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G.R.No.135306

TodayisThursday,March17,2016

RepublicofthePhilippines
SUPREMECOURT
Manila
ENBANC
G.R.No.135306January28,2003
MVRSPUBLICATIONS,INC.,MARSC.LACONSAY,MYLAC.AGUJAandAGUSTINOG.BINEGAS,JR.,
petitioners,
vs.
ISLAMICDA'WAHCOUNCILOFTHEPHILIPPINES,INC.,ABDULRAHMANR.T.LINZAG,IBRAHIMF.P.
ARCILLA,ABDULRASHIDDEGUZMAN,ALFAREDDASILVAandIBRAHIMB.A.JUNIO,respondents.
BELLOSILLO,J.:
Imayutterlydetestwhatyouwrite,butIshallfighttothedeathtomakeitpossibleforyoutocontinue
writingit.
Voltaire
VOLTAIRE'SPONTIFICALVERSEbestirsonceagainthebasiclibertiestofreespeechandfreepressliberties
that belong as well, if not more, to those who question, who do not conform, who differ. For the ultimate good
whichweallstrivetoachieveforourselvesandourposteritycanbetterbereachedbyafreeexchangeofideas,
wherethebesttestoftruthisthepowerofthethoughttogetitselfacceptedinthecompetitionofthefreemarket
notjusttheideaswedesire,butincludingthosethoughtswedespise.1
ISLAMIC DA'WAH COUNCIL OF THE PHILIPPINES, INC., a local federation of more than seventy (70) Muslim
religious organizations, and individual Muslims ABDULRAHMAN R.T. LINZAG, IBRAHIM F.P. ARCILLA, ABDUL
RASHIDDEGUZMAN,ALFAREDDASILVAandIBRAHIMB.A.JUNIO,filedintheRegionalTrialCourtofManila
a complaint for damages in their own behalf and as a class suit in behalf of the Muslim members nationwide
againstMVRSPUBLICATIONS,INC.,MARSC.LACONSAY,MYLAC.AGUJAandAGUSTINOG.BINEGAS,JR.,
arisingfromanarticlepublishedinthe1August1992issueofBulgar,adailytabloid.Thearticlereads:
"ALAMBANINYO?
NaangmgababoyatkahitanonguringhayopsaMindanaoayhindikinakainngmgaMuslim?
Parasakanilaangmgaitoayisangsagradongbagay.Hindinilaitokailangangkaininkahitnasilapaay
magutomatmawalanngulamsatuwingsilaaykakain.GinagawanilaitongDiyosatsinasambapanilaito
satuwingarawngkanilangpangingilinlalunglalonasaarawnatinatawagnilang'Ramadan'."
ThecomplaintallegedthatthelibelousstatementwasinsultinganddamagingtotheMuslimsthatthesewords
alludingtothepigastheGodoftheMuslimswasnotonlypublishedoutofsheerignorancebutwithintenttohurt
the feelings, cast insult and disparage the Muslims and Islam, as a religion in this country, in violation of law,
publicpolicy,goodmoralsandhumanrelationsthatonaccountoftheselibelouswordsBulgarinsultednotonly
the Muslims in the Philippines but the entire Muslim world, especially every Muslim individual in nonMuslim
countries.
MVRSPUBLICATIONS,INC.,andAGUSTINOG.BINEGAS,JR.,intheirdefense,contendedthatthearticledid
not mention respondents as the object of the article and therefore were not entitled to damages and, that the
article was merely an expression of belief or opinion and was published without malice nor intention to cause
damage,prejudiceorinjurytoMuslims.2
On30June1995thetrialcourtdismissedthecomplaintholdingthattheplaintiffsfailedtoestablishtheircauseof
actionsincethepersonsallegedlydefamedbythearticlewerenotspecificallyidentified
Itmustbenotedthatthepersonsallegedlydefamed,thehereinplaintiffs,werenotidentifiedwithspecificity.
ThesubjectarticlewasdirectedattheMuslimswithoutmentioningoridentifyingthehereinplaintiffsxxx.It
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is thus apparent that the alleged libelous article refers to the larger collectivity of Muslims for which the
readersofthelibelcouldnotreadilyidentifythepersonalitiesofthepersonsdefamed.Hence,itisdifficult
for an individual Muslim member to prove that the defamatory remarks apply to him. The evidence
presented in this case failed to convince this court that, indeed, the defamatory remarks really applied to
thehereinplaintiffs.3
On27August1998theCourtofAppealsreversedthedecisionofthetrialcourt.Itopinedthatitwas"clearfrom
thedisputedarticlethatthedefamationwasdirectedtoalladherentsoftheIslamicfaith.Itstatedthatpigswere
sacredandidolizedasgodbymembersoftheMuslimreligion.Thislibelousimputationundeniablyappliedtothe
plaintiffappellantswhoareMuslimssharingthesamereligiousbeliefs."Itaddedthatthesuitfordamageswasa
"class suit" and that ISLAMIC DA'WAH COUNCIL OF THE PHILIPPINES, INC.'s religious status as a Muslim
umbrellaorganizationgaveittherequisitepersonalitytosueandprotecttheinterestsofallMuslims.4
Hence, the instant petition for review assailing the findings of the appellate court (a) on the existence of the
elementsoflibel,(b)therightofrespondentstoinstitutetheclasssuit,and,(c)theliabilityofpetitionersformoral
damages,exemplarydamages,attorney'sfeesandcostsofsuit.
Defamation, which includes libel and slander, means the offense of injuring a person's character, fame or
reputation through false and malicious statements.5 It is that which tends to injure reputation or to diminish the
esteem, respect, good will or confidence in the plaintiff or to excite derogatory feelings or opinions about the
plaintiff.6Itisthepublicationofanythingwhichisinjurioustothegoodnameorreputationofanotherortendsto
bring him into disrepute.7 Defamation is an invasion of a relational interest since it involves the opinion which
othersinthecommunitymayhave,ortendtohave,oftheplaintiff.8
Itmustbestressedthatwordswhicharemerelyinsultingarenotactionableaslibelorslanderperse,andmere
words of general abuse however opprobrious, illnatured, or vexatious, whether written or spoken, do not
constituteabasisforanactionfordefamationintheabsenceofanallegationforspecialdamages.9Thefactthat
thelanguageisoffensivetotheplaintiffdoesnotmakeitactionablebyitself.10
Declarations made about a large class of people cannot be interpreted to advert to an identified or identifiable
individual.Absentcircumstancesspecificallypointingoralludingtoaparticularmemberofaclass,nomemberof
such class has a right of action11 without at all impairing the equally demanding right of free speech and
expression,aswellasofthepress,undertheBillofRights.12Thus,inNewsweek,Inc.v.IntermediateAppellate
Court,13wedismissedacomplaintforlibelagainstNewsweek,Inc.,onthegroundthatprivaterespondentsfailed
to state a cause of action since they made no allegation in the complaint that anything contained in the article
complained of specifically referred to any of them. Private respondents, incorporated associations of sugarcane
planters in Negros Occidental claiming to have 8,500 members and several individual members, filed a class
actionsuitfordamagesinbehalfofallsugarcaneplantersinNegrosOccidental.ThecomplaintfiledintheCourt
ofFirstInstanceofBacolodCityallegedthatNewsweek,Inc.,committedlibelagainstthembythepublicationof
thearticle"IslandofFear"initsweeklynewsmagazineallegedlydepictingNegrosProvinceasaplacedominated
by wealthy landowners and sugar planters who not only exploited the impoverished and underpaid sugarcane
workers but also brutalized and killed them with impunity. Private respondents alleged that the article showed a
deliberateandmalicioususeoffalsehood,slantedpresentationand/ormisrepresentationoffactsintendedtoput
thesugarcaneplantersinabadlight,exposethemtopublicridicule,discreditandhumiliationinthePhilippines
andabroad,andmakethemtheobjectsofhatred,contemptandhostilityoftheiragriculturalworkersandofthe
publicingeneral.Weratiocinated
x x x where the defamation is alleged to have been directed at a group or class, it is essential that the
statementmustbesosweepingorallembracingastoapplytoeveryindividualinthatgrouporclass,or
sufficiently specific so that each individual in the class or group can prove that the defamatory statement
specificallypointedtohim,sothathecanbringtheactionseparately,ifneedbexxxxThecaseatbaris
not a class suit. It is not a case where one or more may sue for the benefit of all, or where the
representationofclassinterestaffectedbythejudgmentordecreeisindispensabletomakeeachmember
oftheclassanactualparty.Wehavehereacasewhereeachoftheplaintiffshasaseparateanddistinct
reputationinthecommunity.Theydonothaveacommonorgeneralinterestinthesubjectmatterofthe
controversy.
Inthepresentcase,therewasnofairlyidentifiablepersonwhowasallegedlyinjuredbytheBulgararticle.Since
thepersonsallegedlydefamedcouldnotbeidentifiable,privaterespondentshavenoindividualcausesofaction
hence, they cannot sue for a class allegedly disparaged. Private respondents must have a cause of action in
commonwiththeclasstowhichtheybelongtoinorderforthecasetoprosper.
AnindividualMuslimhasareputationthatispersonal,separateanddistinctinthecommunity.EachMuslim,as
partofthelargerMuslimcommunityinthePhilippinesofoverfive(5)millionpeople,belongstoadifferenttrade
and profession each has a varying interest and a divergent political and religious view some may be
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conservative,othersliberal.AMuslimmayfindthearticledishonorable,evenblasphemousothersmayfinditas
anopportunitytostrengthentheirfaithandeducatethenonbelieversandthe"infidels."Thereisnoinjurytothe
reputationoftheindividualMuslimswhoconstitutethiscommunitythatcangiverisetoanactionforgrouplibel.
Each reputation is personal in character to every person.Together, the Muslims do not have a single common
reputationthatwillgivethemacommonorgeneralinterestinthesubjectmatterofthecontroversy.
InArcandv.TheEveningCallPublishingCompany,14 the United States Court ofAppeals held that one guiding
principleofgrouplibelisthatdefamationofalargegroupdoesnotgiverisetoacauseofactiononthepartofan
individualunlessitcanbeshownthatheisthetargetofthedefamatorymatter.
Theruleonlibelhasbeenrestrictive.InanAmericancase, 15apersonhadallegedlycommittedlibelagainstall
persons of the Jewish religion. The Court held that there could be no libel against an extensive community in
common law. In an English case, where libel consisted of allegations of immorality in a Catholic nunnery, the
CourtconsideredthatifthelibelwereonthewholeRomanCatholicChurchgenerally,thenthedefendantmustbe
absolved.16Withregardtothelargestsectorsinsociety,includingreligiousgroups,itmaybegenerallyconcluded
thatnocriminalactionatthebehestofthestate,orcivilactiononbehalfoftheindividual,willlie.
In another case, the plaintiffs claimed that all Muslims, numbering more than 600 million, were defamed by the
airing of a national television broadcast of a film depicting the public execution of a Saudi Arabian princess
accused of adultery, and alleging that such film was "insulting and defamatory" to the Islamic religion.17 The
UnitedStatesDistrictCourtoftheNorthernDistrictofCaliforniaconcludedthattheplaintiffs'prayerfor$20Billion
in damages arising from "an international conspiracy to insult, ridicule, discredit and abuse followers of Islam
throughouttheworld,ArabsandtheKingdomofSaudiArabia"borderedonthe"frivolous,"rulingthattheplaintiffs
had failed to demonstrate an actionable claim for defamation.The California Court stressed that the aim of the
law on defamation was to protect individuals a group may be sufficiently large that a statement concerning it
couldnotdefameindividualgroupmembers.18
PhilipWittenberg,inhisbook"DangerousWords:AGuidetotheLawofLibel,"19discussestheinappropriateness
ofanyactionfortortiouslibelinvolvinglargegroups,andprovidesasuccinctillustration:
There are groupings which may be finite enough so that a description of the body is a description of the
members. Here the problem is merely one of evaluation. Is the description of the member implicit in the
description of the body, or is there a possibility that a description of the body may consist of a variety of
persons,thoseincludedwithinthecharge,andthoseexcludedfromit?
A general charge that the lawyers in the city are shysters would obviously not be a charge that all of the
lawyerswereshysters.Achargethatthelawyersinalocalpointinagreatcity,suchasTimesSquarein
NewYorkCity,wereshysterswouldobviouslynotincludeallofthelawyerswhopracticedinthatdistrictbut
astatementthatallofthelawyerswhopracticedinaparticularbuildinginthatdistrictwereshysterswould
beaspecificcharge,sothatanylawyerhavinganofficewithinthatbuildingcouldsue.
If the group is a very large one, then the alleged libelous statement is considered to have no application to
anyone in particular, since one might as well defame all mankind. Not only does the group as such have no
actiontheplaintiffdoesnotestablishanypersonalreferencetohimself.20Atpresent,modernsocietalgroupsare
both numerous and complex. The same principle follows with these groups: as the size of these groups
increases, the chances for members of such groups to recover damages on tortious libel become elusive.This
principleissaidtoembracetwo(2)importantpublicpolicies:first,wherethegroupreferredtoislarge,thecourts
presumethatnoreasonablereaderwouldtakethestatementsassoliterallyapplyingtoeachindividualmember
andsecond,thelimitationonliabilitywouldsatisfactorilysafeguardfreedomofspeechandexpression,aswellas
of the press, effecting a sound compromise between the conflicting fundamental interests involved in libel
cases.21
In the instant case, the Muslim community is too vast as to readily ascertain who among the Muslims were
particularly defamed. The size of the group renders the reference as indeterminate and generic as a similar
attackonCatholics,Protestants,BuddhistsorMormonswoulddo.Theword"Muslim"isdescriptiveofthosewho
arebelieversofIslam,areligiondividedintovaryingsects,suchastheSunnites,theShiites,theKharijites,the
Sufis and others based upon political and theological distinctions. "Muslim" is a name which describes only a
generalsegmentofthePhilippinepopulation,comprisingaheterogeneousbodywhoseconstructionisnotsowell
definedastorenderitimpossibleforanyrepresentativeidentification.
The Christian religion in the Philippines is likewise divided into different sects: Catholic, Baptist, Episcopalian,
Presbyterian, Lutheran, and other groups the essence of which may lie in an inspired charlatan, whose temple
maybeacornerhouseinthefringesofthecountryside.AswiththeChristianreligion,soitiswithotherreligions
that represent the nation's culturally diverse people and minister to each one's spiritual needs. The Muslim
population may be divided into smaller groups with varying agenda, from the prayerful conservative to the
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passionatelyradical.ThesedivisionsintheMuslimpopulationmaystillbetoolargeandambiguoustoprovidea
reasonableinferencetoanypersonalitywhocanbringacaseinanactionforlibel.
TheforegoingareinessencethesameviewscholarlyexpressedbyMr.JusticeReynatoS.Punointhecourseof
thedeliberationsinthiscase.Weextensivelyreproducehereunderhiscomprehensiveandpenetratingdiscussion
ongrouplibel
Defamationismadeupofthetwintortsoflibelandslandertheonebeing,ingeneral,written,whilethe
other in general is oral. In either form, defamation is an invasion of the interest in reputation and good
name.Thisisa"relationalinterest"sinceitinvolvestheopinionothersinthecommunitymayhave,ortend
tohaveoftheplaintiff.
Thelawofdefamationprotectstheinterestinreputationtheinterestinacquiring,retainingandenjoying
one'sreputationasgoodasone'scharacterandconductwarrant.Themerefactthattheplaintiff'sfeelings
andsensibilitieshavebeenoffendedisnotenoughtocreateacauseofactionfordefamation.Defamation
requiresthatsomethingbecommunicatedtoathirdpersonthatmayaffecttheopinionothersmayhaveof
the plaintiff. The unprivileged communication must be shown of a statement that would tend to hurt
plaintiff'sreputation,toimpairplaintiff'sstandinginthecommunity.
Althoughthegistofanactionfordefamationisaninjurytoreputation,thefocusofadefamationactionis
upontheallegedlydefamatorystatementitselfanditspredictableeffectuponthirdpersons.Astatementis
ordinarilyconsidereddefamatoryifit"tend[s]toexposeonetopublichatred,shame,obloquy,contumely,
odium, contempt, ridicule, aversion, ostracism, degradation or disgracex x x." The Restatement of Torts
definesadefamatorystatementasonethat"tendstosoharmthereputationofanotherastolowerhimin
theestimationofthecommunityortodeterthirdpersonsfromassociatingordealingwithhim."
Consequentlyasaprerequisitetorecovery,itisnecessaryfortheplaintifftoproveaspartofhisprimafacie
case that the defendant (1) published a statement that was (2) defamatory (3) of and concerning the
plaintiff.
Theruleinlibelisthattheactionmustbebroughtbythepersonagainstwhomthedefamatorychargehas
beenmade.IntheAmericanjurisdiction,noactionliesbyathirdpersonfordamagessufferedbyreasonof
defamation of another person, even though the plaintiff suffers some injury therefrom. For recovery in
defamation cases, it is necessary that the publication be "of and concerning the plaintiff." Even when a
publication may be clearly defamatory as to somebody, if the words have no personal application to the
plaintiff, they are not actionable by him. If no one is identified, there can be no libel because no one's
reputationhasbeeninjuredxxxx
Infine,inorderforonetomaintainanactionforanallegeddefamatorystatement,itmustappearthatthe
plaintiffisthepersonwithreferencetowhomthestatementwasmade.Thisprincipleisofvitalimportance
incaseswhereagrouporclassisdefamedsince,usually,thelargerthecollective,themoredifficultitisfor
anindividualmembertoshowthathewasthepersonatwhomthedefamationwasdirected.
If the defamatory statements were directed at a small, restricted group of persons, they applied to any
member of the group, and an individual member could maintain an action for defamation. When the
defamatory language was used toward a small group or class, including every member, it has been held
thatthedefamatorylanguagereferredtoeachmembersothateachcouldmaintainanaction.Thissmall
group or class may be a jury, persons engaged in certain businesses, professions or employments, a
restrictedsubdivisionofaparticularclass,asociety,afootballteam,afamily,smallgroupsofunionofficials,
aboardofpublicofficers,orengineersofaparticularcompany.
Incontrast,ifdefamatorywordsareusedbroadlyinrespecttoalargeclassorgroupofpersons,andthere
isnothingthatpoints,orbypropercolloquiumorinnuendocanbemadetoapply,toaparticularmemberof
theclassorgroup,nomemberhasarightofactionforlibelorslander.Wherethedefamatorymatterhad
no special, personal application and was so general that no individual damages could be presumed, and
where the class referred to was so numerous that great vexation and oppression might grow out of the
multiplicity of suits, no private action could be maintained. This rule has been applied to defamatory
publications concerning groups or classes of persons engaged in a particular business, profession or
employment, directed at associations or groups of association officials, and to those directed at
miscellaneousgroupsorclassesofpersons.
Distinguishingasmallgroupwhichifdefamedentitlesallitsmemberstosuefromalargegroupwhich
if defamed entitles no one to sue is not always so simple. Some authorities have noted that in cases
permittingrecovery,thegroupgenerallyhastwentyfive(25)orfewermembers.However,thereisusually
no articulated limit on size. Suits have been permitted by members of fairly large groups when some
distinguishingcharacteristicoftheindividualorgroupincreasesthelikelihoodthatthestatementcouldbe
interpreted to apply individually. For example, a single player on the 60 to 70 man Oklahoma University
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footballteamwaspermittedtosuewhenawriteraccusedtheentireteamoftakingamphetaminesto"hop
