CASE DIGEST IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I (Based on Atty.

Gabriels Syllabus)
ARTICLE VI LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT
Section 1
*Republic Act No. 6735 (system of Initiative &
Referendum)
Section 5
1. Tobias vs. Abalos
2. Mariano Jr. vs. Comelec
3. Montejo vs. Comelec
4. Aguino vs. Comelec
5. Veteran Federation Party vs. Comelec
6. BANAT vs. Comelec
7. Ang Bagong Bayani-OFW Labor Party vs.
Comelec
8. Ang Ladlad LGBT Party vs. COmelec
9. Palparan vs. HRET
*Republic Act No. 7941 (Party List System)
Section 6
10. Romualdez-Marcos vs. Comelec
11. Aquino vs. Comelec
12. Co. vs. House of Representatives Electoral
Tribunal
Section 7
13. Dimaporo vs. Mitra
Section 11
14. Jimenez vs. Cabangbang
15. Osmea vs. Pendatun
16. Pobre vs. Defensor-Santiago
Section 13
17. Zandueta vs. De la Costa
Section 14
18. Puyat vs. De Guzamn
Section 16
19. Santiago vs. Guingona
20. Avelino vs. Cuenco
21. Arroyo vs. De Venecia
22. Osmea vs. Pendatun
23. Santiago vs. Sandiganbayan
24. Paredes Jr. vs. Sandiganbayan
25. De Venecia vs. Sandiganbayan
26. US vs. Pons
27. Casco Philippine Chemical Co. vs. Gimenez
28. Philippine Judges Association vs. Prado
Section 17
29. Robles vs. House of representatives
Electoral Tribunal
30. Angara vs. Electoral Commission
31. Lazatin vs. House of Representatives
Electoral Tribunal
32. Abbas vs. Senate Electoral Tribunal

Abad, Pascasio, Perez & Saludes (2013)

33. Bondoc vs.Pineda

34. Chavez vs. Comelec
35. Pimentel vs. House
Electoral Tribunal
36. Palparan vs. HRET

of

representatives

Section 18
37. Daza vs. Singson
38. Coseteng vs. mitra
39. Guingona vs. Gonzales
Section 21
40. Bengzon
vs.
senate
Blue
Ribbon
Committee
41. Arnault vs. Nazareno
42. Senate vs. Ermita
43. Gudani vs. Senga
44. In re Petition For Issuance of Writ of Habeas
Corpus of Camilo L. Sabio
45. Neri
vs.
Senate
Committee
on
Accountability of Public Officers and
Investigations
46. Garciliiano vs. house of Representatives
Section 22
47. Senate vs. Ermita
Section 24
48. Tolentino vs. Secretary of Finance
49. Alvarez vs. Gungona
Section 25
50. Garcia vs. Mata
51. Demetria vs. Alba
52. Philconsa vs. Enriquez
Section 26
53. Philconsa vs. Gimenez
54. Tio vs. Videogram Regulatory Board
55. Philippine Judges Association vs. Prado
56. Tolentino vs. Secretary of Finance
57. Tan vs. Del Rosario
58. Tobias vs. Abalos
59. ABAKADA Guro Party List vs. Ermita
Section 27
60. Gonzales vs. Macaraig
61. Bengzon vs. Drilon
62. Philconsa vs. Enriquez
Section 28
63. Kapatiran
ng
mga
Naglilingkod
Pamahalaan ng Pilipinas vs. Tan
64. Lung Center vs. Quezon City
65. Province of Abra vs. Hernando
66. Abra Valley College vs. Aquino

sa

Section 29

25

CASE DIGEST IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I (Based on Atty. Gabriels Syllabus)

67. Pascual vs. Secretary of Public Works
68. Aglipay vs. Ruiz
69. Huingona vs. Carague
70. Osmena vs. Orbos
71. Philconsa vs. Enriquez

a.1 Initiative on the Constitution which refers

to a petition proposing amendments to the
Constitution;

Section 30
72. First lepanto Ceramics, Inc. vs. Court of
Appeals
73. Diaz vs. Court of Appeals
Section 32
74. Subic Bay
COMELEC

Metropolitan

Authority

vs.

SECTION 1
Republic Act No. 6735
1989

August 4,

AN ACT PROVIDING FOR A SYSTEM OF

INITIATIVE AND REFERENDUM AND
APPROPRIATING FUNDS THEREFOR
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of
Representatives of the Philippines in Congress
assembled::
I. General Provisions
Section 1. Title. This Act shall be known as
"The Initiative and Referendum Act."
Section 2. Statement of Policy. The
power of the people under a system of
initiative and referendum to directly propose,
enact, approve or reject, in whole or in part,
the
Constitution,
laws,
ordinances,
or
resolutions passed by any legislative body
upon compliance with the requirements of this
Act is hereby affirmed, recognized and
guaranteed.
Section 3. Definition of Terms. For
purposes of this Act, the following terms shall
mean:
(a) "Initiative" is the power of the people to
propose amendments to the Constitution or to
propose and enact legislations through an
election called for the purpose.

a.2. Initiative on statutes which refers to a

petition proposing to enact a national
legislation; and
a.3. Initiative on local legislation which refers
to a petition proposing to enact a regional,
provincial, city, municipal, or barangay law,
resolution or ordinance.
(b) "Indirect initiative" is exercise of initiative
by the people through a proposition sent to
Congress or the local legislative body for
action.
(c) "Referendum" is the power of the
electorate to approve or reject a legislation
through an election called for the purpose. It
may be of two classes, namely:
c.1. Referendum on statutes which refers to a
petition to approve or reject an act or law, or
part thereof, passed by Congress; and
c.2. Referendum on local law which refers to a
petition to approve or reject a law, resolution
or ordinance enacted by regional assemblies
and local legislative bodies.
(d) "Proposition" is the measure proposed by
the voters.
(e) "Plebiscite" is the electoral process by
which an initiative on the Constitution is
approved or rejected by the people.
(f) "Petition" is the written instrument
containing the proposition and the required
number of signatories. It shall be in a form to
be determined by and submitted to the
Commission on Elections, hereinafter referred
to as the Commission.
(g) "Local
provinces,
barangays.

government units" refers to

cities,
municipalities
and

There are three (3) systems of initiative,

namely:

(h) "Local legislative bodies" refers to the

Sangguniang
Panlalawigan,
Sangguniang
Panlungsod,
Sangguniang
Bayan,
and
Sangguniang Nayon.

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26

CASE DIGEST IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I (Based on Atty. Gabriels Syllabus)

(i) "Local executives" refers to the Provincial
Governors, City or Municipal Mayors and
Punong Barangay, as the case may be.
Section 4. Who may exercise. The power
of initiative and referendum may be exercised
by all registered voters of the country,
autonomous
regions,
provinces,
cities,
municipalities and barangays.
Section 5. Requirements. (a) To exercise
the power of initiative or referendum, at least
ten per centum (10%) of the total number of
the registered voters, of which every
legislative district is represented by at least
three per centum (3%) of the registered voters
thereof, shall sign a petition for the purpose
and register the same with the Commission.
(b) A petition for an initiative on the 1987
Constitution must have at least twelve per
centum (12%) of the total number of
registered voters as signatories, of which
every legislative district must be represented
by at least three per centum (3%) of the
registered voters therein. Initiative on the
Constitution may be exercised only after five
(5) years from the ratification of the 1987
Constitution and only once every five (5) years
thereafter.
(c) The petition shall state the following:
c.1. contents or text of the proposed law
sought to be enacted, approved or rejected,
amended or repealed, as the case may be;
c.2. the proposition;
c.3. the reason or reasons therefor;
c.4. that it is not one of the exceptions
provided herein;
c.5. signatures of the petitioners or registered
voters; and

the petition thereof is signed by at least ten

per centum (10%) of the registered voters in
the province or city, of which every legislative
district must be represented by at least three
per centum (3%) of the registered voters
therein; Provided, however, That if the
province or city is composed only of one (1)
legislative district, then at least each
municipality in a province or each barangay in
a city should be represented by at least three
per centum (3%) of the registered voters
therein.
(e) A referendum of initiative on an ordinance
passed in a municipality shall be deemed
validly initiated if the petition therefor is
signed by at least ten per centum (10%) of the
registered voters in the municipality, of which
every barangay is represented by at least
three per centum (3%) of the registered voters
therein.
(f) A referendum or initiative on a barangay
resolution or ordinance is deemed validly
initiated if signed by at least ten per centum
(10%) of the registered voters in said
barangay.
Section 6. Special Registration. The
Commission on Election shall set a special
registration day at least three (3) weeks before
a scheduled initiative or referendum.
Section 7. Verification of Signatures.
The Election Registrar shall verify the
signatures on the basis of the registry list of
voters,
voters'
affidavits
and
voters
identification cards used in the immediately
preceding election.
II. National Initiative and Referendum
SECTION 8. Conduct and Date of Initiative
or Referendum. The Commission shall call
and supervise the conduct of initiative or
referendum.

(d) A referendum or initiative affecting a law,

resolution or ordinance passed by the
legislative assembly of an autonomous region,
province or city is deemed validly initiated if

Within a period of thirty (30) days from receipt

of the petition, the Commission shall, upon
determining the sufficiency of the petition,
publish the same in Filipino and English at
least twice in newspapers of general and local
circulation and set the date of the initiative or
referendum which shall not be earlier than
forty-five (45) days but not later than ninety
(90) days from the determination by the
Commission of the sufficiency of the petition.

Abad, Pascasio, Perez & Saludes (2013)

27

c.6. an abstract or summary in not more than

one hundred (100) words which shall be legibly
written or printed at the top of every page of
the petition.

CASE DIGEST IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I (Based on Atty. Gabriels Syllabus)

Section 9. Effectivity of Initiative or
Referendum Proposition. (a) The
Proposition of the enactment, approval,
amendment or rejection of a national law shall
be submitted to and approved by a majority of
the votes cast by all the registered voters of
the Philippines.
If, as certified to by the Commission, the
proposition is approved by a majority of the
votes cast, the national law proposed for
enactment, approval, or amendment shall
become effective fifteen (15) days following
completion of its publication in the Official
Gazette or in a newspaper of general
circulation in the Philippines. If, as certified by
the Commission, the proposition to reject a
national law is approved by a majority of the
votes cast, the said national law shall be
deemed repealed and the repeal shall become
effective fifteen (15) days following the
completion of publication of the proposition
and the certification by the Commission in the
Official Gazette or in a newspaper of general
circulation in the Philippines.
However, if the majority vote is not obtained,
the national law sought to be rejected or
amended shall remain in full force and effect.
(b) The proposition in an initiative on the
Constitution approved by a majority of the
votes cast in the plebiscite shall become
effective as to the day of the plebiscite.
(c) A national or local initiative proposition
approved by majority of the votes cast in an
election called for the purpose shall become
effective fifteen (15) days after certification
and proclamation by the Commission.
Section 10. Prohibited Measures. The
following cannot be the subject of an initiative
or referendum petition:
(a) No petition embracing more than one (1)
subject shall be submitted to the electorate;
and
(b) Statutes involving emergency measures,
the enactment of which are specifically vested
in Congress by the Constitution, cannot be
subject to referendum until ninety (90) days
after its effectivity.

law, may file a petition for indirect initiative

with the House of Representatives, and other
legislative bodies. The petition shall contain a
summary of the chief purposes and contents of
the bill that the organization proposes to be
enacted into law by the legislature.
The procedure to be followed on the initiative
bill shall be the same as the enactment of any
legislative measure before the House of
Representatives except that the said initiative
bill shall have precedence over the pending
legislative measures on the committee.
Section 12. Appeal. The decision of the
Commission on the findings of the sufficiency
or insufficiency of the petition for initiative or
referendum may be appealed to the Supreme
Court within thirty (30) days from notice
thereof.
III. Local Initiative and Referendum
SECTION 13. Procedure in Local Initiative.
(a) Not less than two thousand (2,000)
registered voters in case of autonomous
regions, one thousand (1,000) in case of
provinces and cities, one hundred (100) in
case of municipalities, and fifty (50) in case of
barangays, may file a petition with the
Regional Assembly or local legislative body,
respectively,
proposing
the
adoption,
enactment, repeal, or amendment, of any law,
ordinance or resolution.
(b) If no favorable action thereon is made by
local legislative body within (30) days from its
presentation, the proponents through their
duly authorized and registered representative
may invoke their power of initiative, giving
notice thereof to the local legislative body
concerned.
(c) The proposition shall be numbered serially
starting from one (1). The Secretary of Local
Government or his designated representative
shall extend assistance in the formulation of
the proposition.
(d) Two or more propositions may be submitted
in an initiative.

Section 11. Indirect Initiative. Any duly

accredited people's organization, as defined by

(e) Proponents shall have one hundred twenty

(120) days in case of autonomous regions,
ninety (90) days in case of provinces and
cities, sixty (60) days in case of municipalities,
and thirty (30) days in case of barangays, from

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28

CASE DIGEST IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I (Based on Atty. Gabriels Syllabus)

notice mentioned in subsection (b) hereof to
collect the required number of signatures.
(f) The petition shall be signed before the
Election
Registrar,
or
his
designated
representative, in the presence of a
representative of the proponent, and a
representative of the regional assemblies and
local legislative bodies concerned in a public
place in the autonomous region or local
government unit, as the case may be.
Signature stations may be established in as
many places as may be warranted.
(g) Upon the lapse of the period herein
provided, the Commission on Elections,
through its office in the local government unit
concerned shall certify as to whether or not
the required number of signatures has been
obtained. Failure to obtain the required
number is a defeat of the proposition.
(h) If the required number of the signatures is
obtained, the Commission shall then set a date
for the initiative at which the proposition shall
be submitted to the registered voters in the
local government unit concerned for their
approval within ninety (90) days from the date
of certification by the Commission, as provided
in subsection (g) hereof, in case of
autonomous regions, sixty (60) days in case of
the provinces and cities, forty-five (45) days in
case of municipalities, and thirty (30) days in
case of barangays. The initiative shall then be
held on the date set, after which the results
thereof shall be certified and proclaimed by
the Commission on Elections.
Section
14.
Effectivity
of
Local
Propositions. If the proposition is approved
by a majority of the votes cast, it shall take
effect fifteen (15) days after certification by
the Commission as if affirmative action
thereon had been made by the local legislative
body and local executive concerned. If it fails
to obtain said number of votes, the proposition
is considered defeated.
Section
15.
Limitations
on
Local
Initiatives. (a) The power of local initiative
shall not be exercised more than once a year.
(b) Initiative shall extend only to subjects or
matters which are within the legal powers of
the local legislative bodies to enact.

(c) If at any time before the initiative is held,

the local legislative body shall adopt in toto
the proposition presented, the initiative shall
be cancelled. However, those against such
action may, if they so desire, apply for
initiative in the manner herein provided.
Section 16. Limitations Upon Local
Legislative Bodies. Any proposition or
ordinance or resolution approved through the
system of initiative and referendum as herein
provided shall not be repealed, modified or
amended, by the local legislative body
concerned within six (6) months from the date
therefrom, and may be amended, modified or
repealed by the local legislative body within
three (3) years thereafter by a vote of threefourths (3/4) of all its members: Provided,
however, that in case of barangays, the period
shall be one (1) year after the expiration of the
first six (6) months.
Section
17.
Local
Referendum.

Notwithstanding the provisions of Section 4

hereof, any local legislative body may submit
to the registered voters of autonomous region,
provinces, cities, municipalities and barangays
for the approval or rejection, any ordinance or
resolution duly enacted or approved.
Said referendum shall be held under the
control and direction of the Commission within
sixty (60) days in case of provinces and cities,
forty-five (45) days in case of municipalities
and thirty (30) days in case of barangays.
The Commission shall certify and proclaim the
results of the said referendum.
Section 18. Authority of Courts. Nothing
in this Act shall prevent or preclude the proper
courts from declaring null and void any
proposition approved pursuant to this Act for
violation of the Constitution or want of
capacity of the local legislative body to enact
the said measure.
IV. Final Provisions
SECTION 19. Applicability of the Omnibus
Election Code. The Omnibus Election Code
and other election laws, not inconsistent with
the provisions of this Act, shall apply to all
initiatives and referenda.
Section 20. Rules and Regulations. The
Commission
is
hereby
empowered
to

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29

CASE DIGEST IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I (Based on Atty. Gabriels Syllabus)

promulgate such rules and regulations as may
be necessary to carry out the purposes of this
Act.
Section 21. Appropriations. The amount
necessary to defray the cost of the initial
implementation of this Act shall be charged
against the Contingent Fund in the General
Appropriations Act of the current year.
Thereafter, such sums as may be necessary
for the full implementation of this Act shall be
included in the annual General Appropriations
Act.
Section 22. Separability Clause. If any
part or provision of this Act is held invalid or
unconstitutional, the other parts or provisions
thereof shall remain valid and effective.
Section 23. Effectivity. This Act shall take
effect fifteen (15) days after its publication in a
newspaper of general circulation.
Approved: August 4, 1989
SECTION 5
ROBERT V. TOBIAS, RAMON M. GUZMAN,
TERRY T. LIM, GREGORIO D. GABRIEL, and
ROBERTO R. TOBIAS, JR. vs. HON. CITY
MAYOR BENJAMIN S. ABALOS, CITY
TREASURER WILLIAM MARCELINO, and
THE SANGGUNIANG PANLUNGSOD, all of
the City of Mandaluyong, Metro Manila
G.R. No. L-114783 December 8, 1994
J. BIDIN
FACTS: Prior to the enactment of the assailed
statute (RA 7675), the municipalities of
Mandaluyong and San Juan belonged to only
one legislative district. Hon. Ronaldo Zamora,
the incumbent congressional representative of
this legislative district, sponsored the bill
which eventually became R.A. No. 7675.
President Ramos signed R.A. No. 7675 into law
on February 9, 1994.
Pursuant to the Local Government Code
of 1991, a plebiscite was held on April 10,
1994. The people of Mandaluyong were asked
whether they approved of the conversion of
the Municipality of Mandaluyong into a highly
urbanized city as provided under R.A. No.
7675. The turnout at the plebiscite was only
14.41% of the voting population. Nevertheless,
18,621 voted "yes" whereas 7,911 voted "no."
By virtue of these results, R.A. No. 7675 was
deemed ratified and in effect.

Abad, Pascasio, Perez & Saludes (2013)

The pertinent provision assailed is the

following
Article VIII, Section 49 of R.A. No. 7675
provides: As a highly-urbanized city, the City of
Mandaluyong shall have its own legislative
district with the first representative to be
elected in the next national elections after the
passage of this Act. The remainder of the
former
legislative
district
of
San
Juan/Mandaluyong shall become the new
legislative district of San Juan with its first
representative to be elected at the same
election.
ISSUE/S: Whether or not Republic Act No.
7675, otherwise known as "An Act Converting
the Municipality of Mandaluyong into a Highly
Urbanized City to be known as the City of
Mandaluyong" is unconstitutional for being
violative of three specific provisions of the
Constitution
HELD: Whether it contravenes the "one
subject-one bill" rule, as enunciated in Article
VI, Section 26(1) of the Constitution
NO. The SC agrees with the observation
of the Solicitor General that the statutory
conversion of Mandaluyong into a highly
urbanized city with a population of not less
than two hundred fifty thousand indubitably
ordains compliance with the "one city-one
representative" proviso in the Constitution:
. . . Each city with a population of at
least two hundred fifty thousand, or each
province,
shall
have
at
least
one
representative" (Article VI, Section 5(3),
Constitution).
Hence, it is in compliance with the
aforestated constitutional mandate that the
creation of a separate congressional district for
the City of Mandaluyong is decreed under
Article VIII, Section 49 of R.A. No. 7675.
Contrary to petitioners' assertion, the
creation of a separate congressional district for
Mandaluyong is not a subject separate and
distinct from the subject of its conversion into
a highly urbanized city but is a natural and
logical consequence of its conversion into a
highly urbanized city. Verily, the title of R.A.
No. 7675, "An Act Converting the Municipality
of Mandaluyong Into a Highly Urbanized City of
Mandaluyong"
necessarily
includes
and
contemplates the subject treated under
Section 49 regarding the creation of a separate
congressional district for Mandaluyong.
Moreover, a liberal construction of the
"one title-one subject" rule has been invariably
adopted by this court so as not to cripple or

30

CASE DIGEST IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I (Based on Atty. Gabriels Syllabus)

impede legislation. Thus, in Sumulong v.
Comelec (73 Phil. 288 [1941]), we ruled that
the constitutional
requirement as now
expressed in Article VI, Section 26(1) "should
be given a practical rather than a technical
construction. It should be sufficient compliance
with such requirement if the title expresses the
general subject and all the provisions are
germane to that general subject."
The liberal construction of the "one
title-one subject" rule had been further
elucidated in Lidasan v. Comelec (21 SCRA 496
[1967]), to wit:
Of course, the Constitution does not
require Congress to employ in the title of an
enactment, language of such precision as to
mirror, fully index or catalogue all the contents
and the minute details therein. It suffices if the
title should serve the purpose of the
constitutional demand that it inform the
legislators, the persons interested in the
subject of the bill and the public, of the nature,
scope and consequences of the proposed law
and its operation" (emphasis supplied).

Congress itself so mandates through a

legislative enactment. Therefore, the increase
in congressional representation mandated by
R.A. No. 7675 is not unconstitutional.
Thus, in the absence of proof that
Mandaluyong and San Juan do not qualify to
have separate legislative districts, the assailed
Section 49 of R.A.
No. 7675 must be allowed to stand.

Whether it violates Article VI, Sections

5(1) and (4) of the Constitution
NO. Proceeding now to the other
constitutional issues raised by petitioners to
the effect that there is no mention in the
assailed law of any census to show that
Mandaluyong and San Juan had each attained
the
minimum
requirement
of
250,000
inhabitants to justify their separation into two
legislative districts, the same does not suffice
to strike down the validity of R.A. No. 7675.
The said Act enjoys the presumption of having
passed through the regular congressional
processes, including due consideration by the
members of Congress of the minimum
requirements
for the
establishment
of
separate legislative districts. At any rate, it is
not required that all laws emanating from the
legislature must contain all relevant data
considered by Congress in the enactment of
said laws.
As to the contention that the assailed
law violates the present limit on the number of
representatives as set forth in the Constitution,
a reading of the applicable provision, Article VI,
Section 5(1), as aforequoted, shows that the
present limit of 250 members is not absolute.
The Constitution clearly provides that the
House of Representatives shall be composed
of not more than 250 members, "unless
otherwise provided by law." The inescapable
import of the latter clause is that the present
composition of Congress may be increased, if

Whether Section 49 of RA 76756

preempts the power of Congress to
reapportion legislative districts
As to the contention that Section 49 of
R.A. No. 7675 in effect preempts the right of
Congress to reapportion legislative districts,
the said argument borders on the absurd since
petitioners overlook the glaring fact that it was
Congress itself which drafted, deliberated upon
and enacted the assailed law, including
Section 49 thereof. Congress cannot possibly
preempt itself on a right which pertains to
itself.
As to the contention that Section 49 of
R.A. No. 7675 in effect preempts the right of
Congress to reapportion legislative districts,
the said argument borders on the absurd since
petitioners overlook the glaring fact that it was
Congress itself which drafted, deliberated upon
and enacted the assailed law, including
Section 49 thereof. Congress cannot possibly
preempt itself on a right which pertains to
itself.
Aside from the constitutional objections
to R.A. No. 7675, petitioners present further
arguments against the validity thereof.
Petitioners contend that the people of
San Juan should have been made to
participate in the plebiscite on R.A. No. 7675
as the same involved a change in their
legislative district. The contention is bereft of
merit since the principal subject involved in
the plebiscite was the conversion of
Mandaluyong into a highly urbanized city. The
matter of separate district representation was
only ancillary thereto. Thus, the inhabitants of
San Juan were properly excluded from the said
plebiscite as they had nothing to do with the
change of status of neighboring Mandaluyong.
Similarly,
petitioners'
additional
argument that the subject law has resulted in
"gerrymandering," which is the practice of
creating legislative districts to favor a
particular candidate or party, is not worthy of
credence. As correctly observed by the
Solicitor General, it should be noted that Rep.
Ronaldo Zamora, the author of the assailed
law, is the incumbent representative of the

Abad, Pascasio, Perez & Saludes (2013)

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CASE DIGEST IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I (Based on Atty. Gabriels Syllabus)

former San Juan/Mandaluyong district, having
consistently won in both localities. By dividing
San
Juan/Mandaluyong,
Rep.
Zamora's
constituency has in fact been diminished,
which development could hardly be considered
as favorable to him.
JUANITO MARIANO, JR. et al., vs. THE
COMMISSION
ON
ELECTIONS,
THE
MUNICIPALITY OF MAKATI, HON. JEJOMAR
BINAY, THE MUNICIPAL TREASURER, AND
SANGGUNIANG BAYAN OF MAKATI
G.R. No. 118577 & 118627March 7, 1995
PUNO, J.:

ISSUE/S: Whether or not R.A. No. 7854 is

entitled, "An Act Converting the Municipality of
Makati Into a Highly Urbanized City to be
known as the City of Makati"
is
unconstitutional
HELD: NO. RA 7854 is valid and constitutional

FACTS: In G.R. No. 118577, a petition for

prohibition and declaratory relief was filed by
petitioners Juanito Mariano, Jr., Ligaya S.
Bautista, Teresita Tibay, Camilo Santos, Frankie
Cruz, Ricardo Pascual, Teresita Abang,
Valentina Pitalvero, Rufino Caldoza, Florante
Alba, and Perfecto Alba. Of the petitioners,
only Mariano, Jr., is a resident of Makati. The
others are residents of Ibayo Ususan, Taguig,
Metro Manila. Suing as taxpayers, they assail
as unconstitutional sections 2, 51, and 52 of
R.A. No. 7854 on the following grounds:
1. Section 2 of R.A. No. 7854 did not
properly identify the land area or territorial
jurisdiction of Makati by metes and bounds,
with technical descriptions, in violation of
Section 10, Article X of the Constitution, in
relation to Sections 7 and 450 of the Local
Government Code;
2. Section 51 of R.A. No. 7854 attempts
to alter or restart the "three consecutive term"
limit for local elective officials, in violation of
Section 8, Article X and Section 7, Article VI of
the Constitution.
3. Section 52 of R.A. No. 7854 is
unconstitutional for:
(a) it increased the legislative district of
Makati only by special law (the Charter in
violation of the constitutional provision
requiring a general reapportionment law to be
passed by Congress within three (3) years
following the return of every census;
(b) the increase in legislative district
was not expressed in the title of the bill; and
(c) the addition of another legislative
district in Makati is not in accord with Section 5
(3), Article VI of the Constitution for as of the
latest survey (1990 census), the population of
Makati stands at only 450,000.
G.R. No. 118627 was filed by the
petitioner John H. Osmea as senator,
taxpayer, and concerned citizen on the same
grounds.

Whether RA 7854 violates sections 7 and

450 of the Local Government Code which
require that the area of a local
government unit should be made by
metes
and
bounds
with
technical
descriptions
NO. Section 2, Article I of R.A. No. 7854
delineated the land areas of the proposed city
of Makati, thus:
Sec. 2. The City of Makati.
The Municipality of Makati shall
be converted into a highly
urbanized city to be known as
the City of Makati, hereinafter
referred to as the City, which
shall comprise the present
territory of the Municipality of
Makati in Metropolitan Manila
Area
over
which
it
has
jurisdiction bounded on the
northeast by Pasig River and
beyond
by
the
City
of
Mandaluyong
and
the
Municipality of Pasig; on the
southeast by the municipalities
of Pateros and Taguig; on the
southwest by the City of Pasay
and the Municipality of Taguig;
and, on the northwest, by the
City of Manila.
The foregoing provision shall be without
prejudice to the resolution by the appropriate
agency or forum of existing boundary disputes
or cases involving questions of territorial
jurisdiction between the City of Makati and the
adjoining local government units. (Emphasis
supplied)
The importance of drawing with precise
strokes the territorial boundaries of a local unit
of government cannot be overemphasized. The
boundaries must be clear for they define the
limits of the territorial jurisdiction of a local
government unit. It can legitimately exercise
powers of government only within the limits,
its acts are ultra vires. Needless to state, any
uncertainty in the boundaries of local
government units will sow costly conflicts in
the exercise of governmental powers which
ultimately will prejudice the people's welfare.

Abad, Pascasio, Perez & Saludes (2013)

32

CASE DIGEST IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I (Based on Atty. Gabriels Syllabus)

This is the evil sought to avoided by the Local
Government Code in requiring that the land
area of a local government unit must be
spelled out in metes and bounds, with
technical descriptions.
Given the facts of the cases at bench,
we cannot perceive how this evil can be
brought about by the description made in
section 2 of R.A. No. 7854, Petitioners have not
demonstrated that the delineation of the land
area of the proposed City of Makati will cause
confusion as to its boundaries. We note that
said delineation did not change even by an
inch the land area previously covered by
Makati as a municipality. Section 2 did not add,
subtract, divide, or multiply the established
land area of Makati. In language that cannot
be any clearer, section 2 stated that, the city's
land area "shall comprise the present territory
of the municipality."
The deliberations of Congress will
reveal that there is a legitimate reason why
the land area of the proposed City of Makati
was not defined by metes and bounds, with
technical descriptions. At the time of the
consideration of R.A. No. 7854, the territorial
dispute between the municipalities of Makati
and Taguig over Fort Bonifacio was under court
litigation. Out of a becoming sense of respect
to co-equal department of government,
legislators felt that the dispute should be left
to the courts to decide. They did not want to
foreclose the dispute by making a legislative
finding of fact which could decide the issue.
This would have ensued if they defined the
land area of the proposed city by its exact
metes and bounds, with technical descriptions.
3 We take judicial notice of the fact that
Congress has also refrained from using the
metes and bounds description of land areas of
other local government units with unsettled
boundary disputes.
We hold that the existence of a
boundary dispute does not per se present an
insurmountable difficulty which will prevent
Congress from defining with reasonable
certitude the territorial jurisdiction of a local
government unit. In the cases at bench,
Congress maintained the existing boundaries
of the proposed City of Makati but as an act of
fairness, made them subject to the ultimate
resolution by the courts. Considering these
peculiar circumstances, we are not prepared to
hold that section 2 of R.A. No. 7854 is
unconstitutional. We sustain the submission of
the Solicitor General in this regard, viz.:
Going now to Sections 7 and 450 of the
Local Government Code, it is beyond cavil that

the requirement stated therein, viz.: "the

territorial jurisdiction of newly created or
converted cities should be described by meted
and bounds, with technical descriptions"
was made in order to provide a means by
which the area of said cities may be
reasonably ascertained. In other words, the
requirement on metes and bounds was meant
merely as tool in the establishment of local
government units. It is not an end in itself.
Ergo, so long as the territorial jurisdiction of a
city may be reasonably ascertained, i.e., by
referring
to
common
boundaries
with
neighboring municipalities, as in this case,
then, it may be concluded that the legislative
intent behind the law has been sufficiently
served.
Certainly, Congress did not intends that
laws creating new cities must contain therein
detailed technical descriptions similar to those
appearing in Torrens titles, as petitioners seem
to imply. To require such description in the law
as a condition sine qua non for its validity
would be to defeat the very purpose which the
Local Government Code to seeks to serve. The
manifest intent of the Code is to empower
local government units and to give them their
rightful due. It seeks to make local
governments more responsive to the needs of
their constituents while at the same time
serving as a vital cog in national development.
To invalidate R.A. No. 7854 on the mere ground
that no cadastral type of description was used
in the law would serve the letter but defeat the
spirit of the Code. It then becomes a case of
the master serving the slave, instead of the
other way around. This could not be the
intendment of the law.
Too well settled is the rule that laws
must be enforced when ascertained, although
it may not be consistent with the strict letter of
the statute. Courts will not follow the letter of
the statute when to do so would depart from
the true intent of the legislature or would
otherwise yield conclusions inconsistent with
the general purpose of the act. (Torres v.
Limjap, 56 Phil., 141; Taada v. Cuenco, 103
Phil. 1051; Hidalgo v. Hidalgo, 33 SCRA 1105).
Legislation is an active instrument of
government,
which,
for
purposes
of
interpretation, means that laws have ends to
achieve, and statutes should be so construed
as not to defeat but to carry out such ends and
purposes (Bocolbo v. Estanislao, 72 SCRA 520).
The same rule must indubitably apply to the
case at bar.

Abad, Pascasio, Perez & Saludes (2013)

33

CASE DIGEST IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I (Based on Atty. Gabriels Syllabus)

Whether section 51, Article X of R.A. No.
7854 violates section 8, Article X and
section 7, Article VI of the Constitution?
NO.
Petitioners in G.R. No. 118577 also
assail the constitutionality of section 51,
Article X of R.A. No. 7854. Section 51 states:
Sec. 51. Officials of the City of Makati.
The represent elective officials of the
Municipality of Makati shall continue as the
officials of the City of Makati and shall exercise
their powers and functions until such time that
a new election is held and the duly elected
officials shall have already qualified and
assume their offices: Provided, The new city
will acquire a new corporate existence. The
appointive officials and employees of the City
shall likewise continues exercising their
functions and duties and they shall be
automatically
absorbed
by
the
city
government of the City of Makati.
They contend that this section collides
with section 8, Article X and section 7, Article
VI of the Constitution which provide:
Sec. 8. The term of office of elective
local officials, except barangay officials, which
shall be determined by law, shall be three
years and no such official shall serve for more
than three consecutive terms. Voluntary
renunciation of the office for any length of
time shall not be considered as an interruption
in the continuity of his service for the full term
for which he was elected.
xxx xxx xxx
Sec. 7. The Members of the House of
Representatives shall be elected for a term of
three years which shall begin, unless otherwise
provided by law, at noon on the thirtieth day of
June next following their election.
No
Member
of
the
House
of
Representatives shall serve for more than
three
consecutive
terms.
Voluntary
renunciation of the office for any length of
time shall not be considered as an interruption
in the continuity of his service for the full term
for which he was elected.
Petitioners stress that under these
provisions, elective local officials, including
Members of the House of Representative, have
a term of three (3) years and are prohibited
from serving for more than three (3)
consecutive terms. They argue that by
providing that the new city shall acquire a new
corporate existence, section 51 of R.A. No.
7854 restarts the term of the present
municipal elective officials of Makati and
disregards the terms previously served by
them. In particular, petitioners point that

section 51 favors the incumbent Makati Mayor,

respondent Jejomar Binay, who has already
served for two (2) consecutive terms. They
further argue that should Mayor Binay decide
to run and eventually win as city mayor in the
coming elections, he can still run for the same
position in 1998 and seek another three-year
consecutive term since his previous three-year
consecutive term as municipal mayor would
not be counted. Thus, petitioners conclude
that said section 51 has been conveniently
crafted to suit the political ambitions of
respondent Mayor Binay.
We cannot entertain this challenge to
the constitutionality of section 51. The
requirements before a litigant can challenge
the constitutionality of a law are well
delineated. They are: 1) there must be an
actual case or controversy; (2) the question of
constitutionality must be raised by the proper
party; (3) the constitutional question must be
raised at the earliest possible opportunity; and
(4) the decision on the constitutional question
must be necessary to the determination of the
case itself. 5
Petitioners have far from complied with
these requirements. The petition is premised
on the occurrence of many contingent events,
i.e., that Mayor Binay will run again in this
coming mayoralty elections; that he would be
re-elected in said elections; and that he would
seek re-election for the same position in the
1998 elections. Considering that these
contingencies may or may not happen,
petitioners merely pose a hypothetical issue
which has yet to ripen to an actual case or
controversy. Petitioners who are residents of
Taguig (except Mariano) are not also the
proper parties to raise this abstract issue.
Worse, they hoist this futuristic issue in a
petition for declaratory relief over which this
Court has no jurisdiction.

Abad, Pascasio, Perez & Saludes (2013)

34

Whether section 52, Article X of R.A. No.

7854 which provides for the addition of
another
legislative
district
is
unconstitutional for: (1) reapportionment
cannot made by a special law, (2) the
addition of a legislative district is not
expressed in the title of the bill and (3)
Makati's population, as per the 1990
census, stands at only four hundred fifty
thousand (450,000).
NO. These issues have been laid to rest
in the recent case of Tobias v. Abalos. 8 In said
case, we ruled that reapportionment of
legislative districts may be made through a
special law, such as in the charter of a new

CASE DIGEST IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I (Based on Atty. Gabriels Syllabus)

city. The Constitution 9 clearly provides that
Congress shall be composed of not more than
two hundred fifty (250) members, unless
otherwise fixed by law. As thus worded, the
Constitution did not preclude Congress from
increasing its membership by passing a law,
other than a general reapportionment of the
law. This is its exactly what was done by
Congress in enacting R.A. No. 7854 and
providing for an increase in Makati's legislative
district.
Moreover,
to
hold
that
reapportionment can only be made through a
general apportionment law, with a review of all
the legislative districts allotted to each local
government unit nationwide, would create an
inequitable situation where a new city or
province created by Congress will be denied
legislative representation for an indeterminate
period of time. 10 The intolerable situations
will deprive the people of a new city or
province a particle of their sovereignty. 11
Sovereignty cannot admit of any kind of
subtraction. It is indivisible. It must be forever
whole or it is not sovereignty.
Petitioners cannot insist that the
addition of another legislative district in Makati
is not in accord with section 5(3), Article VI 12
of the Constitution for as of the latest survey
(1990 census), the population of Makati stands
at only four hundred fifty thousand (450,000).
13 Said section provides, inter alia, that a city
with a population of at least two hundred fifty
thousand (250,000) shall have at least one
representative. Even granting that the
population of Makati as of the 1990 census
stood at four hundred fifty thousand (450,000),
its legislative district may still be increased
since it has met the minimum population
requirement of two hundred fifty thousand
(250,000). In fact, section 3 of the Ordinance
appended to the Constitution provides that a
city whose population has increased to more
than two hundred fifty thousand (250,000)
shall be entitled to at least one congressional
representative. 14
Finally, we do not find merit in petitioners'
contention that the creation of an additional
legislative district in Makati should have been
expressly stated in the title of the bill. In the
same case of Tobias v. Abalos, op cit., we
reiterated the policy of the Court favoring a
liberal construction of the "one title-one
subject" rule so as not to impede legislation. To
be sure, with Constitution does not command
that the title of a law should exactly mirror,
fully index, or completely catalogue all its
details. Hence, we ruled that "it should be
sufficient compliance if the title expresses the

general subject and all the provisions are

germane to such general subject."

Abad, Pascasio, Perez & Saludes (2013)

35

CIRILO ROY G. MONTEJO, vs. COMMISSION

ON ELECTIONS,
SERGIO A.F. APOSTOL, intervenor.
G.R. No. 118702 March 16, 1995
PUNO, J.:
FACTS: Petitioner Cirilo Roy G. Montejo,
representing the First District of Leyte, pleads
for the annulment of section 1 of Resolution
No. 2736 of the COMELEC, redistricting certain
municipalities in Leyte, on the ground that it
violates
the
principle
of
equality
of
representation.
To remedy the alleged inequity,
petitioner seeks to transfer the municipality of
Tolosa from his district to the Second District of
the province. Intervenor Sergio A.F. Apostol,
representing the Second District, vigorously
opposed the inclusion of Tolosa in his district.
On January 1, 1992, the Local Government
Code took effect. Pursuant to its Section 462,
the sub-province of Biliran became a regular
province. The conversion of Biliran into a
regular province was approved by a majority of
the votes cast in a plebiscite held on May 11,
1992. As a consequence of the conversion,
eight (8) municipalities of the Third District
composed the new province of Biliran, i.e.,
Almeria, Biliran, Cabucgayan, Caibiran, Culaba,
Kawayan, Maripipi, and Naval. A further
consequence was to reduce the Third District
to five (5) municipalities with a total
population of 145,067 as per the 1990 census.
To remedy the resulting inequality in the
distribution
of
inhabitants,
voters
and
municipalities in the province of Leyte,
respondent
COMELEC
held
consultation
meetings with the incumbent representatives
of the province and other interested parties.
On December 29, 1994, it promulgated
Resolution No. 2736 where, among others, it
transferred the municipality of Capoocan of
the Second District and the municipality of
Palompon of the Fourth District to the Third
District of Leyte. The composition of the First
District which includes the municipality of
Tolosa and the composition of the Fifth District
were not disturbed. Petitioner Montejo filed a
motion for reconsideration calling the attention
of respondent COMELEC, among others, to the
inequitable distribution of inhabitants and
voters between the First and Second Districts.
He alleged that the First District has 178,688
registered voters while the Second District has
156,462 registered voters or a difference of

CASE DIGEST IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I (Based on Atty. Gabriels Syllabus)

22,226 registered voters. To diminish the
difference, he proposed that the municipality
of Tolosa with 7,7000 registered voters be
transferred from the First to the Second
District. The motion was opposed by
intervenor, Sergio A.F. Apostol. Respondent
Commission denied the motion ruling that: (1)
its adjustment of municipalities involved the
least disruption of the territorial composition of
each district; and (2) said adjustment complied
with the constitutional requirement that each
legislative district shall comprise, as far as
practicable, contiguous, compact and adjacent
territory.
In this petition, petitioner insists that
Section I of Resolution No. 2736 violates the
principle of equality of representation ordained
in the Constitution. Citing Wesberry v.
Sanders, he argues that respondent COMELEC
violated "the constitutional precept that as
much as practicable one man's vote in a
congressional election is to be worth as much
as another's."

HELD: YES. Section I of Resolution No. 2736 is

void.
1. Whether the exercise by the COMELEC
of the legislative power of redistricting
and reapportionment is valid.
NO. The basic powers of respondent
COMELEC, as enforcer and administrator of our
election laws, are spelled out in black and
white in section 2(c), Article IX of the
Constitution. Rightly, respondent COMELEC
does not invoke this provision but relies on the
Ordinance appended to the 1987 Constitution
as the source of its power of redistricting
which is traditionally regarded as part of the
power to make laws. The Ordinance is entitled
"Apportioning the Seats of the House of
Representatives of the Congress of the
Philippines to the Different Legislative Districts
in Provinces and Cities and the Metropolitan
Manila Area." Its substantive sections state:
Sec. 1. For purposes of the election of
Members of the House of Representatives of
the First Congress of the Philippines under the
Constitution
proposed
by
the
1986
Constitutional Commission and subsequent
elections, and until otherwise provided by law,
the Members thereof shall be elected from
legislative districts apportioned among the

provinces, cities, and the Metropolitan Manila

Area as follows:
xxx xxx xxx
Sec. 2. The Commission on Elections is
hereby
empowered
to
make
minor
adjustments of the reapportionment herein
made.
Sec. 3. Any province that may hereafter
be created, or any city whose population may
hereafter increase to more than two hundred
fifty thousand shall be entitled in the
immediately following election to at least one
Member or such number of Members as it may
be entitled to on the basis of the number of its
inhabitants and according to the standards set
forth in paragraph (3), Section 5 of Article VI of
the Constitution. The number of Members
apportioned to the province out of which such
new province was created or where the city,
whose population has so increased, is
geographically
located
shall
be
correspondingly adjusted by the Commission
on Elections but such adjustment shall not be
made within one hundred and twenty days
before the election. (Emphasis supplied)
The Ordinance was made necessary
because Proclamation No. 3 of President
Corazon C. Aquino, ordaining the Provisional
Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines,
abolished the Batasang Pambansa. She then
exercised legislative powers under the
Provisional Constitution.
The Ordinance was the principal
handiwork of then Commissioner Hilario G.
Davide, Jr., 13 now a distinguished member of
this Court. The records reveal that the
Constitutional Commission had to resolve
several prejudicial issues before authorizing
the first congressional elections under the
1987 Constitution. Among the vital issues
were: whether the members of the House of
Representatives would be elected by district or
by province; who shall undertake the
apportionment of the legislative districts; and,
how the apportionment should be made. 14
Commissioner Davide, Jr. offered three (3)
options for the Commission to consider: (1)
allow
President
Aquino
to
do
the
apportionment by law; (2) empower the
COMELEC to make the apportionment; or (3)
let the Commission exercise the power by way
of an Ordinance appended to the Constitution.
Clearly
then,
the
Constitutional
Commission denied to the COMELEC the major
power of legislative apportionment as it itself
exercised the power. Section 2 of the
Ordinance only empowered the COMELEC "to

Abad, Pascasio, Perez & Saludes (2013)

36

ISSUE/S: Whether or not Section I of

Resolution No. 2736 violates the principle of
equality of representation ordained in the
Constitution.

