author; Dilger, "Tank Killer Team," 190; Edward Elko
and T.R. Stuelpnagel, "The 30-mm GAU-8A Ammunition Story," National Defense 66
(September 1981): 51; Kishline, interview by author; COL John Lieberhert, USAF,
personal interview by author, Fairfax, Va., 4 May 1998, notes in author's possession;
Oates, interview by author; Robinson, "USAF Plans A-10 Deployment to Europe,"
AW&ST. 45; Suydam, "GAU the Giant Killer," National Defense. 133-134; Sweettnan,
A-10. 14; Wall, 35-45; and Watson, "Close Air Support Aircraft," 94.
The change was to use potassium nitrate in the gun propellant; the SPO bortowed
this practice from the Navy and its battleship guns. Another gunfiringproblem was gun
gas residue accumulation on the windscreen and engine blades. The solution involved
including a windshield wash system and ensuring regular engine washes. Lieberhert was
involved with A-10 weapons issues from 1977. He recalls an A-10 dual-engine flameout
caused by secondary gun gas ignition in 1978.
Edward Elko was President of Aerojet, and praises the competitive bidding. This
does not square with SPO interviewee account of Aerojet's initial sole contractor efforts.
However, Elko also praises the SPO for granting to contractors the freedom to efficiently
meet specifications, as well as sharing in some production facilities costs.
255

medical and environmental impact." The other issue with this material was ease and cost
of production, something which SPO staffers' initiative solved. They discovered that
Ohio-based Battelle Laboratories knew how to mass-produce depleted uranium shell cores
cheaply, and was also willing to support the two ammunition manufacturers."
In the end, the most dramatic means of proving the gun came with realistic testing.
At the time, this was a novel concept, since most weapons evaluations were either pure
computer studies or controlled, small-scale tests whose results were exttapolated via
computer modelling to make larger conclusions. In gun tests, for example, the Army and
Air Force weapons labsfiredrounds singly at a piece of armor and derived conclusions
about what this did to an entire tank. The labs did this due to an institutionalized faith in
computer analysis and the not-unreasonable fear of mnaway test costs. And though this
may not have been another reason, analysis left itself open to manipulation of the premises.
One can say that any test carties such pitfalls, but computer and other engineering analysis
was especially vulnerable due to the lack of actual, perhaps conflicting, experience. In this
case, the Army BRL wanted to downgrade the GAU-8A's effectiveness due to its potential
for demeaning the importance of tanks, and it did so. As for Eglin, as well as a new Air
Force test monitoring agency called the Air Force Test and Evaluation Center (known by
the acronymic "AFOTEC," and the A-10 was itsfirstaircraft project), the issue apparently
threatened the validity of their own methods.^"

"Dilger, interview by author; Elko and Stuelpnagel, "Ammunition Story," National

Defense. 51-52; Geiger, and others, 98; Charles Gilson, "Can the A-10 Thunderbolt II
Survive in Europe?" Intemational Defense Review (henceforth abbreviated to IDR) 12
(Febmary 1979): 186 (sidebar about GAU-8A and ammunition); Kishline, interview by
author; Oates, interview by author; and Wall, 49-57.
One anonymous interviewee, who was associated with gun testing in the late 1970s,
opined that depleted uranium in large quantities could be a hazard. The author sides with
the govemment study. It occurted during the 1970s, when there was great skepticism
about military weapons in general and nuclear test safety in particular. The Congress had a
post-Watergate, post-Vietnam Democratic majority that probably would have challenged
any suspicious findings.
^"Author interviews with Buchta, Dilger, Chnstie, Kishline, Oates, and Yates. A
good primary source account of the battle to make the BRL adopt realistic weapons testing
256

Against this resistance, and knowing that the A-lO's survival possibly depended
upon it, A-10 SPO staffers Kishline and Dilger set up a live fire demonstration against
tanks at the Nellis Air Force Base test ranges in Nevada. It featured A-10s flying attack
profiles against combat-loaded tanks-that is, normal fuel and ammunition load-using
armor piercing 30 mm ammunition. The results were spectacularly successful, and Dilger,
who was the actual live-fire project manager, made sure that they were filmed. The hail
of shells produced in afiringburst set the tanks on fire, and in some cases, blew them up.
At an autumn 1974 DSARC meeting, Kishline impressed the attendees with these films
and emphatically ended any development phase questions about GAU-8A effectiveness.
Autumn 1975 live firings against T-62 tanks captured by the Israelis in the October War
punctuated the gun's success.^'
Still, there remained the issue of per-round cost, and the SPO needed to reduce it
as much as possible to relieve pressure about A-10 program cost overmns. Ensuring that
there continually be two competitive contractors for ammunition allowed the service to

