01 AUTEN v.

AUTEN
(Fuld, J.,1954, Court of Appeals of the State of New York)
Quick summary and doctrine: Husband leaves behind wife and 2
children in England and remarries in NY. Wife goes to NY, obtains a
separation agreement with terms for support. Wife goes back to
England. However, husband reneges on agreement. Wife sues in
English court. No result. Sues in NY court. Dismissed because of
defense that English suit repudiated the agreement which contained a
waiver of action in all jurisdictions. Held: Deviate from generally
accepted rules (lex loci contractus and lex loci solutionis) and apply
Center of Gravity or Grouping of Contacts theory. English law governs
because England has the most significant contacts: British subjects,
wife and kids live in England, British currency in agreement, etc. NY's
role is only as place of payment. Suit in NY court reinstated.

Harold admitted agreement but one of his defenses (in a motion to

dismiss) was that the suit in England effectively repudiated the
agreement. NY lower court agreed with husband and dismissed the
case. Appellate court affirmed (but permitted Marguerite to assert any
cause of action before the English suit in an amended complaint). So
Marguerite appeals to Court of Appeals of the State of NYCA.
Issue: Choice between NY and English law.
Held.
NYCA English Law is controlling.
Generally accepted rule is for issues of execution of a contract, it is the
law of the place where it was made that governs. For issues of
performance, the law of the place of performance.

Facts:
Harold and Marguerite Auten married in England with 2 kids from
1917-1931. Harold deserted them and went to New York, obtained an
Mexican divorce, and married another woman. Marguerite went to
NY and attempted to settle. They made a separation agreement.
Harold would give support every month (50pounds) and that neither
should sue in any action relating to their separation and that the wife
should not cause any complaint to be lodged against the husband in
any jurisdiction by reason of said alleged divorce or remarriage.
Marguerite went back to England.
Harold failed to live up to the agreement but made a few payments.
Marguerite filed petition for separation in an English court, charging
Harold with adultery. Harold was served summons in NY. Counsel
advised that it was the only method by which she could collect money
from Harold (only for enforcement of agreement, not repudiation of
the agreement). Case never went to trial (but did order support
pendente lite).
Harold still didn't pay. So Marguerite went back to NY and filed suit
there for a total of $26,564 based on the separation agreement.

But not strict rule. Modern methods in choosing law now rationalize
the results achieved by the courts in decided cases.
The Center of Gravity or Grouping of Contacts theory deviates
from general rules and chooses the law of the place which has the most
significant contacts or having the most interest with the matter in
dispute. Also gives effect to the probable intention of the parties.
In this case, English law governs when the theory is applied because it
is the state with the most significant contacts (agreement is between
two British subjects, married in England, children there, lived there for
14 years, wife and children continued to live there). Agreement also
states that payment is in English currency, that first payment be made
immediately before she sailed back to England, that husband may visit
the children if he goes to England. The state of NY only serves as the
place where payment is to be made (to a trustee in NY for the account
of Marguerite and her children).
The probable intention of the parties is for English law to govern since
the wife is a stranger to NY so she couldn't have intended for NY law
to govern. The husband is also still a British subject.

Reversed. Complaint reinstated.

02 HAAG v. BARNES

e) All contributions for support have always been made from

Chicago

(1961)
In contrast, NY contacts are of far less weight and significant:
FACTS: An illegitimate child was born to Norman Barnes (Illinois
lawyer) and Dorothy Haag (New York legal secretary). Haag traveled
to Chicago, Illinois prior to the childs birth, where Barnes promised to
shoulder her hospital expenses. They then entered into a support
agreement in Chicago providing that Barnes would pay $275/mo until
the child reached 16 y/o in exchange for his release from any other
obligation. The agreement contained a choice-of-law clause in favor of
Illinois law which upheld such agreements if the sum was at least
$800. Meanwhile, NY law gave no binding effect to agreements by
parents of an illegitimate child unless it was judicially approved.
Haag and the child returned to NY and filed an action for support.
Barnes interposed the Illinois agreement as bar to the instant
proceeding.
ISSUES & RULING
1) WON Illinois law applies
YES. Under traditional conflicts rule: The agreements choice-of-law
clause and the fact that it was drawn and signed by complainant Haag
in Illinois are conclusive factors resulting in application of Illinois law.
But even if the clause and place of execution are not given conclusive
effect, they are nevertheless to be given heavy weight in determining
which jurisdiction has the most significant contacts with the matter in
dispute. These factors plus other significant contacts point to Illinois
law. Among the other Illinois contacts are:
a) Both parties are designated in the agreement as being of
Chicago, Illinois
b) Defendant Barness place of business has always been in
Illinois
c) Child was born in Illinois
d) Agents (except for a third alternate) and attorneys who
drew the agreement are Illinois residents