CASE DIGEST IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I (Based on Atty. Gabriels Syllabus)

make
minor
adjustments
of
the
reapportionment herein made."
Consistent with the limits of its power
to make minor adjustments, Section 3 of the
Ordinance did not also give the respondent
COMELEC
any
authority
to
transfer
municipalities from one legislative district to
another district. The power granted by Section
3 to the respondent COMELEC is to adjust the
number of members (not municipalities)
"apportioned to the province out of which such
new province was created. . . ."
Prescinding from these premises, we
hold that respondent COMELEC committed
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of
jurisdiction when it promulgated section 1 of
its Resolution No. 2736 transferring the
municipality of Capoocan of the Second
District and the municipality of Palompon of
the Fourth District to the Third District of
Leyte.
It may well be that the conversion of
Biliran from a sub-province to a regular
province brought about an imbalance in the
distribution of voters and inhabitants in the
five (5) legislative districts of the province of
Leyte. This imbalance, depending on its
degree, could devalue a citizen's vote in
violation of the equal protection clause of the
Constitution. Be that as it may, it is not proper
at this time for petitioner to raise this issue
using the case at bench as his legal vehicle.
The
issue
involves
a
problem
of
reapportionment of legislative districts and
petitioner's remedy lies with Congress. Section
5(4), Article VI of the Constitution categorically
gives Congress the power to reapportion, thus:
"Within three (3) years following the return of
every census, the Congress shall make a
reapportionment of legislative districts based
on the standards provided in this section."
In Macias v. COMELEC, 18 we ruled that
the validity of a legislative apportionment is a
justiciable question. But while this Court can
strike
down
an
unconstitutional
reapportionment, it cannot itself make the
reapportionment as petitioner would want us
to do by directing respondent COMELEC to
transfer the municipality of Tolosa from the
First District to the Second District of the
province of Leyte.
Section 1 of Resolution No. 2736 insofar as it
transferred the municipality of Capoocan of
the Second District and the municipality of
Palompon of the Fourth District to the Third
District of the province of Leyte, is annulled
and set aside.

SENATOR BENIGNO SIMEON C. AQUINO III

and MAYOR JESSE ROBREDO
vs.
COMMISSIO N ON ELECTIONS represented
by its Chairman JOSE A.R. MELO and its
Commissioners, RENE V. SARMIENTO,
NICODEMO T. FERRER, LUCENITO N.
TAGLE, ARMANDO VELASCO, ELIAS R.
YUSOPH AND GREGORIO LARRAZABAL
G.R. No. 189793 April 7, 2010
PEREZ, J.

Abad, Pascasio, Perez & Saludes (2013)

37

FACTS: Petitioners Senator Benigno Simeon C.

Aquino III and Mayor Jesse Robredo, as public
officers, taxpayers and citizens, seek the
nullification as unconstitutional of Republic Act
No. 9716, entitled "An Act Reapportioning the
Composition of the First (1st) and Second (2nd)
Legislative Districts in the Province of
Camarines Sur and Thereby Creating a New
Legislative
District
From
Such
Reapportionment." Petitioners consequently
pray that the respondent Commission on
Elections be restrained from making any
issuances and from taking any steps relative to
the implementation of Republic Act No. 9716.
Prior to Republic Act No. 9716, the Province of
Camarines Sur was estimated to have a
population of 1,693,821,2 distributed among
four (4) legislative districts. Following the
enactment of Republic Act No. 9716, the first
and second districts of Camarines Sur were
reconfigured in order to create an additional
legislative district for the province. Hence, the
first district municipalities of Libmanan,
Minalabac, Pamplona, Pasacao, and San
Fernando were combined with the second
district municipalities of Milaor and Gainza to
form a new second legislative district.
Petitioner Aquino III was one of two
senators who voted against the approval of the
Bill by the Senate. His co-petitioner, Robredo,
is the Mayor of Naga City, which was a part of
the former second district from which the
municipalities of Gainza and Milaor were taken
for inclusion in the new second district. No
other local executive joined the two; neither
did the representatives of the former third and
fourth districts of the province.
Petitioners
contend
that
the
reapportionment introduced by Republic Act
No. 9716, runs afoul of the explicit
constitutional standard that requires a
minimum population of two hundred fifty
thousand (250,000) for the creation of a
legislative district.5 The petitioners claim that
the reconfiguration by Republic Act No. 9716
of the first and second districts of Camarines
Sur is unconstitutional, because the proposed

CASE DIGEST IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I (Based on Atty. Gabriels Syllabus)

first district will end up with a population of
less than 250,000 or only 176,383.
ISSUE/S: Whether or not a population of
250,000 is an indispensable constitutional
requirement for the creation of a new
legislative district in a province.
HELD: NO. Any law duly enacted by Congress
carries
with
it
the
presumption
of
constitutionality.24 Before a law may be
declared unconstitutional by this Court, there
must be a clear showing that a specific
provision of the fundamental law has been
violated or transgressed. When there is neither
a violation of a specific provision of the
Constitution nor any proof showing that there
is such a violation, the presumption of
constitutionality will prevail and the law must
be upheld. To doubt is to sustain.25
There is no specific provision in the
Constitution that fixes a 250,000 minimum
population that must compose a legislative
district.
As already mentioned, the petitioners
rely on the second sentence of Section 5(3),
Article VI of the 1987 Constitution, coupled
with what they perceive to be the intent of the
framers of the Constitution to adopt a
minimum population of 250,000 for each
legislative district.
The second sentence of Section 5(3),
Article VI of the Constitution, succinctly
provides: "Each city with a population of at
least two hundred fifty thousand, or each
province,
shall
have
at
least
one
representative."
The provision draws a plain and clear
distinction between the entitlement of a city to
a district on one hand, and the entitlement of
a province to a district on the other. For while a
province
is
entitled
to
at
least
a
representative, with nothing mentioned about
population, a city must first meet a population
minimum of 250,000 in order to be similarly
entitled.
The use by the subject provision of a comma
to separate the phrase "each city with a
population of at least two hundred fifty
thousand" from the phrase "or each province"
point to no other conclusion than that the
250,000 minimum population is only required
for a city, but not for a province. 26
Plainly read, Section 5(3) of the Constitution
requires a 250,000 minimum population only
for a city to be entitled to a representative, but
not so for a province.

Abad, Pascasio, Perez & Saludes (2013)

The 250,000 minimum population

requirement for legislative districts in cities
was, in turn, the subject of interpretation by
this Court in Mariano, Jr. v. COMELEC.27
In Mariano, the issue presented was the
constitutionality of Republic Act No. 7854,
which was the law that converted the
Municipality of Makati into a Highly Urbanized
City. As it happened, Republic Act No. 7854
created an additional legislative district for
Makati, which at that time was a lone district.
The petitioners in that case argued that the
creation of an additional district would violate
Section 5(3), Article VI of the Constitution,
because the resulting districts would be
supported by a population of less than
250,000, considering that Makati had a total
population of only 450,000. The Supreme
Court sustained the constitutionality of the law
and the validity of the newly created district,
explaining the operation of the Constitutional
phrase "each city with a population of at least
two hundred fifty thousand," to wit:
Petitioners cannot insist that the
addition of another legislative district in Makati
is not in accord with section 5(3), Article VI of
the Constitution for as of the latest survey
(1990 census), the population of Makati stands
at only four hundred fifty thousand (450,000).
Said section provides, inter alia, that a city
with a population of at least two hundred fifty
thousand (250,000) shall have at least one
representative. Even granting that the
population of Makati as of the 1990 census
stood at four hundred fifty thousand (450,000),
its legislative district may still be increased
since it has met the minimum population
requirement of two hundred fifty thousand
(250,000). In fact, Section 3 of the Ordinance
appended to the Constitution provides that a
city whose population has increased to more
than two hundred fifty thousand (250,000)
shall be entitled to at least one congressional
representative.28 (Emphasis supplied)
The
Mariano
case
limited
the
application
of
the
250,000
minimum
population requirement for cities only to its
initial legislative district. In other words, while
Section 5(3), Article VI of the Constitution
requires a city to have a minimum population
of 250,000 to be entitled to a representative, it
does not have to increase its population by
another 250,000 to be entitled to an additional
district.
There is no reason why the Mariano
case, which involves the creation of an
additional district within a city, should not be
applied to additional districts in provinces.

38

CASE DIGEST IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I (Based on Atty. Gabriels Syllabus)

Indeed, if an additional legislative district
created within a city is not required to
represent a population of at least 250,000 in
order to be valid, neither should such be
needed for an additional district in a province,
considering moreover that a province is
entitled to an initial seat by the mere fact of its
creation and regardless of its population.
Apropos for discussion is the provision
of the Local Government Code on the creation
of a province which, by virtue of and upon
creation, is entitled to at least a legislative
district. Thus, Section 461 of the Local
Government Code states:
Requisites for Creation. (a) A province
may be created if it has an average annual
income, as certified by the Department of
Finance, of not less than Twenty million pesos
(P20,000,000.00) based on 1991 constant
prices and either of the following requisites:
(i)
a contiguous territory of at
least two thousand (2,000)
square kilometers, as certified
by the Lands Management
Bureau; or
(ii)
a population of not less than
two hundred fifty thousand
(250,000)
inhabitants
as
certified by the National
Statistics Office.
Notably, the requirement of population
is not an indispensable requirement, but is
merely an alternative addition to the
indispensable income requirement.
Mariano, it would turn out, is but a reflection of
the pertinent ideas that ran through the
deliberations on the words and meaning of
Section 5 of Article VI.
The whats, whys, and wherefores of the
population requirement of "at least two
hundred fifty thousand" may be gleaned from
the records of the Constitutional Commission
which, upon framing the provisions of Section
5 of Article VI, proceeded to form an ordinance
that would be appended to the final document.
The Ordinance is captioned "APPORTIONING
THE
SEATS
OF
THE
HOUSE
OF
REPRESENTATIVES OF THE CONGRESS OF THE
PHILIPPINES TO THE DIFFERENT LEGISLATIVE
DISTRICTS IN PROVINCES AND CITIES AND THE
METROPOLITAN MANILA AREA." Such records
would show that the 250,000 population
benchmark was used for the 1986 nationwide
apportionment of legislative districts among
provinces, cities and Metropolitan Manila.
Simply put, the population figure was used to
determine how many districts a province, city,
or Metropolitan Manila should have. Simply

discernible too is the fact that, for the purpose,

population had to be the determinant. Even
then, the requirement of 250,000 inhabitants
was not taken as an absolute minimum for one
legislative district. And, closer to the point
herein at issue, in the determination of the
precise district within the province to which,
through the use of the population benchmark,
so many districts have been apportioned,
population as a factor was not the sole, though
it was among, several determinants.
From its journal,29 we can see that the
Constitutional Commission originally divided
the entire country into two hundred (200)
districts, which corresponded to the original
number of district representatives. The 200
seats were distributed by the Constitutional
Commission in this manner: first, one (1) seat
each was given to the seventy-three (73)
provinces and the ten (10) cities with a
population of at least 250,000;30 second, the
remaining seats were then redistributed
among the provinces, cities and the
Metropolitan Area "in accordance with the
number of their inhabitants on the basis of a
uniform
and
progressive
ratio."31
Commissioner Davide, who later became a
Member and then Chief Justice of the Court,
explained this in his sponsorship remark32 for
the Ordinance to be appended to the 1987
Constitution:
Commissioner Davide: The ordinance
fixes at 200 the number of legislative seats
which are, in turn, apportioned among
provinces and cities with a population of at
least 250, 000 and the Metropolitan Area in
accordance with the number of their
respective inhabitants on the basis of a
uniform and progressive ratio. The population
is based on the 1986 projection, with the 1980
official enumeration as the point of reckoning.
This projection indicates that our population is
more or less 56 million. Taking into account the
mandate that each city with at least 250, 000
inhabitants and each province shall have at
least one representative, we first allotted one
seat for each of the 73 provinces, and each
one for all cities with a population of at least
250, 000, which are the Cities of Manila,
Quezon, Pasay, Caloocan, Cebu, Iloilo, Bacolod,
Cagayan de Oro, Davao and Zamboanga.
Thereafter, we then proceed[ed] to increase
whenever appropriate the number of seats for
the provinces and cities in accordance with the
number of their inhabitants on the basis of a
uniform and progressive ratio. (Emphasis
supplied).

Abad, Pascasio, Perez & Saludes (2013)

39

CASE DIGEST IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I (Based on Atty. Gabriels Syllabus)

Thus was the number of seats
computed for each province and city.
Differentiated from this, the determination of
the districts within the province had to
consider "all protests and complaints formally
received" which, the records show, dealt with
determinants other than population as already
mentioned.
VETERANS FEDERATION PARTY ET. AL., vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS ET AL.,
G.R. No. 136781 October 6, 2000
J. PANGANIBAN
FACTS: Our 1987 Constitution introduced the
party-list method of representation. Under this
system, any national, regional or sectoral party
or
organization
registered
with
the
Commission on Elections may participate in
the election of party-list representatives who,
upon their election and proclamation, shall sit
in the House of Representatives as regular
members. In effect, a voter is given two (2)
votes for the House -- one for a district
congressman and another for a party-list
representative.
Specifically,
this
system
of
representation is mandated by Section 5,
Article VI of the Constitution.
Complying with its constitutional duty to
provide by law the "selection or election" of
party-list representatives, Congress enacted
RA 7941 on March 3, 1995.
The requirements for entitlement to a
party-list seat in the House are prescribed by
this law (RA 7941) in this wise:
"Sec.
11.
Number
of
Party-List
Representatives.
-The
party-list
representatives shall constitute twenty per
centum (20%) of the total number of the
members of the House of Representatives
including those under the party-list.
For purposes of the May 1998 elections,
the first five (5) major political parties on the
basis of party representation in the House of
Representatives at the start of the Tenth
Congress of the Philippines shall not be
entitled to participate in the party-list system.
In determining the allocation of seats
for the second vote, the following procedure
shall be observed:
(a) The parties, organizations, and
coalitions shall be ranked from the highest to
the lowest based on the number of votes they
garnered during the elections.
(b) The parties, organizations, and
coalitions receiving at least two percent (2%)
of the total votes cast for the party-list system

Abad, Pascasio, Perez & Saludes (2013)

shall be entitled to one seat each; Provided,

That those garnering more than two percent
(2%) of the votes shall be entitled to additional
seats in proportion to their total number of
votes; Provided, finally, That each party,
organization, or coalition shall be entitled to
not more than three (3) seats.
Pursuant to Section 18 of RA 7941, the
Comelec en banc promulgated Resolution No.
2847, prescribing the rules and regulations
governing
the
election
of
party-list
representatives through the party-list system.
On May 11, 1998, the first election for
party-list
representation
was
held
simultaneously with the national elections. A
total of one hundred twenty-three (123)
parties,
organizations
and
coalitions
participated. On June 26, 1998, the Comelec
en banc proclaimed thirteen (13) party-list
representatives from twelve (12) parties and
organizations, which had obtained at least two
percent of the total number of votes cast for
the party-list system. Two of the proclaimed
representatives belonged to Petitioner APEC,
which obtained 5.5 percent of the votes. The
proclaimed winners and the votes cast in their
favor were as follows:
Party/Organi Number of
Percentage
zation/
Votes
Nominees
Total Votes
Coalition
Obtained
1. APEC

503,487

5.5%

Rene M. Silos
Melvyn
D.
Eballe

2. ABA

321,646

3.51%

Leonardo
Q.
Montemayor

3. ALAGAD

312,500

3.41%

Diogenes
Osabel

S.

4.VETERANS
FEDERATION 304,802

Eduardo
Pilapil

P.

3.33%

5. PROMDI

255,184

2.79%

Joy A.G. Young

6. AKO

239,042

2.61%

Ariel A. Zartiga

7. NCSCFO

238,303

2.60%

Gorgonio
Unde

P.

8. ABANSE! 235,548
PINAY

2.57%

Patricia
Sarenas

M.

9. AKBAYAN

232,376

2.54%

Loreta Ann
Rosales

P.

10. BUTIL

215,643

2.36%

Benjamin
Cruz

A.

11.
SANLAKAS

194,617

2.13%

Renato
Magtubo

B.

12.
COOP- 189,802
NATCCO

2.07%

Cresente
Paez

C.

40

CASE DIGEST IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I (Based on Atty. Gabriels Syllabus)

After passing upon the results of the
special elections held on July 4, 18, and 25,
1998, the Comelec en banc further determined
that COCOFED (Philippine Coconut Planters
Federation, Inc.) was entitled to one party-list
seat for having garnered 186,388 votes, which
were equivalent to 2.04 percent of the total
votes cast for the party-list system. Thus, its
first nominee, Emerito S. Calderon, was
proclaimed on September 8, 1998 as the 14th
party-list representative.
On July 6, 1998, PAG-ASA (Peoples
Progressive Alliance for Peace and Good
Government Towards Alleviation of Poverty and
Social Advancement) filed with the Comelec a
"Petition to Proclaim [the] Full Number of PartyList
Representatives
provided
by
the
Constitution." It alleged that the filling up of
the twenty percent membership of party-list
representatives
in
the
House
of
Representatives, as provided under the
Constitution, was mandatory. It further claimed
that the literal application of the two percent
vote requirement and the three-seat limit
under RA 7941 would defeat this constitutional
provision, for only 25 nominees would be
declared winners, short of the 52 party-list
representatives who should actually sit in the
House.
Thereafter,
nine
other
party-list
organizations filed their respective Motions for
Intervention, seeking the same relief as that
sought by PAG-ASA on substantially the same
grounds. Likewise, PAG-ASAs Petition was
joined by other party-list organizations in a
Manifestation they filed on August 28, 1998.
These organizations were COCOFED, Senior
Citizens, AKAP, AKSYON, PINATUBO, NUPA,
PRP, AMIN, PCCI, AMMA-KATIPUNAN, OCWUNIFIL, KAMPIL, MAHARLIKA, AFW, Women
Power, Inc., Ang Lakas OCW, FEJODAP, CUP,
Veterans Care, Bantay Bayan, 4L, AWATU, PMP,
ATUCP, ALU and BIGAS.
On October 15, 1998, the Comelec
Second Division promulgated the present
assailed
Resolution
granting
PAG-ASA's
Petition. It also ordered the proclamation of
herein 38 respondents who, in addition to the
14 already sitting, would thus total 52 partylist representatives. It held that "at all times,
the total number of congressional seats must
be filled up by eighty (80%) percent district
representatives and twenty (20%) percent
party-list representatives." In allocating the 52
seats, it disregarded the two percent-vote
requirement prescribed under Section 11 (b) of
RA 7941. Instead, it identified three "elements
of the party-list system," which should

supposedly determine "how the 52 seats

should be filled up."
The Comelec en banc resolved only the
issue concerning the apportionment or
allocation of the remaining seats. The poll
body held that to allocate the remaining seats
only to those who had hurdled the two percent
vote requirement "will mean the concentration
of representation of party, sectoral or group
interests in the House of Representatives to
thirteen
organizations
representing
two
political parties, three coalitions and four
sectors: urban poor, veterans, women and
peasantry x x x. Such strict application of the
2% 'threshold' does not serve the essence and
object of the Constitution and the legislature -to develop and guarantee a full, free and open
party system in order to attain the broadest
possible representation of party, sectoral or
group
interests
in
the
House
of
Representatives. Thus, in its Resolution dated
January 7, 1999, the Comelec en banc,
affirmed the Resolution of its Second Division.
Consequently, several petitions for certiorari,
prohibition and mandamus, with prayers for
the issuance of temporary restraining orders or
writs of preliminary injunction, were filed
before this Court by the parties and
organizations that had obtained at least two
per cent of the total votes cast for the partylist system.

Abad, Pascasio, Perez & Saludes (2013)

41

ISSUE/S:
1. Is the twenty percent allocation for party-list
representatives mentioned in Section 5 (2),
Article VI of the Constitution, mandatory or is it
merely a ceiling? In other words, should the
twenty percent allocation for party-list solons
be filled up completely and all the time?
2. Are the two percent threshold requirement
and the three-seat limit provided in Section 11
(b) of RA 7941 constitutional?
3. If the answer to Issue 2 is in the affirmative,
how should the additional seats of a qualified
party be determined?
HELD:
The 20% allocation is merely a ceiling.
The pertinent provision15 of the Constitution on
the
composition
of
the
House
of
Representatives reads as follows:
"Sec. 5. (1) The House of
Representatives
shall
be
composed of not more than two
hundred and fifty members,
unless otherwise fixed by law,
who shall be elected from
legislative districts apportioned

CASE DIGEST IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I (Based on Atty. Gabriels Syllabus)

among the provinces, cities, and
the Metropolitan Manila area in
accordance with the number of
their respective inhabitants, and
on the basis of a uniform and
progressive ratio, and those
who, as provided by law, shall
be elected by a party-list system
of registered national, regional,
and
sectoral
parties
or
organizations.
(2) The party-list representatives
shall constitute twenty per
centum of the total number of
representatives including those
under the party-list. For three
consecutive terms after the
ratification of this Constitution,
one half of the seats allocated to
party-list representatives shall
be filled, as provided by law, by
selection or election from the
labor, peasant, urban poor,
indigenous
cultural
communities, women, youth,
and such other sectors as may
be provided by law, except the
religious sector."
Determination of the Total Number of PartyList Lawmakers
Clearly, the Constitution makes the
number of district representatives the
determinant in arriving at the number of seats
allocated for party-list lawmakers, who shall
comprise "twenty per centum of the total
number of representatives including those
under the party-list." We thus translate this
legal provision into a mathematical formula, as
follows:
No.
of
district
x .20 = No. of
representatives
party-list
representatives
.80
This formulation means that any
increase
in
the
number
of
district
representatives, as may be provided by law,
will necessarily result in a corresponding
increase in the number of party-list seats. To
illustrate, considering that there were 208
district representatives to be elected during
the 1998 national elections, the number of
party-list seats would be 52, computed as
follows:
208
x .20 =
52
.80

The foregoing computation of seat

allocation is easy enough to comprehend. The
problematic question, however, is this:
Does the Constitution require all such
allocated seats to be filled up all the time and
under all circumstances? Our short answer is
"No."
Twenty Percent Allocation a Mere Ceiling
The Constitution simply states that
"[t]he
party-list
representatives
shall
constitute twenty per centum of the total
number of representatives including those
under the party-list."
According to petitioners, this percentage is a
ceiling; the mechanics by which it is to be
filled up has been left to Congress. In the
exercise of its prerogative, the legislature
enacted RA 7941, by which it prescribed that a
party, organization or coalition participating in
the party-list election must obtain at least two
percent of the total votes cast for the system
in order to qualify for a seat in the House of
Representatives.
Petitioners further argue that the
constitutional provision must be construed
together with this legislative requirement. If
there is no sufficient number of participating
parties, organizations or coalitions which could
hurdle the two percent vote threshold and
thereby fill up the twenty percent party-list
allocation in the House, then naturally such
allocation cannot be filled up completely. The
Comelec
cannot
be
faulted
for
the
"incompleteness," for ultimately the voters
themselves are the ones who, in the exercise
of their right of suffrage, determine who and
how many should represent them.
On the other hand, Public Respondent
Comelec, together with the respondent
parties, avers that the twenty percent
allocation
for
party-list
lawmakers
is
mandatory, and that the two percent vote
requirement in RA 7941 is unconstitutional,
because its strict application would make it
mathematically impossible to fill up the House
party-list complement.
We rule that a simple reading of Section
5, Article VI of the Constitution, easily conveys
the equally simple message that Congress was
vested with the broad power to define and
prescribe the mechanics of the party-list
system of representation. The Constitution
explicitly sets down only the percentage of the
total
membership
in
the
House
of
Representatives
reserved
for
party-list
representatives.
In the exercise of its constitutional
prerogative, Congress enacted RA 7941. As

Abad, Pascasio, Perez & Saludes (2013)

42

CASE DIGEST IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I (Based on Atty. Gabriels Syllabus)

said earlier, Congress declared therein a policy
to promote "proportional representation" in the
election of party-list representatives in order to
enable Filipinos belonging to the marginalized
and underrepresented sectors to contribute
legislation that would benefit them. It however
deemed it necessary to require parties,
organizations and coalitions participating in
the system to obtain at least two percent of
the total votes cast for the party-list system in
order to be entitled to a party-list seat. Those
garnering more than this percentage could
have "additional seats in proportion to their
total number of votes." Furthermore, no
winning party, organization or coalition can
have more than three seats in the House of
Representatives. Thus the relevant portion of
Section 11(b) of the law provides:
"(b) The parties, organizations, and
coalitions receiving at least two percent (2%)
of the total votes cast for the party-list system
shall be entitled to one seat each; Provided,
That those garnering more than two percent
(2%) of the votes shall be entitled to additional
seats in proportion to their total number of
votes; Provided, finally, That each party,
organization, or coalition shall be entitled to
not more than three (3) seats."
Considering the foregoing statutory
requirements, it will be shown presently that
Section 5 (2), Article VI of the Constitution is
not mandatory. It merely provides a ceiling for
party-list seats in Congress.
On the contention that a strict
application of the two percent threshold may
result in a "mathematical impossibility," suffice
it to say that the prerogative to determine
whether to adjust or change this percentage
requirement rests in Congress. Our task now,
as should have been the Comelecs, is not to
find fault in the wisdom of the law through
highly unlikely scenarios of clinical extremes,
but to craft an innovative mathematical
formula that can, as far as practicable,
implement it within the context of the actual
election process.

The two percent threshold is consistent

not only with the intent of the framers of the
Constitution and the law, but with the very
essence
of
"representation."
Under
a
republican
or
representative
state,
all
government authority emanates from the
people, but is exercised by representatives
chosen by them. But to have meaningful
representation, the elected persons must have
the mandate of a sufficient number of people.
Otherwise, in a legislature that features the
party-list system, the result might be the
proliferation of small groups which are
incapable
of
contributing
significant
legislation, and which might even pose a
threat to the stability of Congress. Thus, even
legislative districts are apportioned according
to "the number of their respective inhabitants,
and on the basis of a uniform and progressive
ratio"
to
ensure
meaningful
local
representation.
All in all, we hold that the statutory provision
on this two percent requirement is precise and
crystalline. When the law is clear, the function
of
courts
is
simple
application,
not
interpretation or circumvention.

The two percent threshold and three-seat

limit is valid
Second Issue: The Statutory Requirement
and Limitation
The Two Percent Threshold
In imposing a two percent threshold,
Congress wanted to ensure that only those
parties, organizations and coalitions having a
sufficient number of constituents deserving of
representation are actually represented in
Congress.

The Three-Seat-Per-Party Limit

An important consideration in adopting
the party-list system is to promote and
encourage
a
multiparty
system
of
representation. Again, we quote Commissioner
Monsod:
"MR. MONSOD. Madam President, I just
want to say that we suggested or proposed the
party list system because we wanted to open
up the political system to a pluralistic society
through a multiparty system. But we also
wanted to avoid the problems of mechanics
and operation in the implementation of a
concept that has very serious shortcomings of
classification and of double or triple votes. We
are for opening up the system, and we would
like very much for the sectors to be there. That
is why one of the ways to do that is to put a
ceiling on the number of representatives from
any single party that can sit within the 50
allocated under the party list system. This
way, we will open it up and enable sectoral
groups, or maybe regional groups, to earn
their seats among the fifty. x x x."24
Consistent with the Constitutional
Commission's pronouncements, Congress set
the seat-limit to three (3) for each qualified
party, organization or coalition. "Qualified"
means having hurdled the two percent vote
threshold. Such three-seat limit ensures the
entry of various interest-representations into

Abad, Pascasio, Perez & Saludes (2013)

43

CASE DIGEST IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I (Based on Atty. Gabriels Syllabus)

the legislature; thus, no single group, no
matter how large its membership, would
dominate the party-list seats, if not the entire
House.
Third
Issue:
Method
of
Allocating
Additional Seats
Having determined that the twenty
percent seat allocation is merely a ceiling, and
having upheld the constitutionality of the two
percent vote threshold and the three-seat limit
imposed under RA 7941, we now proceed to
the method of determining how many partylist seats the qualified parties, organizations
and coalitions are entitled to. The very first
step - there is no dispute on this - is to rank all
the participating parties, organizations and
coalitions (hereafter collectively referred to as
"parties") according to the votes they each
obtained. The percentage of their respective
votes as against the total number of votes cast
for the party-list system is then determined. All
those that garnered at least two percent of the
total votes cast have an assured or
guaranteed
seat
in
the
House
of
Representatives. Thereafter, "those garnering
more than two percent of the votes shall be
entitled to additional seats in proportion to
their total number of votes." The problem is
how
to
distribute
additional
seats
"proportionally," bearing in mind the threeseat limit further imposed by the law.
One Additional Seat Per Two Percent
Increment
One proposed formula is to allocate one
additional seat for every additional proportion
of the votes obtained equivalent to the two
percent vote requirement for the first seat.25
Translated in figures, a party that wins at least
six percent of the total votes cast will be
entitled to three seats; another party that gets
four percent will be entitled to two seats; and
one that gets two percent will be entitled to
one seat only. This proposal has the advantage
of simplicity and ease of comprehension.
Problems arise, however, when the parties get
very lop-sided votes -- for example, when Party
A receives 20 percent of the total votes cast;
Party B, 10 percent; and Party C, 6 percent.
Under the method just described, Party A
would be entitled to 10 seats; Party B, to 5
seats and Party C, to 3 seats. Considering the
three-seat limit imposed by law, all the parties
will each uniformly have three seats only. We
would then have the spectacle of a party
garnering two or more times the number of
votes obtained by another, yet getting the

Abad, Pascasio, Perez & Saludes (2013)

same number of seats as the other one with

the much lesser votes. In effect, proportional
representation will be contravened and the law
rendered nugatory by this suggested solution.
Hence, the Court discarded it.
The Niemeyer Formula
Another suggestion that the Court
considered was the Niemeyer formula, which
was developed by a German mathematician
and adopted by Germany as its method of
distributing party-list seats in the Bundestag.
Under this formula, the number of additional
seats to which a qualified party would be
entitled is determined by multiplying the
remaining number of seats to be allocated by
the total number of votes obtained by that
party and dividing the product by the total
number of votes garnered by all the qualified
parties. The integer portion of the resulting
product will be the number of additional seats
that the party concerned is entitled to. Thus:
No.
of
remaining
seats
No.
of
No.
of
to
be
additional
votes of
allocated
seats of party
x party
=
concerned
concerne
Total no. of
(Integer.decima
d
votes
of
l)
qualified
parties
The next step is to distribute the extra
seats left among the qualified parties in the
descending order of the decimal portions of
the resulting products. Based on the 1998
election results, the distribution of party-list
seats under the Niemeyer method would be as
follows:
Party
Numbe Guaran Additi Extr Total
r
of teed
onal a
Votes
Seats
Seat
s
1. APEC

503,48
7

5.73

2. ABA

321,64
6

3.66

3. ALAGAD

312,50
0

3.55

4.
VETERANS
FEDERATIO
N

304,80
2

3.47

5. PROMDI

255,18
4

2.90

44

CASE DIGEST IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I (Based on Atty. Gabriels Syllabus)

6. AKO

239,04
2

2.72

because of essential variances between the

two party-list models.

7. NCSCFO

238,30
3

2.71

8. ABANSE! 235,54
PINAY
8

2.68

9. AKBAYAN 232,37
6

2.64

10. BUTIL

215,64
3

2.45

11.
SANLAKAS

194,61
7

2.21

12. COOP- 189,80

NATCCO
2

2.16

13.
COCOFED

2.12

The Legal and Logical Formula for the

Philippines
It is now obvious that the Philippine
style party-list system is a unique paradigm
which demands an equally unique formula. In
crafting a legally defensible and logical
solution to determine the number of additional
seats that a qualified party is entitled to, we
need to review the parameters of the Filipino
party-list system.
As earlier mentioned in the Prologue,
they are as follows:
First, the twenty percent allocation - the
combined number of all party-list congressmen
shall not exceed twenty percent of the total
membership of the House of Representatives,
including those elected under the party list.
Second, the two percent threshold only those parties garnering a minimum of two
percent of the total valid votes cast for the
party-list system are "qualified" to have a seat
in the House of Representatives;
Third, the three-seat limit - each
qualified party, regardless of the number of
votes it actually obtained, is entitled to a
maximum of three seats; that is, one
"qualifying" and two additional seats.
Fourth, proportional representation the additional seats which a qualified party is
entitled to shall be computed "in proportion to
their total number of votes."
The problem, as already stated, is to
find a way to translate "proportional
representation" into a mathematical formula
that will not contravene, circumvent or amend
the above-mentioned parameters.
After careful deliberation, we now
explain such formula, step by step.
Step One. There is no dispute among
the petitioners, the public and the private
respondents, as well as the members of this
Court, that the initial step is to rank all the
participating
parties,
organizations
and
coalitions from the highest to the lowest based
on the number of votes they each received.
Then the ratio for each party is computed by
dividing its votes by the total votes cast for all
the parties participating in the system. All
parties with at least two percent of the total
votes are guaranteed one seat each. Only
these parties shall be considered in the
computation of additional seats. The party
receiving the highest number of votes shall
thenceforth be referred to as the "first" party.

186,38
8

Total

3,429,3 13
32
7
52
38
However, since Section 11 of RA 7941
sets a limit of three (3) seats for each party,
those obtaining more than the limit will have
to give up their excess seats. Under our
present set of facts, the thirteen qualified
parties will each be entitled to three seats,
resulting in an overall total of 39. Note that like
the previous proposal, the Niemeyer formula
would violate the principle of "proportional
representation," a basic tenet of our party-list
system.
The Niemeyer formula, while no doubt
suitable for Germany, finds no application in
the Philippine setting, because of our threeseat limit and the non-mandatory character of
the twenty percent allocation. True, both our
Congress and the Bundestag have threshold
requirements -- two percent for us and five for
them. There are marked differences between
the two models, however. As ably pointed out
by private respondents,26 one half of the
German Parliament is filled up by party-list
members. More important, there are no seat
limitations, because German law discourages
the proliferation of small parties. In contrast,
RA 7941, as already mentioned, imposes a
three-seat limit to encourage the promotion of
the multiparty system. This major statutory
difference makes the Niemeyer formula
completely inapplicable to the Philippines.
Just as one cannot grow Washington
apples in the Philippines or Guimaras mangoes
in the Arctic because of fundamental
environmental differences, neither can the
Niemeyer formula be transplanted in toto here

Abad, Pascasio, Perez & Saludes (2013)

45

CASE DIGEST IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I (Based on Atty. Gabriels Syllabus)

Step Two. The next step is to determine
the number of seats the first party is entitled
to, in order to be able to compute that for the
other parties. Since the distribution is based
on proportional representation, the number of
seats to be allotted to the other parties cannot
possibly exceed that to which the first party is
entitled by virtue of its obtaining the most
number of votes.
For example, the first party received
1,000,000 votes and is determined to be
entitled to two additional seats. Another
qualified party which received 500,000 votes
cannot be entitled to the same number of
seats, since it garnered only fifty percent of
the votes won by the first party. Depending on
the proportion of its votes relative to that of
the first party whose number of seats has
already been predetermined, the second party
should be given less than that to which the
first one is entitled.
The other qualified parties will always
be allotted less additional seats than the first
party for two reasons: (1) the ratio between
said parties and the first party will always be
less than 1:1, and (2) the formula does not
admit of mathematical rounding off, because
there is no such thing as a fraction of a seat.
Verily, an arbitrary rounding off could result in
a violation of the twenty percent allocation. An
academic mathematical demonstration of such
incipient violation is not necessary because
the present set of facts, given the number of
qualified parties and the voting percentages
obtained, will definitely not end up in such
constitutional contravention.
The Court has previously ruled in
Guingona Jr. v. Gonzales27 that a fractional
membership cannot be converted into a whole
membership of one when it would, in effect,
deprive another party's fractional membership.
It would be a violation of the constitutional
mandate of proportional representation. We
said further that "no party can claim more
than what it is entitled to x x x."
In any case, the decision on whether to
round off the fractions is better left to the
legislature. Since Congress did not provide for
it in the present law, neither will this Court.
The Supreme Court does not make the law; it
merely applies it to a given set of facts.
Formula for Determining Additional Seats
for the First Party
Now, how do we determine the number
of seats the first party is entitled to? The only
basis given by the law is that a party receiving
at least two percent of the total votes shall be

Abad, Pascasio, Perez & Saludes (2013)

entitled to one seat. Proportionally, if the first

party were to receive twice the number of
votes of the second party, it should be entitled
to twice the latter's number of seats and so on.
The formula, therefore, for computing the
number of seats to which the first party is
entitled is as follows:
Number
of
votes
Proportion of votes of
of first party
first
party
relative
to
=
total votes for party-list
Total votes for
system
party-list
system
If the proportion of votes received by
the first party without rounding it off is equal
to at least six percent of the total valid votes
cast for all the party list groups, then the first
party shall be entitled to two additional seats
or a total of three seats overall. If the
proportion of votes without a rounding off is
equal to or greater than four percent, but less
than six percent, then the first party shall have
one additional or a total of two seats. And if
the proportion is less than four percent, then
the first party shall not be entitled to any
additional seat.
We adopted this six percent bench
mark, because the first party is not always
entitled to the maximum number of additional
seats. Likewise, it would prevent the allotment
of more than the total number of available
seats, such as in an extreme case wherein 18
or more parties tie for the highest rank and are
thus entitled to three seats each. In such
scenario, the number of seats to which all the
parties are entitled may exceed the maximum
number of party-list seats reserved in the
House of Representatives.
Applying the above formula, APEC,
which received 5.5% of the total votes cast, is
entitled to one additional seat or a total of two
seats.
Note that the above formula will be
applicable only in determining the number of
additional seats the first party is entitled to. It
cannot be used to determine the number of
additional seats of the other qualified parties.
As explained earlier, the use of the same
formula for all would contravene the
proportional representation parameter. For
example, a second party obtains six percent of
the total number of votes cast. According to
the above formula, the said party would be
entitled to two additional seats or a total of
three seats overall. However, if the first party
received a significantly higher amount of votes

46

CASE DIGEST IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I (Based on Atty. Gabriels Syllabus)

-- say, twenty percent -- to grant it the same
number of seats as the second party would
violate the statutory mandate of proportional
representation, since a party getting only six
percent of the votes will have an equal number
of representatives as the one obtaining twenty
percent. The proper solution, therefore, is to
grant the first party a total of three seats; and
the party receiving six percent, additional
seats in proportion to those of the first party.
Formula for Additional Seats of Other
Qualified Parties
Step Three The next step is to solve for the
number of additional seats that the other
qualified parties are entitled to, based on
proportional representation. The formula is
encompassed by the following complex
fraction:
No. of votes of
concerned party

Additional
seats
for
concerned
party

Total
No.
of
votes
for
party-list
system

No.
of
additional
seats
=
x allocated
to
No. of votes of
the
first
first party
party

Total
No.
of
for party list
system
In simplified form, it is written as follows:
No.
of
Additional
No. of votes of
additional
seats
concerned party
seats
for
=
x allocated
concerned
No. of votes of
to
party
first party
the
first
party
Thus, in the case of ABA, the additional
number of seats it would be entitled to is
computed as follows:
No. of votes
Additional
of ABA
No.
of
seats
additional
for
= No. of vites x seats
concerned
of
allocated to
party (ABA)
first
party
the first party
(APEC)
Substituting actual values would result in the
following equation:
Additional
= 321,64 x 1 .64 or 0 additional
seats
6
= seat,
since
for
rounding off is not

Abad, Pascasio, Perez & Saludes (2013)

concerned
party (ABA)

503,48
7

to be applied

Applying the above formula, we find the

outcome of the 1998 party-list election to be
as follows:
Organizati Votes
%age
on
Garnered of
Total
Votes

Initial Additional Total

No.
Seats
of
Seats

1. APEC

503,487

5.50%

2. ABA

321,646

3.51%

321,646 / 1
503,487 *
1 = 0.64

3.
ALAGAD

312,500

3.41%

312,500 / 1
503,487 *
1 = 0.62

4.
VETERAN
S
FEDERATI
ON

304,802

3.33%

304,802 / 1
503,487 *
1 = 0.61

5.
PROMDI

255,184

2.79%

255,184 / 1
503,487 *
1 = 0.51

6. AKO

239,042

2.61%

239,042 / 1
503,487 *
1 = 0.47

7. NCSFO

238,303

2.60%

238,303 / 1
503,487 *
1 = 0.47

8.
ABANSE!

235,548

2.57%

321,646 / 1
503,487 *
1 = 0.47

9.
AKBAYAN!

232,376

2.54%

232,376 / 1
503,487 *
1 = 0.46

10. BUTIL

215,643

2.36%

215,643 /
503,487 *
1 = 0.43
1

11.
SANLAKA
S

194,617

2.13%

194,617 / 1
503,487 *
1 = 0.39

12. COOP- 189,802

NATCCO

2.07%

189,802 / 1
503,487 *
1 = 0.38

13.
COCOFED

2.04%

186,388 / 1
503,487 *
1 = 0.37

PINAY

186,388

Incidentally, if the first party is not

entitled to any additional seat, then the ratio
of the number of votes for the other party to
that for the first one is multiplied by zero. The
end result would be zero additional seat for
each of the other qualified parties as well.
The above formula does not give an
exact mathematical representation of the

47

CASE DIGEST IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I (Based on Atty. Gabriels Syllabus)

number of additional seats to be awarded
since, in order to be entitled to one additional
seat, an exact whole number is necessary. In
fact, most of the actual mathematical
proportions are not whole numbers and are not
rounded off for the reasons explained earlier.
To repeat, rounding off may result in the
awarding of a number of seats in excess of
that provided by the law. Furthermore,
obtaining absolute proportional representation
is restricted by the three-seat-per-party limit to
a maximum of two additional slots. An
increase in the maximum number of additional
representatives a party may be entitled to
would result in a more accurate proportional
representation. But the law itself has set the
limit: only two additional seats. Hence, we
need to work within such extant parameter.
The net result of the foregoing formula
for determining additional seats happily
coincides with the present number of
incumbents; namely, two for the first party
(APEC) and one each for the twelve other
qualified parties. Hence, we affirm the legality
of the incumbencies of their nominees, albeit
through the use of a different formula and
methodology.
BARANGAY ASSOCIATION FOR NATIONAL
ADVANCEMENT
AND
TRANSPARENCY
(BANAT) vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS
(sitting as the National Board of
Canvassers),
G.R. No. 179271 April 21, 2009
J. Carpio

Aside from the thirteen party-list

organizations proclaimed on 9 July 2007, the
COMELEC proclaimed three other party-list
organizations as qualified parties entitled to
one guaranteed seat under the Party-List
System. Petitioner in G.R. No. 179271
Barangay
Association
for
National
Advancement and Transparency (BANAT) in
a petition for certiorari and mandamus assails
the Resolution promulgated on 3 August 2007
by the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) in
NBC No. 07-041 (PL). The COMELECs
resolution in NBC No. 07-041 (PL) approved the
recommendation of Atty. Alioden D. Dalaig,
Head of the National Board of Canvassers
(NBC) Legal Group, to deny the petition of
BANAT for being moot. BANAT filed before the
COMELEC En Banc, acting as NBC, a Petition to
Proclaim the Full Number of Party-List
Representatives Provided by the Constitution.
ISSUES:
1. Is the two percent threshold prescribed in
Section 11(b) of RA 7941 to qualify for one
seat constitutional?
2. How shall the party-list representative seats
be allocated?
3. Does the Constitution prohibit the major
political parties from participating in the partylist elections? If not, can the major political
parties be barred from participating in the
party-list elections?