up"itsperformancetheindividualwasafullback,i.e.,asignificantpositionontheteamandhadplayedin
allbuttwooftheteam'sgames.
Aprimeconsideration,therefore,isthepublicperceptionofthesizeofthegroupandwhetherastatement
willbeinterpretedtorefertoeverymember.Themoreorganizedandcohesiveagroup,theeasieritisto
tarallitsmemberswiththesamebrushandthemorelikelyacourtwillpermitasuitfromanindividualeven
ifthegroupincludesmorethantwentyfive(25)members.Atsomepoint,however,increasingsizemaybe
seen to dilute the harm to individuals and any resulting injury will fall beneath the threshold for a viable
lawsuit.
xxxxTherearemanyothergroupingsofmenthanthosethatarecontainedwithintheforegoinggroup
classifications.Thereareallthereligionsoftheworld,thereareallthepoliticalandideologicalbeliefsthere
are the many colors of the human race. Group defamation has been a fertile and dangerous weapon of
attackonvariousracial,religiousandpoliticalminorities.Somestates,therefore,havepassedstatutesto
prevent concerted efforts to harass minority groups in the United States by making it a crime to circulate
insidious rumors against racial and religious groups. Thus far, any civil remedy for such broadside
defamationhasbeenlacking.
Therehavebeennumerousattemptsbyindividualmemberstoseekredressinthecourtsforlibelonthese
groups, but very few have succeeded because it felt that the groups are too large and poorly defined to
supportafindingthattheplaintiffwassingledoutforpersonalattackxxxx(citationsomitted).
Our conclusion therefore is that the statements published by petitioners in the instant case did not specifically
identifynorrefertoanyparticularindividualswhowerepurportedlythesubjectoftheallegedlibelouspublication.
Respondentscanscarcelyclaimtohavingbeensingledoutforsocialcensurepointedlyresultingindamages.
Acontraryviewisexpressedthatwhatisinvolvedinthepresentcaseisanintentionaltortiousactcausingmental
distressandnotanactionforlibel.ThatopinioninvokesChaplinskyv.NewHampshire22wheretheU.S.Supreme
Court held that words heaping extreme profanity, intended merely to incite hostility, hatred or violence, have no
socialvalueanddonotenjoyconstitutionalprotectionandBeauharnaisv.Illinois23whereitwasalsoruledthat
hate speech which denigrates a group of persons identified by their religion, race or ethnic origin defames that
groupandthelawmayvalidlyprohibitsuchspeechonthesamegroundasdefamationofanindividual.
Wedonotagreetothecontraryviewarticulatedintheimmediatelyprecedingparagraph.Primarily,an"emotional
distress"tortactionispersonalinnature,i.e.,itisacivilactionfiledbyanindividual24toassuagetheinjuriesto
hisemotionaltranquilityduetopersonalattacksonhischaracter.Ithasnoapplicationintheinstantcasesinceno
particular individual was identified in the disputed article of Bulgar.Also, the purported damage caused by the
article, assuming there was any, falls under the principle of relational harm which includes harm to social
relationshipsinthecommunityintheformofdefamationasdistinguishedfromtheprincipleofreactiveharm
whichincludesinjuriestoindividualemotionaltranquilityintheformofaninflictionofemotionaldistress. In their
complaint,respondentsclearlyassertedanallegedharmtothestandingofMuslimsinthecommunity,especially
totheiractivitiesinpropagatingtheirfaithinMetroManilaandinothernonMuslimcommunitiesinthecountry.25
It is thus beyond cavil that the present case falls within the application of the relational harm principle of tort
actionsfordefamation,ratherthanthereactiveharmprincipleonwhichtheconceptofemotionaldistressproperly
belongs.
Moreover,undertheSecondRestatementoftheLaw,torecoverfortheintentionalinflictionofemotionaldistress
the plaintiff must show that: (a) The conduct of the defendant was intentional or in reckless disregard of the
plaintiff (b) The conduct was extreme and outrageous (c) There was a causal connection between the
defendant's conduct and the plaintiff's mental distress and, (d)The plaintiff's mental distress was extreme and
severe.26
"Extremeandoutrageousconduct"meansconductthatissooutrageousincharacter,andsoextremeindegree,
as to go beyond all possible bounds of decency, and to be regarded as atrocious, and utterly intolerable in
civilized society. The defendant's actions must have been so terrifying as naturally to humiliate, embarrass or
frighten the plaintiff.27 Generally, conduct will be found to be actionable where the recitation of the facts to an
average member of the community would arouse his resentment against the actor, and lead him or her to
exclaim,"Outrageous!"ashisorherreaction.28
"Emotional distress" means any highly unpleasant mental reaction such as extreme grief, shame, humiliation,
embarrassment, anger, disappointment, worry, nausea, mental suffering and anguish, shock, fright, horror, and
chagrin.29"Severeemotionaldistress,"insomejurisdictions,referstoanytypeofsevereanddisablingemotional
ormentalconditionwhichmaybegenerallyrecognizedanddiagnosedbyprofessionalstrainedtodoso,including
posttraumatic stress disorder, neurosis, psychosis, chronic depression, or phobia.30 The plaintiff is required to
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show, among other things, that he or she has suffered emotional distress so severe that no reasonable person
couldbeexpectedtoendureitseverityofthedistressisanelementofthecauseofaction,notsimplyamatterof
damages.31
Any party seeking recovery for mental anguish must prove more than mere worry, anxiety, vexation,
embarrassment, or anger. Liability does not arise from mere insults, indignities, threats, annoyances, petty
expressions, or other trivialities. In determining whether the tort of outrage had been committed, a plaintiff is
necessarily expected and required to be hardened to a certain amount of criticism, rough language, and to
occasionalactsandwordsthataredefinitelyinconsiderateandunkindthemerefactthattheactorknowsthatthe
otherwillregardtheconductasinsulting,orwillhavehisfeelingshurt,isnotenough.32
Hustler Magazine v. Falwell33 illustrates the test case of a civil action for damages on intentional infliction of
emotionaldistress.AparodyappearedinHustlermagazinefeaturingtheAmericanfundamentalistpreacherand
evangelist Reverend Jerry Falwell depicting him in an inebriated state having an incestuous, sexual liaison with
his mother in an outhouse. Falwell sued Hustler and its publisher Larry Flynt for damages. The United States
District Court for the Western District of Virginia ruled that the parody was not libelous, because no reasonable
reader would have understood it as a factual assertion that Falwell engaged in the act described. The jury,
however, awarded $200,000 in damages on a separate count of "intentional infliction of emotional distress," a
causeofactionthatdidnotrequireafalsestatementoffacttobemade.TheUnitedStatesSupremeCourtina
unanimous decision overturned the jury verdict of the Virginia Court and held that Reverend Falwell may not
recoverforintentionalinflictionofemotionaldistress.Itwasarguedthatthematerialmightbedeemedoutrageous
andmayhavebeenintendedtocausesevereemotionaldistress,butthesecircumstanceswerenotsufficientto
overcomethefreespeechrightsguaranteedundertheFirstAmendmentoftheUnitedStatesConstitution.Simply
stated, an intentional tort causing emotional distress must necessarily give way to the fundamental right to free
speech.
It must be observed that although Falwell was regarded by the U.S. High Court as a "public figure," he was an
individualparticularlysingledoutoridentifiedintheparodyappearingonHustlermagazine.Also,theemotional
distress allegedly suffered by Reverend Falwell involved a reactive interest an emotional response to the
parodywhichsupposedlyinjuredhispsychologicalwellbeing.
Verily, our position is clear that the conduct of petitioners was not extreme or outrageous. Neither was the
emotionaldistressallegedlysufferedbyrespondentssoseverethatnoreasonablepersoncouldbeexpectedto
endureit.Thereisnoevidenceonrecordthatpointstothatresult.
ProfessorWilliamProsser,viewstortactionsonintentionalinflictionofemotionaldistressinthismanner34
There is virtually unanimous agreement that such ordinary defendants are not liable for mere insult,
indignity,annoyance,oreventhreats,wherethecaseislackinginothercircumstancesofaggravation.The
reasons are not far to seek. Our manners, and with them our law, have not yet progressed to the point
where we are able to afford a remedy in the form of tort damages for all intended mental disturbance.
Liability of course cannot be extended to every trivial indignity x x x x The plaintiff must necessarily be
expected and required to be hardened to a certain amount of rough language, and to acts that are
definitelyinconsiderateandunkindxxxTheplaintiffcannotrecovermerelybecauseofhurtfeelings.
ProfessorCalvertMagruderreinforcesProsserwiththissuccinctobservation,viz:35
Thereisnooccasionforthelawtointerveneineverycasewheresomeone'sfeelingsarehurt.Theremust
still be freedom to express an unflattering opinion, and some safety valve must be left through which
irascibletempersmayblowoffrelativelyharmlesssteam.
Thus, it is evident that evenAmerican courts are reluctant to adopt a rule of recovery for emotional harm that
would"openupawidevistaoflitigationinthefieldofbadmanners,"anareainwhicha"tougheningofthemental
hide" was thought to be a more appropriate remedy.36 Perhaps of greater concern were the questions of
causation, proof, and the ability to accurately assess damages for emotional harm, each of which continues to
concerncourtstoday.37
Inthisconnection,thedoctrinesinChaplinskyandBeauharnaishadlargelybeensupersededbysubsequentFirst
Amendment doctrines. Back in simpler times in the history of free expression the Supreme Court appeared to
espouse a theory, known as the TwoClassTheory, that treated certain types of expression as taboo forms of
speech,beneaththedignityoftheFirstAmendment.Themostcelebratedstatementofthisviewwasexpressed
inChaplinsky:
There are certain welldefined and narrowly limited classes of speech, the prevention and punishment of
whichhaveneverbeenthoughttoraiseanyConstitutionalproblem.Theseincludethelewdandobscene,
theprofane,thelibelous,andtheinsultingor"fighting"wordsthosewhichbytheirveryutteranceinflict
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injuryortendtoinciteanimmediatebreachofthepeace.Ithasbeenwellobservedthatsuchutterances
arenoessentialpartofanyexpositionofideas,andareofsuchslightsocialvalueasasteptotruththat
anybenefitthatmaybederivedfromthemisclearlyoutweighedbythesocialinterestinorderandmorality.
Today,however,thetheoryisnolongerviablemodernFirstAmendmentprincipleshavepasseditby.American
courtsnolongeraccepttheviewthatspeechmaybeproscribedmerelybecauseitis"lewd,""profane,""insulting"
orotherwisevulgaroroffensive.38Cohenv.California39isillustrative:PaulRobertCohenworeajacketbearing
thewords"FucktheDraft"inaLosAngelescourthouseinApril1968,whichcausedhiseventualarrest.Cohen
was convicted for violating a California statute prohibiting any person from "disturb[ing] the peace x x x by
offensiveconduct."TheU.S.SupremeCourtconcededthatCohen'sexpletivecontainedinhisjacketwas"vulgar,"
butitconcludedthathisspeechwasnonethelessprotectedbytherighttofreespeech.Itwasneitherconsidered
an"incitement"toillegalactionnor"obscenity."Itdidnotconstituteinsultingor"fighting"wordsforithadnotbeen
directedatapersonwhowaslikelytoretaliateoratsomeonewhocouldnotavoidthemessage.Inotherwords,
no one was present in the Los Angeles courthouse who would have regarded Cohen's speech as a direct
personalinsult,norwasthereanydangerofreactiveviolenceagainsthim.
No specific individual was targeted in the allegedly defamatory words printed on Cohen's jacket.The conviction
couldonlybejustifiedbyCalifornia'sdesiretoexercisethebroadpowerinpreservingthecleanlinessofdiscourse
in the public sphere, which the U.S. Supreme Court refused to grant to the State, holding that no objective
distinctionscanbemadebetweenvulgarandnonvulgarspeech,andthattheemotiveelementsofspeecharejust
asessentialintheexerciseofthisrightasthepurelycognitive.AsMr.JusticeHarlansoeloquentlywrote:"[O]ne
man'svulgarityisanotherman'slyricxxxwordsareoftenchosenasmuchfortheiremotiveastheircognitive
force."40 With Cohen, the U.S. Supreme Court finally laid the Constitutional foundation for judicial protection of
provocativeandpotentiallyoffensivespeech.
Similarly,libelousspeechisnolongeroutsidetheFirstAmendmentprotection.Onlyonesmallpieceofthe Two
ClassTheoryinChaplinskysurvivesU.S.courtscontinuetotreat"obscene"speechasnotwithintheprotection
oftheFirstAmendmentatall.Withrespecttothe"fightingwords"doctrine,whileitremainsaliveitwasmodified
bythecurrentrigorousclearandpresentdangertest.41Thus,inCohentheU.S.SupremeCourtinapplyingthe
test held that there was no showing that Cohen's jacket bearing the words "Fuck the Draft" had threatened to
provoke imminent violence and that protecting the sensibilities of onlookers was not sufficiently compelling
interesttorestrainCohen'sspeech.
Beauharnais,whichcloselyfollowedtheChaplinskydoctrine,sufferedthesamefateasChaplinsky.Indeed,when
Beauharnais was decided in 1952, the TwoClass Theory was still flourishing. While concededly the U.S. High
TribunaldidnotformallyabandonBeauharnais,theseminalshiftsinU.S.constitutionaljurisprudencesubstantially
undercutBeauharnaisandseriouslyunderminedwhatisleftofitsvitalityasaprecedent.Amongthecasesthat
dealtacrushingimpactonBeauharnaisandrendereditalmostcertainlyadeadlettercaselawareBrandenburg
v. Ohio,42 and, again, Cohen v. California.43 These decisions recognize a much narrower set of permissible
groundsforrestrictingspeechthandidBeauharnais.44
In Brandenburg, appellant who was a leader of the Ku Klux Klan was convicted under the Ohio Criminal
Syndicalism Statute for advocating the necessity, duty and propriety of crime, sabotage, violence, or unlawful
methods of terrorism as a means of accomplishing industrial or political reforms and for voluntarily assembling
withagroupformedtoteachoradvocatethedoctrinesofcriminalsyndicalism.Appellantchallengedthestatute
and was sustained by the U.S. Supreme Court, holding that the advocacy of illegal action becomes punishable
onlyifsuchadvocacyisdirectedtoincitingorproducingimminentlawlessactionandislikelytoinciteorproduce
suchaction.45Exceptinunusualinstances,Brandenburgprotectstheadvocacyoflawlessnessaslongassuch
speechisnottranslatedintoaction.
TheimportanceoftheBrandenburg ruling cannot be overemphasized. Prof. Smolla affirmed that "Brandenburg
must be understood as overruling Beauharnais and eliminating the possibility of treating group libel under the
sameFirstAmendmentstandardsasindividuallibel." 46Itmaywellbeconsideredasoneofthelynchpinsofthe
moderndoctrineoffreespeech,whichseekstogivespecialprotectiontopoliticallyrelevantspeech.
Inanycase,respondents'lackofcauseofactioncannotbecuredbythefilingofaclasssuit.Ascorrectlypointed
out by Mr. Justice Jose C. Vitug during the deliberations, "an element of a class suit is the adequacy of
representation.Indeterminingthequestionoffairandadequaterepresentationofmembersofaclass,thecourt
mustconsider(a)whethertheinterestofthenamedpartyiscoextensivewiththeinterestoftheothermembersof
theclass(b)theproportionofthosemadepartiesasitsobearstothetotalmembershipoftheclassand,(c)any
otherfactorbearingontheabilityofthenamedpartytospeakfortherestoftheclass.47
Therulesrequirethatcourtsmustmakesurethatthepersonsinterveningshouldbesufficientlynumeroustofully
protecttheinterestsofallconcerned.Inthepresentcontroversy,IslamicDa'wahCouncilofthePhilippines,Inc.,
seeksineffecttoasserttheinterestsnotonlyoftheMuslimsinthePhilippinesbutofthewholeMuslimworldas
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well.Privaterespondentsobviouslylackthesufficiencyofnumberstorepresentsuchaglobalgroupneitherhave
theybeenabletodemonstratetheidentityoftheirinterestswiththosetheyseektorepresent.Unlessitcanbe
shown that there can be a safe guaranty that those absent will be adequately represented by those present, a
classsuit,givenitsmagnitudeinthisinstance,wouldbeunavailing."48
Likewiseonthematterofdamages,weagreethat"moraldamagesmayberecoveredonlyiftheplaintiffisableto
satisfactorily prove the existence of the factual basis for the damages and its causal connection with the acts
complainedof,49andsoitmustbe,asmoraldamagesalthoughincapableofpecuniaryestimationaredesigned
not to impose a penalty but to compensate for injury sustained and actual damages suffered.50 Exemplary
damages,ontheotherhand,mayonlybeawardedifclaimantisabletoestablishhisrighttomoral,temperate,
liquidatedorcompensatorydamages.51Unfortunately,neitheroftherequirementstosustainanawardforeither
ofthesedamageswouldappeartohavebeenadequatelyestablishedbyrespondents."
In a pluralistic society like the Philippines where misinformation about another individual's religion is as
commonplaceasselfappointedcriticsofgovernment,itwouldbemoreappropriatetorespectthefaircriticismof
religious principles, including those which may be outrageously appalling, immensely erroneous, or those
couchedasfairlyinformativecomments.Thegreaterdangerinoursocietyisthepossibilitythatitmayencourage
the frequency of suits among religious fundamentalists, whether Christian, Muslim, Hindu, Buddhist, Jewish, or
others.Thiswouldunnecessarilymakethecivilcourtsabattlegroundtoasserttheirspiritualideas,andadvance
theirrespectivereligiousagenda.
It need not be stressed that this Court has no power to determine which is proper religious conduct or belief
neither does it have the authority to rule on the merits of one religion over another, nor declare which belief to
upholdorcastasunder,forthevalidityofreligiousbeliefsorvaluesareoutsidethesphereofthejudiciary.Such
matters are better left for the religious authorities to address what is rightfully within their doctrine and realm of
influence. Courts must be viewpointneutral when it comes to religious matters if only to affirm the neutrality
principleoffreespeechrightsundermodernjurisprudencewhere"[a]llideasaretreatedequalintheeyesofthe
First Amendment even those ideas that are universally condemned and run counter to constitutional
principles."52 Under the right to free speech, "there is no such thing as a false idea. However pernicious an
opinionmayseem,wedependforitscorrectionnotontheconscienceofjudgesandjuriesbutonthecompetition
ofotherideas."53Denyingcertiorariandaffirmingtheappellatecourtdecisionwouldsurelycreateachillingeffect
ontheconstitutionalguaranteesoffreedomofspeech,ofexpression,andofthepress.
WHEREFORE,thepetitionisGRANTED.TheassailedDecisionoftheCourtofAppealsdated27August1998is
REVERSEDandSETASIDE,andtheDecisionoftheRTCBr.4,Manila,dismissingthecomplaintforlackofmerit,
isREINSTATEDandAFFIRMED.Nopronouncementastocosts.
SOORDERED.
Davide,Jr.,C.J.,Puno,Quisumbing,YnaresSantiago,SandovalGutierrez,CoronaandCallejo,Sr.,JJ.,concur.
Mendoza,J.,intheresult.
Vitug,J.,seeconcurringopinion.
Panganiban,J.,joinsthedissentingopinionofJusticeA.T.Carpio.
Carpio,J.,seedissentingopinion.
AustriaMartinez,J.,seedissentingopinion.
CarpioMorales,J.,joinsthedissentingopinionofJusticeA.T.Carpio.
Azcuna,J.,joinsthedissentingopinionofJusticeAustriaMartinez.