a) Child and mother presently live in NY

b) Part of the liaison (sexual affair) took place in NY
When these contacts are measured against the parties clearly
expressed intention (choice-of-law clause) and the more numerous and
more substantial Illinois contacts, it cannot be denied that the center
of gravity of this agreement is Illinois and that, absent compelling
public policy to the contrary, Illinois law should apply.
In this case, even looking only at the financial provision ($275/mo),
the welfare of the child is fully protected. The public policy of the
State is satisfied. Illinois law applies.
2) WON the Illinois agreement bars the proceeding
YES. Under Illinois law, the agreement bars the present action for
support.

03 BABCOCK v. JACKSON
Georgia Babcock v. Mabel Jackson / 12 N.Y. 2d 473 / May 9, 1963 / J.
Fuld
FACTS

On September 16, 1960, Georgia Babcock and her friends, Mr.

and Mrs. William Jackson, all residents of Rochester, New York,
left the city in the Jacksons car for a weekend trip to Canada. As
they were driving in Ontario, Canada, William lost control of his
car and crashed it on a stone wall along the highway. As a result,
Georgia was seriously injured. Upon her return to NY, she filled
an action against William, alleging negligence on his part in
driving his car.

At the time of the accident, the Highway Traffic Act of Ontario

was in force in Ontario that provided: "the owner or driver of a
motor vehicle, other than a vehicle operated in the business of
carrying passengers for compensation, is not liable for any loss
or damage resulting from bodily injury to, or the death of any
person being carried in *** the motor vehicle".

Even though there was no guest statute that barred recovery

of damages under New Yorks law on torts (as referred to in cited
cases such as Higgins v. Mason and Nelson v. Nygren), the
Jacksons moved to dismiss the complaint on the ground that the
law of the place (lex loci delicti) where the accident occurred
governs and that Ontario's guest statute bars recovery.

Trial Court (Special Term) dismissed the complaint, agreeing with

the Jacksons
Appellate Division affirmed dismissal without opinion. Lex loci
delicti principle governs the case.
ISSUE / HELD

WON the applicable choice of law rule may be used in

consideration of other factors which may be relevant to the

purposes served by the enforcement/denial of the remedy asked

for? NO.
RATIO
Substantive (relevant)
The traditional choice of law rule states that the substantive rights
and liabilities arising out of a tortious occurrence are determinable by
the law of the place of the tort. It had its conceptual foundation in the
vested rights doctrine, namely, that a right to recover for a foreign tort
owes its creation to the law of the jurisdiction where the injury
occurred and depends for its existence and extent solely on such law.
However, the vested rights doctrine has long since been discredited
because it fails to take account of underlying policy considerations in
evaluating the significance to be ascribed to the circumstance that an
act had a foreign situs in determining the rights and liabilities which
arise out of that act. According to the decision, the problem with the
vested rights theory was that it affects [decisions to] concrete cases
upon generalities which do not state the practical considerations
involved. As applied to torts, the vested rights doctrine ignores the
reasons and interests of the jurisdiction applying a statute for the
resolution of particular issues. As a result, there was an increased
criticism of its application by commentators, as well as abandonment
or modification of its use by judicial bodies.
The Court cited Auten v. Auten as an example of the abandonment of
the traditional rules, with its application of the center of gravity or
grouping of contacts theory of the conflict of laws. In the Auten
case, the Court put emphasis on the law of the place which has the
most significant contacts with the matter in dispute". Such theory was
also (implicitly) used in the case of Kilberg v. Northeast Airlines where
the Court weighed the interests of the different jurisdictions involved
to determine their bearing on the issue of the extent of recovery for the
injured parties.
Using the grouping of contacts theory in the case, the Court pointed
out that the concern of New York is unquestionably the greater and
more direct versus Ontarios minimal interest. The cause of action
involves injuries sustained by a New York guest as the result of the
negligence of a New York host in the operation of an automobile,