FACTS: The 14 May 2007 elections included

the elections for the party-list representatives.
The COMELEC counted 15,950,900 votes cast
for 93 parties under the Party-List System. On
9 July 2007, the COMELEC, sitting as the NBC,
promulgated NBC Resolution No. 07-60. NBC
Resolution No. 07-60 proclaimed thirteen (13)
parties as winners in the party-list elections.
Pursuant to NBC Resolution No. 07-60, the
COMELEC, acting as NBC, promulgated NBC
Resolution No. 07-72, which declared the
additional seats allocated to the appropriate
parties. On 9 July 2007, Bayan Muna, Abono,
and A Teacher asked the COMELEC, acting as
NBC, to reconsider its decision to use the
Veterans formula as stated in its NBC
Resolution No. 07-60 because the Veterans
formula is violative of the Constitution and of
Republic Act No. 7941 (R.A. No. 7941). On the
same
day,
the
COMELEC
denied
reconsideration during the proceedings of the
NBC

RULING: The court maintains a Philippinestyle party-list election has at least four
inviolable parameters as clearly stated in
Veterans. For easy reference, these are:
First, the twenty percent allocation
the combined number of all party-list
congressmen shall not exceed twenty percent
of the total membership of the House of
Representatives, including those elected under
the party list;
Second, the two percent threshold
only those parties garnering a minimum of two
percent of the total valid votes cast for the
party-list system are qualified to have a seat
in the House of Representatives;
Third, the three-seat limit each
qualified party, regardless of the number of
votes it actually obtained, is entitled to a
maximum of three seats; that is, one
qualifying and two additional seats;
Fourth, proportional representation
the additional seats which a qualified party is
entitled to shall be computed in proportion to
their total number of votes.
From the first formula in Veterans, thus:

Abad, Pascasio, Perez & Saludes (2013)

48

CASE DIGEST IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I (Based on Atty. Gabriels Syllabus)

Number of seats
available
to x
legislative
=
districts

Number
of
seats
.20 available to
party-list
representatives

.80
This
formula
allows
for
the
corresponding increase in the number of seats
available
for
party-list
representatives
whenever a legislative district is created by
law. Since the 14th Congress of the Philippines
has 220 district representatives, there are 55
seats available to party-list representatives.
220
x .20 = 55
.80
After prescribing the ratio of the
number of party-list representatives to the
total
number
of
representatives,
the
Constitution left the manner of allocating the
seats available to party-list representatives to
the wisdom of the legislature.
Allocation
of
Seats
Representatives:

for

Party-List

The Statutory Limits Presented by the

Two Percent Threshold
and the Three-Seat Cap
All parties agree on the formula to
determine the maximum number of seats
reserved under the Party-List System, as well
as on the formula to determine the guaranteed
seats to party-list candidates garnering at
least two-percent of the total party-list votes.
However, there are numerous interpretations
of the provisions of R.A. No. 7941 on the
allocation of additional seats under the
Party-List System
The Constitution left to Congress the
determination of the manner of allocating the
seats for party-list representatives. Congress
enacted R.A. No. 7941, paragraphs (a) and (b)
of Section 11 and Section 12 of which provide:
Section 11. Number of Party-List
Representatives. x x x
In determining the allocation of seats
for the second vote, the following procedure
shall be observed:
(a) The parties, organizations, and coalitions
shall be ranked from the highest to the lowest
based on the number of votes they garnered
during the elections.
(b)
The
parties,
organizations,
and
coalitions receiving at least two percent (2%)
of the total votes cast for the party-list system
shall be entitled to one seat each: Provided,
That those garnering more than two percent

Abad, Pascasio, Perez & Saludes (2013)

(2%) of the votes shall be entitled to additional

seats in proportion to their total number of
votes: Provided, finally, That each party,
organization, or coalition shall be entitled to
not more than three (3) seats.
Section 12. Procedure in Allocating
Seats for Party-List Representatives. The
COMELEC shall tally all the votes for the
parties, organizations, or coalitions on a
nationwide basis, rank them according to the
number of votes received and allocate partylist representatives proportionately according
to the percentage of votes obtained by each
party, organization, or coalition as against the
total nationwide votes cast for the party-list
system. (Emphasis supplied)
In G.R. No. 179271, BANAT presents
two interpretations through three formulas to
allocate party-list representative seats.
The
first
interpretation
allegedly
harmonizes the provisions of Section 11(b) on
the 2% requirement with Section 12 of R.A. No.
7941. BANAT described this procedure as
follows:
(a) The party-list representatives shall
constitute twenty percent (20%) of the total
Members of the House of Representatives
including those from the party-list groups as
prescribed by Section 5, Article VI of the
Constitution, Section 11 (1st par.) of RA 7941
and Comelec Resolution No. 2847 dated 25
June 1996. Since there are 220 District
Representatives in the 14th Congress, there
shall be 55 Party-List Representatives. All seats
shall have to be proclaimed.
(b) All party-list groups shall initially be
allotted one (1) seat for every two per centum
(2%) of the total party-list votes they obtained;
provided, that no party-list groups shall have
more than three (3) seats (Section 11, RA
7941).
(c) The remaining seats shall, after
deducting the seats obtained by the party-list
groups under the immediately preceding
paragraph and after deducting from their total
the votes corresponding to those seats, the
remaining
seats
shall
be
allotted
proportionately to all the party-list groups
which have not secured the maximum three
(3) seats under the 2% threshold rule, in
accordance with Section 12 of RA 7941.
Forty-four (44) party-list seats will be
awarded under BANATs first interpretation.
The second interpretation presented by
BANAT assumes that the 2% vote requirement
is declared unconstitutional, and apportions
the seats for party-list representatives by

49

CASE DIGEST IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I (Based on Atty. Gabriels Syllabus)

following Section 12 of R.A. No. 7941. BANAT
states that the COMELEC:
(a) shall tally all the votes for the
parties, organizations, or coalitions on
a
nationwide basis;
(b) rank them according to the number
of votes received; and,
(c) allocate party-list representatives
proportionately according to the
percentage
of votes obtained by each party, organization
or coalition as against the total nationwide
votes cast for the party-list system.
BANAT used two formulas to obtain the
same results: one is based on the proportional
percentage of the votes received by each
party as against the total nationwide party-list
votes, and the other is by making the votes of
a party-list with a median percentage of votes
as the divisor in computing the allocation of
seats.Thirty-four (34) party-list seats will be
awarded under BANATs second interpretation.
In G.R. No. 179295, Bayan Muna,
Abono, and A Teacher criticize both the
COMELECs original 2-4-6 formula and the
Veterans formula for systematically preventing
all the party-list seats from being filled up.
They claim that both formulas do not factor in
the total number of seats alloted for the entire
Party-List System. Bayan Muna, Abono, and A
Teacher reject the three-seat cap, but accept
the 2% threshold. After determining the
qualified parties, a second percentage is
generated by dividing the votes of a qualified
party by the total votes of all qualified parties
only. The number of seats allocated to a
qualified party is computed by multiplying the
total party-list seats available with the second
percentage. There will be a first round of seat
allocation, limited to using the whole integers
as the equivalent of the number of seats
allocated to the concerned party-list. After all
the qualified parties are given their seats, a
second round of seat allocation is conducted.
The fractions, or remainders, from the whole
integers are ranked from highest to lowest and
the remaining seats on the basis of this
ranking are allocated until all the seats are
filled up.
We examine what R.A. No. 7941
prescribes to allocate seats for party-list
representatives.
Section 11(a) of R.A. No. 7941
prescribes the ranking of the participating
parties from the highest to the lowest based
on the number of votes they garnered during
the elections.

Table 1. Ranking of the participating parties

from the highest to the lowest based on the
number of votes garnered during the elections.
Votes
Votes
Ra
Ra
Party
Garner
Party
Garnere
nk
nk
ed
d

Abad, Pascasio, Perez & Saludes (2013)

50

BUHAY

1,169,
234

48

KALAHI

88,868

BAYAN
MUNA

979,03 49
9

APOI

79,386

CIBAC

755,68 50
6

BP

78,541

GABRIEL 621,17 51
A
1

AHONBA 78,424
YAN

APEC

619,65 52
7

BIGKIS

77,327

A
TEACHE
R

490,37 53
9

PMAP

75,200

AKBAYA
N

466,11 54
2

AKAPIN

74,686

ALAGAD 423,14 55
9

PBA

71,544

COOPNATCCO

409,88 56
3

GRECON

62,220

10

BUTIL

409,16 57
0

BTM

60,993

11

BATAS

385,81 58
0

A SMILE

58,717

12

ARC

374,28 59
8

NELFFI

57,872

13

ANAKPA
WIS

370,26 60
1

AKSA

57,012

14

ABONO

339,99 61
0

BAGO

55,846

15

AMIN

338,18 62
5

BANDILA 54,751

16

AGAP

328,72 63
4

AHON

54,522

17

AN
WARAY

321,50 64
3

ASAHAN
MO

51,722

18

YACAP

310,88 65
9

AGBIAG!

50,837

19

FPJPM

300,92 66
3

SPI

50,478

20

UNI-MAD 245,38 67
2

BAHANDI 46,612

CASE DIGEST IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I (Based on Atty. Gabriels Syllabus)

21

ABS

235,08 68
6

ADD

45,624

43

ASSALA
M

110,44 90
0

BUKLOD
FILIPINA

8,915

22

KAKUSA

228,99 69
9

AMANG

43,062

44

DIWA

107,02 91
1

LYPAD

8,471

23

KABATAA 228,63 70
N
7

ABAY
PARAK

42,282

45

ANC

99,636 92

AA8,406
KASOSYO

24

ABA-AKO 218,81 71
8

BABAE
KA

36,512

46

SANLAK
AS

97,375 93

KASAPI

6,221

25

ALIF

217,82 72
2

SB

34,835

47

ABC

90,058

TOTAL

15,950,
900

26

SENIOR
CITIZEN
S

213,05 73
8

ASAP

34,098

27

AT

197,87 74
2

PEP

33,938

28

VFP

196,26 75
6

ABA
33,903
ILONGGO

29

ANAD

188,52 76
1

VENDOR
S

33,691

30

BANAT

177,02 77
8

ADDTRIBAL

32,896

31

ANG
170,53 78
KASANG 1
GA

ALMANA

32,255

32

BANTAY

AANGAT
KA
PILIPINO

29,130

33

ABAKAD 166,74 80
A
7

AAPS

26,271

34

1-UTAK

164,98 81
0

HAPI

25,781

35

TUCP

162,64 82
7

AAWAS

22,946

36
37

169,80 79
1

COCOFE 155,92 83
D
0

SM

AGHAM

146,03 84
2

AG

141,81 85
7

AGING
PINOY

16,729

BUHAY

1,169,23 7.33%
4

BAYAN
MUNA

979,039 6.14%

CIBAC

755,686 4.74%

GABRIELA

621,171 3.89%

APEC

619,657 3.88%

A
TEACHER

490,379 3.07%

AKBAYAN

466,112 2.92%

ALAGAD

423,149 2.65%

COOPNATCCO

409,883 2.57%

10

BUTIL

409,160 2.57%

16,916

ANAK

39

ABANSE! 130,35 86
PINAY
6

APO

16,421

40

PM

119,05 87
4

BIYAYAN
G BUKID

16,241

41

AVE

110,76 88
9

ATS

14,161

110,73 89
2

UMDJ

SUARA

1
20,744

38

42

The first clause of Section 11(b) of R.A.

No. 7941 states that parties, organizations,
and coalitions receiving at least two percent
(2%) of the total votes cast for the party-list
system shall be entitled to one seat each.
This clause guarantees a seat to the twopercenters. In Table 2 below, we use the first
20 party-list candidates for illustration
purposes. The percentage of votes garnered
by each party is arrived at by dividing the
number of votes garnered by each party by
15,950,900, the total number of votes cast for
all party-list candidates.
Table 2. The first 20 party-list candidates and
their respective percentage of votes garnered
over the total votes for the party-list.
Votes
Garnere
d over
Votes
Total
Ran
Guarante
Party
Garnere Votes
k
ed Seat
d
for
PartyList, in
%

9,445

Abad, Pascasio, Perez & Saludes (2013)

51

CASE DIGEST IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I (Based on Atty. Gabriels Syllabus)

11

BATAS

385,810 2.42%

12

ARC

374,288 2.35%

13

ANAKPAWI 370,261 2.32%

S

14

ABONO

339,990 2.13%

15

AMIN

338,185 2.12%

16

AGAP

328,724 2.06%

17

AN WARAY 321,503 2.02%

Total

17

18

YACAP

310,889 1.95%

19

FPJPM

300,923 1.89%

20

UNI-MAD

245,382 1.54%

From Table 2 above, we see that only

17 party-list candidates received at least 2%
from the total number of votes cast for partylist candidates. The 17 qualified party-list
candidates, or the two-percenters, are the
party-list candidates that are entitled to one
seat each, or the guaranteed seat. In this first
round of seat allocation, we distributed 17
guaranteed seats.
The second clause of Section 11(b) of
R.A. No. 7941 provides that those garnering
more than two percent (2%) of the votes shall
be entitled to additional seats in proportion to
their total number of votes. This is where
petitioners and intervenors problem with the
formula in Veterans lies. Veterans interprets
the clause in proportion to their total number
of votes to be in proportion to the votes of the
first party. This interpretation is contrary to the
express language of R.A. No. 7941.
***Whether or not the second clause of
Section
11(b)
of
R.A.
No.
7941
is
unconstitutional.
We rule that, in computing the
allocation of additional seats, the continued
operation of the two percent threshold for the
distribution of the additional seats as found in
the second clause of Section 11(b) of R.A. No.
7941 is unconstitutional. This Court finds that
the
two
percent
threshold
makes
it
mathematically impossible to achieve the
maximum number of available party list seats
when the number of available party list seats
exceeds 50. The continued operation of the
two percent threshold in the distribution of the
additional seats frustrates the attainment of
the permissive ceiling that 20% of the
members of the House of Representatives shall
consist of party-list representatives.

Abad, Pascasio, Perez & Saludes (2013)

To illustrate: There are 55 available

party-list seats. Suppose there are 50 million
votes cast for the 100 participants in the party
list elections. A party that has two percent of
the votes cast, or one million votes, gets a
guaranteed seat. Let us further assume that
the first 50 parties all get one million votes.
Only 50 parties get a seat despite the
availability of 55 seats. Because of the
operation of the two percent threshold, this
situation will repeat itself even if we increase
the available party-list seats to 60 seats and
even if we increase the votes cast to 100
million. Thus, even if the maximum number of
parties get two percent of the votes for every
party, it is always impossible for the number of
occupied party-list seats to exceed 50 seats as
long as the two percent threshold is present.
We therefore strike down the two
percent threshold only in relation to the
distribution of the additional seats as found in
the second clause of Section 11(b) of R.A. No.
7941. The two percent threshold presents an
unwarranted
obstacle
to
the
full
implementation of Section 5(2), Article VI of
the Constitution and prevents the attainment
of the broadest possible representation of
party, sectoral or group interests in the House
of Representatives.
In determining the allocation of seats
for party-list representatives under Section 11
of R.A. No. 7941, the following procedure shall
be observed:
The
parties,
organizations,
and
coalitions shall be ranked from the highest to
the lowest based on the number of votes they
garnered during the elections.
The
parties,
organizations,
and
coalitions receiving at least two percent (2%)
of the total votes cast for the party-list system
shall be entitled to one guaranteed seat each.
Those garnering sufficient number of
votes, according to the ranking in paragraph
1, shall be entitled to additional seats in
proportion to their total number of votes until
all the additional seats are allocated.
Each party, organization, or coalition
shall be entitled to not more than three (3)
seats.
In computing the additional seats, the
guaranteed seats shall no longer be included
because they have already been allocated, at
one seat each, to every two-percenter. Thus,
the remaining available seats for allocation as
additional seats are the maximum seats
reserved under the Party List System less the
guaranteed seats. Fractional seats are
disregarded in the absence of a provision in

52

CASE DIGEST IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I (Based on Atty. Gabriels Syllabus)

R.A. No. 7941 allowing for a rounding off of
fractional seats.
In declaring the two percent threshold
unconstitutional, we do not limit our allocation
of additional seats in Table 3 below to the twopercenters. The percentage of votes garnered
by each party-list candidate is arrived at by
dividing the number of votes garnered by each
party by 15,950,900, the total number of votes
cast for party-list candidates. There are two
steps in the second round of seat allocation.
First, the percentage is multiplied by the
remaining available seats, 38, which is the
difference between the 55 maximum seats
reserved under the Party-List System and the
17 guaranteed seats of the two-percenters.
The whole integer of the product of the
percentage and of the remaining available
seats corresponds to a partys share in the
remaining available seats. Second, we assign
one party-list seat to each of the parties next
in rank until all available seats are completely
distributed. We distributed all of the remaining
38 seats in the second round of seat
allocation. Finally, we apply the three-seat cap
to determine the number of seats each
qualified party-list candidate is entitled. Thus:
Table 3. Distribution of Available Party-List
Seats

Rank

Party

Votes
Garn
ered
over
Total
Votes Votes
Garne for
red
Party
List,
in %
(A)

Guara
nteed
Seat

(First
Round
)
(B)

Additi (B)
onal
plus
Seats (C),
in
whol
e
(Seco inte
nd
gers
Roun
d)
(C)

(D)

Appl
ying
the
thre
e
seat
cap

(E)

AKBAY
AN

466,1 2.92
12
%

1.11

N.A.

ALAGA
D

423,1 2.65
49
%

1.01

N.A.

COOPNATCC
O

409,8 2.57
83
%

N.A.

10

BUTIL

409,1 2.57
60
%

N.A.

11

BATAS

385,8 2.42
10
%

N.A.

12

ARC

374,2 2.35
88
%

N.A.

13

ANAKP
AWIS

370,2 2.32
61
%

N.A.

14

ABONO 339,9 2.13

90
%

N.A.

15

AMIN

338,1 2.12
85
%

N.A.

16

AGAP

328,7 2.06
24
%

N.A.

17

AN
321,5 2.02
WARAY 03
%

N.A.

18

YACAP

310,8 1.95
89
%

N.A.

19

FPJPM

300,9 1.89
23
%

N.A.

20

UNIMAD

245,3 1.54
82
%

N.A.

21

ABS

235,0 1.47
86
%

N.A.

22

KAKUS
A

228,9 1.44
99
%

N.A.

23

KABAT
AAN

228,6 1.43
37
%

N.A.

24

ABAAKO

218,8 1.37
18
%

N.A.

25

ALIF

217,8 1.37
22
%

N.A.

26

SENIO
R
CITIZE
NS

213,0 1.34
58
%

N.A.

91<!-[if

supportFo
otnotes]->[31]<!-[endif]-->

BUHAY

1,169 7.33
,234
%

2.79

N.A.

BAYAN
MUNA

979,0 6.14
39
%

2.33

N.A.

CIBAC

755,6 4.74
86
%

1.80

N.A.

27

AT

197,8 1.24
72
%

N.A.

GABRI
ELA

621,1 3.89
71
%

1.48

N.A.

28

VFP

196,2 1.23
66
%

N.A.

APEC

619,6 3.88
57
%

1.48

N.A.

29

ANAD

188,5 1.18
21
%

N.A.

A
490,3 3.07
Teache 79
%
r

1.17

N.A.

30

BANAT

177,0 1.11
28
%

N.A.

31

ANG

170,5 1.07

N.A.

Abad, Pascasio, Perez & Saludes (2013)

53

CASE DIGEST IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I (Based on Atty. Gabriels Syllabus)

Applying
the procedure
of seat
allocation as illustrated in Table 3 above, there
are 55 party-list representatives from the 36
winning party-list organizations. All 55
available party-list seats are filled. The
additional seats allocated to the parties with
sufficient number of votes for one whole seat,
in no case to exceed a total of three seats for
each party, are shown in column (D).
Participation of Major Political Parties in PartyList Elections
The Constitutional Commission adopted
a multi-party system that allowed all political
parties to participate in the party-list elections.
The deliberations of the Constitutional
Commission clearly bear this out, thus:
MR. MONSOD. Madam President, I just
want to say that we suggested or proposed the
party list system because we wanted to open
up the political system to a pluralistic society
through a multiparty system. x x x We are for
opening up the system, and we would like very
much for the sectors to be there. That is why
one of the ways to do that is to put a ceiling on
the number of representatives from any single
party that can sit within the 50 allocated under
the party list system. x x x.
MR. MONSOD. Madam President, the
candidacy for the 198 seats is not limited to
political parties. My question is this: Are we
going to classify for example Christian
Democrats and Social Democrats as political
parties? Can they run under the party list
concept or must they be under the district
legislation side of it only?
MR. VILLACORTA. In reply to that query,
I think these parties that the Commissioner
mentioned can field candidates for the Senate
as well as for the House of Representatives.
Likewise, they can also field sectoral
candidates for the 20 percent or 30 percent,
whichever is adopted, of the seats that we are
allocating under the party list system.

MR. MONSOD. In other words, the

Christian
Democrats
can
field
district
candidates and can also participate in the
party list system?
MR. VILLACORTA. Why not? When they
come to the party list system, they will be
fielding only sectoral candidates.
MR. MONSOD. May I be clarified on
that? Can UNIDO participate in the party list
system?
MR. VILLACORTA. Yes, why not? For as
long as they field candidates who come from
the different marginalized sectors that we shall
designate in this Constitution.
MR. MONSOD. Suppose Senator Taada
wants to run under BAYAN group and says that
he represents the farmers, would he qualify?
MR. VILLACORTA. No, Senator Taada
would not qualify.
MR. MONSOD. But UNIDO can field
candidates under the party list system and say
Juan dela Cruz is a farmer. Who would pass on
whether he is a farmer or not?
MR. TADEO. Kay Commissioner Monsod,
gusto ko lamang linawin ito. Political parties,
particularly minority political parties, are not
prohibited to participate in the party list
election if they can prove that they are also
organized along sectoral lines.
MR. MONSOD. What the Commissioner
is saying is that all political parties can
participate because it is precisely the
contention of political parties that they
represent the broad base of citizens and that
all sectors are represented in them. Would the
Commissioner agree?
MR. TADEO. Ang punto lamang namin,
pag pinayagan mo ang UNIDO na isang
political party, it will dominate the party list at
mawawalang
saysay
din
yung
sector.
Lalamunin mismo ng political parties ang party
list system. Gusto ko lamang bigyan ng diin
ang reserve. Hindi ito reserve seat sa
marginalized sectors. Kung titingnan natin
itong 198 seats, reserved din ito sa political
parties.
MR. MONSOD. Hindi po reserved iyon
kasi anybody can run there. But my question
to Commissioner Villacorta and probably also
to Commissioner Tadeo is that under this
system, would UNIDO be banned from running
under the party list system?
MR. VILLACORTA. No, as I said, UNIDO
may field sectoral candidates. On that
condition alone, UNIDO may be allowed to
register for the party list system.
MR. MONSOD. May I inquire from
Commissioner Tadeo if he shares that answer?

Abad, Pascasio, Perez & Saludes (2013)

54

KASAN
GGA

31

32

BANTA
Y

169,8 1.06
01
%

N.A.

33

ABAKA
DA

166,7 1.05
47
%

N.A.

34

1-UTAK 164,9 1.03

80
%

N.A.

35

TUCP

162,6 1.02
47
%

N.A.

36

COCOF 155,9 0.98

ED
20
%

N.A.

Total

17

55

CASE DIGEST IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I (Based on Atty. Gabriels Syllabus)

MR. TADEO. The same.
MR. VILLACORTA. Puwede po ang
UNIDO, pero sa sectoral lines.
xxxx
MR. OPLE. x x x In my opinion, this will
also create the stimulus for political parties
and mass organizations to seek common
ground. For example, we have the PDP-Laban
and the UNIDO. I see no reason why they
should not be able to make common goals
with mass organizations so that the very
leadership of these parties can be transformed
through
the
participation
of
mass
organizations. And if this is true of the
administration parties, this will be true of
others like the Partido ng Bayan which is now
being formed. There is no question that they
will be attractive to many mass organizations.
In the opposition parties to which we belong,
there will be a stimulus for us to contact mass
organizations so that with their participation,
the policies of such parties can be radically
transformed because this amendment will
create conditions that will challenge both the
mass organizations and the political parties to
come together. And the party list system is
certainly available, although it is open to all
the parties. It is understood that the parties
will enter in the roll of the COMELEC the names
of representatives of mass organizations
affiliated with them. So that we may, in time,
develop this excellent system that they have
in Europe where labor organizations and
cooperatives,
for
example,
distribute
themselves either in the Social Democratic
Party and the Christian Democratic Party in
Germany, and their very presence there has a
transforming effect upon the philosophies and
the leadership of those parties.
It is also a fact well known to all that in
the United States, the AFL-CIO always vote
with
the
Democratic
Party.
But
the
businessmen, most of them, always vote with
the Republican Party, meaning that there is no
reason at all why political parties and mass
organizations should not combine, reenforce,
influence and interact with each other so that
the very objectives that we set in this
Constitution for sectoral representation are
achieved in a wider, more lasting, and more
institutionalized way. Therefore, I support this
[Monsod-Villacorta] amendment. It installs
sectoral representation as a constitutional gift,
but at the same time, it challenges the sector
to rise to the majesty of being elected
representatives later on through a party list
system; and even beyond that, to become
actual political parties capable of contesting

political power in the wider constitutional

arena for major political parties.
x x x (Emphasis supplied)
R.A. No. 7941 provided the details for
the concepts put forward by the Constitutional
Commission. Section 3 of R.A. No. 7941 reads:
Definition of Terms. (a) The party-list
system is a mechanism of proportional
representation
in
the
election
of
representatives
to
the
House
of
Representatives from national, regional and
sectoral parties or organizations or coalitions
thereof registered with the Commission on
Elections (COMELEC). Component parties or
organizations of a coalition may participate
independently provided the coalition of which
they form part does not participate in the
party-list system.
(b) A party means either a political
party or a sectoral party or a coalition of
parties.
(c) A political party refers to an
organized group of citizens advocating an
ideology or platform, principles and policies for
the general conduct of government and which,
as the most immediate means of securing
their adoption, regularly nominates and
supports certain of its leaders and members as
candidates for public office.
It is a national party when its
constituency is spread over the geographical
territory of at least a majority of the regions. It
is a regional party when its constituency is
spread over the geographical territory of at
least a majority of the cities and provinces
comprising the region.
(d) A sectoral party refers to an
organized group of citizens belonging to any of
the sectors enumerated in Section 5 hereof
whose principal advocacy pertains to the
special interests and concerns of their sector,
(e) A sectoral organization refers to a
group of citizens or a coalition of groups of
citizens who share similar physical attributes
or characteristics, employment, interests or
concerns.
(f) A coalition refers to an aggrupation
of duly registered national, regional, sectoral
parties or organizations for political and/or
election purposes.
Congress, in enacting R.A. No. 7941, put the
three-seat cap to prevent any party from
dominating the party-list elections.
Neither the Constitution nor R.A. No.
7941 prohibits major political parties from
participating in the party-list system. On the
contrary, the framers of the Constitution
clearly intended the major political parties to

Abad, Pascasio, Perez & Saludes (2013)

55

CASE DIGEST IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I (Based on Atty. Gabriels Syllabus)

participate in party-list elections through their
sectoral wings. In fact, the members of the
Constitutional Commission voted down, 19-22,
any permanent sectoral seats, and in the
alternative the reservation of the party-list
system to the sectoral groups.In defining a
party that participates in party-list elections
as either a political party or a sectoral party,
R.A. No. 7941 also clearly intended that major
political parties will participate in the party-list
elections. Excluding the major political parties
in party-list elections is manifestly against the
Constitution, the intent of the Constitutional
Commission, and R.A. No. 7941. This Court
cannot engage in socio-political engineering
and judicially legislate the exclusion of major
political parties from the party-list elections in
patent violation of the Constitution and the
law.
Read together, R.A. No. 7941 and the
deliberations of the Constitutional Commission
state that major political parties are allowed to
establish, or form coalitions with, sectoral
organizations
for
electoral
or
political
purposes. There should not be a problem if, for
example, the Liberal Party participates in the
party-list election through the Kabataang
Liberal ng Pilipinas (KALIPI), its sectoral youth
wing. The other major political parties can thus
organize, or affiliate with, their chosen sector
or
sectors.
To
further
illustrate,
the
Nacionalista Party can establish a fisherfolk
wing to participate in the party-list election,
and this fisherfolk wing can field its fisherfolk
nominees. Kabalikat ng Malayang Pilipino
(KAMPI) can do the same for the urban poor.
The qualifications of party-list nominees
are prescribed in Section 9 of R.A. No. 7941:
Qualifications of Party-List Nominees.
No person shall be nominated as party-list
representative unless he is a natural born
citizen of the Philippines, a registered voter, a
resident of the Philippines for a period of not
less than one (1) year immediately preceding
the day of the elections, able to read and
write, bona fide member of the party or
organization which he seeks to represent for at
least ninety (90) days preceding the day of the
election, and is at least twenty-five (25) years
of age on the day of the election.
In case of a nominee of the youth
sector, he must at least be twenty-five (25) but
not more than thirty (30) years of age on the
day of the election. Any youth sectoral
representative who attains the age of thirty
(30) during his term shall be allowed to
continue until the expiration of his term.

Under Section 9 of R.A. No. 7941, it is not

necessary that the party-list organizations
nominee wallow in poverty, destitution and
infirmity
as there is no financial status
required in the law. It is enough that the
nominee
of
the
sectoral
party/organization/coalition belongs to the
marginalized
and
underrepresented
sectors,that is, if the nominee represents the
fisherfolk, he or she must be a fisherfolk, or if
the nominee represents the senior citizens, he
or she must be a senior citizen.
Neither the Constitution nor R.A. No.
7941 mandates the filling-up of the entire 20%
allocation of party-list representatives found in
the
Constitution.
The
Constitution,
in
paragraph 1, Section 5 of Article VI, left the
determination of the number of the members
of the House of Representatives to Congress:
The House of Representatives shall be
composed of not more than two hundred and
fifty members, unless otherwise fixed by law, x
x x. The 20% allocation of party-list
representatives is merely a ceiling; party-list
representatives cannot be more than 20% of
the members of the House of Representatives.
However, we cannot allow the continued
existence of a provision in the law which will
systematically prevent the constitutionally
allocated 20% party-list representatives from
being filled. The three-seat cap, as a limitation
to the number of seats that a qualified partylist organization may occupy, remains a valid
statutory device that prevents any party from
dominating the party-list elections. Seats for
party-list representatives shall thus be
allocated in accordance with the procedure
used in Table 3 above.
However, by a vote of 8-7, the Court
decided to continue the ruling in Veterans
disallowing major political parties from
participating in the party-list elections, directly
or indirectly. Those who voted to continue
disallowing major political parties from the
party-list elections joined Chief Justice Reynato
S. Puno in his separate opinion. On the formula
to allocate party-list seats, the Court is
unanimous in concurring with this ponencia.

Abad, Pascasio, Perez & Saludes (2013)

56

ANG BAGONG BAYANI-OFW LABOR PARTY

(under the acronym OFW), represented
herein
by
its
secretary-general,
MOHAMMAD OMAR FAJARDO, vs. ANG
BAGONG BAYANI-OFW LABOR PARTY GO!
GO! PHILIPPINES; THE TRUE MARCOS
LOYALIST
ASSOCIATION
OF
THE
PHILIPPINES;
PHILIPPINE
LOCAL
AUTONOMY; CITIZENS MOVEMENT FOR

CASE DIGEST IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I (Based on Atty. Gabriels Syllabus)

JUSTICE, ECONOMY, ENVIRONMENT AND
PEACE; CHAMBER OF REAL ESTATE
BUILDERS
ASSOCIATION;
SPORTS
&
HEALTH
ADVANCEMENT
FOUNDATION,
INC.;
ANG
LAKAS
NG
OVERSEAS
CONTRACT WORKERS (OCW); BAGONG
BAYANI ORGANIZATION and others under
"Organizations/Coalitions" of Omnibus
Resolution
No.
3785;
PARTIDO
NG
MASANG PILIPINO; LAKAS NUCD-UMDP;
NATIONALIST
PEOPLE'S
COALITION;
LABAN NG DEMOKRATIKONG PILIPINO;
AKSYON
DEMOKRATIKO;
PDP-LABAN;
LIBERAL PARTY; NACIONALISTA PARTY;
ANG BUHAY HAYAANG YUMABONG; and
others
under
"Political
Parties"
of
Omnibus Resolution No. 3785.
G.R. No. 147589 June 26, 2001
PANGANIBAN, J.
FACTS: With the onset of the 2001 elections,
the Comelec received several Petitions for
registration
filed
by
sectoral
parties,
organizations and political parties. According
to the Comelec, "[v]erifications were made as
to the status and capacity of these parties and
organizations and hearings were scheduled
day and night until the last party w[as] heard.
With the number of these petitions and the
observance of the legal and procedural
requirements, review of these petitions as well
as deliberations takes a longer process in
order to arrive at a decision and as a result the
two (2) divisions promulgated a separate
Omnibus Resolution and individual resolution
on political parties. These numerous petitions
and processes observed in the disposition of
these petition[s] hinder the early release of the
Omnibus Resolutions of the Divisions which
were promulgated only on 10 February 2001."
Thereafter, before the February 12,
2001 deadline prescribed under Comelec
Resolution No. 3426 dated December 22,
2000, the registered parties and organizations
filed their respective Manifestations, stating
their intention to participate in the party-list
elections. Other sectoral and political parties
and organizations whose registrations were
denied also filed Motions for Reconsideration,
together with Manifestations of their intent to
participate in the party-list elections. Still other
registered parties filed their Manifestations
beyond the deadline.
The Comelec gave due course or
approved
the
Manifestations
(or
accreditations)
of
154
parties
and
organizations, but denied those of several

Abad, Pascasio, Perez & Saludes (2013)

others in its assailed March 26, 2001 Omnibus

Resolution No. 3785.
On April 10, 2001, Akbayan Citizens
Action Party filed before the Comelec a Petition
praying that "the names of [some of herein
respondents] be deleted from the 'Certified
List
of
Political
Parties/Sectoral
Parties/Organizations/Coalitions Participating in
the Party List System for the May 14, 2001
Elections' and that said certified list be
accordingly amended." On April 11, 2001,
Bayan Muna and Bayan Muna-Youth also filed a
Petition for Cancellation of Registration and
Nomination
against
some
of
herein
respondents.
Meanwhile, dissatisfied with the pace of the
Comelec, Ang Bagong Bayani-OFW Labor Party
filed a Petition before this Court on April 16,
2001. This Petition, docketed as GR No.
147589, assailed Comelec Omnibus Resolution
No. 3785. In its Resolution dated April 17,
2001, the Court directed respondents to
comment on the Petition within a nonextendible period of five days from notice.
On April 17, 2001, Petitioner Bayan Muna also
filed before this Court a Petition, docketed as
GR No. 147613, also challenging Comelec
Omnibus Resolution No. 3785. In its Resolution
dated May 9, 2001, 13 the Court ordered the
consolidation of the two Petitions before it;
directed respondents named in the second
Petition to file their respective Comments on or
before noon of May 15, 2001; and called the
parties to an Oral Argument on May 17, 2001.
It added that the Comelec may proceed with
the counting and canvassing of votes cast for
the party-list elections, but barred the
proclamation of any winner therein, until
further orders of the Court.
Thereafter, Comments on the second Petition
were received by the Court and, on May 17,
2001, the Oral Argument was conducted as
scheduled. In an Order given in open court, the
parties were directed to submit their
respective Memoranda simultaneously within a
non-extendible period of five days.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not recourse under Rule 65 is
proper under the premises. More specifically,
is there no other plain, speedy or adequate
remedy in the ordinary course of law?
2. Whether or not political parties may
participate in the party-list elections.
3. Whether or not the party-list system is
exclusive
to
'marginalized
and
underrepresented' sectors and organizations.

57

CASE DIGEST IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I (Based on Atty. Gabriels Syllabus)

4. Whether or not the Comelec committed
grave abuse of discretion in promulgating
Omnibus Resolution No. 3785.
HELD:
1.YES. under both the Constitution and the
Rules of Court, such challenge may be brought
before this Court in a verified petition for
certiorari under Rule 65.
Moreover,
the
assailed
Omnibus
Resolution was promulgated by Respondent
Commission en banc; hence, no motion for
reconsideration was possible, it being a
prohibited pleading under Section 1 (d), Rule
13 of the Comelec Rules of Procedure.
The Court also notes that Petitioner
Bayan Muna had filed before the Comelec a
Petition for Cancellation of Registration and
Nomination
against
some
of
herein
respondents. The Comelec, however, did not
act on that Petition. In view of the pendency of
the elections, Petitioner Bayan Muna sought
succor from this Court, for there was no other
adequate recourse at the time. Subsequent
events have proven the urgency of petitioner's
action; to this date, the Comelec has not yet
formally resolved the Petition before it. But a
resolution may just be a formality because the
Comelec, through the Office of the Solicitor
General, has made its position on the matter
quite clear.
In any event, this case presents an
exception to the rule that certiorari shall lie
only in the absence of any other plain, speedy
and adequate remedy. It has been held that
certiorari is available, notwithstanding the
presence of other remedies, "where the issue
raised is one purely of law, where public
interest is involved, and in case of urgency."
Indeed, the instant case is indubitably imbued
with public interest and with extreme urgency,
for it potentially involves the composition of 20
percent of the House of Representatives.
Moreover,
this
case
raises
transcendental constitutional issues on the
party-list system, which this Court must
urgently resolve, consistent with its duty to
"formulate
guiding
and
controlling
constitutional principles, precepts, doctrines,
or rules."
Finally, procedural requirements "may
be glossed over to prevent a miscarriage of
justice, when the issue involves the principle of
social justice x x x when the decision sought to
be set aside is a nullity, or when the need for
relief is extremely urgent and certiorari is the
only adequate and speedy remedy available."

2. YES. Under the Constitution and RA 7941,

private respondents cannot be disqualified
from the party-list elections, merely on the
ground that they are political parties. Section
5, Article VI of the Constitution provides that
members of the House of Representatives may
"be elected through a party-list system of
registered national, regional, and sectoral
parties or organizations."
Furthermore, under Sections 7 and 8,
Article IX (C) of the Constitution, political
parties may be registered under the party-list
system.
"Sec. 7. No votes cast in favor of a
political party, organization, or coalition shall
be valid, except for those registered under the
party-list system as provided in this
Constitution.
"Sec.
8.
Political
parties,
or
organizations or coalitions registered under
the party-list system, shall not be represented
in the voters' registration boards, boards of
election inspectors, boards of canvassers, or
other similar bodies. However, they shall be
entitled to appoint poll watchers in accordance
with law." 30
During
the
deliberations
in
the
Constitutional Commission, Comm. Christian S.
Monsod pointed out that the participants in the
party-list system may "be a regional party, a
sectoral party, a national party, UNIDO, 31
Magsasaka, or a regional party in Mindanao." 32
This was also clear from the following
exchange between Comms. Jaime Tadeo and
Blas Ople: 33
"MR. TADEO. Naniniwala ba kayo na ang
party list ay pwedeng paghati-hatian ng
UNIDO,
PDP-Laban,
PNP,
Liberal
at
Nacionalista?
MR. OPLE. Maaari yan sapagkat bukas
ang party list system sa lahat ng mga partido."
Indeed, Commissioner Monsod stated
that the purpose of the party-list provision was
to open up the system, in order to give a
chance to parties that consistently place third
or fourth in congressional district elections to
win a seat in Congress. 34 He explained: "The
purpose of this is to open the system. In the
past elections, we found out that there were
certain groups or parties that, if we count their
votes nationwide, have about 1,000,000 or
1,500,000 votes. But they were always third or
fourth place in each of the districts. So, they
have no voice in the Assembly. But this way,
they would have five or six representatives in
the Assembly even if they would not win
individually in legislative districts. So, that is

Abad, Pascasio, Perez & Saludes (2013)

58

CASE DIGEST IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I (Based on Atty. Gabriels Syllabus)

essentially the mechanics, the purpose and
objectives of the party-list system."
For its part, Section 2 of RA 7941 also
provides for "a party-list system of registered
national, regional and sectoral parties or
organizations or coalitions thereof, x x x."
Section 3 expressly states that a "party" is
"either a political party or a sectoral party or a
coalition of parties." More to the point, the law
defines "political party" as "an organized group
of citizens advocating an ideology or platform,
principles and policies for the general conduct
of government and which, as the most
immediate means of securing their adoption,
regularly nominates and supports certain of its
leaders and members as candidates for public
office."
Furthermore, Section 11 of RA 7941
leaves no doubt as to the participation of
political parties in the party-list system. We
quote the pertinent provision below:
"For purposes of the May 1998
elections, the first five (5) major political
parties on the basis of party representation in
the House of Representatives at the start of
the Tenth Congress of the Philippines shall not
be entitled to participate in the party-list
system.
Indubitably, therefore, political parties
even the major ones -- may participate in the
party-list elections.
3. That political parties may participate
in the party-list elections does not mean,
however, that any political party -- or any
organization or group for that matter -- may do
so. The requisite character of these parties or
organizations must be consistent with the
purpose of the party-list system, as laid down
in the Constitution and RA 7941. Section 5,
Article VI of the Constitution, provides as
follows:
"(1) The House of Representatives shall
be composed of not more than two hundred
and fifty members, unless otherwise fixed by
law, who shall be elected from legislative
districts apportioned among the provinces,
cities, and the Metropolitan Manila area in
accordance with the number of their
respective inhabitants, and on the basis of a
uniform and progressive ratio, and those who,
as provided by law, shall be elected through a
party-list system of registered national,
regional, and sectoral parties or organizations.
(2) The party-list representatives shall
constitute twenty per centum of the total
number of representatives including those
under the party list. For three consecutive
terms after the ratification of this Constitution,

one-half of the seats allocated to party-list

representatives shall be filled, as provided by
law, by selection or election from the labor,
peasant, urban poor, indigenous cultural
communities, women, youth, and such other
sectors as may be provided by law, except the
religious sector." (Emphasis supplied.)
Notwithstanding the sparse language of
the provision, a distinguished member of the
Constitutional Commission declared that the
purpose of the party-list provision was to give
"genuine power to our people" in Congress.
Hence, when the provision was discussed, he
exultantly announced: "On this first day of
August 1986, we shall, hopefully, usher in a
new chapter to our national history, by giving
genuine power to our people in the
legislature." 35
The foregoing provision on the party-list
system is not self-executory. It is, in fact,
interspersed with phrases like "in accordance
with law" or "as may be provided by law"; it
was thus up to Congress to sculpt in granite
the lofty objective of the Constitution. Hence,
RA 7941 was enacted. It laid out the statutory
policy in this wise:
"SEC. 2. Declaration of Policy. -- The
State
shall
promote
proportional
representation
in
the
election
of
representatives
to
the
House
of
Representatives through a party-list system of
registered national, regional and sectoral
parties or organizations or coalitions thereof,
which will enable Filipino citizens belonging to
marginalized and underrepresented sectors,
organizations and parties, and who lack welldefined political constituencies but who could
contribute to the formulation and enactment of
appropriate legislation that will benefit the
nation as a whole, to become members of the
House of Representatives. Towards this end,
the State shall develop and guarantee a full,
free and open party system in order to attain
the broadest possible representation of party,
sectoral or group interests in the House of
Representatives by enhancing their chances to
compete for and win seats in the legislature,
and shall provide the simplest scheme
possible."