SeparateOpinions
VITUG,J.,concurring:
The innate right of a person to an unimpaired reputation and good name is no less a constitutional imperative
than that which protects his life, liberty or property. Thus, the law imposes upon him who attacks another's
reputation,byslanderouswordsorlibelouspublication,aliabilitytomakecompensationfortheinjurydoneand
thedamagessustained.1
PrivaterespondentIslamicDa'wahCouncilofthePhilippines,Inc.,afederationofmorethan70Muslimreligious
organizations in the country, and the other named respondents all claim, with understandable indignation, that
theyhavebeendefamedbyanitempublishedbypetitionersinBulgar,atabloid,circulatedintheMetroManila
area.Thearticlereads:
"ALAMBANINYO?
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"NaangmgababoyatkahitanonguringhayopsaMindanaoayhindikinakainngmgaMuslim?
"Parasakanilaangmgaitoayisangsagradongbagay.Hindinilaitokailangangkaininkahitnasilapaay
magutomatmawalanngulamsatuwingsilaaykakain.GinagawanilaitongDiyosatsinasambapanilaito
satuwingarawngkanilangpangingilinlalunglalonasaarawnatinatawagnilang'Ramadan'."
Privaterespondents,forthemselvesandinbehalfofallMuslims,filedthecomplaintbeforethetrialcourtagainst
petitioners, alleging that the published article was defamatory and an insult to respondents. The trial court
dismissedthecomplaint.Onappeal,theCourtofAppealsreversedthedecisionofthelowercourtandordered
petitionerstopaydamagestoprivaterespondents.
Aggrieved,petitionersarenowbeforetheCourttoassailthefindingsoftheCourtofAppealsontheexistenceof
the elements of libel, the right of respondents to institute the class suit, and the liability of petitioners for moral
damages,exemplarydamages,attorney'sfeesandcostsofsuit.
Thepresentcontroversystemsfromacivilactionfordamagesandnotfromacriminalcomplaint.TheCivilCode
recognizes the possibility of such a civil action either pursuant to Article 26, paragraph (4), to the effect that
althoughitmaynotconstituteacriminaloffense,"vexingorhumiliatinganotheronaccountofhisreligiousbeliefs,
lowlystationinlife,placeofbirth,physicaldefect,orotherpersonalcondition,"cangiverisetoacauseofaction
for damages, or consonantly with Article 33 which provides that in case of defamation, a civil complaint for
damages, entirely separate and distinct from the criminal case, may be brought by the injured party. Both civil
actions are based on tort liability under common law and require the plaintiff to establish that he has suffered
personaldamageorinjuryasadirectconsequenceofthedefendant'swrongfulconduct.Infine,itmustbeshown
thattheactcomplainedofisvexatiousordefamatoryof,andasitpertainsto,theclaimant,therebyhumiliatingor
besmirchingthelatter'sdignityandhonor.
Defined in simple terms, vexation is an act of annoyance or irritation that causes distress or agitation.2 Early
American cases have refused all remedy for mental injury, such as one caused by vexation, because of the
difficultyofprooforofmeasurementofdamages.3Incomparativelyrecenttimes,however,theinflictionofmental
distressasabasisforanindependenttortactionhasbeenrecognized.Itissaidthat"onewhobyextremeand
outrageousconductintentionallyorrecklesslycausessevereemotionaldistresstoanotherissubjecttoliabilityfor
such emotional distress."4 Nevertheless, it has also been often held that petty insult or indignity lacks, from its
very nature, any convincing assurance that the asserted emotional or mental distress is genuine, or that if
genuineitisserious.5Accordingly,itisgenerallydeclaredthattherecanbenorecoveryforinsults, 6indignitiesor
threats7whichareconsideredtoamounttonothingmorethanmereannoyancesorhurtfeelings.8Atallevents,it
wouldbeessentialtoprovethatpersonaldamageisdirectlysufferedbytheplaintiffonaccountofthewrongful
actofthedefendant.
A kindred concept, albeit of greater degree of perversity, defamation, broadly defined, is an attack on the
reputation of another, the unprivileged publication of false statements which naturally and proximately result in
injurytoanother.9Itisthatwhichtendstodiminishtheesteem,respect,goodwillorconfidenceinwhichaperson
is held, or to excite adverse, derogatory or unpleasant feelings or opinions against him.10 Defamation is an
invasionofa"relationalinterest"sinceitinvolvestheopinionwhichothersinthecommunitymayhave,ortendto
have,oftheplaintiff.11TheRevisedPenalCode,althoughnottheprimarygoverninglawinthisinstance,provides
aninstructivedefinitionoflibelasbeingaformofdefamationexpressedinwriting,print,pictures,orsigns,12 to
wit: "A libel is a public and malicious imputation of a crime, or vice or defect, real or imaginary, or any act,
omission,condition,status,orcircumstancetendingtocausethedishonor,discredit,orcontemptofanaturalor
juridicalperson,ortoblackenthememoryofonewhoisdead."13
While arguably, the article subject of the complaint could be characterized as vexatious or defamatory and as
imparting an erroneous interpretation of a Muslim practice that tends to ridicule the Islamic faith, it is, however,
impersonalonitsface,itslanguagenotbeingdirectedatanyparticularpersonbuttoalargesegmentofsociety.
In order that defamatory words can be actionable in court, it is essential that they are personal to the party
maligned, an ascertained or ascertainable individual.14 It is only then that plaintiff's emotions and/or reputation
canbesaidtohavebeeninjuredthus,theplaintiff,torecover,mustshowthatheorsheisthepersontowhom
thestatementsaredirected.15Declarationsmadeaboutalargeclassofpeoplecannotbeinterpretedtoadvertto
anidentifiedoridentifiableindividual.Absentcircumstancesspecificallypointingoralludingtoaparticularmember
ofaclass,nomemberofsuchclasshasarightofaction16withoutatallimpairingtheequallydemandingrightof
freespeechandexpression,aswellasofthepress,underthebillofrights.17
Ifanarticle,forinstance,statesthat"judgesinthePhilippinesarecorrupt,"suchageneralcondemnationcannot
reasonablybeinterpretedtobepointingtoeachjudgeortoacertainjudgeinthePhilippines.Thus,noparticular
magistratecanclaimtohavebeendisgracedortohavesustainedanimpairedreputationbecauseofthatarticle.
If,ontheotherhand,thearticleproclaimsthat"judgesinMetroManilaarecorrupt,"suchstatementofderogatory
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conductnowreferstoarelativelynarrowgroupthatmightyetwarrantitslookingintoinanappropriatesuit.Andif
the article accuses the "Justices of the Supreme Court" of corruption, then there is a specific derogatory
statementaboutadefinitenumberofnomorethanfifteenpersons.
Jurisprudence would appear to suggest that in cases permitting recovery, the group generally has 25 or fewer
members.18 When statements concern groups with larger composition, the individual members of that group
wouldbehardputtoshowthatthestatementsare"ofandconcerningthem."19Althoughnopreciselimitscanbe
set as to the size of a group or class that would be sufficiently small, increasing size, at some point, would be
seen to dilute the harm to individuals and any resulting injury would fall beneath the threshold for a viable
lawsuit.20Thisprincipleissaidtoembracetwoimportantpublicpolicies:1)wherethegroupreferredtoislarge,
thecourtspresumethatnoreasonablereaderwouldtakethestatementsassoliterallyapplyingtoeachindividual
memberand2)thelimitationonliabilitywouldsatisfactorilysafeguardfreedomofspeechandexpression,aswell
asofpress,effectingasoundcompromisebetweentheconflictingfundamentalinterestsinvolvedinlibelcases.21
Thus,norecoverywasallowedwheretheremarkscomplainedofhadbeenmadeaboutcorrespondenceschools,
oneschoolsuing22 or where there was imputation of criminality to a union, one member suing23 or where an
attackwasmadeonCatholicclergymen,oneclergymansuing.24
InNewsweek, Inc., vs. IntermediateAppellate Court,25 this Court dismissed a class suit for scurrilous remarks
filedbyfourincorporatedassociationsofsugarplantersinNegrosOccidentalinbehalfofallsugarplantersinthat
province, against Newsweek, Inc., on the ground, among other things, that the plaintiffs were not sufficiently
ascribed to in the article published by the defendant.And so also it was in an older case, 26 where the Court
ratiocinatedthatanarticledirectedataclassorgroupofpersonsinbroadlanguagewouldnotbeactionableby
individualscomposingtheclassorgroupunlessthestatementsweresweepingbut,eventhen,itwouldbehighly
probable,saidtheCourt,thatnoactioncouldlie"wherethebodyiscomposedofsolargeanumberofpersons
that common sense would tell those to whom the publication was made that there was room for persons
connected with the body to pursue an upright and law abiding course and that it would be unreasonable and
absurdtocondemnallbecauseoftheactionsofapart."
Inthepresentcase,thesubjectarticlerelatestotheentireMuslimpopulationandnotjusttotheIslamicDa'wah
CouncilofthePhilippinesortoanyoftheindividualrespondents.Thereisnodirectreferenceorallusiontothe
federationoranyofitsmembers,ortoanyoftheindividualcomplainants.Respondentsscarcelycanclaimhaving
beensingledoutforsocialcensurepointedlyresultingindamages.IslamicDa'wahCouncilofthePhilippines,Inc.,
itself,muchlikeanyotherartificialbeingorjuridicalentity,havingexistenceonlyinlegalcontemplation,wouldbe
devoid of any such real feeling or emotion as ordinarily these terms are understood,27 and it cannot have that
kind of reputation that an individual has that could allow it to sue for damages based on impinged personal
reputation.28
WHEREFORE, I vote to GRANT the petition and to SETASIDE the assailed decision of the Court ofAppeals,
REINSTATINGtherebytheorderofdismissalrenderedbytheRegionalTrialCourt.