garaged, licensed and insured in New York, in the course of a weekend journey. In sharp contrast, Ontario's sole relationship with the
occurrence is the purely fortuitous circumstance that the accident
occurred there.
However, the Court here noted that the issue in the case was not
whether the defendant committed an offense against an Ontario road
law for motorists generally or whether he violated some standard of
conduct imposed by Ontario. Rather, the issue was whether the
plaintiff is barred from recovering damages for a wrong concededly
committed while she was a guest in the Jacksons automobile. As to
that issue, it is New York, the place where the parties resided, where
their guest-host relationship arose and where the trip began and was to
end, rather than Ontario, the place of the fortuitous occurrence of the
accident, which has the dominant contacts and the superior claim for
application of its law.
Although the rightness or wrongness of Williams conduct may depend
upon the law of the particular jurisdiction through which the
automobile passes, the rights and liabilities of the parties which stem
from their guest-host relationship should remain constant and not vary
and shift as the automobile proceeds from place to place. Such a result
accords with "the interests of the host in procuring liability insurance
adequate under the applicable law, and the interests of his insurer in
reasonable calculability of the premium."
The Court also took into consideration the fact that New York's policy
of requiring a tort-feasor to compensate his guest for injuries caused
by his negligence cannot be contested, as State Legislature had
repeatedly refused to enact statutes limiting or barring recovery for
cases of similar import to Georgias (wherein she received injuries as a
guest travelling with the tortfeasor). On the other hand, Ontario has no
conceivable interest in denying a remedy to a New York guest against
his New York host for injuries suffered in Ontario by reason of
conduct which was tortious under Ontario law. The object of Ontario's
guest statute, it has been said, is "to prevent the fraudulent assertion of
claims by passengers, in collusion with the drivers, against insurance
companies". Obviously, the fraudulent claims intended to be
prevented by the statute are not availing in the case of Georgia, who is

claiming not against defendants from Ontario or their insurance

companies, but against defendants from New York and their insurance
companies.
The Court concludes therefore, that where the issue involves standards
of conduct, it is more than likely that it is the law of the place of the
tort which will be controlling but the disposition of other issues must
turn, as does the issue of the standard of conduct itself, on the law of
the jurisdiction which has the strongest interest in the resolution of the
particular issue presented.

04 Allison Gibbs (appellee) v. Government of the Philippine

Islands (oppositor-appellant)
Facts:
Appelant is appealing the final order of CFI requiring the Register of
Deeds to cancel the TCTs of lands in Manila and issue another one in
favor of the appellee.
Gibbs and Eva Johnson Gibbs are citizens of California with some
properties here. Eva died intestate in California in November 1929.
Allisson was appointed administrator in the estate of the wife, and in
the intestate proceedings here, he moved to be adjudicated as the sole
owner of the community of property, in accordance with the laws of
California that upon the death of the wife previous to the husband, the
community property belongs absolutely to the husband without
administration. The court granted his petition.
Afterwards, Gibbs presented the court decree to the Register of Deeds
to ask for the cancellation of the titles and to give him a new title over
the lands, which the latter refused, arguing that the corresponding
inheritance tax had not been paid yet. Thus, Gibbs filed the petition
with the CFI, the decision of which the Register of Deeds is appealing
here.
Issue: WON Eva is the owner of a descendible interest over the
properties such that inheritance tax would have to be paid by the heirs
upon the descending of those properties to the heirs.
Ratio:
The argument of the appellee, which was sustained by the CFI, is that
under the law of California, upon the death of the wife, the entire
community property belongs to the surviving husband, not by virtue of
succession or by virtue of her death, but by virtue of the fact that when
the death of the wife precedes that of the husband, he acquires the
community property not as an heir or as the beneficiary of his
deceased wife, but because she never had more than an inchoate
interest or expectancy which is extinguished upon her death.
But the SC said that if appellee does not gain anything from

succession, then why is he invoking the second paragraph of article 10

of the Civil Code to apply California law? Art. 10 provides that:
Nevertheless, legal and testamentary successions, in respect to the
order of succession as well as to the amount of successional rights and
the intrinsic validity of their provisions, shall be regulated by the
national law of the person whose succession is in question, whatever
may be the nature of the property or the country in which it may be
situated.
The SC resolved the question this way: that the law that governs the
descent, alienation and transfer of lands shall be the law of the state in
which such land is located.
In accord with the rule that real property is subject to the lex rei sitae,
the respective rights of husband and wife in such property, in the
absence of an antenuptial contract, are determined by the law of the
place where the property is situated, irrespective of the domicile of the
parties or to the place where the marriage was celebrated.
It is admitted that the Philippine lands here in question were acquired
as community property of the conjugal partnership of the appellee and
his wife. Under the law of the Philippine Islands, she was vested of a
title equal to that of her husband.
Thus, the inheritance tax must be paid before the new title can be
issued.

