Lim vs Pacquing

The Charter of the City of Manila was enacted by Congress on 18 June 1949 (R.A. No. 409).
On 1 January 1951, Executive Order No. 392 was issued transferring the authority to
regulate jai-alais from local government to the Games and Amusements Board (GAB).
On 07 September 1971, however, the Municipal Board of Manila nonetheless passed
Ordinance No. 7065 entitled An Ordinance Authorizing the Mayor To Allow And Permit The
Associated Development Corporation To Establish, Maintain And Operate A Jai-Alai In The
City Of Manila, Under Certain Terms And Conditions And For Other Purposes.
On 20 August 1975, Presidential Decree No. 771 was issued by then President Marcos. The
decree, entitled Revoking All Powers and Authority of Local Government(s) To Grant
Franchise, License or Permit And Regulate Wagers Or Betting By The Public On Horse And
Dog Races, Jai-Alai Or Basque Pelota, And Other Forms Of Gambling, in Section 3 thereof,
expressly revoked all existing franchises and permits issued by local governments.
In May 1988, Associated Development Corporation (ADC) tried to operate a Jai-Alai. The
government through Games and Amusement Board intervened and invoked Presidential
Decree No. 771 which expressly revoked all existing franchises and permits to operate all
forms of gambling facilities (including Jai-Alai) by local governments. ADC assails the
constitutionality of P.D. No. 771.
ISSUE:Whether or not P.D. No. 771 is violative of the equal protection and non-impairment
clauses of the Constitution.
HELD: NO. P.D. No. 771 is valid and constitutional.
RATIO:
Presumption against unconstitutionality. There is nothing on record to show or even suggest
that PD No. 771 has been repealed, altered or amended by any subsequent law or
presidential issuance (when the executive still exercised legislative powers).
Neither can it be tenably stated that the issue of the continued existence of ADCs franchise
by reason of the unconstitutionality of PD No. 771 was settled in G.R. No. 115044, for the
decision of the Courts First Division in said case, aside from not being final, cannot have the
effect of nullifying PD No. 771 as unconstitutional, since only the Court En Banc has that
power under Article VIII, Section 4(2) of the Constitution.
And on the question of whether or not the government is estopped from contesting ADCs
possession of a valid franchise, the well-settled rule is that the State cannot be put in
estoppel by the mistakes or errors, if any, of its officials or agents. (Republic v. Intermediate
Appellate Court, 209 SCRA 90)

Facts:
On 15 September 1994, respondent Associated Development Corporation (ADC) fileda petition for
prohibition seeking to prevent GAB from withdrawing the provisional authoritythat had been granted them
to operate jai-alai. ADC's franchise was invalidated by PD No.771, which expressly revoked
all
existing franchises to operate all forms of gambling facilitiesissued by local governments.Respondent
contends that Ordinance No. 7065 authorized the Mayor to allow ADC to operate Jai-Alai in the City of
Manila. ADC also assails the constitutionality of PD No. 771 as violativeof the equal protection and nonimpairment clauses of the Constitution.
Issue:
Whether ADC has a valid franchise to operate the Jai-Alai de Manila.
Held:
PD No. 771 is a valid exercise of the
inherent
police power of the State. Gambling isessentially antagonistic and self-reliance. It breeds indolence and
erodes the value of good,honest and hard work. It is, as very aptly stated by PD No. 771, a vice and a
social ill whichgovernment must minimize (if not eradicate) in pursuit of social and economic
development. Jai-alai is not a mere economic activity which the law seeks to regulate. It is
essentiallygambling and whether it should be permitted and, if so, under what conditions are
questionsprimarily for the lawmaking authority to determine, talking into account national and
localinterests. Here, it is the police power of the State that is paramount. On the alleged violationof the
non-impairment and equal protection clauses of the Constitution, it should beremembered that a franchise
is not in the strict sense a simple contract but rather it is moreimportantly, a mere privilege specially in
matters which are within the government's powerto regulate and even prohibit through the exercise of the
police power. Thus, a gamblingfranchise is always subject to the exercise of police power for the public
welfare.ADC has no franchise from Congress to operate the jai-alai therefore, it may not operateeven if it
has a license from the Mayor to operate the jai-alai in the City of Manila.
MMDA v. Bel-Air Village Association, 328 SCRA 836, GR 135962 (2000)
1.

MMDA v. Bel-Air Village Association, 328 SCRA 836, GR 135962 (2000)

Facts:
Metropolitan Manila Authority (MMDA) is a government agency tasked with the delivery of
basic services in Metro Manila, while Bel-Air Village Association, Inc. (BAVA) is the registered
owner of Neptune Street, a road inside a private residential subdivision, the Bel-Air Village.
On December 30, 1995, the president of the respondent received from the chairman of
MMDA a notice requesting the respondent to open Neptune Street to public vehicular traffic
starting January 2, 1996. On that same day, the president of the respondent was apprised
that the perimeter wall separating the subdivision from the adjacent Kalayaan Avenue would
be demolished. On January 2, 1996, the respondent instituted an action for injunction
against the petitioner before the Regional Trial Court. The trial court issued a temporary
restraining order. However, after due hearing, the court denied the issuance of a preliminary
injunction. On appeal, the Court of Appeals ruled that the MMDA has no authority to order
the opening of Neptune Street being a private subdivision road and to cause the demolition
of its perimeter walls. It held that the authority is lodged in the City Council of Makati by an
ordinance.
Issue/s:

1. WON MMDA has the right to order the opening of Neptune and to cause the demolition of
its perimeter walls.

Held: The Court ruled that the MMDA has no power to enact ordinances for the welfare of the
community. It is the local government units, acting through their respective legislative
councils, that possess legislative power and police power. In the case at bar, the
Sangguniang Panlunsod of Makati City did not pass any ordinance or resolution ordering the
opening of Neptune Street, hence, its proposed opening by petitioner MMDA is illegal and
the respondent Court of Appeals did not err in so ruling.
Moreover, the MMDA was created to put some order in the metropolitan transportation
system, but unfortunately the powers granted by its charter are limited. Its good intentions
cannot justify the opening for public use of a private street in a private subdivision without
any legal warrant. The promotion of the general welfare is not antithetical to the
preservation of the rule of law.

Police Power : B017 Local laws

Regulatory Ordinances
Alde, Elyzaldy B.Balacuit et al., v. Court of First Instance of Agusan del Norte and Butuan
CityG.R. No. L-38429 (E)30 June 1988
FACTS
This involves a Petition for Review questioning the validity and constitutionality of Ordinance
No.640 passed by the Municipal Board of the City of Butuan on April 21, 1969, penalizing
any person, groupof persons, entity or corporation engaged in the business of selling
admission tickets to any movie orother public exhibitions, games, contests or other
performances to require children between 7 and 12years of age to pay full payment for
tickets intended for adults but should charge only one-half of thesaid ticket.Petitioners who
are managers of theaters, affected by the ordinance, filed a Complaint before theCourt of
First Instance of Agusan del Norte and Butuan City docketed as Special Civil No. 237 on June
30,1969, praying that the subject ordinance be declared unconstitutional and, therefore,
void andunenforceable. The Court rendered judgment declaring Ordinance No. 640 of the
City of Butuanconstitutional and valid.
ISSUE
Whether Ordinance No. 640 passed by the Municipal Board of the City of Butuan is valid
andconstitutional and was the Ordinance a valid exercise of police power.
HELD