DissentingOpinion
CARPIO,J.,dissenting:
I dissent not because the newspaper article in question is libelous, but because it constitutes an intentional
tortiousactcausingmentaldistresstothosewhomprivaterespondentIslamicDa'wahCouncilofthePhilippines
Inc.represents.
1.NatureofAction:NotaLibelbutaTortCase
Private respondents filed this class suit underArticles 19, 20, 21 and 26 of the Civil Code.Accordingly, private
respondentsstatedtheircaseasfollows:
"StatementofCase
TheCivilCodeofthePhilippinesprovides:
'Everypersonmust,intheexerciseofhisrightsandintheperformanceofhisduties,actwithjustice,give
everyonehisdueandobservehonestyandgoodfaith.'[Art.19]
'Every person who, contrary to law, willfully or negligently causes damage to another, shall indemnify the
latterforthesame.'[Art.20]
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'Any person who willfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is contrary to morals, good
customsorpublicpolicyshallcompensatethelatterforthedamage.'[Art.21]
'Every person shall respect the dignity, personality, privacy and peace of mind of his neighbor and other
persons.Thefollowingandsimilaracts,thoughtheymaynotconstituteacriminaloffense,shallproducea
causeofactionfordamages,preventionandotherrelief:
(1)Pryingintotheprivacyofanother'sresidence
(2)Meddlingwithordisturbingtheprivatelifeorfamilyrelationofanother
(3)Intriguingtocauseanothertobealienatedfromhisfriends
(4)Vexingorhumiliatinganotheronaccountofhisreligiousbelief,lowlystationinlife,placeofbirth,
physicaldefect,orotherpersonalcondition.'[Art.26]
ItisonaccountoftheforegoingprovisionsofourCivilCodethatplaintiffsbroughttothecourt'aquo'acivil
casefordamagesonaccountofapublishedarticleattheeditorialsectionofthedefendantnewspaperxx
x."1
Petitioners acknowledge that private respondents' principal cause of action is based on tortious conduct when
petitioners state in their Petition that "[p]laintiffs rely heavily on Article 26 of the Civil Code particularly par. 4
thereof." Petitioners, however, assert that the newspaper article in question has not caused mental anguish,
woundedfeelings,moralshock,socialhumiliationorsimilarinjurytoprivaterespondents.2
Clearly,theinstantcaseisnotaboutlibelwhichrequirestheidentificationoftheplaintiffinthelibelousstatement.
IfthiswerealibelcaseunderArticle30 3oftheCivilCode,whichauthorizesaseparatecivilactiontorecovercivil
liability arising from a criminal offense, I would agree that the instant case could not prosper for want of
identificationoftheprivaterespondentsasthelibeledpersons.Butprivaterespondentsdonotanchortheiraction
onArticle30oftheCivilCode.
Private respondents insist that this case is principally about tortious conduct underArticle 26 of the Civil Code.
UnliketheactioninArticle30oftheCivilCodewhichmustarisefroma"criminaloffense,"theactionunderArticle
26"maynotconstituteacriminaloffense."Article26,adoptedfromAmericanjurisprudence,coversseveralkinds
ofintentionaltorts.Paragraph4ofArticle26,whichreferstoactshumiliatinganotherforhisreligiousbeliefs,is
embracedinthetortknownasintentionalinflictionofmentaloremotionaldistress.Thiscasemustbedecidedon
the issue of whether there was such tortious conduct, and not whether there was defamation that satisfied the
elementsofthecrimeoflibel.
II.TheTortiousActinQuestion
Thenewspaperarticleinquestionpublishedbypetitionersstatesasfollows:
"ALAMBANINYO?
Na ang mga baboy at kahit anong uri ng hayop sa Mindanao ay hindi kinakain ng mga Muslim? Para sa
kanilaangmgaitoayisangsagradongbagay.Hindinilaitokailangangkaininkahitnasilapaaymagutom
at mawalan ng ulam sa tuwing sila kakain. Ginagawa nila itong Diyos at sinasamba pa nila ito sa tuwing
arawngkanilangpangingilinlalunglalonasaarawnatinatawagnilang'Ramadan'."
Private respondents claim that the newspaper article, which asserts that Muslims worship the pig as their god,
waspublishedwithintenttohumiliateanddisparageMuslimsandcastinsultonIslamasareligioninthiscountry.
The publication is not only grossly false, but is also the complete opposite of what Muslims hold dear in their
religion.
The trial court found that the newspaper article clearly imputes a disgraceful act on Muslims. However, the trial
courtruledthatthearticlewasnotlibelousbecausethearticledidnotidentifyornametheplaintiffs.Declaredthe
trialcourt:
"Thereisnodoubtthatthesubjectarticlecontainsanimputationofadiscreditable4actwhenitportrayed
theMuslimstobeworshippingthepigastheirgod.Likewise,thereisnodoubtthatthesubjectarticlewas
published,thenewspaper'Bulgar'containingthesamehavingbeencirculatedinMetroManilaandinother
partsofthecountry.
ThedefendantsdidnotdisputethesefactsxxxHowever,xxxidentityofthepersonisnotpresent.
Itmustbenotedthatthepersonsallegedlydefamed,thehereinplaintiffswerenotidentifiedwithspecificity.
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ThesubjectarticlewasdirectedattheMuslimswithoutmentioningoridentifyingthehereinplaintiffs.xxx
x."
IntheirappealtotheCourtofAppeals,privaterespondentsassailedthetrialcourtfor"decidingthecaseasalibel
caseratherthanacasefordamagesforviolationofArticles19,20,21and26oftheCivilCode."The Court of
AppealsreversedthedecisionofthetrialcourtnotonthebasisofArticles19,20,21and26,butontheground
thatthenewspaperarticlewaslibelous.Thus,theCourtofAppealsheld:
"ItisclearfromthedisputedarticlethatthedefamationwasdirectedatalladherentsoftheIslamicfaith.It
stated that pigs were sacred and idolized as god by members of the Muslim religion. This libelous
imputation undeniably applied to the plaintiffsappellants who are Muslims sharing the same religious
beliefs."
Thus, both the trial and appellate courts found the newspaper article in question insulting and humiliating to
Muslims, causing wounded feelings and mental anguish to believers of Islam. This is a finding of fact that the
Court is duty bound to respect.5 This finding of fact establishes that petitioners have inflicted on private
respondentsanintentionalwrongfulacthumiliatingpersonsbecauseoftheirreligiousbeliefs.Likethetrialand
appellatecourts,wefindthenewspaperarticleinquestiondrippingwithextremeprofanity,grosslyoffensiveand
manifestlyoutrageous,anddevoidofanysocialvalue.Thearticleevidentlyincitesreligioushatred,discrimination
andhostilityagainstMuslims.
Privaterespondentshavecertainlysufferedhumiliationandmentaldistressbecauseoftheirreligiousbeliefs.The
onlyquestioniswhetherthewrongfulactcommittedbypetitioners,whichdoesnotconstitutethecrimeoflibel,is
acaseofdamnumabsqueinjuriaoranactionabletortunderparagraph4,Article26oftheCivilCode.
III.WhyArticle26oftheCivilCodewasEnacted
TheCodeCommissionexplainedtheinclusionofArticle26intheCivilCodeinthiswise:
"Thepresentlaws,criminalorcivil,donotadequatelycopewithinterferencesandvexationsmentionedin
Article26.
Theprivacyofone'shomeisaninviolableright.Yetthelawsinforcedonotsquarelyandeffectivelyprotect
thisright.
TheactsreferredtoinNo.2aremultifarious,andyetmanyofthemarenotwithinthepurviewofthelawin
force.Alienationoftheaffectionofanother'swifeorhusband,unlessitconstitutedadulteryorconcubinage,
is not condemned by the law, much as it may shock society. There are numerous acts, short of criminal
unfaithfulness, whereby the husband or the wife breaks the marital vows, thus causing untold moral
suffering to the other spouse. Why should not these acts be the subject matter of a civil action for
damages?InAmericanlaw,theyare.
Again, there is meddling of socalled friends who poison the mind of one or more members of the family
againsttheothermembers.Inthismannermanyahappyfamilyisbrokenuporestranged.Whyshouldnot
thelawtrytostopthisbycreatingacivilactionfordamages?
OfthesamenatureisthatclassofactsspecifiedinNo.3:intriguingtocauseanothertobealienatedfrom
hisfriends.
NolessseriousaretheactsmentionedinNo.4:vexing,orhumiliatinganotheronaccountofhisreligious
beliefs, lowly station in life, place of birth, physical defect or other personal condition. The penal laws
againstdefamationandunjustvexationareglaringlyinadequate.
Religious freedom does not authorize anyone to heap obloquy and disrepute upon another by reason of
thelatter'sreligion.
Notafewoftherichpeopletreatthepoorwithcontemptbecauseofthelatter'slowlystationinlife. To a
certain extent this is inevitable, from the nature of the social makeup, but there ought to be a limit
somewhere,evenwhenthepenallawsagainstdefamationandunjustvexationarenottransgressed.Ina
democracy,suchalimitmustbeestablished.Thecourtswillrecognizeitineachcase.Socialequalityisnot
soughtbythelegalprovisionunderconsideration,butdueregardfordecencyandpropriety.
Placeofbirth,ofphysicaldefectandotherpersonalconditionsaretoooftenthepretextofhumiliationcast
uponotherpersons.Suchtamperingwithhumanpersonality,eventhoughthepenallawsarenotviolated,
shouldbethecauseofcivilaction.
The article under study denounces "similar acts" which could readily be named, for they occur with
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unpleasantfrequency."6(Emphasissupplied)
TheintentoftheCodeCommissionisquiteclear:Article26specificallyappliestointentionalacts whichfallshort
ofbeingcriminaloffenses.Article24itselfexpresslyreferstotortiousconductwhich"maynotconstitutecriminal
offenses."Thepurposeispreciselytofillagaporlacunainthelawwhereapersonwhosuffersinjurybecauseof
a wrongful act not constituting a crime is left without any redress. UnderArticle 26, the person responsible for
suchactbecomesliablefor"damages,preventionandotherrelief."Inshort,topreservepeaceandharmonyin
thefamilyandinthecommunity,Article26seekstoeliminatecasesofdamnumabsqueinjuriainhumanrelations.
Consequently, the elements that qualify the same acts as criminal offenses do not apply in determining
responsibility for tortious conduct under Article 26. Where the tortious act humiliating another because of his
religiousbeliefsispublishedinanewspaper,theelementsofthecrimeoflibelneednotbesatisfiedbeforethe
aggrieved person can recover damages under Article 26. In intentional tort under Article 26, the offensive
statementsmaynotevenbepublishedorbroadcastedbutmerelyhurledprivatelyattheoffendedparty.
Inintentionalinflictionofmentaldistress,thegravamenofthetortisnottheinjurytoplaintiff'sreputation,butthe
harm to plaintiff's mental and emotional state. In libel, the gist of the action is the injury to plaintiff's reputation.
Reputationisthecommunity'sopinionofwhatapersonis.7Inintentionalinflictionofmentaldistress,theopinion
of the community is immaterial to the existence of the action although the court can consider it in awarding
damages. What is material is the disturbance on themental or emotional state of the plaintiff who is entitled to
peace of mind. The offensive act or statement need not identify specifically the plaintiff as the object of the
humiliation.Whatisimportantisthattheplaintiffactuallysuffersmentaloremotionaldistressbecausehesawthe
actorreadthestatementanditalludestoanidentifiablegrouptowhichheclearlybelongs.
If one of the petitioners, without specifically naming private respondents, hurled the same statement in private
separately to each of the private respondents, the act would be actionable under Article 26 because it would
causementaldistresstoeachprivaterespondent.Thefactthatthestatementwasmadepubliclyinfactmakes
matters worse because the mental or emotional distress caused on private respondents would even be
aggravatedbythepublicity.Thismerelyillustratesthattherequirementsoflibelhavenoapplicationinintentional
tortsunderArticle26wheretheimpressionofthepublicisimmaterialwhiletheimpactonthemindoremotionof
theoffendedpartyisallimportant.ThatiswhyinAmericanjurisprudencethetortofintentionalinflictionofmental
oremotionaldistressiscompletelyseparateanddistinct8fromthetwintortsoflibelandslander.9
The majority opinion, however, cites the U.S. Supreme Court decision in Hustler Magazine v. Falwell10 as
authority that a person "may not recover for intentional infliction of emotional distress arising from a publication
unless the publication contained a false statement of fact that was made with actual malice, that is, with a
knowledgeoffalsityorrecklessdisregardforthetruth."Themajorityopinion'srelianceon Hustler is misplaced.
ThedoctrineinHustlerappliesonlytopublicfigures,andtheU.S.SupremeCourtfoundthat"respondentFalwell
isa'publicfigure'forpurposesofFirstAmendmentlaw."TheU.S.SupremeCourtheldinHustlerthat
"We conclude that publicfiguresandpublicofficials may not recover for the tort of intentional infliction of
emotionaldistressbyreasonofpublicationsuchastheonehereatissuewithout'ashowinginadditionthat
thepublicationcontainsafalsestatementoffactwhichwasmadewith'actualmalice,'i.e.,withknowledge
thatthestatementwasfalseorwithrecklessdisregardastowhetherornotitwastrue.xxx."(Emphasis
supplied)
Evidently,Hustlerallowsrecoveryforintentionalinflictionofemotionaldistressiftheaggrievedpartyisaprivate
personandnotapublicfigureevenifthereisnoshowingthatthefalsestatementwasmadewithactualmalice.In
the instant case, private respondents are not public figures or public officials but ordinary private individuals
representedbyprivaterespondentIslamicDa'wahCouncilofthePhilippines,Inc.
IV.ConstitutionalGuaranteeof'FullRespectforHumanRights'
The 1987 Constitution provides that "[t]he State values the dignity of every human person and guarantees full
respectforhumanrights."11TheConstitutioncreatedaCommissiononHumanRightswiththefunction,among
others, to "[M]onitor the Philippine Government's compliance with international treaty obligations on human
rights."12TheframersoftheConstitutionmadeitclearthattheterm"humanrights"asusedintheConstitution
referred to the civil and political rights embodied in the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights13 to
which the Philippines is a signatory. This is clear from the following exchange in the deliberations of the
ConstitutionalCommission:
"MR.GARCIA:Butitdoesnotmeanthatwewillrefertoeachandeveryspecificarticletherein,butonlyto
those that pertain to the civil and politically related, as we understand it in this Commission on Human
Rights.
MR.GUINGONA:MadamPresident,Iamnotclearastothedistinctionbetweensocialandcivilrights.
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MR. GARCIA: There are two international covenants: the International Covenant (on) Civil and Political
Rights and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. The second covenant
contains all the different rights the rights of labor to organize, the right to education, housing, shelter,
etcetera.
MR.GUINGONA:SowearejustlimitingatthemomentthesenseofthecommitteetothosetheGentleman
hasspecified.
MR.GARCIA:Yes,tocivilandpoliticalrights.
MR.GUINGONA:Thankyou."14(Emphasissupplied)
Article 20 (2) of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights provides that "[a]ny advocacy of x x
xreligioushatredthatconstitutesincitementtodiscrimination,hostilityorviolenceshallbeprohibitedbylaw."The
Human Rights Committee created under the Covenant, in its 1983 Nineteenth Session, reported to member
statesthat:
"1. x x x In view of the nature of article 20, States parties are obliged to adopt the necessary legislative
measuresprohibitingtheactionsreferredtotherein.However,thereportshaveshownthatinsomeStates
such actions are neither prohibited by law nor are appropriate efforts intended or made to prohibit them.
Further, many reports failed to give sufficient information concerning the relevant national legislation and
practice.
2.xxxForarticle20tobecomefullyeffectivethereoughttobealawmakingitclearthatpropagandaand
advocacy as described therein are contrary to public policy and providing for an appropriate sanction in
caseofviolation.xxx."15
The Covenant, being an international treaty to which the Philippines is a signatory, is part of the country's
municipallaw.16The Covenant carries great weight in the interpretation of the scope and meaning of the term
"humanrights"asusedintheConstitution.Unquestionably,theframersoftheConstitutionintentionallyreferredto
the civil and political rights embraced in the Covenant in describing the term "human rights." The Constitution
even mandates the independent Commission on Human Rights to monitor the compliance of the Philippine
Government,whichincludesthejudiciary,withitstreatyobligationsundertheCovenant.
Paragraph 4,Article 26 of the Civil Code makes civilly liable any person who humiliates another because of his
religiousbeliefs.Thisisjustasoftprohibitionofadvocacyofreligioushatredthatincitesdiscrimination,hostilityor
violence, the act the Covenant seeks to curb and which the Philippine Government has undertaken to declare
unlawful. Other countries that signed the Covenant have criminalized the acts prohibited under the Covenant.
SinceourratificationoftheCovenantin1986,thePhilippineshasnotenactedanyspeciallegislationtoenforce
the provisions of the Covenant, on the ground that existing laws are adequate to meet the requirements of the
Covenant. There is no other law, except paragraph 4,Article 26 of the Civil Code, that can provide a sanction
againstintentionalconduct,fallingshortofacriminalact,advocatingreligioushatredthatinciteshostilitybetween
MuslimsandChristiansinthiscountry.
If we are to comply in good faith with our treaty obligations under the Covenant, as the Constitution expressly
mandatesthePhilippineGovernment,wemustgiveredressunderArticle26totheoutrageousprofanitysuffered
byprivaterespondents.OurConstitutionadoptsthegenerallyacceptedprinciplesofinternationallawaspartof
thelawoftheland.Pactasuntservandaeverytreatyinforcebindsthepartieswhomustcomplywiththetreaty
ingoodfaith17isonesuchprinciple.Thus,ifwerefusetoapplyArticle26totheinstantcase,thenweadmit
thatwehavenolawtoenforcetheCovenant.Ineffect,weadmitnoncompliancewiththeCovenant.
The Supreme Court of Canada, in interpreting Canada's obligation under the Covenant, explained in R. v.
Keegstra:18
"C.E.R.D.(ConventionontheEliminationofAllFormsofRacialDiscrimination)andI.C.C.P.R.(International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights) demonstrate that the prohibition of hate promoting expression is
consideredtobenotonlycompatiblewithasignatorynation'sguaranteeofhumanrights,butisaswellan
obligatoryaspectofthisguarantee.DecisionsundertheEuropeanConventionfortheProtectionofHuman
RightsandFundamentalFreedomsarealsoofaidinillustratingthetenoroftheinternationalcommunity's
approach to hate propaganda and free expression. This is not to deny that finding the correct balance
between prohibiting hate propaganda and ensuring freedom of expression has been a source of debate
internationally (see, e.g., Nathan Lerner, The U.N. Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial
Discrimination (1980), at pp. 4354). But despite debate Canada, along with other members of the
international community, has indicated a commitment to prohibiting hate propaganda, and in my opinion
this court must have regard to that commitment in investigating the nature of the government objective
behinds.319(2)oftheCriminalCode.Thattheinternationalcommunityhascollectivelyactedtocondemn
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hatepropaganda,andtoobligeStatePartiestoC.E.R.D.andI.C.C.P.R.toprohibitsuchexpression,thus
emphasizestheimportanceoftheobjectivebehinds.319(2)andtheprinciplesofequalityandtheinherent
dignityofallpersonsthatinfusebothinternationalhumanrightsandtheCharter."
As a signatory to the Covenant, the Philippines is, like, Canada, obligated under international law and the 1987
Constitutiontoprotecttheinherentdignityandhumanrightsofallitscitizens.
V.FreedomofExpressionandProfaneUtterances
The blatant profanity contained in the newspaper article in question is not the speech that is protected by the
constitutionalguaranteeoffreedomofexpression.Wordsthatheapextremeprofanity,intendedmerelytoincite
hostility,hatredorviolence,havenosocialvalueanddonotenjoyconstitutionalprotection.Asexplainedbythe
UnitedStatesSupremeCourtinthelandmarkcaseofChaplinskyv.NewHampshire:19
"Allowing the broadest scope to the language and purpose of the Fourteenth Amendment, it is well
understoodthattherightoffreespeechisnotabsoluteatalltimesandunderallcircumstances.Thereare
certain welldefined and narrowly limited classes of speech, the prevention and punishment of which has
neverbeenthoughttoraiseanyConstitutionalproblem.Theseincludethelewdandobscene,theprofane,
thelibelous,andtheinsultingor'fighting'wordsthosewhichbytheirveryutteranceinflictinjuryortend
toinciteanimmediatebreachofthepeace.Ithasbeenwellobservedthatsuchutterancesarenoessential
partofanyexpositionofideas,andareofsuchslightsocialvalueasasteptotruththatanybenefitthat
may be derived from them is clearly outweighed by the social interest in order and morality. Resort to
epithetsorpersonalabuseisnotinanypropersensecommunicationofinformationoropinionsafeguarded
by the Constitution, and its punishment as a criminal act would raise no question under that instrument."
(Emphasissupplied)
Chaplinskyexpresslyincludesprofaneutterancesasbelongingtothenarrowlylimitedclassesofspeechthatare
notconstitutionallyprotected.Profaneutterances,likeassertingthatMuslimsworshipthepigastheirGod,have
nosocialvaluemeritingconstitutionalprotection.Black'sLawDictionary(6thEd.)definesthewords"profane"and
"profanity"asfollows:
"Profane. Irreverence toward God or holy things. Writing, speaking, or acting, in manifest or implied
contemptofsacredthings.TownofTorringtonv.Taylor,59Wyo.109,137P.2d621,624Duncanv.U.S.,
C.C.A.Or.,48F.2d128,133.Thatwhichhasnotbeenconsecrated."
"Profanity.Irreverencetowardssacredthingsparticularly,anirreverentandblasphemoususeofthename
of God. Vulgar, irreverent, or coarse language. It is a federal offense to utter an obscene, indecent, or
profanelanguageonradio.18U.S.C.A.1464.SeealsoObscenity."
The majority opinion states that the doctrine in Chaplinsky "had largely been superseded by subsequent First
Amendmentdoctrines."Themajorityopinionthencitesthe1971caseofCohenv.California 20asan"illustrative"
casethat"Americancourtsnolongeraccepttheviewthatspeechmaybeproscribedmerelybecauseitis'lewd,'
'profane,''insulting'orotherwisevulgaroroffensive."However,HustlerMagazinev.Falwell,21a1988casewhich
themajorityopinionalsocites,clearlyexplainsthestateofAmericanlawonthismatter,thus:
"Admittedly,theseoftrepeatedFirstAmendmentprinciples,likeotherprinciples,aresubjecttolimitations.
WerecognizedinPacificaFoundationthatspeechthatis'vulgar,offensive,andshocking'is'notentitledto
absoluteconstitutionalprotectionunderallcircumstances.'InChaplinsky v. New Hampshire, we held that
thataStatecouldlawfullypunishanindividualfortheuseofinsulting'fightingwords'thosewhichbytheir
very utterance inflict injury or tend to incite an immediate breach of the peace.'These limitations are but
recognitionoftheobservationinDun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc. 472 U.S. 749 (1985)
that this Court has 'long recognized that not all speech is of equal FirstAmendment importance.' x x x ."
[othercitationsomitted]xxx."
Indeed, while democratic societies maintain a deep commitment to the principle that debate on public issues
shouldbeuninhibited,robustandwideopen,thisfreedebatehasneverbeenmeanttoincludelibelous,obscene
or profane utterances against private individuals.22 Clearly, the newspaper article in question, dripping with
extremeprofanity,doesnotenjoytheprotectionoftheconstitutionalguaranteeoffreedomofspeech.
VI.Court'sDutyandPowertoEnforceConstitutionalRights
The1987ConstitutionhasconferredontheCourtthepowerto"[p]romulgaterulesconcerningtheprotectionand
enforcement of constitutional rights." This is an innovation in the 1987 Constitution to insure, in the words of
former Chief Justice Roberto R. Concepcion, one of the framers of the Constitution, that "the protection and
enforcement of these constitutional rights is something that the courts have to consider in the exercise of their
judicialpower.23This provision stresses that constitutional rights, whether found in the Bill of Rights or in other
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provisionsoftheConstitutionlikeintheDeclarationofPrinciplesandStatePolicies,are"notmerelydeclaratory
butarealsoenforceable."24
One such right, the enforcement and protection of which is expressly guaranteed by the State under the
Constitution,istherightto"fullrespectforhumanrights."Thetrialandappellatecourtshavefoundthatprivate
respondents'religiousbeliefsandpracticeshavebeentwisted,ridiculedandvilifiedbypetitioners.Thisisaclear
violationofthehumanrightsofprivaterespondentsundertheConstitutionandtheInternationalCovenantonCivil
and Political Rights. It now becomes the duty of the Court, as the guardian of the fundamental rights of the
people,toexerciseitspowertoprotectandenforcetheconstitutionalrightsofprivaterespondents.
TheCourt,pursuanttoitsrulemakingpower,canrequirethatinactionsliketheinstantcase,theplaintiffsmust
bring a class suit. This will avoid multiplicity of suits considering the numerous potential plaintiffs all over the
country.Ajudgmentinaclasssuit,whetherfavorableorunfavorabletotheclass,isbindingundertheresjudicata
principleonallmembersoftheclasswhetherornottheywerebeforethecourt.25Thisrulewilladdressthefear
thatcaseswillswampthecourtsalloverthecountryifprofanitiesagainstreligiousgroupsaremadeactionable
underArticle26.
VII.TheSpecialCircumstanceofMuslimSecessionintheSouth
Limitationsonfreedomofexpressionhavealwaysbeenrootedonspecialcircumstancesconfrontingasocietyin
its historical development. In the 1950s, faced with rising racial tension inAmerican society, the U.S Supreme
Court ruled in Beauharnais v. Illinois26 that hate speech which denigrates a group of persons defined by their
religion, race or ethnic origin defames that group and the law may validly prohibit such speech on the same
groundasdefamationofanindividual.ThiswastheonlytimethattheU.S.SupremeCourtupheldgrouplibel,and
sincethen,therehasbeenaconsistentretreatfromthisdoctrineasblacksandotherethnicgroupsbecamemore
assimilated into the mainstream ofAmerican society. Beauharnais expressly acknowledged that race riots and
massive immigration of unassimilated ethnic groups justified the legislature in "punishing x x x libels directed at
designatedcollectivesandflagrantlydisseminated."
ThemajorityopinionstatesalsothatBeauharnaishasbeensupersededbyBrandenburgv.Ohio."27Themajority
opinion explains that Brandenburg, a 1969 decision, ruled that "advocacy of illegal action becomes punishable
onlyifsuchadvocacyisdirectedtoincitingorproducingimminentlawlessactionandislikelytoinciteorproduce
such action." While Beauharnais has been apparently weakened by subsequent decisions of the U.S. Supreme
Court,itwasnotoverturnedinBrandenburgwhichdidnotevenciteormentionBeauharnais.WhatBrandenburg
overturnedwasWhitneyv.California,28thus
"Accordingly, we are here confronted with a statute which, by its own words and as applied, purports to
punish mere advocacy and to forbid, on pain of criminal punishment, assembly with others merely to
advocate the described type of action. Such a statute falls within the condemnation of the First and
FourteenthAmendments.ThecontraryteachingofWhitneyv.California,supra,cannotbesupported,and
thatdecisionisthereforeoverruled."(Emphasissupplied)
In any event, Brandenburg involved the constitutionality of a criminal statute which sought to punish the mere
advocacy of violence as a means to accomplish industrial or political reform.This is distinctly different from the
instant case, which involves profane utterances that have long been recognized as devoid of social value and
outsidethepurviewofconstitutionallyprotectedspeech.29
In 1990, the Canadian Supreme Court, in R. v. Keegstra,30 upheld a law criminalizing hate speech toward any
sectionofthepublicdistinguishedbycolor,race,religionorethnicorigin.TheCanadianSupremeCourtrejected
the clear and present danger test of the U.S. Supreme Court, stating that it did not address the psychological
trauma hate propaganda causes and the subtle and incremental way hate propaganda works. The Canadian
SupremeCourtfoundtheU.S.SupremeCourt'sBeauharnaisdecisionmorereflectiveofCanadianvaluesrather
thanlaterU.S.decisionsthatweakenedBeauharnais.TheCanadianSupremeCourthandeddownKeegstraata
timewhenCanadawasbecomingamultiracialsocietyfollowingtheinfluxofimmigrantsofdifferentcolor,ethnic
originandreligion.ThefollowingpassagesinKeegstraareinstructive:
"AmyriadofsourcesbothjudicialandacademicofferreviewsofFirstAmendmentjurisprudenceasit
pertainstohatepropaganda.Centraltomostdiscussionsisthe1952caseofBeauharnaisv.Illinois,where
theSupremeCourtoftheUnitedStatesupheldasconstitutionalacriminalstatuteforbiddingcertaintypes
of group defamation. Though never overruled, Beauharnais appears to have been weakened by later
pronouncements of the Supreme Court (see, e.g., Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64 (1964) Ashton v.
Kentucky,384U.S.195(1966)NewYorkTimesCo.v.Sullivan,376U.S.2541964)Brandenburgv.Ohio,
395U.S.444(1969)andCohenv.California, 403 U.S. 15 (1971)).The trend reflected in many of these
pronouncementsistoprotectoffensive,publicinvectiveaslongasthespeakerhasnotknowinglyliedand
thereexistsnoclearandpresentdangerofviolenceorinsurrection.
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xxxxxxxxx
Thequestionthatconcernsusinthisappealisnot,ofcourse,whatthelawisorshouldbeintheUnited
States.ButitisimportanttobeexplicitastothereasonswhyorwhynotAmericanjurisprudencemaybe
useful in the s. 1 analysis of s. 319(2) of the Criminal Code. In the United States, a collection of
fundamental rights has been constitutionally protected for over 200 years. The resulting practical and
theoreticalexperienceisimmense,andshouldnotbeoverlookedbyCanadiancourts.Ontheotherhand,
wemustexamineAmericanconstitutionallawwithacriticaleye,andinthisrespectLaForestJ.hasnoted
inR.v.Rahey,(1987)1S.C.R.588at639:
'While it is natural and even desirable for Canadian courts to refer to American constitutional
jurisprudence in seeking to elucidate the meaning of Charter guarantees that have counterparts in
the United States Constitution, they should be wary of drawing too ready a parallel between
constitutionsborntodifferentcountriesindifferentagesandinverydifferentcircumstances...'
Canada and the United States are not alike in every way, nor have the documents entrenching human
rights in our two countries arisen in the same context. It is only common sense to recognize that, just as
similarities will justify borrowing from the American experience, differences may require that Canada's
constitutionalvisiondepartfromthatendorsedintheUnitedStates."(Othercitationsomitted)
xxxxxxxxx
First,itisnotentirelyclearthatBeauharnaismustconflictwithexistingFirstAmendmentdoctrine.Credible
argumentshavebeenmadethatlaterSupremeCourtcasesdonotnecessarilyerodeitslegitimacy(see,
e.g., Kenneth Lasson, "Racial Defamation as Free Speech: Abusing the First Amendment" (1985), 17
Colum. Human Rights L. Rev. 11). Indeed, there exists a growing body of academic writing in the United
States which evinces a stronger focus upon the way in which hate propaganda can undermine the very
valueswhichfreespeechissaidtoprotect.Thisbodyofwritingisreceptivetotheideathat,weretheissue
addressed from this new perspective, FirstAmendment doctrine might be able to accommodate statutes
prohibiting hate propaganda (see, e.g., Richard Delgado, "Words That Wound: A Tort Action for Racial
Insults,Epithets,andNameCalling"(1982),17Harv.C.R.C.L.LawRev.133IrvingHorowitz,"Skokie,the
ACLUandtheEnduranceofDemocraticTheory"(1979),43Law&Contemp.Prob.328Lasson,op.cit.,at
pp.2030MariMatsuda,"PublicResponsetoRacistSpeech:ConsideringtheVictim'sStory,"(1989),87
Mich. L. Rev. 2320, at p. 2348 "Doe v. University of Michigan: First Amendment Racist and Sexist
ExpressiononCampusCourtStrikesDownUniversityLimitsonHateSpeech"(1990),103Harv.L.Rev.
1397)."
IndecidingKeegstra, the Canadian Supreme Court also relied on Canada's treaty obligations under the United
Nations International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights which requires signatory states to prohibit any
"advocacy of x x x religious hatred that constitutes incitement to discrimination, hostility or violence." During the
negotiationsoftheCovenant,theUnitedStatesobjectedtothisprovisiononfreespeechgrounds.Whenitfinally
ratifiedtheCovenant,theUnitedStatesmadeareservationrejectingthisprovisioninsofarasitconflictswithU.S.
constitutionalprotections.31TheCovenantopenedforratificationonDecember19,1966andenteredintoforce
onMarch23,1976.ThePhilippinesratifiedtheCovenantin1986withoutanyreservation,justlikeCanada.The
1987 Constitution of the Philippines even created a Commission on Human Rights to "[M]onitor the Philippine
Government's compliance with international treaty obligations on human rights." Obviously, Canada and the
PhilippinesarealikeintheirobligationsundertheCovenant,buttheUnitedStatesisdifferentlysituated.32
Inourcountry,therehasbeenalongfesteringandbloodyMuslimsecessionistmovementintheSouth,fuelednot
onlybypovertybutalsobythepalpablefeelingamongMuslimsthattheChristianmajorityisnottreatingMuslims
fairly. Private respondents in the instant case, despite the outrageous profanity hurled at them by petitioners,
chosenottojointheirsecessionistbrethreninthearmedstrugglebutinsteaddecidedtopetitionourcourtsfor
legal redress of their grievance.They could have easily retaliated by flinging their own blasphemous invectives
againsttheChristianreligion.Theydidnot,realizingperhapsthatansweringprofanitywithmoreprofanitywould
meanansweringhatredwithmorehatred,furtherdividingratherthanunifyingtheFilipinonation.
Just last November of 2002, a Christian newspaper in Nigeria where the Miss World contest was being held
opinedthattheProphetMohammedwouldhaveapprovedofthebeautycontest.Thenewspaperstated:"What
wouldMohammedthink?Inallhonesty,hewouldhaveprobablychosenawifefromoneofthem."Thesewords
provokedbloodyriotinginNigeriaamongMuslimswhofeltinsultedbythearticle.Hundredsdiedinthereligious
riots. Yet the offensive article in the Nigerian newspaper pales in comparison to the utterly profane newspaper
articleintheinstantcase.
Indeed, private respondent Islamic Da'wah Council of the Philippines, a federation of more than 70 Muslim
religious organizations in the Philippines, deserves commendation for bringing this case before our courts for a
peaceful and legal resolution of the issue. Private respondents have placed their trust and faith in our courts,
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knowingandinsistingthattheyareentitledtoajustremedyunderparagraph4,Article26oftheCivilCode.Itis
timetobreathelifetothislongdormantprovisionoftheCivilCode,togiveevenjustatokenredresstoreligious
minoritieswhosuffermentalandemotionaldistressfrommindlessprofanitycommittedbyirresponsiblepersons
belongingtothereligiousmajority.Intheprocesswewillcontributeinavoidingafurthercleavageinthefabricof
ournation,anddemonstratetoourMuslimbrothersthattheirgrievancescanberedressedundertheruleoflaw.
The instant case does not even call for a reexamination of the clear and present danger test which we have
adoptedinthisjurisdictionindeterminingtheconstitutionalityoflegislationthatimpingesoncivilliberties.33Even
undertheclearandpresentdangertest,profaneutterancesarenotconstitutionallyprotectedatleastwithrespect
to profanities directed against private individuals. The special circumstance involving the Muslim secessionist
movementintheSouthshouldmakeusmoresensitivetothegrievancesofourMuslimbrotherswhocontinueto
havefaithintheruleoflawinthiscountry.
Since the peace of mind of private respondents has been violated by the publication of the profane article in
question, Article 26 of the Civil Code mandates that the tortious conduct "shall produce a cause of action for
damages, prevention and other relief."Article 2219 of the same Code provides that "[M]oral damages may be
recoveredinxxxactionsreferredtoinArticles21,26xxx."Privaterespondentsareentitledtomoraldamages
because,asdulyestablishedbythetestimoniesofprominentMuslims,34privaterespondentssufferedemotional
distress which was evidently the proximate result of the petitioners' wrongful publication of the article in
question.35
VII.Conclusion
Almostthirtyyearsago,IhadoccasiontowriteaboutArticle26inthiswise:
"AtthetimeArticle26wasliftedbytheCodeCommissionfromAmericanjurisprudence,manyoftherights
embodiedthereinwerenotyetwidelyacceptedbyAmericancourts,andinfactevennowatleastone,the
righttoprivacy,isstillstrugglingtogainrecognitioninsomestates.Whilewehavebeenquicktoleapfrog
Americanstatedecisionsinrecognizingsuchrights,wehave,however,beenpainfullyslowingalvanizing
thesameinactualcases.TodateArticle26standsalmostasameredecorativeprovisioninourstatutes
butitmaybeharnessedfruitfullyanytime."36
Nowisthetimetoapplythisprovisionoflawsincetheinstantcasefallsclearlywithinparagraph4ofArticle26.
ApplyingArticle26willnotunderminefreedomofspeechsincetheprofanepublicationinquestionbelongstothe
classofspeechthatclearlydoesnotenjoyconstitutionalprotection.ApplyingArticle26demonstratesgoodfaith
compliance with our treaty obligations under the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. Applying
Article 26 implements the constitutional policy that the "State values the dignity of every human person and
guarantees full respect for human rights." Applying Article 26 constitutes compliance by the Court of its
constitutional duty to protect and enforce constitutional rights.ApplyingArticle 26 will help bind the wounds that
mindlessprofanitiesinflictonreligiousminoritiesinviolationoftheirhumanrights.
Accordingly, I vote to dismiss the petition and affirm the award by the Court of Appeals of P50,000.00 moral
damages, P10,000.00 exemplary damages, and P10,000.00 attorney's fees to respondent Islamic Da'wah
CouncilofthePhilippines,Inc.basedonparagraph4,Article26oftheCivilCode.