05 GRANT v. MCAULIFFE

06 Cadalin and 1,767 Co-Complainants (class action) v. POEA

Administrator, NLRC, Brown & Root International and/or Asia
International Builders (1994).
(1) Class action lawsuit filed by Cadalin and 1,767 overseas
contract workers deployed to multiple Middle Eastern
countries by Asia International Builders (AIBC) and Brown
and Root (BRII).
(2) BRII: foreign company based in Houston and engaged in
construction.
(3) AIBC: local Filipino service contractor that places OCWs on
behalf of foreign principals
(4) Contracts: POEA standard contracts signed in the Philippines
(5) Deployment: From 1975 to 1983 to Saudi Arabia, Libya,
UAE, Bahrain, Indonesia, Malaysia. BUT: case focuses on
those complainants that were deployed in Bahrain. Other
complaints for non-Bahrain based employees were dismissed.
(6) Conflicts of Law: Amiri Decree No. 23 in Bahrain which
governs the rights of overseas contract workers in that nation
vs. Philippine law/Philippine OCW contracts.
ACTION: Complaint for: (1) payment of unexpired portion of
employment contracts which were prematurely terminated (2) payment
of interest on earnings of Travel and Reserved Fund, and other benefits
and penalties.
POEA decision: Awarded $824,652.44 to complainants
NRLC decision: Affirmed with modification (dismissed some
complaints, but ordered the award to most)
ISSUES: (1) Amiri decree also provides for a one year prescriptive
period for labor action. Philippines has 10 years in NCC on contracts
and 3 years in LC on money claims. Which law applies? (2) Amiri
decree provides more benefits than the standard POEA employment
contract. Which should be enforced?
SC ON ISSUE #1: RE prescription period

HELD: Apply Philippine law; 3 year prescriptive period of money

claims arising out of ER-EE (LC)
Prescription Clause in Amiri Decree: A claim rising out of a
contract of employment shall not be actionable after the lapse of one
year from the date of expiry of the contract
GENERAL RULE: foreign procedural law will not be applied in the
forum. Procedural matters, such as service of process, joinder of
actions, period and requisites for appeal, and so forth, are governed by
the laws of the forum. This is true even if the action is based upon a
foreign substantive law
A law on prescription of actions is sui generis in Conflict of Laws in
the sense that it may be viewed either as procedural or substantive,
depending on the characterization given such a law.
Thus in Bournias v. Atlantic Maritime Company, supra, the American
court applied the statute of limitations of New York, instead of the
Panamanian law, after finding that there was no showing that the
Panamanian law on prescription was intended to be substantive. Being
considered merely a procedural law even in Panama, it has to give way
to the law of the forum on prescription of actions.
EXCEPTION: However, the characterization of a statute into a
procedural or substantive law becomes irrelevant when the country of
the forum has a "borrowing statute." Said statute has the practical
effect of treating the foreign statute of limitation as one of substance
(Goodrich, Conflict of Laws 152-153 [1938]). A "borrowing statute"
directs the state of the forum to apply the foreign statute of limitations
to the pending claims based on a foreign law (Siegel, Conflicts, 183
[1975]). While there are several kinds of "borrowing statutes," one
form provides that an action barred by the laws of the place where it
accrued, will not be enforced in the forum even though the local
statute has not run against it. Section 48 of our Code of Civil
Procedure is of this kind. Said Section provides: If by the laws of the
state or country where the cause of action arose, the action is barred, it
is also barred in the Philippines Islands.

Section 48 has not been repealed or amended by the Civil Code of

the Philippines. There is no provision in the Civil Code of the
Philippines, which is inconsistent with or contradictory to Section 48
of the Code of Civil Procedure (Paras, Philippine Conflict of Laws 104
[7th ed.]).
EXCEPTION to the EXCEPTION: The courts of the forum will not
enforce any foreign claim obnoxious to the forum's public policy.
The one-year prescriptive period of the Amiri Decree No. 23 of 1976
as regards the claims in question would contravene the public policy
on the protection to labor.
Conclusion: Apply forum law, specifically labor code 3 years
prescription on money claims.
SC ON ISSUE #2: Additional Benefits of Amiri Decree
NLRC applied the Amiri Decree which provided for better benefits on
the principle that where the laws of the host country are more
favorable and beneficial to workers, then the laws of the host country
shall form part of the overseas contract.
SC: we read the overseas-employment contracts in question as
adopting the provisions of the Amiri Decree No. 23 of 1976 as part and
parcel thereof.
The parties to a contract may select the law by which it is to be
governed (Cheshire, Private International Law, 187 [7th ed.]). In such
a case, the foreign law is adopted as a "system" to regulate the
relations of the parties, including questions of their capacity to enter
into the contract, the formalities to be observed by them, matters of
performance, and so forth
Instead of adopting the entire mass of the foreign law, the parties may
just agree that specific provisions of a foreign statute shall be
deemed incorporated into their contract "as a set of terms." By such
reference to the provisions of the foreign law, the contract does not
become a foreign contract to be governed by the foreign law. The

