Comparative Study of School Inspectors
Comparative Study of School Inspectors
PaperpresentedattheEuropeanConferenceofEducationalResearch(ECER),Network:11.
EducationalImprovementandQualityAssurance.Istanbul,Turkey,September1013,2013.
Abstract
SchoolinspectionhasformedpartofbothEnglishandSwedishapproachestogoverningeducation
forsometimenow(Maclure,2000;Segerholm,2009).Butlatterlyduetochangingpoliticaland
policyregimesbothcountrieshavebeguntoadoptdifferentapproachestotheprocess,reflectedinin
therecruitment,traininganddevelopmentoftheirinspectors(BaxterandClarke,2013;Baxter,2012).
UsingJacobsson'stheoryofgovernanceasaregulative,meditativeandinquisitiveactivity,thispaper
investigatestheeffectsthattheseshiftshavehadontherecruitmentandtrainingofinspectorsandon
theinspectionexperience(Hult&Segerholm,2012;Lindgrenet.al.,2012).Thepaperdrawson
interviewdatawithinspectorsandheadteachersfrombothsystemscombinedwithdocumentary
analysistoinvestigate,whichcompetenciesarerequiredforschoolinspectorswithinbothsystems,
andwhy,andhowchangesinthebothsystemsaffectschoolleaderperceptionsofinspectionasa
governingtool.Thestudyconcludesthatinspiteoftheconcertedeffortsofbothinspectoratesto
ensurethattheirsystemscombineregulatoryrigourwithdevelopmentalimpact,thelargelypolitically
drivenchangesarecausingsubstantialtensionsintherecruitment,trainingandoperatingcapacityof
inspectors.
Introduction
School inspection has formed part of both English and Swedish approaches to governing
education for some time now, a central tenet within the governing projects of both countries
(Maclure, 2000; Segerholm, 2009). But as a result of changing education policy driven partly
by political imperatives emerging as a result of international comparisons such as PISA (The
Programme of International Student Assessment) (see for example Bieber & Martens, 2011),
both countries have changed their approach to the inspection process; this is reflected in
changes to the recruitment, training and development of their inspectors.
In Sweden, the inception of a new inspectorate in 2008 marked a new period for educational
inspection (Rnnberg, 2012). A period during which government focus on inspection
intensified, becoming central to its policies of economic regeneration. As a result of this its
inspection process was transformed from its former far softer and advisory approach, to a far
more punitive regime involving strict penalties for failure to comply. The new regime has, in
common with the new regulatory framework in England, engendered a re-modelling of the
inspector workforce with a move away from the recruitment of those with a background in
education to the recruitment of individuals from the fields of law or academic investigation.
In England the inception of the Coalition administration in 2010 gave rise to a number of
legislative changes in education. Designed to promote an education system based on
neoliberal ideals, the new system has resulted in far greater numbers of free schools and
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academies (schools independent from Local authority financial and curricular control). In
common with other areas of the public service undergoing similar disaggregation; new levels
of school autonomy have demanded new systems of inspection. An inspection framework
able to monitor and control newly autonomous institutions, whilst also retaining credibility
with government and public: an inspection regime that combines regulatory rigour with
perceptible links between it and school improvement- a link that has up until now remained
tenuous to say the least (Ehren & Visscher, 2006; Ehren, Altrichter, McNamara, & O'Hara,
2013). The inception of such a framework early in 2012 (Ofsted, 2012a, 2012b), was aimed
at the creation of an inspectorate that was, Much closer to the ground and much nearer to
schools.(Parliament, 2013a:Q66). An integral part of this has been to combine this change in
framework with a drive to re-model the inspectorate workforce in aiming to recruit in-service
school leaders as part time inspectors (see for further discussion, Baxter and Clarke, 2013;
Baxter, 2012).
Using Jacobsson's theory of governance to examine the work of inspectors as a regulative,
meditative and inquisitive activity, this paper investigates the effects that these shifts have
had on the recruitment and training of inspectors and concomitantly on the inspection
experience (Hult & Segerholm, 2012; Lindgren et.al., 2012).