It is already settled that the operation of theaters, cinematographs and other places of
publicexhibition are subject to regulation by the municipal council in the exercise of
delegated police power bythe local government. However, to invoke the exercise of police
power, not only must it appear that theinterest of the public generally requires an
interference with private rights, but the means adopted mustbe reasonably necessary for
the accomplishment of the purpose and not unduly oppressive uponindividuals. The
legislature may not, under the guise of protecting the public interest, arbitrarily interferewith
private business, or impose unusual and unnecessary restrictions upon lawful occupations.
In other words, the determination as to what is a proper exercise of its police power is not
final or conclusive, butis subject to the supervision of the courts.The Court likewise ruled in
the negative as to the question of the subject ordinance being a validexercise of police
power. While it is true that a business may be regulated, it is equally true that
suchregulation must be within the bounds of reason, that is, the regulatory ordinance must
be reasonable, andits provisions cannot be oppressive amounting to an arbitrary
interference with the business or callingsubject of regulation. The proprietors of a theater
have a right to manage their property in their own way,to fix what prices of admission they
think most for their own advantage, and that any person who did notapprove could stay
away.The exercise of police power by the local government is valid unless it contravenes
thefundamental law of the land, or an act of the legislature, or unless it is against public
policy or isunreasonable, oppressive, partial, discriminating or in derogation of a common
right. For being unreasonable and an undue restraint of trade, it cannot, under the guise of
exercising police power, beupheld as valid.WHEREFORE, the decision of the trial court in
Special Civil Case No. 237 is hereby REVERSEDand SET ASIDE and a new judgment is hereby
rendered declaring Ordinance No. 640 unconstitutionaland, therefore, null and void. This
decision is immediately executory.

Sangalang v. IAC (G.R. No. 71169. December

22, 1988)
18AUG
FACTS:
The Mayor of Makati directed Bel-Air Village Association (BAVA) to opening of several streets to the
general public, after a series of developments in zoning regulations. All but Jupiter St. was voluntarily
opened. The strong opposition later gave way when the municipal officials force-opened the gates of said
street for public use. The area ceased to be purely residential. Action for damages was brought against
Ayala Corporation and BAVA for alleged breach of contract, to maintain the purely residential status of the
area. Other similarly situated also filed their respective cases. All were dismissed in the trial court. The
Court of Appeals affirmed the said dismissals.
ISSUE:
Whether or not there is a contract between homeowners and Ayala Corporation violated in opening the
Jupiter street for public use.
HELD:

No. There was no contract to speak of in the case, hence nothing was violated.
RATIO:
Petitioners cannot successfully rely on the alleged promise by Ayala Corporation, to build a [f]ence along
Jupiter [street] with gate for entrance and/or exit as evidence of Ayalas alleged continuing obligation to
maintain a wall between the residential and commercial sections. Assuming there was a contract violated,
it was still overtaken by the passage of zoning ordinances which represent a legitimate exercise of police
power. The petitioners have not shown why Courts should hold otherwise other than for the supposed
non-impairment guaranty of the Constitution, which is secondary to the more compelling interests of
general welfare. The Ordinance has not been shown to be capricious or arbitrary or unreasonable to
warrant the reversal of the judgments so appealed.

Torio vs. Fontanilla, L-29993 (October

23, 1978)
Posted on October 3, 2012

G.R. No. L-29993; 85 SCRA 399

October 23, 1978
____________________
Facts:
The Municipal Council of Malasiqui, Pangasinan, passed Resolution No. 159 to
manage the 1959 Malasiqui town fiesta celebration The 1959 Malasiqui
Town Fiesta Executive Committee was created, which, in turn, organized a subcommittee on entertainment and stage.
A zarzuela troupe, of which Vicente Fontanilla was a member, arrived for their
performance on January 22. During the zarzuela, the stage collapsed and
Fontanilla was pinned underneath. He was immediately hospitalized, but died
the following day.
Fontanillas heirs filed a complaint to recover damages against the Municipality
of Malasiqui, its Municipal Council and all the Councils individual members.
The municipality invoked inter alia the defense that as a legally and duly
organized public corporation it performs sovereign functions and the holding of a
town fiesta was an exercise of its governmental functions from which no liability
can arise to answer for the negligence of any of its agents.

The councilors maintained that they merely acted as the municipalitys agents
in carrying out the municipal ordinance and as such they are likewise not liable
for damages as the undertaking was not one for profit; furthermore, they had
exercised due care and diligence in implementing the municipal ordinance.
After trial, the RTC dismisses the complaint, concluding that the Executive
Committee had exercised due diligence and care in selecting a competent man
for the construction of the stage, and the collapse was due to forces beyond the
control of the committee. Consequently, the defendants were not liable for the
death of Vicente Fontanilla. Upon appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed the trial
courts decision and ordered all the defendants-appellees to pay jointly and
severally the heirs of Vicente Fontanilla the sums of P12,000.00 by way of moral
and actual damages:P1200.00 its attorneys fees; and the costs.
Issue:
Whether or not the Municipality of Malasiqui may be held liable.
Held:
Yes.
Under Philippine laws, municipalities are political bodies endowed with the
faculties of municipal corporations to be exercised by and through their
respective municipal governments in conformity with law, and in their proper
corporate name, they may inter alia sue and be sued, and contract and be
contracted with.
The powers of a municipality are two-fold in character: public, governmental or
political on the one hand; and corporate, private, or proprietary on the other.
Governmental powers are those exercised by the corporation in administering
the powers of the state and promoting the public welfare. These include the
legislative, judicial public, and political. Municipal powers, on the other hand, are
exercised for the special benefit and advantage of the community. These include
those which are ministerial, private and corporate.
This distinction of powers are necessary in determining the liability of the
municipality for the acts of its agents which result in injury to third persons.
If the injury is caused in the course of the performance of a governmental
function/duty, no recovery can be had from the municipality unless there is an
existing statute on the matter, nor from its officers, so long as they performed

their duties honestly and in good faith or that they did not act wantonly and
maliciously.
With respect to proprietary functions, the settled rule is that a municipal
corporation can be held liable to third persons ex contract or ex delicto. They
may also be subject to suit upon contracts and its tort.

Macasiano vs Diokno GR
97764 (August 10, 1992)
Posted on October 19, 2012

211 SCRA 464

G.R. No. 97764
August 10, 1992
Facts:
Respondent Municipality passed Ordinance No. 86 which authorized the closure
of J.Gabriel, G.G. Cruz, Bayanihan, Lt. Garcia Extension and Opena Streets and
the establishment of a flea market thereon. This was passed pursuant to MMC
Ordinance No.2 and was approved by the Metropolitan Manila Authority on July
20, 1990.
On August 8, 1990, respondent municipality and Palanyag entered into a
contract agreement whereby the latter shall operate, maintain & manage the
flea markets and/or vending areas in the aforementioned streets with the
obligation to remit dues to the treasury of the municipal government of
Paraaque.

On September 13, 1990 Brig. Gen. Macasiano ordered the destruction and
confiscation of stalls along G.G. Cruz & Gabriel Street in Baclaran. He also wrote
a letter to Palanyag ordering the destruction of the flea market.
Hence, respondent filed a joint petition praying for preliminary injunction. The
trial court upheld the assailed Ordinance and enjoined petitioner from enforcing
his letter-order against Palanyag.