said law does not operate as a statute but as a set of contractual

terms deemed written in the contract (Anton, Private International
Law, 197 [1967]; Dicey and Morris, The Conflict of Laws, 702-703,
[8th ed.]).
A basic policy of contract is to protect the expectation of the parties
(Reese, Choice of Law in Torts and Contracts, 16 Columbia Journal of
Transnational Law 1, 21 [1977]). Such party expectation is protected
by giving effect to the parties' own choice of the applicable law (Fricke
v. Isbrandtsen Co., Inc., 151 F. Supp. 465, 467 [1957]). The choice of
law must, however, bear some relationship to the parties or their
transaction (Scoles and Hayes, Conflict of Law 644-647 [1982]).
There is no question that the contracts sought to be enforced by
claimants have a direct connection with the Bahrain law because
the services were rendered in that country.

06 HAUMSCHILD v. CONTINENTAL CASUALTY

07 Aznar v. Garcia
January 31, 1963
LABRADOR, J.

FACTS:

Edward Christensen executed a will dated March 5, 1951.

The will contained provisions saying that Edward has only one
child, Maria Lucy Christensen; that he devised unto Maria
Helen Christensen an amount of P3,600; that even if Maria
Helen was surnamed Christensen, she was not related to
Edward nor was she adopted; that the income from the rest of
his property be devised to his only daughter, Maria Lucy.
the executor in his final account and project of partition ratified
the payment of only P3,600 to Helen and proposed that the
residue of the estate be transferred to Lucy

Helen filed an opposition to the approval of the project

partition, saying that it deprived her of her legitime as an
acknowledged natural child of Edward as she was declared as
one by the Supreme Court in Aznar v. Aznar (1958)

The legal grounds of opposition are:

o (a) that the distribution should be governed by the laws
of the Philippines, and
o (b) that said order of distribution is contrary thereto
insofar as it denies to Helen Christensen, one of two
acknowledged natural children, one-half of the estate in
full ownership.

CFI ruled that as Edward E. Christensen was a citizen of the

United States and of the State of California at the time of his
death, the successional rights and intrinsic validity of the
provisions in his will are to be governed by the law of
California, in accordance with which a testator has the right to
dispose of his property in the way he desires, because the right
of absolute dominion over his property is sacred and inviolable

ISSUES/HELD: WON the Renvoi doctrine should have been applied

Yes
Dispositive: WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby
reversed and the case returned to the lower court with instructions that
the partition be made as the Philippine law on succession provides.
Judgment reversed, with costs against appellees.
RATIO:
Re Edwards citizenship, domicile and residence

There is no question that Edward E. Christensen was a citizen

of the United States and of the State of California at the time of
his death.
o the citizenship that he acquired in California when he
resided in Sacramento, California from 1904 to 1913,
was never lost by his stay in the Philippines, for the
latter was a territory of the United States (not a state)
until 1946 and the deceased appears to have considered
himself as a citizen of California by the fact that when
he executed his will in 1951 he declared that he was a
citizen of that State; so that he appears never to have
intended to abandon his California citizenship by
acquiring another.

o He was born in New York, migrated to California and

resided there for nine years, and since he came to the
Philippines in 1913 he returned to California very rarely
and only for short visits (perhaps to relatives), and
considering that he appears never to have owned or
acquired a home or properties in that state, which would
indicate that he would ultimately abandon the
Philippines and make home in the State of California.

Difference between residence and domicile

o Acquisition of a domicile of choice requires the
exercise of intention as well as physical presence.
Residence simply requires bodily presence of an
inhabitant in a given place, while domicile requires
bodily presence in that place and also an intention to
make it one's domicile.

So what law determines the validity of the testamentary

dispositions? Private law of State of California

determination of the meaning of the term "national law" is

used therein.

There is also no question that at the time of his death he was

domiciled in the Philippines.

The law that governs the validity of his testamentary

dispositions is defined in Article 161 of the Civil Code of the
Philippines, the application of which, requires the

There is no single American law governing the validity of

testamentary provisions in the United States, each state of the
Union having its own private law applicable to its citizens only
and in force only within the state. The "national law" indicated
in CC Art 16 can not, therefore, possibly mean or apply to any
general American law. So it can refer to no other than the
private law of the State of California.

What is the law in California governing the disposition of personal

property?