Abad, Pascasio, Perez & Saludes (2013)

59

The Marginalized and Underrepresented

to Become Lawmakers Themselves
The foregoing provision mandates a
state
policy
of
promoting
proportional
representation by means of the Filipino-style
party-list system, which will "enable" the
election to the House of Representatives of
Filipino citizens,

CASE DIGEST IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I (Based on Atty. Gabriels Syllabus)

1.who belong to marginalized and
underrepresented sectors, organizations and
parties; and
2. who lack well-defined constituencies;
but
3. who could contribute to the
formulation and enactment of appropriate
legislation that will benefit the nation as a
whole.
The key words in this policy are
"proportional representation," "marginalized
and underrepresented," and "lack of welldefined constituencies."
"Proportional representation" here does
not refer to the number of people in a
particular district, because the party-list
election is national in scope. Neither does it
allude to numerical strength in a distressed or
oppressed group. Rather, it refers to the
representation of the "marginalized and
underrepresented" as exemplified by the
enumeration in Section 5 of the law; namely,
"labor, peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor,
indigenous cultural communities, elderly,
handicapped,
women,
youth,
veterans,
overseas workers, and professionals."
However, it is not enough for the
candidate to claim representation of the
marginalized and underrepresented, because
representation is easy to claim and to feign.
The party-list organization or party must
factually and truly represent the marginalized
and
underrepresented
constituencies
mentioned in Section 5. 36 Concurrently, the
persons nominated by the party-list candidateorganization
must
be
"Filipino
citizens
belonging
to
marginalized
and
underrepresented sectors, organizations and
parties."
Finally,
"lack
of
well-defined
constituenc[y] " refers to the absence of a
traditionally identifiable electoral group, like
voters of a congressional district or territorial
unit of government. Rather, it points again to
those with disparate interests identified with
the "marginalized or underrepresented."
In the end, the role of the Comelec is to
see to it that only those Filipinos who are
"marginalized and underrepresented" become
members of Congress under the party-list
system, Filipino-style.
The intent of the Constitution is clear:
to give genuine power to the people, not only
by giving more law to those who have less in
life, but more so by enabling them to become
veritable lawmakers themselves. Consistent
with this intent, the policy of the implementing
law, we repeat, is likewise clear: "to enable

Filipino citizens belonging to marginalized and

underrepresented sectors, organizations and
parties, x x x, to become members of the
House of Representatives." Where the
language of the law is clear, it must be applied
according to its express terms. 37
The marginalized and underrepresented
sectors to be represented under the party-list
system are enumerated in Section 5 of RA
7941, which states:
"SEC. 5. Registration. -- Any organized
group of persons may register as a party,
organization or coalition for purposes of the
party-list system by filing with the COMELEC
not later than ninety (90) days before the
election a petition verified by its president or
secretary stating its desire to participate in the
party-list system as a national, regional or
sectoral party or organization or a coalition of
such parties or organizations, attaching
thereto its constitution, by-laws, platform or
program of government, list of officers,
coalition agreement and other relevant
information as the COMELEC may require:
Provided, that the sector shall include labor,
peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor, indigenous
cultural communities, elderly, handicapped,
women, youth, veterans, overseas workers,
and professionals."
While the enumeration of marginalized
and underrepresented sectors is not exclusive,
it demonstrates the clear intent of the law that
not all sectors can be represented under the
party-list system. It is a fundamental principle
of statutory construction that words employed
in a statute are interpreted in connection with,
and their meaning is ascertained by reference
to, the words and the phrases with which they
are associated or related. Thus, the meaning
of a term in a statute may be limited, qualified
or specialized by those in immediate
association
The Party-List System Desecrated by
the OSG Contentions
Notwithstanding
the
unmistakable
statutory policy, the Office of the Solicitor
General submits that RA No. 7941 "does not
limit the participation in the party-list system
to the marginalized and underrepresented
sectors of society." 39 In fact, it contends that
any party or group that is not disqualified
under Section 6 40 of RA 7941 may participate
in the elections. Hence, it admitted during the
Oral Argument that even an organization
representing the super rich of Forbes Park or
Dasmarias Village could participate in the
party-list elections. 41

Abad, Pascasio, Perez & Saludes (2013)

60

CASE DIGEST IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I (Based on Atty. Gabriels Syllabus)

The declared policy of RA 7941
contravenes the position of the Office of the
Solicitor General (OSG). We stress that the
party-list system seeks to enable certain
Filipino citizens specifically those belonging
to marginalized and underrepresented sectors,
organizations and parties to be elected to the
House of Representatives. The assertion of the
OSG that the party-list system is not exclusive
to the marginalized and underrepresented
disregards the clear statutory policy. Its claim
that even the super-rich and overrepresented
can participate desecrates the spirit of the
party-list system.
Indeed, the law crafted to address the
peculiar disadvantages of Payatas hovel
dwellers cannot be appropriated by the
mansion owners of Forbes Park. The interests
of these two sectors are manifestly disparate;
hence, the OSG's position to treat them
similarly defies reason and common sense. In
contrast, and with admirable candor, Atty.
Lorna Patajo-Kapunan 42 admitted during the
Oral Argument that a group of bankers,
industrialists and sugar planters could not join
the party-list system as representatives of
their respective sectors. 43
While the business moguls and the
mega-rich are, numerically speaking, a tiny
minority, they are neither marginalized nor
underrepresented, for the stark reality is that
their economic clout engenders political power
more awesome than their numerical limitation.
Traditionally,
political
power
does
not
necessarily emanate from the size of one's
constituency; indeed, it is likely to arise more
directly from the number and amount of one's
bank accounts.
It is ironic, therefore, that the
marginalized and underrepresented in our
midst are the majority who wallow in poverty,
destitution and infirmity. It was for them that
the party-list system was enacted -- to give
them not only genuine hope, but genuine
power; to give them the opportunity to be
elected and to represent the specific concerns
of their constituencies; and simply to give
them a direct voice in Congress and in the
larger affairs of the State. In its noblest sense,
the party-list system truly empowers the
masses and ushers a new hope for genuine
change. Verily, it invites those marginalized
and underrepresented in the past the farm
hands, the fisher folk, the urban poor, even
those in the underground movement to come
out and participate, as indeed many of them
came out and participated during the last
elections. The State cannot now disappoint

and frustrate them by disabling and

desecrating this social justice vehicle.
Because
the
marginalized
and
underrepresented had not been able to win in
the congressional district elections normally
dominated by traditional politicians and vested
groups, 20 percent of the seats in the House of
Representatives were set aside for the partylist system. In arguing that even those sectors
who normally controlled 80 percent of the
seats in the House could participate in the
party-list elections for the remaining 20
percent, the OSG and the Comelec disregard
the fundamental difference between the
congressional district elections and the partylist elections.
As earlier noted, the purpose of the
party-list provision was to open up the system,
44
in order to enhance the chance of sectoral
groups
and
organizations
to
gain
representation in the House of Representatives
through the simplest scheme possible. 45 Logic
shows that the system has been opened to
those who have never gotten a foothold within
it -- those who cannot otherwise win in regular
elections and who therefore need the
"simplest scheme possible" to do so.
Conversely, it would be illogical to open the
system to those who have long been within it
-- those privileged sectors that have long
dominated the congressional district elections.
The import of the open party-list system may
be more vividly understood when compared to
a student dormitory "open house," which by its
nature allows outsiders to enter the facilities.
Obviously, the "open house" is for the benefit
of outsiders only, not the dormers themselves
who can enter the dormitory even without
such special privilege. In the same vein, the
open party-list system is only for the
"outsiders" who cannot get elected through
regular elections otherwise; it is not for the
non-marginalized or overrepresented who
already fill the ranks of Congress.
Verily, allowing the non-marginalized
and overrepresented to vie for the remaining
seats under the party-list system would not
only dilute, but also prejudice the chance of
the
marginalized
and
underrepresented,
contrary to the intention of the law to enhance
it. The party-list system is a tool for the benefit
of the underprivileged; the law could not have
given the same tool to others, to the prejudice
of the intended beneficiaries.
This Court, therefore, cannot allow the
party-list system to be sullied and prostituted
by those who are neither marginalized nor
underrepresented. It cannot let that flicker of

Abad, Pascasio, Perez & Saludes (2013)

61

CASE DIGEST IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I (Based on Atty. Gabriels Syllabus)

hope be snuffed out. The clear state policy
must permeate every discussion of the
qualification of political parties and other
organizations under the party-list system.
From its assailed Omnibus Resolution, it
is manifest that the Comelec failed to
appreciate fully the clear policy of the law and
the Constitution. On the contrary, it seems to
have ignored the facet of the party-list system
discussed above. The OSG as its counsel
admitted before the Court that any group,
even
the
non-marginalized
and
overrepresented, could field candidates in the
party-list elections.
When a lower court, or a quasi-judicial
agency like the Commission on Elections,
violates or ignores the Constitution or the law,
its action can be struck down by this Court on
the ground of grave abuse of discretion. 49
Indeed, the function of all judicial and quasijudicial instrumentalities is to apply the law as
they find it, not to reinvent or second-guess it.
50

In its Memorandum, Petitioner Bayan

Muna passionately pleads for the outright
disqualification of the major political parties
Respondents Lakas-NUCD, LDP, NPC, LP and
PMP on the ground that under Comelec
Resolution No. 4073, they have been
accredited as the five (six, including PDPLaban) major political parties in the May 14,
2001 elections. It argues that because of this,
they have the "advantage of getting official
Comelec Election Returns, Certificates of
Canvass, preferred poll watchers x x x." We
note, however, that this accreditation does not
refer to the party-list election, but, inter alia, to
the election of district representatives for the
purpose of determining which parties would be
entitled to watchers under Section 26 of
Republic Act No. 7166.
What is needed under the present
circumstances,
however,
is
a
factual
determination of whether respondents herein
and, for that matter, all the 154 previously
approved
groups,
have
the
necessary
qualifications to participate in the party-list
elections, pursuant to the Constitution and the
law.
Bayan Muna also urges us to immediately rule
out Respondent Mamamayan Ayaw sa Droga
(MAD), because "it is a government entity
using government resources and privileges."
This Court, however, is not a trier of facts. 51 It
is not equipped to receive evidence and
determine the truth of such factual allegations.
Basic rudiments of due process require
that respondents should first be given an

Abad, Pascasio, Perez & Saludes (2013)

opportunity to show that they qualify under

the guidelines promulgated in this Decision,
before they can be deprived of their right to
participate in and be elected under the partylist system.
Guidelines
for
Screening
Party-List
Participants
The Court, therefore, deems it proper to
remand the case to the Comelec for the latter
to determine, after summary evidentiary
hearings, whether the 154 parties and
organizations allowed to participate in the
party-list
elections
comply
with
the
requirements of the law. In this light, the Court
finds it appropriate to lay down the following
guidelines, culled from the law and the
Constitution, to assist the Comelec in its work.
First, the political party, sector,
organization or coalition must represent the
marginalized and underrepresented groups
identified in Section 5 of RA 7941. In other
words, it must show -- through its constitution,
articles of incorporation, bylaws, history,
platform of government and track record -that it represents and seeks to uplift
marginalized and underrepresented sectors.
Verily, majority of its membership should
belong
to
the
marginalized
and
underrepresented. And it must demonstrate
that in a conflict of interests, it has chosen or
is likely to choose the interest of such sectors.
Second, while even major political
parties are expressly allowed by RA 7941 and
the Constitution to participate in the party-list
system, they must comply with the declared
statutory policy of enabling "Filipino citizens
belonging
to
marginalized
and
underrepresented sectors x x x to be elected
to the House of Representatives." In other
words, while they are not disqualified merely
on the ground that they are political parties,
they must show, however, that they represent
the interests of the marginalized and
underrepresented.
Third, in view of the objections directed
against the registration of Ang Buhay Hayaang
Yumabong, which is allegedly a religious
group,
the
Court
notes
the
express
constitutional provision that the religious
sector may not be represented in the party-list
system.
Fourth, a party or an organization must
not be disqualified under Section 6 of RA 7941,
which
enumerates
the
grounds
for
disqualification as follows:

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CASE DIGEST IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I (Based on Atty. Gabriels Syllabus)

"(1) It is a religious sect or
denomination, organization or association
organized for religious purposes;
(2) It advocates violence or unlawful
means to seek its goal;
(3) It is a foreign party or organization;
(4) It is receiving support from any
foreign government, foreign political party,
foundation, organization, whether directly or
through any of its officers or members or
indirectly through third parties for partisan
election purposes;
(5) It violates or fails to comply with
laws, rules or regulations relating to elections;
(6) It declares untruthful statements in
its petition;
(7) It has ceased to exist for at least
one (1) year; or
(8) It fails to participate in the last two
(2) preceding elections or fails to obtain at
least two per centum (2%) of the votes cast
under the party-list system in the two (2)
preceding elections for the constituency in
which it has registered."59
Note should be taken of paragraph 5,
which disqualifies a party or group for violation
of or failure to comply with election laws and
regulations. These laws include Section 2 of RA
7941, which states that the party-list system
seeks to "enable Filipino citizens belonging to
marginalized and underrepresented sectors,
organizations and parties x x x to become
members of the House of Representatives." A
party or an organization, therefore, that does
not comply with this policy must be
disqualified.
Fifth, the party or organization must not
be an adjunct of, or a project organized or an
entity funded or assisted by, the government.
By the very nature of the party-list system, the
party or organization must be a group of
citizens, organized by citizens and operated by
citizens. It must be independent of the
government.
The
participation
of
the
government or its officials in the affairs of a
party-list candidate is not only illegal 60 and
unfair to other parties, but also deleterious to
the objective of the law: to enable citizens
belonging
to
marginalized
and
underrepresented sectors and organizations to
be elected to the House of Representatives.
Sixth, the party must not only comply
with the requirements of the law; its nominees
must likewise do so. Section 9 of RA 7941
reads as follows:
"SEC. 9. Qualifications of Party-List
Nominees. No person shall be nominated as
party-list representative unless he is a natural-

born citizen of the Philippines, a registered

voter, a resident of the Philippines for a period
of not less than one (1) year immediately
preceding the day of the election, able to read
and write, a bona fide member of the party or
organization which he seeks to represent for at
least ninety (90) days preceding the day of the
election, and is at least twenty-five (25) years
of age on the day of the election.
In case of a nominee of the youth
sector, he must at least be twenty-five (25) but
not more than thirty (30) years of age on the
day of the election. Any youth sectoral
representative who attains the age of thirty
(30) during his term shall be allowed to
continue in office until the expiration of his
term."
Seventh, not only the candidate party
or organization must represent marginalized
and underrepresented sectors; so also must its
nominees. To repeat, under Section 2 of RA
7941, the nominees must be Filipino citizens
"who
belong
to
marginalized
and
underrepresented sectors, organizations and
parties." Surely, the interests of the youth
cannot be fully represented by a retiree;
neither can those of the urban poor or the
working class, by an industrialist.
To allow otherwise is to betray the State
policy to give genuine representation to the
marginalized and underrepresented.
Eighth, as previously discussed, while
lacking a well-defined political constituency,
the nominee must likewise be able to
contribute to the formulation and enactment of
appropriate legislation that will benefit the
nation as a whole. Senator Jose Lina explained
during the bicameral committee proceedings
that "the nominee of a party, national or
regional, is not going to represent a particular
district x x x."

Abad, Pascasio, Perez & Saludes (2013)

63

ANG LADLAD LGBT PARTY vs. COMELEC

G.R. No. 190582 April 8, 2010
J. DEL CASTILLO
FACTS: Ang Ladlad is an organization composed
of men and women who identify themselves as
lesbians, gays, bisexuals, or trans-gendered
individuals (LGBTs). Incorporated in 2003, Ang
Ladlad first applied for registration with the
COMELEC in 2006. The application for
accreditation was denied on the ground that the
organization had no substantial membership base.
On August 17, 2009, Ang Ladlad again filed a
Petition for registration with the COMELEC.
Before the COMELEC, petitioner argued
that the LGBT community is a marginalized and

CASE DIGEST IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I (Based on Atty. Gabriels Syllabus)

under-represented sector that is particularly
disadvantaged because of their sexual orientation
and gender identity; that LGBTs are victims of
exclusion, discrimination, and violence; that
because of negative societal attitudes, LGBTs are
constrained to hide their sexual orientation; and
that Ang Ladlad complied with the 8-point
guidelines enunciated by this Court in Ang Bagong
Bayani-OFW Labor Party v. Commission on
Elections.
On November 11, 2009, after admitting
the petitioners evidence, the COMELEC (Second
Division) dismissed the Petition on moral grounds
stating that the definition of the LGBT sector
makes it crystal clear that petitioner tolerates
immorality which offends religious beliefs. ANG
LADLAD collides with Article 695 of the Civil Code
which defines nuisance as Any act, omission,
establishment, business, condition of property, or
anything else which x x x (3) shocks, defies; or
disregards decency or morality x x x It
also
collides with Article 1306 of the Civil Code: The
contracting
parties
may
establish
such
stipulations, clauses, terms and conditions as they
may deem convenient, provided they are not
contrary to law, morals, good customs, public
order or public policy. Art 1409 of the Civil Code
provides that Contracts whose cause, object or
purpose is contrary to law, morals, good customs,
public order or public policy are inexistent and
void from the beginning. Finally to safeguard the
morality of the Filipino community, the Revised
Penal Code, as amended, penalizes Immoral
doctrines, obscene publications and exhibitions
and indecent shows Petitioner should likewise be
denied accreditation not only for advocating
immoral doctrines but likewise for not being
truthful when it said that it or any of its
nominees/party-list representatives have not
violated or failed to comply with laws, rules, or
regulations relating to the elections.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not petitioner does not have a
concrete and genuine national political agenda
to benefit the nation and that the petition was
validly dismissed on moral grounds
2. Whether or not the denial of Ang Ladlads
accreditation by COMELEC violates the
constitutional
guarantee
against
the
establishment of religion.
3. Whether or not the Assailed Resolutions
contravened its constitutional rights to
privacy, freedom of speech and assembly, and
equal protection of laws, as well as constituted
violations of the Philippines international
obligations against discrimination based on
sexual orientation.

Abad, Pascasio, Perez & Saludes (2013)

HELD:
1. As we explicitly ruled in Ang Bagong BayaniOFW Labor Party v. Commission on Elections, the
enumeration
of marginalized and
underrepresented sectors is not exclusive. The crucial
element is not whether a sector is specifically
enumerated, but whether a particular organization
complies with the requirements of the Constitution
and RA 7941. This argument that petitioner made
untruthful statements in its petition when it
alleged its national existence is a new one;
previously, the COMELEC claimed that petitioner
was not being truthful when it said that it or any
of its nominees/party-list representatives have not
violated or failed to comply with laws, rules, or
regulations relating to the elections. Nowhere was
this ground for denial of petitioners accreditation
mentioned or even alluded to in the Assailed
Resolutions. This, in itself, is quite curious,
considering that the reports of petitioners alleged
non-existence were already available to the
COMELEC prior to the issuance of the First Assailed
Resolution. At best, this is irregular procedure; at
worst, a belated afterthought, a change in
respondents theory, and a serious violation of
petitioners right to procedural due process.
Nonetheless, we find that there has been
no misrepresentation. A cursory perusal of Ang
Ladlads initial petition shows that it never claimed
to exist in each province of the Philippines. Rather,
petitioner alleged that the LGBT community in the
Philippines was estimated to constitute at least
670,000 persons; that it had 16,100 affiliates and
members around the country, and 4,044 members
in its electronic discussion group. Since the
COMELEC only searched for the names ANG
LADLAD LGBT or LADLAD LGBT, it is no surprise
that they found that petitioner had no presence in
any of these regions. In fact, if COMELECs findings
are to be believed, petitioner does not even exist
in Quezon City, which is registered as Ang Ladlads
principal place of business.
Against this backdrop, we find that Ang
Ladlad
has
sufficiently
demonstrated
its
compliance with the legal requirements for
accreditation. Indeed, aside from COMELECs
moral objection and the belated allegation of nonexistence, nowhere in the records has the
respondent ever found/ruled that Ang Ladlad is
not qualified to register as a party-list organization
under any of the requisites under RA 7941 or the
guidelines in Ang Bagong Bayani. The difference,
COMELEC claims, lies in Ang Ladlads morality, or
lack thereof.
2. Our Constitution provides in Article III,
Section 5 that [n]o law shall be made

64

CASE DIGEST IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I (Based on Atty. Gabriels Syllabus)

respecting an establishment of religion, or
prohibiting the free exercise thereof. At
bottom, what our non-establishment clause
calls for is government neutrality in religious
matters. Clearly, governmental reliance on
religious justification is inconsistent with this
policy of neutrality. We thus find that it was
grave violation of the non-establishment
clause for the COMELEC to utilize the Bible and
the Koran to justify the exclusion of Ang
Ladlad.
Rather than relying on religious belief,
the legitimacy of the Assailed Resolutions
should depend, instead, on whether the
COMELEC is able to advance some justification
for its rulings beyond mere conformity to
religious
doctrine.
Otherwise
stated,
government must act for secular purposes and
in ways that have primarily secular effects.
3. Public Morals as a Ground to Deny Ang
Ladlads Petition for Registration
The Assailed Resolutions have not
identified any specific overt immoral act
performed by Ang Ladlad. Even the OSG
agrees that there should have been a finding
by the COMELEC that the groups members
have committed or are committing immoral
acts. The OSG argues:
x x x A person may be sexually
attracted to a person of the same gender, of a
different gender, or more than one gender, but
mere attraction does not translate to immoral
acts. There is a great divide between thought
and action. Reduction ad absurdum. If immoral
thoughts could be penalized, COMELEC would
have its hands full of disqualification cases
against both the straights and the gays.
Certainly this is not the intendment of the law..
Respondent has failed to explain what societal
ills are sought to be prevented, or why special
protection is required for the youth. Neither
has the COMELEC condescended to justify its
position that petitioners admission into the
party-list system would be so harmful as to
irreparably damage the moral fabric of society.
We, of course, do not suggest that the state is
wholly without authority to regulate matters
concerning morality, sexuality, and sexual
relations, and we recognize that the
government will and should continue to restrict
behavior considered detrimental to society.
Nonetheless,
we
cannot
countenance
advocates who, undoubtedly with the loftiest
of intentions, situate morality on one end of an
argument or another, without bothering to go
through the rigors of legal reasoning and
explanation. In this, the notion of morality is

Abad, Pascasio, Perez & Saludes (2013)

robbed of all value. Clearly then, the bare

invocation of morality will not remove an issue
from our scrutiny.
We also find the COMELECs reference to
purported violations of our penal and civil laws
flimsy, at best; disingenuous, at worst. Article
694 of the Civil Code defines a nuisance as
any act, omission, establishment, condition of
property, or anything else which shocks,
defies, or disregards decency or morality, the
remedies for which are a prosecution under
the Revised Penal Code or any local ordinance,
a civil action, or abatement without judicial
proceedings. A violation of Article 201 of the
Revised Penal Code, on the other hand,
requires proof beyond reasonable doubt to
support a criminal conviction. It hardly needs
to be emphasized that mere allegation of
violation of laws is not proof, and a mere
blanket invocation of public morals cannot
replace the institution of civil or criminal
proceedings and a judicial determination of
liability or culpability.
As
such,
we
hold
that
moral
disapproval, without more, is not a sufficient
governmental interest to justify exclusion of
homosexuals from participation in the partylist system. The denial of Ang Ladlads
registration on purely moral grounds amounts
more to a statement of dislike and disapproval
of homosexuals, rather than a tool to further
any substantial public interest. Respondents
blanket justifications give rise to the inevitable
conclusion
that
the
COMELEC
targets
homosexuals themselves as a class, not
because
of
any
particular
morally
reprehensible act. It is this selective targeting
that implicates our equal protection clause.
Equal Protection
Despite the absolutism of Article III, Section
1 of our Constitution, which provides nor shall
any person be denied equal protection of the
laws, courts have never interpreted the provision
as an absolute prohibition on classification.
Equality, said Aristotle, consists in the same
treatment of similar persons. The equal protection
clause guarantees that no person or class of
persons shall be deprived of the same protection
of laws which is enjoyed by other persons or other
classes in the same place and in like
circumstances.
Recent jurisprudence has affirmed that if a
law neither burdens a fundamental right nor
targets a suspect class, we will uphold the
classification as long as it bears a rational
relationship to some legitimate government end.
In Central Bank Employees Association, Inc. v.

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CASE DIGEST IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I (Based on Atty. Gabriels Syllabus)

Banko Sentral ng Pilipinas, we declared that [i]n
our jurisdiction, the standard of analysis of equal
protection challenges x x x have followed the
rational basis test, coupled with a deferential
attitude to legislative classifications and a
reluctance to invalidate a law unless there is a
showing of a clear and unequivocal breach of the
Constitution.
The COMELEC posits that the majority of
the Philippine population considers homosexual
conduct as immoral and unacceptable, and this
constitutes sufficient reason to disqualify the
petitioner. Unfortunately for the respondent, the
Philippine electorate has expressed no such belief.
No law exists to criminalize homosexual behavior
or expressions or parties about homosexual
behavior. Indeed, even if we were to assume that
public opinion is as the COMELEC describes it, the
asserted state interest here that is, moral
disapproval of an unpopular minority is not a
legitimate state interest that is sufficient to satisfy
rational basis review under the equal protection
clause. The COMELECs differentiation, and its
unsubstantiated claim that Ang Ladlad cannot
contribute to the formulation of legislation that
would benefit the nation, furthers no legitimate
state interest other than disapproval of or dislike
for a disfavored group.
From the standpoint of the political
process, the lesbian, gay, bisexual, and
transgender have the same interest in
participating in the party-list system on the same
basis as other political parties similarly situated.
State intrusion in this case is equally burdensome.
Hence, laws of general application should apply
with equal force to LGBTs, and they deserve to
participate in the party-list system on the same
basis as other marginalized and under-represented
sectors.
It bears stressing that our finding that
COMELECs act of differentiating LGBTs from
heterosexuals insofar as the party-list system is
concerned does not imply that any other law
distinguishing
between
heterosexuals
and
homosexuals under different circumstances would
similarly fail. We disagree with the OSGs position
that homosexuals are a class in themselves for the
purposes of the equal protection clause. We are
not prepared to single out homosexuals as a
separate class meriting special or differentiated
treatment. We have not received sufficient
evidence to this effect, and it is simply
unnecessary to make such a ruling today.
Petitioner itself has merely demanded that it be
recognized under the same basis as all other
groups similarly situated, and that the COMELEC
made an unwarranted and impermissible

classification not justified by the circumstances of

the case.

Abad, Pascasio, Perez & Saludes (2013)

66

Freedom of Expression and Association

Under our system of laws, every group has
the right to promote its agenda and attempt to
persuade society of the validity of its position
through normal democratic means. It is in the
public square that deeply held convictions and
differing opinions should be distilled and
deliberated upon. As we held in Estrada v. Escritor:
In a democracy, this common agreement
on political and moral ideas is distilled in the public
square. Where citizens are free, every opinion,
every prejudice, every aspiration, and every moral
discernment has access to the public square
where people deliberate the order of their life
together. Citizens are the bearers of opinion,
including opinion shaped by, or espousing religious
belief, and these citizens have equal access to the
public square. In this representative democracy,
the state is prohibited from determining which
convictions and moral judgments may be
proposed for public deliberation. Through a
constitutionally designed process, the people
deliberate and decide. Majority rule is a necessary
principle in this democratic governance. Thus,
when public deliberation on moral judgments is
finally crystallized into law, the laws will largely
reflect the beliefs and preferences of the majority,
i.e., the mainstream or median groups.
Nevertheless, in the very act of adopting and
accepting a constitution and the limits it specifies
including protection of religious freedom "not only
for a minority, however small not only for a
majority, however large but for each of us" the
majority imposes upon itself a self-denying
ordinance. It promises not to do what it otherwise
could do: to ride roughshod over the dissenting
minorities.
Freedom of expression constitutes one of the
essential foundations of a democratic society, and
this freedom applies not only to those that are
favorably received but also to those that offend,
shock, or disturb. Any restriction imposed in this
sphere must be proportionate to the legitimate
aim pursued. Absent any compelling state interest,
it is not for the COMELEC or this Court to impose
its views on the populace. Otherwise stated, the
COMELEC is certainly not free to interfere with
speech for no better reason than promoting an
approved message or discouraging a disfavored
one.
This position gains even more force if one
considers that homosexual conduct is not illegal in
this country. It follows that both expressions
concerning ones homosexuality and the activity of

CASE DIGEST IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I (Based on Atty. Gabriels Syllabus)

forming a political association that supports LGBT
individuals are protected as well.
Other jurisdictions have gone so far as to
categorically rule that even overwhelming public
perception that homosexual conduct violates
public morality does not justify criminalizing samesex conduct. European and United Nations judicial
decisions have ruled in favor of gay rights
claimants on both privacy and equality grounds,
citing general privacy and equal protection
provisions in foreign and international texts. To the
extent that there is much to learn from other
jurisdictions that have reflected on the issues we
face here, such jurisprudence is certainly
illuminating. These foreign authorities, while not
formally binding on Philippine courts, may
nevertheless have persuasive influence on the
Courts analysis.
In the area of freedom of expression, for
instance, United States courts have ruled that
existing free speech doctrines protect gay and
lesbian rights to expressive conduct. In order to
justify the prohibition of a particular expression of
opinion, public institutions must show that their
actions were caused by something more than a
mere desire to avoid the discomfort and
unpleasantness that always accompany an
unpopular viewpoint.
With respect to freedom of association for
the advancement of ideas and beliefs, in Europe,
with its vibrant human rights tradition, the
European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) has
repeatedly stated that a political party may
campaign for a change in the law or the
constitutional structures of a state if it uses legal
and democratic means and the changes it
proposes are consistent with democratic
principles. The ECHR has emphasized that political
ideas that challenge the existing order and whose
realization is advocated by peaceful means must
be afforded a proper opportunity of expression
through the exercise of the right of association,
even if such ideas may seem shocking or
unacceptable to the authorities or the majority of
the population. A political group should not be
hindered solely because it seeks to publicly debate
controversial political issues in order to find
solutions
capable
of
satisfying
everyone
concerned. Only if a political party incites violence
or puts forward policies that are incompatible with
democracy does it fall outside the protection of the
freedom of association guarantee.
We do not doubt that a number of our
citizens may believe that homosexual conduct is
distasteful, offensive, or even defiant. They are
entitled to hold and express that view. On the
other hand, LGBTs and their supporters, in all
likelihood, believe with equal fervor that

relationships between individuals of the same sex

are
morally
equivalent
to
heterosexual
relationships. They, too, are entitled to hold and
express that view. However, as far as this Court is
concerned, our democracy precludes using the
religious or moral views of one part of the
community to exclude from consideration the
values of other members of the community.
Of course, none of this suggests the
impending arrival of a golden age for gay rights
litigants. It well may be that this Decision will only
serve to highlight the discrepancy between the
rigid constitutional analysis of this Court and the
more complex moral sentiments of Filipinos. We do
not suggest that public opinion, even at its most
liberal, reflect a clear-cut strong consensus
favorable to gay rights claims and we neither
attempt nor expect to affect individual perceptions
of homosexuality through this Decision.
The OSG argues that since there has been
neither prior restraint nor subsequent punishment
imposed on Ang Ladlad, and its members have
not been deprived of their right to voluntarily
associate, then there has been no restriction on
their freedom of expression or association. The
OSG argues that:
There was no utterance restricted, no
publication censored, or any assembly denied.
[COMELEC] simply exercised its authority to review
and verify the qualifications of petitioner as a
sectoral party applying to participate in the partylist system. This lawful exercise of duty cannot be
said to be a transgression of Section 4, Article III of
the Constitution.
xxxx
A denial of the petition for registration x x x
does not deprive the members of the petitioner to
freely take part in the conduct of elections. Their
right to vote will not be hampered by said denial.
In fact, the right to vote is a constitutionallyguaranteed right which cannot be limited.
As to its right to be elected in a genuine
periodic election, petitioner contends that the
denial of Ang Ladlads petition has the clear and
immediate effect of limiting, if not outrightly
nullifying the capacity of its members to fully and
equally participate in public life through
engagement in the party list elections.
This argument is puerile. The holding of a public
office is not a right but a privilege subject to
limitations imposed by law. x x x
The OSG fails to recall that petitioner has,
in fact, established its qualifications to participate
in the party-list system, and as advanced by the
OSG itself the moral objection offered by the
COMELEC was not a limitation imposed by law. To
the extent, therefore, that the petitioner has been
precluded, because of COMELECs action, from

Abad, Pascasio, Perez & Saludes (2013)

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CASE DIGEST IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I (Based on Atty. Gabriels Syllabus)

publicly expressing its views as a political party
and participating on an equal basis in the political
process with other equally-qualified party-list
candidates, we find that there has, indeed, been a
transgression of petitioners fundamental rights.
Non-Discrimination and International Law
In an age that has seen international law
evolve geometrically in scope and promise,
international human rights law, in particular, has
grown dynamically in its attempt to bring about a
more just and humane world order. For individuals
and groups struggling with inadequate structural
and governmental support, international human
rights norms are particularly significant, and
should be effectively enforced in domestic legal
systems so that such norms may become actual,
rather than ideal, standards of conduct.
Our Decision today is fully in accord with our
international obligations to protect and promote
human rights. In particular, we explicitly recognize
the principle of non-discrimination as it relates to
the right to electoral participation, enunciated in
the UDHR and the ICCPR.
The principle of non-discrimination is laid
out in Article 26 of the ICCPR, as follows:
Article 26
All persons are equal before the law and
are entitled without any discrimination to the equal
protection of the law. In this respect, the law shall
prohibit any discrimination and guarantee to all
persons equal and effective protection against
discrimination on any ground such as race, colour,
sex, language, religion, political or other opinion,
national or social origin, property, birth or other
status.
In this context, the principle of nondiscrimination requires that laws of general
application relating to elections be applied equally
to all persons, regardless of sexual orientation.
Although sexual orientation is not specifically
enumerated as a status or ratio for discrimination
in Article 26 of the ICCPR, the ICCPR Human Rights
Committee has opined that the reference to sex
in Article 26 should be construed to include
sexual orientation. Additionally, a variety of
United
Nations
bodies
have
declared
discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation to
be prohibited under various international
agreements.
The UDHR provides:
Article 21.
(1)
Everyone has the right to take part in the
government of his country, directly or through
freely chosen representatives.
Likewise, the ICCPR states:
Article 25

Every citizen shall have the right and the

opportunity, without any of the distinctions
mentioned in article 2 and without unreasonable
restrictions:
(a)
To take part in the conduct of public affairs,
directly or through freely chosen representatives;
(b)
To vote and to be elected at genuine
periodic elections which shall be by universal and
equal suffrage and shall be held by secret ballot,
guaranteeing the free expression of the will of the
electors;
(c)
To have access, on general terms of
equality, to public service in his country.
As stated by the CHR in its Comment-inIntervention, the scope of the right to electoral
participation is elaborated by the Human Rights
Committee in its General Comment No. 25
(Participation in Public Affairs and the Right to
Vote) as follows:
1.
Article 25 of the Covenant recognizes and
protects the right of every citizen to take part in
the conduct of public affairs, the right to vote and
to be elected and the right to have access to
public service. Whatever form of constitution or
government is in force, the Covenant requires
States to adopt such legislative and other
measures as may be necessary to ensure that
citizens have an effective opportunity to enjoy the
rights it protects. Article 25 lies at the core of
democratic government based on the consent of
the people and in conformity with the principles of
the Covenant.
15.
The effective implementation of the right
and the opportunity to stand for elective office
ensures that persons entitled to vote have a free
choice of candidates. Any restrictions on the right
to stand for election, such as minimum age, must
be justifiable on objective and reasonable criteria.
Persons who are otherwise eligible to stand for
election should not be excluded by unreasonable
or discriminatory requirements such as education,
residence or descent, or by reason of political
affiliation. No person should suffer discrimination
or disadvantage of any kind because of that
person's candidacy. States parties should indicate
and explain the legislative provisions which
exclude any group or category of persons from
elective office.
We stress, however, that although this
Court stands willing to assume the responsibility of
giving effect to the Philippines international law
obligations, the blanket invocation of international
law is not the panacea for all social ills. We refer
now to the petitioners invocation of the
Yogyakarta
Principles
(the
Application
of
International Human Rights Law In Relation to
Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity, which

Abad, Pascasio, Perez & Saludes (2013)

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CASE DIGEST IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I (Based on Atty. Gabriels Syllabus)

petitioner declares to reflect binding principles of
international law.
At this time, we are not prepared to
declare that these Yogyakarta Principles contain
norms that are obligatory on the Philippines. There
are declarations and obligations outlined in said
Principles which are not reflective of the current
state of international law, and do not find basis in
any of the sources of international law enumerated
under Article 38(1) of the Statute of the
International Court of Justice. Petitioner has not
undertaken any objective and rigorous analysis of
these alleged principles of international law to
ascertain their true status.
We also hasten to add that not everything
that society or a certain segment of society
wants or demands is automatically a human right.
This is not an arbitrary human intervention that
may be added to or subtracted from at will. It is
unfortunate that much of what passes for human
rights today is a much broader context of needs
that identifies many social desires as rights in
order to further claims that international law
obliges states to sanction these innovations. This
has the effect of diluting real human rights, and is
a result of the notion that if wants are couched in
rights language, then they are no longer
controversial.
Using even the most liberal of lenses,
these Yogyakarta Principles, consisting of a
declaration formulated by various international law
professors, are at best de lege ferenda and do
not constitute binding obligations on the
Philippines. Indeed, so much of contemporary
international law is characterized by the soft law
nomenclature, i.e., international law is full of
principles that promote international cooperation,
harmony, and respect for human rights, most of
which amount to no more than well-meaning
desires, without the support of either State
practice or opinio juris.
CONGRESSMAN JOVITO S. PALPARAN, JR.,
vs.
HOUSE
OF
REPRESENTATIVES
ELECTORAL
TRIBUNAL
(HRET),
DR.
REYNALDO
LESACA,
JR.,
CRISTINA
PALABAY, RENATO M. REYES, JR., ERLINDA
CADAPAN,
ANTONIO FLORES and JOSELITO USTAREZ,
G.R. No. 189506 & 189466 February 11,
2010
ABAD, J.
FACTS: In G.R. No. 189506, petitioner Jovito S.
Palparan, Jr. is the first nominee of the Bantay
party-list group that won a seat in the 2007
elections for the members of the House of
Representatives.
Respondents Reynaldo

Abad, Pascasio, Perez & Saludes (2013)

Lesaca, Jr., Cristina Palabay, Renato M. Reyes,

Jr., Erlinda Cadapan, Antonio Flores, and
Joselito Ustarez are members of some other
party-list groups.
Shortly after the elections, respondent
Lesaca and the others with him filed with
respondent HRET a petition for quo warranto
against Bantay and its nominee, petitioner
Palparan, in HRET Case 07-040. Lesaca and
the others alleged that Palparan was ineligible
to sit in the House of Representatives as partylist nominee because he did not belong to the
marginalized and underrepresented sectors
that Bantay represented, namely, the victims
of communist rebels, Civilian Armed Forces
Geographical Units (CAFGUs), former rebels,
and security guards. Lesaca and the others
said that Palparan committed gross human
rights violations against marginalized and
underrepresented sectors and organizations.
On July 23, 2009 respondent HRET issued an
order dismissing the petition against Bantay
for the reason that the issue of the ineligibility
or qualification of the party-list group fell
within the jurisdiction of the COMELEC
pursuant to the Party-List System Act.
In G.R. 189466, petitioner Daryl Grace J.
Abayon is the first nominee of the Aangat Tayo
party-list organization that won a seat in the
House of Representatives during the 2007
elections.
Respondents Perfecto C. Lucaban, Jr.,
Ronyl S. Dela Cruz, and Agustin C. Doroga, all
registered voters, filed a petition for quo
warranto with respondent HRET against
Aangat Tayo and its nominee, petitioner
Abayon, in HRET Case 07-041. They claimed
that Aangat Tayo was not eligible for a partylist seat in the House of Representatives, since
it did not represent the marginalized and
underrepresented sectors.
Respondent Lucaban and the others
with him further pointed out that petitioner
Abayon herself was not qualified to sit in the
House as a party-list nominee since she did
not
belong
to
the
marginalized
and
underrepresented sectors, she being the wife
of an incumbent congressional district
representative.
ISSUE: Whether or not respondent HRET has
jurisdiction over the question of qualifications
of petitioners Abayon and Palparan as
nominees of Aangat Tayo and Bantay party-list
organizations, respectively, who took the seats
at the House of Representatives that such
organizations won in the 2007 elections.

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CASE DIGEST IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I (Based on Atty. Gabriels Syllabus)

HELD: Yes. The Court holds that respondent
HRET did not gravely abuse its discretion when
it dismissed the petitions for quo warranto
against Aangat Tayo party-list and Bantay
party-list but upheld its jurisdiction over the
question of the qualifications of petitioners
Abayon and Palparan.
Petitioners Abayon and Palparan have a
common theory: Republic Act (R.A.) 7941, the
Party-List System Act, vests in the COMELEC
the authority to determine which parties or
organizations have the qualifications to seek
party-list seats in the House of Representatives
during the elections. Indeed, the HRET
dismissed the petitions for quo warranto filed
with
it
insofar
as
they
sought
the
disqualifications of Aangat Tayo and Bantay.
Since petitioners Abayon and Palparan were
not elected into office but were chosen by their
respective organizations under their internal
rules, the HRET has no jurisdiction to inquire
into and adjudicate their qualifications as
nominees.
If at all, says petitioner Abayon, such authority
belongs to the COMELEC which already upheld
her qualification as nominee of Aangat Tayo for
the women sector. For Palparan, Bantays
personality is so inseparable and intertwined
with his own person as its nominee so that the
HRET cannot dismiss the quo warranto action
against Bantay without dismissing the action
against him.
But, although it is the party-list
organization that is voted for in the elections,
it is not the organization that sits as and
becomes a member of the House of
Representatives. Section 5, Article VI of the
Constitution identifies who the members of
that House are:
Sec.
5.
(1).
The
House
of
Representatives shall be composed of not
more than two hundred and fifty members,
unless otherwise fixed by law, who shall be
elected from legislative districts apportioned
among the provinces, cities, and the
Metropolitan Manila area in accordance with
the number of their respective inhabitants,
and on the basis of a uniform and progressive
ratio, and those who, as provided by law, shall
be elected through a party -list system of
registered national, regional, and sectoral
parties
or
organizations.
(Underscoring
supplied)
Clearly, the members of the House of
Representatives are of two kinds: members x
x x who shall be elected from legislative
districts and those who x x x shall be elected
through a party-list system of registered

national, regional, and sectoral parties or

organizations. This means that, from the
Constitutions point of view, it is the party-list
representatives who are elected into office,
not their parties or organizations. These
representatives are elected, however, through
that peculiar party-list system that the
Constitution authorized and that Congress by
law established where the voters cast their
votes for the organizations or parties to which
such party-list representatives belong.
Once
elected,
both
the
district
representatives
and
the
party-list
representatives are treated in like manner.
They have the same deliberative rights,
salaries,
and
emoluments.
They
can
participate in the making of laws that will
directly benefit their legislative districts or
sectors. They are also subject to the same
term limitation of three years for a maximum
of three consecutive terms.
It may not be amiss to point out that
the Party-List System Act itself recognizes
party-list nominees as members of the House
of Representatives, thus:
Sec. 2. Declaration of Policy. - The State
shall promote proportional representation in
the election of representatives to the House of
Representatives through a party-list system of
registered national, regional and sectoral
parties or organizations or coalitions thereof,
which will enable Filipino citizens belonging to
the
marginalized
and
underrepresented
sectors, organizations and parties, and who
lack well-defined political constituencies but
who could contribute to the formulation and
enactment of appropriate legislation that will
benefit the nation as a whole, to become
members of the House of Representatives.
Towards this end, the State shall develop and
guarantee a full, free and open party system in
order to attain the broadest possible
representation of party, sectoral or group
interests in the House of Representatives by
enhancing their chances to compete for and
win seats in the legislature, and shall provide
the simplest scheme possible. (Underscoring
supplied)
As this Court also held in Bantay
Republic Act or BA-RA 7941 v. Commission on
Elections, a party-list representative is in every
sense an elected member of the House of
Representatives. Although the vote cast in a
party-list election is a vote for a party, such
vote, in the end, would be a vote for its
nominees, who, in appropriate cases, would
eventually sit in the House of Representatives.