DissentingOpinion
AUSTRIAMARTINEZ,J.,dissenting:
IvotetoaffirmtheassaileddecisionoftheCourtofAppealswithcertainmodifications.
Foraproperperspectiveoftheissuesinvolvedinthepresentpetition,itmustbeemphasizedthattheportionof
thesubjectarticlewhichalludestotheMuslimsasnoteatingporkbecauseitisdirtyisnottheboneofcontention
ofrespondents,becauseadmittedly,theMuslimsmayeatporkifdrivenbynecessity,asexpressedintheQuran,
towit:
"Allahhasforbiddenyouonlywhatdiesofitselfandbloodandthefleshofswineandthatoverwhichany
other(name)than(thatof)Allahhasbeeninvoked.Then,whoeverisdrivenbynecessity,notdesiring,nor
exceedingthelimit,nosinisuponhim."1
The focal point of private respondents' claim for damages is the insult heaped upon them because of the
malicious publication that the Muslims worship the pig as their God which is absolutely contrary to their basic
beliefasMuslimsthatthereisonlyoneGodtheycallAllah,and,thatthegreatestsininIslamistoworshipthings
orpersonsotherthanAllah.2
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PetitionersareliablefordamagesbothunderArticles33and26(4)oftheCivilCode.Theinstancesthatcanbe
brought underArticle 26 may also be subject to an action for defamation underArticle 33. In such a case, the
actionbroughtunderArticle26isanalternativeremedy,andtheplaintiffcanproceeduponeithertheory,orboth,
althoughhecanhavebutonerecoveryforasingleinstanceofpublicity.3
Article33oftheCivilCodeprovides:
"Article33.Incasesofdefamation,fraudandphysicalinjuries,acivilactionfordamages,entirelyseparate
and distinct from the criminal action, may be brought by the injured party. Such civil action shall proceed
independentlyofthecriminalprosecution,andshallrequireonlyapreponderanceofevidence."(Emphasis
supplied)
Necessarily,Article353oftheRevisedPenalCodecomesintoplay.Inthepresentcivilcase,itisnecessarythat
respondentsareabletoestablishbypreponderanceofevidencethefollowingelementsofdefamation:
"1. That there must be an imputation of a crime, or of a vice or defect, real or imaginary, or any act,
omission,condition,status,orcircumstance.
"2.Thattheimputationmustbemadepublicly.
"3.Thatitmustbemalicious.
"4.Thattheimputationmustbedirectedatanaturalorjuridicalperson,oronewhoisdead.
"5.Thattheimputationmusttendtocausethedishonor,discreditorcontemptofthepersondefamed."4
Anallegationisconsidereddefamatoryifitascribestoapersonthecommissionofacrime,thepossessionofa
viceordefect,realorimaginary,oranyact,omission,condition,statusorcircumstancewhichtendstodishonor
ordiscreditorputhimincontempt,orwhichtendstoblackenthememoryofonewhoisdead.5
Asageneralrule,words,writtenorprinted,arelibelousperseiftheytendtoexposeapersontopublichatred,
contempt,ridicule,aversion,ordisgrace,induceanevilopinionofhiminthemindsofrightthinkingpersons,and
deprive him of their friendly intercourse in society, regardless of whether they actually produce such results.6
Otherwise stated words published are libelous if they discredit plaintiff in the minds of any considerable and
respectable class in the community, taking into consideration the emotions, prejudices, and intolerance of
mankind.7Ithasbeenheldthatitisnotnecessarythatthepublishedstatementsmakeallorevenamajorityof
thosewhoreadthemthinkanylessofthepersondefamed,butitisenoughifanoticeablepartofthosewhodo
readthestatementsaremadetohate,despise,scornorbecontemptuousofthepersonconcerningwhomthe
falsestatementsarepublished.8
Thus,inordertobelibelousperse,thedefamatorywordsmustbeofsuchanaturethatthecourtcanpresume
as a matter of law that they will tend to disgrace and degrade the person or hold him up to public hatred,
contempt,ridiculeorcausehimtobeshunnedandavoidedinotherwords,theymustreflectonhisintegrity,his
character,andhisgoodnameandstandinginthecommunity,andtendtoexposehimtopublichatred,contempt,
ordisgrace.9The imputation must be one which tends to affect plaintiff in a class of society whose standard of
opinionthecourtcanrecognize.10Itisnotsufficient,standingalone,thatthelanguageisunpleasantandannoys
orirksplaintiff,andsubjectshimtojestsorbanter,soastoaffecthisfeelings.11
Inthepresentcase,itisevidentthatthesubjectarticleattributesadiscreditableordishonorableactorcondition
to all Muslims in general, a derision of the religious beliefs of the Muslims and of the objectives of respondent
Council to herald the truth about Islam, in particular.The portion of the assailed article which declares that the
MuslimsworshipthepigsasGodisobnoxiouslycontrarytothebasicbeliefoftheMuslims.
Thus, the article is not only an imputation of irreligious conduct but also a downright misrepresentation of the
religiousbeliefsofMuslims.Ithasbeenheldthatscandalousmatterisnotnecessarytomakealibelitisenough
ifthedefendantinducesanillopiniontobeheldoftheplaintiff,ortomakehimcontemptibleorridiculous 12or
thattheimputationtendstocausedishonor,discreditorcontemptoftheoffendedparty.13
Petitioners'stancethatthearticle"AlamBaNinyo?"isbutanexpressionofbelieforopiniondoesnotjustifysaid
publication. It cannot be considered as a mere information being disseminated. Petitioners' defense that the
articleitselfwasmerelyacontributionofareader,orthatthewriterwassolicitingopinionfromthereaders,does
notholdwater,sincethearticledidnotinanywayrefertosuchcircumstance.Verily,thearticle,readasawhole
withtheotherparagraphs,callstheattentionofthereaderstoastatementoffact,notfiction,andthatthewriter
speakswithauthorityonthesubjectmatter.Bulgarinfactpridesitselfasbeingthe"PahayaganNgKatotohanan".