Exeutor-appelle claims that under the California Probate Code,

a testator may dispose of his property by will in the form and
manner he desires (as found in In re Kaufman). Helen
(appellant), on the other hand, invokes the provisions of
Article 946 of the Civil Code of California, which says: If
there is no law to the contrary, in the place where personal
property is situated, it is deemed to follow the person of its
owner, and is governed by the law of his domicile. It is based
on this provision and following the doctrine of renvoi, the
question of the validity of the testamentary provision in
question should be referred back to the law of the decedent's
domicile, which is the Philippines.

What is the renvoi doctrine?

1 ART. 16. Real property as well as personal property is subject to the law
of the country where it is [Link], intestate and testamentary
successions, both with respect to the order of succession and to the
amount of successional rights and to the intrinsic validity of testamentary
provisions, shall be regulated by the national law of the person
whose succession is under consideration, whatever may be the nature
of the property and regardless of the country where said property may be
found.

(digesters note: basically, there is renvoi when the conflict of rule of

the forum makes reference to a foreign law, and that foreign law has a
rule that refers back to the law of the forum. Ie. PH refers to California
law but California law refers to PH law)

Goodrich, Conflict of Laws, Sec. 7, pp. 13-14.

"When the Conflict of Laws rule of the forum refers a jural

matter to a foreign law for decision, is the reference to the
purely internal rules of law of the foreign system; i.e., to the
totality of the foreign law minus its Conflict of Laws rules?"

rule of which, in turn, refers the matter back again to the law of
the forum. This is renvoi in the narrower sense. The German
term for this judicial process is 'Ruckverweisung.'"
So how do we apply the renvoi doctrine? (explained by Prof.
Lorenzen in an article in the Yale Law Journal)

o Renvoi foreign law

(1) Every court shall observe the law of its country as regards the
application of foreign laws.

o Opponents of renvoi - This would have resulted in the

"endless chain of references". The opponents of the
renvoi would have looked merely to the internal law,
thus rejecting the renvoi or the reference back.

(2) Provided that no express provision to the contrary exists, the court
shall respect:

o It is true that such a solution avoids going on a merrygo-round, but those who have accepted
the renvoi theory avoid this inextricabilis circulas by
getting off at the second reference and at that point
applying internal law. Perhaps the opponents of
the renvoi are a bit more consistent for they look always
to internal law as the rule of reference.
o BUT strange enough, the only way to get uniformity is
if the different courts disagree with each other. If both
accept renvoi or both reject, the result of the litigation
will vary with the choice of the forum. (digesters note:
if both accept renvoi, if filed in PH, PH law will apply
but if filed in California, California law will apply. If
both reject, ganun din)
Harvard Law Review, Vol. 31, pp. 523-571
o In revoi, a jural matter is presented which the conflict-of-laws
rule of the forum refers to a foreign law, the conflict-of-laws

(a) The provisions of a foreign law which disclaims the right to

bind its nationals abroad as regards their personal statute, and
desires that said personal statute shall be determined by the law
of the domicile, or even by the law of the place where the act in
question occurred.
(b) The decision of two or more foreign systems of law,
provided it be certain that one of them is necessarily
competent, which agree in attributing the determination of a
question to the same system of law.
Applying it in the case at bar
o Article 946 of the California Civil Code (invoked by Helen) is
its conflict of laws rule, while the rule applied in In re
Kaufman (invoked by the executor), is its internal law. If the
law on succession and the conflict of laws rules of California
are to be enforced jointly, each in its own intended and
appropriate sphere, the principle cited In re Kaufman should
apply to citizens living in the State, but Article 946 should

apply to such of its citizens as are not domiciled in

California but in other jurisdictions.
o The laws of California have prescribed two sets of laws for its
citizens, one for residents therein and another for those
domiciled in other jurisdictions. Reason demands that We
should enforce the California internal law prescribed for its
citizens residing therein, and enforce the conflict of laws rules
for the citizens domiciled abroad.
o The conflict of laws rule in California, Article 946, Civil Code,
precisely refers back the case, when a decedent is not
domiciled in California, to the law of his domicile, the
Philippines.
o The Philippine court must apply its own law as directed in the
conflict of laws rule of the state of the decedent, if the question
has to be decided, especially as the application of the internal
law of California provides no legitime for children while the
Philippine law, Arts. 887(4) and 894, Civil Code of the
Philippines, makes natural children legally acknowledged
forced heirs of the parent recognizing them.
o THEREFORE, as the domicile of the deceased is the
Philippines, the validity of the provisions of his will
depriving his acknowledged natural child, Helen, should be
governed by the Philippine Law, the domicile, pursuant to
Art. 946 of the Civil Code of California, not by the internal
law of California.