Issues:
WON an ordinance/resolution issued by the municipal council of Paraaque
authorizing the lease & use of public streets/thoroughfares as sites for the flea
market is valid.
Held:
No.
J. Gabriel, G.G. Cruz, Bayanihan, Lt. Garcia Extension and Opena Streets are
local roads used for public service and are therefore considered public properties
of respondent municipality. Properties of the local government devoted to public
service are deemed public and are under the absolute control of Congress.
Hence, local governments have no authority to control/regulate the use of public
properties unless specific authority is vested upon them by Congress.
Sec. 10, Chapter II of the LGC should be read and interpreted in accordance with
basic principles already established by law.
The closure should be for the sole purpose of withdrawing the road or other
public property from public use when circumstances show that such property is
no longer intended/necessary for public use/service. Once withdrawn, the
property then becomes patrimonial property of the LGU concerned and only
then can said LGU use the property as an object of an ordinary contract. Roads
and streets available to the public and ordinarily used for vehicular traffic are

still considered public property devoted to public use. The LGU has no power to
use it for another purpose or to dispose of or lease it to private persons.
Also, the disputed ordinance cannot be validly implemented because it cant be
considered approved by the Metropolitan Manila Authority due to noncompliance with the conditions it imposed for the approval of said ordinance.
The powers of an LGU are not absolute, but subject to the limitations laid down
by the Constitution and laws such as the Civil Code. Every LGU has the sworn
obligation to enact measures that will enhance the public health, safety &
convenience, maintain peace & order and promiote the general prosperity of the
inhanbitants pf the local units.
As in the Dacanay case, the general public have the right to demand the
demolition of the illegally constructed stalls in public roads & streets. The
officials of the respondent municipality have the corresponding duty arising from
public office to clear the city streets and restore them to their specific public
purpose.
The ordinance is void and illegal for lack of basis in authority in laws applicable
during its time.
Case Digest: Ortigas & Co. vs Feati Bank & Trust Co.
Facts:
On March 4, 1952, Ortigas sold Lot 5 and 6, Block 31 of the Highway Hills Subdivision at
Mandaluyong to Augusto Padilla y Angeles and Natividad Angeles. The latter transferred their
rights in favour of Emma Chavez, upon completion of payment a deed was executed with
stipulations, one of which is that the use of the lots are to be exclusive for residential purposes
only. This was annotated in the Transfer Certificate of Titles No. 101509 and 101511. Feati then
acquired Lot 5 directly from Emma Chavez and Lot 6 from Republic Flour Mills. On May 5,
1963, Feati started construction of a building on both lots to be devoted for banking purposes
but could also be for residential use. Ortigas sent a written demand to stop construction but
Feati continued contending that the building was being constructed according to the zoning
regulations as stated in Municipal Resolution 27 declaring the area along the West part of EDSA
to be a commercial and industrial zone. Civil case No. 7706 was made and decided in favour of
Feati.
Issue:

Whether or not Resolution number 27 declaring Lot 5 and 6 to be part of an industrial and
commercial zone is valid considering the contract stipulation in the Transfer Certificate of Titles.
Held:
Resolution No. 27 prevails over the contract stipulations. Section 3 of RA 2264 of the Local
Autonomy Act empowers a Municipal Council to adopt zoning and subdivision ordinances or
regulations for the Municipality. Section 12 or RA 2264 states that implied power of the
municipality should be liberally construed in its favour, to give more power to the local
government in promoting economic conditions, social welfare, and material progress in the
community. This is found in the General Welfare Clause of the said act. Although nonimpairment of contracts is constitutionally guaranteed, it is not absolute since it has to be
reconciled with the legitimate exercise of police power, e.g. the power to promote health,
morals, peace, education, good order or safety and general welfare of the people. Resolution
No. 27 was obviously passed in exercise of police power to safeguard health, safety, peace and
order and the general welfare of the people in the locality as it would not be a conducive
residential area considering the amount of traffic, pollution, and noise which results in the
surrounding industrial and commercial establishments.
Decision dismissing the complaint of Ortigas is AFFIRMED.
Heirs of Juancho Ardona vs. Reyes [GR L-60549, 60553 to 60555; 26 October 1983]
En Banc, Gutierrez Jr. (J): 7 concur, 1 concurs in result, 1 on leave Facts: The
Philippine Tourism Authority filed 4 complaints with the Court of First Instance of
Cebu City for the expropriation of some 282 hectares of rolling land situated in
barangays Malubog and Babag, Cebu City, under PTA's express authority "to acquire
by purchase, by negotiation or by condemnation proceedings any private land
within and without the tourist zones" for the purposes indicated in Section 5,
paragraph B(2), of its Revised Charter (PD 564), more specifically, for the
development into integrated resort complexes of selected and well-defined
geographic areas with potential tourism value, specifically for the construction of a
sports complex (basketball courts, tennis courts, volleyball courts, track and field,
baseball and softball diamonds, and swimming pools), clubhouse, gold course,
children's playground and a nature area for picnics and horseback riding for the use
of the public. The Heirs of Juancho Ardona (Represented by Gloria Ardona)
Constitutional Law II, 2005 ( 15 ) Narratives (Berne Guerrero) Anastacio C. Cabilao,
Heirs of Cipriano Cabilao (Represented by Jose Cabilao) Modesta Cabilao, Heirs of
Roman Cabuenas (Represented by Alberto Cabuenas), Agripino Gabisay and
Prudencia Mabini, Antonio Labrador and Lucia Gabisay, Geronimo Mabini and
Marcelina Sabal, Inocencio Mabini and Arsenia Reyes, Patricio Mabini and Gregoria
Borres, Aniceto Gadapan and Maxima Gabisay, Bartolome Magno and Calineca E.
Magno, Alberto Cabuenas, Narciso Cabuenas and Victoria Cabuenas, Eutiquioseno,
Heirs of Esperidion Cabuenas (Represented by Alberto Cabuenas), Maximina
Navaro, Sulpicio Navaro, Eduardo Navaro, Martiniano Roma (In Representation of

Arcadio Mabini, Deceased), Martin Seno, Fausto Arda, Maxima Cabilao, Estrella
Seno, Eduvegis S. Cabilao, Rosario Cabilao, Minors Danilo, Socorro, Josefina and
Marites, All Surnamed Cabilao, Juan Borres (Represented by Francisca Borres),
Ramon Jabadan, Jesus Alipar and Leonila Kabahar, Antonio Labrador, Heirs of
Nicasio Gabisay (Represented by Arsenio Gabisay), Pacifico Labrador, Demetrio
Labrador and Fructosa Tabura, Venancio Del Mar, Marino Del Mar, Heirs of Teodora
Arcillo (Represented by Brigida Arcillo) Dionisia Gabunada, Heirs of Buenaventura
Francisco (Represented by Felicidad Sadaya Francisco), Heirs of Victoria C.
Cabuenas (Represented by Alberto Cabuenas) Heirs of Cipriano Gabunada
(Represented by Claudio Gabunada) filed their oppositions, and had a common
allegation in that the taking is allegedly not impressed with public use under the
Constitution; alleging that there is no specific constitutional provision authorizing
the taking of private property for tourism purposes; that assuming that PTA has
such power, the intended use cannot be paramount to the determination of the land
as a land reform area; that limiting the amount of compensation by legislative fiat is
constitutionally repugnant; and that since the land is under the land reform
program, it is the Court of Agrarian Relations and not the Court of First Instance
(CFI), that has jurisdiction over the expropriation cases.The Philippine Tourism
Authority having deposited with the Philippine National Bank, Cebu City Branch, an
amount equivalent to 10% of the value of the properties pursuant to Presidential
Decree No. 1533, the lower court issued separate orders authorizing PTA to take
immediate possession of the premises and directing the issuance of writs of
possession. The Heirs of Ardona, et. al. filed a petition for certiorari with preliminary
injunction before the Supreme Court.
Issue: Whether the expropriation of parcels of land for the purpose of constructing a
sports complex, including a golf course, by the Philippine Tourism Authority be
considered taking for public use.
Held: There are three provisions of the 1973 Constitution which directly provide for
the exercise of the power of eminent domain. Section 2, Article IV states that
private property shall not be taken for public use without just compensation. Section
6, Article XIV allows the State, in the interest of national welfare or defense and
upon payment of just compensation to transfer to public ownership, utilities and
other private enterprises to be operated by the government. Section 13, Article XIV
states that the Batasang Pambansa may authorize upon payment of just
compensation the expropriation of private lands to be subdivided into small lots and
conveyed at cost to deserving citizens. While not directly mentioning the
expropriation of private properties upon payment of just compensation, the
provisions on social justice and agrarian reforms which allow the exercise of police
power together with the power of eminent domain in the implementation of
constitutional objectives are even more far reaching insofar as taxing of private
property is concerned. The restrictive view of public use may be appropriate for a
nation which circumscribes the scope of government activities and public concerns