Jacobsson identifies three principal types of governing activity which are articulated through
the act of inspection. The first focuses on regulative activities: the extent to which inspection
activities rely upon formal laws and directives with penalties for their violation. The second
set of activities, termed inquisitive activities; concentrates upon making those who are to be
inspected show and tell, to open up for control. Examples of this is the way in which
inspectors demands access to schools inner life and observe classes and interview school
leaders, teachers, students and governors in order to find out what is really happening in
schools. This overlaps with the third genre of activity: the meditative activity which centres
upon discussion, professional dialogue and negotiations around what constitutes best practice
in that particular context. Taking these three forms of governing activity this study looks to
investigate:
-In light of policy changes, which competencies are required for school inspectors within
both systems, and why?
-How do changes in the both systems affect school leaders perceptions of inspection as a
governing and political tool?
In so doing, we also explore the ways in which inspectors are prepared for this work: the
qualities for which they are recruited and impact of training on their ability to perform these
three interrelated but differing activities. Finally we investigate how these activities are
perceived through the eyes of school leaders. The research draws upon data gained through
semi structured qualitative interviews with inspectors, inspector trainers, school leaders, and
heads of inspection services in both Sweden and England (60 in all). Using an ideographic
case study approach the research uses discourse analytic techniques to draw out elements
relating to inspector identities and the challenges facing them within each system. (Marshak
& Grant, 2008; Satterthwaite, Atkinson, & Gale, 2003; Van Leeuwen, 2007).
The paper concludes with a discussion into the challenges that these changes represent for
inspectors in both systems, examining them in light the political impact that they have
exerted on inspection in both countries. This research forms part of an ESRC and Swedish
Research Council study which examines inspection as a form of educational governance in
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Sweden, Scotland and England. In this particular paper we focus on England and Sweden.
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Laws, rules and regulations are particularly important in the context of regular supervisions
Skolinspektionen n.d.). Once a school or locality has been inspected the inspectorate expect
to receive an action plan from the school and the Principal Organiser detailing how they
intend to comply with SI recommendations. Following acceptance of this written response a
follow-up inspection often is conducted approximately three months later. From the first of
July 2011 failure to improve may be penalised according to the statute contained within the
new Education Act (2010:800). This may involve a range of responses from the imposition
fines or for independent schools withdrawal of school operating licences.
The Swedish Schools Inspectorate may make use of penalties and apply pressure so
that a principal organizer rectifies its activities. If the principal organizer does not
take action or seriously disregards its obligations, the Swedish Schools Inspectorate
may decide to impose a conditional fine or measures at the principal organizer's
expense. In the case of an independent school, its licence to operate may be revoked.
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The Inspectorate is organized into five regional departments and the head management group
is composed of the Director general, the Director of Inspections, the five department head
managers, and the managers from central functions like communication, internal support,
personnel, etc., and law. As mentioned earlier, the agency aimed to re-model its workforce,
replacing many of those with an education background that also worked as inspectors during
the period when the inspections were part of the National Agency for Education 2003- 2008
(Johansson 2012, p. 20).
Although the English inspectorate Ofsted (The Office for Standards in Education, Childrens
Services and Skills) has been in existence far longer than its Swedish counterpart it has, since
its inception in 1992 undergone many iterations (Maclure, 2000). Formed at a time when
public and political confidence in the English Education system was low and the right wing
neo liberal agenda which had begun over a decade earlier and gained pace under Prime
Ministers James Callaghan and Margaret Thatcher, was cemented by John Major, who echoed
earlier speeches by both premiers that, the state must step into schools, (Chitty, 2004:43).
Ofsted was designed to both regulate education and ensure that progressive left wing methods
of teaching popularised during the 60s were not permitted to compromise standards, as well
as opening up the secret garden of education by informing parental choice of schools via,
impartial advice and information offered by means of inspection reports (Ozga, Baxter,
Clarke, Grek, & Lawn, 2013). The new agency required a new breed of inspector: one very
far removed from those employed by the previous agency: Her Majestys Inspectorate (HMI):
inspectors that were expected to leave behind the collegial relationship enjoyed by their
predecessors and employ far more regulatory approach which subsequently came to be
characterised (and caricatured), as punitive and rather than developmental (for further
discussion see Baxter, 2013c).