Abad, Pascasio, Perez & Saludes (2013)

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CASE DIGEST IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I (Based on Atty. Gabriels Syllabus)

Both the Constitution and the Party-List
System Act set the qualifications and grounds
for disqualification of party-list nominees.
Section 9 of R.A. 7941, echoing the
Constitution, states:
Sec. 9. Qualification of Party-List
Nominees. No person shall be nominated as
party-list representative unless he is a naturalborn citizen of the Philippines, a registered
voter, a resident of the Philippines for a period
of not less than one (1) year immediately
preceding the day of the election, able to read
and write, bona fide member of the party or
organization which he seeks to represent for at
least ninety (90) days preceding the day of the
election, and is at least twenty-five (25) years
of age on the day of the election.
In case of a nominee of the youth
sector, he must at least be twenty-five (25) but
not more than thirty (30) years of age on the
day of the election. Any youth sectoral
representative who attains the age of thirty
(30) during his term shall be allowed to
continue until the expiration of his term.
In the cases before the Court, those
who
challenged
the
qualifications
of
petitioners Abayon and Palparan claim that the
two do not belong to the marginalized and
underrepresented sectors that they ought to
represent. The Party-List System Act provides
that a nominee must be a bona fide member
of the party or organization which he seeks to
represent.
It is for the HRET to interpret the
meaning of this particular qualification of a
nomineethe need for him or her to be a bona
fide member or a representative of his partylist organizationin the context of the facts
that characterize petitioners Abayon and
Palparans relation to Aangat Tayo and Bantay,
respectively, and the marginalized and
underrepresented
interests
that
they
presumably embody.
Petitioners Abayon and Palparan of
course point out that the authority to
determine the qualifications of a party-list
nominee belongs to the party or organization
that nominated him. This is true, initially. The
right to examine the fitness of aspiring
nominees and, eventually, to choose five from
among them after all belongs to the party or
organization that nominates them. But where
an allegation is made that the party or
organization had chosen and allowed a
disqualified nominee to become its party-list
representative in the lower House and enjoy
the secured tenure that goes with the position,

the resolution of the dispute is taken out of its

hand.
Parenthetically, although the Party-List
System Act does not so state, the COMELEC
seems to believe, when it resolved the
challenge to petitioner Abayon, that it has the
power to do so as an incident of its authority to
approve
the
registration
of
party-list
organizations. But the Court need not resolve
this question since it is not raised here and has
not been argued by the parties.
What is inevitable is that Section 17,
Article VI of the Constitution provides that the
HRET shall be the sole judge of all contests
relating to, among other things, the
qualifications of the members of the House of
Representatives. Since, as pointed out above,
party-list nominees are elected members of
the House of Representatives no less than the
district representatives are, the HRET has
jurisdiction to hear and pass upon their
qualifications. By analogy with the cases of
district representatives, once the party or
organization of the party-list nominee has
been proclaimed and the nominee has taken
his oath and assumed office as member of the
House of Representatives, the COMELECs
jurisdiction over election contests relating to
his qualifications ends and the HRETs own
jurisdiction begins.

Abad, Pascasio, Perez & Saludes (2013)

71

REPUBLIC ACT No. 7941

AN ACT PROVIDING FOR THE ELECTION OF
PARTY-LIST REPRESENTATIVES THROUGH
THE PARTY-LIST SYSTEM, AND
APPROPRIATING FUNDS THEREFOR
Section 1. Title. This Act shall be known as
the "Party-List System Act."
Section 2. Declaration of part y. The State
shall promote proportional representation in
the election of representatives to the House of
Representatives through a party-list system of
registered national, regional and sectoral
parties or organizations or coalitions thereof,
which will enable Filipino citizens belonging to
marginalized and under-represented sectors,
organizations and parties, and who lack welldefined political constituencies but who could
contribute to the formulation and enactment of
appropriate legislation that will benefit the
nation as a whole, to become members of the
House of Representatives. Towards this end,
the State shall develop and guarantee a full,

CASE DIGEST IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I (Based on Atty. Gabriels Syllabus)

free and open party system in order to attain
the broadcast possible representation of party,
sectoral or group interests in the House of
Representatives by enhancing their chances to
compete for and win seats in the legislature,
and shall provide the simplest scheme
possible.
Section 3. Definition of Terms. (a) The partylist system is a mechanism of proportional
representation
in
the
election
of
representatives
to
the
House
of
Representatives from national, regional and
sectoral parties or organizations or coalitions
thereof registered with the Commission on
Elections (COMELEC). Component parties or
organizations of a coalition may participate
independently provided the coalition of which
they form part does not participate in the
party-list system.
(b) A party means either a political party or a
sectoral party or a coalition of parties.
(c) A political party refers to an organized
group of citizens advocating an ideology or
platform, principles and policies for the
general conduct of government and which, as
the most immediate means of securing their
adoption, regularly nominates and supports
certain of its leaders and members as
candidates for public office.
It is a national party when its constituency is
spread over the geographical territory of at
least a majority of the regions. It is a regional
party when its constituency is spread over the
geographical territory of at least a majority of
the cities and provinces comprising the region.
(d) A sectoral party refers to an organized
group of citizens belonging to any of the
sectors enumerated in Section 5 hereof whose
principal advocacy pertains to the special
interest and concerns of their sector,
(e) A sectoral organization refers to a group of
citizens or a coalition of groups of citizens who
share
similar
physical
attributes
or
characteristics, employment, interests or
concerns.

Section 4. Manifestation to Participate in the

Party-List System. Any party, organization, or
coalition
already
registered
with
the
Commission need not register anew. However,
such party, organization, or coalition shall file
with the Commission, not later than ninety
(90) days before the election, a manifestation
of its desire to participate in the party-list
system.
Section 5. Registration. Any organized group
of persons may register as a party,
organization or coalition for purposes of the
party-list system by filing with the COMELEC
not later than ninety (90) days before the
election a petition verified by its president or
secretary stating its desire to participate in the
party-list system as a national, regional or
sectoral party or organization or a coalition of
such parties or organizations, attaching
thereto its constitution, by-laws, platform or
program of government, list of officers,
coalition agreement and other relevant
information as the COMELEC may require:
Provided, That the sectors shall include labor,
peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor, indigenous
cultural communities, elderly, handicapped,
women, youth, veterans, overseas workers,
and professionals.
The COMELEC shall publish the petition in at
least two (2) national newspapers of general
circulation.
The COMELEC shall, after due notice and
hearing, resolve the petition within fifteen (15)
days from the date it was submitted for
decision but in no case not later than sixty (60)
days before election.
Section 6. Refusal and/or Cancellation of
Registration. The COMELEC may, motu propio
or upon verified complaint of any interested
party, refuse or cancel, after due notice and
hearing, the registration of any national,
regional or sectoral party, organization or
coalition on any of the following grounds:
(1) It is a religious sect or denomination,
organization or association, organized for
religious purposes;

(f) A coalition refers to an aggrupation of duly

registered national, regional, sectoral parties
or organizations for political and/or election
purposes.

(2) It advocates violence or unlawful means to

seek its goal;

Abad, Pascasio, Perez & Saludes (2013)

72

(3) It is a foreign party or organization;

CASE DIGEST IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I (Based on Atty. Gabriels Syllabus)

(4) It is receiving support from any foreign
government,
foreign
political
party,
foundation, organization, whether directly or
through any of its officers or members or
indirectly through third parties for partisan
election purposes;
(5) It violates or fails to comply with laws, rules
or regulations relating to elections;
(6) It declares untruthful statements in its
petition;
(7) It has ceased to exist for at least one (1)
year; or
(8) It fails to participate in the last two (2)
preceding elections or fails to obtain at least
two per centum (2%) of the votes cast under
the party-list system in the two (2) preceding
elections for the constituency in which it has
registered.
Section 7. Certified List of Registered Parties.
The COMELEC shall, not later than sixty (60)
days before election, prepare a certified list of
national,
regional,
or
sectoral
parties,
organizations or coalitions which have applied
or who have manifested their desire to
participate under the party-list system and
distribute copies thereof to all precincts for
posting in the polling places on election day.
The names of the part y-list nominees shall not
be shown on the certified list.
Section
8.
Nomination
of
Party-List
Representatives.
Each
registered
party,
organization or coalition shall submit to the
COMELEC not later than forty-five (45) days
before the election a list of names, not less
than
five
(5),
from
which
party-list
representatives shall be chosen in case it
obtains the required number of votes.
A person may be nominated in one (1) list only.
Only persons who have given their consent in
writing may be named in the list. The list shall
not include any candidate for any elective
office or a person who has lost his bid for an
elective office in the immediately preceding
election. No change of names or alteration of
the order of nominees shall be allowed after
the same shall have been submitted to the
COMELEC except in cases where the nominee
dies, or withdraws in writing his nomination,
becomes incapacitated in which case the
name of the substitute nominee shall be

Abad, Pascasio, Perez & Saludes (2013)

placed last in the list. Incumbent sectoral

representatives
in
the
House
of
Representatives who are nominated in the
party-list system shall not be considered
resigned.
Section 9. Qualifications of Party-List
Nominees. No person shall be nominated as
party-list representative unless he is a naturalborn citizen of the Philippines, a registered
voter, a resident of the Philippines for a period
of not less than one (1)year immediately
preceding the day of the election, able to read
and write, a bona fide member of the party or
organization which he seeks to represent for at
least ninety (90) days preceding the day of the
election, and is at least twenty-five (25) years
of age on the day of the election.
In case of a nominee of the youth sector, he
must at least be twenty-five (25) but not more
than thirty (30) years of age on the day of the
election. Any youth sectoral representative
who attains the age of thirty (30) during his
term shall be allowed to continue in office until
the expiration of his term.
Section 10. Manner of Voting. Every voter
shall be entitled to two (2) votes: the first is a
vote for candidate for member of the House of
Representatives in his legislative district, and
the second, a vote for the party, organizations,
or coalition he wants represented in the house
of Representatives: Provided, That a vote cast
for a party, sectoral organization, or coalition
not entitled to be voted for shall not be
counted: Provided, finally, That the first
election under the party-list system shall be
held in May 1998.
The COMELEC shall undertake the necessary
information
campaign
for
purposes
of
educating the electorate on the matter of the
party-list system.
Section
11.
Number
of
Party-List
Representatives. The party-list representatives
shall constitute twenty per centum (20%) of
the total number of the members of the House
of Representatives including those under the
party-list.
For purposes of the May 1998 elections, the
first five (5) major political parties on the basis
of party representation in the House of
Representatives at the start of the Tenth

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CASE DIGEST IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I (Based on Atty. Gabriels Syllabus)

Congress of the Philippines shall not be
entitled to participate in the party-list system.
In determining the allocation of seats for the
second vote, the following procedure shall be
observed:
(a) The parties, organizations, and coalitions
shall be ranked from the highest to the lowest
based on the number of votes they garnered
during the elections.
(b) The parties, organizations, and coalitions
receiving at least two percent (2%) of the total
votes cast for the party-list system shall be
entitled to one seat each: Provided, That those
garnering more than two percent (2%) of the
votes shall be entitled to additional seats in
proportion to their total number of votes :
Provided, finally, That each party, organization,
or coalition shall be entitled to not more than
three (3) seats.
Section 12. Procedure in Allocating Seats for
Party-List Representatives. The COMELEC shall
tally
all
the
votes
for
the
parties,
organizations, or coalitions on a nationwide
basis, rank them according to the number of
votes
received
and
allocate
party-list
representatives proportionately according to
the percentage of votes obtained by each
party, organization, or coalition as against the
total nationwide votes cast for the party-list
system.
Section 13. How Party-List Representatives
are Chosen. Party-list representatives shall be
proclaimed by the COMELEC based on the list
of names submitted by the respective parties,
organizations, or coalitions to the COMELEC
according to their ranking in said list.
Section 14. Term of Office. Party-list
representatives shall be elected for a term of
three (3) years which shall begin, unless
otherwise provided by law, at noon on the
thirtieth day of June next following their
election. No party-list representatives shall
serve for more than three (3) consecutive
terms. Voluntary renunciation of the office for
any length of time shall not be considered as
an interruption in the continuity his service for
the full term for which he was elected.
Section 15. Change of Affiliation; Effect. Any
elected party-list representative who changes
his political party or sectoral affiliation during

Abad, Pascasio, Perez & Saludes (2013)

his term of office shall forfeit his seat:

Provided, That if he changes his political party
or sectoral affiliation within six (6) months
before an election, he shall not be eligible for
nomination as party-list representative under
his new party or organization.
Section 16. Vacancy. In case of vacancy in
the
seats
reserved
for
party-list
representatives,
the
vacancy
shall
be
automatically filled by the next representative
from the list of nominees in the order
submitted to the COMELEC by the same party,
organization, or coalition, who shall serve for
the unexpired term. If the list is exhausted, the
party, organization coalition concerned shall
submit additional nominees.
Section
17.
Rights
of
Party-List
Representatives. Party-List Representatives
shall be entitled to the same salaries and
emoluments as regular members of the House
of Representatives.
Section 18. Rules and Regulations. The
COMELEC shall promulgate the necessary rules
and regulations as may be necessary to carry
out the purposes of this Act.
Section 19. Appropriations. The amount
necessary for the implementation of this Act
shall be provided in the regular appropriations
for the Commission on Elections starting fiscal
year 1996 under the General Appropriations
Act.
Starting 1995, the COMELEC is hereby
authorized to utilize savings and other
available funds for purposes of its information
campaign on the party-list system.
Section 20. Separability Clause. If any part of
this Act is held invalid or unconstitutional, the
other parts or provisions thereof shall remain
valid and effective.
Section 21. Repealing Clause. All laws,
decrees,
executive
orders,
rules
and
regulations, or parts thereof, inconsistent with
the provisions of this Act are hereby repealed.
Section 22. Effectivity. This Act shall take
effect fifteen (15) days after its publication in a
newspaper of general circulation.
Approved, March 3, 1995.

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CASE DIGEST IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I (Based on Atty. Gabriels Syllabus)

SECTION 6
IMELDA
ROMUALDEZ-MARCOS,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and CIRILO
ROY MONTEJO
G.R. No. 119976 September 18, 1995
KAPUNAN, J.:
FACTS: Petitioner Imelda Romualdez-Marcos
filed her Certificate of Candidacy for the
position of Representative of the First District
of Leyte with the Provincial Election Supervisor
on March 8, 1995, providing the following
information in item no. 8: 4
RESIDENCE IN THE CONSTITUENCY
WHERE I SEEK TO BE ELECTED IMMEDIATELY
PRECEDING THE ELECTION: __________ Years
and seven Months.
On March 23, 1995, private respondent
Cirilo
Roy
Montejo,
the
incumbent
Representative of the First District of Leyte and
a candidate for the same position, filed a
"Petition for Cancellation and Disqualification" 5
with the Commission on Elections alleging that
petitioner did not meet the constitutional
requirement for residency. He contended that
Mrs. Marcos lacked the Constitution's one year
residency requirement for candidates for the
House of Representatives on the evidence of
declarations made by her in Voter Registration
Record 94-No. 3349772 6 and in her Certificate
of Candidacy.
On March 29, 1995, petitioner filed an
Amended/Corrected Certificate of Candidacy,
changing the entry "seven" months to "since
childhood" in item no. 8 of the amended
certificate. 8 On the same day, the Provincial
Election
Supervisor
of
Leyte
informed
petitioner that:
[T]his office cannot receive or accept
the aforementioned Certificate of Candidacy
on the ground that it is filed out of time.
Consequently,
petitioner
filed
the
Amended/Corrected Certificate of Candidacy
with the COMELEC's Head Office in Intramuros,
Manila on March 31, 1995. Her Answer to
private respondent's petition in SPA No. 95-009
was likewise filed with the head office on the
same day. In said Answer, petitioner averred
that the entry of the word "seven" in her
original Certificate of Candidacy was the result
of an "honest misinterpretation" 10 which she
sought to rectify by adding the words "since
childhood"
in
her
Amended/Corrected
Certificate of Candidacy and that "she has
always maintained Tacloban City as her
domicile or residence.

Abad, Pascasio, Perez & Saludes (2013)

ISSUES:
1. Whether or not petitioner was a resident, for
election purposes, of the First District of Leyte
for a period of one year at the time of the May
9, 1995 elections.
2. a) Prior to the elections
Whether or not the COMELEC properly
exercised its jurisdiction in disqualifying
petitioner outside the period mandated by the
Omnibus Election Code for disqualification
cases under Article 78 of the said Code.
b) After the Elections
Whether or not the House of Representatives
Electoral
Tribunal
assumed
exclusive
jurisdiction over the question of petitioner's
qualifications after the May 8, 1995 elections.
HELD:
While the COMELEC seems to be in
agreement with the general proposition that
for the purposes of election law, residence is
synonymous with domicile, the Resolution
reveals a tendency to substitute or mistake the
concept of domicile for actual residence, a
conception not intended for the purpose of
determining a candidate's qualifications for
election to the House of Representatives as
required by the 1987 Constitution. As it were,
residence, for the purpose of meeting the
qualification for an elective position, has a
settled meaning in our jurisdiction.
Article 50 of the Civil Code decrees that
"[f]or the exercise of civil rights and the
fulfillment of civil obligations, the domicile of
natural persons is their place of habitual
residence." In Ong vs. Republic this court took
the concept of domicile to mean an
individual's "permanent home", "a place to
which, whenever absent for business or for
pleasure, one intends to return, and depends
on facts and circumstances in the sense that
they disclose intent." Based on the foregoing,
domicile includes the twin elements of "the
fact of residing or physical presence in a fixed
place" and animus manendi, or the intention of
returning there permanently.
Residence, in its ordinary conception,
implies the factual relationship of an individual
to a certain place. It is the physical presence of
a person in a given area, community or
country. The essential distinction between
residence and domicile in law is that residence
involves the intent to leave when the purpose
for which the resident has taken up his abode
ends. One may seek a place for purposes such
as pleasure, business, or health. If a person's
intent be to remain, it becomes his domicile; if

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CASE DIGEST IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I (Based on Atty. Gabriels Syllabus)

his intent is to leave as soon as his purpose is
established it is residence. It is thus, quite
perfectly normal for an individual to have
different
residences
in
various
places.
However, a person can only have a single
domicile, unless, for various reasons, he
successfully abandons his domicile in favor of
another domicile of choice. In Uytengsu vs.
Republic, 23 we laid this distinction quite
clearly:
There is a difference between domicile
and residence. "Residence" is used to indicate
a place of abode, whether permanent or
temporary;
"domicile" denotes a fixed
permanent residence to which, when absent,
one has the intention of returning. A man may
have a residence in one place and a domicile
in another. Residence is not domicile, but
domicile is residence coupled with the
intention to remain for an unlimited time. A
man can have but one domicile for the same
purpose at any time, but he may have
numerous places of residence. His place of
residence is generally his place of domicile,
but it is not by any means necessarily so since
no length of residence without intention of
remaining will constitute domicile.
For political purposes the concepts of
residence and domicile are dictated by the
peculiar criteria of political laws. As these
concepts have evolved in our election law,
what has clearly and unequivocally emerged is
the fact that residence for election purposes is
used synonymously with domicile.
It is the fact of residence, not a
statement in a certificate of candidacy which
ought to be decisive in determining whether or
not
and
individual
has
satisfied
the
constitution's
residency
qualification
requirement. The said statement becomes
material only when there is or appears to be a
deliberate attempt to mislead, misinform, or
hide a fact which would otherwise render a
candidate ineligible. It would be plainly
ridiculous for a candidate to deliberately and
knowingly make a statement in a certificate of
candidacy which would lead to his or her
disqualification.
It stands to reason therefore, that
petitioner merely committed an honest
mistake in jotting the word "seven" in the
space provided for the residency qualification
requirement. The circumstances leading to her
filing the questioned entry obviously resulted
in the subsequent confusion which prompted
petitioner to write down the period of her
actual stay in Tolosa, Leyte instead of her
period of residence in the First district, which

was "since childhood" in the space provided.

These circumstances and events are amply
detailed in the COMELEC's Second Division's
questioned resolution, albeit with a different
interpretation. For instance, when herein
petitioner announced that she would be
registering in Tacloban City to make her
eligible to run in the First District, private
respondent Montejo opposed the same,
claiming that petitioner was a resident of
Tolosa, not Tacloban City. Petitioner then
registered in her place of actual residence in
the First District, which is Tolosa, Leyte, a fact
which she subsequently noted down in her
Certificate of Candidacy. A close look at said
certificate would reveal the possible source of
the confusion: the entry for residence (Item
No. 7) is followed immediately by the entry for
residence in the constituency where a
candidate seeks election thus:
7. RESIDENCE (complete Address):
Brgy. Olot, Tolosa, Leyte
POST OFFICE ADDRESS FOR ELECTION
PURPOSES: Brgy. Olot, Tolosa, Leyte
8. RESIDENCE IN THE CONSTITUENCY
WHERE I SEEK TO BE ELECTED IMMEDIATELY
PRECEDING THE ELECTION:_________ Years and
Seven Months.
Having
been
forced
by
private
respondent to register in her place of actual
residence in Leyte instead of petitioner's
claimed domicile, it appears that petitioner
had jotted down her period of stay in her legal
residence or domicile. The juxtaposition of
entries in Item 7 and Item 8 the first
requiring actual residence and the second
requiring domicile coupled with the
circumstances
surrounding
petitioner's
registration as a voter in Tolosa obviously led
to her writing down an unintended entry for
which she could be disqualified. This honest
mistake should not, however, be allowed to
negate the fact of residence in the First District
if such fact were established by means more
convincing than a mere entry on a piece of
paper.
We now proceed to the matter of
petitioner's domicile.
In support of its asseveration that
petitioner's domicile could not possibly be in
the First District of Leyte, the Second Division
of the COMELEC, in its assailed Resolution of
April 24,1995 maintains that "except for the
time when (petitioner) studied and worked for
some years after graduation in Tacloban City,
she continuously lived in Manila." The
Resolution additionally cites certain facts as
indicative of the fact that petitioner's domicile

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ought to be any place where she lived in the
last few decades except Tacloban, Leyte. First,
according to the Resolution, petitioner, in
1959, resided in San Juan, Metro Manila where
she was also registered voter. Then, in 1965,
following the election of her husband to the
Philippine presidency, she lived in San Miguel,
Manila where she as a voter. In 1978 and
thereafter, she served as a member of the
Batasang Pambansa and Governor of Metro
Manila. "She could not, have served these
positions if she had not been a resident of
Metro Manila," the COMELEC stressed. Here is
where the confusion lies.
We have stated, many times in the past,
that an individual does not lose his domicile
even if he has lived and maintained residences
in different places. Residence, it bears
repeating, implies a factual relationship to a
given place for various purposes. The absence
from legal residence or domicile to pursue a
profession, to study or to do other things of a
temporary or semi-permanent nature does not
constitute loss of residence. Thus, the
assertion by the COMELEC that "she could not
have been a resident of Tacloban City since
childhood up to the time she filed her
certificate of candidacy because she became a
resident of many places" flies in the face of
settled jurisprudence in which this Court
carefully made distinctions between (actual)
residence and domicile for election law
purposes. In Larena vs. Teves, 33 supra, we
stressed:
[T]his court is of the opinion and so holds
that a person who has his own house wherein
he lives with his family in a municipality
without having ever had the intention of
abandoning it, and without having lived either
alone or with his family in another
municipality, has his residence in the former
municipality, notwithstanding his having
registered as an elector in the other
municipality in question and having been a
candidate for various insular and provincial
positions, stating every time that he is a
resident of the latter municipality.
More significantly, in Faypon vs. Quirino,
34 We explained that:
A citizen may leave the place of his birth
to look for "greener pastures," as the saying
goes, to improve his lot, and that, of course
includes study in other places, practice of his
avocation, or engaging in business. When an
election is to be held, the citizen who left his
birthplace to improve his lot may desire to
return to his native town to cast his ballot but
for professional or business reasons, or for any

other reason, he may not absent himself from

his professional or business activities; so there
he registers himself as voter as he has the
qualifications to be one and is not willing to
give up or lose the opportunity to choose the
officials who are to run the government
especially in national elections. Despite such
registration, the animus revertendi to his
home, to his domicile or residence of origin
has not forsaken him. This may be the
explanation why the registration of a voter in a
place other than his residence of origin has not
been
deemed
sufficient
to
constitute
abandonment or loss of such residence. It finds
justification in the natural desire and longing
of every person to return to his place of birth.
This strong feeling of attachment to the place
of one's birth must be overcome by positive
proof of abandonment for another.
From the foregoing, it can be concluded
that in its above-cited statements supporting
its proposition that petitioner was ineligible to
run for the position of Representative of the
First District of Leyte, the COMELEC was
obviously referring to petitioner's various
places of (actual) residence, not her domicile.
In doing so, it not only ignored settled
jurisprudence on residence in election law and
the
deliberations
of
the
constitutional
commission but also the provisions of the
Omnibus Election Code (B.P. 881). 35
What is undeniable, however, are the
following set of facts which establish the fact
of petitioner's domicile, which we lift verbatim
from the COMELEC's Second Division's assailed
Resolution: 36
In or about 1938 when respondent was a
little over 8 years old, she established her
domicile in Tacloban, Leyte (Tacloban City).
She studied in the Holy Infant Academy in
Tacloban from 1938 to 1949 when she
graduated from high school. She pursued her
college studies in St. Paul's College, now
Divine Word University in Tacloban, where she
earned her degree in Education. Thereafter,
she taught in the Leyte Chinese School, still in
Tacloban City. In 1952 she went to Manila to
work with her cousin, the late speaker Daniel
Z. Romualdez in his office in the House of
Representatives. In 1954, she married exPresident Ferdinand E. Marcos when he was
still a congressman of Ilocos Norte and
registered there as a voter. When her husband
was elected Senator of the Republic in 1959,
she and her husband lived together in San
Juan, Rizal where she registered as a voter. In
1965, when her husband was elected President
of the Republic of the Philippines, she lived

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with him in Malacanang Palace and registered
as a voter in San Miguel, Manila.
[I]n February 1986 (she claimed that) she
and her family were abducted and kidnapped
to Honolulu, Hawaii. In November 1991, she
came home to Manila. In 1992, respondent ran
for election as President of the Philippines and
filed her Certificate of Candidacy wherein she
indicated that she is a resident and registered
voter of San Juan, Metro Manila.
Applying the principles discussed to the
facts found by COMELEC, what is inescapable
is that petitioner held various residences for
different purposes during the last four
decades.
None
of
these
purposes
unequivocally point to an intention to abandon
her domicile of origin in Tacloban, Leyte.
Moreover, while petitioner was born in Manila,
as a minor she naturally followed the domicile
of her parents. She grew up in Tacloban,
reached her adulthood there and eventually
established residence in different parts of the
country for various reasons. Even during her
husband's presidency, at the height of the
Marcos Regime's powers, petitioner kept her
close ties to her domicile of origin by
establishing
residences
in
Tacloban,
celebrating her birthdays and other important
personal milestones in her home province,
instituting well-publicized projects for the
benefit of her province and hometown, and
establishing a political power base where her
siblings and close relatives held positions of
power either through the ballot or by
appointment, always with either her influence
or consent. These well-publicized ties to her
domicile of origin are part of the history and
lore of the quarter century of Marcos power in
our country. Either they were entirely ignored
in the COMELEC'S Resolutions, or the majority
of the COMELEC did not know what the rest of
the country always knew: the fact of
petitioner's domicile in Tacloban, Leyte.
Private respondent in his Comment,
contends that Tacloban was not petitioner's
domicile of origin because she did not live
there until she was eight years old. He avers
that after leaving the place in 1952, she
"abandoned her residency (sic) therein for
many years and . . . (could not) re-establish
her domicile in said place by merely
expressing her intention to live there again."
We do not agree.
First, minor follows the domicile of his
parents. As domicile, once acquired is retained
until a new one is gained, it follows that in
spite of the fact of petitioner's being born in
Manila, Tacloban, Leyte was her domicile of

origin by operation of law. This domicile was

not established only when her father brought
his family back to Leyte contrary to private
respondent's averments.
Second, domicile of origin is not easily
lost. To successfully effect a change of
domicile, one must demonstrate: 37
1. An actual removal or an actual change
of domicile;
2. A bona fide intention of abandoning
the former place of residence and establishing
a new one; and
3. Acts which correspond with the
purpose.
In the absence of clear and positive proof
based on these criteria, the residence of origin
should be deemed to continue. Only with
evidence showing concurrence of all three
requirements
can
the
presumption
of
continuity or residence be rebutted, for a
change of residence requires an actual and
deliberate abandonment, and one cannot have
two legal residences at the same time. 38 In
the case at bench, the evidence adduced by
private respondent plainly lacks the degree of
persuasiveness required to convince this court
that an abandonment of domicile of origin in
favor of a domicile of choice indeed occurred.
To effect an abandonment requires the
voluntary act of relinquishing petitioner's
former domicile with an intent to supplant the
former domicile with one of her own choosing
(domicilium voluntarium).
In this connection, it cannot be correctly
argued that petitioner lost her domicile of
origin by operation of law as a result of her
marriage to the late President Ferdinand E.
Marcos in 1952. For there is a clearly
established distinction between the Civil Code
concepts of "domicile" and "residence." 39 The
presumption that the wife automatically gains
the husband's domicile by operation of law
upon marriage cannot be inferred from the use
of the term "residence" in Article 110 of the
Civil Code because the Civil Code is one area
where the two concepts are well delineated.
Dr. Arturo Tolentino, writing on this specific
area explains:
In the Civil Code, there is an obvious
difference between domicile and residence.
Both terms imply relations between a person
and a place; but in residence, the relation is
one of fact while in domicile it is legal or
juridical, independent of the necessity of
physical presence. 40
Article 110 of the Civil Code provides:
Art. 110. The husband shall fix the
residence of the family. But the court may

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exempt the wife from living with the husband if
he should live abroad unless in the service of
the Republic.
A survey of jurisprudence relating to
Article 110 or to the concepts of domicile or
residence as they affect the female spouse
upon marriage yields nothing which would
suggest that the female spouse automatically
loses her domicile of origin in favor of the
husband's choice of residence upon marriage.
Article 110 is a virtual restatement of
Article 58 of the Spanish Civil Code of 1889
which states:
La mujer esta obligada a seguir a su
marido donde quiera que fije su residencia. Los
Tribunales, sin embargo, podran con justa
causa eximirla de esta obligacion cuando el
marido transende su residencia a ultramar o' a
pais extranjero.
Note the use of the phrase "donde quiera
su fije de residencia" in the aforequoted
article, which means wherever (the husband)
wishes to establish residence. This part of the
article clearly contemplates only actual
residence because it refers to a positive act of
fixing a family home or residence. Moreover,
this interpretation is further strengthened by
the phrase "cuando el marido translade su
residencia" in the same provision which
means, "when the husband shall transfer his
residence," referring to another positive act of
relocating the family to another home or place
of actual residence. The article obviously
cannot be understood to refer to domicile
which is a fixed,fairly-permanent concept when
it
plainly
connotes
the
possibility
of
transferring from one place to another not only
once, but as often as the husband may deem
fit to move his family, a circumstance more
consistent with the concept of actual
residence.
The right of the husband to fix the actual
residence is in harmony with the intention of
the law to strengthen and unify the family,
recognizing the fact that the husband and the
wife bring into the marriage different domiciles
(of origin). This difference could, for the sake
of family unity, be reconciled only by allowing
the husband to fix a single place of actual
residence.
Very significantly, Article 110 of the Civil
Code is found under Title V under the heading:
RIGHTS
AND
OBLIGATIONS
BETWEEN
HUSBAND AND WIFE. Immediately preceding
Article 110 is Article 109 which obliges the
husband and wife to live together, thus:
Art. 109. The husband and wife are
obligated to live together, observe mutual

respect and fidelity and render mutual help

and support.
The duty to live together can only be
fulfilled if the husband and wife are physically
together. This takes into account the situations
where the couple has many residences (as in
the case of the petitioner). If the husband has
to stay in or transfer to any one of their
residences, the wife should necessarily be with
him in order that they may "live together."
Hence, it is illogical to conclude that Art. 110
refers to "domicile" and not to "residence."
Otherwise, we shall be faced with a situation
where the wife is left in the domicile while the
husband, for professional or other reasons,
stays in one of their (various) residences. As
Dr. Tolentino further explains:
Residence and Domicile Whether the
word "residence" as used with reference to
particular matters is synonymous with
"domicile" is a question of some difficulty, and
the ultimate decision must be made from a
consideration of the purpose and intent with
which the word is used. Sometimes they are
used synonymously, at other times they are
distinguished from one another.
xxx xxx xxx
Residence in the civil law is a material
fact, referring to the physical presence of a
person in a place. A person can have two or
more residences, such as a country residence
and a city residence. Residence is acquired by
living in place; on the other hand, domicile can
exist without actually living in the place. The
important thing for domicile is that, once
residence has been established in one place,
there be an intention to stay there
permanently, even if residence is also
established in some other place.
In fact, even the matter of a common
residence between the husband and the wife
during the marriage is not an iron-clad
principle; In cases applying the Civil Code on
the question of a common matrimonial
residence, our jurisprudence has recognized
certain situations 42 where the spouses could
not be compelled to live with each other such
that the wife is either allowed to maintain a
residence different from that of her husband
or, for obviously practical reasons, revert to
her original domicile (apart from being allowed
to opt for a new one). In De la Vina vs. Villareal
43 this Court held that "[a] married woman
may acquire a residence or domicile separate
from that of her husband during the existence
of the marriage where the husband has given
cause for divorce." 44 Note that the Court
allowed the wife either to obtain new

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residence or to choose a new domicile in such
an event. In instances where the wife actually
opts, .under the Civil Code, to live separately
from her husband either by taking new
residence or reverting to her domicile of origin,
the Court has held that the wife could not be
compelled to live with her husband on pain of
contempt. In Arroyo vs. Vasques de Arroyo 45
the Court held that:
Upon examination of the authorities, we
are convinced that it is not within the province
of the courts of this country to attempt to
compel one of the spouses to cohabit with,
and render conjugal rights to, the other. Of
course where the property rights of one of the
pair are invaded, an action for restitution of
such rights can be maintained. But we are
disinclined to sanction the doctrine that an
order, enforcible (sic) by process of contempt,
may be entered to compel the restitution of
the purely personal right of consortium. At
best such an order can be effective for no
other purpose than to compel the spouses to
live under the same roof; and he experience of
those countries where the courts of justice
have assumed to compel the cohabitation of
married people shows that the policy of the
practice is extremely questionable. Thus in
England, formerly the Ecclesiastical Court
entertained suits for the restitution of conjugal
rights at the instance of either husband or
wife; and if the facts were found to warrant it,
that court would make a mandatory decree,
enforceable by process of contempt in case of
disobedience, requiring the delinquent party to
live with the other and render conjugal rights.
Yet this practice was sometimes criticized even
by the judges who felt bound to enforce such
orders, and in Weldon v. Weldon (9 P.D. 52),
decided in 1883, Sir James Hannen, President
in the Probate, Divorce and Admiralty Division
of the High Court of Justice, expressed his
regret that the English law on the subject was
not the same as that which prevailed in
Scotland, where a decree of adherence,
equivalent to the decree for the restitution of
conjugal rights in England, could be obtained
by the injured spouse, but could not be
enforced by imprisonment. Accordingly, in
obedience to the growing sentiment against
the practice, the Matrimonial Causes Act
(1884) abolished the remedy of imprisonment;
though a decree for the restitution of conjugal
rights can still be procured, and in case of
disobedience may serve in appropriate cases
as the basis of an order for the periodical
payment of a stipend in the character of
alimony.

In the voluminous jurisprudence of the

United States, only one court, so far as we can
discover, has ever attempted to make a
preemptory order requiring one of the spouses
to live with the other; and that was in a case
where a wife was ordered to follow and live
with her husband, who had changed his
domicile to the City of New Orleans. The
decision referred to (Bahn v. Darby, 36 La.
Ann., 70) was based on a provision of the Civil
Code of Louisiana similar to article 56 of the
Spanish Civil Code. It was decided many years
ago, and the doctrine evidently has not been
fruitful even in the State of Louisiana. In other
states of the American Union the idea of
enforcing cohabitation by process of contempt
is rejected. (21 Cyc., 1148).
In a decision of January 2, 1909, the
Supreme Court of Spain appears to have
affirmed an order of the Audiencia Territorial
de Valladolid requiring a wife to return to the
marital domicile, and in the alternative, upon
her failure to do so, to make a particular
disposition of certain money and effects then
in her possession and to deliver to her
husband, as administrator of the ganancial
property, all income, rents, and interest which
might accrue to her from the property which
she had brought to the marriage. (113 Jur. Civ.,
pp. 1, 11) But it does not appear that this
order for the return of the wife to the marital
domicile was sanctioned by any other penalty
than the consequences that would be visited
upon her in respect to the use and control of
her property; and it does not appear that her
disobedience to that order would necessarily
have been followed by imprisonment for
contempt.
Parenthetically when Petitioner was
married to then Congressman Marcos, in 1954,
petitioner was obliged by virtue of Article
110 of the Civil Code to follow her
husband's actual place of residence fixed by
him. The problem here is that at that time, Mr.
Marcos had several places of residence,
among which were San Juan, Rizal and Batac,
Ilocos Norte. There is no showing which of
these places Mr. Marcos did fix as his family's
residence. But assuming that Mr. Marcos had
fixed any of these places as the conjugal
residence, what petitioner gained upon
marriage was actual residence. She did not
lose her domicile of origin.
On the other hand, the common law
concept of "matrimonial domicile" appears to
have been incorporated, as a result of our
jurisprudential experiences after the drafting
of the Civil Code of 1950, into the New Family

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Code. To underscore the difference between
the intentions of the Civil Code and the Family
Code drafters, the term residence has been
supplanted by the term domicile in an entirely
new provision (Art. 69) distinctly different in
meaning and spirit from that found in Article
110. The provision recognizes revolutionary
changes in the concept of women's rights in
the intervening years by making the choice of
domicile a product of mutual agreement
between the spouses. Without as much
belaboring the point, the term residence may
mean one thing in civil law (or under the Civil
Code) and quite another thing in political law.
What stands clear is that insofar as the Civil
Code is concerned-affecting the rights and
obligations of husband and wife the term
residence should only be interpreted to mean
"actual residence." The inescapable conclusion
derived from this unambiguous civil law
delineation therefore, is that when petitioner
married the former President in 1954, she kept
her domicile of origin and merely gained a new
home, not a domicilium necessarium.
Even assuming for the sake of argument
that petitioner gained a new "domicile" after
her marriage and only acquired a right to
choose a new one after her husband died,
petitioner's acts following her return to the
country clearly indicate that she not only
impliedly but expressly chose her domicile of
origin (assuming this was lost by operation of
law) as her domicile. This "choice" was
unequivocally expressed in her letters to the
Chairman of the PCGG when petitioner sought
the PCGG's permission to "rehabilitate (our)
ancestral house in Tacloban and Farm in Olot,
Leyte. . . to make them livable for the Marcos
family to have a home in our homeland." 47
Furthermore, petitioner obtained her residence
certificate in 1992 in Tacloban, Leyte, while
living in her brother's house, an act which
supports the domiciliary intention clearly
manifested in her letters to the PCGG
Chairman. She could not have gone straight to
her home in San Juan, as it was in a state of
disrepair, having been previously looted by
vandals. Her "homes" and "residences"
following her arrival in various parts of Metro
Manila merely qualified as temporary or
"actual residences," not domicile. Moreover,
and proceeding from our discussion pointing
out specific situations where the female
spouse either reverts to her domicile of origin
or chooses a new one during the subsistence
of the marriage, it would be highly illogical for
us to assume that she cannot regain her
original domicile upon the death of her

husband absent a positive act of selecting a

new one where situations exist within the
subsistence of the marriage itself where the
wife gains a domicile different from her
husband.
In the light of all the principles relating to
residence and domicile enunciated by this
court up to this point, we are persuaded that
the facts established by the parties weigh
heavily in favor of a conclusion supporting
petitioner's claim of legal residence or domicile
in the First District of Leyte.