and which possesses big and correctly located public lands that obviate the need to
take private property for public purposes. Neither circumstance applies to the
Philippines. The Philippines has never been a laissez faire State, and the necessities
which impel the exertion of sovereign power are all too often found in areas of
scarce public land or limited government resources. There can be no doubt that
expropriation for such traditional purposes as the construction of roads, bridges,
ports, waterworks, schools, electric and telecommunications systems, hydroelectric
power plants, markets and slaughterhouses, parks, hospitals, government office
buildings, and flood control or irrigation systems is valid. However, the concept of
public use is not limited to traditional purposes. Here as elsewhere the idea that
"public use" is strictly limited to clear cases of "use by the public" has been
discarded. The Philippine Tourism Authority has stressed that the development of
the 808 hectares includes plans that would give the Heirs of Ardona, et. al. and
other displaced persons productive employment, higher incomes, decent housing,
water and electric facilities, and Constitutional Law II, 2005 ( 16 ) Narratives (Berne
Guerrero) better living standards. The Courts dismissal of the petition is, in part,
predicated on those assurances. The right of the PTA to proceed with the
expropriation of the 282 hectares already identified as fit for the establishment of a
resort complex to promote tourism is, therefore, sustained.
G.R. No. L-3491 June 24, 1983
CITY GOVERNMENT OF QUEZON CITY and CITY COUNCIL OF QUEZON CITY,
petitioners,
vs.
HON. JUDGE VICENTE G. ERICTA as Judge of the Court of First Instance of Rizal,
Quezon City, Branch XVIII; HIMLAYANG PILIPINO, INC., respondents.

Facts:

Section 9 of Ordinance No. 6118, S-64 provides that at least 6% of the total area of
the memorial park cemetery shall be set aside for the charity burial of deceased
persons who are paupers and have been residents of Quezon City for at least 5
years prior to their death. As such, the Quezon City engineer required the
respondent, Himlayang Pilipino Inc, to stop any further selling and/or transaction of
memorial park lots in Quezon City where the owners thereof have failed to donate
the required 6% space intended for paupers burial.

The then Court of First Instance and its judge, Hon. Ericta, declared Section 9 of
Ordinance No. 6118, S-64 null and void.

Petitioners argued that the taking of the respondents property is a valid and
reasonable exercise of police power and that the land is taken for a public use as it
is intended for the burial ground of paupers. They further argued that the Quezon
City Council is authorized under its charter, in the exercise of local police power, to
make such further ordinances and resolutions not repugnant to law as may be
necessary to carry into effect and discharge the powers and duties conferred by this
Act and such as it shall deem necessary and proper to provide for the health and
safety, promote the prosperity, improve the morals, peace, good order, comfort and
convenience of the city and the inhabitants thereof, and for the protection of
property therein.

On the otherhand, respondent Himlayang Pilipino, Inc. contended that the taking or
confiscation of property was obvious because the questioned ordinance
permanently restricts the use of the property such that it cannot be used for any
reasonable purpose and deprives the owner of all beneficial use of his property.

Issue:
Is Section 9 of the ordinance in question a valid exercise of the police power?

Held:

No. The Sec. 9 of the ordinance is not a valid exercise of the police power.

Occupying the forefront in the bill of rights is the provision which states that no
person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of law (Art.
Ill, Section 1 subparagraph 1, Constitution). On the other hand, there are three
inherent powers of government by which the state interferes with the property
rights, namely-. (1) police power, (2) eminent domain, (3) taxation. These are said
to exist independently of the Constitution as necessary attributes of sovereignty.

An examination of the Charter of Quezon City (Rep. Act No. 537), does not reveal
any provision that would justify the ordinance in question except the provision
granting police power to the City. Section 9 cannot be justified under the power
granted to Quezon City to tax, fix the license fee, and regulate such other business,
trades, and occupation as may be established or practised in the City. The power to
regulate does not include the power to prohibit or confiscate. The ordinance in
question not only confiscates but also prohibits the operation of a memorial park
cemetery.

Police power is defined by Freund as the power of promoting the public welfare by
restraining and regulating the use of liberty and property. It is usually exerted in
order to merely regulate the use and enjoyment of property of the owner. If he is
deprived of his property outright, it is not taken for public use but rather to destroy
in order to promote the general welfare. In police power, the owner does not
recover from the government for injury sustained in consequence thereof.

Under the provisions of municipal charters which are known as the general welfare
clauses, a city, by virtue of its police power, may adopt ordinances to the peace,
safety, health, morals and the best and highest interests of the municipality. It is a
well-settled principle, growing out of the nature of well-ordered and society, that
every holder of property, however absolute and may be his title, holds it under the
implied liability that his use of it shall not be injurious to the equal enjoyment of
others having an equal right to the enjoyment of their property, nor injurious to the
rights of the community. A property in the state is held subject to its general
regulations, which are necessary to the common good and general welfare. Rights
of property, like all other social and conventional rights, are subject to such
reasonable limitations in their enjoyment as shall prevent them from being injurious,
and to such reasonable restraints and regulations, established by law, as the
legislature, under the governing and controlling power vested in them by the
constitution, may think necessary and expedient. The state, under the police power,
is possessed with plenary power to deal with all matters relating to the general
health, morals, and safety of the people, so long as it does not contravene any
positive inhibition of the organic law and providing that such power is not exercised
in such a manner as to justify the interference of the courts to prevent positive
wrong and oppression.

However, in the case at hand, there is no reasonable relation between the setting
aside of at least six (6) percent of the total area of an private cemeteries for charity
burial grounds of deceased paupers and the promotion of health, morals, good
order, safety, or the general welfare of the people. The ordinance is actually a

taking without compensation of a certain area from a private cemetery to benefit

paupers who are charges of the municipal corporation. Instead of building or
maintaining a public cemetery for this purpose, the city passes the burden to
private cemeteries.

The expropriation without compensation of a portion of private cemeteries is not

covered by Section 12(t) of Republic Act 537, the Revised Charter of Quezon City
which empowers the city council to prohibit the burial of the dead within the center
of population of the city and to provide for their burial in a proper place subject to
the provisions of general law regulating burial grounds and cemeteries. When the
Local Government Code, Batas Pambansa Blg. 337 provides in Section 177 (q) that a
Sangguniang panlungsod may provide for the burial of the dead in such place and
in such manner as prescribed by law or ordinance it simply authorizes the city to
provide its own city owned land or to buy or expropriate private properties to
construct public cemeteries. This has been the law and practise in the past. It
continues to the present. Expropriation, however, requires payment of just
compensation. The questioned ordinance is different from laws and regulations
requiring owners of subdivisions to set aside certain areas for streets, parks,
playgrounds, and other public facilities from the land they sell to buyers of
subdivision lots. The necessities of public safety, health, and convenience are very
clear from said requirements which are intended to insure the development of
communities with salubrious and wholesome environments. The beneficiaries of the
regulation, in turn, are made to pay by the subdivision developer when individual
lots are sold to home-owners.
WHEREFORE, the petition for review is hereby DISMISSED. The decision of the
respondent court is affirmed.