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Significantly,liabilityforlibeldoesnotdependontheintentionofthedefamer,butonthefactofthedefamation.14
In matters of libel, the question is not what the writer of an alleged libel means, but what is the meaning of the
wordshehasused.15Themeaningofthewriterisquiteimmaterial.Thequestionis,notwhatthewritermeant,
butwhatheconveyedtothosewhoheardorread.16
In other words, it is not the intention of the speaker or writer, or the understanding of the plaintiff or of any
particularhearerorreader,bywhichtheactionablequalityofthewordsistobedetermined.Itisthemeaningthat
the words in fact conveyed, rather than the effect which the language complained of was fairly calculated to
produce and would naturally produce on the minds of persons of reasonable understanding, discretion, and
candor,takingintoconsiderationaccompanyingexplanationsandsurroundingcircumstanceswhichwereknown
to the hearer or reader. The alleged defamatory statement should be construed not only as to the expression
usedbutalsowithrespecttothewholescopeandapparentobjectofthewriter.17
Wantofintentiontovilifydoesnotrenderanobjectionablepublicationanythelessalibelandapublicationisnot
excused by the publisher's ignorance that it contains libelous matter.18 The state of mind of the person who
publishes a libel is immaterial in determining liability. The law looks at the tendency and consequences of the
publicationratherthanthemotiveorintentionofthewriterorpublisher.19Itdoesnotsignifywhatthemotiveof
thepersonpublishingthelibelwas,orwhetherheintendedittohavealibelousmeaningornot.20Thedefendant
maynothaveintendedtoinjuretheplaintiff'sreputationatallandhemayhavepublishedthewordsbymistakeor
inadvertence,21 or in jest, or without intending to refer, or knowing that he was referring, to the plaintiff, or any
existingperson,oragainhemayhavebeenactuatedbythebestmotivesinpublishingthewords,butsuchfacts
willusuallyaffordthedefendantnodefense,thoughtheymaybeurgedinmitigationofdamages.22
Testedwiththeforegoingprinciplesoflaw,thereisnodoubtthatthearticleinquestionisdefamatoryunderArticle
33oftheCivilCode.Iftheimputationisdefamatory,23theCourthasheldthatmaliceispresumedandtheburden
ofovercomingthepresumptionofmalicebymerepreponderanceofevidencerestedonthepetitioners.
A careful examination of the records of the case does not reveal any cogent reason that would set aside the
presumption of malice. In fact, there is convincing evidence that the publication of the assailed article was
malicious,asmoreextensivelydiscussedinthelatterportionofhereinopinion.
Furthermore,thereisnoshowingthattheinstantcasefallsunderanyoftheexceptionsprovidedforinArticle354
oftheRevisedPenalCode,towit:
"Art.354.Requirementofpublicity.Everydefamatoryimputationispresumedtobemalicious,evenifit
betrue,ifnogoodintentionandjustifiablemotiveformakingitisshown,exceptinthefollowingcases:
"1. A private communication made by any person to another in the performance of any legal, moral or
socialdutyand
"2.Afairandtruereport,madeingoodfaith,withoutanycommentsorremarks,ofanyjudicial,legislative
or other official proceedings which are not of confidential nature, or of any statement, report or speech
delivered in said proceedings, or of any other act performed by public officers in the exercise of their
functions."
Consequently, there is no compelling reason to disregard the findings of the Court ofAppeals that no evidence
waspresentedtoovercomesaidpresumptionofmalice.
On the matter of publication, there is no dispute that the same is present, as the subject article was admittedly
publishedinthenewspaper"Bulgar"whichwascirculatedinMetroManilaandinotherpartsofthecountry.
Itmustbeemphasizedthatnotonlydidboththetrialcourtandtheappellatecourtfindthatthesubjectarticlewas
published,theyalsoheldthatthesubjectarticlecontainsanimputationofadiscreditableactwhenitportrayedthe
Muslimstobeworshippingthepigastheirgod.
Butthetrialcourtandtheappellatecourtdifferedastothepresenceoftheelementoftheidentityofthepersons
defamed. While the trial court held that the libelous article does not identify the personalities of the persons
defamedandthereforerespondentshadnocauseofaction,theCourtofAppealsruledthattheMuslimswerethe
defamedpersonsandrespondentIDCPhastherequisitepersonalitytosuefordamages.Theappellatecourtis
right.
Specificidentityofthepersondefamedmeansthatthethirdpersonwhoreadorlearnedaboutthelibelousarticle
must know that it referred to the plaintiff.24 In order to maintain a libel suit, it is essential that the victim is
identifiable although it is not necessary that he be named it is likewise not sufficient that the offended party
recognized himself as the person attacked or defamed, but it must be shown that at least a third person could
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identifyhimastheobjectofthelibelouspublication.25
ItcannotberefutedthattheobviousvictimsinthearticleinquestionarespecificallyidentifiedtheMuslims.The
principlelaiddowninNewsweek,Inc.vs.IntermediateAppellateCourt,26that"wherethedefamationisallegedto
havebeendirectedatagrouporclass,itisessentialthatthestatementmustbesosweepingorallembracingas
to apply to every individual in that class or group, or sufficiently specific so that each individual in that class or
group can prove that the defamatory statement specifically pointed to him, so that he can bring the action
separately,ifneedbe,"obviouslyappliestothepresentcase.Certainly,thedefamatoryimputationcontainedin
the subject article is a sweeping statement affecting a common or general interest of all Muslims, that is, their
religious belief in Allah as the one and only God. The publication was directed against all Muslims without
exceptionsanditisnotnecessarytonameeachoneofthemastheycouldonlyhaveonecauseofactionwhichis
thedamagesufferedbythemcausedbytheinsultinflictedontheirbasicreligioustenets.
Allpremisesconsidered,petitionersareindeedliablefordamagesunderArticle33oftheCivilCode.
Significantly, the respondents brought to the attention of the Court of Appeals the failure of the trial court to
appreciateArticle26(4)oftheCivilCode,buttheappellatecourtsimplydelvedexclusivelyontheapplicabilityof
libelandtheexistenceofitselements.
Ordinarily, the Court may only pass upon errors assigned.27 However, this rule is not without exceptions. The
Courthasruledthatanappellatecourtisaccordedabroaddiscretionarypowertoconsidererrorsnotassigned,
involving,amongothers,(1)mattersnotassignedaserrorsonappealbutconsiderationofwhichisnecessaryin
arriving at a just decision and complete resolution of the case or to serve the interests of justice or to avoid
dispensingpiecemealjustice(2)mattersnotspecificallyassignedaserrorsonappealbutraisedinthetrialcourt
andaremattersofrecordhavingsomebearingontheissuesubmittedwhichthepartiesfailedtoraiseorwhich
thelowercourtignoredand(3)mattersnotassignedaserrorsonappealbutuponwhichthedeterminationofa
questionproperlyassigned,isdependent.28Evidently,allthreeexceptionsapplytothepresentcase.
Necessarily,theCourthastodwellontheapplicabilityofArticle26(4)oftheCivilCodeinsupportofrespondents'
claimfordamages.
Before proceeding any further, a distinction must first be made between a cause of action based on libel or
defamation,whetherinacriminalorcivilcase,andonebasedonArticle26.Inlibel,thegravamenoftheclaimis
reputational harm whereas, underArticle 26, it can be the embarrassment, emotional harm or mental distress
caused upon a person.29 In libel cases, its four (4) constitutive elements, to wit: (a) defamatory imputation (b)
malice (c) publication and (d) identifiability of the victim,30 must be established, by mere preponderance of
evidenceinacivilcasewhichhereinpetitionershavedoneinthepresentcase.Saidelements,however,arenot
essential in a cause of action based on tort underArticle 26, wherein one is liable for personal injury, whether
administered intentionally, wantonly or by negligence.31 Personal injury herein refers not only to reputation but
alsoencompassescharacter,conduct,manner,andhabitsofaperson.32
AmericanTortLaw,onthebasisofwhich,PhilippineTortLawwaspatterned,hasrecognizedthatiftheplaintiffis
shown to have suffered a wrong, the mere paucity of cases or absence of any precedent does not constitute
sufficient reason for refusing relief if a sound principle of law can be found which governs, or which by analogy
oughttogovern.33Thefactthatacaseisnoveldoesnotoperatetodefeatrecovery,ifitcanbebroughtwithinthe
generalrulesoflawapplicabletotorts.34Neitheristhefactthatatortactiondoesnotfitintoanicelydefinedor
established "cubbyhole" of the law has been said not to warrant, in itself, the denial of relief to one who is
injured.35Thus,toignoretheapplicationoftheproperprovisionoflawintheinstantcasewouldbeanabdication
ofthejudiciary'sprimordialobjective,whichis,thejustresolutionofdisputes.
Article 26 is an integral part of the Chapter in the Civil Code on human relations, "designed to indicate certain
normsthatspringfromthefountainofgoodconscience.Theseguidesforhumanconductshouldrunasgolden
threadsthroughsociety,totheendthatlawmayapproachitssupremeideal,whichistheswayanddominanceof
justice."36Article26,whichenhancesandpreserveshumandignityandpersonality,provides:
"Article26.Everypersonshallrespectthedignity,personality,privacyandpeaceofmindofhisneighbors
andotherpersons.Thefollowingandsimilaracts,thoughtheymaynotconstituteacriminaloffense,shall
produceacauseofactionfordamages,preventionandotherrelief.
"(1)Pryingintotheprivacyofanother'sresidence
"(2)Meddlingwithordisturbingtheprivatelifeorfamilyrelationsofanother
"(3)Intriguingtocauseanothertobealienatedfromhisfriends
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"(4) Vexing or humiliating another on account of his religious beliefs, lowly station in life, place of
birth,physicaldefect,orotherpersonalcondition."(Emphasissupplied)
Theraisond'trefortheforegoingstatutoryprovision,asstatedbytheCodeCommissioninitsReport,isworth
settingforthverbatim:
"The sacredness of human personality is a concomitant of every plan for human amelioration. The
touchstone of every system of laws, of the culture and civilization of every country, is how far it dignifies
man.Ifinlegislation,inadequateregardisobservedforhumanlifeandsafetyifthelawsdonotsufficiently
forestallhumansuffering,ordonottryeffectivelytocurbthosefactorsorinfluencesthatwoundthenoblest
sentimentsif the statutes insufficiently protect persons from being unjustly humiliated, in short, if human
personality is not properly exalted then the laws are indeed defective. Sad to say, such is to some
"degreethepresentstateoflegislationinthePhilippines.Toremedythisgravefaultinthelawsisoneof
theprincipalaimsoftheProjectofCivilCode.Instanceswillnowbespecified.
"The present laws, criminal and civil, do not adequately cope with the interferences and vexations
mentionedinArticle26."37(Emphasissupplied)
Thus,Article26providesaggrievedindividualswithalegalremedyagainstviolationsofhumanpersonality,even
though such do not amount to violations of penal laws. Social equality is not sought, but simply due regard for
decencyandpropriety.38
Among the rights covered byArticle 26 are: (a) personal dignity, (b) personal security (c) family relations, (d)
socialintercourse,(e)privacyand(f)peaceofmind.39However,ithasbeenheldthattheviolationsmentionedin
the Article 26 are not exclusive but are merely examples and do not preclude other similar acts. 40 Thus,
disturbing or offensive utterances, such as threats, false statements, or insulting, humiliating, scandalous, or
abusive language,41 may give rise to an action in tort where such language causes mental or emotional
disturbance,asinthiscase,orbodilyinjuryorillnessresultingtherefrom.42
Paragraph 4 ofArticle 26 which makes one liable for vexing or humiliating another on account of his religious
beliefs finds proper application in the case at bar. The Code Commission stressed in no uncertain terms that
religious freedom does not authorize anyone to heap obloquy and disrepute upon another by reason of the
latter'sreligion.43
In support of respondents' claim for damages, Professor Abdul Rafih Sayedy, Dean of the Institute of Islamic
AffairsoftheUniversityofthePhilippines,testifiedinthiswise:
"WITNESS:
"A:First,Iunderstoodthatthistabloidisthevoiceofkatotohananbutregardingthisarticleitisnot
'katotohanan'.TotheMuslimitisablasphemy.ItisanabuseanddesecrationandbeliefoftheMuslimsand
theMuslimsarecommandedbyGodtoworshipnootherthanHim.Sohowcouldthepublisherpublishthat
theMuslimsareworshippingpigs,thatMuslimsinhisminddonoteatanimalswhiletheyarealsoeating
slaughteredchicken,cowandcarabaoandothernonprohibitedanimals.SototheMuslimsthisisaninsult,
not only to the Muslims in Mindanao but to the whole Muslim community. This is a blasphemy to the
Muslims.
"QAsaMuslim,ProfessorSayedy,howdoyoufeelaboutthisarticle?
"AIfeelinsultedandIfeelthatthebeliefsoftheMuslimsareoverabusedbythepublisheranditisa
defamationanddesecrationonthereligionoftheIslam.
"QWhatistheconceptofGodinsofarasthereligionofIslamisconcerned?
"ATheconceptofGodisthatGodistheonlyGod,HewasnotbegottenandHeistobeworshipped
andnoothertobeworshippedasidefromhim,Hehasnobeginningandhasnoend,Heisthecreatorof
allcreaturesandHeshouldbehonoredbyallcreatures."44
Clearlytherefrom,theassailedarticleisvexatiousandhumiliatingtoMuslimsastheyadoreonlyoneGod,they
callAllah.MuslimsarecalledMuslimsbecausetheysincerelybelieveintheQuranandtheHadith(theSayingand
theConductoftheProphet).ItcannotbeoverstressedthatMuslimsdonoteatporkbecauseitisforbiddeninthe
Quran for being unclean not because they hold pigs as sacred and worship them and that to the Muslims, the
greatestsininIslamistoworshippersonsorthingsotherthanAllah.45
PetitionerMylaC.Aguja,whotestifiedasMylaTabora,admittedinopencourtthatshe:wrotethesubjectarticle
wasagraduateof"MassCom"basedthesaidarticleonherinterpretationofwhatsherecalledshehadreadin
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Reader's Digest while she was still in high school and did not verify if what she recalled was true46 . Such
shockingirresponsibleattitudeonherpartwhoatthattimewasanAssistantEditorofBulgarisutterlymalicious,
inthesamedegreeasthefailureoftherestofthepetitioners(exceptBinegas,Jr.)47toverifythetruthfulnessof
thesubjectarticle,forwhichtheyshouldbeheldliablefordamages.
Thefreedomofexpressionandtherightofspeechandofthepressare,tobesure,amongthemostzealously
protectedrightsintheConstitution.Buttheconstitutionalrightoffreedomofexpressionmaynotbeavailedofto
broadcastliesorhalftruthsnormayitbeusedtoinsultothers,forsuchwouldbecontrarytotheplainmandateof
theCivilCodeforeachperson"torespectthedignity,personality,privacyandpeaceofmindofhisneighborsand
otherpersons."The freedom of speech does not require a journalist to guarantee the truth of what he says or
publishesbutitdoesprohibitpublishingorcirculatingstatementsinrecklessdisregardwithoutanybonafideeffort
toascertainthetruththereof.48
By causing the assailed article to be published in reckless disregard of the truth thereof, petitioners publisher
MVRS,EditorinChiefMarsC.Laconsay,AssistantEditorandwriterMylaC.Aguja(MylaTabora)exhibitedutter
irresponsibilityandactedcontrarytotheCodeofEthicsadoptedbythejournalismprofessioninthePhilippines,
forwhichtheydeservecondemnation.TheassailedarticlehasfalselyportrayedallMuslimsasworshippersofpig
orswineandthus,pervertedtheirreligiousbeliefsanddemeanedtheMuslimsasasegmentofhumansociety.It
belittledtheMuslimsbyinvertingtherelativeimportanceoftheirreligiousbeliefsandpractice,therebydisgracing
theidealsandaspirationsoftheMuslimpeople.Suchamountstoaviolationoftheirpersonaldignityandpeaceof
mind,whicharetheveryrightsaffirmedbyArticle26.
Petitioner Binegas should be absolved from liability. It is not refuted that the principal function of petitioner
Binegas, Jr., as Circulation Manager of Bulgar, was to supervise the delivery and the distribution of the paper,
monitortheaccountsoftheagentsandschedulethecirculationpersonnel.Itislikewiseunrebuttedthatpetitioner
Binegas,Jr.wasneverconsultedonwhatarticlesaretobepublishedthathehadnoauthoritytodecidewhether
ornotacertainpublicationofBulgarshallbecirculatedandthathisonlydutywastodistributetheissueafterits
printing.49Assuch,hisdutybeingministerialincharacter,petitionerBinegas,Jr.,shouldhavebeenexonerated
fromliability.
Now,doplaintiffsrespondentsIDCPanditsofficershavetherequisitepersonalitytoinstitutethesuit?Theanswer
isintheaffirmative.RespondentsIDCPanditsofficershavetherequisitepersonalitytoinstitutethesuitinasmuch
astheactionisproperlyaclasssuit.
The concept of a "true" class suit has been elucidated upon in Re: Request of the Heirs of the Passengers of
DoaPaz,50thus:
"What makes a situation a proper case for a class suit is the circumstance that there is only one right or
causeofactionpertainingorbelongingincommontomanypersons,notseparatelyorseverallytodistinct
individuals.
'The 'true' class action, which is the invention of equity, is one which involves the enforcement of a
right which is joint, common, or secondary or derivative. x x (It) is a suit wherein, but for the class
actiondevice,thejoinderofallinterestedpartieswouldbeessential.
'A 'true class action' as distinguished from the socalled hybrid and the spurious class action in
U.S. Federal Practice 'involves principles of compulsory joinder, since x x (were it not) for the
numerosityoftheclassmembersallshouldxx(be)beforethecourt.Includedwithinthetrueclass
suit x x (are) the shareholders' derivative suit and a class action by or against an unincorporated
association x x. A judgment in a true class suit, whether favorable or unfavorable to the class, is
binding under res judicata principles upon all the members of the class, whether or not they were
before the court. It is the nondivisible nature of the right sued on which determines both the
membershipoftheclassandtheresjudicataeffectofthefinaldeterminationoftheright.'
"Theobjectofthesuitistoobtainrelieffororagainstnumerouspersonsasagrouporasanintegralentity,
and not as separate, distinct individuals whose rights or liabilities are separate from and independent of
thoseaffectingtheothers."(Emphasissupplied)
Inorderthataclasssuitmayprosper,Section12,Rule3oftheRulesofCourtrequirestheconcurrenceofthree
(3) essential elements, namely: (1) that the subject matter of the controversy is one of common or general
interesttomanypersons(2)thatthepartiesaresonumerousthatitisimpracticabletobringthemallbeforethe
courtand(3)thattheactionbemaintainedbypartieswhowillfairlyandadequatelyrepresenttheclass.
Underthefirstrequisite,thepersonwhosuesmusthaveaninterestinthecontroversy,commonwiththosefor
whom he sues, and there must be that unity of interest between him and all such other persons which would
entitlethemtomaintaintheactionifsuitwasbroughtbythemjointly.51
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As to what constitutes common interest in the subject matter of the controversy has been explained in Sulo ng
Bayan,Inc.vs.Araneta,Inc.,52thus:
"Theinterestthatwillallowpartiestojoininabillofcomplaint,orthatwillenablethecourttodispensewith
thepresenceofalltheparties,whennumerous,exceptadeterminatenumber,isnotonlyaninterestinthe
question,butoneincommoninthesubjectmatterofthesuit,xxxacommunityofinterestgrowingoutof
the nature and condition of the right in dispute for, although there may not be any privity between the
numerousparties,thereisacommontitleoutofwhichthequestionarises,andwhichliesatthefoundation
oftheproceedingsxxx[here]theonlymatterincommonamongtheplaintiffs,orbetweenthemandthe
defendants, is an interest in the question involved, which alone cannot lay a foundation for the joinder of
parties.Thereisscarcelyasuitatlaw,orinequity,whichsettlesaprincipleorappliesaprincipletoagiven
state of facts or in which a general statute is interpreted, that does not involve a question in which other
partiesareinterestedxxx."
Ithasfurtherbeenheldthatinordertomaintainaclassactiontheremustbeanascertainableclassaswellasa
communityofinterestamongthemembersofthatclassinquestionsoflawandfactinvolved.53Theclassmust
be cognizable and manageable, and must be defined at the outset of the action. There must be a cognizable
classbeyondthegeneralstrainswhichcanbeconceivedtocreateaclassofanysuperficiallyresemblingparties,
but it is not necessary that the exact number comprising the class be specified or that the members be
identified.54
Thefirstelementispresentinthiscase.Theclassspokenofintheassailedarticlethatsegregatesthemfromthe
other members of the general populace is the Muslim people, and their common interest, undoubtedly, is their
religiousbeliefinadoringAllahastheoneandonlyGodandthatthegreatestsinistoworshippersonsorthings
otherthanAllah.Thearticleisanoutrageousmisrepresentation,inflictingstarkinsultonthereligiousbeliefsofthe
Muslims.
Concerningthesecondelement,i.e.,numerosityofpartiesonemustbearinmindthatthepurpose.oftherule
permittingclassactionsistofurnishamodeofobtainingacompletedeterminationoftherightsofthepartiesin
suchcases,whenthenumberissogreatastoprecludeinvolvementbyactualservice.Inthisclassofcases,one
is allowed to sue for all as a matter of convenience in the administration of justice.A class action is particularly
properinanactionwhereinthepersonsaresomultitudinousasvexatiouslytoprolongandprobablyaltogether
preventafullhearing.55
Judicial notice may be taken of the fact that Muslims in this country comprise a lot of the population, thus, it is
highly impractical to make them all parties or bring them all before the court. It is beyond contradiction that the
Muslims affected by the assailed article are multitudinous, and therefore, the second element is present in the
instantcase.
Withregardstothethirdelement,thattheactionbemaintainedbyonewhofairlyandadequatelyrepresentsthe
class,itisessentialthatthereliefsoughtmustbebeneficialtotheclassmembers,thepartymustrepresentthe
entireclassasserted,andbeamemberoftheclassheclaimstorepresent,inadditiontohavinganinterestinthe
controversycommonwiththoseforwhomhesues.56Foradequaterepresentation,itissufficientthatthereare
persons before the court who have the same interest as the absent persons and are equally certain to bring
forwardtheentiremeritsofthequestionandthusgivesuchinteresteffectiveprotection.57Ithasalsobeenheld
that whether the class members are adequately represented by the named plaintiffs depends on the quality of
representationratherthanonthenumberofrepresentativepartiesascomparedwiththetotalmembershipofthe
class.58 Thus, even one member of a large class can provide the kind of representation for all that is
contemplatedbytheclasssuit.59
RespondentIDCP,asareligiousorganization,beingafederationorumbrellaorganizationofmorethanseventy
(70)MuslimreligiousorganizationsinthePhilippines,anditsofficerswhoareindividualrespondentsaswell,carry
therequisitepersonalitytofileacasefordamagesinbehalfofallMuslims.Unequivocally,theyproperlyrepresent
theMuslimswhoaresimilarlysituatedandaffectedbytheassailedarticle.
RespondentofficersofIDCPnamely,AbdulrahmanR.T.Linzag,IbrahimF.P.Arcilla,AbdulRashidDeGuzman,
and Ibrahim B.A. Junio, as well as their witness, ProfessorAbdul Rafih Sayedy, not only testified on how the
assailedarticleemotionally,aswellaspsychologically,affectedeachofthem,butalsoastohowthesaidarticle
receivedthecondemnationandcontemptofotherMuslims,furtherevidencedbytheletterdatedSeptember21,
1992fromthirtyone(31)studentsoftheIslamicUniversityMadinahAlMukarramah,K.S.A., 60andtheseething
letterofoneAbdilT.ArafatofSouthCotabatoprovince,datedSeptember29,1992.61
Moreover, an officer may sue in his own behalf if the defamation affects him as well as the corporation62 , or
wherethedefamationagainsttheofficerhasadirectrelationtothecorporation'stradeorbusinessanditcauses
injury63.
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Thus, without a shred of doubt, respondents IDCP and the individual respondents, and all Muslims they
represent,haveinterestsoidenticalthatthemotiveandinducementtoprotectandpreservemaybeassumedto
bethesameineach.64Byinstitutingthesuit,therespondentsnecessarilyrepresentallMuslims.65
Under Article 2217 of the Civil Code, moral damages which include physical suffering, mental anguish, fright,
serious anxiety, besmirched reputation, wounded feelings, moral shock, social humiliation, and similar injury,
althoughincapableofpecuniarycomputation,mayberecoveredforactsandactionsbasedonArticle26.66
Individual Muslim plaintiffsrespondents, Abdulrahman R.T. Linzag, Ibrahim F. P. Arcilla, Abdul Rashid De
Guzman, and Ibrahim B. A. Junio, as well as their witness, Professor Abdul Rafih Sayedy, as proper
representativesoftheclassactiontestifiedonthedespair,mentalanguish,socialhumiliationandinferiorfeeling
experiencedbytheMuslimsasaresultofthevexatiousarticle.67Thus,theawardofmoraldamagesisjustified.
Theawardofexemplarydamagesandattorney'sfeesislikewisewarrantedandtheamountisinaccordancewith
Articles222968and220869oftheCivilCode.
However, damages awarded to individual respondents should be deleted inasmuch as the instant case is
considered as a class suit and they merely acted as officers and members of the principal plaintiffrespondent
IDCP.
Onelastpoint.Thereshouldbenoroomforapprehensiononfuturelitigationsrelatingtotheassailedarticlein
viewofthefactthattheinstantsuitisaclasssuit.Inaclasssuit,eachmemberoftheclassforwhosebenefitthe
actionisbroughtisapartyplaintiffthepersonsrepresentedarequasipartiesorpartiesbyrepresentation.Asuit
broughtinbehalfofothersinaclassgivesthecourtjurisdictionofthewholesubjectmatter,andofalltheparties,
suchthatthejudgmentwillbebindingonallpersonsbelongingtotheclassrepresented.70
Inotherwords,ajudgmentinaclassactionconcludesuponallmembersoftheclass,whetherformallyjoinedas
parties or not. 71 The class action has preclusive effect against one who was not named representative of the
class,aslongashewasamemberoftheclasswhichwasapartytothejudgment.72
Thus, in the case at bar, the Muslims, who are parties represented by respondent IDCP and its officers, are
therebyprecludedfrominstitutingseparateorindividualsuitsfordamagesagainstMVRSPublications,Inc.,etal.,
astheyareboundbythejudgmentinthisclassaction,whichamountstoresjudicata.
Inthelightofalltheforegoing,Iamconstrainedtodissentfromthemajorityopinion.