Since then the education landscape has altered a great deal. The 1988 Education Reform Act
formalised the expansion of marketized forms of education (Parliament, 1988), this was
followed by a number of Acts all designed to offer schools so called freedom from Local
Authority control, and greater autonomy over curriculum and teacher employment
(Parliament, 2010). But these changes have also placed increasing political pressure on
Ofsted; a number of influential international reports such as PISA (Programme for
International Student Assessment), have shown English education to be underperforming
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compared to its European counterparts,(Grek, Lawn, & Ozga, 2009; OECD, 2010b), these
combined with other national studies have called Ofsteds role into question demanding why
English education appears to be lagging so far behind its counterparts after two decades of
funding for a very expensive inspectorate (Parliament 2011,(Matthews & Sammons, 2004).
These enquiries resulted in recommendations that Ofsted should take a far greater role in
supporting schools to improve: in order to do this it would also have to make considerable
efforts to re-build its relationship with the teaching profession: a relationship which had
moved from bare tolerance to outright aggression, culminating in 2013 with the National
Association of Head Teachers formation of an alternative inspectorate (INSTEAD) at their
annual conference in 2013. (Elmes, 2013; Marquand, 2013; Paton, 2013).
In order to effect these changes Ofsted introduced a New Inspection Framework in January
2012, refining it in autumn of the same year (Ofsted, 2012d, 2012e). The new Framework
and its accompanying handbook reduced the number of judgements from the previous twenty
nine to just four. Not only did the new framework make the role of school improvement a
core element of the inspection process, but also heightened the emphasis on inspector
professional judgement, doing away with the tick box approach that had been subject to
sustained criticism in the previous version (for further discussion see Baxter & Clarke, 2013).
As in the case of the SSI, These innovations were accompanied by efforts to re-model the
inspector workforce: a workforce that had been accused by profession, press and Parliament
of being out of touch with current issues in education (Abrams, 2012a, 2012b). In order to
counter these accusations Inspection providers, in the form of three agencies; CfBT, Tribal
and Serco (Ofsted, 2009c), were given a Key performance indicator of recruiting in-service
school leaders as part time inspectors. This, it was hoped would enable to more readily effect
school improvement by their ability to speak the same language as those being inspected
whilst the fact that they are practising school leaders from good or outstanding schools would
concomitantly enhance the credibility of their judgements.
To sum up, both inspectorates have undergone substantial changes over a relatively short
time. The earlier inspection carried out by The NAE in Sweden was, to a great extent,
directed towards school development through professional dialogue and remarks on areas to
be improved. The SSI (inspired by Ofsted), in contrast has adopted a tougher, control
focussed approach and a process of ticking boxes often by inspectors, when describing it to
head teachers and teachers, compared to the box-ticking process carried out in the inspection
of Motor Vehicles in Sweden. This parable could be compared to the criticisms of earlier,
similar Ofsted inspection frameworks (see for further discussion Baxter & Clarke, 2013)
Theoretical approach
Public sector inspection involves a number of elements which are described as fundamental
to a successful inspection (Boyne, 2006) in order to render it both effective and credible. In
the case of this research we understand effective inspection as a tool by which to govern
education (Ozga, Baxter et al., 2013). But the process of inspection is a complex one leading
in many cases to the type of performance paradoxes outlined by Clarke (Clarke, 2008) and
described in the case of educational inspection in earlier work (Baxter, 2013a). These
paradoxes emerge as regulatory bodies that strive to represent the public interest in an
increasingly complex system (Clarke, 2008:125). One such paradox he terms, the paradox of
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independence, is indicative of the extent to which the regulatory body can be said to be
impartial, as Ofsted describes it, to inspect without fear or favor. (Ofsted, 2012d).Clarke
argues that in striving to fulfill their regulatory function whilst concomitantly retaining
credibility in an constantly changing environment (and often in the face of considerable
criticism by press and public), inspectorates inadvertently produce paradoxical inspection
effects; these effects often creating new problems in terms of their legitimacy and credibility
(see for further discussion Baxter, 2013b).