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81

2. It is a settled doctrine that a statute

requiring rendition of judgment within a
specified time is generally construed to be
merely directory, 49 "so that non-compliance
with them does not invalidate the judgment on
the theory that if the statute had intended
such result it would have clearly indicated it."
50 The difference between a mandatory and a
directory provision is often made on grounds of
necessity.
The
mischief
in
petitioner's
contending that the COMELEC should have
abstained from rendering a decision after the
period stated in the Omnibus Election Code
because it lacked jurisdiction, lies in the fact
that our courts and other quasi-judicial bodies
would then refuse to render judgments merely
on the ground of having failed to reach a
decision within a given or prescribed period.
In any event, with the enactment of
Sections 6 and 7 of R.A. 6646 in relation to
Section 78 of B.P. 881, 52 it is evident that the
respondent Commission does not lose
jurisdiction to hear and decide a pending
disqualification case under Section 78 of B.P.
881 even after the elections. As to the House
of
Representatives
Electoral
Tribunal's
supposed assumption of jurisdiction over the
issue of petitioner's qualifications after the
May 8, 1995 elections, suffice it to say that
HRET's jurisdiction as the sole judge of all
contests relating to the elections, returns and
qualifications of members of Congress begins
only after a candidate has become a member
of the House of Representatives. 53 Petitioner
not being a member of the House of
Representatives, it is obvious that the HRET at
this point has no jurisdiction over the question.
It would be an abdication of many of
the ideals enshrined in the 1987 Constitution
for us to either to ignore or deliberately make
distinctions in law solely on the basis of the
personality of a petitioner in a case. Obviously
a distinction was made on such a ground here.
Surely, many established principles of law,
even of election laws were flouted for the sake

CASE DIGEST IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I (Based on Atty. Gabriels Syllabus)

perpetuating power during the pre-EDSA
regime. We renege on these sacred ideals,
including the meaning and spirit of EDSA
ourselves bending established principles of
principles of law to deny an individual what he
or she justly deserves in law. Moreover, in
doing so, we condemn ourselves to repeat the
mistakes of the past.
AGAPITO A. AQUINO vs. COMMISSION ON
ELECTIONS,
MOVE
MAKATI,
MATEO
BEDON and JUANITO ICARO
G.R. No. 120265 September 18, 1995
KAPUNAN, J.
FACTS: On March 20, 1995, petitioner Agapito
A. Aquino filed his Certificate of Candidacy for
the position of Representative for the new
Second Legislative District of Makati City.
Among others, Aquino provided the following
information in his certificate of candidacy, viz:.
(7) RESIDENCE (Complete Address):
284 AMAPOLA COR. ADALLA STS., PALM
VILLAGE, MAKATI.
xxx xxx xxx
(8) RESIDENCE IN THE CONSTITUENCY
WHERE I SEEK TO BE ELECTED IMMEDIATELY
PRECEDING THE ELECTION: ______ Years and
10 Months.
xxx xxx xxx
THAT I AM ELIGIBLE for said Office; That
I will support and defend the Constitution of
the Republic of the Philippines and will
maintain true faith and allegiance thereto;
That I will obey the law, rules and decrees
promulgated
by
the
duly
constituted
authorities; That the obligation imposed to
such is assumed voluntarily, without mental
reservation or purpose of evasion, and that the
facts therein are true to the best of my
knowledge. 1
On April 24, 1995, Move Makati, a duly
registered political party, and Mateo Bedon,
Chairman of the LAKAS-NUCD-UMDP of
Barangay Cembo, Makati City, filed a petition
to disqualify Agapito A. Aquino on the ground
that
the
latter
lacked
the
residence
qualification as a candidate for congressman
which, under Section 6, Art. VI of the 1987 the
Constitution, should be for a period not less
than one (1) year immediately preceding the
May 8, 1995 elections.
On April 25, 1995, a day after said
petition for disqualification was filed, petitioner
filed
another
certificate
of
candidacy
amending the certificate dated March 20,
1995. This time, petitioner stated in Item 8 of
his certificate that he had resided in the

Abad, Pascasio, Perez & Saludes (2013)

constituency where he sought to be elected for

one (l) year and thirteen (13) days.
On May 2, 1995, petitioner filed his
Answer dated April 29, 1995 praying for the
dismissal of the disqualification case. On the
same day, May 2, 1995, a hearing was
conducted by the COMELEC wherein petitioner
testified and presented in evidence, among
others, his Affidavit dated May 2, 1995, lease
contract between petitioner and Leonor
Feliciano dated April 1, 1994, Affidavit of
Leonor Feliciano dated April 28,1995
and
Affidavit of Daniel Galamay dated April 28,
1995.
After hearing of the petition for
disqualification, the Second Division of the
COMELEC promulgated a Resolution dismissing
the instant petition for Disqualification against
respondent AGAPITO AQUINO and declares him
ELIGIBLE
to
run
for
the
Office
of
Representative in the Second Legislative
District of Makati City.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not petitioner has met the
residency requirement to be qualified to run as
Representative for 2nd Legislative District of
Makati
2. Whether or not the COMELEC erred in
issuing it Order instructing the Board of
Canvassers of Makati City to proclaim as
winner the candidate receiving the next higher
number of votes
HELD:

We agree with COMELEC's contention

that in order that petitioner could qualify as a
candidate for Representative of the Second
District of Makati City the latter "must prove
that he has established not just residence but
domicile of choice.
The Constitution requires that a person
seeking
election
to
the
House
of
Representatives should be a resident of the
district in which he seeks election for a period
of not less than one (l) year prior to the
elections.
Residence, for election law purposes,
has a settled meaning in our jurisdiction.
In Co v. Electoral Tribunal of the House
of Representatives this Court held that the
term "residence" has always been understood
as synonymous with "domicile" not only under
the previous Constitutions but also under the
1987 Constitution. The Court there held:
The deliberations of the Constitutional
Commission reveal that the meaning of
residence vis-a-vis the qualifications of a

82

CASE DIGEST IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I (Based on Atty. Gabriels Syllabus)

candidate for Congress continues to remain
the same as that of domicile, to wit:
Mr. Nolledo: With respect to Section 5, I
remember that in the 1971 Constitutional
Convention, there was an attempt to require
residence in the place not less than one year
immediately preceding the day of elections. So
my question is: What is the Committee's
concept of domicile or constructive residence?
Mr. Davide: Madame President, insofar
as the regular members of the National
Assembly are concerned, the proposed section
merely provides, among others, and a resident
thereof', that is, in the district, for a period of
not less than one year preceding the day of
the election. This was in effect lifted from the
1973 Constitution, the interpretation given to
it was domicile (emphasis ours) Records of the
1987 Constitutional Convention, Vol. II, July 22,
1986, p. 87).
xxx xxx xxx
Mrs. Rosario Braid: The next question is
on section 7, page 2. I think Commissioner
Nolledo has raised the same point that
"resident" has been interpreted at times as a
matter of intention rather than actual
residence.
Mr. De Los Reyes: Domicile.
Ms. Rosario Braid: Yes, So, would the
gentlemen consider at the proper time to go
back to actual residence rather than mere
intention to reside?
Mr. De los Reyes: But We might
encounter
some
difficulty
especially
considering that the provision in the
Constitution in the Article on Suffrage says
that Filipinos living abroad may vote as
enacted by law. So, we have to stick to the
original concept that it should be by domicile
and not physical and actual residence.
(Records
of
the
1987
Constitutional
Commission, Vol. II, July 22, 1986, p. 110).
The framers of the Constitution
adhered to the earlier definition given to the
word "residence" which regarded it as having
the same meaning as domicile.
Clearly, the place "where a party
actually or constructively has his permanent
home," 21 where he, no matter where he may
be found at any given time, eventually intends
to return and remain, i.e., his domicile, is that
to which the Constitution refers when it speaks
of residence for the purposes of election law.
The manifest purpose of this deviation from
the usual conceptions of residency in law as
explained in Gallego vs. Vera at 22 is "to
exclude strangers or newcomers unfamiliar
with the conditions and needs of the

community" from taking advantage of

favorable circumstances existing in that
community for electoral gain. While there is
nothing wrong with the practice of establishing
residence in a given area for meeting election
law requirements, this nonetheless defeats the
essence of representation, which is to place
through the assent of voters those most
cognizant and sensitive to the needs of a
particular district, if a candidate falls short of
the period of residency mandated by law for
him to qualify. That purpose could be obviously
best met by individuals who have either had
actual residence in the area for a given period
or who have been domiciled in the same area
either by origin or by choice. It would,
therefore, be imperative for this Court to
inquire into the threshold question as to
whether or not petitioner actually was a
resident for a period of one year in the area
now encompassed by the Second Legislative
District of Makati at the time of his election or
whether or not he was domiciled in the same.
As found by the COMELEC en banc
petitioner in his Certificate of Candidacy for
the May 11, 1992 elections, indicated not only
that he was a resident of San Jose,
Concepcion, Tarlac in 1992 but that he was a
resident of the same for 52 years immediately
preceding that election. 23 At the time, his
certificate indicated that he was also a
registered voter of the same district. 24 His
birth certificate places Concepcion, Tarlac as
the birthplace of both of his parents Benigno
and Aurora. 25 Thus, from data furnished by
petitioner himself to the COMELEC at various
times during his political career, what stands
consistently clear and unassailable is that this
domicile of origin of record up to the time of
filing of his most recent certificate of
candidacy for the 1995 elections was
Concepcion, Tarlac.
Petitioner's alleged connection with the
Second District of Makati City is an alleged
lease agreement of condominium unit in the
area. As the COMELEC, in its disputed
Resolution noted:
The intention not to establish a
permanent home in Makati City is evident in
his leasing a condominium unit instead of
buying one. While a lease contract maybe
indicative of respondent's intention to reside in
Makati City it does not engender the kind of
permanency required to prove abandonment
of one's original domicile especially since, by
its terms, it is only for a period of two (2)
years, and respondent Aquino himself testified
that his intention was really for only one (l)

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CASE DIGEST IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I (Based on Atty. Gabriels Syllabus)

year because he has other "residences" in
Manila or Quezon City.
While property ownership is not and
should never be an indicia of the right to vote
or to be voted upon, the fact that petitioner
himself claims that he has other residences in
Metro Manila coupled with the short length of
time he claims to be a resident of the
condominium unit in Makati (and the fact, of
his stated domicile in Tarlac) "indicate that the
sole purpose of (petitioner) in transferring his
physical residence" 27 is not to acquire's new
residence or domicile "but only to qualify as a
candidate for Representative of the Second
District of Makati City." 28 The absence of clear
and positive proof showing a successful
abandonment of domicile under the conditions
stated above, the lack of identification
sentimental, actual or otherwise with the
area, and the suspicious circumstances under
which the lease agreement was effected all
belie petitioner's claim of residency for the
period required by the Constitution, in the
Second District of Makati. As the COMELEC en
banc emphatically pointed out:
[T]he lease agreement was executed
mainly to support the one year residence
requirement as a qualification for a candidate
of
Representative,
by
establishing
a
commencement date of his residence. If a
perfectly valid lease agreement cannot, by
itself establish; a domicile of choice, this
particular lease agreement cannot do better. 29
Moreover, his assertion that he has
transferred his domicile from Tarlac to Makati
is a bare assertion which is hardly supported
by the facts in the case at bench. Domicile of
origin is not easily lost. To successfully effect a
change of domicile, petitioner must prove an
actual removal or an actual change of
domicile; a bona fide intention of abandoning
the former place of residence and establishing
a new one and definite acts which correspond
with the purpose. 30 These requirements are
hardly met by the evidence adduced in
support of petitioner's claims of a change of
domicile from Tarlac to the Second District of
Makati. In the absence of clear and positive
proof, the domicile of origin be deemed to
continue requirements are hardly met by the
evidence adduced in support of petitioner's
claims of a change of domicile from Tarlac to
the Second District of Makati. In the absence
of clear and positive proof, the domicile of
origin should be deemed to continue.
Finally, petitioner's submission that it
would be legally impossible to impose the one
year residency requirement in a newly created

political district is specious and lacks basis in

logic. A new political district is not created out
of thin air. It is carved out from part of a real
and existing geographic area, in this case the
old Municipality of Makati. That people actually
lived or were domiciled in the area
encompassed by the new Second District
cannot be denied. Modern-day carpetbaggers
cannot be allowed take advantage of the
creation of new political districts by suddenly
transplanting themselves in such new districts,
prejudicing their genuine residents in the
process of taking advantage of existing
conditions in these areas. It will be noted, as
COMELEC did in its assailed resolution, that
petitioner was disqualified from running in the
Senate because of the constitutional two-term
limit, and had to shop around for a place
where he could run for public office. Nothing
wrong with that, but he must first prove with
reasonable certainty that he has effected a
change of residence for election law purposes
for the period required by law. This he has not
effectively done.
2. This, it bears repeating, expresses
the more logical and democratic view. We
cannot, in another shift of the pendulum,
subscribe to the contention that the runner-up
in an election in which the winner has been
disqualified is actually the winner among the
remaining qualified candidates because this
clearly represents a minority view supported
only by a scattered number of obscure
American state and English court decisions.
These decisions neglect the possibility that the
runner-up, though obviously qualified, could
receive votes so measly and insignificant in
number that the votes they receive would be
tantamount to rejection. Theoretically, the
"second placer" could receive just one vote. In
such a case, it is absurd to proclaim the totally
repudiated candidate as the voters' "choice."
Moreover, even in instances where the votes
received by the second placer may not be
considered numerically insignificant, voters
preferences are nonetheless so volatile and
unpredictable that the result among qualified
candidates, should the equation change
because of the disqualification of an ineligible
candidate, would not be self-evident. Absence
of the apparent though ineligible winner
among the choices could lead to a shifting of
votes to candidates other than the second
placer. By any mathematical formulation, the
runner-up in an election cannot be construed
to have obtained a majority or plurality of
votes cast where an "ineligible" candidate has

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CASE DIGEST IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I (Based on Atty. Gabriels Syllabus)

garnered either a majority or plurality of the
votes.

HELD:
ON THE ISSUE OF CITIZENSHIP
The
pertinent
portions
of
the
Constitution found in Article IV read:
SECTION 1, the following are citizens of
the Philippines:
1. Those who are citizens of the
Philippines at the time of the adoption of the
Constitution;
2. Those whose fathers or mothers are
citizens of the Philippines;
3. Those born before January 17, 1973,
of Filipino mothers, who elect Philippine

citizenship upon reaching the age of majority;

and
4. Those who are naturalized in
accordance with law.
SECTION 2, Natural-born Citizens are
those who are citizens of the Philippines from
birth without having to perform any act to
acquire or perfect their citizenship. Those who
elect Philippine citizenship in accordance with
paragraph 3 hereof shall be deemed naturalborn citizens.
The foregoing significantly reveals the
intent of the framers. To make the provision
prospective from February 3, 1987 is to give a
narrow
interpretation
resulting
in
an
inequitable situation. It must also be
retroactive.
It should be noted that in construing
the law, the Courts are not always to be
hedged in by the literal meaning of its
language. The spirit and intendment thereof,
must prevail over the letter, especially where
adherence to the latter would result in
absurdity and injustice. (Casela v. Court of
Appeals, 35 SCRA 279 [1970])
A Constitutional provision should be
construed so as to give it effective operation
and suppress the mischief at which it is aimed,
hence, it is the spirit of the provision which
should prevail over the letter thereof. (Jarrolt v.
Mabberly, 103 U.S. 580)
In the words of the Court in the case of
J.M. Tuason v. LTA (31 SCRA 413 [1970]:
To that primordial intent, all else is
subordinated.
Our
Constitution,
any
constitution is not to be construed narrowly or
pedantically for the prescriptions therein
contained, to paraphrase Justice Holmes, are
not mathematical formulas having their
essence in their form but are organic living
institutions, the significance of which is vital
not formal. . . .
The provision in question was enacted
to correct the anomalous situation where one
born of a Filipino father and an alien mother
was automatically granted the status of a
natural-born citizen while one born of a Filipino
mother and an alien father would still have to
elect Philippine citizenship. If one so elected,
he was not, under earlier laws, conferred the
status of a natural-born.
Under the 1973 Constitution, those
born of Filipino fathers and those born of
Filipino mothers with an alien father were
placed on equal footing. They were both
considered as natural-born citizens.
Hence, the bestowment of the status of
"natural-born" cannot be made to depend on

Abad, Pascasio, Perez & Saludes (2013)

85

ANTONIO Y. CO vs. ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL

OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
AND JOSE ONG, JR.,
G.R. Nos. 92191-92 July 30, 1991
GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:
FACTS: The HRET declared that respondent
Jose Ong, Jr. is a natural born Filipino citizen
and a resident of Laoang, Northern Samar for
voting purposes. The sole issue before us is
whether or not, in making that determination,
the HRET acted with grave abuse of discretion.
On May 11, 1987, the congressional
election for the second district of Northern
Samar was held.
Among the candidates who vied for the
position of representative in the second
legislative district of Northern Samar are the
petitioners, Sixto Balinquit and Antonio Co and
the private respondent, Jose Ong, Jr.
Respondent Ong was proclaimed the
duly elected representative of the second
district of Northern Samar.
The petitioners filed election protests
against the private respondent premised on
the following grounds:
1) Jose Ong, Jr. is not a natural born
citizen of the Philippines; and
2) Jose Ong, Jr. is not a resident of the
second district of Northern Samar.
The HRET in its decision dated
November 6, 1989, found for the private
respondent.
A motion for reconsideration was filed
by the petitioners on November 12, 1989. This
was, however, denied by the HRET in its
resolution dated February 22, 1989.
ISSUE: Whether or not private respondent
Ong is a citizen of the Philippines and whether
he has met the residency requirement

CASE DIGEST IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I (Based on Atty. Gabriels Syllabus)

the fleeting accident of time or result in two
kinds of citizens made up of essentially the
same similarly situated members.
It is for this reason that the
amendments were enacted, that is, in order to
remedy
this
accidental
anomaly,
and,
therefore, treat equally all those born before
the 1973 Constitution and who elected
Philippine citizenship either before or after the
effectivity of that Constitution.
The Constitutional provision in question
is, therefore curative in nature. The enactment
was meant to correct the inequitable and
absurd situation which then prevailed, and
thus, render those acts valid which would have
been nil at the time had it not been for the
curative provisions.
There
is
no
dispute
that
the
respondent's mother was a natural born
Filipina at the time of her marriage. Crucial to
this case is the issue of whether or not the
respondent elected or chose to be a Filipino
citizen.
Election becomes material because
Section 2 of Article IV of the Constitution
accords natural born status to children born of
Filipino mothers before January 17, 1973, if
they elect citizenship upon reaching the age of
majority.
To expect the respondent to have
formally or in writing elected citizenship when
he came of age is to ask for the unnatural and
unnecessary. The reason is obvious. He was
already a citizen. Not only was his mother a
natural born citizen but his father had been
naturalized when the respondent was only
nine (9) years old. He could not have divined
when he came of age that in 1973 and 1987
the Constitution would be amended to require
him to have filed a sworn statement in 1969
electing citizenship inspite of his already
having been a citizen since 1957. In 1969,
election through a sworn statement would
have been an unusual and unnecessary
procedure for one who had been a citizen
since he was nine years old.
We have jurisprudence that defines
"election" as both a formal and an informal
process.
In the case of In Re: Florencio Mallare
(59 SCRA 45 [1974]), the Court held that the
exercise of the right of suffrage and the
participation in election exercises constitute a
positive
act of
election
of Philippine
citizenship. In the exact pronouncement of the
Court, we held:

Esteban's exercise of the right of

suffrage when he came of age, constitutes a
positive act of election of Philippine citizenship
The private respondent did more than
merely exercise his right of suffrage. He has
established his life here in the Philippines. For
those in the peculiar situation of the
respondent who cannot be expected to have
elected citizenship as they were already
citizens, we apply the In Re Mallare rule.
The respondent was born in an outlying
rural town of Samar where there are no alien
enclaves and no racial distinctions. The
respondent has lived the life of a Filipino since
birth. His father applied for naturalization
when the child was still a small boy. He is a
Roman Catholic. He has worked for a sensitive
government agency. His profession requires
citizenship for taking the examinations and
getting a license. He has participated in
political exercises as a Filipino and has always
considered himself a Filipino citizen. There is
nothing in the records to show that he does
not embrace Philippine customs and values,
nothing to indicate any tinge of alien-ness no
acts to show that this country is not his natural
homeland. The mass of voters of Northern
Samar are frilly aware of Mr. Ong's parentage.
They should know him better than any
member of this Court will ever know him. They
voted by overwhelming numbers to have him
represent them in Congress. Because of his
acts since childhood, they have considered
him as a Filipino.
The filing of sworn statement or formal
declaration is a requirement for those who still
have to elect citizenship. For those already
Filipinos when the time to elect came up, there
are acts of deliberate choice which cannot be
less binding. Entering a profession open only
to Filipinos, serving in public office where
citizenship is a qualification, voting during
election time, running for public office, and
other categorical acts of similar nature are
themselves formal manifestations of choice for
these persons.
An election of Philippine citizenship
presupposes that the person electing is an
alien. Or his status is doubtful because he is a
national of two countries. There is no doubt in
this case about Mr. Ong's being a Filipino when
he turned twenty-one (21).
We repeat that any election of
Philippine citizenship on the part of the private
respondent would not only have been
superfluous but it would also have resulted in
an absurdity. How can a Filipino citizen elect
Philippine citizenship?

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CASE DIGEST IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I (Based on Atty. Gabriels Syllabus)

The
respondent
HRET
has
an
interesting view as to how Mr. Ong elected
citizenship. It observed that "when protestee
was only nine years of age, his father, Jose
Ong Chuan became a naturalized Filipino.
Section 15 of the Revised Naturalization Act
squarely applies its benefit to him for he was
then a minor residing in this country.
Concededly, it was the law itself that had
already elected Philippine citizenship for
protestee by declaring him as such."
The
petitioners
argue
that
the
respondent's father was not, validly, a
naturalized citizen because of his premature
taking of the oath of citizenship.
The Court cannot go into the collateral
procedure of stripping Mr. Ong's father of his
citizenship after his death and at this very late
date just so we can go after the son.
The petitioners question the citizenship
of the father through a collateral approach.
This can not be done. In our jurisdiction, an
attack on a person's citizenship may only be
done through a direct action for its nullity.
To ask the Court to declare the grant of
Philippine citizenship to Jose Ong Chuan as null
and void would run against the principle of due
process. Jose Ong Chuan has already been laid
to rest. How can he be given a fair opportunity
to defend himself. A dead man cannot speak.
To quote the words of the HRET "Ong Chuan's
lips have long been muted to perpetuity by his
demise and obviously he could not use beyond
where his mortal remains now lie to defend
himself were this matter to be made a central
issue in this case."
The issue before us is not the
nullification of the grant of citizenship to Jose
Ong Chuan. Our function is to determine
whether or not the HRET committed abuse of
authority in the exercise of its powers.
Moreover, the respondent traces his natural
born citizenship through his mother, not
through the citizenship of his father. The
citizenship of the father is relevant only to
determine whether or not the respondent
"chose" to be a Filipino when he came of age.
At that time and up to the present, both
mother and father were Filipinos. Respondent
Ong could not have elected any other
citizenship unless he first formally renounced
Philippine citizenship in favor of a foreign
nationality. Unlike other persons faced with a
problem of election, there was no foreign
nationality of his father which he could
possibly have chosen.

What
was
the
basis
for
the
Constitutional Convention's declaring Emil Ong
a natural born citizen?
Under the Philippine Bill of 1902,
inhabitants of the Philippines who were
Spanish subjects on the 11th day of April 1899
and then residing in said islands and their
children born subsequent thereto were
conferred the status of a Filipino citizen.
Was the grandfather of the private
respondent a Spanish subject?
Article 17 of the Civil Code of Spain
enumerates those who were considered
Spanish Subjects, viz:
ARTICLE 17. The following are Spaniards:
1. Persons born in Spanish territory.
2. Children born of a Spanish father or mother,
even though they were born out of Spain.
3. Foreigners who may have obtained
naturalization papers.
4. Those without such papers, who may have
acquired domicile in any town in the Monarchy.
(Emphasis supplied)
The domicile of a natural person is the
place of his habitual residence. This domicile,
once established is considered to continue and
will not be deemed lost until a new one is
established.
As earlier stated, Ong Te became a
permanent resident of Laoang, Samar around
1895. Correspondingly, a certificate of
residence was then issued to him by virtue of
his being a resident of Laoang, Samar.
The domicile that Ong Te established in
1895 continued until April 11, 1899; it even
went beyond the turn of the 19th century. It is
also in this place were Ong Te set-up his
business and acquired his real property.
As concluded by the Constitutional
Convention, Ong Te falls within the meaning of
sub-paragraph 4 of Article 17 of the Civil Code
of Spain.
Although Ong Te made brief visits to
China, he, nevertheless, always returned to
the Philippines. The fact that he died in China,
during one of his visits in said country, was of
no moment. This will not change the fact that
he already had his domicile fixed in the
Philippines and pursuant to the Civil Code of
Spain, he had become a Spanish subject.
If Ong Te became a Spanish subject by
virtue of having established his domicile in a
town
under
the
Monarchy
of
Spain,
necessarily, Ong Te was also an inhabitant of
the Philippines for an inhabitant has been
defined as one who has actual fixed residence
in a place; one who has a domicile in a place.
(Bouvier's Law Dictionary, Vol. II) A priori, there

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can be no other logical conclusion but to educe
that Ong Te qualified as a Filipino citizen under
the provisions of section 4 of the Philippine Bill
of 1902.
The HRET itself found this fact of
absolute verity in concluding that the private
respondent was a natural-born Filipino.
The
petitioners'
sole
ground
in
disputing this fact is that document presented
to prove it were not in compliance with the
best the evidence rule. The petitioners allege
that the private respondent failed to present
the original of the documentary evidence,
testimonial evidence and of the transcript of
the proceedings of the body which the
aforesaid resolution of the 1971 Constitutional
Convention was predicated.
On the contrary, the documents
presented by the private respondent fall under
the exceptions to the best evidence rule.
It was established in the proceedings
before the HRET that the originals of the
Committee Report No. 12, the minutes of the
plenary session of 1971 Constitutional
Convention held on November 28, 1972
cannot be found.
This was affirmed by Atty. Ricafrente,
Assistant Secretary of the 1971 Constitutional
Convention; by Atty. Nolledo, Delegate to the
1971 Constitutional Convention; and by Atty.
Antonio Santos, Chief Librarian of the U.P Law
Center, in their respective testimonies given
before the HRET to the effect that there is no
governmental agency which is the official
custodian of the records of the 1971
Constitutional Convention.
The execution of the originals was
established by Atty. Ricafrente, who as the
Assistant Secretary of the 1971 Constitutional
Convention was the proper party to testify to
such execution. The inability to produce the
originals before the HRET was also testified to
as aforestated by Atty. Ricafrente, Atty.
Nolledo, and Atty. Santos. In proving the
inability to produce, the law does not require
the degree of proof to be of sufficient
certainty; it is enough that it be shown that
after a bona fide diligent search, the same
cannot be found.
Since the execution of the document
and the inability to produce were adequately
established, the contents of the questioned
documents can be proven by a copy thereof or
by the recollection of witnesses.
Moreover, to erase all doubts as to the
authenticity of the documentary evidence
cited in the Committee Report, the former
member
of
the
1971
Constitutional

Convention, Atty. Nolledo, when he was

presented as a witness in the hearing of the
protest against the private respondent,
categorically stated that he saw the disputed
documents presented during the hearing of
the election protest against the brother of the
private respondent.
In his concurring opinion, Mr. Justice
Sarmiento,
a
vice-president
of
the
Constitutional Convention, states that he was
presiding officer of the plenary session which
deliberated on the report on the election
protest against Delegate Emil Ong. He cites a
long list of names of delegates present. Among
them are Mr. Chief Justice Fernan, and Mr.
Justice Davide, Jr. The petitioners could have
presented any one of the long list of delegates
to refute Mr. Ong's having been declared a
natural-born citizen. They did not do so. Nor
did they demur to the contents of the
documents
presented
by
the
private
respondent. They merely relied on the
procedural
objections
respecting
the
admissibility of the evidence presented.
The Constitutional Convention was the
sole judge of the qualifications of Emil Ong to
be a member of that body. The HRET by
explicit mandate of the Constitution, is the
sole judge of the qualifications of Jose Ong, Jr.
to be a member of Congress. Both bodies
deliberated at length on the controversies over
which they were sole judges. Decisions were
arrived at only after a full presentation of all
relevant factors which the parties wished to
present. Even assuming that we disagree with
their conclusions, we cannot declare their acts
as committed with grave abuse of discretion.
We have to keep clear the line between error
and grave abuse.

Abad, Pascasio, Perez & Saludes (2013)

88

ON THE ISSUE OF RESIDENCE

The petitioners question the residence
qualification of respondent Ong.
The petitioners lose sight of the
meaning of "residence" under the Constitution.
The term "residence" has been understood as
synonymous with domicile not only under the
previous Constitutions but also under the 1987
Constitution.
The framers of the Constitution
adhered to the earlier definition given to the
word "residence" which regarded it as having
the same meaning as domicile.
The term "domicile" denotes a fixed
permanent residence to which when absent for
business or pleasure, one intends to return.
(Ong Huan Tin v. Republic, 19 SCRA 966
[1967]) The absence of a person from said

CASE DIGEST IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I (Based on Atty. Gabriels Syllabus)

permanent residence, no matter how long,
notwithstanding, it continues to be the
domicile of that person. In other words,
domicile is characterized by animus revertendi
(Ujano v. Republic, 17 SCRA 147 [1966])
The domicile of origin of the private
respondent, which was the domicile of his
parents, is fixed at Laoang, Samar. Contrary to
the petitioners' imputation, Jose Ong, Jr. never
abandoned said domicile; it remained fixed
therein even up to the present.
The
private
respondent,
in
the
proceedings before the HRET sufficiently
established that after the fire that gutted their
house in 1961, another one was constructed.
Likewise, after the second fire which
again destroyed their house in 1975, a sixteendoor apartment was built by their family, two
doors of which were reserved as their family
residence.
The petitioners' allegation that since
the private respondent owns no property in
Laoang, Samar, he cannot, therefore, be a
resident of said place is misplaced.
The properties owned by the Ong
Family are in the name of the private
respondent's parents. Upon the demise of his
parents, necessarily, the private respondent,
pursuant to the laws of succession, became
the co-owner thereof (as a co- heir),
notwithstanding the fact that these were still
in the names of his parents.
Even assuming that the private
respondent does not own any property in
Samar, the Supreme Court in the case of De
los Reyes v. Solidum (61 Phil. 893 [1935]) held
that it is not required that a person should
have a house in order to establish his
residence and domicile. It is enough that he
should live in the municipality or in a rented
house or in that of a friend or relative.
(Emphasis supplied)
To require the private respondent to
own property in order to be eligible to run for
Congress would be tantamount to a property
qualification. The Constitution only requires
that the candidate meet the age, citizenship,
voting and residence requirements. Nowhere is
it required by the Constitution that the
candidate should also own property in order to
be qualified to run. (see Maquera v. Borra, 122
Phil. 412 [1965])
It has also been settled that absence
from residence to pursue studies or practice a
profession or registration as a voter other than
in the place where one is elected, does not
constitute loss of residence. (Faypon v. Quirino,
96 Phil. 294 [1954])

As previously stated, the private

respondent stayed in Manila for the purpose of
finishing his studies and later to practice his
profession, There was no intention to abandon
the residence in Laoang, Samar. On the
contrary, the periodical journeys made to his
home province reveal that he always had the
animus revertendi.

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89

SECTION 7
MOHAMMAD ALI DIMAPORO, vs. HON.
RAMON V. MITRA, JR., Speaker, House of
Representatives, and (Hon. QUIRINO D.
ABAD SANTOS, JR.) HON. CAMILO L.
SABIO
Secretary,
House
of
representatives,
G.R. No. 96859 October 15, 1991
DAVIDE, JR., J.
FACTS: Petitioner Mohamad Ali Dimaporo was
elected Representative for the Second
Legislative District of Lanao del Sur during the
1987 congressional elections. He took his oath
of office on 9 January 1987 and thereafter
performed the duties and enjoyed the rights
and privileges pertaining thereto.
On 15 January 1990, petitioner filed
with the Commission on Elections a Certificate
of Candidacy for the position of Regional
Governor of the Autonomous Region in Muslim
Mindanao. The election was scheduled for 17
February 1990.
Upon
being
informed
of
this
development by the Commission on Elections,
respondents Speaker and Secretary of the
House of Representatives excluded petitioner's
name from the Roll of Members of the House
of Representatives pursuant to Section 67,
Article IX of the Omnibus Election Code.
Having lost in the autonomous region
elections, petitioner, in a letter dated 28 June
1990 and addressed to respondent Speaker,
expressed his intention "to resume performing
my duties and functions as elected Member of
Congress." The record does not indicate what
action was taken on this communication, but it
is apparent that petitioner failed in his bid to
regain his seat in Congress since this petition
praying for such relief was subsequently filed
on 31 January 1991.
In this petition, it is alleged that
following the dropping of his name from the
Roll, petitioner was excluded from all
proceedings of the House of Representatives;
he was not paid the emoluments due his
office; his staff was dismissed and disbanded;
and his office suites were occupied by other

CASE DIGEST IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I (Based on Atty. Gabriels Syllabus)

persons. In effect, he was virtually barred and
excluded from performing his duties and from
exercising his rights and privileges as the duly
elected and qualified congressman from his
district.
Petitioner admits that he filed a
Certificate of Candidacy for the position of
Regional Governor of Muslim Mindanao. He,
however, maintains that he did not thereby
lose his seat as congressman because Section
67, Article IX of B.P. Blg. 881 is not operative
under the present Constitution, being contrary
thereto, and therefore not applicable to the
present members of Congress.
In support of his contention, petitioner
points out that the term of office of members
of the House of Representatives, as well as the
grounds by which the incumbency of said
members may be shortened, are provided for
in the Constitution. Section 2, Article XVIII
thereof provides that "the Senators, Members
of the House of Representatives and the local
officials first elected under this Constitution
shall serve until noon of June 30, 1992;" while
Section 7, Article VI states: "The Members of
the House of Representatives shall be elected
for a term of three years which shall begin,
unless otherwise provided by law, at noon on
the thirtieth day of June next following their
election." On the other hand, the grounds by
which such term may be shortened may be
summarized as follows:
a) Section 13, Article VI: Forfeiture of
his seat by holding any other office or
employment in the government or any
subdivision, agency or instrumentality thereof,
including government-owned or controlled
corporations or subsidiaries;
b) Section 16 (3): Expulsion as a
disciplinary action for disorderly behavior;
c) Section 17: Disqualification as
determined by resolution of the Electoral
Tribunal in an election contest; and,
d) Section 7, par. 2: Voluntary
renunciation of office.
He asserts that under the rule
expressio unius est exclusio alterius, Section
67, Article IX of B.P. Blg. 881 is repugnant to
these constitutional provisions in that it
provides for the shortening of a congressman's
term of office on a ground not provided for in
the Constitution. For if it were the intention of
the framers to include the provisions of
Section 67, Article IX of B.P. Blg. 881 as among
the means by which the term of a
Congressman may be shortened, it would have
been a very simple matter to incorporate it in
the present Constitution. They did not do so.

On
the
contrary,
the
Constitutional
Commission only reaffirmed the grounds
previously found in the 1935 and 1973
Constitutions and deliberately omitted the
ground provided in Section 67, Article IX of B.P.
Blg. 881.
On the premise that the provision of
law relied upon by respondents in excluding
him from the Roll of Members is contrary to
the
present
Constitution,
petitioner
consequently concludes that respondents
acted without authority. He further maintains
that respondents' so-called "administrative
act" of striking out his name is ineffective in
terminating his term as Congressman. Neither
can it be justified as an interpretation of the
Constitutional
provision
on
voluntary
renunciation of office as only the courts may
interpret laws. Moreover, he claims that he
cannot be said to have forfeited his seat as it
is only when a congressman holds another
office or employment that forfeiture is
decreed. Filing a certificate of candidacy is not
equivalent to holding another office or
employment.

Abad, Pascasio, Perez & Saludes (2013)

90

ISSUE: Whether or not Section 67, Article IX of

B.P. Blg. 881 is still operative under the
present Constitution
HELD:
Section 67, Article IX of B.P. Blg. 881 reads:
Any elective official whether national or
local running for any office other than the one
which he is holding in a permanent capacity
except for President and Vice-President shall
be considered ipso facto resigned from his
office upon the filing of his certificate of
candidacy.
The precursor of this provision is the
last paragraph of Section 2 of C.A. No. 666,
which reads:
Any elective provincial, municipal, or city
official running for an office, other than the
one for which he has been lastly elected, shall
be considered resigned from his office from the
moment of the filing of his certificate of
candidacy.
Section 27 of Article II of Republic Act
No. 180 reiterated this rule in this wise:
Sec. 27. Candidate holding office.
Any elective provincial, municipal or city
official running for an office, other than the
one which he is actually holding, shall be
considered resigned from office from the
moment of the filing of his certificate of
candidacy.

CASE DIGEST IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I (Based on Atty. Gabriels Syllabus)

The 1971 Election Code imposed a
similar proviso on local elective officials as
follows:
Sec. 24. Candidate holding elective
office. Any elective provincial, subprovincial, city, municipal or municipal district
officer running for an office other than the one
which he is holding in a permanent capacity
shall be considered ipso facto resigned from
his office from the moment of the filing of his
certificate of candidacy.
Every elected official shall take his oath
of office on the day his term of office
commences, or within ten days after his
proclamation if said proclamation takes place
after such day. His failure to take his oath of
office as herein provided shall be considered
forfeiture of his right to the new office to which
he has been elected unless his failure is for a
cause or causes beyond his control.
The 1978 Election Code provided a
different rule, thus:
Sec. 30. Candidates holding political
offices. Governors, mayors, members of
various sanggunians, or barangay officials,
shall, upon filing of a certificate of candidacy,
be considered on forced leave of absence from
office.
It must be noted that only in B.P. Blg.
881 are members of the legislature included in
the enumeration of elective public officials who
are to be considered resigned from office from
the moment of the filing of their certificates of
candidacy for another office, except for
President and Vice-President. The advocates of
Cabinet Bill No. 2 (now Section 67, Article IX of
B.P. Blg. 881) elucidated on the rationale of
this inclusion, thus:
MR. PALMARES: In the old Election
Code, Your Honor, in the 1971 Election Code,
the provision seems to be different I think
this is in Section 24 of Article III.
Any elective provincial, sub-provincial,
city, municipal or municipal district officer
running for an office other than the one which
he is holding in a permanent capacity shall be
considered ipso facto resigned from his office
from the moment of the filing of his certificate
of candidacy.
May I know, Your Honor, what is the
reason of the Committee in departing or
changing these provisions of Section 24 of the
old Election Code and just adopting it en toto?
Why do we have to change it? What could
possibly be the reason behind it, or the
rationale behind it?
MR. PEREZ (L.): I have already stated
the rationale for this, Mr. Speaker, but I don't

mind repeating it. The purpose is that the

people must be given the right to choose any
official who belongs to, let us say, to the
Batasan if he wants to run for another office.
However, because of the practice in the past
where members of the legislature ran for local
offices, but did not assume the office, because
of that spectacle the impression is that these
officials were just trifling with the mandate of
the people. They have already obtained a
mandate to be a member of the legislature,
and they want to run for mayor or for governor
and yet when the people give them that
mandate, they do not comply with that latter
mandate, but still preferred (sic) to remain in
the earlier mandate. So we believe, Mr.
Speaker, that the people's latest mandate
must be the one that will be given due course.
...
Assemblyman Manuel M. Garcia, in
answer to the query of Assemblyman Arturo
Tolentino on the constitutionality of Cabinet Bill
No. 2, said:
MR. GARCIA (M.M.): Thank you, Mr.
Speaker. Mr. Speaker, on the part of the
Committee, we made this proposal based on
constitutional grounds. We did not propose this
amendment mainly on the rationale as stated
by the Gentlemen from Manila that the officials
running for office other than the ones they are
holding will be considered resigned not
because of abuse of facilities of power or the
use of office facilities but primarily because
under our Constitution, we have this new
chapter on accountability of public officers.
Now, this was not in the 1935 Constitution. It
states that (sic) Article XIII, Section 1 Public
office is a public trust. Public officers and
employees shall serve with the highest degree
of
responsibility,
integrity,
loyalty
and
efficiency and shall remain accountable to the
people.
Now, what is the significance of this
new provision on accountability of public
officers? This only means that all elective
public officials should honor the mandate they
have gotten from the people. Thus, under our
Constitution, it says that: 'Members of the
Batasan shall serve for the term of 6 years, in
the case of local officials and 6 years in the
case of barangay officials. Now, Mr. Speaker,
we have precisely included this as part of the
Omnibus Election Code because a Batasan
Member who hold (sic) himself out with the
people and seek (sic) their support and
mandate should not be allowed to deviate or
allow himself to run for any other position
unless he relinquishes or abandons his office.

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91

CASE DIGEST IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I (Based on Atty. Gabriels Syllabus)

Because his mandate to the people is to serve
for 6 years. Now, if you allow a Batasan or a
governor or a mayor who was mandated to
serve for 6 years to file for an office other than
the one he was elected to, then, that clearly
shows that he has not (sic) intention to service
the mandate of the people which was placed
upon him and therefore he should be
considered ipso facto resigned. I think more
than anything that is the accountability that
the Constitution requires of elective public
officials. It is not because of the use or abuse
of powers or facilities of his office, but it is
because of the Constitution itself which I said
under the 1973 Constitution called and
inserted this new chapter on accountability.
Now, argument was said that the mere
filing is not the intention to run. Now, what is it
for? If a Batasan Member files the certificate of
candidacy, that means that he does not want
to serve, otherwise, why should he file for an
office other than the one he was elected to?
The mere fact therefore of filing a certificate
should be considered the overt act of
abandoning or relinquishing his mandate to
the people and that he should therefore resign
if he wants to seek another position which he
feels he could be of better service.
As I said, Mr. Speaker, I disagree with
the statements of the Gentleman from Manila
because the basis of this Section 62 is the
constitutional provision not only of the fact
that Members of the Batasan and local officials
should serve the entire 6-year term for which
we were elected, but because of this new
chapter on the accountability of public officers
not only to the community which voted him to
office, but primarily because under this
commentary on accountability of public
officers, the elective public officers must serve
their principal, the people, not their own
personal ambition. And that is the reason, Mr.
Speaker, why we opted to propose Section 62
where candidates or elective public officers
holding offices other than the one to which
they were elected, should be considered ipso
facto resigned from their office upon the filing
of the certificate of candidacy."
It cannot be gainsaid that the same
constitutional basis for Section 67, Article IX of
B.P. Blg. 881 remains written in the 1987
Constitution. In fact, Section 1 of Article XI on
"Accountability of Public Officers" is more
emphatic in stating:
Sec. 1. Public office is a public trust.
Public officers and employees must at all times
be accountable to the people, serve them with
utmost responsibility, integrity, loyalty, and

efficiency, act with patriotism and justice, and

lead modest lives.
Obviously then, petitioner's assumption
that the questioned statutory provision is no
longer operative does not hold water. He failed
to discern that rather than cut short the term
of office of elective public officials, this
statutory provision seeks to ensure that such
officials serve out their entire term of office by
discouraging them from running for another
public office and thereby cutting short their
tenure by making it clear that should they fail
in their candidacy, they cannot go back to
their former position. This is consonant with
the constitutional edict that all public officials
must serve the people with utmost loyalty and
not trifle with the mandate which they have
received from their constituents.
In theorizing that the provision under
consideration cuts short the term of office of a
Member of Congress, petitioner seems to
confuse "term" with "tenure" of office. As
succinctly distinguished by the Solicitor
General:
The term of office prescribed by the
Constitution may not be extended or
shortened by the legislature (22 R.C.L.), but
the period during which an officer actually
holds the office (tenure) may be affected by
circumstances within or beyond the power of
said officer. Tenure may be shorter than the
term or it may not exist at all. These situations
will not change the duration of the term of
office (see Topacio Nueno vs. Angeles, 76 Phil
12).
Under the questioned provision, when
an elective official covered thereby files a
certificate of candidacy for another office, he is
deemed to have voluntarily cut short his
tenure, not his term. The term remains and his
successor, if any, is allowed to serve its
unexpired portion.
That the ground cited in Section 67,
Article IX of B.P. Blg. 881 is not mentioned in
the Constitution itself as a mode of shortening
the tenure of office of members of Congress,
does not preclude its application to present
members of Congress. Section 2 of Article XI
provides that "(t)he President, the VicePresident, the Members of the Supreme Court,
the
Members
of
the
Constitutional
Commissions, and the Ombudsman may be
removed from office, on impeachment for, and
conviction of, culpable violation of the
Constitution, treason, bribery, graft and
corruption, other high crimes, or betrayal of
public trust. All other public officers and
employees may be removed from office as

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provided by law, but not by impeachment.
Such
constitutional
expression
clearly
recognizes that the four (4) grounds found in
Article VI of the Constitution by which the
tenure of a Congressman may be shortened
are not exclusive. As held in the case of State
ex rel. Berge vs. Lansing, the expression in the
constitution of the circumstances which shall
bring about a vacancy does not necessarily
exclude all others. Neither does it preclude the
legislature from prescribing other grounds.
Events so enumerated in the constitution or
statutes are merely conditions the occurrence
of any one of which the office shall become
vacant not as a penalty but simply as the legal
effect of any one of the events. And would it
not be preposterous to say that a congressman
cannot die and cut his tenure because death is
not one of the grounds provided for in the
Constitution? The framers of our fundamental
law never intended such absurdity.
The basic principle which underlies the
entire field of legal concepts pertaining to the
validity of legislation is that by enactment of
legislation, a constitutional measure is
presumed to be created. This Court has
enunciated the presumption in favor of
constitutionality of legislative enactment. To
justify the nullification of a law, there must be
a clear and unequivocal breach of the
Constitution, not a doubtful and argumentative
implication. A doubt, even if well-founded,
does not suffice.
The maxim expressio unius est exclusio
alterius is not to be applied with the same
rigor in construing a constitution as a statute
and only those things expressed in such
positive affirmative terms as plainly imply the
negative of what is not mentioned will be
considered as inhibiting the power of
legislature. The maxim is only a rule of
interpretation and not a constitutional
command. This maxim expresses a rule of
construction and serves only as an aid in
discovering legislative intent where such intent
is not otherwise manifest.
Even then, the concept of voluntary
renunciation of office under Section 7, Article
VI of the Constitution is broad enough to
include the situation envisioned in Section 67,
Article IX of B.P. Blg. 881. As discussed by the
Constitutional Commissioners:
MR. MAAMBONG: Could I address the
clarificatory question to the Committee? The
term 'voluntary renunciation' does not only
appear in Section 3; it appears in Section 6.
MR. DAVIDE: Yes.