G.R. No. 97619 November 26, 1992

SPOUSES SOCRATES PILAPIL and ROSARIO PILAPIL, petitioners,
vs.
THE COURT OF APPEALS, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF CEBU, BRANCH 17, and SPOUSES
GORGONIO COLOMIDA and GLORIA COLOMIDA, respondents.

DAVIDE, JR., J:

From the denial of 13 February 1991 of their motion for the reconsideration of the 26 October 1990
decision of the Court of Appeals, in CA-G.R. CV No. 17235, 1 which affirmed the 8 February 1988
decision of Branch 17 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Cebu, petitioners filed this petition for review
under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.
The kernel issue in this case is whether or not there exists in sitio Bahak, barangay Poblacion,
Municipality of Liloan, Province of Cebu a camino
vecinal; 2 and if so, whether the same traverses the property belonging to the petitioners.
The pleadings disclose the antecedents of this controversy.
The petitioners-spouses (hereinafter, Pilapils) own a 6,598 square meter 3 parcel of land situated in
Bahak, Poblacion, Liloan, Cebu and covered by Tax Declaration No. 15067. 4 The said parcel
corresponds to Lot No. 320 and Lot 323 5 and that portion covered by Plan Psu-07-005007, 6 duly
approved by the Regional Director of Region VII of the Bureau of Lands. The land formerly belonged to
Marcelo Pilapil, the grandfather of petitioner Socrates Pilapil.
Private respondents (hereinafter, Colomidas), who are residents of Mandaue City, purchased on 4
June 1981 from Esteria vda. de Ceniza and the heirs of Leoncio Ceniza a parcel of land, also
located at Bahak, Poblacion, Liloan, Cebu, covered by Tax Declaration No. 19764 and described as
follows:
. . . Boundaries: N-Gregorio Longakit; S-Gregorio Longakit; E-Manglar; W-Gregorio
Longkit; Area: 10,910 sq. meters; Kind of land: Pasture cocal and wood;
Improvements: 20 cocos prod.; Assessed Value: P1,360.00; Present Possessors:
The herein petitioners. 7
This parcel of land, per Plan Psu-07-002763,

8 was found to contain only 6,448 square meters. It is now covered by Free

of the Register of Deeds of the

Province of Cebu issued in the name of the Colomidas and is located around 70 meters from the National
Road. The Colomidas claim that they had acquired from Sesenando Longkit a road right of way which
leads towards the National Road; this road right of way, however, ends at that portion of the property of
the Pilapils where a camino vecinal exists all the way to the said National Road. 10
Patent No. (VII-1)-15448, issued on 23 March 1982, and Original Certificate of Title No. P-20588 9

In the early part of July of 1981, the Colomidas "tried to improve the road of "camino vecinal", for the
convenience of the public," but the Pilapils harassed and threatened them with "bodily harm from
making said improvement." The Pilapils also threatened to fence off the camino vecinal. 11
Thus, on 16 July 1981, the Colomidas filed against the Pilapils a
petition 12 for injunction and damages with a prayer for a writ of preliminary mandatory and/or prohibitory
injunction with the Regional Trial Court of Cebu. Docketed as Civil Case No. R-20732, the petition was
raffled off to Branch 17 thereof. The Colomidas specifically allege in paragraph IV of the petition that:
. . . Granting arguendo, even in the very remote possibility that the "camino
vecinal" cannot be proved, the petitioners are entitled to the use of the same under
Articles 649 to 651 of the Civil Code, it being their only access to public (sic)
highway. 13

and pray that upon the filing of the petition, a restraining order be issued directing the Pilapils or
anyone acting in their behalf to cease and desist from preventing or harassing them (Colomidas)
from using the camino vecinaland/or fencing off the same, and after hearing, a writ of preliminary
injunction be issued commanding the Pilapils to cease and desist from proceeding with the acts
complained of. They also asked that the injunction be made permanent and that the Pilapils be
ordered to pay, jointly and severally, the sum of P100,000.00 as moral damages, P50,000.00 as
exemplary damages, 10,000.00 as attorney's fees and other litigation expenses as may be duly
proved. Consistent with the aforequoted allegation of paragraph IV of the petition, the Colomidas
additionally pray that:
6. In the remote possibility that the "camino vecinal" cannot be proved, to consider
the same as a right of way for the petitioners and to fix compensation for the sum
(sic) at TEN PESOS (P10.00) per square
meter. 14
On the other hand, on 29 July 1981, the Pilapils filed against the Colomidas an action for damages
in the Municipal Circuit Trial Court (MCTC) of Liloan-Compostela, Cebu which was docketed as Civil
Case No. 93-R. 15
On 18 August 1981, the Pilapils filed their Answer 16 in Civil Case No. R-20732. They specifically deny
therein the existence of a "camino vecinal" on their property and allege, inter alia, that the enclosing of
their property and allege, inter alia, that the enclosing of their property by a fence was done in the valid
exercise of their right of ownership and that if the Colomidas were prejudiced thereby, they only have
themselves to blame for buying said property without verifying its condition and existing easements. As
affirmative and special defenses, the Pilapils aver that the petition does not state facts sufficient to
constitute a valid cause of action; the Colomidas were the ones who employed threats and intimidation;
and, to add insult to injury, the latter caused a heavy bulldozer to enter their (Pilapils) property and cause
great damage to the plants and crops in the process. The Pilapils also set up a counterclaim for attorney's
fees, reimbursement for the damages caused to their land and moral and exemplary damages as may be
determined by the court.
During trial on the merits in Civil Case No. R-20732, the Colomidas presented the following
witnesses: Gorgonio Colomida, Jr. himself, Sesenado Longakit and Florentino Pepito. They also
offered in evidence documentary exhibits. the more relevant and material of which are (1) Resolution
No. 106 of the Municipal Council of Liloan passed on 18 August 1973 and entitled "Authorizing the
Residents of Bahak, Poblacion, Liloan to Repair and Improve a Camino Vecinal in their Sitio" 17 and
(2) a sketch 18 prepared by witness Sesenando Longakit purportedly showing that the camino
vecinal traverses the property of the Pilapils. Both Longakit and Pepito testified on the said camino
vecinal, insisting that it traverses the property of the Pilapils.
Upon the other hand, the Pilapils presented the following as their witnesses: Roman Sungahid,
Engineer Epifanio Jordan (the Municipal Planning and Development Coordinator of the Municipality
of Liloan) and petitioner Socrates Pilapil. Engineer Jordan testified on Liloan's Urban Land Use
Plan 19 or zoning map which he prepared upon the instruction of then Municipal Mayor Cesar Butai and
which was approved by the Sangguniang Bayan of Liloan. Per the said plan, the camino vecinal in sitio
Bahak does not traverse, but runs along the side 20 of the Pilapil property. 21