A body of research into school inspection agrees that inspectorates are to a great extent
judged by public, profession and government in terms of the quality and credibility of their
inspectors (Ferguson, Earley, Fidler, & Ouston, 2000; Perryman, 2007), and that this is
particularly so within regimes that emphasise the relationship between inspection and school
improvement (Matthews & Sammons, 2004; Sammons, 1999). In order to investigate the
work of the inspector we draw on the work of Bengt Jacobsson who, in his work on global
trends of state transformation describes three dimensions of governance activities (Jacobsson,
2006): these are illustrated in figure one.
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development in which the inspector learns on the job, and develops in experience and
knowledge moving from a peripheral role in terms of their experience (see Lave, 2009) to one
in which they may be considered to have expert inspector status. In this paper we
understand this learning to take place within the constructivist premise in which inspectors
learn as much from one another as from their trainers; that they bring knowledge to the
process as well as learning from it and that their professional standing as inspectors is one in
which their professional identity is negotiated in relation to the relationship and standing they
acquire with their inspectees (Dewey, 1916; Piaget, 1954). We employ this understanding of
inspector development to investigate the ways in which inspector development, preparation
and work is affecting the inspection process under the new systems in both countries, and
consider the challenges, tensions and opportunities inherent within the processes.
Data collection and analysis: Methodology
This paper is part of the project: Governing by Inspection- School Inspection and Education
Governance in Sweden, Scotland and England (res-2009-5770)1. The research project on
which this paper is based examines inspection as a means of governing education and
investigates the governing work that inspection regimes do in three national education
systems: Sweden, England and Scotland. The project investigates tensions between increased
regulation through technical means such as performance data and the rules followed by
inspectors in their school assessments, and their expert knowledge, professional judgement
and use of support, development and persuasion in encouraging self-regulation in the
teaching profession.
The wider project methodology includes: documentary analysis of relevant literature,
including official literature and inspection handbooks and inspection reports within each
system sample; interviews with key system actors at the international, national and local
levels [90 in total] and investigation of the background, training, experience and assumptive
worlds of each national Inspectorate. There are also detailed case studies of a sample of
inspection events (5 in England and 12 in Sweden. This paper is based upon the case studies
carried out in Sweden and England and the interview data emanating from the studies. 2
Transcripts from forty qualitative semi- structured interviews from both the English and
Swedish case studies, each interview lasting between 45 mins and an hour, were analysed
using key themes arising from the analytic framework for this research (figure two).The key
themes employed emerged by translating Jacobssons classification of governance activities
into inspectors work and include: laws, regulation, penalization, practices, teacher
observation, interviews, feedback, policies, action planning, discussion, professional
dialogue.
Analysis was then further broken down according to each genre of inspection activity and is
1 The Authors acknowledge the support of the ESRC Governing by Inspection: School Inspection and
Education Governance in Scotland, England and Sweden (ESRC RES 062 23 2241A and the Swedish Research
Council (Vetenskapsrdet). The project is funded from 2010-2013 and the authors acknowledge the support of
their respective Research Councils. Further details about the project and working papers are available at:
http://jozga.co.uk/GBI/. We also acknowledge the support from Umea School of Education, Ume university to
the project: Juridicering av skolans styrmedel (Juridification of the governing over school).
2 Also including a master thesis interviewing additional head teachers, Novak, J. (2013)
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outlined in diagrammatic form in figure two.
Findings
In this section of the paper we discuss our findings in relation to the three areas of activity
outlined in figure one: we begin by a discussion of the role of regulative activities within the
two systems.