MR. MAAMBONG: It is also a recurring

phrase all over the constitution. Could the
Committee please enlighten us exactly what
'voluntary renunciation' means? Is this akin to
abandonment?
MR. DAVIDE: Abandonment is voluntary.
In other words, he cannot circumvent the
restriction by merely resigning at any given
time on the second term.
MR. MAAMBONG: Is the Committee
saying that the term voluntary renunciation is
more
general
than
abandonment
and
resignation?
MR. DAVIDE: It is more general, more
embracing.
That the act, contemplated in Section
67, Article IX of B.P. Blg. 881, of filing a
certificate of candidacy for another office
constitutes an overt, concrete act of voluntary
renunciation of the elective office presently
being held is evident from this exchange
between then Members of Parliament Arturo
Tolentino and Jose Rono:
MR. RONO: My reasonable ground is
this: if you will make the person ... my, shall
we say, basis is that in one case the person is
intending to run for an office which is different
from his own, and therefore it should be
considered,
at
least
from
the
legal
significance, an intention to relinquish his
office.
MR. TOLENTINO: Yes ...
MR. RONO: And in the other, because
he is running for the same position, it is
otherwise.
MR. TOLENTINO: Yes, but what I cannot
see is why are you going to compel a person to
quit an office which he is only intending to
leave? A relinquishment of office must be
clear, must be definite.
MR. RONO: Yes, sir. That's precisely, Mr.
Speaker, what I'm saying that while I do not
disagree with the conclusion that the intention
cannot be enough, but I am saying that the
filing of the certificate of candidacy is an over
act of such intention. It's not just an intention;
it's already there.
In Monroy vs. Court of Appeals, a case
involving Section 27 of R.A. No. 180 abovequoted, this Court categorically pronounced
that "forfeiture (is) automatic and permanently
effective upon the filing of the certificate of
candidacy for another office. Only the moment
and act of filing are considered. Once the
certificate is filed, the seat is forever forfeited
and nothing save a new election or
appointment can restore the ousted official.

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Thus, as We had occasion to remark, through
Justice J.B.L. Reyes, in Castro vs. Gatuslao:
... The wording of the law plainly
indicates that only the date of filing of the
certificate of candidacy should be taken into
account. The law does not make the forfeiture
dependent
upon
future
contingencies,
unforeseen and unforeseeable, since the
vacating is expressly made as of the moment
of the filing of the certificate of candidacy. ...
As the mere act of filing the certificate
of candidacy for another office produces
automatically the permanent forfeiture of the
elective position being presently held, it is not
necessary, as petitioner opines, that the other
position be actually held. The ground for
forfeiture in Section 13, Article VI of the 1987
Constitution is different from the forfeiture
decreed in Section 67, Article IX of B.P. Blg.
881, which is actually a mode of voluntary
renunciation of office under Section 7, par. 2 of
Article VI of the Constitution.
The legal effects of filing a certificate of
candidacy for another office having been
spelled out in Section 67, Article IX, B.P. Blg.
881 itself, no statutory interpretation was
indulged in by respondents Speaker and
Secretary of the House of Representatives in
excluding petitioner's name from the Roll of
Members. The Speaker is the administrative
head of the House of Representatives and he
exercises administrative powers and functions
attached to his office. As administrative
officers, both the Speaker and House
Secretary-General
perform
ministerial
functions. It was their duty to remove
petitioner's name from the Roll considering the
unequivocal tenor of Section 67, Article IX, B.P.
Blg. 881. When the Commission on Elections
communicated
to
the
House
of
Representatives that petitioner had filed his
certificate of candidacy for regional governor
of Muslim Mindanao, respondents had no
choice but to abide by the clear and
unmistakable legal effect of Section 67, Article
IX of B.P. Blg. 881. It was their ministerial duty
to do so. These officers cannot refuse to
perform their duty on the ground of an alleged
invalidity of the statute imposing the duty. The
reason for this is obvious. It might seriously
hinder the transaction of public business if
these officers were to be permitted in all cases
to question the constitutionality of statutes
and ordinances imposing duties upon them
and which have not judicially been declared
unconstitutional. Officers of the government
from the highest to the lowest are creatures of
the law and are bound to obey it.

In conclusion, We reiterate the basic

concept that a public office is a public trust. It
is created for the interest and benefit of the
people. As such, the holder thereof is subject
to such regulations and conditions as the law
may impose and he cannot complain of any
restrictions which public policy may dictate on
his office.

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94

SECTION 11
NICANOR T. JIMENEZ, ET AL.,
BARTOLOME CABANGBANG,
G.R. No. L-15905 August 3, 1966
CONCEPCION, C.J.:

vs.

FACTS: This is an ordinary civil action,

originally instituted in the Court of First
Instance of Rizal, for the recovery, by plaintiffs
Nicanor T. Jimenez, Carlos J. Albert and Jose L.
Lukban, of several sums of money, by way of
damages for the publication of an allegedly
libelous letter of defendant Bartolome
Cabangbang. Upon being summoned, the
latter moved to dismiss the complaint upon
the ground that the letter in question is not
libelous, and that, even if were, said letter is a
privileged communication. This motion having
been granted by the lower court, plaintiffs
interposed the present appeal from the
corresponding order of dismissal.
ISSUE:
(1) whether the publication in question is a
privileged communication; and, if not, (2)
whether it is libelous or not entitling plaintiffs
to damages.
HELD:
No. The first issue stems from the fact that, at
the time of said publication, defendant was a
member of the House of Representatives and
Chairman of its Committee on National
Defense,
and
that
pursuant
to
the
Constitution:
The Senators and Members of the
House of Representatives shall in all cases
except treason, felony, and breach of the
peace, be privileged from arrest during their
attendance at the sessions of the Congress,
and in going to and returning from the same;
and for any speech or debate therein, they
shall not be questioned in any other place.
(Article VI, Section 15.)
The determination of the first issue
depends
on
whether
or
not
the
aforementioned publication falls within the
purview of the phrase "speech or debate

CASE DIGEST IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I (Based on Atty. Gabriels Syllabus)

therein" that is to say, in Congress used
in this provision.
Said expression refers to utterances
made by Congressmen in the performance of
their official functions, such as speeches
delivered, statements made, or votes cast in
the halls of Congress, while the same is in
session, as well as bills introduced in Congress,
whether the same is in session or not, and
other acts performed by Congressmen, either
in Congress or outside the premises housing
its offices, in the official discharge of their
duties as members of Congress and of
Congressional Committees duly authorized to
perform its functions as such, at the time of
the performance of the acts in question.1
The publication involved in this case
does not belong to this category. According to
the complaint herein, it was an open letter to
the President of the Philippines, dated
November
14,
1958,
when
Congress
presumably was not in session, and defendant
caused said letter to be published in several
newspapers of general circulation in the
Philippines, on or about said date. It is obvious
that, in thus causing the communication to be
so published, he was not performing his official
duty, either as a member of Congress or as
officer or any Committee thereof. Hence,
contrary to the finding made by His Honor, the
trial Judge, said communication is not
absolutely privileged.
Was it libelous, insofar as the plaintiffs
herein are concerned? Addressed to the
President, the communication began with the
following paragraph:
In the light of the recent developments
which however unfortunate had nevertheless
involved the Armed Forces of the Philippines
and the unfair attacks against the duly elected
members of Congress of engaging in intriguing
and
rumor-mongering,
allow
me,
Your
Excellency, to address this open letter to focus
public attention to certain vital information
which, under the present circumstances, I feel
it my solemn duty to our people to
expose.1wph1.t
It has come to my attention that there
have been allegedly three operational plans
under serious study by some ambitious AFP
officers, with the aid of some civilian political
strategists.
Then, it describes the "allegedly three
(3) operational plans" referred to in the second
paragraph. The first plan is said to be "an
insidious plan or a massive political build-up"
of then Secretary of National Defense, Jesus
Vargas, by propagandizing and glamorizing

him in such a way as to "be prepared to

become a candidate for President in 1961". To
this end, the "planners" are said to "have
adopted the sales-talk that Secretary Vargas is
'Communists' Public Enemy No. 1 in the
Philippines." Moreover, the P4,000,000.00
"intelligence and psychological warfare funds"
of the Department of National Defense, and
the "Peace and Amelioration Fund" the
letter says are "available to adequately
finance a political campaign". It further adds:
It is reported that the "Planners" have
under their control the following: (1) Col.
Nicanor Jimenez of NICA, (2) Lt. Col. Jose
Lukban of NBI, (3) Capt. Carlos Albert (PN) of
G-2 AFP, (4) Col. Fidel Llamas of MIS (5) Lt. Col.
Jose Regala of the Psychological Warfare
Office, DND, and (6) Major Jose Reyna of the
Public information Office, DND. To insure this
control, the "Planners" purportedly sent Lt. Col.
Job Mayo, Chief of MIS to Europe to study and
while Mayo was in Europe, he was relieved by
Col. Fidel Llamas. They also sent Lt. Col.
Deogracias Caballero, Chief of Psychological
Warfare Office, DND, to USA to study and while
Caballero was in USA, he was relieved by Lt.
Col. Jose Regala. The "Planners" wanted to
relieve Lt. Col. Ramon Galvezon, Chief of CIS
(PC) but failed. Hence, Galvezon is considered
a missing link in the intelligence network. It is,
of course, possible that the offices mentioned
above are unwitting tools of the plan of which
they may have absolutely no knowledge.
(Emphasis ours.)
Among the means said to be used to
carry out the plan the letter lists, under the
heading "other operational technique the
following:
(a) Continuous speaking engagements
all over the Philippines for Secretary Vargas to
talk on "Communism" and Apologetics on
civilian supremacy over the military;
(b) Articles in magazines, news
releases, and hundreds of letters "typed in
two (2) typewriters only" to Editors of
magazines
and
newspapers,
extolling
Secretary Vargas as the "hero of democracy in
1951, 1953, 1955 and 1957 elections";
(c) Radio announcements extolling
Vargas and criticizing the administration;
(d) Virtual assumption by Vargas of the
functions of the Chief of Staff and an attempt
to pack key positions in several branches of
the Armed Forces with men belonging to his
clique;
(e) Insidious propaganda and rumors
spread in such a way as to give the impression
that they reflect the feeling of the people or

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CASE DIGEST IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I (Based on Atty. Gabriels Syllabus)

the opposition parties, to undermine the
administration.
Plan No. II is said to be a "coup d'etat",
in connection with which the "planners" had
gone no further than the planning stage,
although the plan "seems to be held in
abeyance
and
subject
to
future
developments".
Plan No. III is characterized as a
modification of Plan No. I, by trying to assuage
the President and the public with a loyalty
parade, in connection with which Gen. Arellano
delivered a speech challenging the authority
and integrity of Congress, in an effort to rally
the officers and men of the AFP behind him,
and gain popular and civilian support.
The letter in question recommended.:
(1) that Secretary Vargas be asked to resign;
(2) that the Armed Forces be divorced
absolutely from politics; (3) that the Secretary
of National Defense be a civilian, not a
professional military man; (4) that no
Congressman be appointed to said office; (5)
that Gen. Arellano be asked to resign or retire;
(6) that the present chiefs of the various
intelligence agencies in the Armed Forces
including the chiefs of the NICA, NBI, and other
intelligence agencies mentioned elsewhere in
the letter, be reassigned, considering that
"they were handpicked by Secretary Vargas
and Gen. Arellano", and that, "most probably,
they belong to the Vargas-Arellano clique"; (7)
that all military personnel now serving civilian
offices be returned to the AFP, except those
holding positions by provision of law; (8) that
the Regular Division of the AFP stationed in
Laur, Nueva Ecija, be dispersed by batallion
strength to the various stand-by or training
divisions throughout the country; and (9) that
Vargas
and
Arellano
should
disqualify
themselves from holding or undertaking an
investigation of the planned coup d'etat".
We are satisfied that the letter in
question is not sufficient to support plaintiffs'
action for damages. Although the letter says
that plaintiffs are under the control of the
unnamed persons therein alluded to as
"planners", and that, having been handpicked
by Secretary Vargas and Gen. Arellano,
plaintiffs "probably belong to the VargasArellano clique", it should be noted that
defendant, likewise, added that "it is of course
possible" that plaintiffs "are unwitting tools of
the plan of which they may have absolutely no
knowledge". In other words, the very
document upon which plaintiffs' action is
based explicitly indicates that they might be
absolutely unaware of the alleged operational

plans, and that they may be merely unwitting

tools of the planners. We do not think that this
statement is derogatory to the plaintiffs, to the
point of entitling them to recover damages,
considering that they are officers of our Armed
Forces, that as such they are by law, under the
control of the Secretary of National Defense
and the Chief of Staff, and that the letter in
question seems to suggest that the group
therein described as "planners" include these
two (2) high ranking officers.
It is true that the complaint alleges that
the open letter in question was written by the
defendant, knowing that it is false and with the
intent to impeach plaintiffs' reputation, to
expose them to public hatred, contempt,
dishonor and ridicule, and to alienate them
from their associates, but these allegations are
mere conclusions which are inconsistent with
the contents of said letter and can not prevail
over the same, it being the very basis of the
complaint. Then too, when plaintiffs allege in
their complaint that said communication is
false, they could not have possibly meant that
they were aware of the alleged plan to stage a
coup d'etat or that they were knowingly tools
of the "planners". Again, the aforementioned
passage in the defendant's letter clearly
implies that plaintiffs were not among the
"planners" of said coup d'etat, for, otherwise,
they could not be "tools", much less,
unwittingly on their part, of said "planners".

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96

SERGIO OSMEA, JR., vs. SALIPADA K.

PENDATUN ET. AL.,
G.R. No. L-17144 October 28, 1960
BENGZON, J.:
FACTS: On July 14, 1960, Congressman Sergio
Osmea, Jr., submitted to this Court a verified
petition for "declaratory relief, certiorari and
prohibition with preliminary injunction" against
Congressman Salapida K. Pendatun and
fourteen other congressmen in their capacity
as members of the Special Committee created
by House Resolution No. 59. He asked for
annulment of such Resolution on the ground of
infringenment of his parliamentary immunity;
he also asked, principally, that said members
of the special committee be enjoined from
proceeding in accordance with it, particularly
the portion authorizing them to require him to
substantiate his charges against the President
with the admonition that if he failed to do so,
he must show cause why the House should not
punish him.
In support of his request, Congressman
Osmea alleged; first, the Resolution violated

CASE DIGEST IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I (Based on Atty. Gabriels Syllabus)

his constitutional absolute parliamentary
immunity for speeches delivered in the House;
second, his words constituted no actionable
conduct; and third, after his allegedly
objectionable speech and words, the House
took up other business, and Rule XVII, sec. 7 of
the Rules of House provides that if other
business has intervened after the member had
uttered obnoxious words in debate, he shall
not be held to answer therefor nor be subject
to censure by the House.
Although some members of the court
expressed doubts of petitioner's cause of
action and the Court's jurisdiction, the majority
decided to hear the matter further, and
required respondents to answer, without
issuing any preliminary injunction. Evidently
aware of such circumstance with its
implications, and pressed for time in view of
the imminent adjournment of the legislative
session, the special committee continued to
perform its talk, and after giving Congressman
Osmea a chance to defend himself,
submitted its reports on July 18, 1960, finding
said congressman guilty of serious disorderly
behaviour; and acting on such report, the
House approved on the same daybefore
closing its sessionHouse Resolution No. 175,
declaring him guilty as recommended, and
suspending him from office for fifteen months.
Thereafter, on July 19, 1960, the
respondents
(with
the
exception
of
Congressmen De Pio, Abeleda, San Andres
Ziga, Fernandez and Balatao)1 filed their
answer, challenged the jurisdiction of this
Court to entertain the petition, defended the
power of Congress to discipline its members
with suspension, upheld a House Resolution
No. 175 and then invited attention to the fact
that Congress having ended its session on July
18, 1960, the Committeewhose members
are the sole respondentshad thereby ceased
to exist.

HELD:
No. Section 15, Article VI of our
Constitution provides that "for any speech or
debate" in Congress, the Senators or Members
of the House of Representative "shall not be
questioned in any other place." This section
was taken or is a copy of sec. 6, clause 1 of
Art. 1 of the Constitution of the United States.
In that country, the provision has always been

understood to mean that although exempt

from prosecution or civil actions for their words
uttered in Congress, the members of Congress
may, nevertheless, be questioned in Congress
itself. Observe that "they shall not be
questioned in any other place" than Congress.
Furthermore, the Rules of the House
which petitioner himself has invoked (Rule
XVII, sec. 7), recognize the House's power to
hold a member responsible "for words spoken
in debate."
Our
Constitution
enshrines
parliamentary
immunity
which
is
a
fundamental privilege cherished in every
legislative assembly of the democratic world.
As old as the English Parliament, its purpose
"is to enable and encourage a representative
of the public to discharge his public trust with
firmness and success" for "it is indispensably
necessary that he should enjoy the fullest
liberty of speech, and that he should be
protected from the resentment of every one,
however powerful, to whom exercise of that
liberty may occasion offense."2 Such immunity
has come to this country from the practices of
Parliamentary as construed and applied by the
Congress of the United States. Its extent and
application remain no longer in doubt in so far
as related to the question before us. It
guarantees the legislator complete freedom of
expression without fear of being made
responsible in criminal or civil actions before
the courts or any other forum outside of the
Congressional Hall. But is does not protect him
from responsibility before the legislative body
itself whenever his words and conduct are
considered by the latter disorderly or
unbecoming a member thereof. In the United
States Congress, Congressman Fernando Wood
of New York was censured for using the
following language on the floor of the House:
"A monstrosity, a measure the most infamous
of the many infamous acts of the infamous
Congress." (Hinds' Precedents, Vol. 2,. pp. 798799). Two other congressmen were censured
for employing insulting words during debate.
(2 Hinds' Precedents, 799-801). In one case, a
member of Congress was summoned to testify
on a statement made by him in debate, but
invoked his parliamentary privilege. The
Committee rejected his plea. (3 Hinds'
Precedents 123-124.)
For unparliamentary conduct, members
of Parliament or of Congress have been, or
could be censured, committed to prison3, even
expelled by the votes of their colleagues. The
appendix to this decision amply attest to the
consensus of informed opinion regarding the

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97

ISSUE: Whether or not the Constitution gave

petitioner Osmena complete parliamentary
immunity
and so, for words spoken in the House, he
ought not to be questioned

CASE DIGEST IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I (Based on Atty. Gabriels Syllabus)

practice and the traditional power of legislative
assemblies to take disciplinary action against
its
members,
including
imprisonment,
suspension or expulsion. It mentions one
instance of suspension of a legislator in a
foreign country.
And to cite a local illustration, the
Philippine Senate, in April 1949, suspended a
senator for one year.
Needless to add, the Rules of Philippine
House of Representatives provide that the
parliamentary practices of the Congress of the
United States shall apply in a supplementary
manner to its proceedings.
This brings up the third point of
petitioner: the House may no longer take
action against me, he argues, because after
my speech, and before approving Resolution
No. 59, it had taken up other business.
Respondents answer that Resolution No. 59
was unanimously approved by the House, that
such approval amounted to a suspension of
the House Rules, which according to standard
parliamentary
practice
may
done
by
unanimous consent.
Granted, counters the petitioner, that
the House may suspended the operation of its
Rules, it may not, however, affect past acts or
renew its rights to take action which had
already lapsed.
The situation might thus be compared
to laws4 extending the period of limitation of
actions and making them applicable to actions
that had lapsed. The Supreme Court of the
United States has upheld such laws as against
the contention that they impaired vested
rights
in
violation
of
the
Fourteenth
Amendment (Campbell vs. Holt, 115 U. S.
620). The states hold divergent views. At any
rate, court are subject to revocation
modification or waiver at the pleasure of the
body adopting them."5 And it has been said
that
"Parliamentary
rules
are
merely
procedural, and with their observancem, the
courts have no concern. They may be waived
or disregarded by the legislative body."
Consequently, "mere failure to conform to
parliamentary usage will not invalidate the
action (taken by a deliberative body) when the
requisited number of members have agreed to
a particular measure."
The following is quoted from a reported
decision of the Supreme court of Tennessee:
The rule here invoked is one of
parliamentary procedure, and it is uniformly
held that it is within the power of all
deliberative bodies to abolish, modify, or waive
their own rules of procedure, adopted for the

orderly con duct of business, and as security

against hasty action.
It may be noted in this connection, that
in the case of Congressman Stanbery of Ohio,
who insulted the Speaker, for which Act a
resolution of censure was presented, the
House approved the resolution, despite the
argument that other business had intervened
after the objectionable remarks.
On the question whether delivery of
speeches attacking the Chief Executive
constitutes disorderly conduct for which
Osmea may be discipline, many arguments
pro and con have been advanced. We believe,
however, that the House is the judge of what
constitutes disorderly behaviour, not only
because the Constitution has conferred
jurisdiction upon it, but also because the
matter
depends
mainly
on
factual
circumstances of which the House knows best
but which can not be depicted in black and
white for presentation to, and adjudication by
the Courts. For one thing, if this Court
assumed the power to determine whether
Osmea
conduct
constituted
disorderly
behaviour, it would thereby have assumed
appellate jurisdiction, which the Constitution
never intended to confer upon a coordinate
branch of the Government. The theory of
separation of powers fastidiously observed by
this Court, demands in such situation a
prudent refusal to interfere. Each department,
it has been said, had exclusive cognizance of
matters within its jurisdiction and is supreme
within its own sphere. (Angara vs. Electoral
Commission, 63 Phil., 139.)
SEC. 200. Judicial Interference with
Legislature. The principle is well established
that the courts will not assume a jurisdiction in
any case amount to an interference by the
judicial department with the legislature since
each department is equally independent within
the power conferred upon it by the
Constitution. . . . .
The general rule has been applied in
other cases to cause the courts to refuse to
intervene in what are exclusively legislative
functions. Thus, where the stated Senate is
given the power to example a member, the
court will not review its action or revise even a
most arbitrary or unfair decision. [Emphasis
Ours.].
The above statement of American law
merely abridged the landmark case of Clifford
vs. French.In 1905, several senators who had
been expelled by the State Senate of California
for having taken a bribe, filed mandamus
proceeding to compel reinstatement, alleging

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CASE DIGEST IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I (Based on Atty. Gabriels Syllabus)

the Senate had given them no hearing, nor a
chance to make defense, besides falsity of the
charges of bribery. The Supreme Court of
California declined to interfere , explaining in
orthodox juristic language:
Under our form of government, the
judicial department has no power to revise
even the most arbitrary and unfair action of
the legislative department, or of either house
thereof, taking in pursuance of the power
committed exclusively to that department by
the Constitution. It has been held by high
authority that, even in the absence of an
express provision conferring the power, every
legislative body in which is vested the general
legislative power of the state has the implied
power to expel a member for any cause which
it may deem sufficient. In Hiss. vs. Barlett, 3
Gray 473, 63 Am. Dec. 768, the supreme court
of Mass. says, in substance, that this power is
inherent in every legislative body; that it is
necessary to the to enable the body 'to
perform its high functions, and is necessary to
the safety of the state;' 'That it is a power of
self-protection, and that the legislative body
must necessarily be the sole judge of the
exigency which may justify and require its
exercise. '. . . There is no provision authority
courts to control, direct, supervise, or forbid
the exercise by either house of the power to
expel a member. These powers are functions
of the legislative department and therefore, in
the exercise of the power this committed to it,
the senate is supreme. An attempt by this
court to direct or control the legislature, or
either house thereof, in the exercise of the
power, would be an attempt to exercise
legislative functions, which it is expressly
forbidden to do.
We have underscored in the above
quotation those lines which in our opinion
emphasize the principles controlling this
litigation. Although referring to expulsion, they
may as well be applied to other disciplinary
action. Their gist as applied to the case at bar:
the House has exclusive power; the courts
have no jurisdiction to interfere.
Our refusal to intervene might impress
some readers as subconscious hesitation due
to discovery of impermissible course of action
in the legislative chamber. Nothing of that sort:
we merely refuse to disregard the allocation of
constitutional functions which it is our special
duty to maintain. Indeed, in the interest of
comity, we feel bound to state that in a
conscientious survey of governing principles
and/or episodic illustrations, we found the
House of Representatives of the United States

taking the position upon at least two

occasions, that personal attacks upon the
Chief Executive constitute unparliamentary
conduct or breach of orders. And in several
instances, it took action against offenders,
even
after
other
business
had
been
considered.
Petitioner's principal argument against
the House's power to suspend is the
Alejandrino precedent. In 1924, Senator
Alejandrino was, by resolution of Senate,
suspended from office for 12 months because
he had assaulted another member of the that
Body or certain phrases the latter had uttered
in the course of a debate. The Senator applied
to this Court for reinstatement, challenging the
validity of the resolution. Although this Court
held that in view of the separation of powers, it
had no jurisdiction to compel the Senate to
reinstate petitioner, it nevertheless went on to
say the Senate had no power to adopt the
resolution because suspension for 12 months
amounted to removal, and the Jones Law
(under which the Senate was then functioning)
gave the Senate no power to remove an
appointive member, like Senator Alejandrino.
The Jones Law specifically provided that "each
house may punish its members for disorderly
behaviour, and, with the concurrence of twothirds votes, expel an elective member (sec.
18). Note particularly the word "elective."
The Jones Law, it mist be observed,
empowered the Governor General to appoint
"without consent of the Senate and without
restriction as to residence senators . . . who
will, in his opinion, best represent the Twelfth
District." Alejandrino was one appointive
Senator.
It is true, the opinion in that case
contained an obiter dictum that "suspension
deprives the electoral district of representation
without that district being afforded any means
by which to fill that vacancy." But that remark
should be understood to refer particularly to
the appointive senator who was then the
affected party and who was by the same Jones
Law charged with the duty to represent the
Twelfth District and maybe the view of the
Government of the United States or of the
Governor-General, who had appointed him.
It must be observed, however, that at
that time the Legislature had only those power
which were granted to it by the Jones Law;
whereas now the Congress has the full
legislative powers and preprogatives of a
sovereign nation, except as restricted by the
Constitution. In other words, in the Alejandrino
case, the Court reached the conclusion that

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the Jones Law did not give the Senate the
power it then exercisedthe power of
suspension for one year. Whereas now, as we
find, the Congress has the inherent legislative
prerogative
of
suspension
which
the
Constitution did not impair. In fact, as already
pointed out, the Philippine Senate suspended a
Senator for 12 months in 1949.
The Legislative power of the Philippine
Congress is plenary, subject only to such
limitations are found in the Republic's
Constitution. So that any power deemed to be
legislative by usage or tradition, is necessarily
possessed by the Philippine Congress, unless
the Constitution provides otherwise. (Vera vs.
Avelino, 77 Phil., 192, 212 .)
In any event, petitioner's argument as
to
the
deprivation
of
the
district's
representation can not be more weightly in the
matter of suspension than in the case of
imprisonment of a legislator; yet deliberative
bodies have the power in proper cases, to
commit one of their members to jail
Now come questions of procedure and
jurisdiction. the petition intended to prevent
the Special Committee from acting tin
pursuance of House Resolution No. 59.
Because no preliminary injunction had been
issued, the Committee performed its task,
reported to the House, and the latter approved
the suspension order. The House had closed it
session, and the Committee has ceased to
exist as such. It would seem, therefore, the
case should be dismissed for having become
moot or academic.. Of course, there is nothing
to prevent petitioner from filing new pleadings
to include all members of the House as
respondents, ask for reinstatement and
thereby to present a justiciable cause. Most
probable outcome of such reformed suit,
however, will be a pronouncement of lack of
jurisdiction, as in Vera vs. Avelino and
Alejandrino vs. Qeuaon.

And I am not only that, I feel like throwing up

to be living my middle years in a country of
this nature. I am nauseated. I spit on the face
of Chief Justice Artemio Panganiban and his
cohorts in the Supreme Court, I am no longer
interested in the position [of Chief Justice] if I
was to be surrounded by idiots. I would rather
be in another environment but not in the
Supreme Court of idiots x x x.
In her comment on the complaint dated
April 25, 2007, Senator Santiago, through
counsel,
does
not
deny
making
the
aforequoted
statements.
She,
however,
explained that those statements were covered
by
the
constitutional
provision
on
parliamentary immunity, being part of a
speech she delivered in the discharge of her
duty as member of Congress or its committee.
The purpose of her speech, according to her,
was to bring out in the open controversial
anomalies in governance with a view to future
remedial legislation. She averred that she
wanted to expose what she believed to be an
unjust act of the Judicial Bar Council [JBC],
which, after sending out public invitations for
nomination to the soon to-be vacated position
of Chief Justice, would eventually inform
applicants that only incumbent justices of the
Supreme Court would qualify for nomination.
She felt that the JBC should have at least given
an advanced
advisory that
non-sitting
members of the Court, like her, would not be
considered for the position of Chief Justice.
ISSUE: Whether or not Santiagos speech is
covered
by
constitutional
provison
on
parliamentary immunity

FACTS:In his sworn letter/complaint dated

December 22, 2006, with enclosures, Antero J.
Pobre invites the Courts attention to the
following excerpts of Senator Miriam DefensorSantiagos speech delivered on the Senate
floor:
x x x I am not angry. I am irate. I am
foaming in the mouth. I am homicidal. I am
suicidal. I am humiliated, debased, degraded.

HELD: No. The immunity Senator Santiago

claims is rooted primarily on the provision of
Article VI, Section 11 of the Constitution, which
provides: A Senator or Member of the House
of Representative shall, in all offenses
punishable by not more than six years
imprisonment, be privileged from arrest while
the Congress is in session. No member shall
be questioned nor be held liable in any
other place for any speech or debate in
the Congress or in any committee
thereof. Explaining the import of the
underscored portion of the provision, the
Court, in Osmea, Jr. v. Pendatun, said:
Our
Constitution
enshrines
parliamentary
immunity
which
is
a
fundamental privilege cherished in every
legislative assembly of the democratic world.
As old as the English Parliament, its purpose

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100

ANTERO
POBRE
vs.
SEN.
DEFENSOR-SANTIAGO
AC No. 7399 August 25, 2009
J. Velasco Jr

MIRIAM

CASE DIGEST IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I (Based on Atty. Gabriels Syllabus)

is to enable and encourage a representative
of the public to discharge his public trust with
firmness and success for it is indispensably
necessary that he should enjoy the fullest
liberty of speech and that he should be
protected from resentment of every one,
however, powerful, to whom the exercise of
that liberty may occasion offense.
As American jurisprudence puts it, this
legislative privilege is founded upon long
experience and arises as a means of
perpetuating inviolate the functioning process
of the legislative department. Without
parliamentary immunity, parliament, or its
equivalent, would degenerate into a polite and
ineffective debating forum. Legislators are
immune from deterrents to the uninhibited
discharge of their legislative duties, not for
their private indulgence, but for the public
good. The privilege would be of little value if
they could be subjected to the cost and
inconvenience and distractions of a trial upon
a conclusion of the pleader, or to the hazard of
a judgment against them based upon a judges
speculation as to the motives.
This Court is aware of the need and has
in fact been in the forefront in upholding the
institution of parliamentary immunity and
promotion of free speech. Neither has the
Court lost sight of the importance of the
legislative and oversight functions of the
Congress that enable this representative body
to look diligently into every affair of
government,
investigate
and
denounce
anomalies, and talk about how the country and
its citizens are being served. Courts do not
interfere with the legislature or its members in
the manner they perform their functions in the
legislative floor or in committee rooms. Any
claim of an unworthy purpose or of the falsity
and mala fides of the statement uttered by the
member of the Congress does not destroy the
privilege. The disciplinary authority of the
assembly and the voters, not the courts, can
properly discourage or correct such abuses
committed in the name of parliamentary
immunity.
For the above reasons, the plea of
Senator Santiago for the dismissal of the
complaint for disbarment or disciplinary action
is well taken. Indeed, her privilege speech is
not actionable criminally or in a disciplinary
proceeding under the Rules of Court. It is felt,
however, that this could not be the last word
on the matter.
The Court wishes to express its deep
concern about the language Senator Santiago,
a member of the Bar, used in her speech and

its effect on the administration of justice. To

the Court, the lady senator has undoubtedly
crossed the limits of decency and good
professional conduct. It is at once apparent
that her statements in question were
intemperate and highly improper in substance.
To reiterate, she was quoted as stating that
she wanted to spit on the face of Chief Justice
Artemio Panganiban and his cohorts in the
Supreme Court, and calling the Court a
Supreme Court of idiots.
The lady senator alluded to In Re:
Vicente Sotto. We draw her attention to the
ensuing passage in Sotto that she should have
taken to heart in the first place:
x x x [I]f the people lose their
confidence in the honesty and integrity of this
Court and believe that they cannot expect
justice therefrom, they might be driven to take
the law into their own hands, and disorder and
perhaps chaos would be the result.
No lawyer who has taken an oath to
maintain the respect due to the courts should
be allowed to erode the peoples faith in the
judiciary. In this case, the lady senator clearly
violated Canon 8, Rule 8.01 and Canon 11 of
the Code of Professional Responsibility, which
respectively provide:
Canon 8, Rule 8.01.A lawyer shall not,
in his professional dealings, use language
which is abusive, offensive or otherwise
improper.
Canon 11.A lawyer shall observe and
maintain the respect due to the courts and to
the judicial officers and should insist on similar
conduct by others.
A careful re-reading of her utterances
would readily show that her statements were
expressions of personal anger and frustration
at not being considered for the post of Chief
Justice. In a sense, therefore, her remarks were
outside the pale of her official parliamentary
functions. Even parliamentary immunity must
not be allowed to be used as a vehicle to
ridicule, demean, and destroy the reputation of
the Court and its magistrates, nor as armor for
personal wrath and disgust. Authorities are
agreed that parliamentary immunity is not an
individual privilege accorded the individual
members of the Parliament or Congress for
their personal benefit, but rather a privilege
for the benefit of the people and the institution
that represents them.
To be sure, Senator Santiago could
have given vent to her anger without indulging
in
insulting
rhetoric
and
offensive
personalities.

Abad, Pascasio, Perez & Saludes (2013)

101

CASE DIGEST IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I (Based on Atty. Gabriels Syllabus)

Lest
it
be
overlooked,
Senator
Santiagos outburst was directly traceable to
what she considered as an unjust act the JBC
had taken in connection with her application
for the position of Chief Justice. But while the
JBC functions under the Courts supervision, its
individual members, save perhaps for the
Chief Justice who sits as the JBCs ex-officio
chairperson,have no official duty to nominate
candidates for appointment to the position of
Chief Justice. The Court is, thus, at a loss to
understand Senator Santiagos wholesale and
indiscriminate assault on the members of the
Court and her choice of critical and defamatory
words against all of them.
At any event, equally important as the
speech and debate clause of Art. VI, Sec. 11 of
the Constitution is Sec. 5(5) of Art. VIII of the
Constitution that provides:
Section 5. The Supreme Court shall
have the following powers:
(5) Promulgate rules concerning the
protection and enforcement of constitutional
rights, pleading, practice, and procedure in all
courts, the admission to the practice of the
law, the Integrated Bar, and legal assistance
to the underprivileged. (Emphasis ours.)
The Court, besides being authorized to
promulgate
rules
concerning
pleading,
practice, and procedure in all courts, exercises
specific
authority
to
promulgate
rules
governing the Integrated Bar with the end in
view that the integration of the Bar will, among
other things:
(4)
Shield
the
judiciary,
which
traditionally cannot defend itself except within
its own forum, from the assaults that politics
and self interest may level at it, and assist it to
maintain
its integrity,
impartiality and
independence;
xxxx
(11) Enforce rigid ethical standards x x
x.
In Re: Letter Dated 21 February 2005
of Atty. Noel S. Sorreda, we reiterated our
pronouncement in Rheem of the Philippines v.
Ferrer that the duty of attorneys to the courts
can only be maintained by rendering no
service involving any disrespect to the judicial
office which they are bound to uphold. The
Court wrote in Rheem of the Philippines:
x x x As explicit is the first canon of
legal ethics which pronounces that [i]t is the
duty of a lawyer to maintain towards the
Courts a respectful attitude, not for the sake of
the temporary incumbent of the judicial office,
but for the maintenance of its supreme
importance. That same canon, as a corollary,

makes it peculiarly incumbent upon lawyers to

support the courts against unjust criticism
and clamor. And more. The attorneys oath
solemnly binds him to a conduct that should
be with all good fidelity x x x to the courts.
Also, in Sorreda, the Court revisited its
holding in Surigao Mineral Reservation Board
v. Cloribel that:
A lawyer is an officer of the courts; he
is, like the court itself, an instrument or
agency to advance the ends of justice. His
duty is to uphold the dignity and authority of
the courts to which he owes fidelity, not to
promote distrust in the administration of
justice. Faith in the courts, a lawyer should
seek to preserve. For, to undermine the judicial
edifice is disastrous to the continuity of
government and to the attainment of the
liberties of the people. Thus has it been said
of a lawyer that [a]s an officer of the court, it
is his sworn and moral duty to help build and
not destroy unnecessarily that high esteem
and regard towards the courts so essential to
the proper administration of justice.
The lady senator belongs to the legal
profession bound by the exacting injunction of
a strict Code. Society has entrusted that
profession with the administration of the law
and
dispensation
of
justice.
Generally
speaking, a lawyer holding a government
office may not be disciplined as a member of
the Bar for misconduct committed while in the
discharge of official duties, unless said
misconduct also constitutes a violation of
his/her oath as a lawyer.
Lawyers may be disciplined even for
any conduct committed in their private
capacity, as long as their misconduct reflects
their want of probity or good demeanor, a
good character being an essential qualification
for the admission to the practice of law and for
continuance of such privilege. When the Code
of Professional Responsibility or the Rules of
Court speaks of conduct or misconduct,
the reference is not confined to ones behavior
exhibited in connection with the performance
of lawyers professional duties, but also covers
any misconduct, whichalbeit unrelated to the
actual practice of their professionwould show
them to be unfit for the office and unworthy of
the privileges which their license and the law
invest in them.
This Court, in its unceasing quest to
promote the peoples faith in courts and trust
in the rule of law, has consistently exercised its
disciplinary authority on lawyers who, for
malevolent purpose or personal malice,
attempt to obstruct the orderly administration

Abad, Pascasio, Perez & Saludes (2013)

102

CASE DIGEST IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I (Based on Atty. Gabriels Syllabus)

of justice, trifle with the integrity of courts, and
embarrass or, worse, malign the men and
women who compose them. We have done it
in the case of former Senator Vicente Sotto in
Sotto, in the case of Atty. Noel Sorreda in
Sorreda, and in the case of Atty. Francisco B.
Cruz in Tacordan v. Ang who repeatedly
insulted and threatened the Court in a most
insolent manner.
The Court is not hesitant to impose
some form of disciplinary sanctions on
Senator/Atty. Santiago for what otherwise
would have constituted an act of utter
disrespect on her part towards the Court and
its
members.
The
factual
and
legal
circumstances of this case, however, deter the
Court from doing so, even without any sign of
remorse
from her. Basic constitutional
consideration dictates this kind of disposition.
We, however, would be remiss in our
duty if we let the Senators offensive and
disrespectful language that definitely tended
to denigrate the institution pass by. It is
imperative on our part to re-instill in
Senator/Atty. Santiago her duty to respect
courts of justice, especially this Tribunal, and
remind her anew that the parliamentary nonaccountability thus granted to members of
Congress is not to protect them against
prosecutions for their own benefit, but to
enable them, as the peoples representatives,
to perform the functions of their office without
fear of being made responsible before the
courts
or
other
forums
outside
the
congressional hall. It is intended to protect
members of Congress against government
pressure and intimidation aimed at influencing
the decision-making prerogatives of Congress
and its members.
The Rules of the Senate itself contains
a provision on Unparliamentary Acts and
Language that enjoins a Senator from using,
under any circumstance,
offensive or
improper language against another Senator or
against any public institution. But as to
Senator Santiagos unparliamentary remarks,
the Senate President had not apparently called
her to order, let alone referred the matter to
the Senate Ethics Committee for appropriate
disciplinary action, as the Rules dictates under
such circumstance. The lady senator clearly
violated the rules of her own chamber. It is
unfortunate that her peers bent backwards
and avoided imposing their own rules on her.
Finally, the lady senator questions Pobres
motives in filing his complaint, stating that
disciplinary proceedings must be undertaken
solely for the public welfare. We cannot agree

with her more. We cannot overstress that the

senators use of intemperate language to
demean and denigrate the highest court of the
land is a clear violation of the duty of respect
lawyers owe to the courts.

Abad, Pascasio, Perez & Saludes (2013)

103

SECTION 13
FRANCISCO ZANDUETA, vs. SIXTO DE LA
COSTA
G.R. No. L-46267 November 28, 1938
VILLA-REAL, J.:
FACTS:
Prior to the promulgation of
Commonwealth Act No. 145, the petitioner, the
Honorable Francisco Zandueta was discharging
the office of judge of first instance, Ninth
Judicial District, comprising solely the City of
Manila, and was presiding over the Fifth
Branch of the Court of First Instance of said
city, by virtue of an ad interim appointment
issued by the President of the Philippines in his
favor on June 2, 1936, and confirmed by the
Commission on Appointments of the National
Assembly on September 8th of the same year.
On November 7, 1936, the date on
which Commonwealth Act No. 145, otherwise
known as the Judicial Reorganization Law, took
effect, the petitioner received from the
President of the Commonwealth a new ad
interim appointment as judge of first instance,
this time of the Fourth Judicial District, with
authority to preside over the Courts of First
Instance of Manila and Palawan, issued in
accordance with said Act. As the National
Assembly adjourned on November 20, 1937,
without its Commission on Appointments
having acted on said ad interim appointment,
another ad interim appointment to the same
office was issued in favor of said petitioner,
pursuant to which he took a new oath on
November 22, 1937, before discharging the
duties thereof. After his appointment and
qualification as judge of first instance of the
Fourth Judicial District, the petitioner, acting as
executive judge, performed several executive
acts, some of which consist in the designation
of the assistant clerk of the Court of First
Instance of Manila, Ladislao Pasicolan, as
administrative officer, under the orders of the
petitioner, as executive judge of said court, to
take charge of all matters pertaining to the
Court of First Instance of Palawan, which are
handled by said execute judge in Manila
(Exhibit 2); in the appointment of attorney
Rufo M. San Juan as notary public for the
Province of Palawan, said appointment to
expire on December 31, 1938 (Exhibit 3); in

CASE DIGEST IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I (Based on Atty. Gabriels Syllabus)

having authorized justice of the peace Iigo R.
Pea to defend a criminal case the hearing of
which had begun during the past sessions in
Coron, Palawan (Exhibit 5); in having granted a
leave of absence of ten days to justice of the
peace Abordo (of Puerto Princesa), Palawan
(Exhibit 8); and in having granted a leave of
absence of thirteen days to the justice of the
peace of Coron, Palawan (Exhibit 9).
On May 19, 1938, the Commission on
Appointments of the National Assembly
disapproved
the
aforesaid
ad
interim
appointment of said petitioner, who was
advised thereof by the Secretary of Justice on
the 20th of said month and year.
On August 1, 1938, the President of the
Philippines appointed the herein respondent,
Honorable Sixto de la Costa, judge of first
instance of the Fourth Judicial District, with
authority to preside over the Fifth Branch of
the Court of First Instance of Manila and the
Court of First Instance of Palawan, and his
appointment was approved by the Commission
on Appointments of the National Assembly. By
virtue of said appointment, the respondent
took the necessary oath and assumed office.
On the same date, August 1, 1938, the
President of the Philippines, pursuant to said
appointment of judge of first instance of the
Fourth Judicial District and after confirmation
thereof, issued the corresponding final
appointment in favor of the respondent,
Honorable Sixto de la Costa (Exhibit 11).
The respondent, in answer to the
petition, admits some of the facts alleged
therein and denies the rest, and alleges, as
one of his special defenses, that the petitioner
is
estopped
from
attacking
the
constitutionality of Commonwealth Act No.
145, for having accepted his new appointment
as judge of first instance of the Fourth Judicial
District, issued by virtue thereof, to preside
over the Courts of First Instance of Manila and
Palawan, and for having taken the necessary
oath, entering into the discharge of the
functions of his office and performing judicial
as well as administrative acts.