On 8 February 1988, the trial court rendered its decision 22 in favor of the Colomidas the dispositive
portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of petitioners, and, accordingly,
respondents are permanently enjoined from preventing or harassing petitioners from
using the "camino vecinal" across respondents' land at Bahak, Poblacion, Liloan, or
from fencing the same or in any manner preventing its use by other people; and
respondents are ordered to pay petitioners jointly and severally the sum of P4,500.00
as actual damages, the sum of P5,000.00 as attorney's fees, and the sum of
P2,000.00 as litigation expenses. Costs against respondents.
SO ORDERED. 23
This disposition is based on the following findings of fact and conclusions:
Resolution No. 106 of the Municipal Council of Liloan, passed on August 18, 1973
and entitled "Authorizing the Residents of Bahak, Poblacion, Liloan to Repair and
Improve a Camino Vecina (sic) in Their Sitio" (Exh. "A") shows that there is a "camino
vecinal" at Bahak. It is true, as claimed by respondents, that Resolution No. 106
does not state that the "camino vecinal" referred to therein traverses respondents'
land; however, the following facts of record support petitioners' theory that the said
"camino vecinal" runs across respondents' land:
1 Resolution No. 106 (Exh. "A") states that upon inspection of the "camino vecinal"
by one of the councilors, it was established that the said "camino vecinal" needed
"some improvements to make it usable," but the Municipal Council did not have the
necessary funds for the purpose, and that "the residents of Bahak, headed by Mr.
Sesenando Longakit, have signified to (sic) repair the camino vecinal on voluntary
(sic) basis," hence (sic) it was resolved "to authorize the residents of Bahak to repair
aforesaid road" provided the labor would be on a purely voluntary basis, the
municipal government would not be liable for any expense, and there would be no
discrimination in the use of the road.
The "Mr. Sesenando Longkit" alluded to in Resolution No. 106 as heading the
residents of Bahak who had asked for authority to repair the "camino vecinal" at
Bahak took the witness stand. His testimony has established that he has been
residing at Bahak since birth on July 16, 1933, that he is the occupant of a lot (Exh.
"B-5") not far from petitioners' lot, and that he and other residents in that area have
been using the "camino vecinal" as their access to the National Road.
It appears from the sketch (Exh. "B") drawn by Mr. Longakit that the "camino vecinal"
traverses the land of respondents (Exhs. "B-6 & "B-7"). Obviously, the "camino
vecinal" subject matter of Resolution No. 106 is the "camino vecinal" running across
respondents' land, somewhere at the back of which is the land occupied by Mr.
Longakit, who for the reason that he and other residents were using that "camino
vecinal" offered to the municipal government their services to improve it.

2. As testified to by Mr. Longakit, who has been living at Sitio Bahak since 1933, and
whose testimony the Court finds credible, both sides of the "camino vecinal" formerly
belonged to the grandfather of respondent Socrates Pilapil, it was that "camino
vecinal" in connection with which he secured Resolution No. 106, and that before it
was partly fenced by respondents, and when he was a child, everybody could use
that "camino vecinal" and carabao carts could pass through it, and, later, 4-wheeled
motor vehicles could pass through it.
3. Mr. Florentino Pepito, 79 years of age when he took the witness stand in 1982,
and who was a councilor in Liloan from 1955 to 1967, and was chairman of the
Committee on Roads & Bridges, testified that the former owner of the lots now
owned by respondents at Bahak was Marcelo Pilapil, grandfather of respondent
Socrates Pilapil and close (sic) friend of his (witness Pepito) that the subject "camino
vecinal"' is located between those lots, and fact he has a parcel of land in that area
covered by Tax Declaration No. 36168 (Exh. "E:"), which shows that on the North it is
bounded by a "camino vecinal" (Exh. "E-1"), which passes between the two lots of
respondents, proceeds to his (witness Pepito's) land, crosses the National Road up
to Sitio Looc between Km. 19 and Km. 20, up to Martires Street, facing Camotes;
and that when he was a child, he and his father used to pass through that "camino
vecinal" in a carabao cart. The Court finds no reason to disbelieve Mr. Pepito's
testimony. 24
It discredited the version of the Pilapils in this wise:
4. Respondent Socrates Pilapil insisted on direct examination that there is no
"camino vecinal" traversing his lots. However, on cross-examination he declared that
his two lots at Bahak, numbered 320 and 323, were formerly covered by two
separate tax declarations, but later he had (sic) fused into one, namely Tax
Declaration No. 15067 (Exh. "4"), which begins with the year 1985 (long after the
present case was filed). Respondent Socrates Pilapil admitted that before the fusion
of the two tax declarations covering Lots 320 and 323 owned by him, those tax
declarations showed that there was a "camino vecinal" at the South boundary of Lot
320 and at the North Boundary of Lot 323, but after the fusion of the two tax
declarations into one, the "camino vecinal" no longer appears in the new tax
declaration (Exh. "4").
In the face of the foregoing established facts, it would appear that the common
testimony of respondent Socrates Pilapil and Ramon Sungahid to the effect that
there is no "camino vecinal" across respondents' lots is nothing more than an
unsupported conclusion. Mr. Sungahid adamantly insisted that there was no such
"camino vecinal" despite the fact that he was confronted on cross-examination with
tax declarations stating that there was a "camino vecinal" across respondents' lot.
Ironically, when respondent Socrates Pilapil later took the witness stand, as already
stated, he himself admitted that the tax declarations previously covering his two lots
showed that there was a "camino vecinal" between the lots.

Respondents' other witness, Engr. Epifanio Jordan, Municipal Planning &

Development Coordinator of Liloan, prepared a zoning map (Exh. "1") of Poblacion,
Liloan. The map contains a portion (Exh. "1-F") which shows "camino vecinal"
passing through the land of respondents at Bahak, but he declared that the "camino
vecinal" on the map is merely a proposal by his office to the Sangguniang Bayan of
Liloan. The Court notes that in the map (Exh. "I") (sic) some streets and projects are
labelled "proposed," but the "camino vecinal" (Exh. "I-F") (sic) which Engr. Jordan
admits to be passing through respondents' land is not so labelled. Besides, it is not
clear whether or not he was authorized him. On direct examination he declared that
the Sangguniang Bayan instructed him to prepare the map; but on cross-examination
he stated, when asked whether the Sangguniang Bayan authorized him to prepare
the map, that it was the Mayor who directed him to do so. 25
The Pilapils appealed from the above decision to the public respondent Court of Appeals which
docketed the case as CA-G.R. CV No. 17235. In support of their plea for the reversal of the decision,
the Pilapils sought to convince the public respondent that the trial court erred in:
I . . . HOLDING THAT A CAMINO VECINAL EXISTED ACROSS THE LOT OF THE
DEFENDANTS . . .
II . . . NOT APPRECIATING THE EVIDENCE PRESENTED BY THE DEFENDANTS .
..
III . . . CONDEMNING THE DEFENDANT . . . TO PAY PLAINTIFFS . . . JOINTLY
AND SEVERALLY THE SUM OF P4,500.00 AS ACTUAL DAMAGES, THE SUM OF
P5,000.00 AS ATTORNEY'S FEES, THE SUM OF P2,000.00 AS LITIGATION
EXPENSES AND TO PAY THE COSTS.
IV . . . NOT AWARDING TO DEFENDANTS . . . DAMAGES TO COMPENSATE FOR
THE DAMAGED CONCRETE SLABS, COCONUTS, BANANAS AND OTHER FRUIT
TREES THAT WAS (sic) CAUSED BY THE BULLDOZER HIRED BY THE
PLAINTIFFS . . . ATTORNEY'S FEES, LITIGATION EXPENSES AND COSTS. 26
In its decision affirming in toto the 8 February 1988 ruling of the trial court, the public respondent
opined that the arguments adduced in support of the assigned errors boil down to the question of
credibility of the witnesses and the weight assigned by the lower court to their testimonies and the
documentary exhibits. It then concluded that (a) there exists no exception to the deeply rooted rule
that findings of fact of trial courts are entitled to great weight and respect and will not be disturbed on
appeal; (b) while the 18 August 1973 Resolution of the Municipal Council of Liloan (Exhibit "A") does
not state that the camino vecinal traverses the property of the Pilapils, the testimony of Sesenando
Longakit, the person named therein who has knowledge of the surrounding facts and circumstances,
and who was present during the deliberations, passage and signing thereof, confirmed the existence
of the camino vecinal on the property of the Pilapils; (c) as to the claimed damages to the fruit trees
and other plants belonging to the Pilapils, the same had been separately litigated on, at the latter's
instance, before the Municipal Circuit Trial Court and had already been resolved against the Pilapils;
besides, there is insufficient proof to indicate that damage was done to such plants or that the