Regulative activities
Although the SSI system of inspection is heavily weighted around issues of compliance there
is a very significant discretionary element to the process. This is reflected in the three main
competencies that the agency focuses upon in their inspector training programme: juridical,
pedagogical and investigative. Although highly prescriptive, the process is dependent upon
inspector knowledge and expertise and as this may vary from inspector to inspector,
judgements may differ accordingly. The new training programme takes place over six months
and includes twelve centrally organised days of face to face input, accompanied by
submission of written assignments that build into a portfolio of experience. To make sure that
the departments have inspectors with the right competences, a new competence tool has been
developed by the inspectorate. This examines inspector abilities across 107 different
competencies. The list was compiled according to the results of a number of qualitative
interviews carried out across the different departments; the aim being to create a tool which
accurately reflects the skills, knowledge and personal attributes required of jobbing
inspectors. All inspectors are asked to self-report on each competency. This is then discussed
with a full time department manager who will compare the self-evaluation with their own
view of the inspectors fitness to practice. For the SSI the new system has a number of
strengths as a Swedish Inspector Competence developer recounts:
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You can look at the individual level, unit level, department level, authority level and
also related to the three different professional backgrounds (S1)
The new competency framework was also premised on the fact that a number of inspectors
had moved from the previous regime (The National Agency for Education) and were found to
be lacking in some of the skills needed for the new system. Many of these had been heads or
senior teachers and the new recruitments were, according to managers at national level,
motivated by the need for interview techniques and analytical skills. The mix of skills would
secure their capacity to perform constructive developmental work as part of their supervisory
role.3
The role of the training in regulatory matters is articulated by this inspector who recognises
the challenges inherent within the role:
On the one hand it [the school inspection] is to be one piece of the large jigsaw
puzzle in which so many policy actors have different types of responsibilities and
where we are one, as mentioned, helping to contribute to the development of the
Swedish school [] but we also have a commission to control, and in that way act
as the extension of the government and see to that in fact it turns out the way it has
been decided. (Officer 6 in Segerholm, 2011:6)
The idea of the inspector as government agent is more readily acceptable by those with a
legal background than those whose educational background can make them prey to the type
of partiality referred to as capture by Boyne and colleagues (Boyne, Day, & Walker, 2002)
and also referred to by Clarke in terms of the paradoxes of inspection (see Baxter, 2013b).
This element of proximity or partiality in maintaining a professional distance whilst also
retaining credibility is also an issue in the English context. England in comparison to her
Swedish counterpart is focusing on the engagement of in service heads and senior leaders
from good and outstanding schools in order to carry out at least one inspection a term. The
rationale for their recruitment is discussed more fully later in this paper, but the challenges
they pose in training and recruitment are outlined by these lead inspectors:
We do interviews and assessment and part of that interview and its quite a crucial
part is to try and look at the nature of the person: we are looking for people who can
apply the criteria fairly and err, leave behind their baggage. That is actual quite
difficult; its one of the issues that we face above anything else; even throughout the
training, we often encounter people that say, thats not the way I would do it and the
emphasis is not only what they would do but what a school or other institution is
doing and whether it works. (EP5)
In terms of the regulatory and legal function of each inspectorate the SSI have very clearly
prescribed lists of criteria which require a tick box approach as to whether the school
complies or not, as stated on their website:
3 The supervisory role is a Swedish term which denotes both the schools capacity to comply with educational
policy whilst also agreeing and acting on a developmental action plan in collaboration with the SSI. It is part of
the function of the SSI to ensure the on-going compliance with the developmental plan in order to achieve the
required degree of improvement.
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Swedish Schools Inspectorates conducts regular supervision of all municipal and
independent schools, from pre-school to adult education. Activities are scrutinized on
a number of points. Our decision states in which areas a school is failing to meet
national requirements. At a seminar with those responsible from the municipality and
school, we discuss the areas where improvements are needed.
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In the case of the English inspectorate there is certainly a compliance element to the process
but this tends to be centred upon aspects such as for example; safeguarding4. This aspect did
appear as one of the criteria for judgement in the previous Inspection Framework produced in
2009 in which it featured as one out of some 29 judgements (Ofsted, 2009b) along with
elements of pastoral care. But the new Framework comprises only four judgements and the
inspection team is expected to integrate the compliance elements of inspection into these.