Footnotes
1Cf.Holmes,J.,dissentinginAbramsv.UnitedStates,250U.S.630.
2PetitionersMarsC.LaconsayandMylaC.AgujafailedtofiletheirAnswerandweredeclaredindefault.
3DecisionpennedbyJudgeVetinoE.Reyes,RTCBr.4,Manila,CivilCaseNo.9262441,"IslamicDa'wah

CouncilofthePhilippines,Inc.v.MVRSPublications,Inc."
4DecisionpennedbyJusticeTeodoroP.Regino,concurredinbyJusticesQuirinoD.AbadSantos,Jr.,and

ConradoM.Vasquez,Jr.
5Black'sLawDictionary(4thed.1951),505.
6 Words and Phrases, "Defamation," citing Local 15 of Independent Workers of Noble County, Inc. v.

InternationalBroth.ofElec.Workers,D.C.,Ind.,273F.Stipp.313,320.
7Id.,citingWhitbyv.AssociatesDiscountCorp.,207N.E.2d482,484,591Ill.App.2d337.
8ProsserandKeetononTorts,(5thed.1984).
950Am.Jur.2d,"LibelandSlander,"705(1995).
10Ibid.
1150AmJur2d,"LibelandSlander,"674(1995).

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12Art.III,Sec.4,1987Constitution.
13G.R.No.63559,30May1986,142SCRA171,176177.
14567F.2d1163,1164(1977).
15P.Wittenberg,"DangerousWords:AGuidetotheLawofLibel,"226227,citingPeoplev.Edmundson,

168N.Y.Misc.141.
16Id.,227,citingRexv.Gathercole,2Lewin237.
17 Khalid Abdullah Tariq Al Mansour Faissal Fahd Al Talal v. Fanning , Civ. No. C 801869 RPA, 25

September1980,506F.Supp.186.
18Id.,187.
19Ibid.
20SeeNote8,767768.
2150AmJur2d,675(1995).
22315U.S.568(1942).
23343U.S.250(1952).
24Notagroup,unlesstheattackisdirectedagainstidentifiableindividualswithinthegroup.
25Rollo,55.
26SeeSECONDRESTATEMENTOFTHELAW,TORTS2D46.