is COL James Burton's The Pentagon Wars. In his telephonic interview with the author,
COL Burton said that the realistic gun tests for the GAU-8A inspired this approach to
Army testing.
"DDR&E, "Development Coordinating Paper, A-10 Specialized Close Air Support
Aircraft, #23B," (henceforth known as DCP 23B), 1,4 supporting documents; Dilger,
"Tank Killer Team," 190-191; Elko and Stuelpnagel, 52; Kaplan, "Beast of Battle," 12;
and author interviews with Dilger, Kishline, O'Bryon, Oates, Stolfi, and Yates; and Wall,
66-67. The official live fire details were that A-10s made 22 passes against 15 tanks,
immobilizing all 15 and desttoying 8. O'Bryon intimated BRL suspicions that the Air
Force put gasoline inside the tiurets to create a more spectacular display This was
something that Oates, who participated in the gun tests, denied. The author sides with
Oates in this case. After all, the tanks also carried diesel fuel in their fuel tanks and
explosive ammunition inside their tiurets, just as in real combat. One must consider the
effect of 30 mm shells upon this setup. GAU-8A rounds contact the turtet and either
penetrate outright with pyrophoric effect or at least cause spalling effect (pushes the armor
inward and causes it to liquify and separate at roughly the same velocity as the impacting
round). Molten, flaming balls of the material ricochet and splatter within the turtct at high
rates of speed. If the material contacts explosive shells and causes them to in tum detonate,
the result could be equally dramatic. There is a limit to realistic testing, of course, and no
crew was aboard during the live fire. However, one can easily imagine the 30 mm rounds'
effect upon them.
257

work the cost per round from neariy eighty dollars per round to around twenty dollars per
round. When one considers that the gun fired seventy rounds in a two-second burst, and
that pilots would require a great many rounds for both practice and combat, this created
spectacular savings. Additionally, the A-10 SPO staff found that aluminum shell casings
worked as well as steel or brass, which not only saved money but also weight. The SPO
staff also suppressed various Eglin shell improvement initiatives that would have increased
costs and added development time and risk. Finally, Colonel Dilger spearheaded creation
of an automatic loading machine that would reduce time, complexity, and cost when
conducting routine reloadings."
Resolving gun issues was the last major hurdle before OSD and the Air Force
allowed Fairchild to commence full production of operational models. Upon the DSARC's
Milestone IIIB recommendation in early 1976, OSD approved a total buy of between six
hundred and seven hundred aircraft (though Congress would approve spending on a
year-by-year basis). This meant that the plane still had to prove itself somewhat, as the
later Enforcer hearings attested. There was resistance within the service as well, as A-10
defenders allegedly spoiled an attempt to place responsibility for the program in some OSD
bureaucratic backwater in 1975. This brings up the issue of the A-10 SPO staffers' efforts
on behalf of their plane. In later years-especial ly in the 1980s when the military reform
movement decried the inverse evils of increased weapons costs and allegedly decreased
military quality-observers cited the A-10 and its project staffers as paragons of what
common sense and initiative could do for military effectiveness. Specifically, reformist
writers presented Colonel Bob Dilger as an example of a hard-charging innovator
single-handedly challenging an incompetent defense management. Certainly, Dilger was
aggressive and innovative; all accounts agree on that point. From his service while at the
"James Coates and Michael Killian, Heavy Losses: The Dangerous Decline of
American Defense (New York: Viking Press, 1985), 154-155; MAJ Michael Riley, USA,
"The A-10 Thunderbolt as an Organic Army Asset" (Master's thesis. Army Command and
General Staff College, 1991), 77 (praises automatic loading system as part of the plane's
easy maintainability); and Wall, 17-20, 36-37, 69-70, 78-80 (Wall cites one study that
pointed out that ammunition accounted for 90 percent of costs in the life of a gun system),
and the following interview by author: Buchta, Casey, Dilger, Kishline, and Oates
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Pentagon, through the development stage just recounted, and onward to later actions, he
substantially contributed to the A-10 gun's success. However, he was not the only man
involved with some of decisive actions mentioned. The official accounts and personal
interviews reveal that others, such as Al Casey, Bob Buchta, Tom Christie, John Foster,
Sam Kishline, and Ron Yates played big roles in securing such things as dual-source
contracting and realistic tests."
On 30 March 1976, General Dixon presided over the Langley Air Force Base
ceremony that formally welcomed the A-10 into the Air Force operational inventory.
There were still obstacles to overcome, but the aircraft was the product of nearly ten years
of extensive concept development work, competition, challenges, and constant paring and
refining to make it meet both operational andfinancialdemands. The issue about whether
it actually met its design-to-cost goal was still open to interpretation-though even if one