Inquisitive activities
The regulative activities of both the SSI and Ofsted are supported by evidence. It is to a great
extent within the inquisitive activities (numbered two in figure one), that this evidence is
brought into play. The role of what constitutes knowledge and evidence in inspection has
changed and evolved according to political and policy changes (Chitty, 2004; Lindgren,
2012b; Ozga, 2009b). Lindgren points out how this plays out in the case of Sweden:
Judgements tend to be located within an on-going struggle between two parallel
professional cultures: a pedagogical and a juridical. (Lindgren, 2012:1)
In England the tensions tend to be between the use of statistical and numerical data weighed
against the extent to which qualitative, context specific data is used to inform judgements
(Ozga, Baxter et al., 2013; Ozga, Dahler-Larsen, Segerholm, & Simola, 2011). In both
systems the inquisitive activities of the inspectors manifested by the ways in which they
investigate practices, policies and data not only equip them with an evidence base upon
which to work, but equally offer individual schools the opportunity to show their work in the
best light. In the English system the current inspection framework was designed to eradicate
(as far as possible), any opportunity for schools to play the system, as one headteacher
outlined:
You know, you just know that the guy down the road has shipped all of the bad kids
out to the seaside for the day. (EP14)
Shorter lead in times (schools only have one days notice), more teacher observation,
inspections which only last two days and a system which places an emphasis upon teaching
over time as opposed to the classroom performance of the teacher, all combine with the aim
of making inspections: shorter and sharper. (EP`12). But the short sharp inspections are
creating tensions of their own as one school leader told us:
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They [Ofsted] come in and they see around 50 observations, but say my best staff
work Monday, Tuesday and Wednesday and they come Thursday Friday? (EP20)
The shorter nature of inspection has brought challenges of its own to the process, raising
questions about the scale and nature of the inquisitive process and the extent to which
qualitative data is are weighed against student attainment data. In some cases this has led to
increasing levels of cynicism amongst heads who feel that the present scale and nature of
inspector duties render it impossible for them to go by anything other than statistical data
based evidence:
Do you really get a feel for what a school is like over 2 days? .I actually think
that they [Ofsted] should have that first conversation with the SIP (School
improvement Officer), [..] tell me about the leadership and management of the
school, where do you see the grades over the next 3 years under this management?
Then we will go and inspect it. Otherwise, stay in London and look at
RAISEONLINE5
Recent changes to the inspection system in Sweden have also placed additional demands. In
contrast to their English counterpart, Swedish inspectors do not inspect teaching. Instead their
inquisitive activities centre upon individual school development plans, documentation and
data pertaining to student achievement. Swedish school leaders complain about the time
consuming nature of the task of collating the required levels of documentary evidence, and
they, like their English counterparts view the changes as specious; voicing concerns that the
short time spent in school, combined to the quantity of written, statistical and legal
compliance documentation means that many inspectors have judged a school before they
even embark on the inspection visit:
The time they met students and teachers were really short [.] so I think its a short
time for them to really see. (SR17)
I thought that the SSI didnt always listen to what we had to say, but rather they had
already decided and they were not interested in the truth. (SR11)
The short timescales for inspection combined with the sheer quantity of evidence for analysis,
put considerable pressure upon inspectors abilities to synthesise and analyse a range of
evidence. In Sweden this has led to the recruitment of individuals with academic degrees in
the art and science of investigation. In England the employment of in service head teachers
has meant that this skill has had to be honed within the context of initial and on-going
training. One inspector explained the challenges that this poses to lead inspectors in the
English system:
Its a very, very difficult role; because youve got all of that responsibility at the start
of inspection: to prepare; youve got to build a relationship with the head teacher and
the senior team and I think thats a crucial part of a successful inspection: if they feel
theyve been listened to and youve gone to look at the stuff they suggested: lesson
5 Data management system for school attainment and achievement data in English secondary and primary
education.