46.OutrageousConductCausingSevereEmotionalDistress
(1) One who by extreme and outrageous conduct intentionally x x xcauses severe emotional distress to
anotherissubjecttoliabilityforsuchemotionaldistress,andifbodilyharmtotheotherresultsfromit,for
suchbodilyharmxxx.
27See38Am.Jur.2d15citingcases.SeealsoD.Givelber,TheRighttoMinimumSocialDecencyand

theLimitsofEvenhandedness:IntentionalInflictionofEmotionalDistressbyOutrageousConduct,82Col.
L.Rev.42(1982).
28Ibid.
29Ibid.
30Ibid.
31Ibid.
32See38Am.Jur2d7citingcases.
33485U.S.46(1988).Mr.JusticeAnthonyKennedydidnottakepart.
34SeeNote8,12,p.59citingMagruder,MentalandEmotionalDisturbanceintheLawofTorts,49Harv.

L.Rev.1033,1035.SeealsoSECONDRESTATEMENTOFTHELAW,TORTS2D46.
35 49 Harv. L. Rev. 1053. See also SECOND RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW, TORTS 2D 46 citing

Magruder.
36 S. Olsen, White v. Monsanto: Louisiana Adopts the Restatement Approach to Intentional Infliction of

EmotionalDistress,66TulaneL.Rev.2096(1992)citingMagruder.
37Ibid.citing38Am.Jur.2D812.
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38Smolla,FreeSpeechinanOpenSociety,1993Ed.,atpp.160162.
39403U.S.15(1971).
40Id.at2526.
41SeeNote38.
42395U.S.444(1969).
43403U.S.15(1971).
44SeeHarvardLawReview,Vol.101:6821988,atp.684687.
45Ibid.at447.
46SeeNote38atp.165.
4759AmJur2d,456(1977).
48Citing Industrial Generating Co. v. Jenkins 410 SW 2d 658 Los Angeles County Winans, 109 P 640,

Weberpalsv.Jenny,133NE62.
49Art.2217,NewCivilCode.
50SimexInternational,Inc.v.CourtofAppeals,G.R.No.88013,19March1990,183SCRA360.
51SeeArt.2234,NewCivilCode.
52SeeNote38atp.46.
53Id.,citingGertzv.RobertWelch,Inc.,418U.S.323,339340(1974)

VITUG,J.,concurring:
1SeeWorcestervs.Ocampo,22Phil.42.
2Black'sLawDictionary,6thEd.,p.1565.
3ProsserandKeetononTorts,5thEd.,p.55.
4Restatement(Second)ofTorts46(1965)
5ProsserandKeeton,supra,p.59.
6Slocum vs. Food Fair Stores of Florida, Inc., Fla. 1958, 100 So. 2d 396 Wallace vs. Shoreham Hotel

Corp.,Mun.App.D.C.1946,49A2d81 Stavnezarvs.SageAllen&Co.,1959,146Conn.460,152A.2d.
312.
7Taft vs. Taft, 1867, 40 Vt. 229 Stratton vs. Posse Normal School of Gymnastics, 1928 163 N. E. 905

StateNationalBankofIowaParkvs.Rogers,Tex.Civ.App.1935,S.W.2d825.
8Wallacevs.ShorehamHotelCorp.,supra.
953C.J.S.,LibelandSlander2.
10Black'sLawDictionary,6thEd.,p.417.
11ProsserandKeeton,supra,p.771.
12SeeArticle355,RevisedPenalCode.
13Article353,RevisedPenalCode.
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14Corpusvs.Cuaderno,Sr.,16SCRA807Kunklevs.CablenewsAmerican,etal.,42Phil.757Borjalvs.

CourtofAppeals,301SCRA1.
1550AmJur2d(1995),p.674.
16Id.
17Sec.4,Art.III,1987Constitution.
18Restatement(Second)ofTorts564Acommentb(1977).
1950AmJur2d,(1995),p.675.
20NeilJ.Rosini,ThePracticalGuidetoLibel,supra,citingBradyv.OttawayNewspapers,Inc.,84A.D.2d

229.
2150AmJur2d,(1995),p.675.
22189F.86,ascitedbyEllaCooperThomasinTheLawofLibelandSlander(NewYork,1973),p.21.
23131N.Y.S.680,ascitedinTheLawofLibelandSlander,supra.
2481N.E.459,ascitedinTheLawofLibelandSlander,supra.
25142SCRA171
26UyTiocovs.YangShuWen,32Phil.624.
27ABSCBNBroadcastingCorporationvs.CourtofAppeals,301SCRA572.
2850AmJur2d(1995),p.678.

CARPIO,J.,dissenting:
1BriefforPlaintiffsAppellants,pp.45.
2Pages1617,Petition.
3Article30oftheCivilCodeprovidesasfollows:"Whenaseparatecivilactionisbroughttodemandcivil

liability arising from a criminal offense, and no criminal proceedings are instituted during the pendency of
thecivilcase,apreponderanceofevidenceshalllikewisebesufficienttoprovetheactcomplainedof."
4Shouldbediscreditable.
5 International Corporate Bank v. Gueco, 351 SCRA 516 (2001) French Oil Mill Machinery Co., Inc. v.

CourtofAppeals,295SCRA462(1998)Lagandaonv.CourtofAppeals,290SCRA330(1998) Sandoval
v.CourtofAppeals,260SCRA283(1996).
6ReportoftheCodeCommission,pp.3233.
7 In People v. Silvela, 103 Phil. 773, the Court, citingAmerican jurisprudence, stated: "If the defamatory

matter is not seen or heard by anyone except the defamer and the defamed, damages to character
reputationcannotresultsinceaman'sreputationistheestimateinwhichothersholdhim,andnotwhathe
himselfthinks."Black'sLawDictionary(6thEd.)defines"reputation"thus:"Estimationinwhichoneisheld
thecharacterimputedtoapersonbythoseacquaintedwithhim.Thatbywhichweareknownandisthe
totalsumofhowweareseenbyothersxxx.Generalopinion,goodorbad,heldofapersonbythoseof
thecommunityinwhichheresides."
8M.B.M.Co.v.Counce,268Ark.269,596S.W.2d681(1980)Section46,Restatement(Second)ofTorts.
9NewYorkTimesv.Sullivan,376U.S.254,84S.Ct.710(1964).
10485U.S.46(1988).

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11Section11,1987Constitution.
12Section18(7),ArticleXIII,1987Constitution.
13EnteredintoforceonMarch23,1976.
14Simon,Jr.v.CommissiononHumanRights,229SCRA117(1994).
15CCPRGeneralComment11,19thSession(1983),OfficeoftheHighCommissionerforHumanRights.
16 La Chemise Lacoste, S.A. v. Fernandez, 129 SCRA 373 (1984) Ram Singh v. Insular Collector of

Customs,38Phil.862(1918).
17ViennaConventionontheLawofTreaties,Art.26.
183S.C.R.697(1990).
19315U.S.568,62S.Ct.766(1942).
20403U.S.15(1971).
21Supra,note10.
22NewYork Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964). Prior to New York Times, the prevailing view in the

U.S. was that lewd, obscene and profane speech was not constitutionally protected, whether directed at
private individuals or public officials. New York Times imposed, with respect to public officials, a qualified
constitutionalprivilege.TheU.S.SupremeCourtstatedthat"theconstitutionalprotectionsforspeechand
press require a federal rule that prohibits a public official from recovering damages for a defamatory
falsehoodrelatingtohisofficialconductunlessheprovesthatthestatementwasmadewith'actualmalice,'
thatis,withknowledgethatitwasfalseormadewithrecklessdisregardofwhetheritwasfalseornot."
23RecordoftheConstitutionalCommission,Vol.1,pp.491492.
24Ibid.
25Re:RequestoftheHeirsofthePassengersofDoaPaz,159SCRA623(1988).
26343U.S.250(1952).
27395U.S.444(1969).
28274U.S.357.
29Chaplinskyv.NewHampshire,supra,note18HustlerMagazinev.Falwell,supra,note10.
30Supra,note18.
31 Hate Speech in the Constitutional Law of the United States, William B. Fisch, American Journal of

ComparativeLaw,Fall2002.
32 "American constitutional law generally protects hate speech of various kinds, including religious and

racial. In this area, the law of the United States is precisely contrary to international human rights norms.
Article 20(2) of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights states, 'Any advocacy of national,
racialorreligioushatredthatconstitutesincitementtodiscrimination,hostilityorviolenceshallbeprohibited
bylaw."'DavidM.Smolin,ExportingtheFirstAmendment?Evangelism,Proselytism,andtheInternational
ReligiousFreedomAct,31CumberlandLawReview,20002001.
33ABSCBNBroadcastingCorp.v.CommissiononElections,323SCRA811(2000).
34DecisionofJudgeVetinoE.ReyesdatedJune31,1995,pp.46.
35Article2217,CivilCode.
36AntonioT.Carpio,IntentionalTortsinPhilippineLaw,PhilippineLawJournal,Vol.47,No.5(December
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1972).
AUSTRIAMARTINEZ,J.,dissenting:
1Quran,Chapter16:115.SeealsoChapter7:145.
2MichaelJ.DiamondandPeterG.Gowing,"IslamandMuslim:SomeBasicInformation".1981NewDay

Publishing, Quezon City, pp. 2930. (Michael J. Diamond is Vicar General of the Prelature of Marawi,
MarawiCity,LanaodelSurPeterG.GowingwasaDoctorofTheologyinEcumenicsandChurchHistory).
3R.A.Epstein,C.O.Gregory,andH.Kalven,Jr.,CasesandMaterialsonTorts,1984Ed.,p.1271citing

Restatement(Second)oftheLawofTorts,Section652E.
4LuisB.Reyes,"TheRevisedPenalCode",BookII,FourteenthEdition,Revised1998,p.921.
5Vasquezvs.CourtofAppeals,314SCRA460,471(1999).
653C.J.S.,LibelandSlander,13.
7Ibid.
8Ibid.
953C.J.S.,LibelandSlander,13.Seealso50Am.Jur.2d,LibelandSlander,82.
10Ibid.
11Ibid.
1225WordsandPhrases,Libel,p.119citingCoopervs.Greeley,N.Y.,1Denio,347,359.
13Article353,RevisedPenalCode.
14 R. L. McEwen and P. S. C. Lewis, Gatley on Libel and Slander, 89 (1967), citing Russell L. J. in

Cassidyvs.DailyMirror,2K.B.354(1929)Newsteadvs.LondonExpress,1K.B.377,396(C.A.)(1940).
Seealso50Am.Jur.,LibelandSlander,25.
15 People vs. Encarnacion (CA), 48 Official Gazette 1817, 1820 (1952), citing Lord Bramwell in Henty's

Case,52L.J.Q.B.232(1882).
16Ibid.
17Peoplevs.Encarnacion(CA),supraciting53C.J.S.4850.
18 M. H. Newell,The Law on Slander and Libel in Civil and Criminal Cases, 6, (1924), citing Curtis vs.

Mussey,6Gray(Mass.)261.
19R.L.McEwenandP.S.C.Lewis,GatleyonLibelandSlander,8,(1967).
20Ibid.,citingNevillvs.FineArtsCo.,2Q.B.163(1895).
21Ibid.,citingBlakevs.Stevens11L.T.543(1864)Foxvs.Broderick,14Ir.C.L.R.453(1864)Shepheard

vs.Whitaker,LR.L.10C.P.502(1875)Tompsonvs.Dashwood,11Q.B.D.43(1883)Morrisonvs.Ritchie,
4F.645(Ct.ofSess.)(1902)VanWigintonvs.Pulitzer,218Fed.R.795(1914).
22Ibid.,citingCookvs.Ward,6Bing,409(1830)R.vs.Hicklin,L.R.3Q.B.360.(1868)Bowenvs.Hall,6

Q.B.D.343(1881)Jonesvs.Hulton,2K.B.279(1909).
23Vicariovs.CourtofAppeals,308SCRA25,34(1999).
2450Am.Jur.3d,LibelandSlander493.
25Borjalvs.CourtofAppeals,301SCRA1,18(1999),citingKunklevs.CablenewsAmerican,42Phil.757

(1922),Corpusvs.Cuaderno,Sr.,16SCRA807(1966),andPeoplevs.Monton,6SCRA801(1962).
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26142SCRA171(1986).
27Jimenezvs.Patricia,Inc.,340SCRA525(2000)PhilippineBasketballAssociationvs.CourtofAppeals,

337 SCRA 358 (2000) Victorias Milling Co., Inc. vs. Court of Appeals, 333 SCRA 663 (2000) Roman
CatholicArchbishopofManilavs.CourtofAppeals,269SCRA145,153(1997).
28CatholicBishopofBalangavs.CourtofAppeals,264SCRA181,191192(1996).SeealsoSyvs.Court

ofAppeals,330SCRA550,555556(2000)Logroniovs.Taleseo,312SCRA52,6162(1999)Dandovs.
Frazer,227SCRA126,133(1993)Espinavs.CourtofAppeals,215SCRA484,488(1992)Carillovs.De
Paz,18SCRA467,471(1966)Hernandezvs.Andal,78Phil.196,209210(1947).
29T.B.Aquino,TortsandDamages,2001Ed.,p.470,citingWatkins,p.145.
30Vasquezvs.CourtofAppeals,314SCRA460,471(1999) Alonzovs.CourtofAppeals,241SCRA51,

59(1995)Daezvs.Vasquez,191SCRA61,67(1990).
3174AmJur2dTorts2,citingFishervs.Toler,194Kan701,401P2d1012.
32 74Am Jur 2dTorts 2, citing Tisdale vs. Eubanks, 180 NC 153, 104 SE 339, 11ALR 374 Smithvs.

Buck,119OhioSt101,162NE383,61ALR1343.
3374AmJur2dTorts41AmJur2d,Actions49.
3474AmJur2dTorts4,citingMillervs.Monsen,228Minn400,37NW2d543,Harrisvs.NashvilleTrust

Co.,128Tenn573,162SW584.
3574AmJur2dTorts4,citingSeidelvs.Greenberg,108NJSuper248,260A2d863,40ALR3d987.
36ReportoftheCodeCommission,p.39.
37ReportoftheCodeCommission,pp.3334.
38Ibid.
39Tolentino,supraat89.
40Concepcionvs.CourtofAppeals,324SCRA85,94(2000)citingE.P.Caguioa,CommentsandCases

onCivilLaw,1959Ed.,Vol.I,p.41.
41Ibid.
4274AmJur2dTorts32.38AmJur2dFright,ShockandMentalDisturbance.
43ReportoftheCodeCommission,p.33.
44TSN,May10,1993,pp.89.
45MichaelJ.DiamondandPeterG.Gowing,supra,Note24.
46TSN,HearingofNovember18,1990,pp.89and19.
47Seenextpage.
48InRe:EmilP.Jurado,243SCRA299,327(1995),citing AyerProductionsPty.Ltd.vs.Capulong,160

SCRA861(1988).
49Ibid.,pp.6,1112.
50159SCRA623,627(1988),citing59Am.Jur.2dParties415,Moore,FederalPractice,2d.,Vol.3B,

pp.23257,23258.
51Certiavs.NotreDameduLacUniversity,141N.E.318.
5272SCRA347,357(1976)citingScottvs.Donald,165U.S.107,41Law.Ed.447,52S.Ct.217.
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5367AC.J.S.Parties,24.
54Ibid.
55Ibid.Also59Am.Jur.2dParties46,55and6267AC.J.S.Parties,698.
56Ibid.
5759Am.Jur.2dParties63.
58Ibid.
59Ibid.
60Exhibit"B".
61Exhibit"C".
62 53 C.J.S., Libel and Slander, 146 citing Stidham vs. State Bank of Ebson, 270 p. 594,126 Kan 600

(1928), Rusciano & Son Corporation vs. Mihalyfi, 1 N.Y.S. 2d 787, 165 Misc. 932 R.G. Dun & Co. vs.
Shepp,91S.W.2d330,127Tex.80.
63Braytonvs.ClevelandSpecialPoliceCo.,63OhioSt83,57N.E.1085(1900).
6459Am.Jur.2dParties62,p.473citingMaxwellvs.Brougher,222P2d910,99C.A.2d824.
6559Am.Jur.2dParties62,p.473citingNunellyvs.FirstFederalBuilding&LoanAssociationofAgden,

154P.2d620,107Utah347.
66Article2219Moraldamagesmayberecoveredinthefollowingandanalogouscases:

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(10)ActsandactionsreferredtoinArticles21,26,27,28,29,30,32,34,and35.
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67TSNs,April26,1993,pp.23,25July30,1993,pp.1314,1617November12,1993pp.7,9,2021

April18,1994,pp.7,1012.
68Article 2229 Exemplary or corrective damages are imposed, by way of example or correction for the

publicgood,inadditiontothemoral,temperate,liquidatedorcompensatorydamages.
69Article2208Intheabsenceofstipulation,attorney'sfeesandexpensesoflitigation,otherthanjudicial

costs,cannotberecovered,except:
(1)Whenexemplarydamagesareawarded
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(11) In any other case where the court deems it just and equitable that attorney's fees and expenses of
litigationshouldberecovered.
Inallcases,theattorney'sfeesandexpensesoflitigationmustbereasonable.
7067AC.J.S.Parties30.
71 59Am. Jur. 2d Parties 90, citing Williams v. State (La), 350 So. 2d 131 Schlosser v.AllisChalmers

Corp.,86Wis.2d226,271N.W.2d879DrainageDist.OfLincolnCountyv.KirkpatrickPettisCo.,140Neb
530,300NW582.
7246Am.Jur.2dJudgments108.
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