"Examples of the heroic Dilger accounts are Burton, Pentagon Wars. 24-25, 58-59
(Burton worked with Dilger on other gun projects, and was impressed with his
no-nonsense, can-do style); Coates and Killian, Heavy Losses. 154-155; "Cost Cutter,"
Time. March 1983, 29; Frank Greve, "A Career Cut Short by a Mission Well Done," San
Jose Mercury 15 November 1982, reprinted in More Bucks. Less Bang, ed. Rasor, 284288; Kaplan, "Beast of Battle," 12; and Mintz, "The Maverick Missile," in More Bucks.
Less Bang, ed. Rasor, 176.
The A-lO's approval for production is from U.S. Air Force Systems Command,
"AFSC History, 1 January 1976-31 December 1976," n.d., 168-169, DCP 23B, 1, and
Watson, "Close Air Support Aircraft," 96-97.
In his "Maverick Missile," article, Mintz writes that, in mid-1974, people within
both OSD and the Air Force attempted to stall A-10 production indefinitely. In this
account, Tom Christie (then working in OSD's Programs, Analysis and Evaluation Office)
leamed of it and not only threatened to propose transferring the A-10 to the Army but also
alerted both Deputy Defense Secretary William Clements and TAC Commander Robert
Dixon, who halted the effort. On 12 March 1997, the author phoned Mintz for more
details, but Mintz could not remember specific sources. In their interviews with the author,
neither former TAC Commander Dixon nor former Air Force Chief of Staff Jones
remembered any such action. Dixon said that Air Force generals may have opposed the
A-10 (Mintz mentioned U.S. Air Forces in Europe commander, GEN John Vogt), but
added that it was unwise to attempt terminating a project that the top leaders supported,
lom Christie told the author that there were two attempts within OSD and the Air Force to
halt production, but that both were stopped long before they gained any momentum He
did not provide extensive details, however.
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accepted the pessimistic estimates, it had not missed by much. It was now time to prove
itself outside the developmental worid as well.

The Warthog
The Air Force later christened the A-10 the Thunderbolt II, in honor of the
Republic Aviation Company's mgged P-47 Thunderbolt that did such good ground support
in Worid War II. However, both supporters and detractors among the service's pilots
called the plane the "Warthog" for its ugly appearance compared to other tactical planes (it
was also simply called the "Hog"). Indeed, one late-1970s commander of a new A-10
wing later recalled his wife's reaction uponfirstseeing the Warthog. She said that she was
always confused about identifying other jets he had flown, but she would never have any
problem remembering this one. Before too long, jokes about the Warthog's relative lack of
speed and technological sophistication appeared. One was, "What is the greatest threat to
the A-10 during low-level flight? Bird strikes from the rear." Another joke went, "Two
tanks are driving down the road, and the commander of one radios the other, 'A-10s are
attacking us from behind! Step on it, and we'll outmn 'em!'" And still another informed,
"What is the speed indicator in an A-10? A calendar.""

"Adams, interview by author (wife anecdote); Lou Drendel, A-10 Warthog in

Action (Cartollton, Tex.: Squadron/Signal Publications, 1981), 3-5 (Drendel gives the
official naming date as April 1978, which apparently occiured during the ceremony
honoring Fairchild-Republic's production of the 100th A-10); Len Famiglietti, "A-10,
Thunderbolt II, Harks Back to P-47," Air Force Times. 17 April 1978, 10; Lieberhert,
interview by author; "Remarks of General Dixon at 100th A-10 Ceremony on April 3,
1978," AFHRC Holding K417.168-119 (Dixon refers to the P-47's exploits, and then
refers to the A-10, "which we now call the Thunderbolt If); Smallwood, Warthog. 16-19;
Sweetman, A-10. 12, 15 (notes official name and unofficial name; cites Eglin AFB
Tactical Air Warfare Center [TAWC] Major Michael G. Major with the first recorded use
of "Warthog" nickname in a 1974 TAWC Review article on the plane). Drendel,
Lieberhert, and Smallwood note that A-10 pilots embraced the nickname and insisted to
newcomers that it be called thus. Lieberhert recalled that TAC headquarters initially
banned use of the nickname (apparently due to fears about A-10 unit morale and negative
public image), but Air Force aviation painter Keith Ferris' picture, "Warthog at Work,"
illustrated, so to speak, the ban's futility. Jokes are courtesy of author's Air Force tours as
an A-10 pilot, as well as Smallwood, Warthog. 9
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The acceptance issue was an important one, for the plane had its Air Force
enemies. General John Vogt, at the time commander of the U.S. Air Forces in Europe
(USAFE), bluntly told people that the plane would not long survive European air combat.
Nellis Air Force Base in Nevada was the service's premierfighterbase, since its fighter
weapons and tactics testing. Fighter Weapons School (FWS), and the newly created "Red
Flag" tactical combat exercise were all there. The Nellis non-Warthog pilots' attitude
toward the A-10 was and remains cool, if not downright contemptuous. Also, one aviation
weekly noted that "Ninety-five percent of the pilots transitioning to the A-10 do not want
to