08 ANNESLEY v ANNESLEY
95 LJ Ch. 404 (1926)
Russell, J.
Topic: Renvoi
Facts:
Sybil Annesley, a British subject, was married in 1860 to an army
officer whose domicile was English. They resided in Pau, France until
her husbands death in 1884. From that date, Mrs. Annesley was open
to adopt a domicile of her choice. She remained in France until her
death in 1924. She went back to England only a few times, to visit one
of her daughters and for short periods of time.
She considered France as her home. She never had any place
of residence in England. According to her daughter, her mother
expressed her dislike of England and the English people, and stated
she never wished to live anywhere but in France. She also declared
that she wished to be buried in France of Germany, where her husband
was buried.
Mrs. Annesley never took steps prescribed by Art. 13 of the
French Civil Code to obtain a formal French domicile according to
French law.
Mrs. Annesley owned immovable property in France only and
owned movable properties in both France and England.
On Dec. 13, 1919, she executed in France a will in English
form, which revoked all former testamentary dispositions and purports
to dispose of all her real and personal estate. In Clause 5, she left the
residue to her daughter. In Clause 8 of her will, she declared that
although she has lived in France for many years it was not her
intention to abandon her domicile of origin and she has not made any
application to fix her domicile in France, nor had she done anything to
become a naturalized subject of France and she intends to remain a
British subject.
Mrs. Annesley was domiciled in France according to English
law, but not according to French law for not complying with the

provisions of the French Civil Code for the acquisition of French

domicile.
Issues:
1. WON she had abandoned her English domicile and acquired a
French Domicile of choice in accordance with English law -- YES
2. Whether the domicile of the testatrix at the time of her death was
French or English (If it were French, she could only dispose of 1/3 of
her personal property.) According to English law, she is domiciled
in France.
Ratio:
1.
The requirements of English law are the factum of residence
coupled with the animus manendi, regardless of whether she
complied with the formalities of French law. She resided in France
since her marriage and remained there until her death and she only had
real property in France.
- She was a British national domiciled in France, according to
English law. BUT, according to French law, she was not
domiciled in France.
2.
The domicile of the testatrix at the time of her death was
French. According to French municipal law, the law applicable in the
case of a foreigner not legally domiciled in France is the law of that
persons nationality, in this case English law. But the law of that
nationality (English) refers the question back to French law, the
law of the domicile. (DOUBLE RENVOI)
According to French law, the French courts, in administering
the movable property of a deceased foreigner who, according to the
law of his country (ENGLAND) is domiciled in France, and whose

property must, according to that law (ENGLISH LAW), be applied in

accordance with the law of the country in which he was domiciled
(FRANCE), will apply French Municipal law.
- In this case, she could only dispose of 1/3 of her English
personal estate and her French movable property.
- The English court employed double renvoi it decided the
case as a French court would have decided it in accordance
with its own municipal law.
- Had the English court applied single renvoi, it would have
followed English internal law.

09 UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO v. DATER

Facts
The spouses George R. Dater (George) and Nellie E. Dater and the
spouses John R. Price (John) and Clara A. Price (Clara) obtained
a USD 75,000 loan from the Chicago Title and Trust Company
secured by a trust mortgage over a piece of property owned by
George and John.
The promissory notes and deed were prepared in Illinois and mailed to
Michigan for the signature of the mortgagors.
The promissory note was payable in Illinois.
The checks constituting the loaned amount were payable and cashed in
Illinois.
After Johns death, foreclosure proceedings were instituted in Illinois.
In the meantime, a suit was filed in Michigan involving the same
transaction in which no cause of action was found against Clara.
Issue
Whether or not Clara is liable for the loan.
Held
No. The laws of Michigan governs her capacity to enter into the
contract, under which, she is not capacitated to do so.
Ratio
The issue involved is not which law governs the contract, but whether
or not Clara had the capacity to enter it in the first place.
The present case is similar to that of Burr v. Beckler (which also
involves a resident of Illinois) in which the court ruled that the law
of the state where the delivery of the loan instruments were
completed governs the capacity of the debtor.
In the present case, the promissory notes were delivered completely in
Michigan under the laws of which, Clara had no capacity (Michigan
law does not allow a married woman to bind her separate estate for
the benefit of others.).