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plans etc. .One of the criticisms made [recently] about our evidence forms was that
they werent clinical enough, judgemental enough or explicit enough. (EP2)
Striking a balance between building a relationship with school leaders: listening to their story
of their school and the evidence that they are keen to present and yet remaining impartial and
drawing on evidence that may place them in a poor light, is a delicate one to achieve. It
overlaps a great deal with the meditative activities outlined in section three of figure one, yet
it is in essence quite a different activity. The tensions between the inquisitive practices and
the meditative activities are elucidated by this English lead inspector and inspector trainer
who talks about his own experiences of learning to be an inspector whilst working as a head
teacher:
I used to drive away from the training [to be an inspector] thinking, you know any of
my staff could do this, whether it is the most high flying senior teacher that youve got
or the newly qualified teaching assistant with no experience. Cos surely its a case of
applying a set of criteria to a given situation? In my naivety I underestimated the
interpersonal element and as I inspected more it came very vividly to me that actually
its 98% interpersonal. (EP11)
The interpersonal element of inspection is intrinsically linked to both the meditative and
regulative activities: a facet that is recognised and articulated within the new English system
in which teaching inspectors are thought to add credibility to the process and, it is hoped, will
encourage school leaders to more readily enter into professional dialogue with inspectors, and
concomitantly be more ready to accept judgements (for further discussion see Baxter &
Clarke, 2013).
In the Swedish system not only the lack of a teaching background but the particular manera
de ser6 of those from a legal background has created problems which then overlap into the
meditative activities of the inspectorate, as two Swedish school leaders told us:
We felt it [inspection] as a medieval inquisition more than as an inspection. (SR11)
[They] could not think outside of the box: this is what the law says [] this is our
directiveso he was a real jobs worth7. (SR9)
Meditative activities
The comments above demonstrate the perceptual problems engendered by having individuals
without an educational background working as inspectors. The new English system in
contrast with its drive to introduce a perceptual proximity between inspectors and inspectees,
has done so at the risk of inspector capture, as discussed earlier; with its accompanying
occluded discourse of partiality. (Boyne, 2006). The notion of professional inspectors who
6 Way of being
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can effect positive change within schools has proven deeply seductive to the English
inspectorate who, influenced by evidence given at a Parliamentary inquiry into the work of
Ofsted in 2011 which commended the manner of inspections carried out in the independent
inspectorate:
Within our system, the team inspectors are themselves current serving practitioners.
We deploy around a thousand of these a year to go into and inspect other schools. The
exchange of information and the opportunity to see the most effective practice and to
take it back into their particular institutions is phenomenal. The inspectors
themselves frequently comment that it is the best professional development that they
get, as well as the benefit to the sector as a whole (Parliament, 2011)
This very much reflects the type of meditative activities alluded to by Jacobsson, the
generation and sharing of best practices and the idea of inspection as a discussion between
professional experts, as one head reported :
It felt much more collaborative: like we were doing inspection with them rather than
having it done to us. (EP22)
In the new inspection Framework the word professional appears 40% more frequently than in
the previous 2009 version (Ofsted, 2009a, 2009b, 2012a, 2012b) and the Handbook for
Inspection and its accompanying Framework makes the link between inspection and school
improvement much more specific than it has been in the past, stating that the agency aims to:
2. Provide information to the Secretary of State for Education and to Parliament
about the work of schools and the extent to which an acceptable standard of
education is being provided. This provides assurance that minimum standards are
being met provides confidence in the use of public money and assists accountability,
as well as indicating where improvements are needed. (Ofsted, 2012a, 2012b)
The Swedish Inspectorate also pertains to take a developmental view of inspection, but this is
effected in a slightly different way to the new English system. In the Swedish regular
supervision there are very few teaching observations and no individual feedback sessions
with teachers, only with heads. However in the newly introduced feedback seminars, after the
report is published the inspectors meet with the representatives for the municipality and the
head teachers and have a dialogue about points for development and how to deal with them.