HELD: Yes.
The rule of equity, sanctioned by
jurisprudence, is that when a public official
voluntarily accepts an appointment to an office
newly created or reorganized by law, which
new office is incompatible with the one

formerly occupied by him , qualifies for the

discharge of the functions thereof by taking
the necessary oath, and enters into the
performance of his duties by executing acts
inherent in said newly created or reorganized
office and receiving the corresponding salary,
he will be considered to have abandoned the
office he was occupying by virtue of his former
appointment (46 Corpus Juris, 947, sec. 55),
and he can not question the constitutionality
of the law by virtue of which he was last
appointed (11 American Jurisprudence, 166,
par. 121; id., 767, par. 123). He is excepted
from said rule only when his non-acceptance of
the new appointment may affect public
interest or when he is compelled to accept it
by reason of legal exigencies (11 American
Jurisprudence, 770, par. 124). lawphi1.net
In the case under consideration, the
petitioner was free to accept or not the ad
interim appointment issued by the President of
the Commonwealth in his favor, in accordance
with said Commonwealth Act No. 145. Nothing
or nobody compelled him to do so. While the
office of judge of first instance of public
interest, being one of the means employed by
the Government to carry out one of its
purposes, which is the administration of
justice, considering the organization of the
courts of justice in the Philippines and the
creation of the positions of judges-at-large or
substitutes, the temporary disability of a judge
may be immediately remedied without
detriment to the smooth running of the judicial
machinery. If the petitioner believed, as he
now seems to believe, that Commonwealth Act
No. 145 is unconstitutional, he should have
refused to accept the appointment offered him
or, at least, he should have accepted it with
reservation, had he believed that his duty of
obedience to the laws compelled him to do so,
and afterwards resort to the power entrusted
with the final determination of the question
whether a law is unconstitutional or not. The
petitioner, being aware of his constitutional
and legal rights and obligations, by implied
order of the law (art. 2, Civil Code), accepted
the office of judge of first instance of the
Fourth Judicial District, with authority to
preside over the Fifth Branch of the Court of
First Instance of Manila and the Court of First
Instance of Palawan and entered into the
performance of the duties inherent therein,
after taking the necessary oath, thereby acting
with full knowledge that if he voluntarily
accepted the office to which he was appointed,
he would later be estopped from questioning
the validity of said appointment by alleging

Abad, Pascasio, Perez & Saludes (2013)

104

ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner is estopped

to assail the validity of the Commonwealth Act
145

CASE DIGEST IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I (Based on Atty. Gabriels Syllabus)

that the law, by virtue of which his
appointment was issued, is unconstitutional.
He likewise knew, or at least he should know,
that his ad interim appointment was subject to
the
approval
of
the
Commission
on
Appointments of the National Assembly and
that if said commission were to disapprove the
same, it would become ineffective and he
would cease discharging the office.
It appears from all the foregoing that
the petitioner having voluntarily abandoned
his appointment of June 2, 1936, and,
consequently, the office of judge of first
instance of Manila, Ninth Judicial District,
whose Fifth Branch was being presided over by
him by virtue thereof, upon accepting the ad
interim appointment of November 7, 1936, to
the office of judge of first instance of the
Fourth Judicial District, with authority to
preside over said Fifth Branch of the Court of
First Instance of Manila together with the Court
of First Instance of Palawan, and entering into
the discharge of the functions of said office, he
can not now claim to be entitled to repossess
the office occupied by him under his said
appointment of June 2, 1936 (22 R. C. L., 560,
par. 264), or question the constitutionality of
Commonwealth Act No. 145, by virtue of which
he has been appointed judge of first instance
of the Fourth Judicial District, with authority to
preside over the Fifth Branch of the Court of
First Instance of Manila and the Court of First
Instance of Palawan, which appointment was
disapproved
by
the
Commission
on
Appointments of the National Assembly.
Having arrived at the conclusion that
the petitioner is estopped by his own act from
proceeding to question the constitutionality of
Commonwealth Act No. 145, by virtue of which
he was appointed, by accepting said
appointment
and
entering
into
the
performance of the duties appertaining to the
office conferred therein.

MELENCIO-HERRERA, J.:

EUGENIO J. PUYAT, ERWIN L. CHIONGBIAN,

EDGARDO P. REYES, ANTONIO G. PUYAT,
JAIME R. BLANCO, RAFAEL R. RECTO and
REYNALDO
L.
LARDIZABAL,
vs.
HON. SIXTO T. J. DE GUZMAN, JR., as
Associate Commissioner of the Securities
& Exchange Commission, EUSTAQUIO T. C.
ACERO, R. G. VILDZIUS, ENRIQUE M.
BELO, MANUEL G. ABELLO, SERVILLANO
DOLINA,
JUANITO
MERCADO
and
ESTANISLAO A. FERNANDEZ,
G.R. No. L-51122 March 25, 1982

FACTS:
a) May 14,1979. An election for the
eleven Directors of the International Pipe
Industries
Corporation
(IPI)
a
private
corporation, was held. Those in charge ruled
that the following were elected as Directors:
Eugenio J. Puyat Eustaquio T.C. Acero
Erwin
L.
Chiongbian
R.
G.
Vildzius
Edgardo
P.
Reyes
Enrique
M.
Belo
Antonio
G.
Puyat
Servillano
Dolina
Jaime
R.
Blanco
Juanito
Mercado
Rafael R. Recto
Those named on the left list may be
called the Puyat Group; those on the right, the
Acero Group. Thus, the Puyat Group would be
in control of the Board and of the management
of IPI.
b) May 25, 1979. The Acero Group
instituted at the Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC) quo warranto proceedings,
docketed as Case No. 1747 (the SEC Case),
questioning the election of May 14, 1979. The
Acero Group claimed that the stockholders'
votes were not properly counted.
c) May 25-31, 1979. The Puyat Group
claims that at conferences of the parties with
respondent SEC Commissioner de Guzman,
Justice Estanislao A. Fernandez, then a
member of the Interim Batasang Pambansa,
orally entered his appearance as counsel for
respondent Acero to which the Puyat Group
objected on Constitutional grounds. Section
11, Article VIII, of the 1973 Constitution, then
in force, provided that no Assemblyman could
"appear
as
counsel
before
...
any
administrative body", and SEC was an
administrative body. Incidentally, the same
prohibition was maintained by the April 7,
1981 plebiscite. The cited Constitutional
prohibition
being
clear,
Assemblyman
Fernandez did not continue his appearance for
respondent Acero.
d) May 31, 1979. When the SEC Case
was called, it turned out that:
(i) On May 15, 1979, Assemblyman
Estanislao A. Fernandez had purchased from
Augusto A. Morales ten (10) shares of stock of
IPI for P200.00 upon request of respondent
Acero to qualify him to run for election as a
Director.
(ii) The deed of sale, however, was
notarized only on May 30, 1979 and was
sought to be registered on said date.
(iii) On May 31, 1979, the day following
the notarization of Assemblyman Fernandez'
purchase, the latter had filed an Urgent Motion

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105

SECTION 14

CASE DIGEST IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I (Based on Atty. Gabriels Syllabus)

for Intervention in the SEC Case as the owner
of ten (10) IPI shares alleging legal interest in
the matter in litigation.
e) July 17, 1979. The SEC granted leave
to intervene on the basis of Atty. Fernandez'
ownership of the said ten shares. 1 It is this
Order allowing intervention that precipitated
the instant petition for certiorari and
Prohibition with Preliminary Injunction.
f) July 3, 1979. Edgardo P. Reyes
instituted a case before the Court of First
Instance of Rizal (Pasig), Branch XXI, against
N.V. Verenigde Bueinzenfabrieken Excelsior
De Maas and respondent Eustaquio T. C. Acero
and others, to annul the sale of Excelsior's
shares in the IPI to respondent Acero (CC No.
33739). In that case, Assemblyman Fernandez
appeared as counsel for defendant Excelsior In
L-51928,
we
ruled
that
Assemblyman
Fernandez could not appear as counsel in a
case originally filed with a Court of First
Instance as in such situation the Court would
be one "without appellate jurisdiction."
On September 4, 1979, the Court en
banc issued a temporary Restraining Order
enjoining
respondent
SEC
Associate
Commissioner from allowing the participation
as an intervenor, of respondent Assemblyman
Estanislao Fernandez at the proceedings in the
SEC Case.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Assemblyman
Fernandez, as a then stockholder of IPI may
intervene in the SEC Case without violating
Section 11, Article VIII of the Constitution
HELD: Ordinarily, by virtue of the Motion for
Intervention, Assemblyman Fernandez cannot
be said to be appearing as counsel. Ostensibly,
he is not appearing on behalf of another,
although he is joining the cause of the private
respondents.
His
appearance
could
theoretically be for the protection of his
ownership of ten (10) shares of IPI in respect of
the matter in litigation and not for the
protection of the petitioners nor respondents
who have their respective capable and
respected counsel.
However, certain salient circumstances
militate
against
the
intervention
of
Assemblyman Fernandez in the SEC Case. He
had acquired a mere P200.00 worth of stock in
IPI, representing ten shares out of 262,843
outstanding shares. He acquired them "after
the fact" that is, on May 30, 1979, after the
contested election of Directors on May 14,
1979, after the quo warranto suit had been
filed on May 25, 1979 before SEC and one day

Abad, Pascasio, Perez & Saludes (2013)

before the scheduled hearing of the case

before the SEC on May 31, 1979. And what is
more, before he moved to intervene, he had
signified his intention to appear as counsel for
respondent Eustaquio T. C. Acero, 2 but which
was objected to by petitioners. Realizing,
perhaps, the validity of the objection, he
decided, instead, to "intervene" on the ground
of legal interest in the matter under litigation.
And it maybe noted that in the case filed
before the Rizal Court of First Instance (L51928), he appeared as counsel for defendant
Excelsior, co-defendant of respondent Acero
therein.
Under those facts and circumstances,
we are constrained to find that there has been
an indirect "appearance as counsel before ...
an administrative body" and, in our opinion,
that is a circumvention of the Constitutional
prohibition.
The
"intervention"
was an
afterthought to enable him to appear actively
in the proceedings in some other capacity. To
believe the avowed purpose, that is, to enable
him eventually to vote and to be elected as
Director in the event of an unfavorable
outcome of the SEC Case would be pure
naivete. He would still appear as counsel
indirectly.
A ruling upholding the "intervention"
would make the constitutional provision
ineffective. All an Assemblyman need do, if he
wants to influence an administrative body is to
acquire a minimal participation in the
"interest" of the client and then "intervene" in
the proceedings. That which the Constitution
directly prohibits may not be done by
indirection or by a general legislative act which
is intended to accomplish the objects
specifically or impliedly prohibited.
In brief, we hold that the intervention of
Assemblyman Fernandez in SEC. No. 1747 falls
within the ambit of the prohibition contained in
Section 11, Article VIII of the Constitution.
Our resolution of this case should not
be construed as, absent the question of the
constitutional prohibition against members of
the Batasan, allowing any stockholder, or any
number of stockholders, in a corporation to
intervene in any controversy before the SEC
relating
to
intra-corporate
matters.
A
resolution of that question is not necessary in
this case.
SECTION 16
SEN. MIRIAM DEFENSOR SANTIAGO and
SEN. FRANCISCO S. TATAD vs. SEN.

106

CASE DIGEST IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I (Based on Atty. Gabriels Syllabus)

TEOFISTO T. GUINGONA, JR. and SEN.
MARCELO B. FERNAN,
PANGANIBAN, J.:
G.R. No. 134577 November 18, 1998
FACTS: The Senate of the Philippines, with
Sen. John Henry R. Osmea as presiding
officer, convened on July 27, 1998 for the first
regular session of the eleventh Congress.
On the agenda for the day was the
election of officers. Nominated by Sen. Blas F.
Ople to the position of Senate President was
Sen. Marcelo B. Fernan. Sen. Francisco S. Tatad
was also nominated to the same position by
Sen. Miriam Defenser Santiago. By a vote of 20
to 2, Senator Fernan was declared the duly
elected President of the Senate.
The following were likewise elected:
Senator Ople as president pro tempore, and
Sen. Franklin M. Drilon as majority leader.
Senator Tatad thereafter manifested
that, with the agreement of Senator Santiago,
allegedly the only other member of the
minority, he was assuming the position of
minority leader. He explained that those who
had voted for Senator Fernan comprised the
"majority," while only those who had voted for
him, the losing nominee, belonged to the
"minority."
During the discussion on who should
constitute the Senate "minority," Sen. Juan M.
Flavier manifested that the senators belonging
to the Lakas-NUCD-UMDP Party numbering
seven (7) and, thus, also a minority had
chosen Senator Guingona as the minority
leader. No consensus on the matter was
arrived at. The following session day, the
debate on the question continued, with
Senators Santiago and Tatad delivering
privilege speeches. On the third session day,
the Senate met in caucus, but still failed to
resolve the issue.
On July 30, 1998, the majority leader
informed the body that he was in receipt of a
letter signed by the seven Lakas-NUCD-UMDP
senators, stating that they had elected
Senator Guingona as the minority leader. By
virtue thereof, the Senate President formally
recognized Senator Guingona as the minority
leader of the Senate.
On July 31, 1998, Senators Miriam
Defensor Santiago and Francisco S. Tatad
instituted an original petition for quo warranto
under Rule 66, Section 5, Rules of Court,
seeking the ouster of Senator Teofisto T.
Guingona, Jr. as minority leader of the Senate
and the declaration of Senator Tatad as the
rightful minority leader.

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ISSUES:
(1) Does the Court have jurisdiction over the
petition?
(2) In recognizing Respondent Guingona as the
Senate minority leader, did the Senate or
its officials, particularly Senate President
Fernan, violate the Constitution or the
laws?
(3) Was Respondent Guingona usurping,
unlawfully holding and exercising the
position of Senate minority leader?
(4) Did Respondent Fernan act with grave
abuse
of
discretion
in
recognizing
Respondent Guingona as the minority
leader?
HELD: After a close perusal of the pleadings
and a careful deliberation on the arguments,
pro and con, the Court finds that no
constitutional or legal infirmity or grave abuse
of discretion attended the recognition of and
the assumption into office by Respondent
Guingona as the Senate minority leader.
NOTE: The principle of separation of powers
ordains that each of the three great branches
of government has exclusive cognizance of
and is supreme in matters falling within its
own
constitutionally
allocated
sphere.
Constitutional respect and a becoming regard
for the sovereign acts, of a coequal branch
prevents this Court from prying into the
internal workings of the Senate. Where no
provision of the Constitution or the laws or
even the Rules of the Senate is clearly shown
to have been violated, disregarded or
overlooked, grave abuse of discretion cannot
be imputed to Senate officials for acts done
within their competence and authority. This
Court will be neither a tyrant nor a wimp;
rather, it will remain steadfast and judicious in
upholding the rule and majesty of the law.
(1) Yes.
First Issue: The Court's Jurisdiction
In the regular course, the regional trial
courts and this Court have concurrent
jurisdiction to hear and decide petitions for
quo warranto (as well as certiorari, prohibition
and mandamus), and a basic deference to the
hierarchy of courts impels a filing of such
petitions in the lower tribunals. However, for
special and important reasons or for
exceptional and compelling circumstances, as
in the present case, this Court has allowed
exceptions to this doctrine. In fact, original

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petitions for certiorari, prohibition, mandamus
and quo warranto assailing acts of legislative
officers like the Senate President and the
Speaker of the House have been recognized as
exceptions to this rule.
Petitioners principally invoke Avelino v.
Cuenco
in arguing that this Court has
jurisdiction to settle the issue of who is the
lawful Senate minority leader. They submit
that the definitions of "majority" and
"minority" involve an interpretation of the
Constitution, specifically Section 16 (1), Article
VI thereof, stating that "[t]he Senate shall
elect its President and the House of
Representatives its Speaker, by a majority vote
of all its respective Members."
Respondents and the solicitor general,
in their separate Comments, contend in
common that the issue of who is the lawful
Senate minority leader is an internal matter
pertaining exclusively to the domain of the
legislature, over which the Court cannot
exercise jurisdiction without transgressing the
principle of separation of powers. Allegedly, no
constitutional issue is involved, as the
fundamental law does not provide for the
office of a minority leader in the Senate. The
legislature alone has the full discretion to
provide for such office and, in that event, to
determine the procedure of selecting its
occupant.
Respondents also maintain that Avelino
cannot apply, because there exists no question
involving an interpretation or application of the
Constitution, the laws or even the Rules of the
Senate;
neither
are
there
"peculiar
circumstances" impelling the Court to assume
jurisdiction over the petition. The solicitor
general adds that there is not even any
legislative practice to support the petitioners'
theory that a senator who votes for the
winning Senate President is precluded from
becoming the minority leader.
To resolve the issue of jurisdiction, this
Court carefully reviewed and deliberated on
the various important cases involving this very
important and basic question, which it has
ruled upon in the past.
The early case Avelino v. Cuenco
cautiously tackled the scope of the Court's
power of judicial review; that is, questions
involving an interpretation or application of a
provision of the Constitution or the law,
including the rules of either house of Congress.
Within this scope falls the jurisdiction of the
Court over questions on the validity of
legislative or executive acts that are political in
nature,
whenever
the
tribunal
"finds

constitutionally imposed limits on powers or

functions conferred upon political bodies." 12
In the aforementioned case, the Court
initially declined to resolve the question of who
was the rightful Senate President, since it was
deemed
a
political
controversy
falling
exclusively within the domain of the Senate.
Upon a motion for reconsideration, however,
the Court ultimately assumed jurisdiction (1)
"in the light of subsequent events which justify
its intervention;" and (2) because the
resolution of the issue hinged on the
interpretation of the constitutional provision on
the presence of a quorum to hold a session
and therein elect a Senate President.
Justice
Feria
elucidated
in
his
Concurring Opinion: "[I] concur with the
majority that this Court has jurisdiction over
cases like the present . . . so as to establish in
this country the judicial supremacy, with the
Supreme Court as the final arbiter, to see that
no one branch or agency of the government
transcends the Constitution, not only in
justiceable but political questions as well."
In Taada v. Cueno, this Court
endeavored to define political question. And
we said that "it refers to 'those questions
which, under the Constitution, are to be
decided by the people in their sovereign
capacity, or in regard to which full
discretionary authority has been delegated to
the legislative or executive branch of the
government.' It is concerned with issues
dependent upon the wisdom, not [the] legality,
of a particular measure."
The Court ruled that the validity of the
selection of members of the Senate Electoral
Tribunal by the senators was not a political
question. The choice of these members did not
depend on the Senate's "full discretionary
authority," but was subject to mandatory
constitutional limitations. Thus, the Court held
that not only was it clearly within its
jurisdiction to pass upon the validity of the
selection proceedings, but it was also its duty
to consider and determine the issue.
In another landmark case, Lansang v.
Garcia, Chief Justice Roberto Concepcion wrote
that the Court "had authority to and should
inquire into the existence of the factual bases
required by the Constitution for the suspension
of the privilege of the writ [of habeas corpus]."
This ruling was made in spite of the previous
pronouncements in Barcelon v. Baker and
Montenegro v. Castaeda that "the authority
to decide whether the exigency has arisen
requiring suspension (of the privilege . . .)
belongs to the President and his 'decision is

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final and conclusive' upon the courts and upon
all other persons." But the Chief Justice
cautioned: "the function of the Court is merely
to check not to supplant the Executive, or
to ascertain merely whether he has gone
beyond the constitutional limits of his
jurisdiction, not to exercise the power vested
in him or to determine the wisdom of his act."
The eminent Chief Justice aptly
explained later in Javellana v. Executive
Secretary:
The reason why the issue
under consideration and other
issues of similar character are
justiciable, not political, is plain
and simple. One of the principal
bases of the non-justiciability of
so-called political questions is
the principle of separation of
powers characteristic of the
presidential
system
of
government the functions of
which are classified or divided,
by reason of their nature, into
three (3) categories, namely, 1)
those involving the making of
laws, which are allocated to the
legislative department; 2) those
concerning mainly with the
enforcement of such laws and of
judicial
decisions
applying
and/or interpreting the same,
which belong to the executive
department;
and
3)
those
dealing with the settlement of
disputes,
controversies
or
conflicts involving rights, duties
or prerogatives that are legally
demandable and enforceable,
which are apportioned to courts
of justice. Within its own sphere
but only within such sphere
each department is supreme
and independent of the others,
and each is devoid of authority
not only to encroach upon the
powers or field of action
assigned to any of the other
departments, but also to inquire
into
or
pass
upon
the
advisability or wisdom of the
acts performed, measures taken
or decisions made by the other
departments provided that
such acts, measures or decisions
are within the area allocated
thereto by the Constitution.

Accordingly, when the

grant of power is qualified,
conditional
or
subject
to
limitations, the issue of whether
or
not
the
prescribed
qualifications or conditions have
been met, or the limitations
respected is justiciable or nonpolitical, the crux of the problem
being one of legality or validity
of the contested act, not its
wisdom.
Otherwise,
said
qualifications,
conditions
or
limitations particularly those
prescribed by the Constitution
would be set at naught. What is
more, the judicial inquiry into
such issue and the settlement
thereof are the main functions of
the courts of justice under the
presidential form of government
adopted
in
our
1935
Constitution, and the system of
checks and balances, one of its
basic
predicates.
As
a
consequence, we have neither
the authority nor the discretion
to decline passing upon said
issue, but are under the
ineluctable obligation made
particularly more exacting and
peremptory by our oath, as
members of the highest Court of
the land, to support and defend
the Constitution to settle it.
This explains why, in Miller v.
Johnson [92 Ky. 589, 18 SW 522,
523], it was held that courts
have a "duty, rather than a
power," to determine whether
another
branch
of
the
government has "kept within
constitutional limits."
Unlike our previous constitutions, the
1987 Constitution is explicit in defining the
scope of judicial power. The present
Constitution now fortifies the authority of the
courts to determine in an appropriate action
the validity of the acts of the political
departments. It speaks of judicial prerogative
in terms of duty, viz.:
Judicial power includes
the duty of the courts of justice
to settle actual controversies
involving rights which are legally
demandable and enforceable,
and to determine whether or not
there has been a grave abuse of

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discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction on the part
of any branch or instrumentality
of the Government.
This express definition has resulted in
clearer and more resolute pronouncements of
the Court. Daza v. Singson, Coseteng v. Mitra,
Jr. and Guingona Jr. v. Gonzales similarly
resolved issues assailing the acts of the
leaders of both houses of Congress in
apportioning among political parties the seats
to which each chamber was entitled in the
Commission on Appointments. The Court held
that the issue was justiciable, "even if the
question were political in nature," since it
involved "the legality, not the wisdom, of the
manner of filling the Commission on
Appointments as prescribed by [Section 18,
Article VI of] the Constitution."
The same question of jurisdiction was
raised in Taada v. Angara, wherein the
petitioners sought to nullify the Senate's
concurrence in the ratification of the World
Trade Organization (WTO) Agreement. The
Court ruled: "Where an action of the legislative
branch is seriously alleged to have infringed
the Constitution, it becomes not only the right
but in fact the duty of the judiciary to settle
the dispute." The Court en banc unanimously
stressed that in taking jurisdiction over
petitions questioning, an act of the political
departments of government, it will not review
the wisdom, merits or propriety of such action,
and will strike it down only on either of two
grounds: (1) unconstitutionality or illegality
and (2) grave abuse of discretion.
Earlier in Co v. Electoral Tribunal of the
House of Representatives (HRET), the Court
refused to reverse a decision of the HRET, in
the absence of a showing that said tribunal
had committed grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack of jurisdiction. The Court
ruled that full authority had been conferred
upon the electoral tribunals of the House of
Representatives and of the Senate as sole
judges of all contests relating to the election,
the returns, and the qualifications of their
respective members. Such jurisdiction is
original and exclusive. The Court may inquire
into a decision or resolution of said tribunals
only if such "decision or resolution was
rendered without or in excess of jurisdiction, or
with grave abuse of discretion"
Recently, the Court, in Arroyo v. De
Venecia, was asked to reexamine the enrolled
bill doctrine and to look beyond the
certification of the Speaker of the House of
Representatives that the bill, which was later

enacted as Republic Act 8240, was properly

approved by the legislative body. Petitioners
claimed that certain procedural rules of the
House had been breached in the passage of
the bill. They averred further that a violation of
the constitutionally mandated House rules was
a violation of the Constitution itself.
The Court, however, dismissed the
petition, because the matter complained of
concerned the internal procedures of the
House, with which the Court had no concern. It
enucleated: It would-be an unwarranted
invasion of the prerogative of a coequal
department for this Court either to set aside a
legislative action as void because the Court
thinks the House has disregarded its own rules
of procedure, or to allow those defeated in the
political arena to seek a rematch in the judicial
forum when petitioners can find their remedy
in that department itself. The Court has not
been invested with a roving commission to
inquire into complaints, real or imagined, of
legislative skullduggery. It would be acting in
excess of its power and would itself be guilty
of grave abuse of discretion were it to do so. . .
. In the absence of anything to the contrary,
the Court must assume that Congress or any
House thereof acted in the good faith belief
that its conduct was permitted by its rules, and
deference rather than disrespect is due the
judgment of that body.
In
the
instant
controversy,
the
petitioners one of whom is Senator
Santiago, a well-known constitutionalist try
to hew closely to these jurisprudential
parameters. They claim that Section 16 (1),
Article VI of the constitution, has not been
observed in the selection of the Senate
minority leader. They also invoke the Court's
"expanded" judicial power "to determine
whether or not there has been a grave abuse
of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction" on the part of respondents.
Dissenting in part, Mr. Justice Vicente V.
Mendoza submits that the Court has no
jurisdiction over the petition. Well-settled is
the doctrine, however, that jurisdiction over
the subject matter of a case is determined by
the allegations of the complaint or petition,
regardless of whether the plaintiff or petitioner
is entitled to the relief asserted. In light of the
aforesaid allegations of petitioners, it is clear
that this Court has jurisdiction over the
petition. It is well within the power and
jurisdiction of the Court to inquire whether
indeed the Senate or its officials committed a
violation of the Constitution or gravely abused

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their discretion in the exercise
functions and prerogatives.

of

their

(2) No.
Second
Issue:
Violation
of
the
Constitution
Petitioners answer the above question
in the affirmative. They contend that the
constitutional provision requiring the election
of the Senate President "by majority vote of all
members" carries with it a judicial duty to
determine the concepts of "majority" and
"minority," as well as who may elect a minority
leader. They argue that "majority" in the
aforequoted constitutional provision refers to
that group of senators who (1) voted for the
winning Senate President and (2) accepted
committee chairmanships. Accordingly, those
who voted for the losing nominee and
accepted no such chairmanships comprise the
minority, to whom the right to determine the
minority leader belongs. As a result,
petitioners assert, Respondent Guingona
cannot be the legitimate minority leader, since
he voted for Respondent Fernan as Senate
President. Furthermore, the members of the
Lakas-NUCD-UMDP cannot choose the minority
leader, because they did not belong to the
minority, having voted for Fernan and
accepted committee chairmanships.
We
believe,
however,
that
the
interpretation proposed by petitioners finds no
clear support from the Constitution, the laws,
the Rules of the Senate or even from practices
of the Upper House.
The term "majority" has been judicially
defined a number of times. When referring to a
certain number out of a total or aggregate, it
simply "means the number greater than half or
more than half of any total." The plain and
unambiguous
words
of
the
subject
constitutional clause simply mean that the
Senate President must obtain the votes of
more than one half of all the senators. Not by
any construal does it thereby delineate who
comprise the "majority," much less the
"minority," in the said body. And there is no
showing that the framers of our Constitution
had in mind other than the usual meanings of
these terms.
In effect, while the Constitution
mandates that the President of the Senate
must be elected by a number constituting
more than one half of all the members thereof,
it does not provide that the members who will
not vote for him shall ipso facto constitute the
"minority," who could thereby elect the
minority leader. Verily, no law or regulation

states that the defeated candidate shall

automatically become the minority leader.
The Comment of Respondent Guingona
furnishes some relevant precedents, which
were not contested in petitioners' Reply.
During the eighth Congress, which was the
first to convene after the ratification of the
1987 Constitution, the nomination of Sen.
Jovito R Salonga as Senate President was
seconded by a member of the minority, then
Sen. Joseph E. Estrada. During the ninth
regular session, when Sen. Edgardo J. Angara
assumed the Senate presidency in 1993, a
consensus was reached to assign committee
chairmanships to all senators, including those
belonging to the minority. This practice
continued during the tenth Congress, where
even the minority leader was allowed to chair
a committee. History would also show that the
"majority" in either house of Congress has
referred to the political party to which the
most number of lawmakers belonged, while
the "minority" normally referred to a party with
a lesser number of members.
Let us go back to the definitions of the
terms "majority" and "minority." Majority may
also refer to "the group, party, or faction with
the larger number of votes," not necessarily
more than one half. This is sometimes referred
to as plurality. In contrast, minority is "a group,
party, or faction with a smaller number of
votes or adherents than the majority."
Between two unequal parts or numbers
comprising a whole or totality, the greater
number would obviously be the majority while
the lesser would be the minority. But where
there are more than two unequal groupings, it
is not as easy to say which is the minority
entitled to select the leader representing all
the minorities. In a government with a multiparty system such as in the Philippines (as
pointed out by petitioners themselves), there
could be several minority parties, one of which
has to be indentified by the Comelec as the
"dominant minority party" for purposes of the
general
elections.
In
the
prevailing
composition of the present Senate, members
either belong to different political parties or
are independent. No constitutional or statutory
provision prescribe which of the many minority
groups or the independents or a combination
thereof has the right to select the minority
leader.
While the Constitution is explicit on the
manner of electing a Senate President and a
House Speaker, it is, however, dead silent on
the manner of selecting the other officers in
both chambers of Congress. All that the

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Charter says is that "[e]ach House shall choose
such other officers as it may deem necessary."
To our mind, the method of choosing who will
be such other officers is merely a derivative of
the exercise of the prerogative conferred by
the aforequoted constitutional provision.
Therefore, such method must be prescribed by
the Senate itself, not by this Court.
In this regard, the Constitution vests in
each house of Congress the power "to
determine the rules of its proceedings."
Pursuant thereto, the Senate formulated and
adopted a set of rules to govern its internal
affairs. Pertinent to the instant case are Rules I
and II thereof, which provide:
Rule I
ELECTIVE OFFICERS
Sec 1. The Senate shall
elect, in the manner hereinafter
provided,
a
President,
a
President
Pro
Tempore,
a
Secretary, and a Sergeant-atArms.
These officers shall take
their oath of office before
entering into the discharge of
their duties.
Rule II
ELECTION OF OFFICER
Sec. 2. The officers of the
Senate shall be elected by the
majority vote of all its Members.
Should there be more than one
candidate for the same office, a
nominal vote shall be taken;
otherwise, the elections shall be
by viva voce or by resolution.
Notably, the Rules of the Senate do not
provide for the positions of majority and
minority leaders. Neither is there an open
clause providing specifically for such offices
and prescribing the manner of creating them
or of choosing the holders thereof, At any rate,
such offices, by tradition and long practice, are
actually extant. But, in the absence of
constitutional or statutory guidelines or
specific rules, this Court is devoid of any basis
upon which to determine the legality of the
acts of the Senate relative thereto. On grounds
of respect for the basic concept of separation
of powers, courts may not intervene in the
internal affairs of the legislature; it is not
within the province of courts to direct
Congress how to do its work. Paraphrasing the
words of Justice Florentino P. Feliciano, this
Court is of the opinion that where no specific,
operable norms and standards are shown to
exist, then the legislature must be given a real

and effective opportunity to fashion and

promulgate as well as to implement them,
before the courts may intervene.
Needless to state, legislative rules,
unlike statutory laws, do not have the imprints
of permanence and obligatoriness during their
effectivity. In fact, they "are subject to
revocation, modification or waiver at the
pleasure of the body adopting them." Being
merely matters of procedure, their observance
are of no concern to the courts, for said rules
may be waived or disregarded by the
legislative body at will, upon the concurrence
of a majority.
In view of the foregoing, Congress
verily has the power and prerogative to
provide for such officers as it may deem. And
it is certainly within its own jurisdiction and
discretion to prescribe the parameters for the
exercise of this prerogative. This Court has no
authority to interfere and unilaterally intrude
into that exclusive realm, without running
afoul of constitutional principles that it is
bound to protect and uphold the very duty
that justifies the Court's being. Constitutional
respect and a becoming regard for the
sovereign acts of a coequal branch prevents
this Court from prying into the internal
workings of the Senate. To repeat, this Court
will be neither a tyrant nor a wimp; rather, it
will remain steadfast and judicious in
upholding the rule and majesty of the law.
To accede, then, to the interpretation of
petitioners would practically amount to judicial
legislation, a clear breach of the constitutional
doctrine of separation of powers. If for this
argument alone, the petition would easily fail.
While no provision of the Constitution
or the laws or the rules and even the practice
of the Senate was violated, and while the
judiciary is without power to decide matters
over which full discretionary authority has
been lodged in the legislative department, this
Court may still inquire whether an act of
Congress or its officials has been made with
grave abuse of discretionThis is the plain
implication of Section 1, Article VIII of the
Constitution, which expressly confers upon the
judiciary the power and the duty not only "to
settle actual controversies involving rights
which
are
legally
demandable
and
enforceable," but likewise "to determine
whether or not there has been a grave abuse
of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction on the part of any branch or
instrumentality of the Government."
Explaining the above-quoted clause,
former Chief Justice Concepcion, who was a

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member
of
the
1986
Constitutional
Commission, said in part:
. . . the powers of
government
are
generally
considered divided into three
branches: the Legislative, the
Executive and the Judiciary. Each
one is supreme within its own
sphere and independent of the
others.
Because
of
that
supremacy[, the] power to
determine whether a given law
is valid or not is vested in courts
of justice.
Briefly stated, courts of
justice determine the limits of
power of the agencies and
offices of the government as
well as those of its officers. In
other words, the judiciary is the
final arbiter on the question
whether or not a branch of
government or any of its officials
has acted without jurisdiction or
in excess of jurisdiction, or so
capriciously as to constitute an
abuse of discretion amounting
to excess of jurisdiction or lack
of jurisdiction. This is not only a
judicial power but a duty to pass
judgment on matters of this
nature.
This is the background of
paragraph 2 of Section 1, which
means that the courts cannot
hereafter evade the duty to
settle matters of this nature, by
claiming that such matters
constitute a political question.
(3) No.
Third Issue: Usurpation of Office
Usurpation
generally
refers
to
unauthorized
arbitrary
assumption
and
exercise of power by one without color of title
or who is not entitled by law thereto. A quo
warranto proceeding is the proper legal
remedy to determine the right or title to the
contested public office and to oust the holder
from its enjoyment. The action may be brought
by the solicitor general or a public prosecutor
or any person claiming to be entitled to the
public office or position usurped or unlawfully
held or exercised by another. The action shall
be brought against the person who allegedly
usurped, intruded into or is unlawfully holding
of exercising such office.

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In order for a quo warranto proceeding

to be successful, the person suing must show
that he or she has a clear right to the
contested office or to use or exercise the
functions of the office allegedly usurped or
unlawfully held by the respondent. In this case,
petitioners present no sufficient proof of a
clear and indubitable franchise to the office of
the Senate minority leader.
As discussed earlier, the specific norms
or standards that may be used in determining
who may lawfully occupy the disputed position
has not been laid down by the Constitution,
the statutes, or the Senate itself in which the
power has been vested. Absent any clear-cut
guideline, in no way can it be said that
illegality or irregularity tainted Respondent
Guingona's assumption and exercise of the
powers of the office of Senate minority leader.
Furthermore, no grave abuse of discretion has
been shown to characterize any of his specific
acts as minority leader.
(4) No.
Fourth Issue: Fernan's Recognition of
Guingona
The all-embracing and plenary power
and duty of the Court "to determine whether
or not there has been a grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction on the part of any branch or
instrumentality
of
the
Government"
is
restricted only by the definition and confines of
the term "grave abuse of discretion."
By grave abuse of discretion is meant
such capricious or whimsical exercise of
judgment as is equivalent to lack of
jurisdiction. The abuse of discretion must be
patent and gross as to amount to an evasion
of positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform
a duty enjoined by law, or to act at all in
contemplation of law as where the power is
exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner
by reason of passion and hostility.
By the above standard, we hold that
Respondent Fernan did not gravely abuse his
discretion as Senate President in recognizing
Respondent Guingona as the minority leader.
Let us recall that the latter belongs to one of
the minority parties in the Senate, the LakasNUCD-UMDP. By unanimous resolution of the
members of this party that he be the minority
leader, he was recognized as such by the
Senate President. Such formal recognition by
Respondent Fernan came only after at least
two Senate sessions and a caucus, wherein
both sides were liberally allowed to articulate
their standpoints.

113

CASE DIGEST IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I (Based on Atty. Gabriels Syllabus)

Under these circumstances, we believe
that the Senate President cannot be accused
of "capricious or whimsical exercise of
judgment" or of "an arbitrary and despotic
manner by reason of passion or hostility."
Where no provision of the Constitution, the
laws or even the rules of the Senate has been
clearly shown to have been violated,
disregarded or overlooked, grave abuse of
discretion cannot be imputed to Senate
officials for acts done within their competence
and authority.
WHEREFORE, for the above reasons,
the petition is hereby DISMISSED.

FACTS: In the session of the Senate of

February 18, 1949, Senator Lorenzo M.
Taadare quested that his right to speak on
the next session day, February 21, 1949, to
formulate charges against the then Senate
President Jose Avelino be reserved. His request
was approved.
On February 21, 1949, hours before the
opening of the session Senator Taada and
Senator Taada and Senator Prospero Sanidad
filed with the Secretary of the Senate a
resolution enumerating charges against the
then Senate President and ordering the
investigation thereof.
Although a sufficient number of
senators to constitute a quorum were at the
Senate session hall at the appointed time
(10:00 A.M.), and the petitioner was already in
his office, said petitioner delayed his
appearance at the session hall until about
11:35 A.M. When he finally ascended the
rostrum, he did not immediately open the
session, but instead requested from the
Secretary a copy of the resolution submitted
by Senators Taada and Sanidad and in the
presence of the public he read slowly and
carefully said resolution, after which he called
and conferred with his colleagues Senator
Francisco and Tirona.
Shortly before 12:00 noon, due to the
session be opened, the petitioner finally called
the meeting to order. Except Senator Sotto
who was confined in a hospital and Senator
Confesor who is in the United States, all the
Senator were present.
Senator Sanidad, following a long
established practice, moved that the roll call
be dispensed with, but Senator Tirona opposed
said motion, obviously in pursuance of a
premeditated plan of petitioner and his

partisans to make use of dilatory tactics to

prevent Senator Taada from delivering his
privilege speech. The roll was called.
Senator Sanidad next moved, as is the
usual practice, to dispense with the reading of
the minutes, but this motion was likewise
opposed by Senator Tirona and David,
evidently, again, in pursuance of the abovementioned conspiracy.
Before and after the roll call and before
and after the reading of the minutes, Senator
Taada repeatedly stood up to claim his right
to deliver his one-hour privilege speech but
the petitioner, then presiding, continuosly
ignored him; and when after the reading of the
minutes, Senator Taada instead on being
recognized by the Chair, the petitioner
announced that he would order the arrest of
any senator who would speak without being
previously recognized by him, but all the while,
tolerating the actions of his follower, Senator
Tirona, who was continuously shouting at
Senator Sanidad "Out of order!" everytime the
latter would ask for recognition of Senator
Taada.
At this juncture, some disorderly
conduct broke out in the Senate gallery, as if
by pre-arrangement. At about this same time
Senator Pablo Angeles David, one of the
petitioner's followers, was recognized by
petitioner, and he moved for adjournment of
session, evidently, again, in pursuance of the
above-mentioned
conspiracy
to
muzzle
Senator Taada.
Senator
Sanidad
registered
his
opposition to the adjournment of the session
and this opposition was seconded by herein
respondent who moved that the motion of
adjournment be submitted to a vote. Another
commotion ensued.
Senator David reiterated his motion for
adjournment and herein respondent also
reiterated his opposition to the adjournment
and again moved that the motion of Senator
David be submitted to a vote.
Suddenly, the petitioner banged the
gavel and abandoning the Chair hurriedly
walked out of the session hall followed by
Senator David, Tirona, Francisco, Torres,
Magalona and Clarin, while the rest of the
senators
remained.
Whereupon
Senator
Melencio Arranz, Senate President Protempore, urged by those senators present took
the Chair and proceeded with the session.
Senator Cabili stood up, and asked that
it be made of record it was so made that
the deliberate abandonment of the Chair by
the petitioner, made it incumbent upon Senate

Abad, Pascasio, Perez & Saludes (2013)

114

JOSE AVELINO vs. MARIANO J. CUENCO

G.R. No. L-2821 March 4, 1949

CASE DIGEST IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I (Based on Atty. Gabriels Syllabus)

President
Pro-tempore
Arranz
and
the
remaining members of the Senate to continue
the session in order not to paralyze the
functions of the Senate.
Senate President Pro-tempore Arranz
then suggested that respondent be designated
to preside over the session which suggestion
was carried unanimously. the respondent
thereupon took the Chair.
Upon motion of Senator Arranz, which
was approved Gregorio Abad was appointed
Acting Secretary, because the Assistance
Secretary, who was then acting as Secretary,
had followed the petitioner when the latter
abandoned the session.
Senator Taada, after being recognized
by the Chair, was then finally able to deliver
his privilege speech. Thereafter Senator
Sanidad read aloud the complete text of said
Resolution (No. 68), and submitted his motion
for approval thereof and the same was
unanimously approved.
With Senate President Pro-tempore
Arranz again occupying the Chair, after the
respondent had yielded it to him, Senator
Sanidad introduced Resolution No. 67, entitled
"Resolution declaring vacant the position of
the President of the Senate and designated the
Honorable Mariano Jesus Cuenco Acting
President of the Senate." Put to a vote, the
said resolution was unanimously approved.
Senator Cuenco took the oath.
The next day the President of the
Philippines recognized the respondent as
acting president of the Philippines Senate.
By his petition in this quo warranto
proceeding petitioners asked the Court to
declare him the rightful President of the
Philippines senate and oust respondent.

alleged affected without any immediate

remedy. A fortiori we should abstain in this
case because the selection of the presiding
officer affect only the Senators themselves
who are at liberty at any time to choose their
officers, change or reinstate them. Anyway, if,
as the petition must imply to be acceptable,
the majority of the Senators want petitioner to
preside, his remedy lies in the Senate Session
Hall not in the Supreme Court.
The Court will not sally into the
legitimate domain of the Senate on the plea
that our refusal to intercede might lead into a
crisis, even a resolution. No state of things has
been proved that might change the temper of
the Filipino people as a peaceful and lawabiding citizens. And we should not allow
ourselves to be stampeded into a rash action
inconsistent with the calm that should
characterized judicial deliberations.
The precedent of Werts vs. Roger does
not apply, because among other reasons, the
situation is not where two sets of senators
have constituted themselves into two senates
actually functioning as such, (as in said Werts
case), there being no question that there is
presently one Philippines Senate only. To their
credit be it recorded that petitioner and his
partisans have not erected themselves into
another Senat