10 Testate Estate of Amos Bellis v. Edward Bellis (1967)

Bengzon, J:

Issue: WON Texas or Philippine law should apply Texas Law

Facts:
Amos Bellis, an American citizen, was born and resided in
Texas. He had 5 legitimate children by his first wife, 3 legitimate
children by his second wife and 3 illegitimate children.
He executed a will in the Philippines, directing that his
distributable estate should be divided, in trust, in the following order
and manner: (a) $240,000.00 to his first wife, Mary E. Mallen; (b)
P120,000.00 to his three illegitimate children, Amos Bellis, Jr., Maria
Cristina Bellis, Miriam Palma Bellis, or P40,000.00 each and (c) after
the foregoing two items have been satisfied, the remainder shall go to
his seven surviving children in equal shares
On July 8, 1958, Amos G. Bellis died a resident of San
Antonio, Texas, USA. His will was admitted to probate in the CFI of
Manila on September 15, 1958.
As executor of the will, Peoples Bank and Trust Company
paid $240,000 in the form of shares of stock to Mary E. Mallen and to
the 3 illegitimate children, Amos Bellis, Jr., Maria Cristina Bellis and
Miriam Palma Bellis, amounts totalling P40,000 each.
When the executor submitted its Final Account, Report of
Administration and Project of Partition, Maria Cristina Bellis and
Miriam Palma Bellis filed their oppositions to the project of partition
on the ground that they were deprived of their legitimes as illegitimate
children.
The CFI of Manila overruled the oppositions and approved the
executor's final account, report and administration and project of
partition. Relying upon Art. 16 of the Civil Code, it applied the
national law of the decedent, which in this case is Texas law, which did
not provide for legitimes.
Appellants argue that their case falls under the circumstances
mentioned in the third paragraph of Article 17 in relation to Article 16
of the Civil Code. Art 17(3)-- Prohibitive laws concerning persons,
their acts or property, and those which have for their object public
order, public policy and good customs shall not be rendered ineffective
by laws or judgments promulgated, or by determinations or
conventions agreed upon in a foreign country.

Ratio:
The parties do not submit the case on, nor even discuss, the
doctrine of renvoi, Said doctrine is usually pertinent where the
decedent is a national of one country, and a domicile of another. In the
present case, the decedent was both a national of Texas and a domicile
thereof at the time of his death. Even assuming Texas has a conflict of
law rule providing that the domiciliary system (law of the domicile)
should govern, the same would still refer to Texas law.
Nonetheless, if Texas has a conflicts rule adopting the situs
theory (lex rei sitae) calling for the application of the law of the place
where the properties are situated, renvoi would arise, since the
properties here involved are found in the Philippines. In the absence,
however, of proof as to the conflict of law rule of Texas, it should not
be presumed different from ours.
Article 16, par. 2, and Art. 1039 of the Civil Code, render
applicable the national law of the decedent, in intestate or testamentary
successions, with regard to four items: (a) the order of succession; (b)
the amount of successional rights; (e) the intrinsic validity of the
provisions of the will; and (d) the capacity to succeed.
Appellants would however counter that Art. 17, paragraph 3 of
the Civil Code prevails as the exception to Art. 16, par. 2 of the Civil
Code. This is not correct. Precisely, Congress deleted the phrase,
"notwithstanding the provisions of this and the next preceding article"
when they incorporated Art. 11 of the old Civil Code as Art. 17 of the
new Civil Code, while reproducing without substantial change the
second paragraph of Art. 10 of the old Civil Code as Art. 16 in the
new. It must have been their purpose to make the second paragraph of
Art. 16 a specific provision in itself which must be applied in testate
and intestate succession. As further indication of this legislative intent,
Congress added a new provision, under Art. 1039, which decrees that
capacity to succeed is to be governed by the national law of the
decedent.
Whatever public policy or good customs may be involved in
our System of legitimes, Congress has not intended to extend the same
to the succession of foreign nationals. For it has specifically chosen to

leave, inter alia, the amount of successional rights, to the decedent's

national law. Specific provisions must prevail over general ones.
Appellants would also point out that the decedent executed two
wills one to govern his Texas estate and the other his Philippine
estate arguing from this that he intended Philippine law to govern
his Philippine estate. Such intention would not alter the law, for as this
Court ruled in Miciano v. Brimo, a provision in a foreigner's will to the
effect that his properties shall be distributed in accordance with
Philippine law and not with his national law, is illegal and void
The parties admit that the decedent, Amos G. Bellis, was a
citizen of the State of Texas, U.S.A., and that under the laws of Texas,
there are no forced heirs or legitimes. Accordingly, since the intrinsic

validity of the provision of the will and the amount of successional

rights are to be determined under Texas law, the Philippine law on
legitimes cannot be applied to the testacy of Amos G. Bellis.