This kind of meditative activity is highly appreciated by those attending, here one chairman
of the (political) municipal board of education:
WhenitcomestothefeedbackseminarImactuallyabitimpressed,theyhave
organisedtheprocesssothattheybothhavewrittenthereportsandalsohelpfully
arrangedgroupworkwithschoolleaderstoworkthroughtheirreports.Sofarthey
havetoppedmyexpectations.(S10)
However the developmental aspect of Swedish inspection foremost relies on the schools
response to the judgement as Lindgren reports;
Before the final and public version of the decision is published on the SI website there
is an internal quality assurance meeting at SSI where the responsible inspector, the
14
team inspector, the team lawyer and occasionally the head of unit, specify the
judgements in the decisions. The decision is published at www.skolinspektionen.se
and a press release distributed. Finally, after three months, schools are obliged to
submit an account describing how they have acted on the criticism in the inspection
report. (Lindgren, 2012:6)
This combination of evaluation and response to evaluation is interesting since in the
interviews there are both representatives from municipalities and schools (head teachers) that
refers to their transformation of critique in the evaluation report to a response document that
will function as a valuable steering document for development. This contrasts greatly with
the English approach. Viewed in light of Jacobssons three areas of activity it is evident that
whilst both systems use inquisitive activities to reach their judgements; whilst the English
system appears to choose superficially meditative activities to govern; its Swedish
counterpart relies very firmly on the regulative activates as outlined in area one (figure one).
Our final discussion explores these aspects in light of Jacobssons original theory and
examines the challenges and tensions for the new inspection regimes in each country.
Concluding Discussion
This paper has revealed that the work of both inspectorates is driven by not only the national
political contexts in which they operate, but equally in response to international policies on
education. In responding to these economic, social and political drivers, each country has
created inspection policy which attempts to resolve the political complexities of inspection
whilst also ensuring that both inspectorates retain public credibility in the regulation,
monitoring and control of education. The legal and regulatory backgrounds of the new
Swedish inspectors permit them to exercise a formal judicial role over schools; this is also
accompanied by penalisation should schools fail to deliver adequate action to deal with
reported deficiencies. Jacobssons original work asks the rhetorical question: why would
states and other organizations follow rules without being formally required to? and goes on
to report, this is frequently done, for example by claiming special expertise. (ibid: 208).
This special expertise is the tool by which the English inspectors achieve their credibility;
exercising their authority through a combination of meditative activities which, if carried out
effectively, combine with their inquisitive activities to create a powerfully convincing
governing effect which echoes the idea of soft governance, a less overt but none the less
equally powerful manner of regulatory control (Grek & Lawn, 2010; Ozga, 2009a). But if
both inspectorates aim to effect school improvement then this paper has argued that it is the
meditative activities that seem to provoke the unintended consequences that have the power
to exert a detrimental effect upon the canon of inspection. As discussed earlier, the very
overtly legal approach taken by Sweden employs individuals who operate, as Clarke puts it,
at arms-length from those they inspect (Clarke, 2008). This, whilst minimising the risk of
accusations of partiality, concomitantly creates a bureaucratic discourse which precludes
many of the meditative activities that affect the inspection effects and convince the
profession that inspection is indeed a useful and developmental activity for their school (Hult
& Segerholm, 2012:3, Segerholm & Hult, 2013:15).
In contrast, the heightened focus on regulation via meditative activities described in the
English system, creates different challenges for both inspected and inspectors. As the
qualitative data has illustrated, decisions about what data to include: as to what constitutes the
most powerful evidence when faced with a range of externally generated and school
generated data, combined with professional proximity can lead to accusations of subjectivity
15
and partiality. This is borne out by an increase in the number of complaints made about the
system since its inception in 2012 (in the first five months of the new Framework 262 schools
one in 12 of those inspected made a formal complaint afterwards (Garner, 2012), and
culminating in a major rebellion by head teachers at their annual conference in 2013 (Paton,
2013).
A definition of what it means to govern education is not easily discerned and any
interpretation risks sounding reductionist. Governing education has, as others have pointed
out, a complex mix of political rhetoric, ideological positioning and manipulation of the
teaching profession for political ends (Ozga, 1995). If, as a number of writers have argued,
schools are best placed to effect their own development (MacBeath & McGlynn, 2002;
MacBeath, 1999; MacBeath, 2006), then both the Swedish and English systems of inspection
need to take account of this in the context of their regulative, inquisitive and meditative
inspection activities, or risk failure in the eyes of public, profession and their political
masters.
16
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