Pilapils planted trees and other plants on thecamino vecinal; and (d) there is no merit in the claim
that witnesses Longakit and Pepito, being private individuals, are incompetent to testify on the
existence and location of the camino vecinal; both possess all the qualifications and none of the
disqualification's for witnesses under Section 20, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court. As regards Exhibit
"1" which the Pilapils relied upon in support of their theory that the camino vecinal does not traverse
their property, the public respondent made the following disquisition:
Respondents-appellants' Exhibit "1" is a zoning map for the Poblacion of the
Municipality of Liloan (TSN, Epifanio Jordan, February 12 1986, p. 6), prepared and
testified to by Engineer Epifanio Jordan, Municipal Planning and Development
Coordinator of Liloan. By this Exhibit, respondents-appellants attempted to show that
no "camino vecinal" existed across their land, and that although there is a "camino
vecinal" illustrated therein, it is a proposed one and does not traverse, but only
passes through the side of their land (TSN, Epifanio Jordan, November 5, 1985, p.
10; Exhibit "1-F").
After a thorough perusal of Exhibit "1" and a careful review of the transcript of
stenographic notes taken on November 5, 1985 and February 12, 1986, We find that
the "camino vecinal" illustrated in Exhibit "1" and claimed by witness Engineer
Epifanio Jordan as a proposed "camino vecinal" (TSN, Epifanio Jordan, November 5,
1985, p. 10), is indeed not so labelled as the other proposed streets or passageways
are. And more importantly, witness Engineer Epifanio Jordan did in fact admit and
establish the existence of the "camino vecinal" traversing respondents-appellants
land.
Respondents-appellants' witness, Engineer Epifanio Jordan produced before the
lower court an old map of the Poblacion which was drawn and traced by a certain
Atty. Sotero Auman, and from which said witnesses (sic) based his Exhibit "1". In
Exhibit "1" witness Engineer Epifanio Jordan identified respondents-appellants' land
as that encompassed in the circle, Exhibit "1-C" also Exhibit "G-1". On crossexamination, when confronted and asked to compare his zoning map (Exhibit "1")
with the old map, it was shown that said Exhibit "1-A" also Exhibit "G-1",
encompasses the figures "320" and "323" Lot numbers appearing in the old map,
and (sic) consequently, was (sic) identified by said witness and marked as Exhibits
"G-1-b" and "G-1-c" respectively, in Exhibit "1"; and that furthermore, the "camino
vecinal," Exhibit "G-1-a", passess (sic) between Lot Nos. 320 and 323 which lots (sic)
belong to respondents-appellants (TSN, Epifanio Jordan, February 12, 1986, pp. 113).
It is noted that on direct examination, witness Engineer Epifanio Jordan testified that
the Sangguniang Bayan of Liloan, Cebu, instructed him to prepare the zoning map
(Exhibit "1") (TSN, Epifanio Jordan, November 5, 1985, p. 9) but on crossexamination, stated (sic) that he did so upon oral orders of the mayor (TSN, Epifanio
Jordan, February 12, 1986, pp. 6-7). Also on cross-examination, said witness
testified that the zoning map (Exhibit "1") prepared by him was based on an old map
drawn and traced by Atty. Sotero Auman, a casual worker in the Municipality of Liloan

(Ibid., pp. 8 and 14) yet on redirect examination testified (sic) that he did not know
who authorized said Atty. Sotero Auman to draw the map which served as his basis
for Exhibit "1", or if it was approved by the Sangguniang Bayan of Liloan (Ibid., pp.
14-15). 27
Their motion for the reconsideration of the above decision having been denied by the public
respondent Court of Appeals in its Resolution of 13 February 1991, 28 the Pilapils filed by mail on 8
April 1991 the instant petition. They interpose the following ground for the allowance thereof:
4. The respondent Court, in affirming the Decision of the respondent RTC and in
denying petitioners' motion for reconsideration, acted in a manner so patently and
grossly contrary to law and jurisprudence, resulting in a miscarriage of justice to the
prejudice and detriment of petitioners, by:
4.1. disregarding the official act of the Sangguniang Bayan of the
Municipality of Lilo-an, Cebu;
4.2. quoting merely a portion of the testimony of a witness and not
the totality of his testimony;
4.3. considering documentary exhibits not formally offered in
evidence;
4.4. affirming the award of damages to the private respondent, and
4.5. affirming the denial of the award of damages to the petitioners.

29

In a Manifestation 30 posted on 17 May 1991, the Colomidas pray for the dismissal of the petition on the
basis of the rule on conclusiveness of findings of fact of the Court of Appeals; they further aver that the
petition is but another attempt on the part of the Pilapils to unjustly delay the final resolution of the case.
Petitioners moved to expunge 31 the Manifestation on the ground that it was filed without prior leave of
the Court and that it is not one of the pleadings allowed by the Rules of Court or required by this Court.
We denied this motion, considered the Manifestation as the Colomidas' Comment to the petition and
required the Pilapils to file a reply thereto, 32 which they subsequently complied with 33
We then gave due course to the petition and required the parties to submit their respective
Memoranda. 34
The core issue in this case, as already stated, is whether or not the Municipality of Liloan has
a camino vecinal in sitio Bahak of barangay Poblacion, and if it does, whether such road traverses
the property of the Pilapils of only passes along its side. While both parties agree that a camino
vecinal actually exists, the Colomidas assert that the same traverses the property of the Pilapils. The
latter, on the other hand, vigorously maintain that it does not. By any standard, the issue is quite
simple and could have been easily resolved without much procedural fanfare if the trial court either
took full advantage of the rule on pre-trial, 35 or conducted an ocular inspection of the premises. Such
inspection would have been a wise course of action 36 to take in view of the divergent versions of the

parties as to the location of the camino vecinal. Even the Colomidas, as petitioners below, could have
expedited the resolution of the controversy by moving for the appointment of a commissioner who could
determine the exact location of the camimo vecinal and submit a vicinity map or plan indicating the same;
and, if the parties cannot agree on its location, the latter could indicate its relative locations on the basis of
the parties' respective versions. The trial court's decision does not even make any reference to a pre-trial
conference being held. Neither does it appear that the appointment of a commissioner, allowed by the
Rules of Court, 37 was sought. As a consequence thereof, it took the trial court more than six (6) long
years to decide the case. And even then, it had to contend with conflicting testimonial evidence and draw
conclusions from a sketch prepared by witness Sesenando Longakit, the zoning map prepared by
Engineer Jordan and various tax declarations.

The above issue has been further obscured by the unnecessary quibbling on whether or not the
testimonies of Sesenando Longakit and Florentino Pepito should be accorded full faith and credit. To
this Court's mind, the issue of their credibility has been rendered moot by the unrebutted evidence
which shows that the Municipality of Liloan, through its Sangguniang Bayan, had approved a zoning
plan, otherwise called an Urban Land Use Plan. 38 This plan indicates the relative location of the camino
vecinal in sitio Bahak, 39 Poblacion, Liloan, Cebu.
It is beyond dispute that the establishment, closure or abandonment of the camino vecinal is the sole
prerogative of the Municipality of Liloan. No private party can interfere with such a right. Thus, even
if We are to agree with both the trial court and public respondent that Longakit and Pepito were
telling the truth, the decision of the Municipality of Liloan with respect to the said camino vecinal in
sitio Bahak must prevail. It is thus pointless to concentrate on the testimonies of both witnesses
since the same have, for all intents and purposes, become irrelevant.
The property of provinces, cities and municipalities is divided into property for public use and
patrimonial property.40 The first consists of the provincial roads, city streets, municipal streets, squares,
fountains, public waters, promenades, and public works for public service paid for by the said provinces,
cities or municipalities. 41 They are governed by the same principles as property of public dominion of the
same character. 42 Under the applicable law in this case, Batas Pambansa Blg. 337 (The Local
Government Code), the Sangguniang Bayan, the legislative body of the municipality, 43 had the power to
adopt zoning and subdivision ordinances or regulations subject to the provisions of existing laws, and to
provide for the construction, improvement, repair and maintenance of municipal streets, avenues, alleys,
sidewalks, bridges, parks and other public places, regulate the use thereof and prohibit the construction
or placing of obstacles or encroachments on them 44 Section 10, Chapter 2, Title One, Book I of said Code
provided: 45
Sec. 10. Closure of roads. A local government unit may likewise, through its head
acting pursuant to a resolution of its Sangguniang and in accordance with existing
law and the provisions of this Code, close any barangay, municipal, city or provincial
road, street, alley, park or square. No such way or place or any part thereof shall be
closed without indemnifying any person prejudiced thereby. A property thus
withdrawn from public use may be used or conveyed for any purpose for which other
real property belonging to the local unit concerned might be lawfully used or
conveyed.

A camino vecinal is a municipal road. It is also property for public use. Pursuant, therefore, to the
above powers of a local government unit, the Municipality of Liloan had the unassailable authority to
(a) prepare and adopt a land use map, (b) promulgate a zoning ordinance which may consider,
among other things, the municipal roads to be constructed, maintained, improved or repaired and (c)
close any municipal road.
In the instant case, the Municipality of Liloan, through the Sangguniang Bayan, approved the Urban
Land Use Plan; this plan was duly signed by the Municipal Mayor (Exhibit "1"). By doing so, the said
legislative body determined, among others, the location of the camino vecinal in sitio Bahak. The
following unrebutted testimony of Engineer Epifanio Jordan shows that the same was approved by
the Sangguniang Bayan:
ATTY. CAETE:
xxx xxx xxx
Q After you prepared this map, what did you do with this?
A I submitted the map to the Sangguniang Bayan of Liloan, Cebu for
approval and action.
Q What action was taken by the Sangguniang Bayan of Liloan, Cebu
in (sic) this map that you prepared and submitted?
A It approved the map.
Q Why do you know that this map was approved by the Sangguniang
Bayan of Liloan, Cebu?
A I was present during the session.
COURT:
Q You mean there was a resolution passed by the Sangguniang
Bayan of Liloan, Cebu?
A Yes, sir. 46
The reluctance of the trial court and public respondent to give due weight to the testimony of
Engineer Jordan stemmed from a doubt as to his authority to prepare the plan. There is also some
confusion regarding the party who directed him to do so. Both courts observed that while on direct
examination, he testified that the Sangguniang Bayan instructed him to prepare the zoning
map, 47 during cross-examination, he stated that he prepared it upon the Mayor's oral order. 48 Such
inconsistency is quite trivial and hence, did not affect the preparation and subsequent approval of the
zoning map. In the first place, under the applicable law, the mayor was both a member and the presiding
officer of the Sangguniang Bayan. 49 Secondly, what invested the zoning map with legal effect was neither

the authority of the person who ordered its preparation nor the authority of the person who actually
prepared it, but its approval by the Sangguniang Bayan. Furthermore, with or without the order of the
Mayor or Sangguniang Bayan, Engineer Jordan, as the then Municipal Planning and Development
Coordinator, had the authority to prepare the plan and admit it to the Sangguniang Bayan for approval.
Among his functions under the governing law at the time was to formulate an integrated economic, social,
physical and other development objectives and policies for the consideration and approval of
thesangguniang bayan and the municipal mayor, and prepare municipal comprehensive plans and other
development planning document. 50 Thus, even if he had not been instructed by anyone to prepare the
map, he could nevertheless, on his own initiative and by virtue of his functions, make one. The trial court
and public respondent then failed to appreciate the role and function of a Municipal Planning and
Development Coordinator.

As further declared by Engineer Jordan, this camino vecinal in sitio Bahak "passes the side of the
land of Socrates Pilapil. This is the proposed road leading to the national highway." 51 The Colomidas
presented no rebuttal witness to show that by the approval of the zoning map by the Sangguniang Bayan,
they were effectively deprived of access to the national highway from their property. Of course, they may
argue that the zoning map was prepared for and approved by the Sangguniang Bayan after the filing of
their petition in Civil Case No. R-20732. Be that as it may, this preparation and approval, clearly a
supervening event, was relied upon, introduced in evidence without objection on the part of the
Colomidas and evaluated by the trial court. In short, the latter allowed the issue raised by the supervening
event to be tried. There was nothing procedurally objectionable to this; on the contrary, Section 5, Rule 10
of the Rules of Court allows it. Said section reads:
Sec. 5. Amendment to conform to or authorize presentation of evidence. When
issues not raised by the pleadings are tried by express or implied consent of the
parties, they shall be treated in all respects, as if they had been raised in the
pleadings. Such amendment of the pleadings as may be necessary to cause them to
conform to the evidence and to raise these issues may be made upon motion of any
party at any time, even after judgment, but failure to amend does not affect the result
of the trial of these issues. If evidence is objected to at the trial on the ground that it
is not within the issues made by the pleadings, the court may allow the pleading, to
be amended and shall do so freely when the presentation on the merits of the action
will be subserved thereby and the objecting party fails to satisfy the court that the
admission of such evidence would prejudice him in maintaining his action or defense
upon the merits. The court may grant a continuance to enable the objecting party to
meet such evidence.
Such supervening fact, duly proved to be an official act of the Municipality of Liloan, binds not only
the Pilapils and the Colomidas, but also the general public. The solemn declarations of old people
like Sesenando Longakit and Florentino Pepito cannot overturn the decision of the Municipality of
Liloan.
The foregoing exposition renders unnecessary further discussion on the other issues raised by the
petitioners.
WHEREFORE, the instant Petition is GRANTED. The challenged Decision of 26 October 1990 and
Resolution of 13 February 1991 of public respondent Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 17235, as

well as the Decision of 8 February 1988 of Branch 17 of the Regional Trial Court of Cebu in Civil
Case No. R-20732 are hereby SET ASIDE. Said Civil Case No. R-20732 is hereby DISMISSED with
costs against the private respondents.
SO ORDERED.
Gutierrez, Jr., Romero and Melo, JJ., concur.
Bidin, J., took no part.